note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h.zip) military instructors manual by captain james p. cole, th infantry instructor rd battalion, th provisional training regiment, plattsburg, n.y. and major oliver schoonmaker, th division assistant instructor rd battalion, th provisional training regiment, plattsburg, n.y. to colonel wolf under whose careful supervision so many have received their military training in order that they may show the world in battle the true spirit of american manhood. acknowledgment. to have prepared this book within the time allotted to it, without the assistance of candidates alcott farrar elwell and lyle milton prouse would have been impossible, and grateful recognition is made of their services. not only much of the manual labor, but the preparation of entire chapters, has been in their hands. candidates charles huntington jacobs and michael francis mcaleer have rendered very valuable assistance and we wish to thank the following candidates for the loan of materials used elsewhere, for typewriting and other work: glenn mack ainsworth. philip m. brown. nelson p. bump. edwin g. burrows. philip doremus. walter lane hardenbrook. albert blanchard kellogg. henry pratt mckean. loren ray pierce. harry raphael saftel. roland emery packard. hoyt sherman. introduction. the officer of to-day has big problems to face at short notice. his training has necessarily been so intensive that he cannot absorb a large amount of it. he has little time to make out schedules or even to look over the hasty notes he may have made during his training period, yet he finds himself facing problems which force him to immediate action. this book so condenses and systematizes general military instruction and the work done at plattsburg so that it may be easily utilized in training other troops. no broad claim for originality is made except in the arrangement of all available material; the bibliography makes acknowledgment to all texts so utilized. besides bringing helpful reminders to new officers regarding the elements of modern warfare, much of the material will be found of radical importance, as it is practically new and never before condensed. since under the new army organization the platoon leader virtually has assumed the roll of a captain of a company, it is not enough for him to know simply his own part; he must be ready with all the information that his non-commissioned officers and men should know, and more important still, he must know how to teach them. having little or no time to work over and digest for himself this mass of new material pouring in upon him, the officer may find in this book, material condensed and already arranged. it is hoped that this work will serve to recall to many officers, valuable points of military training which would otherwise be lost, to them in the mass of notes never looked at since the day they were made. more than this, every reader will find help in planning his work, saving thereby precious hours already too full of necessary duties, and will find fresh material for progress in the game of war. it is the purpose of this book to help men who are in the service of the united states, and through them to share in bringing victory. table of contents. page. chapter . schedules chapter . infantry drill regulations chapter . physical training voice culture. chapter . use of modern arms . s.a.f.m. . range practice. . pistol. . bayonet. . machine guns. . grenade instruction. chapter . map sketching chapter . articles of war. (courts-martial.) chapter . army regulations chapter . practice marches field work. chapter . feeding men camping and camp sanitation. chapter . personal hygiene first aid. chapter . signaling chapter . guard duty chapter . company administration chapter . conferences study. small problems in infantry. examinations. chapter . trench warfare . general principles. . siting trenches. . construction. . occupation. conclusion bibliography chapter index chapter . schedules. schedule of instruction, reserve officers' training camp _plattsburg, n.y., august to september , _ organization. | | | issue of equipment. | | drill | organization of | drill | physical | barracks | i.d.r. | m.p.t. | ====================|=================|==================| | | | monday, aug. | | | . - . a.m. | | | . - . p.m. | | | | | | ====================|=================|==================| tuesday, aug. | without arms | . - . a.m. | | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | pars - | | | --------------- | | | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | | | | ====================|=================|==================| | with arms | | | . - . a.m. | | | pars - | . - . a.m. | wednesday, aug. | --------------- | pgs. - | | . - . a.m. | | | par. - | | | | | ====================|=================|==================| | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | par. - | pgs. - | | | | thursday, aug. | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | | | | | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | ====================|=================|==================| | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | par. - | pgs. - | | | | friday, aug. | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | | | | | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | ====================|====================================| saturday, sept. . | as prescribed by senior instructors. ====================|===================================== | | | | musketry | | practice | training | | march | s.a.f.m. | study | conferences =================|================|================|================== | | . - . p.m. | | | par. - | | | par. - - | | | - | | | i.d.r. | =================|================|================|================== | | . - . p.m. | | | par. - | | | s.a.f.m. | . - . p.m. | | | care of arms and | | . - . p.m. | equipment | | par. - | | | i.d.r. | =================|================|================|================== | | . - . p.m. | | | par. - | without arms | . - . p.m. | s.a.f.m. | . - . p.m. . - . a.m. | par. - | -------------- | assembling and | | . - . p.m. | adjusting pack | | par. - | | | i.d.r. | =================|================|================|================== | | | | | | | | | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. with arms | par. - | par. - | assembling and | | i.d.r. | adjusting pack | | | | | | =================|================|================|================== | | | | | | with arms and | | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. light pack | . - . p.m. | par. - - | military . - . a.m. | par. - | - | courtesy | | i.d.r. | | | | | | | =================|================|================|================== ====================================================================== schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., september to september , _ | | drill | | drill | physical | | i.d.r. | m.p.t. | ===================|================|===================| monday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pgs. - | | - | | ===================|================|===================| tuesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pgs. - | | - | | ===================|================|===================| wednesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pgs. - | | - | | ===================|================|===================| thursday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pgs. - | | - | | ===================|================|===================| friday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pgs. - | | - | | ===================|====================================| saturday, sept. | as prescribed by senior instructor. ===================|===================================== musketry | | companies training | semaphore | practice march s.a.f.m. | signalling | full kit =================|==================|================= . - . a.m. | | par. - | . - . a.m. | | | =================|==================|================= . - . a.m. | | par. - | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | =================|==================|================= . - . p.m. | | par. - | . - . a.m. | | | =================|==================|================= . - . a.m. | | par. - | | . - . a.m. | | =================|==================|================= . - . a.m. | | par. - | . - . a.m. | | | =================|==================|================= ====================================================== schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., september to september , _--(_concluded_) | grenade instruction [a] | bayonet drill | ===================|=========================|==================| | | . - . p.m. | | | lesson | monday, sept. | . - . a.m. | notes on | | | bayonet training | ===================|=========================|==================| | | . - . p.m. | | | lessons and | tuesday, sept. | . - . m. | notes on | | | bayonet training | ===================|=========================|==================| | | . - . p.m. | | | lessons and | wednesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | notes on | | | bayonet training | | | | ===================|=========================|==================| | | . - . p.m. | | | lessons and | thursday, sept. | . - . m. | notes on | | | bayonet training | ===================|=========================|==================| | | . - . p.m. | | | lessons and | friday, sept. | . - . a.m. | notes on | | | bayonet training | ===================|=========================|==================| saturday, sept. | as prescribed by senior instructor. ===================|============================================= voice culture | conferences | study ===================|=========================|==================== | | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | pars. - i.d.r . - . m. | par. - i.d.r. | pgs. - | pgs. - m.g.d. | m.g.d. ===================|=========================|==================== | | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | par. - i.d.r. | pars. - i.d.r. | pgs. - | pgs. - m.g.d. | m.g.d. ===================|=========================|==================== | physical exam. | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | par. - i.d.r. . - . m. | pars. - | part iii--u.s. | part , , , | signal book | u.s.s.b. | ===================|=========================|==================== | | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | par. - i.d.r. | pars. - , - | par. - | s.a.f.m. | s.a.f.m. ===================|=========================|==================== | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. . - . m. | pars. - i.d.r. | par. - - | - s.a.f.m. | s.a.f.m. | | ===================|=========================|==================== ================================================================== [footnote a: as prescribed by senior grenade instructor.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., september to september , _ | | | | drill | musketry training | | i.d.r. | s.a.f.m. | ====================|====================|===================| | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | . - . a.m. | | ------------------ | pars. - | monday, sept. | . - . a.m. | sight setting | | pars. - | and loadings | | ------------------ | | | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | ====================|====================|===================| | | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | tuesday, sept. | same as for monday | sight setting | | | and loadings | ====================|====================|===================| wednesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | ------------------ | sight setting | | . - . a.m. | and loadings | | pars. - | | ====================|====================|===================| | . - . a.m. | | thursday, sept. | pars. - | . - . a.m. | | ------------------ | pars. - | | . - . a.m. | sight setting | | pars. - | and loadings | ====================|====================|===================| | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | friday, sept. | pars. - | pars. - | | | sight setting | | | and loadings | ====================|====================|===================| saturday, sept. | as prescribed by senior instructors. ============================================================== first aid manual, | signaling | n.c.o's and | morse code | practice march privates | (wig wag) | full kit ====================|====================|================== | | | | . - . a.m. | | wounds | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | | | | | | ====================|====================|================== | | | | | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | ====================|====================|================== | | . - . a.m. | | fractures | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | | ====================|====================|================== | | | | | | . - . a.m. | | | | ====================|====================|================== . - . a.m. | | resuscitation | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | | ====================|====================|================== ============================================================ schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., september to september , _--(_concluded_) | grenade instruction | drill, physical | | [b] | m.p.t. | =====================|=====================|=================| | | | | | . - . p.m. | monday, sept. | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | pgs. - | | | | | | | =====================|=====================|=================| | | | | | | | | . - . p.m. | tuesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | pgs. - | | | | | | | =====================|=====================|=================| | | | wednesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | | pgs. - | | | pgs. - | | | | =====================|=====================|=================| | | | | | | | | . - . p.m. | thursday, sept. | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | pgs. - | | | | | | | | | | =====================|=====================|=================| | | | | | | | | . - . p.m. | friday, sept. | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | pgs. - | | | | | | | | | | | | | =====================|=======================================| saturday, sept. | as prescribed by senior instructors. ============================================================== bayonet drill | conference | study | | ===============|======================|============================ | . - . p.m. | mon. | . - . p.m. | pars. - , | | pars. - , | - i.d.r. | | - i.d.r. . - . p.m. | -------------------- | | ------------------ | . - . p.m. | | . - . p.m. | pars. - s.a.f.m. | | pars. - s.a.f.m. ===============|======================| |===================== | | | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - i.d.r. . - . p.m. | pars. - i.d.r. | | -------------------- | pgs. - | | . - . p.m. | notes on | | pgs. - | bayonet training | | notes on | | | bayonet training ===============|======================|======|===================== | . - . p.m. | tues.| . - . p.m. | pars. - i.d.r. | | pars. - i.d.r. . - . p.m. | pgs. - | | pgs. - | notes on | | notes on | bayonet training | | bayonet training ===============|======================|======|===================== | . - . p.m. | wed. | . - . p.m. | patrolling, messages,| | patrolling, messages, | orders, etc. | | orders, etc. . - . p.m. | pgs. - f.s.r. | | pgs. - f.s.r. | -------------------- | | -------------------- | . - . p.m. | | . - . p.m. | notes on | | notes on | grenade warfare | | grenade warfare ===============|======================|======|===================== | . - . p.m. |thurs.| . - . p.m. | advance and | | advance and | rear guards | | rear guards | pgs. - f.s.r. | | pgs. - f.s.r. . - . p.m. | -------------------- | | -------------------- | . - . p.m. | | . - . p.m. | training & | | training & | employment of | | employment of | bombers | | bombers =================================================================== =================================================================== [footnote b: as prescribed by senior grenade instructor.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., september to september , _ | drill, i.d.r. | musketry training | | | s.a.f.m. | ====================|==================|===================| | | | | | | monday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | close order only | | | | | ====================|==================|===================| | | | tuesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | close order only | | ====================|==================|===================| | | | wednesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | close order only | | ====================|==================|===================| | | | thursday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | close order only | | | | | ====================|==================|===================| friday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | close order only | | ====================|==================|===================| saturday, sept. | as prescribed by senior instructors. ============================================================ drill, physical | sketching | study m.p.t. | [c] | ===================|=================|====================== . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. pgs. - , - | . - . p.m. | pgs. - | | notes on bayonet | | training | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | pars. - , i.d.r. ===================|=================|====================== . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. pgs. - , - | . - . p.m. | outposts | | pgs. - , f.s.r. | | pars. - , i.d.r. ===================|=================|====================== . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. pgs. - , - | . - . p.m. | orders | | pgs. - , f.s.r. | | pars. - , i.d.r. ===================|=================|====================== . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. pgs. - , - | . - : p.m. | marches | | pgs. - , f.s.r. | | pars. - , - , | | e.f.m. ===================|=================|====================== . - . a.m. | . - : a.m. | . - . p.m. pgs. - , - | . - . p.m. | pars. - , - , | | - , e.f.m. ============================================================ ============================================================ [footnote c: as prescribed by senior instructor in sketching.] _september - , _. construction of trenches. schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , ._ | drill, i.d.r. | physical | | | m.p.t. | ==================|=================|=====================| monday, oct. | / hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - and | | | arm combinations | ==================|=================|=====================| tuesday, oct. | company | / hour | | / hour | pgs. - and | | pars. - | arm combinations | ==================|=================|=====================| wednesday, oct. | battalion | / hour | | / hour | pgs. - and | | pars. - | arm combinations | ==================|=================|=====================| thursday. oct. | battalion | / hour | | / hour | pgs. - and | | pars. - | arm combinations | ==================|=================|=====================| friday, oct. | battalion | / hour | | / hour | pgs. - and | | pars. - | arm combinations | ==================|=======================================| saturday, oct. |as prescribed by senior instructors. =========================================================== bayonet | range practice | signalling [d] | [e] | ==========|==================|================= / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | ==========|==================|================= / hour | . - . a.m. | hour | . - . p.m. | semaphore and | | wigwag ==========|==================|================= / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | ==========|==================|================= / hour | . - . a.m. | hour | . - . p.m. | semaphore and | | wigwag ==========|==================|================= / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | =============================================== =============================================== [footnote d: per bayonet program.] [footnote e: per schedule senior instructor musketry training.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , _--(_concluded_) | field work | pistol | ==================|==============|=======================| monday, oct. | hour | / hour | | patrolling | nomenclature | | | / hour | | | manual | ==================|==============|=======================| tuesday, oct. | | same as for monday | | | | | | | | | | ==================|==============|=======================| wednesday, oct. | hour | / hour | | patrolling | manual | | | / hour | | | position and aiming | ==================|==============|=======================| thursday, oct. | | same as for wednesday | | | | | | | | | | ==================|==============|=======================| friday, oct. | hour | same as for wednesday | | patrolling | | | | | | | | ==================|==============|=======================| saturday, oct. | as prescribed by senior instructors. ==================|======================================= conference | study | ==========================|===========================|======= hours | . - . p.m. | pars. - , i.d.r. | pars. - , i.d.r. | prob. to situation . | problem , s.p.i. | s.p.i. | | ==========================|===========================|======= hours | . - . p.m. | pars. - , i.d.r. | pars. - , i.d.r. | situation , prob. , to | problem , s.p.i. | end of problem, s.p.i. | | ==========================|===========================|======= hours | . - . p.m. | pars. - , i.d.r. | pars. - , i.d.r. | problem , s.p.i. | problem to situation | | s.p.i. | ==========================|===========================|======= hours | . - . p.m. | pars. - , i.d.r. | pars. - , i.d.r. | prob. to situation , | situation , problem to | s.p.i. | end of problem, s.p.i. | ==========================|===========================|======= hours | . - . p.m. | pars. - , i.d.r. | per later | situation , prob. , to | announcement | end of problem, s.p.i. | | ==========================|===========================|======= ============================================================== schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , _. | drill, i.d.r. | physical drill | | | m.p.t. | ======================|===============|=====================| monday, october | hour | | | pars. - | | | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - , - | | - | | ======================|===============|=====================| tuesday, october | hour | | | pars. - | | | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - , - | | - | | ======================|===============|=====================| wednesday, october | / hour | | | pars. - | | | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - , - | | - | | ======================|===============|=====================| thursday, october | hour | | | pars. - | | | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - , - | | - | | ======================|===============|=====================| friday, october | | | ======================|===============|=====================| saturday, october | as prescribed by senior instructors. ============================================================= bayonet | range practice | signaling [f] | [g] | ==========|=================|============ | | | | / hour | - - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | ==========|=================|============ | | | | / hour | - - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | ==========|=================|============ | | | | / hour | - - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | / hour | | ==========|=================|============ | | | | / hour | - - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | ==========|=================|============ | | ========================================= ========================================= [footnote f: per bayonet program.] [footnote g: rifle, pistol, machine gun, estimating distances, etc., as prescribed by senior instructor musketry training.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , _--(_concluded_) | field work | | | (company) [h] | conferences | ======================|=====================|=========================| monday, october | | hours | | | prob. to situation | | | exclusive, s.p.i. | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | ======================|=====================|=========================| tuesday, october | | hours | | | situation , prob. to | | | end of problem, s.p.i. | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | ======================|=====================|=========================| wednesday, october | | hours | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | ======================|=====================|=========================| thursday, october | | hours | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | | ======================|=====================|=========================| friday, october | . - . a.m. | | | . - . p.m. | | | advance and rear | | | guards, outposts, | | | patroling, messages | | | and orders | | ======================|===============================================| saturday, october | as prescribed by senior instructors. ======================|================================================ | | study | | =======================|=======|======= . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | | =======================|=======|======= . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | | =======================|=======|======= . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | =======================|=======|======= . - . p.m. | | problem to | | situation , exclusive | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | =======================|=======|======= | | | | . - . p.m. | | as per later | | announcement | | | | =======================|=======|======= =======================|=======|======= [footnote h: to include conferences and critique on the ground of exercise conducted.] _october - , _. construction of trenches. _october - , _. occupation of the trenches from . a.m. _october , _ to . a.m. _october , ._ _october , _. . a.m.- a.m. conference of trench occupation, a.m. inspection. schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , _ | drill, i.d.r. | physical drill | | | m.p.t. | ======================|===============|=====================| monday, october | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - | | | pg. | ======================|===============|=====================| tuesday, october | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - | | | pg. | ======================|===============|=====================| wednesday, october | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - | | | pg. | ======================|===============|=====================| thursday, october | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - | | | pg. | ======================|===============|=====================| friday, october | | | ======================|===============|=====================| saturday, october | as prescribed by senior instructors. ============================================================= bayonet | range practice | signaling [i] | [j] | =============|==================|=========== / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | =============|==================|=========== / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | =============|==================|=========== / hour | . - . a.m. | / hour | . - . p.m. | | | =============|==================|=========== / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | =============|==================|=========== | | =============|==================|=========== ============================================ [footnote i: per bayonet program.] [footnote j: rifle, pistol, machine gun, estimating distances, etc., as prescribed by senior instructor of musketry training.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , _--(_concluded_) | field work | | | [k] | conferences | ======================|=============|=========================| monday, october | | hours | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | review problems - | | | s.p.i. | | | | ======================|=============|=========================| tuesday, october | | hours | | | pars. - , i.d.r | | | prob. to situation | | | s.p.i. | | | | ======================|=============|=========================| wednesday, october | | hours | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | situation , prob. | | | to end of prob. | ======================|=============|=========================| thursday, october | | hours | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | | ======================|=============|=========================| friday, october | | . - . a.m. | | | . - . p.m. | | | companies in attack | | | and defense (to include | | | siting of trenches) | ======================|=============|=========================| saturday, october | as prescribed by senior instructors. ======================|======================================== | | study | | ========================|========|========= hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | prob. to situation , | | s.p.i. | | ========================|========|======== hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | situation , prob. to | | end of prob. s.p.i. | | ========================|========|======== hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | prob. , s.p.i. | | ========================|========|======== hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | problem , s.p.i. | | ========================|========|======== . - . p.m. | | as per later | | announcement | | | | | | ========================|========|======== ========================|========|======== [footnote k: to include conferences and critique on the ground of exercise conducted.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to november , _ | drill | physical drill | | | | =======================|==================|==================| monday, october | hour | / hour | | attack formation | | | [trench] | | =======================|==================|==================| tuesday, october | hour | / hour | | attack formation | | | [trench] | | =======================|==================|==================| wednesday, october | hour | / hour | | attack formation | | | [trench] | | =======================|==================|==================| thursday, november | hour | / hour | | attack formation | | | [trench] | | =======================|==================|==================| friday, november | | | =======================|==================|=================== saturday, november | as prescribed by senior instructors. =======================|====================================== bayonet | signaling | range practice [l] | [m] | ==============|===========|================= / hour | | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | ==============|===========|================= / hour | | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | ==============|===========|================= / hour | / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | ==============|===========|================= / hour | | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | ==============|===========|================= | | ==============|===========|================= ============================================ [footnote l: per bayonet program.] [footnote m: rifle, pistol, machine gun, estimating distances, etc., as prescribed by senior instructor of musketry training.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to november , _--(_concluded_) | field work | conferences | | [n] | | ======================|======================|=======================| monday, october | | hours | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | | | | | ======================|======================|=======================| tuesday, october | | hours | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | battle fire training | | | (lesson scheduled | | | later) | ======================|======================|=======================| wednesday, october | | hours | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | battle fire training | | | (lesson scheduled | | | later) | ======================|======================|=======================| thursday, november | | hours | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | battle fire training | | | (lesson scheduled | | | later) | ======================|======================|=======================| friday, november | battalions in attack | | | and defense | | | (field kit) | | ======================|======================|=======================| saturday, november | as prescribed by senior instructors. ======================|=============================================== | | study | | =========================|========|========= hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | battle fire training | | (lesson scheduled later) | | =========================|========|========= hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | battle fire training | | (lesson scheduled later) | | =========================|========|========= hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | battle fire training | | (lesson scheduled later) | | =========================|========|========= hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | battle fire training | | (lesson scheduled later) | | =========================|========|========= . - . p.m. | | as per later | | announcement[o] | | =========================|========|========= =========================|========|========= [footnote n: to include conferences and critique on the ground of exercise conducted.] [footnote o: during the week each battalion will be given / day's instruction in camouflage under direction senior engineer instructor.] schedules. _november th- th, ._ infantry drill regulations, hours. march in full kit, - / hours. signaling, / hour. physical drill, - / hours, bayonet, - / hours, machine gun instruction, - / hours. field fortification, hours. conferences, hours. study, hours. in the study and conferences the following will be taken up: manual of courts-martial--pp. to end. first aid. personal hygiene. camp sanitation. _november th- th, ._ physical, drill, - / hours. bayonet drill, - / hours. battalion ceremonies, - / hours. battalion march, full kit, - / hours. field fortification and trench warfare, hours. study and conferences, hours. in the study and conference's the following will be taken up: trench warfare. grenades gas attack and defense. communication. _november th- rd, ._ physical, drill, - / hours. bayonet drill, - / hours. infantry drill regulations, - / hours. company administration and army regulations, hours. ceremonies, parades and reviews, hours. chapter . infantry drill regulations. the greatest lesson of the present war is that the keynote of success is discipline. in trenches the direct control of the men is even less than in extended order in open warfare, and only thoroughly disciplined troops with a trusted leader can hope to succeed. the successful officer will show anger or irritation only in rare cases, and then by design: he will know his men individually and be as considerate of them as possible, ready to do himself what he asks to have done; just in administering punishments; clear in giving his commands and insistent that they be carried out promptly; he will learn from drilling his men the quickest way a desired result can be accomplished, and to give the necessary commands in the most effective manner. he will read his infantry drill regulations through each month and will always find something that he never knew or has forgotten. he will always consult it before going to drill. in explaining movements he will use blackboard diagrams in conferences. on the field he will take the fewest possible men and have movement executed by the numbers properly before the other men. then have all the men go through the movement a number of times. the object of each exercise or drill should be explained to the men whenever possible. "success in battle is the ultimate object of all military training." school of the soldier. instruction without arms. the object of the facings and marchings is to give the soldier complete control of his body in drills so that he can move easily and promptly at any command. attention. position of attention.--this is the position a soldier assumes when in ranks or whenever the command _attention_ is given. in the training of anyone nothing equals the importance of a proper posture; it is the very foundation upon which the entire fabric of any successful training must be founded. instructors must persist in the development of this position until the men assume it from habit. at the command, . company (squad, etc.), . attention, the following position is assumed: . heels together and on a line.--if the heels are not on a line, the hips and sometimes even the shoulders, are thrown out of line. . feet turned out equally, forming an angle of degrees.--if the feet are not turned out equally, the result will be the same as above. . knees extended without stiffness.--muscles should be contracted just enough to keep the knees straight. if locked, men tire easily and faint if at attention a long time. . the trunk erect upon the hips, the spine extended throughout its entire length; the buttocks well forward. the position of the trunk, spine and buttocks is most essential. in extending the spine the men must feel that the trunk is being _stretched up_ from the waist until the back is as straight as it can be made. in stretching the spine the _chest_ should be _arched_ and raised, _without_, however, _raising the shoulders or interfering with natural respiration_. . shoulders falling naturally and moved back until they are square. being square, means having the shoulder ridge and the point of the shoulder at right angles to a general anterior-posterior plane running through the body. they should never be forced back of this plane, but out rather in line with it. . arms hanging naturally, thumbs against the seams of the trousers, fingers extended, and back of hand turned out. the arms must not be forcibly extended nor held rigidly; if they are, a compensating faulty curve will occur in the lumbar region. . head erect, chin raised until neck is vertical, eyes fixed upon some object at their own height. every tendency to draw the chin in must be counteracted. . when this position is correctly assumed, the men will be taught to _incline the body forward_ until the weight rests chiefly upon the balls of the feet, heels resting lightly upon the ground. when properly assumed, a vertical line drawn from the top of the head should pass in front of the ear, shoulder and thighs, and find its base at the balls of the feet. every tendency toward rigidity _must be avoided_; all muscles are contracted only enough to maintain this position, which is one of co-ordination, of _physical and mental alertness_, that makes for mobility, activity and grace. a man who faints standing at attention has not taken the proper position. rests. position of rest and at ease.--when men are standing _at rest_ or _at ease_ they must be cautioned to avoid assuming any position that will nullify the object of the position of attention. standing on one leg, folding arms, allowing shoulders or head to droop forward, must be discountenanced persistently until the men form the habit of resting with feet separated but on the same line, hands elapsed behind the back,--head, shoulders and trunk erect, (m.p.t., pp. and .) fall out.--leave ranks. rest.--one foot in place. can talk. at ease.--one foot in place. silence. parade rest.--do not slouch down on right foot. keep chest well up. eyes right, . front.--have it snappy. right face.--to face _in marching_ and advance, turn on the ball of either foot and step off with the other foot in the new line of direction. (do not confuse with the ordinary command, "right face.") right half face.-- degrees, used to show position in right oblique. about face.--have weight well back. not necessary to move right foot after turn is made. hand salute.--manner of rendering is index to manner in which all other duties are performed. forward march.--shift weight to right foot, _mentally_. double time, march.--tendency to go too fast. time it. steps in seconds. take one step quick time, then take up double time. mark time, march.--given as either foot strikes the ground. to resume full step, _forward, march._ half step, march.--all steps and marchings executed from a halt, except right step, begin with left foot. right step, march. backward, march.--executed in quick time only and at trail, without command. inch step. squad, halt.--given as either foot strikes the ground. by the right flank, march.--step off with right foot. to the rear, march.--given as right foot strikes the ground. if marching in double time, turn to the rightabout taking steps, in place, in cadence, and step off with left foot. change step, march.--being in march; given as either foot strikes the ground. manual of arms. purpose.--to make the man so accustomed to the rifle that he handles it without a thought. eight rules govern the carrying of the piece. see paragraph , infantry drill regulations. six rules govern the execution of the manual. see paragraph , infantry drill regulations. commands and cautions. order, arms.--see that all the fingers of the right hand are around the piece. present, arms.--left forearm horizontal and against the body. port, arms.--right forearm horizontal. left forearm against the body. right shoulder, arms.--insist on an angle of degrees. trigger guard in hollow of shoulder. right hand does the work. left shoulder, arms.--right hand in next to last position grasps small of stock. parade, rest.--left hand grasps piece just below stacking swivel. right foot straight back inches. trail, arms.--piece at angle of about degrees, about inches off the ground. rifle salute.--left forearm horizontal. fix bayonet.--parade rest and resume order after bayonet is fixed. unfix bayonet.--parade rest and resume order after bayonet is unfixed. inspection arms.--be sure men glance down in chamber and keep hold of bolt handle. parade, rest can be executed only from order arms, and the command attention follows parade, rest. any movement not in the manual, _e.g._, right, face, breaks the execution of movements by the numbers. the number of counts in the execution of each command must be remembered. distinguish between _raise_ and _carry_ and _throw_. school of the squad. object.--to give basic element, the squad, its first lesson in team work. team work wins battles just as it does football games. avoid keeping men too long at the same movement. composition of squad.-- men and a corporal. never less than nor more than men. fall in.--instructor paces in front of where center is to be. fall out.--if under arms, always preceded by inspection arms. does not mean dismissed. count off.--right file front and rear do not execute eyes right. front and rear rank men count off together. inspection arms.-- right dress, front: ( ) company commander must establish base file or files before giving the command right dress. ( ) right flank men remain facing to front. ( ) be sure first four men are on desired line and rest of company can easily be made to conform. ( ) right guide may be established at any point desired and at command right dress all march to their proper positions without other command, and at the trail. ( ) have men beyond base files step forward until one pace beyond where new line is to be and then dress back on line established. guide right.--keep head and eyes off the ground. close in or open out gradually. take interval, to the right, march, squad, halt.--(at command "to the right") rear rank falls back inches. at march, all face to right and leading man of each rank steps off, followed by the others at four-pace intervals, rear-rank men marching abreast of their file leaders. when halted all face to the front. to reform, assemble to the right (left), march. take distance, march.-- - - - front rank, - - - rear rank, -pace intervals. guide in each four is right. assemble, march.--no. , front rank stands fast. stack arms.--piece of even number front rank: butt between his feet, barrel to front. even number rear rank passes piece to file leader. take arms.--loose pieces are returned by even numbers front rank. if no. of rear rank is absent, no. rear rank takes his place in making or breaking stacks and resumes his post. pieces are never stacked with bayonet fixed. oblique, march.--taught from right half face. half faced to front after obliquing, forward, march. if at half step or mark time while obliquing, oblique, march. in place, halt.--all halt and stand fast without changing position of pieces. resume march.--only given after in place, halt. right turn.--turn on moving pivot is used by subdivisions of a column in executing change of direction. each rank successively and on same ground executes movement. all except pivot man execute two right obliques. no marking time. arriving on new line, all take the half step, glance toward marching flank and take full step without command as last man arrives on the line. right half turn.--executed in similar manner. squads right.--turn on fixed pivot is used in all formations from line into column and the reverse. no half step. right flank man faces to right in marching and marks time. rest of front rank oblique once to new position. step off on th step. squad right about.--front rank twice executes squads right. in rear rank, no. with no. abreast of him on his left and followed in column by the second and first moves straight forward until on prolongation of new line he is to occupy; faces to right in marching and proceeds to place. then all face to the right in marching, mark time and glance toward marching flank. as last man arrives on new line all step off without command on th step. deploying as skirmishers and following the corporal are covered under company extended order. school of the company. the company is the basic fighting and administrative unit, and must be easily handled and capable of promptly carrying out the will of its commander. team work among the squads, so that the company can be easily managed as a whole, is the purpose of company drill. close order drill is for discipline. numerical designations of squads or platoons do not change. center squad is middle or right middle squad of the company. ( - ) men = squad. ( - ) squads = platoon. platoons = company ( men, officers). ( - ) companies = battalion ( , officers and men). battalions = regiment ( , , including medical detachment). regiments = brigade ( , officers and men). brigades = division ( , officers and men). first sergeant when not commanding a platoon is opposite the rd file from outer flank of first platoon, in line of file closers. fall in.--first sergeant paces front of center, facing company. right guide takes post at such point that the center will be paces from and opposite the first sergeant. squad leaders salute and report all present; or private(s) ---- absent. first sergeant does not return salute of squad leaders. captain takes post paces in front of center of company in time to receive report of first sergeant, "sir, all present or accounted for," or names of unauthorized absentees. e.g. a man in hospital might be reported absent by squad leader if he did not know where he was, but first sergeant would know, and would not report him absent. captain returns salute of first sergeant who then takes his post _without command_. platoon movements in platoon column. _leading platoon, c.o._ on right into line ... right turn. column right ... right turn. right front into line ... continue. (caution) if halted, forward. _rear platoon, c.o._ on right into line ... continue. (caution) if halted, forward. column right ... continue. (caution) if halted, forward. right front into line ... right oblique questions which come up in daily military life. it is well to have a solution on hand. ( ) the company is in line reversed,-- th squad where st squad should be. bring the company into proper line, - - - ; - - - ; - - - ; - - - . ( ) you are platoon leader. your platoon is drilling separately and you get assembled in company line. - - - ; - - - ; - - - ; - - - . what commands do you give to get the platoon into line properly arranged? ( ) you are in charge of the company and find yourself marching into the company street in reverse order. what commands do you give to correct this? ( ) you are marching your company to the rear along a road through a narrow cut. suddenly around a bend comes an ambulance. to let it pass, you must immediately reduce your marching front. what is the quickest method? (this can be used also in arranging the advance party of the outguard.) ( ) you are marching your company in company front, and wish to march in column of platoons. what do you command? answers. ( ) right (left) by squads. column left (right). squads right (left) company, halt. ( ) forward; march. on left into line; platoon; halt. ( ) on right (left) into line. ( ) squads right; march. by the left flank; march. ( ) right by squads; march. platoons left front into line; double time; march. on the o.d. shirt collar insignia is worn as follows: "on the right side, in the middle of the collar, the letters (u.s.), (u.s.r.), (u.s.n.a.), and the insignia of rank; the letters one inch from the end of the collar and the insignia of rank one-half inch from letters." "on the left side in the middle of the collar, and one inch from the end, the insignia of the arm of the service." _for second lieutenants._ on the right side, in the middle of the collar, and one inch from the end, the letters (u.s.), (u.s.r.), (u.s.n.a.). on the left side, in the middle of the collar and one inch from the end, the insignia of the arm of service. when the star spangled banner is played, an officer in uniform if uncovered stands at attention. if covered he salutes. an officer "presents his compliments" only to his juniors. . company right, march; company, halt; forward march. being in line to turn. right-flank man is pivot. right guide steps back at command march, and marks time. . platoons right, march; company, halt; forward march. line to column platoons, reverse. guides must be covering. . squads right, march; company, halt. line to column squads, reverse. line of platoon to column platoons, reverse. . right turn, march; forward, march. line to change direction. right guide is pivot. men do not glance toward flank. rear rank begins oblique on same ground as front rank. all take full step at command, forward, march. . column right, march. first platoon leader, right turn. other platoon leaders (if halted), forward; (if marching), cautions, continue the march. all platoons execute right turn on same ground. column of platoons to change direction. . column right, march. column squads to change direction. . platoons, column right, march. column squads to line of platoons. . squads right, column right, march. right by squads, march. line to column squads and change direction. right guide posts himself and takes short steps. right squad conforms. . squads right, platoons, column right, march. platoons right by squads, march. line to line of platoons. guide same as in . . squads right about, march; company, halt. to face or march to the rear. _about face_; forward, march. to the rear a few paces. . on right into line, march; company, halt, front. column platoons or squads to line to side. if executed in double time, leading squad marches double time until halted. . right front into line, march; company, halt, front. column platoons or squads to line (front). in double time, halting and aligning are omitted. guide is toward side of first unit in line. if halted, leader of leading unit commands, forward. . platoons, right front into line, march; company, halt, front. column squads to column platoons. line of platoons to company line. . route step, march. muzzles kept elevated. ranks cover, preserve distances. (if halted, at rest.) at ease, march. silence preserved. (halted, at ease.) . right by twos, march. all but right files of leading squad execute in place, halt. right by files, march. to diminish the front in column squads. . squads right front into line, march. twos right front into line, march. twos or files, to column squads. leading file or files halt. n.b.--if right by twos, then left into line or reverse. dismiss the company.--first sergeant places himself paces to front. paces from nearest flank, salutes, faces toward opposite flank, commands, inspection arms, port arms, dismissed. to fall in company when it cannot be formed by squads.--inspection arms. right shoulder arms. roll call. each man as name is called, executes order arms. for muster, commands are: open ranks, march, front. (at command open ranks, rear rank drops back steps, counts.) (as mustering officer approaches) right shoulder arm's. attention to muster. each man, as name is called, answers "here" and comes to order arms. company commander is on right flank, in same place as "prepare for inspection." in aligning company.--captain places himself paces from and facing the flank toward which dress is made, verifies alignment and commands front. (platoon leaders same position for platoon alignment.) to march squad without unnecessary commands.--the corporal commands, _follow me_. men always at ease. squad conform to pace of corporal, and carry pieces as he does. in line or skirmish line, no. front rank follows in trace of corporal at paces. others guide on no. . as skirmishers, march.--at run. rear rank men on right of file leaders. all conform to corporals gait. in squad alone, skirmish line is formed on no. , front rank, corporal ahead when advancing, in rear when halted. regular interval in skirmish line / pace = yard per man. squad deployed = paces. any number of paces may be specified, _e.g._ as skirmishers, at paces, march. assemble, march.--men form on corporal. if he continues to advance, move in double time, form and follow. do not assemble while marching to rear. kneel.--left forearm and left lower leg form straight line. lie down.--on both knees, then both elbows. rise.--stand on point marked by both knees. (when deployed, may sit instead of kneel.) loadings and firings.--loadings are executed only in line and skirmish line. firings are always executed at a halt. when kneeling and lying down in double rank, rear rank does not load, aim or fire. in both cease firing and suspend firing pieces are loaded and locked. (sec. , i.d.r., april, , is incorrect.) . aiming.--target carefully pointed out. . sight-setting announced. (battle sight if none announced.) . (if by volley), ready, aim, squad fire. to continue volley firing, aim, squad fire. volley fire is used against large, compact enemy or in fire of position. fire at will.--normally employed in attack and defense; shots per minute at effective ranges ( to , yards); to shots per minute at close ranges (up to yards). clip fire: used ( ) to steady men. ( ) to produce a short burst of fire. unload.--safety lock up. extended order. a squad acting alone, as one out on a patrol or for instruction, the corporal acts as the leader of a small platoon leading the advance, and in rear when halted. men come to trail as they come on the skirmish line. on halting, a deployed line faces front (direction of real or assumed enemy), and takes cover. corporal cautions.--by the right flank (if halted). corporal steps out looking back to get his -pace interval. squad halt. left face.--base squad deploys as soon as it has room. guide of a deployed squad is center without command. captain indicates point on which corporal of base squad is to march. company right is executed as explained for front rank of company, but at / pace intervals. deployments. _from line, to form skirmish line to front._ as skirmishers, guide right, march.-- . if marching, corporal commands, follow me. corporal of base squad moves straight to front, deploys as soon as possible and advances until company, halt, is given. other squads move to left front and place squads on the line. if guide is center, other corporals on right of center squad move to the right, and squads on the left to the left, and bring their squads on the line. if guide is left, other corporals move to right front. . if at halt, base squad deploys abreast of its corporal, paces in front of the former line, as soon as it has room. other squads are conducted by the left flank, to their places. to deploy from column of squads, forming skirmish line to the front.--if at a halt, base squad deploys abreast of its corporal paces in front of its former position. if marching, base squad deploys and moves straight to the front. if guide is right, other corporals move to left front and place squads on line. if guide is center, corporals in front move to right (if at a halt, to right rear), the corporals in rear of center squad move to left and come on line in succession. column of twos or files are deployed by same commands in same manner. if deployment in an oblique direction is desired, the captain points out desired direction. column of squads may be turned to the flank or rear and then deployed. assemble, march.--in skirmish line, men assemble at a run, to their places individually. squads do not assemble and march to places as units as do platoons. platoons, assemble.--men assemble individually on the run, in their platoons and are then marched to relative position on base platoon as indicated by position or command of captain. platoon columns.--platoon leaders should be sure to go through center of platoon. platoon guides in rear. columns should be yards apart, or more. (used to take advantage of few favorable routes where cover is poor or ground difficult.) squad columns.--men oblique and follow squad leader. no advantage in cover, but used to advance more quickly over rough or brush grown ground. (it might be desirable to teach men to take squad columns from column of squads.) in assembling from platoon or squad columns, the men reform by platoons or squads and are conducted by their leaders to point indicated by captain. _thin lines_ are used to cross wide stretches under artillery fire or heavy, long range rifle fire which cannot be profitably returned. no. 's forward, march. first line is led by platoon leader, right platoon. second line is led by platoon guide, right platoon. third line is led by platoon leader, next platoon, etc. quick time, unless conditions otherwise demand. captain points out new line.--original intervals preserved. disadvantage.--serious loss of control over company. advantage.--offers less definite target and is less likely to draw fire. being in skirmish line. by platoon ( platoons, squads, men, etc.), from the right, rush.--leader of rush usually platoon leader. ( ) selects new line. ( ) cease firing. ( ) prepare to rush. ( ) follow me. ( ) commence firing. when whole company rushes, it is led by captain. platoon leader lead their platoons. commands. commands should be so given as to be distinctly heard by all the men who have to execute them. it is unfair to expect good execution of a slovenly command or one that cannot be heard. a sufficient interval should be allowed between the preparatory command and the command of execution, proportioned to the size of the command, so that each man has time to grasp the movement before execution is required. school of the battalion. basis.-- companies to a battalion. arrangement.--right to left by rank of captains. after formation order is not kept with reference to rank of captains. number.--from right to left in whatever direction. center.--actual center or right center company. band.--places itself as if it were an adjoining battalion on right. dressing.--each company is dressed by its captain who places himself on the flank toward which the dress is to be made. in battalion line beside the guide (or beside flank file of the front rank if guide is not in line) facing front. in column of companies-- paces from the guide and facing down the line. to form the battalion. other than ceremonies.--column of squads. adjutant does not take his post until companies are formed. each captain halts company and salutes adjutant. adjutant returns salutes and when last captain has saluted, faces major and reports "sir, the battalion is formed." he joins major without command. for ceremonies.--or when directed, battalion is formed in line. adjutant places himself paces to right of right company and facing in direction line is to extend. guides precede companies on line by paces. adjutant causes guides to cover. companies are halted one pace in rear of line and dressed to right against arm of guide. when guides of left company have been posted, adjutant by shortest route moves to post facing battalion midway between post of major and center of battalion. adjutant commands: . guides, . posts, . present, . arms. he then faces about and reports, "sir, the battalion is formed." major commands, "take your post, sir." to dismiss the battalion.--dismiss your companies. to rectify the alignment.--see infantry drill regulations, paragraphs - . to rectify the column.--see infantry drill regulations, paragraph . helpful hints to beginners.--these hold good with few exceptions. when in column of squads; first command of captain begins with word "column." when in column of companies; first command of captain begins with word "squads." in column of squads.-- major: _on right (left) into line._ first captain: squads right. (captain marches beside right guide.) rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward). major: _march_. rear captains: (upon uncovering preceding company) squads right. major: _battalion_. first captain: company. major: _halt_. first captain: right dress, front. rear captains: (coming on line). company halt, right dress, front. major: _right (left) front into line._ first captain: column right. rear captains: column half right. major: _march_. first captain: (halts and allows company to pass him and form column of squads to right.) squads left, company halt, left dress, front. rear captains: when company in column of squads arrives one pace in rear of the right flank of the company that has formed in line. column half right, march. the captain then takes paces beyond the flank of the last company in line, allows company to pass him, and as rear guide reaches him, commands: squads left, march, company halt, left dress, front. major: _line of companies at_ (seven) paces, guide left (right). (close on first company from column of squads is no longer used in battalion drill.) first captain: continue to march (if halted, forward). rear captains: column half right. major: _march_. rear captains: (when company reaches a position paces to the flank of the leading company.) column half right. major: _battalion_. all captains: company. major: _halt_. major: _column of companies, first company_ squads right (left). first captain: squads right. rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward.). as each company reaches the point where the first company formed line the captain commands: squads right, march. in column of companies or close column of companies.-- major: _on right (left) into line._ first captain: right turn. rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward). major: _march_. rear captains: each captain takes paces beyond the left flank of the company that has just executed the turn and commands: right turn, march. major: _battalion_. first captain: company. major: _halt_. first captain: right dress, front. rear captains: (as they come on line.) company halt, right dress, front. major: _right (left) front into line._ first captain: company. second capt: right by squads. third and fourth captains: squads right. major: _march_. first captain: halt, left dress, front. rear captains: column half left, march, column half right march. taking paces from the flank of the company last on line and allowing the company to pass by him until the rear guide reaches him, captain commands: squads left, march, company halt, left dress, front. major: _close on first company_ (never any other). first captain: company. rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward). major: _march_. first captain: halt. rear captains: as each successive company closes to paces from the company immediately in front, the captain commands: company halt. major: _extend on fourth company._ (never any other.) first captain: continue to march (if halted, forward). rear captains: company. major: _march_. rear captains: halt. then as each company in rear of the leading company gets the proper distance (company front plus paces) the captain commands: forward march. close column not extended in double time. major: _column of squads, first company_ squads right (left). first captain: squads right. rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward). as each company reaches the point where the first company formed column of squads, the captain commands: squads right, march. major: _column right (left)._ first captain: right turn. rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward). major: _march_. first captain: when the marching flank of the company is one pace from the new line the captain commands: forward march. rear captains: other companies march squarely up to the turning point and each changes direction at the captain's command: right turn, march, forward, march. line of companies or close line of companies. major: _battalion right (left)._ first captain: column right. flank captains: column half right. major: _march_. flank captains: when each company has moved paces to the flank of the base company the command is: column half right, march. the companies are then marched echeloned with an interval of paces. major: _battalion_. first captain: company. major: _halt_. flank captains: continue to march. as each company comes into line with the base company the captain commands: company, halt. major: _close on first (fourth) company._ _extend on first (fourth) company._ both movements executed in the same manner. first captain: (if marching.) halt. (if halted, cautions "stand fast.") flank captains: squads right. major: _march._ flank captains: right oblique, march. (when the company has closed sufficiently): forward march, squads left, march. (then as the company comes on the line with first company): company, halt. major: _column of squads, first (fourth) company, forward._ first captain: forward. flank captains: column half right (left). major: _march._ flank captains: as their companies come onto the line behind the leading company (at . paces) the captain commands: column half right, march. in battalion line. major: _close on first (fourth) company._ first captain: stand fast (caution). second captain: squads right, column right. third and fourth captains: squads right, column half right. major: _march._ second, third and fourth captains: as each company reaches a point paces behind the company just preceding it into close column, the command is given: column half right, march. (cautioning "guide left" when closing on first company--"guide right" when closing on fourth company): squads left, march, company, halt. major: _halt._ first captain: right dress, front. rear captains: (as they come on the line): company halt, right dress, front. [illustration: plate no. a. co. i--n.e. proper arrangement of shelter tents.] [illustration: plate no. b. layout of equipment for inspection. tent pins should be laid in echelon three inches apart.] inspections. (kitchen and mess inspections have been covered under feeding men.) daily inspection of the barracks should be made and rigid discipline enforced as to the floors being kept clean, scrubbed once a week, bedding and bed clothes aired out of doors every tuesday, shoes cleaned and kept in order under bunks, lockers under bunks, toilet articles and books all kept in order. sheets, comforters and blankets should be shaken out, folded as for pack and laid on top of pillow until afternoon, each day. in inspecting men every week see that hair is kept short and feet clean and in good condition, toe nails trimmed. insist on woolen socks. equipment must be inspected carefully, each week, to see that it is in good condition. special points of company inspection. after open ranks, march, given from usual position in front of company, the captain takes his post paces in front of right guide, facing to the left and commands: . front. . prepare for inspection. the lieutenants are paces in front of the center of their respectives platoons, facing to front. if equipment is also to be inspected, commands are as follows: . close ranks. . march. stack arms. backward, march. take interval to the right, march. company, halt. . unsling equipment. . open packs. close packs. sling equipment. battalion inspection. at command, prepare for inspection, given by the major, each captain commands, open ranks. they do not salute when the major and inspector approach. the lieutenants take their places as in company inspection. each captain commands: company attention. prepare for inspection. lieutenants face about and stand at ease, after being inspected or passed. after inspection: close ranks, march. rest. regimental inspection. commands mean and principles are same as for battalion. (look up post of colonel, par. , infantry drill regulations.) ceremonies. battalion review. after battalion is formed in line, major faces front. when reviewing officer halts, major turns about and commands: present arms; turns to front and salutes. major turns about; commands order arms, and again faces front. when reviewing officer is within paces, the major salutes, takes post on the right and accompanies him. on arriving at the right of the line again, major salutes, halts, takes his post in front of battalion and commands: pass in review. squads right, march. major and staff execute eyes right and take post on right of reviewing officer remaining until battalion has passed, when he salutes and rejoins it. double time is given by major when the battalion comes to its original starting place and the battalion passes in review as before except that eyes right is omitted and major salutes only when he leaves reviewing officer. major and staff may be dismounted at discretion of commanding officer. battalion parade. when band sounds off, the reviewing officer and his staff stands, if dismounted, with arms folded: if mounted they remain at attention at a convenient distance in front of the center and facing the battalion. the battalion is not presented for battalion parade. the lieutenants take posts in front of center of their platoons at captain's command for dressing his company on the line. after guides posts, the adjutant commands: (to battalion) parade rest. (to band) sound off. battalion, attention. present arms. at conclusion of national anthem adjutant reports: sir: the parade is formed. the major directs: _take your post, sir_. major then commands: _order arms_. at conclusion of manual of arms, major directs: _receive the reports, sir_. captains report "'c' company present or accounted for," or "'c' company, officer, enlisted men are absent." publish the orders, sir: after publishing them, adjutant commands: officers, center, march. at command center, officers face center: at command march, march to center and halt, facing front. commands forward and halt are given by senior officer. left officer of center company is guide and marches on the major. halt at paces from major, salute and come down with the major. at command officers posts, march, officers face about at command "posts" and are conducted by senior officer who halts them paces from line. officers, halt. posts, march. face outward at command, posts, step off with pace intervals. lieutenants go to their posts by shortest route, in rear of company. regimental parade. lieutenants remain in file closers. at command, officers center, captains remain at their posts with their companies. regimental review. regiment formed in line or line of masses. colonel commands: pass in review. each major commands: , _squads right_; , _march_. if in line of masses, colonel commands: "pass in review." major of right battalion commands: _column of squads, first company squads, right, march_. fire direction is the function of the captain and higher commanders. above the grade of captain and direction is principally tactical. with a captain it implies the ability to issue correct fire orders to meet given situations in order that the fire of the company may be as effective as possible. fire control is the combined product of the fire unit commanders and the firers. the fire unit is the platoon. fire discipline means strict attention to the signals and orders of the commander, and is the faculty developed in the men by instruction and training, of commencing, ceasing, or diminishing fire, or of concentrating it upon a defined object in obedience to the deliberate will of the commander. note.--it is to be remembered that all grades of commanders are supposed to be familiar with the duties of all below them. in issuing orders all officers, in addition to announcing where they will be found will give the location of the next higher commander. the authorities for statements under the platoon leader and below are not given after each statement but the paragraphs from which they are deduced are given under the heading for each grade. this course was thought necessary to avoid repetition. i. the colonel. position--( , , --i.d.r.) . advancing to the battlefield: as (a) independent commander ordinarily with the advance guard in order that he may: . receive information promptly. . personally see the situation (reconnoiter). . order the deployment. . begin the action strictly in accordance with his own wishes. (b) subordinate commander ( , i.d.r.). after receiving his order for the action, precedes his command as far as possible in order to: . personally reconnoiter the ground. . be prepared to issue his orders promptly. note--for a discussion of the position of leaders see subject v. . during the action; such as will enable him to: (a) observe the progress of events. (b) receive and transmit messages and orders. (c) be in constant, direct, and easy communication with the reserve. ( , i.d.r.) duties: a. after having received his orders, the regimental commander leads his regiment forward in a column, or in line of columns, until the time arrives for issuing the regimental order, he then: ( , i.d.r.) b. assigns targets and sectors or tasks to battalions and special units. ( , and , i.d.r.) c. provides for necessary reconnaissance to front and flank. ( , i.d.r.) d. announces his position and also that of the next higher commander. e. controls the reserve as the tactical situation demands. ( , i.d.r.) f. regulates ammunition supply. ( , f.s.r. and , i.d.r.) see also full discussion of the ammunition supply in subject viii. note--the colonel is assisted in the performance of his duties by the regimental staff. ii. the major. the battalion is the attack unit whether acting alone or as part of a larger force. ( , i.d.r.) position: (the general rules for a colonel apply) . where he can best: a. direct the reinforcing of the firing line from the support. ( , i.d.r.) b. observe the progress of events, ( , i.d.r.) c. maintain contact with regimental headquarters. ( , i.d.r.) . on the firing line when all the supports have joined. ( , i.d.r.) (see subject v.) general. duties: . conducts his battalion according to sector and mission assigned him. . directs first disposition of battalion by tactical orders, giving subordinates-- a. information of the enemy. b. position of supporting and neighboring troops. c. the general object to be attained. d. the special problem for each company ( , i.d.r.) (this includes making the primary apportionment of the target.) ( , i.d.r.) e. if practicable, the point or time at which the fire fight is to open. ( , i.d.r.) f. orders for flank protection and reconnaissance, unless specifically provided for by higher authority. ( , and , i.d.r.) g. his position and that of the next higher commander. . controls supports, dispatches reinforcements from support to firing line. ( and , i.d.r.) . controls subsequent movements by suitable orders or commands. ( , i.d.r.) . regulates ammunition supply--(see subject viii, also pars. - , f.s.r.) (the combat train is the immediate reserve supply of the battalion.) a. is responsible for the proper use of the combat train. b. insures maintenance of the prescribed allowance at all times. c. causes combat trains to march immediately in rear of the battalion unless directed otherwise. ( , i.d.r.) d. when battalion deployed on his own initiative, indicates whether extra ammunition shall be issued. ( , i.d.r.) e. when battalion deployed pursuant to orders from higher authority, causes issue of extra ammunition unless specifically ordered not to do so. ( , , i.d.r.) f. when combat wagons are emptied, directs them to proper rendezvous to be refilled. ( , i.d.r.) g. sees that combat wagons and belts of men are refilled as soon as possible after an engagement. ( , i.d.r.) . maintains contact with adjoining troops. ( i.d.r.) . may harmonize ranges used by the companies on the firing line. . determines when bayonets shall be fixed. ( , i.d.r.) . subject to orders from higher authority, determines the point from which the charge to be made. ( , i.d.r.) . orders the charge. ( , i.d.r.) special. . _in attack_: a. may select formation in which companies advance. ( , i.d.r.) b. designates-- . the direction of the objective. ( , i.d.r.) . the companies for the firing line. . the companies for the support. . the order and front of the companies in the firing line. . the right or left company of the firing line as the base company. . may indicate when the advance by rushes is to start. ( , i.d.r.) . _in defense_: a. describes front of each company. ( , i.d.r.) b. assigns sector of fire. ( , , i.d.r.) c. locates fire, communicating and cover trenches. d. directs preparation of obstacles. e. assigns companies to construct trenches and obstacles. f. details troops to occupy trenches. ( , i.d.r.) g. causes firing line and supports to fix bayonets when a charge by the enemy is imminent. ( , i.d.r.) h. seeks opportunities for counter attacks. ( , i.d.r.) iii. battalion staff. positions: battalion adjutant } battalion sergeant major } with major. mounted orderlies--both with major (one with major and one with adjutant) until horses are sent to rear when both may be with the horses or one take the horses and the other remain with the major, as he may direct. duties: all assist the major in any way directed, by a. reconnaissance. ( , i.d.r., , f.s.r.) b. observation of the firing line. c. maintaining contact with regimental headquarters. d. maintaining contact with the support. e. receiving, communicating, and sending visual signals from and to front and rear. f. observing fire effect and progress of events. g. keeping copies of all orders, messages, and other data necessary, for his war diary. ( , f.s.r.) when there is only one range finder to the battalion, the battalion sergeant major is the battalion range taker. when not actually engaged in taking ranges, he assists the major as above or, preferably, he may be charged with the duty of maintaining communication with the companies of the firing line. the major designates a sergeant to take charge of the battalion combat train. under the major's direction, he a. conducts combat train as far to the front with the battalion as directed. b. issues ammunition to the battalion. c. takes combat train to rendezvous for refilling, under direction of the regimental commander. d. rejoins battalion, if it is not in action, or, if it be engaged, joins or establishes communication with the regimental reserve. ( , and , i.d.r.) (this sergeant is not provided for in the present organization. recommendation has been made to the war department that he be included in the tables of organization.) iv. the captain. (the fire director.) position: _where he can best:_ . control his four platoons. ( , i.d.r.) . observe fire effect. ( , i.d.r.) . see the major and platoon chiefs. ( , i.d.r.) duties: _before fire action:_ . conducts his company to place of deployment assigned by the major's orders ( , i.d.r.) in best manner. ( , i.d.r.) . designates target, and allots part to each platoon. ( and , i.d.r.) (see overlapping method, page , subject v. fire tactics.) . determines the range. ( and , i.d.r.) . announces the sight setting. } . indicates class of fire and } ( , i.d.r.) . time to open fire. } . informs the subordinates as to the location of the battalion commander, and, when necessary, announces his own position. _during the action:_ . observes fire effect. ( , , , i.d.r., and , s.a.f.m.) . corrects material errors in sight setting. ( , i.d.r.) . prevents exhaustion of ammunition supply. ( , , , i.d.r.) . distributes ammunition received from rear. ( , i.d.r.) . provides for the collection and distribution of the ammunition of the dead and wounded. ( , i.d.r.) . is on the alert for the major's signals or commands. ( and , i.d.r.) . in the absence of express directions from the major, if commanding a flank company, determines when advances by rushes shall be attempted. ( , i.d.r.) . indicates size of fractions to rush. ( , i.d.r.) . leads a rush by entire company. ( , i.d.r.) . leads the charge. ( , i.d.r.) . when necessary, designates new platoon leaders and sees that new squads are organized and new squad leaders designated to replace those disabled. ( , , i.d.r.) v. buglers. position: join the captain when the company deploys. ( , i.d.r.) duties: ( , i.d.r.) . _one bugler_-- a. observes the enemy. b. observes the target. c. observes for fire effect. d. watches platoon leaders for signals. e. transmits signals to platoon leaders. . _the other_-- a. watches the major for signals and repeats them back. b. transmits information to the major. . both-- a. repeat bugle signals "charge." ( , i.d.r.) b. carry field glasses, message pads, pencils and signal flags. (i.u.a.e.m., , i.d.r.) c. act as messengers. all of the above implies that they must be proficient in: a. signaling--hand, arm and letter codes. b. observation for fire effect. c. location and definition or description of targets. d. bugle calls. vi. range estimators. five or six officers or men, selected from the most accurate estimators in the company are designated "range finders." ( , i.d.r.) the term "range finder" is a misnomer as a range finder is an instrument. the school uses the term "range estimator" when applied to an individual. the attention of the war department has been called to this. the range estimators are given special training in the estimation of ranges. when an action is pending, the captain receives from the major the primary apportionment of the target or sector of fire. ( , i.d.r.) the captain returns to the company, and, avoiding dangerous grouping, assembles the platoon leaders and range estimators, and points out to both the target of the battalion and company. the range estimators immediately begin their estimation of the range to the company target; the captain meanwhile continues with his instructions to the platoon leaders. the instructions to the platoon leaders completed, the range estimators announce to the captain either their individual estimates, or the mean of their estimates as deduced by one of the estimators. the range estimators then take their customary posts ( , i.d.r.), and the captain indicates to the platoon leaders the range to be used. the range estimators act in an advisory capacity to the captain. the mean of their estimates will usually be the most accurate deduction available in battle. the adoption by the captain of the range thus determined, however, is not obligatory. range estimators should be ready to signal their estimates of the range to the platoon leaders at any time during the action. vii. the platoon leader. (the fire controller.) position: where he can best: . control the squads constituting his platoon. ( , i.d.r.) . observe the target and fire effect. ( , , , i.d.r., and , s.a.f.m.) . observe the captain for signals or commands. ( , , i.d.r.) duties: ( , , , , - , , - , , , , i.d.r.) controls the fire of his platoon and in his fire orders. . receives his orders from the company commander. . if necessary, may indicate the fire position that has been ordered. . announces sight setting. . points out designated target to his platoon, if practicable, otherwise to his corporals only, or . when the target cannot be seen, indicates an aiming target. ( and , i.d.r., call this an aiming "point", but the occasions upon which infantry would use an aiming "point" are so rare that it is believed aiming "target" is a more accurate term as it includes both point and line.) . assigns target so as to insure that the entire front or sector given him by the company commander will be covered with fire. . gives class of fire. . announces rate of fire. . if commanding a flank platoon, details a man to watch for signals from the combat patrols. . when his corporals have signaled that their squads are ready to fire, signals the captain by looking toward him and holding up his hand. . when captain signals a "commence firing", repeats same to the corporals. thereafter: . observes for fire effect. . when platoon is not firing, insures that the front assigned is kept under constant observation for any appearance of the enemy or any change of position. . changes sight-setting of his platoon when necessary. . regulates rate of fire. . increases rate of fire when large and distinct targets appear and decreases it when the target becomes small and indistinct. . prevents decrease in rate of fire when-- ( ) changing sight-setting, ( ) preparing for rushes, ( ) fixing bayonets, ( ) transmitting firing data to supports, ( ) distributing ammunition. . increases the rate of fire to cover the advance of adjacent units. for this purpose progress and movements of adjoining units are kept under observation. . maintains direction of advance of his platoon in rushing, so as not to blanket fire of adjacent units. . is on the alert for captain's commands or signals, for this purpose he may use his platoon guide. . may use his platoon guide to observe adjoining units. . must understand all signals. . leads his platoon in advancing and charging. . prevents changing fire to unauthorized targets. . insures distribution of ammunition brought up from the rear and the collection and distribution of same from the dead and wounded. ( , i.d.r.). . in coming up with re-enforcements, he takes over the duties of disabled platoon leaders of the platoon into which his men have dropped, or it may be some other section of the line needs his service in which case he goes there. . endeavors to preserve the integrity of squads, designates new squad leaders to replace those disabled, organizes new squads when necessary, sees that every man is placed in a squad and takes every opportunity for restoring order in the firing line. ( , , i.d.r.) . in "advance by thin lines", leads odd numbered lines. ( , i.d.r.). viii. the first sergeant. commands a platoon, never a guide. guides. general rules: . guides must be resourceful, have good health, vigorous physique, keen eyesight, presence of mind and courage, with good judgment, military training and experience. they must be able to read maps, make sketches and send clear and concise messages. . equipment.--guides are equipped with whistle, watch, compass, message book, knife, pencil, wire cutters, map, pace scale and glasses if possible. . as instructors they go where needed. . as file closers they insure steadiness and promptness in the ranks. . in column of subdivisions the guide of the leading subdivision is charged with the step and direction. close order.--the guides of the right and left, or leading and rear, platoons, are the right and left, or leading and rear guides respectively of the company when it is in line or in column of squads. other guides are in the line of file closers. in platoon movements the post of the platoon guide is at the head of the platoon, if the platoon is in column, and on the guiding flank if in line. when a platoon has two guides their original assignment to flanks of the platoon does not change. the guides of a column of squads place themselves on the flank opposite the file closers. to change the guides and file closers to the other flank, the captain commands: . _file closers on left (right) flank;_ . march. the file closers dart through the column; the captain and guides change. in column of squads, each rank preserves the alignment toward the side of the guide. men in the line of file closers do not execute the loadings or firings. guides and enlisted men in the line of file closers execute the manual of arms during the drill unless specially excused, when they remain at the order. during ceremonies they execute all movements. in taking intervals and distances.--unless otherwise directed, the right and left guides, at the first command, place themselves in the line of file closers, and with them take a distance of paces from the rear rank. in taking intervals, at the command "march", the file closers face to the flank and each steps off with the file nearest him. in _assembling_ the guides and file closers resume their places in line. to form the company.--at the sounding of the assembly the first sergeant takes position paces in front of where the center of the company is to be, faces it, draws saber, and commands "fall in". the right guide of the company places himself, facing to the front, where the right of the company is to rest, and at such point that the center of the company will be paces from and opposite the first sergeant; the squads form in their proper places on the left of the right guide, superintended by the other sergeants, who then take their posts. for the instruction of platoon leaders and guides, the company, when small, may be formed in single rank. in this formation close order movements only are executed. the single rank executes all movements as explained for the front rank of the company. alignments.--the alignments are executed as prescribed in the school of the squad, the guide being established instead of the flank file. the rear-rank man of the flank file keeps his head and eyes to the front and covers his file leader. at each alignment the captain places himself in prolongation of the line, paces from and facing the flank toward which the dress is made, verifies the alignment and commands: "front". platoon leaders take a like position when required to verify the alignments. in "company right" the right guide steps back on the command "march", aligning the first two men next to him as he does so, to establish the correct line. in "platoon right" the captain announces the guide and the guides cover promptly. in "right turn" the right guide is the pivot of the front rank. in "column right" the right flank man of the leading squad is the pivot, _not the guide_. in "right by squads" the right guide (when he has posted himself in front of the right squad) takes four short steps and then resumes the full step. the right squad conforms. "squads right about." if the company or platoons are in column of squads, file closers turn about toward the column and take posts. if in line, each darts through the nearest interval between squads. the right and left guides place themselves in the new front rank. file closers on facing about, maintain their relative positions. when the company executes "about face", guides place themselves in the new front rank. in "right front into line, double time" halting and aligning commands are omitted. guide is toward side of the first unit. in "take interval" or "take distance" guides drop back at the first command. in "squads right" or "platoons, column right" interior guides of platoons cross the company. a good rule for beginners is always to cross over (except in "column right"). guide of a company in line is right (unless otherwise announced). guide of a platoon in line is right. guide of a battalion in line is center. guide of a line of subdivisions is center. guide of a deployed line is center. guide of a squad is toward the side of the guide of the company. guide of successive formations into line is toward the point of rest. file closers remain on the same side of the company except when in so doing they would be left in front of the company. if the battalion is in line, the guide away from the point of rest (in each company) comes to the "right shoulder arms" at the command to dress. at the command "eyes right", guides who are charged with the direction do not execute "eyes right", but simply salute. at "retreat" guides unarmed stand at "attention". only officers salute. in "stack arms" the right guide should align the stacks. in squads (acting alone) the corporal is the guide; number of the front rank, if the corporal is not in line. the guides of rear units are charged with the step, trace and distance. exercise for guides.--lay out a course of arbitrary distance; yards will answer the purpose. instruct the guides to march the course as they would if they were guiding a company, but being sure to count their steps (a pebble transferred to the left hand at steps is often found useful). result.--the number of steps will range from to . after getting the number of steps taken by each man, show them that they should have taken steps and that each man took too long a step. have them march back guiding on two points in line as before, cautioning them to cut down the length of the step to inches from the start, and not to wait until they get half way down the course and find that they have less than steps. result.--all of the men, even after the caution, will have taken too long a step. instructor times the guides both ways, and calls attention to the fact that in all cases the cadence was under steps per minute. after repeating above as much as desired have the men march in pairs, one man keeping time and the other counting steps and marching on two points. they may check up every seconds if desired. ix. platoon guides. position: . behind the firing line, on left of platoon leader. ( , i.d.r.) . advancing in line--behind center of platoon. ( and , i.d.r.) to insure prompt and orderly advance. . "advance by thin lines"--lead even numbered lines. ( , i.d.r.) . advancing in squad or platoon column--in rear. duties: ( , , , , , , , and , i.d.r.) . the platoon leader's assistant and may be assigned any duty the platoon leader sees fit. . keeps adjoining units under observation. . watches firing line. . checks every breach of fire discipline. . prevents skulking, men leaving the ranks at any time to care for wounded, etc. . designates new squad leaders and organizes new squads when necessary. . attaches men that have become separated from squads to other squads. . insures prompt and orderly advance. . on joining firing line from the support takes over duties of sergeants disabled. . may receive and transmit signals to the captain. . if the platoon leader is disabled, he takes over his duties. hence he should know what the platoon leader is doing and how. . when taking over the duties of the platoon leader he calls the senior corporal of his platoon out to act as guide. x. corporal. position: . marching in line, as center skirmisher of squad ( , i.d.r.) or . when skirmish line is halted, immediately behind his squad. note.--the school has recommended to the war department that the infantry drill regulations be changed to provide that the corporal's position be as prescribed above and in paragraph , page . duties: paragraphs , , , , , , and , i.d.r., cover in general the corporal's duties. the squad leader (corporal) controls the fire of his squad, he must understand the duties of the private and in issuing his fire orders: . receives his instructions from the platoon leader. . points out indicated objective to his squad. . takes as the squad target that portion of the platoon target which corresponds to the position of the squad in the platoon. . announces sight setting. . announces class and rate of fire. . when his squad is ready to fire looks toward the platoon leader and holds up his hand. at the platoon leader's signal to commence firing he sees that the squad opens fire. thereafter: . makes all fire from the shoulder. . makes all use ordered rate of fire. . insures that all fire at designated objective. . prevents slighting of invisible portions of the target for more visible parts. . prevents men from changing fire to unauthorized targets not in the assigned front or sector. . maintains constant observation to the front; when squad is firing, for effect of fire--when squad is not firing, for appearance of enemy. . insures prompt obedience to orders to suspend and cease firing. . makes men utilize ground to fullest extent for concealment in firing and advancing. . in sight-setting, changing sights and fixing bayonets, has front rank perform operation first (rear-rank men increasing rate of fire) and then the rear-rank follow while the front-rank men make up for loss of fire for the rear rank, thus insuring that the rate of fire for the squad does not fall off. . prevents increasing vulnerability of squad while preparing for a rush, and rushes as soon after cease firing as possible. . when other squads of his platoon, are rushing, or the platoon which is covering the same target as is his platoon, is rushing he has his squad increase its rate of fire to make up for lost fire effect of the rushing element. . in rushing causes men to spring to feet running at full speed, all men to drop to the ground at the same time, and those who are in rear to crawl up to the line. . when re-enforcing the firing line, takes over the duties of disabled squad leaders. for this purpose his squad may drop into line at one place and he may move to the next squad on the right or left where there is a squad leader needed. if there are no vacancies caused by disabled squad leaders, he drops into line and assists the squad leaders who are there. . prevents decreasing rate of fire when men are transmitting data to arriving supports. . prevents wasting of ammunition. . prevents use of rounds in right pocket section of belts except on order of an officer. . distributes ammunition of dead and wounded and ammunition brought up from the rear. . prevents decreasing the rate of fire while ammunition is being distributed. . looks to the rear only at his platoon leader's whistle "attention." pays no attention to any other except suspend firing. . takes his position in rear of his squad when it is firing and remains there, where he can control its fire, and only crawls into line and adds his rifle when all control is lost. (short ranges.) . to control his squad he does not walk up and down behind his squad but rolls along behind his line and keeps down. . leads his squad in moving to the front or rear. . must know thoroughly the drill regulation signals and have a good practical knowledge of the theory of fire. . in rushing, maintains the direction of advance of his squad so as not to blanket the fire of squads in his rear. . takes advantage of every lull in the action and every favorable opportunity to reorganize his squad and get it more under control. . checks every breach of fire discipline, abates excitement, and prevents any man from leaving the squad to go to the rear for any purpose whatsoever. . if called out of line to act as guide, notifies designated private ( , i.d.r.) to take command of squad. xi. the private. position: deployed in line: one man per yard ( , i.d.r.), unless a greater extension is directed in the order for deployment. ( , i.d.r.) duties: ( , , , , , , , , - , , , , , , , , , , , i.d.r., and , s.a.f.m.) the individual soldier must be trained: . to recognize targets from description quickly. . to describe and define targets. . to use rear sight in describing targets. . to use horizontal and vertical clock systems, singly or in combination in describing target. . to set sights quickly and accurately as ordered. . to bring piece to shoulder, aim carefully and deliberately from habit, and to reload quickly. . to fire at the ordered rate. (par. , standard for field firing.) . to fire at the part of the designated objective which corresponds to his position in the firing line. . to continue firing in the designated sector and not to change therefrom unless ordered. . not to slight invisible parts of the target for more visible ones. . to maintain constant observation to the front. . to utilize folds of ground for concealment in advancing and firing. . to select firing positions. . to understand effects of visibility and the selection of backgrounds. . to fire from all positions, from behind hillocks, trees, heaps of earth and rocks, depressions, gullies, ditches, doorways and windows. . to obey promptly orders to suspend and cease firing. . to ignore whistle signals, except suspend firing. . to watch closely for the expected target after having suspended firing. . to obey promptly all orders from his squad leader. . to drop into the nearest interval when reinforcing the firing line and obey the orders of the nearest squad leader. . to transmit firing data to men of the supports coming into the line rapidly and accurately, without decreasing his rate of fire. . to call for range and target when reinforcing the firing line. . to have confidence in his own ability to hit. . to a system of sight setting and fixing bayonets in order that there may be no cessation of fire in the unit during this operation. . to prepare for rushes without decreasing fire of the unit unduly. . to avoid unnecessary movement in preparing for rushes. . to spring forward at command "rush" or "follow me" without preliminary rising. . to avoid bunching in rushing. . not to swerve to the right or left in search of cover but to advance in a straight line, in order not to blanket the fire of men in his rear. . to drop quickly at end of rush and crawl up to line if in rear of it. . to remain with his own company, but if he accidentally becomes detached from his company or squad to join the nearest one. . to maintain silence except when transmitting or receiving firing data and charging. . to retain presence of mind. . to be careful not to waste ammunition. . to use the thirty rounds of ammunition in the right pocket section of the belt only upon the order of an officer. . to remain with the firing line after bringing up ammunition. . to utilize ammunition of dead and wounded. . never to attempt to care for dead or wounded during the action. . to have confidence in his ability to use the bayonet. . to a firm determination to close with the enemy. . to preserve the line in charging. . to understand that a charge should be slow and steady (the faster men must not run away from the slower ones). . to form up immediately after the charge and follow the enemy with fire, not attempting a disorganized pursuit. . to understand that it is suicidal to turn his back to an enemy and that, if he cannot advance, he must intrench and hold on until dark. . to count distant groups of object or beings. . to recognize service targets. . never to fire until he understands what the target is, at what part he is to fire, and with what sight setting. packs. instructions for assembling the infantry equipment, model of . . the cartridge belt.--(a) to assemble the belt. place the adjusting strap on the ground, eyeleted edge to the front; place the pocket sections on the ground in prolongation of the adjusting strap, pockets down, tops of pockets to the front; insert end of adjusting strap in outer loop of metal guide, from the upper side, carry it under the middle bar and up through the inner loop; engage the wire hook on the end of adjusting strap in the eyelets; provided on the inner surface of the belt. (b) to adjust the belt. adjust the belt to fit loosely about the waist--i.e., so that when buckled it may rest well down over the hip bones on the sides of the body and below the pit of the abdomen in front. care should be taken that the adjustment be made equally from both ends of the adjusting strap, so that the center eyelet will be in the middle of the belt. (c) to fill the belt. unsnap the flap of the pocket and the interior retaining strap; lay the retaining strap out flat in prolongation of the pocket, insert a clip of cartridges, points of bullets up, in front of the retaining strap; press down until the base of the clip rests on the bottom of the pocket; pass the retaining strap over the bullet points and fasten it to the outside of the pocket by means of the fastener provided; insert a second clip of cartridges, points of bullets down, in rear of the first clip; press down until the points of the bullets rest on the bottom of the pocket; close the flap of the pocket and fasten by means of the fastener provided. the remaining nine pockets are filled in like manner. . to attach the first-aid pouch.--attach the pouch under the second pocket of the right section of the belt by inserting one hook of the double-hook attachment in the eyelet, from the inside of the belt; pinch the base of the pocket, bringing eyelets close together, and insert the other hook in the same manner in the adjoining eyelet. place the first-aid packet in the pouch and secure the cover. . to attach the canteen cover.--attach the canteen cover to the belt under the rear pocket of the right section in the same manner as the first-aid pouch. place the canteen and cup (assembled) in the cover and secure the flaps. . to attach the pack carrier to the haversack.--spread the haversack on the ground, inner side down, outer flap to the front (fig. ); place the buttonholed edge of the pack carrier on the buttonholed edge of the haversack, lettered side of carrier up; buttonholes of carrier superimposed upon the corresponding ones of the haversack; lace the carrier to the haversack by passing the ends of the coupling strap down through the corresponding buttonholes of the carrier and haversack nearest the center of the carrier, bringing the ends up through the next buttonholes and continuing to the right and left, respectively, to the sides. . to attach the cartridge belt to the haversack.--place the haversack and pack carrier (assembled) on the ground, inner side down (fig. ); place the cartridge belt, pockets down, tops to the front, along the junction of the haversack and carrier; insert hook on rear of belt suspender in the center eyelet of the adjusting strap, so that the end of the hook will be on the outside of the belt; insert hooks on ends of front belt suspenders in the eyelets between the second and third pockets from the outer ends of the belt, so that the end of the hooks will be on the outside of the belt. . to attach the bayonet scabbard to the haversack.--attach the scabbard by passing its lower end through the loop provided on the side of the haversack body, then engage the double-hook attachment in the eyelets on the outer flap on the haversack, inserting the hooks from the inside. place the bayonet in the scabbard. . to attach the intrenching tool carrier to the haversack.--fold the outer flap of the haversack over so that the meat-can pouch is uppermost; pass the intrenching tool carrier underneath the meat-can pouch and engage the double-hook attachment in the eyelets in the flap provided, inserting the hooks from the underside. place the intrenching tool in the carrier and secure. place the meat-can, knife, fork, and spoon in the meat-can pouch. the equipment is now assembled and is never disassembled except to detach the pack carrier and its contents as hereinafter provided for. to assemble the full equipment. (_with rations._) place the assembled equipment on the ground, suspender side of haversack down, pockets of cartridge belt up, haversack spread out, inside flap and pack carrier extended their full length to the rear (fig. ). place three cartons of hard bread in the center of the haversack body, the lower one on the line of attachment of the inside flap; lay the remaining carton of hard bread, the condiment can and the bacon can on the top of these, the condiment can and the bacon can at the bottom, top of the bacon can to the front; the socks and toilet articles are rolled, towel on the outside, into a bundle of the same approximate dimensions as a carton of hard bread, and are placed in front of the two rows thus formed. the inside flap of the haversack is folded over these articles, the end of the flap being turned in so that the flap, thus shortened, extends about inches beyond the top of the upper row; the sides of the haversack are folded over the sides of the rows; the upper binding straps are passed through the loops on the outside of the inside flap, each strap through the loop opposite the point of its attachment to the haversack body, and fastened by means of the buckle on the opposite side, the strap being passed through the opening in the buckle next to its attachment, over the center bar, and back through the opening of the buckle away from its attachment; the strap is pulled tight to make the fastening secure; the outer flap of the haversack is folded over and fastened by means of the lower haversack binding strap and the buckle on the inside of the outer flap; the strap is pulled tight, drawing the outer flap snugly over the filled haversack. the haversack is now packed and the carrier is ready for the reception of the pack (fig. ). if one haversack ration and one emergency ration are carried in lieu of two haversack rations, the haversack is packed in the manner described above, except that two cartons of hard bread and the bacon can form the bottom layer, the bacon can on the bottom; the condiment can, the emergency ration, and the toilet articles form the top layer. if one emergency ration is carried in addition to the two haversack rations, it is packed on top of the top layer. to make the pack (fig. ).--spread the shelter half on the ground and fold in the triangular ends, forming an approximate square from the half, the guy on the inside; fold the poncho once across its shortest dimension, then twice across its longest dimension, and lay it in the center of the shelter half; fold the blanket as described for the poncho and place it on the latter; place the shelter tent pins in the folds of the blanket, in the center and across the shortest dimension; fold the edges of the shelter half snugly over the blanket and poncho and, beginning on either of the short sides, roll tightly and compactly. this forms the pack. to assemble the pack (fig. ).--place the pack in the pack carrier and grasp the lower suspension rings, one in each hand; place the right knee against the bottom of the roll; pull the carrier down and force the pack up close against the bottom of the packed haversack; without removing the knee, pass the lower carrier binding strap over the pack and secure it by means of the opposite buckle; in a similar manner secure the lower haversack binding strap and then the upper carrier binding strap. engage the snap hook on the pack suspenders in the lower suspension rings. the equipment is now assembled and packed as prescribed for the full equipment. to assemble the full equipment. (_without rations._) place the assembled equipment on the ground as heretofore described; fold up the inside flap of the haversack so that its end will be on a line with the top of the haversack body; fold up the lower haversack strap in the same manner. to make up the pack.--fold the poncho, blanket and shelter half, and make up the pack as heretofore prescribed, except that the condiment and bacon can (the former inside the latter) and the toilet articles and socks are rolled in the pack. in this case the pack is rolled, beginning on either of the long sides instead of the short sides, as heretofore described. to assemble the pack.--place the pack on the haversack and pack carrier, its upper end on a line with the upper edge of the haversack body; bind it to the haversack and carrier by means of the haversack and pack binding straps; fold down the outer flap on the haversack and secure it by means of the free end of the middle haversack banding strap and the buckle provided on the underside of the flap; engage the snap hooks of the pack suspenders in the lower suspension rings. the equipment is now packed and assembled (fig. ). to adjust the equipment to the soldier.--put on the equipment, slipping the arms one at a time through the pack suspenders as through the sleeves of a coat; by means of the adjusting buckles on the belt suspenders, raise or lower the belt until it rests well down over the hip bones on the sides and below the pit of the abdomen in front; raise or lower it in rear until the adjusting strap lies smoothly across the small of the back; by means of the adjusting buckles on the pack suspenders, raise or lower the load on the back until the top of the haversack is on a level with the top of the shoulders, the pack suspenders, from their point of attachment to the haversack to the line of tangency with the shoulder, being horizontal. _the latter is absolutely essential to the proper adjustment of the load_. the position of the belt is the same whether filled or empty. to assemble the full equipment less the pack. (_with rations._) (fig. .) detach the carrier from, the haversack; place the rest of the equipment on the ground as heretofore described; place the four cartons of hard bread, the bacon can, the condiment can, and the toilet articles in one row in the middle of the haversack body, the toilet articles at the top, the bacon can at the bottom, top to the front, the row extending from top to bottom of the haversack; fold the inside flap over the row thus formed; fold the sides of the haversack up and over; pass the three haversack binding straps through the loops on the inside flap and secure by means of the buckles on the opposite side of the haversack; pass the lower haversack binding strap through the small buttonhole in the lower edge of the haversack, fold the outer flap of the haversack over the whole and secure by means of the buckle on its underside and the lower haversack binding strap. pass the haversack suspension rings through the contiguous buttonholes in the lower edge of the haversack and engage the snap hooks on the ends of the pack suspenders. if one haversack ration and one emergency ration are carried in lieu of two haversack rations, the haversack is packed in the manner described above, except that one emergency ration is substituted for two of the cartons of hard bread. if one emergency ration is carried in addition to the two haversack rations, it is packed on top of the layer. to assemble the full equipment less the pack. (_without rations._) detach the carrier from the haversack; place the rest of the equipment on the ground as heretofore described; fold up the inside flap of the haversack until its upper end is on a line with the top of the haversack body; fold the sides of the haversack over, pass the three haversack binding straps through the loops on the inside flap and secure by means of the buckles on the opposite side of the haversack; pass the lower haversack binding strap through the small buttonhole in the lower edge of the haversack; place the condiment and bacon can (the former inside the latter) and the toilet articles and socks in the bottom of the pouch thus formed; fold the outer flap of the haversack over the whole and secure by means of the buckle on its underside and the lower haversack binding strap. pass the haversack suspension rings through the contiguous buttonholes in the lower edge of the haversack and engage the snap hooks on the ends of the pack suspenders. to adjust the equipment to the soldier.--put on the equipment as prescribed for the full equipment. adjust the cartridge belt as prescribed for the full equipment. adjust the pack suspenders so that the top of the haversack is on a level with the top of the shoulders. to discard the pack without removing the equipment from the body. unsnap the pack suspenders from the suspension rings and snap them into the eyelets on top of the belt and in rear of the rear pockets of the right and left pocket sections; support the bottom of the pack with the left hand and with the right hand grasp the coupling strap at its middle and withdraw first one end, then the other; press down gently on the pack with both hands and remove it. when the pack has been removed, lace the coupling strap into the buttonholes along the upper edge of the carrier. adjust the pack suspenders. for illustration of how packs are made up and carried, see privates' manual, chapter . care of equipment. leather.-- . keep leather clean. use material furnished by ordnance department, or castile soap and water. . oil leather frequently to keep it pliable. use neatsfoot oil, viscol or harness soap. . dry in the shade; never in the sun or in artificial heat. always store in a cool, dry place without artificial heat. shoe polishes are almost always injurious. woolen clothes.--wash in tepid or cold water with a non-alkaline soap; do not wring it out; dry in the shade. mending.--always keep equipment ready for use. cloth equipment.--dry cleaning.--scrub with a stiff brush frequently. washing.--only under the direction of an officer. dissolve piece of q.m. soap (not yellow), in cups of water. one cup will clean the equipment of one man. apply with a brush and lather well. rub soap directly on persistent spots. wash off in cold water and dry in the shade. instructions on making packs. four methods: full equipment with rations. full equipment without rations. full equipment less pack, with rations. full equipment less pack, without rations. haversack, weight - / carrier cartridge belt, canteen, weight - / suspenders mess rations weight - / mess pouch gun clothing ------- adjusting cartridge belt.-- . fits loosely around waist. . resting on hips. . hole between buckles. insert ammunition: first, clip in front, points up, fastened with retaining strap, second clip points down. first aid pouch under th pocket, left. canteen under rear pocket, right. bayonet between rd and th pocket, left. (new bayonet scabbard fastens on haversack.) distribution of intrenching tools in the squads. no. rear of each odd-numbered squad ... bolo no. rear of each even-numbered squad ... hand axe. no. rear of each squad ... pick mattock. nos. , and front of each squad ... shovels no. rear of each squad ... wire cutter. chapter . physical training. only the carefully trained and conditioned man can make victory possible. for this reason the first and most important concern of a nation at war is the physical training of its soldiers. the setting-up exercises are the basis for all other activities and their disciplinary value is almost as great as their physical value. physical training.--each period should include exercises for all parts of the body. following the setting-up exercises the following should be given in the order named: marching, jumping, double timing, gymnastic contests, and concluding or restorative exercises. rifle exercises have for their purpose the development of "handiness" with the piece. they should be used moderately and with frequent rests, for they develop big muscles at the expense of agility--a muscle bound man cannot use his strength. bayonet training in addition to its military value calls into play every muscle of the body and makes for alertness, agility, quick perception, decision, aggressiveness and confidence. time schedule. a.m. (begins / hour p.m. (end / hour after breakfast): before retreat): . disciplinary exercises, . bayonet training, minutes. minutes. . starting positions, . games and contests, minute. minutes. . setting up exercises, alternating daily with: minutes. . bombing practice, . marching and marching minutes. exercises, to . conditioning exercises, minutes. minutes. . jumping, to minutes. double timing. . double timing, minutes vaulting and overcoming obstacles. . rifle practice, minutes. instructions must be: . an inspiration to the men. . well prepared themselves. . stripped for action. . an example to the men. . must make drill attractive. . never have men overdo. temper the exercises to the endurance of the weakest man. . accompany every exercise with the proper breathing. . see that the men are clothed according to the season. . have the drills short and snappy. . have frequent rests at the beginning--less frequent as work progresses. the platoon is the best unit for physical drills. formations.--when exercising in small squads, the men "fall in" in a single rank and, after having "counted off" by fours, threes or twos, as the instructor may direct, distance is taken at the command: take distance, march, squad halt. at "march" no. moves forward, being followed by the other numbers at intervals of four paces. halt is commanded when all have taken their distances. at the discretion of the instructor the distance may be any number of paces, the men being first cautioned to that effect. when distance is taken from the double rank, no. of the rear rank follows no. of the front rank, and he is in turn followed by the other numbers of the rear rank. if the instructor desires the files to cover, he commands: in file _cover_. nos. stand fast, the others moving to the right with the side step, until the nos. are covered. to return to the original formation, the instructor commands: assemble march. no. of the front rank stands fast and the other members move forward to their original places. _second formation._ to the right and left. take interval, march. _front rank:_ _rear rank:_ no. , steps right step. no. , steps right step. no. , steps right step. no. , stands fast. no. , stands fast. no. , steps left step. no. , steps left step. no. , steps left step. commands. kinds of commands, and how given.--there are two kinds, _preparatory_ and _executive_. the _preparatory command_ describes and specifies what is desired and the _executive command_ calls what has been described into action. the tone of the command should always be animated, distinct, and of a loudness proportioned to the number of men for whom it is intended. instructors should cultivate a proper command, as its value as a tributary to the success of any military drill cannot be overestimated. after an exercise has been described, its various movements or parts should be performed at _executive words_, which indicate not only the movement that is desired but the manner of the execution. thus: . trunk forward, . bend, . recover (or raise), here the word _bend_ is drawn to indicate moderately slow execution; the recovery being a little faster, the word _recover_ should be spoken to indicate it. the word recover should always be used to bring the men back to the original position. if it is desired to continue an exercise, the command exercise should be used and the cadence or rhythm should be indicated by words or numerals. if numerals are used, they should equal the number of movements composing the exercise. thus an exercise of two movements will be repeated at _one, two_; one of four movements will require four counts, etc. the numeral or word preceding the command halt should always be given with a rising inflection in order to prepare the men for the command halt. thus: . thrust arms forward, . exercise one, two, one, two, one, halt. if any movement of any exercise is to be performed with more energy than the others, the word or numeral corresponding to that movement should be emphasized. first lesson.--a. disciplinary exercises. . attention; . at ease; . rest; . facings. b. starting positions. (m.p.t., pp. to .) c. setting-up exercises (every exercise has two motions)[p]: . arms forward, . raise. swing arms downward and forward. . hands on hips, . place. rise on toes. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend head backward; same, forward. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. turn trunk right; same, left. ( .) . arms to thrust, . raise. half bend knees slowly. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend trunk forward. ( .) . arms to thrust, . raise. raise and lower shoulders. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend trunk sideward, right; same, left. ( .) . arms forward, . raise. stretch arms sideward. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend trunk backward. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. raise knees forward alternatingly. ( .) . breathing exercise: inhale, raising arms sideward; exhale, lowering arms. d. marching exercises: . marching in column in quick time and halting. . same, marking time, marching forward and halting. . same, marching on toes. [footnote p: note.--jumping and double-timing exercises and contests should not be included in the first week's work. bracketed numbers refer to pages in "manual of physical training," where similar exercises are illustrated and described.] second lesson.--a. disciplinary exercises. same as in first lesson. b. starting positions. c. setting-up exercises (every exercise has two motions): . arms forward, . raise. swing arms sideward. . hands on hips, . place. rise on toes. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. turn head right; same, left. ( .) . hands on shoulders, . place. turn trunk sideward, right; same, left. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. full bend knees, slowly. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend trunk forward. ( .) . arms to thrust, . raise. move shoulders forward and backward. ( .) . arms sideward, . raise. bend trunk sideward, right; same, left. ( .) . from attention. stretch arms forward and sideward. . hands on hips, . place. bend trunk backward. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. extend right and left leg forward. ( .) . breathing exercise: inhale, raising arms sideward and upward; exhale, lowering arms sideward. d. marching exercises: . marching in column in quick time, mark time, marching in quick time and halting. ( .) . marching on toes. ( .) . marching on toes and rocking. e. jumping exercises: . rise on toes and arms forward, raise. swing arms downward and bend knees; swing arms forward and extend knees, and recover attention. . jumping in place. ( .) f. double timing: . double timing, change to quick time and halting. ( .) g. concluding exercises: . breathing exercise, raising and lowering arms sideward. third lesson.--a disciplinary exercises, as in first lesson. b. starting positions. c. setting-up exercises: . arms forward, . raise. swing arms downward and sideward. ( motions.) . hands on hips, . place. rise on right and left toes, alternatingly. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend head forward and backward. ( motions.) ( .) . arms sideward, . raise. turn trunk right and left. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on hips, . place. rise on toes and full bend knees slowly. ( motions.) ( .) . fingers in rear of head, . place. bend trunk forward. ( motions.) ( .) . arms to thrust, . raise. move shoulders forward, upward, backward, and recover. ( motions.) . hands on shoulders, . place. bend trunk sideward, right, and left. ( motions.) ( .) . from attention. stretch arms sideward, upward, sideward, and recover. ( motions.) . hands on shoulders, . place. bend trunk backward. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on hips, place. extend right and left leg backward. ( motions.) . breathing exercise: inhale, raising arms forward, upward; and exhale, lowering arms sideward, down. d. marching exercises: . marching in quick time, raising knees. ( .) . thrusting arms sideward. e. jumping exercises: . standing broad jump. . three successive broad jumps. f. double timing: . double timing. ( .) . double timing, marking time in the double and forward. . double timing and halting from the double. g. gymnastic contests. two of these games should be included in each lesson. see pp. - . h. concluding exercises: . breathing exercise, as in . fourth lesson.--a. disciplinary exercises, as in first lesson. b. starting positions. c. setting-up exercises: . hands on shoulders, . place. extend arms forward; swing sideward, forward, and recover. ( motions.) . hands on hips, . place. rise on toes quickly. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on hips, . place. turn head right and left. ( motions.) ( .) . arms upward, . raise. turn trunk right and left. ( motions.) . hands on hips, . place. half bend knees, quickly. ( motions.) ( .) . arms sideward, . raise. bend trunk forward. ( motions.) . hands on shoulders, . place. move elbows forward, and stretch backward. ( motions.) ( .) . arms upward, . raise. bend trunk sideward, right and left. ( motions.) . from attention. stretch, arms forward, sideward, upward, sideward, forward, and recover. ( motions.) . arms sideward, . raise. bend trunk backward. ( motions.) . hands on hips, . place. extend legs sideward. ( motions.) . breathing exercise: . inhale, raising arms forward, upward; exhale, lowering arms sideward. d. marching exercises: . marching in quick time, raising knees, and rising on toes of other foot. . raising heels. . thrusting arms sideward. e. jumping exercises: . three successive standing broad jumps. . jumping in place, raising knees. f. double timing: . double timing. . raising heels. . double timing, sideward, crossing legs. g. gymnastic contests. h. concluding exercises: . swing arms forward, upward, relaxed. . breathing exercise, as in . fifth lesson.--a. disciplinary exercises. b. starting positions. c. setting-up exercises: . arms to thrust. thrust arms upward; swing downward; forward; upward, and recover. ( motions.) ( .) . hands in rear of head. rise on toes and rock. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on hips. bend head forward and backward. ( motions.) . hands on shoulders. turn trunk right and left, stretching arms sideward. ( motions.) ( .) . full bend knees. hands on ground between knees, squatting position, extend right and left leg backward, alternatingly. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on shoulders. bend trunk forward and stretch arms sideward. ( motions.) ( .) . from attention. curl shoulders forward and stretch backward. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on shoulders. bend trunk sideward, right and left, extending arms sideward. ( motions.) ( .) . from attention. flex forearms vertically; extend upward; flex and recover. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on shoulders. bend trunk backward, stretching arms sideward. ( motions.) ( .) . from attention. raise arms forward and extend leg forward; stretch arms sideward, extending leg backward; move arms and leg to first position and recover attention. ( motions.) ( .) . breathing exercise: raise arms sideward; upward; and lower laterally quickly. ( motions.) d. marching exercises: . march in quick time and swing extended leg forward, ankle high. . raising knee and hopping on other foot. . from arms forward. swing arms upward. e. jumping exercises: . standing hop, step and jump. . preliminary running broad jumps. . broad jump from a walking start of four paces. ( .) f. double timing. . double timing. . double timing sideward, crossing leg in front. . double timing, raising knees. g. gymnastic contests. h. concluding exercises: . bend trunk forward and backward, relaxed. . breathing exercise, as in . for further work for recruits and work to be given trained soldiers, see special regulation no. , "field physical training of the soldier." to prevent grumbling, keep men at work. idle men are the ones who growl. the french consider periods spent in the trenches as periods of rest; instead of letting the men go on pass when relieved, they restore discipline by close order drill. the physical benefit is less than half of physical exercises. there should be mental exertion in every exercise. but the most important part is the disciplinary benefit. the exercises must teach men to jump at commands, and by this means must make the organization a homogeneous mass. the principal thing in the position of attention is "chest lifted; and arched." there should be a stretch upward at the waist. the position should give the impression of a man as proud of himself as he can be. this is a bluff which works, not only by making a good first impression on others, but by causing the man himself to live up to it. insist on precision. especially when men are losing interest, don't let the work sag, but make it interesting by requiring concentration. at the beginning of each exercise, wake the men up by calling them to attention until they do it well, giving the facings, etc. commands.--there is a tone at which each voice carries best. each man must find it for himself. to make commands understood, enunciate carefully with lips and teeth. sound especially first and last letters of words. officer's posture adds to effect of command. his personality is impressed on his men largely by his voice. preparatory command should be vibrant and cheerful--not a harsh tone that grates on the men and antagonizes them. the command of execution must be short and sharp; drill can be made or marred by it. marching.--a cadence faster than a minute adds snap to marching, but snap can not be gained in proportion as the cadence is run up. snap is attained chiefly by the proper gait. soldiers should march, not with knees always slightly bent, but should straighten them smartly at the end of each step. this adds drive to the step, and gives the men confidence and a mob spirit of courage. after long drill at attention, this spirit can be carried into extended order work. marching exercises are useful and can be greatly varied. the command "exercise" should always be given as the left foot strikes the ground. "exercise" is a command of execution, and the first movement should be executed at once when it is given. the count "one" is given when this first position is reached. the command to stop all marching exercises is "quick time--march." in all exercises the instructor should cultivate the ability to pick mistakes. he can develop this until he can watch much larger groups than at first. voice culture. mastery of the voice is a necessity for every officer; for without it the giving of commands will soon make his throat look and feel like a piece of raw hamburg steak. quality of voice is more effective than quantity. brute force may produce a roar that has tremendous volume at a short distance; but the sound will not carry unless it is so placed that it gets the benefit of the resonance spaces in the head. if the tone is produced properly, so that it has the singing quality necessary in all right commands, quantity of tone will come of itself. this singing quality has nothing to do with music; it may be attained by a man who can hardly distinguish a bar of music from a bar of soap. it depends upon three principles, which are very simple in themselves but can not be applied without careful practise. the first covers proper use of the breath. air must be drawn into the lungs by expanding the diaphragm and abdomen, a process best seen in the natural breathing of a man who is lying on his back with all muscles relaxed. filling the upper part of the lungs by raising the chest puts the work on the comparatively small muscles between the ribs; but filling the base of the lungs by pulling downward brings into play the diaphragm, the largest muscle in the body. the sensation which accompanies proper deep control of the breath is as if the tone were not pushed out of the mouth, but drawn in and upwards. it is partly described by the phrases of singing teachers, "drawn tone" and "singing on the breath." the diaphragm must not only relieve the muscles between the ribs, but, still more important, the small muscles of the throat. the second great principle of voice production is that the throat must be perfectly relaxed. any tension there interferes with the free vibration which is essential for strong and resonant tone. this relaxation is most easily gained by drawing the chin in slightly, loosening the muscles under it. the base of the tongue can be relaxed by rolling the letter "r," even to the extent of making two syllables of such words as "gr-rand." talking with the teeth closed loosely will also help to ease incorrect, tension about the throat. if the throat is properly relaxed, there will be no sensation in it during the production of the voice. any sensation between the diaphragm and the resonance chambers of the head is a sign of wrong and harmful tension. the use of these resonance chambers is required by the third principle--that the tone must be reinforced by resonance in all the hollow spaces of the head. these are found in the nose, above the palate and even above the eyes. they have the same effect as the sounding board of a musical instrument, in giving quality to the tone. the best way to put this principle into practice is to learn the sensation of the clear and ringing tone which is produced by proper placing of the voice. exercises containing the letters "m" and "n" will give this effect. this does not mean that the sound should be nasal; it should be made in the nose, but not through it. another way to increase resonance is to think of crying the words rather than talking them. a slightly whining intonation or a sound like that of a laugh has more ring to it than an ordinary flat talking tone. these principles should not be neglected because they are simple. they can not be mastered without work, and unless they are mastered the voice will not be heard at a distance and will not last under the work of giving commands. further suggestions on the manner of giving commands will be found under physical training. chapter . use of modern arms. [illustration: plate # ] small arms firing. under this heading we have many phases of the training and exercises given to our armed forces. it has been found best to use simple every day methods to get the best results. there are two principal factors--the rifle and the pistol. the former only will be taken up now. the scheme is to make the soldier a good shot singly and collectively, in time of peace and in time of war. the course of instruction at this camp was arranged as follows: (a) nomenclature and care of the rifle. (b) sighting drills. (c) position and aiming drills. (d) deflection and aiming drills. (e) range practice. (f) estimating distance drill. (g) combat firing. (a) every man should be taught the names of the principal parts (see cut) of the rifle and how to clean and keep it clean. (b) if time permits, the sighting bar described on page , s.a.f.m. should be used. to illustrate the normal and peep sight make a drawing on a blackboard of page , s.a.f.m. using a sand bag or some convenient rest for the rifle. the instructor sights it on some object showing the normal and peep sight. using the above rests have a marker hold a disk against a large piece of paper towards which the rifle is pointed. there is a pin hole in the center of the bull's eye on the disk. the range should be about feet, and the bull's eye about inch in diameter. the marker moves it about until the man sighting tells him to "hold," at which time he marks the center with the point of a pencil. this is done three times, the three points are then connected. the triangle thus formed is then used by the instructor to show the man whether he took too much or too little front sight or whether he leaned to one side or the other while aiming. use for this exercise both the normal and peep sight. to show the effect of canting the piece use a sight setting of , yards, take out the bolt, aim the rifle while lying on a sand bag at a -inch bull's eye feet away. then look through the bore of the rifle and have the place where the target would be approximately hit by a bullet marked. cant the piece to the right and aim at the same bull's eye. then look through the bore of the rifle and mark the place where the bullet would approximately strike the target. the last mark would be lower and to the right of the first mark. it should be readily seen that in canting the piece to the right your sight is to the right of its original position--that is right windage. also by canting it to the right your elevation is lowered, that is, lessened. canting the piece to the left would make the bullet strike low and to the left. (c) preliminary command "position and aiming drill," command of execution "squad (platoon, or company) ready." at the command "ready" each man faces half right and carries the right foot about foot to the right, in such a position that will insure the greatest firmness and steadiness, raises the piece and drops it into the left hand at the balance, left thumb along the stock, muzzle at the height of the breast. if kneeling or sitting the position of the piece is similar--if kneeling the left forearm rests on the left thigh--if sitting the elbows are supported by the knees. if lying down the left hand steadies and supports the piece at the balance, the toe of the butt resting on the ground, the muzzle off the ground. from the position of ready the four exercises--position, aiming, trigger squeeze, and rapid fire--are given. these exercises given on pages - , s.a.f.m. should be carefully studied. do not leave it to the sergeant, etc., to do--give your company your own instruction when practicable, and in time of battle they will know you and you will know them, and there will grow up between you that mutual understanding which is necessary for the real success of any undertaking. do not forget to give these exercises in all positions of firing, namely, standing, sitting, kneeling, and prone. (d) a change of one point of windage at the yard range will change the point struck by the bullet of the next shot inches. if right windage is taken the bullet will strike to the right, if left windage is taken it will strike to the left: number of range. windage. direction. inches change. point right or left point right or left point right or left point right or left point right or left remember to take windage in the direction you want the bullet to strike. a change of yards in your sight setting raises or lowers the point struck by the bullet of the next shot at the yards range inch: number inches range. change in sight. change on target. yards yards yards yards yards yards yards (e) range practice. target details must be thoroughly familiar with paragraphs - , s.a.f.m. scorers must be familiar with the method of recording scores. the following schedule is the one that was followed at this camp: slow fire. =====+==========+=====+======+==========+====================+========== range| time |shots|target| position | sights |ammunition -----|----------|-----|------|----------|--------------------|---------- | no limit | | a | prone | leaf | guard | no limit | | a | kneeling | leaf | guard | no limit | | a | standing | leaf | guard | no limit | | a | prone | leaf, battles | service | no limit | | a | kneeling | leaf, battles | service | no limit | | a | prone | leaf, battles | service | no limit | | a | sitting | leaf, battles | service =====+==========+=====+======+==========+====================+========== rapid fire. =====+=========+=====+=======+========================+======+========== range| time |shots|target |position |sights|ammunition -----|---------|-----|-------|------------------------|------|---------- | min | | d | prone | leaf | service | min. | | h | prone | leaf | service | min. | | d | kneeling from standing | leaf | service | min. | | h | prone from standing | leaf | service | '- " | | d | prone from standing | leaf | service | '- " | | h | prone from standing | leaf | service =====+=========+=====+=======+========================+======+========== at each range with the rapid fire additional shots should be fired with the battle sight and with half the allotted time. (f) a course should be laid off in an open field. the base should be marked. at least natural objects whose distances are to be estimated should be placed so that they are clearly visible from the base. the objects should be men standing, kneeling or prone, and should be placed from to , yards from the base. each company should be conducted to the base and extended along it, backs towards the objects, in single rank. each man should have a pencil and paper. the objects whose distances are to be estimated are pointed out by the company commander and the men told to estimate and record their estimates. at the conclusion of the exercise, the company commander should read off the correct distances, and have each man figure his per cent of error. it is important that the men know the correct distances while the objects are still in view. for record, paragraph , s.a.f.m. should be followed. remember that there are four principal ways to estimate distances by: , it cannot be more than a certain distance, and it cannot be less than a certain distance--take the mean; , divide the distance into a certain number of familiar lengths; select a halfway point, estimate this and multiply by ; , estimate the distance along a parallel line, as a road having well defined objects; , take the mean of several estimates. (g) in combat the platoon is the fire unit. the fire of the company, battalion or regiment is nothing more than the combined fire of all the fire units. the enemy can be imaginary, outlined or represented. the exercise must be conducted under an assumed tactical situation. the commander must lead his men according to the assumptions made by the umpire. signals are used to indicate the enemy's actions, strength, etc. the situation should be simple, and after the exercise a critique should be held on the ground. combat practice with ball ammunition against disappearing targets, and at estimated ranges, gets excellent results. the officer conducting the exercise will prohibit the advance if it would be impossible were the enemy real. have every man play the game. a point to be remembered is that for battle sight the sight slide must be as far to the rear as it will go. if it is part way up the leaf, the drift correction cut in the slot upon which it moves will throw it to the left, and left windage will be taken. point blank range is yards. battle sight is set for this distance because this is the extreme range at which a bullet would strike a man kneeling between the rifle and the target. [illustration: plate # .] pistol. nomenclature and care.--the soldier is first taught the nomenclature of the parts of the pistol. ordinance pamphlet no. gives this information, (see cut of pistol.) manual for the pistol. . the pistol being in the holster: . raise, . pistol. at the command raise, unbutton the flap of the holster with the right hand and grasp the stock, back of hand outward. at the command pistol, draw the pistol from the holster, reverse it, muzzle up, the hand holding the stock with the thumb and last three fingers; forefinger outside of the guard; barrel to the rear, and inclined to the front at an angle of about thirty degrees; hand as high as the neck and six inches in front of the point of the right shoulder. this is the position of raise pistol, and it may be similarly taken from any position. . to withdraw magazine, pistol in any position: . withdraw. . magazine. at the command magazine, place pistol, barrel down, in left hand and clasp barrel in full grip of left hand, thumb clasped over barrel in front of trigger guard, butt of pistol up, barrel pointing to the left front and slightly downward. with tip of right forefinger press stud releasing magazine and then place tip of same finger under projection at front of magazine base. raise magazine about an inch then close thumb and second finger on sides of magazine, giving a secure grasp with which it can be withdrawn from socket, placed inside belt (in pocket of shirt or otherwise disposed of without throwing it away). right hand then grasps stock, back of hand to the left. . to open chamber, the pistol in any position: . open. . chamber. carry the pistol to the left hand (if not already there) barrel to the left, front end of slide grasped between the thumb and forefinger of left hand; right hand grasping stock, back of hand up; right thumb under slide stop. hold left hand steady and push forward with right hand till slide reaches end of stroke; engage slide stop, and come to raise pistol. should the pistol be cocked and locked, it will be unlocked so that the slide can move. . to close chamber, being at raise pistol, chamber open: . close. . chamber. at the command chamber, release slide top with right thumb and let hammer down gently. to let hammer down, pull downward with point of right thumb till hammer presses against grip safety and forces it home; then while continuing this pressure on hammer, pull trigger; and while continuing pull on trigger, let the hammer down. while letting hammer down, grasp stock firmly between the palm and last three fingers to prevent pistol rotating in hand. . to insert magazine, pistol being in any position, no magazine in socket: . insert. . magazine. lower pistol into left hand as in withdrawn magazine, grasp magazine with tip of right forefinger on projection at base of magazine, withdraw from pocket and insert in pistol. to make sure that magazine is home, strike base of magazine with palm of right hand. bring the pistol to the position of raise pistol. . to return pistol, being at raise pistol: . return. . pistol. lower the pistol and raise the flap of the holster with the right thumb; insert the pistol in the holster and push it down; button the flap with the right hand. if the pistol be loaded and cocked the command. . lock, . pistol must precede the command "return." . to load, having loaded magazine in pistol, pistol in any position, chamber empty: . load. . pistol. place pistol in left hand, barrel down, butt of pistol up, barrel pointing to left front and downward, slide grasped between thumb and forefinger. push forward with right hand until the slide is fully open, then release slide allowing it to move forward and load cartridge into chamber. come to raise pistol. if the last shot in the magazine has been fired, to reload; same command, but execute withdrawn magazine, insert magazine, close chamber. as soon as the pistol is loaded, it will be immediately locked by the commands. . lock. . pistol. should the command for locking pistol be inadvertently omitted it will be locked without command. . to unload pistol, being in any position, loaded: execute by the commands, withdraw magazine, open chamber, close chamber, insert magazine. . to inspect pistol, it being in the holster: . inspection. . pistol. execute, raise pistol. to inspect the pistol more minutely, add . withdraw. . magazine. . open. . chamber. to avoid accidents, individual men out of ranks, in barracks or camp will first withdraw magazine then open chamber whenever the pistol is removed from the holster for cleaning, for examination, or for any other purpose. accidental discharges will not occur if the above rule is always observed, and failure to observe it must be considered a military offense, whether or not accident results. . whenever men fall in ranks with the automatic pistol the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge will command: . raise, . pistol; . withdraw, . magazine; . open, . chamber; . close, . chamber. . insert, . magazine. . return, . pistol. when falling in the above commands are given after chamber of rifles have been opened and closed, and the order resumed--the rifle being held against the left wrist. the commander of any company or detachment thereof is responsible for giving the necessary commands to put the pistols in a safe condition. . the pistol with cartridge in chamber is habitually carried cocked and locked, whether in the hand or in the holster. the hammer will not be lowered while a cartridge is in the chamber. . in campaign, the pistol should habitually be carried with a magazine in the socket, loaded with seven ball cartridges, chamber empty, hammer down. the extra magazines should also be loaded with seven ball cartridges each. when action seems imminent, the pistol should be loaded by command. it may then be returned by command to the holster till the time for its use arrives. . recruits are first taught the motions of loading and firing without using cartridges. however, the automatic action and the effect of ball cartridges in operating the slide cannot be taught without firing ball cartridges. practice without cartridges is very necessary to acquire facility in the exact movements of the manual and in aiming, holding and trigger squeeze. to execute the movements without cartridges, first withdraw magazine, open chamber, and examine both pistols and magazines to assure that none contain ball cartridges. . all the movements in loading pistol should be practiced without looking at it. in order to do this successfully it is necessary to know exactly where the magazines are carried so the hand may find them without fumbling. also, since the projection at the front of the magazine base is on the same side as the bullets, and the magazine must be inserted in the socket with these to the front, the magazine should be carried in the pocket with the projection to the left and should be withdrawn from the pocket with the same grasp as is prescribed for withdrawn magazine. . this manual must be practiced with all the precision and exactness required for the manual for the rifle. accidents will be reduced to a minimum and familiarity with the pistol gained. position stand firmly on both feet, body perfectly balanced and erect and turned at such an angle as is most comfortable when the arm is extended toward the target; the feet far enough apart (about to inches) as to insure steadiness; weight of body borne equally upon both feet; right arm fully extended but not locked; left arm hanging naturally. the grip.--grasp the stock as high as possible with the thumb and last three fingers, the forefinger alongside the trigger guard, the thumb extended along the stock. the barrel hand and fore-arm should be as nearly in one line as possible when the weapon is pointed toward the target. the grasp should not be so tight as to cause tremors but should be firm enough to avoid losing grip. the lower the stock is grasped the greater will be the movement or jump of the muzzle caused by recoil. if the hand be placed so that the grasp is on one side of the stock, the recoil will cause a rotary movement of the weapon toward the opposite side. the releasing of the sear causes a slight movement of the muzzle, generally to the left. the position and pressure of the thumb along the stock overcomes much of this movement. to do uniform shooting the weapon must be held with exactly the same grip for each shot, not only must the hand grasp the stock at the same point for each shot, but the tension of the grip must be uniform. the trigger squeeze.--the trigger must be squeezed in the same manner as in rifle firing. the pressure of the forefinger on the trigger should be steadily increased and should be straight back, not sideways. the pressure should continue to that point beyond which the slightest movement will release the sear. then when the aim is true, the additional pressure is applied and the pistol fired. when the pistol is fired the greatest effort should be taken to hold the pistol to the mark as nearly as possible. this will be of great benefit in automatic firing. position and aiming drills.--the squad is formed with an interval of one pace between files. black pasters are used as aiming points. the pasters are ten paces distant from the squad. the instructor command, . raise, . pistol and cautions "position and aiming drill." the men take the position prescribed in paragraph . at the command, . squad, . fire, slowly extend the arm till it is nearly horizontal, the pistol directed at a point; about six inches below the bull's-eye. at the same time put the forefinger inside the trigger guard and gradually feel the trigger. inhale enough air to comfortably fill the lungs and gradually raise the piece until the line of sight is directed at the point of aim, _i.e._, just below the bull's-eye at six o'clock. while the sights are directed upon the mark, gradually increase the pressure on the trigger until it reaches that point where the slightest additional pressure will release the sear. then, when the aim is true, the additional pressure necessary to fire the piece is given so smoothly as not to derange the alignment of the sights. the weapon will be held on the mark for an instant after the hammer falls and the soldier will observe what effect, if any, the squeezing of the trigger has had on his aim. when the soldier has become proficient in taking the proper position the exercise is conducted "at will." quick fire.--being at the raise pistol, chamber and magazine empty, . quick fire exercise, . one. lower the forearm until it is nearly horizontal, pistol pointing at the target, . two. thrust the pistol forward to the position of aim, snapping the pistol just before the arm reaches its full extension. then look through sights to verify the pointing. . three. return to raise pistol and cock the pistol. in this exercise the soldier must keep his eyes fixed upon the mark. he should constantly practice pointing the pistol until he acquires the ability to direct it on the mark in the briefest interval of time and practically without the aid of the sights. in other words, the pistol in this exercise is accurately pointed instead of accurately aimed. in night firing pointing the pistol is the only method that can be used. after careful practice in this exercise it is surprising what good results can be obtained at night. this exercise should then be practiced from the position of the pistol in the holster instead of raise pistol. classes of fire: . slow fire.--as described above. target l or a or improvised target. . quick fire.--being at raise pistol, pistols locked, at the command "commence firing" fire and return to raise pistol after each shot following the principles of quick fire exercise. target e, five yards apart, one for each man firing. this firing should be done by the numbers as described in quick fire exercise. . automatic fire (target e).--being at raise pistol, pistols locked. at the command "commence firing" empty the magazine in seven seconds, keeping the arm extended. target e, yards apart, one for each man firing. . trench fire (target e).--two lines of targets. the first line is composed of f targets, yards apart, one figure for each man firing. the second line is composed of two e figures, one yard apart, for each man firing, placed in a trench immediately in rear of the figures of the first line. this gives for each firer a group of three figures, one placed on top at the near edge of the trench and the other two in the trench immediately in rear. in case a trench is not available the rifle pit can be used. a gutter, sunken road, embankment, or hedge can be used for this purpose so long as trench fire is simulated. [illustration: plate # . trench target course for the automatic pistol.] the firing line advances at a walk from yards takes up a double time yards from trench, fires one shot at the double time when within ten yards of the first target continues to the trench and fires the remaining six shots, automatic fire, at the two targets in the trench in rear of the first line target. score (target e, bobbing).--a score will be seven shots. targets will be marked after the men in the firing line have completed their scores. all loading and firing should be done by command. course: . slow fire.-- yards. minimum of one maximum of five scores. . quick fire.-- yards. minimum of one maximum of three scores. . automatic fire.-- yards. minimum of one maximum of three scores. . trench fire.--minimum of one maximum of three scores. bayonet training. a. the functions of bayonet training are: . to teach the correct use of the bayonet until it becomes instinctive. . to develop the fighting spirit. . to develop speed, accuracy, and coördination. b. general principles: . fencing, in modern combat, is out of the question. almost every fight will consist of but one or two motions. hence the class must be taught that the best defence is the quickest offensive. . every available means of offence, with hands and feet as well as with rifle and bayonet, is a part of bayonet training. . teamwork is essential. men must be taught, especially in the combat, to exercise, to seize every opportunity to act together. . personal control during combat, especially at night, will be nearly impossible. control should be practiced, therefore, in the form of clear instructions delivered to the men before assault, and fulfilled individually. . in every assault and combat exercise, the men must be taught never to leave an enemy alive, or who may be alive, behind them. c. technique of bayonet combat: . the _point_ is the main reliance. its use should be practiced in every possible situation, until a correct choice or combination of long point, short point, and jab, and the execution thereof, becomes a matter of instinct. . the point must always be directed at a definite target. the most vulnerable points of the body are: lower abdomen, base of the neck, small of the back (on either side of the spine), chest, and thighs. bony parts of the trunk must be avoided by accurate aim. . the use of the rifle as a club, swinging or striking, is valuable only: a. when the point is not available. b. in sudden encounters at close quarters, when a sharp butt swing to the crotch may catch an opponent unguarded. c. after parrying a swinging butt blow, when a butt strike to the jaw is often the quickest possible riposte. the use of butt swings overhead or sidewise to the head or neck, is to be avoided; they are slow, inaccurate, easily parried or side-stepped, and leave the whole body unguarded. after every butt blow a thrust must immediately follow, since no butt blow, of itself, is apt to be fatal. . the parries must be regarded and practiced chiefly as means of opening the opponent's guard; hence, a thrust must immediately follow each parry. . the foot movements shown in the old manual are useful only to promote quickness and steadiness. they should, therefore, be practiced in combination with the points and butt blows, and so combined can be executed in the oblique directions as well as at right angles. the left foot moves in the direction of the thrust. d. manual of the bayonet: there are only exercises to learn in the new bayonet drill: . _guard_.--point of the bayonet directed at the opponent's throat, the rifle held easily and naturally with both hands, barrel inclined slightly to the left, right hand at the height of the navel and grasping the small of the stock, left hand holding the rifle at a convenient position above the lower band, so that the left arm is slightly bent, making an angle of about degrees. the legs should be well separated and in an easy position. lean forward, on your toes, left knee slightly bent, right foot flat on the ground and turned to the right front. remember in this position to have your eye on your opponent, do not restrain your muscles, keep them taut, but flexible. . "_high port_."--the hands hold the rifle as in guard; the left wrist level with, and directly in front of the left shoulder; the right hand above the right groin and on level with the navel. remember that the barrel in this position is to the rear. this position is assumed on the advance without command. . "_long point_."--being in the position of "guard," grasp the rifle firmly, vigorously deliver the point to the full extent of the left arm, butt along side and close to the right forearm; body inclined forward; left knee well bent, right leg braced, and weight of the body pressed well forward with the fore part of the right foot, heel raised. the right hand gives the power to the point, while the left guides it. if a point is made in the oblique direction the left foot should move in that direction. this exercise is done in counts. at the point is made; at , the withdrawal; at , resume the guard. the withdrawal must be straight back, and not with the downward motion, until the right hand is well behind the hip. . _right (left) parry_.-- . straighten the left arm, without bending the wrist or twisting the rifle in the hand, and force the rifle forward far enough to the right (left) to ward off the opponent's weapon, . resume "guard." remember to keep your eyes on the weapon to be parried. . _short point_.-- . shift the left hand quickly toward the muzzle and draw the rifle back to the full extent of the right arm, butt either high or low as a low or high point is to be made. . deliver the point vigorously to the full extent of the left arm. . withdrawal. . resume the "guard." . _jab point_.-- . shift the left hand quickly toward the muzzle, draw the rifle back, and shift the right hand up the rifle and grasp it above the rear sight, at the same time bringing the rifle to an almost vertical position close to the body. bend the knees. . straighten the knees, jab the point of the bayonet upward into the throat or under the chin of the opponent--chiefly by a body movement. . withdrawal. . carry the rifle forward with the left hand, grasping the small of the stock with the right. . resume guard. remember in the first motion to have the hands at least inches apart. . _butt swing--butt strike_--out.-- . swing the butt up at the opponent's ribs, forearms, etc., using a full arm blow, bringing the rifle to a horizontal position over the left shoulder, butt to the front. . advance the rear foot, and dash the butt into the opponent's face. . advance the rear foot and at the same time slash the bayonet down on the opponent's head or neck. . resume the "guard." (the easiest guard to a swing at the crotch is simply to get the left knee in the opponent's right.) e. progressive exercises: . the class works in pairs with scabbards on bayonets. one man alternately in each pair signals; the other promptly executes the movement, at the target, designated by the signal. the following signals are suggested: the hand, placed against the body, indicates the target. long point--back of hand outward. short point--palm of hand outward. jab point--hand horizontal against chin, palm down. high port--fist against left breast. parry right (left)--hand waved to right (left). butt swing--fist against crotch. butt strike--fist against jaw. instead of signals, thrusting sticks are then used. these are strong wands having a padding of paper and burlap over one end and a rope ring tied to the other. points and butt swings are executed at the padding and rings, respectively, as these are presented. the man holding the stick must remember to stand to one side of the man with the bayonet. . as in first exercise.--one man thrusts with a stick: the other parries. . thrusts are practiced at dummies, first from a distance of five feet, then by advancing two paces or more. to simulate fighting conditions, a frame is then arranged in which dummies are slung on ropes passed over pullies, and so manipulated that as the man withdraws his bayonet from one dummy another swings at, him from a different direction. . as soon as proficiency has been gained in the above exercises, the assault practice is taken up. a. _a course is laid out as follows:_ ( ) a fire trench about yards long, well _revetted_. ( ) yards in front of the trench, smooth wire entanglements. ( ) yards further, another trench, parallel to the first, yards long, feet deep and feet wide. in this trench prone dummies are placed, one per yard. ( ) yards further, dummies, hung on frames, parallel to the trenches. ( ) yards further, a hurdle feet high and yards long, parallel to the trenches. ( ) yards further, a low trip wire, stretched parallel to the trenches. ( ) yards further, dummies, hung on frames, parallel to the trenches. ( ) yards further, a large trench, yards long, feet deep, feet wide, containing prone dummies, per yard. b. _procedure:_ each platoon, in turn, enters the first trench at skirmish intervals, bayonets fixed. on signal, all move out at a walk, guiding carefully in line on a leader previously designated. after passing each obstacle, the line is again carefully formed. on each of the swinging dummies one of the seven movements of the manual is used; a long or short point is used on each prone dummy. all go down into the last trench together, with a good loud yell, point of the bayonet level with the toe, and land on the dummies in the bottom, stabbing as they land. this course should be repeated several times at quick time, then at double time, and finally at a run. remember that in the advance the rifle is carried at high port. . combat exercises (to be used in conjunction with the assault practice): a. _equipment for each man:_ thrusting stick or other wooden rod with wooden ball or thick padding covering one end. (old rifles with spring-bayonets are even better.) plastron. baseball mask. pair of broadsword or single stick gloves. b. _procedure_: the class is formed in two lines of about equal numbers, facing each other, about fifty paces apart, with intervals in each line of about two paces. a leader is designated for each line. the instructor stands at one end of the space between; an assistant at the other end. on the instructor's whistle, the lines advance, guiding carefully on their leaders. when about ten paces apart, they charge, each seeking to break and roll up the opposing line. sticks are carried and used as rifles with bayonets fixed. any other use disqualifies. use of the butt is barred. one thrust on the plastron or mask, or two hits on the extremities, disables the recipient, who must promptly retire--or be retired. the combat continues until the second whistle, blown not more than seconds after contact; when they cease fighting promptly, separate, and form as before. c. _criticism:_ after each combat, the instructor will criticize the manner of advance and of fighting, especially the alignment kept in the advance and the team work in combat, and the advantage taken of opponents' mistakes. he counts the casualties and awards the decision. he must continually urge the men never to lag behind nor advance ahead of the line, never to allow large gaps to occur in the line, and always to seize the advantage given by opponents who disregard these principles. d. _the terrain for this exercise_ should be frequently varied. it may also be conducted at night, the opposing sides being clearly distinguished.[q] [footnote q: the last exercise was devised and perfected by m. jules leslabay, master of fencing, harvard r.o.t.c., . it is more completely described in his "manual of bayonet training."] machine guns. . properties of the machine guns are divided into three general classes: mode of action, fire, and inconspicuousness. (a) the mode of action.--the machine gun acting only by its fire can prepare an attack or repulse an offensive movement, but it does not conquer ground. the latter role is almost exclusively that of infantry which is fitted for crossing all obstacles. when it will suffice to act by fire, employ the machine gun in preference to infantry, preserving the latter for the combined action of movement and fire. by the employment of the machine gun economize infantry, reserving a more considerable portion of it for manoeuvre purposes. (b) fire.--machine gun fire produces a sheath, dense, deep but narrow. the increase of the width of the sweeping fire gives to the sheath a greater breadth, but when the density becomes insufficient, the effect produced is very weak. machine gun fire will have its maximum power upon an objective of narrow front and great depth. with the infantry fighting normally in thin lines the preceding conditions will generally only be realized when these lines are taken in the flank. "the fire of the machine gun parallel to the probable front of the enemy--a flanking fire--must therefore be the rule." the fire perpendicular to the front will be employed generally on certain necessary points of passage as, bridges, roads, defiles, cuts, roadways, communicating trenches, etc., where the enemy is generally forced to take a deep formation with a narrow front, or where he is in massed formation. (c) inconspicuousness.--by reason of its small strength the machine gun section can utilize the smallest cover, and can consequently hide from the enemy; the machine gun therefore, more than the infantry, has the chance to act by surprise. the opening of the fire by surprise will be the rule; the machine gun will avoid revealing itself upon objectives not worth the trouble. flank action and surprise are the two conditions to try for under all circumstances. . offensive reinforcement of a front momentarily stationary.--the machine guns assisted by small elements of infantry cover thoroughly the getting in hand of the main body, the machine guns presenting to the enemy a line of little vulnerability. the machine guns assist in securing the possession of the ground previously taken, and will permit time to prepare for the resumption of the forward movement. preparation of the attack--machine gun fire completes the preparation done by the artillery, either by acting on the personnel or by opening breaches in the accessary defenses. at times the machine guns alone may be charged with the preparation of the attack where it is necessary to act very quickly as in pursuit, exploitation of a success. whatever the situation, concentrate the machine gun fire on one or several points. machine guns cover the flanks of attacking troops. they follow the advance of these troops remaining on the flanks, so as to be able to fire instantly on all points from which an attack might come. machine guns will likewise be employed in intervals created intentionally or accidentally between units. it is here a powerful weapon which can rapidly be put into action by the commander. the personnel and material must be protected as far as possible from the effects of fire. . defensive.--it is here that the flanking fire is especially necessary. in the defensive preparation of a position the machine guns must be so placed that they will provide along the front several successive fire barriers. the machine guns must be ready at all times to stop by instantaneous fire all hostile attack. in order to have machine gun protection at all, it is absolutely necessary that they be protected from bombardment. this is best done by the following: place the machine guns under solid cover; make their emplacement invisible; echelon the machine guns in depth. the cover must be placed where it can be hidden from the sight of the enemy, such as a counter slope, a position where it is impossible to blend it, relief with an accentuated slope of the ground, woods, brush, etc. it is essential that the principal parts of the machine gun casemate be prepared in the rear. only in this manner will the work be done solidly and rapidly. while the machine gunners and helpers do the excavating, specialists in rear prepare the parts for assembling. the latter are then transported to the position and, the casemate is established, hiding the work with the greatest care from enemy observation. remember that it is of the utmost importance that the machine gun be invisible, so the firing emplacements must be made outside of the shelter, but near enough for the gun to be brought out instantly and put into action. all communicating trenches leading to the firing emplacement must be concealed. enough emplacements should be built to avoid firing daily from the emplacements especially reserved for cases of attack. do not place too many machine guns in the first line; in case of a violent bombardment they are sure to be destroyed. the object to be attained is to install the machine guns in conditions such that if the enemy penetrates our first line, by aid of his bombardment or asphyxiating gas, his infantry, as it advances, comes under the fire of machine guns echeloned previously in depth, under whose fire it must stop. it is not a matter of sweeping a wide sector, but of giving over certain strips of ground flanking fire which will cut down surely the enemy's waves when they push forward. the commander should, therefore, divide between the first line and the terrain in rear, the machine guns which he controls, organizing for each particular case a firing emplacement in accord with the surrounding ground and the purpose in view. general rules for installation. machine gunners must under no circumstances abandon their positions. they must, when necessary, allow themselves to be surrounded and defend themselves in their place to the end. in many cases the heroism and tenacity of a few machine gunners have permitted the rapid retaking of a lost position. to provide for this resistance to a finish, the machine gun emplacements must fulfil the following conditions: . be surrounded by a wire entanglement of irregular trace and as invisible as possible. . in the enclosure thus created having several firing emplacements, in case one or more becomes useless. . the personnel must have all the means for protection against gas and have in addition rations, water and abundant ammunition. employment of fire and instruction. the more grazing the fire of a machine gun the more effective it is. this causes the principal employment of the machine gun to be at distances where the trajectory is flattest, that is under or , yards. however, the effort to obtain a grazing fire must not exclude long distance fire. this latter will always be justified when directed upon important objectives, or necessary points of passage. for this fire to have some efficacy, it is necessary to calculate the range with the greatest precision. on the defensive indirect fire will be employed sometimes to annoy the supply, reliefs, etc. to give results, great quantities of ammunition will have to be expended. all of the officers and non-commissioned officers and as many men as possible must be capable of firing the machine gun, so that at the time of an attack no gun will remain idle for want of personnel. it is, moreover, essential to keep up the training of the personnel by having them fire at least twice a month, and, if possible, once a week. resume. machine guns must be utilized in the greatest measure in order to _economize the infantry._ seek to employ them always in a, _flank fire_. conceal them so as to get _surprise fire_. _echelon_ them and _shelter_ them so as to avoid their premature destruction. points before firing. . thoroughly overhaul the gun to see that no part is deficient, and that the mechanism works freely. . see that the barrel is clean and dry. . see that the barrel mouthpiece is tight. . see that small hole in gas regulator is to the rear. . thoroughly oil all working parts, especially the cam slot and exterior of the bolt, and the striker post and piston. . weigh and adjust the mainspring. . see that the mounting is firm. . examine the magazines and ammunition. . see that the spare parts and oil reserve are handy. points during firing . during a temporary cessation of fire, re-oil all working parts. . replace a partly emptied magazine with a full one. . examine the mounting to see that it is firm. . see that empty magazines are refilled without delay. points after firing. . unload. . oil the bore and chamber, piston rod and gas cylinder. . sort out live rounds from empty cases. . see that mainspring is eased. . thoroughly clean and oil the gun on returning to quarters. clean the bore daily for several days. it is of the greatest importance that the points before, during, and after firing, should be carefully attended to as otherwise the number of stoppages will be unnecessarily increased. nine out of ten stoppages are due to want of care. immediate action must become instinctive and automatic. grenade instruction. introduction.--war, as it is being fought on the western front, has brought to light many new weapons; but no other weapon that this struggle has brought forth exceeds the grenade in importance. it is not a new weapon, but its present importance is entirely new. its extensive use has grown out of conditions on the western front; conditions which have never been seen previous to this war. the fact that armies have taken to "digging themselves in" has necessitated the use of some other weapon than the rifle. the rifle with its flat trajectory is of little use against an enemy who is completely hidden from view and who can go on existing under ground. hence the reversion to the ancient grenade--but with all its modern improvements. the grenade has shown itself to be the weapon that can solve the problem of seeking out an enemy who is under ground; its trajectory is high and its fire is plunging, so that it can be thrown from a place of concealment and protection and into a place equally well concealed from ordinary view. the importance of the grenade may be judged from its extensive use by both the allies and the germans; and also by the formations now adopted by both british and french armies for the purpose of exploiting its use. in a british battalion the normal percentage of expert bombers is . in the french company per cent of the men are devoted to grenade work. a grenade has been defined as a slow moving, high trajectory missile containing high explosive and exploding by contact or time fuse. grenades may be divided roughly into two classes-- , hand grenades, and , rifle grenades, and each of these classes may be subdivided as regards means of explosion, into , time fuse, or , percussion grenades. among the time-fuse hand grenades may be mentioned the mills no. , stokes bomb, smoke bombs, fumite bombs, etc. the mills is easily the most important and has come to be the standard adopted by the allies. the percussion grenade is little used--the most important among those of this type is the so-called "mushroom," named from its shape. chief among the rifle grenades may be mentioned the mills no. , the hale no. and the newton no. . just as the mills hand grenade has become the standard, so has the mills rifle grenade attained that pre-eminence. a more detailed description of the various sorts of grenades cannot be attempted in this brief space; but one or two diagrams at the close of the chapter may serve to clarify the subject to some extent. any course in grenade training should have a three-fold purpose: st. to give the individual a practical knowledge of the working of the grenades in use. nd. to teach him how to throw them. rd. to make him acquainted with the general principles of organization and the execution of a grenade attack, either as a separate operation or as a part of a general attack. the time spent on any such course of training is a matter to be settled in the light of local considerations; but for purposes of preliminary training of a great number of men a period of two weeks is usually sufficient, with time allotted according to some such plan as this: ( ) separate half-hour sessions of practice in throwing from various positions and at the various targets; ( ) hours of study and a like amount of time spent in a conference for the purpose of clearing up matters that are hazy. in this brief time (only hours) the foundation may be laid for a more thorough training of the specialists later on. in any such course the use of dummy grenades should always precede the use of any live ones; and men should be taught caution above all other things. this is a point easily lost sight of when men are using only dummies; but it is well worth remembering, for obvious reasons. first: giving the individual a practical knowledge of the working of the grenades in use.--the differences in the construction and the uses of hand and rifle grenades should be brought out clearly. the various sorts of grenades should be explained and men should not forget the importance of knowing the grenades of the enemy as well as our own. this knowledge may one day prove of no little importance. as has already been stated, the mills no. is the standard among hand grenades of the allies. it conforms to the general description of hand grenades; _i.e._, it is an egg-shaped projectile, more or less hollow, and loaded with a charge of explosive. besides this it has an apparatus for setting off the bursting charge. it weighs pound ounces approximately, and ounces of this is high explosive. the shell being of serrated cast-iron, an explosion will scatter a sort of shrapnel over an area equal to three times the height. no more need be said of the effectiveness of such a weapon. among rifle grenades the mills is also the standard more or less, although the french make great use of a rifle grenade that fits over the muzzle of the rifle, fired by ball cartridge, in contrast to the mills no. , which has a rod running down the barrel of the rifle and which is propelled by the explosion of a blank cartridge. the maximum range of this grenade with a - / -inch stem is yards, the gun being fired at an angle of degrees. the newton improved (a rifle grenade which explodes on contact) has a range of yards; the hale no. also explodes on contact and has a range of - yards. [illustration: plate # ] second: instruction in throwing.--as previously stated the use of dummy grenades should precede the use of any live ones. due precautions should be taken at all times, even when working with dummy grenades, for a habit of carelessness is not to be tolerated with this sort of weapon. men should be instructed to throw from standing, kneeling and prone positions; although this last-named position is little used. distance is important but accuracy is essential. men should always be taught to throw at a definite target, even when throwing in the open during preliminary work. the men may work in groups, one group throwing and the other returning. this method keeps all hands occupied and furnishes a medium for a little competition, which is a very helpful thing in training of this sort. a manual of the following sort may be of use in acquiring the proper sort of throw. . pick up the grenade with the left hand. . prepare to throw--face to the right and transfer the grenade to the right hand. . take aim--left hand and arm extended up and straight toward the target, right hand and arm behind the thrower in the same plane as the left. . withdraw pin with left hand. . throw--use a straight overhead motion and do not bend the arm at the elbow. it is not a baseball throw. the tendency for most of us americans is to follow a perfectly natural habit--try to use the baseball throw. this is to be discouraged for several reasons, the chief one being that the grenade weighs about a pound and a half, whereas our baseball weighs only a third of this amount. then, too, it often happens in the trenches that a grenade duel will last for hours. under such circumstances the last grenade may decide the issue and endurance will be a mighty telling factor. hence, the insistence upon the overhead throw. the preliminary throwing should take place in the open but always with a definite target, an outline of a section of trench being the best sort of target. another excellent idea is to have a target arranged according to the diagram shown herewith and to keep score. this procedure will also add incentive for competition and will produce results. after men have thrown in the open for a sufficient period, they should proceed to the next stage: this is the stage of throwing in a cage or from behind and over obstacles. there are three distinct phases of this feature of the training: ( .) the thrower sees the target but must throw over an obstacle. ( .) the target is invisible; the thrower is aided by an observer and a periscope; the observer notes the fall of the grenades and gives directions as follows--"so many yards right or left" or "shorten or lengthen so many yards." ( .) actual throwing in trenches. this stage immediately precedes that of "working up a trench." third: instruction in grenade organization.--men should be given a certain amount of theoretical instruction as to the composition of the armies now on the western front; this in order that they may see the part that grenadiers and bombers are playing in the struggle. they should be shown the organization of the british infantry and how the first section of each platoon is composed exclusively of bombers and--rifle grenadiers; they should also be taught how the bombers and grenadiers are concentrated in the french organization. the typical bombing squad consists of or men and a leader who take positions as follows: and , bayonet men; , first thrower; , first carrier; , leader; , rifle bomber; , second thrower; , second carrier; , rifle bomber. one of these bayonet men may be reserved to act as a sniper. the leader acts as an observer and directs the work of the bombers. the rifle bombers outrange the hostile bombers and also afford protection on the flanks. every man must be taught his job and must be thoroughly instructed in the work of the squad as a whole in order that each man may be able to fill any position and that there may be perfect teamwork. [illustration: plate # ] points to remember. . men should always have a definite target for their throwing--an outline of a trench is usually to be preferred. . caution in handling grenades should be made a habit. . accuracy is essential. . training should be progressive, both for men and organizations. . keep up competition among the men; rivalry will increase practice and men will throw grenades for recreation. this will get results. let two men throw at each other. a good shot will make the other man move. . insist upon the straight overhead throw. it is less tiresome and when developed properly will give equal accuracy with any other method. . teamwork in a bombing squad is essential. . under new methods of warfare every infantryman is a bomber; but specialists must be trained. . officer must be a real leader and the best fighter in his platoon. . qualification tests should be arranged and the better qualified men taken for special training in this art. chapter . map sketching. map sketching is an important factor in trench warfare to-day as it is in a war of movement. a fairly accurate map will indicate more than many words and in much less time. time is the great factor in war. instruction must also be rapid. here are ten lessons which would occupy a week if taken morning and afternoon. the aim of the instruction as in company rifle shooting is to train many men to do a satisfactory job, not to make a few finished topographers. neatness, accuracy and initiative are cardinal points. for the instructor, reference should be made to _grieves'_ "_military sketching and map reading_", nd edition, if he desires to supplement any points given here. lesson . (class room--four hours.) _problem--map reading._ study the conventional signs found in the "manual for non-commissioned officers and privates of infantry of the army of the u.s.," , page , or in grieves, pages - . these conventional signs are not universal and must be used only as indications of the general practice. in map sketching in the field few conventional signs are used, and the items of importance are written on the map, such as woods, cultivated, hedge, swamp, etc. taking up map scales.--there are three ways of indicating the relation between the actual distance on the ground and the space the same distance occupies on the map: . the graphic scale is a straight line divided into units, as miles, yards, feet or meters, which represents the actual ground distance. thus if " = mile the line would be six inches long and marked at one end and mile at the other, three inches being marked / mile, etc. it is important to always have this graphic scale on a map so that if the paper gets wet or is stretched from its original size the scale will change in the same proportion. . a statement in words or figures, e.g., inches equal one mile, meaning that inches measured anywhere on the map represent mile on the actual ground. . the representative fraction (generally known abbreviated as r.f.) having a number above the line that shows the unit length on the map and below the line the number of units which are in the corresponding actual ground distance. for example, if " = mile, then the r.f. is: " (map distance) ----------------------------------- , " ( mile--ground distance) if " = mile the r.f. is: " (map distance) ----------------------------------- or ------- , " ( mile--ground distance) if " = mile: " -------- or ------- " if " = mile: " --------- or ------ " in reading a map one must know the scale and also where the north is. this is always indicated by an arrow pointing either to the magnetic north or the true north. if to the magnetic north the needle will have but one barb away from the true north. the angle between the magnetic and the true north is the declination. placing the map in proper relation to the ground so that points of the compass coincide on map and ground is called _orienting the map_. in map work there is one vital point to remember; practically all the ground surface is in its present form as a result of water action . look for the water courses, that is the drainage system. it will give the general slope of the land. . look for the high points between the water courses, remembering that there is always a valley then a hill then a valley again continued in succession. . finally locate towns, railroads, main highways and work down to the minor details. in measuring a map to get the actual distances on the ground, copy the graphic scale on any piece of paper and apply this directly or if your distances exceed your scale use the edge of a piece of paper and then apply it to the graphical scale on the map. lesson . (field work--five hours.) _problem--stride scale map making_. producing a map from the actual ground requires certain instruments. the second lesson takes up the preparation of the stride scale on the alidade and the different kinds of maps, made in military sketching. the alidade is a triangular ruler with one or more working scales on it beside other measurements. the _working scale_ is, for infantry, the stride or the space of ground covered from left foot to left foot again in walking, reduced to the proper map distance. this varies with individuals of course. any scale of units, however, can be used as, horse trot, telegraph poles, etc. the working scale for each man is made by having him step off a measured course, say yards. the ground should not be too even as a general average is needed, moreover the pace must be the natural gait of the individual under ordinary circumstances. let him count the course three times then average the three results for the final estimate. now to convert this into a working scale for the alidade made on a scale of six inches to the mile; take the case of a man who takes strides in yards: yards = , inches , ÷ = , or his stride in inches then strides = mile or " on the scale. it is better to have a scale of , strides which is easily done by the proportion: , sts. : sts. : : x : x = . now draw a line . inches long and a diagonal line from it; divide this diagonal line into equal parts for each paces at any convenient scale and draw a line from the end of the tenth part to the end of the . inches line; draw lines parallel to this line from each of the divisions. the . " line is then divided into equal parts; each of these parts may be divided in the same manner into tenths. your scale is ready to be pasted or transferred to the alidade and each . . inches on the map will equal , of your strides on the ground, or about - / miles ( , yards). there are two general classes of sketches: . road sketch.--a traverse (passing over) made along a definite rout showing all features of military importance for a distance of or yards on each side of the road. a road sketch is always made on a scale of inches to mile. . area sketch.--a map of a definite locality. there are kinds of area sketches according to opportunity for observation: (a) position sketch--when access may be had to the whole area. (b) outpost sketch--where part of the ground must be mapped without passing over it. this form is applicable particularly to trench warfare. intersection and resection are used to locate points within the enemy's lines. (c) place sketch--when sketch must be made from one point, as when the proximity of the enemy would prevent any movement; as from trench observation stations, etc.; also an elaboration of the _landscape_ or _horizon_ sketch which is used everywhere in the trenches today. from one point an actual outline of the opposite trench and background is made in perspective, reference points on the horizon being marked on the edge of a pad at arm's length. these marks are then prolonged on the paper and the horizon is sketched. in like manner the middle distance and the foreground come under observation and are put on in one below the other. time must be allowed the men to make their stride scales and to paste or transfer them to their alidades. [illustration: plate # ] lesson . (field work--five hours.) the problem is to make a position sketch about one mile square closing the traverse. first considering the sketch board, compass, pencils, etc.; next the orienting, sighting and pacing; finally the uses of intersection and resection and in making allowance for error. the sketch board should be about to inches square, being used with or without a tripod. a cheap camera tripod is excellent. the board should have a compass attached so that it will remain in the same relative position on the board. if iron thumb tacks are used avoid getting them too near the compass. a hard pencil must be used to obtain good results. the paper must be smooth and where possible covered with another sheet fastened on but one side which will readily fold back when one desires to work on the sketch. by always placing the board so that the compass reads north it will be oriented correctly. care must be used when near electric wires or masses of metal as automobiles, railroad tracks, etc., which will attract the needle from its true azimuth (n. and s. direction) and thus throw off the whole map. in such cases it is far better to back sight and use the compass only at intervals to verify the sights. this brings up the matter of sighting. it is important to make long shots thus reducing the amount of individual error. in taking a sighting point make sure it can be recognized when reached and make sure to look at the reverse side in order to recognize it in case of back sighting if necessary. always carry several large-headed pins using one at your present station and resting the side of the alidade against it, swinging the other end for sighting. after sighting and lining the sight on your sketch, step off evenly to pace the distance. time is always a factor in military mapping and where possible make mental notes as you go along as to where roads or other important features are located, so that you can place them in their proper place on the map when you have reached the next station. it is well always to set a good pace for here time can be readily saved. making an _intersection_ is very simple. for as the sketcher moves along he ties his map together by sighting at any prominent object near his area, running these lines very lightly and only where he assumes the points to lie on his map. an abbreviation on the line or a number referring to a list off to one side will answer to recall the object. at any other station where the same point can be seen a similar line is drawn and where the two lines cross will be the location of the object. in the case of three lines not crossing at the same point take the middle of the triangle so formed. _resection_ is just the reverse of this process. the mapper wants to know where he is located on the map. if he is properly oriented and can aim at two points on the ground which he has located on the map, he places a pin at one of these locations on the map and aims with the alidade at the object on the ground drawing a line towards himself; this is repeated with the other known point and where the two lines cross on the map will be the point he is standing at. in intersection the greatest accuracy is obtained by running the rays so as to meet as nearly as possible at right angles. in running a traverse the sketcher must expect to find some error at his closing point. this error must be distributed over the whole traverse so as not to have all the error concentrated at one point. lesson . (field work--four hours.) problem.--make a simple sketch, containing topographical details using the traverse made during the preceding lesson. use of conventional signs should be emphasized and the appreciation of features of military importance impressed. a tendency is to put in details to a point of confusion. judgment must be developed to choose telling points. a sharp pencil is always needed in sketching; in putting in the topographical details special attention must be given to the pencil. keep the point sharp and make clear, distinct signs. lesson . (class room--four hours.) problem.--contours, the vertical interval, use of the slope board, map distance, visibility and profiles. a contour is an imaginary line on the surface of the earth all points of which have the same elevation from a base or datum level, sea level usually being this base. slice an apple into pieces / -inch thick; where the cuts come may represent the contour lines. take these individual slices, beginning at the bottom and outline them on a sheet of paper with a pencil (having run a nail through the apple first to keep each piece in place). the resulting circles will represent the apple's outline at / -inch intervals. contours are always at equal elevations from each other, and the vertical interval (known by the abbreviation v.i.) is the measure between successive contour lines. in military maps the v.i. is always the same for each map scale: inch to the mile, the v.i. is feet. inch to the mile, the v.i. is feet. inch to the mile, the v.i. is feet. inch to the mile, the v.i. is feet. note that the v.i. changes in proportion to the scale, a map on a inch to the mile scale is times as large as one on a scale of inch to the mile, while the v.i. is / as great, hence the former shows times as many contours as the latter. map distance means the horizontal distance between two contour lines on a map and indicates a certain degree of slope. as the scale increases the v.i. decreases in proportion and the m.d. therefore remains the same for the same degree of slope whatever the scale of the map. by computation we find that a one degree slope rises one foot for every . feet horizontal distance, so a one degree slope would have a foot rise in , feet horizontal distance, this distance equals . of an inch on the map if the scale is " to mile. the term "map distance" is also loosely used to denote distance between points as measured on the map. care should be taken to distinguish between these two meanings. distances between contours, scale " to mile: / ° slope = . ", ° slope =. ", ° slope =. ", ° slope =. ". these distances are already on the alidade and if you get a slope of ° with the slope board and have the distance from your station on the map to the point of aim either by pacing, intersection or resection, apply the m.d. scale as many times as it will go. this will give the number of contour lines crossing the traverse and the difference in elevation. the spacing of the contours may not be even between your station and the point of aim in which case the position of the contours must be estimated by eye. if your elevation above the datum or sea level is unknown at the start assume any elevation which is great enough to put the datum lower than the lowest spot of the area to be sketched. the sketching board is easily made to serve as a slope board in this manner. hang a plumb bob about an inch below the center of a straight edge of the board while pointing at the horizon, using the back of the board. mark a point . " directly below and draw a semicircle through it with the same radius. now mark the point below the center zero and from it divide the arc using chords one tenth of an inch long. this will give a scale reading in degrees. by sighting along the top of the board at some object at the height of the eye from the ground the degree of slope is shown by the plumb bob on the scale below. care must be exercised to prevent the wind from disturbing the reading. a protractor may be used in the same manner by sighting along the top and using a plumb bob to record the angle. in reading maps it is important to know whether points are visible from each other due to intervening ridges or other topographical features. this can be told by laying off accurately the distance on the map between the points in question and using as datum the lowest of the points, then draw vertical lines, from the higher points, making them in proportion to their elevation with any convenient scale. draw a line between the first and last points and, if the intervening vertical cuts this line the second point is not visible from the first. take for example, two points a and b, , yards apart, by the map, a feet and b feet above sea level, the intervening point c is feet above sea level and yards from b. as b is the lowest we will call its elevation zero or at datum, then elevation of a is feet and c feet. [illustration: plate # ] another method of deciding visibility is by proportion. measure the distance between the three points a, b, and c, and obtain their elevations above the datum (lowest of the ) and using similar triangles. take the same case as above, letting x represent the point above which the view is clear at , yards from point a, the line of sight passes through this point. (a--b) : (b--c) : : (elev. a) : x solving, x = . now, since the ground at point c is feet above the base and the line of sight passes within . feet of the base at this place, an observer at a is unable to see b. the matter of profiling is very simple. merely mark where the contours cut the edge of a piece of co-ordinate paper and extend the proper elevations, then pass a line through these points, remembering that the surface of the ground has a natural curve. lesson . (field work--five hours.) problem.--by use of the slope scale on the sketch board and the contour interval scale on the alidade, each man will secure vertical data on the flat sketch made in the fourth lesson. certain critical elevations will be determined and marked with red flags before hand. the elevations of two points on the ground will be furnished, one as the datum and the other as a check. draw in contours of this sketch with the help of drainage lines and elevations already secured. the chief points to be considered are to take slopes from points established on the sketch; to take several sights and average the angle of slope; to properly lay off the elevation by using the slope scale on the alidade; and finally to put in the contours along these lines of sight _on the spot_ thus allowing for difference in topography between the point of sight and the station from which the elevation is taken. careful note must be made of the drainage systems as these are the keynotes to the sketch and finally the contours are connected together, keeping in mind always that no contour stops unless it makes a closed curve or goes off the map. remember also that contours make fingers pointing up stream and are blunt around hill sides. contours cross streams to opposite points and break at roads, continuing on the other side. uniform slopes have equally-spaced contours. do not try to measure every slope, two intersecting elevation sights on a hill will check the height. put the intervening contours in by eye. lesson . (classroom--four hours.) problem.--completing the map sketch previously made and making a landscape sketch. it is important to complete a map and no matter how good it is, if certain points are omitted, the value of the work is very much decreased. the sketcher must clear the sketch of all unnecessary lines and notes and make his lettering clear on the map. be sure that the following items are on the sketch before it is turned in. . location of the ground shown. . line of magnetic north shown by an arrow, and if declination is known, the true north also. . graphic scale and representative fraction--r.f. . vertical interval--v.i. . sketcher's name and organization to which he belongs. . date. a landscape sketch is a place sketched with details shown in perspective. the horizon is always of military importance and should be shown as well as intervening crests, woods, houses, etc. landscape sketching in trench warfare is a necessary accomplishment of the observer. the beginner will at first be confused by a mass of details, but he must note only the outline of the features sketched. first draw the sky line and crests, then fill in the other details with fewest lines possible. unnecessary shading tends to detract from the clearness of the sketch. there will be great difficulty in getting the perspective, note the size of objects, the further away they are the smaller they seem. make them so. in making the sketch, hold the pad in front with one eye closed, the upper edge of the pad horizontal; a string inches long is tied to the pad and held between the teeth to insure the same distance from the eye each time. moreover, if it is desired to locate objects by deflection of an angle from a reference point, this can be done by using _mils_. one mil is - of a circle. at inches a half-inch interval subtends mils. [illustration: plate # ] the paper is oriented by bringing the sector desired along the upper edge of the pad. the points desired are then in proper positions, both horizontally and vertically. place a mark at the upper edge for points desired. the sky line should be located first. now carry these lines down, having drawn three horizontal lines about / inch apart, beginning with the highest point on the top line. marks locating the other features are likewise transposed in vertical and horizontal portions. now draw sky line connecting transposed marks, then such other points as crests, trenches, houses, etc. after practice most other features can be drawn in without reorienting, the sky line having been drawn. the vertical elevation should be slightly exaggerated. objects in the background should be drawn in lightly while nearby features are indicated by _heavy lines_. avoid details, draw only silhouette, shade only in showing woods. lesson . (field work--five hours.) problem.--make complete area sketch including contours, with no data furnished other than the initial elevation. before commencing the work summarize the important points involved. . if possible select a base line. . locate as many points by intersection as possible. . make traverse by road, check locations by resection. . at good observation points observe and complete the sketch as far as possible. at each station keep the following points in view: . back sight on previous station. . select new sighting point ahead. . determine elevation by slope board. . put in contours where possible noting the drainage and critical points of the general slope and the terrain. . put in details along traverse just made of all topographical features of military importance. . determine your present elevation. . make as many shots for intersection as you can and mark them. . look for possible resection shots. lessons and . (field work--nine hours.) problem.--make a road sketch of about miles with scale of inches to the mile, v.i. feet. this should include details of military importance to a distance of yards on either side of the road. keep in mind these points: . start carefully and give attention to every part of the map. . keep the board properly oriented. . watch the water drainage systems. . put down all necessary details at each _setup_. . note high hills and towns not on immediate route, condition of roads, fences, cultivation, hedges, cuts and fills, bridges (kind and length), railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, schools, churches, etc., notice particularly woods and points of concealment for hostile troops. do the work at each station for elevation, contours and the noting of necessary details so that the sketch will be complete as you go along. make certain that the title of the sketch, scale, orientation, etc., are all clearly indicated, for a road map may have to be completed by another or may be called for suddenly when it will be useless without these details. remember there are but two things absolutely essential to a good road sketch; a good traverse and the location of the drainage system in its relation to this traverse. with this control approximate contours can be drawn by anyone having a knowledge of the principles of topography. never plot unimportant details. prominent buildings and farm houses are of value for locating oneself. woods and orchards are shown for tactical reasons but no one can expect to show every fence, ditch or bit of cover that might hide a patrol. map reading. (gettysburg " map--hunterstown sheet.) plattsburg barracks, n.y., sept. , : . what is the shortest distance by road from biglersville to texas? . describe the road between texas and table rock. . is it a cut or a fill along the railroad about / mile east of granite hill station? . what is meant by on chestnut hill? . can a man on the summit of hill (about one mile southwest of plainview) be seen from the town of plainview? . point out two fords on the conewago river. . where is the highest point on the road from plainview to heidlersburg? . describe the fences along the road from texas to table rock station. . is hill s.w. from d. wert visible from henderson meeting house? . of what material is the bridge at bridge school house constructed? harvard college: . can a sentinel standing at see road fork (about , yards south)? . an enemy patrol is marching north on the - road, and has crossed the stream ( yards north of .) can this patrol see the red outguard at from any point between stream and cross roads ? . can the sentinel at see the road fork ( , yards southwest from )? . can the sentinel at see the cross roads (about , yards southeast)? assuming the height of a man as ' " above the ground and trees and buildings as ' ". . is the ground at road fork near d. wirt visible to a patrol on hill ? if not what is the obstructing point? turn in profile, using cross section paper. . disregarding trees, is a man standing on bridge near bridge s.h. visible from hill ? solve by any method desired indicating the method. . make a profile from location of the letter "u" of chestnut hill near center mills to hill , - / miles to the south. . is the location of the letter "b" of beatrich visible from "u" of chestnut hill? if not what obstructs? . can a man on hill see a man at cross roads in hunterstown (disregard trees)? . to a man standing at the point where contour crosses the road just south of , where does the roadbed first become invisible? . when the point arrives at hill can it see the road fork to the northwest? . when the flank patrol reaches benders church cross roads can it see an enemy patrol at the house midway on the road - one mile to the northeast? . looking north along the center mills road from hill , where does the road first become invisible? . what does / mean? . what direction is the general drainage system on this sheet? chapter . helpful references to the articles of war. (extracted from m.c.m. and guide to the articles of war--waumbaugh's lectures.) military law is the body of rules that governs members of the army. military law is based upon the articles of war approved by congress, august , , effective march , . this body of rules defines: ( ) punishable offenses of members of the army. ( ) the method of determining guilt. ( ) punishment. the present articles of war are revisions of those from the revolution. article . definitions: ( ) the word "officer" shall be construed to refer to a commissioned officer (and no one else). ( ) the word "soldier" to include non-commissioned officer or any other enlisted man. article . persons subject to military law: ( ) all officers and soldiers of the regular army. ( ) all volunteers in the service of the u.s. ( ) all other persons lawfully called, drafted or ordered into such service. ( ) west point cadets. ( ) officers and soldiers of the marine corps when detached for service with the army, by order of the president. ( ) all retainers to the camp, or accompanying or serving with the army in time of war, both within and without territorial jurisdiction of u.s. ( ) all persons under sentence by court-martial. articles - . courts martial classified: (a) general courts martial. appointed by ( ) president, ( ) commanding officer of department or territorial division. ( ) commanding officer of separate army division brigade. ( ) commanding officer of district or force empowered by president. jurisdiction. over all persons subject to military law as regards all offenses punishable by military law. sentence. everything. (b) special courts martials ( to officers inclusive). appointed by ( ) commanding officer of district, garrison, fort or camp. ( ) commanding officer of brigade, detached battalion. jurisdiction. over any person subject to military law (except an officer), and for any crime not capital. (only soldiers excluding those having certificate of eligibility for promotion.) sentence. ( ) no power to adjudge dishonorable discharge. ( ) no confinement in excess of six ( ) months. ( ) no forfeiture of pay in excess of six ( ) months. (c) summary courts martial (one ( ) officer). appointed by ( ) commanding officer of garrison, fort, camp, etc. ( ) commanding officer of regiment, detached battalion, etc. (n.b.) when but one ( ) officer is present with command he shall be the summary court martial. jurisdiction. ( ) only privates holding no certificate of eligibility for promotion--and ( ) for crimes not capital. sentence. ( ) confinement not over months. ( ) no dishonorable discharge. ( ) no punishment over one ( ) month without higher authority. method of entering a charge against a man: example: charge: violation of the ---- article of war. specification: in that (rank, name, organization) did at (place) on or about (date) etc. (brief description of offence committed). signed (name) (rank and branch of service) in cases where there are more than one charge the number of each a.w. is put down in the charge. a description of each offence is put down separately under specification. note that double lines are drawn under charge, single line under specification. general remarks: the three ( ) courts martial are alike in the following: (a) composed only of officers of army or marine corps on detached service with the army by order of the president. (b) pass upon both law and fact. (c) criminal courts only. (d) unable to promulgate any finding that does not require approval of appointing authority. the three ( ) courts martial differ in the following: (a) number of members. (b) appointing authority. (c) punishments. article . order of voting: members in general or special courts martial shall vote from junior to senior. article . limitations upon prosecutions: military offences fall into three ( ) groups: ( ) war desertion, mutiny, murder. have no limitations. ( ) burglary, etc. (a w. ) and frauds against government (a.w. ). prosecution limited to years. ( ) all other offences. years. in some cases the statute of limitations is suspended (a.w. ), especially in cases of absence from the united states. * * * * * the following articles of war are the important ones for officers to be acquainted with in the ordinary course of his duties: article . fraudulent enlistment: punishment: court martial. "any person procuring himself to be enlisted by means of willful misrepresentation or concealment as to his qualifications for enlistment and shall receive pay or allowance," ... this offense requires two ( ) steps: ( ) misrepresentation or concealment. ( ) receiving pay or allowances. article . desertion: punishment: (wartime) death or court martial. (peacetime) court martial. "any person--who deserts or attempts to desert in time of war ... death or such other punishment as the court martial may direct ... any other time any punishment except death." essential features are: ( ) an intent not to return. ( ) an overt act of separation from duty. drunkenness tends to show absence of the intent. minority is no defense. enlistment while in desertion does not remove the charge of desertion. article . absence without leave: punishment: court martial. "any person who fails to repair at the fixed time to duty, or goes from same without leave of absence, or absents himself from his command, guard, quarters, station or camp without proper leave...." does not require to prove intent, yet persons ignorant of military law, drunk or victims of mistake are dealt with gently. article . disrespect toward president, vice-president, congress, secretary of war, governors, legislatures: punishment: (officer) dismissal from the service, (soldier) court martial. "any officer who uses contemptuous or disrespectful words against the president, etc.... any other person subject to military law who so offends." contemptuous language is objectionable and liable to court martial whether ( ) used in public or private. ( ) in official or private capacity. ( ) written or spoken. ( ) true or untrue. article . disrespect toward a superior officer: punishment: court-martial. "any person subject to military law who behaves himself with disrespect toward his superior officer...." unlike article , disrespect toward a superior officer requires no words--acting or neglecting to act (such as rudeness or failure to salute) are enough. article . assaulting or willfully disobeying superior officer: punishment: death or court-martial. ( ) "any person subject to military law who on any pretense whatsoever, strikes his superior officer--lifts a weapon, or offers violence against him, being in the execution of his office." ( ) "or willfully disobeys any lawful command of his superior officer." drunkenness here tends to show absence of the essential willfullness. self defense is not forbidden nor violence to suppress mutiny. article . insubordinate conduct toward a non-commissioned officer: punishment: court-martial. ( ) "any soldier who assaults or attempts or threatens to strike or assault." ( ) "or willfully disobeys the lawful order of a non-commissioned officer while in the execution of his office." ( ) "or uses threatening or insulting language." ( ) "or behaves in an insubordinate or disrespectful manner." drunkenness will not have the effect here of showing an absence of willfullness. article . disorders: punishment: court-martial. "all officers and non-commissioned officers have power to quell disorders and to order officers who take part in the same into arrest, and other persons into arrest or confinement. whosoever, being so ordered: ( ) refuses to obey. ( ) draws a weapon. ( ) otherwise threatens or does violence shall be punished." this is one instance (except a.w., , mutiny) where even a corporal might order a general into arrest. this is the only instance: ( ) where anyone other than a commissioned officer can put an officer under arrest. ( ) where anyone other than an officer can order, arrest or confinement of a soldier except on power given by c.o. article . breaking arrest: punishment: (officer) dismissal, (soldier) court-martial. "any officer charged with crime shall be placed in arrest by c.o.... in exceptional cases ... confined." "a soldier charged with crime ... shall be placed in confinement ... when charged with minor offense placed in arrest." "any person placed in arrest ... shall be restricted to barracks, quarters, tent, unless limits are enlarged by proper authority." "an officer or any other person breaking his arrest or who escapes from confinement before being set at liberty by proper authority shall be punished by...." to break arrest is punishable even though a person is innocent of the charge or ought to have been released. article . misbehavior before the enemy: punishment: death or court-martial. "any officer or soldier who: ( ) misbehaves before the enemy--runs away, or shamefully abandons post. ( ) or speaks words inducing others to do so. ( ) or quits his post or colors to plunder or pillage. ( ) occasions false alarms in camp or quarters shall suffer ...." the word "enemy" implies "any hostile body" such as a mob or riot crowd. article . neglect of military property: punishment: make good the loss and court-martial. "any person subject to military law who willfully or through neglect suffers to be lost, damaged, or wrongfully disposed of, any military property belonging to united states of america--shall make good the loss and...." article . waste or unlawful disposal of property issued to soldiers: punishment: court-martial. "any soldier who sells or wrongfully disposes of any property issued for military service shall be punished...." article . drunk on duty: punishment: (war time) dismissal and court-martial, (peace time) court-martial. "any officer ... drunk on duty shall ... in time of war be dismissed ... and any other person subject to military law, drunk on duty ... shall be punished...." article . misbehavior of a sentinel: punishment: (war time) death or court-martial, (peace time) court-martial. "any sentinel found: ( ) drunk. ( ) asleep. ( ) or who leaves before being regularly relieved shall be punished...." article . murder or rape: punishment: death or life imprisonment. "any person who commits murder or rape shall suffer death or life imprisonment as the court-martial may direct." no person shall be tried for murder or rape committed in the limits of the u.s.a. in time of peace. this is left to civil courts. article . various crimes: punishment: court-martial. "any person who commits ( ) manslaughter, ( ) mayhem (cutting), ( ) arson, ( ) burglary, ( ) larceny, ( ) embezzlement, ( ) perjury, ( ) assault with intent to commit any felony. ( ) assault with intent to do bodily harm. shall be punished...." definition of these crimes is left to local law. article . frauds against the government: punishment: court-martial. article of war no. is equivalent to prohibiting any person subject to military law from defrauding or attempting, or conspiring to defraud the government of the u.s.a.--also from stealing, embezzling any government property. article . conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman: punishment: dismissal. "any officer or cadet convicted of unbecoming conduct shall be dismissed...." misconduct may be official or unofficial. article . general article, the catch all: punishment: court-martial. "... all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good military discipline. all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service. all crimes and offences not capital shall be taken cognizance of by ( ) general, ( ) special, ( ) summary court-martials according to the nature and degree of the offense and punished.... article of war covers all crimes and is handy when no other article of war fits. it is wise, however, to use this article sparingly on charges, finding if possible the exact article necessary to cover the case at hand." examples. problem : charge.--violation of ---- article of war. specification.--in that private john doe, company c. st regiment infantry, did at albany, new york, on or about september th, , dress himself in the uniform of a st lieutenant and attend a dance at odd fellows hall. (signed) john hancock, captain, st infantry. under what article of war, if any, does this belong? problem : charge.--violation of ---- and ---- articles of war. specification.--in that sergeant james hopkins, company h, th infantry, did at franconia, n.h., on or about july th return to barracks intoxicated. in that sergeant james hopkins, moreover, refused to appear at reveille july th. (signed) william hitchcock, captain, th infantry. under what articles of war do these offenses belong? what kind of court-martial required? problem : charge.--violation of ---- article of war. specification.--in that captain george jones, th infantry did at laconia, maine, on or about august , , make a speech in which he stated that the reichstag of germany was a more efficient and democratic body than the united states congress. (signed) albert smith, major, th infantry. under what article of war does this offense belong? no. articles of war. punishment. . fraudulent enlistment court martial . desertion war: death or court martial peace: except death . absence without leave court martial . disrespect to presidents officer: dismissal vice-president, secretary soldier: court martial of war, congress, etc. . disrespect to superior officer court martial . assaulting or disobeying death or court martial superior officer . insubordination to a court martial non-commissioned officer . arrest or confinement officer: dismissal of accused persons soldier: court martial . misbehavior before the enemy death or court martial . loss, etc., military property make good the loss and court martial . loss of military property court martial issued to soldiers . drunk on duty { officers-- { war: dismissal { peace: court martial { soldiers: court martial . misbehavior of sentinel { war: death or { peace: court martial (except death) . various crimes court martial . frauds against the government court martial . conduct unbecoming an officer dismissal . general article court martial (general or special) chapter . notes on army regulations . obedience required in the military service--strict and prompt. . authority exercised with firmness, kindness and justice--prompt and lawful punishment. . abusive language or conduct by superiors forbidden. . respect to superiors will be extended upon all occasions, whether on duty or not. . remarks by officers or soldiers upon others in the military service, whether praise or censure, public or private, written or spoken, is prohibited. any effort to affect legislation for a personal favor will be entered against a man's military record. . furloughs not granted to men about to be discharged. not more than five per cent of a company shall be absent at one time. . men on furlough may not leave the united states. . for men in foreign countries furlough can begin on date of reaching united states. . no payments made to men while on furlough. arms not to be taken on furlough or while reporting sick. (n.b.--there will unquestionably be a modification of this ruling, as the custom abroad is to have every man keep his complete equipment with him whenever possible.) . desertion. property lost or destroyed will be charged against deserter. . abandoned clothes turned over to quartermaster. personal effects sold and credited to united states. . reward of $ for apprehension and delivery of deserter or military prisoner. . costs of apprehension will be charged against deserter. . no pay or clothes drawn by soldier awaiting trial on charge of desertion. . will be restored to duty only by court martial or authority competent to order trial. . absent without leave. enlisted man forfeits all pay and allowances while away. soldier will not be charged with desertion until commanding officer has reason to believe he intended to desert. absence of less than hours will not be noted upon the muster roll. . discharge of enlisted man only . by order of president or secretary of war. . by order of general court martial. . by order of united states court or justice or judge, on writ of habeas corpus. . by command of territorial department. . by disability in line of duty. . by sentence of civil court. . by purchase. (n.b.--in time of war it is probable that the last two methods would not be effective for discharge from the service.) . final statements. the company commander will furnish each enlisted man a final statement (or duplicate) or a full statement in writing explaining why such final statement is not furnished. no final statement will be furnished a soldier who has forfeited all pay and allowances or who has no deposits due him. . certificate will give . character certified by company commander. . whether recommended for re-enlistment. in case of negative opinion, the soldier should be notified at least days prior to discharge. in that case the company commander shall convene a board of three officers (if possible) to determine what kind of discharge shall be given. the soldier will be given a hearing. . loss of discharge certificate. discharge certificates will not be made in duplicate. upon proper proof of loss or destruction without fault of person entitled to it, the war department will issue a certificate of service, showing date of enlistment and discharge from the army and character given in original certificate. discharge certificates should never be forwarded to the war department in correspondence unless called for. . physical disability certificate issued when an enlisted man is permanently unfitted for service, in line of duty. certificates of disability not made in duplicate. . death of soldier. . effects are secured. . nearest relatives notified. . adjutant general of army notified. in active service the war department requires the following reports: . report of company commander to adjutant general, covering death and disposal of remains. . report of surgeon or company commander embodying a. cause of death. b. whether in line of duty. c. whether due to another soldier's misconduct. . inventory of effects in duplicate. . effects, when not claimed within reasonable time, sold and credited to united states. no authority for officers to pay debts of dead soldiers. trinkets will not be sold but sent to the adjutant general's office. . effects will be delivered, if called for, to legal representative of deceased after arrears are paid. . medal of honor. authorized by congress to be awarded to officers and men for extreme acts of gallantry in action, beyond line of duty. recommendations will be considered by standard of extraordinary merit, and must have incontestible proof. . certificate of merit. granted by president to any enlisted man in the service for distinguished acts in line of duty, on recommendation of company commander, based upon statement of eye witness, preferably the immediate company commander. $ permanent additional pay is allowed. . quarters. name of each soldier on bunk. arms on rack. accoutrements hung up by the belts. . saturday inspection preceded by thorough policing. leaders of squads will see that everything is clean. . neglect of rooms or furniture by officer or soldier a military offense. all necessary costs shall be paid by him. . destruction of tableware or kitchen utensils by soldiers will be charged against their pay. . chiefs of squads are responsible . for cleanliness of men. . for their proper equipment for duty. . for their proper dress when going "on pass." . premises shall be policed daily after breakfast. . company commander will see that public property held by men is kept in good order, and missing or spoiled articles paid for. . arms shall not be taken down without proper supervision and by order of commissioned officer. no changing of parts or finish. tompions (muzzle plugs) in small arms forbidden. . accountability and responsibility--both devolve upon persons entrusted with public property. responsibility without accountability devolves upon one to whom property is entrusted, but who does not have to make returns therefor. responsibility does not end until property has been given back to accountable officer and a receipt taken, or he has been relieved by regulations or by orders. accountability without responsibility occurs when an officer holds proper memorandum receipts for property delivered to others. example.--the company commander is accountable and responsible for the rifles turned over to his company. he is accountable without responsibility when each enlisted man has been issued a rifle and has signed a receipt for it. each enlisted man is then responsible for his rifle, without accountability, until he returns it in proper condition. in general, therefore: accountability requires evidence of the disposition that has been made of property. responsibility implies possession, and requires return of the property or payment for it. . loss of public property by neglect of any officer or soldier shall be paid by him, at such rates as a survey of the property may determine. charges will be made only after conclusive proof, and not without a survey if the soldier demands one. signing the payroll will be regarded as an acknowledgment of the justice of the charge. . ration is the allowance of food for one person or animal for one day. . forfeiture of ration is made when a soldier overstays furlough. . pay for continuous service is credited a soldier if he enlists within three months after honorable discharge. for privates an increase of $ per month is allowed up to and including the third enlistment, beyond this $ per month increase given up to and including the seventh enlistment. for non-commissioned officers the increase of $ per month continues to and includes the seventh enlistment. no increased pay is given after the seventh enlistment to private or non-commissioned officer. . allotments (revised by act of congress, october, ). the new law does away with future pensions. allotments may be made to: . family. . bank. for married men or those with dependents, such as children, parents divorced wives, whose support is required by court order, allotments are compulsory, and must not be less than $ a month and not more than one-half of his pay. the company commander is responsible for finding who comes under this rule. by this arrangement soldiers cannot shirk the support of dependents. the government will double the amount allotted by each soldier, to a limit of $ . a month. in cases where the soldier allots half of his pay the government will add to the allotment according to the following scale, even though it more than doubles the amount paid by the soldier: class a. wife, no child, $ . wife, one child, $ . wife, two children, $ . . for each additional child, $ more. no wife living, one child, $ . two children, $ . . three children, $ . four children, $ . for each additional child, $ . class b. one parent, $ . two parents, $ . each grandchild, brother, sister or additional dependent, $ . nurses can make allotment. when both a and b classes are in need of allotment from a soldier's pay, and he has allotted half of his pay to class a, he may allot an additional one-seventh of his pay for the support of class b dependents, and the government will pay the sums listed above to the class b dependents, to the limit of $ a month. payments under this act were begun november , . in case less than one-half of a soldier's pay is allotted, the secretary of war may require the allotment to be increased up to one-half of the pay. compensation for death or disability in line of duty. in all cases must be applied for. in case of death, monthly compensation shall be as follows per month: widow, $ . widow and child, $ . widow and children, $ . . each additional child, $ . one child alone, $ . two children, $ . three children, $ . each additional child, $ . widowed mother, $ . for transportation of body, $ . no women can receive compensation from two sources. the government will continue to pay compensation to a dependent wife until her death or remarriage, and to children until they are years old, unless they are insane or helpless, in which case it will continue to pay the compensation during such incapacity. in case of total disability, compensation will be as follows per month: soldier alone, $ . with wife, no child, $ . with wife, one child, $ . with wife, two children, $ . three children or more, $ . no wife living, one child, $ . no wife living, each additional child, $ . soldier and widowed mother, $ . in case of total disability where attendance is needed, $ per month will be added to the compensation, unless the soldier is blind, bedridden, or has lost both feet or hands, in which case the compensation will be $ per month, with no extra allowance for attendance. in case of partial disability, compensation will be a percentage of the amount paid in case of total disability. these annuities continue only during the life of the person for whom they are first paid. additional insurance.--uniform compensation for all ranks can go only to blood relations. in case of death or disability in line of duty, it is paid in monthly instalments for years. insurance is from $ , to $ , in multiples of $ . the rate is exceedingly low. insurance must be applied for within days after entering the service. premiums are paid monthly, quarterly or yearly from the pay of the insured man. after the war this insurance must be converted within five years into a policy either of straight life insurance, -year payment or endowment, maturing at the age of . in case of death when there is no blood relationship, the reserve value, according to the american insurance mortality tables, is paid to the estate. none of these payments can be attached for debt, nor legal action started against them except in a united states court. the maximum lawyer's fee in any such case is $ . . deposits of not less than $ may be made by an enlisted man (not retired) to any quartermaster. deposit book, signed by quartermaster and company commander, given to man who makes the deposit. this book is not transferable. . a lost deposit book is not replaced without an affidavit of the soldier, testifying that he has not sold nor assigned it. . payment made only on final statement. the soldier should be informed of the importance of keeping the deposit book. . withdrawal of deposit when discharged or furloughed to reserve. . interest on sum greater than $ is per cent. . forfeiture due to desertion, but not by sentence of court martial. deposits not exempt from liabilities due the united states. . officers and men lose pay while confined by civil authorities. . furloughed to reserve or discharged, a soldier is given a final statement in duplicate. this must be presented to be valid. . transportation and subsistence is allowed to the point of enlistment, or for the same distance. not subject to deduction for debts due the united states. . discharged soldier under charge of fraudulent enlistment is not entitled to transportation and subsistence. . transfer of claims on the government made by an enlisted man are only recognized after discharge or furlough to the reserve. they must be in writing and must be endorsed by a commissioned officer or other responsible person known to the quartermaster. . no one is allowed to accompany sick or wounded from the battle line to the rear except those specifically authorized. . ammunition lost or used without orders or not in line of duty shall be charged to the soldier using it. notes on the laws of war. (from manual for commanders of infantry platoons, translated from the french at the army war college, . war department document no. .) the laws of war were instituted under the generous error that certain well-organized peoples had entirely emerged from barbarism and that they considered themselves bound by the placing of their signatures to international conventions, freely agreed to. an infinite number of acts minutely and officially investigated have established that our troops and our nation should never count on the observance of these laws and that the atrocities committed prove to be not only individual violations dishonoring merely the perpetrator, but violations premeditated and ordered in cold blood by the commanders with the moral support of the heads of the enemy nation. these laws are nevertheless repeated here in order that: . the knowledge of how the war should have been conducted may develop in the heart of each man the sentiment of hate (applicable only to foes such as we actually have), that in no case should a chief of platoon tolerate any intercourse between his men and the enemy other than that of the rifle; this duty is explicit and not to be departed from except in the case of the wounded and prisoners incapable of doing harm. . that every violator of these laws, taken in the act, shall be the subject of an immediate report with witnesses, then sent to the division headquarters to be tried as to the facts of the case. the laws of war resulted from the geneva convention, from the declaration of st. petersburg (petrograd), and from the different hague conventions. all these diplomatic papers were signed by germany, austria-hungary, turkey and bulgaria. the following are the principal articles: protect the wounded on the field of battle from pillage and from bad treatment; respect ambulances and evacuation convoys; respect the personnel exclusively concerned with the transportation, treatment and guarding of wounded; do not treat this personnel as prisoners of war if it falls into the hands of the enemy; but return such personnel, as well as material, when its retention shall be no longer necessary for the care of the wounded prisoners. refrain from employing any projectile which weighs less than grams that is either explosive or loaded with incendiary or inflammable material, from all projectiles having for their sole object the spreading of asphyxiating or harmful gases, all expanding bullets or those which will easily flatten out inside the human body, such as jacketed bullets whose jacket does not entirely cover the core or is nickel. forbid the use of poisons or of poisoned arms, killing or wounding an enemy who has thrown down his arms and surrendered; declarations that there will be no quarter; refrain from bombarding towns and cities which are not defended, from firing on churches, historical monuments, edifices devoted to the arts, to science, to charity, to sick and wounded and which are marked by a conspicuous signal known to the enemy. prisoners should be treated as to rations, housing and clothing the same as troops of the country which has captured them. all their personal belongings, except their arms and military papers, should be left in their possession. the following should be inviolate: the emissary--that is to say, an individual authorized by a belligerent to enter into talks with the authorities of the other side and coming under a white flag; also his trumpeter, his standard bearer, and his interpreter. he loses his inviolability if it is proven that he has profited by his privilege to provoke or commit treachery. an undisguised military man can never be treated as a spy. chapter . practice marches. "special attention should be paid to the fitting of shoes and the care of the feet." (i.d.r., .) short marches from to miles should be made daily and at a uniform rate until the troops become hardened. particular attention must always be paid to the rate of march--it is imperative for the leading element to keep a uniform rate per hour. be careful and see to it that your troops march on the right-hand side of the road, and during halts, no one, not even officers, must be permitted on the left. keep closed up, and during the last mile of your march have your company sing some real snappy song, and they will come in in jubilant spirits. keep the muzzles of your rifles always elevated on the march so that men marching in rear wont be bothered. on the march the first halt is for minutes taken after minutes of marching. the men should be taught to use this time to adjust their clothing and equipment, and answer the calls of nature. do not halt where there are houses, etc., on this first halt, as a great many men want to relieve themselves. the succeeding halts are for minutes after minutes of marching--except of course during a forced march--when you would march for a longer period. during rainy or very hot weather the halts should be made oftener. do not have any straggling, remember if a man falls out he must have a certificate signed by an officer stating the cause. have one officer march in rear of the company. be careful about the use of water. have your men take a good drink early in the morning just after reveille, and on the march use their canteen sparingly. one canteen of water must last one man one day. do not allow men to drink until after the second halt. on reaching camp the kitchens are put up, latrines are dug, and tents are pitched. when everything has been tended to each man should give his feet a good salt water bath. put them in the water and let them remain there for minutes. do not dry them by rubbing, but sponge them--this will harden the feet. this should be done for the first three days, after which it can be dispensed with. a change of socks daily should be made, take one pair of socks from the pack, and wash out the dirty pair. try to avoid night marching. the leading company in each regiment regulates the rate of march. "the marching efficiency of an organization is judged by the amount of straggling and elongation and the condition of the men at the end of the march." (i.d.r., .) remember a sanitary squad should be detailed daily to police the immediate vicinity after each halt. field work. field work will be classified under the following heads: orders, deployment, fire, attack, defense, leadership, communications, night operations, patrols, advance guards, rear guards, flank guards, camp, march outpost, and outpost. (a) an order is the will of the commander expressed verbally or in writing to his subordinates. it should be clear, concise and to the point. a field order should be given as follows: . information of the enemy and supporting troops. . general plan of the commander. . dispositions of the troops. . instructions for the trains. . place where messages are to be sent. (b) do not deploy too early. it is very fatiguing, and has a tendency to disorganize the skirmish line. the major designates the companies to be on the firing line, and those to remain in support. the distance between the firing line and support is from to yards. the support should be as close as possible under cover. (c) fire direction is the function of the company commander. he gives each platoon its sector or objective, determines the range, target, indicates the class of fire, and the time to open fire. fire control is given to platoon commanders. the platoon is the fire unit. "fire control implies the ability to stop firing, change the sight setting and target, and resume a well directed fire. the best troops are those that submit longest to fire control." fire discipline is the function of the individual soldier. "it implies that in a firing line without leaders, each man retains his presence of mind and directs effective fire upon the target." (d) the troops march in column of squads until under the observation of the enemy. platoon columns are used in crossing ground where there is cover. squad columns are used across the artillery zone. at approximately yards a skirmish line is formed. thin lines may then be used to advance to the attack. remember the major has assigned each company in the firing line an objective. be sure to watch out for flank protection. if the major has forgotten to have combat patrols on the exposed flank or flanks, it is up to the flank company to send out a combat patrol. this patrol should be slightly in advance of the front line, and off to the right or left. the advance is made by a fraction rushing forward. these rushes are from to yards. when a rush is made the remaining troops fire faster. the firing line should not be reinforced by less than a platoon. the major determines when to fix bayonets. the front rank men fix bayonets first, the rear rank men fire faster, then the rear rank men fix bayonets while the front rank fire faster. a battalion is the smallest unit in the firing line to inaugurate a charge. remember the battalion is the attack unit. in changing sight setting follow same plan as fixing bayonet, _i.e._, each front rank first, the rear rank man firing faster, etc. (e) defense.--in defense the line is usually stronger and the support weaker than in the attack. do not give up your ground unless you have written orders from the high command. watch out for flank protection by combat patrols. (f) leadership.--a good leader should possess self reliance, initiative, aggressiveness, superior knowledge, and have a conception of teamwork. make your work a game in which each man has a part to play. reward merit and give the disagreeable things to be done to the "knockers." a leader must know his men. never give them a job to do that you couldn't do yourself. train yourself to estimate the situation quickly and calmly. have your men well disciplined, well drilled, well equipped, and well dressed. it might be called unmilitary by some of the sterner characters in our service, but we believe by occasionally drawing comparisons to something real amusing--a good joke--you show your men that the "old man" is really made of human stuff. be sympathetic, and it has been shown by experience that, for some slight breach of discipline a "little talk" in the orderly room does the most good, and is the best form of punishment. do your work cheerfully, and your men will do likewise. keep yourself abreast of the times in all matters military--remember your men look to you in time of action and excitement and you must be ready to deliver the goods. work out and plan your orders, etc., simply. morale is the greatest asset an organization can have. keep all your troubles and have the men keep theirs within the company. have _esprit de corps_. the real successful leader knows and plays the game. (g) communications.--communication is maintained by wireless, telegraph, telephone, signals, runners, carrier pigeons, aeroplanes, motor cars, patrols, and connecting files. each unit usually maintains communication with the next higher command, and with similar commands on the flanks. (h) night operations.--they are used to minimize losses from hostile fire, to escape observation, and to gain time. the ground to be traversed at night should be carefully looked over in daylight. some distinctive badge should be worn by our troops. the bayonet is chiefly used at night. avoid firing. the enemy should be surprised. place obstacles in front of your own lines at night. usually yards is the maximum range to fire at night. (i) patrols.--"a commander may be excused for being defeated, but never for being surprised." patrols. commander selects leader, strength, gives it a mission, when to report back, and where to send messages. he gives it a number if more than one patrol is sent out, information of the enemy, and location of any friendly patrols that may be or have been sent out. patrol leader is then allowed to ask questions. _patrol leader_.--he should have a compass, watch, pencil, note-book, knife, and a map of the country. he should then do the following: . assemble his men. . inspect them. a. to see if they are fit for this duty. b. that they have no valuable maps or papers, that their equipment does not rattle or shine. c. rations and water. . he repeats the instruction that he has received. . he explains any signals that are to be used. . designates a rallying point in case they are scattered. . details a second in command. . takes a formation that will favor the escape of at least one man. _conduct of the patrol_.-- . move cautiously but not timidly. . do not flinch or show consciousness of it in case you become suddenly aware that you are under the observation of the enemy. not knowing that you are aware of his presence he will let you come on, and suddenly, when you see cover, make a dash for it and escape. . do not get lost. . do not allow yourself to think of the enemy as being in one direction only. . in entering or passing through woods take an extended skirmish line formation. . in passing any short defile bridge or ford, send one man ahead. . if you suspect the presence of the enemy under certain cover, a good way to find out is to let one man approach within a reasonable distance and then, acting as though he had been discovered, turn and run. this will generally draw his fire. . keep quiet. forbid unnecessary talking. . from time to time select suitable rallying points in case you become separated. . remember that you do not fight unless in self defense. _report_.-- . do not report the presence of small patrols unless you have been ordered to do so. locate the main body or a large command. . determine his strength, kind of troops and movements. . remember the indispensable qualities of a report are: accuracy as to facts, simplicity, clearness, legibility and correct spelling. surmises must not be given as facts. separate what you know and what has been told you. a report should not be expressed carelessly in ten words when it could be clearly stated in twenty. send a sketch if practicable. . do not send a verbal message. . address it to c.o. support or c.o. advance guard, etc., not to the commander of a certain body of troops. give date, place and time. . remember to state what you intend to do. . in hostile country send two messages by different routes. in friendly country one will suffice. . when the capture of your message is likely, give messenger a false one that will be easily found and conceal the true message carefully. _return_.-- . do not return over the same route as you avoid ambuscade and widen your field of reconnaissance. . report any special features of military value that you have seen to your c.o. . compliment your men. (j) _advance guard._--"an advance guard is a detachment of the main body which precedes it and covers it on the march" (i.d.r. ). the commander of troops designates the advance guard, the distance between it and the main body, and also designates a commander. the advance guard commander if he has more than a battalion designates the reserve, support, distance between them. if the advance guard is a battalion or less it would have no reserve, and in that case the advance guard commander would designate the support, advance party, and the distance between them. in the former case the support commander would designate the advance party, and the distance between the support and the advance party. in both cases the advance party commander designates the point, and the distance between the point and the advance party. usually it is the duty of the advance party to send out flank patrols. the strength varies from / to / of the main body. remember "the formation of the advance guard must be such that the enemy will first be met by a patrol, then in turn by one or more larger detachments, each capable of holding the enemy until the next in rear has time to deploy before coming under effective fire." the advance guard must be aggressive. do not put up with a cautious point. have a double connecting file, and if possible every yards. "each element of the column sends the necessary connecting files to its front." on the road in order are: point--advance party--support--reserve (if there is one)--main body. have the point precede the advance party, all the remaining elements follow the one ahead. this has been found by experience to be the best method of getting "there." (k) _rear guards_.--"a rear guard is a detachment detached to protect the main body from attack in the rear." "the general formation is that of the advance guard reversed." i.e. rear point, rear party, support, and main body. "in retreat a column is preceded by a body of troops designated 'leading troops,' whose principle duty is to clear the road of obstacles and to facilitate the withdrawal of the command." (l) _flank guards_.--as their name imply protect the flanks. they should be in constant communication with the column. their formation usually conforms to that of patrols. (m) _camps_.--the four principal factors to be considered in the selection of the camp site are: near a good road or roads, have good drainage, plenty of room to accommodate your troops, and have a good water supply. immediately after camp is made sinks are dug for the disposal of excreta. one should be dug for each company on the opposite flank from the kitchen for the disposal of human excreta, and one near the kitchen for the disposal of wastes, etc., that cannot be burned around the kitchen. (n) _march outpost_.--a march outpost is usually an advance guard halted, with observers in each unit on the alert. a cossack post might be established on a good near by observation point. the march outpost is the protection furnished the main body at short halts, or on making camp before the outpost is established. (o) _outpost_.--the outpost may be best illustrated by circles: each support is numbered from right to left. each outguard in each support is numbered from right to left. each sentinel post in each outguard is numbered from right to left. outguards are divided into three classes, cossack posts, sentry squads and packets. a cossack post consists of men, posted in observation near the posts of the remaining three. a sentry squad consists of one squad, posts a double sentinel post in observation near the post of the squad. a picket consists of two or more squads not exceeding half a company. it furnishes cossack posts, sentry squads, sentinel posts, and patrols. it is usually placed at the more important points of the outguard line, as a road fork, etc. the post furnished by pickets may be as far as yards away. there should be also a sentinel post near the picket in observation. if the outguard consists of two or more companies there is a reserve. the reserve is held at some suitable point, where it can readily support the line. the reserve maintains connection with the main body and the support. the support occupies the line to be held. this line should be entrenched. the support maintains communication with its outguards and with each support on its flanks. it also sends out the necessary reconnoitering patrols. the outguards furnish sentinel posts and maintain communication with them, and with the outguards on each flank. it is the duty of the support commander to inspect his line and make such changes in the outguards as he deems necessary, then to report to the outpost commander with a sketch if practicable of his line when his dispositions are completed. the outpost commander should inspect the line, order such changes as he deems necessary, and report with a sketch of the outpost line to the commander of troops when his outpost has taken up its position. "the support commander must practice the greatest economy on men consistent with the requirements of practical security." instead of using outguards along the whole front, part of it may be covered by patrols. [illustration: plate # diagram of outpost line] outline of field service regulations. land forces of u.s. regular army. organized land militia. volunteer forces. how grouped: mobile army. coast artillery. mobile army: for offensive operations against enemy and so requires maximum degree of mobility. basis of organization the division, a self-contained unit composed of all necessary arms and services. coast artillery: ( ) permanent fortifications for defense against naval attack. ( ) semi-permanent fortifications for protection of permanent from raiders. ( ) organization of mobile troops to prevent landing of enemy. military information. essential: ( ) to enable war department to estimate equipment and size of force necessary. ( ) to enable commander properly to estimate the situation in the field of operations. transmission of information. wire, signaling, radio and messenger: message.--concise, written information sent by messenger or wire. source always given.--"heard" separated from "seen." report.--formal account of some enterprise. war diary.--record of events kept in campaigns. maps. reconnaissance: the work of individuals or units in gathering information. to keep contact with the enemy--to be acquainted with the terrain; to protect flanks and rear and guard against surprise. reconnaissance begins on entering theater of operations and lasts through campaign. effected by patrols and air craft. indications of enemy: tracks on road. abandoned camps and clothing. infantry, thick, low cloud of dust. cavalry, high, thin cloud of dust. artillery and wagons, broken cloud. determination of enemy forces: timing past a given point. cavalry (walk), per minute. cavalry (trot), per minute. infantry, per minute. artillery and wagons, per minute. security: those measures taken to protect a command from enemy observation, annoyance and surprise. obtained by covering the front with detachments. march.--advance, flank and rear guards. camp.--outposts. march and camp detachments.--to give warning and resist attack until such time as detachment in rear can deploy. advance guard: detachment from main body to cover its advance. against surprise for information. push back small bodies. check enemy's advance until deployment in rear. seize good position and locate enemy lines. remove obstacles. strength - to - of entire command. divisions of advance guard: cavalry point. infantry point. advance party. support. reserve. leading troops: a detachment protecting the head of a column in retreat. rear guard: detachments protecting the rear of a retreating column. formation like that of advance guard. flank patrols: detachments for protecting the flanks of marching column. march outpost: detachments for protection of column halted on march. formation, that of the marching protection. outpost: the detachments forming the protection for a force in camp or bivouac. divisions of outpost: reserve. line of supports. line of outguards. pickets. sentinel posts: sentry squads. cossack posts. sentinels. detached posts (from support). hours of special danger: evening and dawn; thus good times to relieve outposts. examining post: intelligence and a place where prisoners, etc., are brought in. orders: the expression of the will of a commander, either written or verbal. letters of instruction--plans of the superior leaders. field orders: regulate tactical and strategical actions of troops. general orders include: ( ) all necessary detailed instructions. ( ) all standing instructions (avoid repetition). ( ) proceedings of general and special courts-martial. special orders: relate to assignment and movement of individuals, not necessary to be communicated to the whole command. bearers of verbal orders must _repeat._ field orders: ( ) heading.--title, place, date, hour and number. ( ) distribution of troops.--division of command. ( ) body: (a) information of enemy and supporting troops. (b) general plan of commander. (c) detailed tactical dispositions to carry out general plan. (d) instructions for trains--also the positions of ammunition and dressing stations. ( ) ending.--authentication and method of sending. marches and convoys: successful march.--that which places troops at destination on time, and in best possible condition. rates of march: infantry.-- to - / miles per hour. cavalry.-- miles (walk), miles (trot), miles (gallop). artillery.--(same.) average marches: infantry.-- - miles per day. cavalry.-- miles per day. artillery.-- - miles per day. load of pack mules equals pounds. march orders, state: ( ) object of march. ( ) distribution of troops. ( ) order of march of main body. ( ) manner of forming the column. halts: first hour, minutes' rest. each successive hour, a -minute rest. weather conditions create exceptions to above rule. marches in peace: ( ) changing station. ( ) practice. in war: ( ) concentration. ( ) in presence of enemy. ( ) forced marches. ( ) night marches. convoys (on land): those trains by which supplies are forwarded to an army from depots, etc., in the rear--also trains bringing supplies collected by requisition. security furnished by an escort: ( ) advance guard. ( ) main body. ( ) flank guard when necessary. ( ) rear guard. favorable places for attacking convoys: through woods defile. over hedges. sharp bends. ascending or descending slopes. farming corral, watering. whenever conditions are such that escort cannot quickly prepare for defense. conducting prisoners: foot soldiers to every prisoners. infantry: the principal arm, charged with the main field work. its role is the role of the entire force and its success is the success of the whole force. artillery: the close supporting arm of the infantry. its targets are those most dangerous in the eyes of the infantry. cavalry: reconnaissance--supports the other arms and is valuable in pursuit. combat: offensive. defensive. (a) temporary. (b) passive defense. combat principles: fire superiority. unity of command. simple and direct plans and methods. all troops necessary to mission must be assigned at beginning. detachments justifiable only when they can contribute directly to success of main battle. some reserves must be kept. flank protection and reconnaissance. fire superiority: must be gained early and maintained. frontage of units: depth in formation for combat rather than extension of line. reserves: fresh troops must be on hand to ( ) give fire line impetus. ( ) to penetrate enemy lines. ( ) to fill gaps and help reorganization. ( ) to meet counter attacks. plan of action: mission of army is to win battle. offensive action must be the rule. when enemy is near every available means must be taken to gain information, in order to prepare for deployment. offensive combat: the attack develops into parts. ( ) assaulting hostile position at selected points. ( ) threaten or assault all other parts of enemy line in order to hold enemy from reinforcing operations. enveloping attack: advantage of converging fire upon position. holding attack: an attack for holding enemy in one place, while assaults made at another point. assaults: the local concentrated offensive. pursuit: only by energetic pursuit can the full fruit of victory be gleaned. its purpose is to cause the greatest loss in personnel and morale possible cavalry and artillery active. defensive combat: passive defense--to gain time, or to hold certain points pending results in other parts of the line. defense seeking a favorable decision--a parrying of blows while seeking a favorable opening. counter attack the crisis of this form. counter attack--made by launching reserves at the flank, while the enemy is fully committed to the attack. defensive positions: requisites: clear field of fire. flanks naturally secure. extent of ground suitable to strength of force. effective corps for reserves. good lines of retreat. good communication. position in readiness: a position intended to resist the advance of an enemy in the immediate vicinity information of whose movements is not full enough to warrant definite action. withdrawal from action: troops most readily disengaged from the enemy should be withdrawn first. demands highest order of skill in troop leadership. covering positions--those positions chosen to cover the retreating force. retreat--a step by step opposition to the enemy's advance on a prearranged plan. delaying actions: . advance delayed as long as possible, consistent with safe withdrawal. . delayers must hold position. night combat: offensive advisable. . where fire superiority is impossible by day. . to avoid heavy losses by advance to assaulting position by day. . to capture posts or patrols. . to surprise for moral effect. defensive: obstacles in front of position. trenches heavily manned and supports drawn close. shelter: troops under canvas--in camp. troops on ground without canvas--bivouac. troops in huts or villages--cantonment. tactical considerations are paramount in the selection of camp sites in the theater of operations. selection of camp site: . suitably large to accommodate command. . water supply sufficient and accessible. . good roads to and in camp. . wood and grass forage near at hand. . sandy subsoil for drainage. . hot weather shade--cold protection. to maintain the efficiency of a command, troops must have adequate shelter. sanitary considerations around camp: latrines on opposite side of camp from kitchens. short camps, straddle trenches. long camps, trenches by by with seats. have latrines screened. burn the trenches out daily and keep covered. wash boxes and paint with tar. questions and answers on f.s.r. . how are the land forces of the u.s. organized? _ans_.--the _mobile army_ consisting of regular army, organized land militia when called to federal service, drafted army, volunteers and the field artillery and the _coast artillery._ basis of organization is the division composed of all arms and self-sufficient. several divisions may be grouped into a field army, to which are attached field army troops. these are organized into a brigade for purpose of supply and administration when necessary through numbers. coast artillery is charged with the care and use of land and coast fortifications, including submarine mines and torpedo defenses. . what is the object of collecting military information? _ans_.--to enable the war department to decide upon the size of army or expedition, the proportions of different arms, the character of clothing, equipment, etc., needed for any operation. information collected by the gen. staff in time of peace should include geography, physical resources, and military strength of the various nations. . define reconnaisance. _ans_.--reconnaisance is used to designate the work of troops or individuals when gathering information in the field. it is necessary during combat for the tactical use of troops. it is carried on by: (a) aero squadron; (b) independent cavalry; (c) divisional cavalry; (d) by infantry as reconnoitering patrols. . what are some indications of the presence of the enemy? _ans_.--clothing or material on roads or in abandoned camps. a thick, low cloud of dust indicates infantry. a high, thin cloud cavalry. a broken cloud artillery or wagon trains. how would you determine from these indications what the number and organization of the enemy might be? _ans_.--estimate strength by length of time it takes to pass a given point. assuming that infantry in column of squads occupies half a yard per man, cavalry in column of fours yard per trooper, and artillery in single column yards per gun or caisson, a given point would be passed in one minute by about: infantry, cavalry at walk, cavalry at trot, guns or caissons. . suppose on patrol and safely concealed for sighting the enemy at no great distance, by what rough method would you ascertain the approximate strength of the force assuming it to be composed of infantry, cavalry and artillery? see answer no. . . what is the composition and arrangement of the advance guard? _ans_.--all arms of the service. in open country much cavalry and field artillery, the latter seldom assigned to command smaller than a brigade. also machine guns, ambulance company if the force is large and engineers for purpose of removing obstacles to the march. large command; advance cavalry, support, reserve. small command; point, advance party, support, reserve. strength should be / to / , depending on size of command and character of terrain. advance guard increases in size proportionately with size of command. why? . define: (a) outguard; they constitute small detachments farthest to the front and nearest to the enemy. (b) cossack post; observation group at indicated point consisting of four men, post single sentinel. (c) picket; small command up to platoon placed in line of outguards at more important points such as road forks. . what is an order? _ans_.--orders are used by commanders of divisions and separate brigades for regulating the movement and supply of field trains, fixing position of distributing points for rations and forage, in short, have to do with supplies of all kinds, especially food. form: the heading. the distribution of troops (in certain orders). the body. the ending. the body contains: . information about the enemy and our supporting troops. . general plan of the commander. . disposition of the troops. . instructions for the trains. . where the commander may be found or messages are to be sent. . during an advance what is the general order of advance of a column? _ans_.--cavalry and horse artillery. infantry and light artillery. engineering and signal troops. trains. . what is the average march per day of various arms? _ans_.--infantry, miles per day. infantry in large bodies, miles per day. cavalry, miles per day. field artillery, to miles per day. horse artillery, same as cavalry, to which it may be attached. forced marches are from to miles for infantry. . how is the escort distributed in guarded convoys? _ans._--advance guard, with advance cavalry to miles ahead. main body may be opposite most important point of the train, usually opposite its center. section of infantry at head and tail of train. flank guard--if necessary. rear guard-- / of escort. what places are most favorable for attacking convoy? when passing through woods, defile, or over bridge, when going around sharp bends in the road; when convoy is forming corral. . discuss uses of the various arms in combat. _ans._--infantry: the most important arm, charged with the main work of the battle. artillery: supporting arm of infantry. its target is the opposing arm most dangerous to the infantry. cavalry: reconnaisance before combat, support of other arms during combat. . what is the difference between the attack and the assault? _ans._--in combat where the force is as large or larger than a division, a simultaneous advance against the entire hostile front is out of the question. attack is made up of a number of local combats. some where enemy is engaged with view to driving him out. this is called the assault. other parts of attack with fewer troops simply to keep the enemy from coming to the support of those troops of the assaulted lines. the entire advance against the enemy is the attack. after the firing lines have advanced some distance the weak and the strong points of the enemy's lines are disclosed. the weak points of course are selected. . discuss the manner in which a pursuit should be carried out? _ans._--if enemy commences withdrawal before front lines have given way, troops in action push forward until enemy in their front are driven away. cavalry and horse artillery are thrown against flanks of retreating enemy, or on their front. purpose to further disorganize the enemy, beat him to bridges, defiles, etc. in meantime reserve is sent into the pursuit, while troops engaged are assembling to constitute a new reserve. general scheme is to keep in continuous contact with enemy, giving him no chance to reorganize. boldness necessary. . what are the different kinds of defense, and what is the purpose of each? _ans._--(a) passive; to retain position for specified time with or without combat, or to prevent enemy from carrying position. (b) defense seeking favorable decision; troops forced temporarily to assume the defensive, with intention of assuming the offensive at first favorable opportunity. . what is the purpose of the counter attack? _ans._--to win victory, stave off defeat or prevent lines from being entered. it may be launched either at the enemy's strong or weak points depending on conditions. if enemy are beaten off and disorganized at some point, it may be good opportunity to follow up the advantage by counter attack. also at other points where weakness develops. counter attack is made at strength of enemy to prevent him from penetrating the defensive position. . how should advance position be organized and held? _ans._--force should not be so weak that it can be driven back to main body before it accomplishes its purpose, nor so strong that it will hold out too long, thereby committing the entire force to action in advance line instead of the line selected. trenches. what is position in readiness? troops placed in readiness for action where it is intended to resist the advance of enemy in immediate vicinity, but knowledge of his movements not yet sufficiently definite to decide upon plan of action. preliminary to taking up offensive, or more usually to taking up and occupying defensive position. hasten deployment when time comes. . if it becomes necessary to withdraw troops from action state steps necessary to insure the safety of troops during the withdrawal and retreat. _ans._--last reserves should be used. if none, troops least pressed used to cover withdrawal. cavalry and artillery used unsparingly. depends on the terrain. first covering position well to the rear so as not to suffer demoralization. on flanks of line of retreat. there should also be facilities to withdraw the occupying force. firing line made as strong as possible, minimum of reserves held. use m.g. perhaps successive covering points necessary further to rear before advance of enemy can be checked. when a few miles to the rear, or far enough to free troops from all contact with the enemy, reorganize. step-by-step opposition useless. number of covering positions should be reduced to the minimum. retreat; trains at once put into march. other forces at once put into order of march. all roads used, separate roads for divisions. effective rear guard from troops whose strength and morale is least impaired. divisional cavalry and as much artillery as can effectively be used. use artillery at long range to keep the enemy deployed, destroy bridges, etc. chapter . feeding men. in camp.--you will usually have plenty of food but continual inspecting is necessary to have it properly cared for, prepared and served. the kitchen must be kept clean: company commanders inspect daily and insist on the following: . have cooks and enlisted men come to attention at the command of the first man who sees you approach. . have all refrigerators opened, and put your head in far enough to detect any bad odors. . check the bill of fare and see that food not consumed one day is utilized later--waste bread for bread pudding, for example. . see that doors close properly, that windows are screened and roof is tight--allow no flies. . have floors, tables and refrigerators scrubbed daily. . have the ground around the mess shack raked and thoroughly policed. towels hung out to dry must be so hung as not to fall to the ground. raked ground does not allow flies to build undisturbed. . taste the coffee and look in the coffee bins. . inspect pans, knives, meat grinder (have latter taken apart for you occasionally). . see that the mess sergeant looks after the incinerator properly; that he makes the cooks use what he tells them to. cooks should not be allowed to help themselves to things; the mess sergeant should weigh out or set out just what is to be used each day. . have the food served hot and in individual portions as far as possible; see that the food is not put on the table too soon. . during each month talk with an old soldier, a raw recruit and a non-commissioned officer about the mess to see what the men think of it. on the march.--( . i.d.r., - .) if portable kitchens accompany troops, the men should fall in in single file and be helped to food as they pass by in companies. for individual cooking.--rations issued might be: carton of hard-tack, ration of bacon, potato, tablespoons of rice, heaping tablespoon of coffee, sugar. fires for individual cooking are best made out of small dried twigs to produce a hot fire large enough for a group of four men. there are two methods of cooking with the issue mess-kit. first method: each man cooking for himself. as there are but two cooking utensils, the tin cup and the frying pan, the cooking must be systematized in order to cook four articles on the two utensils. to do this, the rice is first cooked in the tin cup filling the tin cup one-third full of water throwing in the rice. the water is brought to a boil and boiled until the individual grains of rice are soft through. the tin cup is then removed from the fire, the water poured off, and the cup covered with the lid of the mess tin, the rice being allowed to steam. in the meantime, the bacon should be fried in the frying pan, the grease being saved. when the rice is well steamed, it is turned out in the lid of the meat can, then the bacon placed on top of it. the tin cup is washed out and the man is then ready to fry his potato and boil his coffee. the cup is filled two-thirds full of water and the coffee placed in it and boiled until the desired strength is attained. to prevent the coffee from boiling over, a canteen of water should be handy and water thrown in whenever the coffee begins to boil over. when the coffee is strong enough, the addition of cold water will settle the grounds. in the meantime, cut the potatoes very thin and fry them in the bacon grease and the meal is ready: hard-tack, potatoes, rice, bacon and coffee. second method: squads of four may specialize; one man to collect the frying pans and fry all the bacon, another the potatoes, another the rice and coffee, and the other for collection of wood. either method may be followed. mess-kits should be cleaned immediately after using, sand being used for scouring. mess-kits must be cleaned thoroughly. in the trenches.--usually rations and stores will be carried up to the trenches by the supports and the reserves. if this is not possible and it becomes necessary that men from the front line trenches be employed, not more than per cent of the men in the firing line are to be away from the trenches at the same time. rations and cooking: (a) ration parties from the support and reserve trenches will be made up in complete units, _i.e._, platoons or companies. (b) the company mess sergeant will accompany the ration parties for his company and will report his arrival to the company commander. (c) great care is to be taken that ration and carrying parties make as little noise as possible. (d) cooking if possible will be done behind the front line trenches, and should be concentrated by sections or companies. steps must be taken to insure that as little smoke as possible is made by the cook's fires. (e) waste in any form will be discouraged. (f) arrangements should be made to insure that soup or some hot drink be available for the men between midnight and a.m. each company commander must see that timely requisitions for rations are made and to have no delays at meal times. food should be brought up in tin boilers about the size of wash boilers so that two men can handle one of them easily without a relief. in front line, men send mess kit relayed from hand to hand to these boilers at stations in each platoon or section and they are relayed back. sometimes men in the front line are relieved for a few minutes. always carry hours rations. camping and camp sanitation. general principles: great care must be exercised in selecting a camp site, but it must never be forgotten that the tactical situation is of paramount importance. the following principles govern the selection: ( ) sufficient supply of pure water. ( ) good roads, but not too near a main highway on account of dust and noise. ( ) wood and forage must be obtainable. the ground should: ( ) give ample room without crowding. ( ) have porous soil. ( ) have high elevation to make site dry. avoid: ( ) marshy ground and mosquitoes. ( ) woods or dense vegetation. ( ) ravines or depressions in terrain or dry stream beds subject to sudden freshets. water must be obtainable: ( ) arrange immediately where to obtain (a) drinking and cooking water. (b) water for animals. (c) water for bathing and washing. in the case of running water, the point furthest up-stream shall be guarded for drinking and cooking water. bathing shall be done at a point furthest down-stream. successful military camping depends upon three ( ) things: ( ) discipline. ( ) cooking. ( ) sanitation. discipline means control; it means order. nowhere are these more essential. confusion is loss of control, loss of time, and loss of respect by the men. upon arrival at a favorable camp site get the men off their feet. do not wait around. as c.o. have your decisions made and the work organized, so that each squad will be under a leader. keep squads together, allowing none to stray off until the work is done, then let everyone rest except the sentinels. do not omit to post sentinels over the water supply and at important points, even though you have not decided upon the exact location of camp. organize the work by platoons or squads and rotate, if camp is to be made every few days. discipline in camp means more than order and dispatch, however, men must understand that they are under discipline when off duty--that they cannot disregard sanitary measures, eat promiscuously, destroy property, vegetation, or timber and must police the grounds at all times. papers, cigarette butts, and newspapers, should never be allowed on the ground near camp. eatables should never be kept in tents to draw vermin. where possible, in dry weather, the company street should be wet down to keep the dust out of the tents. have men ditch around tents immediately upon making camp. though it may seem somewhat of a hardship, a sudden down pour of rain, will recompense them for this labor many times over. in ditching the tents, completely circle them, for if this is not done a great deal of rain will come in the front of the tent. food means everything to a soldier. the camp cooking is a barometer of the organized efficiency and of the enlisted men's attitude. nothing else can do so much to help or hinder. the company commander should realize the controlling power exercised by the company cook and keep the matter in his own hands. he should accept no excuse for burnt or dirty food. if officers mess with their companies they will appreciate the attitude of the men and be able to judge the real situation. officers will be well repaid for doing this, as it gives them an idea of the food that is being served their men. in the mechanical details of preparing food, the fire is of first importance. a quick method of cooking is by laying a pair of large green logs on the surface of the ground just wide enough to place the pots between them, so that the bottom of the pots will be resting upon them. build a fire between these logs, making sure to place the logs parallel to the direction of the wind. a pit may be dug, with a sloping bottom, and across this may be placed the pots, and if iron rails are available, the utensils may be placed on these. for longer stays this pit may be lined with stone. stones retain the heat and less wood is required. four trenches radiating from a central chimney will give one flue whatever may be the direction of the wind. (for more specific data on the subject of fires and camp cooking, see manual for army cooks--u.s.a.--also notes in i.d.r., pp. - .) make a rule never to allow food to remain in tin cans after opening them. remember to place kitchen near available water supply and furthest from latrines, horse picket lines, or dumps of any kind. sanitation comes last in the thoughts of the enlisted man, but it is no less important for that. the first requisite is cleanliness. food receptacles must be scoured and covers and cracks in tin ware scraped as well as scalding the tins themselves. have boiling hot water in tanks (galvanized iron ash cans are good) for men to wash mess kits in after meals. one can should contain soapy water so as to cut the grease from the dishes, and the second tank should contain clean, boiling water for scalding the kits. scraps of food should be scraped from the mess tins before immersing them in water, otherwise washing water becomes filled with small particles of food. wiping cloths will greatly add to the convenience of the men and takes but a short time to make them clean and fit for use again. care must be exercised over three kinds of waste: ( ) garbage. ( ) kitchen slops. ( ) excreta. garbage can be burned in the kitchen fires. it should never stand exposed to the air, but should be tightly covered in iron cans, and should be disposed of every twenty-four hours. kitchen help have an aversion to prompt disposal of garbage and need watching. fly traps should be made of muslin and used freely about the kitchen. kitchen slops, fats, greasy water, etc., must be drained into covered pits, never allowing them to be tossed on the ground around the cook tent. a hole dug and partially filled with stones with a barrel placed upside down on them, makes a very good receptacle for kitchen slops. the barrel should be placed so that the inverted top will be a little way beneath the surface of the ground. a hole should be bored in the bottom of the barrel and a funnel inserted, through which the slops may be poured. if the soil is porous, a trough may be dug and covered with mosquito netting or cheese cloth, and the water poured through this and allowed to drain off. excreta is the most deadly form of waste, and too much care cannot be exercised in disposing of it. impress upon every man that he must cover completely with dirt all excreta so that flies may not have a chance to approach it. for short stops and while working in the field "straddle," latrines are the best. these are shallow trenches the width of a shovel, about inches wide, and several feet in length. for long stops a deep latrine is dug of the following dimensions: feet wide, feet deep by feet long. two posts with crotches, driven at the ends of this trench, supporting a substantial pole to make a seat * * * for convenience a hand rail placed in front of this improvised seat will add to the comfort of the men. a more permanent latrine is made by covering the pit with a wooden box, in the top of which are cut holes of the necessary diameter. to these holes should be fitted spring covers which will shut down tightly. a wooden frame boarded around this arrangement makes a satisfactory enclosure. a urinal made of two long boards joined together to form a v-shaped trough and drained by a pipe into the pit completes the whole. a pitch sufficient for rapid drainage should be given the urinal trough. when necessary to utilize separate urinals, a hole filled with stone and sprinkled daily with quicklime is sufficient for short periods. at night there should be a galvanized iron can placed in each company street and emptied before reveille each morning. this can must be disinfected by burning out, as must be the latrines when earth or sand is not used as a covering each time. pits must be covered daily with quicklime, ashes, earth and filled when within two ( ) feet of the surface. their position should be distinctly marked so as to prevent reopening. it is a safe rule never to use an old camp ground, but select a new one, even if less conveniently located. camp sites should be changed if it is found that the soil is becoming polluted, or if the ground is cut up and dusty from constant use. the condition in which a camp site is left by an organization will clearly indicate the efficiency and discipline in a command. chapter . personal hygiene and first aid. this is a purely arbitrary grouping of topics for the purpose of saving space. either of the topics mentioned could be treated at length; detailed information will be found in any of the reference books mentioned in the bibliography. personal hygiene means "the preservation of health by attention to the care of the body;" it is determined by the formation of correct habits. cleanliness of person, clothing and bedding should become a habit of life with the soldier; but some men will always require watching and admonition. these habits are: personal cleanliness; regulation of diet; avoidance of excesses (eating, drinking and sexual matters); wearing suitable clothing; keeping the bodily processes at work (kidneys, bowels and skin); taking sufficient exercise, preferably in the open air; rest of body and mind, with recreation for the latter; maintaining the surroundings in which one lives in a cleanly state. bathing is easily the most important requirement in matters of personal hygiene; men should bathe as often as conditions of life in barracks and camp will permit. on the march a vigorous "dry rub" with a coarse towel will often prove an excellent substitute when water is not available. _teeth_ should be cleaned at least twice daily. _clothing_ should be kept clean, particularly underclothing. _diet_ is not a matter which a soldier can determine to any extent for himself; but he can follow a certain few precautions: . don't eat hurriedly; chew the food properly. . don't overload the stomach. . don't eat green or overripe fruit. . don't eat anything while away from camp or barracks, whose materials or manner of preparation seem questionable. . don't bring a "grouch" to the table with you. . don't eat on the march; don't drink too much water on the march. sexual indulgence is a matter to be handled tactfully, but with absolute frankness. men should be taught that it is not a matter of necessity; that their health will not suffer by any lack of it; that they themselves will be the sufferers for any violations of rules of health. the procedure directed by the war department for purposes of combatting infection is as follows: . that physical inspections of enlisted men be made twice each month for the detection of venereal disease. . that any soldier who exposes himself to infection shall report for cleansing and preventive treatment immediately upon return to camp or garrison. . that any soldier who fails so to report, if found to be suffering from a venereal infection, shall be brought to trial by court martial for neglect of duty. . that men so infected shall be confined strictly to the limits of the post during the infectious stages of the disease. . that all officers serving with troops shall do their utmost to encourage healthful exercises and physical recreation and to supply opportunities for cleanly social and interesting mental occupations for the men under their command. . that company and medical officers shall take advantage of favorable opportunities to point out the misery and disaster that follow upon moral uncleanliness; and the fact that venereal disease is never a trivial affair. with a great many men these precautions and measures will not be necessary but for the sake of those who are ignorant or neglectful, proper steps should at all times be taken. exercise.--a sufficient amount of exercise to maintain health is ordinarily provided by military drills and other duties requiring active movement. but this should be regarded only as the minimum of exercise; athletic work should be encouraged (and this will be done by the present activities of those "higher up"); bayonet training will be found an excellent medium of accomplishing a double purpose; calisthenics should be short but snappy and vigorous. a vigorous policy of an officer as regards things of this sort will ward off a great many minor ills and particularly "colds," which are often the result of poor ventilation. cleanliness of surroundings.--men should be taught that cleanliness of surroundings is not merely for purposes of inspection; but that it is absolutely necessary where a great number of men are living together in close quarters. quarters should be well policed; the company street should be kept clean; refuse of all sorts should be kept in receptacles provided for that purpose and frequently removed. a police squad appointed daily should be charged with this work, and the corporal of the same made responsible for the condition of quarters and the company street. preventable diseases.--men should be given a certain amount of theoretical knowledge of preventable diseases. these matters will be taken care of to a large extent by the medical corps; but men should be taught just what precautions are necessary to avoid recourse to the hospital. venereal diseases have already been touched upon. typhoid fever is a germ disease and communicable. vaccination is the first preventive; protection of water supply is the second; thorough disposal of wastes is a third; and sharp punishment for violation of sanitary regulations is a fourth. habits of personal cleanliness will do much to prevent any such disease. dysentery is very common in field service, but may be prevented by same methods as for typhoid fever, save for vaccination; men suffering from this malady should be isolated, if possible, and utmost precaution taken to prevent spread of the disease. malaria is a mosquito disease; get rid of mosquitoes and then you will get rid of the carrier of the germs. quinine may act as a preventive. cases should be isolated, if possible. tonsilitis and colds may be combatted very effectively by proper precautions as to ventilation. measles.--very important but little known; isolation recommended. there are many other diseases concerning which the men should be instructed, but lack of space prevents further treatment of them. they should be taught the proper treatment of blistered feet, for they incapacitate a great many men; the chief causes are ill-fitting shoes and our old friend "uncleanliness." shoes are the most important article of clothing of the infantryman; each man should have one pair well broken in for marching, and two other pairs. socks should be soft, smooth and without holes--also _clean_. further steps for the prevention of blisters are; hardening of the skin by appropriate baths for the feet; soaping the feet; or adopting some other means of reducing the friction of the foot against the sock. _treatment_--wash the feet; open the blister at the lowest point, with a clean needle; dress with vaseline or other ointment and protect with adhesive plaster, care being taken not to shut out the air. zinc oxide plaster is excellent. sterilize a needle; thread it with a woolly thread and run it through blister, leaving ends projecting about one-half inch; this will act as a wick and dry up blister in short time. first aid.--explain to the men the uses of the first aid packet and of the pouch carried by the medical corps. (this pouch is being replaced by web-belts with pockets.) wounds may be classed as ordinary cuts, inside wounds, lacerated, punctured and poisoned wounds. for ordinary minor wounds--iodine and exposure to the air are usually sufficient. _war wounds_ are usually caused by something having an explosive effect and may be accompanied by hemorrhage, shock and even loss of function; they may be arterial or venous. poisoned wounds are of two sorts; external and internal. diagnosis tag.--this tag placed on a soldier shows wound, name, rank, regiment, treatment received, etc. this tag should be carefully read before further treatment is accorded. treatment of wounds.--the compress, of the first aid packet will always prove of help. bleeding wounds.--the bandage of the first aid packet will stop all ordinary bleeding; but in aggravated cases the bleeding may be stopped by pressure on the artery, between the wound and the heart. this may be done by hand or by means of the forceps in the medical pouch. the points of compression should be learned and located; in front of the ear just above the socket of the jaw; in the neck in front of the strongly marked muscle reaching from behind the ear to the upper part of the breast bone; in the hollow behind the collar bone; just behind the inner border of the larger muscle of the arm; the femoral artery at the middle of the groin where the artery passes over the bone. bleeding may also be stopped to some extent by elevating the wounded part. a tourniquet may be improvised by using the compress, running a stick or the bayonet through the band, and taking up the slack by twisting. poisoned wounds.--for a _snakebite_ make a tight constriction just above the wound; make an incision at the bite and suck out the poison. _do it quickly_. if this is impossible, follow the same plan but give a stimulant; repeatedly loosen the constriction and let a little of the poison into the system at a time to be neutralized. in cases of chemical poisoning do not follow the usual method of treating poisoning. _do not make the patient vomit_, but give him something fat or albuminous such as raw eggs or milk. this forms mercurial albuminate. _ptomaine_ poisoning (symptoms are headache, cramps, nausea, high fever and chills, etc.). drink salt water, vomit and repeat the procedure to clean out the stomach. a purgative should also be taken. ice cream and milk kept too long are frequent causes of this sort of poisoning, as are dishes kept in the icebox over night. fainting, heat exhaustion and shock are all of the same class; symptoms are the same--weak pulse, paleness and low temperature, tendency to fall to ground. often follows taking too much water on the march. treatment should be in nature of stimulant; make patient lie down, get blood to his head, wrap him in blankets, give him hot drinks, etc. sunstroke.--symptoms and treatment are different. patient has a high temperature. keep his head high and feet low; disrobe him and pour cold water on him; keep him in a cool place until temperature lowers to ; then remove cold water and temperature will go down itself. do not apply cold water too long as the temperature may go to sub-normal which is just as dangerous as a temperature abnormally high. burns and scalds.--air should be shut out; otherwise treat like blister, care being taken not to remove skin. do not put on anything that will stick and do not try to remove anything that has a tendency to stick; put on linseed oil and water, cotton and a loose bandage. freezing and frostbites.--use ice water and snow to start with. keep the patient cool until he is thawed out. massage and gradually work up to a warmer temperature. fractures are of three kinds; simple, compound and comminuted. simple: bones do not penetrate the skin (may be single or double). compound: bones penetrate the skin and cause infection. comminuted: bone is shattered. indications of a fracture are: pain, redness, swelling and mobility where it ought not to be. treatment.--find out the kind of fracture. paint the wound and put on first aid packet; replace the clothes and splint the break. splints should not be too long so as to cause any friction or annoyance to the patient. they may be made out of any available material, such as rifle, bayonet, shingle, piece of board, scabbard, etc. bind them firmly but not too tightly. artificial respiration.--this subject is worthy of more treatment than it can be accorded here. any text on first aid will explain thoroughly the schaefer method, which is now the standard method in the army. points to be remembered in this method are; remove foreign articles from the mouth; curl the little finger over the th rib; avoid the pelvic bones; hold the arms straight and apply the pressure by means of the whole body brought forward; take care not to break a rib; do not give up too soon. trench foot.--this is due to long standing with legs and feet in wet clothes. there are three types: mild: symptoms are numbness and a slight swelling. medium: additional symptom of a bluing of the leg; also large blisters. severe: gangrene sets in. tight clothes help to bring on these things. keep the shoes, socks and breeches loose; keep the clothes dry; furnish the men with hot food in the trenches and so keep up the circulation. _do not use grease_. trench foot can be avoided by proper treatment, and punishment should follow upon its contraction. chapter . signaling. this chapter proposes to cover a large amount of ground in a small compass; hence treatment must be brief. a more liberal treatment will be found at different sources; here a few suggestions and hints will be given. semaphore.--time spent, hours: sessions / hours, session hour, conference hours. it is easy to say "just learn the semaphore," but to learn it quickly and well is another matter. a few suggestions as to the methods followed by others will usually prove helpful. learn the semaphore by what may be called the "cycle" method, _i.e._, teach and illustrate how the successive letters are formed by moving the arm or arms around the body in a clockwise direction through successive stages. there are a few exceptions to the rule as will be pointed out; but they only serve as a few landmarks and help to fix the whole matter more firmly in mind. first cycle.-- arm. a to g. one arm always at the interval. be sure to make the "d" with right arm straight overhead--then it is more distinct at a distance. (plate.) second cycle.-- arms. h to n, inclusive, with exception of j. one arm always in the a position. in making i always be sure that the left hand is at the a position. some men insist in making this letter wrong by crossing the body with the left hand uppermost. this is very awkward and also very indistinct at a distance. p changes arms but retains same relative position of flags. third cycle.-- arms. t and u. right arm in position of c. letter u actually resembles that letter. third cycle.-- arms. o to s. one arm always in b position. in letter o, left arm is in b position; in all others, right arm. fourth cycle.-- arms. t and u. right arm in position of c. letter u actually resembles that letter. doubles.--l, u, r, n. these letters are keys to many others and should be promptly learned. opposites.--v and k, o and w, q and y, s and m, z and h, x and i, m follows l in cycle and is opposite of s, s follows e in cycle and is opposite of m, k precedes l in cycle and is opposite of v. figures are first letters of alphabet, preceded by crossing flags overhead. instructing.--this plan of teaching the semaphore will be found very helpful, for it helps to reason out the alphabet for the student. by fixing firmly in mind a few things the student can soon reason out the alphabet for himself by a very logical plan. second step.--after the men have been taught the alphabet they should either pair off and one man send to the other, or one man should be selected to send for the entire class. at first only letters should be sent until the men have learned the alphabet thoroughly. in this way the key characters of the alphabet can be fixed in mind, as well as their relation to the other letters. third step.--the men should next be paired off and instructed to send simple messages to each other. you should insist that there be no other communication between the men than by means of their flags. fourth step.--proceed to simple qualification tests, four men working in two pairs and the pairs alternating in sending and receiving. one man of first pair should read for his companion to send. on the other end, one man should read and the other copy. the distances should be such as to preclude the possibility of conversation. forty letters per minute is a fair test; or this system may be followed: have a good signalman send combinations of letters each to the whole class. the men should read these and write them down, _one combination at a time_. time limit should be minutes. [illustration: plate ] wig wag.--time spent: same as semaphore course. the alphabet can be found in any standard signal book, or in the "manual for non-commissioned officers and privates." the dots are made to the right of the body, the dashes to the left; interval at the end of a word by dipping the flag once to the front, at the end of a sentence by dipping it twice, and at the end of a message by dipping it three times. the alphabet should be learned first according to the same general plan as in the semaphore; _i.e._, the key letters to certain combinations should first be learned. the following grouping of letters may be found helpful: e i s h; t m o; a u v; n d b; r f l; k c y; w p j; g z q. the instructor can find many other groupings that will aid him. it should also be pointed out that each number from one to ten consists of five characters, and that each succeeding number follows the previous one according to a regular method. after the men have studied the alphabet sufficiently, have them send to each other, limiting the work at first to letters only. then gradually work up to the point where they may send simple messages. make them rely upon the flags for communicating during the practice. do not permit conversation--separate the men by a considerable distance. in both wig wag and semaphore instruction the same plan should be followed as in teaching a foreign language; _i.e._, confine all communication to the medium under study. qualification tests are similar to those for the semaphore, except that less speed can be exacted; characters per minute or combinations of letters each to be received and written down in minutes. in both the semaphore and the wig wag men should be taught the conventional signals used in field work. these can be found in any manual on the subject. points to remember. the semaphore is a quicker means of communication than the wig wag; but the wig wag can be used in a prone position under shelter. lanterns can be used at night for semaphoring. acetylene lamps can be used at night in place of the wig wag. in this case a short flash represents a dot, a long flash a dash. a few men in each company should be developed into expert signalers; some men always show aptitude for this sort of thing. frequent use should be made of signaling in field work. letter codes. infantry. for use with general service code or semaphore hand flags. --------------+---------------------------+---------------------------- letter of | if signaled from the rear | if signaled from the firing alphabet | to the firing line | line to the rear --------------+---------------------------+---------------------------- am | ammunition going forward. | ammunition required. ccc | charge (mandatory at | am about to charge if | all times). | no instructions to the | | contrary. cf | cease firing | cease firing. dt | double time or "rush." | double time or "rush." f | commence firing. | fb | fix bayonets. | fl | artillery fire is causing | | us losses. | g | move forward. | preparing to move forward. hhh | halt. | k | negative. | lt | left. | o | what is the (r.n., etc.)? | what is the (r.n., etc.)? (ardois and | interrogatory. | interrogatory. semaphore | | only). | | | | ..--.. | what is the (r.n., etc.)? | what is the (r.n., etc.)? (all methods | interrogatory. | interrogatory. but ardois | | and | | semaphore). | | p | affirmative. | affirmative. rn | range. | range. rt | right. | right. sss | support going forward. | support needed. suf | suspend firing. | suspend firing. t | target. | target --------------+---------------------------+---------------------------- arm signals. the following arm signals are prescribed. in making signals either arm may be used. officers who receive signals on the firing line "retreat back" at once to prevent misunderstandings. forward march.--carry the hand to the shoulder; straighten and hold the arm horizontally, thrusting it in direction of march. this signal is also used to execute quick time from double time. halt.--carry the hand to the shoulder; thrust the hand upward and hold the arm vertically. double time, march.--carry the hand to the shoulder; rapidly thrust the hand upward the full extent of the arm several times. squads right, march.--raise the arm laterally until horizontal; carry it to a vertical position above the head and swing it several times between the vertical and horizontal positions. squads left, march.--raise the arm laterally until horizontal; carry it downward to the side and swing it several times between the downward and horizontal positions. squads right about, march (if in close order) or, to the rear, march (if in skirmish line).--extend the arm vertically above the head; carry it laterally downward to the side and swing it several times between the vertical and downward positions. change direction or column right (left), march.--the hand on the side toward which the change of direction is to be made is carried across the body to the opposite shoulder, forearm horizontal; then swing in a horizontal plane, arm extended, pointing in the new direction. as skirmishers, march.--raise both arms laterally until horizontal. as skirmishers, guide center, march.--raise both arms laterally until horizontal; swing both simultaneously upward until vertical and return to the horizontal; repeat several times. as skirmishers, guide right (left), march.--raise both arms laterally until horizontal; hold the arm on the side of the guide steadily in the horizontal position: swing the other upward until vertical and return it to the horizontal; repeat several times. assemble, march.--raise the arm vertically to its full extent and describe horizontal circles. range, or change elevation.--to announce the range, extend the arm, toward the leaders or men for whom the signal is intended, fist closed; by keeping the fist closed battle sight is indicated; by opening and closing the fist, expose thumb and fingers to a number equal to the hundreds of yards; to add yards describe a short horizontal line with forefinger. _to change elevation_, indicate the _amount of increase or decrease_ by fingers as above; point upward to indicate increase and downward to indicate decrease. what range are you using? or what is the range?--extend the arms toward the person addressed, one hand open, palm to the front, resting on the other hand, fist closed. are you ready? or i am ready.--raise the hand, fingers extended and joined, palm toward the person addressed. commence firing.--move the arm extended in full length, hand palm down, several times through a horizontal arc in front of the body. fire faster.--execute rapidly the signal "commence firing." fire slower.--execute slowly the signal "commence firing." to swing the cone of fire to the right, or left.--extend the arm in full length to the front, palm to the right (left); swing the arm to right (left), and point in the direction of the new target. fix bayonet.--simulate the movement of the right hand in "fix bayonet." suspend firing.--raise and hold the forearm steadily in a horizontal position in front of the forehead, palm of the hand to the front. cease firing.--raise the forearm as in _suspend firing_ and swing it up and down several times in front of the face. platoon.--extend the arm horizontally toward the platoon leader; describe small circles with the hand. squad.--extend the arm horizontally toward the platoon leader; swing the hand, up and down from the wrist. rush.--same as _double time_. the signals platoon and squad are intended primarily for communication between the captain and his platoon leaders. the signal platoon or squad indicates that the platoon commander is to cause the signal which follows to be executed by platoon or squad. chapter . guard duty. time spent: study, hours. conference, hours. formal guard mounting. guards are divided roughly into four classes: . exterior--(which come more properly under head of field service). . interior--their purpose is to preserve order, protect property and enforce police regulations. . military police--also treated of in field service. . provost guards--used in the absence of military police to aid civil authorities in preserving order among soldiers beyond the interior guard. here we are concerned chiefly with interior guards. we shall make up a brief summary of what an officer must know and what he ought to teach his non-coms. and men. also we shall touch upon the subject of guard duty as it has been changed by trench warfare. an officer ought to have a good grasp of the following subjects relative to guard duty: . guard mounting (both formal and informal). . posting reliefs. . preparation and running of rosters. . general orders--also special orders at post no. . . duties of the following in reference to guard duty: . commanding officer. . officer of the day. . adjutant. . sergeant major. . commander of the guard. . sergeant of the guard. . corporal of the guard. . musicians. . orderlies and color sentinels. . privates of the guard. . compliments of the guard. . prisoners: general. garrison. awaiting trial. awaiting result of trial. how is an officer arrested? can an enlisted man arrest him? how is a non-com. arrested? how is a soldier arrested? how is a civilian arrested? (see a.w. no. .) an officer ought to-teach to his non-coms. as much of the above as is consistent with time and other demands; he ought to teach to his privates all that is necessary to the proper discharge of their duties in this connection. formal guard mounting.--here follow a few reminders that may help the reader to keep the ceremony in mind: . weather conditions permitting, guard mounting takes place every day at the discretion of the c.o. . tour of duty is hours; there are reliefs, hours on and hours off. no organization is detailed for guard duty more than once in days if this can be prevented. ceremony.-- . the band takes post, its left paces to the right of where the right of the guard is to be. . adjutant's call.--the adjutant marches to the parade ground (sergeant major on his left) and takes post paces in front of and facing the center of where the guard is to rest. the sergeant major continues on, marches by the left flank and takes post paces to the left of the band and facing in the direction the line is to extend. . the details are marched to the parade ground by the senior non-commissioned officers, halted and dressed as follows: first detail.--non-commissioned officer.-- . detail; . halt. the detail is halted against the left arm of the sergeant major; the non-commissioned officer steps out, faces the sergeant major at a distance slightly greater than the front of the detail and commands: . right; . dress. the detail dresses on the line formed by the sergeant major and the commander of the detail. . front. the commander of the detail salutes and reports: "the detail is correct" (or otherwise). when the report is made the sergeant major returns the salute. the commander of the detail passes by the right of the guard and takes post in rear of the right file of his detail. other details.--non-commissioned officers.-- . detail; . halt; . right; . dress; . front. each commander of a detail halts his detail, dresses it on the general line, salutes and reports as does the first; then takes his post in a similar manner. should the commander of a detail not be a non-commissioned officer he passes by the right of the guard and retires. . sergeant major.--he takes one step to the right, draws sword and verifies the detail, and then commands: "count off." he completes the last squad if necessary and indicates the division into platoons: then takes his post and commands: . open ranks; . march. this is executed as laid down in the infantry drill regulations. . front. he then moves parallel to the front rank until opposite the center, turns to the right, halts half-way to the adjutant, salutes and reports: "sir, the details are correct" (or otherwise). . adjutant: "take your post." (adjutant draws saber.) . sergeant major.--faces about, approaches to within two paces of the center of the guard, turns; to the right and moves three paces beyond the left of the guard, turns to the left, halts on the line of the front rank, faces about and brings his sword to the order. (when the sergeant major has reported the officer of the guard takes his post, as shown in the diagram, and draws saber.) . adjutant.-- . officer (officers) and non-commissioned officers; . front and center; . march. at "center" the officer carries saber; at "march" the officer advances and halts paces from the adjutant, remaining at the carry; non-commissioned officers pass by the flank, move along the front and form in order of rank from right to left, paces behind the officer, remaining at the right shoulder. if there is no officer of the guard the non-commissioned officers halt paces from the adjutant. the adjutant assigns them to their positions in order of rank--commander of the guard; leader of the first platoon; leader of the second platoon, etc., and commands: . officer (officers) and non-commissioned officers; . posts; . march. at the command "march" they take their posts as prescribed in the school of the company with open ranks (platoon leaders paces in front of center of their platoons). . adjutant: "inspect your guard, sir." . officer of the guard.--faces about and commands: "prepare for inspection." . adjutant (after the inspection is ended, and after posting himself paces in front of and facing center of the guard--at the same time the new officer of the day takes position about paces behind the adjutant, facing the guard, and with the old officer of the day pace in rear and paces to the right): . parade; . rest; . sound off. (the band, playing passes in front of the officer of the guard to the left of the line, returns to its post and ceases to play.) . guard; . attention; . close ranks; . march. (as in the school of the company.) . present; . arms. he then faces the new officer of the day, salutes, and reports: "sir, the guard is formed." . new officer of the day (returning salute): "march the guard in review, sir." . adjutant.--he carries saber, faces about, brings the guard to the order and commands: " . at trail, platoons right; . march; . guard; . halt." the band takes post paces in front of the first platoon, the adjutant paces from the flank and abreast of the commander of the guard, and the sergeant major paces from the flank of the second platoon. adjutant commands: " . pass in review; . forward; . march." . commander of the guard (as the guard reaches a position paces from the officer of the day): . eyes; . right; (at paces beyond the officer of the day) . front. at paces beyond the officer of the day the adjutant and the sergeant-major halt, salute and retire. . commander of the guard (as the adjutant and the sergeant major retire): . platoons, right by squads; . march. the guard is then marched to its post; the old guard is then relieved and sentinels posted according to the principles laid down in the manual of interior guard duty. (see diagrams at the end of this chapter.) guard duty in the trenches.--it differs from guard duty as we are accustomed to it. the challenge is not "who is there?" but rather a sudden and imperative "hands up." the party challenged throws up his hands and gives the countersign in a low voice. sentinels are posted in the front line and in the line of dugouts, one at each entrance to a dugout to give immediate warning. watchers are posted at places having a good range of view; at night they keep watch over the parapets rather than through the loopholes since the latter afford only a narrow range of view. auto riflemen ( or to a post) are used as watchers, one being on duty at a time. they should have a favorable background to provide concealment. [illustration: plate ] [illustration: plate a.] chapter . company administration. company administration is a very broad subject and can be really learned only by experience. however, this chapter will attempt to point out a few suggestions and practices that may prove of some assistance, particularly to the new officer. we shall treat briefly of the first organization of the company; then we shall try to reproduce in some slight measure the actual work of a day in camp (more particularly of a training camp such as plattsburg); then finally we shall treat of the orderly room and some of the problems that come up in army paper work. notes on organization. (by major w.h. waldron, twenty-ninth infantry.) . prepare in advance to receive men assigned to company. (a) detail one of the lieutenants in charge of the company mess. duties.--secure the necessary kitchen and dining room equipment and prepare everything to start the mess; make up a bill-of-fare for a week based on the ration components and supplies available; secure the rations and issue them to the cooks daily. train a mess sergeant in the duties that fall to him. in fine, this lieutenant will have complete charge of the company mess, the cooking, and serving of the meals, training of cooks and men detailed for duty in connection with the mess. (b) detail the other lieutenant in charge of property. duties.--procure all the articles of individual and company equipment from the regimental supply officer. get into the company storeroom and prepare it for issue. train the company supply sergeant in the duties that will fall to him. (c) this leaves the company commander free to organize the orderly room and make the necessary preparations to receive the men as they report. if in cantonment.--lay out the quarters into platoon sections and subdivide these into squads, allowing space for platoon leaders and guides. starting at the end of the quarters plainly mark each squad section, beds, four on each side of the aisle with the number of the squad--first squad, second squad, etc. if in tents.--number the tents, one for each squad, leaving two tents in the center for platoon leaders, guides, etc. prepare a sheet having a space for each squad, large enough to enter eight names in it. prepare a measuring post where the men can be measured for height as they report. . men reporting: (a) when the men arrive they will be sent to regimental headquarters direct. there they will receive their assignment to a company. when so assigned they will be directed to join the company. (b) a table on which is spread the squad assignment sheet is located at the head of the company street. nearby is located the measuring post. when a man reports, look him over, receive him in the company, make him feel at home. make him feel that he is welcome. this little act will pay you large dividends in contentment and company _esprit de corps_ later on. turn him over to the man in charge of the measuring post to get his height. assign him to a squad corresponding to his height. enter his name in the squad space to which he is assigned and send him to the section of the cantonment designated for that particular squad. detail a few of the first men who report for duty to assist in this work. say you have squads. they will run in height about as follows: st squad, over feet; nd, feet; rd, feet; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches. if there are more squads put them in the feet to feet inches class. (c) as soon as practicable place one member of the squad in charge for the ensuing hours, change this detail every day until every man of the squad has had an opportunity to demonstrate his ability. this will assist you greatly in the selection of your non-commissioned officers. (d) should the entire company be assigned in a body, line them up in a row according to height and assign them to squads. place the most likely looking man in each squad in charge for the time being. . issue of equipment: (a) the articles of camp equipment, bedding and poncho should be issued as soon as practicable. these are necessary for the immediate comfort of the men. (b) hold the articles of personal equipment for issue later on. do not dump the entire equipment on a man all at once. there is nine-tenths of it that he knows nothing about. he does not know what it is for. as the training progresses you can issue it to him, an article or two at a time until he has finally gotten all of it. before issuing an article, explain at a company formation, what it is for, the purpose it serves and where it is carried. (c) uniforms and clothing should be procured as soon as practicable. the commanding officer will indicate whether or not the clothing will be requisitioned for in bulk or on individual clothing slips. the supply officer will provide a quartermaster publication which shows the sizes of clothing by the numbers. seek out a couple of tailors in the company, have them measure the men and make a record of the sizes of clothing that they require. shoes will have to be fitted to each man. make them large enough. the average recruit will want to wear a shoe at least one size too small for him. when he gets the pack on and drags it around all day his feet will swell and fill his small shoes to the bursting point. do not let the men decide what size shoes they will wear; you decide it for them and make them plenty big. this work of measuring the men can be started right out the first day. the captain that gets in his requisition first, properly made out, will be the first to get his clothing. . organization: (a) as soon as practicable get the company organized into permanent squads. try out squad leaders for a few days. you will soon be able to select the men that you will want for non-commissioned officers. be careful in their selection so that you will not have to make many changes. don't be in too much of a hurry about making sergeants; try them out as corporals first. try to get a good man and start him in as mess sergeant. a man with hotel experience, especially the kitchen and dining room end of the business, give him a trial. your lieutenant in charge of the mess can tell in a day or two how he stacks up. make it plain that the men detailed from day to day are merely acting non-commissioned officers and that you are merely placing them in charge to give them an opportunity to demonstrate their ability. it's better to work this proposition out in a systematic manner than it is to jump in and make a lot of non-commissioned officers that you will have to break later on to make way for better men. give your acting non-commissioned officers all the responsibility you can. assign tasks with their squads and see how they get away with it. (b) at one of the first formations explain the rules of camp sanitation and personal cleanliness and the necessity for their strict observance. (c) start right out with a system of rigid inspections so that the men will acquire habits of cleanliness and tidiness of their surroundings. once this is acquired it is easily maintained. the reverse of this statement is equally true. let a company get started in a slovenly, untidy manner and it is difficult to get it back on the right track again. (d) as soon as uniforms are issued have every man dispose of his civilian clothing, dress suit cases, trunks, etc. there is no place for them in the cantonments or tents. strip right down to uniforms and allow no civilian clothing around. (e) before issuing rifles provide places for their safe keeping in cantonments. if wooden trunks are used, a wire staple driven into the upright of the bed at the height of the slacking swivel forms an excellent support; simply hook the slacking swivel into the staple. (f) get every man interested in the company. be personally interested in every man yourself. do not permit any swearing at the men or around the barracks. explain the idea of military courtesy and the salute and insist on its being carried out at all times. by doing all of these things and systematizing your work of training and instruction right from the start you lay the foundation for a "good company." fifteen good companies make a "good regiment" and so on up to the division, and that's what we want "good divisions"--the basis of which lies in the "good company" which you are going to command. day's routine.--the day's routine will soon develop and cannot be a stereotyped thing. it will be determined to a large extent by local conditions. but in all training camps some such model as the following will no doubt be followed: reveille: first call, . a.m. march, . a.m. assembly, . a.m. at first call the non-commissioned officer in charge of quarters, or some other charged with that duty, will go through the barracks and awaken the men. after a short time this may be dispensed with. mess: first call (followed by mess call), . a.m. assembly, . a.m. allow the men approximately minutes for breakfast and the privilege of returning individually--this for purposes of attending to the calls of nature. sick call, . a.m.--have the non-commissioned officer in charge of quarters put through this call; the sick will report to the orderly room, be entered on the sick report and marched to the hospital by the same non-commissioned officer. all men answering sick call should be questioned as to the nature of their trouble and its cause; men who are trying to dodge work should be caught up with. care should be exercised in making out the sick report; be careful what you put on it and where you put it. the sick report will be treated further under "paper work." morning instruction: first call, . a.m. assembly, . a.m. recall, . m. utilize this time according to the schedule laid down by higher authorities. it will no doubt be insisted that the schedule be closely adhered to; but this can be done without completely destroying individual initiative. mess: first call (followed by mess call), . p.m. assembly, . p.m. allow minutes for noon mess. the men may not consume it all; but judgment must be used in this matter. after mess have the company formed and marched back to barracks. this plan should be followed for a time, at least, particularly with "green" men purely for disciplinary purposes. afternoon instruction: first call, . p.m. assembly, . p.m. recall, , p.m. same general procedure as for morning work. sick call, . p.m.--when the sick report is sent to the hospital in the afternoon, it is customary to make a new entry for all men who are in the hospital. in this way a running account is kept and quickly referred to without running all through the book. the time from recall to retreat at . or thereabouts can usually be used to advantage in cleaning up and getting ready for this ceremony. retreat.--(formal--on the parade grounds). first call, . p.m. assembly, . p.m. retreat, . p.m. mess: first call, followed by mess call, . p.m. assembly, . p.m. school call (except saturdays), . p.m. tattoo, . p.m. call to quarters, . p.m. taps, . p.m. at taps lights should be out and absolute quiet should prevail. this rule should be insisted upon from the very beginning of the training period. a check roll call is often taken at taps and the company reported to the officer of the day. likewise, the company is reported to the officer of the day at reveille, retreat and mess formations; however, these things are determined entirely by local conditions. sundays and holidays.--calls are / hour later, except retreat, tattoo, call to quarters and taps. in case an entertainment is given on the post, taps usually follow its close by a half hour. details for any day should be published at retreat formation the day previous; bulletins and notices should also be published to the company at this formation. paper work.--paper work in the army is generally viewed askance. a certain amount of it is absolutely necessary, but the amount can be reduced by careful attention to the way in which the work is done. a good first sergeant and a good company clerk will take a load of trouble off the shoulders of the company commander in this respect; but usually these men must be trained. instructions on the blank forms should be carefully read the first time a certain paper is made out. attend to all paper work promptly and make a note of anything that cannot be handled immediately. do not let anything get into the company files until it has been o.k'd. by the company commander or initialed by the officers. have a basket for the company commander and one for the other officers where they may expect to find matters that are of interest to them. get reports, requisitions and other papers in on time. do not wait until they are called for. establish a daily, as well as a monthly, system of doing things in the orderly room and then stick to it as nearly as possible. have a file for: . general orders, post and w.d. . special orders. . memorandums, bulletins and notices may be included under this head. . company orders. . document file (copies of letters, etc.). the needs for files will be determined largely by local conditions. the point is to have things where they can be found readily under an appropriate heading; and to have them accessible to others besides the company clerk. keep a copy of everything, as nearly as possible, but do not clutter up your company files with unimportant items. keep your orderly room looking as neat as possible. military correspondence.--a very important feature of army paper work. neatness, brevity and clarity are to be sought--ceremonial forms are avoided. references to army regulations: paragraphs , , , , , , , , , (g.o. w.d.). a letter consists of three parts; heading, body and signature. the heading consists of designation of the command, place and date, all placed in the upper right-hand corner. at the left, and with a margin of about an inch, should be: from: to: subject: a double space should be left between these lines. the body should be divided into numbered paragraphs, each paragraph treating of but one topic. the lines should be single-spaced, but a double space should be left between the paragraphs. the signature should be made without any unnecessary forms. any good treatise on this subject will show the proper forms for a military letter. indorsements follow the signature in succession on the same page or on added pages. they are very brief, follow a prescribed form and, if necessary, are paragraphed in the same way as the letter. letters should be made in three, four, five or six copies, according to destination. they should always be handled through military channels; time will be lost if you try to dodge it. morning report.--this is a complete record of daily events and should be kept with great care. it is submitted daily to the proper authority, checked and returned. any standard work on this subject will show the proper method of making entries. be sure to make entry of all events affecting your company, its numbers or condition. if there is no change, say so. ration return.--this form is made out in duplicate for periods of from days to a month. in case men join the company after the ration return has been submitted for a given period, one ration for each man for each day from date of joining to date of submitting next return, may be drawn on the next return. the same plan is followed in making deductions for men in the hospital or absent from the company. for ration allowances see a.r. - . sick report.--a commissioned officer of the company and the medical officer sign on one line following the last entry for the occasion. neither may encroach on the territory of the other and both enter their opinions as to whether the sickness is in line of duty. no erasures are allowed. duty roster.--for any roster the key word should be "equality of all duties." it means the difference between contentment and dissatisfaction among your men. keep an exact list of men available for every duty and detail them in exact rotation; adjust to complete satisfaction any little differences that arise. let the men know that you want to give them a square deal and they will respond. the longest man off duty is the first man to be called. in the regular service the roster covers guard duty and other duties, notably kitchen, police and other fatigue work. monthly return.--the form is self explanatory. read the instructions on the blanks before filling them in. by keeping in the company a record of events you can easily fill out the return properly when the time comes. service record.--references in army regulations: paragraphs , , , , , , , , , . article . the service record is a complete personal history of the soldier and follows him wherever he goes. it contains: a descriptive list, report of assignment, record of prior service, current enlistment, military record, record of allotments, clothing account and settlement, deposits, indorsements (this latter to give reasons for change of status or station of the soldier). discharge.--discharges are of three kinds: honorable, dishonorable and plain discharge. the first is on a white sheet and entitles the soldier to re-enlist; the second is on a yellow sheet and is given following sentence of a general court-martial; the third is on a blue sheet and is given on account of physical disability--it does not entitle the soldier to re-enlist. final statement, a.r., art. .--the final statement is issued to every enlisted man upon his discharge unless he has forfeited all pay and allowances and has no deposits due him. the final statement is not to be prepared on the type-writer. money amounts shall be written in both figures and words. the final statement should show the amount due the soldier for: additional pay; clothing; deposits; pay detained; miscellaneous causes. it also should show the amounts due the united states by the soldier for various reasons. in addition it should also state the period covered by the last pay of the soldier. officers signing and certifying to the various entries are responsible. muster roll. a.r. article .--the muster roll is made bi-monthly and great care should be taken in its preparation to make it both correct and complete. all officers and enlisted men are taken up on the muster roll from the date of receipt of notice of assignment. the following are entered on the rolls: . commissioned officers belonging to the organization, in order of rank. . commissioned officers attached to the organization, in order of rank. . non-commissioned officers in order of grade. . all others except musicians and privates, alphabetically arranged in order of grade. . musicians. . privates. all names, except those entered by rank, are entered in alphabetical order with the last name first. the names of enlisted men attached to the company are borne on a detachment roll. this is not true of officers attached to an organization, however. remarks should be entered according to the model which can be obtained from the adjutant general's office. all changes should be noted which affect the status of the soldier. an excellent idea for retaining this data is to keep a separate card for each man and to enter thereon anything that affects his status. pay roll. a.r. - .--the pay roll is made out monthly in triplicate, one copy being retained and two copies being sent to the quartermaster. on the pay roll there are four certificates to be signed: . the commander of the organization examines the roll carefully and certifies that all entries are correct. . the inspecting and mustering officer signs certifying that all are present or accounted for--or notes exceptions. . the commanding officer witnesses the payment of each man and certifies to that effect. . the commanding officer certifies that the duplicate and triplicate are exact copies of the original. names.--the last name is entered first; _e.g._, smith, john a. but the soldier signs as follows: john a. smith. losses.--the losses should follow immediately on the next line after the last entry. they include those by reason of: discharge, transfer, retirement, desertion and the fact that the man has been dropped. each officer should check his knowledge and be sure that he knows the purpose of, and is familiar with the following papers: (references are to army regulations and to adjutant and quartermaster forms.) ( ) morning report (a.r. ). ( ) daily sick report (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) duty roster (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) company fund book (a.r. ), ( q.m.c.). ( ) delinquency record (a.r. ), ( q.m.c.). ( ) property responsibility: quartermaster (a.r. ), ( cc q.m.c.). ordnance (a.r. ), ( c q.m.c.). ( ) descriptive list, military record and clothing account (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) memorandum receipts (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) abstract record of memorandum receipts (par. , g.o., , ), ( b a.g.o.). ( ) summary court records (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) statement of clothing charged to enlisted man ( b q.m.c.). ( ) abstract of clothing ( q.m.c.). ( ) company target records ( a.g.o.). ( ) individual clothing slips ( q.m.c.). ( ) files of orders (a.r. ). ( ) correspondence book with index (a.r. ). ( ) document file. ( ) record of rifles (p. , ordnance pamphlet no. ). ( ) record of sizes of clothing (g.o. , ). ( ) company return (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) muster roll (a.g. ). ( ) returns (a.g. ). ( ) return of casualties. ( ) pay roll ( q.m.c.). as well as numerous other forms for special occasions which are not here listed. except for the morning report, sick report, duty roster, correspondence book and various files, practically all the afore-mentioned records are now kept at regimental headquarters instead of in the company orderly room. chapter . conferences. (time-- hours each day in afternoon.) . know your subject and be thoroughly prepared. . have an outline to refer to, showing main points you wish to cover. . do not allow a man to give an entire chapter in reply to a question. make your questions short and specific--and require answers to be the same. . get every man on his feet at least once every day. . have a laugh every little while--keep the men awake. . vary your system of calling on men so that no one will know when he is likely to be called on. . avoid reading to the men. . require men to put things on the blackboard when possible. . in case of a conference for which no time has been given for preparation, use all possible schemes to get the points home without having either a lecture or a study period. allot--a definite time and require definite results--_e.g._, allow minutes for a rough map showing the placing of a picket-- minutes for an outline of a certain chapter, etc. . never forget that there are sides to every conference--what you plan to give and what you plan to get. you must test the men to see how well they know the work but you must also make sure that every man knows it when he goes out even if he didn't when he came in. study. the study period usually comes after a full day in the open, and the warm air and artificial light soon make the most ardent soldier doze off into cat-naps. something must be done to counteract these influences and keep the men on the job. the terror of the next day's conference will not do it, as that time seems safely distant, with all night ahead. assign the men three to five questions on the work to be studied, which will be asked in conference and which require a pretty general knowledge of the subject. every man will then have a definite objective and a certain minimum of attainment for the evening. or reverse the process and let each of the class write several questions about what they have studied. the following day let these questions, with the names of the men who asked them, be read before the class and answered. the effect of reading the name of the writer is to insure careful preparation of the question and study of the subject. a good question can hardly be asked without a basis of knowledge, and a foolish question condemns its author. another plan is to let the men, whenever possible, instruct the class. announce that any man may be called upon to take charge, and the uncertainty will keep everyone studying. this plan will also give the men valuable practice in teaching others. their periods of instruction, of course, must be limited, and unsatisfactory parts of their work reviewed before the conference is dismissed. another way to stimulate study is to have a short discussion, talk or quiz just before the close of the study hour, when the men, if left to themselves, will incline to look at their watches more often than at their books. a brief explanation of the work assigned, with emphasis upon a few especially important points, makes good use of this closing time, especially when the men are required to write down the points emphasized. syllabus: small problems for infantry. (references, f.s.r., p. - , - .) first problem: advance guard and point: a. definition and function.--small patrol sent ahead from advance party for disclosing enemy's position and strength, in time for larger bodies to make suitable defensive and offensive dispositions. function primarily warning; but to give specific information, it may have to fight and thus feel enemy out. b. principles: . formed zig-zag; distance from advance party =? . controlled by leader of advance party. . speed must be great enough not to impede the main column. must not halt at first sign of enemy, nor go off on a flank. . interest and co-operation of inferiors, by adequate explanation of situation and of individual duties ("repeats"). . rules for estimating numerical strength of the moving body of troops (cf., f.s.r., sec. ). . point as a "march outpost" (=?) when the column is halted. only then may the a.g. point make any lateral arrangement of its members (cf. above). second problem: advance guard connecting file, cf., f.s.r., reference above: a. definition and function.--two men (usually) for liaison en route where elements too widely separated or roads too curved and wooded. distance to yards apart. b. principles: . constant touch with elements before and behind. . relay both ways messages sent to or from remoter parts of the column. speed and accuracy of signaling. . guide to be forward in daytime, at night on the main body. third problem: advance guard flank patrol, pp. - : a. definition and function.--for protecting a marching column from attack, by warning it on the basis of information gained in reconnaissance. interval between men depends on circumstances. b. principles: . start from near head of the column, _i.e._, from smallest element in the advance guard that can afford to cut down its numbers. . speed rather than safety, to keep abreast of own column and to force the enemy to disclose himself by firing on f.p. rather than on main body. . sent to investigate suspicious areas, _e.g._ in woods, behind houses. . action in case of firing on main body; advance and counterfire, deployed. . get-away man in rear of column. . _stick to the job_: no wandering or chasing of enemy beyond range of column. job is to warn and protect against flank attack. fourth problem: platoon as advance party: a. definition and function: body of infantry, amounting to / to / the support (depending on the number of cavalry ahead) cf., f.s.r., p. . duty.--to back up the point and the advance cavalry (if any) if fired upon; remove enemy bodies and other obstacles. b. principles: . describe general mission to inferiors. . explain individual duties to inferiors. . send out point and connecting files. . form in platoon; zig-zag. . keep going; prosecute engagements briskly, not to delay main column. . procedure under fire: deploys and drops, when fired upon; looks for enemy's direction and assigns target and range. advance under cover if any, when fire light; when heavy seek to divert fire to you away from main body of advance guard to facilitate latter's disposition for advance to your support. seek to drive off a weaker enemy, and to hold off a stronger. . speedy decisions. value of imaginary situations, while on the march; and planning your commands. fifth problem: combat patrol: a. definition and function.--contrasted with covering detachment, which is large enough to offer considerable resistance, the combat patrol is primarily to _warn_, especially against flank attacks. size varies widely because of looseness in definition, _e.g._, men might be _covering detachment_ for a regiment, but a combat patrol for a brigade. b. principles: . comparison of thin line versus thin column, regarding: (a) vulnerability, (b) fatigue, (c) tactical advantage, when engagement materializes, (e) control of movement and of fire. . agent between advance and main body. . attack any enemy of reasonable size that attacks main body. . corn as concealment versus corn as obstruction to sight. . vulnerability of charging cavalry. . lieutenant as tactical chief, sergeant as disciplinarian, in a platoon; except when? . messages concise, not ambiguous, written versus oral? repeats. . limitations of use of map. vegetation changes; errors in contouring. sixth problem and seventh problem: two pickets: a. definition and function.--outpost contrasted with advance guard in that former is stationed around a camp or bivouac, while latter precedes a marching column. to check enemy attempting to attack main body, and hold him till larger force is able to deploy. consists of outpost reserve, outpost line of supports, line of outguards (pickets, sentry squads, and cossack posts), plus sentinels, patrols, etc. picket ordinarily merely warns of an attack, but may offer resistance. b. principles: . smooth posting of outpost very desirable; influence of delay on spirits of men, after day's march. . outpost support sends out pickets. . picket sends out sentry squads, cossack posts, sentinels, etc. . provisional dispositions by leaders of outguard elements; importance of good sketch; intrenchments? . confirmation and alteration by higher officers; especially changes at night regarding layout and manning. fire ineffective at night except at short ranges. . roster =? . instructions regarding enemy's position and strength, and the friendly outguards to right and left. . mode of numbering elements (from right to right). arrangement for smooth withdrawal of each element upon stronger one. . disposition of strangers; use for information. . need of explicit arrangements in case of attack in day or night. . sleep near arms. eighth problem--cossack post and sentry squad: a. definition and function: . cossack post: men in charge of a corporal (usually) primarily to observe and warn; secondarily to keep concealed, and intercept strangers who might be useful to enemy or to us. . sentry squad: men in charge of a corporal. duties similar but strength is greater. posts double sentinel. . post important enough for a cossack post is often doubled into a sentry squad at night. b. principles: . opportunity to "pick off" enemies ought to be ignored until position of c.p. or s.s. or of its supporting body has unquestionably been learned by enemy. then fire away. . _stop_ enemy's patrolling. is as important as to _force_ your own observation. . advantages of s.s. over c.p. for night work: (a) strength, (b) sureness, (c) adequacy of observation before firing alarm. . use of prisoners, and papers on dead bodies. . value of imagining yourself in position of enemy commander in deciding what enemy dispositions you will combat him with. ninth problem: reconnoitering patrol: a. definition and function.--gather information in the field. no resistance unless compelled. concealment and flight rather than resistance by fire: opposite of "covering detachment." b. principles. . judgment in deciding what equipment is appropriate to the particular patrol. . sketch copies; contours as guides for concealed route. . fight only in self defence. . how to question hidden sentinel without disclosing his position to enemy. . judicious choice of cover in approaching destination. . dating and placing of messages. . rate of passage of troops: "rule of - - ." tenth problem--visiting patrol: a. definition and function: two men or more sent from supports and pickets liaison between adjoining outguards. more useful at night, because of reduced visibility of terrain between outguards. . inform the sending body of conditions at sentinel posts. . prevent enemy from penetrating lines between posts. . exchange information between adjoining posts. . take back captured strangers to commander. . reenforce feeling of mutual support among the isolated sentinels. b. principles. . keen sight and hearing; silence. . need of signals. both countersign and check--countersign. . equipment; nothing that rattles or glistens. . disposition: leader in front, because of need for quick decision. . distance not over two miles even in most open country. . danger of startling a friend sentinel by unwarned approach. eleventh problem--detached post: a. definition and function.--posted where connection cannot be easily maintained with other elements of outpost. sent usually by outpost reserve or by main body, and retires to them, rather than to the line of supports. function same as element of outpost proper,--_observation, resistance, reconnaissance_; but less resistance than _warning_. may be as small as men, or as large as a support, depending on location and importance of detached position. b. principles. . established under precautions, because of danger of enemy breaking between the main body and the detached post. . entrenchment: what time of day? what other circumstances? treatment of bridges? night? . requisitioning order: need of payment; for justice, for military advantage later (reassure farmers through whose territory you will need to pass and keep supplied). twelfth problem--requisitioning detachment or patrol: a. definition and function.--a patrol may have any mission: here it is sent to take (on payment) the provender designated. a.r.d. sent by commander with specific instructions, is legal; a raid for booty illegal. (see f.s.r., sec, .) b. principles. . preparation essential. . sending of men singly or in pairs across open spaces. . deliberate start on _wrong_ road to deceive enemy scouts. . not to fire unless obliged,--until return trip. thirteenth problem--a contact patrol: a. definition and function.--a small patrol sent out from a stationary body of troops, usually at night, to find out whether enemy is starting a retreat. (compact formation in column.) b. principles. . travel light, but prepare to spend some time lying still. . route rear and parallel to a road, but not on it. . do not attack enemy patrols unless necessary. . get through enemy line of observation and watch support or larger body. . return together when you have definite information. do not send single messengers. fourteenth problem.--a small outguard: the principles used in are same as those listed under - ; and should be clinched by assigning yourself the problem of completely arranging an outpost for a brigade to be encamped or bivouacked at some assigned position on the hunter's town sheet. exchange solutions, for mutual criticism. examinations. the following examinations, given at the second plattsburg training camp, will enable students of military matters to form some idea as to where they stand in their grasp of the subject: plattsburg training camp: . explain the "position of the soldier." (par. , i.d.r.) . being at parade rest, explain position of right foot. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the "hand salute." (par. , i.d.r.) . ( ) give length of full step (a) in quick time, (b) in double time. ( ) how is the full step measured? (par. , i.d.r.) . explain "halt" from quick time. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain position of butt of rifle at "order arms" standing. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain position of left forearm at present arms. (par. , i.d.r.) . at parade rest under arms (rifle), explain position of left hand. (par. , i.d.r.) . the squad being in line explain "squad right." (par. , i.d.r.) . the company in line, give commands and explain "to dismiss the company." (par. , i.d.r.) * * * * * . being in any formation assembled, give commands and explain movements for deploying the squad as skirmishers. (par. , i.d.r.) . when deployed as skirmishers (a) how do the men march? (b) how are the pieces carried? (c) who is the guide? (d) what is the normal interval between skirmishers? (e) what is the length of the front of the squad when deployed at normal intervals? (par. , i.d.r.) . in what formations are the loadings executed? (par. , i.d.r.) . at the preparatory command for forming skirmish line, what does each squad leader do? (par. , i.d.r.) . in what direction does a deployed line face on halting? (par. .) . being in skirmish line, explain the movement "platoon columns." march. (par. , i.d.r.) . what is the purpose of the advance in a succession of thin lines? (par. , i.d.r.) . name three classes of fire. which class is normally employed in action? (par. - - , i.d.r.) . why is it necessary to have proper distribution of fire? (par. , i.d.r.) . explain briefly the functions of platoon leaders, platoon guides and squad leaders in the fire fight. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the position of parade rest (without arms). (par. , i.d.r.) . being in the position of the soldier, explain the position of the heels, feet and knees. (par. , i.d.r.) . give the commands for and explain the execution of "right face." . being at a halt, give the commands for moving forward in quick time and explain the execution thereof. (par. , i.d.r.) . (a) being in march in quick time, give the commands necessary to march in double time and explain the execution thereof, (par. , i.d.r.) (b) what is the length of step and the rate of steps per minute in double time? (par. , i.d.r.) . at "right shoulder arms": (a) explain the position of the trigger guard. (par. , i.d.r.) (b) what is the position of the barrel? (par. , i.d.r.) . in the rifle salute (right shoulder arms), describe the position of the: (a) left forearm on first count, (par. , i.d.r.) (b) left hand on first count. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the position of the left forearm on the second count of right shoulder arms from order arms. (par. , i.d.r.) . the squad being in line explain "squad right about." (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the execution of "right by squads," march. (par. , i.d.r.) . what are the two general classes of military information? (par. , f.s.r.) . what do you understand by the term "reconnaissance?" (par. , f.s.r.) . (a) name the various kinds of patrols. (note to par. , f.s.r.) (b) what are the advantages of small patrols over strong patrols? (par. , f.s.r.) . what governs the formation adopted by the patrol? (par. , f.s.r.) . what is a field message? (par. , f.s.r.) . (a) what is the function of an advance guard? (par. , f.s.r.) (b) what of a flank guard? (par. , f.s.r.) . (a) what is an outpost? (par. , f.s.r.) (b) how are the outguards classified? (par. , f.s.r.) . define a successful march. (par. , f.s.r.) . what rules govern the halts of a column of troops on the march? (par. , f.s.r.) . (a) from a certain point off the road you observe a column of troops marching on the road. you can distinguish that these troops are infantry in column of squads. it requires minutes for them to pass a given point. how much infantry is in the column? (par. , f.s.r.) (b) the day is still, no wind blowing, further to the rear you can see a broken cloud of dust extending in prolongation of the road but cannot see the cause. what does this indicate? (par. , f.s.r.) * * * * * harvard college. school of the soldier: . define depth, distance, interval, front, base, point of rest, deployment, pace. (i.d.r. definitions.) . (a) what is the guide of the leading subdivision, in column of subdivisions, charged with? (par. , i.d.r.) (b) what is the guide of the subdivisions in rear charged with? (par. , i.d.r.) . what are orders, commands and signals. (par. , , i.d.r.) . describe position of the soldier or attention (without arms.) (i.d.r. .) . what are the rests? describe each. (par. , i.d.r.) . describe about face. (par. , i.d.r.) . (a) being at a halt, or marching in quick time, to march in double time. describe commands and how executed. (par. , i.d.r.) (b) marching in double time, to resume quick time. describe commands and how executed. (par. , i.d.r.) . what are the rules that govern the carrying of the piece? (par. , i.d.r.) . what general rules govern the execution of the manual of arms? (par. , i.d.r.) . give the rate per minute and length of the half step and full step in quick and double time. (par. , i.d.r.) . what are the arm signals for: column left, march; halt; as skirmishers, march; assemble, march; suspend firing; range, yards; fix bayonets. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the execution of the command "right dress." (par. , i.d.r.) * * * * * school of the squad: . to suspend firing: give the commands and describe execution. same, to cease firing. (par. - , i.d.r.) . describe in detail the execution of "squads right." (par. , i.d.r.) . give the commands and explain execution for taking intervals. how does it differ from taking distances? (pars. , , , , i.d.r.) . describe in detail "right oblique, march." (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the use of "in place, halt." (par. , i.d.r.) . when can the following commands be used: resume march. (par. , i.d.r.) oblique march. (par. , i.d.r.) by the right flank, march. (par. , i.d.r.) take arms. (par. , i.d.r.) . describe by what commands and in what manner a squad is formed. . (a) being in line, give the commands and describe the movements for turning on a moving pivot. (b) being in line, give the commands and describe the movements for turning on a fixed pivot. . being in any formation, assembled, give the commands and describe the movements for deploying as skirmishers. * * * * * school of the company: . give the proper commands for the following movements: (a) company being in line, to march to the front in column of squads. (par. , i.d.r.) (b) company being in line, to form column of squads to the flank. (par. , i.d.r.) (c) company being in line, to form skirmish line. (par. , , , i.d.r.) (d) company being in column of squads, to form line to the right so the leading squad shall be on the right of the line. (par. , i.d.r.) . being in line, to align the company. give the commands and explain the movement. (pars. , , i.d.r.) . the company having gone from line into column of squads by the command: "squads right, march," state the position of the captain, two lieutenants and right and left guides. (pars. , and plate ii, i.d.r.) . show by diagram: (a) a company of two platoons in column of platoons, (b) a company of three platoons in line of platoons. (plate ii, i.d.r.) . what commands are given to form the company? . (a) who is the pivot in executing "company left?" (b) who is the pivot in executing "left turn?" military science and tactics. minor tactics. map: gettysburg--antietam (hunterstown sheet). first problem: an advance party--situation i: _your battalion_ and the _machine gun_ company occupy _center mills_, in enemy's country. the remainder of the _harvard regiment_ is encamped _two miles north of center mills_. the battalion has an outguard _at j. fohl, yards southeast_ of center mills. _it is mid-winter;_ there is _no snow_, but the _streams are frozen_. at . a.m., feb., , your battalion and the machine gun company are _hurriedly assembled, pieces are loaded_, and the column, _your company in the lead_, is marched out of town, over the southeast road. your captain calls the _officers and non-commissioned officers_ to the head of the company and gives the following verbal order: _a blue force, estimated at one battalion with machine guns, is marching north from granite hill sta. blue patrols have been reported in vicinity of henderson meeting house ( yards north of hunterstown). there are no red troops south of here. our battalion and the machine gun company are going to take up a position on the - hills, which flank this road, about miles south of here. this company will be the advance guard. the main body, which is the rest of our column, follows at yards. lieutenant allen, your platoon ( st) and the second platoon will constitute the_ advance party. _the third and fourth platoons will form the_ support, _and will follow the advance party at yards. here is a map for you. follow this road (pointing and indicating on map) through j. fohl-- - --bridge s.h., to crossroads , where you will halt and establish a_ march outpost. _i will be with the support. when we reach the outguard at j. fohl the column will halt and the advance guard will move out. posts._ the column halts at the outguard. you are lieutenant allen. required: your instructions, and dispositions in detail. situation ii: the _advance party_ has just cleared roadfork when it is fired upon from the woods along the stream about _ yards southeast_. there are probably _ rifles firing upon you_. the enemy's fire is well-directed. the _point_ has crossed the first bridge, yards south of . the _support_ has halted; but is not under fire. required: your instructions and dispositions. second problem: an advance guard point--situation i: the situation is the same as in the first problem. you are the commander of the point. required: your instructions and dispositions as the _point_ clears the outguard. required: the _point_ has just crossed the first bridge yards southeast of , when you hear firing and observe that the _advance party_ is being fired upon from the woods directly east of you. a few moments later you note a few dismounted men crossing the island about yards to the east. the firing has ceased. required: your instructions and dispositions. situation iii: the _advance guard_ has resumed its march. when the point reaches bridge s.h., it is fired upon from the woods yards to the east. about ten cavalrymen are hurriedly mounting, others are already riding into the woods. required: your instructions and dispositions. third problem: an advance guard flank patrol-- situation: the situation is the same as in the _first problem_, and follows _situation iii, second problem_. when the _advance party_ is two hundred yards from the roadfork where unimproved road leads northeast, about yards southeast of bridge s.h., lieutenant allen gives the following instructions to corporal adams, d squad: _corporal, about fifteen blue cavalry have been driven back through those woods (pointing out woods to east). when we reach the roadfork in front of us take your squad and comb the woods until you reach southern edge. from there go east until you observe the crossroads ( ) which are about yards beyond. return over first improved road running southwest to the crossroads ( ) about - / miles south of here and just under the hilltop, where you will rejoin advance party._ you are corporal adams. required: your instructions, dispositions, and route of the patrol. map reading. visibility problems. map: gettysburg--antietam (hunterstown sheet). note.--_observation points and are the hills referred to in the first problem under minor tactics._ _where one point is invisible from another, state points of interference._ _problem _. can a sentinel standing at see the roadfork (about yards south)? _problem _. an enemy patrol is marching north on the - road, and has crossed the stream ( yards north of ). can this patrol see the red outguard at from any point between stream and crossroads ? _problem _. can the sentinel at see the roadfork ( yards southwest from )? _problem _. can the sentinel at see the crossroads (about yards southeast)? * * * * * general situation--hunterstown sheet. the _harvard regiment_ camps the night of may -june on opossum creek just west of friends grove s.h. (a- ) in hostile territory. the regiment is part of a brigade, the remainder of the brigade being in camp one day's march north of center mills. problem i: an advance guard point: at daylight of june st the regimental commander receives the following message from brigade headquarters: "our aeroplanes report a large force of the enemy near hunterstown. move at once on hunterstown. develop the strength of this enemy and locate his exact position. i will send reinforcements to you by motor-train if necessary." officers call is sounded, and this information transmitted to all the officers of the regiment. the _first battalion_ is designated as _advance guard_ and ordered to move out at once by crossroads and , and road forks and towards hunterstown. major a, commanding the first battalion, designates the first two platoons of "d" company as advance party and c company and the remainder of d company as support. lieut. x, commanding the advance party, calls up all his non-commissioned officers and explains the situation to them. he then says: "sergeant mason, take men and move out on that road (pointing) as the point. at crossroads and road forks semaphore w.w. and i will indicate the direction. the remainder of these two platoons will be the advance party. i will be with it. move out." you are sergeant mason. (_a_) what instructions, and information do you give the point before you reach crossroads ? after passing crossroads about yards one of your men reports about a squad of hostile cavalry on the road south of road fork , yards east of you. (_b_) what do you do? problem ii: an advance guard connecting file: situation as in preceding problem. after the advance party has moved out about yards, captain y, commanding the support, says: "smith, you take jones and move out as connecting file." after smith and jones have moved about yards, he says: "donnelly, you take burke and move out as connecting file." you are donnelly. (_a_) what instructions do you give burke before reaching crossroads ? after passing crossroads you go about yards without seeing the connecting file in rear of you. (_b_) what do you do? problem iii: an advance guard flank patrol: situation as in preceding problem. on arriving at crossroads lieut. x commanding the advance party calls up sergeant clifford and says: "sergeant, the point has just reported a squad of hostile cavalry about a mile down this road (pointing toward road fork ). take _your squad_ and scout down this road. i will take the next road to the left leading to hunterstown. rejoin me on that road." you are sergeant clifford. (_a_) what formation do you adopt for your patrol? nothing happens until you arrive near road fork , when you hear firing from the woods southwest of you. this fire is not directed toward you. there is evidently about a squad firing. you can see no enemy in any direction. (_b_) what do you do? problem iv: platoon as an advance party: general situation same as before. you are lieut. x commanding the advance party. you have arrived near the small orchard southeast of road fork . a sharp fire is suddenly opened from the woods to the southeast, apparently from a _squad or small platoon_. (_a_) give your orders and dispositions. after firing about a minute the fire of the enemy stops. you move out into the road and can see no sign of your point or connecting files. the support is closing up on you. (_b_) what do you do? visibility problems: (_a_) can a man on hill see a man at crossroads in hunterstown? (disregard trees.) (_b_) a man stands at the point where contour crosses the road followed in above problem, just south of hill . where does the roadbed first become invisible? * * * * * map: gettysburg--- antietam (hunterstown sheet). first problem: a connecting file--situation i: the harvard regiment is in camp in hostile country the night may - in the corn field yards east of boyd s.h., just northeast of cross roads . the line of outguards extends approximately through boyd s.h., hill , mcelheny. at . a.m.; may st, the regimental commander receives the following telephone message from brigade headquarters at gettysburg (just off the map to the south)--an enemy force estimated strength one regiment is in camp miles north of center mills. his patrols were seen yesterday by our advance cavalry near guernsey and center mills. it is reliably reported that this force will march by center mills and guernsey on biglersville to-morrow morning to destroy a large amount of rolling stock at that point. move at once toward center mills to stop and drive back this force. officers call is sounded. the situation is explained to the officers and they are told to have their companies ready to move at . a.m. the st battalion is designated as advance guard. the advance guard is directed to move across the field to road fork thence north by the main road. the _first platoon_ of "a" company is designated as advance party. "b" company and the remainder of "a" company form the support. as the advance party moves out captain smith commanding the support, says to private long, "long, you and williams move out as connecting files. this is a dark night so be careful to keep connection both front and rear." before long is out of sight; he says, "scott, you and hunt move out as connecting files following long." you are scott. required: (a) what instructions do you give hunt? (b) what do you do up to the time you reach the main road at ? situation ii: after you have passed road fork in _table rock_ about yards you notice that hunt who has been watching to the rear does not seem to be alert. you look back and can see no sign of the connecting file in rear of you. it is still dark. required: what do you do? second problem: an advance guard point--general situation same as in problem i: sergeant hill and four men constitute the point. the situation has been explained to sergeant hill by the advance party commander. about daylight the point arrives at crossroads . a sharp fire evidently from about a squad is received from the house on the rise yards north along the road. you are sergeant hill. required: what do you do? third problem: an advance guard flank patrol--situation i--general situation same as problem i: up to daylight no flank patrols have been sent out. when the support reaches table rock the support commander calls corporal bell and says to him "corporal take your squad as a flank patrol up this road to the right. take the left hand road at the first two road forks and follow the road past the church and school-house until you reach this road again about - / miles north of here. report every thing you have seen when you rejoin. your squad consists of seven men besides yourself." required: (a) the disposition of your squad on the march. (b) what do you do when you hear the firing near crossroads ? fourth problem: platoon as advance party--situation--general situation same as in the first problem: when you arrive at a point about yards south of hill you hear firing yards north of you. you cannot see who is firing nor can you see the point. you are lieutenant clark commanding the advance party. required: what do you do? visibility problems: (a) when the point arrives at hill can it see the crossroads to the northeast? (b) when the flank patrol reaches benders' church crossroads can it see an enemy patrol at the house midway on the road - one mile to the northeast? (c) looking north along the center mills road from hill where does the road first become invisible? * * * * * map: hunterstown sheet. general situation: the harvard regiment encamped on the night of july - at biglerville (b- ) in hostile territory. the remainder of the brigade of which the regiment is a part is in camp miles west of biglerville. problem i: at daylight, july , the regimental commander receives the following message from brigade headquarters: "it is reported that the enemy is in force near heidlersburg. move on heidlersburg at once; locate the position of the enemy, and develop his strength. reinforcements will be sent you, if necessary." this information is transmitted to all officers of the regiment. the first battalion is ordered to move out at once as advance guard on biglerville- - road toward heidlersburg. major dunn, commanding first battalion, designates the first two platoons of c company as advance party, and d company and the remainder of c company as support. lieut. gibbs, commanding the advance party, explains the situation to his non-commissioned officers, and then orders: "sergeant dow, take four men and move out on that road (indicating road to heidlersburg) as point. the remainder of these two platoons will be the advance party and will follow you at yards. i shall be with it. move out." you are sergt. dow. how do you place your men, and what information and instructions do you give the point before you pass the orchard east of biglerville? situation : you are still sergt. dow. the point has reached crossroads . you are informed by a farmer living at crossroads that about half an hour before there were some soldiers half a mile north of on the road to center mills. he says he does not know where they went. what do you do? problem ii: the advance party has arrived at crossroads . information has come to lieut. gibbs, both from the point and from the farmer direct, that red soldiers have been seen on road to north leading to center mills. lieut. gibbs on arrival at sends out a squad under sergt. jones to patrol north on the center mills road half a mile, then east by farm road to corner, then by fence south of house and barn to opossum creek and down creek to main road again. the advance party then proceeds about yards easterly from , when the point signals "enemy in small numbers in creek bottom due north." (a) what does lieut. gibbs and the advance party do? (b) what does he tell the point to do? (c) what does the flank patrol under sergt. jones do? problem iii: because of the action taken in problem ii the reds have ceased to menace the left flank of the advance guard: (a) what does the advance party and its commander do? (b) what does he tell the point to do? another situation--problem iv: enemy is in the vicinity of hunterstown. your brigade has marched south through guernsey to road fork , and has turned east, and is about to camp in grass field north of road - , - of a mile west of . your battalion is to form the outpost. you are its major. where do you post: (a) the outpost reserve? (b) the outpost supports? (c) the outguards? (note: the sector up to and including the road center mills-- - --bridge s.h. is covered by another brigade to your left.) problem v: on the same general scheme as in problem iv. you are sergt. robinson of support no. . you are ordered by its commander to move out with squads to form a picket, outguard no. , putting out observation posts on the road about half a mile south of the support. (a) state what directions you give to your picket and how you move to your position. (b) where do you post the picket and its observation posts? (c) what orders and instructions do you give on arrival at the place selected? chapter . trench warfare. general principles. . defense may be made in depth by all organizations, down to and including the platoon, or it may be made laterally. . the smallest active segment, be it only three men, must have a chief and a second in command, who is responsible for the proper upkeep and defense of the segment. all occupants of active segments must know all instructions which should be simple. . any troops in charge of a portion of trench must never abandon it, no matter what happens, even if surrounded. . all ground lost must be retaken at once by immediate counter attack launched by the unit which lost the ground. as a matter of fact a counter attack is difficult for a platoon or company; it is really necessary for it to be made by a battalion. . each company must provide for emplacements for mine throwers to be served by the artillery and for pneumatic guns to be served by their own men. instructions to be issued by battalion commander. . disposition of companies in sector assigned (best done by sketch showing sectors assigned to companies). . special orders to companies (concerns field of fire to be obtained not only in own sector, but also in those adjoining it). . improvement of defense. (brief reports from company commanders to be followed by work being done on order of battalion commander after inspection.) . organization of watching (not sentry duty) (by company commander under supervision of battalion commander). . organization of observation (not sentry duty) (by company commander under supervision of battalion commander). . organization of supply (procuring, routing, etc., of tools, ammunition, food, water, etc.), (by company commander under supervision of battalion commander). . organization of liaison (communication) (runners, telephone, telegraph visual signaling, pigeons, etc., by company commander under the supervision of battalion commander). _all telephonic communication must be in code_. . organization of supplies to include amounts to be expected daily from the rear. . knowledge of enemy must be imparted to company commanders in order to assist them in making their dispositions. . frequent reports to be made of existing conditions at the front for information of higher commanders. . lateral defense of boyaux must not be overlooked. . wide turning movements are not possible. enveloping movements are possible only on local attacks against small portions of the hostile line after it has been pierced. all main attacks are confined to purely frontal attacks. . the most important obstacle is barbed wire entanglements. . communication (liaison) between and co-ordination and co-operation of, the different elements of a command is of the utmost importance. . artillery co-operates more closely than ever with infantry. its reconnaissance officers accompany infantry lines in order to obtain information. _there is a certain number of artillery observers attached to each battalion of infantry_. the general method of attack is to smother the defense with a torrent of explosive shells, kept up incessantly for one or more days, and shatter the defense so they will offer but slight resistance to the infantry; then rush forward with the infantry and seize the positions while the enemy is demoralized, and consolidate them before reenforcements can be brought up. the artillery bombardment is necessary to prepare the way for the infantry advance. it has for its objects: ( ) to destroy the hostile artillery, wire entanglements and infantry trenches. ( ) to produce curtains of fire and prevent bringing up reenforcements. _light guns are assigned to_ each battalion of infantry, subject only to orders of regimental and battalion commanders concerned. save under exceptional circumstances the light gun is always attached to the machine gun company for the attack. the essential role of the light gun is to destroy with direct fire the visible machine guns; they are employed separately and not grouped. the infantry is divided into two classes: holding troops--and attacking or shock troops. holding troops are those doing routine or trench duty; shock troops are picked organizations of young and vigorous men and are kept in camps well behind the battle front. holding troops are two weeks in and two weeks out of the trenches. all specialist groups, _i.e._, machine gun companies, etc., are officered, allowing company and battalion commanders to concentrate them, if the situation requires. _they play the normal part in combat if they do not receive special instructions._ attack of a defensive position. unity of command in depth must be preserved everywhere, unless there is an imperative reason for doing otherwise. the front of each regiment should be divided between two or three battalions. _each battalion commander having to look after a front of from to yards, can exercise efficient control of his command._ in preparing for an assault, seniors must take steps to organize it and make all necessary preparations themselves, and not leave all the responsibility with the juniors. in the assault each unit must know its special task beforehand, and it should be rehearsed in rear of the line of trenches. each commander must know the exact time he is to start and must start on time. the first waves of men are placed at or pace interval. chief of section can command only a front of to paces and it is necessary to form the section in two ( ) waves. the first containing the grenadiers and automatic riflemen, the latter in the center. the second wave contains the riflemen and rifle grenadiers, the latter in the center. if the terrain is cut up by woods, villages, etc., the proportion of grenadiers may be increased by taking them from the sections in support and the automatic riflemen sent back to the second wave. if the distance to cross exceeds or yards, the number of automatic riflemen should be increased. _two or three sections are usually placed abreast on the company front, which thus covers two to three hundred yards._ the support sections follow the leading sections of their company at about yards, marching in two lines, if possible in two lines of squad columns at yard intervals. the first wave of the support is usually formed of the one-half section of specialists. the echeloning of the specialists in front is also the most favorable formation to progress by rushes in a terrain cut up by shell holes. the chief of section is between the two ( ) waves of his section. the captain is usually in front of the support sections. the support sections are closely followed by a powerful line of machine guns, which are thrown into the fight when needed to reenforce the leading units. "trench cleaners" usually march immediately after the leading sections and may be taken from the support sections. they are armed with pistols, knives and hand grenades. the captain can use his section complete, or take out the specialists and use them for a particular purpose. the specialists carry only the weapons of their specialty and have their loads lightened. the ordinary riflemen carry the usual packs and equipment. officers no longer lead the assault, but direct it. they are equipped with the rifle and bayonet, the same as the enlisted man. each unit of the first wave of the attack is given a definite objective. different waves must not break upon the first wave. fire is opened by the assaulting troops only at short ranges, the advance being protected by a curtain of artillery fire. the advancing line makes use of shell holes and all other available cover. when the first section reaches its objective it is joined by the half section of riflemen; it immediately organizes the captured ground. attacking from trenches.--the commanders of brigades and battalions, with the commander of the artillery detailed to support them, study on the ground the artillery plan so far as it affects them. immediately after the advance of the infantry begins, the artillery supporting it commences an intense bombardment with the object of forcing the enemy to take cover. at the moment laid down in the table of artillery fire the barrage lifts clear of the trench and the infantry rush in and capture it. the infantry must be taught that their success depends upon their getting within yards of the barrage before it lifts, in order that they may reach the trenches before the enemy can man them. the secret of a successful assault is exact synchronization of the movements of the infantry with those of the barrage. the pace of a barrage depends, to a certain extent, on the pace of the infantry, which varies with the condition of the ground, the length of the advance, the number of enemy trenches to be crossed, etc. it may be from to yards per minute. the pace of the barrage should be quicker at first, and should gradually slow down as the men become exhausted, in order to give them time to get close to the barrage and pull themselves together for the final rush. in an attack each unit must have sufficient driving power in itself to carry it through to its objective and enable it to hold its ground when it gets there. when a number of trenches have to be carried, considerable depth will be required, and the frontage must be reduced. a brigade usually has a front in attack of to yards, but this may be increased to , or , yards. a battalion should have a front of to yards. the battalion must be organized in depth in a series of waves. two companies are usually put abreast in the first line and the others in the second line. each company in both lines attacks in column of platoons at about yards' distance, with intervals of three to five paces between men, so there would be eight lines of waves, of two platoons each. the th and th platoons, the two in rear forming the eighth wave, are usually not employed in the attack, but are left behind as a nucleus to form on in case of heavy casualties. the front line must not be less than yards from the enemy's front line. the leading two or three waves are likely to meet machine gun fire, and generally move in extended order. not more than two waves can be accommodated in one trench. subsequent waves will move in line or in line of section columns in single file. russian saps must be run out as far as possible across "no man's land" to be opened up immediately after the assault, as approach trenches. ladders or steps are necessary to assist the leading waves in leaving the trenches, as they must move in lines. provision must be made for bridges over the first line trenches for the rear waves. in the original assault line will be more suitable for both leading and rear waves. in later stages it is better for the rear waves to move in small and handy columns. in the original assault the distance between waves may be to yards; in later stages they may follow each other at yards. in the original assault, zero, or the time for the assault to begin, may be fixed for the moment at which our barrage lifts from the enemy front trench, the infantry timing their advance so as to be close under our barrage before it lifts. in the later stages zero must be the moment at which our barrage commences, and this commencement will be the signal for the infantry to leave their trenches. each wave is assigned its own objective. all watches must be synchronized in order that all units may start off at the appointed time. the first wave is composed of bombers and rifle grenade men, and attacks the enemy's first line of trenches. it must go straight through to its objective, following the artillery barrage as closely as possible. the second and third waves, composed of riflemen with bayonets and lewis guns, re-enforce the first wave after the latter has occupied the enemy's first line trench, and attack the second line trench. the fourth wave takes up tools, ammunition and sand bags and assists in consolidating the line. the fifth wave is a mopping-up party to clear the enemy's dugouts. the sixth wave comprises battalion headquarters and has two lewis guns, kept for a special purpose. the seventh and eighth waves, if used, seize and consolidate the enemy's third line trench. bombing squads ( non-commissioned officer and men) are on the flank of each attacking wave. battalion bombers are assigned a special task. all movements must be over the top of the ground. the pace throughout should be a steady walk, except for the last or yards, when the line should break into a steady double time, finishing up the last yards with a rush. barrage is continued or minutes after the objective has been reached. mopping parties must be trained with great care under selected officers. they should always wear a distinguishing mark. they must at once dispose of any occupants who may have emerged from their dugouts, and picket the dugout entrances. the ultimate unit in the assault is the platoon. it must be organized and trained as a self-contained unit, capable of producing the required proportion of riflemen, bombers, rifle bombers, lewis gunners, and carriers, all trained to work in combination. assaulting troops should have twelve hours of daylight in the trenches before the assault begins, to enable them to get acquainted with the ground and get some rest. all ranks must be given a hot meal, including hot tea or coffee, before the assault. take every precaution to prevent the enemy from realizing that the assault is about to take place. bayonets must not be allowed to show. no increase in rate of artillery fire. no unusual movements must be made in the trenches, and there must be no indication of the impending assault until the barrage is dropped. when the trench has been taken, it should be consolidated at once to prevent counterattack. to protect this consolidation, throw out an outpost line, the posts consisting of one non-commissioned officer and riflemen with a lewis gun, about to yards apart and to yards beyond the line. these posts should be established in shellholes, which are to be converted into fire trenches, protected by wire entanglements, as soon as possible. approach trenches toward the enemy should be blockaded and hand and rifle grenadiers posted to guard them. the main captured trench should be converted at once into a fire trench facing the enemy. if it is badly knocked to pieces, a new trench may be constructed or yards in front of the captured line. the commander must reorganize in depth to provide supports and reserves for counterattacks. situation reports should be sent back frequently. rough sketches are better than messages. tanks follow infantry as closely as possible to deal with strong points. they are employed in sections of four. machine guns may be used to provide covering fire for attacking infantry, cover its withdrawal if the attack fails, fill gaps in the assaulting lines, assist in the consolidation of positions and repel counterattacks. lewis guns are of great value in knocking out hostile machine guns. they usually move on the flanks of the second wave of assault. later they are used to back up patrols and to hold the outpost line while the garrison line is being consolidated. as soon as consolidation begins, wire entanglements should be constructed. every effort should be made to secure the objective against recapture. any men available should be used to continue the offensive. all commanders down to and including company commanders must keep some portion of their command as a reserve. the company commander needs his reserve to work around points which are holding against the leading lines, to protect his flanks in case the companies on his right and left are delayed in their advance and to exploit his success and gain ground to the front. he must keep it well in hand behind the company. battalion reserves must start with the assaulting column and get across "no man's land" as soon as possible; they must not get out of hand. such a reserve is usually checked in the vicinity of the enemy's front line trench, where it can be thrown in to assist the advance or extend a flank as needed. the brigade reserve is kept well in hand just clear of the friendly front line and support trenches. reserves of companies and battalions must start moving over the top of the ground with the rest of the assaulting troops. defense of trenches.--the latest methods consist in constructing, supporting and strong points at the most favorable points to be held, such as villages, woods, etc. these are separated by intervals not too great for mutual support. they are of such resisting power that they must be taken before the attack can progress. in the intervals between them fire and communicating trenches are constructed, but these are only held lightly. dummy trenches may be placed in these intervals. lines of the various works are so traced that they bring enfilading fire on troops attacking adjacent positions. the lines need not be continuously occupied, but the obstacles extend in an unbroken line along the whole front. wire entanglements are set in front of important positions in belts feet wide, in two or three rows, each yards apart. each supporting point usually is occupied by a battalion, and consists of a series of trenches formed into strong points, each held by a garrison of one or more platoons or a company. the supporting points are from to yards in depth and have a front of to , yards. the first line of strong points is occupied by one or two companies in firing and cover trenches, while the remainder of the battalion occupies the support and reserve trenches. bomb-proofs are built along the cover trenches and are connected with the firing trenches. approach trenches are protected on both flanks by wire entanglements. strong points in support and reserve trenches are prepared for an all-around defense and divided into two or more separate strong points by wire entanglements. a body of infantry attacked is to oppose to the assailant its high powered weapons, machine guns, automatic rifles, rifle grenades and hand grenades and to reserve for the counter attack the grenadiers and riflemen. there is always one line upon which the resistance must be made with the greatest energy; for its defense the following methods have been found successful. machine guns should be placed where they can secure the best flanking fire, and every one put out of action should immediately be replaced by an automatic rifle. if machine gun barrage fire is to play its role successfully at the moment of assault, the guns must survive the bombardment. their protection is secured by placing them under shelter during the bombardment and making their emplacements as nearly invisible as possible. they should be echeloned in depth as far as practicable. they are generally placed in re-entrants of the firing trenches and cover the intervals between the adjoining supporting and strong points. where the ground will permit they are often placed in concealed positions to yards in front of the trenches, to break up attacks made by hostile infantry. not too many should be placed in the front line, and they should be echeloned in depth so as to confuse their disposition. the value of machine guns depends on the possibility of using them suddenly for brief periods, and in using them as long as they are effective. machine guns disposed for flanking fire must be well covered by grenadiers; this is also true of automatic rifles. automatic rifles, rifle grenades and hand grenades are used to constitute a barrage to keep back the enemy. the entire front should be defended by a barrage of hand grenades, while the barrage of automatic rifles and rifle grenades is superposed farther to the front, up to yards. all riflemen and those grenadiers not employed in forming barrages are reserved to make a counterattack. companies on the second line operate on similar principles; machine guns, automatic rifles and rifle grenades are arranged so as to cover every portion of the first line that might be invaded. after a short preparation by fire from these, the grenadiers and riflemen make the counterattack. the captains in charge of the two lines are responsible for the arrangement of the machine guns, automatic rifles and rifle grenades, the distribution of barrages and the distribution of groups for the counterattack. the real strength of the defense consists, not in holding the fire and cover trenches, nor even the support trenches, but in holding the supporting and strong points until the counterattack can be launched. liaison.--the question of liaison in battle is of the utmost importance, and complete co-ordination of the different arms is absolutely necessary. each battalion sends an officer or non-commissioned officer and a cyclist to the colonel, and each colonel sends a soldier to the battalion commander. the principal means of communication are the telephone, telegraph, wireless, aeroplane, mounted messengers, autos and motorcycles; and at the front runners, visual signals, rockets and carrier pigeons. each battalion commander is connected by telephone with each company commander, with the artillery observers, with the artillery commander, with his own colonel and with the adjacent battalions on either side. the signallers of assaulting companies move with the company commander. all signallers should be given a special training in repeating a message several times to a known back station which may not be able to reply forward. at the commencement of the assault the pigeons and pigeon carriers must be kept back at battalion headquarters, and sent forward as soon as the position has been gained. runners can be relied upon when all other means fail. they must be trained with their companies. runners should be lightly equipped and wear a distinctive mark. they must be familiar with all the principal routes to all the principal centers within their battalion sector. the quicker they go the safer they are. company and platoon runners must go forward with their respective commanders. messages to be carried long distances will be relayed. never send a verbal message by a runner; ignore any received; all messages must be written. company and battalion commanders must be prepared to assist artillery liaison officers in getting their messages back. liaison officers must be exchanged by all the assaulting battalions with the battalion on either flank. trench orders.--(battalion): trenches are usually divided into a certain number of bays; the number of men to defend these bays depends upon the length of trench allotted to each company. each section is detailed to guard a certain number of bays. non-commissioned officers and men must always wear their equipment by day and night. every company will "stand to" arms daily one-half hour before dusk and one-half hour before dawn, and will remain until dismissed by the company commander. the enemy's trenches are so close that it is very important for the men to have their rifle sights always at battle sight, so that there will be no necessity to alter their sights in case of alarm. by night all bayonets are to be fixed and half of the men on duty in the trenches are to be sitting on the firing platform with their rifles by their side. in case of attack, especially at night, it should be impressed upon the men that they fire low. section commanders are responsible that the men under their command have sufficient standing room for the purpose of firing over the parapet. they must have a clear field of fire, and not only be able to see the enemy trenches but the ground in the immediate vicinity of their trench. when making new trenches parapets should be at least five feet thick at the top in order to be bullet proof. repairs or alterations of the parapet should be reported at once by the section commander to the platoon commander, who will report it to superior authority. repairing of trenches, fatigue, etc., will be carried on either by day or night according to company arrangement. certain hours will be allotted for these tasks and no man is to be employed upon any kind of work out of these hours. no man should leave his post in the trenches at any time without the permission of the non-commissioned officer in charge of that post. at night there should be at least one sentry post to each ten yards of parapet. at night, double sentries should be posted if possible, and no sentry should be kept on duty for longer than an hour at a time. the arrangement should be such that when one sentry is doing his last half hour, his comrade will be doing his first half hour. sentries at night should always have their rifles resting on the parapet, ready to fire at a moment's notice. as few sentries as possible should be posted by day, so as to give as much rest as possible to the remainder of the men. by day any existing loop-holes may be used by a sentry for observation purposes, but this must be strictly prohibited at night, when the sentry must look over the parapet. if a sentry is continually fired at, the section commander will post him in another position, but not too far from his original position. there is no excuse for a man going to sleep on sentry duty; if he is sick he should report the fact to the non-commissioned officer, who will report to superior authority. an armed party of the enemy approaching the trench under a flag of truce should be halted at a distance, ordered to lay down their arms, and the matter at once reported to the company commander. if the party fails to halt when ordered to do so, or does not convey a flag of truce, they should be fired upon. an unarmed party should be halted in the same way. it is not necessary to challenge at night; open fire at once. this is modified only by special instructions. men especially picked for listening patrols and sharp-shooters will be given special privileges. all loud talking must be checked at night by officers and non-commissioned officers. all working parties must wear their equipment and carry their rifles. all picks and shovels will be returned after use to the company store room. ration parties and parties carrying materials for repairs, etc., need not wear their equipment or carry rifles; they should be accompanied by a fully armed non-commissioned officer as an escort. not more than men are to be away from the company at one time; one non-commissioned officer and four men per platoon. rifles must be kept clean and in good condition while in the trenches. they will be cleaned every morning during an hour appointed by the company commander for the purpose. platoon commanders will be responsible that section commanders superintend this work. all rifles except those used by sentries are to be kept in racks during the day. trenches must be kept in sanitary condition. platoon commanders will be responsible for the latrines in their sections of the trenches. all water for drinking and cooking is to be taken from a water cart or tank provided for this purpose. stretcher bearers will be stationed at a place designated by the commanding officer. no soldier will be buried nearer than yards from the trenches. in every platoon a non-commissioned officer will be detailed for duty by day; he will do no night duty. he will post the day sentries and see that they are on the alert and carry out their orders correctly. he will be responsible for the cleanliness of his lines and will frequently visit the latrines. he will see that all loose ammunition is collected. the platoon commander will always send a non-commissioned officer to draw rations and he will be responsible for their delivery. the passing along of messages by word of mouth will not be used. all messages should be written. special instructions will be issued as to precautions against gas. selection of site. (a) fire trench should be selected with due regard to tactical requirements and the economy of men. (b) every fire trench should have a good field of fire, at least yards. (c) the trenches should have the best possible cover. (d) the forward position on a slope for the first line has the best advantage. the support trench should be on the reverse slope from to yards in rear of the first line to prevent direct observation and to be practically free from artillery fire. the reserve trench is usually from / to mile in rear of the first line. remember that the first line, the support line, and the reserve line are all fire trenches. do not put them on a crest. (e) the communicating trenches (boyaux) should be zigzagged, wide and deep, and should follow the low ground. the longest straight trench should not exceed thirty paces. the angle made by each turn should be less than degrees. (f) the fire trenches should have salients and re-entrants so as to flank the wire entanglements. the bays are usually feet long with feet of traverse. (g) there are two problems in the siting of trenches, one for those to be constructed under fire and another for those that will be constructed without any danger from fire. trenches built under fire are usually made by connecting up individual shelters made by the front line when forced to halt. trenches built under quiet conditions can be laid out according to the best possible plan. trench construction. several kinds of difficulties face the trench digger: sand, clay, water and bullets. in order to overcome them he must be familiar with the general arrangement of a trench, the principles which govern its construction and the standard trench as it has been worked out in the present war at the cost of thousands of lives. general arrangement.--a position is a combination of trenches, consisting of: the fire trench, or first line, nearest the enemy; the cover trench, just behind the first line, where all but sentinels of the fire trench garrison are held in dugouts or shelters; the support trench, from to yards in rear of the cover trench, and the reserve, from to , yards still further to the rear. the support trench is placed far enough from the first line to prevent the enemy from shelling both trenches at once. by a concentration of artillery fire and a determined advance of the hostile infantry the first line may be captured. the support trench must be so organized that it will then act as a line of resistance upon which the enemy's advance will break. lieutenant colonel azan of the french army says: "as long as the support trenches are strongly held, the position is not in the hands of the enemy." [illustration: plate # ] the reserve is usually a _strong point_, so organized that it can maintain independent resistance for several days if necessary, should the enemy obtain control of adjacent areas. where possible trenches should be on reverse slopes, with the exception of the first line; but usually the outline of a trench is determined in actual combat, or is a part of hostile trench converted. under these circumstances it cannot be arranged according to tactical ideals. artillery and the automatic gun are the determining factors in trench warfare to-day. the effect of artillery fire must be limited in its area as far as possible, and trenches are, therefore, cut by _traverses_, which are square blocks of earth not less than nine feet square, left every feet along the trench. they should overlap the width of the trench by at least one yard, thereby limiting the effect of shell burst to a single _bay_, the -foot length of firing trench between two traverses. sharp angles have the same effect as traverses, but angles of more than degrees cannot be utilized in this way. the sides of the trench are kept as nearly perpendicular as possible, to give the maximum protection from shell burst and the fall of high angle projectiles. the _parados_, the bank of earth to the rear of the trench, has been developed during the war to give protection from flying fragments of shells exploding to the rear, and to prevent the figure of a sentinel from being outlined through a loop-hole against the sky. the _berm_, a ledge or shelf left between the side of the trench and the beginning of the parados, has come into general use in order to take the weight of the parados off the earth at the immediate edge of the trench, and so prevent the reverse slope from caving in easily under bombardment or heavy rain. [illustration: plate # a] automatic guns have made it necessary to break the line of the trench at every opportunity, in order to secure a flanking fire for these arms. auto-rifles and machine guns have tremendous effectiveness only in depth, and flanking fire gives them their greatest opportunity. trench construction.--the methods of building trenches are the same whether the work is carried on under fire or not. in an attack, upon reaching the limit of advance, the men immediately dig themselves in, and later connect these individual holes to make a continuous line of trench. most of the digging must be done at night, and must be organized to obtain the most work with the least confusion. there are three ways of increasing the efficiency of the men. in the first of these, squad shifts, the squad leader divides his men into reliefs and gives each man a limited period of intensive work. reliefs may be made by squads or by individuals. the second way of increasing efficiency is to induce competition among the man and squads, thus making the work a game in which each soldier's interest will be aroused in the effort to do better than the others. the third method is to assign a fixed amount of work to each man. an average task, which all ought to accomplish in a given time, is found by experience, and those who finish before their time is up are relieved from further work during that shift, and allowed to return to their shelters. continual care must be used to check up the tools on hand, as the men are prone to leave them where they were working rather than carry them back and forth to work. each unit must guard its property from appropriation by neighbors on its flanks. system of laying out trenches.--the trace of the trench is first staked out, particularly at traverses and corners when the work is to be done at night. measurements should be exact, and the men should be required to line the limits of each trench so as not to exceed them in digging. all sod should be taken up carefully and used on the parapet for concealment or on the berm to make a square back wall for the dirt of the parapet. if possible this should be done with the parados wall, so as to make it as inconspicuous as possible from the front. men should begin to dig at the center of the trench and throw the dirt as far out on the sides as possible, so that as they go deeper the earth can be thrown just over the berm. the slope of the sides will be kept steep and the men prevented from widening the trench as they dig. in sandy soil the sides of the trench should be allowed to reach their angle of repose (which is wider at the top than required), then the trench walls supported with _revettments_ to the proper width, which are filled in behind with sand. always dig to full depth before beginning to revet, as it is impossible to dig deeper afterwards without loosening the revetting. revettments.--every trench at points needs support, and this _revetting_ may be done with any of the following materials: sod; corduroy of logs laid lengthwise; sand bags (size in. x in. x in.); galvanized iron; chicken wire and cloth made in a frame about six feet long; _hurdles_, wicker mats made by driving three-inch stakes into the ground, leaving uprights as high above the ground as the depth of the trench, then weaving withes and slender saplings between the uprights; expanded metal; _gabions_, cylindrical baskets made like hurdles except that the stakes are driven in a circle; _fascines_, bundles of faggots about inches in diameter by feet long. the faggots are laid together on a horse or between stakes driven in the ground, then "choked," or bound tightly together, by a rope feet inches long with loops at each end, tightened with two stiff levers. the bundle is then bound with wire at intervals of two feet. the circumference of a fascine should be inches. [illustration: plate # ] capt. powell of the c.e.f. found during months' service in the trenches, that a separate construction for the bottom and firing step from that of the parapet made repair much simpler when the trench was damaged by shell fire. the upper part of the trench usually suffers most, while the bottom section, if unattached, often remains intact and the drainage system needs only to be cleared out. if the portion above the firing step is one piece with that below, however, the whole trench has to be reconstructed. there is nothing more important than the supports used to keep revetting in place. with sods, sand bags, concrete and gabions, a proper arrangement in the first place will make other support unnecessary. sod should be placed carefully, with a slope of not more than one inch on four, with the vegetation uppermost. this type is least affected by rain. sand bags should be used like brickwork, laid in alternate headers (binders) and stretchers. their use should be confined as far as possible to emergency and repair work, because after a few weeks the bags rot and cannot be moved about. if the trench wall has been demolished by artillery fire, the particles of cloth make digging out the bottom of the trench a very difficult matter. concrete work has been used extensively by the germans, but the chips fly like bullets under shell explosion, and the concrete cracks and disintegrates in severe weather. it is used in the bottom of trenches for drainage and for the firing step. gabions may be set into the wall of the trench and filled with earth, or used at corners to prevent the wearing down of the edge, which reduces the protective effect of the trench. set in at a slight angle they will hold the side without further re-enforcement. with the other forms of revetting some secondary support is required. this is usually furnished by sinking stakes into the bottom of the trench and securing their upper ends to a "dead man"--a stake or log sunk in the ground more than three feet away. the tendency is to sink the dead men too near to the trench, and to attach too many wires to one of them. it is important to sink the stakes at least one foot below the bottom of the trench. by digging holes for them instead of driving them in directly, the sides of the trench need not be disturbed by the concussion of driving the stakes. this is especially important in sandy soils. stakes should be placed about two feet apart. dead men should be buried deeply enough to prevent cutting by shell explosions. trench armament.--a few machine guns are set in concealed emplacements along the trench to cover important salients. the automatic rifle is used over the parapet. besides these there is the rifle grenade and trench mortar. the rifle grenade has a simple emplacement. after securing the proper elevation, the butt of the rifle is placed between posts or blocks of wood and the muzzle rested against a log on the wall of the trench. a trench mortar emplacement is dug in the rear wall of the trench, or a shell hole is utilized, care being taken to conceal it from aerial observation. loopholes.--loopholes are still much in use for observation, but they are employed less and less for firing, as they are difficult to conceal from the enemy and almost useless when the enemy is close. they should cut the parapet diagonally, not directly to the front, and should be concealed by vegetation and by a curtain over the opening when they are not in use. sheet steel plates with small peep holes are used on the parapet. they are set up with a slope to the rear to deflect bullets. trench bottoms.--in clay or hard soil special arrangements must be made for drainage. where possible the trench should have a convex surface and should be smooth. a rough bottom means delay in reliefs, and possible injuries. where trenches are used for long periods board walks should be constructed. under these drains or sink holes can be placed to collect water. a sink hole may be constructed by digging a pit filled with small stones, or a barrel may be sunk into the ground and filled with stone. where there is not sufficient slope to carry off the water, or at the lowest point of a drainage system, a water hole should be dug in front of the trench large enough to handle the drainage water. [illustration: plate # ] communication trench (or boyau).--running to the rear and joining the different parallel resistance trenches are communication trenches or boyaux. these are for transportation of men and material as well as for communication. communication trenches should be made wide enough to allow travel for men with loads, should be at least seven feet deep and as smooth as possible on the bottom. rough places will delay traffic. they are dug with turns every or yards to prevent their being swept by gun fire. when boyaux are built by night sharp zig-zag corners should be used, or the angles will not be acute and protection will be lost. during daylight when the directions can be seen, the construction may be a serpentine curve, with no stretch of more than yards visible from one point. boyaux are sometimes used for lateral defence and often emplacements for automatic guns are arranged to cover stretches of them. bombing stations are placed near by to protect the guns and to clear the boyau of the enemy. at these points the boyau is left straight for a short distance in front. where provision is made for lateral or frontal defence by rifle fire, firing steps are constructed. if this is inconvenient for movement along the boyau, individual emplacements must be made in the side wall for firing. sentry posts are dug at right angles to the boyau. arrangements for passage of men moving in opposite directions may be made by extending short spurs at the corners, enlarging the boyau at the bends, digging niches or passing points here and there, or constructing island traverses with the boyau running around on each side. [illustration: plate # ] every boyau should be marked where it meets a trench with a sign indicating the place and trench. without this messengers, reliefs and re-enforcements may easily be lost in the maze of trenches. latrines should be run out about feet from boyaux at points directly in rear of lateral trenches. if possible they should be placed so that men cannot enter them without passing near the platoon leaders. this will prevent men from leaving the front line, under the pretense of going to latrines, during bombardments or mining operations. the trench leading to a latrine should be constructed like a boyau, and the pit should be close to the side nearest the enemy, to give the best possible protection from shell fire. there are three types of trench latrines: deep boxes which are covered and have rough seats; short straddle trenches or trenches equipped with a single horizontal bar, and portable cans, used where the ground or the limited space make it impossible to dig pits. these cans should be emptied daily into holes behind the trenches, which are covered after the cans are emptied into them. urinals should be separate from the latrines. they may be either holes about three feet deep filled with stone, troughs with a covered pit at the end, or portable cans. shelters. for the protection of men not actually on duty three forms of shelters are used. the _splinter-proof_ is a form of light shelter whose covering affords protection only against splinters. these are usually on the reserve line. about inches to inches of earth over a roof of logs or planks will afford protection from splinters and shrapnel. curved sheets of iron may also be used. the _deep shelter_ or _bomb-proof_ is a chamber constructed by digging from the surface and constructing a roof. to protect against eight-inch shells the top of the chamber should be twenty feet below the surface. heavy beams or sections of railroad iron are laid across the roof. above them is a layer of earth several feet thick; then another layer of timber extending to undisturbed ground on the sides with concrete, crushed stone, metal, etc., above to make a percussion surface for exploding projectiles that penetrate the upper layer of earth. this layer fills in the rest of the space to the level of the ground. [illustration: plate no. .] shelters should not exceed six feet in width, but can be of any length. this will prevent the crushing in of the roof timber by the explosion of a projectile buried in the upper layer of earth. the principles of constructing shelters will be considered under "dugouts," as they are similar for the two types. dugouts are chambers tunnelled into the ground with twenty feet or more of undisturbed earth above them. they are used in the cover trenches and sometimes in the first line. enough of them must be built to shelter the garrison of each sector, allowing one man per yard of front. they must also be built for machine gun and trench mortar detachments. sentries must be stationed in observation posts which command the ground in front of each dugout. they must be connected with the dugouts by telephone or speaking tube. position.--dugouts must always be on the side of the trench toward the enemy. this prevents flying shells from falling into the entrances. they should connect with lateral trenches, not with boyaux, as men at the entrance obstruct traffic through the boyaux. entrances and exits must be well concealed, with not less than five feet of head cover. this should be provided with a bursting layer. all dugouts must have at least two openings, one on the opposite side of the traverse or angle from the other. it is well to have an exit behind the parados leading to a surprise position for a machine gun and bombers. all openings must have a sill inches to inches high, to prevent water from entering the dugout. galleries leading to dugouts should be built at an incline of degrees. their dimensions should be feet inches by feet. frames are of squared timber. the sill and two side posts should be not less than inches square, and the frames in the passageways feet inches by feet inches. they must be placed at right angles to the slope of the gallery, with distance pieces between uprights. in treacherous soil the frames rest on sills. steps in the passageway are foot broad and foot high. bomb-traps, extensions of the gallery about feet long, should be dug beyond the point where the entrance to the dugout chamber leads off from the gallery. these will catch bombs thrown in from the surface and protect the chamber from the effects of their explosion. interior. the standard section is feet by feet, to allow for bunks on each side. frames of by timber spaced feet inches apart support the sides and roof. roof planking should be inches thick, and the sides should be covered with - / inch plank or corrugated iron. two shovels and two picks for emergencies should always be kept in each dugout. the construction of the chamber should be that of a very strong box, so that it will stand strain, if necessary, from within as well as from without. depots for supplies must be near the headquarters of the platoon, company, battalion and regiment. shelters may be made with ammunition boxes set into the side of the trench. places should be provided for the following: food, ammunition for rifles and auto-rifles, grenades, rockets, tools and other supplies. places must also be arranged in the front line for ammunition, rockets and hand and rifle grenades. telephones. communication is established as speedily as possible with the various units. in the forward trenches wires do not last long under bombardment and fire left open along the side of the trench, where quick repairs can be made. all soldiers must be taught to respect these wires and to care for them when they are found under foot or hanging. conduits are dug for wires to battalion and regimental headquarters, and these are fairly safe from shell fire. departure parallel. in preparing for an advance upon the enemy, a straight line trench without traverses, and with steps at the end for exit to the surface, is built in front of the first line trench. this line of departure is generally brought within about yards of the hostile line by means of _saps_, short trenches run out from the front line to the new parallel. since this line of departure can be seen by the enemy, it is sometimes better to construct steps in the front line trench itself, or when possible to build a _russian sap_. this is a tunnel very near the ground, which can be broken through at a moment's notice when troops are ready to advance. machine gun emplacements.--shell-holes with a good field of fire and emplacements along boyaux are the best location for machine guns. few guns are placed in the front line, and these only at strong points in the line, which command a maximum field of effectiveness. shell-holes may be imitated for machine gun emplacements, but in any case they should be connected by underground passage with the trenches. thus when trenches are destroyed by bombardment the machine guns remain intact. the field of fire for each machine gun should be carefully determined and marked by three stakes, one for the position of the gun, the other two for the limits of the field of fire. using these as guides, the gun can be fired correctly at night. during the day it is never left in place nor fired from its actual emplacement. [illustration: no. ] listening posts.--these stations are usually carried out to the edge of the entanglements nearest the enemy. the listening station must be large enough for half a squad, and often has an automatic rifle and grenade thrower. there should be not more than two posts for each battalion. they are not occupied during the day. they are hard to defend and easily captured by a raiding party which cuts the wire to one of the flanks and comes in from the rear. the boyau leading to the post should be zig-zagged. the post itself should be deep enough for good head cover. wire entanglements.--the object of the entanglement is not to stop completely the advance of the enemy, but to delay him at close range under machine gun, auto rifle and rifle fire, and within range of grenades and bombs. entanglements should be concealed as much as possible from the enemy's trenches and from aerial observation. if possible, they should be placed on a reverse slope or in a dead angle. they should be from to yards in front of the trench, so that artillery fire directed upon the trench will not be effective on the wire. at the same time the wire must not be far enough advanced so that the enemy's raiding parties can cut the entanglements. wire entanglements are classified as high entanglements, low entanglements and loose wire. high entanglements are strung on metal or wood posts about four feet high, both wire and posts being painted for camouflage. the driving of posts must be muffled, and metal screw posts are used when near the enemy's line. posts are placed in two parallel lines, two yards apart, spaced alternately so that the posts in one line are opposite the middle of the interval in the other. tracing entanglements is done by a sergeant followed by two stake placers, two holders and two drivers, who in turn are followed by men attaching wire. two men carry each roll of wire, and each pair (there are twelve pairs in all) strings one wire. a panel between stakes is composed of four strands. each wire should be wrapped around each post. the same arrangement of panels should run between the two lines of posts. the entanglements are in three lines about yards apart, the nearest being yards from the front line trench. the entanglement nearest the enemy should be constructed first, so that men always work nearest their own trenches. all wire entanglements should be at all points commanded by the flanking fire of machine guns. high entanglements (known as abatis) may be made by felling trees toward the enemy, and similar entanglements made of brushwood are useful in emergency. low entanglements are formed of pickets two feet high, - / inches in diameter, wired in all directions. vegetation renders the entanglement invisible from the enemy and from aerial observation. this type may also be placed in shallow excavations which are concealed from the enemy and partly protected from artillery fire. sharpened stakes, with their points hardened by fire, driven obliquely into the ground, may also be used. loose wire in the form of loops of small diameter fastened to stakes, or wire laid along the ground and attached at the ends, or spirals of barbed wire in racks, is used for entanglements. it is reported that this form is coming into considerable use, but the details have not been published. such entanglements are much harder to locate by aerial observation. * * * * * the following are a number of criticisms made by lieut. henri poire of the french army, detailed as instructor at plattsburg, upon the system of field works constructed by the th and th provisional training regiments. the ground was of loose sand, with some gravel at a depth of about six feet. . dimensions of trenches as laid out were not followed. (a) bottom of trenches behind firing steps too narrow. (b) firing step too deep. it should never be more than feet inches below berm of parapet. (c) parapet much too thin in most cases. it should be at least three feet thick. (d) communication trenches (boyaux) generally too narrow. (e) islands in communication trenches should never be less than x yards--otherwise one shell will demolish the entire passageway. . revettment work not well anchored. in some cases too many wires from supports fastened to one dead man. another fault is that dead men were not buried deeply enough in the ground, nor far enough back from the trench. in one case a dead man (a stake) supported all four sides of an island in a communication trench. the destruction of this post would have completely blocked every passage around the island. furthermore, dead men rot quickly and tend to break off. it is necessary, therefore, to have a number of them, each holding only a portion of the weight. all projecting branches and irregularities along a trench should be removed by occupying troops. . too many loop-holes. except for snipers, riflemen and automatic riflemen fire over the parapet. . machine gun loop-holes not wide enough. they should not be less than inches wide. there must be vegetation planted in front and a curtain hung over the loop-holes to prevent detection. the growing plants in front will be easily swept away at the first discharge. . remember never to imitate shell-holes until after a real bombardment by the enemy. . the dugouts made were never deep enough and afforded no protection. in fact it would be far better to have none than to be caught inside when a shell exploded in a shallow one, because the confinement of the explosion would intensify the effect. . shelters were all too wide. six feet is the maximum. the platoon headquarters dugout should be of the same width as the trench, not over three feet, but as long as necessary. company headquarters is six feet wide and of whatever depth required. . in digging, not enough care was used to conceal the fresh earth from the enemy. make false emplacements to utilize this dirt; also dig dummy trenches about one foot deep, leaving the sides sharp so that they will show clearly on aerial photographs. . in using plants as camouflage, distinct care must be exercised not to put growing plants too freely nor to place them where they never existed. the actual ground conditions must be copied. . some latrines were not arranged with the stools close beneath the wall nearest the enemy. this caused the loss of protection, which it is imperative to consider, as many casualties occur here. . too many listening posts. they are easily captured by hostile fighting patrols. there should never be more than two listening posts to a battalion. . the observation stations in many instances had no good field of fire or were outlined against the sky on the crest of some rise. the site for an observation post should always be placed over the crest and have a good field of fire for use in case of attack. occupation. i. relief in the trenches. a. the two main classes of relief: . general relief. applied to the relief of a whole position manned by a division or more. executed when large units are going to "full rest" in the rear or being removed from one part of the front to another. executed in the same way as interior relief; i.e., by successive relief of the battalions involved. . interior relief. applied to the relief of one sector or portion of a sector manned by a brigade or less. b. general principles of relief: . interior relief is executed about once every six days; more frequently when the stay in the trenches is particularly arduous, less frequently when it is unusually comfortable. . the battalion is the relieving unit. . it is advisable to arrange the relief between units which have friendly relations to one another; e.g., battalions of the same regiment; and, so far as possible, to assign each unit to the same trenches on each relief. this promotes continuity of effort. . relief is executed at night; the hour must be varied; secrecy is imperative. . prompt execution is essential, to prevent fatigue of the troops and congestion of the boyaux. c. the mechanism of relief: . reconnaissance, hours in advance, by the captain of each relieving company, accompanied by his platoon leaders and non-commissioned officers. he ascertains: ( ) the plan of occupation; i.e., the dispositions and duties of the unit to be relieved. ( ) the shelter accommodations. ( ) work being done and proposed. ( ) condition of the wire and other defences. ( ) the available water supply. ( ) artillery support. ( ) communications. ( ) the location, amount and condition of stores. ( ) danger points. ( ) all available information of the enemy; his habits, location of his snipers, what work he is doing. ( ) the ways and means of liaison, both lateral and from front to rear. to the success of this reconnaissance, the closest co-operation between all officers of the companies relieving and relieved, is indispensable. . the march from billets to the trenches: (a) transportation, by auto-trucks and wagons, is utilized to a point as near the lines as possible, to carry the packs of the men, the auto rifles, extra ammunition and other heavy equipment. when the distance is great the men themselves should be carried by auto-truck; this saves time and fatigue. the men will carry rifles loaded and locked, full cartridge belts, gas masks, and all other lighter equipment, with rations for hours at least. grenades will be secured in the trenches. electric torches will be carried by company and platoon commanders. (b) the strictest discipline must be maintained. on arrival within sight of the enemy, noise and smoking (or other lights) will be prohibited. (c) guides, from the company to be relieved, will meet the relieving company promptly at a point definitely agreed upon in advance. . the march through the boyaux (communicating trenches): (a) distance; often as much three or four miles. (b) order of march: company in single file, captain at the head; each platoon leader at the head of his platoon; a non-commissioned officer at rear of each platoon. (c) the column must be kept closed up. each man must consider himself a connecting file, guiding on the head, and behave accordingly. a guide should accompany the commander of the last platoon. (d) rate of march: roughly, about yards per minute. it takes men about minutes to pass a given point. (e) route and right of way: the first line and support trenches will never be used as roads. separate boyaux should, if possible, be assigned to the troops relieving and relieved. in no case will one company cross the path of another. in case of two columns meeting, one moving forward, the other to the rear, the former has the right of way. . no man of the unit in occupation will leave his post until he has actually been relieved and has transmitted all orders and information relative to that post. . liaison must be established, immediately on arrival, with the units on the flanks and with headquarters in the rear. captains must make sure that their runners are thoroughly acquainted with the routes of communication. . as soon as relief is accomplished both captains will report that fact to their respective commanders. . the relieving commander then inspects his trenches. he ascertains that all his watchers are at their posts and that the balance of his men know their posts and duties and are prepared to assume them quickly. . the duties of the relieved commander are: ( ) to turn over his sector thoroughly policed and in good condition as regards its construction and the new work, if any, in progress. ( ) to turn over his supplies in good condition and fully accounted for. ( ) after reporting the relief, to march his men back to billets as promptly and secretly as possible, in column of files, platoon leaders in the rear of their platoons, a non-commissioned officer and guide at the head of each. ( ) on the evening preceding relief, to send his cooks back to billets so that his men may be provided with a hot meal immediately on arrival. d. if an attack occurs during the march through the boyaux, to or from relief, the company affected occupies the nearest defensive position and at once notifies its battalion commander. if an attack occurs during the actual process of relief, the senior officer present takes command. ii. the stay in the trenches. a. the four objects of a trench commander: . security of his sector. . protection of his troops. . constant and accurate observation. . a continuous offensive. b. his plan of defense: . general principles of defense: (a) arrangement in depth. the most dependable defense is in prearranged counter attacks. the system of defense must react like a helical spring. (b) tenacity of defense. . each unit must be prepared to hold its post to the last extremity. . orders to withdraw will never be obeyed unless unmistakably valid. . all ground lost must be retaken at once in counter attack by the unit which lost it. (c) apportionment of responsibility. each active segment must have a commander responsible for its defense, upkeep and sanitation, and the discipline and instruction of his men. . basis: (a) the plan of defense turned over by the preceding commander. this will usually suffice for the first hours after relief. (b) general information of the enemy's lines, dispositions, and intentions, based chiefly on aerial photographs. c. organization of defense: . allocation of front. (the front of an american battalion will average about , yards.) diagrams: a. the regiment. b. the battalion. c. the company. d. the platoon. . distribution of effectives. determined chiefly by the terrain and by . . employment of the several arms: (a) machine guns. crew of men per gun. (furnished by detachments of a machine gun company.) located by the infantry commander, in concealed emplacements behind the first line, to deliver successive barrages from flanking positions. effective range: up to yards. (b) automatic rifles. crew of men per rifle. usually posted to enfilade the entanglements of the first line. they concentrate the fire effect of from to riflemen. effective range: up to yards. (c) rifle grenadiers. located near enough to first line to hold the enemy trenches under fire and deliver effective barrages near the mouths of our own communicating trenches. should be located near observation posts so that their fire can be promptly corrected. (d) trench mortars. located similarly to (c). manned by riflemen. (e) bombers. one supply man to each grenadiers. used for protection of auto-rifles, in counter attacks, for protection of communicating trenches and fighting in close quarters. (f) riflemen. posted to deliver frontal fire. grouped according to the plan of counter attacks. (g) as many men as possible should be instructed in the use of the enemy's weapons. d. liaison: (a) by telephone. quickest and most accurate. maintained between each platoon and its company headquarters, and between adjoining companies. especially subject to destruction in bombardment. wireless and ground telegraphy are used only between brigade and division headquarters. (b) by runners ("liaison agents"). five detailed from each company to battalion headquarters; one sent to each adjoining company headquarters; one from each platoon to company headquarters; four or five on duty at each platoon headquarters; five from each machine gun company to battalion headquarters. messages sent by them should, if practicable, be written and signed, and should be receipted for by the addressee. (c) by rockets and flares. quickest means of liaison with the artillery in rear. (d) domestic (message carrying) grenades. (e) dogs and carrier pigeons. sent out to the rear from battalion headquarters. (f) one searchlight--with a radius of miles--is furnished to each company. (g) noise. klaxon signals, etc., give warning of gas attacks. e. observation: (a) observers: . must be men of infinite patience, keen hearing and eyesight. . they are located behind the first line in positions combining good view with concealment. . each is provided with a panoramic map, made from aeroplane photographs, of the enemy's trenches. on this must be promptly noted every slightest change in the trace, height of parapet, etc., of the enemy's line. such notes greatly assist in locating machine gun emplacements. . each observer will also record in a note book everything of importance, with the time observed. . a report of changes, with an abstract of observer's notes, is forwarded daily to regimental headquarters. (b) watchers (sentinels): . stationed, one near the door of each dugout, in the first line, support and intermediate trenches. . they must be carefully concealed. . they must watch over the parapet (never through slits or loopholes) so as to have unrestricted view. . they are furnished with signal rockets and flares for prompt communication with the artillery, and have authority to use them. . double sentinels are posted at night. (c) listening posts: . located, usually in shell holes, just inside the entanglements. connected with front line by tunnels. protected from grenades by heavy gratings, when possible, and by concealment. . occupied by men ( in command), in reliefs. usually occupied only at night unless our trenches are on a reverse slope. . chief function is protection of the entanglements. (d) microphone posts.--installed usually behind the first line. intercept the enemy's telephone and ground-telegraph messages and any loud conversation in his trenches. (e) fixed patrols.--generally remain in shell holes in front of our entanglements. (f) reconnoitering patrols: . composed of from to men, commanded by a non-commissioned officer. sent out at night only. . the company commander must promptly notify commanders of adjoining companies of the dispatch of these patrols, their time of departure, route and probable time of return. . men should be assigned to this duty by roster. f. trench work: . constant battle with the elements, care for drainage, revettment, sanitation and storage. . repair of the effects of bombardment. . new work, for better security, communication and observation. . work in the open. (a) usually consists of repair or rearrangement of wire entanglements, digging new listening posts, etc. (b) effected by parties detailed by roster. (c) they are guarded by fighting patrols, composed like reconnaissance patrols. their best protection is in silence and concealment. (d) adjoining companies must be notified of their dispatch, location and probable time of return. (e) this work, like all operations conducted outside the protection of the trenches, offers a valuable tonic to the morale. g. offensive operations: . sniping: (a) snipers constitute one of the most dependable and productive agencies of attrition. (b) the best shots of the company are especially trained and assigned for this duty exclusively. (c) they operate in pairs and post themselves to cover any exposed portions of the enemy's trenches, especially his communicating trenches. (d) they should be well supplied with all necessary special equipment; _e.g._, sniperscopes, telescopic sights, painted headgear, etc. . mining operations. . raiding: (a) object of raids: destruction of the enemy's defenses, disturbance of his morale, collection of prisoners and information. (b) the personnel of raiding parties will usually include: a commander and second in command, bayonet men, bombers, engineers, signal men, stretcher bearers. their numbers and proportions are regulated by the nature and difficulty of the task. (c) co-ordination with the artillery barrage is the essential of their success. the limit of advance, extent of operations, and time of return will therefore be set in advance and rigidly adhered to. h. role of the trench commander: . inspections: the men will be formally inspected twice daily at the general "stand to" by the company commander. particular attention will be paid to the health of the men, condition of their feet and their clothing. each man must have at least one pair of dry socks always available. arms, gas masks, and other equipments will also be rigidly inspected. . roster: the company commander will carefully supervise the preparation of the duty roster. an obviously equal distribution of the arduous duties involved in trench life is essential to the maintenance of morale. . reports and records: (additional to those already required by regulations.) log book, report of casualties, wind report (daily), bombardment report (daily), intelligence report, which will include observer's notes and changes (twice daily), and a daily report of work completed and undertaken. . "one principle which the trench commander should never forget is the necessity for his frequent presence in the midst of his men. * * * direct contact with the troops on as many occasions as possible is the most certain way to gain their confidence." [illustration] [illustration] duties of the company commander. . to inspect the sector his company is to occupy, one day in advance of occupying it. . to assign segments to the platoons. . to prepare a plan of defense. . to connect by liaison with the companies on his flanks. . to have an agent or runner at battalion headquarters. . to prepare a plan for counter attacks. . to report to the battalion commander when his company has taken up its position: (a) its situation. (b) security. (c) liaison. (d) state of position left by predecessor. (e) defense of sector. (f) plan of counter attacks. . to inspect the trenches frequently to see that everything is in proper condition and that his men are in jubilant spirits. . to have platoon guides report to battalion headquarters on the date for the relief of his company and act as guides to the company that relieves him. . to keep a special log book in which the following are kept: (a) work completed by his unit. (b) work under way. (c) work proposed. . turn over to his successor: (a) measures taken for security. (b) plan of attacks. (c) plan of counterattacks. . have one officer on duty at all times. . "stand to" will take place one ( ) hour before daylight, and all available men will attend. there will be a thorough inspection. rapid loading will be practiced. the firing position of every man will be tested to see if he can hit the bottom of our wire. gas helmets will be inspected. . time table--allot hours of work, rest and meals. . supplies--make timely requisitions for them--be especially watchful about meals and rations--have no delays. . to have one watcher and one relief on duty near company headquarters at all times. . to get a good field of fire to the front and cover the sectors of each company on flanks. . (subject to change) red rocket-artillery barrage wanted. white rocket gas attack. . to report twice daily all changes in wind direction. . to report to battalion commander when relieved. duties of platoon leaders as officers on duty with company. . report with old officer at company headquarters. . make frequent inspections of all trenches occupied by company. . visit each listening post; at least once during tour of duty. . visit all sentinels and receive their reports. . see that one non-commissioned officer per platoon is on duty. . receive reports of non-commissioned officers after they have posted sentinels. . at end of tour hand over to new officer all orders, a report of work in progress, and any useful information. . report with new officer at company headquarters on completion of tour. . to report anything unusual to company headquarters. . to send dead and wounded to dressing station trenches. . to send patrols to front at night. duties of platoon leaders. . must accompany company commander on inspection of trenches one day previous to occupying them. . make necessary reliefs for his men in his segment. . make a plan of defense and counterattack for his position or approve the one left there. . establish sniping posts and arrange reliefs. . establish listening posts and arrange reliefs. . assign non-commissioned officer to duty with platoon and arrange relief. . instruct every man as to his place in case of attack. . establish liaison with platoons on both flanks; and one runner to company headquarters. . have one platoon guide report to company headquarters on day his platoon is to be relieved. . on completion of posting his platoon, report to his company commander. . turn over to platoon relieving him all orders and data pertaining to his position. . be especially attentive to rigid military discipline; _i.e._, every soldier to be neat; equipment must be clean at all times; to render the required salute when not observing or firing at the enemy. . have one non-commissioned officer on duty at all times. . to inspect rifles, equipment and latrines twice daily. (a) to have at least one latrine in working order at all times. (b) to have a sentry on duty at each platoon dugout at all times. (c) establish one observation post in daytime. . in front line trenches: (a) no smoking or talking to be allowed at night. (b) every man to wear his equipment except packs. (c) have rifle within reaching distance. (d) all reliefs to be within kicking distance of soldier on duty. . inspect at "stand to" and report results to company headquarters, especially if each man has rounds of ammunition and necessary grenades and bombs. . to be especially attentive to sanitation and care of the men's feet. . to have one ( ) watcher and relief on duty at all times near platoon dugouts. . to get a good field of fire to his front and to cover the sector of each platoon on his flanks. . make requisition for material. . to see that all of his men are properly fed. . report to company commander when relieved. . must know what every man is doing at all times. duties of non-commissioned officer on duty (each platoon). . to make frequent inspections of the position occupied by his platoon. . to be responsible that each soldier knows his duties. . to report anything of special importance to officer on duty. . on being relieved to report with the new non-commissioned officer to the officer on duty. . after posting sentinels to report "all is well" to officer on duty. . explain to his sentinel his duties, the position of section and platoon commanders and of sentries on either side; and to caution his sentries when friendly patrols are out, the probable time and place of return. . bayonets will always be fixed in front line trenches. . at night time to have double sentinel. . to see that each sentinel in daytime has a periscope. . rifles to be loaded; no cartridge shall be in the chamber except when necessary to shoot. . to report to company headquarters any change in direction of wind. patrols. . usual orders about patrols. . always go out at night via the listening post; tell the men in the listening post your mission and probable time of return. sentinels. . to sound klaxon horn on approach of gas attack. . to report immediately to non-commissioned officer on duty any change in direction of wind. . in cold weather to work bolt frequently to keep it from freezing. . at night to challenge only in case of necessity, and then only in a low tone. challenge "_hands up._" . number of posts depends on assumed nearness of enemy and local conditions. normally one per platoon by day and three double sentinels per platoon at night. . relief kept close at hand. report "all is well," or otherwise, when officer passes. . screened from observation. . remain standing unless height of parapet renders this impossible. machine guns. . non-commissioned officer and one ( ) watcher on duty at all times. . except in emergency they will not be fired from their regular emplacements. . unless emplacements are well concealed, guns will not be mounted except between evening and morning "stand to." . before dusk each gun will be sighted on some particular spot either in front of or behind the enemy's line. . range cards will be prepared and kept with each gun. snipers. . sniping post consists of one ( ) observer and one ( ) rifleman with relief of two ( ) men posted close by. . sniping post should be well concealed. . daily report from each post, of (a) any work done by enemy. (b) enemy seen; place, uniform, apparent age, physique, equipment. (c) any other information of interest. . sniper to be appointed from each section. . must be intelligent, alert, good scout, good shot, courageous. . snipers should spend hours in trenches with those of command which theirs is to relieve, before relief takes place. . no night work required of these men since they must be constantly on the alert during the day. organization of a platoon--rifle company--table no. platoon platoon headquarters lieut. sgt. privates. st section | d section | d section | th section hand bombers |rifle grenadiers| riflemen | auto-riflemen ----------------+----------------+-------------------+-------------------- teams, each | team of | sgt. | sgt. and corps. leader | grenadiers | squads of | teams, each thrower | carriers | men each | gunner carrier | (may be | extra | carriers scout | subdivided) | riflemen[r] | corps. | corps. | sgt. and cpl. | sgt. and cpls. pvts. st cl. | pvt. st cl. | pvts. st cl. | pvts. st cl. pvts. | pvts. | pvts. | pvts. total-- | total-- | total-- | total-- [footnote r: runners: attached to d section and th squad. with platoon commander when company is in extended order formation.] _suggested organization of platoon in close order and for administration._ st squad | d squad | d squad | th squad | ---------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------| bomber section | / auto rifle | / auto rifle | | (less bomber | section i.e., | section i.e., | grenadier | team) | cpl and teams | cpl and teams | section | | | | | corp | cpl. | cpl. | cpl. | pvts. | pvts. | pvts. | pvts. | | | | (extra cpl. in | | | | file closers) | ---------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+ th squad | th squad | th squad | ---------------+-----------------+-----------------| rifle squad | rifle squad | bomber team | | | plus extra | | | riflemen[s] | | | | cpl. | cpl. | cpl. | pvts. | pvts. | pvts. | | | | | | | ---------------+-----------------+-----------------+ right guide--automatic gun sgt. left guide--rifle sgt. chief of platoon--lieut. file closer or acting st sgt.--sgt.-asst. note.--if desirable the mechanics and privates (signalmen) who are not assigned to platoons regularly, can be used to fill the blank files in the d and d squads. [footnote s: runners: attached to d section and th squad. with platoon commander when company is in extended order formation.] deployments. general principles: (a) the following plans for deployment are not to be regarded as rigid. the positions of the various squads depends upon tactical considerations. (b) the platoon in attack will be used only for accomplishment of its offensive mission. moppers-up, additional carriers, etc., will be furnished by other organizations. a. being in line, to form single skirmish line to the front. . as skirmishers (so many) paces, guide right (left or center). . march. executed as described in pars. and , i.d.r. normal interval to be ordered, or paces. this formation to be regarded as exceptional. b. being in column of squads, to form single skirmish line. same command as in (a). executed as described in para and , i.d.r. c. being in line to form double skirmish line to the front (_i.e._, to take the "formation for attack" in the diagram.) . in two lines. . as skirmishers (so many) paces, guide right (left or center). march. executed according to the principles in pars. and , i.d.r., except that at the command march the even-numbered squads stand fast while the odd-numbered squads form the first line by deploying on the base squad as in the case of deployment in single line. similarly, the even-numbered squads form the second line by deploying on their base squad after the odd-numbered squads have moved forward about paces. [illustration: normal battalion formation in attack] d. being in line or column of squads to deploy in line of squad columns in one or two lines. use same commands and execute in same manner as described in (a), (b), (c), except that in the command "squad columns" is substituted for "as skirmishers," and in the execution each corporal on approaching the line forms his squad in "squad column" instead of deploying it as skirmishers. _e.g._ . in two lines-- . squad columns (so many) paces, guide right (left or center)-- . march. this gives a "formation of approach" as the french describe it, or as an "artillery formation" as the british describe it; which may be used directly or indirectly (by means of echelons) for advancing when not liable to infantry fire. [illustration: plate # ] e. being in above formation to vary the intervals. . squad columns (so many) paces, . guide right (left or center). executed in the same manner as similar movement described in i.d.r. . general principles of the platoon formation in the assault of fortified positions in trenches. (points of resistance, etc.). . the platoon is now a complete fighting unit within itself. it contains riflemen, bombers, auto-riflemen, and rifle grenadiers. with this combination the platoon commander has, under his immediate control, all the different kinds of fire available to the infantry. [illustration: plate # ] . this formation was developed so that the platoon commander could meet the different contingencies that arise from being opposed by points of resistance in a "trench-to-trench" attack or the "semi-open-warfare;" that is the secondary stage of a push. . when strong opposition develops, the principle on which the platoon works is to develop or surround the point of resistance, the platoon acting either alone or in conjunction with neighboring platoons. the four different kinds of fire are then used to their best advantages to silence or diminish the enemy fire thus making this manoeuvre possible. . in order to obtain success it is first necessary to impress on the officers and men that the primary advantage of the entire formation is its mobility, and the scope it gives to the initiative of the platoon section, squad and team leaders. in studying this formation it is first necessary to free the mind of all parade ground formations and to feel that there is nothing to hinder any desired movement of the sections, so long as the movement is not contrary to the operation orders for the attack. until this idea is grasped thoroughly no progress can be made. . there is no typical or "normal formation." the one given at the beginning of this instruction here is a drill or parade ground formation, and while it may be used under actual conditions of warfare, it is simply utilized at this time as a basis from which the necessary variations may be worked out. in an attack, every platoon in the battalion may use a different formation. . the formation to be used is decided upon after a careful study of air-photographs. as far as possible all points of resistance are picked out and the best method of meeting the situations that may arise are then considered. the platoon is then arranged so as to best facilitate this manoeuvre. it must be realized that there will be other platoons on the flanks and in the rear, and their dispositions must be studied with a view of their probable bearing on the points of resistance. . in order to know how to get results it is first necessary to have a very clear conception of the uses and limitations of the different weapons in the platoon. briefly they can be used in the following ways: (a) the auto-rifles open up a point blank fire on the strong point as soon as it is discovered. their function is to either draw the fire of the enemy or to silence him by a hit or forcing him to take cover. their work may be compared to the work of the field artillery in a barrage. they cover the movement of the infantry across the open. the auto rifles so place themselves at such points that their line of fire will in no way interfere with the manoeuvre of the commander of the platoon or the remaining units of the platoon interfere with the effective use of the auto rifles of the platoon. (b) the rifle grenadiers advance at once just as close as possible, but at all costs to within effective grenade range. they then take cover in shell holes, trenches, etc., and open up a rapid fire. they are the long distance howitzers of the platoon and are very valuable. by a well placed grenade the whole resistance may be overcome. this section usually works around a flank. (c) the riflemen work up by squad as far as practicable and to a flank, when an opportunity presents itself, the squad opens fire in such a manner as to protect advance of other squads or teams. (d) the bombers endeavor to get well around behind the enemy and taking advantage of cover get to within bomb range. they may be compared to the close range howitzers or trench mortars. when all four sections are in action at proper ranges, the opposition can probably last but a short time, and as soon as the machine guns cease fire the platoon, especially the riflemen, go after the remainder of the garrison with the bayonet. [illustration: plate # ] it may happen that the barrage put up will so demoralize the enemy that the riflemen can advance before his machine guns are even put out of action. this operation allows the rifle men to get in with the bayonet, if the resistance is not sooner overcome. when the different sections are getting to their places, they usually find enough shell holes or old trenches to obtain cover. they should not move as entire sections, but as small groups of three or four at a time. . after the encircling movement has once begun, the platoon commander loses all control, and the action is then conducted by the section, squad or team leaders. they must be trained to act on their own initiative, as further orders are rarely practicable. the resistance will finally be overcome, either because the enemy will retreat or surrender under the menace of encirclement, or by the losses caused by our fire or by the attack at close range of our bombers or else by the final assault with the bayonet led by our riflemen. it must be remembered that under an artillery barrage it is never possible to issue verbal orders, so the sections must be trained to understand and obey the arm signals of its officer, or more often to work without orders. . a sequence of command must be arranged in each section, squad and team down to the last man. remarks regarding the forming of wave from close order. the sketch of deployment attached is an illustration of one of the formations that may be adopted. it is given as an example. any other wave formation may be practically as easily formed up. the platoon commander simply calls out the squads he wants in the first line. _it must not be imagined that this transition from close order to extended is done in the field when actually under fire or as a result of surprise._ before the platoon goes into an attack it is all arranged so as to allow it to be changed with ease from column of sections at extended intervals (formation for approach) to the wave formation decided upon. this arrangement is made when the platoon is miles to the rear. when the change is made from column of sections to the wave formation there must be no crossing of sections as they go to their places. some of the many questions a platoon commander should ask himself on taking over a trench, and at frequent intervals afterwards. . _i am here for two purposes: to hold this line under all circumstances, and to do as much damage as possible to the enemy? am i doing all i can to make this line as strong as possible? am i as_ offensive _as i might be with organized snipers, sniperscopes, rifle grenades, catapults, etc., and patrols?_ . do i connect up all right with the platoons on my right and left? do i know the position of my nearest support? . does every man know his firing position and can he fire from it, over the parapet, at the foot of the wire? . where are my s.a.a. and bomb stores? are they under cover from the weather? . do all my men know their duties in case of attack--bombers especially? . are all my rifles and ammunition clean and in good order? have all the men got rifle covers? are the magazines kept charged? . is my wire strong enough? . are my parapets and traverses bullet-proof everywhere? . where are my sally ports? . where are my listening posts? are my listening patrols properly detailed? . what points in front particularly require patrolling at night? . are my sentries in their right places? are they properly posted by n.c.o's.? have they received proper instructions? . have i got the s.o.s. message in my pocket, and do i know the orders regarding its use? . are the trenches as clean and as sanitary as they might be? are live rounds and cases properly collected? are my bags for refuse and empties in position? . are my trenches as dry as i might make them? . am i doing all i can to prevent my men getting "trench feet"? . how can i prevent my parapets and dugouts from falling in? . have i got at least one loophole, from which men can snipe, for every section? have i pointed out to section commanders the portion of the enemy's trench they are responsible for keeping under fire, and where his loopholes are? . have my men always got their smoke helmets on and are they in good order? . are the arrangements, in case of gas attack, complete and known to all ranks? . are the orders as to wearing equipment carried out? . are my men using wood from the defences as firewood? . are my men drinking water from any but authorized sources? . _i am here for two purposes: to hold this line under all circumstances, and i do as much damage as possible to the enemy? am i doing all i can to make this line as strong as possible? am i as_ offensive _as i might be with organized snipers, sniperscopes, rifle grenades, catapults, etc., and patrols?_ defensive measure against gas attacks. i. introduction. a. general considerations: in the absence of suitable means of protection the poison gases used in war are extremely deadly and the breathing of only very small quantities of them may cause death or serious injury. this being the case, it is essential that not the slightest time should be lost in putting on the anti-gas device on the gas alarm being given. it cannot be too strongly insisted on that the measures to meet hostile gas attacks afford _perfect protection_, and if they are carried out properly no one will suffer from gas poisoning. the whole basis of protecting troops against gas lies (a) in keeping the appliances in perfect working order; (b) in learning to adjust them rapidly under all conditions, and (c) in ensuring that every man is given immediate warning. these results can only be attained: ( ) by frequent and thorough inspection of all protective appliances. ( ) by thorough instruction and training in their use. ( ) by every man understanding and complying with all standing orders on the subject of defense against gas. if these are effectually carried out, there is nothing to fear from hostile gas attacks. officers must impress this on their men, as an important object of all anti-gas instruction should be to inspire complete confidence in the efficacy of the methods which are adopted. b. nature of gas attacks: ( ) gas clouds: this method of making a gas attack is entirely dependent on the direction of the wind. the gas is carried up to the trenches compressed in steel cylinders. these are dug in at the bottom of the trench and connected with pipes leading out over the parapet. when the valves of the cylinders are opened, the gas escapes with a hissing sound, which, on a still night, can frequently be heard at a considerable distance. it mixes with the air and is carried by the wind towards the opposing trenches, spreading out as it goes forward. a continuous wave of gas and air is thus formed, the color of which may vary: (a) because of the weather conditions. in very dry air it may be almost transparent and slightly greenish in color, while in damp weather it forms a white cloud. (b) because it may be mixed with smoke of any color. a cloud attack can only take place when there is a steady but not too strong wind blowing from the enemy's lines towards our own. a wind between and miles an hour is the most likely condition. an -mile wind will carry the gas cloud twice as quickly as a man walks rapidly. gas attacks may occur at any time of the day, but are most likely to be made during the night or in the early morning. gentle rain is without appreciable effect on a gas attack, but strong rain washes down the gas. fogs have hardly any effect and may, in fact, be taken advantage of to make an attack unexpectedly. water courses and ponds are no obstruction to a gas cloud. the gas used by the enemy is generally a mixture of chlorine and phosgene, both of which are strongly asphyxiating. the gases are heavier than air, and therefore, tend to flow along the ground and into trenches, shelters, craters and hollows. the gas cloud may flow round slight eminences, thus leaving patches of country which remain free from gas. chlorine and phosgene strongly attack the mucous membranes of the respiratory organs, causing bad coughing. in strong concentrations of gas, or by longer exposure to low concentrations, the lungs are injured and breathing becomes more and more difficult and eventually impossible, so that the unprotected man dies of suffocation. death is sometimes caused by two or three breaths of the gas. even when very dilute, chlorine can be recognized by its peculiar smell, which is like chloride of lime, but stronger and more irritating. both chlorine and phosgene also exert a strongly corrosive action on metals, so that the metal parts of arms must be carefully protected by greasing them. the speed with which the gas cloud approaches depends entirely on the wind velocity. gas attacks have been made with wind velocities varying from to miles per hour, _i.e._, from - / to yards per second. in a -mile wind, the gas would reach trenches yards distant in seconds. gas attacks have been made on fronts varying from to miles; their effects at points up to miles behind the front trenches have been sufficiently severe to make it necessary to wear helmets. ( ) gas projectiles: the use of these is not entirely dependent on the direction of the wind. in gas projectiles such as shells, hand grenades, and trench mortar bombs, a part or the whole of the explosive charge is replaced by a liquid which is converted into gas by the explosion. the explosive force and noise of detonation of these projectiles is less than that of the ordinary kind, and a large number of them are usually discharged into a comparatively small space. after the explosion, the irritant chemicals form a small gas cloud, though some may sink to the ground and remain active for a considerable time. for using gas shells, the best condition is calm, or a wind of low velocity. gas projectiles can be used in all types of country. woods, bushes, corn fields and clumps of buildings may hold the gas active for a considerable time. two kinds of shell gases are used by the enemy, viz., lachrymators, which mainly affect the eyes, and poison gases, which may affect the eyes and are just as deadly as the gases used in the form of clouds. ( ) tear, or lachrymatory shells: these shells on explosion drive the liquid chemical which they contain into the air as a mist. they cause the eyes to water strongly and thereby gradually put men out of action. their actual smell may be slight. large concentrations of lachrymators begin to affect the lungs and cause sickness, coughing and general irritation. ( ) poison shells: besides the comparatively harmless lachrymators the enemy also uses projectiles which contain a gas, the action of which is very similar to that of phosgene. because of their slight detonation, these shells are liable to be mistaken for blinds, but they emit large quantities of a gas which attacks the lungs strongly and is very dangerous, and even in slight cases may cause serious after effects. ( ) smoke: the enemy may make use of smoke, either in the form of a cloud or emitted from shells and bombs. smoke may be used with gas or between gas clouds; it may also be used alone to distract attention from a real discharge of gas, to cover the advance of infantry, or merely as a false gas attack. ( ) mine and explosion gases: the poisonous gases which occur in mines, and which are formed in large quantities when high explosive goes off in an enclosed space, _e.g._, from a direct hit in a shelter, or on the explosion of a charge in a mine, are not protected against by the ordinary anti-gas appliances. the chief of these gases is carbon monoxide. protection against such gases will not be considered in these notes. officers are held responsible that all the anti-gas appliances for protecting their men are maintained in perfect condition, and that all ranks under their command are thoroughly trained in the use of these appliances and in all other measures which may affect their safety against gas. summary of protective measures: (a) provision to each man of individual protective devices. (b) arrangement for the inspection of those appliances and training in their use and instruction in all other measures of gas defense. (c) provision of protected and gas-proof shelters. (d) weather observations to determine periods when the conditions are favorable to a hostile gas attack. (e) arrangement of signals and messages; for immediate warning of a gas attack. (f) provision of appliances for clearing gas from trenches and shelters. c. protection of shelters: ( ) methods of protection: protection of dugouts, cellars, buildings, etc., is given if all entrances are closed by well-fitting doors or by blankets sprayed with hypo. solution. practically no gas passes through a wet blanket, and the protection depends on getting a good joint at the sides and bottom of a doorway, so as to stop all draughts. this can be effected by letting the blanket rest on battens, fixed with a slight slope, against the door frame. the blanket should overlap the outer sides and a fold should lie on the ground at the bottom. a pole is fastened to the blanket, which allows the latter to be rolled up on the frame and causes it to fall evenly. wherever possible, particularly where there is likely to be movement in and out of the shelter, two blankets fitted in this way but sloping in opposite directions should be provided. there should be an interval of at least three feet between the two frames, and the larger this vestibule is made the more efficient is the dugout. when not in use, the blankets should be rolled up and held so that they can be readily released, and should be sprayed occasionally with water or a little vermorel sprayer solution. if the blankets became stiff from a deposit of chemicals, they should be sprayed with water. all ranks must be taught how to use gas-proof dugouts, _e.g._, how to enter a protected doorway quickly, replacing the blanket immediately, and carrying in as little outside air as possible. the protection afforded by these means is just as complete against lachrymatory gases as it is against cloud gas and poisonous shell gases. ( ) shelters which should be protected: the following should always be protected: medical aid posts and advanced dressing stations; company, battalion and brigade headquarters; signal shelters and any other place where work has to be carried out during a gas attack. in addition to the above, it is desirable to protect all dugouts, cellars and buildings within the shell area, particularly those of artillery personnel. it should be noted, however, that the protection of dugouts for troops in the front line of trenches is usually inadvisable on account of the delay involved in getting men out in time of attack. it is desirable to protect stretcher bearers' dugouts with a view to putting casualties in them. d. protection of weapons and equipment: arms and ammunition and the metal parts of special equipment (_e.g._, telephone instruments) must be carefully protected against gas by greasing them or keeping them completely covered. otherwise, particularly in damp weather, they may rust or corrode so badly as to refuse to act. a mineral oil must be used for this purpose. the following in particular should be protected: ( ) small arms and s.a.a. machine guns and rifles must be kept carefully cleaned and well oiled. the effects of corrosion of ammunition are of even more importance than the direct effects of gas upon machine guns and rifles. ammunition boxes must be kept closed. vickers belts should be kept in their boxes until actually required for use. the wooden belt boxes are fairly gas-tight, but the metal belt boxes should be made gas-tight by inserting strips of flannelette in the joint between the lid and the box. lewis magazines should be kept in some form of box, the joints of which are made as gas-tight as possible with flannelette. a recess should be made, high up in the parapet if possible, for storing ammunition and guns. a blanket curtain, moistened with water or sprayer solution, will greatly assist in keeping the gas out. ( ) hand and rifle grenades: unboxed grenades should be kept covered as far as possible. all safety pins and working parts, especially those made of brass, should be kept oiled to prevent their setting from corrosion by the gas. ( ) light trench mortars and their ammunition: as far as the supply of oil permits, the bore and all bright parts of light trench mortars and their spare parts should be kept permanently oiled. when not in use, mortars should be covered with sacking or similar material. unboxed ammunition should be kept covered as far as possible and the bright parts oiled immediately after arrival. ammunition which has been in store for some time should be used up first. sentries must be prepared to give the alarm on the first appearance of gas, as a few seconds delay may involve very serious consequences. signals must be passed along by all sentries as soon as heard. the earliest warning of a gas attack is given: (a) by the noise of the gas escaping from the cylinders. (b) by the appearance of a cloud of any color over the enemy's trenches. if the attack takes place at night, the cloud will not be visible from a distance. (c) by the smell of the gas in listening posts. ( ) action to be taken in the trenches on gas alarm: (a) respirators to be put on immediately by all ranks (a helmet, if no box respirator is available). (b) rouse all men in trenches, dug-outs and mine shafts, warn officers and artillery observation posts and all employed men. (c) artillery support to be called for by company commanders by means of prearranged signals. (d) warn battalion headquarters and troops in rear. (e) all ranks stand to arms in the front trenches and elsewhere where the tactical situation demands. (f) blanket curtains at entrances to protected shelters to be let down and carefully fixed. (g) movement to cease except where necessary. ( ) action to be taken in billets and back areas: (a) all men in cellars or houses to be roused. (b) the blanket curtains of protected collars, etc., to be let down and fixed in position. (c) box respirators to be put on immediately, the gas is apparent. h. action during a gas attack: ( ) protective measures: there should be as little moving about and talking as possible in the trenches. men must be made to realize that with the gas now used by the enemy, observance of this may be essential for their safety. when an attack is in progress, all bodies of troops or transport on the move should halt and all working parties cease work until the gas cloud has passed. if a relief is going on, units should stand fast as far as possible until the gas cloud has passed. supports and parties bringing up bombs should only be moved up if the tactical situation demands it. if troops in support or reserve lines of trenches remain in, or go into, dug-outs, they must continue to wear their anti-gas appliances. officers and n.c.o's must on no account remove or open up the masks of the box respirators or raise their helmets to give orders. the breathing tube may be removed from the mouth when it is necessary to speak, but it must be replaced. men must always be on the look-out to help each other in case an anti-gas device is damaged by fire or accident. when a man is wounded, he must be watched to see that he does not remove his respirator or helmet until he is safely inside a protected shelter; if necessary, his hands should be tied. men must be warned that if they are slightly gassed before adjusting their respirators or helmets they must not remove them. the effect will wear off. ( ) tactical measures: from the point of view of protection against gas, nothing is gained by men remaining in unprotected dug-outs or by moving to a flank or to the rear. it is, therefore, desirable that on tactical and disciplinary grounds all men in the front line of trenches should be forbidden to do these things. in support or reserve lines where there are protected dug-outs, it is advisable for men to stay in them unless the tactical situation makes it desirable for them to come out. nothing is gained by opening rapid rifle fire unless the enemy's infantry attacks. a slow rate of fire from rifles and occasional short bursts of fire from machine guns will lessen the chance of their jamming from the action of the gas and tends to occupy and steady the infantry. it should be remembered that the enemy's infantry cannot attack while the gas discharge is in progress and is unlikely to do so for an appreciable time--at least minutes--after it has ceased. it is, in fact, a common practice for the enemy infantry to retire to the second and third line of trench whilst gas is being discharged. there is, therefore, no object in opening an intense s.o.s. barrage of artillery on "no man's land" during the actual gas cloud and it is advisable that the warning to the artillery of a gas attack should be a signal differing from the ordinary s.o.s. signal, as the latter may have to be sent later if an infantry attack develops. it must be remembered that smoke may be used by the enemy at the same time as, or alternately with, the gas and that under cover of a smoke cloud he may send out assaulting or raiding parties. a careful look-out must, therefore, be kept; hostile patrols or raiders may be frustrated by cross-fire of rifles and machine guns and should an assault develop the ordinary s.o.s. procedure should be carried out. i. precautions against gas shells: owing to the small explosion which occurs with these shells, they are liable to be mistaken for blinds, and even when the gas is smelt men may not realize its possibly dangerous character at once and so may delay putting on respirators or helmets until too late. men sleeping in dug-outs may be seriously affected unless they are roused. men in the open air are unlikely to be seriously affected by poison gas shells, provided they put on respirators or helmets on first experiencing the gas. the following points should therefore be attended to: (i) all shells which explode with a small detonation or appear to be blind should be regarded with particular attention; the respirator or helmet should be put on at the first indication of gas and blanket protection of shelters adjusted. (ii) arrangements must be made for giving a _local_ alarm in the event of a sudden and intense bombardment with poison gas shells, but care must be taken that this alarm is not confused with the main alarm. strombos horns must on no account be used to give warning of a gas shell bombardment. (iii) all shelters in the vicinity of an area bombarded with poison gas shells must be visited and any sleeping men roused. (iv.) box respirators or helmets should continue to be worn throughout the area bombarded with poison gas shells until the order is given by the local unit commander for their removal. lachrymatory or "tear" shells are frequently used by the enemy for the purpose of hindering the movements of troops, for preventing the bringing up of supports, or for interfering with the action of artillery. owing to the deadly nature of poison gas shells, however, the precautions given in paragraph above, must be taken for all gas shells. the goggles are intended for use after lachrymatory bombardments only, in cases where the irritant gas persists in the neighborhood. k. action subsequent to a gas attack: . general: the most important measure to be taken after a cloud gas attack is to prepare for a further attack. the enemy frequently sends several successive waves of gas at intervals varying from a few minutes up to several hours and it is therefore necessary to be on the alert to combat this procedure. the following measures should be adopted as soon as the gas cloud has passed: (a) removal of respirators.--anti-gas fans should be used to assist in clearing the trenches of gas, so as to admit of respirators being removed. respirators and helmets must not be removed until permission has been given by the company commander. a sharp look out must be kept for a repetition of the gas attack, as long as the wind continues in a dangerous quarter. . movement: owing to the enemy gas sometimes causing bad after effects, which are intensified by subsequent exertion, the following points should be attended to: (a) no man suffering from the effects of gas, however slightly, should be allowed to walk to the dressing station. (b) the clearing of the trenches and dugouts should not be carried out by men who have been affected by the gas. (c) after a gas attack, troops in the front trenches should be relieved of all fatigue and carrying work for hours by sending up working parties from companies in rear. (d) horses which have been exposed to the gas should not be worked for hours if it can be avoided. . clearing dugouts and other shelters: it is essential that no dugout be entered after a gas attack event with box respirators or helmets adjusted, until it has been ascertained that it is free from gas. the only efficient method of clearing dugouts from gas is by thorough ventilation. the older method of spraying is not efficient. an appreciable quantity of gas may be retained in the clothing of men exposed to gas attacks and also in bedding, coats, etc., left in shelters. precaution should, therefore, be taken to air all clothing. . ventilation: _natural ventilation_.--unless a shelter has been thoroughly ventilated by artificial means, as described below, it must not be slept in or occupied without wearing respirators, until at least hours after a gas attack. it must not be entered at all without respirators on for at least hours. the above refers to cloud gas attacks. in the case of gas shell bombardments the times cannot be definitely stated, as they depend on the nature of the gas used and the severity of the bombardment. with lachrymatory gases the times after which shelters can be used without discomfort may be considerably longer than those mentioned above. _ventilation by fire_.--all kinds of shelters can be efficiently and rapidly cleared of gas by the use of fires. shelters with two openings are the easiest to ventilate and where possible, dugouts with only one entrance should have a second opening made, even a very small one, to assist in ventilation. in dugouts provided with a single exit at the end of a short passage, the best results are obtained if the fire is placed in the center of the floor of the dugout and at a height of about inches. in dugouts provided with a single exit at the end of a long and nearly horizontal passage, the best results are obtained if the fire is placed about one-third of the distance from the inner end of the passage. in dugouts provided with two or more exits, the fire should be placed at the inner end of one of the exit passages. in general, pound of dry wood per cubic feet of air space is sufficient for clearance of any gas. the best fuel is split wood, but any fuel which does not smoulder or give off thick smoke can be used. the materials for the fire, _e.g._, the split wood, newspaper, and a small bottle of paraffine for lighting purposes, should be kept in a sand bag, enclosed in a biscuit tin provided with a lid. an improvised brazier should be kept ready for use. the fire must be kept burning for at least ten minutes and the atmosphere in the shelter should be tested from time to time. _ventilation by fanning_.--dugouts can be ventilated by producing air currents in them by means of special anti-gas fans. if no anti-gas fans are available, ventilation can be assisted by flapping with improvised fans such as sand bags, ground sheets, etc. . cleaning of arms and ammunition: rifles and machine guns must be cleaned after a gas attack and then re-oiled. oil cleaning will prevent corrosion for hours or more, but the first available opportunity must be taken to dismantle machine guns and clean all parts in boiling water containing a little soda. if this is not done, corrosion continues slowly even after oil cleaning and may ultimately put the gun out of action. after a gas attack, s.a.a. should be carefully examined. all rounds affected by gas must be replaced by new cartridges immediately and the old ones cleaned and expended as soon as possible. all hand and rifle grenades exposed to the gas should have their safety-pins and working parts cleaned and re-oiled. all bright parts of light trench mortars, together with all accessories and spare parts exposed to the gas, must be cleaned and wiped dry as soon as possible after the attack and in any case within hours, after which they should be thoroughly coated afresh with oil. the same applies to ammunition which may have been exposed to the gas. ammunition which, for any reason, had not been oiled, must be cleaned and oiled and expended as soon as possible. for details regarding the cleaning of guns and artillery ammunition and signal equipment, see paragraphs and . . treatment of shell holes: in the neighborhood of shelters or battery positions where gas from shell holes is causing annoyance, the holes and the ground round them should be covered with at least a foot of fresh earth. shell holes so treated should not be disturbed, as the chemical is not thereby destroyed and only disappears slowly. concealment from aerial observers. a. . an aeroplane cannot conduct reconnaissance at a height of less than , feet without being within easy range of anti-aircraft artillery; nor of less than , feet without coming into range of machine-gun and rifle fire. . to be observed from such heights, objects on the ground must be distinguished by: (a) motion. (b) color contrast. (c) line contrast, or (d) shadows. b. concealment: . (a) on warning of hostile aircraft, troops on the march should withdraw to the side of the road (if possible, into shade), or lie down flat in the road and remain motionless. (b) if it is necessary to continue the march, this should be done in broken detachments, which are far less distinct than continuous column. (c) troops in a trench should crouch down in the shadowy side and remain motionless. (d) faces should never be turned up, as the high lights on cheek-bones and foreheads then show up distinctly. (e) bright metal on arms, equipment and headgear must be kept covered. . artillery wagon-trains, etc., should if possible be halted promptly on warning. when halted, their neutral coloring protects them. . trenches are best concealed: (a) by avoiding, in construction, a too regular outline, and following as far as possible the contours of the ground. (b) by coloring the parapet and parados to match the ground. this may be done most quickly by painted canvas; if the latter is not available, by planting or strewing the loose earth with surrounding herbage. in this work care must be taken not to make the covering itself too conspicuous by brightness or monotony of coloring. (c) by covering the trench itself, where convenient, with a thin material, colored like the parapet and parados. (d) by avoiding all overt movement of troops in the trenches under observation. . buildings, _e.g._, ammunition dumps, hangars, etc., can be completely concealed by being painted the color of the ground they stand on and fitted with canvas curtains, similarly painted and stretched from the eaves to the ground at a horizontal angle of degrees. these curtains completely eliminate shadows. . success in each work of concealment by camouflage is best assured by the assistance of an aeroplane observer to test and correct it. * * * * * orders governing intrenchment problems at second plattsburg training camp. headquarters plattsburg training camp, plattsburg barracks, new york. september , . divisional entrenching problem. general situation: the salmon river forms the boundary line between two states, the "blue" on the north and the "red" on the south. war has been declared and the red army is mobilizing near keeseville. mobilization by the first blue army at plattsburg has been completed. special situation, blue: our advanced troops are holding the line of the salmon river against strong detachments of the red army. the commanding general of the blue army has decided to establish a second position on the line, _bluff point to the bend_ ( ) _in the saranac river_. the following order is issued by the division commander: headquarters, st div., plattsburg, n.y. sept., ' , : a.m. field orders, no. . . our advanced troops are holding the line of the salmon river. . this division and brigade division will entrench along the line: _bluff point_--_chateaugay branch railroad_--_saranac river_ ( ). . (a) the chief of artillery will prepare the positions, and lines of communication for his brigade, determine his sectors, and submit his plan of action. (b) the st brig. and bns. th inf. will entrench the sector, _saranac river_ ( ) to _sand road_, exclusive. the nd brig. will entrench the sector _sand road to bluff point_, both inclusive. the supports will entrench on the line, _saranac river_ ( )--_cliff haven_. (c) the reserve-- brig. div. less bns., will construct crossings on the _saranac river_--under direction of the chief of engineers, and prepare them for defense. (d) the chief of engineers will supply tools for entrenching and lay out the lines of entrenchments. he will repair the following trunk roads: _peru road_, _sand road_, _lake-shore road_; and construct a transverse trunk line road from _pulp mill to o'connell's farm_, and the necessary tram lines. the engineer depot for stores and material will be established at _plattsburg barracks_. (e) the chief signal officer will establish necessary lines of communication, utilizing equipment at _plattsburg barracks, central station_. aero squadron at _chazy_. . (a) the chief medical officer will establish his dressing stations in the _butts_ of the rifle range and in ravine on _o'connell's farm_. a field hospital will be established at the _lozier works_. (b) ammunition train and supply train will be parked in the _fair ground_. ammunition distributing stations at railroad spurs, _plattsburg barracks_, and _o'connell's farm_. the division ordnance officer will locate the ammunition dumps along transverse trunk line road. (c) field trains, until further orders, at north end of _plattsburg barracks reservation_. distributing point, _plattsburg railroad station_--regimental supply stations: _saranac river_ ; intersection _peru road_ and _rifle range road_, _sand hole_ in _rifle range_, _sand road on o'connell's farm_, _ravine on o'connell's farm_. (d) the commander of trains will establish traffic regulations for all roads. . messages to _statistical office_. wolf, major general. official copy: j.a. baer, genl. staff, chief of staff. copies to: brig. and regt. commanders. c. of e. div. q.m. c.s.o. c.m.o. div. o.o. c. of tr. * * * * * headquarters, st brigade, st division, plattsburg barracks, n.y. rd sept., , p.m. field orders no. . . strong detachments of the red army, now mobilizing at _keeseville_, are south of the _salmon river_. our advance troops are holding the line of the _salmon river_. . our division and one brigade, nd division, will entrench and occupy the line _bluff point-chateaugay branch (d. & h.r.r.), saranac river_ ( ). this brigade, reinforced by two battalions, th infantry, will entrench and occupy the sector, _saranac river_ ( ), _sand road_, exclusive. . (a) the st and nd battalions, th infantry will entrench and occupy the sector from the _saranac river_ to a point yards east. (b) the th infantry, the sector from a point yards east of the _saranac river_, connecting with the trenches of the th infantry, to a point yards east of _peru road_. (c) the th infantry, the sector from a point yards east of the _peru road_, and connecting with the trenches of the th infantry, to the _sand road_ exclusive. (d) the brigade machine gun battalion will organize and maintain strong points along line regimental reserves. the c.o. of this organization will, at once, consult with the regimental commanders relative to preparation of machine gun emplacements and probable need for re-enforcements within their respective sectors. (e) the brigade signalmen will establish telephonic communications between brigade and regimental headquarters. . (a) the regimental commanders and senior officers of the two battalions, th infantry, will at once report to the chief engineer of the division for plan of entrenchments in their respective sectors. (b) tools and materials for entrenching will be supplied at the trench sites. . messages to brigade headquarters near _peru road_, east savoy hotel. goodrich, brigadier general, commanding. official copy: wm. kirby, major of cavalry, u.s.r., adjutant. copies to: c.o., th infantry. c.o., th infantry. c.o., st and nd battalions, th infantry. c.o., brigade m.g. co. headquarters, st division. headquarters, st battalion, th infantry plattsburg barracks, n.y. oct. , . field orders no. . blue print of trenches; scale inches equals mile. . the enemy strongly occupies a line of trenches immediately _south_ of the _chateaugay branch railroad_, the center of their line being about opposite the center sector of our first line of trench, _sand road-target range fence_, their line of trenches being within yards of the railroad at that point, and then retiring slightly from the railroad to the _east_ and _west_. the th infantry occupies the section of trenches directly to the east of us and the th infantry occupies the section of trenches directly to the west of us. . this battalion will take up a defensive position in the nearly completed line of trenches, _sand road-target range fence_, and as rapidly as possible complete the trench system in the following order of work: a. deepen all trenches to at least three feet. b. construct latrines. c. provide cover. d. revet work previously done. . a. front lines, _i.e._, fire, communicating and support trenches: company "b" will occupy the _east_ sector, _i.e._, _sand road_ to _belgium boyau_, inclusive, including _slum boyau_ and the salient at _south_ end reserve trench immediately in rear of _east_ end of support trench. company "c" will occupy the _central_ sector, _i.e._, from _east_ sector (_belgium boyau_, exclusive), to _cardona boyau_, inclusive, including _poire boyau_. company "a" will occupy the _west_ sector, _i.e._, from _central_ sector (_cardona boyau_, exclusive), to and including salient near _southwest_ corner of _target range fence_. b. reserve line: company "d" will occupy the line from the _target range fence_ on the _west_ to a point yards _east_ of the _verdun salient_, one-half of the company occupying the sector, _target range fence_, to a point yards _east_ of the _rams horn boyau_, including _rams horn boyau_, and the other half of the company occupying the sector from a point yards _east_ of the _rams horn boyau_ to a point yards _east_ of the _verdun salient_. c. machine guns: headquarters, st platoon and st platoon machine gun company, will report to the commanding officer, company "a," for assignment to the shell craters (converted) and dugouts (constructed for machine guns), four in all, in the _west_ sector. headquarters, nd platoon and third section ( nd platoon) machine gun company, will report to the commanding officer, company "c," for assignment to the shell crater (converted), and dugout (constructed for machine gun), two in all, in the _central_ sector. fourth section ( nd platoon), machine gun company, will report to the commanding officer, company "b," for assignment to the shell crater (converted), two in all, in the _east_ sector. d. trench mortars: two trench mortars have been assigned to the _central_ sector and the commanding officer, company "c," is charged with the construction of emplacements therefor and the manning of them. . a. dressing stations have been established in the _butts_ of the rifle range and in ravine on _o'connell's farm_. b. ammunition distributing points are located at _plattsburg barracks_ and _o'connell's farm_. c. regimental supply stations are located at _saranac river_ ( ), intersection _peru road_ and _rifle range road_, _sand hole in rifle range_, _sand road_ on _o'connell's farm_, and _ravine_ on _o'connell's farm_. . battalion headquarters are located in dugout in _support_ trench (west tremont), midway between _rams horn_ and _poire boyaux_, to which place messages will be sent. boschen, captain, th infantry, commanding. copies to: c.o., th infantry. c.o., companies a, b, c and d. c.o., m.g. company. c.o., headquarters company. r.s.o. * * * * * hdqtrs. st batt., th infty., plattsburg bcks., n.y., _oct. , ._ field orders no. . dispositions: a. the assignment of companies to sectors is as announced in field orders no. , these headquarters. b. company commanders are charged with the details of occupation of the trenches and the proper disposition of the "specialists" (bombers, grenadiers, auto-riflemen, etc.), directing particular attention to the active and passive areas of their sectors. . fields of fire: company commanders must arrange for and obtain the best fields of fire in their own sectors, and provide for protection of visible areas in adjoining sectors by lateral fire. . improvements or changes in trenches: company commanders before making any changes or improvements in trenches will render to battalion headquarters brief recommendations of changes desired. these recommendations will be submitted at . a.m. and . p.m., after which hours the battalion commander will inspect and if deemed necessary will be ordered. . organization for watching and observation: a. each company commander will organize a system for watching the enemy by day and will establish look-out posts for this purpose; this system will be augmented at night by patrols if necessary. b. the watching of the enemy must be continuous and long occupation of the sector will not warrant any laxity. . organization for supply: a. company commanders will make the necessary details for obtaining supplies; these details to be in charge of mess or supply sergeants and will not exceed three squads for each lettered company. b. _food_: machine guns details and members of the medical corps assigned to each sector are attached to the lettered companies for rations. c. cooked food will be at the _food station_ at . a.m., . a.m. and . p.m. daily, and will be distributed at that point. d. company commanders will detail the mess sergeant, with an appropriate detail (about squads) to proceed to _food station_, which is located at the wire entanglement on the _west_ side of the _target range_ about yards _north of brigade headquarters_. e. the details mentioned above will proceed via trenches, leaving same at junction of _tipperary_ trench and _rams horn_ boyau in the following order: co. d: detail will clear junction _rams horn_ boyau and _tipperary_ trench at . a.m., . a.m. and . p.m. co. a: detail will clear junction _tremont_ trench, and _rams horn_ boyau at . a.m., . a.m. and . p.m., proceeding via _rams horn_ boyau. co. b: detail will clear junction _tremont_ trench, and _poire_ boyau at . a.m., . a.m. and . p.m., proceeding via _poire_ boyau and _tipperary_ trench. co. c: detail will clear junction _tremont_ trench and _slum_ boyau at . a.m., . a.m. and . p.m., proceeding via _slum_ boyau and _tipperary_ trench. f. these details will return to their respective sectors via the indicated routes, moving in reverse order at five-minute intervals, and company commanders will make necessary arrangements for distribution of food within their respective sectors. g. company commanders will cause the necessary police after each meal to insure sanitary condition of trenches. h. food containers will be held in company until the next meal hour when they will be returned to the _food station_. i. _water_: water wagon will be at the _food station_ from . a.m. to . p.m. daily. j. containers for water will be furnished by regimental supply officer at the _food station_. k. all men will carry full canteens of water when entering the trenches. l. company commanders will detail the mess sergeant, with an appropriate detail (about squads), to proceed to the _food station_ to procure water in containers; these details will proceed via the routes indicated in paragraph , section "e": co. d, . p.m.; co. a, . p.m.; co. b, . p.m.; co. c, . p.m. m. these details will return to their respective sectors in reverse order at five-minute intervals. n. _miscellaneous_: details for obtaining tools, ammunition, trench supplies, etc., will be arranged for as required. o. requisitions for miscellaneous supplies required will be submitted by company commanders to the regimental supply officer not later than . p.m., october , . . organization for liaison: a. the signal officer will establish necessary telephonic communications. b. each organization will detail one runner to report to the battalion commander at regimental headquarters at . a.m. c. four runners will be detailed for duty with each company headquarters and one runner will be detailed for duty with each platoon headquarters. these runners should be lightly equipped and wear a distinctive mark. d. at least two men per section must be able to act as guides to all company headquarters of the battalion. e. verbal messages will not be sent by runners; all messages must be written. f. company commanders, or their representatives, will report daily at battalion headquarters at . p.m. g. there must be accurate communication between platoons in company, and companies in battalion, in order to insure co-ordinated action. . defense: a. immediately after the occupation of the trenches, company commanders will make a careful estimate of all tactical situations presented in their sectors and will plan for a stubborn defense. care must be exercised in providing for defense in depth and lateral defense. the front line trenches of each sector will be held until actually entered by the enemy, and no sector will be abandoned until the occupants are actually forced out. b. the main line of resistance will be the support trenches (_tremont_) and special attention must be given to the preparation for defense. if the front line trenches of any sector be captured by the enemy there will be no withdrawal from any other sector of the front line trenches for the purpose of establishing a continuous line in the support trench. c. the company commander of the reserve will organize parties for counterattacks and these parties will be held in readiness at convenient points to insure prompt movement to the front. d. continuous occupation of the trenches without fire action must not cause a feeling of security and result in being surprised by the enemy. . stand to: "stand to" will take place at . a.m. and . p.m., daily. at this formation every available man will be present. rifles, ammunition, equipment, clothing, etc., will be inspected. rapid loading will be practiced. the firing position of every man will be tested to see whether he can hit the bottom edge of our wire. gas helmets and respirators will be inspected if worn. after "stand to" in the morning and before "stand to" in the evening rifles will be thoroughly cleaned and oiled. . trench orders: a. current "trench standing orders" recently published from brigade headquarters are in force. b. during the occupation of the trenches it will be assumed that, the trenches are under the observation and fire of the enemy and all movement in the trenches will be conducted accordingly. all movements of troops, either individuals or groups, will be via the trenches at all times. c. no one will be allowed to go overland between trenches or to enter the trenches by the flank. all persons will enter the trenches from the reserve trenches and no visitors will be allowed in the trenches except on passes issued from the regimental headquarters. d. commanding officers, companies a and b, are responsible for the posting of the necessary sentinels along the flanks of the position (during the day), with instructions covering the provisions contained in paragraph , sections "b" and "c." . reports: a. company commanders will submit by . p.m., october , , a report showing the dispositions and plan of defense of their respective sectors. b. frequent reports of information obtained and any change of conditions at the front will be made to battalion headquarters when necessary. boschen, _captain, th infantry._ _commanding._ copies to: c.o. th infty. c.o. cos, a, b, c and d. c.o. m.g. co. c.o., hdq. co. r.s.o. company organization (in detail): company headquarters: captain, commanding company, first lieutenant (senior), second in command, first sergeant, armed with pistol, mess sergeant, armed with rifle, supply sergeant, armed with rifle, corporal, company clerk, armed with rifle, mechanics, armed with rifle, wagoners (from supply company), cooks, armed with rifle, buglers, armed with pistol, privates, first class, company agent and signalmen. _equipment_: rifles, pistols, automatic rifles (for replacement), trench knives (to be distributed as needed), bicycles. following from supply company: rolling kitchen, -mule; combat wagon, -mule; ration and baggage wagon, -mule; ration cart, -mule; water cart, -mule; mules, draft. _ platoons, each organized as follows_ (numbered to in company): headquarters: first lieutenant; st and th platoons commanded by first lieutenants; nd and rd platoons commanded by second lieutenants, armed with pistol. sergeant, assistant to platoon commander, armed with pistol and rifle. _equipment_: rifle, pistols. st section: bombers and rifle grenadiers: sergeant, armed with pistol and rifle, corporals, armed with pistol and rifle, trained as rifle grenadier; remainder trained as bombers, privates, first class, armed with pistol and rifle, and remainder with rifle only; trained as rifle grenadier, and remainder as bombers. privates, armed with rifles; trained as rifle grenadiers, remainder trained as bombers. _equipment_: rifles, pistols. nd section: riflemen: corporals, armed with pistols and rifles, privates, first class, armed with rifle, privates, armed with rifle, _equipment_: rifles, pistols. rd section: riflemen: corporals, armed with pistol and rifle, privates, first class, armed with rifle, privates, armed with rifle. _equipment_: rifles, pistols. th section: auto-riflemen: sergeant, armed with pistol and rifle, corporal, armed with pistol and rifle, privates, first class; armed with rifle, armed with pistols; auto-rifle gunners, including extra, privates, armed with rifle. _equipment_: rifles, pistols, auto-rifles. note.--sections numbered from to in company. personnel: commissioned: captain first lieutenants second lieutenants ---- total ==== enlisted: first sergeant mess sergeant supply sergeant sergeants corporals mechanics wagoners (from supply company) ( ) cooks buglers privates, first class privates ----- total ===== equipment: rifles pistols auto rifles trench knives bicycles from supply company: rolling kitchen, -mule combat wagon, -mule ration and baggage wagon, -mule ration cart, -mule water cart, -mule mules, draft ==== trench standing orders. . duties.--a. one officer per company and one non-commissioned officer per platoon will always be on duty. during their tour of duty they will not be in their dugouts. they will frequently visit all trenches occupied by their units. every listening post will be visited at least once by an officer during his tour of duty. b. the officer and non-commissioned officer on duty will, when his tour of duty is completed, turn over to the officer or non-commissioned officer relieving him all orders, a report of the work in progress, if any, and any other information of use. c. at night the officer and non-commissioned officer on duty will frequently patrol the trench line, to see that the sentries are alert and to receive any reports they may desire to make. d. the-non-commissioned officer coming on duty will go round and post new sentinels with the non-commissioned officer coming off duty. e. the length of the tour of duty will depend upon the number of officers and non-commissioned officers on duty. normally each tour should be, by night, two hours; by day, four hours. this may be modified, however, so that all officers and non-commissioned officers will have an equal amount of this duty while in the trenches. f. non-commissioned officers, after posting sentinels, will report "all is well" or otherwise to the officers on duty. g. no man will be detailed for a duty in the trench without being given suitable warning of this duty and be informed at which hour he will come on duty. h. the company commander will be responsible for sending any report required by battalion headquarters. . sentries.--a. the number of sentry posts required will depend on the assumed propinquity or distance of the enemy, strength of obstacles, ease with which sentry posts can be re-enforced and other local conditions. normally by day this should be one sentinel for each platoon and at night three double sentinels for each platoon. there must be sentries enough to insure alarm being given promptly in case of attack and that local resistance is sufficient until help can arrive. b. the next relief will remain within an easy distance of the sentry on post, usually in shelters provided for this purpose. c. every sentry is to be regularly posted by a non-commissioned officer who will explain to him his duties and ascertain that the sentry is aware of the position of the section and platoon commanders and of the sentries on either side, and whether there are any patrols or working parties out in front. d. every sentinel will report when an officer passes his post, "all is well," or otherwise. e. every sentinel by day will be provided with a head-cover to blend with the ground (this may be improvised), and while observing the ground to the front will remain perfectly still. an empty sand bag or some other suitable material may be utilized for this purpose. . patrols.--a. it is the duty of all the troops holding the front lines to establish a command of the ground in front of their parapet up to the enemy's wire. this can be done by extended and constant patrolling by night and reconnaissance by day so that the ground is thoroughly well known to as large a portion as possible of officers and men and so no enemy can move or remain in his front by night or day without detection. one of the particular duties of these patrols is to observe the condition of the wire entanglements. b. every patrol must have definite orders as to its mission; broadly speaking, patrols may be divided into two classes: ( ) reconnoitering patrols, ( ) fighting patrols. c. the first duty of reconnoitering patrols is to obtain the information for which they are sent out. they fight only in self-defense or if any especially favorable opportunity arises to inflict loss upon the enemy without prejudice to their mission. they usually consist of two to six men, under an officer or non-commissioned officer. d. fighting patrols are sent out for the express purpose of causing loss or damage to the enemies by such means as engaging the enemy's patrols or working parties, or by raiding saps, listening posts or trenches. for identification purposes they should always endeavor to secure at least one prisoner. their strength depends upon the resistance they are likely to meet with. e. company commanders are responsible for the orders given to patrols, subject to any instructions which may be issued by higher authority. they are also responsible that all troops, whom it concerns, including companies on both flanks, are warned when and where patrols will be out, length of time they will be out, and of the points to which they will return. f. information gained by patrols is of little value unless transmitted quickly to those whom it concerns. patrol reports will be made out by the commander of the patrol immediately upon his return and sent at once to the company commander unless orders to the contrary have been given. . stand to.--a. "stand to" will take place one-half hour after a relief has been posted and one-half hour before being relieved. at this parade every available man will be present. rifles, equipment, clothing, etc., will be inspected. firing steps will be tested as soon as practicable after reliefs have been posted to see that each man can fire on the foot of the nearest part of the wire entanglement which he is required to cover by his fire. the same procedure will be gone through at the "stand to" one-half hour before being relieved. other "stand tos" may be ordered in the discretion of the company commander. these should be sufficiently often to insure that every man turns out promptly and knows his place in case of attack. . machine guns.--a. the concealment of machine gun emplacements is important. consequently, it is only at night or in case of attack that machine gun crews will occupy their defense emplacements. at night guns should take up other position than their defense emplacements and fire a stated number of rounds in order to test out the guns and mislead the enemy as to their numbers and real emplacements, after which they will at once go back to their defense emplacements. b. the guns and their crews will be tactically under the orders of the company commander in whose sector they are located, but no alteration will be made by him in their disposition or arcs of fire; he will, however, bring before the senior machine gun instructor any suggestions for improvements in machine gun dispositions for defense. c. two men per gun will always be on duty with the guns. d. range cards will be prepared and kept with each gun. e. officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of guns will remain in close proximity to the guns. they will frequently inspect their guns, emplacements, etc. they are responsible for cleanliness and maintenance of the emplacements. f. machine gun commanders are responsible for guns always being ready for action, and that emplacements are clear of all material except such as is required for the service of the guns; that embrasures or loopholes are kept clear of all obstructions which may interfere with fire or view. . reliefs.--a. reconnaisance. prior to taking over the line of trenches the company commander, accompanied by his senior first lieutenant and first sergeant, will reconnoiter the trenches. b. points to be noted by the company commanders. the following points will be specially noted by company commanders before taking over trenches: . plan of occupation (number of men holding lines to be taken over, their distribution and duties). . shelter accommodations. . work being done and proposed. . conditions of the wire and defenses generally. . information as to the enemy, his habits, snipers, and the work he is doing, etc. . water supply. . artillery support. . communications. . danger points. . location and condition of stores. . liaison. . guides.--a. arrangements will be made between the company commanders of the incoming and outgoing companies as to the rendezvous where guides will be provided by the latter to conduct the incoming troops to the trenches. b. one guide per platoon, one for each company and one for battalion headquarters will be provided. these guides must know the exact spot where they will meet the relief troops and the best way to conduct the units to the particular section of the trench they will occupy. . smoking and talking.--a. after leaving the rendezvous there will be no smoking and talking until arrival in trenches. strictest march discipline will be enforced on the way to and from the trenches. . procedure on arrival at trenches.--a. the troops being relieved will not leave the trenches until the relieving troops are in position and the new sentries have been posted, all trench stores have been handed over and receipted for, and orders to move have been received from the company commander. b. platoon commanders will at once personally see that all sentinels are properly posted, that the non-commissioned officer is on duty, that every man knows his place in case of attack, and that both flanks of his platoon are in liaison with the adjoining platoon. c. when reliefs are completed, platoon commanders will report to that effect to the company commander. d. men will not be dismissed until the company commander has received the reports from all of his platoon commanders that everything is in order. . log books.--a. each company commander will keep a log book in which will be entered: . work done. . number of men working. . hours worked. . any information obtained from sentries, patrols, or other sources. they will also enter in this book a list of any trench stores that come into their possession. . equipment.--a. equipment will be worn in the front trenches. haversacks, packs, and trench tools need not be worn, these will be left in the shelters. in support and reserve trenches, they will be worn at the discretion of the company commander. b. ration and carrying parties will wear equipment and carry rifles unless otherwise ordered. c. pieces will be assumed to be loaded and locked at all times. d. in the firing trenches bayonets will be fixed at night. e. non-commissioned officers and men of the firing line will at all times be in possession of their rifles and bayonets. the rifles of men in the support and reserve trenches or dugouts will be where they can be quickly seized, even in the dark. . stretcher bearers.--a. stretcher bearers will be stationed at a point designated by the company commander. . discipline.--a. sleeping in the firing trenches will not be permitted. b. no man will enter the firing trench, except in discharge of his duty, unless so ordered by his company or platoon commander. c. sentries will remain standing unless the height of the parapet renders this impossible. d. saluting and standing at attention, etc., will be as carefully adhered to as when in camp except that sentinel will not let this interfere with their duties. . rations and cooking.--a. cooking will be done in the rear of the reserve at a point to be designated. b. company quartermaster sergeants will accompany ration parties, which will be limited in size to the actual needs for bringing up cooked rations from the point where cooking is done, to the trenches. at no time should this exceed ten per cent of the effective strength of the unit from which sent. c. care will be taken that as little noise as possible be made by these carrying parties. . sanitation.--a. the importance of strict attention to sanitation will be impressed upon all ranks. b. the commanding officer of each unit is responsible for sanitation in his sector. he will make frequent inspections of latrines, refuse pits and trenches to ascertain that no unsanitary conditions exist. c. latrines will be constructed in the trenches, excreta kept covered at all times and such disinfectants as may be provided will be used at regular intervals. when filled within eighteen inches of the top, pits will be filled with earth and labeled. d. urinal cans will be provided and men required to use these cans and contents will be emptied as often as necessary into deep pits at least one hundred yards from the trenches. empty tin cans, particles of food and other refuse will be collected in receptacles kept in the trenches for that purpose and carried to the rear and buried in pits. this is usually done at night. emergency dumps for companies (material). . any large shell crater will do for these or holes can be dug ' x ,' x ' deep. contents of dump. rolls barbed wire. coils french accordion wire. long screw stakes. short screw stakes. prepared wire blocks (gooseberries). stores for company. very flares. s.o.s. rockets. verminal sprayers. strombos horn. (gas alarm) rubber boots. periscopes. revolver ammunition. log book. set maps. set air photos. defense scheme. . these are taken over and signed for. each dugout must have a gas blanket and some form of gas alarm (usually empty shell case.) stores at battalion headquarters. strombos horn. verminal sprayers. very flares. s.o.s. rockets. revolver ammunition. ground flares. [illustration: plate # ] conclusion. the present army of the united states had its inception at plattsburg in . the first regiment of the business mens' training camp will go down in history as the first chapter of preparedness. the training camps of , not only at plattsburg, but at various other places throughout the united states, constituted the second chapter. we are just finishing chapter three in the officers' training camps of . this book brings together the essential points of the instruction given at the second and probably the last of the officers' training camps at plattsburg, in such a way that an officer may refresh his memory when he is about to take up with his men any of the subjects covered. it is hardly necessary to add that no attempt has been made to cover fully any branch of the work. the bibliography provides for further study and the books in it should be at every officer's command. as the war progresses many changes will be made; not only will methods change but some branches now considered essential may be cast aside as useless. nothing but work can make the pages of any military book have real meaning. this book gives what are now considered the essentials of military training. if it has brought to the conscientious officer points he might otherwise have forgotten to the detriment of his command, it will have served its purpose. bibliography. chapter ii. i.d.r. balck "tactics" vol. . infantry. howell "lectures on the swiss army." bjornstadt "lectures on the german army." "drill and field training" (english)--imperial army series. "instructions on the offensive conduct of small units." war department, may, . "notes on the methods of attack and defense to meet the conditions of modern warfare." army war college, april, . privates manual. (moss.) "instructions for assembling the infantry pack," ordnance department. pamphlet no. manual of military training. (moss.) chapter iii. physical training. "manual of physical training." (koehler.) "field physical training of the soldier." special regulation no. . voice culture. (robert lloyd.) (in lecture form.) chapter iv. small arms firing manual. bull's eye scorebook. u.s. marines scorebook. "how to shoot." (moss.) "notes on training for rifle fire in trench warfare." army war coll., april, . "the rifle in war." (eames.) "suggestions to military riflemen." (whelen.) "musketry" sheets from first camp, plattsburg, new york. "control of the firing line." army service school. "musketry training." (pickering.) "a synopsis of the rifle in war." army service schools. british--"aids in musketry." "fire problems." (pilcher.) "fire orders"--"direction and control"--"musketry"--imperial army series. "lecture and lessons on musketry and instructions for officers and n.c.o.s. musketry diagrams." (clutterbuck.) "notes on bayonet training." army war college, march, . "british manual of the bayonet." ordnance pamphlet no. and no. . (pistol.) "notes on bombing." (mcclintock.) "notes on grenade training"--plattsburg training camp. "notes on grenade warfare." army war college. chapter v. military sketching and map heading. "military map reading." (sherrill.) "military sketching and map reading." (grieves.) "an officer's notes" (parker.) "topography." (sherrill.) engineers field manual. "manual of infantry training." (moss.) "training manual in topography, map reading and reconnaissance." (by major spalding, u.s.a.) "military sketching and map reading." (capt. barnes.) chapter vi. articles of war. "a guide to the articles of war." (professor eugene waumbaugh.) manual of courts martial. chapter vii. army regulations. "manual for commanders of infantry platoons." translated from the french by the army war college, , war department document no. . a.r., . chapter viii. (field work.) "notes on field fortification." army service schools, . "e.f.m." and addendum thereto. "elements of trench warfare." (waldron.) "field entrenchments." (solano.) "scouting and patrolling." (waldron.) "scout instruction." (mckenney.) "scout's handwork." (mckenney.) "the nd matabele war." (baden powell.) "aids to scouting." (baden powell.) "manual of military training." (moss.) "small problems in infantry." (bjornstadt.) "s.m. tactics." "a military primer." (marshall & simonds.) "technique of modern tactics." (von allen.) "night movements." (burnett.) "night operations for infantry." (dawkins.) chapter ix. (feeding men.) "manual for army cooks." "mess sergeant's handbook." (holbrook.) "mess officer's assistant." "mess account book." (frink.) "handling the straight army ration." (holbrook.) "manual of military training." (moss.) "field service." (moss.) chapter x. (personal hygiene and first aid.) "manual of military training." (moss.) "lectures on military sanitation and management of sanitation service," army service schools. "lectures" delivered at plattsburg training camp, . "elements of military hygiene." (ashburn.) "red cross pamphlet on first aid." "manual for non-coms. and privates." chapter xi. (signaling.) "united states signal book." "infantry drill regulations." chapter xii. (guard duty.) "manual of interior guard duty." chapter xiii. (company administration.) "company administration." (waldron.) "army paper work." (perrin-smith pub. co.) "notes on organizations." (waldron.) "synopsis of work done at st plattsburg camp." (farley.) "army paper work." (moss.) "army regulations." chapter xiv. (conferences. study. s.p.i. examinations.) "examinations in military science," harvard university, . chapter xv. (trench warfare.) "field fortifications." (lt. henri poire.) plattsburg, n.y., . "the french automatic rifle." (capt. gene loriot.) "notes on liaison in modern warfare." "notes on the method of attack and defense to meet the conditions of modern warfare." "machine gun tactics." (applin.) "grenades, hand and rifle." (solano.) "training for the trenches." (vickers.) "studies in leading troops." (vernois.) "tactical decisions and orders." (buddecke.) "problems in leading troops--army service schools." "battle orders." (von kiesling.) " problems." (morrison.) "tactical principles and problems." (hanna.) "technique of modern tactics." (bond and mcdonough.) "estimating tactical situations." (fitch.) the book department, army service schools, fort leavenworth, kansas, or the united states infantry association, washington, d.c., will get any books available. index. chapter . page. schedules; chapter . infantry drill regulations; school of the soldier; instruction without arms; attention; position of; heels together and on a line; feet turned out equally, forming angle of degrees; knees extended without stiffness; trunk erect upon hips; shoulders falling naturally; arms hanging naturally; head erect, chin raised; rests; position of rest and at ease; fall out; rest; at ease; parade rest; eyes right; right face; right half face; about face; hand salute; forward march; double time, march; mark time, march; half step, march; right step, march; squad, halt; by right flank, march; to the rear, march; change step, march; manual of arms; purpose; commands and cautions; order, arms; present, arms; port, arms; right shoulder, arms; left shoulder, arms; parade, rest; trail, arms; rifle salute; fix bayonet; unfix bayonet; inspection arms; school of the squad; object; composition of squad; fall in; fall out; count off; inspection arms--right dress, front; guide right; take interval; to reform; take distance; assemble, march; stack arms; take arms; oblique, march; in place, halt; resume march; right turn; right half turn; squads right; squad right about; school of the company; object; composition; fall in; platoon movements; leading platoon; rear platoon; questions which come up in daily military life; answers; insignia; for second lieutenants; company right, march; platoons right, march; squads right, march; right turn, march; column right, march; platoons, column right, march; squads right, column right, march; squads right, platoons, column right, march; squads right about, march; right into line, march; right front into line, march; platoons, right front into line, march; route step, march; right by twos, march; squads right front into line, march; dismiss the company; to fall in company when it cannot be formed by squads; for muster; in aligning company; to march squad without unnecessary commands; as skirmishers, march; assemble, march; kneel; lie down; rise; loadings and firings; arming; sight-setting announced; fire at will; clip fire; unload; extended order; corporal cautions; left face; company right; deployments; as skirmishers, guide right, march; to deploy from column or squad; assemble, march; platoons, assemble; platoons, columns; squad columns; no. 's forward, march; captain points out new line; disadvantage; advantage; being in skirmish line; by platoon; commands; school of the battalion; basis; arrangement; number; center; band; dressing; to form the battalion; other than ceremonies; for ceremonies; to dismiss the battalion; to rectify the alignment; to rectify the column; helpful hints to beginners; in column of squads; in column of companies; line of companies; in battalion line; inspections; special points of company; battalion inspection; regimental inspection; ceremonies; battalion review; battalion parade; regimental parade; regimental review; fire direction; fire control; fire discipline; the colonel; position; duties; the major; position; the general; duties; special; battalion staff; positions; duties; position; duties: before fire action; during the action; buglers; position; duties; must be proficient in; range estimators; platoon leader; position; duties; thereafter; first sergeant; guides; general rules; equipment; close order; taking intervals and distances; to form the company; alignments; exercise for; result; platoon guides; position; duties; corporal; position; duties; thereafter; the private; position; duties; packs; cartridge belt; to attach first-aid pouch; to attach canteen cover; to attach pack carrier to haversack; to attach cartridge belt to haversack; to attach bayonet scabbard to haversack; to attach intrenching tool carrier to haversack; to assemble the full equipment (without rations); to make the pack; to assemble the pack; to assemble the full equipment (with rations); to make the pack; to assemble the pack; to adjust to the soldier; to assemble full equipment, less the pack (with rations); to assemble full equipment, less the pack (without rations); to discard pack without removing equipment from body; care of equipment; leather; woolen clothes; mending; cloth equipment--dry cleaning; washing; instructions on making packs; methods; adjusting cartridge belt; distribution of intrenching tools in the squad; chapter . physical training; physical training; bayonet training; time schedule; formations; second formation; commands; kinds of and how given; first lesson; second lesson; third lesson; fourth lesson; fifth lesson; voice culture; chapter . use of modern arms; small arms firing; slow fire; rapid fire; pistol; nomenclature and care; manual for the pistol; position; the grip; the trigger squeeze; position and aiming drills; quick fire; classes of fire; slow fire; quick fire; automatic fire; trench; score; course; slow fire; quick fire; automatic fire; trench fire; bayonet training; functions of; general practice; technique of bayonet combat; manual of the bayonet; progressive exercises; machine guns; mode of action; fire; inconspicuousness; offensive reinforcement of a front momentarily stationary; defensive; general rules for installation; employment of fire and instruction; resume; points before firing; points during firing; points after firing; grenade instruction; introduction; working of grenades in use; instruction in throwing; instruction in grenade organization; points to remember; chapter . map sketching; class room--map reading; taking up map scales; field work--strict scale map making; road sketch; area sketch; problem; class room--problem; field work--problem; class room--problem; field work--problem; problem; map reading; chapter . helpful references to the articles of war; military law; article ; definitions; article ; persons subject to military law; articles - ; courts martial classified; method of entering a charge against a man; specification; general remarks; article ; order of voting; article ; limit upon prosecutions; article ; fraudulent enlistment; article ; desertion; article ; absence without leave; article ; disrespect toward president and others; article ; disrespect toward a superior officer; article ; assaulting or wilfully disobeying superior officer; article ; insubordinate conduct toward a non-commissioned officer; article ; disorders; article ; breaking arrest; article ; misbehavior before the enemy; article ; neglect of military property; article ; waste or unlawful disposal of property issued to soldiers; article ; drunk on duty; article ; misbehavior of sentinel; article ; murder or rape; article ; various crimes; article ; frauds against the government; article ; conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman; article ; general articles, the catch all; examples; problem ; problem ; problem ; chapter . notes on army regulations; authority exercised; abusive language; respect to superiors; remarks by officers; furloughs; men on furloughs; men in foreign countries; no payments; desertion; abandoned clothes; reward; costs of apprehension; no pay or clothes; will be restored; absent without leave; discharge of enlisted men; final statements; certificate; loss of discharge certificate; physical disability certificate; death of soldier; effects; will be delivered; medal of honor; certificate of merit; quarters; saturday; neglect of rooms; destruction of tableware; chiefs of squads; premises; company commanders; arms; accountability and responsibility; example; loss of public property; ration; forfeiture; pay; allotments; class a; class b; compensation for death or disability; additional insurance; deposits; a lost deposit book; payment; withdrawal of deposits; interest; forfeiture; officers and men; furloughed to reserve; transportation; discharged soldier; transfer of claims; notes on the laws of war; chapter . practice marches; field work; an order; do not deploy too early; fire direction; the troops; defense; leadership; communications; night operations; patrols; leader; conduct of; report; return; advance guard; rear guard; flank guard; camps; march outpost; outpost; outline of field service regulations; land forces of u.s.; military information; transmission of information; questions and answers on; chapter . feeding men; in camp; on the march; for individual cooking; in the trenches; rations and cooking; camping and camp sanitation; general principles; chapter . personal hygiene and first aid; personal hygiene; bathing; sexual indulgence; exercise; cleanliness of surroundings; preventable diseases; typhoid fever; dysentery; malaria; tonsilitis and colds; measles; first aid; grounds; poisoned wounds; diagnosis tag; treatment of wounds; bleeding wounds; fainting, heat exhaustion and shock; sunstroke; burns and scalds; freezing and frostbites; fractures; treatment; artificial respiration; trench foot; chapter . signaling; semaphore; first cycle; second cycle; third cycle; fourth cycle; doubles; instructing; second step; third step; fourth step; wig wag; points to remember; letter codes; arm signals; forward, march; halt; double time, march; squads right, march; squads left, march; squads right about, march; change direction or column right, march; as skirmishers, march; as skirmishers, guide center, march; as skirmishers, guide right, march; assemble, march; range, or change elevation; what range are you using?; are you ready?; commence firing; fire faster; fire slower; to swing the cone of fire; fix bayonet; suspend firing; cease firing; platoon; squad; rush; chapter . guard duty; guards; formal guard mounting; ceremony; first detail; other details; sergeant major; adjutant; , , officer of the guard; new officer of the day; commander of the guard; guard duty in the trenches; chapter . company administration; notes on organization; prepare in advance to receive men; duties; if in cantonments; if in tents; men reporting; issue of equipment; organization; day's routine; reveille; mess; , sick call; , morning instruction; afternoon instruction; retreat; school call; tattoo; call to quarters; taps; sundays and holidays; details; paper work; military correspondence; morning report; ration return; sick report; duty roster; monthly return; service record; discharge; final statement; muster roll; pay roll; names; losses; chapter . conferences; study; syllabus: small problems for infantry; examinations; military science and tactics; minor tactics; chapter . trench warfare; general principles; instructions to be issued by battalion commander; attack of a defensive position; attacking from trenches; defense of trenches; liaison; trench orders; selection of site; trench construction; , general arrangement; system of laying out trenches; revettments; sod; sand bags; concrete work; gabions; trench armament; loopholes; trench bottoms; communication trench; latrines; shelters; dugouts; sentries; position; entrances; galleries; bomb-traps; interior; depots for supplies; telephones; departure parallel; machine gun emplacements; listening posts; wire entanglements; high entanglements; tracing entanglements; low entanglements; loose wire; criticisms by lieut henri poire; occupation; two main classes of relief; general principles of relief; mechanism of relief; attack during the march; the stay in the trenches; four objects of a trench commander; his plan of defense; organization of defense; liaison; observation; trench work; offensive operations; rule of the trench commander; duties of the company commander; duties of platoon leaders as officers on duty; duties of platoon leaders; in front line trenches; duties of non-commissioned officer on duty; patrols; sentinels; machine guns; snipers; organization of a platoon; deployments; normal battalion formation in attack; general principles of the platoon formation in assault of fortified positions; remarks regarding forming of wave from close order; some questions a platoon commander should ask himself; defensive measure against gas attacks; general considerations; nature of gas attacks; gas clouds; gas projectiles; tear or lachrymatory shells; poison shells; smoke; mine and explosion gases; protection of shelters; methods of protection; shelters which should be protected; protection of weapons and equipment; small arms and s.a.a.; hand and rifle grenades; light trench mortars; action to be taken in trenches on gas alarm; action to be taken in billets and back areas; action during gas attack; protective measures; tactical measures; precautions against gas shells; action subsequent to a gas attack; general; movement; clearing dugouts and other shelters; ventilation; natural; by fire; by fanning; cleaning arms and ammunition; treatment of shell holes; concealment from aerial observers; orders governing intrenchment problems; company organization; company headquarters; headquarters; personnel; commissioned; enlisted; equipment; trench standing orders; duties; sentries; patrols; stand to; machine guns; reliefs; guides; smoking and talking; procedure on arrival at trenches; log books; equipment; stretcher bearers; discipline; rations and cooking; sanitation; emergency dumps for companies (material); contents of dump; stores for company; stores at battalion headquarters; conclusion; bibliography; elements of military art and science: or, course of instruction in strategy, fortification, tactics of battles, &c. embracing the duties of staff, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers. adapted to the use of volunteers and militia. third edition. with critical notes on the mexican and crimean wars. by h. wager halleck, a.m., major general, u.s.a. new york: d. appleton & company, & broadway. london: little britain . entered, according to the act of congress, in the year , by d. appleton & company, in the clerk's office of the district court of the united states for the southern district of new york. contents page preface i. introduction.--dr. wayland's arguments on the justifiableness of war briefly examined. ii. strategy.--general divisions of the art.--rules for planning a campaign.--analysis of the military operations of napoleon. iii. fortifications.--their importance in the defence of states proved by numerous historical examples. iv. logistics.--subsistence.--forage.--marches.--convoys.-- castrametation. v. tactics.--the twelve orders of battle, with examples of each.--different formations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers on the field of battle, with the modes of bringing troops into action. vi. military polity.--the means of national defence best suited to the character and condition of a country, with a brief account of those adopted by the several european powers. vii. defence of our sea-coast.--brief description of our maritime fortifications, with an examination of the several contests that have taken place between ships and forts, including the attack on san juan d'ulloa, and on st. jean d'acre. viii. our northern frontier defences.--brief description of the fortifications on the frontier, and an analysis of our northern campaigns. ix. army organization.--staff and administrative corps.--their history, duties, numbers, and organization. x. army organization.--infantry and cavalry.--their history, duties, numbers, and organization. xi. army organization.--artillery.--its history and organization, with a brief notice of the different kinds of ordnance, the manufacture of projectiles, &c. xii. army organization.--engineers.--their history, duties, and organization,--with a brief discussion, showing their importance as a part of a modern army organization. xiii. permanent fortifications. historical notice of the progress of this art.--description of the several parts of a fortress, and the various methods of fortifying a position. xiv. field engineering.--field fortifications.--military communications.--military bridges.--sapping, mining, and the attack and defence of a fortified place. xv. military education.--military schools of france, prussia, austria, russia, england, &c.--washington's reasons for establishing the west point academy.--rules of appointment and promotion in foreign services.--absurdity and injustice of our own system. explanation of plates preface the following pages were hastily thrown together in the form of lectures, and delivered, during, the past winter, before the lowell institute of boston. they were written without the slightest intention of ever publishing them; but several officers of militia, who heard them delivered, or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire their publication, on the ground of their being useful to a class of officers now likely to be called into military service. it is with this view alone that they are placed in the hands of the printer. no pretension is made to originality in any part of the work; the sole object having been to embody, in a small compass, well established military principles, and to illustrate these by reference to the events of past history, and the opinions and practice of the best generals. small portions of two or three of the following chapters have already appeared, in articles furnished by the author to the new york and democratic reviews, and in a "report on the means of national defence," published by order of congress. h.w.h. may, . elements of military art and science. chapter i. introduction. our distance from the old world, and the favorable circumstances in which we have been placed with respect to the other nations of the new world, have made it so easy for our government to adhere to a pacific policy, that, in the sixty-two years that have elapsed since the acknowledgment of our national independence, we have enjoyed more than fifty-eight of general peace; our indian border wars have been too limited and local in their character to seriously affect the other parts of the country, or to disturb the general conditions of peace. this fortunate state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge, promote commerce, agriculture, and manufactures; in fine, to increase the greatness of the nation and the happiness of the individual. under these circumstances our people have grown up with habits and dispositions essentially pacific, and it is to be hoped that these feelings may not soon be changed. but in all communities opinions sometimes run into extremes; and there are not a few among us who, dazzled by the beneficial results of a long peace, have adopted the opinion that war in any case is not only useless, but actually immoral; nay, more, that to engage in war is wicked in the highest degree, and even _brutish_. all modern ethical writers regard _unjust_ war as not only immoral, but as one of the greatest of crimes--murder on a large scale. such are all wars of mere ambition, engaged in for the purpose of extending regal power or national sovereignty; wars of plunder, carried on from mercenary motives; wars of propagandism, undertaken for the unrighteous end of compelling men to adopt certain religious or political opinions, whether from the alleged motives of "introducing a more orthodox religion," or of "extending the area of freedom." such wars are held in just abhorrence by all moral and religious people: and this is believed to be the settled conviction of the great mass of our own citizens. but in addition to that respectable denomination of christians who deny our right to use arms under any circumstances, there are many religious enthusiasts in other communions who, from causes already noticed, have adopted the same theory, and hold _all_ wars, even those in self-defence, as unlawful and immoral. this opinion has been, within the last few years, pressed on the public with great zeal and eloquence, and many able pens have been enlisted in its cause. one of the most popular, and by some regarded one of the most able writers on moral science, has adopted this view as the only one consonant with the principles of christian morality. it has been deemed proper, in commencing a course of lectures on war, to make a few introductory remarks respecting this question of its justifiableness. we know of no better way of doing this than to give on the one side the objections to war as laid down in dr. wayland's moral philosophy, and on the other side the arguments by which other ethical writers have justified a resort to war. we do not select dr. wayland's work for the purpose of criticizing so distinguished an author; but because he is almost the only writer on ethics who advocates these views, and because the main arguments against war are here given in brief space, and in more moderate and temperate language than that used by most of his followers. i shall give his arguments in his own language. "i. all wars are contrary to the revealed will of god." it is said in reply, that if the christian religion condemns all wars, no matter how just the cause, or how necessary for self-defence, we must expect to find in the bible some direct prohibition of war, or at least a prohibition fairly implied in other direct commandments. but the bible nowhere prohibits war: in the old testament we find war and even conquest positively commanded, and although war was raging in the world in the time of christ and his apostles, still they said not a word of its unlawfulness and immorality. moreover, the fathers of the church amply acknowledge the right of war, and directly assert, that when war is justly declared, the christian may engage in it either by stratagem or open force. if it be of that highly wicked and immoral character which some have recently attributed to it, most assuredly it would be condemned in the bible in terms the most positive and unequivocal. but it has been said that the use of the sword is either directly or typically forbidden to the christian, by such passages as "thou shalt not kill," (deut. v. ,) "i say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also," (matt. v. ,) &c. if these passages are to be taken as literal commands, as fanatics and religious enthusiasts would have us believe, not only is war unlawful, but also all our penal statutes, the magistracy, and all the institutions of the state for the defence of individual rights, the protection of the innocent, and the punishment of the guilty. but if taken in conjunction with the whole bible, we must infer that they are hyperbolical expressions, used to impress strongly on our minds the general principle of love and forgiveness, and that, so far as possible, we over come evil with good. can any sober-minded man suppose, for a moment, that we are commanded to encourage the attacks of the wicked, by literally turning the left cheek when assaulted on the right, and thus induce the assailant to commit more wrong? shall we invite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depredations, by literally giving him a cloak when he takes our coat; and the insolent and the oppressor to proceed in his path of crime, by going two miles with him if he bid us to go one? again, if the command, "thou shalt not kill," is to be taken literally, it not only prohibits us from engaging in just war, and forbids the taking of human life by the state, as a punishment for crime; it also forbids, says dr. leiber, our taking the life of any animal, and even extends to the vegetable kingdom,--for undoubtedly plants have life, and are liable to violent death--to be _killed_. but dr. wayland concedes to individuals the right to take vegetable and animal life, and to society the right to punish murder by death. this passage undoubtedly means, thou shalt not unjustly kill,--thou shalt do no murder; and so it is rendered in our prayer-books. it cannot have reference to war, for on almost the next page we find the israelites commanded to go forth and smite the heathen nations,--to cast them out of the land,--to utterly destroy them,--to show them no mercy, &c. if these passages of the bible are to be taken literally, there is no book which contains so many contradictions; but if taken in connection with the spirit of other passages, we shall find that we are permitted to use force in preventing or punishing crime, whether in nations or in individuals; but that we should combine love with justice, and free our hearts from all evil motives. ii. all wars are unjustifiable, because "god commands us to love every man, alien or citizen, samaritan or jew, as ourselves; and the act neither of society nor of government can render it our duty to violate this command." it is true that no act of society can make it our duty to violate any command of god: but is the above command to be taken literally, and as forbidding us to engage in just war? is it not rather intended to impress upon us, in a forcible manner, that mutual love is a great virtue; that we should hate no one, not even a stranger nor an enemy, but should treat all with justice, mercy, and loving-kindness? if the meaning attempted to be given to this command in the above quotation be the true one, it is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civil justice, to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections. but are we bound to love all human beings alike; that is, to the same degree? does the bible, as a whole, inculcate such doctrine? on the contrary, christ himself had his _beloved_ disciple,--one whom he loved pre-eminently, and above all the others; though he loved the others none the less on that account. we are bound to love our parents, our brothers, our families first, and above all other human beings; but we do not, for this reason, love others any the less. a man is not only permitted to seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, but if he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. we are bound to protect our families against the attacks of others; and, if necessary for the defence of their lives, we are permitted to take the life of the assailant; nay more, we are bound to do so. but it does not follow that we _hate_ him whom we thus destroy. on the contrary, we may feel compassion, and even love for him. the magistrate sentences the murderer to suffer the penalty of the law; and the sheriff carries the sentence into execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner: nevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have the kindest feelings towards him whom they thus deprive of life. so it is in the external affairs of the state. next to my kindred and my neighbors do i love my countrymen. i love them more than i do foreigners, because my interests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties of friendship and affection, bind me to them more intimately than to the foreigner. i sympathize with the oppressed greek, and the enslaved african, and willingly contribute to their relief, although their sufferings affect me very remotely; but if my own countrymen become oppressed and enslaved, nearer and dearer interests are affected, and peculiar duties spring from the ties and affections which god has formed. if my countrymen be oppressed, my neighbors and kindred will be made unhappy and suffering; this i am bound to take all proper measures in my power to prevent. if the assailant cannot be persuaded by argument to desist from his wicked intentions, i unite with my fellow-citizens in forcibly resisting his aggressions. in doing this i am actuated by no feelings of hatred towards the hostile forces; i have in my heart no malice, no spirit of revenge; i have no desire to harm individuals, except so far as they are made the instruments of oppression. but as instruments of evil, i am bound to destroy their power to do harm. i do not shoot at my military enemy from hatred or revenge; i fight against him because the paramount interests of my country cannot be secured without destroying the instrument by which they are assailed. i am prohibited from exercising any personal cruelty; and after the battle, or as soon as the enemy is rendered harmless, he is to be treated with kindness, and to be taken care of equally with the wounded friend. all conduct to the contrary is regarded by civilized nations with disapprobation. that war does not properly beget personal malignity but that, on the contrary, the effects of mutual kindness and courtesy on the battle-field, frequently have a beneficial influence in the political events of after years, may be shown by innumerable examples in all history. soult and wellington were opposing generals in numerous battles; but when the former visited england in , he was received by wellington and the whole british nation with the highest marks of respect; and the mutual warmth of feeling between these two distinguished men has contributed much to the continuance of friendly relations between the two nations. and a few years ago, when we seemed brought, by our civil authorities, almost to the brink of war by the northeastern boundary difficulties, the pacific arrangements concluded, through the intervention of general scott, between the governors of maine and new brunswick, were mainly due to ancient friendships contracted by officers of the contending armies during our last war with great britain. iii. "it is granted that it would be better for man in general, if wars were abolished, and all means, both of offence and defence, abandoned. now, this seems to me to admit, that this is the law under which god has created man. but this being admitted, the question seems to be at an end; for god never places man under circumstances in which it is either wise, or necessary, or innocent, to violate his laws. is it for the advantage of him who lives among a community of thieves, to steal; or for one who lives among a community of liars, to lie?" the fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it is scarcely necessary to point out its logical defects. my living among a community of thieves would not justify me in stealing, and certainly it would be no reason why i should neglect the security of my property. my living among murderers would not justify me in committing murder, and on the other hand it would be no reason why i should not fight in the defence of my family, if the arm of the law were unable to protect them. that other nations carry on unjust wars is no reason why we should do likewise, nor is it of itself any reason why we should neglect the means of self-defence. it may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we were placed in a world where there were no wars, or murders, or thefts; but god has seen fit to order it otherwise. our duties and our relations to our fellow-men are made to suit the world as it is, and not such a world as we would make for ourselves. we live among thieves: we must therefore resort to force to protect our property--that is, to locks, and bars, and bolts; we build walls thick and high between the robber and our merchandise. and more: we enact laws for his punishment, and employ civil officers to forcibly seize the guilty and inflict that degree of punishment necessary for the prevention of other thefts and robberies. we live among murderers: if neither the law nor the ordinary physical protections suffice for the defence of our own lives and the lives of our innocent friends, we forcibly resist the murderer, even to his death, if need be. moreover, to deter others from like crimes, we inflict the punishment of death upon him who has already taken life. these relations of individuals and of society are laid down by all ethical writers as in accordance with the strictest rules of christian morality. even dr. wayland considers it not only the right, but the duty of individuals and of society to resort to these means, and to enact these laws for self-protection. let us extend the same course of reasoning to the relations of different societies. we live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars; who, disregarding the rights of others, oppress and rob, and even murder their citizens, in order to reach some unrighteous end. as individuals, we build fences and walls for the protection of our grounds and our merchandise; so, as a nation, we build ships and forts to protect our commerce, our harbors, and our cities. but the walls of our houses and stores are useless, unless made so strong and high that the robber cannot break through or scale them without great effort and personal danger; so our national ships and forts would be utterly useless for protection, unless fully armed and equipped. further: as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers for the protection of our property and lives, and, when necessary, arm them with the physical means of executing the laws, even though the employment of these means should cost human life. the prevention and punishment of crime causes much human suffering; nevertheless the good of community requires that crime should be prevented and punished. so, as a nation, we employ military officers to man our ships and forts, to protect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish those who seek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. national aggressions are far more terrible in their results than individual crime; so also the means of prevention and punishment are far more stupendous, and the employment of these means causes a far greater amount of human suffering. this may be a good reason for greater _caution_ in resorting to such means, but assuredly it is no argument against the _moral right_ to use them. iv. war is unjustifiable because unnecessary: " st. the very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its measures, and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than any thing else to prevent the occurrence of injury. the moral sentiment of every community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just the kind, and the merciful." the moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of individuals. active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, so far as may be proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue. if we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the robber, and the murderer, think you that crime will be diminished? reason and experience prove the contrary. active benevolence and kindness should always attend just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibit it. the laws of god's universe are founded on justice as well as love. "the moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful;" but this fact does not entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent persons, and therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shall be punished, in order that those who are dead to all moral restraints may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment. " d. but suppose the [national] injury to be done. i reply, the proper appeal for moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physical force, but to the consciences of men. let the wrong be set forth, but be set forth in the spirit of love; and in this manner, if in any, will the consciences of men be aroused to justice." argument, and "appeals to the consciences of men" should always be resorted to in preference to "physical force;" but when they fail to deter the wicked, force must be employed. i may reason with the robber and the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt to rob my house, and murder my family; but if he refuse to listen to moral appeals, i employ physical force,--i call in the strong arm of the law to assist me; and if no other means can be found to save innocent life that is assailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed. "if," says puffendorf, "some one treads the laws of peace under his feet, forming projects which tend to my ruin, he could not, without the highest degree of impudence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this i should consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be touched; in other words, that i should betray myself, and abandon the care of my own preservation, in order to give way to the malice of a criminal, that he may act with impunity and with full liberty. on the contrary, since he shows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has placed himself in a position which does not permit me safely to practice towards him the duties of peace, i have only to think of preventing the danger which menaces me; so that if i cannot do this without hurting him, he has to accuse himself only, since he has reduced me to this necessity." _de jure nat. et gent_, lib. ii., ch. v., § . this same course of reasoning is also applied to the duties of a nation towards its enemy in respect to war. " d. but suppose this method fail. why, then, let us suffer the evil." this principle, if applied to its full extent, would, we believe, be subversive of all right, and soon place all power in the hands of the most evil and wicked men in the community. reason with the nation that invades our soil, and tramples under foot our rights and liberties, and should it not desist, why, then, suffer the evil! reason with the murderer, and if he do not desist, why, then, suffer him to murder our wives and our children! reason with the robber and the defaulter, and if they will not listen, why, then, let them take our property! we cannot appeal to the courts, for if their decisions be not respected, they employ _force_ to _compel_ obedience to their mandates. but dr. wayland considers the law of benevolence to forbid the use of force between men. he forgets this, it is true, in speaking of our duties towards our fellow-men of the same _society_, and even allows us to punish the murderer with death; but towards the foreigner he requires a greater forbearance and benevolence than towards our neighbor; for if another nation send its armies to oppress, and rob, and murder us by the thousand, we have no right to employ physical force either to prevent or to punish them, though we may do so to prevent or punish a neighbor for an individual act of the same character. the greater the scale of crime, then, the less the necessity of resorting to physical force to prevent it! " th. but it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated and continued aggression? i answer, first, not instruments of destruction, but the moral principle which god has placed in the bosom of every man. i think that obedience to the law of god, on the part of the injured, is the surest preventive against the repetition of injury. i answer, secondly, suppose that acting in obedience to the law of benevolence will not prevent the repetition of injury, will acting on the principle of retaliation prevent it?" again; "i believe aggression from a foreign nation to be the intimation from god that we are disobeying the law of benevolence, and that this is his mode of teaching nations their duty, in this respect, to each other. so that aggression seems to me in no manner to call for retaliation and injury, but rather to call for special kindness and good-will." this argument, if such it can be called, is equally applicable to individual aggressions. we are bound to regard them as intimations of our want of benevolence, and to reward the aggressors for the intimations! is it true, that in this world the wicked only are oppressed, and that the good are always the prospered and happy? even suppose this true, and that i, as a sinful man, deserve god's anger, is this any reason why i should not resist the assassin, and seek to bring him to punishment? the whole of this argument of dr. wayland applies with much greater force to municipal courts than to war. v. "let us suppose a nation to abandon all means both of offence and of defence, to lay aside all power of inflicting injury, and to rely for self-preservation solely upon the justice of its own conduct, and the moral effect which such a course of conduct would produce upon the consciences of men. * * * * how would such a nation be protected from external attack, and entire subjugation? i answer, by adopting the law of benevolence, a nation would render such an event in the highest degree improbable. the causes of national war are, most commonly, the love of plunder and the love of glory. the first of these is rarely, if ever, sufficient to stimulate men to the _ferocity necessary to war_, unless when assisted by the second. and by adopting as the rule of our conduct the law of benevolence, all motive arising from the second cause is taken away. there is not a nation in europe that could be led on to war against a harmless, just, forgiving, and defenceless people." history teaches us that societies as well as individuals have been attacked again and again notwithstanding that they either would not or could not defend themselves. did mr. white, of salem, escape his murderers any the more for being harmless and defenceless? did the quakers escape being attacked and hung by the ancient new englanders any the more because of their non-resisting principles? have the jews escaped persecutions throughout christendom any the more because of their imbecility and non-resistance for some centuries past? poland was comparatively harmless and defenceless when the three great european powers combined to attack and destroy the entire nation, dividing between themselves the polish territory, and enslaving or driving into exile the polish people. "oh, bloodiest picture in the book of time, sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime!" we need not multiply examples under this head; all history is filled with them. let us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war, disband our army and navy, and apply the lighted torch to our military munitions and to our physical means of defence of every description; let it be proclaimed to the world that we will rely solely upon the consciences of nations for justice, and that we have no longer either the will or the ability to defend ourselves against aggression. think you that the african and asiatic pirates would refrain, any the more, from plundering our vessels trading to china, because we had adopted "the law of benevolence?" would england be any the more likely to compromise her differences with us, or be any the more disposed to refrain from impressing our seamen and from searching our merchant-ships? experience shows that an undefended state, known to suffer every thing, soon becomes the prey of all others, and history most abundantly proves the wisdom and justice of the words of washington--"if we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." but let us bring this case still nearer home. let it be known to-morrow that the people of boston or new york have adopted the strictly non-resisting principle, and that hereafter they will rely solely on the consciences of men for justice; let it be proclaimed throughout the whole extent of our union, and throughout the world, that you have destroyed your jails and houses of correction, abolished your police and executive law officers, that courts may decide justice but will be allowed no force to compel respect to their decisions, that you will no longer employ walls, and bars, and locks, to secure your property and the virtue and lives of your children; but that you will trust solely for protection to "the law of active benevolence." think you that the thieves, and robbers, and murderers of philadelphia, and baltimore, and new orleans, and the cities of the old world, will, on this account, refrain from molesting the peace of new york and boston, and that the wicked and abandoned men now in these cities, will be the more likely to turn from the evil of their ways? assuredly, if this "law of active benevolence," as dr. wayland denominates the rule of non-resistance, will prevent nations from attacking the harmless and defenceless, it will be still more likely to prevent individuals from the like aggressions; for the moral sense is less active in communities than where the responsibility is individual and direct. throughout this argument dr. wayland assumes that all wars are wars of aggression, waged for "plunder" or "glory," or through "hatred" or "revenge," whereas such is far from being true. he indeed sometimes speaks of war as being _generally_ of this character; at others he speaks of it as being _always_ undertaken either from a spirit of aggression or retaliation. take either form of his argument, and the veriest schoolboy would pronounce it unsound: viz., _all_ wars are undertaken either for aggression or retaliation; aggression and retaliation are forbidden by god's laws;--therefore, _all_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable. or, wars are _generally_ undertaken either for aggression or retaliation; aggression and retaliation are forbidden by god's laws--therefore, _all_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable. vi. "let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary expenditure, and the awful waste of human life, which the wars of the last hundred years have occasioned, and then we will ask him whether it be not evident, that the one-hundredth part of this expense and suffering, if employed in the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, would, long before this time, have banished wars from the earth, and rendered the civilized world like the garden of eden? if this be true, it will follow that the cultivation of a military spirit is injurious to a community, inasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil, the corrupt passions of the human breast, by the very manner in which it attempts to correct the evil itself." much has been said to show that war begets immorality, and that the cultivation of the military spirit has a corrupting influence on community. and members of the clergy and of the bar have not unfrequently so far forgotten, if not truth and fact, at least the common courtesies and charities of life, as to attribute to the military profession an unequal share of immorality and crime. we are declared not only parasites on the body politic, but professed violators of god's laws--men so degraded, though unconsciously, that "in the pursuit of justice we renounce the human character and assume that of the beasts;" it is said that "murder, robbery, rape, arson, theft, if only plaited with the soldier's garb, go unwhipped of justice."[ ] it has never been the habit of the military to retort these charges upon the other professions. we prefer to leave them unanswered. if demagogues on the "stump," or in the legislative halls, or in their fourth of-july addresses, can find no fitter subjects "to point a moral or adorn a tale," we must be content to bear their misrepresentations and abuse. [footnote : sumner's oration.] unjust wars, as well as unjust litigation, are immoral in their effects and also in their cause. but just wars and just litigation are not demoralizing. suppose all wars and all courts of justice to be abolished, and the wicked nations as well as individuals to be suffered to commit injuries without opposition and without punishment; would not immorality and unrighteousness increase rather than diminish? few events rouse and elevate the patriotism and public spirit of a nation so much as a just and patriotic war. it raises the tone of public morality, and destroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissiveness which so often result from a long-protracted peace. such was the dutch war of independence against the spaniards; such the german war against the aggressions of louis xiv., and the french war against the coalition of . but without looking abroad for illustration, we find ample proof in our own history. can it be said that the wars of the american revolution and of , were demoralizing in their effects? "whence do americans," says dr. lieber, "habitually take their best and purest examples of all that is connected with patriotism, public spirit, devotedness to common good, purity of motive and action, if not from the daring band of their patriots of the revolution?" the principal actors in the military events of the revolution and of , held, while living, high political offices in the state, and the moral tone which they derived from these wars may be judged of by the character stamped on their administration of the government. these men have passed away, and their places have, for some time, been filled by men who take their moral tone from the relations of peace. to the true believer in the efficacy of _non-resistance,_ and in the demoralizing influence of all wars, how striking the contrast between these different periods in our political history! how infinitely inferior to the rulers in later times were those, who, in the blindness of their infatuation, appealed to physical force, rather than surrender their life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness! let us trace out this contrast:-- in the earlier ages of our republic, and under the rule of those whose moral character had been corrupted by war, party spirit ran higher and was less pure than at later periods in our history. the object of the principal leaders of the great political parties was then to render the opinions of the opposite party odious: now, their only object is to sustain their own opinions by argument. then, each party claimed to itself an exclusive love of country, and stigmatized the other as aliens and the natural enemies of the state: now, they both practise great forbearance, love, and charity, towards political opponents. then, men obtained place through intrigue and corruption, and a universal scramble for the loaves and fishes of office on the one side, and a universal political proscription on the other, were regarded as the natural results of an election: now, this disgusting strife for office has ceased; men no longer seek place, but wait, like cincinnatus, to be called from their ploughs; and none are proscribed for opinion's sake. then, in electing men to office the most important social and constitutional principles were forgotten or violated: now, we have the august spectacle of a nation-choosing its rulers under the guidance of strict moral principle. then, the halls of congress were frequently filled with demagogues, and tiplers, and the _small men_ of community: now, the ablest and best of the country are always sought for as representatives. then, the magnates of party were the mere timid, temporizing slaves of expediency, looking, not to the justice and wisdom of their measures, but to their probable popularity with then sneaking train of followers: now, they rely for respect and support upon the judgment of the honest and enlightened. then, the rank and file of party were mere political hirelings, who sold their manhood for place, who reviled and glorified, and shouted huzzas and whispered calumnies, just as they were bidden; they could fawn upon those who dispensed political patronage with a cringing servility that would shame the courtiers of louis xiv., or the parasites and hirelings of walpole: now, all political partisans, deriving their moral tone from the piping times of peace, are pure, disinterested patriots, who, like the roman farmer, take office with great reluctance, and resign it again as soon as the state can spare their services. then, prize-fighters, and blacklegs, and gamblers, having formed themselves into political clubs, were courted by men high in authority, and rewarded for their dirty and corrupting partisan services by offices of trust and responsibility: now, no man clothed with authority would dare to insult the moral sense of community by receiving such characters in the national councils, or by bestowing public offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of society. such, the advocates of non resistance would persuade us, are the legitimate results in this country of war on the one hand and of a long-protracted peace on the other. but there are men of less vivid imaginations, and, perhaps, of visions less distorted by fanatical zeal, who fail to perceive these results, and who even think they see the reverse of all this. these men cannot perceive any thing in the lives of washington, hamilton, and knox, to show that they were the less virtuous because they had borne arms in their country's service: they even fail to perceive the injurious effects of the cultivation of a military spirit on the military students of west point, whose graduates, they think, will compare favorably in moral character with the graduates of yale and cambridge. nay, more, some even go so far as to say that our army, as a body, is no less moral than the corresponding classes in civil life; that our common soldiers are as seldom guilty of riots, thefts, robberies, and murders, as similarly educated men engaged in other pursuits; that our military officers are not inferior in moral character to our civil officers, and that, as a class, they will compare favorably with any other class of professional men--with lawyers, for example. in justification of these opinions--which may, perhaps, be deemed singularly erroneous--they say, that in the many millions of public money expended during the last forty years, by military officers, for the army, for military defences, and for internal improvements, but a single graduate of west point has proved a defaulter, even to the smallest sum, and that it is exceedingly rare to see an officer of the army brought into court for violating the laws. but even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse immorality through community, is it not equally true that habitual submission to the injustice, plunder, and insult of foreign conquerors would tend still more to degrade and demoralize any people? with regard to "pecuniary expenditures" required in military defence, many absurd as well as false statements have been put forth. with respect to our own country, the entire amounts expended, under the head of war department, whether for indian pensions, for the purchase of indian lands, the construction of government roads, the improvement of rivers and harbors, the building of breakwaters and sea-walls, for the preservation of property, the surveying of public lands, &c., &c.; in fine, every expenditure made by officers of the army, under the war department, is put down as "expenses for military defence." similar misstatements are made with respect to foreign countries: for example, the new fortifications of paris are said to have already cost from fifty to seventy-five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to be required to complete them. indeed, we have seen the whole estimated cost of those works stated at two hundred and forty millions of dollars, or twelve hundred millions of francs! the facts are these: the works, when done, will have cost about twenty-eight millions. we had the pleasure of examining them not long since, in company with several of the engineer officers employed on the works. they were then three-fourths done, and had cost about twenty millions. we were assured by these officers that the fortifications proper would be completed for somewhat less than the original estimate of twenty-eight millions. had we time to enter into details, other examples of exaggeration and misrepresentation could be given. but it is not to be denied that wars and the means of military defence have cost vast amounts of money. so also have litigation and the means deemed requisite for maintaining justice between individuals. it has been estimated that we have in this country, at the present time, thirty thousand lawyers, without including pettifoggers. allowing each of these to cost the country the average sum of one thousand dollars, and we have the annual cost to the country, for lawyers, thirty millions of dollars. add to this the cost of legislative halls and legislators for making laws; of court-houses, jails, police offices, judges of the different courts, marshals, sheriffs justices of the peace, constables, clerks, witnesses, &c., employed to apply and enforce the laws when made; the personal loss of time of the different plaintiffs and defendants, the individual anxiety and suffering produced by litigation; add all these together, and i doubt not the result for a single year will somewhat astonish these modern economists. but if all the expenditures of this nature that have been made for the last fifty years, in this individual "war of hate," be added together, we have no doubt a very fruitful text might be obtained for preaching a crusade against law and lawyers! but could any sane man be found to say that, on account of the cost of maintaining them, all laws and lawyers are useless and should be abolished? if, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed necessary to secure justice between individuals of the same nation, can we expect that the means of international justice can be maintained without expenditures commensurate with the object in view? if we cannot rely exclusively upon the "law of active benevolence" for maintaining justice between brothers of the same country, can we hope that, in the present state of the world, strangers and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its requisitions? the length of the preceding remarks admonishes us to greater brevity in the further discussion of this subject. it is objected to war, that men being rational beings, should contend with one another by argument, and not by force, as do the brutes. to this it is answered, that force properly begins only where argument ends. if he who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make restitution, i apply to the court,--that is, to _legal_ force,--to compel him to do me justice. so nations ought to resort to _military force_ only when all other means fail to prevent aggression and injury. but war often fails to procure redress of grievances, or to prevent repeated and continued aggression. so does a resort to civil force; but such a resort is none the less proper and just on that account. but in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, while the guilty triumph. so it often is in civil life: god, for some wise purpose, sometimes permits the wicked to triumph for a season. but in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and frequently the war is unjust on both sides. so in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and frequently both resort to the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends. but nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, to settle their differences. for the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character--a congress of nations, as it has been called,--would be more productive of evil than of good. by such an arrangement the old and powerful european monarchies would acquire the authority to interfere in the domestic affairs of the weaker powers. we see the effects of establishing such a tribunal in the so-called holy alliance, whose influence is regarded by the friends of liberty as little less dangerous than the holy inquisition. moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent war, for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its decisions. for these and other reasons, it is deemed better and safer to rely on the present system of international law. under this system, and in this country, a resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of impulse and passion,--a yielding to the mere "bestial propensities" of our nature; it is a deliberate and solemn act of the legislative power,--of the representatives of the national mind, convened as the high council of the people. it is this power which must determine when all just and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain national justice, and when a resort to military force is requisite and proper. if this decision be necessarily unchristian and barbarous, such, also, should we expect to be the character of other laws passed by the same body, and under the same circumstances. a declaration of war, in this country, is a law of the land, made by a deliberative body, under the high sanction of the constitution. it is true that such a law may be unjust and wrong, but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily be so. the distinction between war, as thus duly declared, and "international lynch-law" is too evident to need comment. but it is said that the benefits of war are more than counterbalanced by the evils it entails, and that, "most commonly, the very means by which we repel a despotism from abroad, only establishes over us a military despotism at home." much has been said and written about _military_ despotism; but we think he who studies history thoroughly, will not fail to prefer a military despotism to a despotism of mere politicians. the governments of alexander and charlemagne were infinitely preferable to those of the petty civil tyrants who preceded and followed them; and there is no one so blinded by prejudice as to say that the reign of napoleon was no better than that of robespierre, danton, and the other "lawyers" who preceded him, or of the bourbons, for whom he was dethroned. "cæsar," says a distinguished senator of our own country, "was rightfully killed for conspiring against his country; but it was not he that destroyed the liberties of rome. that work was done by the profligate politicians without him, and before his time; and his death did not restore the republic. there were no more elections: rotten politicians had destroyed them; and the nephew of cæsar, as heir to his uncle, succeeded to the empire on the principle of hereditary succession." "and here history appears in her grand and instructive character, as philosophy teaching by example: and let us not be senseless to her warning voice. superficial readers believe it was the military men who destroyed the roman republic! no such thing! it was the politicians who did it!--factious, corrupt, intriguing politicians--destroying public virtue in their mad pursuit after office--destroying their rivals by crime--deceiving and debauching the people for votes--and bringing elections into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they were conducted. from the time of the gracchi there were no elections that could bear the name. confederate and rotten politicians bought and sold the consulship. intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals. fraud, violence, bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public treasury commanded votes. the people had no choice; and long before the time of cæsar, nothing remained of republican government but the name and the abuse. read plutarch. in the 'life of cæsar,' and not three pages before the crossing of the rubicon, he paints the ruined state of the elections,--shows that all elective government was gone,--that the hereditary form had become a necessary relief from the contests of the corrupt,--and that in choosing between pompey and cæsar, many preferred pompey, not because they thought him republican, but because they thought he would make the milder king. even arms were but a small part of cæsar's reliance, when he crossed the rubicon. gold, still more than the sword, was his dependence; and he sent forward the accumulated treasures of plundered gaul, to be poured into the laps of rotten politicians. there was no longer a popular government; and in taking all power himself, he only took advantage of the state of things which profligate politicians had produced. in this he was culpable, and paid the forfeit with his life. but in contemplating his fate, let us never forget that the politicians had undermined and destroyed the republic, before he came to seize and to master it." we could point to numerous instances, where the benefits of war have more than compensated for the evils which attended it; benefits not only to the generations who engaged in it, but also to their descendants for long ages. had rome adopted the non-resistance principle when hannibal was at her gates, we should now be in the night of african ignorance and barbarism, instead of enjoying the benefits of roman learning and roman civilization. had france adopted this principle when the allied armies invaded her territories in , her fate had followed that of poland. had our ancestors adopted this principle in , what now had been, think you, the character and condition of our country? dr. lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just and apposite. "the continued efforts," says he, "requisite for a nation to protect themselves against the ever-repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may be infinitely greater than the evils entailed by a single and energetic war, which forever secures peace from that side. nor will it be denied, i suppose, that niebuhr is right when he observes, that the advantage to rome of having conquered sicily, as to power and national vigor, was undeniable. but even if it were not so, are there no other advantages to be secured? no human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance, nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively, all the immeasurable blessings and the unspeakable good which have resolved to mankind from the ever-memorable victories of little greece over the rolling masses of servile asia, which were nigh sweeping over europe like the high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand over all the germs of civilization, liberty, and taste, and nearly all that is good and noble. think what we should have been had europe become an asiatic province, and the eastern principles of power and stagnation should have become deeply infused into her population, so that no process ever after could have thrown it out again! has no advantage resulted from the hebrews declining any longer to be ground in the dust, and ultimately annihilated, at least mentally so, by stifling servitude, and the wars which followed their resolution? the netherlands war of independence has had a penetrating and decided effect upon modern history, and, in the eye of all who value the most substantial parts and elementary ideas of modern and civil liberty, a highly advantageous one, both directly and through great britain. wars have frequently been, in the hands of providence, the means of disseminating civilization, if carried on by a civilized people--as in the case of alexander, whose wars had a most decided effect upon the intercourse of men and extension of civilization--or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen into lethargy, if attacked by less civilized and numerous hordes. frequently we find in history that the ruder and victorious tribe is made to recover as it were civilization, already on the wane with a refined nation. paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless, amply proved by history, that the closest contact and consequent exchange of thought and produce and enlargement of knowledge, between two otherwise severed nations, is frequently produced by war. war is a struggle, a state of suffering; but as such, at times, only that struggling process without which--in proportion to the good to be obtained, or, as would be a better expression for many cases, to the good that is to be borne--no great and essential good falls ever to the share of man. suffering, merely as suffering, is not an evil. our religion, philosophy, every day's experience, prove it. no maternal rejoicing brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of labor." one word more, and we must leave this subject. it has been said by some that the duties of patriotism are less binding upon us than upon our ancestors; that, whatever may have been the practice in years that are past the present generation can in no manner bear arms in their country's cause, such a course being not only _dishonorable_, but in the eye of the christian, _wicked_, and even _infamous_! it is believed, however, that such are not the general opinions and sentiments of the religious people of this country. our forefathers lighted the fires of religion and patriotism at the same altar; it is believed that their descendants have not allowed either to be extinguished, but that both still burn, and will continue to burn, with a purer and brighter flame. our forefathers were not the less mindful of their duty to their god, because they also faithfully served their country. if we are called upon to excel them in works of charity, of benevolence, and of christian virtue, let it not be said of us that we have forgotten the virtue of patriotism.[ ] [footnote : for further discussion of this subject the reader is referred to lieber's political ethics, part ii., book vii. chap. ; paley's moral and political philosophy; legare's report of june , , in the house of representatives; mackintosh's history of the revolution of , chap. x.; bynkershock; vatel; puffendorf; clausewitz; and most other writers on international law and the laws of war. dr. wayland's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by dymond in his inquiry into the accordancy of war with the principles of christianity; jay's peace and war; judd's sermon on peace and war; peabody's address, &c.; coue's tract on what is the use of the navy? sumner's true grandeur of nations.] chapter ii. strategy war has been defined, "a contest between nations and states carried on by force." but this definition is by some considered defective, inasmuch as it would exclude all civil wars. when war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace, it is called _offensive_, and when undertaken to repel invasion, or the attacks of an enemy, it is called _defensive_. a war may be essentially defensive even where we begin it, if intended to prevent an attack or invasion which is under preparation. besides this general division of war, military writers have made numerous others, such as-- _wars of intervention_, in which one state interferes in favor of another. this intervention may either have respect to the _internal_ or to the _external_ affairs of a nation. the interference of russia in the affairs of poland, of england in the government of india, austria and the allied powers in the affairs of france during the revolution and under the empire, are examples under the first head. the intervention of the elector maurice of saxony against charles v., of king william against louis xiv., in , of russia and france in the seven years' war, of russia again between france and austria, in , and between france and prussia, in , are examples under the second head. most liberal-publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs of nations as indefensible; but the principle is supported by the advocates of the old monarchies of europe. _wars of insurrection_ to gain or to regain liberty; as was the case with the americans in , and the modern greeks in . _wars of independence_ from foreign dictation and control as the wars of poland against russia, of the netherlands against spain, of france against the several coalitions of the allied powers, of the spanish peninsula against france and of china and india against england. the american war of partook largely of this character, and some judicious historians have denominated it the war of independence, as distinguished from the war of the revolution. _wars of opinion_, like those which the vendeans have sustained in support of the bourbons, and those france has sustained against the allies, as also those of propagandism, waged against the smaller european states by the republican hordes of the french revolution. to this class also belong-- _religious wars_, like those of islamism, of the crusades, and of the reformation. _wars of conquest_, like those of the romans in gaul, of the english in india, of the french in egypt and africa, and of the russians in circassia. _national wars_, in which the great body of the people of a state engage, like those of the swiss against austria and the duke of burgundy, of the catalans in , of the americans against england, of the dutch against phillip ii., and of the poles and circassians against russia. _civil wars_, where one portion of the state fights against the other, as the war of the roses in england, of the league in france, of the guelphs and ghibelines in italy, and of the factions in mexico and south america. it is not the present intention to enter into any discussion of these different kinds of war, but rather to consider the general subject, and to discuss such general principles and rules as may be applicable to all wars. war in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a _science_ and an _art_. it is a science so far as it investigates general principles and institutes an analysis of military operations; and an art when considered with reference to the practical rules for conducting campaigns, sieges, battles, &c. so is engineering a science so far as it investigates the general principles of fortification, and also artillery, in analyzing the principles of gunnery; but both are arts when considered with reference to the practical rules for the construction, attack, and defence of forts, or for the use of cannon. this distinction has not always been observed by writers on this subject, and some have asserted that strategy is the _science_, and tactics the _art_ of war. this is evidently mistaking the general distinction between science, which investigates principles, and art, which forms practical rules. in popular language, however, it is usual to speak of _the military art_ when we refer to the general subject of war, and of _the military sciences_ when we wish to call attention more particularly to the scientific principles upon which the art is founded. we shall here consider the military art in this general sense, as including the entire subject of war. as thus defined, the military art may be divided into four distinct branches, viz.: st. _strategy_; d. fortification, or _engineering_; d. _logistics_; th. _tactics_. several general treatises on this art add another branch, called _the policy of war_, or the relations of war with the affairs of state. _strategy_ is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisive points, or the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each other's cannon. _engineering_ embraces all dispositions made to enable troops to resist a superior force the longest time possible; and also the means resorted to by the opposing army to overcome these material obstacles. _logistics_ embraces the practical details of moving and supplying armies. _tactics_ is the art of bringing troops into action, or of moving them in the presence of an enemy, that is, within his view, and within the reach of his artillery. all these are most intimately connected. a fault in tactics may occasion the loss of strategic lines; the best combined manoeuvres on the field of battle may lead to no decisive results, when the position, or the direction of the operation is not strategic; sometimes not only battles, but entire campaigns, are lost through neglect of the engineer's art, or faults in his dispositions; again, armies would be of little use without the requisite means of locomotion and of subsistence. . _strategy_ regards the theatre of war, rather than the field of battle. it selects the important points in this theatre, and the lines of communication by which they may be reached; it forms the plan and arranges the general operations of a campaign; but it leaves it to the engineers to overcome material obstacles and to erect new ones; it leaves to logistics the means of supporting armies and of moving them on the chosen lines; and to tactics, the particular dispositions for battle, when the armies have reached the destined points. it is well to keep in mind these distinctions, which may be rendered still more obvious by a few illustrations. the point where several lines of communications either intersect or meet, and the centre of an arc which is occupied by the enemy, are strategic points; but tactics would reject a position equally accessible on all sides, especially with its flanks exposed to attack. sempronius at trebbia and varro at cannae, so placed their armies that the carthagenians attacked them, at the same time, in front, on the flanks, and in rear; the roman consuls were defeated: but the central strategic position of napoleon at rivoli was eminently successful. at the battle of austerlitz the allies had projected a _strategic_ movement to their left, in order to cut off napoleon's right from vienna; weyrother afterwards changed his plans, and executed a corresponding _tactical_ movement. by the former there had been some chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction. the little fort of koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more useful to the french, in , than the vast works of dresden. the little fort of bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the operations of napoleon in , by holding in check his entire army; whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of ticino, in , caused an army of , french to be defeated by only , men under prince eugene of savoy. war, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. if the attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a war of _invasion_. if only a province, or a military position, or an army, be attacked, it is simply regarded as taking the _initiative_ in offensive movements. _offensive_ war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral and political influence. it is waged on a foreign soil, and therefore spares the country of the attacking force; it augments its own resources at the same time that it diminishes those of the enemy; it adds to the moral courage of its own army, while it disheartens its opponents. a war of invasion may, however, have also its disadvantages. its lines of operation may become too _deep_, which is always hazardous in an enemy's country. all the natural and artificial obstacles, such as mountains, rivers, defiles, fortifications, &c., are favorable for defence, but difficult to be overcome by the invader. the local authorities and inhabitants oppose, instead of facilitating his operations; and if patriotism animate the defensive army to fight for the independence of its threatened country, the war may become long and bloody. but if a political diversion be made in favor of the invading force, and its operations be attended with success, it strikes the enemy at the heart, paralyzes all his military energies, and deprives him of his military resources, thus promptly terminating the contest. regarded simply as the initiative of movements, the offensive is almost always the preferable one, as it enables the general to choose his lines for moving and concentrating his masses on the decisive point. the first and most important rule in offensive war is, to keep your forces as much concentrated as possible. this will not only prevent misfortune, but secure victory,--since, by its necessary operation, you possess the power of throwing your whole force upon any exposed point of your enemy's position. to this general rule some writers have laid down the following exceptions:-- st. when the food and forage of the neighborhood in which you act have been exhausted and destroyed, and your magazines are, from any cause, unable to supply the deficiency, one of two things must be done; either you must go to places where these articles abound, or you must draw from them your supplies by _detachments_. the former is rarely compatible with your plan, and necessarily retards its execution; and hence the preference which is generally given to the latter. d. when reinforcements are about to join you, and this can only be effected by a march through a country actually occupied by hostile corps, or liable to be so occupied, you must again waive the general rule, and risk one party for the security of the other; or, (which may be better,) make such movements with your main body as shall accomplish your object. d. when you have complete evidence of the actual, or probable insurrection in your favor, of a town or province of your enemy, or of a division of his army, you must support this inclination by strong _detachments_, or by movements of your main body. napoleon's operations in italy, in - , furnish examples of what is here meant. th. when, by dispatching a _detachment_, you may be able to intercept a convoy, or reinforcement, coming to the aid of your enemy. these are apparent rather than real exceptions to the rule of concentration. this rule does not require that _all the army should occupy the same position_. far from it. concentration requires the main body to be in immediate and supporting reach: small detachments, for temporary and important objects, like those mentioned, are perfectly legitimate, and in accordance with correct principles. napoleon's position in spain will serve as an illustration. a hand, placed on the map of that country, will represent the position of the invading forces. when opened, the fingers will represent the several detachments, thrown out on important strategic lines, and which could readily be drawn in, as in closing the hand, upon the principal and central mass, preparatory to striking some important blow. "if, as we have seen, it be the first great rule for an army acting on the offensive principle, to keep its forces _concentrated_, it is, no doubt, the second, _to keep them fully employed._ is it your intention to seize a particular province of your enemy? to penetrate to his capital? or to cut him off from his supplies? whatever measure be necessary to open your route to these objects must be _promptly_ taken; and if you mean to subsist yourself at his expense, your movements must be more rapid than his. give him time to _breathe_,--and above all, give him time to _rest_, and your project is blasted; his forages will be completed, and his magazines filled and secured. the roads of approach will be obstructed, bridges destroyed, and strong points everywhere taken and defended. you will, in fact, like burgoyne, in , reduce yourself to the necessity of bleeding at every step, without equivalent or use." "such cannot be the fate of a commander who, knowing all the value of acting on the offensive, shakes, by the vigor and address of his first movements, the moral as well as physical force of his enemy,--who, selecting his own time, and place, and mode of attack, confounds his antagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unexpected,--and who at last leaves to him only the alternative of resistance without hope, or of flying without resistance." the british army, in the war of the american revolution, must have been most wretchedly ignorant of these leading maxims for conducting offensive war. instead of concentrating their forces on some decisive point, and then destroying the main body of our army by repeated and well-directed blows, they scattered their forces over an immense extent of country, and became too weak to act with decision and effect on any one point. on the other hand, this policy enabled us to call out and discipline our scattered and ill-provided forces. the main object in _defensive_ war is, to protect the menaced territory, to retard the enemy's progress, to multiply obstacles in his way, to guard the vital points of the country, and--at the favorable moment, when the enemy becomes enfeebled by detachments, losses, privations, and fatigue--to assume the offensive, and drive him from the country. this combination of the defensive and offensive has many advantages. the enemy, being forced to take the defensive in his turn, loses much of the moral superiority due to successful offensive operations. there are numerous instances of this kind of war, "the defensive-offensive," as it is sometimes called, to be found in history. the last four campaigns of frederick the great of prussia, are examples which may serve as models. wellington played a similar part in the spanish peninsula. to merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding gradually to the advances of the enemy, without any effort to regain such positions or provinces as may have fallen into his power, or to inflict on him some fatal and decisive blow on the first favorable opportunity; such a system is always within the reach of ignorance, stupidity, and cowardice; but such is far from being the true fabian system of defensive war. "instead of finding security only in flight; instead of habitually refusing to look the enemy in the face; instead of leaving his march undisturbed; instead of abandoning, without contest, points strong by nature or by art;--instead of all this, the true war of defence seeks every occasion to meet the enemy, and loses none by which it can annoy or defeat him; it is always awake; it is constantly in motion, and never unprepared for either attack or defence. when not employed in efforts of courage or address, it incessantly yields itself to those of labor and science. in its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges; while it erects or repairs those in its rear: it forms abbatis, raises batteries, fortifies passes, or intrenches encampments; and to the system of deprivation adds all the activity, stratagem, and boldness of _la petite guerre_. dividing itself into detachments, it multiplies its own attacks and the alarms of the enemy. collecting itself at a single point, it obstructs his progress for days, and sometimes for weeks together. does it even abandon the avenues it is destined to defend? it is but for the purpose of shielding them more securely, by the attack of his hospitals, magazines, convoys, or reinforcements. in a word, by adopting the maxim, that the _enemy must be made to pay for whatever he gains_, it disputes with him every inch of ground, and if at last it yields to him a victory, it is of that kind which calls forth only his sighs." in discussing the subject of strategy, certain technical terms are employed, such as _theatre of war; theatre of operations; base of operations_, or the line from which operations start; _objective points_, or points to which the operations are directed; _line of operations_, or the line along which an army moves; _key points_, or points which it is important for the defensive army to secure; _line of defence,_ or the line which it is important to defend at all hazards: and in general, _strategic points, strategic lines, strategic positions, &c._ as these terms are very generally used in military books, it may be well to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with their import. after defining these terms and explaining their meaning and application, it is deemed best to illustrate their use by reference to well-known and striking historical examples. _the theatre of a war_ embraces not only the territory of the two belligerent powers, but also that of their allies, and of such secondary powers as, through fear or interest, may be drawn into the contest. with maritime nations it also embraces the seas, and sometimes crosses to another continent. some of the wars between france and england embraced the two hemispheres. _the theatre of operations_, however, is of a more limited character, and should not be confounded with the theatre of war. in general, it includes only the territory which an army seeks, on the one hand, to defend, and on the other, to invade. if two or more armies be directed towards the same object, though by different lines, their combined operations are included in the same theatre but if each acts independently of the others, and seeks distinct and separate objects, each must have its own independent theatre of operations. a war between france and austria may embrace all italy and germany, but the theatre of operations may be limited to only a portion of these countries. should the oregon question lead to hostilities between the united states and england, the theatre of war would embrace the greater part of north america and the two oceans, but the theatre of operations would probably be limited to canada and our northern frontier, with naval descents upon our maritime cities. the first point to be attended to in a plan of military operation is to select a good _base_. many circumstances influence this selection, such as mountains, rivers, roads, forests, cities, fortifications, military dépôts, means of subsistence, &c. if the frontier of a state contain strong natural or artificial barriers, it may serve not only as a good base for offensive operations, but also as an excellent line of defence against invasion. a single frontier line may, however, be penetrated by the enemy, and in that case a second or third base further in the interior becomes indispensable for a good defence. a french army carrying on military operations against germany would make the rhine its first base; but if driven from this it would form a second base on the meuse or moselle, a third on the seine, and a fourth on the loire; or, when driven from the first base, it would take others perpendicular to the front of defence, either to the right, on béfort and besançon, or to the left, on mézières and sedan. if acting offensively against prussia and russia, the rhine and the main would form the first base the elbe and the oder the second, the vistula the third, the nieman the fourth, and the dwina and the dnieper the fifth. a french army operating against spain would have the pyrenees for its first base; the line of the ebro for a second, resting its wings on the gulf of gascony and the mediterranean. if from this position it advance its left, possessing itself of the kingdom of valencia, the line of the sierra d'estellas becomes its third base of operations against the centre of spain. a base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to our line of operations, or to the enemy's line of defence. some prefer one plan and some another; the best authorities, however, think the oblique or perpendicular more advantageous than the parallel; but we are not often at liberty to choose between these, for other considerations usually determine the selection. in , the french forces first moved perpendicular to their base on the main, but afterwards effected a change of front, and moved on a line oblique or nearly parallel to this base. they had pursued the same plan of operations in the seven years' war. the russians, in , based perpendicularly on the oka and the kalouga, and extended their flank march on wiozma and krasnoi; in , the allies, based perpendicularly on bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing napoleon's army on the elbe. an american army moving by lake champlain, would be based perpendicular on the great line of communication between boston and buffalo; if moving from the new england states on quebec and montreal, the line of operations would be oblique; and if moving from the niagara frontier by lake ontario and the st. lawrence, the line would be nearly parallel both to our base and to the enemy's line of defence--an operation, under the circumstances, exceedingly objectionable. any point in the theatre of operations which gives to the possessor an advantage over his opponent, is regarded as _strategic_. their geographical position and political and military character, give them a greater or less influence in directing the campaign. these points are occupied by the defensive army, and attacked by the offensive; if on or near the base, they become the _key_ points for the former, and the _objective_ points for the latter.[ ] there are also between these two a greater or less number of strategic points, which have an important though inferior influence upon the result of the war. [footnote : it may be well to remark that a strategic point is not necessarily a geometrical point; an entire province, or a considerable portion of a geographical frontier, is, in military language, sometimes denominated a _point_. in the same way, strategic lines, instead of being mathematical lines, are frequently many miles in width.] the first object of the french in attacking belgium, is to gain possession of the meuse, as this position would give them a decided advantage in any ulterior operations. in attacking southern germany, the course of the danube offers a series of points which exercise an important influence on the war. for northern germany, leipsic and the country bordering on the saale and the elbe, are objects often fiercely contested by the french and other belligerent powers. in a war between this country and england, montreal and the points on the st. lawrence between montreal and quebec, would become objects of the highest importance, and their possession would probably determine the result of the war. the capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its military influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. the possession of genoa, turin, alexandria, milan, &c., in , both from their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon the results of the war in these several states. in the same way venice, rome, and naples, in , vienna, in the campaigns of and , berlin, in , madrid, in , and paris, in and . if hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of cannae;, he would thus have destroyed the roman power. the taking of washington, in , had little or no influence on the war, for the place was then of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominal capital. it, however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and required many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our national escutcheon. _lines of defence_ in strategy are either permanent or temporary. the great military frontiers of a state, especially when strengthened by natural and artificial obstacles, such as chains of mountains, rivers, lines of fortresses, &c., are regarded as permanent lines of defence. the alpine range between france and piedmont, with its fortified passes; the rhine, the oder, and the elbe, with their strongly-fortified places; the pyrenees, with bayonne at one extremity and perpignon at the other; the triple range of fortresses on the belgian frontier--are all permanent lines of defence. the st. lawrence river is a permanent line of defence for canada; and the line of lake champlain, the upper st. lawrence, and the lakes, for the united states. temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for the campaign. napoleon's position in saxony, in ; the line of the allies in belgium, in ; the line of the marne, in , are examples of temporary lines of defence. it will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence are not necessarily bases of operation. _strategic positions_ are such as are taken up during the operations of a war, either by a _corps d'armée_ or grand detachment, for the purpose of checking or observing an opposing force; they are named thus to distinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle. the positions of napoleon at rivoli, verona, and legnano, in and , to watch the adige; his positions on the passarge, in , and in saxony and silesia in front of his line of defence, in ; and massena's positions on the albis, along the limmat and the aar, in , are examples under this head. before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic relations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams. (fig. .) the army at a covers the whole of the ground in rear of the line dc perpendicular to the line ab, the position of the enemy being at b. (fig. .) aj being equal to bj, a will still cover every thing in rear of dc. (fig. .) if the army a is obliged to cover the point _a_, the army b will cover all the space without the circle whose radius is _a_ b; and of course a continues to cover the point _a_ so long as it remains within this circle _a_ b. _a line of operations_ embraces that portion of the theatre of war which an army or _corps d'armée_ passes over in attaining its object; _the front of operations_ is the front formed by the army as it advances on this line. when an army acts as a single mass, without forming independent corps, the line it follows is denominated a _simple line of operations_. if two or more corps act in an isolated manner, but against the same opposing force, they are said to follow _double_ or _multiple lines_. the lines by which moreau and jourdan entered germany in , were double lines; but napoleon's advance by bamberg and gera, in , although moving in seven distinct _corps d'armée,_ formed but a single line of operations. _interior lines of operations_ are those followed by an army which operates between the enemy's lines in such a way as to be able to concentrate his forces on one of these lines before the other can be brought to its assistance. for example, napoleon's line of operations in , between the marne and the seine, where he manoeuvred with so much skill and success against the immensely superior forces of the allies. _exterior lines_ present the opposite results; they are those which an army will form in moving on the extremities of the opposing masses. for example, the lines of the marne and the seine, followed by the army of silesia and the grand austro-russian army, in the campaign of . burgoyne's line of operations, in , was double and exterior. _concentric lines_ are such as start from distant points, and are directed towards the same object, either in the rear or in advance of their base. if a mass leaves a single point and separates into several distinct corps, taking divergent directions, it is said to pursue _eccentric lines_. lines are said to be _deep_, when the end to be attained is very distant from the base. the lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force are denominated _secondary lines_. the lines pursued by the army of the sombre-et-meuse in , and by bagration in , were _secondary lines_, as the former were merely secondary to the army of the rhine, and the latter to that of barclay. _accidental lines_ are those which result from a change in the primitive plan of campaign, which give a new direction to the operations. these are of rare occurrence, but they sometimes lead to important results. the direction given to a line of operations depends not only on the geographical situation of the country, but also on the positions occupied by the enemy. the general plan of campaign is frequently determined on previous to beginning operations, but the choice of lines and positions must ordinarily result from the ulterior events of the war, and be made by the general as these events occur. as a general rule, _a line of operations should be directed upon the centre_, or _one of the extremities of the enemy's line of defence_; unless our forces be infinitely superior in number, it would be absurd to act against the front and extremities at the same time. if the configuration of the theatre of operations be favorable to a movement against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, this direction maybe best calculated to lead to important results. (fig. .) in the army of the rhine was directed against the extreme left of the line of the black forest; the army of reserve was directed by the st. bernard and milan on the extreme right and rear of melas's line of defence: both operations were most eminently successful. (fig. .) it may be well to remark that it is not enough merely to gain the extremity and rear of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible for him to throw himself on our communications and place us in the very dilemma in which we had hoped to involve him. to avoid this danger it is necessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that our army shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base. thus, if napoleon, in , after crossing the alps, had marched by turin on alexandria and received battle at marengo, without having first secured lombardy and the left of the po, his own line of retreat would have been completely cut off by melas; whereas, by the direction which he gave to his line of operations he had, in case of reverse, every means for reaching either the var or the valois. (fig. .) again, in , if he had marched directly from gera to leipsic, he would have been cut off from his base on the rhine; whereas, by turning from gera towards weimar, he not only cut off the prussians from the elbe, but at the same time secured to himself the roads of saalfield, schleitz, and hoff, thus rendering perfectly safe his communications in his rear. (fig. .) we have said that the configuration of the ground and the position of the hostile forces may _sometimes_ render it advisable to direct our line of operations against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence; but, _as a general rule_ a central direction will lead to more important results. this severs the enemy's means of resistance, and enables the assailant to strike, with the mass of his force, upon the dissevered and partially paralyzed members of the hostile body. (fig. .) such a plan of operations enabled napoleon, in the italian campaigns of and , to pierce and destroy, with a small force, the large and successive armies which austria sent against him. in his operations were both interior and central: in they were most eminently central: in , by the central operations in the vicinity of ratisbonne, he defeated the large and almost victorious army of the archduke charles: in , from his central position between the marne and seine, with only seventy thousand men against a force of more than two hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and barely failed of complete success. again in , with an army of only one hundred and twenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twenty thousand, by his central advance on charleroi and ligny, he gained a most decided advantage over the enemy--an advantage lost by the eccentric movement of grouchy: and even in , his central position at dresden would have secured him most decisive advantages, had not the faults of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of kulm and the katzbach. for the same frontier it is objectionable to form more than one army; grand detachments and corps of observation may frequently be used with advantage, but double or multiple lines of operation are far less favorable than one simple line. it may however sometimes occur that the position of the enemy's forces will be such as to make this operation the preferable one. in that case, interior lines should always be adopted, unless we have a vast superiority in number. double exterior lines, with corps several days' march asunder, must be fatal, if the enemy, whether acting on single or double interior lines, take advantage of his position to concentrate his masses successively against our isolated forces. the roman armies under the consuls flaminius and servilius opposed hannibal on exterior lines, the one by florence and arrezzio, and the other by modena and ariminum. hannibal turned the position of flaminius and attacked the roman armies separately, gaining a complete and decisive victory. such also was the character of the operations of the french in , under pichegru and jourdan; they met with a bloody and decisive defeat. again in , the french armies under jourdan and moreau, pursued exterior lines; the archduke charles, from his interior position, succeeded in defeating both the opposing generals, and forcing them to retreat. if the two armies united had pursued a single line, the republican flag had been carried in triumph to vienna. _converging_ lines of operation are preferable, under most circumstances, to diverging lines. care should be taken, however, that the point of meeting be such that it may not be taken as a strategic position by the enemy, and our own forces be destroyed in detail, before they can effect a junction. in the main body of the austrians, under alvinzi, advanced against napoleon, on three separate lines, intending to concentrate at rivoli, and then attack the french in mass; but napoleon took his strategic position at rivoli, and overthrew the enemy's corps as they successively appeared. in the same way the archduke charles took an interior position, between moreau and jourdan, in , and prevented them from concentrating their forces on a single point. wurmser and quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on the mincio, by moving on the opposite shores of lake garda; but napoleon took an interior position and destroyed them. in blucher and wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of napoleon and grouchy. _diverging_ lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by this means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if occasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by converging lines. such was the manoeuvre of frederick the great, in , which produced the battles of rosbach and leuthen; such also was the manoeuvre of napoleon at donawert in , at jena in , and at ratisbon in . _interior_ lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other extraneous circumstances of the campaign. there may, however, be cases where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's flank; the geographical character of the theatre of war, the position of other collateral forces, &c., rendering such a direction necessary. but as a general rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderate forces, will lead to decisive results. napoleon's italian campaigns in and , the campaign of the archduke charles in , napoleon's campaigns of and against austria, and of and against prussia and russia, of in spain, his manoeuvres in , between the battle of brienne and that of paris, and his operations previous to the battle of ligny in , are all brilliant examples under this head. to change the line of operations, in the middle of a campaign, and follow _accidental lines_, is always a delicate affair, and can only be resorted to by a general of great skill, and with disciplined troops. in such a case it may be attended with important results. it was one of napoleon's maxims, that "a line of operations, when once chosen, should never be abandoned." this maxim, however, must sometimes be disregarded by an army of undisciplined troops, in order to avoid entire destruction; but the total abandonment of a line of operations is always attended with great loss, and should be regarded as a mere choice of evils. a regular army can always avoid this result, by changing the direction of its line; thus frequently gaining superior advantages in the new theatre of action. if the plan of this change be the result of a good _coup d'oeil_, and it be skilfully executed, the rear of the operating army will be secure from the enemy; and moreover, he will be left in doubt respecting its weak points. but such is the uncertainty of this manoeuvre, that it is very rarely taken by the best troops, unless actually forced upon them. if the army be of incongruous materials, generally a change of direction will be less advantageous than to entirely abandon the line, and save as many as possible of the troops for some new plan of operations. (maxim .) if, however, the undisciplined army be sustained by fortifications, it can take up the _accidental line of operations_ in the same manner, and with the same probability of success, as is done by a regular force. we have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of prussia, after the battle of hohenkirchen, and of washington, in new-jersey, after the action of princeton. this is one of the finest in military history. napoleon had projected a change in his line of operations, in case he lost the battle of austerlitz; but victory rendered its execution unnecessary. again in he had planned an entire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the forces under mortier and marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if properly executed, had probably defeated the allies. jomini pronounced it one of the most brilliant of his military career. having explained the principal terms used in strategy, let us trace out the successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations. we will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be just entering upon a campaign. the political and military authorities of the state determine upon the nature of the war, and select the theatre of its enterprises. the chief selects certain points, on or near the borders of the seat of war, where his troops are to be assembled, and his _materiel_ collected. these points, together, form his base of operations. he now selects some point, within the theatre of the war, as the first object of his enterprises, and chooses the line of operations most advantageous for reaching this objective point. the temporary positions taken on this line become strategic positions, and the line in his rear, a line of defence. when he arrives in the vicinity of his first object, and the enemy begins to oppose his enterprises, he must force this enemy to retreat, either by an attack or by manoeuvres. for this purpose he temporarily adopts certain lines of manoeuvre, which may deviate from his general line of operations. the ulterior events of the campaign may possibly cause him to make these new, or accidental lines, his lines of operations. the approach of hostile forces may cause him to detach secondary corps on secondary lines; or to divide his army, and pursue double or multiple lines. the primitive object may also be relinquished, and new ones proposed, with new lines and new plans of operations. as he advances far from his primitive base, he forms new depots and lines of magazines. he may encounter natural and artificial obstacles. to cross large rivers in the face of an enemy is a hazardous operation; and he requires all the art of the engineer in constructing bridges, and securing a safe passage for his army. if a fortified place is to be taken, he will detach a siege corps, and either continue his march with the main army, or take a strategic position to cover this siege. thus napoleon, in , with an army of only , combatants, could not venture to penetrate into austria, with mantua and its garrison of , men in his rear, and an austrian force of , before him. but in the great superiority of his army enabled him to detach forces to besiege the principal fortresses of silesia, and still to continue his operations with his principal forces. the chief of the army may meet the enemy under circumstances such as to induce or compel him to give battle. if he should be victorious, the enemy must be pursued and harassed to the uttermost. if he should be defeated, he must form the best plan, and provide the best means of retreat. if possible, he must take shelter in some line of fortifications, and prepare to resume the offensive. lines of intrenchment and temporary works may sometimes serve him as a sufficient protection. finally, when the unfavorable season compels him to suspend his operations, he will go into winter cantonments, and prepare for a new campaign. such are the ordinary operations of war: its relations to strategy must be evident, even to the most superficial reader. not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more upon the strategic operations of an army, than upon its victories gained in actual combat. tactics, or movements within the range of the enemy's cannon, is therefore subordinate to the _choice of positions_: if the field of battle be properly chosen, success will be decisive, and the loss of the battle not disastrous; whereas, if selected without reference to the principles of the science, the victory, if gained, might be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally fatal: thus demonstrating the truth of napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener due to the genius of the general, and to the nature of the theatre of war, than to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (maxim , .) we have a striking illustration of this in the french army of the danube, which, from the left wing of general kray, marched rapidly through switzerland to the right extremity of the austrian line, "and by this movement alone conquered all the country between the rhine and danube without pulling a trigger." again, in , the army of mack was completely paralyzed, and the main body forced to surrender, at ulm, without a single important battle. in , the prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of jena. the operations about heilesberg, in , the advance upon madrid, in , the manoeuvres about ratisbon, in , the operations of the french in , and the first part of the campaign of , against vastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the maxim. strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though least understood, of all the branches of the military art.[ ] [footnote : strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general military histories. there are very few good elementary works on this branch of the military art. the general treatises of the archduke charles, and of general wagner, in german, (the former has been translated into french,) are considered as the best. the discussions of jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are exceedingly valuable; also the writings of rocquancourt, jacquinot de presle, and gay de vernon. the last of these has been translated into english, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. the military histories of lloyd, templehoff, jomini, the archduke charles, grimoard, gravert, souchet, st. cyr, beauvais, laverne, stutterheim, wagner, kausler, gourgaud and montholon, foy, mathieu dumas, ségur, pelet, koch, clausewitz, and thiers, may be read with great advantage. napier's history of the peninsular war is the only english history that is of any value as a _military_ work: it is a most excellent book. alison's great history of europe is utterly worthless to the military man; the author is ignorant of the first principles of the military art, and nearly every page is filled with the grossest blunders. we subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy, either directly or in connection with military history. _principes de la stratégie, &c._, par le prince charles, traduit de l'allemand, vols. in vo. this is a work of great merit. the technical terms, however, are very loosely employed. _précis de l'art de la guerre_, par le baron jomini. his chapter on strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art. _grundsätze der strategic_, von wagner. _cours elémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaire_, par rocquancourt. this work contains much valuable information connected with the history of the art of war; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for an elementary book. _cours d'art et d'histoire militaire_, par jacquinot de presle. this work is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches of military service are but very briefly discussed. de vernon's treatise on the science of war and fortification contains much valuable information; but, as an elementary book, it has the same objections as that of rocquancourt. _history of the seven years' war_, by lloyd and templehoff. the military writings of lloyd and templehoff are valuable as connected with the history of strategy; but many of the principles laid down by these writers are now regarded as erroneous. _mémoires de napoléon_. the memoirs of napoleon, as dictated by himself to gourgaud and montholon, have been translated into english. it is hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles of military art and science. no military man should fail to study them thoroughly. the matter is so condensed, and important principles are embodied in so few words, that they are not easily understood by the ordinary reader, and probably will never be popular with the multitude. _essai général de tactique_, par guibert. a work very popular in its day, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned. _ausführliche beschreibung der schlacht des pirmasens_, von gravert. regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment. _mémoires sur les campagnes en espagne_. souchet. _mémoires de gouvion st. cyr._ _statistique de la guerre_, par reveroni st. cyr. _première campagnes de la revolution_, par grimoard. _victoires et conquêtes_. beauvais. _campagnes de suwarrow_. laverne. _histoire de la guerre de la péninsule_. foy. _précis des evénements militaires_. mathieu dumas. _histoire de napoléon et de la grande armée en _. ségur _mémoires sur la guerre de _. pelet. _la campagne de _. koch. _vom kriege--die feldzügge, &c._ clausewitz. _la révolution, le consulat et l'empire._ thiers. _mémoires sur la guerre de --sur la campagne du vice roi en italie, en et ; histoire de la guerre en allemagne en ; histoire des campagnes de et , en france_. vaudoncourt. _essai sur l'art militaire, &c._ carion-nisas. _histoire de l'expédition en russie en _. chambray. _war in spain, portugal, and the south of france_. john jones. _peninsular war_. napier. _notices of the war of _. armstrong all the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to the military man than the military histories of jomini and kausler, with their splendid diagrams and maps.] chapter iii. fortifications. _fortifications, or engineering_, may be considered with reference to the defence of states and the grand operation of armies; or with reference to the details of the construction, and attack, and defence of forts, and the influence of field-works on the tactical manoeuvres of armies. it is proposed to speak here only of its general character, as a branch of the military art, without entering into any professional discussion of details. the connection of fortification and strategy may be considered under two distinct heads: st, the choice of sites for constructing fortresses for defence; d, their influence in offensive operations, and the determination of the question whether they can be passed with safety, or whether the attacking force will be under the necessity of besieging them. the centre and extremities of _a base of operations_ should always be secured either by natural or artificial obstacles. this base is generally chosen so that fortifications will be necessary for strengthening only a part of the line. but if a frontier, like the side of france towards belgium, be destitute of natural obstacles, the artificial means of defence must be proportionally increased. great care should be taken that permanent fortifications be made only on such places as may favor military operations. if otherwise, the troops detached from the active army for garrisoning them, will only tend to weaken this force without any corresponding advantages. in this way, fortifications may become actually injurious to defence. a number of the european fortresses which were built before the subject of strategy was properly understood, are now regarded as utterly useless, from their ill-advised positions. whether a fortress may be safely passed with merely blockading or observing it, depends very much upon the nature of the war, and the numbers and position of the defensive army. the allies, in , invading france with a million of soldiers, assisted by the political diversion of factions and bourbonists within the kingdom, and treason in the frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks of napoleon's army, could conduct their military operations on a very different plan from that which would be adopted by either austria, prussia, russia, england, spain, portugal, holland, italy, and the german powers, if singly waging war with the french. napoleon sometimes detached a corps to observe a fortress which threatened his line of operations or of manoeuvre; at others, he delayed his advance till the place could be reduced. "an army," says jomini, "may sometimes penetrate between places on an open frontier, to attack the enemy's forces in the field, taking care at the same time to _observe_ these places; but no invading army can cross a great river, like the danube, the rhine, or the elbe, without reducing at least one of the fortresses on that river, so as to secure a line of retreat; but being in possession of such a place, it can continue the offensive, while its _matériel de siège_ successively reduces the other places." in case the main army is obliged to remain and cover the besieging corps, it should take some central position, where it can command all the avenues of approach, and fall with vigor on the enemy, should he attempt to raise the siege. napoleon's operations before mantua, in , offer the finest model for imitation. the old system of intrenched camps and lines of contravallation is unsuited to the spirit of modern warfare. in ancient times, and more particularly in the middle ages, too much importance was attached to tactical positions, and not enough to strategic points and lines. this gave to fortifications a character that never properly belonged to them. from the middle ages down to the period of the french revolution, wars were carried on mainly by the system of positions--one party confining their operations to the security of certain important places, while the other directed their whole attention to the siege and capture of these places. but carnot and napoleon changed this system, at the same time with the system of tactics, or rather, returned from it to the old and true system of strategic operations. some men, looking merely at the fact that a _change_ was made, but without examining the _character_ of that change, have rushed headlong to the conclusion that fortified places are now utterly useless in war, military success depending entirely upon a good system of marches. on this subject, general jomini, the great military historian of the wars of the french revolution, remarks that "we should depend entirely upon neither organized masses, nor upon material obstacles, whether natural or artificial. to follow exclusively either of these systems would be equally absurd. the true science of war consists in choosing a just medium between the two extremes. the wars of napoleon demonstrated the great truth, that distance can protect no country from invasion, but that a state, to be secure, must have a good system of fortresses, and a good system of military reserves and military institutions." in all military operations _time_ is of vast importance. if a single division of an army can be retarded for a few hours only, it not unfrequently decides the fate of the campaign. had the approach of blucher been delayed for a few hours, napoleon must have been victorious at the battle of waterloo. an equilibrium can seldom be sustained for more than six or seven hours between forces on the field of battle; but in this instance, the state of the ground rendered the movements so slow as to prolong the battle for about twelve hours; thus enabling the allies to effect a concentration in time to save wellington. many of napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing troops to bear suddenly upon some decisive point. rivoli in - , marengo in , ulm in , jena in , ratisbon in , brienne in , and ligny in , are familiar examples. but this concentration of forces, even with a regular army, cannot be calculated on by the general with any degree of certainty, unless his communications are perfectly secure. and this difficulty is very much increased where the troops are new and undisciplined. when a country like ours is invaded, large numbers of such troops must suddenly be called into the field. not knowing the designs of the invaders, much time will be lost in marches and countermarches; and if there be no safe places of resort the operations must be indecisive and insecure. to a defensive army fortifications are valuable as points of repose, upon which the troops, if beaten, may fall back, and shelter their sick and wounded, collect their scattered forces, repair their materials, and draw together a new supply of stores and provisions; and as rallying points, where new troops may be assembled with safety, and the army, in a few days, be prepared to again meet the enemy in the open field. without these defences, undisciplined and inexperienced armies, when once routed, can seldom be rallied again, except with great losses. but when supported by forts, they can select their opportunity for fighting, and offer or refuse battle according to the probability of success; and, having a safe place of retreat, they are far less influenced by fear in the actual conflict. the enemy, on the other hand, being compelled either to besiege or _observe_ these works, his army will be separated from its magazines, its strength and efficiency diminished by detachments, and his whole force exposed to the horrors of partisan warfare. it has therefore been estimated by the best military writers, that an army supported by a judicious system of fortifications, can repel a land force _six_ times as large as itself. every government should prepare, in time of peace, its most prominent and durable means of defence. by securing in a permanent manner its important points, it will enable a small force to retain possession of these places against a greatly superior army, for a considerable length of time. this serves the same purpose as a battle gained; for, in the beginning of a war of invasion, the economy of time is of the utmost importance to the defensive party, enabling it to organize and prepare the great military resources of the state. in all mountainous frontiers, or sides of states bordering on large rivers, or chains of lakes, there will necessarily be but few points by which an invader can penetrate into the interior of the country. let us suppose that, for a frontier of moderate extent, there are _five_ passes, or avenues through which the enemy may approach the interior. to effectually defend these approaches against the invading army will require, for each, an army of ten thousand men. not being able to decide positively on the plans of the enemy, all these communications must be defended at the same time. this requires a defending army of fifty thousand men. let us now suppose each of these passes to be fortified in such a way, that one thousand men will be able to hold the enemy in check, and force him to resort to the operations of a siege; or, at least, to retard his advance till an active army can be organized in the interior, and prepared to meet him in the field. we here see that five thousand men, by means of fortifications, can accomplish the same defensive object as fifty thousand men without these artificial means of security. but let us enter a little more into the details of frontier defences, and examine the character of the several systems which have been successively proposed or adopted. frontiers are divided into four distinct classes, according as the state may be open on one or more sides, or bounded by mountains, large rivers and lakes, or by the sea. an open frontier is the most difficult of defence; and while there exists a perfect uniformity among military men upon the vast importance of fortifying such a frontier, there is an equal diversity of opinion respecting the best manner of arranging these works. we shall here mention three general systems of arranging forts for the defence of an open country, each of which has been advocated at different times, and afterwards received various modifications and additions. these three systems comprise the main features of all others worthy of much consideration. they are:-- st. the system of continuous lines, proposed by montalembert. d. a system of three lines of detached works, strongly recommended by d'arçon and others. d. a system proposed by vauban, and advocated by rogniat, consisting of lines of very strong works, placed at considerable distances from each other and covering large _intrenched camps_. the first of these systems was proposed in , and for a time attracted considerable notice in france, but has long since been discarded, as being utterly incompatible with the principles of the military art. a writer, however, of some pretensions in this country, recommends its adoption for the defence of baltimore and the shores of the chesapeake. the same author would dispense entirely with our present system of fortifications on the sea-coast, and substitute in their place wooden martello towers! this would be very much like building gun ships at pittsburg and memphis, for the defence of the ohio and the mississippi rivers, and sending out duck-boats to meet the enemy on the atlantic! in the second system, the works on the extreme frontier are to be placed about thirty or forty miles apart, and those of the second and third lines respectively thirty or forty miles in rear of the first and second lines, and opposite the intervals. in the third system, first recommended by vauban and more recently by rogniat, the works are to be arranged in the same manner as in that of d'arçon, but the distance between them is to be from seventy to one hundred miles, and each fort arranged for covering a large intrenched camp. either of these last two systems is well suited to the defence of an open frontier. the former is applied to the side of france towards belgium, and the latter, with certain modifications, to the defence of western germany. the first line of fortifications on the northern frontier of france consists of dunkirk, lille, valenciennes, condé, quesnoy, rocroi, charlemont, mézières, and sedan; the second line, of calais, andres, st. omer, béthune, arras, douai, chambrai, landrecies, and avesnes; the third line, of boulogne, montreuil, hesdin, abbeville, amiens, bapaume, peronne, ham, and laon. for mountainous frontiers it is deemed necessary to secure all the important passes with small redoubts or military works, and to defend with strong forts the grand interior strategic points on which these communications are directed. for a frontier of moderate extent there may be some six or eight gorges in the mountains by which an army might penetrate; but it will always be found that these roads concentrate on two or three points in the great valleys below. take, for example, the frontier of france towards switzerland and italy. the passes of the mountains are secured by the little works of fort l'ecluse, fort pierre-châtel, fort barraux, briançon, mont dauphin, colmars, entrevaux, and antibes; while besançon, grenoble, and toulon, form a second line; and lyons a grand central dépôt. where a great river or chain of lakes forms the boundary of a state, the system of defence will be much the same as that of an open land frontier, the works of the first line being made to secure the great bridges or ferries by which the enemy might effect a passage; those of the second line, to cover the passes of the highlands that generally approach more or less near the great watercourse; and those of the third line, far enough in rear to protect the great internal communications of the country. let us take, for example, the side of france bordering on the rhine. wissembourg and lauterbourg, fort louis, haguenau, strasbourg, schelstadt, neuf-brisach, and huneguen, cover the several passages of the river; while bitche, phalsbourg, and béfort form a second line; thionville, metz, and toul, a third line; and verdun a grand central dépôt. the following are the principal objects proposed to be accomplished by fortifications on a sea-coast. st. to close all important harbors to an enemy, and secure them to the navy of the country. d. to prevent the enemy from forming an establishment on our shores, from which, by his naval superiority, he might destroy our commerce and keep the whole frontier in continual alarm. d. to cover our great cities against a maritime attack and bombardment. th. to cover our ship-yards and great naval depots. th. to prevent, as much as possible, the great avenues of interior navigation from being blockaded by naval means at their entrance into the ocean. th. to give to our navy facilities for protecting our coast trade from the enemy's ships of war, and our internal communications, which lie near the coast, from maritime descents. let us notice how france has attempted to accomplish this object. the mediterranean frontier has fort quarré, fort st. marguérite, st. tropez, brigançon, the forts of point man, of l'ertissac, and of langoustier, toulon, st. nicholas, castle of if, marseilles, tour de boue, aigues-montes, fort st. louis, fort brescou, narbonne, château de salces, perpignan, collioure, fort st. elme, and port vendre. toulon is the great naval dépôt for this frontier, and marseilles the great commercial port. both are well secured by strong fortifications. the atlantic frontier has bayonne; the forts of royan, grave, medoc, paté, &c., on the gironde; rochefort, with the forts of chapus, lapin, aix, oleron, &c., to cover the roadstead; la rochelle, with the forts of the isle of ré; sables, with the forts of st. nicholas, and des moulines, isle dieu, belle isle, fort du pilier, mindin, ville martin; quiberon, with fort penthièvre; l'orient, with its harbor defences; fort cigogne; brest, with its harbor defences; st. malo, with forts cézembre, la canchée, l'anse du verger, and des rimains; cherbourg, with its defensive forts and batteries; havre, dieppe, boulogne, calais, and dunkirk. cherbourg, brest, and rochefort, are great naval dépôts; and havre, nantes, and bordeaux, the principal commercial ports. many of the works above enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in their construction, and some of them quite old and dilapidated nevertheless, they have heretofore been found sufficient for the defence of the naval depots and commercial seaports of france against the superior naval forces of her neighbor. omitting for the present all discussion of sea-coast defences, let us examine more particularly the character and influence of fortifications on land frontiers. all military writers agree that fortifications have heretofore exerted a great, and frequently a decisive, influence on the operations of a war. those of france are frequently referred to as proofs of this influence. but, while all are disposed to allow that these works contributed much in former times to the defence of states, yet some have said that modern improvements in the mode of attack have rendered forts far less valuable than formerly. such, however, is not the case. improvements in the mode of attack have not kept pace with the facilities of locomotion; and, although fortifications do not now usually sustain a siege of as _many days_ as in former times, still, as compared with the relative lengths of campaigns in ancient and modern wars, the _proportional_ length of sieges is now even _greater_ than formerly. when the same is accomplished in a campaign of seven weeks as was formerly done in a war of seven years, it is not necessary that fortified places should hold out a very long time. a place that can sustain a siege of a month is now deemed sufficiently strong for ordinary campaigns; for by the end of that time the defensive army will either be destroyed, or be able to come to its succor. in either case a longer defence would not be required. a reference to the most important sieges of the last century or two will show that forts are, on an average, capable of sustaining a siege for more than that length of time. lille, in , held the allies in check for a whole year; and again, in , compelled the austrians to raise the siege after an unsuccessful attack of fifteen days. antwerp, in , sustained a siege of fourteen months against greatly superior forces; in carnot defended the citadel of this place for four months, and until an armistice had been concluded between the contending parties; in , it sustained, with a garrison of only , men and pieces of ordnance, a siege of twenty-five days, against a force of , men and cannon. namur, near the end of the seventeenth century, sustained a siege of ten weeks. ismaïl, in , sustained a siege of more than two months against the russians. maestricht, in , sustained a siege of nearly two weeks; and again, in , sustained a blockade and siege of nearly two months. magdeburg, in the thirty years' war, resisted the army of wallenstein for seven months; and in - , although garrisoned by only , men, it for a long time resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies. dantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against superior forces for more than nine months. landau, in , sustained a siege of nine months. valenciennes and mayence, in , each sustained a siege of about three months. charleroi, fort vauban, and l'ecluse, in , each sustained a siege of about thirty days. quesnoy, in , sustained a siege of about three weeks. rosas, in , sustained a siege of some seventy days. mantua, in - , protected from invasion, for eight months, the tyrol and the heart of the austrian monarchy. kehl and huninguen, in , sheltered moreau for three months against all the efforts of the archduke charles. st. jean d'acre, in , sustained a siege of sixty days of open trench. ulm, in , held moreau in check for more than a month. genoa, in , sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days. saragossa in sustained a close siege of near two months; and in it was again besieged for two months. rosas in sustained a siege of thirty days. gerona in sustained a siege and blockade of seven months, nearly four of them being of open trench. mequinenza (a very small work) in sustained a siege of more than two weeks. astorga in sustained a siege of thirty days; twenty-four being of open trench. lerida in sustained a siege of thirty days, two weeks being of open trench. ciudad rodrigo in sustained a siege of two months. almeida in sustained a siege of more than a month. tortosa in sustained a siege of six months. tarragona in sustained a siege of nearly two months. badajos in sustained a siege of more than forty days open trench. lerida in sustained a siege of two weeks open trench. saguntum in sustained a siege of a month. valencia in - sustained a siege of two months ciudad rodrigo in sustained a blockade of several months, and a close siege of two weeks. badajos in sustained twenty-one days of open trenches. burgos in sustained thirty-three days of open trenches. st. sebastian in sustained a siege and blockade of nearly three months, with fifty-nine days of open trenches. pampeluna in sustained a siege of more than four months. monzon in - also sustained a siege of more than four months. this list might be increased with numerous other examples, to show that even poorly fortified towns are capable of defending themselves, on an average, for more than a month. these examples, be it remembered, are nearly all taken from a period of history since any material improvements have been made in the art of attack. since the time of vauban the improvements in attack have not kept pace with the increased means of defence. moreover, these examples are taken from the sieges of towns defended mainly by old and antiquated works, and entirely incapable of offering the same resistance as detached fortifications, with all the modern improvements. the value of fortifications, as land defences, is sufficiently proved by showing their general capability of resisting an invader, even for a limited period; thus affording us time and opportunity to provide other means of security. but it must not be inferred that forts besieged _en règle_ will necessarily fall after so many days. such is far from being the case. the besieged have usually great advantages over the besiegers; and unless the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of a very inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of the requisite means and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken. mezieres was not taken in ; nor marseilles in ; nor peronne in ; nor landrecies in ; nor metz in ; nor montauban in ; nor lerida in ; nor maestricht in ; nor vienna in , and again in ; nor turin in ; nor conde in ; nor lille in ; nor landau in ; nor ulm in ; nor saragossa in ; nor burgos in . this list might be extended almost indefinitely with the names of places that could be reduced neither by force nor by starvation. but, as has already been noticed, some have asserted that fortifications have become of little comparative importance, under the new system of warfare introduced during the wars of the french revolution. on this subject let us consult the opinions of the best military judges of the present century. napoleon says of fortifications, "they are an excellent means of retarding, fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting a conquering foe." "the possession of strategic points," says the archduke charles, "is decisive in military operations; and the most efficacious means should, therefore, be employed to defend points whose preservation is the country's safeguard. this object is accomplished by fortifications, inasmuch as they can resist, for a given time, with a small number of troops, every effort of a much larger force; fortifications should, therefore, be regarded as the basis of a good system of defence." "it should be a maxim of state policy in every country, to fortify, in time of peace, all such points, and to arrange them with great care, so that they can be defended by a small number of troops. for the enemy, knowing the difficulty of getting possession of these works, will look twice before he involves himself in a war." "establishments which can secure strategic advantages are not the works of a moment; they require time and labor. he who has the direction of the military forces of a state, should, in time of peace, prepare for war." "the proper application or neglect of these principles will decide the safety or the ruin of the state." "fortifications arrest the enemy in the pursuit of his object, and direct his movements on less important points;--he must either force these fortified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which offer only disadvantages. in fine, a country secured by a system of defences truly strategic, has no cause to fear either the invasion or the yoke of the enemy; for he can advance to the interior of the country only through great trouble and ruinous efforts. of course, lines of fortifications thus arranged cannot shelter a state against all reverses; but these reverses will not, in this case, be attended by total ruin; for they cannot take from the state the means nor the time for collecting new forces; nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel alternative of submission or destruction." "fortifications," says jomini, "fulfil two objects of capital importance,-- st. the protection of the frontiers; and d. assisting the operations of the army in the field." "every part of the frontiers of a state should be secured by one or two great places of refuge, secondary places, and even small posts for facilitating the active operations of the armies. cities girt with walls and slight ditches may often be of great utility in the interior of a country, as places of deposit, where stores, magazines, hospitals, &c., may be sheltered from the incursions of the enemy's light troops. these works are more especially valuable where such stores, in order not to weaken the regular army by detachments, are intrusted to the care of raw and militia forces." it is not supposed that any system of fortifications can hermetically close a frontier; "but, although they of themselves can rarely present an absolute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it is indisputable that they straiten its movements, change the direction of its marches, and force it into detachments; while, on the contrary, they afford all the opposite advantages to the defensive army; they protect its marches, favor its debouches, cover its magazines, its flanks, and its movements, and finally furnish it with a place of refuge in time of need." these opinions were uttered, be it remembered, long since the period at which modern military quacks date the downfall of fortifications as inland defences, by men, too, who were not engineers, and consequently had no professional predilections in favor of fortifications. the archduke charles, as a general, knew no rival but napoleon, and general jomini is universally regarded as the first military historian of the age. the truth of their remarks on fortifications is most fully confirmed by the military histories of germany and france. for a long period previous to the thirty years' war, its strong castles and fortified cities secured the german empire from attacks from abroad, except on its extensive frontier, which was frequently assailed, but no enemy was able to penetrate to the interior till a want of union among its own princes opened its strongholds to the swedish conqueror; nor then, did the cautious gustavus adolphus venture far into its territories till he had obtained possession of all the military works that might endanger his retreat. again, in the seven years' war, when the french neglected to secure their foothold in germany, by placing in a state of defence the fortifications that fell into their power, the first defeat rendered their ground untenable, and threw them from the elbe back upon the rhine and the mayne. they afterwards took the precaution to fortify their positions, and to secure their magazines under shelter of strong places, and, consequently, were enabled to maintain themselves in the hostile country till the end of the war, notwithstanding the inefficiency of their generals, the great reverses they sustained in the field, the skill and perseverance of the enemy they were contending with, and the weak and vacillating character of the cabinet that directed them. but this system of defence was not so carefully maintained in the latter part of the eighteenth century, for at the beginning of the french revolution, says jomini, "germany had too few fortifications; they were generally of a poor character, and improperly located." france, on the contrary, was well fortified: and although without armies, and torn in pieces by domestic factions, (we here use the language of the archduke,) "she sustained herself against all europe; _and this was because her government, since the reign of louis xiii_., _had continually labored to put her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably to the principles of strategy_; starting from such a system for a basis, she subdued every country on the continent that was not thus fortified; and this reason alone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an army, and even an entire state, merely by a strategic success." this may be illustrated by reference to particular campaigns. in , when the duke of brunswick invaded france, she had no armies competent to her defence. their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it is true, but the license of the revolution had so loosened the bonds of discipline as to effect an almost complete disorganization. "it seemed, at this period," says the historian, "as if the operations of the french generals were dependent upon the absence of their enemies: the moment they appeared, the operations were precipitately abandoned." but france had on her eastern frontier a triple line of good fortresses, although her miserable soldiery were incapable of properly defending them. the several works of the first and second lines fell, one after another, before the slow operations of a prussian siege, and the duke of brunswick was already advancing upon the third, when dumourier, with only twenty-five thousand men, threw himself into this line, and by a well-conducted war of positions, placing his raw and unsteady forces behind unassailable intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a disciplined army nearly four times as numerous as his own. had no other obstacle than the french troops been interposed between paris and the prussians, all agree that france must have fallen. in the campaign, of , the french army in flanders were beaten in almost every engagement, and their forces reduced to less than one half the number of the allies. the french general turned traitor to his country, and the national guards deserted their colors and returned to france. the only hope of the republicans, at this crisis, was vauban's line of flemish fortresses. these alone saved france. the strongholds of lille, condé, valenciennes, quesnoy, landrecies, &c., held the austrians in check till the french could raise new forces and reorganize their army. "the important breathing-time which the sieges of these fortresses," says an english historian, "afforded to the french, and the immense advantage which they derived from the new levies which they received, and fresh organization which they acquired during that important period, is a signal proof of the vital importance of fortresses in contributing to national defence. napoleon has not hesitated to ascribe to the three months thus gained the salvation of france. it is to be constantly recollected that the republican armies were then totally unable to keep the field; that behind the frontier fortresses there was neither a defensive position, nor a corps to reinforce them; and that if driven from their vicinity, the capital was taken and the war concluded." in the following year, , when france had completed her vast armaments, and, in her turn, had become the invading power, the enemy had no fortified towns to check the progress of the republican armies; which, based on strong works of defence, in a few weeks overran flanders, and drove the allies beyond the rhine. in the campaign of , when the army of moreau had been forced into a precipitate retreat by the admirable strategic operations of the archduke charles, the french forces owed their safety to the fortifications on the rhine. these works arrested the enemy's pursuit and obliged him to resort to the tedious operations of sieges; and the reduction of the french advanced posts alone, kehl and huninguen, poorly as they were defended, employed all the resources of the austrian army, and the skill of their engineers, from early in october till late in february. kehl was at first assaulted by a force _four_ times as numerous as the garrison; if the enemy had succeeded, he would have cut off moreau's retreat, and destroyed his army. fortunately the place was strong enough to resist all assaults; and moreau, basing himself on the fortresses of alsace, his right covered by huninguen, neuf-brisach, and béfort, and his left by the iron barrier of the netherlands, effectually checked the waves of austrian success. let us now turn to the campaigns of napoleon. in his first campaign in italy, , the general was directed "to seize the forts of savona, compel the senate to furnish him with pecuniary supplies, and to surrender the keys of gavi, a fortress perched on the rocky height commanding the pass of the bocchetta." setting out from savona, he crossed the mountains at a weak point between the alps and the apennines, and succeeded in piercing the enemy's line of defence. the king of sardinia, jealous of austrian influence, had refused to permit the austrian army to garrison his line of fortifications. napoleon, profiting by his victorious attitude, the mutual jealousy of austria and sardinia, and the intrigues of his diplomatists, soon gained possession of these important works. "_these sardinian fortresses_," he wrote to the directory, "_at once put the republicans in possession of the keys of the peninsula_." basing himself on coni, mondovi, ceva, gavi, and alessandria, with tortosa as his dépôt of magazines, he advanced against lombardy. now basing himself on the adda and po, with the fortress of pizzighettone as the dépôt of his magazines, he advanced upon the line of the adige. pechiera became his next dépôt, and he now had four fortresses in echelon between him and his first dépôt of magazines; and, after the fall of mantua, basing himself on the po, he advanced against the states of the church, making ferrara and then ancona, his places of dépôt. from the solid basis of the fortresses of piedmont and lombardy, "he was enabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of the austrians, and thus commence, with some security, that great career of conquest which he already meditated in the imperial dominions." in this campaign of , after scouring his base, he fortified palma-nuova, osapo, &c., repaired the old fortifications of klagenfurth, and, as he advanced, established, to use his own words, "a good _point d'appui_ at every five or six marches." afterwards, when the austrians had nearly wrested italy from the weak grasp of napoleon's successors, the french saved their army in the fortress of genoa and behind the line of the var, which had been fortified with care in - . numerous attempts were made to force this line, the advanced post of fort montauban being several times assaulted by numerous forces. but the austrian columns recoiled from its murderous fire of grape and musketry, which swept off great numbers at every discharge. again the assault was renewed with a vast superiority of numbers, and again "the brave men who headed the column almost perished at the foot of the intrenchment; and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon the enterprise." while the forces on the var thus stayed the waves of austrian success, massena, in the fortifications of genoa, sustained a blockade of sixty, and a siege of forty days, against an army five times as large as his own; and when forced to yield to the stern demands of famine, he almost dictated to the enemy the terms of the treaty. these two defences held in check the _élite_ of the austrian forces, while the french reserve crossed the alps, seized the important points of the country, and cut off the austrian line of retreat. "but even after the victory of marengo," says napoleon, "i did not consider the whole of italy reconquered, until all the fortified places between me and the mincio should be occupied by my troops. i gave melas permission to return to mantua, on condition of his surrendering all these fortresses." he now directed chasseloup de laubat and his engineers to repair and remodel the fortifications of verona, legnano, pechiera, mantua, the line of the adda, milan, alessandria,[ ] roco d'aufo, genoa, and several smaller works; thus forming a quadruple line of defence against austrian aggression in italy. these works were of great service to the french in , enabling massena with fifty thousand men to hold in check the archduke charles with more than ninety thousand, while napoleon's grand army, starting from the solid base of the rhine, traversed germany and seized upon the capital of austria. [footnote : more than twenty millions of money were appropriated for this place alone.] the neglect of the prussians to place their country in a state of military defence, previous to declaring war against napoleon in , had a most disastrous influence upon the campaign. napoleon, on the other hand, occupied and secured all the important military positions which he had captured in the preceding campaign. "the prussians," said he, "made no preparations for putting into a state of defence the fortifications on their first line, not even those within a few marches of our cantonments. while i was piling up bastion upon bastion at kehl, cassel, and wesel, they did not plant a single palisade at magdeburg, nor put in battery a single cannon at spandau." the works on the three great lines of the oder, the elbe, and the weser, had they been properly repaired, garrisoned, and defended, were sufficient to have held in check the french, even after the great victory of jena, till the newly-organized forces, acting in concert with the russian army, could re-establish the prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness. profiting by the neglect of the prussians, napoleon seized upon the great defensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, were readily surrendered into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who commanded them; and french garrisons were almost immediately established in the fortresses of stettin, custrin, glogau, magdeburg, spandau, hameln, nieubourg, &c. "spandau," said he in the th bulletin, "is an inestimable acquisition. in our hands it could sustain two months of operations. but such was the general confusion, that the prussians had not even armed its batteries." the possession of these fortifications inclined the scale at eylau. all the historians of the war notice their influence on the campaigns of friedland and tilsit. these prussian fortresses were retained by napoleon at the treaty of tilsit. the campaign of proved the wisdom of this policy, as they effectually prevented prussia from joining austria in rekindling the flames of war. and again in , these works might have produced a decided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy of austria, and the treason of the french generals, prevented napoleon from profiting by the advantages of his position. the influence of the fortifications of spain upon the peninsular campaigns has often been alluded to by historians. those works which had been given up to napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his arms; while those which had been retained by spain and her allies contributed in an equal degree to fetter and embarrass his operations. some of these, like saragossa, tarragona, gerona, tortosa, &c. &c., with their broken walls and defective armaments, kept the enemy in check for months; and, by compelling the french to resort to the tedious operations of sieges, did much to weaken the french power in the peninsula. the influence of the fortifications of the french frontiers in furnishing a secure basis for the successful operations of napoleon into the enemy's territory, has already been noticed. if these fortresses of france, after the disasters of and ' , failed to save the nation, the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasion itself, rather than any lack of military influence in the french defences. as has been already remarked, a million of disciplined men, under consummate leaders, were here assailing a single state, impoverished by the fatal war in russia,--torn in pieces by political factions,--deserted by its sworn allies,--its fortresses basely betrayed into the enemy's hands, and its military power paralyzed by the treason of generals with their entire armies. its only hope was in the fortresses which had remained faithful; and napoleon said at st. helena, that if he had collected together the garrisons of these few fortresses and retired to the rhine, he could have crushed the allies even after their entrance into paris. but political considerations prevented the operation. again in , napoleon, even after the defeat of waterloo, possessed lines of defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion. but again the want of co-operation on the part of the government at paris, and the treason of his own generals, forced his second abdication. if he had retained the command of the army, and the nation had seconded his efforts, the allies would never have reached paris. but the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening the way for the enemies of their country. "france," said napoleon, "will eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her whole people to pass under the caudine-forks, by ordering the disbanding of an army that had for twenty-five years been its country's glory, _and by giving up to our astonished enemies our still invincible fortresses_." history fully supports napoleon's opinion of the great danger of penetrating far into a hostile country to attack the capital, even when that capital is without fortifications. the fatal effects of such an advance, without properly securing the means of retreat, is exemplified by his own campaign of , in russia. if, after the fall of smolensk, he had fortified that place and vitepsk, which by their position closed the narrow passage comprised between the dnieper and the dwina, he might in all probability, on the following spring, have been able to seize upon moscow and st. petersburg. but leaving the hostile army of tschkokoff in his rear, he pushed on to moscow, and when the conflagration of that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there, and the premature rigor of the season destroyed the horses of his artillery and provision-trains, retreat became impossible, and the awful fate of his immense army was closed by scenes of horror to which there is scarcely a parallel in history. this point might be still further illustrated by the russian campaign of charles xii., in - , the fatal advance of the french army on lisbon, in the peninsular war, and other examples of the same character. even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of fortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire army. thus, lille suspended for a whole year the operations of prince eugene and marlborough; the siege of landrecies gave villars an opportunity of changing the fortunes of the war; pavia, in , lost france her monarch, the flower of her nobility, and her italian conquests; metz, in , arrested the entire power of charles v., and saved france from destruction; prague, in , brought the greatest warrior of his age to the brink of ruin; st. jean d'acre, in , stopped the successful career of napoleon; burgos, in , saved the beaten army of portugal, enabled them to collect their scattered forces, and regain the ascendancy; strasburg has often been, the bulwark of the french against germany, saving france from invasion, and perhaps subjugation. in nearly the language of napoleon, (memoirs, vol. ix.,) if vienna had been fortified in , the battle of ulm would not have decided the fate of the war. again, in , if this capital had been fortified, it would have enabled the archduke charles, after the disaster of eckmuhl, by a forced retreat on the left of the danube, to form a junction with the forces of general hiller and the archduke john. if berlin had been fortified in , the army routed at jena would have rallied there and been joined by the russians. if madrid had been strongly fortified in , the french army, after the victories of espinosa, tudela, burgos, and sommo-sierra, would not have marched towards that capital, leaving in rear of salamanca and valladolid, both the english army of general moore and the spanish army of romana. if moscow had been fortified in , its conflagration would have been avoided, for, with strong defensive works, and the army of kutusoff encamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been impossible. had not constantinople been well fortified, the empire of constantine must have terminated in the year , whereas the standard of the prophet was not planted there until . this capital was therefore indebted to its walls for eight hundred years of existence. during this period it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one of these sieges was successful. the french and venetians took it, but not without a very severe contest. paris has often owed its safety to its walls. in the normans besieged it for two years without effect. in the dauphin besieged it in vain. in edward, king of england, encamped at montrouge, devastated the country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, and retired to chartres. in it repulsed the attack of charles vii. in the count of charlerois surrounded the city, but was unsuccessful in his attacks. in it repulsed the army of the duke of bourgone, who had already ravaged its precincts. in , when attacked by charles v., it again owed its safety to its walls. in and it repulsed the armies of henry iii. and henry iv. in and several succeeding years the inhabitants of paris owed their safety to its walls. if this capital had been strongly fortified in and , the allied armies would not have dared to attempt its investment. but it is deemed unnecessary to further specify examples; the whole history of modern warfare is one continued proof of the importance of fortifications as a means of national defence, and as an auxiliary in offensive military operations. our illustrations have been mostly drawn from european wars, but our own brief history, as will be shown hereafter, is not without its proofs. the use and importance of field-fortifications, intrenched camps, &c., as well as the class of military works called coast-defences, will be discussed hereafter.[ ] [footnote : the use of fortifications in the defence of states is discussed by ternay, vauban, cormontaigne, napoleon, the archduke charles, jomini, fallot, and, incidentally, by most of the military historians of the wars of the french revolution. the names of such standard works as give the detailed arrangements of fortifications will be mentioned hereafter.] chapter iv. logistics. iii. we have defined _logistics_ to be that branch of the military art which embraces all the practical details of moving and supplying armies. the term is derived from the title of a french general officer, _(major-général des logis,)_ who was formerly charged with directing the marches, encampments, and lodging of the troops. it has been still further extended by recent military writers, and many of them now regard logistics as a distinct and important branch of the art. we shall here consider logistics as including the military duties ordinarily attributed to the pay, subsistence, clothing, medical, hospital, and transportation departments; in fine, of all the civil and civico-military corps of the army. we shall therefore discuss under this head, the preparation of all the necessary materials for fitting out troops for a campaign and for putting them in motion; the regulating of marches, convoys, the means of transport for provisions, hospitals, munitions, and supplies of all kinds; the preparation and protection of magazines; the laying out of camps and cantonments; in fine, every thing connected with preparing, moving, and guarding the _impedimenta_ of an army. the officers connected with this branch of service must consult with the engineers in every thing relating to the defence of their depots, magazines, camps, cantonments, communications, and the passage of rivers, and in all that relates to their connection with the attack and defence of places: but in all that relates to strategy and tactics they must receive instructions directly from the chief of the staff of the army, who will have the general direction of every thing connected with logistics. before commencing the operations of the campaign, or beginning the execution of the plans decided upon at head-quarters, this officer should satisfy himself respecting the condition of the various materials belonging to the different departments of the army;--the horses and horse equipments, carriages, caissons, ponton and artillery equipages, siege equipages, moveable hospitals, engineer and artillery utensils, clothing, and munitions of all kinds; he must supply whatever may be wanting, and provide means for the transportation of every thing. _subsistence_.--the art of subsisting troops during active operations in a hostile country, is one of the most difficult subjects connected with war; and it is a question well worthy of study, both for the statesman and the warrior, how darius and xerxes, philip and alexander, in ancient times--and the greek emperors and the barbarians--and, later still, the crusaders of the middle ages, contrived to support the immense masses of men which they led to war. cæsar has said that war should be made to support war; and some modern generals have acted upon this principle to the extreme of supporting their armies entirely at the expense of the country passed over. others have adopted either in part or entirely the principle of regular magazines. louis xiv. and frederick ii. fought mostly on their own frontiers, and followed the system of regular dépôts and supplies. but the revolutionary armies of france made war without magazines, subsisting, sometimes on the inhabitants, sometimes by requisitions levied on the country passed over, and at others by pillage and marauding. napoleon found little difficulty in supporting an army of a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand men in italy, suabia, and on the rich borders of the rhine and the danube; but in spain, poland, and russia, the subject of subsistence became one of extreme embarrassment. all depots of provisions and other supplies for an army are denominated _magazines_; these are divided into _principal, secondary,_ and _provisional_. the first are usually on the base of operations; the second, on the line of operations; and the last in the immediate vicinity of the troops, and contain supplies for a few days only. the system of _magazines_ is objected to by some, because it fetters the movements of an army, and makes its military operations subordinate to the means of supply. moreover, as the movements of an army must be so arranged as to cover these magazines, their establishment at given points reveals to the enemy our plan of campaign. on the other hand, the system of _requisitions_, either for immediate supplies or for secondary magazines, gives far greater velocity and impetuosity to an active army; and if it be so regulated as to repress pillage, and be levied with uniformity and moderation, it may be relied on with safety in well-cultivated countries; but in more barren and less populous districts, an army without magazines, especially in case of a prolonged stay or a forced retreat, will be exposed to great suffering and loss, if not to total destruction. before commencing a campaign the general should make himself acquainted with all the resources of the country to be passed over--determine the amount of supplies which it may be necessary to take with him, and the amount that can be obtained by requisitions; these requisitions being levied in a uniform and legal manner, and through the existing local authorities. in great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, at least for a time, to provide for the immense forces placed on foot, by any regular system of magazines or of ordinary requisitions: in such cases their subsistence is entirely intrusted to the troops themselves, who levy contributions wherever they pass. the inevitable consequences of this system are universal pillage and a total relaxation of discipline; the loss of private property and the violation of individual rights, are followed by the massacre of all straggling parties, and the ordinary peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and implacable enemies. in this connection the war in the spanish peninsula is well worthy of study. at the beginning of this war napoleon had to choose between methodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army, or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for; and irregular warfare, with forced requisitions--war being made to support war. the question was thoroughly discussed. on the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions of francs from the french treasury, he would have been able to support his troops without requisitions, would have maintained good order and discipline in his armies, and by the distribution of this money among a people poor and interested, he would have made many partisans. he could then have offered them, with a firm and just hand, the olive or the sword. but then the drafts upon the french treasury, had the war been a protracted one, would have been enormous for the support of an army of , men in spain. moreover, the hostile and insurrectionary state of the local authorities rendered regular and legal requisitions almost impossible; and the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport, rendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantity of stores in an insurrectionary country. besides, no great detachments could have been made to regulate the administration of the provinces, or to pursue the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains. in fine, by this system, he would have effected a military occupation of spain without its subjugation. on the other hand, by marching rapidly against all organized masses, living from day to day upon the local resources of the country, as he had done in italy, sparing his reserves for the occupation and pacification of the conquered provinces; this mode promised more prompt and decisive results than the other. napoleon, therefore, determined to adopt it for his active masses, employing the system of magazines and regular requisitions so far as practicable. in favorable parts of the country, soult and souchet, with smaller armies, succeeded in obtaining in this way regular supplies for a considerable length of time, but the others lived mainly by forced requisitions levied as necessity required. this sometimes gave place to great excesses, but these were principally the faults of subordinate officers who tolerated them, rather than of napoleon, who punished such breaches of discipline, when they were known to him, with great severity. he afterwards declared that, "had he succeeded he would have indemnified the great mass of the spanish people for their losses, by the sale of the hoarded wealth of the clergy, which would have rendered the church less powerful, and caused a more just division of property; thus the evil of the war would have been forgotten in the happy triumph of public and private interest over the interest of an ambitious and exclusive clergy." the following maxims on subsistence have the sanction of the best military writers: st. regular magazines should be formed, so far as practicable, for the supplies of an army; the levying of requisitions being resorted to only where the nature of the war, and the requisite rapidity of marches, render these absolutely necessary to success. d. dépôts should be formed in places strengthened by nature or art, defended by small corps, or garrisons, and situated in positions least liable to attack. d. all great dépôts should be placed on navigable rivers, canals, railways, or practical roads, _communicating with the line of operations_, so that they may be transported with ease and rapidity, as the army advances on this line. th. an army should never be without a supply for ten or fifteen days, otherwise the best chances of war may be lost, and the army exposed to great inconveniences. templehoff says that the great frederick, in the campaign of , always carried in the prussian provision-train _bread_ for _six_, and _flour_ for _nine days_, and was therefore never at a loss for means to subsist his forces, in undertaking any sudden and decisive operation. the roman soldier usually carried with him provisions for fifteen days. napoleon says, "experience has proved that an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten days' food being carried by the men and baggage-horses and a supply for twenty days by the train of wagons; so that at least four hundred and eighty wagons would be required for an army of forty thousand men; two hundred and forty being regularly organized, and two hundred and forty being obtained by requisition. for this purpose there would be a battalion of three companies for the military stores of each division, each company having its establishment for forty wagons, twenty being furnished by the commissariat, and twenty obtained by requisition. this gives for each division one hundred and twenty wagons, and for each army, four hundred and eighty. each battalion for a provision-train should have two hundred and ten men." th. an army, while actually in motion, can find temporary resources, unless in a sterile country, or one already ravaged by war, or at the season of the year when the old crops are nearly exhausted and the new ones not ready for harvest; but, even supposing the army may in this way be partially or wholly supplied, while in motion, it nevertheless frequently happens that it may remain for some days in position, (as the french at austerlitz and ulm;) a supply of hard bread for some ten days will therefore be important to subsist the army till a regular commissariat can be established. th. "supplies of bread and biscuit," says napoleon, "are no more essential to modern armies than to the romans; flour, rice, and pulse, may be substituted in marches without the troops suffering any harm. it is an error to suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay great attention to their magazines; it may be seen in caesar's commentaries, how much he was occupied with this care in his several campaigns. the ancients knew how to avoid being slaves to any system of supplies, or to being obliged to depend on the purveyors; but all the great captains well understood the art of subsistence." _forage_ is a military term applied to food of any kind for horses or cattle,--as grass, hay, corn, oats, &c.; and also to the operation of collecting such food. forage is of two kinds, _green_ and _dry_; the former being collected directly from the meadows and harvest-fields, and the latter from the barns and granaries of the farmers, or the storehouses of the dealers. the animals connected with an army may be subsisted by regular magazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorized _foraging_ [ ] as has already been remarked, it is not always politic, or even possible, to provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army during the active operations of a campaign. on account of the great expense and difficulty of transporting forage, the general of an army is more frequently under the necessity of resorting to requisitions, or forced contributions as they are called, and to foraging, for the subsistence of his animals, than to provide food for his men. nor are requisitions and foragings for this object so objectionable as in the other case, being far less likely to produce general want and distress among the non-combatant inhabitants. [footnote : this term is sometimes, though improperly, applied to the operation of forcibly collecting food for the troops.] the commanding officer of troops should always use his best endeavors to obtain his forage by purchase of the inhabitants, or by requisitions on the local authorities; and even where these means are impracticable, the foraging parties should be strictly directed to make their levies with uniformity and due moderation. accurate accounts should be kept of the kinds and quantities of all produce and other property taken, so that it may be regularly distributed and accounted for. under no circumstances should individuals be permitted to appropriate to themselves more than their _pro rata_ allowance. foraging parties may sometimes attain their object in a peaceful manner, by representing to the inhabitants the nature of their instructions and the necessity of obtaining immediate supplies. even where no recompense is proposed, it may be well to offer certificates to the effect that such articles have been taken for the use of the army. these certificates, even when of no value in themselves, frequently tend to appease excited passions and allay insurrections. in defensive war, carried on in one's own country, it is often necessary to seize upon private property and appropriate it to the public service: in all such cases the certificates of the foraging officers become proofs of individual claims against the government. no foraging party should ever be sent out till after the country has been properly reconnoitred. a good military escort and vanguard should always accompany and precede the foragers, for protection against the enemy's light cavalry and an insurgent militia. trustworthy troops must be placed in the villages and hamlets of the country to be foraged, in order to prevent the foragers from engaging in irregular and unauthorized pillage. officers of the staff and administrative corps are sent with the party to see to the proper execution of the orders, and to report any irregularities on the part of the troops. in case any corps engage in unauthorized pillage, due restitution should be made to the inhabitants, and the expense of such restitution deducted from the pay and allowances of the corps by whom such excess is committed. a few examples of this kind of justice will soon restore discipline to the army, and pacify the inhabitants of the country occupied. experience is the best guide in estimating the amount of hay or grain that may be taken from a given field: the produce of an acre is, of course, very different for different soils and climates. in distributing the burdens to the several pack-horses and wagons employed in conveying the forage to the army, it is important for the foraging officers to know the relative weight and bulk of each article. ordinary pressed hay in this country will average about . lbs. per cubic foot. wheat . . . weighs. . lbs. per bushel. rye . . . . " . . . . " " maize or indian corn . " " barley . . . " . . . . " " oats . . . . " . . . . " " meal, flour, and ground feed of all kinds, are purchased by the pound. as it would be exceedingly dangerous to send forward the regular train of the army for the conveyance of forage collected by these foraging parties, the country wagons and pack-horses are usually pressed into service for this purpose. troops of horse are sometimes sent into the vicinity of meadows and grain-fields for temporary subsistence: in such cases the horses and cattle may be farmed in the neighborhood, and the grass and grain issued in regular rations, immediately as taken from the field; but in no case should the animals be turned out to pasture. in a country like ours, where large bodies of new and irregular forces are to be suddenly called into the field in case of war, it is important to establish very rigid rules in relation to forage and subsistence; otherwise the operations of such troops must be attended with great waste of public and private property, the want of means of subsistence, the consequent pillage of the inhabitants, and a general relaxation of discipline. regular troops are far less liable to such excesses than inexperienced and undisciplined forces. _marches_.--marches are of two kinds: st. route marches,-- d. marches within reach of the enemy. the former belong to the domain of strategy; the latter to that of tactics; both, however, are connected with logistics in every thing that concerns the means of their execution. when an army is moving on a line of operations, it should be in as many columns as the facility of subsistence, celerity of movement, the nature of the roads, &c., may require. large columns cannot move with the same rapidity as smaller ones, nor can they be so readily subsisted. but when an army is within striking distance of the enemy, concentration becomes more important than celerity, and the forces must be kept in mass, or at least within supporting distances of each other. we find only two instances in the seven years' war, in which frederick attempted attacks by several columns at considerable distances from each other; and in both these instances (at torgau and at namiest, against laudon, during the siege of olmutz) he was unsuccessful. his usual mode was to bring his columns near together as he approached the enemy, and to form his troops into line at the moment of attack. such was his order of march at prague, kollin, rosbach, leuthen, zornsdorf, and kunersdorf. the following is one of frederick's orders respecting marches, (october d, .) "the army will, as usual, march in three columns by lines. the first column will consist of the first line; the second, of the second line; and the third, of the reserve. the wagons, and hospital wagons, of regiments, will follow their corps. the batteries of heavy calibre will follow the infantry brigades to which they are assigned. on passing woods, the regiments of cavalry will march between two infantry corps." "each column will have a vanguard of one light battalion and ten squadrons of hussars or dragoons. they will be preceded by three wagons carrying plank-bridges. the rear-guard is charged with taking up these bridges after the army has defiled over them." "the parks will be divided among the columns, to avoid the embarrassment resulting from a great many wagons being together in a body." "if any thing should happen to the second and third columns, the king will be instantly apprized of it; he will be found at the head of the first column. should any thing occur to the rear-guard, the same will be instantly communicated to lieutenant-general zeithen, who will be with the rear-guard of the first column." "the officers will take care that the soldiers march with equal step, and that they do not stray to the right or left, and thus uselessly fatigue themselves and lose their distances." "when orders are given to form the line, the wagons will file out of the columns to the left, and will march to be parked," &c. the position of the baggage, when near the enemy, will depend on the nature of the march. if the march be to the front, it will be in rear of the column; if the march be by the flank, and the enemy be on the outer flank, the baggage will be on the inner one, most remote from danger; if the march be in retreat, the baggage will be in advance of the army. in either case it should be strongly guarded. it was in direct violation of this rule that general hull, in the campaign of , on reaching the miami of the lake, (maumee,) embarked his baggage, stores, sick, convalescent, and "even the instructions of his government and the returns of his army," on board the cuyahoga packet, and dispatched them for detroit, while the army, with the same destination, resumed its march by land. the result of thus sending his baggage, stores, official papers, &c., _without a guard, and on the flank nearest the enemy,_ was just what might have been anticipated:--in attempting to pass the british post of malden the whole detachment was attacked and captured, "by a subaltern and six men, in a small and open boat." to prevent a surprise, detachments of light troops should be always thrown out in front, on the flanks, and in rear of the column, denominated from their position, _advanced-guard, flankers,_ and _rear-guard._ these scan the country which is to be passed over by the column, watch the enemy's motions, and give notice of his approach in time to allow the main force to choose a suitable field of battle, and to pass from the order of march to that of combat. the strength and composition of these detachments depend upon the nature of the ground, and the character and position of the enemy. in case of an attack they retire slowly, and on joining the main body, take their assigned position in the line of battle. in an open country the order of march presents but little difficulty; but in a broken country, and especially in the vicinity of the enemy, a march cannot be conducted with too many precautions. before engaging in a _defile_ it should be thoroughly examined, and sufficient detachments sent out to cover the main body from attack while effecting the passage. a neglect of these precautions has sometimes led to the most terrible disasters. in military operations very much depends upon the rapidity of marches. the roman infantry, in scipio's campaigns in africa, frequently marched a distance of twenty miles in five hours, each soldier carrying from fifty to eighty pounds of baggage. septimius severus, gibbon states, marched from vienna to rome, a distance of eight hundred miles, in forty days. cæsar marched from rome to the sierra-morena, in spain, a distance of four hundred and fifty leagues, in twenty-three days! napoleon excelled all modern generals in the celerity of his movements. others have made for a single day as extraordinary marches as the french, but for general activity during a campaign they have no rivals in modern history. a few examples of the rapidity of their movements may not be without interest. in a part of napoleon's army left verona after having fought the battle of st. michaels, on the th of january, then marched all night upon rivoli, fought in the mountains on the th, returned to mantua on the th, and defeated the army of provera on the morning of the th,--thus, in less than four days, having marched near fifty leagues, fought three battles, and captured more than twenty thousand prisoners! well might he write to the directory that his soldiers had surpassed the much vaunted rapidity of cæsar's legions. in the campaign of , macdonald, wishing to prevent the escape of loudon, in a single day marched forty miles, crossing rivers, and climbing mountains and glaciers. in the grand french army broke up their camp at boulogne, in the early part of september, and in two weeks reached their allotted posts on the rhine, averaging daily from twenty-five to thirty miles. during the same campaign the french infantry, pursuing the archduke ferdinand in his retreat from ulm, marched thirty miles a day in dreadful weather, and over roads almost impassable for artillery. again, in the campaign of , the french infantry pursued the prussians at the rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per day. in the advanced posts of napoleon's army pursued sir john moore's army at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, in the midst of winter. napoleon transported an army of fifty thousand men from madrid to astorga with nearly the same rapidity, marching through deep snows, across high mountains, and rivers swollen by the winter rains. the activity, perseverance, and endurance of his troops, during these ten days' march, are scarcely equalled in history. in , the activity of the french forces under clausel was truly extraordinary. after almost unheard-of efforts at the battle of salamanca, he retreated forty miles in a little more than twelve hours! in , napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten leagues a day, besides fighting a battle every twenty-four hours. wishing to form a junction with other troops, for the succor of paris, he marched his army the distance of seventy-five miles in thirty-six hours; the cavalry marching night and day, and the infantry travelling _en poste_. on his return from elba, in , his guards marched fifty miles the first day after landing; reached grenoble through a rough and mountainous country, a distance of two hundred miles, in six days, and reached-paris, a distance of six hundred miles, in less than twenty days! the marches of the allied powers, during the wars of the french revolution, were much less rapid than those of the armies of napoleon. nevertheless, for a single day the english and spaniards have made some of the most extraordinary marches on record. in , on the day of the battle of talavera, general crawford, fearing that wellington was hard pressed, made a forced march with three thousand men the distance of sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours! the spanish regiment of romana, in their march from jutland to spain, marched the extraordinary distance of fifty miles in twenty-one hours. cavalry, for a single day, will march a greater distance than infantry; but for a campaign of several months the infantry will march over the most ground. in the russian campaign of napoleon, his cavalry failed to keep pace with the infantry in his forced march on moskwa. but in the short campaigns of and , the cavalry of murat displayed the most wonderful activity, and effected more extraordinary results than any mounted troops of modern ages. the english cavalry, however, have made one or two short marches with a rapidity truly extraordinary. in wellington's cavalry in india marched the distance of sixty miles in thirty-two hours. but the march of the english cavalry under lord lake, before the battle of furruckabad, is, if we can trust the english accounts, still more extraordinary than any thing recorded of the romans or the french--it is said that he marched _seventy miles in twenty-four hours!!!_ as a general rule, troops marching for many days in succession will move at the rate of from fifteen to twenty miles per day. in forced marches, or in pursuit of a flying enemy, they will average from twenty to twenty-five miles per day. and for only two or three days in succession, with favorable roads, thirty miles per day may be calculated on. marches beyond this are unusual, and, when they do occur, are the result of extraordinary circumstances. _convoy_.--a convoy consists of provisions, military munitions, &c., sent from one point to another, under the charge of a detachment of troops, called an _escort_. when regular depots and magazines are established, with proper relations to the line of operations, convoys requiring particular escorts are seldom necessary, because the position of the army will cover the space over which the magazines are to be moved. but in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, or in a country whose inhabitants are hostile or insurrectionary, precautions of this kind should always be resorted to. the size and composition of the escort must depend upon the nature of the country and the imminence of the danger. the ground to be passed over should be previously reconnoitred, and the line of march be taken up only after the most satisfactory reports. when once put in motion, the convoy should be thoroughly hemmed in by flankers, to give warning to the escort of the approach of the enemy. small parties of cavalry are detached on all sides, but particularly in advance. the main body of the escort is concentrated on the most exposed point of the convoy while the other sides are guarded by subdivisions. in case of an attack by a large party, the baggage wagons may be formed into a kind of defensive field-work, which, with one or two pieces of light artillery, can in this way resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away the convoy. as a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an army by small successive convoys than by periodical and large ones. even should some of the former be captured their loss would not be materially felt; but a large periodical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterprise of the enemy, and is so difficult to escort, that he will venture much to destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our plans of a siege or of an important military operation. if the prussian army, when besieging olmutz, had observed this rule, the capture of a convoy would not have forced them to raise the siege and to retreat. napoleon estimates that an army of , men in position will require the daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads of provisions. the difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a retreat, is always very great, and the very best generals have frequently failed on this point. indeed, the best concerted measures will sometimes fail, amid the confusion and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able and active enemy in pursuit. in such a case, the loss of the provision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead to the most terrible disasters. we will allude to two examples of this kind: the retreat of the english from spain in , and that of the french from russia in . when sir john moore saw that a retreat had become necessary to save his army from entire destruction, he directed all the baggage and stores to be taken to the rear, and every possible arrangement to be made for their preservation and for the regular supplies of the army. but the want of discipline in his troops, and more especially the want of a proper engineer organization to prepare the requisite means for facilitating his own marches, and impeding the enemy's pursuit, prevented his plans from being fully carried into execution. much suffering and great losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops; a large portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, and even the treasure of his army, amounting to some , dollars, was abandoned through the ignorance and carelessness of the escorting officer. in napoleon's march into russia, his plans had been so admirably combined, that from mentz to moscow not a single estafette or convoy, it is said, was carried off in this campaign; nor was there a day passed without his receiving intelligence from france. when the retreat was begun, (after the burning of moscow,) he had six lines of magazines in his rear; the st, at smolensk, ten days' march from moscow; those of the d line at minsk and wilna, eight marches from smolensk; those of the d line at kowno, grodno, and bialystok; those of the th line at elbing, marienwerder, thorn, plock, modlin, and warsaw; those of the th line at dantzic, bamberg, and posen; those of the th line at stettin, custrin, and glogau. when the army left moscow it carried with it provisions sufficient for twenty days, and an abundance of ammunition, each piece of artillery being supplied with three hundred and fifty rounds; but the premature cold weather destroyed thirty thousand horses in less than three days, thus leaving the trains without the means of transportation or suitable escorts for their protection: the horrible sufferings of the returning army now surpassed all description. the officer selected to escort convoys should be a man of great prudence, activity, and energy, for frequently very much depends upon the safe and timely arrival of the provisions and military stores which he may have in charge. _castrametation_.--castrametation is, strictly speaking, the art of laying out and disposing to advantage the several parts of the camp of an army. the term is sometimes more extensively used to include all the means for lodging and sheltering the soldiers during a campaign, and all the arrangements for cooking, &c., either in the field or in winter quarters. a camp, whether composed of tents or barracks, or merely places assigned for bivouacking, must be divided and arranged in such a way that the several divisions shall be disposed as they are intended to be drawn up in order of battle; so that, on any sudden alarm, the troops can pass from it promptly, and form their line of battle without confusion. suitable places must also be assigned for cooking, for baggage, and for provisions, military stores, and ammunitions. the extent of the color front of a camp depends much on the character of the ground and the means of defence, but as a general rule, it should never exceed the position which the army would occupy in the line of battle. the different arms should be encamped in the same order as that of battle; this order of course depending on the nature of the battle-ground. a _corps d'armeé_ is composed of battalions of infantry, squadrons of cavalry, batteries of artillery, and companies of engineer troops, and the art of encampments consists in arranging each of these elements so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions. the choice of ground for a camp must be governed, st, by the general rules respecting military positions, and, d, by other rules peculiar to themselves, for they may be variously arranged in a manner more or less suitable on the same position. that the ground be suitable for defence, is the first and highest consideration. it should also be commodious and dry: moist ground in the vicinity of swamps and stagnant waters, would endanger the health of the army: for the same reason it should not be subject to overflow or to become marshy by heavy rains, and the melting of snow. the proximity of good roads, canals, or navigable streams, is important for furnishing the soldiers with all the necessaries of life. the proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing firewood, materials for huts, for repairs of military equipments, for works of defence, &c. good water within a convenient distance, is also an essential element in the choice of ground for a camp; without this the soldiers' health is soon undermined. the proximity of running streams is also important for the purposes of washing and bathing, and for carrying off the filth of the camp. the camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or commanded by any point within long cannon range; if bordering on a river or smaller stream, there should be space enough between them to form in order of battle; the communications in rear should offer the means of retreating in case of necessity, but should not afford facilities to the enemy to make his attack on that side. if the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length of time, as for _cantonments_ or _winter-quarters_, the greater must be the care in selecting its position and in the arrangement for the health and comfort of the soldiers. in the latter case, (of winter-quarters,) the engineer's art should always be called in play to form intrenchments, lines of abattis, inundations, &c., to render the position as difficult of access to the enemy as possible. a _bivouac_ is the most simple kind of camp. it consists merely of lines of fires, and huts for the officers and soldiers. these huts may be made of straw, of wood obtained from the forest, or by dismantling houses and other buildings in the vicinity of the camp, and stripping them of their timbers, doors, floors, &c. troops may be kept in bivouac for a few days, when in the vicinity of the enemy, but the exposure of the soldier in ordinary bivouacs, especially in the rainy seasons or in a rigorous climate, is exceedingly destructive of human life, and moreover leads to much distress to the inhabitants of the country occupied, in the destruction of their dwellings and the most common necessaries of life. if the position is to be occupied for any length of time, the huts should be arranged like tents, according to a regular system, and made comfortable for the troops. such should always be the system adopted in camps of practice or manoeuvre, in cantonments, winter-quarters, or in intrenched positions. we have adopted in our service the system of encamping in tents. these may do very well under the ordinary circumstances; but in the active operations of a campaign they are exceedingly objectionable, as greatly encumbering the baggage-trains. it would seem preferable to resort to bivouacs for the temporary camp of a single night, and to construct a regular system of huts where a position is to be occupied for any length of time. this may be regarded as a general rule, but in certain countries and climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable. napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interesting, if not decisive of the question: "tents," says he, "are not wholesome. it is better for the soldier to bivouac, because he can sleep with his feet towards the fire; he may shelter himself from the wind with a few boards or a little straw. the ground upon which he lies will be rapidly dried in the vicinity of the fire. tents are necessary for the superior officers, who have occasion to read and consult maps, and who ought to be ordered never to sleep in a house--a fatal abuse, which has given rise to so many disasters. all the european nations have so far followed the example of the french as to discard their tents; and if they be still used in camps of mere parade, it is because they are economical, sparing woods, thatched roofs, and villages. the shade of a tree, against the heat of the sun, and any sorry shelter whatever, against the rain, are preferable to tents. the carriage of the tents for each battalion would load five horses, who would be much better employed in carrying provisions. tents are a subject of observation for the enemies' spies and officers of the staff: they give them an insight into your numbers, and the position that you occupy; and this inconvenience occurs every day, and every instant in the day. an army ranged in two or three lines of bivouac is only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke, which the enemy may mistake for the vapor of the atmosphere. it is impossible to count the number of fires; it is easy, however, to count the number of tents, and to trace out the position that they occupy." the guarding of camps is a very important matter, and requires much attention. the _camp-guard_ consists of one or two rows of sentinels placed around the camp, and relieved at regular intervals. the number of rows of sentinels, and the distance between each man, will depend upon the character of the ground and the degree of danger apprehended. detachments of infantry and cavalry, denominated picquets, are also thrown out in front and on the flanks, which, in connection with the camp-guards, serve to keep good order and discipline in and around the camp, to prevent desertions, intercept reconnoitering parties, and to give timely notice of the enemy's approach. still larger detachments, denominated _grand-guards_, are posted in the surrounding villages, farm-houses, or small field-works, which they occupy as outposts, and from which they can watch the movements of the enemy, and prevent any attempts to surprise the camp. they detach patrols, videttes, and sentries, to furnish timely notice of danger. they should never be so far from the camp as to be beyond succor in case of sudden attack. outposts, when too far advanced, are sometimes destroyed without being able to give notice of the enemy's approach. in encamping troops in winter-quarters, it is sometimes necessary to scatter them over a considerable extent of ground, in order to facilitate their subsistence. in such a case, the arrangement of guards requires the utmost care. a chain of advanced posts should be placed several miles' distance from the line of camp; these posts should be supported by other and larger detachments in their rear, and concentrated on fewer points; and the whole country around should be continually reconnoitered by patrols of cavalry. the manner in which napoleon quartered and wintered his army on the passarge, in - , furnishes a useful lesson to military men, both in the matters of encampment and subsistence. an immense army of men were here quartered and subsisted, in a most rigorous climate, with a not over fertile soil, in the midst of hostile nations, and in the very face of a most powerful enemy. a roman army invariably encamped in the same order, its troops being always drawn up in the same battle array. a roman staff-officer who marked out an encampment, performed nothing more than a mechanical operation; he had no occasion for much genius or experience. the form of the camps was a square. in later times, they sometimes, in imitation of the greeks, made them circular, or adapted them to the ground. the camp was always surrounded with a ditch and rampart, and divided into two parts by a broad street, and into subdivisions by cross-streets and alleys. each tent was calculated to hold ten privates and a petty officer. in the middle ages, the form of the camp did not differ very essentially from that of the romans, the variation consisting principally in the interior arrangements, these arrangements being made to correspond to the existing mode of forming a line of battle. the details of this system may be found in the military work of machiavelli. the art of fixing a camp in modern times is the same as taking up a line of battle on the same position. of all the projectile machines must be in play and favorably placed. the position must neither be commanded, out-fronted, nor surrounded; but on the contrary ought, as far as possible, to command and out-front the enemy's position. but even in the same position there are numerous modes of arranging an encampment, or of forming a line of battle, and to select the best of these modes requires great experience, _coup d'oeil_, and genius. in relation to this point napoleon makes the following remarks:-- "ought an army to be confined to one single encampment, or ought it to form as many as it has corps or divisions? at what distance ought the vanguard and the flankers to be encamped? what frontage and what depth ought to be given to the camp? where should the cavalry, the artillery, and the carriages be distributed? should the army be ranged in battle array, in several lines? and if it should, what space should there be between those lines? should the cavalry be in reserve behind the infantry, or should it be placed upon the wings? as every piece has sufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire twenty-four hours, should all the artillery be brought into action at the beginning of the engagement, or should half of it be kept in reserve?" "the solution of these questions depends on the following circumstances:-- st. on the number of troops, and the numbers of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, of which the army is composed. d. on the relation subsisting between the two armies. d. on the quality of the troops. th. on the end in view. th. on the nature of the field. and th. on the position occupied by the enemy, and on the character of the general who commands them. nothing absolute either can or ought to be prescribed on this head. in modern warfare there is no natural order of battle." "the duty to be performed by the commander of an army is more difficult in modern armies, than it was in those of the ancients. it is also certain that his influence is more efficacious in deciding battles. in the ancient armies the general-in-chief, at a distance of eighty or a hundred toises from the enemy, was in no danger; and yet he was conveniently placed, so as to have an opportunity of directing to advantage all the movements of his forces. in modern armies, a general-in-chief, though removed four or five hundred toises, finds himself in the midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is very much exposed; and still he is so distant that several movements of the enemy escape him. in every engagement he is occasionally obliged to approach within reach of small-arms. the effect of modern arms is much influenced by the situation in which they are placed. a battery of guns, with a great range and a commanding position that takes the enemy obliquely, may be decisive of a victory. modern fields of battle are much more extended than those of the ancients, whence it becomes necessary to study operations on a large scale. a much greater degree of experience and military genius is requisite for the direction of a modern army than was necessary for an ancient one." figure represents a camp (on favorable ground) of a grand-division of an army, composed of two brigades or twelve battalions of infantry, twelve squadrons of cavalry, five batteries of artillery, and three companies of engineers. figure represents the details of a camp of a battalion of infantry composed of eight companies. figure is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. figure is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companies of foot engineers. figure is the camp of two batteries of mounted artillery, or two companies of mounted sappers and pontoniers. on undulating or broken ground the arrangement and order of the general camp, as well as the details of the encampment of each arm, would admit of much variation.[ ] [footnote : there are many valuable remarks on the various subjects comprised under the head of logistics, in the works of jomini, grimoard, thiebault, boutourlin, guibert, laroche amyon, bousmard, ternay, vauchelle, odier, audouin, bardin, chemevrieres, daznan, ballyet, dremaux, dupre d'aulnay, morin, and in the published regulations and orders of the english army.] chapter v. tactics. iv. tactics.--we have defined tactics to be the art of bringing troops into action, or of moving them in the presence of the enemy;--that is, within his view, and within the reach of his artillery. this branch of the military art has usually been divided into two parts: st. grand tactics, or the tactics of battles; and d. elementary tactics, or tactics of instruction.[ ] [footnote : "it does not come within the view of this work to say any thing of the merely mechanical part of the art; because it must be taken for granted, that every man who accepts the command of an army knows at least the alphabet of his trade. if he does not, (unless his enemy be as ignorant as himself,) defeat and infamy await him. without understanding perfectly what are called _the evolutions_, how is it possible that a general can give to his own army that order of battle which shall be most provident and skilful in each particular case in which he may be placed? how know which of these evolutions the enemy employs against him? and, of course, how decide on a counter-movement which may be necessary to secure victory or avoid defeat? the man who shall take the command of an army without perfectly understanding this elementary branch, is no less presumptuous than he who should pretend to teach greek without knowing even his letters. if we have such generals, let them, for their own sakes, if not for their country's, put themselves immediately to school."] a _battle_ is a general action between armies. if only a small portion of the forces are engaged it is usually denominated a _combat_, an _affair_, an _action_, a _skirmish_, &c., according to the character of the conflict. the art of combining and conducting battles of all descriptions has been designated by the name of grand tactics. battles may be arranged into three classes; st. _defensive_ battles, or those given in a chosen position by an army waiting the attack of the enemy. d. _offensive_ battles, or those made by an army which attacks the enemy in position. d. the _mixed_ or _unforeseen_ battles, given by two armies meeting while on the march. i. when an army awaits the attack, it takes its position and forms its line of battle according to the nature of the ground and the supposed character and strength of the enemy's forces. such is usually the case when an army wishes to cover a siege, protect a capital, guard dépôts of provisions and military stores, or some important strategic point. the general relations of positions with strategy and engineering have already been considered; we will now discuss merely their relations to battles. the first condition to be satisfied by a tactical position is, that its debouches shall be more favorable for falling on the enemy when he has approached to the desired point, than those which the enemy can have for attacking our line of battle. d. the artillery should have its full effect upon all the avenues of approach. d. we should have good ground for manoeuvring our own troops unseen, if possible, by the enemy. th. we should have a full view of the enemy's manoeuvres as he advances to the attack. th. we should have the flanks of our line well protected by natural or artificial obstacles. th. we should have some means of effecting a retreat without exposing our army to destruction. it is very seldom that all these conditions can be satisfied at the same time; and sometimes the very means of satisfying one, may be in direct violation of another. a river, a forest, or a mountain, which secures a flank of a line of battle, may become an obstacle to a retreat, should the defensive forces be thrown back upon that wing. again, the position may be difficult of attack in front or on the wings, and at the same time unfavorable for retreat. such was wellington's position at waterloo. the park of hougomont, the hamlet of haye sainte, and the marshy rivulet of papelotte, were serious obstacles against the attacking force; but the marshy forest of soignies in rear, with but a single road, cut off all hope of retreat. ii. according to the strategic relations of the contending forces in a campaign, will it be determined whether we are to await the enemy, or to seek him out and attack him wherever he may be found. we may sometimes be obliged to make the attack at all hazards, for the purpose of preventing the junction of two corps, or to cut off forces that may be separated from the main body by a river, &c. as a general rule the attacking force has a moral superiority over the defensive, but this advantage is frequently more than counterbalanced by other conditions. the main thing in an _offensive_ battle is to seize upon the decisive point of the field. this point is determined by the configuration of the ground, the position of the contending forces, the strategic object of the battle; or, by a combination of these. for example, when one wing of the enemy rests on a height that commands the remainder of his line, this would seem the decisive point to be attacked, for its occupation would secure the greatest advantages; but this point may be so very difficult of access, or be so related to the strategic object as to render its attack out of the question. thus it was at the battle of bautzen: the left of the allies rested on the mountains of bohemia, which were difficult of attack, but favorable for defence; moreover, their only line of retreat was on the right, which thus became the point of attack for the french, although the topographical and tactical key of the field was on the left. iii. it frequently happens in modern warfare that battles result from the meeting of armies in motion, both parties acting on the offensive. indeed, an army that is occupying a defensive position may, on the approach of the enemy, advance to meet him while on the march. battles of this kind may partake of the mixed character of offensive and defensive actions, or they may be of the nature of a surprise to both armies. to this class belong the battles of rosbach, eylau, lutzen, luzzara, abensberg, &c. surprises were much more common in ancient than in modern times, for the noise of musketry and the roar of artillery, belonging to the posts or wings assailed, will prevent any general surprise of an army. moreover, the division into separate masses, or _corps d'armée,_ will necessarily confine the surprise to a part, at most, of the forces employed. nevertheless, in the change given to military terms, a surprise may now mean only an unexpected combination of manoeuvres for an attack, rather than an actual falling upon troops unguarded or asleep. in this sense marengo, lutzen, eylau, &c. are numbered with surprises. benningsen's attack on murat at zarantin in was a true surprise, resulting from the gross negligence and carelessness of the king of naples. an _order of battle_ is the particular disposition given to the troops for a determined manoeuvre on the field of battle. a _line of battle_ is the general name applied to troops drawn up in their usual order of exercise, without any determined manoeuvre; it may apply to defensive positions, or to offensive operations, where no definitive object has been decided on. military writers lay down twelve orders of battle, viz.: st. the simple parallel order; d. the parallel order with a crotchet; d. the parallel order reinforced on one or both wings; th. the parallel order reinforced on the centre; th. the simple oblique order; th. the oblique order reinforced on the assailing wing; th. the perpendicular order on one or both wings; th. the concave order; th. the convex order; th. the order by echelon on one or both wings; th. the order by echelon on the centre; th. the combined orders of attack on the centre and one wing at the same time. (figure .)[ ] the simple parallel order is the worst possible disposition for a battle, for the two parties here fight with equal chances, and the combat must continue till accident, superior numbers, or mere physical strength decides the day; skill can have little or no influence in such a contest. [footnote : in the plans, b is the army in position, and a the attacking force arranged according to the different orders of battle. to simplify the drawings, a single line represents the position of an army, whereas, in practice, troops are usually drawn up in three lines. each figure represents a grand division of twelve battalions.] (figure .) the parallel order with a crotchet on the flank, is sometimes used in a defensive position, and also in the offensive with the crotchet thrown forward. malplaquet, nordlingen, prague, and kolin, are examples of this order. wellington, at waterloo, formed the parallel order with the retired crotchet on the right flank. (figure .) a line of battle parallel to the enemy's, if strongly reinforced on one point, is according to correct principles, and may in certain cases secure the victory; but it has many inconveniences. the weak part of the line being too near the enemy, may, notwithstanding its efforts to the contrary, become engaged, and run the risk of a defeat, and thereby counterbalance the advantages gained by the strong point. moreover, the reinforced part of the line will not be able to profit by its success by taking the enemy's line in flank and rear, without endangering its connection with the rest of the line. (figure ) represents the parallel order reinforced on the centre. the same remarks are applicable to this as to the preceding. these two orders were frequently used by the ancients: as at the battle of zama, for example; and sometimes by modern generals. turenne employed one of them at ensheim. (figure ) is the simple oblique order. (figure ) is the oblique order, with the attacking wing reinforced. this last is better suited for an inferior army in attacking a superior, for it enables it to carry the mass of its force on a single point of the enemy's line, while the weak wing is not only out of reach of immediate attack, but also holds the remainder of the enemy's line in check by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the favorable point as occasion may require. the most distinguished examples under this order are the battles of leuctra and mantinea, under the celebrated epaminondas; leuthen, under frederick; the pyramids, marengo, and jena, under napoleon. (figure .) an army may be perpendicular upon a flank at the beginning of a battle, as was the army of frederick at rosbach, and the russian army at kunersdorff; but this order must soon change to the oblique. an attack upon both wings can only be made when the attacking force is vastly superior. at eylau, napoleon made a perpendicular attack on one wing at the same time that he sought to pierce the enemy's centre. (figure .) the concave order may be used with advantage in certain cases, and in particular localities. hannibal employed it at the battle of cannæ, the english at crecy and agincourt, and the austrians at essling, in . (figure .) the convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile, to attack a concave line, or to oppose an attack before or after the passage of a river. the romans formed this order at the battle of cosilinum; the french at ramilies in , at fleurus in , at essling in , and at the second and third days of leipsic in , and at brienne in . (figure .) the order by echelon on one wing may be frequently employed with advantage; but if the echelon be made on both wings, there is the same objection to its use as to the perpendicular order on both wings. at dresden, napoleon attacked both wings at the same time; this is the only instance in his whole history of a similar attack, and this was owing to peculiar circumstances in the ground and in the position of his troops. (figure .) the echelon order on the centre alone may be employed with success against an army formed in a thin or too extended line of battle, for it would be pretty certain to penetrate and break the line. the echelon order possesses in general very great advantages. the several corps composing the army may manoeuvre separately, and consequently with greater ease. each echelon covers the flank of that which precedes it; and all may be combined towards a single object, and extended with the necessary _ensemble_. at the battle of the pyramids, napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon by squares. portions of his forces were arranged in echelon in some of his other battles. (figure .) the combined order in columns on the centre and one extremity at the same time, is better suited than either of the preceding for attacking a strong contiguous line. napoleon employed this order at wagram, ligny, bautzen, borodino, and waterloo. it is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which of these orders of battle should be employed, or that either should be exclusively followed throughout the whole battle. the question must be decided by the general himself on the ground, where all the circumstances may be duly weighed. an order well suited to one position might be the worst possible in another. tactics is in this respect the very reverse of strategy--the latter being subject to more rigid and invariable rules. but whatever the plan adopted by the attacking force, it should seek to dislodge the enemy, either by piercing or turning his line. if it can conceal its real intentions, and deceive him respecting the true point of attack, success will be more certain and decisive. a turning manoeuvre may frequently be employed with advantage at the same time with the main attack on the line. the operations of davoust at wagram, and richepanse at hohenlinden, are good examples under this head. the manoeuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed with skill, may lead to disasters like the turning manoeuvres of the austrians at rivoli and austerlitz, and of the french under jourdan at stackach, and under marmont at salamanca. we will now discuss the particular manner of arranging the troops on the line of battle, or the manner of employing each arm, without entering, however, much into the detailed tactics of formation and instruction. we shall begin with _infantry_, as the most important arm on the battle-field. there are four different ways of forming infantry for battle: st, as tirailleurs, or light troops; d, in deployed lines; d, in lines of battalions, ployed on the central division of each battalion, or formed in squares; th, in deep masses. these different modes of formation are reduced to four separate systems: st, the thin formation of two deployed lines; d, a line of battalions in columns of attack on the centre, or in squares by battalions; d, a combination of these two, or the first line deployed, and the second in columns of attack; and th, the deep formation of heavy columns of several battalions. the tirailleurs are merely accessories to the main forces, and are employed to fill up intervals, to protect the march of the columns, to annoy the enemy, and to manoeuvre on the flanks. st. formerly the line of battle for infantry was very generally that of two deployed lines of troops, as shown in fig. . but reason and experience have demonstrated that infantry in this thin or light order, can only move very slowly; that in attempting rapid movements it breaks and exhibits great and dangerous undulations, and would be easily pierced through by troops of a deeper order. hence it is that the light formation is only proper when the infantry is to make use of its fire, and to remain almost stationary. d. if the formation of a line of battalions in columns of attack be employed, the depth and mobility will depend upon the organization or habitual formation of this arm. in our service a battalion is supposed to be composed of ten companies, each formed in three ranks. the two flank companies are designed for tirailleurs. this would give a column of four divisions, and consequently twelve files deep; and as only two of these files could employ their fire, there would be much too large a portion of non-combatants exposed to the enemy's artillery. in practice, however, we employ the two-rank formation, which, if the flank companies be detached, would give a column of attack eight files in depth, which is not objectionable. if however, the flank companies should be present in the battalion, the depth of the column would still be ten files. in the french service, each battalion is composed of four divisions, formed in either two or three ranks. the two-rank formation is the one habitually employed. if all the companies be present, and the formation in three ranks, the depth of column will be twelve files; if in two ranks the depth will be eight, files. if the flank companies be detached, the depth of column will be, for three ranks nine files, and for two ranks six files. (figs. and .) in the russian service each, battalion has four divisions of three ranks each. but the third rank is employed as tirailleurs, which gives a depth of column of eight files. the employment of the third rank for tirailleurs is deemed objectionable on account of the difficulty of rallying them on the column. for this reason, the best authorities prefer detaching an entire division of two companies. the formation of squares is exceedingly effective in an open country, and against an enemy who is superior in cavalry. formerly very large squares were employed, but they are now formed either by regiment or by battalion. the former are deemed best for the defensive, and the latter for offensive movements. the manner of arranging these is shown in figure . d. the mixed system, or the combination of the two preceding, has sometimes been employed with success. napoleon used this formation at tagliamento, and the russians at eylau. each regiment was composed of three battalions, the first being deployed in line, and the other two formed in columns of attack by division in rear of the two extremities, as shown in fig. . it may in some cases be better to place the second and third battalions in line with the first, and on the two extremities of this battalion, in order to prolong the line of fire. the centre of the line of each regiment would be less strong, however, than when the two battalions by column are placed in rear of the other which is deployed. this mixed system of formation has many advocates, and in certain situations may be employed with great advantage. th. the deep order of heavy columns of several battalions is objectionable as an habitual formation for battle, inasmuch as it exposes large masses of men to the ravages of artillery, and diminishes the mobility and impulsion of an attack without adding greatly to its force. macdonald led a column of this kind at the battle of wagram with complete success, although he experienced enormous losses. but ney's heavy columns of attack at waterloo failed of success, and suffered terribly from the concentric fire of the enemy's batteries. whenever deep columns are employed, jomini recommends that the grand-division of twelve battalions should have one battalion on each flank, (fig. ,) marching by files, in order to protect its flanks from the enemy's attacks. without this defence a column of twelve battalions deep becomes an inert mass, greatly exposed to be thrown into disorder or broken, as was the column of fontenoy, and the macedonian phalanx by paulus emillus. a grand-division is sometimes arranged in two columns by brigade, as is represented in figure . these are less heavy than a single column of grand-division by battalion, but are subject to nearly the same objections. all offensive operations on the field of battle require _mobility, solidity_, and _impulsion_; while, on the other hand, all defensive operations should combine _solidity_ with _the greatest possible amount of fire_. troops in motion can make but little use of their fire-arms, whatever may be their formation. if in very large masses, they move slower and are more exposed; but the moral effect of these large moveable columns is such, that they frequently carry positions without ever employing their fire. the french columns usually succeeded against the austrian and prussian infantry, but the english infantry could not so easily be driven from their ground; hey also employed their fire to greater advantage, as was shown at talavera, busaco, fuente de honore, albuera and waterloo. the smaller columns and the mixed formation were always most successful against such troops. from these remarks we must conclude-- st. that the very thin as well as the very deep formation is objectionable under ordinary circumstances, and can seldom be employed with safety. d. that the attack by battalions in columns by division is the best for carrying a position; the column should, however, be diminished in depth as much as possible, in order both to increase its own fire and to diminish its exposure to the fire of the enemy; moreover, it should be well covered by tirailleurs and supported by cavalry. d. that the mixed formation of the first line deployed and the second in columns of battalion by division is the best for defence. th. that either of the last two may be employed in the offensive or defensive, according to the nature of the ground, the character of the general, and the character and position of the troops. squares are always good against cavalry. troops should be habituated to all these formations, and accustomed to pass rapidly from one to another in the daytime or at night. none, however, but disciplined troops can do this: hence the great superiority of regulars on the field of battle, where skilful manoeuvres frequently effect more than the most undaunted courage. the arm next in importance on the battle-field is _cavalry_. the principal merit of this arm consists in its _velocity_ and _mobility_. cavalry has little solidity, and cannot of itself defend any position against infantry; but in connection with the other arms, it is indispensable for beginning a battle, for completing a victory, and for reaping its full advantage by pursuing and destroying the beaten foe. there are four different modes of forming cavalry, the same as for infantry: st in deployed lines; d, a line of regiments in column of attack on the centre; d, the mixed formation; and th, the deep formation of several columns. st. the thin formation was deemed objectionable for infantry, on account of its liability to be penetrated by cavalry. the same objection does not hold so forcibly with respect to this latter arm; but full lines are deemed less advantageous than lines deployed checker-wise or in echelon. in either case the distance between the lines should be sufficient to prevent the second line from coming in contact with the first, in case the latter receives a slight check. this distance need not be so great in lines deployed checker-wise, as when they are full, or in echelon. d. the second system of formation, that is, a line of columns of attack on the central division for infantry, is by battalion, but for cavalry, by regiment. if the regiment is composed of eight squadrons, the column will contain four lines, two squadrons forming a division; but if composed of only six squadrons, the column will contain only three lines, and consequently will be six files in depth. in either case the distance between the lines should be that of a demi-squadron, when the troops are drawn up in battle array; but when charging, the divisions may close to a less distance. d. in forming a grand division of two brigades, by the third or mixed system, two regiments may be deployed in the first line, and three formed in columns of attack in rear of the flanks and centre, as is shown in fig. , the sixth being held in reserve. this formation is deemed a good one. th. the fourth system, of deep columns of cavalry, is entirely unsuited for the charge, and this formation can only be employed for troops drawn up in reserve. the flanks of lines or columns of cavalry are always much exposed, and squadrons should therefore be formed in echelon on the right and left, and a little in rear of the main body, in order to protect the flanks from the attacks of the enemy's horse. irregular cavalry is usually employed for this purpose. in the formation of a grand division in line of battle, care should be taken not to give too great an extent to the command of the generals of brigade. if the formation be in two lines, neither brigade should form an entire line, but each should form a wing of the division, two regiments of the same brigade being placed in rear of each other. this rule is an important one, and should never be neglected. it may also be laid down as a maxim, in the formation of cavalry on the battle-field, that the first line after the charge, even if most successful, may require reforming in rear of the second line, and that this last should be prepared to act in the front line after the first onset. the success of the battle frequently depends upon the charge of the final reserve of cavalry on the flanks of lines already engaged. it is on account of this frequent manoeuvring of the cavalry on the battle-field, its reforming for repeated charges, that great bodies deployed in full lines are principally objected to. they cannot be handled with the facility and rapidity of columns of regiments by divisions. the attack of nansouty's cavalry, formed in this way, on the prussian cavalry, deployed in advance of chateau-thierry, in , is a good proof of this. cavalry may be brought to a charge-- st, in columns; d, in line; and d, in route, or at random, _(à la déban-dade.)_ these may also be varied by charging either at a trot or a gallop. all these modes have been employed with success. in a regular charge in line the lance offers great advantages; in the melee the sabre is the best weapon; hence some military writers have proposed arming the front rank with lances, and the second with sabres, the pistol and the carabine are useless in the charge, but may sometimes be employed with advantage against convoys, outposts, and light cavalry; to fire the carabine with any effect, the troop must be at a halt. in all charges in line, especially against cavalry, the fast trot is deemed preferable to the gallop, on account of the difficulty of keeping up the alignment when the speed is increased. lances are utterly useless in a melée, and in employing troops armed in this way, it is of the greatest importance to keep them in order and in line. in charging with the sabre against artillery the gallop may sometimes be employed, for velocity here may be more important than force. we will now consider the formation and use of _artillery_ on the field of battle. it may be laid down as a fundamental principle, that the fire of artillery should be directed on that part of the enemy's line which we design to pierce; for this fire will not only weaken this point, but will also aid the attack of the cavalry and infantry when the principal efforts are directed towards the intended point. in the defence, the artillery is usually distributed throughout the whole line, on ground favorable for its fire; but the reserve should be so placed that it can easily be brought to bear on the point where the enemy will be most likely to direct his principal attack. artillery placed on a plain, or with ground slightly inclined in front, and using the point-blank or ricochet fire, is the most effective; very high points are unfavorable if possible, the concentric fire should be employed against the enemy's columns of attack. the position of the english artillery on the field of waterloo, and the use of the concentric fire, furnishes one of the best examples for the disposition of this arm to be found in modern military history. the proper use of artillery on the battle-field is against the enemy's infantry and cavalry, consequently only a small part of it should be employed to respond to the fire of the enemy's batteries; not more than one third at most can be spared for this object. if possible, batteries should be established so as to take the enemy's line in flank, either by an oblique or enfilading fire. a direct fire against columns of attack, with a few light pieces thrown out to take it in flank at the same time, will always be advantageous. a direct and flank fire was employed with success by kleist against the column of ney at the battle of bautzen; the french marshal was forced to change his direction. batteries should always be well secured on the flanks, and constantly sustained by infantry or cavalry. if attacked by cavalry, the artillery should keep up its fire as long as possible, first with ball, and then with grape when the enemy arrives within a suitable distance. the same rule will apply to attacks of infantry, except that the fire of solid shot at a great distance is much less effective than against mounted troops. the _engineer troops_ are employed on the field of battle principally by detachments, acting as auxiliaries to the other arms. each regiment of infantry should have a detachment of sappers armed with axes to act as pioneers, for the removal of obstacles that may impede its advance. these sappers are of the utmost importance, for without them an entire column might be checked and thrown into confusion by impediments which a few sappers with their axes would remove in a very short time. detachments of engineer troops must also act in concert with the cavalry and artillery for the same purpose as above. in establishing the batteries of artillery, in opening roads for their manoeuvres, and in arranging material obstacles for their defence, the axes, picks, and shovels of the sappers are of infinite value. fieldworks, bridges, and bridge-defences, frequently have a decisive influence upon the result of a battle, but as these are usually arranged previous to the action, they will be discussed in another place. in the attack and defence of these field-works, the engineer troops play a distinguished part. the consideration of this part of the subject, though perhaps properly belonging to the tactics of battles, will also be postponed to another occasion. we will now discuss the employment of the combined arms on the field of battle. before the french revolution, all the infantry, formed by regiments and brigades, was united in a single body and drawn up in two lines. the cavalry was placed on the two flanks, and the artillery distributed along the entire line. in moving by wings, they formed four columns, two of cavalry and two of infantry: in moving by a flank, they formed only two very long columns; the cavalry, however, sometimes formed a third and separate column in flank movements, but this disposition was rarely made. the french revolution introduced the system of grand divisions composed of the four arms combined; each division moved separately and independently of the other. in the wars of the empire, napoleon united two or more of these divisions into a _corps d'armée,_ which formed a wing, the centre, or reserve of his grand army. in addition to these divisions and _corps d'armée,_ he had large reserves of cavalry and artillery, which were employed as distinct and separate arms. if the forces be sufficiently numerous to fight by _corps d'armée,_ each corps should have its own reserve, independent of the general reserve of the army. again, if the forces be so small as to act by grand divisions only, each division should then have _its_ separate reserve. an army, whether composed of separate corps or of grand divisions, usually forms, on the field of battle, a centre, two wings, and a reserve. each corps or division acts by itself, with its infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineer troops. the reserve of cavalry may be formed in rear of the centre or one of the wings. in small forces of fifty or sixty thousand men, the cavalry may act with advantage on the wings, in the manner of the ancients. if the reserve of this arm be large enough to form three separate bodies, it may _itself_ very properly be formed into a centre and wings. if it be formed into two columns only, they may be placed in rear of the openings between the centre and the wings of the main force. the reserve of artillery is employed either to reinforce the centre or a wing, and in the defensive is frequently distributed throughout the whole line of battle. in offensive operations, it may be well to concentrate as much fire as possible on the intended point of attack. the mounted artillery either acts in concert with the cavalry, of is used to reinforce that arm; the light-foot acts with the infantry, and the batteries of heavy calibre are distributed along the line, or concentrated on some important point where their fire may be most effectual. they reach the enemy's forces at a distance, and arrest the impulsion of his attack. they may also be employed to draw the fire of his artillery; but their movements are too slow and difficult for a reserve. the order of succession in which the different arms are engaged in a battle, depends upon the nature of the ground and other accidental circumstances, and cannot be determined by any fixed rules. the following, however, is most frequently employed, and in ordinary cases may be deemed good. the attack is first opened by a cannonade; light troops are sent forward to annoy the enemy, and, if possible, to pick off his artillerists. the main body then advances in two lines: the first displays itself in line as it arrives nearly within the range of grape-shot; the second line remains in columns of attack formed of battalions by division, at a distance from the first sufficient to be beyond the reach of the enemy's musketry, but near enough to support the first line, or to cover it, if driven back. the artillery, in the mean time, concentrates its fire on some weak point to open a way for the reserve, which rushes into the opening and takes the enemy in flank and rear. the cavalry charges at the opportune moment on the flank of the enemy's columns or penetrates an opening in his line, and cutting to pieces his staggered troops, forces them into retreat, and completes the victory. during this time the whole line of the enemy should be kept occupied, so as to prevent fresh troops from being concentrated on the threatened point. the following maxims on battles may be studied with advantage:-- st. _general battles_ are not to be fought but under the occurrence of one of the following circumstances: when you are, from any cause, decidedly superior to the enemy; when he is on the point of receiving reinforcements, which will materially effect your relative strength; when, if not beaten or checked, he will deprive you of supplies or reinforcements, necessary to the continuance or success of your operations; and, generally, when the advantage of winning the battle will be greater than the disadvantage of losing it. d. whatever may be your reason for risking a general battle, you ought to regard as indispensable preliminaries,--a thorough knowledge of the ground on which you are to act; an ample supply of ammunition; the most perfect order in your fire-arms; hospital dépôts regularly established, with surgeons, nurses, dressings, &c., sufficient for the accommodation of the wounded; points of rendezvous established and known to the commanders of corps; and an entire possession of the passes in your own rear. d. the battle being fought and _won_, the victory must be followed up with as much alacrity and vigor, as though nothing had been gained,--a maxim very difficult of observance, (from the momentary disobedience which pervades all troops flushed with conquest,) but with which an able general will never dispense. no one knew better the use of this maxim than napoleon, and no one was a more strict and habitual observer of it. th. the battle being fought and _lost_, it is your first duty to do away the _moral_ effect of defeat,--the want of that self-respect and self-confidence, which are its immediate followers, and which, so long as they last, are the most powerful auxiliaries of your enemy. it is scarcely necessary to remark that, to effect this object,--to reinspire a beaten army with hope, and to reassure it of victory,--we must not turn our backs on an enemy, without sometimes presenting to him our front also;--we must not confide our safety to mere flight, but adopt such measures as shall convince him that though wounded and overpowered, we are neither disabled nor dismayed; and that we still possess enough both of strength and spirit to punish his faults, should he commit any. do you operate in a covered or mountainous country?--avail yourself of its ridges and woods; for by doing so you will best evade the pressure of his cavalry. have you defiles or villages to pass?--seize the heads of these, defend them obstinately, and make a show of fighting another battle. in a word, let no error of your enemy, nor any favorable incident of the ground, escape your notice or your use. it is by these means that your enemy is checked, and your troops inspirited; and it was by these that frederick balanced his surprise at hohenkirchen, and the defeat of his plans before olmutz. the movement of our own washington, after losing the battle of brandywine, was of this character. he hastily recrossed the schuylkill with the professed intention of seeking the enemy and renewing the combat, which was _apparently_ prevented only by a heavy and incessant fall of rain. a rumor was now raised that the enemy, while refusing his left wing, was rapidly advancing upon his right, to intercept our passage of the river, and thus gain possession of philadelphia. this report justified a retreat, which drew from the general repeated assurances, that in quitting his present position and giving to his march a retrograde direction, it was not his object to avoid, but to follow and to fight the enemy. this movement, though no battle ensued, had the effect of restoring the confidence as well of the people as of the army.[ ] [footnote : there are innumerable works in almost every language on elementary tactics; very few persons, however, care to read any thing further than the manuals used in our own service. our system of infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics is generally taken from the french; and also the course of engineer instruction, so far as matured, for sappers, miners, and pontoniers, is based on the french manuals for the varied duties of this arm. on grand tactics, or tactics of battles, the military and historical writings of general jomini abound in most valuable instructions. napoleon's memoirs, and the writings of rocquancourt, hoyer, decker, okouneff, roguiat, jocquinot-de-presle, guibert, duhesme, gassendi, warnery, baron bohan, lindneau, maiseroy, miller, and ternay, are considered as being among the best authorities.] chapter vi. military polity and the means of national defence. _military polity_.--in deciding upon a resort to arms, statesmen are guided by certain general rules which have been tacitly adopted in the intercourse of nations: so also both statesmen and generals are bound by rules similarly adopted for the conduct of hostile forces while actually engaged in military operations. in all differences between nations, each state has a right to decide for itself upon the nature of its means of redress for injuries received. previous to declaring open and public war, it may resort to some other forcible means of redress, short of actual war. these are:-- st. laying an embargo upon the property of the offending nation. d. taking forcible possession of the territory or property in dispute. d. resorting to some direct measure of retaliation. th. making reprisals upon the persons and things of the offending nation. it is not the present purpose to discuss these several means of redress, nor even to enter into any examination of the rights and laws of public war, when actually declared; it is intended to consider here merely such military combinations as are resorted to by the state in preparation for defence, or in carrying on the actual operations of a war. in commencing hostilities against any other power, we must evidently take into consideration all the political and physical circumstances of the people with whom we are to contend: we must regard their general character for courage and love of country; their attachment to their government and political institutions; the character of their rulers and their generals; the numbers, organization, and discipline of their armies; and particularly the relations between the civil and military authorities in the state, for if the latter be made entirely subordinate, we may very safely calculate on erroneous combinations. we must also regard their passive means of resistance, such as their system of fortifications, their military materials and munitions, their statistics of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, and especially the geographical position and physical features of their country. no government can neglect, with impunity, these considerations in its preparations for war, or in its manner of conducting military operations. napoleon's system of carrying on war against the weak, effeminate, and disorganized italians required many modifications when directed against the great military power of russia. moreover, the combinations of eylau and friedland were inapplicable to the contest with the maddened guerrillas of minos, animated by the combined passions of hatred, patriotism, and religious enthusiasm. military power may be regarded either as absolute or relative: the absolute force of a state depending on the number of its inhabitants and the extent of its revenues; the relative force, on its geographical and political position, the character of its people, and the nature of its government. its military preparations should evidently be in proportion to its resources. wealth constitutes both the apprehension and the incentive to invasion. where two or more states have equal means of war, with incentives very unequal, an equilibrium cannot exist; for danger and temptation are no longer opposed to each other. the preparation of states may, therefore, be equal without being equivalent, and the smaller of the two may be most liable to be drawn into a war without the means of sustaining it. the numerical relation between the entire population of a state, and the armed forces which it can maintain, must evidently vary with the wealth and pursuits of the people. adam smith thinks that a country purely agricultural may, at certain seasons, furnish for war one-fifth, or even in case of necessity one-fourth, of its entire population. a commercial or manufacturing country would be unable to furnish any thing like so numerous a military force. on this account small agricultural states are sometimes able to bring into the field much larger armies than their more powerful neighbors. during the seven years' war, frederick supported an army equal to one-twentieth of the entire prussian population, and at the close of this memorable contest one-sixth of the males capable of bearing arms had actually perished on the field of battle. but the number of troops that may be brought into the field in times of great emergency is, of course, much greater than can be supported during a long war, or as a part of a permanent military establishment. montesquieu estimates that modern nations are capable of supporting, without endangering their power, a permanent military force of about one-hundredth part of their population. this ratio differs but little from that of the present military establishments of the great european powers. great britain, with a population of about twenty-five millions, and a general budget of $ , , , supports a military and naval force of about , effective and , non-effective men, , in all, at an annual expense of from seventy to eighty millions of dollars. russia, with a population of about seventy millions, supports an active army of , men, with an immense reserve, at an expense of about $ , , , out of a general budget of $ , , ; that is, the expense of her military establishment is to her whole budget as to . austria, with a population of thirty-five millions, has an organized peace establishment of , , (about , in active service,) and a reserve of , , at an expense of $ , , , out of a general budget of $ , , . prussia, with a population of about fifteen millions, has from , to , men in arms, with a reserve of , , at an annual expense of more than $ , , , out of a general budget of about $ , , . france, with a population of near thirty-five millions, supports a permanent establishment of about , men, at an expense of seventy or eighty millions of dollars, out of a total budget of $ , , . france has long supported a permanent military force of from one-hundredth to one hundred-and-tenth of her population, at an expense of from one-fourth to one-fifth of her whole budget. the following table, copied from the "spectateur militaire," shows the state of the army at six different periods between and . it omits, of course, the extraordinary levies of the wars of the revolution and of the empire. _table_. budget. army. dates. population. remarks. of state. of the army. peace war estab. estab. livres. livres. men. men. , , , , , , , , francs. francs. ordinance of , , , , , , , , report of , , , , , , , , minister of war. report of , , , , , , , , , minister of war. , , , , , , , , - budget of . estimated , , , , , , , , , expenses of . from these data we see that the great european powers at the present day maintain, in time of peace, military establishments equal to about one-hundredth part of their entire population. the geographical position of a country also greatly influences the degree and character of its military preparation. it may be bordered on one or more sides by mountains and other obstacles calculated to diminish the probability of invasion; or the whole frontier may be wide open to an attack: the interior may be of such a nature as to furnish security to its own army, and yet be fatal to the enemy should he occupy it; or it may furnish him advantages far superior to his own country. it may be an island in the sea, and consequently exposed only to maritime descents--events of rare occurrence in modern times. again, a nation may be placed between others who are interested in its security, their mutual jealousy preventing the molestation of the weaker neighbor. on the other hand, its political institutions may be such as to compel the others to unite in attacking it in order to secure themselves. the republics of switzerland could remain unmolested in the midst of powerful monarchies; but revolutionary france brought upon herself the armies of all europe. climate has also some influence upon military character, but this influence is far less than that of education and discipline. northern nations are said to be naturally more phlegmatic and sluggish than those of warmer climates; and yet the armies of gustavus adolphus, charles xii., and suwarrow, have shown themselves sufficiently active and impetuous, while the greeks, romans, and spaniards, in the times of their glory, were patient, disciplined, and indefatigable, notwithstanding the reputed fickleness of ardent temperaments. for any nation to postpone the making of military preparations till such time as they are actually required in defence, is to waste the public money, and endanger the public safety. the closing of an avenue of approach, the security of a single road or river, or even the strategic movement of a small body of troops, often effects, in the beginning, what afterwards cannot be accomplished by large fortifications, and the most formidable armies. had a small army in , with a well-fortified depot on lake champlain, penetrated into canada, and cut off all reinforcements and supplies by way of quebec, that country would inevitably have fallen into our possession. in the winter of - , napoleon crossed the vistula, and advanced even to the walls of königsberg, with the austrians in his rear, and the whole power of russia before him. if austria had pushed forward one hundred thousand men from bohemia, on the oder, she would, in all probability, says the best of military judges, jomini, have struck a fatal blow to the operations of napoleon, and his army must have been exceedingly fortunate even to regain the rhine. but austria preferred remaining neutral till she could increase her army to four hundred thousand men. she then took the offensive, and was beaten; whereas, with one hundred thousand men brought into action at the favorable moment, she might, most probably, have decided the fate of europe. "defensive war," says napoleon, "does not preclude attack, any more than offensive war is exclusive of defence," for frequently the best way to counteract the enemy's operations, and prevent his conquests, is, at the very outset of the war, to invade and cripple him. but this can never be attempted with raw troops, ill supplied with the munitions of war, and unsupported by fortifications. such invasions must necessarily fail. experience in the wars of the french revolution has demonstrated this; and even our own short history is not without its proof. in , the conquest of canada was determined on some time before the declaration of war; an undisciplined army, without preparation or apparent plan, was actually put in motion, eighteen days previous to this declaration, for the canadian peninsula. with a disciplined army of the same numbers, with an efficient and skilful leader, directed against the vital point of the british possessions at a time when the whole military force of the provinces did not exceed three thousand men, how different had been the result! while, therefore, the permanent defences of a nation must be subordinate to its resources, position, and character, they can in no case be dispensed with. no matter how extensive or important the temporary means that may be developed as necessity requires, there must be some force kept in a constant state of efficiency, in order to impart life and stability to the system. the one can never properly replace the other; for while the former constitutes the basis, the latter must form the main body of the military edifice, which, by its strength and durability, will offer shelter and protection to the nation; or, if the architecture and materials be defective, crush and destroy it in its fall. the permanent means of military defence employed by modern nations, are-- st. an army; d. a navy; d. fortifications. the first two of these could hardly be called permanent, if we were, to regard their _personnel_; but looking upon them as institutions or organizations, they present all the characteristics of durability. they are sometimes subjected to very great and radical changes; by the hot-house nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation, they may become overgrown and dangerous, or the storms of popular delusion may overthrow and apparently sweep them away. but they will immediately spring up again in some form or other, so deeply are they rooted in the organization of political institutions. its army and navy should always be kept within the limits of a nation's wants; but pity for the country which reduces them in number or support so as to degrade their character or endanger their organization. "a government," says one of the best historians of the age, "which neglects its army, under whatever pretext, is a government culpable in the eyes of posterity, for it is preparing humiliations for its flag and its country, instead of laying the foundation for its glory." one of our own distinguished cabinet ministers remarks, that the history of our relations with the indian tribes from the beginning to the present hour, is one continued proof of the necessity of maintaining an efficient military force in time of peace, and that the treatment we received for a long series of years from european powers, was a most humiliating illustration of the folly of attempting to dispense with these means of defence. "twice," says he, "we were compelled to maintain, by open war, our quarrel with the principal aggressors. after many years of forbearance and negotiation, our claims in other cases were at length amicably settled; but in one of the most noted of these cases, it was not without much delay and imminent hazard of war that the execution of the treaty was finally enforced. no one acquainted with these portions of our history, can hesitate to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration of the wrongs we endured, to a knowledge on the part of our assailants of the scantiness and inefficiency of our military and naval force." "if," said mr. calhoun, "disregarding the sound dictates of reason and experience, we, in peace, neglect our military establishment, we must, with a powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities." these remarks were made in opposition to the reduction of our military establishment, in , below the standard of thirteen thousand. nevertheless, the force was reduced to about six or seven thousand; and we were soon made to feel the consequences. it is stated, in a report of high authority, that if there had been two regiments available near st. louis, in , the war with black hawk would have been easily avoided; and that it cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and savage warfare which overspread the floridas for nearly seven years would also have been avoided, and some thirty millions have been saved the country, if two regiments had been available at the beginning of that conflict.[ ] [footnote : we may now add to these remarks, that if our government had occupied the country between the nueces and the rio grande with a well-organized army of twelve thousand men, war with mexico might have been avoided; but to push forward upon matamoras a small force of only two thousand, in the very face of a large mexican army was holding out to them the strongest inducements to attack us. the temporary economy of a few thousands in reducing our military establishment to a mere handful of men, again results in a necessary expenditure of many millions of dollars and a large sacrifice of human life.] we must, in this country, if we heed either the dictates of reason or experience, maintain in time of peace a skeleton military and naval force, capable of being greatly expanded, in the event of danger, by the addition of new troops. much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to an army or navy by the addition of new forces. the strength thus acquired is sometimes in even a far greater ratio than the increase of numbers. but it must be remembered that these new elements are, of themselves, far inferior to the old ones in discipline, steady courage, and perseverance. no general can rely on the accuracy of their movements in the operations of a campaign, and they are exceedingly apt to fail him at the critical moment on the field of battle. the same holds true with respect to sailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a man-of-war. there is this difference, however: an army usually obtains its recruits from men totally unacquainted with military life, while a navy, in case of sudden increase, is mainly supplied from the merchant marine with professional sailors, who, though unacquainted with the use of artillery, &c., on ship-board, are familiar with all the other duties of sea life, and not unused to discipline. moreover, raw seamen and marines, from being under the immediate eye of their officers in time of action, and without the possibility of escape, fight much better than troops of the same character on land. if years are requisite to make a good sailor, surely an equal length of time is necessary to perfect the soldier; and no less skill, practice, and professional study are required for the proper direction of armies than for the management of fleets. but some have said that even these skeletons of military and naval forces are entirely superfluous, and that a brave and patriotic people will make as good a defence against invasion as the most disciplined and experienced. such views are frequently urged in the halls of congress, and some have even attempted to confirm them by historical examples. there are instances, it is true, where disorganized and frantic masses, animated by patriotic enthusiasm, have gained the most brilliant victories. here, however, extraordinary circumstances supplied the place of order, and produced an equilibrium between forces that otherwise would have been very unequal; but in almost every instance of this kind, the loss of the undisciplined army has been unnecessarily great, human life being substituted for skill and order. but victory, even with such a drawback, cannot often attend the banners of newly raised and disorderly forces. if the captain and crew of a steamship knew nothing of navigation, and had never been at sea, and the engineer was totally unacquainted with his profession, could we expect the ship to cross the atlantic in safety, and reach her destined port? would we trust our lives and the honor of our country to their care? would we not say to them, "first make yourselves acquainted with the principles of your profession, the use of the compass, and the means of determining whether you direct your course upon a ledge of rocks or into a safe harbor?" war is not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance. its principles constitute one of the most intricate of modern sciences; and the general who understands the art of rightly applying its rules, and possesses the means of carrying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success. history furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of relying upon undisciplined forces in the open field. almost every page of napier's classic history of the peninsular war contains striking examples of the useless waste of human life and property by the spanish militia; while, with one quarter as many regulars, at a small fractional part of the actual expense, the french might have been expelled at the outset, or have been driven, at any time afterwards, from the peninsula. at the beginning of the french revolution the regular army was abolished, and the citizen-soldiery, who were established on the th of july, , relied on exclusively for the national defence. "but these three millions of national guards," says jomini, "though good supporters of the decrees of the assembly, were nevertheless useless for reinforcing the army beyond the frontiers, and utterly incapable of defending their own firesides." yet no one can question their individual bravery and patriotism; for, when reorganized, disciplined, and properly directed, they put to flight the best troops in europe. at the first outbreak of this revolution, the privileged classes of other countries, upholding crumbling institutions and rotten dynasties, rushed forth against the maddened hordes of french democracy. the popular power, springing upward by its own elasticity when the weight of political oppression was removed, soon became too wild and reckless to establish itself on any sure basis, or even to provide for its own protection. if the attacks of the enervated enemies of france were weak, so also were her own efforts feeble to resist these attacks. the republican armies repelled the ill-planned and ill-conducted invasion by the duke of brunswick; but it was by the substitution of human life for preparation, system, and skill; enthusiasm supplied the place of discipline; robbery produced military stores; and the dead bodies of her citizens formed _épaulements_ against the enemy. yet this was but the strength of weakness; the aimless struggle of a broken and disjointed government; and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away before the combined opposition of europe, when the great genius of napoleon, with a strong arm and iron rule, seizing upon the scattered fragments, and binding them together into one consolidated mass, made france victorious, and seated himself on the throne of empire. no people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiastic patriotism than the americans during the war of our own revolution. and yet our army received, even at that time, but little support from irregular and militia forces in the open field. washington's opinions on this subject furnish so striking a contrast to the congressional speeches of modern political demagogues, who, with boastful swaggers, would fain persuade us that we require no organization or discipline to meet the veteran troops of europe in the open field, and who would hurry us, without preparation, into war with the strongest military powers of the world--so striking is the contrast between the assertions of these men and the letters and reports of washington, that it may be well for the cool and dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh his memory by reference to the writings of washington. the following brief extracts are from his letters to the president of congress, december, : "the saving in the article of clothing, provisions, and a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with the militia, unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common course of events, would amply support a large army, which, well officered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. in my opinion, if any dependence is placed on the militia another year, congress will be deceived. when danger is a little removed from them they will not turn out at all. when it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of flying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing their families and effects; while the disaffected are concerting measures to make their submission, and spread terror and dismay all around, to induce others to follow their example. daily experience and abundant proofs warrant this information. short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. the militia come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last, at a critical moment." these remarks of washington will not be found too severe if we remember the conduct of our militia in the open field at princeton, savannah river, camden, guilford court-house, &c., in the war of the revolution; the great cost of the war of as compared with its military results; the refusal of the new england militia to march beyond the lines of their own states, and of the new-york militia to cross the niagara and secure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the southern militia from the field of bladensburg. but there is another side to this picture. if our militia have frequently failed to maintain their ground _when drawn up in the open field_, we can point with pride to their brave and successful defence of charleston, mobile, new orleans, fort mchenry, stonington, niagara, plattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia in connection with fortifications. these examples from our history must fully demonstrate the great value of a militia when properly employed as a defence against invasion, and ought to silence the sneers of those who would abolish this arm of defence as utterly useless. in the open field militia cannot in general be manoeuvred to advantage; whereas, in the defence of fortified places their superior intelligence and activity not unfrequently render them even more valuable than regulars. and in reading the severe strictures of washington, greene, morgan, and others, upon our militia, it must be remembered that they were at that time entirely destitute of important works of defence; and the experience of all other nations, as well as our own, has abundantly shown that a newly-raised force cannot cope, _in the open field_, with one subordinate and disciplined. here _science_ must determine the contest. habits of strict obedience, and of simultaneous and united action, are indispensable to carry out what the higher principles of the military profession require. new and undisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions, and strategic and tactical combinations of a regular army, and lose all confidence in their leaders and in themselves. but, when placed behind a breastwork, they even overrate their security. they can then coolly look upon the approaching columns, and, unmoved by glittering armor and bristling bayonets, will exert all their skill in the use of their weapons. the superior accuracy of aim which the american has obtained by practice from his early youth, has enabled our militia to gain, under the protection of military works, victories as brilliant as the most veteran troops. the moral courage necessary to await an attack behind a parapet, is at least equal to that exerted in the open field, where _movements_ generally determine the victory. to watch the approach of an enemy, to see him move up and display his massive columns, his long array of military equipments, his fascines and scaling-ladders, his instruments of attack, and the professional skill with which he wields them, to hear the thunder of his batteries, spreading death all around, and to repel, hand to hand, those tremendous assaults, which stand out in all their horrible relief upon the canvass of modern warfare, requires a heart at least as brave as the professional warrior exhibits in the pitched battle. but we must not forget that to call this force into the open field,--to take the mechanic from his shop, the merchant from his counter, the farmer from his plough,--will necessarily be attended with an immense sacrifice of human life. the lives lost on the battle-field are not the only ones; militia, being unaccustomed to exposure, and unable to supply their own wants with certainty and regularity, contract diseases which occasion in every campaign a most frightful mortality. there is also a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars and militia forces. the cost of a regular army of twenty thousand men for a campaign of six months, in this country, has been estimated, from data in the war-office, at a hundred and fifty dollars per man; while the cost of a militia force, under the same circumstances, making allowance for the difference in the expenses from sickness, waste of camp-furniture, equipments, &c., will be two hundred and fifty dollars per man. but in short campaigns, and in irregular warfare, like the expedition against black hawk and his indians in the northwest, and during the hostilities in florida, "the expenses of the militia," says mr. secretary spencer, in a report to congress in , "invariably exceed those of regulars by _at least three hundred per cent_." it is further stated that "_fifty-five thousand militia_ were called into service during the black hawk and florida wars, and that _thirty millions of dollars have been expended in these conflicts_!" when it is remembered that during these border wars our whole regular army did not exceed twelve or thirteen thousand men, it will not be difficult to perceive why our military establishment was so enormously expensive. large sums were paid to sedentary militia who never rendered the slightest service. again, during our late war with great britain, of less than three years' duration, _two hundred and eighty thousand muskets were lost,_--the average cost of which is stated at twelve dollars,--making an aggregate loss, in muskets alone, _of three millions and three hundred and sixty thousand dollars_, during a service of about two years and a half;--resulting mainly from that neglect and waste of public property which almost invariably attends the movements of newly-raised and inexperienced forces. facts like these should awaken us to the necessity of reorganizing and disciplining our militia. general knox, when secretary of war, general harrison while in the senate, and mr. poinsett in , each furnished plans for effecting this purpose, but the whole subject has been passed by with neglect. permanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either of the two preceding elements of national defence. they are passive in their nature, yet possess all the conservative properties of an army or navy, and through these two contribute largely to the active operations of a campaign. when once constructed they require but very little expenditure for their support. in time of peace they withdraw no valuable citizens from the useful occupations of life. of themselves they can never exert an influence corrupting to public morals, or dangerous to public liberty; but as the means of preserving peace, and as obstacles to an invader, their influence and power are immense. while contributing to the economical support of a peace establishment, by furnishing drill-grounds, parades, quarters, &c.; and to its efficiency still more, by affording facilities both to the regulars and militia for that species of artillery practice so necessary in the defence of water frontiers; they also serve as safe dépôts of arms and the immense quantity of materials and military munitions so indispensable in modern warfare. these munitions usually require much time, skill, and expense in their construction, and it is of vast importance that they should be preserved with the utmost care. maritime arsenals and depots of naval and military stores on the sea-coast are more particularly exposed to capture and destruction. here an enemy can approach by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blow before any effectual resistance can be organized. but in addition to the security afforded by harbor fortifications to public property of the highest military value, they also serve to protect the merchant shipping, and the vast amount of private wealth which a commercial people always collect at these points. they furnish safe retreats, and the means of repair for public vessels injured in battle, or by storms, and to merchantmen a refuge from the dangers of sea, or the threats of hostile fleets. moreover, they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon the enemy's shipping; and if he attempt a descent, their well-directed fire will repel his squadrons from our harbors, and force his troops to land at some distant and unfavorable position. the three means of permanent defence which have been mentioned, are, of course, intended to accomplish the same general object; but each has its distinct and proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded as antagonistical to the others. any undue increase of one, at the expense of the other two, must necessarily be followed by a corresponding diminution of national strength. we must not infer, however, that all must be maintained upon the same footing. the position of the country and the character of the people must determine this. england, from her insular position and the extent of her commerce, must maintain a large navy; a large army is also necessary for the defence of her own coasts and the protection of her colonial possessions. her men-of-war secure a safe passage for her merchant-vessels, and transport her troops in safety through all seas, and thus contribute much to the acquisition and security of colonial territory. the military forces of the british empire amount to about one hundred and fifty thousand men, and the naval forces to about seven hundred vessels of war,[ ] carrying in all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thousand men. france has less commerce, and but few colonial possessions. she has a great extent of sea-coast, but her fortifications secure it from maritime descents; her only accessible points are on the land frontiers. her army and navy, therefore, constitute _her_ principal means of defence. her army numbers some three hundred and fifty thousand men, and her navy about three hundred and fifty vessels,[ ] carrying about nine thousand guns and thirty thousand men. russia, austria, prussia, sweden, and other continental powers, have but little commerce to be protected, while their extensive frontiers are greatly exposed to land attacks: their fortifications and armies, therefore, constitute their principal means of defence. but for the protection of their own seas from the inroads of their powerful maritime neighbor, russia and austria support naval establishments of a limited extent. russia has, in all, some one hundred and eighty vessels of war, and austria not quite half that number.[ ] [footnote : these numbers include _all_ vessels of war, whether in commission, building, or in ordinary.] the united states possess no colonies; but they have a sea-coast of more than three thousand miles, with numerous bays, estuaries, and navigable rivers, which expose our most populous cities to maritime attacks. the northern land frontier is two thousand miles in extent, and in the west our territory borders upon the british and mexican possessions for many thousand miles more. within these limits there are numerous tribes of indians, who require the watchful care of armed forces to keep them at peace among themselves as well as with us. our authorized military establishment amounts to , men, and our naval establishment consists of seventy-seven vessels of all classes, carrying , guns, and , men.[ ] this is certainly a very small military and naval force for the defence of so extended and populous a country, especially one whose political institutions and rapidly-increasing power expose it to the distrust and jealousy of most other nations. [footnote : since these pages were put in the hands of the printer, the above numbers have been nearly doubled, this increase having been made with special reference to the present war with mexico.] the fortifications for the defence of our sea-coast and land frontiers will be discussed hereafter.[ ] [footnote : jomini's work on the military art contains many valuable remarks on this subject of military polity: also the writings of clausewitz, dupin, lloyd, chambray, tranchant de laverne, and rudtorfer. several of these questions are also discussed in rocquancourt, carion-nisas, de vernon, and other writers on military history. the several european annuaires militaires, or army registers, and the french and german military periodicals, contain much valuable matter connected with military statistics.] chapter vii. sea-coast defences. the principal attacks which we have had to sustain, either as colonies or states, from civilized foes, have come from canada. as colonies we were continually encountering difficulties and dangers from the french possessions. in the war of the revolution, it being one of national emancipation, the military operations were more general throughout the several states; but in the war of the attacks were confined to the northern frontier and a few exposed points along the coast. in these two contests with great britain, boston, new york, philadelphia, baltimore, washington, charleston, savannah, mobile, and new orleans, being within reach of the british naval power, and offering the dazzling attraction of rich booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults. similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future war with england. an attempt at permanent lodgment would be based either on canada or a servile insurrection in the southern states. the former project, in a military point of view, offers the greatest advantages, but most probably the latter would also be resorted to for effecting a diversion, if nothing more. but for inflicting upon us a sudden and severe injury by the destruction of large amounts of public and private property, our seaport towns offer inducements not likely to be disregarded. this mode of warfare, barbarous though it be, will certainly attend a conflict with any great maritime power. how can we best prepare in time of peace to repel these attacks? immediately after the war of a joint commission of our most distinguished military and naval officers was formed, to devise a system of defensive works, to be erected in time of peace for the security of the most important and the most exposed points on our sea-coast. it may be well here to point out, in very general terms, the positions and character of these works, mentioning only such as have been completed, or are now in course of construction, and such as are intended to be built as soon as congress shall grant the requisite funds. there are other works projected for some future period, but as they do not belong to the class required for immediate, use, they will not be referred to. maine. beginning at the northeastern extremity of our coast, we have, for eastport and wiscasset, projected works estimated to carry about fifty guns. nothing has yet been done to these works. next portland, with works carrying about forty or fifty guns, and fort penobscot and batteries, carrying about one hundred and fifty guns. these are only partly built. new hampshire. defences of portsmouth and the vicinity, about two hundred guns. these works are also only partly built. massachusetts. projected works east of boston, carrying about sixty guns. these are not yet commenced. works for defence of boston harbor carry about five hundred guns. these are nearly three-quarters completed. those of new bedford harbor carry fifty guns: not yet begun. rhode island. newport harbor,--works carry about five hundred guns, nearly completed. connecticut. new london harbor, new haven, and the connecticut river. the first of these nearly completed; the two latter not yet begun. new york. the works projected for the defence of new york harbor are estimated to carry about one thousand guns. these works are not yet one-half constructed. pennsylvania. the works projected for the defence of the delaware bay and philadelphia will carry about one hundred and fifty guns. they are not one-quarter built. maryland and virginia. baltimore and annapolis--these works will carry some two hundred and fifty guns. the works for the chesapeake bay will carry about six hundred guns; and those for the potomac river about eighty guns. these are more than one-half completed. north carolina. the works at beaufort and smithville carry about one hundred and fifty guns. they are essentially completed. south carolina. the works for the defence of charleston carry some two hundred guns. they are one-half constructed. georgia. the defences of savannah carry about two hundred guns and are nearly three-quarters finished. florida. the works projected for the defence of st. augustine, key west, tortugas, and pensacola will carry some eight or nine hundred guns. those at st. augustine and pensacola are essentially completed, but those at key west and tortugas are barely begun. alabama. the works for the defence of mobile will carry about one hundred and sixty guns. these are nearly constructed. louisiana. the works for the defence of new orleans will carry some two hundred and fifty or three hundred guns; they are nearly completed. the works north of the chesapeake cost about three thousand dollars per gun; those south of that point about six thousand dollars per gun. this difference in cost is due in part to the character of the soil on which the fortifications are built, and in part to the high prices paid in the south for materials and workmanship. * * * * * having pointed out the character and condition of our system of sea-coast defences, let us briefly examine how far these works may be relied on as a means of security against a maritime descent. to come to a proper conclusion on this subject, let us first examine the three or four great maritime descents attempted by the english during the wars of the french revolution; a period at which the great naval superiority of england over other nations, gave her the title of _mistress of the seas_. let us notice what have been the results of the several attempts made by this power at maritime invasions, and the means by which such attacks have been repelled. in , a maritime expedition was fitted out against quiberon, at an expense of eight millions of dollars. this port of the french coast had then a naval defence of near thirty sail, carrying about sixteen hundred guns. lord bridport attacked it with fourteen sail of the line, five frigates, and some smaller vessels, about fifteen hundred guns in all, captured a portion of the fleet, and forced the remainder to take shelter under the guns of the fortifications of l'orient. the french naval defence being destroyed, the british now entered quiberon without opposition. this bay is said by brenton, in his british naval history, to be "the finest on the coast of france, or perhaps in the world, for landing an army." besides these natural advantages in favor of the english, the inhabitants of the surrounding country were in open insurrection, ready to receive the invaders with open arms. a body of ten thousand troops were landed, and clothing, arms, &c., furnished to as many more royalist troops; but the combined forces failed in their attack upon st. barbe, and general hoche, from his intrenchments, with seven thousand men, held in check a body of eighteen thousand, penned up, without defences, in the narrow peninsula. reinforced by a new debarkation, the allies again attempted to advance, but were soon defeated, and ultimately almost entirely destroyed. in , the english and russians made a descent upon holland with fourteen ships of the line and ten frigates, carrying about eleven hundred guns and a great number of transports, with an army of thirty-six thousand men. the dutch naval defences consisted of eight ships of the line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight forty-eight gun ships and eight smaller frigates, carrying in all about twelve hundred guns; but this force contributed little or nothing to the defence, and was soon forced to hoist the hostile flag. the defensive army was at first only twelve thousand, but the republicans afterwards increased it to twenty-two thousand, and finally to twenty-eight thousand men. but notwithstanding this immense naval and military superiority, and the co-operation of the orange party in assisting the landing of their troops, the allies failed to get possession of a single strong place; and after a loss of six thousand men, were compelled to capitulate. "such," says alison, "was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from the british harbors during the war." in , nelson, with three ships of the line, two frigates, and thirty-five smaller vessels, made a desperate attack upon the harbor of boulogne, but was repulsed with severe loss. passing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the descent upon the scheldt, or as it is commonly called, the walcheren expedition, in . this expedition, though a failure, has often been referred to as proving the expediency of maritime descents. the following is a brief narrative of this expedition:-- napoleon had projected vast fortifications, dock-yards, and naval arsenals at flushing and antwerp for the protection of a maritime force in the scheldt. but no sooner was the execution of this project begun, than the english fitted out an expedition to seize upon the defences of the scheldt, and capture or destroy the naval force. flushing, at the mouth of the river, was but ill-secured, and antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles further up the river, was entirely defenceless; the rampart was unarmed with cannon, dilapidated, and tottering, and its garrison consisted of only about two hundred invalids and recruits. napoleon's regular army was employed on the danube and in the peninsula. the british attacking force consisted of thirty-seven ships of the line, twenty-three frigates, thirty-three sloops of war, twenty-eight gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, thirty-six smaller vessels, eighty-two gunboats, innumerable transports, with over forty thousand troops, and an immense artillery train; making in all, says the english historian, "an hundred thousand combatants." a landing was made upon the island of walcheren, and siege laid to flushing, which place was not reduced till eighteen days after the landing; the attack upon the water was made by seven or eight ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb vessels, but produced no effect. the channel at the mouth of the river was too broad to be defended by the works of flushing, and the main portion of the fleet passed out of reach of the guns, and ascended the scheldt part way up to antwerp. but in the mean time, the fortifications of that place had been repaired, and, after a fruitless operation of a whole month in the river, the english were gradually forced to retreat to walcheren, and finally to evacuate their entire conquest. the cost of the expedition was immense, both in treasure and in life. it was certainly very poorly managed. but we cannot help noticing the superior value of fortifications as a defence against such descents. they did much to retard the operations of the enemy till a defensive army could be raised. the works of flushing were never intended to close up the scheldt, and of course could not intercept the passage of shipping; but they were not reduced by the english naval force, as has sometimes been alleged. col. mitchel, of the english service, says that the fleet "kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries, that the french officers who had been present at austerlitz and jena declared that the cannonade in these battles had been a mere _jeu d'enfans_ in comparison. yet what was the effect produced on the defences of the place by this fire, so formidable, to judge by the sound alone? the writer can answer the question with some accuracy, for he went along the entire sea-line the very day after the capitulation, and found no part of the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence, and only one solitary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell, and which could not, of course, have been thrown from the line of battle ships, but must have been thrown from the land batteries."[ ] [footnote : the batteries constructed in the siege of this place were armed with fifty-two heavy guns and mortars.] but it may be said that although great naval descents on a hostile coast are almost always unsuccessful, nevertheless a direct naval attack upon a single fortified position will be attended with more favorable results; and that our seaport towns, however fortified, will be exposed to bombardment and destruction by the enemy's fleets. in other words, that in a direct contest between ships and forts the former will have at least an equal chance of success. let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. the fort is to be properly constructed and in good repair; its guns in a position to be used with effect; its garrison skilful and efficient; its commander capable and brave. the ship is of the very best character, and in perfect order; the crew disciplined and courageous; its commander skilful and adroit; the wind, and tide, and sea--all as could be desired.[ ] the numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more than requisite, with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the lists of the slain. the issue of this contest, unless attended with extraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances, would be a fair test of their relative strength. [footnote : these conditions for a battery are easily satisfied, but for the ship, are partly dependent on the elements, and seldom to be wholly attained.] what result should we anticipate from the nature of the contending forces? the ship, under the circumstances we have supposed, can choose her point of attack, selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable; but she herself is everywhere vulnerable; her men and guns are much concentrated, and consequently much exposed. but in the fort the guns and men are more distributed, a fort with an interior area of several acres not having a garrison as large as the crew of a seventy-four-gun ship. all parts of the vessel are liable to injury; while the fort offers but a small mark,--the opening of the embrasures, a small part of the carriage, and now and then a head or arm raised above the parapet,--the ratio of exposed surfaces being not less than _twenty to one_. in the vessel the guns are fired from an oscillating deck, and the balls go at random; in the fort the guns are fired from an immoveable platform, and the balls reach their object with unerring aim. there is always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship's guns, though accurately pointed at one moment, at the next will be thrown entirely away from the object, even when the motion is too slight to be otherwise noticed; whereas in the battery the guns will be fired just as they are pointed; and the motion of the vessel will merely vary to the extent of a few inches the spot in which the shot is received. in the fort the men and guns are behind impenetrable walls of stone and earth; in the vessel they are behind frail bulwarks, whose splinters are equally destructive with the shot. the fort is incombustible; while the ship may readily be set on fire by incendiary projectiles. the ship has many points exposed that may be called vital points. by losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her spars, she may become unmanageable, and unable to use her strength; she may receive shots under water, and be liable to sink; she may receive hot shot, and be set on fire: these damages are in addition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed by shots that pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers; while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned above--namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be struck. the opinions of military writers, and the facts of history, fully accord with these deductions of theory. some few individuals mistaking, or misstating, the facts of a few recent trials, assert that modern improvements in the naval service have so far outstripped the progress in the art of land defence, that a floating force is now abundantly able to cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery. ignorant and superficial persons, hearing merely that certain forts had recently yielded to a naval force, and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case, have paraded them before the public as proofs positive of a new era in military science. this conclusion, however groundless and absurd, has received credit merely from its novelty. let us examine the several trials of strength which have taken place between ships and forts within the last fifty years, and see what have been the results. in a considerable french squadron attacked cagliari, whose fortifications were at that time so dilapidated and weak, as scarcely to deserve the name of defences. nevertheless, the french fleet, after a bombardment of three days, was most signally defeated and obliged to retire. in two british ships, "the fortitude of seventy-four, and the juno frigate of thirty-two guns," attacked a small town in the bay of martello, corsica, which was armed with one gun in barbette, and a garrison of thirty men. after a bombardment of two and a half hours, these ships were forced to haul off with considerable damage and loss of life. the little tower had received no injury, and its garrison were unharmed. here were _one hundred and six guns_ afloat against _one_ on shore; and yet the latter was successful. in nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries of santa crux, in teneriffe, with eight vessels carrying four hundred guns. but notwithstanding his great superiority in numbers, skill, and bravery, he was repelled with the loss of two hundred and fifty men, while the garrison received little or no damage. a single ball from the land battery, striking the side of one of his vessels, instantly sunk her with near a hundred seamen and marines! in , a french flotilla of fifty-two brigs and gunboats, manned with near seven thousand men, attacked a little english redoubt on the island of marcou, which was armed with two thirty-two-pounders, two six-pounders, four four-pounders, and two carronades, and garrisoned with two hundred and fifty men. notwithstanding this great disparity of numbers, the little redoubt sunk seven of the enemy's brigs and gunboats, captured another, and forced the remainder to retreat with great loss; while the garrison had but one man killed and three wounded. in , the french, with three frigates and six thousand men, attacked the poorly-constructed works of porto ferrairo, whose defensive force was a motley garrison of fifteen hundred corsicans, tuscans, and english. here the attacking force was _four_ times as great as that of the garrison; nevertheless they were unsuccessful after several bombardments and a siege of five months. in july of the same year, , admiral saumarez, with an english fleet of six ships of the line and two smaller vessels, carrying in all five hundred and two guns, attacked the spanish and french defences of algesiras. supposing the floating forces of the contending parties to be equal, gun for gun, (which is certainly a very fair estimate for the attacking force, considering the circumstances of the case,) we have a french land-battery of only twelve guns opposed by an english floating force of one hundred and ninety-six guns. notwithstanding this inequality of nearly _seventeen_ to _one_, the little battery compelled the superior naval force to retreat with great loss. shortly after this, the french and spanish fleets attacked the same english squadron with a force of nearly _three_ to _one_, but met with a most signal defeat; whereas with a land-battery of only _one_ to _seventeen_, the same party had been victorious. what proof can be more decisive of the superiority of guns on shore over those afloat! in the english garrison of diamond rock, near port royal bay, with only one hundred men and some fifteen guns, repelled a french squadron of two seventy-four-gun ships, a frigate, and a brig, assisted by a land attack of two hundred troops. there was not a single man killed or wounded in the redoubt, while the french lost fifty men! the place was afterwards reduced by famine. in a french battery on cape licosa, of only two guns and a garrison of twenty-five men, resisted the attacks of a british eighty-gun ship and two frigates. the carriage of one of the land-guns failed on the second shot, so that, in fact, only _one_ of them was available during the action. here was _a single piece of ordnance_ and a garrison of _twenty-five men,_ opposed to a naval force of _over one hundred and fifty guns_ and about _thirteen hundred men._ and what effects were produced by this strange combat? the attacking force lost _thirty-seven_ men killed and wounded, the eighty-gun ship was much disabled, while the fort and garrison escaped entirely unharmed! what could not be effected by force was afterwards obtained by negotiation. in a french land-battery of only _three_ guns, near fort trinidad, drove off an english seventy-four-gun ship, and a bomb-vessel. in leghorn, whose defences were of a very mediocre character, and whose garrison at that time was exceedingly weak, was attacked by an english squadron of six ships, carrying over three hundred guns, and a land force of one thousand troops. the whole attempt was a perfect failure. "in , when the english advanced against antwerp," says colonel mitchell, an english historian, "fort frederick, a small work of only two guns, was established in a bend of the polder dyke, at some distance below lillo. the armament was a long eighteen-pounder and a five and a half inch howitzer. from this post the french determined to dislodge the english, and an eighty-gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored near the flanders shore, about six hundred yards from the british battery. by her position she was secured from the fire of the eighteen-pounder, and exposed to that of the howitzer only. as soon as every thing was made tight her broadside was opened; and if noise and smoke were alone sufficient to ensure success in war, as so many of the moderns seem to think, the result of this strange contest would not have been long doubtful, for the thunder of the french artillery actually made the earth to shake again; but though the earth shook, the single british howitzer was neither dismounted nor silenced; and though the artillery-men could not, perfectly exposed as they were, stand to their gun while the iron hail was striking thick and fast around, yet no sooner did the enemy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to their post, ready to return at least one shot for eighty. this extraordinary combat lasted from seven o'clock in the morning till near twelve at noon, when the french ship, having had forty-one men killed and wounded, her commander being in the list of the latter, and having besides sustained serious damage in her hull and rigging, returned to antwerp without effecting any thing whatever. the howitzer was not dismounted, the fort was not injured,--there being in fact nothing to injure,--and the british had only one man killed and two wounded." it is unnecessary to further specify examples from the wars of the french revolution; the whole history of these wars is one continued proof of the superiority of fortifications as a maritime frontier defence. the sea-coast of france is almost within stone's throw[ ] of the principal british naval depots; here were large towns and harbors, filled with the rich commerce of the world, offering the dazzling attraction of rich booty. the french navy was at this time utterly incompetent to their defence; while england supported a maritime force at an annual expense of near _ninety millions of dollars._ her largest fleets were continually cruising within sight of these seaports, and not unfrequently attempting to cut out their shipping. "at this period," says one of her naval historians, "the naval force of britain, so multiplied and so expert from long practice, had acquired an intimate knowledge of their (the french) harbors, their bays and creeks; her officers knew the depth of water, and the resistance likely to be met with in every situation." on the other hand, these harbors and towns were frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities of distant wars, being left with no other defence than their fortifications and militia. and yet, notwithstanding all this, they escaped unharmed during the entire contest. they were frequently attacked, and in some instances the most desperate efforts were made to effect a permanent lodgment; but in no case was the success at all commensurate with the expense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent hold was made on either the maritime frontiers of france or her allies. this certainly was owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of the british navy, as the battles of aboukir and trafalgar, and the almost total annihilation of the french marine, have but too plainly proven. why then did these places, escape? we know of no other reason, than that _they were fortified_; and that the french knew how to defend their fortifications. the british maritime expeditions to quiberon, holland, boulogne, the scheldt, constantinople, buenos ayres, &c., sufficiently prove the ill-success, and the waste of life and treasure with which they must always be attended. but when her naval power was applied to the destruction of the enemy's marine, and in transporting her land forces to solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies, in portugal and belgium, the fall of napoleon crowned the glory of their achievements. [footnote : only eighteen and a half miles across the channel at the narrowest place.] let us now examine the several british naval attacks on our own forts, in the wars of the revolution and of . in sir peter parker, with a british fleet of nine vessels, carrying about two hundred and seventy[ ] guns, attacked fort moultrie, in charleston harbor, which was then armed with only twenty-six guns, and garrisoned by only three hundred and seventy-five regulars and a few militia. in this contest the british were entirely defeated, and lost, in killed and wounded, two hundred and five men, while their whole two hundred and seventy guns killed and wounded only thirty-two men in the fort. of this trial of strength, which was certainly a fair one, cooper in his naval history, says:--"it goes fully to prove the important military position that ships cannot withstand forts, when the latter are properly armed, constructed, and garrisoned. general moultrie says only thirty rounds from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that the want of powder alone prevented the americans from destroying the men-of-war." [footnote : these vessels _rated_ two hundred and fifty-four guns, but the number actually carried is stated to have been two hundred and seventy.] in a british fleet of four vessels, carrying ninety-two guns, attacked fort boyer, a small redoubt, located on a point of land commanding the passage from the gulf into the bay of mobile. this redoubt was garrisoned by only one hundred and twenty combatants, officers included; and its armament was but twenty small pieces of cannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and most of them poorly mounted "in batteries hastily thrown up, and leaving the gunners uncovered from the knee upward," while the enemy's land force, acting in concert with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists with a battery of two guns, and seven hundred and thirty marines, indians, and negroes. his ships carried five hundred and ninety men in all. this immense disparity of numbers and strength did not allow to the british military and naval commanders the slightest apprehension "that four british ships, carrying ninety-two guns, and a land force somewhat exceeding seven hundred combatants, could fail in reducing a small work mounting only twenty short carronades, and defended by a little more than a hundred men, unprovided alike with furnaces for heating shot, or casements to cover themselves from rockets and shells." nevertheless, the enemy was completely repulsed; one of his largest ships was entirely destroyed, and men were killed and wounded on board the other; while our loss was only eight or nine. here a naval force of _five_ to _one_ was repelled by the land-battery. again, in , a barbette battery of one four-pounder and two eighteen-pounder guns at stonington, repelled a british fleet of one hundred and thirty-four guns. during the engagement the americans exhausted their ammunition, and spiked their eighteen-pounders, and only one of them was afterwards used. two of the enemy's ships, carrying one hundred and twelve guns, were engaged during the whole time of attack, and during much of this time bombarded the town from a position beyond reach of the land-battery. they were entirely too far off for the four-pounder gun to be of any use. supposing the two eighteen-pounders to have been employed during the whole action, and also all the guns of the fleet, _one_ eighteen-pounder on land must have been more than equivalent to _sixty-seven_ guns afloat, for the ships were so much injured as to render it necessary for them to withdraw. the british loss was twenty killed, and more than fifty wounded. ours was only two killed and six wounded.[ ] [footnote : perkins says two killed and six wounded. holmes says six wounded, but makes no mention of any killed.] the fleet sent to the attack of baltimore, in , consisted of forty sail, the largest of which were ships of the line, carrying an army of over six thousand combatants. the troops were landed at north point, while sixteen of the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reach of fort mchenry, and commenced a bombardment which lasted twenty-five hours. during this attack, the enemy threw "fifteen hundred shells, four hundred of which exploded within the walls of the fort, but without making any impression on either the strength of the work or the garrison," and the british were compelled to retire with much loss. in , a squadron of british ships, stationed off the mouths of the mississippi, for the purpose of a blockade, ascended the river as high as fort st. philip, which is a small work capable of an armament of only twenty guns in all. a heavy fire of shot and shells was continued with but few and short pauses for nine days and nights, but making no impression either on the fort or garrison, they retreated to their former position at the mouth of the river. there is but a single instance in the war of , where the enemy's vessels succeeded in reducing a fort; and this has sometimes been alluded to, by persons ignorant of the real facts of the case, as a proof against the ability of our fortifications to resist naval attacks. even if it were a case of decided failure, would this single exception be sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other side? we allude to the reduction of the so-called fort washington by the british fleet that ascended the potomac in , to assist in the disgraceful and barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the archives of the nation. fort washington was a very small and inefficient work, incorrectly planned by an incompetent french engineer; only a small part of the fort was then built, and it has not yet been completed. the portion constructed was never, until very recently, properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack could not possibly have held out a long time. but no defence whatever was made. capt. gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying one hundred and seventy-three guns, under orders "to ascend the river as high as fort washington, and try upon it the experiment of a bombardment," approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latter deserted the works, and rapidly retreated. the commanding officer was immediately dismissed for his cowardice. an english naval officer, who was one of the expedition, in speaking of the retreat of the garrison, says: "we were at loss to account for such an extraordinary step. the position was good and the capture would have cost us at least fifty men, and more, had it been properly defended; besides, an unfavorable wind and many other chances were in their favor," &c. the fleet ascended the river to alexandria, but learning soon afterwards that batteries were preparing at white house and indian head to cut off its retreat, it retired, in much haste, but not without injury. some have also pretended to find in modern european history a few examples contradictory of the relative power which we have here assigned to ships and forts. overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated examples, where forts of small dimensions and of small armament have repelled large fleets, they would draw their conclusions from the four or five instances where fleets have gained (as was at first supposed) a somewhat doubtful victory over forts. but a careful and critical examination of the facts in these cases, will show that even these are no exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of guns ashore over guns afloat. the only instances where it has ever been pretended by writers of any note, that ships have gained advantage, are those of the attack on copenhagen in ; the passage of the dardanelles, in ; the attack on algiers, in ; the attack on san juan d'ulloa, in ; and the attack on st. jean d'acre, in . let us examine these examples a little in detail:-- _copenhagen_.--the british fleet sent to attack copenhagen, in , consisted of fifty-two sail, eighteen of them being line-of-battle ships, four frigates, &c. they sailed from yarmouth roads on the th of march, passed the sound on the th, and attacked and defeated the danish line on the d of april. the sound between cronenberg and the swedish coast is about two and a half miles wide, (vide fig. .) the batteries of cronenberg and elsinore were lined with one hundred pieces of cannon and mortars; but the swedish battery had been much neglected, and then mounted only six guns. nevertheless, the british admiral, to avoid the damage his squadron would have to sustain in the passage of this wide channel, defended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his ships, preferred to attempt the difficult passage of the belt; but after a few of his light vessels, acting as scouts, had run on rocks, he returned to the sound. he then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threatening, however, a declaration of war if his vessels should be fired upon. it must be remembered that at this time england was at peace with both denmark and sweden, and that no just cause of war existed. hence, the admiral inferred that the commanders of these batteries would be loath to involve their countries in a war with so formidable a power as england, by commencing hostilities, when only a free passage was asked. the danish commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to pass his post, whose object and destination were unknown to him. he fired upon them, as he was bound to do by long-existing commercial regulations, and not as an act of hostility against the english. the swedes, on the contrary, remained neutral, and allowed the british vessels to lie near by for several days without firing upon them. seeing this friendly disposition of the swedes, the fleet neared their coast, and passed out of the reach of the danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls and shells; but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short of the fleet, which escaped without the loss of a single man. the swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have been impossible to construct batteries at that season, and that, even had it been possible, denmark would not have consented to their doing so, for fear that sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the rich duties levied by denmark on all ships passing the strait. there may have been some grounds for the last excuse; but the true reason for their conduct was the fear of getting involved in a war with england. napoleon says that, even at that season, a few days would have been sufficient for placing a hundred guns in battery, and that sweden had much more time than was requisite. and with a hundred guns on each side of the channel, served with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily have sustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack copenhagen. on this passage, we remark:-- st. the whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the sound amounted to only one hundred and six, while the fleet carried over seventeen hundred guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of more than _sixteen_ to _one_, the british admiral preferred the dangerous passage of the belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries. d. by negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of england, he persuaded the small swedish battery to remain silent and allow the fleet to pass near that shore, out of reach of cronenberg and elsinore. d. it is the opinion of napoleon and the best english writers, that if the swedish battery had been put in order, and acted in concert with the danish works, they might have so damaged the fleet as to render it incapable of any serious attempt on copenhagen. we now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and defence of copenhagen itself. the only side of the town exposed to the attack of heavy shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoal extending out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrow approach to the heart of the city, (fig. ) on the most advanced part of this shoal are the crown-batteries, carrying in all eighty-eight guns.[ ] the entrance into the baltic between copenhagen and salthorn, is divided into two channels by a bank, called the middle ground, which is situated directly opposite copenhagen. to defend the entrance on the left of the crown-batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channel four ships of the line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying in all three hundred and fifty-eight guns. to secure the port and city from bombardment from the king's channel, (that between the middle ground and town,) a line of floating defences were moored near the edge of the shoal, and manned principally by volunteers. this line consisted of old hulls of vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &c., carrying in all six hundred and twenty-eight guns--a force strong enough to prevent the approach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the purpose for which it was intended,) but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships of war; but these the danes thought would be deterred from approaching by the difficulties of navigation. these difficulties were certainly very great; and nelson said, beforehand, that "the wind which might carry him in would most probably not bring out a crippled ship." had the danes supposed it possible for nelson to approach with his large vessels, the line of floating defences would have been formed nearer copenhagen, the right supported by batteries raised on the isle of amack. "in that case," says napoleon, "it is probable that nelson would have failed in his attack; for it would have been impossible for him to pass between the line and shore thus lined with cannon." as it was, the line was too extended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receive assistance from the battery of amack. a part of the fleet remained as a reserve, under admiral parker, while the others, under nelson, advanced to the king's channel. this attacking force consisted of eight ships of the line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying in all eleven hundred guns, (without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is not given.) one of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought into action, and two others grounded; but, lord nelson says, "although not in the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of great service." this force was concentrated upon _a part_ of the danish line of floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it by three hundred and eighty-two guns, but so situated as to be beyond the reach of succor, and without a chance of escape. the result was what might have been expected. every vessel of the right and centre of this outer danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two small ones, which cut and run under protection of the fortifications. the left of the line, being supported by the crown-battery, remained unbroken. a division of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate substitute for the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to engage them, but "it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, was obliged to relinquish this enterprise, and sheer off." [footnote : some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but the english writers generally say eighty-eight. a few, (apparently to increase the brilliancy of the victory,) make this number still greater.] the danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel which leads to the city, were not attacked, and took no material part in the contest. they are to be reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that the british ships of the reserve should be included in the attacking force. nor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the enemy did not advance far enough to be within their range. the crown-battery was _behind_ the danish line, and mainly masked by it. a part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this line, and in repelling the direct attacks of the frigates, which it did most effectually. but we now come to a new feature in this battle. as the danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of the english, the range of the crown-battery enlarged, and its power was felt. nelson saw the danger to which his fleet was exposed, and, being at last convinced of the prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat, "made up his mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement." to retreat, however, from his present position, was exceedingly difficult and dangerous. he therefore determined to endeavor to effect an armistice, and dispatched the following letter to the prince-regent: "lord nelson has directions to spare denmark when no longer resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of denmark, lord nelson must be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without the power to save the brave danes who have defended them." this produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly ceased, when three of the english ships, including that in which nelson himself was, struck upon the bank. "they were in the jaws of destruction, and would never have escaped if the batteries had continued their fire. they therefore owed their safety to this armistice." a convention was soon signed, by which every thing was left _in statu quo_, and the fleet of admiral parker allowed to proceed into the baltic. edward baines, the able english historian of the wars of the french revolution, in speaking of nelson's request for an armistice, says: "this letter, which exhibited a happy union of policy and courage, was written at a moment when lord nelson perceived that, in consequence of the unfavorable state of the wind, the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enterprise; that _the principal batteries_ of the enemy, and the ships at the mouth of the harbor, _were yet untouched;_ that two of his own division had grounded, and others were likely to share the same fate." campbell says these batteries and ships "_were still unconquered._ two of his [nelson's] own vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy fire; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate, while he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes under the fire of the batteries." with respect to the fortifications of the town, a chronicler of the times says they were of no service while the action lasted. "they began to fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, but it was at the same time the parley appeared." the danish commander, speaking of the general contest between the two lines, says: "the crown-battery did not come at all into action." an english writer says distinctly: "the works (fortifications) of copenhagen were absolutely untouched at the close of the action." colonel mitchel, the english historian, says: "lord nelson never fired a shot at the town or fortifications of copenhagen; he destroyed a line of block-ships, prames, and floating batteries that defended the sea approach to the town; and the crown prince, seeing his capital exposed, was willing to finish by armistice a war, the object of which was neither very popular nor well understood. what the result of the action between copenhagen and the british fleet might ultimately have been, is therefore altogether uncertain. the bombardment of copenhagen by nelson, as it is generally styled, is therefore, like most other oracular phrases of the day, a mere combination of words, without the slightest meaning." the british lost in killed and wounded nine hundred and forty-three men; and the loss of the danes, according to their own account, which is confirmed by the french, was but very little higher. the english, however, say it amounted to sixteen or eighteen hundred; but let the loss be what it may, it was almost exclusively confined to the floating defences, and can in no way determine the relative accuracy of aim of the guns ashore and guns afloat. the facts and testimony we have adduced, prove incontestably-- st. that of the fleet of fifty-two sail and seventeen hundred guns sent by the english to the attack upon copenhagen, two ships carrying one hundred and forty-eight guns were grounded or wrecked; seven ships of the line, and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying over one thousand guns, were actually brought into the action; while the remainder were held as a reserve to act upon the first favorable opportunity. d. that the danish line of floating defences, consisting mostly of hulls, sloops, rafts, &c., carried only six hundred and twenty-eight guns of all descriptions; that the fixed batteries supporting this line did not carry over eighty or ninety guns at most; and that both these land and floating batteries were mostly manned and the guns served by _volunteers_. d. that the fixed batteries in the system of defence were either so completely masked, or so far distant, as to be useless during the contest between the fleet and floating force. th. that the few guns of these batteries which were rendered available by the position of the floating defences, repelled, with little or no loss to themselves, and some injury to the enemy, a vastly superior force of frigates which attacked them. th. that the line of floating defences was conquered and mostly destroyed, while the fixed batteries were uninjured. th. that the fortifications of the city and of amack island were not attacked, and had no part in the contest. th. that, as soon as the crown-batteries were unmasked and began to act, nelson prepared to retreat, but, on account of the difficulty of doing so, he opened a parley, threatening, with a cruelty unworthy of the most barbarous ages, that, _unless the batteries ceased their fire upon his ships, he would burn all the floating defences with the danish prisoners in his possession;_ and that this armistice was concluded just in time to save his own ships from destruction. th. that, consequently, the battle of copenhagen cannot be regarded as a contest between ships and forts, or a triumph of ships over forts: that, so far as the guns on shore were engaged, they showed a vast superiority over those afloat--a superiority known and confessed by the english themselves. _constantinople_.--the channel of the dardanelles is about twelve leagues long, three miles wide at its entrance, and about three-quarters of a mile at its narrowest point. its principal defences are the outer and inner castles of europe and asia, and the castles of sestos and abydos. constantinople stands about one hundred miles from its entrance into the sea of marmora, and at nearly the opposite extremity of this sea. the defences of the channel had been allowed to go to decay; but few guns were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. in constantinople not a gun was mounted, and no preparations for defence were made; indeed, previous to the approach of the fleet, the turks had not determined whether to side with the english or the french, and even then the french ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuading them to resist the demands of duckforth. the british fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two frigates, two sloops, and several bomb-vessels, carrying eight hundred and eighteen guns, (besides those in the bomb-ships.) admiral duckforth sailed through the dardanelles on the th of february, , with little or no opposition. this being a turkish festival day, the soldiers of the scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the occasion, and none were left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been prepared for defence. but while the admiral was waiting on the sea of marmora for the result of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make the attack upon constantinople, the fortifications of this city were put in order, and the turks actively employed, under french engineers and artillery officers, in repairing the defences of the straits. campbell, in his naval history, says:--"admiral duckforth now fully perceived the critical situation in which he was placed. he might, indeed, succeed, should the weather become favorable, in bombarding constantinople; _but unless the bombardment should prove completely successful in forcing the turks to pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would not compensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain. with this damaged and crippled fleet, he must repass the dardanelles, now rendered infinitely stronger than they were when he came through them_." under these circumstances the admiral determined to retreat; and on the d of april escaped through the dardanelles, steering midway of the channel, with a favorable and strong current. "this escape, however," says baines, "was only from destruction, but by no means from serious loss and injury. * * * * in what instance in the whole course of our naval warfare, have ships received equal damage in so short a time as in this extraordinary enterprise?" in detailing the extent of this damage, we will take the ships in the order they descended. the first had her wheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, but escaped with the loss of only three men. a stone shot penetrated the second, between the poop and quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen-mast, carried away the wheel, and did other serious damage, killing and wounding twenty men. two shot struck the third, carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts; loss in killed and wounded, thirty. the fourth had her mainmast destroyed, with a loss of sixteen. the fifth had a large shot, six feet eight inches in circumference, enter her lower deck; loss fifty-five. the sixth, not injured. the seventh, a good deal damaged, with a loss of seventeen. the eighth had no loss. the ninth was so much injured that, "had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite tack, she must have gone down:" her loss was eight. the tenth lost twelve. the eleventh was much injured, with a loss of eight--making a total loss in repassing the dardanelles, of one hundred and sixty-seven; and in the whole expedition two hundred and eighty-one, exclusive of two hundred and fifty men who perished in the burning of the ajax. such was the effect produced on the british fleet, sailing with a favorable wind and strong current past the half-armed and half-manned forts of the dardanelles. duckforth himself says, that "had he remained before constantinople much longer--till the forts had been completely put in order--no return would have been open to him, and the unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence." scarcely had the fleet cleared the straits, before it (the fleet) was reinforced with eight sail of the line; but, even with this vast increase of strength, the english did not venture to renew the contest. they had effected a most fortunate escape. general jomini says that if the defence had been conducted by a more enterprising and experienced people, the expedition would have cost the english their whole squadron. great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves were uninjured. the english say their own fire did no execution, the shot in all probability not even striking their objects--"the rapid change of position, occasioned by a fair wind and current, preventing the certainty of aim." the state of the batteries when the fleet first passed, is thus described in james's naval history: "some of them were dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned." and alison says: "they had been allowed to fall into disrepair. the castles of europe and asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the dominion of the crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an english broadside." much has been said because the fortifications of the dardanelles did not hermetically seal that channel, (an object they were never expected to accomplish, even had they been well armed and well served;) but it is forgotten, or entirely overlooked, that twelve _turkish line-of-battle -ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with their sails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, and lying within the line of fortifications; and yet this naval force effected little or nothing against the invaders._ it is scarcely ever mentioned, being regarded of little consequence as a means of defence; and yet the number of its guns and the expense of its construction and support, could hardly have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts, some of which were as ancient as the reign of amurath! _algiers._--the following narrative of the attack on algiers, in , is drawn from the reports of the english and dutch admirals, and other official and authentic english papers. the attack was made by the combined fleets, consisting of five sail of the line, eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels, besides five bomb-vessels and several rocket-boats, carrying in all about one thousand guns. the armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given, but the guns of those whose armaments are known, amount to over nine hundred. the harbor and defences of algiers had been previously surveyed by captain warde, royal navy, under lord exmouth's direction; and the number of the combined fleet was arranged according to the information given in this survey--just so many ships, and no more, being taken, as could be employed to advantage against the city, without being needlessly exposed. moreover, the men and officers had been selected and exercised with reference to this particular attack. from the survey of captain warde, and the accompanying map, it appears that the armament of all the fortifications of algiers and the vicinity, counting the water fronts and the parts that could flank the shore, was only two hundred and eighty-four guns of various sizes and descriptions, including mortars. but not near all of these could act upon the fleet as it lay. other english accounts state the number of guns actually opposed to the fleet at from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and thirty. some of these were in small and distant batteries, whereas nearly all the fleet was concentrated on the mole-head works. (fig. .) supposing only one broadside of the ships to have been engaged, the ratio of the forces, as expressed by the number of guns, must have been about as to . this is a favorable supposition for the ships; for we know that several of them, from their position and a change of anchorage, brought both broadsides to bear; moreover, at no one time could _all_ the guns of the water fronts of the batteries bear on the attacking ships. the algerine shipping in the harbor was considerable, including several vessels of war, but no use was made of them in defence, and nearly all were burnt. the attacking ships commanded some of the batteries, and almost immediately dismounted their guns. the walls of the casemated works were so thin as to be very soon battered down. most of the algerine guns were badly mounted, and many of them were useless after the first fire. they had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as "they loaded their guns with loose powder, put in with a ladle," they could not possibly have used hot shot, even had they constructed furnaces. the ships approached the forts, and many of them anchored in their intended position, without a shot being fired from the batteries. the action commenced at a quarter before three, and did not entirely cease till half-past eleven. the ships then took advantage of the land breeze, and, by warping and towing off, were able to get under sail and come to anchor beyond reach of the land-batteries. negotiations were again opened, and the dey surrendered the christian slaves and yielded to the terms of the treaty. during the contest, the fleet "fired nearly one hundred and eighteen tons of powder, and fifty thousand shot, (weighing more than five hundred tons of iron,) besides nine hundred and sixty thirteen and ten-inch shells, (thrown by the bomb-vessels,) and the shells and rockets from the flotilla." the vessels were considerably crippled, and their loss in killed and wounded amounted to eight hundred and eighty-three. the land batteries were much injured, and a large part of their guns dismounted. their loss is not known; the english confess they could obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very great. this seems more than probable; for, besides those actually employed in the defence, large numbers of people crowded into the forts to witness the contest. so great was this curiosity, that, when the action commenced, the parapets were covered with the multitude gazing at the manoeuvres of the ships. to avoid so unnecessary and indiscriminate a slaughter, lord exmouth (showing a humanity that does him great credit) motioned with his hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some place of safety. this loss of life in the batteries, the burning of the buildings within the town and about the mole, the entire destruction of their fleet and merchant vessels anchored within the mole and in the harbor, had a depressing effect upon the inhabitants, and probably did more than the injuries received by the batteries in securing an honorable conclusion to the treaty. we know very well that these batteries, though much injured, _were not silenced_ when lord exmouth took advantage of the land breeze and sailed beyond their reach. the ships retired-- st, because they had become much injured, and their ammunition nearly exhausted; d, in order to escape from a position so hazardous in case of a storm; and d, to get beyond the reach of the algerine batteries. lord exmouth himself gives these as his reasons for the retreat, and says, "the land wind saved me many a gallant fellow." and vice-admiral von de capellan, in his report of the battle, gives the same opinion: "_in this retreat_" says he, "which, from want of wind and the damage suffered in the rigging, was very slow, _the ships had still to suffer much from the new-opened and redoubled fire of the enemy's batteries_; at last, the land breeze springing up," &c. an english officer, who took part in this affair, says: "it was well for us that the land wind came off, or we should never have got out; and god knows what would have been our fate, had we remained all night." the motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubted. had the arabs set themselves zealously at work, during the night, to prepare for a new contest, by remounting their guns, and placing others behind the ruins of those batteries which had fallen,--in other words, had the works now been placed in hands as skilful and experienced as the english, the contest would have been far from ended. but (to use the words of the board of defence) lord exmouth relied on the effects produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade; and the result proves that he was right. his anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city, than to keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. what was this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries? the true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury done on the one side or the other--particularly as there was on one side a city to suffer as well as the batteries--as the relative efficiency of the parties when the battle closed. all political agitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been continued, or even had lord exmouth renewed it next morning? these are questions that can be answered only on conjecture; but the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, had the subsequent demands of lord exmouth been rejected, he had it in his power to enforce them by his ships; whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated. on the whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre-eminent as an example of naval success over batteries, presents an argument to shake the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seaboard. we cannot help regarding these conclusions as just, when we reflect upon all the circumstances of the case. the high character, skill, and bravery of the attacking force; their immense superiority in number of guns, with no surplus human life to be exposed; the antiquated and ill-managed works of defence, the entire want of skill of the algerine artillerists, and the neglect of the ordinary means of preparation; the severe execution which these ill-served guns did upon the enemy's ships,--an execution far more dreadful than that effected by the french or dutch fleets in their best-contested naval battles with the ships of the same foe,--from these facts, we must think that those who are so ready to draw from this case conclusions unfavorable to the use of land-batteries as a means of defence against shipping, know but little of the nature of the contest. an english historian of some note, in speaking of this attack, says:--"it is but little to the purpose, unless to prove what may be accomplished by fleets against towns exactly so circumstanced, placed, and governed. algiers is situated on an amphitheatre of hills, sloping down towards the sea, and presenting therefore the fairest mark to the fire of hostile ships. but where is the capital exactly so situated that we are ever likely to attack? and as to the destruction of a few second-rate towns, even when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy species of warfare, by which nothing was ever gained. the severe loss sustained before algiers must also be taken into account, because it was inflicted by mere algerine artillery, and was much inferior to what may be expected from a contest maintained against batteries manned with soldiers instructed by officers of skill and science, not only in working the guns, but in the endless duty of detail necessary for keeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper state of formidable efficiency." _san juan d'ulloa._--the following facts, relative to the attack on san juan d'ulloa by the french, in , are drawn principally from the report of a french engineer officer who was one of the expedition. the french fleet consisted of four ships, carrying one hundred and eighty-eight guns, two armed steamboats, and two bomb-ketches with four large mortars. the whole number of guns, of whatever description, found in the fort was one hundred and eighty-seven; a large portion of these, however, were for land defence. (fig. .) when the french vessels were towed into the position selected for the attack, "it was lucky for us," says the french officer in his report, "that the mexicans did not disturb this operation, which lasted nearly two hours, and that they permitted us to commence the fire." "we were exposed to the fire of one twenty-four-pounder, five sixteen-pounders, seven twelve-pounders, one eight-pounder, and five eighteen-pounder carronades--_in all nineteen pieces only_." if these be converted into equivalent twenty-four-pounders, in proportion to the weight of the balls, the whole nineteen guns will be _less than twelve twenty-four pounders_. this estimate is much too great, for it allows three eight-pounders to be equal to one twenty-four-pounder, and each of the eighteen-pounder carronades to be three quarters the power of a long twenty-four-pounder; whereas, at the distance at which the parties were engaged, these small pieces were nearly harmless. two of the powder magazines, from not being bomb-proof, were blown up during the engagement, by which three of the nineteen guns on the water front of the castle were dismounted; thus reducing the land force to _an equivalent of ten twenty-four-pounders_. the other sixteen guns were still effective when abandoned by the mexicans. the cannonade and bombardment continued about six hours, eight thousand two hundred and fifty shot and shells being fired at the fort by the french. the principal injury received by the work was from the explosion of the powder magazine. but very few guns were dismounted by the fire of the french ships, and only three of these on the water front. the details of the condition of the ships and fort are given in the report of the french officer,[ ] but it is unnecessary to repeat them here. [footnote : vide also house doc. no. , twenty-sixth congress, first session] in general terms, it appears from the above-mentioned report, that the number of guns actually brought into action by the floating force, (counting only one broadside of the ship,) amounted to _ninety-four guns, besides four heavy sea-mortars_; that the whole number so employed in the fort was only _nineteen, including the smallest calibres_; that these guns were generally so small and inefficient, that their balls would not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking frigates; the principal injury sustained by the castle was produced by the explosion of powder magazines injudiciously placed and improperly secured; that the castle, though built of poor materials, was but slightly injured by the french fire; that the mexicans proved themselves ignorant of the ordinary means of defence, and abandoned their works when only a few of their guns had been dismounted; that notwithstanding all the circumstances in favor of the french, their killed and wounded, in proportion to the guns acting against them, was upwards of _four times_ as great as the loss of the english at the battle of trafalgar! _st. jean d'acre_.--the narratives of the day contained most exaggerated accounts of the english attack on st. jean d'acre; now, however, the principal facts connected with this attack are fully authenticated. for the amount of the fleet we quote from the british official papers, and for that of the fort, from the pamphlet of lieutenant-colonel matuszewiez. these statements are mainly confirmed by the narratives, more recently published, of several english and french eye-witnesses. the fortifications were built of poor materials, antiquated in their plans, and much decayed. their entire armament amounted to only two hundred guns, some of which were merely field-pieces. the water fronts were armed with one hundred cannon and sixteen mortars, those of the smaller calibre included. (fig. .) when approached by the british fleet, the works were undergoing repairs, and, says commodore napier, "were fast getting into a state of preparation against attack." the british fleet consisted of eight ships of the line, carrying six hundred and forty-six guns; six frigates, carrying two hundred and thirty-six guns; four steamers, carrying eighteen guns; and two or three other vessels, whose force is not given. "only a few guns," says napier, "defended the approach from the northward," and most of the ships came in from that direction. the western front was armed with about forty cannon; but opposed to this were six ships and two steamers, carrying about five hundred guns. their fire was tremendous during the engagement, but _no breach was made_ in the walls. the south front was armed in part by heavy artillery and in part by field-pieces. this front was attacked by six ships and two steamers, carrying over two hundred guns. the eastern front was armed only with light artillery; against this was concentrated the remainder of the fleet, carrying about two hundred and forty guns. the guns of the works were so poorly mounted, that but few could be used at all; and these, on account of the construction of the fort, could not reach the ships, though anchored close by the walls. "only five of their guns," says napier, "placed in a flanking battery, were well served, and never missed; but they were pointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only." the stone was of so poor a quality, says the narrative of colonel matuszewiez, that the walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered appearance, but they were nowhere seriously injured. in the words of napier, "_they were not breached, and a determined enemy might have remained secure under the breastworks, or in the numerous casemates, without suffering much loss_." the accidental explosion of a magazine within the fort, containing six thousand casks of powder, laid in ruins a space of sixty thousand square yards, opened a large breach in the walls of the fortifications, partially destroyed the prisons, and killed and wounded a thousand men of the garrison. this frightful disaster, says the french account, hastened the triumph of the fleet. the prisoners and malefactors, thus released from confinement, rushed upon the garrison at the same time with the mountaineers, who had besieged the place on the land side. the uselessness of the artillery, the breaches of the fort, the attacks of the english, all combined to force the retreat of the garrison, "in the midst of scenes of blood and atrocious murders." we will close this account with the following extract of a speech of the duke of wellington, in the house of lords, feb. , : "he had had," he said, "a little experience in services of this nature; and he thought it his duty to warn their lordships, on this occasion, that they must not always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallant their seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully with stone walls. he had no recollection, in all his experience, except the recent instance on the coast of syria, of any fort being taken by ships, excepting two or three years ago, when the fort of san juan d'ulloa was captured by the french fleet. this was, he thought, the single instance that he recollected, though he believed that something of the sort had occurred at the siege of havana, in . the present achievement he considered one of the greatest of modern times. this was his opinion, and he gave the highest credit to those who had performed such a service. it was, altogether, a most skilful proceeding. he was greatly surprised at the small number of men that was lost on board the fleet; and, on inquiring how it happened, he discovered that it was because the vessels were moored within one-third of the ordinary distance. the guns of the fortress were intended to strike objects at a greater distance; and the consequence was, that the shot went over the ships that were anchored at one-third the usual distance. by that means, they sustained not more than one-tenth of the loss which they would otherwise have experienced. not less than five hundred pieces of ordnance were directed against the walls, and the precision with which the fire was kept up, the position of the vessels, and, lastly, the blowing up of the large magazine--all aided in achieving this great victory in so short a time. he had thought it right to say thus much, because he wished to warn the public against supposing that such deeds as this could be effected every day. he would repeat that this was a singular instance, in the achievement of which undoubtedly great skill was manifested, but which was also connected with peculiar circumstances, which they could not hope always to occur. it must not therefore be expected, as a matter of course, that all such attempts must necessarily succeed." having completed our examination of the ability of land batteries to cope, gun for gun, with a naval force, let us consider, for a few moments, the objection which is sometimes made to the use of fortifications for the defence of the sea-coast, viz.: _that our maritime cities and arsenals can be better and more economically secured by a home squadron_. we have already alluded to the impossibility of substituting one means of defence for another. the efficiency of the bayonet can in no way enable us to dispense with artillery, nor the value of engineer troops in the passage of rivers, and the attack and defence of forts, render cavalry the less necessary in other operations of a campaign. to the navy alone must we look for the defence of our shipping upon the high seas; but it cannot replace fortifications in the protection of our harbors, bays, rivers, arsenals, and commercial towns. let us take a case in point. for the defence of new york city, it is deemed highly important that the east river should be closed to the approach of a hostile fleet at least fifteen or twenty miles from the city, so that an army landed there would have to cross the westchester creek, the bronx, harlem river, and the defiles of harlem heights--obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence. throg's neck is the position selected for this purpose; cannon placed there not only command the channel, but, from the windings of the river, sweep it for a great distance above and below. no other position, even _in_ the channel itself, possesses equal advantages. hence, if we had only naval means of defence, it would be best, were such a thing possible, to place the floating defences themselves on this point. leaving entirely out of consideration the question of relative _power, position_ alone would give the superior efficiency to the fort. but there are other considerations no less important than that of position. fort schuyler can be garrisoned and defended in part by the same militia force which will be employed to prevent the march of the enemy's army on the city. on the other hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen; they will consequently be of less value in the subsequent land operations. moreover, forts, situated as this is, can be so planned as to bring to bear upon any part of the channel a greater number of guns than can be presented by any hostile squadron against the corresponding portion of the fort. this result can be obtained with little difficulty in narrow channels, as is done in most of the other works for the defence of new york, the works for boston, newport, philadelphia, baltimore, charleston, savannah, new orleans, &c., and an approximation to it is not incompatible with the defence of the broader estuaries, like the chesapeake. but we will suppose that there are no such points of land, in the inlets to our harbors, and that we rely for defence upon a naval force exclusively. let us leave out of consideration the security of all our other harbors and our commerce on the high seas, and also the importance of having at command the means of attacking the enemy's coast, in the absence of his fleet. we take the single case of the attack being made on new york harbor, and that our whole fleet is assembled there. now, if this fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success may be regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us--for an attacking force would probably be of picked men and of the best materials. but here the consequences of victory are very unequal: the enemy can lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both our squadron and the objects it is intended to defend. if we suppose our own naval force superior to that of the enemy, the defence of this harbor would in all respects be complete, provided this force never left the harbor. but, then, all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must be left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleets within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor. these remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single harbor of new york; whereas portland, portsmouth, boston, newport, the delaware, the chesapeake, charleston, savannah, pensacola, mobile, new orleans, and numerous other places, are equally open to attack, and therefore must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemy will direct his assaults. if he come to one of these in the absence of our fleet, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. could our fleet be so arranged as to meet these enterprises? "as it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot? and if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe? suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length--a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to ours? must the gulf of mexico be swept, as well as the atlantic; or shall we give up the gulf to the enemy? shall we cover the southern cities, or give them up also? we must unquestionably do one of two things--either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question." "on the practicability of covering a small extent of coast by cruising in front of it--or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an enemy's operations, discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of the ocean--it may be well to consult experience." the naval power of spain under philip ii. was almost unlimited. with the treasures of india and america at his command, the fitting out of a fleet of one hundred and fifty or two hundred sail, to invade another country, was no very gigantic operation. nevertheless, this naval force was of but little avail as a coast defence. its efficiency for this purpose was well tested in . england and holland attacked cadiz with a combined fleet of one hundred and seventy ships, which entered the bay of cadiz without, on its approach to their coast, being once seen by the spanish navy. this same squadron, on its return to england, passed along a great portion of the spanish coast without ever meeting with the slightest opposition from the innumerable spanish floating defences. in , a french fleet of twenty ships, and a land force of twenty-two thousand men, sailed from brest to the english coast, without meeting with any opposition from the superior british fleet which had been sent out, under sir john norris, on purpose to intercept them. the landing of the troops was prevented by a storm, which drove the fleet back upon the coast of france to seek shelter. in , a french fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, and many smaller vessels, sailed from brest for america. nine of these soon afterwards returned to france, and the others proceeded to the gulf of st. lawrence. an english fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some frigates had been sent out to intercept them; but the two fleets passed each other in a thick fog, and all the french vessels except two reached quebec in safety. in , a french fleet, blockaded in the port of dunkirk by a british force under commodore bogs, seizing upon a favorable opportunity, escaped from the enemy, attacked the coast of scotland, made a descent upon carrickfergus, and cruised about till february, , without meeting a single british vessel, although sixty-one ships of the line were then stationed upon the coasts of england and france, and several of these were actually in pursuit. in , when the french attempted to throw the army of hoche into ireland, the most strenuous efforts were made by the british navy to intercept the french fleet in its passage. the channel fleet, of near thirty sail of the line, under lord bridport, was stationed at spithead; sir roger curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to the westward; vice-admiral colpoys was stationed off brest, with thirteen sail of the line; and sir edward pellew (afterwards lord exmouth) watched the harbor, with a small squadron of frigates. notwithstanding this triple floating bulwark, as it was called--one fleet on the enemy's coast, a second in the downs, and a third close on their own shores--the french fleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of twenty-five thousand men, reached bantry bay in safety! this fleet was eight days on the passage, and three more in landing the troops; and most of the vessels might have returned to brest in safety, had it not been for disasters by storms, for only _one_ of their whole number was intercepted by the vast naval force which england had assembled for that express object. "the result of this expedition," says alison, "was pregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries. to the french, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a maritime expedition, in comparison with a land campaign; the small number of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet; and the unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, defeat the best concerted enterprises. to the english, as showing that _the empire of the seas does not always afford security against invasion;_ that, in the face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen days at the mercy of the enemy; and that neither the skill of her sailors nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of the elements, saved them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions. while these considerations are fitted to abate the confidence in invasion, they are calculated, at the same time, to weaken an overweening confidence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that _the only base upon which certain reliance can be placed_, even by an insular power, _is a well-disciplined army and the patriotism of its own subjects_." subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks. in the following year, a french squadron of two frigates and two sloops, passed the british fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping in the port of ilfracombe, and safely landed their troops on the coast of wales. again, in , the immense british naval force failed to prevent the landing of general humbert's army in the bay of killala; and, in the latter part of the same year, a french squadron of nine vessels and three thousand men escaped sir j.b. warren's squadron, and safely reached the coast of ireland. as a further illustration, we quote from the report of the board of national defence in . the toulon fleet, in , consisting of about twenty sail of the line and twenty smaller vessels of war, and numerous transports, making in all, three hundred sail and forty thousand troops, slipped out of port and sailed to malta. "it was followed by nelson, who, thinking correctly that they were bound for egypt, shaped his course direct for alexandria. the french, steering towards candia, took the more circuitous passage; so that nelson arrived at alexandria before them, and, not finding them there, returned, by way of caramania and candia, to sicily, missing his adversary in both passages. sailing again for alexandria, he found the french fleet at anchor in aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, achieved the memorable victory of the nile. when we consider the narrowness of the sea; the numerous vessels in the french fleet; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad atlantic." "the escape of another toulon fleet in ; the long search for them in the mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the west indies; their evasion of him among the islands; the return to europe; his vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of portugal, in the bay of biscay, and off the english channel; and the meeting at last at trafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of a battle--these are instances, of the many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, and how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse chances. for more than a year nelson most closely watched his enemy, who seems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. when out, nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course villeneuve had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of egypt. scattered by tempests, the french fleet again took refuge in toulon; whence it again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the spanish fleet at cadiz." "on the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to belong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country, this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible. it demands of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which, to do at all, seems impossible. the navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance, and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the purpose itself is formed. on an element where man is but the sport of storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of fogs and darkness." "finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the war, having no hope or reserve beyond." "the proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has a more glorious sphere--that of the _offensive_. in our last war, instead of lying in harbor, and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number--instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our commerce without countenance or aid, they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's navigation. and we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the enemy's property thus destroyed, of american property protected or recovered, and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal--they rendered benefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors. confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. in order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active and energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence." a few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy of their support, and we will close this discussion. we do not regard this question, however, as a matter of any great importance, for it can seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. no matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be substituted for the other. there are some few cases, however, where this might be taken into consideration, and would be decisive. let us endeavor to illustrate our meaning. for the defence of new york city, the narrows and east river must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in this case, be substituted. but let us suppose that the _outer_ harbor of new york furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops, or that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel them. this outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a shelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous preparatory to a forcible passage of the narrows; while to us its possession would not be absolutely essential, though very important. strong fortifications on sandy hook, and one of the shoals, might probably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the entrance of this outer harbor; on the other hand, a naval force stationed within the inner harbor, and acting under the protection of forts at the narrows, might also furnish a good, though perhaps less certain protection for this outer roadstead. here, then, we might well consider the question of relative cost and economy of support of the proposed fortifications, and of a home squadron large enough to effect the same object, and to be kept continually _at home_ for that special purpose. if we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of our commerce, its character and efficiency as a _harbor_ defence would be lost. we can therefore regard it only as a local force--fixed within the limits of the defence of this particular place--and our estimates must be made accordingly. the average durability of ships of war in the british navy, has been variously stated at seven and eight years in time of war, and from ten to twelve and fourteen years in time of peace. mr. perring, in his "brief inquiry," published in , estimates the average durability at about eight years. his calculations seem based upon authentic information. a distinguished english writer has more recently arrived at the same result, from estimates based upon the returns of the board of admiralty during the period of the wars of the french revolution. the data in our own possession are less complete; the appropriations for _building_ and _repairing_ having been so expended as to render it impossible to draw any accurate line of distinction. but, in the returns now before us, there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the _timbers_ used for these two purposes; and consequently, so far as this (the main item of expense) is concerned, we may form pretty accurate comparisons. according to edge, (pp. , ,) the average cost of timber, for hulls, masts, and yards, in _building_ an english gun ship, is £ , . let us now compare this cost of timber for _building_, with that of the same item for _repairs_, for the following fifteen ships, between and . the list would have been still further enlarged, but the returns for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect: ============================================================ name of ship. |no. of| when | repaired from | cost. |guns. |built.| | ------------------------------------------------------------ vengeance,...........| | -- | to | £ , ildefonso,...........| | -- | to | , scipio,..............| | -- | to | , tremendous,..........| | -- | to | , elephant,............| | -- | to | , spencer,.............| | | to | , romulus,.............| | -- | to | , albion,..............| | | to | , donegal,.............| | -- | to | , implacable,..........| | -- | to | , illustrious,.........| | | to | , northumberland,......| | -- | to | , kent,................| | -- | to | , sultan,..............| | | to | , sterling castle,.....| | -- | to | , ------------------------------------------------------------ this table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships, during a period of less than twenty years, the cost of _timber alone_ used in their repair, an average of about $ , each. more timber than this was used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid for out of the funds appropriated "for such as may be ordered in course of the year to be repaired." but the amount specifically appropriated for timber for these fifteen ships, would, in every twelve or fifteen years, equal the entire _first cost_ of the same items. if we add to this amount, the cost of labor required in the application of timber to the operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense of other materials and labor, and the decayed condition of many of the ships at the end of this period, we should not be surprised to find the whole sum _expended_ under these heads to equal the first cost, even within the minimum estimate of seven years. the whole cost of timber used for hulls, masts, and yards, in building between and , was £ , , ; in repairs and "ordinary wear and tear," £ , , ; making an annual average of $ , , for building timber, and $ , , for that used in repairs. a large portion of the vessels _built_ were intended to replace others which had been lost, or were so decayed as to be broken up. but it may be well to add here, the actual supplies voted for the sea-service, and for wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing of ships from to . =============================================================== | | for the wear|ext. expenses| for entire | | year | and tear of |for building,| sea-service. | | | ships. |repairing,&c.| | |---------------------------------------------------| | | £ , , | £ , | £ , , | | | , , | , | , , | | | , , | , | , , | | | , , | , | , , | | | , , | , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | --------------------------------------------------------------- it appears from this table that the appropriations for the service, during the first fifteen years of the present century, amounted to a little less than _ninety millions_ of dollars per annum; and for the wear and tear of ships, and "the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing ships, &c.," the annual appropriations amounted to near _thirty millions_. our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to form any very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and repairs of our men-of-war. the following table, compiled from a report of the secretary of the navy, in , (senate doc. no. , th congress,) will afford data for an approximate calculation:-- ====================================================================== name of no. total cost when cost of repaired ship. of of building, completed. repairs, between. guns. exclusive of exclusive armament, of stores, ordnance, &c. &c. &c. &c. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- delaware, $ , $ , and n. carolina, , , and constitution, , , and united states , , and brandywine, [ ] , [ ] , and potomac, [ ] , [ ] , and concord, , , and falmouth, , , and john adams, , , and boston, , , and st. louis, , , and vincennes, , , and vandalia, , , and lexington, ? , , and warren, ? , , and fairfield, , , and natches,[ ] ? , , and boxer, , , and enterprise, , , and grampus, , , and dolphin, , , and shark, , , and ---------------------------------------------------------------------- [footnote : returns incomplete.] [footnote : broken up in .] it appears from the above table, that the cost of constructing ships of the line is about $ , per gun; of frigates, $ , per gun; of smaller vessels of war, a little less than $ , per gun: making an average cost of vessels of war to be _more than six thousand dollars per gun._ and the expense of repairs for these vessels is _more than seven per cent. per annum_ on their first cost. we have as yet had but little experience in the use of war-steamers. the fulton, four guns, built in -' , cost three hundred and thirty-three thousand seven hundred and seventy dollars and seventy-seven cents; the mississippi and missouri, ten guns each, built in , cost about six hundred thousand dollars a piece; making an average cost for war-steamers of _over sixty thousand dollars per gun._ the cost of repairs of steam ships will be much greater than those for vessels of war; but we have not yet had sufficient experience to determine the exact amount. it has been estimated, however, by competent judges, that when kept, the expense of repairs will at least equal twelve per cent. of the first cost. the expense of keeping them in commission is enormously great. "their engines," says the secretary of the navy, in his annual report in , "consume so much fuel as to add enormously to their expenses; and the necessity that they should return to port, after short intervals of time, for fresh supplies, renders it impossible to send them on any distant service. they cannot be relied on as cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service in time of peace. i have therefore determined to take them out of commission, and substitute for them other and less expensive vessels." the average cost of permanent fortifications is but _little more than three thousand dollars per gun_. and it must be obvious, from the nature of the materials of which they are constructed, that the expense of their support must be inconsiderable. it is true that for some years past a large item of annual expenditure for fortifications has been under the head of "repairs;" but much of this sum is for alterations and enlargements of temporary and inefficient works, erected anterior to the war of . some of it, however, has been for actual repairs of decayed or injured portions of the forts; these injuries resulting from the nature of the climate, the foundations, the use of poor materials and poor workmanship, and from neglect and abandonment. but if we include the risk of abandonment at times, it is estimated, upon data drawn from past experience, that _one-third of one per cent. per annum_, of the first cost, will keep in perfect repair any of our forts that have been constructed since the last war. but it is unnecessary to further discuss this question we repeat what has already been said, no matter what may be the relative cost of ships and forts, the one, as a general thing, cannot be substituted for the other. each has its own sphere of action, and each will contribute, in its own way, to the national defence; and any undue increase of one, at the expense of the other, will be attended by a corresponding diminution of national power.[ ] [footnote : for further information concerning our system of sea-coast defences, the reader is referred to house doc. , twenty-sixth congress, second session; senate doc. , twenty-eighth congress, second session; and to the annual reports of the chief engineer.] chapter viii. our northern frontier defences. in discussing engineering as a branch of the military art, we spoke of the use of fortifications on land frontiers, and their influence on the strategic operations of a campaign. a brief notice was also given of the different systems that have been proposed for arranging these defensive works. let us now apply this discussion to our northern frontier. the principle laid down by napoleon and jomini, "that fortifications should always be constructed on important strategic points," is undoubtedly the correct one: but how to determine these points is a question that will often perplex the patience and try the skill of the engineer; yet determine them he must, or his fortifications will be worse than useless; for a fort improperly located, like a cannon with its fire reversed on its own artillerists, will be sure to effect the destruction of the very forces it was designed to protect. the selection of positions for fortifications on our northern frontier must have reference to three distinct classes of objects, viz.: the security, _first_, of the large frontier towns, where much public and private property is exposed to sudden dashing expeditions of the foe, made either on land or by water; _second_, of lake harbors, important as places of refuge and security to our own ships, or to the enemy's fleets while engaged in landing troops or furnishing supplies to an invading army; _third_, of all strategic points on the probable lines of offensive or defensive operations. these objects are distinct in their nature, and would seem to require separate and distinct means for their accomplishment; nevertheless, it will generally be found that positions selected with reference to one of these objects equally fulfil the others, so intimately are they all connected. to determine the strategic points of a probable line of military operations is therefore the main thing to be attended to in locating fortifications. that such points of maximum importance are actually marked out by the peaceful or hostile intercourse of nations cannot be doubted. the _relative_ importance of cities and towns is less varied by the fluctuations of commerce on a land frontier than on the sea-coast. the ever-changing system of "internal improvements," by furnishing new highways and thoroughfares for the transportation of the products of manufacturers and agriculture, either continually varies the relative standing of the seaports already opened, or opens new ones for the exportation of these products, and the importation of foreign articles received in exchange. but these "internal improvements" are seldom carried so far as to connect together two separate and distinct countries, and consequently the principal places on the dividing line usually retain their relative importance, no matter how often they may have declined during times of hostility, or again flourished with the increased commercial intercourse which results from peace. the principal european places of traffic near the frontiers have remained the same for ages, and in all probability ages hence the great frontier marts will be nearly the same as at present. this stability of rank among border towns is not confined to commercial influence; the same holds true with respect to that established by intercourse of a hostile character. military history teaches us that lines of hostile operations, and the fields upon which the principal battles between any two countries have been fought, are nearly the same, no matter how remote the periods of comparison. these points and lines, so important in commerce as well as in war, result from the natural features of the ground, and we ought therefore to expect that they would be as little liable to sudden changes as the character of the earth itself. from these remarks it will readily be perceived that there are three distinct methods of determining the strategic points between this country and canada: st, by an examination of the topography of the two countries; d, by tracing out the main channels of commercial intercourse; d, by reviewing the lines of their military operations. the last method is the least liable to error, and perhaps is the most easily understood, inasmuch as it is sometimes difficult to point out the precise degree of connection between prospective military lines and the channels of commerce, or to show why these two have a fixed relation to the physical features of the country. in the present instance, moreover, this method furnishes ample data for the formation of our decision, inasmuch as the campaigns between this country and canada have been neither few in number nor unimportant in their character and results. in tracing out the main features of the early wars upon our northern frontier, it must be borne in mind that nearly the same portion of country which is now possessed by the english, was then occupied by the french, and that the english possessions in north america included the present middle and northern states. at the period of the american revolution the french and english had completely changed ground, the armies of the former operating in the "states," while the english were in possession of canada. the first expedition to be noticed against that portion of the country, was conducted by samuel argall, who sailed from virginia in , with a fleet of eleven vessels, attacked the french on the penobscot, and afterwards the st. croix. in , sedgwick, at the head of a small new england army, attacked the french on the penobscot, and overrun all arcadia. in , during the contest between charles ii. and louis xiv., it was proposed to march the new england troops across the country by the kennebec or penobscot, and attack quebec; but the terrors and difficulties of crossing "over rocky mountains and howling deserts" were such as to deter them from undertaking the campaign. in , count frontenac, governor of canada, made a descent into new york to assist the french fleet in reducing that province. his line of march was by the river sorrel and lake champlain. an attack upon montreal by the iroquois soon forced him to return; but in the following january a party of french and indians left montreal in the depth of a canadian winter, and after wading for two and twenty days, with provisions on their backs, through snows and swamps and across a wide wilderness, reached the unguarded village of schenectady. here a midnight war-whoop was raised, and the inhabitants either massacred or driven half-clad through the snow to seek protection in the neighboring towns. in , a congress of the colonies, called to provide means for the general defence, assembled at new york, and resolved to carry war into canada: an army was to attack montreal by way of lake champlain, and a fleet to attempt quebec by the st. lawrence. the former advanced as far as the lake, when the quarrels of the commanding officers defeated the objects of the expedition. the massachusetts fleet of thirty-four vessels, (the largest carrying forty-four guns each,) and two thousand men, failed to reduce quebec, though the defences of that place were then of the slightest character, and armed with only twenty-three guns. in , and again in , port royal was attacked by costly expeditions fitted out by the eastern colonies; and again, in , a land force of fifteen hundred men advanced against montreal by lake champlain; but nothing of importance was effected by either expedition. in , lord bolingbroke planned the conquest of canada. the land forces, numbering five thousand men in all, were separated into two distinct armies, the one sent against detroit, and the other against montreal by lake champlain; while a fleet of fifteen ships of war, forty transports, and six store-ships, carrying a land force of six thousand five hundred men, was to attack quebec. the maritime expedition failed to reach its destination, and after losing a part of the fleet and more than a thousand men in the st. lawrence, this part of the project was abandoned. nor was any thing important accomplished by either division of the land forces. the same plan of campaign was followed in . an army of four thousand men marched against montreal by lake champlain, but on hearing of the failure of the naval expedition and of the concentration of the french forces on the river sorel, they retired towards albany. the next expedition of any importance was the naval one of against louisburg. for the attack of this place the colonies raised about four thousand men, and one hundred small vessels and transports, carrying between one hundred and sixty and two hundred guns. they were afterwards joined by ten other vessels carrying near five hundred guns. this attacking force now, according to some of the english writers, consisted of six thousand provincials, and eight hundred seamen, and a combined naval force of near seven hundred guns. the troops landed, and laid siege to the town. the garrison of the fortifications of louisburg consisted of six hundred regulars and one thousand breton militia, or, according to some writers, of only twelve hundred men in all. the armament of these works was one hundred and one cannon, seventy-six swivels, and six mortars. auxiliary to the main works were an island-battery of thirty twenty-two-pounders, and a battery on the main land armed with thirty large cannon. frequent attempts were made to storm the place, but the most persevering efforts were of no avail, many of the new englanders being killed and wounded, and their boats destroyed, while the garrison remained unharmed. at length, after a siege of forty-nine days, want of provisions and the general dissatisfaction of the inhabitants, caused the garrison to surrender. when the new englanders saw the strength of the works, and the slight impression which their efforts had produced, they were not only elated but greatly astonished at their success. it should be noticed, that in the above attack the number of guns in the fleet was almost _three_ times as great as that of all the forts combined; and yet the _naval_ part of the attack was unsuccessful. the besieging army was more than _four_ times as great as all the garrisons combined; and yet the place held out forty-nine days, and at last was surrendered through the want of provisions and the disaffection of the citizens. this place was soon afterwards restored to the french. we see that, thus far in these wars, the english were vastly superior in strength and numbers, yet the result of the several campaigns was decidedly in favor of the french, who not only retained their possessions in the north, but extended their jurisdiction to the mouth of the mississippi, and laid claim to the whole country west of the alleghany mountains. this success must be attributed, not to any superiority of the canadians in bravery, but to the higher military character of their governors, _and more especially to their fortifications_, which were constructed in situations most judiciously selected, to influence the indians and facilitate incursions into the english colonies. the french pursued interior and central lines, while the english followed exterior and divergent lines. the disparity of numbers was always very great. at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the whole population of the colonies amounted to upwards of one million of souls, while that of both canada and louisiana did not exceed fifty-two thousand. but the french possessions, though situated at the extremities of a continent and separated by an almost boundless wilderness, were nevertheless connected by a line of military posts, strong enough to resist the small arms that could then be brought against them. this fort-building propensity of the french became a matter of serious alarm to the colonies, and in the legislature of new york especially protested against it in an address to the crown. while the military art was stationary in england, france had produced her four great engineers--errard, pagan, vauban, and cormontaigne; and nowhere has the influence of their system of military defence been more strikingly exhibited than in the security it afforded to the canadian colony, when assailed by such vastly superior british forces. still further accessions were now made to these english forces by large reinforcements from the mother country, while the canadians received little or no assistance from france; nevertheless they prolonged the war till , forcing the english to adopt at last the slow and expensive process of reducing all their fortifications. this will be shown in the following outline of the several campaigns. very early in , a considerable body of men was sent from great britain to reinforce their troops in this country. these troops were again separated into four distinct armies. the _first_, consisting of near two thousand men, marched to the attack of fort du quesne, but was met and totally defeated by one-half that number of french and indians. the _second_ division, of fifteen hundred, proceeded to attack fort niagara by way of oswego, but returned without success. the _third_, of three thousand seven hundred men, met and defeated dieskau's army of twelve hundred regulars and six hundred canadians and indians, in the open field, but did not attempt to drive him from his works at ticonderoga and crown point. the _fourth_, consisting of three thousand three hundred men and forty-one vessels, laid waste a portion of nova scotia; thus ending the campaign without a single important result. it was commenced under favorable auspices, with ample preparations, and a vast superiority of force; _but this superiority was again more than counterbalanced by the faulty plans of the english, and by the fortifications which the french had erected, in such positions as to give them a decided advantage in their military operations._ washington early recommended the same system of defence for the english on the ohio; and, after braddock's defeat, advised "the erection of small fortresses at convenient places to deposit provisions in, by which means the country will be eased of an immense expense in the carriage, and it will also be a means of securing a retreat if we should be put to the rout again." but this advice of washington was unheeded, and the campaign of was based upon the same erroneous principles as the preceding one. the _first_ division, of three thousand men, was to operate against fort du quesne; the _second_, of six thousand men, against niagara; the _third_, of ten thousand men, against crown point; and a _fourth_, of two thousand men, was to ascend the kennebec river, destroy the settlements on the chaudiere, and, by alarming the country about quebec, produce a diversion in favor of the third division, which was regarded as the main army, and was directed along the principal line of operations. the entire french forces at this time consisted of only three thousand regulars and a body of canadian militia. nevertheless, the english, with forces nearly _six times_ as numerous, closed the campaign without gaining a single advantage. we here see that the french, with very inferior forces, still continued successful in every campaign, uniformly gaining advantage over their enemy, and gaining ground upon his colonies. by the possession of forts william henry, ticonderoga, and crown point, they completely commanded lake george and lake champlain, which afforded the shortest and easiest line of communication between the british colonies and canada. by means of their forts at montreal, frontenac, detroit, &c., they had entire dominion of the lakes connecting the st. lawrence with the mississippi, and canada with louisiana; moreover, by means of fort du quesne and a line of auxiliary works, their ascendency over the indians on the ohio was well secured. but experience had at length taught the english wherein lay the great strength of their opponents, and a powerful effort was now to be made to displace the french from their fortresses, or at least to counterbalance these works by a vast and overwhelming superiority of troops. in , a british fleet of fifteen ships of the line, eighteen frigates, and many smaller vessels, and a land force of twelve thousand effective men, were sent to attempt the reduction of the fortifications of louisburg; but they failed to effect their object. in the forces sent against this place consisted of twenty ships of the line and eighteen frigates, with an army of fourteen thousand men. the harbor was defended by only five ships of the line, one fifty-gun ship, and five frigates, three of which were sunk across the mouth of the basin. the fortifications of the town had been much neglected, and in general had fallen into ruins. the garrison consisted of only two thousand five hundred regulars, and six hundred militia. notwithstanding that the number of guns of the british fleet exceeded both the armaments of the french ships and of all the forts, these british ships did not risk an attack, but merely acted as transports and as a blockading squadron. even the french naval defence, and the outer works commanding the harbor, were reduced by the temporary land-batteries which wolfe erected; and the main work, although besieged by an inequality of forces of nearly _five_ to _one_, held out for two months, and even then surrendered through the fears and petitions of the non-combatant inhabitants, and not because it had received any material injury from the besiegers. the defence, however, had been continued long enough to prevent, for that campaign, any further operations against canada. the whole number of the english land forces in this campaign was computed at fifty thousand men, of which more than forty thousand were in the field. the _first_ division, of nine thousand men, was directed against fort du quesne, whose garrison did not exceed as many hundred. the _second_ division, of sixteen thousand effective troops, proceeded against ticonderoga and crown point; while a detachment of three thousand men captured fort frontenac, then garrisoned by only one hundred and ten men. the whole force of the french amounted to only five thousand; the english attempted to drive them from their works by storm, but were repulsed with a loss of near two thousand men, while their opponents were scarcely injured. the _third_ division acted, as has just been stated, in concert with the naval force against louisburg. in , the _western_ division of the english army, consisting of a strong body of indians, and five thousand troops, wasted the whole season in reducing fort niagara, which was garrisoned by only six hundred men. the _central_ column of thirteen thousand men was sufficiently successful to enable it to winter at crown point. the _eastern_ division of eight thousand men under wolfe ascended the st. lawrence with a fleet of twenty-two ships, thirteen frigates, and fourteen sloops, and smaller vessels, carrying one thousand nine hundred and ninety guns, and five thousand five hundred and ninety seamen. the naval defence of quebec consisted of eight frigates, carrying two hundred and ten guns; the land forces numbered about nine thousand, and the fortifications were armed with ninety-four guns and five mortars, only a part of which could be brought to bear upon the anchorage ground. several attempts were made by the combined forces to carry these works, but they proved equally unsuccessful. although the english fleet carried _twenty times_ as many guns as the forts, their inability to reduce these works was acknowledged. the siege had continued for two months, and still the fortifications were uninjured. general wolfe himself distinctly stated, that, in any further attempt to carry the place, the "guns of the shipping could not be of much use;" and the chief engineer of the expedition gave it as his opinion, that "the ships would receive great damage from the shot and bombs of the upper batteries, without making the least impression upon them." under these circumstances it was finally determined to endeavor to decoy montcalm from his works, and make him risk a battle in the open field. in an evil hour, the french consented to forego the advantages of their fortifications, and the contest was finally decided on the plains of abraham, with forces nearly equal in number. both wolfe and montcalm fell in this battle, but the former on the field of victory; and five days afterwards the inhabitants of quebec, weakened and dispirited by their losses, surrendered the town, although its fortifications were still unharmed. the french, in this campaign, had relinquished all idea of opposing the enemy in the open field, and confined their efforts to retard the advance of the english till france could send troops to their relief; but no such relief came, and when the campaign of opened, the little french army was concentrated at montreal. as the english divisions advanced, one by oswego, one by lake champlain, and the third by quebec, they afforded to the french a fine opportunity for the strategic movement from a centre against converging lines; but the garrison was too weak to hope for success in either direction, and therefore awaited the enemy within their works. montreal, being but slightly fortified, was soon reduced, and with it fell the french empire erected in this country at infinite labor and expense. at the first outbreak of the american revolution, it was so obviously important to get possession of the military works commanding the line of lake champlain, that expeditions for this purpose were simultaneously fitted out by massachusetts and connecticut. the garrisons of these works were taken by surprise. this conquest, says botta, the able and elegant historian of the revolution, "was no doubt of high importance, but it would have had a much greater influence upon the course of the whole war, if these fortresses, _which are the bulwarks of the colonies_, had been defended in times following, with the same prudence and valor with which they had been acquired." in the campaign of , an army of two thousand seven hundred and eighty-four effective men, with a reserve of one thousand at albany, crossed the lake and approached the fortress of st. john's about the st of september. the work was garrisoned by only about five or six hundred regulars, and some two hundred militia. this was the only obstacle to prevent the advance of our army into the very heart of canada; to leave it unreduced in rear would cut off all hope of retreat. allen had already made the rash and foolish attempt, and his whole army had been destroyed, and he himself made prisoner. the reduction of this place was therefore deemed absolutely necessary, but was not effected till the d of november, and after a long and tedious siege. this delay decided the fate of the campaign; for, although montreal fell immediately afterwards, the season was so far advanced that a large portion of our troops, wearied with their sufferings from cold and want of clothing, now demanded their discharge. the eastern division, of one thousand men under arnold, crossing the country by the kennebeck and chaudiere, through difficulties and suffering almost unparalleled, arrived opposite quebec on the th of november. the place was at this time almost without defence, and, had arnold possessed a suitable pontoon equipage, it might easily have been taken by surprise. but by the time that the means for effecting a passage could be prepared, and a junction could be effected between the two american armies, quebec was prepared to sustain their attack. the result of that attack is too well known to require a repetition here. early the next season it was deemed necessary to withdraw the american army from canada. this retreat of undisciplined troops, in the presence of vastly superior numbers of the enemy, would have been extremely hazardous had it not been effected on a line of forts which were held by our own troops. as it was we sustained no considerable loss. carleton pursued on rapidly, to co-operate with general howe, who was now lying at new york with over one hundred ships and about thirty-five thousand troops; but he received a decided check from the guns of ticonderoga, and retired again to canada. by the british plan of campaign in , the entire force of their northern army was to concentrate at albany. one division of fifteen hundred men, including indians, advanced by oswego, wood creek, and the mohawk; but fort stanwix, with a garrison of only six hundred men, arrested their progress and forced them to return. another, leaving new york, ascended the hudson as far as esopus; but its progress was so much retarded by the small forts and water-batteries along that river, that it would have been too late to assist burgoyne, even if it could possibly have reached albany. the principal division of the enemy's army, numbering about nine thousand men, advanced by the champlain route. little or no preparations were made to arrest its progress. the works of ticonderoga were so out of repair as to be indefensible on the flanks. its garrison consisted of only fifteen hundred continental troops, and about as many militia, over whom the general had no control. their supply of provisions was exhausted, and only one man in ten of the militia had bayonets to their guns. under these circumstances it was deemed best to withdraw the garrison six days after the investment. burgoyne now advanced rapidly, but with so little precaution as to leave his communications in rear entirely unprotected. being repulsed by the american forces collected at saratoga, his line of supplies cut off by our detached forts, his provisions exhausted, his troops dispirited, and his indian allies having deserted him, retreat became impossible, and his whole army was forced to capitulate. this campaign closed the military operations on our northern frontier during the war of the revolution. we now come to the war of . in the beginning of this war the number of british regulars in the canadas did not exceed three thousand men, who were scattered along a frontier of more than nine hundred miles in extent. in the whole of upper canada there were but seven hundred and twenty men, and at montreal, three rivers, and on the whole line of the sorel the whole defensive force amounted to only thirteen hundred and thirty men, and the garrison of quebec was so small, that no detachment could be made without great inconvenience and danger. the fortifications of isle aux noix, then emphatically the key of central canada, was without a garrison during nearly the whole of the first campaign. under these circumstances an american force of fifteen hundred or two thousand men marching rapidly from albany, might readily have broken the enemy's line of defence, and cut off all upper canada from supplies and reinforcements from england by way of quebec. let us see what course was pursued. on the st of june an army of two thousand men was collected at dayton, in ohio, placed under the command of an imbecile old officer of the revolution, and directed by detroit against the canadian peninsula. the dilatory march, absurd movements, and traitorous surrender of hull's army to a british force of three hundred regulars and four hundred militia, are but too well known. another american army of about ten thousand men was afterwards raised in the west; the main division of this army under harrison marched by three separate routes to invade canada by way of malden; but they failed to reach their destination, and wintered behind the river portage. the eastern army was collected at albany in the early part of the summer and placed under the command of general dearborn, another old officer of the revolution. instead of pushing this force rapidly forward upon the strategic line of lake champlain, the general was directed to divide it into three parts, and to send one division against the niagara frontier, a _second_ against kingston, and a _third_ against montreal. these orders were dispatched from washington the th of june, nearly a month after hull had begun his march from dayton. dearborn's army, on the first of september, consisted of six thousand five hundred regulars and seven thousand militia--thirteen thousand five hundred in all: six thousand three hundred for the niagara frontier, two thousand two hundred at sacketts harbor, and five thousand for lake champlain. even with this absurd plan of campaign and faulty division of the forces, we might have succeeded if the general had acted with energy, so exceedingly weak were the canadian means of defence; but instead of taking advantage of his superiority in numbers and the favorable circumstances of the time, he entered into an armistice with the british general, and his whole army of thirteen thousand five hundred men lay inactive till the th of october, when the absurd project of crossing the niagara at lewiston failed, because the new-york militia had _constitutional scruples_ against crossing a river so long as the enemy were on the other side. the lake champlain column, consisting of three thousand regulars and two thousand militia, a considerable portion of which had been collected as early as the first of august, had in four months advanced as far as la cole river, a distance of about two hundred miles from albany. the unimportant action at this place terminated the campaign, and the army of the north returned to winter-quarters. all the early part of the campaign of , on the northern frontier, was spent in a war of detachments, in which our troops captured fort george and york, and repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy. in these operations our troops exhibited much courage and energy, and the young officers who led them, no little skill and military talent. but nothing could have been more absurd than for a general, with superior forces in the vicinity of an enemy, to act only by detachments at a time when his opponents were daily increasing in number. this useless war of outposts and detachments was continued till july, when general dearborn was recalled, and general wilkinson, another old officer of the revolution, put in his place. it was now determined to make a push for montreal, with the combined forces of the northern army. wilkinson, with , men, descended the st. lawrence, but did not reach prescott till the th of november, thus affording to the english plenty of leisure to prepare for his reception. hampton, another old officer of the revolution, ascended lake champlain with another column of , men, but refused to form any co-operation with wilkinson, and after the unimportant combat of chrystler's field, the whole army again retired to winter-quarters. in the mean time the army of the west, under harrison, who was assisted by the military skill and science of mccrea and wood, and the bravery of croghan and johnson, held in check the british and indians; and the battle of the thames and the victory of lake erie formed a brilliant termination to the campaign in that quarter. had such victories been gained on the montreal or eastern portion of the frontier, they would have led to the most important results. the plan of operations for the campaign of was of the same diverse and discordant character as before. but the command of the troops had now fallen into the hands of young and energetic officers, and brown, assisted by such men as wood, mccrea, scott, ripley, miller, soon gained the victories of fort erie, chippewa, and lundy's lane; while mccomb and mcdonough drove back the enemy from the line of lake champlain. with these operations terminated the northern campaign of , the last which has been conducted on that frontier. let us now turn to the system of works projected for the defence of this line. the first works are at the falls of st. mary, on the western extremity of the line. the second works are at mackinaw. the third works are at the foot of lake huron. the fourth works are near detroit. the fifth works are near buffalo. the sixth works are at the mouth of the niagara river. the seventh works are at oswego. the eighth works are at sacketts harbor. the ninth works are below ogdensburg. the tenth works are at rouse's point. the eleventh works are near the head-waters of the kennebec or the penobscot. the twelfth works are at calais, on the st. croix. all these works are small, and simple in their character, well calculated to assist the operations of armed forces in the field, but incapable of resisting a protracted siege. they are entirely different in their character from those on the coast, the latter being intended principally for the use of our citizen-soldiery, in the defence of our seaport towns, while the former are intended merely as auxiliaries to the operations of more disciplined troops. this system of defence for our northern frontier has been much commented on by men professing some knowledge of the military art, and various opinions have been advanced respecting its merits. some have thought that more and larger works should be placed on the western extremity of this line; others attach by far the greatest importance to the central or montreal portion of the frontier; while others, again, attach a higher value to the eastern extremity of the line. these last would have us concentrate our main forces on the head-waters of the kennebec and the penobscot, and then advance upon quebec, a distance of some miles, along the isolated carriage-road, through the valley of the chaudiere. here is only a single road, but little travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness. general jomini says emphatically, that _a line of operations should always offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in the sphere of its enterprises_,--an insuperable objection to the kennebec route, except as a diversion to the main attack. but there are still stronger objections to this route, than its want of feasibility for the transportation of the main army; for even should that army succeed in reaching quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely without military results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced,--a contingency which would be extremely doubtful under the most favorable circumstances; and even should we be ever so fortunate in our operations, the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable length of time. it would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line of operations, against the strongest point in the enemy's line of defence, and making the success of the whole plan depend upon the contingency of a reduction, in a few days, of one of the strongest fortresses in the world. what principle in military science would justify such a plan of campaign? we are fully aware of the great advantages to be derived from the reduction of quebec; and we are also aware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to accomplish that object. it may, and probably will ere long, be made to surrender to our arms; but it would be utter folly to base our military operations on the contingency of a short and successful siege. by advancing upon montreal by the lake champlain route, we could cut off the canadian forces in the west from all reinforcements; and then, as circumstances might direct, could besiege quebec, or attack the enemy in the field, or perhaps, manoeuvring as the french did at the siege of mantua, accomplish both objects at the same time. we have seen that it was one of napoleon's maxims that _an army should choose the shortest and most direct line of operations, which should either pierce the enemy's line of defence, or cut off his communications with his base_. it is the opinion of men of the best military talent in our army that the lake champlain line satisfies all these conditions at the same time;--that it is the most direct, most feasible, and most decisive line which can be pursued in case of operations against canada; and that it is indispensable to success in war that this line be well fortified in time of peace. all agree that the st. lawrence above quebec constitutes the _key_ point of the enemy's defence, and the _objective_ point towards which all our operations should be directed. to reach this point, all our boards of engineers have deemed it best to collect our troops at albany and advance by lake champlain, a distance of only two hundred miles. besides the advantages of a good water communication the whole distance for the transportation of military stores, there are several roads on each side, all concentrating on this line within our own territory. it has already been shown by the brief sketch of our northern wars, that this line has been the field of strife and blood for _fifteen campaigns_. nature has marked it out as our shortest and easiest line of intercourse with canada, both in peace and war. military diversions will always be made on the eastern and western extremities of this frontier, and important secondary or auxiliary operations be carried on by the eastern and western routes; but until we overthrow the whole system of military science as established by the romans, revived by frederick and practised and improved by napoleon, the _central and interior line_, under all ordinary circumstances, will furnish the greatest probabilities of success. if the line of lake champlain is, as we have endeavored to show, the most important line in the north; its security by fortifications is a matter of the greatest interest. the works recommended by the board, consist of a single fort, costing $ , , at rouse's point, on the extreme frontier, and unfortified dépôts at plattsburg and albany. but is this sufficient to accomplish the object? if the hostile army should pass the extreme frontier barrier, what is to retard his advance,--what defensive works are to protect the débouché of the northern canal, or even to save the great central dépôt? we know of no foreign engineer who has recommended less than _three_ lines of fortifications for the security of a land frontier; and napoleon, the archduke charles, and general jomini, agree in recommending at least this number of lines. there may be circumstances that render it unnecessary to resort to a three-fold defence throughout the whole extent of our northern frontier; but upon our main line of communication with canada,--a line of maximum importance both to us and to the enemy, we know of no reason for violating the positive rules of the art,--rules which have been established for ages; and sanctioned by the best engineers and greatest generals of modern times. ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of northern invasion; and we know of no change in the art of war, or in the condition of the country, that renders less important than formerly the advantages of an intermediate point of support between albany and the canadian lines. indeed it would seem that the connection of the hudson with the lake by the northern canal had even increased the value of such a point. it would seem, moreover, that the great value of a central dépôt near albany would warrant a resort to the best means of security which can be afforded by defensive works. here we already have one of our largest arsenals of construction; here are to be located magazines for the collection and deposit, in time of peace, of gunpowder; here, in time of war, is to be formed the grand military dépôt for our whole northern armies; and here is the point of junction of the lines of communication of our northern and eastern states, and the great central rallying point where troops are to be collected for the defence of our northern frontier, or for offensive operations against canada. such a place should never be exposed to the _coup-de-main_ of an enemy. the chance operations of a defensive army are never sufficient for the security of so important a position. we do not here pretend to say what its defences should be. perhaps strong _têtes-de-pont_ on the mohawk and hudson rivers, and detached works on the several lines of communication, may accomplish the desired object; perhaps more central and compact works may be found necessary. but we insist on the importance of securing this position by _some_ efficient means. the remarks of napoleon, (which have already been given,) on the advantages to be derived from fortifying such a central place, where the military wealth of a nation can be secured, are strikingly applicable to this case. but let us look for a moment at what is called the _western_ plan of defence for our northern frontier. certain writers and orators of the western states, in their plans of military defence, would have the principal fortifications of the northern frontier established on lake erie, the detroit river, the st. clair, and lake huron; and the money proposed for the other frontier and coast works, expended in establishing military and naval dépôts at memphis and pittsburg, and in the construction of a ship-canal from the lower illinois to lake michigan,--for the purpose of obtaining the naval control of the northern lakes. it is said that british military and steam naval forces will ascend the st. lawrence to lake ontario; that to counteract these operations we must build an opposition steam-navy at pittsburg and memphis, and collect out troops on the ohio and mississippi, ascend the mississippi and illinois, lake michigan, lake huron, and the georgian bay, cross over to the ottawa by french river and lake nipissing, or moon river and the muskago, then descend the ottawa river to montreal. but as there might be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers over some twelve or fifteen portages between the georgian bay and the ottawa, and as the upper waters of that river are not navigable by such craft, it has, by some of the military writers before alluded to, been deemed preferable to descend lake huron, st. clair river and lake, run the gauntlet past the british forts on the detroit, descend lake erie and the niagara[ ] into lake ontario, so as to meet the english as they come steaming up the st. lawrence! [footnote : how they are to pass the falls was not determined either by harry bluff or the memphis convention.] it is agreed upon all sides that the british must first collect their forces at quebec, and then pass along the line of the st. lawrence and lake ontario to reach the niagara and detroit frontiers. our boards of engineers have deemed it best to collect troops on the champlain line, and, by penetrating between montreal and quebec, separate the enemy's forces and cut off all the remainder of canada from supplies and reinforcements from england. but it has been discovered by certain western men that to cut the _trunk_ of a tree is not the proper method of felling it: we must climb to the _top_ and pinch the buds, or, at most, cut off a few of the smaller limbs. to blow up a house, we should not place the mine under the foundation, but attach it to one of the shingles of the roof! we have already shown that troops collected at albany may reach the great strategic point on the st. lawrence by an easy and direct route of _two hundred miles_; but forces collected at pittsburg and memphis must pass over a difficult and unfrequented route of _two thousand miles_. our merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a naval superiority in that quarter at the beginning of a war; and our facilities for ship-building are there equal if not superior to any possessed by the enemy. the only way, therefore, in which our ascendency on the lakes can be lost, is by the introduction of steam craft from the atlantic. the canals and locks constructed for this object will pass vessels of small dimensions and drawing not over eight and a half feet water. how are we to prevent the introduction of these atlantic steamers into our lakes? shall we, at the first opening of hostilities, march with armed forces upon the enemy's line of artificial communication and blow up the locks of their ship-canals, thus meeting the enemy's marine at the very threshold of its introduction into the interior seas; or shall we build opposition steam-navies at pittsburg and memphis, some two thousand miles distant, and then expend some forty or fifty millions[ ] in opening an artificial channel to enable them to reach lake ontario, after its borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces? very few disinterested judges would hesitate in forming their opinion on this question.[ ] [footnote : the construction of the illinois ship-canal, for vessels of eight and a half feet draught, is estimated at fifteen millions; to give the same draught to the mississippi and lower illinois, would require at least ten millions more; a ship canal of the corresponding draught around niagara falls, will cost, say, ten millions; the navy yard at memphis, with docks, storehouses, &c., will cost about two millions, and steamers sent thence to the lakes will cost about fifty thousand dollars per gun. on the other hand, the military defences which it is deemed necessary to erect in time of peace for the security of the champlain frontier, will cost only about two thousand dollars per gun; the whole expenditure not exceeding, at most, two millions of dollars! it is not to be denied that a water communication between the mississippi and the northern lakes will have great commercial advantages, and that, in case of a protracted war, auxiliary troops and military stores may be drawn from the valley of the mississippi to assist the north and east in preventing any great accessions to the british military forces in the canadas. we speak only of the policy of expending vast sums of money on this _military_ (?) _project_, to the neglect of matters of more immediate and pressing want. we have nothing to say of its character as a _commercial project_, or of the ultimate military advantages that might accrue from such a work. we speak only of the present condition and wants of the country, and not of what that condition and those wants may be generations hence!] [footnote : there are no books devoted exclusively to the subjects embraced in this chapter; but the reader will find many remarks on the northern frontier defences in the histories of the war of , in congressional reports, (vide house doc. , xxvith congress, d session; and senate doc., no. , xxviiith congress, d session,) and in numerous pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the press within the last few years.] chapter ix. army organization--staff and administrative corps. by the law of the th of december, , on the organization of the public force of france, the army was defined, "a standing force drawn from the public force, and designed to act against external enemies." [_une force habituelle extraite de la force publique, et destinée essentiellement à agir contre les ennemis du dehors_.] in time of peace, the whole organized military force of the state is intended when we speak of _the army_; but in time of war this force is broken up into two or more fractions, each of which is called an _army_. these armies are usually named from the particular duty which may be assigned to them--as, _army of invasion, army of occupation, army of observation, army of reserve, &c._; or from the country or direction in which they operate--as, _army of the north, of the south, of mexico, of canada, of the rhine, &c._; or from the general who commands it--as, the _army of soult, army of wellington, army of blücher, &c._ all modern armies are organized on the same basis. they are made up of a staff and administrative departments, and four distinct arms--infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers; each having distinct duties, but all combining to form one and the same military body. in the actual operations of a campaign, these forces are formed into _corps d'armée_, each _corps d'armée_ being composed of two or more _grand-divisions_; each grand-division, of two or more _brigades_; and each brigade, of several _companies, squadrons_, or _batteries_. in speaking of an army in the field, it is sometimes supposed to be divided into two classes of men--the _staff_ and _the line_. we here include in the first class-- all officers, of whatever arm, above the rank of colonel; all officers of the staff corps of whatever grade, and all officers attached to the staff as aides, &c.; all officers of the administrative departments; all officers of artillery and engineer staffs; the corps of geographical or topographical engineers, and the guards. in the second class are included all troops, of whatever arm, which belong to the active army, in infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers. all troops on detached service, such as recruiting, guarding posts and depots, escorting convoys, &c., as well as all sedentary corps, garrisons of fortified places, &c., are not regarded in this classification as composing any part of the _line_ of the army. _troops of the line_ is a term applied only to such troops as form the principal line on the battle-field, viz:--the heavy infantry and heavy cavalry. these are technically called _infantry of the line_, and _cavalry of the line_. in this sense of the term, light infantry, light cavalry or dragoons, artillery, and engineers, are not classed as troops of the _line_. but this distinction is now pretty much fallen into disuse, and the division of an army into staff and administrative departments, and four arms of service--infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers--is now regarded as the most convenient, from being precise and definite in its meaning. the _general staff_ of an army includes all general officers of the army, and such officers of lower grades as are attached to this general duty, instead of serving with troops, or on special administrative duty. the general officers are-- st, the _generalissimo_, or commander-in -chief; d, _generals_, or marshals, as they are called in france, or field-marshals and generals of infantry and cavalry, as they are called in england and the northern states of europe; d, _lieutenant-generals_; th, _generals of division_, or major-generals, as they are called in england; th, _generals of brigade_, or brigadier-generals, as they are sometimes called;--colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, and cornets or cadets, are also either attached to the staff, or form a part of the _staff corps_. the titles of "adjutant-general," and of "inspector-general," are given to staff officers selected for these special services, either in the general staff or in the several _corps d'armée_. no special rank is attached to these offices themselves, and the grade of those who hold them is fixed by some special rule, or by their general rank in the army. in the war of the revolution, washington held the rank of general, and in the rank of lieutenant-general. in the war of , the highest grade held by any of our officers was that of general of division, or major-general, as it was called. the highest grade in our army at the present time is called major-general--a title that properly belongs, not to the general of an army, but to the chief of staff. hamilton had this title when chief of washington's staff; berthier and soult when chief of napoleon's staff, the former till the close of the campaign of , and the latter in the waterloo campaign. general jomini first greatly distinguished himself as chief of ney's staff, and afterwards on the staff of the emperor of russia. other generals have owed much of their success to the chiefs of their staff:--pichegru to regnier, moreau to dessoles, kutusof to toll, barclay to diebitsch, and blücher to sharnharst and gneisenau. the _generalissimo_ or commander-in-chief of an army is the person designated by the law of the land to take charge of the organized military forces of the state. in this country the president, through his secretary of war, exercises this general command. in england, wellington acts in the capacity of commander-in-chief of all the british military forces. in france, the minister of war, under the king, has this general direction. in other european services, some prince of the blood, or distinguished general, exercises the functions of generalissimo. an active army in the field should be commanded by a _general_, or, as is done in some european countries, by a marshal. these may be regarded as of assimilated rank. a _corps d'armée_ should, be commanded by a _lieutenant-general_. this rule is almost universal in europe. the number of marshals in france under napoleon was so great, that officers of this grade were often assigned to _corps d'armée_. a grand division of an army should be commanded by a _general of division_. in england, the assimilated grade is that of major-general, and in france at the present time, the younger lieutenant-generals, or the _maréchaux-de-camp_, command divisions. a brigade should be commanded by a _brigadier-general_. at the present time in the french service, _maréchaux-de-camp_ act as commanders of brigades. the several _corps d'armée_ are designated by numbers, st, d, d, &c., and in the same way the several divisions in each _corps d'armée_, and the several brigades in each division. when the number of troops are placed on a war footing, each _corps d'armée_ ordinarily contains from twenty to thirty thousand men. the command of these several _corps d'armée_, divisions, and brigades, is taken by the officers of the corresponding grades according to seniority of rank, and without reference to arms, unless otherwise directed by the generalissimo, who should always have the power to designate officers for special commands. the _chief of staff_ of an army is usually selected from the grade next below that of the general commanding, and receives the title, for the time being, which is used to designate this special rank. in some european armies, and formerly in our own service, this officer was called major-general. in france, if the generalissimo commands in person, a marshal is made chief of staff with the temporary title of _major-général_; but if a marshal commands the army, a lieutenant -general or _maréchal-de-camp_ becomes chief of staff with the title of _aide-major-général_. the chiefs of staff of _corps d'armée_ and of divisions, are selected in precisely the same way. the position assigned by the commanding general for the residence of his staff, is denominated the _general head-quarter of the army_; that of a _corps d'armée_ staff, the _head-quarters of_ [ st or d, &c.] _corps d'armée_; that of a division, the _head-quarters of_ [ st or d, &c.] _division_, [ st or d, &c.] _corps d'armée_. the petty staffs of regiments, squadrons, &c., consisting of an adjutant, sergeant-major, &c., are especially organized by the commandants of the regiments, &c., and have no connection whatever with the general staff of an army. of course, then, they are not embraced in the present discussion. the subordinate officers of the staff of an army, in time of war, are charged with important and responsible duties connected with the execution of the orders of their respective chiefs. but in time of peace, they are too apt to degenerate into fourth-rate clerks of the adjutant-general's department, and mere military dandies, employing their time in discussing the most unimportant and really contemptible points of military etiquette, or criticising the letters and dispatches of superior officers, to see whether the wording of the report or the folding of the letter exactly corresponds to the particular regulation applicable to the case. such was the character given to the first staff of wellington, and a similar class of men composed the staff of the army of italy when it was abolished by napoleon and a new one formed in its place. there are also some officers of this stamp in our own service, but they are regarded by the army with universal contempt. the staff of our army requires a new and different organization, and should be considerably enlarged. the following is the composition of a regularly organized general staff in the french service, for an army of forty or fifty thousand men divided into two _corps d'armée_ and a reserve. st. the marshal (or general) commanding-in-chief; and one colonel or lieutenant-colonel, one major, three captains and three subalterns, as aides-de-camp. d. a lieutenant-general as chief-of-staff, with the title of _major-general_, assisted by one colonel or lieutenant-colonel, three majors, five captains, and one subaltern, as aides-de-camp. d. three lieutenant-generals, commanding the _corps d'armée_ and reserve. each of these will be assisted by aides in the same way as the _major-general_, and each will also have his regularly-organized staff of _corps d'armée_, with a general of division or general of brigade as chief. th. six or nine generals commanding divisions, each having his own distinct and separately organized staff. in the french army, the staff of an officer commanding a division is composed of one colonel, two majors, three captains, and six subalterns. th. twelve or more generals of brigade, each having one captain, and one subaltern for aides. th. there is also attached to the staff of the general-in-chief of the army, the commandants of artillery and engineers, with several subordinates, inspector-generals, and the ranking officers of each of the administrative departments, with their assistants. the generals select their aides and assistants from the staff corps, or from either of the four arms of service. the troops of these arms may be distributed as follows: battalions of infantry, , men. squadrons of horse, . . , " batteries of artillery, ( mounted and foot,) . , " companies of sappers, of pontoniers,[ ] and of artificers, . . . . . , " ------ , " [footnote : one bridge-equipage is required for each _corps d'armée_.] if we add to these the staff, and the several officers and employés of the administrative departments, we have an army of nearly fifty thousand men. this, it will be remembered, is the organization of an army in the field; in the entire military organization of a state, the number of staff officers will be still higher. in , france, with a military organization for about three hundred and twenty thousand men, had eighteen marshals, two hundred and twenty-five lieutenant-generals, five hundred and thirty-eight _maréchaux-de-camp_, and four hundred and eighty-three brigadiers. a similar organization of the general staff was maintained by napoleon. at present the general staff of the french army consists of nine marshals, (twelve in time of war;) eighty lieutenant-generals in active service, fifty-two in reserve, and sixty two _en retraite_--one hundred and ninety-four in all; one hundred and sixty _maréchaux-de-camp_ in active service, eighty-six in reserve, and one hundred and ninety _en retraite_--four hundred and thirty-six in all. the officers of the staff-corps are: thirty colonels, thirty lieutenant-colonels, one hundred majors, three hundred captains, and one hundred lieutenants. those of other european armies are organized on the same basis. it will be seen from these remarks that the organization of our own general staff is exceedingly defective, and entirely unsuited to the object for which it is created. we have two brigadier-generals for the command of two brigades, and one general of division, with the title of major-general, who acts in the fourfold capacity of general commanding the army, lieutenant-general, general of division, and chief of staff of the army. but as it is impossible with this number to maintain a proper organization, the president (with the advice and consent of the senate) has, from time to time, increased this number to three major-generals, and nine brigadier-generals, and numerous officers of staff with lower grades. nearly all these officers are detached from their several regiments and corps, thus injuring the efficiency of regiments and companies; and we have in our service, by this absurd mode of supplying the defects of our system of organization by brevet rank, the anomaly of _officers being generals, and at the same time not generals; of holding certain ranks and grades, and yet not holding these ranks and grades!_ let congress do away this absurd and ridiculous system, and establish a proper and efficient organization of the general staff, and restore the grades of general and lieutenant-general. in the war of , instead of resorting to a proper organization when an increase of the general staff was required, we merely multiplied the number of major-generals and generals of brigade by direct appointment, or by conferring brevet rank. it is now conceded that there never was a more inefficient general staff than that with which our army was cursed during the war; and the claims of brevet rank have ever since been a source of endless turmoils and dissatisfaction, driving from the army many of its noblest ornaments. in the event of another war, it is to be hoped that congress will not again resort to the ruinous system of . possibly it may by some be objected to the creation of generals, lieutenant-generals, &c., that it increases the expense of the army and the number of its officers. this need not be. the number, pay, &c., may remain the same, or nearly the same, as at present. but by increasing the grades you avoid in a considerable measure the difficulties of seniority claims and brevet rank--the principal curses of our present system. if we merely increase the number of each existing grade, giving a part of these rank above their name and office, we merely multiply evils. but we will leave this subject for the present, and recur to the general discussion of staff duties. the following remarks of jomini on the importance of the staff of an army are worthy of attention. "a good staff," says he, "is, more than all, indispensable to the constitution of an army; for it must be regarded as the nursery where the commanding general can raise his principal supports--as a body of officers whose intelligence can aid his own. when harmony is wanting between the genius that commands, and the talents of those who apply his conceptions, success cannot be sure; for the most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults in execution. moreover, a good staff has the advantage of being more durable than the genius of any single man; it not only remedies many evils, but it may safely be affirmed that it constitutes for the army the best of all safeguards. the petty interests of coteries, narrow views, and misplaced egotism, oppose this last position: nevertheless, every military man of reflection, and every enlightened statesman, will regard its truth as beyond all dispute; for a well-appointed staff is to an army what a skilful minister is to a monarchy--it seconds the views of the chief, even though it be in condition to direct all things of itself; it prevents the commission of faults, even though the commanding general be wanting in experience, by furnishing him good councils. how many mediocre men of both ancient and modern times, have been rendered illustrious by achievements which were mainly due to their associates! reynier was the chief cause of the victories of pichegru, in ; and dessoles, in like manner, contributed to the glory of moreau. is not general toll associated with the successes of kutusof? diebitsch with those of barclay and witgenstein? gneisenau and muffling with those of blücher? numerous other instances might be cited in support of these assertions." "a well-established staff does not always result from a good system of education for the young aspirants; for a man may be a good mathematician and a fine scholar, without being a good warrior. the staff should always possess sufficient consideration and prerogative to be sought for by the officers of the several arms, and to draw together, in this way, men who are already known by their aptitude for war. engineer and artillery officers will no longer oppose the staff, if they reflect that it will open to them a more extensive field for immediate distinction, and that it will eventually be made up exclusively of the officers of those two corps who may be placed at the disposal of the commanding general, and who are the most capable of directing the operations of war." "at the beginning of the wars of the revolution," says this able historian elsewhere, "in the french army the general staff, which is essential for directing the operations of war, had neither instruction nor experience." the several adjutant-generals attached to the army of italy were so utterly incompetent, that napoleon became prejudiced against the existing staff-corps, and virtually destroyed it, drawing his staff-officers from the other corps of the army. in his earlier wars, a large portion of staff duties were assigned to the engineers; but in his later campaigns the officers of this corps were particularly required for the sieges carried on in germany and spain, and considerable difficulty was encountered in finding suitable officers for staff duty. some of the defects of the first french staff-corps were remedied in the latter part of napoleon's career, and in it was reorganized by marshal saint-cyr, and a special school established for its instruction. some european nations have established regular staff-corps, from which the vacancies in the general staff are filled; others draw all their staff-officers from the corps of the army. a combination of the two systems is preferred by the best judges. jomini recommends a regular staff-corps, with special schools for its instruction; but thinks that its officers should be drawn, at least in part, from the other corps of the army: the officers of engineers and artillery he deems, from their instruction, to be peculiarly qualified for staff duty. the policy of holding double rank at the same time in the staff and in the corps of the army, as is done in our service, is pronounced by all competent judges as ruinous to an army, destroying at the same time the character of the staff and injuring the efficiency of the line. the following remarks on the character and duties of general-officers of an army, made at the beginning of the war of , are from the pen of one of the ablest military writers this country has yet produced:-- "generals have been divided into three classes,--_theorists_, who by study and reflection have made themselves acquainted with all the rules or maxims of the art they profess; _martinets_, who have confined their attention merely to the mechanical part of the trade; and _practical men_, who have no other or better guide than their own experience, in either branch of it. this last description is in all services, excepting our own, the most numerous, but with us gives place to a fourth class, viz., men destitute alike of _theory_ and of _experience_." "self-respect is one thing, and presumption another. without the former, no man ever became a good officer; under the influence of the latter, generals have committed great faults. the former is the necessary result of knowledge; the latter of ignorance. a man acquainted with his duty can rarely be placed in circumstances new, surprising, or embarrassing; a man ignorant of his duty will always find himself constrained to _guess_, and not knowing how to be right by _system_, will often be wrong by _chance_." "these remarks are neither made nor offered as applying exclusively to the science of war. they apply to all other sciences; but in these, errors are comparatively harmless. a naturalist may amuse himself and the public with false and fanciful theories of the earth; and a metaphysician may reason very badly on the relations and forms of matter and spirit, without any ill effect but to make themselves ridiculous. their blunders but make us merry; they neither pick pockets, nor break legs, nor destroy lives; while those of a general bring after them evils the most compounded and mischievous,--the slaughter of an army--the devastation of a state--the ruin of an empire!" "in proportion as ignorance may be calamitous, the reasons for acquiring instruction are multiplied and strengthened. are you an _honest_ man? you will spare neither labor nor sacrifice to gain a competent knowledge of your duty. are you a man of _honor_? you will be careful to avoid self-reproach. does your bosom glow with the holy fervor of _patriotism_? you will so accomplish yourself as to avoid bringing down upon your country either insult or injury." "nor are the more selfish impulses without a similar tendency. has _hunger_ made you a soldier? will you not take care of your bread! is _vanity_ your principle of action? will you not guard those mighty blessings, your epaulets and feathers! are you impelled by a love of _glory_ or a love of _power_? and can you forget that these coy mistresses are only to be won by intelligence and good conduct?" "but the _means_ of instruction, say you, where are they to be found? our standing army is but a bad and ill-organized militia, and our militia not better than a mob. nor have the defects in these been supplied by lycées, prytanées, and polytechnic schools. the morbid patriotism of some, and the false economy of others, have nearly obliterated every thing like military knowledge among us." "this, reader, is but one motive the more for reinstating it. thanks to the noble art of printing! you still have _books_ which, if _studied_, will teach the art of war." "_books_! and what are they but the dreams of pedants? they may make a mack, but have they ever made a xenophon, a cæsar, a saxe, a frederick, or a bonaparte? who would not laugh to hear the cobbler of athens lecturing hannibal on the art of war?" "true; but as you are not hannibal, listen to the cobbler. xenophon, cæsar, saxe, frederick, and napoleon, have all thought well of books, and have even composed them. nor is this extraordinary, since they are but the depositories of maxims which genius has suggested, and experience confirmed; since they both enlighten and shorten the road of the traveller, and render the labor and genius of past ages tributary to our own. _these_ teach most emphatically, that the secret of successful war is not to be found in mere _legs_ and _arms_, but in the _head_ that shall direct them. if this be either ungifted by nature, or uninstructed by study and reflection, the best plans of manoeuvre and campaign avail nothing. the two last centuries have presented many revolutions in military character, all of which have turned on this principle. it would be useless to enumerate these. we shall quote only the greatest and the last--_the troops of frederick!_ how illustrious under him! how contemptible under his successors! yet his system was there; his double lines of march at full distance; his oblique order of battle; his simple lines of manoeuvre in the presence of an enemy; his wise conformation of an _état-major;_--all, in short, that distinguished his practice from that of ordinary men, survived him; but the head that truly comprehended and knew how to apply these, died with frederick. what an admonition does this fact present for self-instruction,--for unwearied diligence,--for study and reflection! nor should the force of this be lessened by the consideration that, after all, unless nature should have done her part of the work,--unless to a soul not to be shaken by any changes of fortune--cool, collected, and strenuous--she adds a head fertile in expedients, prompt in its decisions, and sound in its judgments, no man can ever merit the title of a _general_." the celebrated marshal saxe has made the following remarks on the necessary qualifications to form a good general. the most indispensable one, according to his idea, is valor, without which all the rest will prove nugatory. the next is a sound understanding with some genius: for he must not only be courageous, but be extremely fertile in expedients. the third is health and a robust constitution. "his mind must be capable of prompt and vigorous resources; he must have an aptitude, and a talent at discovering the designs of others, without betraying the slightest trace of his own intentions; he must be, _seemingly_, communicative, in order to encourage others to unbosom, but remain tenaciously reserved in matters that concern his own army; he must, in a word, possess activity with judgment, be able to make a proper choice of his officers, and never deviate from the strictest line of military justice. old soldiers must not be rendered wretched and unhappy by unwarrantable promotions, nor must extraordinary talents be kept back to the detriment of the service on account of mere rules and regulations. great abilities will justify exceptions; but ignorance and inactivity will not make up for years spent in the profession." "in his deportment he must be affable, and always superior to peevishness or ill-humor; he must not know, or at least seem not to know, what a spirit of resentment is; and when he is under the necessity of inflicting military chastisement, he must see the guilty punished without compromise or foolish humanity; and if the delinquent be from among the number of his most intimate friends, he must be doubly severe towards the unfortunate man. for it is better, in instances of correction, that one individual should be treated with rigor (by orders of the person over whom he may be supposed to hold some influence) than that an idea should go forth in the army of public justice being sacrificed to private sentiments." "a modern general should always have before him the example of manlius; he must divest himself of personal sensations, and not only be convinced himself, but convince others, that he is the organ of military justice, and that what he does is irrevocably prescribed. with these qualifications, and by this line of conduct, he will secure the affections of his followers, instill into their minds all the impulses of deference and respect; he will be feared, and consequently obeyed." "the resources of a general's mind are as various as the occasions for the exercise of them are multiplied and checkered: he must be perfectly master of the art of knowing how to support an army in all circumstances and situations; how to apply its strength, or be sparing of its energy and confidence; how to post all its different component parts, so as not to be forced to give or receive battle in opposition to settled plans. when once engaged, he must have presence of mind enough to grasp all the relative points of disposition and arrangement, to seize favorable moments for impression, and to be thoroughly conversant in the infinite vicissitudes that occur during the heat of a battle; on a ready possession of which its ultimate success depends. these requisites are unquestionably manifold, and grow out of the diversity of situations and the chance medley of events that produce their necessity." "a general to be in perfect possession of them, must on the day of battle be divested of every thought, and be inaccessible to every feeling, but what immediately regards the business of the day; he must reconnoitre with the promptitude of a skilful geographer, whose eye collects instantaneously all the relative portions of locality, and feels his ground as it were by instinct; and in the disposition of his troops he must discover a perfect knowledge of his profession, and make all his arrangements with accuracy and dispatch. his order of battle must be simple and unconfused, and the execution of his plan be as quick as if it merely consisted in uttering some few words of command; as, _the first line will attack! the second will support it! or, such a battalion will advance and support the line._" "the general officers who act under such a general must be ignorant of their business indeed, if, upon the receipt of these orders, they should be deficient in the immediate means of answering them, by a prompt and ready co-operation. so that the general has only to issue out directions according to the growth of circumstances, and to rest satisfied that every division will act in conformity to his intentions; but if, on the contrary, he should so far forget his situation as to become a drill-sergeant in the heat of action, he must find himself in the case of the fly in the fable, which perched upon a wheel, and foolishly imagined that the motion of the carriage was influenced by its situation. a general, therefore, ought on the day of battle to be thoroughly master of himself, and to have both his mind and his eye riveted to the immediate scene of action. he will by these means be enabled to see every thing; his judgment will be unembarrassed, and he will instantly discover all the vulnerable points of the enemy. the instant a favorable opening offers, by which the contest may be decided, it becomes his duty to head the nearest body of troops, and, without any regard to personal safety, to advance against the enemy's line. [by a ready conception of this sort, joined to a great courage, general dessaix determined the issue of the battle of marengo.] it is, however, impossible for any man to lay down rules, or to specify with accuracy all the different ways by which a victory may be obtained. every thing depends upon a variety of situations, casualties of events, and intermediate occurrences, which no human foresight can positively ascertain, but which may be converted to good purposes by a quick eye, a ready conception, and prompt execution." "prince eugene was singularly gifted with these qualifications, particularly with that sublime possession of the mind, which constitutes the essence of a military character." "many commanders-in-chief have been so limited in their ideas of warfare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and two rival armies have been drawn out for action, their whole attention has devolved upon a straight alignment, an equality of step, or a regular distance in intervals of columns. they have considered it sufficient to give answers to questions proposed by their aides-de-camp, to send orders in various directions, and to gallop themselves from one quarter to another, without steadily adhering to the fluctuations of the day, or calmly watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. they endeavor, in fact, to do every thing, and thereby do nothing. they appear like men whose presence of mind deserts them the instant they are taken out of the beaten track, or reduced to supply unexpected calls by uncommon exertions; and from whence, continues the same sensible writer, do these contradictions arise? from an ignorance of those high qualifications without which the mere routine of duty, methodical arrangement, and studied discipline must fall to the ground, and defeat themselves. many officers spend their whole lives in putting a few regiments through a regular set of manoeuvres; and having done so, they vainly imagine that all the science of a real military man consists in that acquirement. when, in process of time, the command of a large army falls to their lot, they are manifestly lost in the magnitude of the undertaking, and, from not knowing how to act as they ought, they remain satisfied with doing what they have partially learned." "military knowledge, as far as it regards a general or commander-in-chief, may be divided into two parts, one comprehending mere discipline and settled systems for putting a certain number of rules into practice; and the other originating a sublimity of conception that method may assist, but cannot give." "if a man be born with faculties that are naturally adapted to the situation of a general, and if his talents do not fit the extraordinary casualties of war, he will never rise beyond mediocrity." "it is, in fact, in war as it is in painting, or in music. perfection in either art grows out of innate talent, but it never can be acquired without them. study and perseverance may correct ideas, but no application, no assiduity will give the life and energy of action; these are the works of nature." "it has been my fate (observes the marshal) to see several very excellent colonels become indifferent generals. i have known others, who have distinguished themselves at sieges, and in the different evolutions of an army, lose their presence of mind and appear ignorant of their profession, the instant they were taken from that particular line, and be incapable of commanding a few squadrons of horse. should a man of this cast be put at the head of an army, he will confine himself to mere dispositions and manoeuvres; to them he will look for safety; and if once thwarted, his defeat will be inevitable, because his mind is not capable of other resources." "in order to obviate, in the best possible manner, the innumerable disasters which must arise from the uncertainty of war, and the greater uncertainty of the means that are adopted to carry it on, some general rules ought to be laid down, not only for the government of the troops, but for the instruction of those who have the command of them. the principles to be observed are: that when the line or the columns advance, their distances should be scrupulously observed; that whenever a body of troops is ordered to charge, every proportion of the line should rush forward with intrepidity and vigor; that if openings are made in the first line, it becomes the duty of the second instantly to fill up the chasms." "these instructions issue from the dictates of plain nature, and do not require the least elucidation in writing they constitute the a, b, c of soldiers. nothing can be more simple, or more intelligible; so much so, that it would be ridiculous in a general to sacrifice essential objects in order to attend to such minutiæ. his functions in the day of battle are confined to those occupations of the mind, by which he is enabled to watch the countenance of the enemy; to observe his movements, and to see with an eagle's or a king of prussia's eye, all the relative directions that his opponents take. it must be his business to create alarms and suspicions among the enemy's line in one quarter, while his real intention is to act against another; to puzzle and disconcert him in his plans; to take advantage of the manifold openings which his feints have produced, and when the contest is brought to issue, to be capable of plunging with effect upon the weakest part, and carrying the sword of death where its blow is certain of being mortal. but to accomplish these important and indispensable points, his judgment must be clear, his mind collected, his heart firm, and his eyes incapable of being diverted, even for a moment, by the trifling occurrences of the day." the _administrative service_ of an army is usually divided into several distinct departments, as-- pay department. subsistence " clothing " medical "} } these in our service are united. hospital " barrack "}these in our service are combined fuel "}in one, called the quartermaster's transportation "}department recruiting " military justice, or court martial department. it was intended to enter into the history, organization, and use of each of these civico-military departments of an army; but our limits are such as to preclude any thing like so detailed a discussion as would be necessary for a proper understanding of the subject. we therefore pass from the staff directly to the _line_ or rather the four principal arms of an army organization.[ ] [footnote : of works that treat directly of staff organization and duties, those of grimoard, thiébault, boutourlin, labaume, are esteemed among the best. the writings of jomini, napoleon, rocquancourt, vauchelle, odier, scharnhorst, also contain much valuable information on this subject. the following list of books may be referred to for further information on the subjects alluded to in this chapter: _aide-mémoire des officiers généraux et supérieurs et des capitaines._ _précis de l'art de la guerre._ jomini. _mémoires de napoléon._ montholon et gourgaud. _cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires._ rocquancourt. _cours élémentaire d'administration militaire._ vauchelle. _droite élémentaire d'art militaire, &c._ gay de vernon. _annuaire militaire historique, &c._ sicard. _cours abrégé d'administration militaire._ bernier. _cours d'administration militaire, &c._ odier. _de l'administration de l'armée d'espagne._ odier. _de l'organization de la force armée en france._ carion-nisas. _elémens de l'art militaire, &c._ cugnot. _mémoires sur la guerre._ feuquiéres. _cours d'art militaire et d'histoire._ jacquinot de presle. _cours d'art militaire._ fallot. _théorie de l'officier supérieur._ léorier. _histoire de l'administration de la guerre._ audouin. _instructions diverses a l'usage de l'école d'application du corps royal d'état-major._ _handbuch für offiziere, &c._ scharnhorst. having omitted all discussion of the several departments of the administrative service of an army organization, it is not deemed necessary to give the names of books of reference on the subjects of pay, courts-martial, medicinal and hospital departments, &c., &c.] chapter x army organization.[ ]--infantry and cavalry _infantry_.--infantry constitutes, in active service, by far the most numerous portion of an army; in time of peace its duties are simple, and, in most countries, of little comparative importance; but in our country the continually recurring difficulties on the indian frontiers, render this arm peculiarly necessary and important, even in time of general peace. from the nature of infantry service--no peculiar technical knowledge (we speak of the privates and officers of the lower grades) being so absolutely indispensable as in the other arms--the soldier may in a short time be trained and instructed in his duties. for this reason the ratio of infantry in a peace establishment is ordinarily much less than in active service, this arm being always capable of great expansion when occasion requires. [footnote : in discussing our own organization, it may be well to compare it with the armies of some of the principal nations of europe. our limits will not allow us to go very much into details, nor to make a comparison with more than a single european power. we shall select france, inasmuch as her army organization has served as a model for the rest of europe, and is still, in some respects, superior to most others.] in the early periods of society, and in countries where horses abounded, men have usually preferred fighting on horseback; but civilization and a more thorough acquaintance with war has always increased the importance of infantry. the hebrews, and also the egyptians, employed this arm almost exclusively. the asiatics generally employed both infantry and cavalry, but with the greeks the _infantry_ was the favorite arm. even their kings and generals usually fought on foot. the romans conquered the world mainly with their infantry. this arm was also considered of the greatest importance by the ancient germans and gauls; but the migration of the huns and other mongolic tribes mounted on small and fleet horses, and the acquaintance formed by the franks of northern spain with the moors, who were mounted on beautiful horses from arabia and the plateau of asia, introduced a taste for cavalry in western europe. this taste was still further cultivated under the feudal system, for the knights preferred fighting on horseback to serving on foot. during the crusades the infantry fell into disrepute. but the invention of gunpowder changed the whole system of warfare, and restored to infantry its former importance. "the romans," says napoleon in his memoirs, "had two infantries; the first, lightly armed, was provided with a missile weapon; the second, heavily armed, bore a short sword. after the invention of powder two species of infantry were still continued: the arquebusiers, who were lightly armed, and intended to observe and harass the enemy; and the pikemen, who supplied the place of the heavy-armed infantry. during the hundred and fifty years which have elapsed since vauban banished lances and pikes from all the infantry of europe, substituting for them the firelock and bayonet, all the infantry has been lightly armed...... there has been since that time, properly speaking, only one kind of infantry: if there was a company of chasseurs in every battalion, it was by way of counterpoise to the company of grenadiers; the battalion being composed of nine companies, one picked company did not appear sufficient. if the emperor napoleon created companies of voltigeurs armed like dragoons, it was to substitute them for those companies of chasseurs. he composed them of men under five feet in height, in order to bring into use that class of the conscription which measured from four feet ten inches to five feet; and having been until that time exempt, made the burden of conscription fall more heavily on the other classes. this arrangement served to reward a great number of old soldiers, who, being under five feet in height, could not enter into the companies of grenadiers, who on account of their bravery, deserved to enter into a picked company: it was a powerful incentive to emulation to bring the giants and pigmies into competition. had there been men of different colors in the armies of the emperor, he would have composed companies of blacks and companies of whites: in a country where there were cyclops or hunchbacks, a good use might be made of companies of cyclops, and others of hunchbacks." "in , the french army as composed of regiments of the line and battalions of chasseurs; the chasseurs of the cevennes, the vivarais, the alps, of corsica, and the pyrenees, who at the revolution formed half brigades of light infantry; but the object was not to have two different sorts of infantry, for they were raised alike, instructed alike, drilled alike; only the battalions of chasseurs were recruited by the men of the mountainous districts, or by the sons of the garde-chasse; whence they were more fit to be employed on the frontiers of the alps and pyrenees; and when they were in the armies of the north, they were always detached, in preference, for climbing heights or scouring a forest; when these men were placed in line, in a battle, they served very well as a battalion of the line, because they had received the same instructions, and were armed and disciplined in the same manner. every power occasionally raises, in war-time, irregular corps, under the title of free or legionary battalions, consisting of foreign deserters, or formed of individuals of a particular party or faction; but that does not constitute two sorts of infantry. there is and can be but one. if the apes of antiquity must needs imitate the romans, it is not light-armed troops that they ought to introduce, but heavy-armed soldiers, or battalions armed with swords; for all the infantry of europe serve at times as light troops." most european nations, for reasons probably similar to those of napoleon, keep up this nominal division of _infantry of the line_ and _light infantry_; but both are usually armed and equipped alike, and both receive the same organization and instruction. the light infantry are usually made up from the class of men, or district of country, which furnishes the greatest number of riflemen and sharpshooters. in france, the light infantry is best supplied by the hunters of the ardennes, the vosges, and the jura districts; in austria, by the croates and tyrolese; in prussia, by the "försters," or woodsmen; and in russia, by the cossacks. our own western hunters, with proper discipline, make the best tirailleurs in the world. light infantry is usually employed to protect the flanks of the main army, to secure outposts, to reconnoitre the ground, secure avenues of approach, deceive the enemy by demonstrations, and secure the repose of the other troops by patrolling parties. they usually begin a battle, and afterwards take their places in the line, either on the flanks, or in the intervals between the larger bodies. the battle of jena furnishes a good example of the use of french light infantry; and at the battle of waterloo, the prussian tirailleurs were exceedingly effective in clearing the ground for the advance of blücher's heavy columns. the attack of floh-hug by augereau, of vierzehn heilegen by suchet, of iserstaedt by desjardins, are models well worthy of study. the infantry of the line acts in masses, and, on the field of battle, constitutes the principal fighting force. its formations and the manner of engaging it have already been discussed under the head of tactics. the importance of infantry is due, in considerable part, to the fact that it can be used everywhere--in mountains or on plains, in woody or open countries, in cities or in fields, on rivers or at sea, in the redoubt or in the attack of the breach; the infantry depends only on itself, whereas the other arms must depend in a considerable degree on the efficiency of their materials and the will and strength of brute force; and when the snows of russia or the deserts of egypt deprive their animals of the means of sustenance, they become perfectly useless. foot-soldiers, in olden times, were armed with a spear and sometimes with a sword, arrows, lance, and sling. at present they are armed with a gun and bayonet, and sometimes with a sword. in some european services, a few of the foot-soldiers are armed with a pike. some of the light troops used as sharpshooters carry the rifle, but this weapon is useless for the great body of infantry. the short-sword is more useful as an instrument for cutting branches, wood, &c., than for actual fighting. the infantry have no defensive covering, or at least very little. the helmet or cap serves to protect the head, and the shoulders are somewhat defended by epaulets. it has often been proposed in modern times to restore the ancient defensive armor of the foot-soldier; but this would be worse than useless against fire-arms, and moreover would destroy the efficiency of these troops by impeding their movements. the strength of this arm depends greatly upon its discipline; for if calm and firm, a mass of infantry in column or in square is almost impenetrable. the bayonet was introduced by vauban in the wars of louis xiv., and after the years and ' , the pike was totally suppressed in the french army. this measure was warmly opposed by marshal montesquieu, and the question was discussed by him and marshal vauban with an ability and learning worthy of these great men. the arguments of vauban were deemed most conclusive, and his project was adopted by the king. this question has been agitated by military writers in more recent times, puységur advocating the musket, and folard and lloyd contending in favor of restoring the pike. even in our own service, so late as the war of , a distinguished general of the army strongly urged the use of the pike, and the fifteenth (and perhaps another regiment) was armed and equipped in part as _pikemen_; but experience soon proved the absurdity of the project. napoleon calls the infantry the _arm of battles_ and the _sinews of the army_. but if it be acknowledged, that, next to the talent of the general-in-chief, the infantry is the first instrument of victory, it must also be confessed that it finds a powerful support in the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and that without these it would often be compromised, and could gain but a half success. the french infantry is divided into one hundred regiments of three battalions each, a battalion being composed of seven companies. there are also several other battalions of chasseurs, zuaves, &c., being organized especially for service in africa, and composed in part of native troops. in our own army we have eight regiments of infantry, each regiment forming a single battalion of ten companies. the flank companies are intended for light infantry. in all properly organized armies the infantry constitutes from three-fourths to four-fifths of the entire active force in the field, and from two-thirds to three-fourths, say about seven-tenths of the entire military establishment. in time of peace this proportion may be slightly diminished. _cavalry._--the use of cavalry is probably nearly as old as war itself. the egyptians had cavalry before the time of moses, and the israelites often encountered cavalry in their wars with their neighbors, though they made no use of this arm themselves until the time of solomon. the greeks borrowed their cavalry from the asiatics, and especially from the persians, who, according to xenophon, held this arm in great consideration. after the battle of platea, it was agreed by assembled greece that each power should furnish one horseman to every ten foot-soldiers. in sparta the poorest were selected for this arm, and the cavalry marched to combat without any previous training. at athens the cavalry service was more popular, and they formed a well-organized corps of twelve hundred horsemen. at thebes also this arm had consideration in the time of epaminondas. but the cavalry of thessaly was the most renowned, and both philip and alexander drew their mounted troops from that country. the romans had made but little progress in this arm when they encountered the thessalians, who fought in the army of pyrrhus. they then increased their cavalry, but it was not numerous till after their wars with the carthaginians. scipio organized and disciplined the roman cavalry like that of the numidians. this arm was supplied from the ranks of the richest citizens, and afterwards formed an order intermediary between the senate and the people, under the name of _knights_. at a later period, the cavalry of the gauls was particularly good. the franks were without cavalry when they made their first irruption into gaul. under the reign of childeric i. we see for the first time the "cavaliers francs" figure as a part of the national forces. at the battle of tours the cavalry and infantry were in the proportion of one to five, and under pepin and charlemagne their numbers were nearly equal. under charles the bald armies were composed entirely of cavalry, and during the middle ages the knights disdained the foot service, and fought only on horseback. after the introduction of artillery, cavalry was still employed, though to little advantage. gustavus adolphus was the first to perceive the real importance of this arm in modern warfare, and he used it with great success. but it was left for seidlitz to perfect it under the direction of frederick the great. marshal saxe very justly remarked, that cavalry is the "_arme du moment,_" for in almost every battle there are moments when a decisive charge of cavalry will gain the victory, but if not made at the instant it may be too late. the efficiency of cavalry depends upon the moral impression which it makes on the enemy, and is greater in proportion to the size of the mass, and the rapidity of its motion. this last quality enables a commander to avail himself immediately of a decisive moment, when the enemy exposes a weak point, or when disorder appears in his ranks. but this requires a bold and active spirit, which shrinks not from responsibility, and is able to avail itself with quickness and decision of every opportunity. if it be remembered that it is essential that this _coup d'oeil_, so rare and so difficult to acquire, be accompanied by a courage and vigor of execution which nothing can shake, we shall not be astonished that history furnishes so few good cavalry generals, and that this arm so seldom does such execution as it did under frederick and napoleon, with seidlitz and murat as commanders. the soldier gains great _velocity_ by the use of the horse in war; but in other respects he is the loser. the great expense and care required of the cavalier to support his horse; the difficulty experienced in surmounting ordinary obstacles, and in using his fire-arms to advantage, are all prejudicial to success. the unequal size of the horse, and the great diversity in his strength and breed, have rendered it necessary to divide this arm into _light_ and _heavy_ cavalry, and a mixed class called _dragoons_. the heavy cavalry is commonly used in masses where _force_ is mainly requisite; the lighter troops are used singly and in small detachments, where rapidity of movement is most desired. the _heavy_ cavalry are divided into carabiniers, cuirassiers, and sometimes lancers. the two latter are frequently united, the cuirassiers being armed with the lance. these troops are seldom used for scouts, vanguards, and convoys; but are frequently employed to sustain the light cavalry. their main duty is "_to appear on the field of battle and make the decisive charges_." the _light_ cavalry is composed of chasseurs, or troopers, hussars, and lancers. the latter, when composed of large men and mounted on heavy horses, are attached to the heavy cavalry. the _dragoons_ were formerly a mixed body of horse and foot, but it being found impossible to unite these two distinct arms in one, and the attempt having destroyed the usefulness of the body to act in either capacity, the term was applied to a mixed kind of cavalry between the heavy and the light horse. in more recent wars they have also been instructed as infantry and employed as foot-soldiers, till horses could be found in the enemy's country with which to mount them. but we believe there is no instance in more modern wars in which they have been employed at the same time in both capacities. this term is, very improperly, applied to all our cavalry; and some of the congressional wiseacres have recently experimented on one of our so-called regiments of _dragoons_, by dismounting it one year, selling its horses at auction, and changing its arms and equipments, and again, the next year, purchasing new horses, arms, and equipments for remounting it; and all this for _economy!_ the roman cavalry at first wore a round shield and helmet, the rest of their body being nearly uncovered. their arms were a sword and long thin javelin, or lance, with an iron head. they afterwards reduced the shield to a much smaller size, and made square, and their lance was greatly increased in size and length, and armed at both ends. in other respects they were armed in the same way as infantry. the use of the lance and the shield at the same time, of course rendered both nearly worthless. the roman cavalry was superior to that of their enemies, except, perhaps, the light cavalry of the parthians. the heavy armor which was sometimes worn by the ancients, like the _gens d'armes_ of the middle ages, rendered them greatly inferior to infantry in a close engagement. tigranes, king of armenia, brought an army of one hundred and fifty thousand horse into the field, against the roman general lucullus, who had only about six thousand horse and fifteen thousand foot. but the armenian cavalry, called _cataphratti_ were so overburdened with armor, that when they fell from their horses they could scarcely move or make any use of their arms. they were routed by a mere handful of roman infantry. the modern cavalry is much lighter, and, by dispensing with armor, shields, &c., it can move with much greater rapidity. a modern cavalry horse carries a weight of from two hundred and fifty to three hundred pounds, viz.: heavy light cavalry. cavalry. the rider, . . . . lbs. his arms and equipments, . . . his horse equipments, . . . two days' rations of provisions and grain, ----------------- the horse moves per minute-- at a walk, from yards to at a trot, at a gallop, but on a march over the ordinary average of good and bad roads, cavalry will walk about one hundred yards per minute, and at an easy trot, two hundred. an ordinary day's march for cavalry is about thirty miles, but on a forced march this arm can march fifty miles within the twenty-four hours. a single horseman, or a small detachment, can easily exceed this distance. "light cavalry," says napoleon, in his memoirs, "ought to reconnoitre and watch the motions of the enemy, considerably in advance of the army; it is not an appendage to the infantry: it should be sustained and protected especially by the cavalry of the line. rivalry and emulation have always existed between the infantry and cavalry: light cavalry is indispensable to the vanguard, the rearguard, and the wings of the army; it, therefore, cannot properly be attached to, and forced to follow the movements of any particular corps of infantry. it would be more natural to attach it to the cavalry of the line, than to leave it in dependence upon the infantry, with which it has no connection; but it should be independent of both." "if the light cavalry is to form vanguards, it must be organized into squadrons, brigades, and divisions, for the purpose of manoeuvring; for that is all vanguards and rearguards do: they pursue or retreat by platoons, form themselves into several lines, or wheel into column, or change their position with rapidity for the purpose of outfronting a whole wing. by a combination of such evolutions, a vanguard, of inferior numbers, avoids brisk actions and general engagements, and yet delays the enemy long enough to give time for the main army to come up, for the infantry to deploy, for the general-in-chief to make his dispositions, and for the baggage and parks to file into their stations. the art of a general of the vanguard, or of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding a defeat, to hold the enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him to spend three or four hours in moving a single league: tactics point out the methods of effecting these important objects, and are more necessary for cavalry than for infantry, and in the vanguard, or the rear-guard, than in any other position. the hungarian insurgents, whom we saw in , , and , were pitiful troops. if the light troops of maria theresa's times became formidable, it was by their excellent organization, and, above every thing, by their numbers. to imagine that such troops could be superior to wurmser's hussars, or to the dragoons of latour, or to the archduke john, would be entertaining strange ideas of things; but neither the hungarian insurgents, nor the cossacks, ever formed the vanguards of the austrian and russian armies; because to speak of a vanguard or a rear-guard, is to speak of troops which manoeuvre. the russians considered a regiment of cossacks who had been trained worth three regiments untrained. every thing about these troops is despicable, except the cossack himself, who is a man of fine person, powerful, adroit, subtle, a good horseman, and indefatigable; he is born on horseback, and bred among civil wars; he is in the field, what the bedouin is in the desert, or the barbet in the alps; he never enters a house, never lies in a bed; and he always changes his bivouac at sunset, that he may not pass a night in a place where the enemy may possibly have observed him." "two mamelukes kept three frenchmen at bay, because they were better armed, better mounted, and better exercised; they had two pairs of pistols, a _tromblon_, a carbine, a helmet with a visor, a coat of mail, several horses, and several men on foot to attend them. but a hundred french did not fear a hundred mamelukes; three hundred were more than a match for an equal number; and one thousand would beat fifteen hundred: so powerful is the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions! murat, leclerc, and lasalle, cavalry generals, presented themselves to the mamelukes in several lines: when the latter were upon the point of outfronting the first line, the second came to its assistance on the right and left; the mamelukes then stopped, and wheeled, to turn the wings of this new line: this was the moment seized for charging them; they were always broken." "the duty of a vanguard, or a rear-guard, does not consist in advancing or retiring, but in manoeuvring. it should be composed of a good light cavalry, supported by a good reserve of cavalry of the line, by excellent battalions of foot, and strong batteries of artillery: the troops must be well trained; and the generals, officers, and soldiers, should all be equally well acquainted with their tactics, each according to his station. an undisciplined troop would only embarrass the advanced guard." "it is admitted that for facility in manoeuvring, the squadron should consist of one hundred men, and that every three or four squadrons should have a superior officer." "it is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to wear cuirasses: dragoons, mounted upon horses of four feet nine inches in height, armed with straight sabres, and without cuirasses, should form a part of the heavy cavalry; they should be furnished with infantry-muskets, with bayonets: should have the _shakot_ of the infantry, pantaloons covering the half-boot-buskin, cloaks with sleeves, and portmanteaus small enough to be carried slung across the back when the men are on foot. cavalry of all descriptions should be furnished with fire-arms, and should know how to manoeuvre on foot. three thousand light cavalry, or three thousand cuirassiers, should not suffer themselves to be stopped by a thousand infantry posted in a wood, or on ground impracticable to cavalry; and three thousand dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack two thousand infantry, should the latter, favored by their position, attempt to stop them. "turenne, prince eugene of savoy, and vendome, attached great importance to dragoons, and used them successfully. the dragoons gained great glory in italy, in and . in egypt and in spain, during the campaigns of and , a degree of prejudice sprung up against them. the divisions of dragoons had been mustered at compiegne and amiens, to be embarked without horses for the expedition of england, in order to serve on foot until they should be mounted in that country. general baraguay d'hilliers, their first inspector, commanded them; he had them equipped with gaiters, and incorporated with them a considerable number of recruits, whom he exercised in infantry manoeuvres alone. these were no longer cavalry regiments: they served in the campaign of on foot, until after the battle of jena, when they were mounted on horses taken from the prussian cavalry, three-fourths of which were unserviceable. these combined circumstances injured the dragoons; but in and their divisions acquired honor in rivalling the cuirassiers. dragoons are necessary for the support of light cavalry in the vanguard, the rear-guard, and the wings of an army; cuirassiers are little adapted for van and rearguards: they should never be employed in this service but when it is requisite to keep them in practice and accustom them to war." napoleon further recommends that light cavalry be divided into two kinds, chasseurs or troopers, and light horse; and the heavy to be composed of dragoons and cuirassiers; the troopers to be mounted on horses of ft in.; light cavalry on horses of ft. or in.; dragoons on horses of ft. in.; and cuirassiers on horses of ft. or in.; which employ horses of all kinds for mounting the troops. all cavalry must receive the same instruction; and all should be capable, in case of need, of performing any of the duties of mounted troops. the shock is the principal effect produced by this arm; therefore, the greater the velocity the greater must be this effect, provided the troops can be kept in mass. but it is found, by experience, that it is impossible to preserve them in line when put to the height of their speed. the best authorities therefore prefer, as we have said elsewhere, the charge at the trot, or at any rate the gallop should not be taken up till within a very short distance of the enemy. the charge of a compact mass at a trot is much greater than that of a wavering one at a gallop. on the field of battle the cavalry of the line is considered as the arm of the shock, to break through any corps that may be in opposition; but it is unable of itself to resist a shock, and therefore should on no account wait to receive the charge of another body of mounted troops. it was on this account that frederick directed his cavalry officers, under the severest penalties, never to receive a charge, but always to meet the attacking force half way. this is the only mode of preventing defeat. a good infantry can always sustain itself against the charges of cavalry. at the battle of auerstedt, in , davoust ordered the divisions of gudin to form squares to resist the prussian cavalry, which, by means of a fog, had gained a most advantageous position. blücher led his cavalry in repeated and impetuous charges, but all was in vain; the french infantry presented a front of iron. at the combat of krasnoi, in , the cavalry of grouchy, nansonty, and bordesoult, attacked and overthrew the dragoons of clarkof, but the russian infantry under neveroffskoi sustained itself against the repeated charges of vastly superior numbers of these french horse. at the battle of molwitz, the grenadiers sustained the charges of the enemy's cavalry, although the cavalry of the great frederick had already been completely overthrown. but when the infantry is engaged with the infantry of the enemy, the charges of cavalry are generally successful, and sometimes decide the fate of the battle, as was the case at rosbach, zornsdorf, wurtsburg, marengo, eylau, borodino, &c. cavalry may also be very efficacious against infantry in wet weather, when the rain or snow renders it impossible for the foot soldiers to use their fire-arms to advantage, as was the case with the corps of augereau, at eylau, and with the austrian left, at the battle of dresden. again, if the infantry be previously weakened, or thrown into disorder by the fire of batteries. the charge of the russian cavalry at hohenfriedberg, in , is a remarkable example of this kind. cavalry should always be immediately sustained in its efforts either by infantry or other bodies of horse; for as soon as the charge is made, the strength of this arm is for a time exhausted, and, if immediately attacked, defeat becomes inevitable. the charge of the cavalry of ney on prince hohenlohe at the battle of jena, and of the french horse on gossa at leipsic, are fine examples of the successful charges of cavalry when properly sustained. kunnersdorf and waterloo are examples of the disastrous consequences of leaving such charges without support. the choice of the field of battle is sometimes such as to render cavalry almost useless. such was the case at the battle of cassano, between the duke of vendome and the prince eugene. the field was so cut up by the adda and the canals of rittorto and pendina, that prince eugene could make no use of his horse. if, when master of the bridge of rittorto, he had been able to charge the french with a body of cavalry, there had been no doubt of his complete success. after a battle, and in the pursuit of a flying enemy, cavalry is invaluable. if napoleon had possessed a suitable number of mounted troops, with an able commander, at the battles of lutzen and ligny, the results of these victories had been decisive; whereas they were really without consequence. on the other hand, the prussian army in , after the battle of jena, and napoleon's army in at waterloo, were completely cut to pieces by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit of a defeated and dispirited foe. the want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war of the american revolution. had washington possessed a few good squadrons of horse, his surprise and defeat in the lines of brooklyn, and the consequent loss of new york, had never taken place. the efficient employment of a few good squadrons of cavalry might readily have prevented the defeat at bladensburg, and the loss of the capitol, in . in a well-organized army, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry, according to the nature of the war.[ ] [footnote : to gain a competent knowledge of the duties connected with the two arms of service mentioned in this chapter, the officer should make himself thoroughly acquainted with scott's system of infantry tactics, for the united states' infantry, or at least with major cooper's abridged edition of infantry tactics, and with the system of cavalry tactics, adopted in our army; also with the directions for the use of these two arms in a campaign, and their employment on the battle-field, given in the writings of jomini, decker, okouneff, rocquancourt, and jacquinot de presle.] the following books may be referred to for further information respecting the history, organization, use, and instruction of infantry and cavalry:-- _essai général de tactique._ guibert. _considérations générales sur l'infanterie française,_ par un général en rétraite. a work of merit. _de l'infanterie,_ par l'auteur de l'histoire de l'expédition de russie. _histoire de la guerre de la peninsule._ foy. this work contains many interesting and valuable remarks on the french and english systems of tactics, and particularly on the tactics of infantry. _cours d'art et d'histoire militaires._ jacquinot de presle. _art de la guerre._ rogniat. _instruction destinée aux troupes légères,_ &c., redigée sur une instruction de frederick ii. à ses officiers. _english infantry regulations._ _ordonnance_ (french) _pour l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie,_ par le commission de manoeuvres. _aide-mémoires des officiers généraux et supérieurs, et des capitaines._ _essai sur l'histoire générale de l'art militaire._ carion-nisas. _histoire de la milice française._ daniel. _cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires._ rocquancourt. _traité élémentaire d'art militaire,_ &c. gay de vernon. _introduction à l'étude de l'art de la guerre._ la roche-amyou. _tactique des trois armes._ decker. _examen raisonné des trois armes,_ &c. okouneff. the last two are works of great merit. the writings of okouneff, however, are very diffuse. _instruction pour le service de l'infanterie légère._ guyard. _instruction de l'infanterie,_ &c. schauenbourg. _traité de tactique._ ternay et koch. _mécanism des manoeuvres de guerre de l'infanterie polonaise._ vroniecki. _traité sur l'infanterie légère._ beurmann. _english cavalry regulations._ _ordonnance_ (french) _sur l'exercice et les évolutions de la cavalerie._ _les troupes à cheval de france,_ &c. de bourge. _avant-postes de cavalerie légère._ brack. the author served with distinction under lassale, colbert, maison, pujol, and excelmans. _réflexions sur l'emploi de la cavalerie,_ &c. caraman. _observations sur l'ordonnance, &c., de la cavalerie._ dejean. _tactique de la cavalerie._ itier. _eléments de tactique pour la cavalerie,_ par mottin de la balme. a work of rare merit. _de l'emploi de la cavalerie à la guerre._ schauenbourg. _rémarques sur la cavalerie._ warnery. this work has long enjoyed a high reputation among the cavalry officers of the european services. the paris edition is enriched with notes by a french general officer. _nachrichten und betrachtungen über die thaten und schicksale der reiterei,_ &c. this work discusses the operations of cavalry in the campaigns of frederick the great and of napoleon, down to the battle of lutzen in . _examen du livret provisoire,_ &c. marbot. _le spectateur militaire,_ contains many essays by cavalry officers on the various questions connected with the organization and use of this arm. _die gefechtslehre der beiden verbundenen waffen-kavallerie und reitenden artillerie._ decker. _manuel de l'officier._ ruhle de lilienstern. _aide-mémoire, à l'usage des officiers de cavalerie._ _journal de l'infanterie et de la cavalerie._ _traité de tactique pour les officiers d'infanterie et de cavalerie._ _histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie prussienne._ coutz. chapter xi. army organization.--artillery. _artillery_.--previous to the invention of gunpowder in the thirteenth century, the machines of war were divided between two classes of military men, the engineers (_engignours_, as they were called in the middle ages) and the artillery, (_artilliers_, as they were formerly called,) the latter being particularly charged with the management of the lighter and more portable projectile machines, such as the balistas and arco-balistas, which were used for throwing different kinds of arrows--_flêches, viretons, carreaux, matras_, &c., while the former managed the battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c. and, indeed, for a long time after the discovery of gunpowder, this distinction was kept up, and the artillery retained all the more ordinary projectile machines, while the engineers constructed and managed the more ponderous weapons of attack and defence. but the new artillery was gradually introduced, without, however, immediately displacing the old, and there were for a time, if we may be allowed the expression, _two_ artilleries, the one employing the old projectile machines, and the other those of the new invention. the latter were called _canoniers_, to distinguish them from the former, who still retained the name of _artilliers_. the first cannon were invented in the early part of the fourteenth century, or, perhaps, among the arabs as early as the middle of the thirteenth century, but they were not much known in europe till about . cannon are said to have been employed by the moors as early as , and by the french in . the english used artillery at the battle of crecy in . both cannon and the ancient projectile machines were employed at the siege of aiguillon in , at zara in , at rennes in , and at naples in . at this last siege the ancient balista was employed to throw into the castle of naples barrels of infectious matter and mutilated limbs of prisoners of war. we read of the same thing being done in spain at a later period. cannon in france were at first called _bombards_ and _couleuverines_, but were afterwards named from certain figures marked on them, such as _serpentines, basilisks, scorpions,_&c. in the infancy of the art they were made small, weighing only from twenty to fifty pounds, and were mounted on small moveable carriages. this species of fire-arms became quite numerous about the beginning of the fifteenth century. they were followed by heavier pieces, used in the attack and defence of towns. this siege artillery continued to be increased in dimensions till, towards the latter part of the fifteenth century, they reached such an enormous size as to be almost useless as a military machine. louis xi. had an immense piece constructed at tours, in , which, it was said, carried a ball from the bastille to charenton, (about six miles!) its caliber was that of five hundred pounds. it was intended for experiment, and burst on the second discharge. the famous culverin of bolduc was said to carry a ball from that city to bommel. the culverin of nancy, made in , was more than twenty-three feet in length. there is now an ancient cannon in the arsenal at metz of about this length, which carries a ball of one hundred and forty pounds. cannon balls were found at paris as late as , weighing near two hundred pounds, and from twelve to sixteen inches in diameter. at the siege of constantinople in , there was a famous metallic bombard which threw stone balls of an incredible size; at the siege of bourges in , a cannon was used which, it was said, threw stone balls "of the size of mill-stones." the gantois, under arteville, made a bombard fifty feet in length, whose report was heard at a distance of ten leagues! the first cannon were made of wood, and covered with sheet-iron, or embraced by iron rings: longitudinal bars of iron were afterwards substituted for the wooden form. towards the end of the fourteenth century, brass, tin, copper, wrought and cast iron, were successively used for this purpose. the bores of the pieces were first made in a conical shape, and it was not until a much later period that the cylindrical form was introduced. in the wars between the spaniards and moors in the latter part of the fifteenth century, very great use was made of artillery in sieges and battles. ferdinand the catholic had at this time, probably, a larger artillery train than any other european power. the spanish cannon, generally very large, were composed of iron bars about two inches in breadth, held together by bolts and rings of the same metal. the pieces were firmly attached to their carriages, and incapable of either horizontal or vertical movement. the balls thrown by them were usually of marble, though sometimes of iron. many of the pieces used at the siege of baza, in , are still to be seen in that city, and also the cannon balls then in use. some of the latter are fourteen inches in diameter, and weigh one hundred and seventy-five pounds. the length of the cannon was about twelve feet. these dimensions are a proof of a slight improvement in this branch of military science, which was, nevertheless, still in its infancy. the awkwardness of artillery at this period may be judged of by its slowness of fire. at the siege of zeteuel, in , five "bombards," as the heavy pieces of ordnance were then called, were able to discharge only forty shot in the course of a day; and it is noticed as a remarkable circumstance at the siege of albahar, that two batteries discharged one hundred and forty balls in the course of the twenty-four hours! in the italian wars between france and spain, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, the difficulty of moving the heavy cannon then in use was so great that only a very small number of pieces were brought upon the battle-field. at the battle of cerignola, in , the number of cannon in the french army was only thirteen. indeed, during the greater part of this century, four or five pieces were considered sufficient for an ordinary army in the field, and many agreed to the doctrine of machiavelli, that the only legitimate use of artillery was in the attack and defence of places. but in the wars of henry iv. of france, this arm of service was again increased, and the troops which this king destined against the house of austria had an artillery train of fifty pieces. great improvements were also made about this period in the manufacture of powder, and all kinds of fire-arms. sully gave greater development to this arm of service, improving its materials, and increasing its efficiency. then, as at most other periods, the french were in advance of most other nations in artillery. it was near the close of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century, that the heavy and ill-shaped artillery began to give place to more wieldy and useful pieces. a certain m. de linar demonstrated, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, that cannon twelve feet in length would give a greater range than those seventeen feet in length, the calibre being the same; but some years elapsed before advantage was taken of this discovery. in , gustavus adolphus caused experiments to be made to verify this point, and, on being convinced of its truth, caused his batteries to be furnished with shorter and lighter pieces. this great king introduced, about the same time, a new and lighter kind of artillery, made of sheet iron and leather. each piece had its chamber formed of thin metal and embraced by strong iron rings; over these was placed a form of hardened leather, which was again encircled with rings and held compactly together. these pieces were mounted on light carriages, so that two men could easily manoeuvre them. it was said that they would fire from eight to ten rounds without requiring repairs. gustavus made use of them in all his military operations from to the time of his death. they did him excellent service on numerous occasions; being so very light they could be easily transported, and, on the field of battle, their movements could be made to conform to the movements of his troops. as cannon and small arms were gradually introduced into general use, various inventions and improvements were proposed and introduced from time to time. cannon were constructed with two or more barrels; some were arranged for being loaded in the breech, and others at the mouth of the piece; two pieces were sometimes connected by horizontal timbers, which revolved about a vertical axis, so that the recoil of one piece would bring the other into battery; and various other arrangements of this description, which have recently been revived and some of them patented as new inventions. the small arms employed at this period were much the same as those used at the present day, except the matchlock, which afterwards gave place to flint-locks. arms of this description were sometimes made to be loaded at the breach, and guns with two, three, and even as many as eight barrels, were at one time in fashion. in the _musée de l'artillerie_ at paris may be found many arms of this kind, which have been reproduced in this country and england as new inventions. in this museum are two ancient pieces, invented near the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century, which very nearly correspond with _colt's patent_, with the single exception of the lock![ ] [footnote : it is not to be inferred that the modern _improvements_ (as they are called) are copied from the more ancient _inventions_. two men of different ages, or even of the same age, sometimes fall upon the same identical discovery, without either's borrowing from the other.] the _materiel_ of artillery employed in modern warfare is divided into two general classes: st. _siege artillery_, or such as is employed in the attack and defence of places. d. _field artillery_, or such as is used in battle, or in the field-operations of an army. . _siege artillery_ is composed of _mortars, large howitzers, paixhan guns_ or _columbiads_,[ ] and _all cannon_ of _a large calibre._ in our service this class of ordnance includes the twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty-two, and forty-two-pounder guns, the eight, ten, and thirteen-inch mortars, the sixteen-inch stone mortar, the twenty-four-pounder coehorn mortar, the twenty-four-pounder carronade, and the eight, ten, and twelve-inch howitzers. [footnote : these pieces were first invented by colonel bomford, of the u.s. army, and used in the war of . the dimensions of these guns were first taken to europe by a young french officer, and thus fell into the hands of general paixhan, who immediately introduced them into the french service. they were by this means first made known to the rest of europe, and received the name of the person who introduced them into the european services, rather than that of the original inventor. all these facts are so fully susceptible of proof, that europeans now acknowledge themselves indebted to us for the invention; even general paixhan gives up all claim to originality in his gun, and limits himself to certain improvements which he introduced. the original gun, which was invented by colonel bomford, and whose dimensions were carried to general paixhan in france, is now lying at the ordnance dépôt, in new york harbor.] all these, except the smaller mortars, are made of cast iron. this substance is less tenacious than wrought iron or bronze, and the cannon made of it are, on this account, much heavier than of the other materials; but for the naval service, and the attack and defence of fortifications, the weight required to secure the necessary strength is not very objectionable. wrought iron and bronze are much more expensive and less durable. moreover, the difficulty of forging wrought iron in masses of sufficient size has been such as to prevent its being brought into general use for artillery. numerous attempts have been made, at different periods, to construct large guns of this material, but none have yet been successful. improvements which are now making in the manufacture of wrought iron, may render this the preferable material for the smaller pieces of artillery; but the best informed military men deem it objectionable for the heavier cannon, both on account of its cost and the imperfection of its manufacture. even should the latter objection be removed, its cost must prevent its general application to the construction of siege artillery. charlatans in military science, both in this country and in europe, bring this subject up every fifteen or twenty years as a new _invention_, and flaming notices of the _improvement_, and predictions of the revolution it is to effect in the art of war, are circulated in the newspapers to "gull" a credulous public; and after some fifty or one hundred thousand dollars have been squandered on some court-favorite, the whole matter ends in the explosion of the "_improvement_," and probably the destruction of the "_inventor_," and perhaps also of his spectators. let us be distinctly understood on this subject. there may be _inventions_ and _improvements_ in the manufacture of wrought iron, but there is nothing _new_ in its _application_ to the construction of cannon, for it has been used for this purpose as long ago as the first invention of the art. . _field artillery_ is composed of the smaller guns and howitzers. in our service this class of cannon includes the six and twelve-pounder guns, and the twelve and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. all these are now made of bronze. this material is more expensive than cast-iron, but its superior tenacity renders it more useful where great weight is objectionable. improvements in the manufacture of cast iron may render it safe to employ this metal in the construction of field-pieces. it is also possible the wrought iron may be forged in masses large enough, and the cost be so reduced as to bring it into use for field-pieces. it is here important to combine strength with lightness, and additional expense may very properly be incurred to secure this important object. the _projectiles_ now in use are solid shot, shells, strap-shot, case or canister-shot, grape-shot, light and fire-balls, carcasses, grenades, and rockets. _solid shot_ are now almost invariably made of cast iron,[ ] formed in moulds of sand or iron. this projectile is used under almost every circumstance, whether in the battle-field or in the attack and defence of places, and is the only one that is effectual against the stone walls of forts. _hot shot_ are used against shipping and wooden structures of every description. red-hot balls were first employed by the king of poland, in , but, on account of the difficulty of heating them with rapidity, and the danger of loading the piece with them, this kind of projectile was not in general use till a much later period. it was at first supposed that the expansion of the metal would be so great, when heated to a red or white heat, as to prevent the ball from entering the piece; it is found, however, that the windage is still sufficient for loading with facility. these red-hot balls are principally used to fire wooden buildings, ships, and other combustible matter. they are therefore much used as a projectile for coast defence, and all fortifications on the seaboard should be provided with furnaces and grates, arranged so as to heat them with facility and rapidity. [footnote : in mexico, where iron is scarce, copper is used for shot and shells; but it is a poor substitute.] there are several kinds of _hollow-shot_ and _shells_, called _bombs, howitzes, grenades_, &c. they are made of cast iron, and usually in a spherical shape, the cavity being concentric with the exterior surface. the cavity was formerly made eccentric with the exterior, under the belief that the heavier side would always strike first. the rotary motion of the shell during its flight rendered this precaution of no use. fire is communicated to the combustible matter within the shell by means of a fuse, which is so regulated that the explosion shall take place at the desired moment. hollow-shot are used with advantage to destroy ordinary buildings, ships, earthwork, and thin walls of masonry; they, however, are of little avail in breaking the massive walls of well-constructed forts. howitzes and grenades are particularly effective against cavalry and columns of infantry, and are much employed on the battle-field; they are also much used in the attack and defence of places. we find that as early as the spaniards made use of a projectile similar to the modern bomb. "they threw from their engines large globular masses, composed of certain inflammable ingredients mixed with gunpowder, which, scattering long trains of light," says an eye-witness, "in their passage through the air, filled the beholders with dismay, and descending on the roofs of edifices, frequently occasioned extensive conflagration." in the siege of constantinople by mahomet ii., shells were used, and also mortars of enormous size. in valturus proposed to throw, with a kind of mortar, "globes of copper filled with powder." in , an artificer of venloo burned wachtendeck by throwing bombs into the place. a similar attempt had just been made at berg-op-zoom. the use of this projectile became quite common in france under louis xiii. howitzes were not much used till the seventeenth century. they are of german origin, and the howitzer first bore the name of _hausmitz_. the _strap-shot_ consists of a round ball attached to a _sabot_ of the same calibre, by means of two strips of tin passing over the shot at right angles, and fastened to a third, which is soldered around the sabot. one end of the sabot is arranged for attaching it to the cartridge, the other being hollowed out to receive the shot. the supposed advantages of this arrangement are, st, a diminution of the windage; d, the gun may be loaded with greater rapidity; and, d, the cartridge is transported with greater safety. the _case_ or _canister-shot_ is prepared by filling a tin canister with grape-shot or musket-balls, and attaching it to the cartridge by means of a sabot. there being two sizes of grape-shot, and one of musket-balls, we have three kinds of canister-shot calculated to reach at different distances. the three sizes of shot are frequently mixed in the same canister. this projectile is particularly effective against lines of infantry and cavalry, when the distance is short. the _grape-shot_ is composed of small balls arranged round an upright pin attached to a plate of wood or iron. the concave cast-iron plate is preferable, as it increases the range of the shot. the balls are covered with canvass, and thoroughly confined by a quilting of strong twine. this shot is used for the same purposes as the canister. _light_ and _fire-balls_ are formed of an oval case of sacking, filled with combustible matter, and attached to a culot of cast-iron. the whole is covered with a net of spun-yarn. light-balls are used to light up our own works, and are not armed; fire-balls being employed to light up the works or approaches of an enemy, it is necessary to arm them with pistol-barrels, in order to prevent, any one from extinguishing them. when made of very combustible materials, and used for setting fire to wooden structures, they are denominated _incendiary balls_. _carcasses_ are employed for the same purpose as incendiary balls; they are of two kinds: st, the _shell-carcass_; and, d, the _ribbed-carcass_. the first is composed of a spherical shell, cast with five fuse-holes, one being at the top, and the other four in a plane perpendicular to this and at right angles with each other; the shell is filled with matter highly combustible. the second is formed of iron ribs connected by iron straps, and attached at the ends to culots of the same material, the whole being filled with combustible composition. this is more expensive than the shell carcass, and cannot be fired with as great accuracy; it is now seldom used. carcasses may be armed in the same manner as fire-balls. _smoke_ and _suffocating balls_ are used to drive an enemy from galleries and mines. they are thrown by hand. the _personnel_ of the french artillery was for a long time retained, together with the engineers, under the general direction of the "grand master of cross-bows." in the master-general of artillery was made independent of the grand-master of cross-bows; but previous to the reign of louis xiv., the artillery troops had no organization as a separate corps. in six companies of _canoniers_ were created, and soon after two companies of _bombardiers_. in the first regiment of fusiliers was changed into a _royal regiment of artillery_, and both the canoniers and bombardiers were eventually incorporated with it. the staff of artillery, towards the close of this reign, was composed of one grand-master, sixty lieutenants, sixty commissaries, and eighty _officiers-pointeurs_. in the artillery was divided into five battalions and stationed at metz, strasbourg, grenoble, perpignan, and la fère, where they established schools of theory and practice. in the artillery was organized into seven regiments, each regiment having its own separate school. this organization continued without any remarkable change till the revolution. during the earlier campaigns of the french revolution it is impossible to trace out the changes that took place in army organization, every thing was then so irregular and confused, the troops of different arms being frequently united together. in the campaign of there were some six or seven regiments of foot artillery, and ten companies of horse. this arm was greatly increased during the subsequent campaigns, and its organization was completely remodelled by napoleon on his elevation to the head of the government. the _personnel_ of the artillery was then composed of a general staff, nine regiments of foot and six of horse. in it was reduced to eight regiments of foot and four of horse. the _personnel_ of artillery in modern army organization is divided into four classes: the _staff, guards, artificers,_ and _troops_. i. the _staff_, or _ordnance_, as it is called in our service, is charged with the construction of all the materials of artillery, and the collection of powder and military stores. as the lives of persons using these materials, and, in a considerable degree, the success of war, depend upon the nature and quality of the stores thus manufactured and collected, it is obvious that the members of this branch of the artillery service should possess high and peculiar qualifications. in the french army the artillery staff is composed of two hundred and eighty-three officers of different grades: also twenty-four officers of the general staff are attached to this service. in our army the _ordnance_ is composed of twenty-eight officers of different grades. ii. _artillery-guards._--these in our service are divided into two classes: st. _military store-keepers._ d. _ordnance sergeants._ both are alike charged with the care and preservation of the artillery property and stores at the several garrisons, arsenals, and magazines. in our army we have fifty-eight of these guards, viz: fifteen commissioned military store-keepers, and forty-three ordnance sergeants. we seldom have more than this number of permanent posts; each one can therefore be supplied with an artillery guard for the care of the artillery stores. in the french service there are three hundred and fifteen of these artillery guards; they are divided into three classes. iii. _artificers._--this class of men are employed in the construction and repairs of military materials. in most of our arsenals and armories it is thought to be best to employ unenlisted workmen, by the piece or contract. nevertheless a limited number of enlisted men of this description are found to be both useful and necessary. we have three hundred and thirty of these in our army, viz: two hundred and fifty enlisted "ordnance men," and eighty "artificers" attached to the regiments. in the french army they have for the service of the arsenals and establishments, one hundred and forty-nine "ouvriers," and twelve "artificers;" there are also three hundred and sixty "ouvriers" and seventeen "armuriers" attached to the corps of artillery, making in all five hundred and thirty-eight. iv. _artillery troops._--artillery, as an arm of service, is divided in the same manner as its _materiel_; the _field_-artillery being intended for field service, and the garrison or _siege_-artillery, for the attack and defence of places. the troops of the artillery corps of a modern army usually do duty either in the field, or in sieges, or garrison, as occasion may require. when employed in the service of a campaign, artillery is usually divided into two classes: st. _foot_ artillery; and d. _horse_ artillery. in the early history of artillery, as has already been shown, but few pieces were ever brought upon the battle-field. charles viii. crossed the alps with a pretty large train; but a part of these were hand-guns, and but very few of the larger pieces were ever brought into battle; indeed, it was then thought that this arm would be of little use except in sieges. at the battle of gravelines the army of philip ii. had only seventeen pieces of artillery; and at the battle of ivry the french had only four pieces of cannon, and two culverins: the army of the league had also only four pieces. at the battle of moncontour the opposing armies had but eight pieces each. gustavus adolphus of sweden not only improved the character of artillery, but also gave to it great development as an arm of service. at the battle of bréetenfield he had one hundred pieces of artillery, great and small, and at the camp of nuremberg he numbered about three hundred. this king also made a more skilful use of his cannon by uniting them more in mass than had been done by his predecessors; his system was nevertheless very imperfect. in the disposition of this arm on the field of battle, a vast improvement was made by condé, turenne, and prince eugene of savoy. frederick the great also made great use of this arm, and was the first to introduce horse artillery. this mode of using field-pieces has peculiar properties which in many circumstances render it an invaluable arm. the promptness and rapidity of its movements enable it to act with other troops without embarrassing them. the french soon introduced into their army the improvements made by the king of prussia, and in the celebrated gribeauval appeared. he improved the form of the cannon and greatly diminished the weight of field artillery, giving it an organization which has been but slightly changed since his time. the successive improvements in artillery have for a long time constituted a prominent feature in war. the power of this arm to throw projectiles to a great distance, and to overturn and destroy opposing obstacles, renders it a necessary arm on the battle-field, and a strong barrier and safeguard of states. it is an essential element in all army organization. in our army we have four regiments of artillery, forming the basis of forty batteries. in the french service there are fourteen regiments, forming the basis of two hundred and six field batteries. the term _battery_, when applied to artillery as an arm of service, refers to a permanent organization of a certain number of cannon, with the men and other accessaries required to serve them. this is the unit of force in this arm. the regimental organization is a mere nominal arrangement, for in actual service artillery acts by batteries, and never by regiments. its strength is therefore invariably estimated by the number of its batteries. a battery is ordinarily composed of six pieces, two of them being howitzers. the lighter batteries would, in our service, be formed of six-pounder guns and twelve-pounder howitzers; and the heavier of twelve-pounder guns and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. these heavy batteries would usually form the reserve. each piece being attended by its caisson, this formation would give twelve carriages to each battery, six for the guns and six for the caissons. the extra caissons form a part of the reserve, and move with the train. in some foreign services a battery is composed of eight pieces with their caissons. this arm admits of three formations--_in column, in battle_, and _in battery_. in column it ordinarily moves by sections of two pieces, each piece being followed or preceded by its caisson. columns of half-batteries are sometimes formed, and also columns of single pieces; but the latter ought never to be employed except in cases of necessity in passing a narrow defile, and at a distance from the enemy. in order of battle, the pieces are drawn up in line, their caissons forming a second line, at the distance of a few paces. when in order of battery, the pieces are formed in the same way as for battle, except that the guns are directed towards the enemy and prepared for firing. the movements and manoeuvres of foot artillery correspond with those of infantry, and of mounted artillery with those of cavalry, a battery being regarded as a battalion or squadron, of which the pieces form the platoons. mounted batteries can seldom move with greater rapidity than the trot, except in cases of emergency, and even then the gallop can be kept up only for a very short time; but this is of no great importance, as the batteries never accompany cavalry in the charge. the french and german writers discuss artillery as employed in battle, under two distinct heads-- st, as an arm of preparation, and d, as an arm of succor. i. as an arm of preparation it serves, st, to protect the deploying of the other troops; d, to disorganize the enemy's masses, and to facilitate the action of infantry and cavalry, by weakening the intended points of attack; d, to force an enemy to evacuate a position by overthrowing obstacles with which he has covered himself; th, to keep up the action till the other troops can be prepared to strike the decisive blow. the force of this arm depends upon the rapidity and accuracy of its fire; rash valor is therefore far less desirable in artillery than skill, patience, and cool courage. artillery always acts at a distance, and in mass; single pieces are seldom employed, except to cover reconnoitring parties, or to sustain the light infantry in a skirmish. mounted batteries sometimes approach within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's infantry; but this is only done with a strong support of other troops, and to prepare the way for a charge of cavalry. the batteries do not accompany the charge, but they should always follow up and complete the success; mounted batteries are particularly useful in pursuit. if murat, in , had accompanied his attacks upon neveroffskoi's retreating columns of sixty thousand infantry by two or three batteries of mounted artillery, the whole column must have been captured or destroyed. artillery, on the field of battle, is very liable to allow its fire to be drawn, and its projectiles wasted, while the enemy is at too great a distance to be reached. it is a very common thing in a battle, to employ two or three pieces of heavy calibre at the beginning of the fight, in order to provoke the opposing batteries to open their fire before the proper time. the waste of material is not the only loss attending this error; the troops are fatigued and disheartened, while the courage and confidence of their opponents are always revived by a weak and inaccurate fire. to avoid such an error the commanding officer of a battery of artillery should be perfectly familiar with the effective ranges of his pieces, and accustomed to form a correct estimate of distances. for this purpose the eye should be frequently practised in time of peace in estimating the ranges for different calibres. the effective range of a -pounder field-piece is about . . . . . . yds. " " " " " " " " " " " " howitzer, " " " " " " " " " " " " grape and case shot is from . . . . . . to " even at these distances the aim is usually so inaccurate that a large portion of the projectiles are lost. in the attack on spires, a whole column of artillery expended its fire while at a distance of yards from the enemy, who, of course, received little or no injury. in firing from fortifications, the aim is far more accurate, and the artillery may therefore be employed to advantage as soon as the enemy comes within the longest range. ii. as an arm of succor, the artillery serves, st, to give impulsive force to the attacking columns; d, to assist in arresting, or at least in retarding, the offensive movements of an enemy; d, to protect the avenues of approach, and to defend obstacles that cover a position; and, th, to cover a retrograde movement. mounted artillery is, like cavalry, much the most effective in attack; but batteries of foot are better calculated for defence. the cannoniers are so armed as to be capable of defending their pieces to the last extremity; they therefore cannot be easily captured by opposing columns of infantry. "as to pretending to rush upon the guns," says napoleon, "and carry them by the bayonet, or to pick off the gunners by musketry, these are chimerical ideas. such things do sometimes happen; but have we not examples of still more extraordinary captures by a _coup de main?_ as a general rule, there is no infantry, however intrepid it may be, that can, without artillery, march with impunity the distance of five or six hundred toises, against two well-placed batteries ( pieces) of cannon, served by good gunners; before they could pass over two-thirds of the way, the men would be killed, wounded, or dispersed. * * * * a good infantry forms, no doubt, the sinews of an army; but if it were required to fight for a long time against a very superior artillery, its good quality would be exhausted, and its efficiency destroyed. in the first campaigns of the wars of the revolution, what france had in the greatest perfection was artillery; we know not a single instance in which twenty pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, and in battery, were ever carried by the bayonet. in the affair at valmy, at the battles of jemmapes, nordlingen, and fleurus, the french had an artillery superior to that of the enemy, although they had often only two guns to one thousand men; but that was because their armies were very numerous. it may happen that a general, more skilful in manoeuvring, more expert than his adversary, and commanding a better infantry, may obtain successes during a part of a campaign, although his artillery may be far inferior to that of his opponent; but on the critical day of a general engagement, his inferiority in point of metal will be severely felt." history furnishes us numerous examples of the use of artillery in protecting avenues of approach:--such as the defile of köesen at the battle of auerstedt; the avenues between the redoubts of pultowa, &c., &c. when an army is forced to retreat, it covers its rear by that portion of its cavalry and mounted artillery which has suffered least during the battle. by placing the squadrons of horse and the light batteries in echelon, the retiring column may be well protected. the artillery, by using the prolonge, may also continue its retreat while in battery and firing. it was in this way that at the battle of albuera, in , the french artillery on the left wing held in check the right and centre of the anglo-spaniards till the army effected its retreat; the artillery then retired in echelons, by batteries and fractions of batteries, under the protection of the cavalry. we have already discussed, under the general head of tactics, the position and use of artillery on the battle-field a few additional remarks must suffice. as a general rule, batteries should be placed in positions from which they can employ their fire to advantage, and also be free to move in any direction that the progress of the battle may require. advantage should always be taken of natural or artificial obstacles, such as hedges, clumps of trees, logs, mounds of earth, &c., to cover and conceal the guns till the moment they open their fire. elevated positions are, contrary to the common opinion, generally unfavorable, for artillery cannot fire to advantage at any considerable angle of depression. the slopes in front should be of considerable length, otherwise the balls would do very little execution upon that portion of the column of attack which occupied the valley. the ground should also be smooth, for if rough the balls will either bury themselves in the earth, or ricochet at a high angle of deflection, thus destroying a considerable part of the effect of the fire. the counterforts or spurs of hills are favorable for artillery, as they enable it to see, with an enfilading fire, the slopes of the principal range. batteries should seldom be placed so as to fire over other troops, for they will not only be intimidated by this fire, but also exposed to the opposing fire of the enemy's artillery. a large number of pieces should never be crowded into the same place, but an interval should be left between the guns of forty or fifty feet, according to the locality. the most favorable position for this arm in ordinary ground, is in the intervals between the regiments or brigades of the line, and far enough in advance of this line not to draw upon the other troops the fire of the enemy's artillery. the flanks of the line are also favorable for the action of this arm. sometimes artillery has been employed to form a part of the line of battle; but such instances are exceptions, and can never be comprised in general rules. whenever this disposition has been made, it has resulted from the defective character of the other arms, or from some peculiar circumstance in the battle which enabled a bold and skilful commander to deviate from the ordinary rules of tactics. such was the case with napoleon at wagram. in saxony, in , he was several times obliged to substitute his artillery to supply the want of other arms. in the defence and attack of field-works, and in the passage of rivers, artillery plays an important and indispensable part; but it here becomes an auxiliary to the dispositions of the engineers, or at least acts in concert with that arm. the troops of artillery, in all well-regulated army organizations, should equal about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the infantry.[ ] [footnote : to qualify himself for the duties connected with his arm of service, the artillery officer must make himself thoroughly acquainted with--. _the instruction for united states field artillery, horse and foot; capt. anderson's instruction for garrison artillery; kinsley's notes on pyrotechny; knowlton's notes on gunpowder_,&c.; and the writings of thiroux and piobert on theoretical and practical instruction, and the writings of jomini, decker, and okotmeff, on the use of this arm on the field of battle. the following list of books of reference may be of use to those who wish to make themselves perfectly familiar with all the branches of artillery. _histoire général de l'artillerie_. brunet. _l'artillerie à cheval dans les combats de cavalerie_. par un officier de l'artillerie prussienne. _considérations et experiences sur le tir des obus à bulles_. bormann. _essai sur les obusiers_. dusaert. _essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie_. le bourg. _traité sur l'artillerie_, (traduit de l'allemand.) rouvroy. _bombardier français_. bélidor. _mémoires d'artillerie_. st. rémy. _essai sur l'usage de l'artillerie dans la guerre de campagne et celle de siége_. dupuget. _mémoires sur les nouveaux systèmes d'artillerie_. st. aubin. _treatise on artillery_. müller. _artificial fire-works_. jones. _table de tir les canons et obusiers_. lombard. _on gunpowder_. antoni. _recherches sur l'artillerie en général_. texier de norbec. _déscription de l'art de fabriquer les canons_. monge. _procédés de la fabrication des armes blanches_. vandermonde. _manuel de l'artilleur_. durtubie. _traité du mouvement des projectiles_. lombard. _treatise on artillery_. scheel. (translated from the german.) _traité pratique des feux d'artifice_. morel. _manuel du canonnier marin_. cornibert. _new principles of gunnery_. robins. _mémoires sur la fabrication des armes portatives_. cotty. _recherches sur la poudre_. cossigny. _supplement_. cossigny. _fabrication de la poudre_. renaud. _american artillerist's companion_. toussard. _tables des portées des canons et canonades de la marine_. cornilwert. _traité d'artifices de guerre_. bigot. _traité élémentaire de la fabrication des bouches à feu_. dartein. _traité de l'art de fabriquer la poudre à canon_. bottée et riffault. _l'art du salpétrier_. bottée et riffault. _dictionary of artillery_. hoyer. (german.) _new experiments on gunnery_. hutton--(hutton's tracts.) _des bois propres au service des arsenaux_. herbin de halles. _instruction sur le service de l'artillerie_. hulot. _manoeuvres de force_. bigot. _balistique_. obenheim. _treatise on artillery_. german. scharnhorst. (translated into french, .) _essai sur l'art de pointer_. poumet. _réflexions sur la fabrication des bouches à feu_. lamartillière. _mémoire sur la planchette du canonnier_. obenheim. _aide-mémoire_. gassendi. _observations on the use of artillery at the sieges of badajos, st. sebastian, &c_. _treatise on artillery_. lallemand. _elémens de pyrotechnie_. ruggieri. _nouvelle force maritime_. paixhans. _dictionnaire d'artillerie_. cotty. _recherches balistiques_. coste. _poudres fulminantes_. vergnaud. _manuel de la métallurgie du fer_. culman. _pyrotechnic militaire,_ (traduit de l'allemand, par r. de peretsdorff.) _journal des sciences militaires_. _pyrotechny_. cutbush. _traité élémentaire d'artillerie_. decker. _fusées de guerre_. montgery. _documens sur la matière à canons_. hervé. _observations sur le nouveau système d'artillerie_. allix. _système d'artillerie de campagne_. allix. _pocket gunner_. adye. _on the rocket system_. congreve. _essai sur l'art des fontes_. serres. _receuil de mémoires sur la poudre à canon_. proust. _mémorial de l'artilleur marin_. michel. _observations sur le nouveau système de l'artillerie_. poumet. _mémorial d'artillerie_. _british gunner_. spearman. _régles de pointage à bord des vaisseaux_. montgery. _manuel du maître de forges_. landrin. _naval gunnery_. douglass. _métallurgie du fer_ (traduit de l'allemand, par culman.) karsten. _aide-mémoire à l'usage des officers d'artillerie_. (strasbourg.) _traité de l'organisation et de la tactique de l'artillerie,_ (traduit de l'allemand par peretsdorff.) grewenitz. _supplement au dictionnaire d'artillerie_. cotty. _memoir on gunpowder_. braddock. _manuel de l'armurier_. paulin-desormeaux. _journal des armes spéciales_. _cours sur le service des officiers dans les fonderies_. serres. _expériences sur la fabrication et la durée des bouches à feu en fer et bronze,_ (traduit de l'allemand par peretsdorff.) meyer. _applications du fer aux constructions de l'artillerie_. thierry. _aide-mémoire d'art militaire_. lebas. _mémorial à l'usage de l'armée belge_. _instructions and regulations for the service and management of heavy ordnance in the british service_. _experiences sur les principes du tir,_ faites à metz, en . _traité d'artillerie théorique et pratique_. piobert. _aide-mémoire à l'usage des officiers d'artillerie,_ (avec approbation du comité d'artillerie.) _manuel d'artillerie à l'usage des officiers de la république helvétique._ bonaparte, (napoleon louis.) _expériences comparatives entre des bouches à feu en fonte de fer, d'origine franzaise, anglaise et suédoise,_ faites à gavres, en . _expériences faites à brest en_ , _sur les canons._ paixhans. _essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie._ le bourg. _expériences sur des projectiles creux,_ faites en , ' , ' . _instruction pratique sur l'emploi des projectiles,_ (traduit de l'allemand par peretsdorff.) decker. _effects of heavy ordnance as applied to ships of war._ simmons. _expériences sur les poudres de guerre,_ faites à esquerdes, en , ' , ' , and ' . maguin. _cours d'artillerie à l'usage des sous-officiers._ de crépy. _instruction théorique et pratique d'artillerie,_ à l'usage des élèves de st. cyr. thiroux. _cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les forges._ _manuel historique de la technologie des armes à feu,_ (traduit de l'allemand par m. rieffel.) meyer. _formules rélatives aux effets du tir sur affût._ poisson. _manuel de l'artificer._ vergnaud. _etat actuel de l'artillerie de campagne de toutes les puissances de l'europe,_ (traduit par mazé; ire partie, artillerie anglaise.) jacobi. (six other parts have been published in german, containing descriptions of the french, belgian, hessian, wirtemburg, nassau, and swedish systems.) _introduction à l'étude de l'artillerie._ madelaine. _cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les fonderies. description de la fabrication des bouches ù feu à la fonderie royale de liège._ huguenin. _poudre ù canon._ timmerhans. _procédés de fabrication dans les forges,_ (extrait du cours sur le service des officiers dans les forges.) _renseignements sur le matériel de l'artillerie navale de la grande bretagne._ zeni et des hays. _théorie des affûts et des voitures de l'artillerie._ migout et bergery _artillerist's manual._ griffith. _handbuch für die k.k. oesterreichische artillerie offiziere,_ (manual for the austrian artillery officers.) _sammlung von steindruckzeichnungen der preussischen artillerie,_ _mit erläuterungen_, (collection of plates of the prussian artillery, with explanatory text.) _histoire des fusées de guerre._ _ordnance manual_, for the use of the officers of the united states army. _experiments on gunpowder_. capt. mordecai. _pyrotechny_, for the use of the cadets at the united states military academy. kinsley. _notes on gunpowder, percussion powder, cannon, and projectiles_. lt. knowlton.] chapter xii. army organization--engineers. _engineers_.--the term _engineer_ is derived from the unclassical latin word _ingenium_, which was applied both to a _machine_ and the _mind_ or _skill_ of the person who devised or constructed it. it was philip augustus, say the french writers, who first introduced engineers (_engigneurs_, or _engignours_, as they were called) into france, and restored the art of sieges. the engineers of that age were seldom charged with the construction of works of military defence, but, like archimedes at syracuse, and longinus at palmyra, they directed their attention principally to devising implements of war and the most effective manner of using them. engines of war were at that time divided between the _engigneurs_ and the _artilliers_; the former being charged with the heavier machines, and the latter with the smaller weapons used for throwing projectiles. after the invention of gunpowder, the old battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c., disappeared, and with them the _engigneurs_, or masters of engines. the new inventions were united with the few old projectile machines that remained in the artillery, and the engineers were for a time left almost without employment. the revival of the art of fortification was very slow, and the modern system scarcely began to be developed till near the sixteenth century. we must omit for the present giving even an outline of the history of military engineering, and pass to the troops of this arm, as constituting an essential element of an army organization. the subject of fortification, and the history of its various changes, will be examined in the next chapter. the engineers, in modern army organization, constitute the fourth arm of service, as, compared with artillery, their relative numbers are about as two to three. they are divided in the same manner as the artillery, viz.:-- st, the staff; d, guards, or fort-keepers; d, artificers; and th, the troops. i. the officers constituting the staff of this corps are charged in time of peace with planning, constructing, and repairing all fortifications and other defensive works; the construction and preparation of all military materials, and stores connected with this arm; and (in our service) with the disbursements of money connected with these operations: in time of war they are charged with the attack and defence of military works, the laying out and construction of field defences, redoubts, intrenchments, roads, &c.; in the attack they form a part of the vanguard, to remove obstructions; and in retreat they form a part of the rear-guard, to erect obstacles, destroy roads, bridges, &c., so as to retard an enemy's pursuit. from the important character of these duties as connected with the means essential to a national defence, and the vast amount of money expended in these operations, it is evident that a high order of acquirements should be deemed necessary to qualify one to perform the duties of a military engineer. this officer requires a knowledge of chemistry, to guide his choice of materials for mortars, cements, and mastics; of mineralogy and geology, for selecting stone; of botany, for timber and the means of preventing its decay; of mathematics, in laying out his work and calculating the thickness and stability of his walls, embankments, &c.; of mechanical philosophy, in constructing his machinery; of military engineering, in his plans of fortifications; and of all the higher branches of military science, in selecting positions for these works, such that they shall have the proper relations to the means of national defence, and to the grand operations of armies in the field. the avenues to appointment to this corps are guarded, in most european armies, with special care, to prevent the influence of money, politics, or family connections; and in our own army it is now specified by law of congress, that the vacancies shall be filled only from the most distinguished graduates of the military academy. formerly our service suffered most severely from the employment of incompetent persons, introduced through political influence from civil life, and foreign charlatans, the refuse of european armies. many of our earlier military works (as will be mentioned hereafter) were modelled upon systems for a long time discarded by the profession in europe, and even some of those which have been constructed within the last thirty years are made of such wretched materials and workmanship, that they are already crumbling into ruins. while the existing laws and regulations seem well calculated to prevent the recurrence of similar abuses and errors, it nevertheless can be shown that the organization of this arm of our service requires modifications and extensions to give it the requisite degree of efficiency, and to economize the public expenditures. the wars of louis xiv. first led to a regular military organization, and a regular system of defence. in these wars the engineers received great development, and have ever since occupied a prominent position as parts of an army organization. we therefore find in all the great sieges and battles of this era a large and continually increasing number of engineers and engineer troops, this force being gradually augmented as the true principles of war became better understood, and as the wants of the service required. even in the earliest of these battles we find the engineers taking a prominent and distinguished part. in the war of , twenty-four engineers were killed and wounded at the siege of philipsbourg, eighteen at namur, eight at huy, ten at charleroi, eight at ath, thirty at barcelona, &c. such losses were good proofs of the usefulness of these officers, and before this war was closed, their number was increased to six hundred; and in the army contained eight brigades of engineers and four companies of miners. the engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early part of the french revolution, great difficulty was experienced in reorganizing it and in finding competent men to supply the places of those who had been driven into exile or sacrificed during the reign of terror. energy and activity, combined with republican zeal, could supply the place of skill in the other arms, but the science of the engineer could not be acquired in a day. in , the staff of the engineer corps consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers, without including the general officers, commanding departments, or those connected with the engineer troops. the same organization was continued in . the engineer staff of the french army now numbers four hundred and thirty-two officers. we have in our service forty-three engineer officers, for staff duty, who are now engaged in the construction and repairs of some sixty or seventy fortifications, and other works of a civil and military character. ii. _engineer guards_, or _fort-keepers_, are a class of men charged with the general care of forts, and all public property deposited in the several engineer dépôts and garrisons, and in the public works during their construction. there are five hundred and fifty of these "_gardes du genie_" in the french army, who rank next the sub-lieutenants of engineers, and are assimilated with the sub-lieutenants of infantry in the hospitals, marches, &c. _in our service we have no engineer guards or fort-keepers._ this defect in our organization has been the cause of serious inconvenience, and the consequent waste of public property. the expense of hiring civil agents for this purpose has more than trebled the cost of supporting a suitable number of non-commissioned guards to maintain the good order and efficiency of our forts, in the absence of engineer officers, and to preserve and keep in repair the military implements and stores connected with this department of the army. it has already been shown that we have fifty-eight of these guards for the artillery service, and it really seems somewhat singular that the engineers, with a much greater amount of public property in their charge, are allowed no assistants of this kind. iii. _engineer artificers_ are a class of men employed in the practical operations of constructing forts and other military defences, and in making and repairing all the implements used by the engineer troops in the operations of sapping and mining, in crossing rivers, in constructing field-defences, and in the attack and defence of fieldworks. as very few new fortifications are now required in france, the services of engineer artificers are less necessary and important than in our service, where large sums of money are annually expended upon military defences, there are, however, in the french army a corps of engineer artificers, consisting of eight officers and a cadre of fifty-four non-commissioned officers, with a variable number of privates, organized into two companies. _but in our army we have no regular engineer artificers!_ in our artillery service we have three hundred and thirty enlisted artillery artificers. if these are useful and necessary to the artillery service, which no one doubts, for still stronger reasons would it be advantageous to the public service to employ at least an equal number of enlisted engineer artificers on our fortifications; for the annual expenditure of public money is here much greater than in the corresponding branch of the artillery service. iv. _engineer troops_ are divided into three classes-- st, _sappers and pioneers_; d, _miners_; and d, _pontoniers_. in the french army of , there were four battalions of sappers, consisting of officers and , men. in , napoleon organized five battalions of these troops, consisting of officers and , men. even this number was found insufficient in his campaigns in germany and spain, and he was obliged to organize an additional number of sappers from the italian and french auxiliaries. the pioneers were then partly attached to other branches of the service. there is, at present, in the french army a considerable number of sappers or pioneers detached for the service of the infantry regiments, three companies of _sapeurs-conducteurs_, and forty-two companies of _sapeurs_. in the french army of , there were six companies of miners, consisting of officers and men. in , napoleon increased these troops to nine companies, containing officers and men. the present french peace establishment contains six companies of miners, organized much the same as under napoleon. in the french army of there were two regiments of pontoniers, of officers and men. but this number was found too small in the remaining campaigns, and the deficiency was temporarily supplied by organizing sailors for these duties. in the present french army organization, there are eleven companies of pontoniers, forming a regiment of sixty-three officers. _we have in our service no sappers, miners, or pontoniers_, and, in case of war, would be found without the means of executing any military works, or performing any military operation which would require engineer troops. in the preliminary stages of army organization under louis xiv., infantry troops were detailed as sappers, and instructed in these duties by the engineers. this irregularity of service soon caused difficulties and losses, and the evils springing from it were so great, that vauban urged the propriety of a separate organization. in he officially recommended to the king to establish a regiment of twelve hundred sappers and _ouvriers_, and in a subsequent report on the value of these troops, used the following language: "they would be useful in peace as well as in war, and would be the means of saving much in all fortifications where they should be employed. in fact, i have not the least doubt that they would save annually to the king much more than their pay. i assert all i have said on this subject with as much confidence as if i had seen the result; and i can, with the same certainty, add, that this small troop will be the means of saving large numbers of good engineers and brave officers and soldiers, from the stern necessity to which we are reduced of exposing, almost always, the laborers and those who support them; which necessity would not arise had we at command a sufficient number of this kind of workmen well instructed. to such a degree have i felt the necessity of sappers, at every siege at which i have been present, that i have always had reason to repent of not having more urgently solicited the creation of this company." such are the views of the greatest of military engineers, a man who fought one hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or repaired three hundred fortifications. his anticipations of the usefulness of engineer troops were fully realized, and they have ever since received the most careful attention, and now form, as has just been shown, one of the most important and efficient arms in the french service. the fortifications constructed by the engineers, as organized by vauban, have ever since constituted one of the principal elements of the french military power. in the wars of napoleon there are innumerable instances in illustration of the delays and disasters attending the operations of armies not supplied with engineer troops; and, on the other hand, the advantages resulting from their services when properly organized and instructed. we have already pointed out the influence which the fortifications in the hands of the french exerted on the results of these wars, and the fatal consequences to the allies of neglecting these works of national defence. every student of military history will immediately call to mind the influence of savona, coni, mondovi, ceva, govi, alessandria, tortona, pizzighitone, peschiera, mantua, palma-nuova, osopo, klagenfurth, &c., in the campaigns of - ; of genoa, port bard, the fortifications of the var, ulm, ingoldstadt, &c., in ; of milan, turin, mantua, roco d'aufo, genoa, alessandria, &c., in ; the importance of kehl, cassel, wesel, &c., to the french in , and the fatal consequences to the prussians in that campaign, of their total and culpable neglect of their own fortifications. all military historians speak of the influence of fortifications in the peninsular campaigns: those which had been given up to napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his arms, while those which were retained by spain and her allies, contributed in an equal degree to hamper and embarrass his operations. some of these, like saragossa and tarragona, with their broken walls and defective armaments, kept the enemy in check some sixty days each, and did much to weaken the french power in the peninsula. temporary or field-fortifications also had an important influence here. the lines of torres-vedras, the field-works of ronda, the intrenched camps of the pyrenees, bayonne, toulouse, &c., are examples under this head. in fact, field-works played a most important part in all of napoleon's wars. we might mention the redoubt of montenotte, the intrenchments at milesimo, the batteries of lobau, the field-defences of hougomont, la haye-sainte, and papelotte at waterloo, and numerous other cases equally striking. just before the battle of waterloo, wellington employed some eighteen thousand peasants and two thousand horses, under the direction of british officers of engineers. in speaking of these defences, colonel pasley says: "it may be easily conceived that to have directed such a great body of workmen to proper advantage, by means of a few officers of engineers, would have been impossible, but for the system adopted of subdividing the various works among the non-commissioned officers and privates of the engineer troops, each of whom was made responsible for laying out the details of his own portion, and for the direction of a party of from twenty to one hundred men, or even more, according to circumstances." but to return to the peninsular war. these campaigns exhibit in strong colors the advantages derived, on the one side, from a well-organized engineer corps, and the losses, delays, and defects suffered on the other, until the defects of the organization were remedied. napoleon entered spain with a well-appointed army, and soon, through strategy and well-directed force, gained possession of the important fortresses of the peninsula; seizing in this way the strategic routes and important geographical points, he was enabled to retain possession of the country for eight years, in spite of the numerous forces arrayed against him, the absence of himself and his best generals in germany, and the great inefficiency of joseph and of many of his generals. these fortifications were old, and of strength inferior to modern works of defence, but it required years and the expenditure of millions in blood and treasure to expel from the country those who had possession of them. for the first five years of this war the english struggled with a most imperfect army organization.[ ] when "the first serious siege," says napier, was undertaken by the british army, "to the discredit of the english government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means of prosecuting such an enterprise. the engineer officers were exceedingly zealous; and many of them were well versed in the theory of their business. but the ablest trembled when reflecting on their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service. without a corps of sappers and miners, without a single private who knew how to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age." [footnote : in a letter dated february th, , wellington wrote to the secretary of state as follows:--"i would beg leave to suggest to your lordship the expediency of adding to the engineer establishment a corps of sappers and miners. it is inconceivable with what disadvantages we undertake any thing like a siege for want of assistance of this description. there is no french _corps d'armée_ which has not a battalion of sappers and a company of miners; but we are obliged to depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the line; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the knowledge and training which are necessary. many casualties among them consequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the siege."] "the best officers and finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government, always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. the sieges carried on by the british in spain were a succession of butcheries; because the commonest materials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied the engineers." colonel j.t. jones writes in nearly the same terms of the early sieges in the peninsula, and with respect to the siege of badajos, adds in express terms, that "a body of sappers and miners, and the necessary fascines and gabions, would have rendered the reduction of the work certain."[ ] soon after this siege a body of engineer troops arrived from england, but their number was insufficient, and wellington, having learned by sad experience the importance of engineer troops, ordered a body of two hundred volunteers to be detached from the line, "and daily instructed in the practice of sapping, making and laying fascines and gabions, and the construction of batteries, &c." the siege of ciudad rodrigo, which immediately followed this organization, was conducted with greater skill and success than any other till nearly the close of the war; and all military writers have attributed this result to the greater efficiency of the engineer force engaged in the siege. this arm was now gradually increased, and the last year of the war the engineer force with the english army in the field consisted of seventy-seven officers, seven assistant-engineers and surveyors, four surgeons and assistants, one thousand six hundred and forty-six sappers, miners, artificers, &c., one thousand three hundred and forty horses and one hundred and sixty carriages. [footnote : colonel pasley states that only _one and a half yards of excavation_, per man, was executed _in a whole night_, by the untrained troops in the peninsular war; whereas an instructed sapper can easily accomplish this _in twenty minutes_, and that it has been done by one of his most skilful sappers, at chatham, _in seven minutes!_] during all this time the french furnished their armies in spain with well-organized engineer forces. we have endeavored to form a comparison of the number of french engineers and artillerists employed on these peninsular sieges. but from the loose manner in which these details are usually given by historians, it is almost impossible to distinguish between the two. both are not unfrequently given under the same head, and when a distinction is apparently kept up, only the engineer _staff_ is mentioned under the head of engineers--the sappers, miners, artificers, the train, &c., all being put down as artillery. in the following table we have endeavored to arrange them as is done in our own army. the trains of both arms are left out, for frequently that of one arm performed the duties of the other. moreover, in our service a portion of these duties of engineer and artillery trains is performed by the quartermaster's department. for those who wish to know the exact organization of the french engineer train, we give it as it existed in , viz.:--seven troops, each troop consisting of three officers, one hundred and forty-one non-commissioned officers and privates, two hundred and fifty horses, and fifty wagons, conveying five thousand two hundred and seventy intrenching tools, one thousand seven hundred cutting tools, one thousand eight hundred and two artificers' tools, two hundred and fifty-three miners' tools, and eight thousand three hundred and eighteen kilogrammes' weight of machinery and stores, each article being made to a particular pattern. the pioneers in spain acted sometimes with one arm and sometimes with the other, and we have assigned them accordingly in the table. the pontoniers, however, in our service are included with the engineers; we have therefore put them, in our table, in the same column with the engineers. _____________________________________________________________________ | engineer |artillery staff,| total | total of |staff, sappers,| horse and foot | of | artillery | miners, | artillery, |engineers, |staff, horse | pontoniers, | ouvriers, and | sappers, | and foot |and pioneers. | pioneers. | miners, |artillery, name of siege. |________________________________|pontoniers,|ouvriers, | | | | | and | and |offic. | men. |offic. | men. | pioneers. | pioneers. _______________|_______|_______|_______|________|___________|____________ saragossa, | | | | | | rosas, | | | -- | -- | | girona, | | | | | | astorga, | | | | | | lerida, | | | | | | meguinenza, | | | -- | -- | | st ciudad | | | | | | rodrigo, | | | -- | -- | | almeida, | | | -- | -- | | tortosa, | | | | | | tarragona, | | | | | | olivensa, | | | -- | -- | | st badajos, | | | | | | tarifa, | | | | | | peniscola, | | | | | | d ciudad | | | | | | rodrigo, | | | | | | d badajos, | | | -- | -- | | burgos, | | | | | | castio udiales, | | | | | | st. sebastian, | | | | | | ________________|_______|_______|_______|________|___________|____________ from this table it appears that the ratio of the two arms at these sieges, making the comparison on the basis of our own organization, is about the same as for the present french army in algeria, or a little more than five of engineers to six of artillery. thus far we have spoken of the field-operations of engineer troops in connection with fortifications, alluding only incidentally to the use of military bridges and the passage of rivers. in the early wars of the french revolution the want of pontoniers was severely felt, and from the deficiency of this branch of service, the operations of the french generals were on several occasions very much restricted. the evil was afterwards remedied in a great degree by the introduction of several battalions of ponioniers in the regular army organization. on many occasions, during his wars, did napoleon feel and acknowledge the importance of these troops; but on none, perhaps, was this importance more clearly shown than in the passage of the beresina during his retreat from moscow with the wreck of his army. the russians had cut the bridge of borisow and taken position in great strength on the right bank of the river, both at this point and below; the french, wearied with long and difficult marches, destitute of artillery, provisions, and military stores, with a wide and deep river in front, and a powerful enemy on their flank and rear, benumbed by the rigors of a merciless climate, and dispirited by defeat--every thing seemed to promise their total destruction. "general eblé," says an english general officer, in his remarks on this retreat, "who, from the beginning of the campaign, had made all the arrangements for the equipment and construction of military bridges, was specially charged with the important duty of providing for the passage of this river; and he discharged that duty with a degree of forecast and ability to which certainly napoleon owed his escape and the wreck of his army its safety. general eblé had begun to prepare, at smolensko, for the difficulties which he foresaw in this operation. he formed, with every care, a train sufficient for the transport of all the tools and stores that might be required; and, further to provide against casualties and accidents, every man belonging to the companies of pontoniers was obliged to carry from smolensko a tool or implement of some kind, and a proportion of nails: and fortunate was it for the army that he did so; for such was the difficulty in getting through the carriages containing stores, that only two forge-wagons and six caissons of tools and nails could be preserved. to these the general added a quantity of iron-work taken from the wheels of carriages that were abandoned on the march. much was sacrificed to bring off these valuable materials for making clamps and fastenings, but, as segur observes, that exertion '_sauva l'armée_.'" but it is not always in the possession of a thing that we are most likely to appreciate its utility; the evils and inconveniences resulting from the want of it not unfrequently impress us most powerfully with its importance and the advantages to be derived from its possession. a few examples of this nature, drawn from military history, may be instructive. we need not go back to the disastrous passage of the vistula by charles xii., the failure of marlborough to pass the dyle, and eugene to cross the adda in , nor of the three unsuccessful attempts of charles of lorraine to cross the rhine in . the wars following the french revolution are sufficiently replete with useful instruction on this subject.[ ] [footnote : before recurring to these, it might be useful to give one example, as it is often referred to, in the campaign of . it was deemed important for the success of the campaign to attack the prince of baden in his camp at friedlingen. accordingly, a bridge was thrown across the rhine at huningen, the passage effected, and the victory gained. but villars was several times on the point of losing all for want of a sufficient ponton equipage. having but a _single_ bridge, the passage was necessarily slow; the artillery and stores were frequently interrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle; disorder ensued, and the whole movement was retarded; villars could bring only a small part of his artillery into action, and towards the close of the battle the infantry were in want of ammunition: moreover, the whole operation had nearly failed from the attempt of the enemy to destroy this bridge, but the skill of the french pontoniers saved it. we here remark, st, the passage secured to villars an important victory; d, from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his whole army was placed in great peril, and the operation had nearly failed; d, if the prince of baden had possessed a skilful corps to oppose that of villars, this single bridge would have been destroyed, and the army cut to pieces; th, the skill of the little corps of french pontoniers saved the bridge, and of consequence, the army.] in so great was the disorder in the direction of affairs, that the boats of the bridges across the wahal and the rhine were disposed of for commercial purposes; and in the beginning of , says jomini, "the conquerors of belgium and holland had not even a bridge equipage, at a time too when the success of the campaign depended solely on the means of crossing a river." a few boats were procured from the wahal and the meuse, and others manufactured in the forests of the moselle; but "these operations consumed precious time, and _four months_ thus passed away in preparations." even after other things were all ready, the army was obliged to wait thirty days for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges; during this delay the austrians strengthened their position, and with very little exertion they might easily have prevented the passage. in , profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, the french collected more suitable bridge equipages, and the two armies passed the rhine at neuweid and kehl without loss or delay. the latter of these passages has often been referred to as a model for such operations, and certainly does credit to the general who directed it. but moreau's bridge equipage having been destroyed during this disastrous campaign, his operations the following year were considerably delayed in preparing a new one, and even then he was under the necessity of seizing all private boats that could be found within reach; but the difficulty of collecting and using boats of all sizes and descriptions was so great as entirely to defeat his plan of surprising the enemy on the opposite bank of the river. the necessity of co-operating with hoche admitted of no further delay, and he was now obliged to force his passage in the open day, and in face of the enemy. undertaken under such circumstances, "the enterprise was extremely sanguinary, and at one time very doubtful;" and had it failed, "moreau's army would have been ruined for the campaign." napoleon's celebrated passage of the po, at placentia, shows plainly how important it is for a general to possess the means of crossing rivers. "i felt the importance of hastening the enterprise in order not to allow the enemy time to prevent it. but the po, which is a river as wide and deep as the rhine, is a barrier difficult to be overcome. we had no means of constructing a bridge, and were obliged to content ourselves with the means of embarkation found at placentia and its environs. lannes, chief of brigade, crossed in the first boats, with the advanced guard. the austrians had only ten squadrons on the other side, and these were easily overcome. the passage was now continued without interruption, but very slowly. _if i had had a good ponton-equipage, the fate of the enemy's army had been sealed; but the necessity of passing the river by successive embarkations saved it."_ in the campaign of , the archduke attempted to pass the aar, and attacked the french on the opposite side, but for want of suitable equipage his operation was delayed till the enemy had collected sufficient forces to intercept the passage; he was now obliged to enter into a stipulation for a suspension of hostilities, and to withdraw his bridges. the operations of the french in the campaign of , led to the most glorious results, but their execution was attended with the greatest difficulties. the passage of the alps was greatly facilitated by the ability of the chief engineer, marescot, and the skill of the troops under his command; and the facility of passing rivers afforded napoleon by his pontoniers, had an important influence upon the success of the campaign. "the army of the reserve had many companies of pontoniers and sappers; the pontons of course could not be taken across the st. bernard, but the pontoniers soon found materials on the po and tesin for constructing bridge equipages." moreau's army in the same year profited well by his pontoniers, in the passages of the inn, the salza, the traun, the alza, &c., and in the pursuit of the austrian army--a pursuit that has but a single parallel example in modern history. the facility with which napoleon crossed rivers, made forced marches, constructed redoubts, fortified depots, and grasped the great strategic points of the enemy in the campaign of , resulted from the skilful organization of his army, and the efficiency given to the forces employed in these important operations. the engineer staff of the french army at this period, consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers, and there were four battalions of sappers, of one hundred and twenty officers and seven thousand and ninety-two men; six companies of miners, of twenty-four officers and five hundred and seventy-six men; and two regiments of pontoniers, of thirty-eight officers and nine hundred and sixty men. on the contrary, the enemy's neglect of these things is one of the most striking of the many faults of the war, and his ill-directed efforts to destroy the great wooden bridge across the danube, and the successful operations of the french sappers in securing it, formed one of the principal turning points in the campaign. the same organization enabled the french to perform their wonderfully rapid and decisive movements in the prussian campaign of , and the northern operations of . in , napoleon's army crossed, with the most wonderful rapidity, the inn, the salza, the traun, and other rivers emptying into the danube, and reached vienna before the wonder-stricken austrians could prepare for its defence. it was then necessary for the french to effect a passage of the danube, which was much swollen by recent rains and the melting snow of the mountains. considering the depth and width of the river, the positions of the enemy, and his preparations to oppose a passage, with the disastrous consequences that would result to the french from any failure in its execution; taking all these things into consideration, jomini pronounced it "one of the most hazardous and difficult of all the operations of war." here the fate of the army depended, apparently, upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers and pontoniers, and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in them. when the pontons failed, tressel-bridges were substituted, and even fifty-four enormous boats were put in requisition. so skilfully were these operations conducted, that napoleon's immense army crossed over in safety, directly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same day fought the memorable battle of esling. forced to retire before numbers vastly superior to his own, napoleon concentrated his forces on the island of lobau, and intrenched his position. surrounded by the broad and deep channel of the danube, and watched by numerous and skilful enemies, it required the most constant activity and the greatest good fortune to effect a passage. here the skill and efficiency of the engineers shone conspicuously; a number of bridges were thrown across the river in the face of the austrians, and against obstacles almost insurmountable; the whole french army passed in safety, and soon put the finishing stroke to that brilliant campaign. so high an estimate did napoleon attach to the construction of these bridges, that, when the passage was completed, he offered to place bertrand, the constructing engineer, though of comparatively low rank, at the head of the french _corps du genie_. on many occasions during the retreat in - , from the beresina to the left of the rhine, across the niemen, the vistula, the oder, the elbe, and the numerous other rivers which divide that immense country, the french derived vast advantages from the experience and skill of their engineers and pontoniers, several times whole corps escaping through their means from the grasp of their pursuers. when, however, the disasters of this retreat had absorbed most of the material of the army, and had sadly thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience, they sustained many severe, and, in other circumstances, unnecessary losses. of this character we may mention the passage of the elster by the bridge of lindnau, where, through the ignorance and carelessness of those charged with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridge arrangements, thousands of brave men were buried in the muddy waters of this small river. so sensibly did napoleon feel this want of bridge equipages, in the winter of - , that he addressed to his minister of war, on this subject, the following remarkable words: "if i had had pontons, i should have already annihilated the army of schwartzenberg, and closed the war; i should have taken from him eight or ten thousand wagons, and his entire army in detail; but for want of the proper means i could not pass the seine." again, on the d of march he wrote: "if i had had a bridge equipage this morning, blücher's army had been lost." whoever will examine the details of the operations of this campaign, will be convinced of the full force of these remarks. in spain in , sir john moore, in order to assist the native forces, had penetrated so near the army of napoleon, that retreat became exceedingly difficult, and he was several times on the point of being lost. the english army was at this time very deficient in engineer troops, and moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy bridges, and pontoniers to construct new ones. in order to cover his retreat and impede the advance of the french, the commander-in-chief, says napier, "directed several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers [for want of miners and miner's tools] failed of success in every attempt." in soult's retreat, in , he crossed the duero at oporto, and destroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pursuit of wellington. but while soult, deceived by treachery in his own corps, neglected to guard the river with proper vigilance, wellington collected boats at different points, crossed over his army, surprised the french, and, had it not been for the singular delay and indecision of general murray, would most certainly have forced the entire army to capitulate; as it was, his operation produced a decided influence on the campaign, and effected the safety of beresford's corps. soult destroyed his artillery and baggage, and hastily retreated through the mountain passes; but his army was again arrested at the river cavado, and placed on the very brink of destruction, when the brave and skilful dulong succeeded in effecting a passage at the ponte nova; the same daring officer opened, on the same day, a way for the further escape of the french across the misarella by the saltador. in the pursuit of massena, in , it was important to the english to cross the guadiana, and attack the french before badajos could be put in a state of defence. beresford was directed by wellington to pass this river at jerumina, where the portuguese had promised to furnish pontons; but they neglected to fulfil their engagement, and the army had to wait till capt. squire, an able and efficient officer of engineers, could construct other means for effecting a passage. every thing was done that genius could devise and industry execute; nevertheless, the operations of the army were greatly delayed--"_a delay,_" says the historian, "_that may be considered as the principal cause of those long and bloody operations which afterwards detained lord wellington more than a year on the frontiers of portugal._" we might prolong these remarks by discussing the passages of the ceira and alva, and their influence on the pursuit of massena; wellington's passage of the tagus, and his retreat from burgos in ; the passage of the adour and garonne in ; and the failure of the mines to blow up the bridges of saltador, alcantara, &c.; but a sufficient number of examples, it is believed, has already been adduced to show the advantage of maintaining a properly organized and instructed body of sappers, miners, and pontoniers, and the fatal results attending the want of such troops, as a component part of an army organization. it has already been remarked that the infantry of an army must always form the basis of the apportionment; and by the general rule laid down by military writers, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry, according to the character of the war; the artillery about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the infantry; and the engineers from one-half to three-fourths of the artillery,--say about two-thirds. the staff and administrative corps must vary according to the nature of the organization, and the character of the theatre of war. the former ought to be from two to five in a thousand, and the latter from twenty-five to seventy-five,[ ] as a general rule. these ratios would give for a good army organization; staff, about ................................... administrative service--pay, medical, commissary, quarter-master, &c. ............................. infantry, ...................................... cavalry, ....................................... artillery, ...................................... engineers, ...................................... ----- total, ................... , in a broken country, and against savage and undisciplined foes, like the indians in this country, the natives opposed to the english in india, to the french in algeria, or to the russians in circassia, the cavalry, artillery, and engineers would be diminished, and the infantry and administrative corps proportionably increased; the former because light troops are always preferable against an undisciplined foe, and the latter because of the difficulty of moving and procuring supplies in new and uncultivated countries. the french forces in algeria, in , amounted to about sixty thousand men, in the following proportion:-- staff, ................................... . administrative, &c., ................... . infantry, .............................. . cavalry, ................................ . artillery, .............................. . engineers, .............................. . --------- men. [footnote : this supposes the teamsters, wagon-masters, hospital-servants, &c., to be enlisted men, and not persons hired for the occasion as is done in our army.] in small peace establishments the relative proportion of infantry and cavalry should be much less than when prepared for the field, because troops for these two arms can be much more readily formed in case of emergency, than for those which require more scientific information, and technical skill and instruction. the staff and engineers are evidently the most difficult to be formed in case of war, and next to these the artillery and administrative corps. in this country we can maintain, in time of peace, only the framework of an army, looking to our citizen soldiery to form, in case of need, the great mass of our military force. this is the starting point in our military system, and the basis of our army organization. let us see whether this principle is carried out in practice. for every thousand men in our present organization[ ] we have, for the staff, administrative, [ ] infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, ---- [footnote : these numbers are the real rather than the _nominal_ proportions, many of our officers being called _staff_, who properly belong to one of the other classes.] [footnote : much of the administrative duty in our army is done by unenlisted men, or by soldiers detached from their companies. where such is the case, the ratio of this branch of the service ought to be no higher than is represented above.] we see from this table, that while our artillery is nearly six times as numerous as in ordinary armies, our staff is less by one-half, and our engineers not more than one-half what ought to be their proportion in a war establishment. to this excess of artillery over infantry and cavalry in our army in time of peace there is no objection, inasmuch as the latter could be more easily expanded in case of war than the artillery. but for a still stronger reason our staff and engineers should also be proportionally increased, instead of being vastly diminished, as is actually the case. experience in the first campaigns of the american revolution strongly impressed on the mind of washington the absolute necessity of forming a regular and systematic army organization. but so difficult was it to obtain properly instructed engineers, that he was obliged to seek his engineer officers in the ranks of foreign adventurers, and to make drafts from the other arms of service, and have them regularly instructed in the duties of engineer troops, and commanded by the officers of this corps. an order, in his own handwriting, giving the details of this temporary arrangement, is dated march th, . until men are enlisted for the purpose, companies of sappers and miners shall be formed by drafts from the line. "the duties of the companies of sappers and miners," he continues, "shall be under the direction of the engineers, to construct field-works of every kind, and all works necessary for the attack or defence of places, as circumstances may require. on a march in the vicinity of an enemy, a detachment of the companies of sappers and miners shall be stationed at the head of the column, directly after the vanguard, for the purpose of opening and mending the roads, and removing obstructions," &c. &c. the great difficulties encountered by washington in instructing his inexperienced forces in the more difficult branches of the art, made him the more earnest, in after years, to impress on us how important it was for us _in peace to prepare for war._ the preparation here meant is not the keeping up, in time of peace, of a large standing army, ever ready to take the field; but rather the formation of a small body, educated and practised in all the scientific and difficult parts of the profession; a body which shall serve as the _cadre_ or framework of a large army, capable of imparting to the new and inexperienced soldiers of the republic that skill and efficiency which has been acquired by practice. how far have we accomplished this object, and what will be the probable operations in case of another contest with a european power? new and inexperienced troops will be called into the field to oppose a veteran and disciplined army. from these troops we shall expect all the bravery and energy resulting from ardent patriotism and an enthusiastic love of liberty. but we cannot here expect much discipline, military skill, or knowledge of the several branches of the military art. the peaceful habits of our citizens tend but little to the cultivation of the military character. how, then, are we to oppose the hostile force? must human blood be substituted for skill and preparation, and dead bodies of our citizens serve as epaulements against the inroads of the enemy? to some extent, we fear it must be the case; but not entirely so, for government has not altogether neglected to make preparation for such an event. fortifications have been planned or erected on the most important and exposed positions; military materials and munitions have been collected in the public arsenals; a military school has been organized to instruct in the military sciences; there are regularly kept up small bodies of infantry and cavalry, weak in numbers, but capable of soon making good soldiers of a population so well versed as ours is in the use of the musket and the horse; an artillery force, proportionally much larger, is also regularly maintained, with a sufficient number of men and officers to organize and make good artillery-men of citizens already partially acquainted with the use of the cannon. but an acquaintance with infantry, cavalry, and artillery duties is not the only practical knowledge requisite in war. in the practical operations of an army in the field, rivers are to be crossed, bridges suddenly erected and suddenly destroyed, fieldworks constructed and defended, batteries captured and destroyed; fortifications are to be put in order and defended, or to be besieged and recaptured; trenches must be opened, mines sprung, batteries established, breaches made and stormed; trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, gabions, fascines, and numerous other military implements and machinery are to be constructed. have our citizens a knowledge of these things, or have we provided in our military establishment for a body of men instructed and practised in this branch of the military art, and capable of imparting to an army the necessary efficiency for this service? unfortunately this question must be answered in the negative; and it is greatly to be feared that the future historian will have to say of us, as napier has said of the english:--"_the best officers and soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government always ready to plunge the nation into a war, without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. their sieges were a succession of butcheries; because the commonest materials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied the engineers_."[ ] [footnote : the subjects discussed in this chapter are also treated by most authors on military organization and military history, and by the several writers on military engineering. allent, vauban, cormontaigne, rocquancourt, pasley, douglas, jones, belmas, napier, gay de vernon, may be referred to with advantage. pasley, douglas, jones, and napier, speak in the strongest terms of the importance of engineer troops in the active operations of a war, and of the absolute necessity of organizing this force in time of peace. a list of books of reference on military engineering will be given at the close of the following chapters. while these pages are passing through the press, congress has authorized the president to raise _one company_ of engineer troops! this number is altogether too small to be of any use in time of war.] chapter xiii. permanent fortifications. _fortification_ is defined,--the art of disposing the ground in such a manner as to enable a small number of troops to resist a larger army the longest time possible. if the work be placed in a position of much importance, and its materials be of a durable character, it is called permanent; if otherwise, it receives the appellation of _field_, or _temporary_. fieldworks are properly confined to operations of a single campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only for a short period. generally these works are of earth, thrown up by the troops in a single day. they are intimately connected with a system of permanent fortifications, but from the facility of their construction, no provision need be made for them before the actual breaking out of war. indeed, they could not well be built before hostilities commenced, as their locality in each case must be determined by the position of the hostile forces. having already described the general influence of permanent fortifications as a means of national defence, we shall here speak merely of the principles of their construction. it is not proposed to enter into any technical discussion of matters that especially belong to the instruction of the engineer, but merely to give the nomenclature and use of the more important parts of a military work; in a word, such general information as should belong to officers of every grade and corps of an army. the first species of fortification among the ancients was of course very simple, consisting merely of an earthen mound, or palisades. a wall was afterwards used, and a ditch was then added to the wall. it was found that a straight wall could be easily breached by the enemy's battering-rams; to remedy this evil, towers were built at short intervals from each other, forming a broken line of salient and re-entering parts. these towers or salient points gradually assumed a shape approximating to the modern bastion. after the invention of gunpowder and the application of cannon to the attack and defence of places, it became necessary to arrange earthen ramparts behind the thin walls of the ancient works, for the reception of the new artillery. moreover these walls were soon found inadequate to resist the missiles of the besiegers, and it became necessary to replace them by parapets of earth. in order to cover the retaining walls of these parapets from the besieging batteries, it was also found to be necessary to lower these walls as much as possible, and to raise the counterscarps. the traces or plans of the works, however, received no material change till about the close of the fifteenth century. it is not known who first changed the ancient towers into bastions. some attribute it to an italian, and with considerable show of reason, for a bastion was built at turin as early as . achmet pacha, it is said, fortified otranto in this way, in , but whether the system was previously known among the turks cannot be determined. others attribute the invention to ziska, the celebrated leader of the hussites. it is most probable that the transition from the tower to the bastion was a very gradual one, and that the change was perfected in several countries at about the same time. fortifications, like other arts and sciences, greatly flourished in italy under the medicis, and that country furnished europe with its most skilful engineers. catharine of medicis introduced into france many of her countrymen, distinguished in this profession; among these may be named bellamat, bephano, costritio, relogio, vorganno, the two marini, campi, and hieronimo, who built several important places and directed the sieges of others. these able foreigners were rivalled by some distinguished french engineers, who laid the foundation of the "_corps du genie_" which has since become a school of military instruction for the world. among the early french engineers may be distinguished lafontaine de serré, feuquières, and st. remy. pedro navarro had been appointed a member of this corps, but his attention was more specially directed to mining, and we do not learn that he distinguished himself in the construction of any fortification. in germany, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, albert durer distinguished himself as a writer on fortification; his book is remarkable as containing the germs of many of the improvements which were made by those who followed him. this is the more to be wondered at as he was not a professed engineer. after him followed spekel, a native of strasburg, who died in . his writings are valuable as showing the state of the art at that time, and the changes which he himself introduced. he was an engineer of much practical knowledge and experience, having assisted at the sieges of malta, golletta, vienna, jula, nicosia, famagusta, &c. the first french engineer who wrote on fortification was errard de bar-le-duc, who published near the close of the sixteenth century. as an engineer, he was rivalled by chatillon, a man of distinguished merit. errard fortified amiens, built a part of the castle of sedan, and a portion of the defences of calais. under the reign of louis xiii., desnoyers, deville, pagan, and fabre were greatly distinguished. deville published in . he was a man of much learning and experience; but he is said to have adopted, both in his theory and practice, the principles of the italian school, with most of its errors. pagan began his military career while young, and became _maréchal de champ_ at the age of , when, having the misfortune to become blind, he was compelled to relinquish his brilliant hopes. he was the ablest engineer of his age, and was also greatly distinguished in other branches of science. in his plans he inclined to the dutch rather than the italian school of fortification. he published in . at the close of the sixteenth century, the dutch had been forced to resort to military defences to protect themselves against the aggressions of the spaniards. as the dutch were inferior in other military means, fortification became one of the vital resources of the country. their works, however, thrown up in much haste, were in many respects defective, although well adapted to the exigencies of the time. freytag, their principal engineer, wrote in . some of his improvements were introduced into france by pagan. he was preceded by marolois, (a cotemporary of pagan,) who published in . in germany, rimpler, a saxon, wrote on fortification in . he was a man of great experience, having served at the sieges of candia, phillipsburg, bonn, riga, bremen, dansburg, bommeln, &c. he fell at the siege of vienna in . his writings are said to contain the groundwork of montalembert's system. in italy, after the time of tartaglia, marchi, campi, &c., we find no great improvement in this art. several italians, however, distinguished themselves as engineers under the spaniards. the fortifications of badajos are a good example of the state of the art in italy and spain a that epoch. the citadel of antwerp, built by two italian engineers, pacciotti and cerbelloni, in , has become celebrated for the siege it sustained in . the age of louis xiv. effected a great revolution in the art of fortification, and carried it to such a degree of perfection, that it has since received but slight improvement. the years and are interesting dates in the history of this art, as having given birth respectively to vauban and coehorn. the former was chief engineer of france under louis xiv., and the latter held a corresponding position under the dutch republic. coehorn's ideas upon fortification are conceived with an especial view to the marshy soil of his own country, and, although well suited to the object in view, are consequently of less general application than those of his more distinguished cotemporary and rival. the best specimens of his mode of construction that exist at the present day, are the fortresses of manheim, bergen-op-zoom, nimiguen, and breda. coehorn was followed in holland by landsberg, an able and practical engineer, who to much reading added extensive experience, having himself served at sixteen sieges. his system was in many respects peculiar, both in trace and relief; it dispensed with the glacis, and all revertments of masonry. his plans could be applied only to marshy soils. the first edition of his work was published in . but the career of vauban forms the most marked and prominent era in the history of fortification; it constitutes the connecting link between the rude sketches of the earlier engineers, and the well-established form which the art has since assumed. in his earlier works we find many of the errors of his predecessors; but a gradual change seems to have been wrought in his mind by reflection and experience, and these faults were soon remedied and a new and distinct system developed. vauban has left no treatise upon his favorite art, and his ideas upon fortification have been deduced from his constructions, and from detached memoirs left among his papers. the nature of his labors, and the extent of his activity and industry, may be imagined from the fact that he fought one hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or repaired three hundred fortifications. his memoirs, found among his manuscript papers, on various military and political subjects, are numerous, and highly praised even at the present day. but his beautiful and numerous constructions, both of a civil and military character, are real monuments to his genius. the best illustrations of his principles of fortification occur at lille, strasbourg, landau, givet, and neuf-brisack. his writings on mines, and the attack and defence of places, are, by the profession, regarded as classic. his improvements in the existing method of attack gave great superiority to the arms of his countrymen, and even enabled him to besiege and capture his rival coehorn, in his own works. he died in , and was soon succeeded by cormontaigne. the latter did not attempt the introduction of any new system, but limited himself to improving and perfecting the plans of his illustrious predecessors. his improvements, however, were both extensive and judicious, and are sufficient to entitle him to the place he holds as one of the ablest military engineers the world has ever produced. his works on the subject of fortification, besides being elegantly written, contain the most valuable information of any works we have. his most admired constructions are to be found at metz, thionville, and bitche. the beautiful crown works of billecroix, at metz, are perfect models of their kind. cormontaigne died in . cotemporary with him were sturin and glasser. the former deviated but slightly from the systems of his predecessors, but the latter invented several ingenious improvements which gave him great reputation. next follows rosard, a bavarian engineer; and frederick augustus, king of poland, who devoted himself particularly to this art. the former casemated only the flanks of his works, but the latter introduced casemate fire more extensively than any one who had preceded him. in france, belidor and de filey published about the middle of the last century. they were both able engineers but their systems were inferior to that of cormontaigne. in de la chiche introduced a system of fortification in many respects original. he raised his covered-ways so as to conceal all his masonry, and casemated a great portion of his _enceinte_. for exterior defence, he employed direct fire from his barbettes, and curvated fire from his casemates; the direct fire of the latter secured his ditches. next to de la chiche follows montalembert, who published in . he was a man of much experience and considerable originality, but of no great ability as an engineer. most of his ideas were derived from de la chiche and the german school of rimpler. his plans have generally been rejected by his own countrymen, but they still have advocates among the germans. general virgin, a distinguished swedish engineer, wrote in . his idea of strongly fortifying the smaller towns to the comparative neglect of the larger cities, constitutes one of the principal novelties in his system. in , reveroni devised a system in which the casemates of montalembert were employed, but his guns were so arranged as to be employed in barbette while the besiegers were at a distance, and afterwards to be used for casemated fire. the casemate gun-carriage, which formed a part of his invention, was ingenious, but never much employed in practice. bousmard, a french emigrant, published in . he adopted the general trace of vauban, but introduced modifications in the details essentially different from those of cormontaigne. some of these modifications are very valuable improvements, while others are of a more doubtful character. bousmard is, on the whole, a very able writer, and his works should be found in the library of every military engineer. carnot's celebrated treatise was published in . he was evidently a man of genius, and during his career at the head of the war department of france, numerous and very important improvements were made in the several branches of the military art, and especially in strategy. his work on fortification exhibits much originality and genius, but it is doubtful whether it has very much contributed to the improvement of this art. his ideas have been very severely, and rather unfairly criticised by the english, and particularly by sir howard douglas. chasseloup de laubat early distinguished himself as an engineer of much capacity and talent. he followed napoleon in nearly all his campaigns, and conducted many of his sieges. he remodelled the fortifications of northern italy and of the lower rhine. he published in . the improvements which he introduced are numerous and valuable, and he probably contributed more to advance his art, and to restore the equilibrium between attack and defence, than any other engineer since cormontaigne. after the fall of napoleon and the partition of his empire, the allies mutilated or destroyed the constructions of chasseloup, so that, it is believed, no perfect specimen of his system remains. the cotemporaries of chasseloup were mostly engaged in active field service and sieges, and few had either leisure or opportunity to devote themselves to improvements in permanent fortification. choumara published in . his system contains much originality, and his writings give proof of talent and genius. he has very evidently more originality than judgment, and it is hardly probable that his system will ever be generally adopted in practice. the metz system, as arranged by noizet, as a theoretical study, is undoubtedly the very best that is now known. it, however, requires great modifications to suit it to different localities. for a horizontal site, it is probably the most perfect system ever devised. it is based on the system of vauban as improved by cormontaigne, and contains several of the modifications suggested by modern engineers. it is applied in a modified form to the new fortifications of paris. baron rohault de fleury has introduced many modifications of the ordinary french system in his new defences of lyons. we have seen no written account of these works, but from a hasty examination in , they struck us as being too complicated and expensive. the new fortifications of western germany are modifications of rempler's system, as improved by de la chiche and montalembert. it is said that general aster, the directing engineer, has also introduced some of the leading principles of chasseloup and carnot. the english engineers have satisfied themselves with following in the track of their continental neighbors, and can offer no claims to originality. of the system of fortification now followed in our service we must decline expressing any opinion; the time has not yet arrived for subjecting it to a severe and judicious criticism. but of the system pursued previous to , we may say, without much fear of contradiction, that a worse one could scarcely have been devised. instead of men of talent and attainments in military science, most of our engineers were then either foreigners, or civilians who owed their commissions to mere political influence. the qualifications of the former were probably limited to their recollection of some casual visit to two or three of the old european fortresses; and the latter probably derived all their military science from some old military book, which, having become useless in europe, had found its way into this country, and which they had read without understanding, and probably without even looking at its date. the result was what might have been anticipated--a total waste of the public money. we might illustrate this by numerous examples. a single one, however, must suffice. about the period of the last war, eight new forts were constructed for the defence of new york harbor, at an expense of some two millions of dollars. six of these were _circular_, and the other two were _star forts_--systems which had been discarded in europe for nearly two thousand years! three of these works are now entirely abandoned, two others are useless, and large sums of money have recently been expended on the other three in an attempt to remedy their faults, and render them susceptible of a good defence. moreover, a number of the works which were constructed by our engineers before that corps was made to feel the influence of the scientific education introduced through the medium of the military academy--we say, a considerable number of our fortifications, constructed by engineers who owed their appointment to political influence, are not only wrong in their plans, but have been made of such wretched materials and workmanship that they are already crumbling into ruins. a fortification, in its most simple form, consists of a mound of earth, termed, the _rampart_, which encloses the space fortified; a _parapet_, surmounting the rampart and covering the men and guns from the enemy's projectiles; a _scarp wall,_ which sustains the pressure of the earth of the rampart and parapet, and presents an insurmountable obstacle to an assault by storm; a wide and deep _ditch_, which prevents the enemy from approaching near the body of the place; a _counterscarp wall_, which sustains the earth on the exterior of the ditch; a _covered way_, which occupies the space between the counterscarp and a mound of earth called a _glacis_, thrown up a few yards in front of the ditch for the purpose of covering the scarp of the main work. the work by which the space fortified is immediately enveloped, is called the _enceinte_, or _body of the place_. other works are usually added to the enceinte to strengthen the weak points of the fortification, or to lengthen the siege by forcing the enemy to gain possession of them before he can breach the body of the place: these are termed _outworks_, when enveloped by the covered way, and _advanced works_, when placed exterior to the covered way, but in some way connected with the main work; but if entirely beyond the glacis, and not within supporting distance of the fortress, they are called _detached works_. in a bastioned front the principal outwork is the _demi-lune_, which is placed in front of the curtain; it serves to cover the main entrance to the work, and to place the adjacent bastions in strong re-enterings. the _tenaille_ is a small low work placed in the ditch, to cover the scarp wall of the curtain and flanks from the fire of the besieger's batteries erected along the crest of the glacis. the _places of arms_, are points where troops are assembled in order to act on the exterior of the work. the _re-entering places of arms_, are small redans arranged at the points of junction of the covered ways of the bastion and demi-lune. the _salient places of arms_ are the parts of the covered way in front of the salients of the bastion and demi-lune. small permanent works, termed _redoubts_, are placed within the demi-lune and re-entering places of arms for strengthening those works. works of this character constructed within the bastion are termed _interior retrenchments;_ when sufficiently elevated to command the exterior ground, they are called _cavaliers._ _caponniers_ are works constructed to cover the passage of the ditch from the tenaille to the gorge of the demi-lune, and also from the demi-lune to the covered way, by which communication may be maintained between the enceinte and outworks. _posterns_ are underground communications made through the body of the place or some of the outworks. _sortie-passages_ are narrow openings made through the crest of the glacis, which usually rise in the form of a ramp from the covered way, by means of which communication may be kept up with the exterior. these passages are so arranged that they cannot be swept by the fire of the enemy. the other communications above ground are called _ramps, stairs,_ &c. _traverses_ are small works erected on the covered way to intercept the fire of the besieger's batteries. _scarp_ and _counterscarp_ galleries are sometimes constructed for the defence of the ditch. they are arranged with loop-holes, through which the troops of the garrison fire on the besiegers when they have entered the ditch, without being themselves exposed to the batteries of the enemy. in sea-coast defences, and sometimes in a land front for the defence of the ditch, embrasures are made in the scarp wall for the fire of artillery; the whole being protected from shells by a bomb-proof covering over head: this arrangement is termed a _casemate_. sometimes double ramparts and parapets are formed, so that the interior one shall fire over the more advanced; the latter in this case is called _a faussebraie_. if the inner work be separated from the other it is called a _retrenchment_[ ] and if in addition it has a commanding fire, it is termed, as was just remarked, a _cavalier_. [footnote : the term _retrenchment_ implies an interior work, which is constructed within or in rear of another, for the purpose of strengthening it; the term _intrenchment_, on the contrary, implies an independent work, constructed in the open field, without reference to any other adjoining work.] the _capital_ of a bastion is a line bisecting its salient angle. all the works comprehended between the capitals of two adjacent bastions is termed a _front_: it is taken as the unit in permanent fortification. fig. represents the ground plan of a modern bastioned front, of a regular and simple form, on a horizontal site. _a, a, a_--is the enceinte, or body of the place. _b_--the bastions. _c_--the main ditch. _d_--the covered ways. _e_--the re-entering places of arms. _f_--the salient places of arms. _g_--the demi-lune. _h_--the demi-lune ditch. _j_--the demi-lune redoubt. _l_--the ditch of the demi-lune redoubt. _m_--the redoubt of the re-entering places of arms. _n_--the ditches of the redoubts. _o_--the tenaille. _p_--the double caponier. _a_--the traverses. _b_--the sortie-passages. _c_--stairs. _d_--cut in the demi-lune to flank the redoubt of the re-entering place of arms. fig. represents a section through the line _mn'_ of the preceding figure. _a_--is the rampart. _b_--the parapet. _c_--the ditch. _d_--the scarp wall. _e_--the counterscarp wall. _f_--the glacis. _g_--the covered way. _h_--the terre-plain. _j_--the parade. sometimes half embrasures are cut in the earthen parapet of a fort, so as to sink the gun below the crest, and thus more effectually cover the men from the enemy's fire. but guns in embrasure have a far less extended field of fire than when mounted in barbette; moreover, the embrasures present openings through which an enemy may penetrate in an assault. owing to these objections, they are employed only for the protection of particular points; that is, where it is important to cover the artillerists from the enemy's fire, or where the guns are to be used merely to protect a ditch, or to enfilade a road, &c. the bottom of the embrasure is called the _sole_, the sides are called _cheeks_, and the mass of earth between two embrasures, the _merlon_. embrasures may be made either direct or oblique, according as the fire is required to be perpendicular or oblique to the parapet. a _coverport_ is a small outwork of any convenient form, erected immediately in front of a gateway, to screen it from the enemy's fire. a _counterguard_ is a more extensive work, constructed in front of a part of the fortress itself, or of some other outwork of greater importance, which it is intended to cover. these are sometimes called _coverfaces_, from their situation and object; but the former term is most commonly used. sometimes outworks, called _tenaillons_, consisting of one long and one short face, are placed on each side of the demi-lune of a front of fortification, for the purpose of prolonging the siege. (fig. .) small, or _demi_-tenaillons, are frequently so arranged as to cover only one-half of the demi-lune, and then a _bonnet_ constructed in front of the salient of the demi-lune. (fig. .) in this case the bonnet is flanked by the short faces of the demi-tenaillons; these short faces are themselves flanked by the demi-lune, while the bastions flank the long faces. a _horn-work_ consists of a front of fortification, and two wings resting on the faces of bastions of a front of the fortress. it sometimes has also a demi-lune or bonnet, as in the case of demi-tenaillons. (fig. .) a _crown-work_ consists of two fronts of fortification, and two wings. (fig. .) it is sometimes made _double_, and even _triple_. these works are also employed as advanced works, and placed entirely in front of the glacis. they have generally been added to a fortress for the purpose of occupying some important piece of ground not included within the limits of the main work. they may be constructed with covered ways, and sometimes it may be found advantageous to secure them by retrenchments. a _detached work_ may be made in any form deemed best suited to the site. being but remotely connected with the fortress, the latter will exercise but slight influence on the character of its plan or construction. they are usually of limited extent and slight relief, partaking much of the nature of field-works.[ ] [footnote : the general principles of permanent fortification may be best learned from the writings of cormontaigne, st. paul de noizet, and laurillard-fallot. a list of valuable books of reference on the several branches of military engineering will be given at the close of the next chapter.] chapter xiv. field-engineering. _field-engineering_ includes the making of military reconnaissances, temporary fortifications, and military roads; the planning and construction of military bridges; the attack and defence of military works;--in fine, all the various duties of engineer troops, either in the operations of a campaign, or in the dispositions on the battle-field. _military reconnaissance._--by this term is meant an examination of a portion of the theatre of war, to ascertain its military character and resources. if the examination be made of a large district of country, and for an entire campaign, the reconnaissance is _general_; if made for collecting detailed information respecting a proposed line of march, the passage of a river, the position of an enemy, &c., it is termed _special_. in making a general reconnaissance, great care should be taken to collect accurate information respecting the general topography of the country; the character of the mountains, forests, and water-courses; the nature of the roads, canals, and railways; the quality of the soil, and the amount of provisions and forage it produces; the population and character of the cities, towns, and villages, the commercial and manufacturing resources of every part of the country, and the means of transportation to be found in each district. the plan of military operations will be based on the information thus obtained, and any serious error in the reconnaissance may involve the results of the campaign, and even the fate of the war. in a special reconnaissance, not only accurate but minute information will be required: the character of the roads must be given in detail; the nature of the water-courses, their depth and velocity; the position and character of bridges, and fords;--in fine, a full description of all obstacles to be encountered, and the means that can be made available for overcoming these obstacles. a reconnoitring officer may usually derive much valuable information from the published maps and descriptions of the country to be examined; additional matters of detail may be obtained from woodsmen, hunters, and fishermen; and also from the innkeepers and local authorities of the district. but the officer should always verify this information, so far as practical, by personal examination. in making a reconnaissance in the vicinity of an enemy, he must be supported by a strong escort of mounted troops, and in all his operations the greatest precaution will be requisite to ensure success. some simple instrument, such as a pocket sextant, or compass, will be sufficient to enable the reconnoitring officer to measure, with considerable accuracy, the height of mountains, the width of streams, &c., and an ordinary scale and dividers will enable him to make a suitable military sketch. _temporary fortification._--it has been stated in the preceding chapter that temporary fortifications are properly confined to the operations of a single campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only for a short period; and that they are usually made of earth, thrown up by the troops in a single day. temporary fortifications, as a part of field-engineering, may therefore be regarded rather as an _arm_ than an _art_. the principles of their construction are derived, of course, from the theory of permanent fortification, but in applying these principles to practice in the field, much greater latitude is allowed than in the exact scientific arrangement of permanent works. the purpose of field-works (or intrenchments, as they are commonly called) is to arrest, or at least to impede, the march of the attacking foe; to shelter the defensive troops from the missive weapons of the assailants, and to detain them in a position where they will be exposed to the fire of the defensive force. the numerical and positive strength of the assailed may be much less than that of the assailant, and yet an equilibrium exist; the material obstacles compensating for the difference in numbers. intrenchments, though inert masses, must therefore be regarded as most valuable and important accessaries in the defence of a position. intrenchments consist either of _lines_ of works made to cover extended positions, or of _detached_ works designed simply to defend the ground they occupy. the former generally present a front against the enemy in but one direction, while the latter are usually closed on all their sides. the following figures have been employed for the plan of simple intrenchments, viz.: the polygon, redan, lunette, mitre, star-fort, and bastion. _square_ or _polygonal redoubts_ are the most common forms given to field-works, on account of the ease of their construction. but they have many defects. there is a sector without fire in front of each salient, and the ditches are without protection. the latter objection also holds good against all circular works. the _redan_ (fig. ) is frequently used to cover a point in rear, as a bridge, a ford, or a defile. when used alone, its gorge should be closed by palisades. its ditches are unprotected. the _lunette_ (fig. ) has nearly the same defects as the redan. the _mitre_, or _priest-cap,_ (fig. ,) may be employed with advantage when a cross-fire is required on the capital of the work. the _star-fort_ has all the defects, without the merit of simplicity, which belong to the polygonal redoubt. the _bastion-fort_ (fig. ) more fully satisfies the conditions of a good defence than any other plan; but it is less simple and easy of execution. it is usually composed of four or five fronts, but it may be applied to a polygon of any number of sides. for the details of the construction of these several works, we must refer to the special treatises on field-fortification. lines of intrenchments may be made either continuous or with intervals. in adopting either plan, the engineer should avail himself of all the natural obstacles presented by the position, so as to diminish the labor of erecting artificial means of defence. the simplest arrangement for a continuous intrenchment is the _cremaillière_ or indented line. when applied to an irregular site, or used to connect together distant and detached works, the indented line may be regarded as a good disposition. mitres and redans, connected by straight curtains, are sometimes employed, as also a combination of large and small redans, forming alternate salient and re-entering angles. a continuous line of bastions is preferable to any other arrangement, when there is plenty of time for their construction. lines with intervals are frequently formed of alternate lunettes and square redoubts. other detached works may be employed in the same way. this manner of intrenching a position has several advantages, with disciplined troops. the first shock of the assailant is sustained by the detached works, and when he attempts to penetrate in the intervals, his flanks become exposed to a deadly cross fire. these intervals also allow the assailed to act on the offensive, by charging the enemy at the opportune moment. but with raw and militia forces it will be safer to resort to continuous lines. if cavalry form any part of the defensive force, it will be absolutely necessary to leave intervals through which these troops may charge. a vertical section of all intrenchments is of the same general form; the dimensions will, of course, vary with the nature of the soil, and the time and means employed in their construction. the minimum dimensions that can be used with any considerable advantage are given in fig. . in laying out field-works advantage should be taken of all available artificial obstacles, such as hedges, walls, houses, outbuildings, &c. a thickset hedge may be rendered defensible by throwing up against it a slight parapet of earth. stone fences may be employed in the same way. walls of masonry may be pierced with loop-holes and arranged for one or two tiers of fire. the walls of houses are pierced in the same manner, and a projecting wooden structure, termed a _machicoulis gallery_, is sometimes made from the floor of the second story, to enable the assailed to fire down upon their opponents. this arrangement is frequently employed to advantage in wooden blockhouses against a savage foe; but it is of little avail when exposed to the fire of artillery. some have proposed galleries of this description in permanent works of masonry, but the project is too obviously absurd to merit discussion. in addition to the parapet of an intrenchment, a good engineer will always find time and means for constructing other artificial obstacles, such as trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, stockades, fraises, chevaux-de-frise, crows'-feet, mines, &c. _trous-de-loup_ are pits dug in the earth in the form of an inverted truncated cone, some six feet in diameter, and about the same number of feet in depth. they are usually placed a few yards in front of the ditch, and concealed by some slight covering. _abattis_ are tops and large limbs of trees arranged along the glacis of a work; the ends of the branches are lopped off and sharpened. _palisades_ are stakes some eight or ten feet long, with one end fastened in the ground and the other made sharp. they are placed in juxtaposition and connected together by horizontal riband-pieces. this arrangement is frequently placed at the foot of the counterscarp. when the timbers are large and the work is intended as a part of a primary defence, it is called a _stockade_; when the stakes are placed at the foot of the scarp, either horizontally or inclined, they receive the name of _fraises_. a _cheval-de-frise_ consists of a horizontal piece of timber armed with wooden or iron lances, which project some eight or ten feet. it is much employed against cavalry, and on rocky soils serves as a substitute for palisades. _crows'-feet_ are small wooden or iron forms filled with sharp spikes. they are thrown, with their points upward, on ground which is to be passed over by cavalry. _mines_ are sometimes used in connection with intrenchments, but more commonly in the attack and defence of permanent works. they will be noticed further on. fieldworks which are to be occupied for a considerable length of time will usually have their steeper slopes revetted, and be arranged with scarp and counterscarp, galleries, traverses, blindages, &c. such works hold an intermediary rank between temporary and permanent fortification. as examples of the importance of field fortifications and of the manner of organizing them, the reader is referred to the celebrated battle of fontenoy, in , where the carefully-arranged intrenchments of marshal saxe enabled the french to repel, with immense destruction, the attacks of greatly superior numbers; to the battle of fleurus, in , where the prince of waldeck exposed himself to a most disastrous defeat "by neglecting the resources of fortification and other indispensable precautions;" to the battle of malplaquet, in , where marshal villars, by neglecting to occupy and intrench the farm that closed the passage between the woods of sars and lanière, exposed himself to a disastrous defeat; to the operations of , where general custine, by neglecting to intrench the heights that covered bingen, as the engineers had recommended, exposed himself to those terrible disasters which forced him to a precipitate retreat; to the works of wervike, which, by a vigorous resistance on the th of september, , saved the dutch army from total destruction; to the intrenched camp of ulm, in , which for six weeks held in check the victorious army of moreau; to the intrenched lines of torres vedras, in , which saved from destruction the english army of wellington; to the field-defences of hougomont, which contributed so much to the victory of waterloo, &c. _military communications._--the movements of armies are always much embarrassed by forests, marshes, and water-courses, and nothing contributes more to the dispatch of military operations than the means of opening practical and easy communication through these various obstacles. it is not necessary here to enter into any detailed discussion of the manner of constructing military communications through forests or marshes. in a new country like ours, where almost every one has had some experience in road-making, no very great technical knowledge is required for the construction of temporary works of this character; but much professional skill and experience will be requisite for the engineers who make the preliminary reconnaissances, and fix the location of these roads. water-courses may be crossed by means of fords, on the ice, or by ferries and bridges. when temporary bridges or ferries are constructed by the army in the field, they are classed under the general head of _military bridges_, or more properly, _pontoniering_. where the depth of the stream is not great, the current slight, and the bottom smooth and hard, the passage may be effected by _fording_. if the bottom be of mud, or large stones, the passage will be difficult and dangerous, even where the depth and current are favorable. under favorable circumstances infantry can ford a stream where the depth is not greater than four feet; cavalry to a depth of four or five feet; but artillery, and engineer trains, cannot go to a depth of more than two and a half feet, without greatly exposing their ammunition and military stores the fords should be accurately staked out before the passage is attempted, and ropes ought to be stretched across the stream, or cavalry and small boats stationed below, to prevent the loss of life. ice may be crossed by infantry, in small detachments. its strength may be increased by covering it with boards, or straw, so as to distribute the weight over a greater surface. by sprinkling water over the straw, and allowing it to freeze, the mass may be made still more compact. but large bodies of cavalry, and heavy artillery, cannot venture on the ice unless it be of great thickness and strength. an army can never trust, for any length of time, to either fords or ice; if it did a freshet or a thaw would place it in a most critical state. military bridges will, therefore, become its only safe reliance for keeping open its communications. military bridges are made with trestles, rafts, boats, and other floating bodies. rope bridges are also sometimes resorted to by troops for passing rivers. _trestle bridges_ are principally used for crossing small streams not more than seven or eight feet in depth: they also serve to connect floating bridges with the shore, in shallow water. the form of the trestle is much the same as that of an ordinary _carpenter's horse,_ i.e., a horizontal beam supported by four inclined legs. these trestles are placed in the stream, from twelve to twenty feet apart, and connected by string-pieces, (or _balks_ as they are termed in technical language,) which are covered over with plank. the action of the current against the bridge may be counteracted by anchors and cables, or by means of boxes or baskets attached to the legs of the trestles, and filled with stones. a more substantial form may be given to the bridge by substituting for the trestles, piles, or the ordinary framed supports so much used in the newer parts of our country. for examples of the use of bridges of this description we would refer to caesar's celebrated bridge across the rhine; the passage of the scheldt in by the spaniards; the passage of the lech in by gustavus adolphus; the passage of the danube in by marshal saxe; the great bridge across the var during napoleon's italian campaigns; the passage of the lech in by lecourbe; the bridges across the piava, the isonso, &c., in the subsequent operations of the army in italy; the celebrated passage of the danube at the island of lobau in ; the passage of the agueda in by the english; the passages of the dwina, the moscowa, the dneiper, the beresina, &c., in the campaign of ; the repairing of the bridge near dresden, and the passage of the elbe in , &c. _rafts_ formed of timbers, casks, barrels, &c., are frequently used as military bridges. they may be made to bear almost any weight, and will answer for the passage of rivers of any depth and width, provided the current be not rapid. where the bridge is to be supported by rafts made of solid timbers, these timbers should be first placed in the water, to ascertain their natural position of stability, and then the larger ends cut away on the under side, so as to present the least possible resistance to the action of the current. they are afterwards lashed together by strong rope or withe lashing, or fastened by cross-pieces let into the timbers, and held firm by bolts, or wooden pins. these rafts are kept in place by anchors and cables placed up and down stream. the roadway is formed in nearly the same manner as for a bridge supported on trestles. empty casks, and other floating bodies, may be substituted in place of logs in the construction of rafts. for examples of the use of rafts in the construction of military bridges, we would refer to the passage of the seine in by count charolais; the passage of the meuse in , by alexander farnése; the passage of the vistula in , the borysthenese in , and the sound in , by charles xii.; the passage of the adige in ; the passage of the po in ; and the subsequent military operations in the spanish peninsula. military bridges are frequently made of _boats_, and the ordinary river-craft found in the vicinity of the intended passage. flat-bottomed boats are the most suitable for this purpose, but if these cannot be obtained, keel boats will serve as a substitute. when these water-craft are of very unequal sizes, (as is frequently the case,) two smaller ones may be lashed together to form a single support; they can be brought to the same level by means of stone ballast. the gunwales must be suitably arranged for supporting the balks, or else frameworks should be erected for this purpose from the centre of the boat. the arrangement of the roadway, anchors, &c., is the same as before. a _bridge-equipage_ made to follow an army in its movements in the field, is generally composed of light skiffs or batteaux, and the necessary timbers, planks, anchors, &c., for forming the roadway, and keeping the bridge in its position. all these articles are constructed especially for this purpose. all the wood-work should be of tough and well-seasoned timber, so as to impose no unnecessary weight on the wagon trains. the bateaux should also be made of strong and light materials. for convenience in transportation, these boats are sometimes made with hinges so as to fold up. the ribs are usually of oak, and the sides and bottom of pine. instead of plank, a covering of tin, copper, india-rubber, &c., has sometimes been substituted. floating supports of this character are often made in compartments, so as to prevent their sinking when injured by the enemy's projectiles. indian-rubber pontons may be folded up into a small space, and their slight weight renders them convenient for transportation. on navigable streams a part of the bridge resting on one or two bateaux should be so arranged that it can be shipped out of its place, forming a _draw_ for the passage of river-craft. indeed, it would be well, even where the river is not navigable, to form a draw for the passage of trees, and other floating bodies, sent down by the enemy against the bridge. an ordinary bridge-equipage of bateaux, or light pontons, for crossing a river of from three to four hundred yards in width, and of moderate current, will require a train of from sixty to eighty wagons.[ ] under favorable circumstances, and with a well-instructed corps of pontoniers, the bridge may be thrown across the river, and prepared for the passage of an army in a few hours at most.[ ] after the troops have passed over, the bridge may be taken up, and replaced on the wagons in from a quarter to half an hour. [footnote : the number of wagons in a ponton train will be greatly diminished if it be found that indian-rubber boats may be used as supports for the bridge. the engineer department of our army are making experiments to determine this point.] [footnote : in , three bridges of bateaux were thrown across the po, near placentia, each fifteen hundred feet in length, and entirely completed in eight hours. in , two bridges of bateaux were thrown across the rhine, at wesel, in half an hour; again, in the same year, a third bridge was thrown across this river near dusseldorf, in six hours. in , col. birago, of the austrian army, arrived on the bank of the weisgerben arm of the danube, with his bridge-equipage, at a round trot, and immediately began the construction of his bridge, without any previous preparation or examination. in less than three-quarters of an hour the bridge was completed, and three loaded four-horse wagons passed over on a trot, followed by a column of infantry.] the following examples will serve to illustrate the use of different kinds of boat-bridges in military operations:--the passage of the rhine, in , by villars; the passage of the dnieper and the bog, in , by the russians; the passage of the danube, in , by marshal saxe; the passage of the rhine, near cologne, in , by the prince of clermont; the passage of the rhine, in , by jourdan; the passage of the rhine, at kehl, in , by moreau; and again the same year, at weissenthurn, and at neuwied, by jourdan; the bridges across the rhine, at the sieges of kehl and huninguen, in ; the passage of the limmat, in , by massena; the passages of the mincio, the adige, the brenta, the piava, &c., in ; the passages of these rivers again in ; the passages of the narew, in , by the russians; the several passages of the danube, in , by the french and austrian armies; the passages of the tagus and douro, in , by the english; the passages of the niemen, the dwina, the moskwa, and the beresina, in , by the french; and of the great rivers of germany and france, in and . a floating body, propelled from one bank to the other by the current of the stream, is termed a _flying-bridge._ the usual mode of establishing a ferry of this kind, is to attach the head of the boat by means of a cable and anchor to some point near the middle of the stream. by steering obliquely to the current, the boat may be made to cross and recross at the same point. a single passage may be made in the same way, by the action of the current without the cable and anchor, but the boat in this case will be carried some distance down the stream. rowboats are employed for crossing over infantry by successive debarkations; but this process is too slow for the passage of a large force; it may very well be resorted to as auxiliary to other means. steam craft are so common at the present day on all navigable streams, that an army in the field will frequently be able to avail itself of this means of passing the larger rivers. but, in a hostile country, or in one already passed over by the enemy, it will not be safe to rely with confidence upon obtaining craft of this character. a well-organized army will always carry in its train the means of effecting a certain and speedy passage of all water-courses that may intercept its line of march. flying-bridges or rowboats were employed in the passage of the dwina, in , by the swedes; the passage of the po, in , by prince eugene; the passage of the rhine, at huninguen, in ; jourdan's passage of the rhine in ; moreau's passage in ; the sieges of kehl and huninguen in ; massena's passage of the limmat, and soult's passage of the linth, in ; the passage of the rhine, at lucisteig in ; the passage of the po, by the french, just before the battle of marengo; and others in italy, germany, and spain, in the subsequent campaigns of napoleon. military bridges have sometimes been formed of ropes, cables stretched across the stream, and firmly attached at each end to trees, or posts let into the earth. if the shore is of rock, rings with staples let into the stone form the best means for securing the ends of the main ropes. plank are laid on these cables to form the roadway. the ropes forming the "side-rail" of the bridge are passed over trestles at each shore, and then fastened as before. short vertical ropes attach the main supports to these side ropes, in order that they may sustain a part of the weight passing over the bridge. constructions of this character are fully described in douglas's essay on military bridges. for example, see the passage of the po, near casal, in , by the swiss; the bridge thrown over the clain by admiral coligni, at the siege of poitiers, in ; the operations of the prince of orange against ghent and bruges, in ; the passage of the tagus, at alcantara, in , by the english; the bridge constructed across the zezere, by the french, in ; the bridge thrown across the scarpe, near douai, in ; the experiments made at fêre in , &c. the passage of a river in the presence of an enemy, whether acting offensively or in retreat, is an operation of great delicacy and danger. in either case the army is called upon to show the coolest and most determined courage, for its success will depend on its maintaining the strictest discipline and good order. in the case of a retreat the bridge should be covered by field intrenchments, called a _tête de pont_, and defended by a strong guard. if the river be of moderate width, the enemy may be kept at a distance by heavy batteries on the opposite shore. as soon as the passage is effected by the main body, the bridge, if permanent, will be blown up, or otherwise destroyed by the miners, and if floating, will be swung round to the other shore. the rear-guard will pass over in rowboats, or the end pontons detached for that purpose. an army retreating in the face of an enemy should never rely upon one single bridge, no matter what may be its character: for the slightest accident happening to it might expose the whole army to inevitable destruction. the passage of a river by main force, against an enterprising and active enemy on the opposite shore, is always an operation of the greatest difficulty, and not unfrequently accompanied with the most bloody results. the most effectual method of accomplishing this object is by stratagem. demonstrations are made at several points at the same time: bodies of troops are thrown across, after nightfall, in rowboats or by flying-bridges, to get possession of the opposite bank. the vanguard of light cavalry may cross by swimming. the pontoniers should have their bridge equipage in readiness near the intended point of passage, so that it can be thrown across with the greatest possible rapidity, while the advanced guards are still able to keep the enemy at a distance. under favorable circumstances the pontoniers will have the bridge in readiness for the passage of the army before the enemy can collect his troops upon the threatened point. cannon-balls and hollow shot are the most effectual means for destroying an enemy's bridge when our batteries can be planted within reach. when this cannot be done, we must resort to fire-boats, floating rafts, &c., to accomplish our object. operations of this kind carried on in the night, are most likely to succeed. to protect bridges from the action of these floating bodies, stockades, or floating chevaux-de-frise are constructed across the stream at some distance above the bridge; strong cables, or chains stretched directly across the river, or with an angle up stream, may be used in place of stockades, or in conjunction with them. guards should be stationed above the bridge, with boats, ropes, grapnels, &c., for the purpose of arresting all floating bodies and drawing thorn ashore, or directing them safely through the _draw_ in the bridge arrangement. the troops especially charged with the construction and management of the various kinds of military bridges, are denominated _pontoniers_. the duties of these troops are arduous and important, and, in a country like ours, intersected by numerous water-courses, the success of a campaign will often depend upon their skill and efficiency. _sapping_.--this is a general term applied to the operations of forming trenches, along which troops may approach a work without being exposed to the fire of the besieged. in addition to the ordinary sapping-tools, such as shovels, picks, gabion-forks, &c., used in constructing trenches, there will also be required a considerable amount of sapping materials, such as gabions, fascines, sap-fagots, sandbags, &c. the _gabion_ is a cylindrical basket of twigs, about two feet in diameter, and some three feet in length, and without a bottom. it is made by driving into the ground, in a circular form, a number of small pickets about an inch in diameter, and of the length required for the gabion. twigs are wattled between the pickets like ordinary basket-work, and fastened at the ends by withs or packthread. gabions are used in forming saps, batteries, blindages, powder-magazines, and in revetting the steep slopes of field-works. the _fascine_ is a bundle of twigs closely bound up, from nine to twelve inches in diameter, and from ten to fifteen or twenty feet in length. the largest are sometimes called _saucissons_. in making a fascine, straight twigs about the thickness of a man's finger are laid side by side, and firmly compressed together by a strong rope or chain attached to the extremities of two levers. while held in this position the twigs are firmly bound together by withs or cords. fascines are used in constructing trenches, batteries, &c., and for filling up wet ditches. the _sap-fagot_ is a strong fascine about ten inches in diameter and two feet in length, with a picket inserted through the middle. it is used in the double sap in connection with gabions. _sand-bags_ are usually made of coarse canvass. when filled with earth they are some six or eight inches in diameter, and from eighteen inches to two feet in length. from their perishable nature, they are used only when other materials cannot be procured, and where it is important to place the troops speedily under cover from the enemy's fire. bales of wool, cotton, hay, straw, &c., may be employed in sapping for the same purposes as the above materials, when they can be procured in sufficient quantity. pork and flour barrels, which are usually in abundance in a camp, are frequently filled with sand and used for forming magazines, blindages, &c., in field-works. a trench constructed in ordinary soil beyond the range of the enemy's grape, is called a _simple sap_, or ordinary trench. the earth is thrown up on the side towards the place besieged, so as to form a kind of parapet to cover the men in the trench. the labor is here executed under the supervision of engineer soldiers, by working parties detached from the other arms. fig. represents a vertical section of a simple sap. when within range of the enemy's grape, the _flying sap_ is resorted to in order to place the workmen speedily under cover. in this operation, gabions are placed in juxtaposition on the side towards the besieged work, and filled with all possible speed by the workmen. three rows of fascines are usually placed on the top of the gabions to increase the height. the most difficult part of the flying sap is executed by engineer troops, and the trench is completed by the ordinary working parties. fig. represents a section of this sap. the _full-sap_ is employed when the works of the besiegers are within range of musketry, or when the grape fire of the besieged is so deadly that the flying sap can no longer be used. this is a difficult operation, and unless executed with great care and by well-instructed engineer troops, the construction of the trench will be attended with an immense loss of life. the work must be executed under cover of a _sap-roller,_ which is a cylindrical mass of fascines, wool, or cotton, some two feet in diameter. on very smooth ground a ball-proof shelter on wheels might be used as a substitute. the sap-roller being placed along the line of the trench so as to cover the sapper in front, who is armed with a musket-proof headpiece and cuirass, this sapper commences the sap by placing a gabion on the line of the proposed trench and fills it with earth, working on his hands and knees. having filled the first gabion, he pushes forward the sap-roller and places a second one next the first, stopping the open joint between the two with a stop-fagot. the second gabion being filled in the same manner as the first, others are successively established. when the first sapper has advanced a few feet, he is followed by a second, also in defensive armor, who increases the excavation and embankment; this sapper is then followed in the same way by a third and a fourth, after which the trench will be sufficiently advanced to be turned over to the ordinary workmen. the sap-fagots may be removed when the embankment becomes thick enough to resist grape. fig. represents a plan and section of a full-sap. when the direction of the trench is such that the men are exposed on both sides, it will be necessary to throw up an embankment both to the right and left. this operation is called the _double sap,_ and is executed by two parties of sappers, working side by side. in this sap it will be necessary to frequently change the direction of the trench, or to throw up traverses, in order to cover the men at a distance from the sap-roller. wing-traverses, on the side of the trench which is least exposed, some times serve the same purpose as a double sap. _mines_.--by _mining_, as a military term, we understand the operations resorted to for the demolition, with powder, of a military structure of any description. the term _mine_ is applied both to the excavation charged with powder for the purpose of producing an explosion, and to the communications which lead to this excavation. the place in which the charge of powder is lodged is called the _chamber_, the communication by which this place is reached the _gallery_, and the excavation made by the explosion is termed the _crater_. the form of the crater caused by an explosion in ordinary soils is assumed to be a truncated cone, the diameter, _c d_, (fig. ,) of the lower circle being one-half the diameter, _a b_, of the upper circle. this form has never been ascertained to be exactly correct, but the theoretical results deduced from a mathematical discussion of this figure have been fully verified in practice. the radius, _p b_, of the upper circle is termed the _crater radius_; the line _o p_, drawn from the centre of the charge perpendicular to the surface where the explosion takes place, is termed the _line of least resistance_; the line _o b_, drawn from the centre of the powder to any point in the circumference of the upper circle, is termed the _radius of explosion_. when the crater radius is equal to the line of least resistance, the mine is termed _common_; when this radius is greater than the line of least resistance, the mine is termed _overcharged_; and when the radius is less, _undercharged_. a mine of small dimensions, formed by sinking a shaft in the ground, is termed a _fougasse_. the term _camouflet_ is applied to a mine used to suffocate the enemy's miner, without producing an explosion. small mines made in rock or masonry, merely for the purpose of excavation, without any considerable external explosion, are called _blasts_. from experiments made on common mines, whose line of least resistance did not exceed fifteen feet, it has been ascertained that the tenacity of the earth is completely destroyed around the crater to a distance equal to the crater radius, and that empty galleries would be broken in at once and a half that distance. it has also been proved by experiment, that the crater radius in overcharged mines may be increased to six times the line of least resistance, but not much beyond this; that within this limit the diameter of the crater increases nearly in the ratio of the square roots of the charge; and that empty galleries may be destroyed by overcharged mines at the distance of four times the line of least resistance. by means of the deductions of physico-mathematical theory, and the results of experiments, rules have been determined by which the miner can calculate, with much accuracy, the charge necessary to produce a required result in any given soil. in the earlier stages of the history of this art, mines were only used to open breaches and demolish masses of masonry; but in later times they have been employed as important elements in the attack and defence of places. an isolated wall, only two or three feet thick, may readily be demolished by exploding one or two casks of powder placed in contact with its base. if the wall be five or six feet thick, the charges should be placed under the foundation. for walls of still greater thickness it will be best to open a gallery to the centre of the wall, a foot or two above its base, and place the powder in chambers thus excavated. revetment walls may be overturned by placing the charges at the back of the wall, about one-third or one-quarter of the way up from the base. if placed too near the base, a breach will be made in the wall without overturning it. to demolish a bridge of masonry the powder should be lodged in chambers excavated in the centre of the piers. when there is not time for excavating these chambers in the piers, a trench may be cut over the key of the arch, in which the powder is placed and exploded; or, the casks of powder may be suspended immediately under the arch, with the same results. where a saving of powder is of consequence, small chambers may be excavated in the haunches of the arch, and the mine carefully _tamped_ before firing it. bridges of wood may be destroyed by suspending casks of powder under the principal timbers, or attaching them to the supports. palisading, gates, doors, &c., may be destroyed in the same way, by suspending casks or bags of powder against their sides; or still more effectually, by burying the charges just beneath their base. to demolish a tower, magazine, or house, of masonry, place charges of powder under the piers and principal walls of the building. in wooden structures the powder should be placed under, or attached to the principal supports. where time is wanting to effect these arrangements, a building may be blown down by placing a large mass of powder in the interior. the powder may be economized, in this case, by putting it in a strong case, which should be connected with the walls of the building on all sides by wooden props. special treatises on military mining contain full instructions for regulating the size and position of the charge for the various cases that may be met with in the practical operations of field-engineering. as applied to the attack and defence of a fortified place, mines are divided into two general classes--_offensive_ and _defensive_ mines. the former are employed by the besiegers to overthrow the scarps and counterscarps of the place, to demolish barriers, palisades, walls, and other temporary means of defence, and to destroy the mines of the besieged. the latter are employed by the opposite party to blow up the besiegers' works of attack, and to defend the passage of ditches against an assault. small mines called _fougasses_ may be employed for the last named object. the _shell-fougasse_ is composed of a wooden box filled with one or more tiers of shells, and buried just below the surface of the earth. sometimes a quantity of powder is placed under the shells, so as to project them into the air previous to their explosion. the _stone fougasse_ is formed by making a funnel-shaped excavation, some five or six feet deep, and placing at the bottom a charge of powder enclosed in a box, and covered with a strong wooden shield; several cubic yards of pebbles, broken stone, or brickbats, are placed against the shield, and earth well rammed round, to prevent the explosion from taking place in the wrong direction. these mines are fired by means of powder hose, or by wires connected with a galvanic battery. the defensive mines employed to blow up the besiegers' works, are generally common mines with the lines of least resistance seldom greater than fifteen feet. all the main galleries and principal branches of mines for a permanent fortification are constructed at the same time with the other portions of the work, leaving only the secondary branches, chambers, &c., to be made during the siege. for the general arrangement of these galleries, and the precautions necessary for their protection from the operations of the besiegers, reference must be made to treatises specially devoted to the discussion of this subject. mines can seldom be employed with advantage in works of slight relief, and liable to an assault. but if judiciously arranged in the plan of their construction, and well managed during the operations of the siege, they contribute very materially to the length of the defence. _attack and defence_.--this subject admits of two natural divisions: st, of intrenchments, and d, of permanent works. i. intrenchments maybe attacked either by _surprise_, or by _open force_. in either case the operations should be based on exact information of the strength of the works and the number and character of the garrison--information that can be obtained from spies, deserters, and prisoners, and confirmed by examinations or reconnaissances made by officers of engineers. by these means a pretty accurate knowledge may be obtained of the natural features of the ground exterior to the works; their weak and strong points; and their interior arrangements for defence. in an attack by surprise, the troops should consist of a storming party and a reserve of picked men. the attacking column is preceded by a company of sappers armed with axes, shovels, picks, crowbars, &c.; bags of powder are also used for blowing down gates, palisades, &c. all the operations must be carried on with the utmost dispatch. the time most favorable for a surprise is an hour or two before day, as at this moment the sentinels are generally less vigilant, and the garrison in a profound sleep; moreover, the subsequent operations, after the first surprise, will be facilitated by the approach of day. under certain circumstances, it may be advisable to make false attacks at the same time with the true one, in order to distract the attention of the garrison from the true point of danger. but false attacks have, in general, the objection of dividing the forces of the assailants as well as of the assailed. in all attacks by surprise, secrecy is the soul of the enterprise. in an open assault, if artillery be employed, the troops should be drawn up in a sheltered position, until the fire of the works is silenced, and breaches effected in the parapet. but if the bayonet alone be resorted to, the troops are immediately brought forward at the beginning of the assault. the attack is begun by a storming party of picked men: they are preceded, as before, by a body of sappers, provided with necessary means for removing obstacles, and followed by a second detachment of engineers, who will widen the passages, and render them more accessible to the main body of troops who now advance to the assistance of the storming party. if the assailants should be arrested at the counterscarp by obstacles which must be removed before any farther progress can be made, the infantry troops of the detachment display and open a fire upon the assailed, in order to divert their fire from the sappers. a few pieces of light artillery, on the flanks of the column, may sometimes be employed for this purpose with great advantage. the storming party should always be provided with scaling-ladders, planks, fascines, &c., for crossing the ditch, and mounting the scarp. if the counterscarp be revetted with masonry, the troops must either descend by ladders, or fill up the ditch with fascines, bales of straw, bundles of wool, &c.: if not revetted, a passage for the troops into the ditch will soon be formed by the shovels of the sappers. when the ditch is gained, shelter is sought in a dead angle till the means are prepared for mounting the scarp, and storming the work. if the scarp be of earth only, the sappers will soon prepare a passage for the escalade; but if revetted with masonry, the walls must be breached with hollow shot, or scaled by means of ladders. in the defence, the strictest vigilance should be at all times exerted to guard against a surprise: sentinels are posted on all the most commanding points of the work; all the avenues of approach are most thoroughly guarded; and patroles are constantly scouring the ground in all directions. at night all these precautions are redoubled. light and fire-balls are thrown out in front of the work to light up the ground, and discover the movements and approach of the enemy. each man should have his particular post assigned to him, and be thoroughly instructed in the duties he will have to perform. all auxiliary arrangements, such as palisades, abattis, &c., should be defended with the utmost obstinacy; the longer the enemy is held in check by these obstacles, the longer will he be exposed to the grape and musketry of the main work. when he assaults the parapet, he will be opposed by the bayonet in front and a well-aimed fire in flank. while in the ditch, or as he mounts the scarp, hollow projectiles, incendiary preparations, stones, logs, &c., will be rolled down upon his head. but when the assaulting column has gained the top of the scarp, the bayonet forms the most effective means of resistance. the measures resorted to in the attack and defence of the larger class of field-works, will necessarily partake much of the nature of the operations employed in the attack and defence of permanent fortifications. ii. the attack and defence of a fortress may be carried on either by a regular siege, or by irregular operations and an assault. the latter plan has sometimes been adopted when the works of the place were weak and improperly defended; where the time and means were wanting for conducting a regular siege; or where the assailants were ignorant of the means proper to be resorted to for the reduction of the fortress. such operations, however, are usually attended by an immense sacrifice of human life, and the general who neglects to employ all the resources of the engineer's art in carrying on a siege, is justly chargeable with the lives of his men. in the siege of cambrai, louis xiv., on the solicitation of du metz, but contrary to the advice of vauban, ordered the demi-lune to be taken by assault, instead of waiting for the result of a regular siege. the assault was made, but it was unsuccessful, and the french sustained great losses. the king now directed vauban to take the demi-lune by regular approaches, which was done in a very short time, and with a loss of _only five men!_ again, at the siege of ypres, the generals advised an assault before the breaches were ready. "you will gain a day by the assault," said vauban, "but you will lose a thousand men." the king directed the regular works to be continued, and the next day the place was taken with but little loss to the besiegers. but a work may be of such a character as to render it unnecessary to resort to all the works of attack which would be required for the reduction of a regular bastioned fort, on a horizontal site. for example: the nature of the ground may be such as to enable the troops to approach to the foot of the glacis, without erecting any works whatever; of course, all the works up to the third parallel may in this case be dispensed with without any violation of the rules of a siege. again, the point of attack may be such that the other parts of the place will not flank the works of approach; here a single line of _boyaux_ and short parallels may be all-sufficient. but for the purpose of discussion, we will here suppose the place besieged to be a regular bastioned work on a horizontal site, (fig. .) the operations of the siege may be divided into three distinct periods. st. the preliminary operations of the attack and defence previous to the opening of the trenches. d. the operations of the two parties from the opening of the trenches to the establishment of the third parallel. d. from the completion of the third parallel to the reduction of the place. _first period._ the object of the _investment of the place_ is to cut off all communication between the work and the exterior, thus preventing it from receiving succors, provisions, and military munitions, and also to facilitate a close reconnoissance of the place by the engineers, who should always accompany the investing corps, and pursue their labors under its protection. this corps should be composed chiefly of light troops--cavalry, light infantry, horse artillery, "brigades of engineers and mounted sappers,"--who march in advance of the besieging army, and, by a sudden movement, surround the work, seize upon all the avenues of approach, and carry off every thing without the work that can be of service either to the garrison or to the besiegers. to effect this object, the enterprise must be conducted with secrecy and dispatch. the investing corps is now distributed around the work in the most favorable positions for cutting off all access to it, and also to prevent any communication with the exterior by detachments from the garrison, and even single individuals are sent out to give intelligence to a succoring army or to reconnoitre the operations of the besieging corps. these posts and sentinels, called the _daily cordon_, are placed some mile or mile and a half from the work, and beyond the reach of the guns. but in the night-time these posts are insufficient to accomplish their object, and consequently as soon as it is dark the troops move up as close to the work as possible without being exposed to the fire of musketry. this arrangement constitutes the _nightly cordon_. by the time the main army arrives the reconnoissance will be sufficiently complete to enable the chief engineer to lay before the general the outline of his plan of attack, so as to establish the position of his depots and camp. these will be placed some two miles from the work, according to the nature of the ground. as they occupy a considerable extent of ground around the work, it will generally be necessary to form intrenchments strong enough to prevent succors of troops, provisions, &c., from being thrown into the place, and also to restrain the excursions of the garrison. the works thrown up between the camp and besieged place are termed the _line of countervallation_, and those on the exterior side of the camp form the _line of circumvallation_. these lines are generally about six hundred yards apart. it is not unusual in modern warfare to dispense with lines of circumvallation, (except a few detached works for covering the parks of the engineers and artillery,) and to hold the succoring army in check by means of an opposing force, called the _army of observation_. the measures of defence resorted to by the garrison will, of course, be subordinate, in some degree, to those of attack. as soon as any danger of an investment is apprehended, the commanding general should collect into the place all the necessary provisions, forage, military munitions, &c., to be found in the surrounding country; all useless persons should be expelled from the garrison; a supply of timber for the works of the engineers and artillery, fascines, gabions, palisades, &c., prepared; all ground within cannon range around the work levelled; hedges and trees cut down; holes filled up; temporary buildings demolished or burnt; and all obstacles capable of covering an enemy and interrupting the fire of the work, removed. during this period the engineer troops and working parties detached from the other arms will be most actively employed. as soon as the investing corps makes its appearance, bodies of light troops are thrown out to cut off reconnoitring parties, and, if possible, to draw the enemy into ambush. to facilitate these exterior operations, and to prevent a surprise, several guns of long range are placed on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes, and others, loaded with grape, in the embrasures of the flanks, so as to sweep the ditches. about one-third of the garrison may be employed in exterior operations, and the other two-thirds in arranging the means of defence in the interior. _second period._--as soon as the engineers have completed their reconnaissances and determined on the front of attack, and all the other preparations are made, the general will direct the opening of the trenches. the ground being previously marked out, battalions of light troops, termed _guards of the trenches_, as soon as it is dark, are placed about thirty yards in front of the first parallel, (a. fig. ,) with smaller sections, and sentinels about the same distance further in advance. these guards lie down, or otherwise conceal themselves from the fire of the work. the engineer troops and detachments of workmen being first marched to the dépôts and supplied with all the necessary tools for carrying on the work, now commence their labors under the protection of these guards. by daybreak the construction of the first parallel, and the trenches connecting it with the dépôts, will be sufficiently advanced to cover the men from the fire of the place; the guards will therefore be withdrawn, and the workmen continue their labors during the day to give the trenches the proper size and form. the _parallels_ are the long lines of trench which envelop the besieged work, and serve both as covered ways for the circulation of the besiegers, and as means of defence against sorties from the garrison; they are therefore arranged with banquettes for musketry fire. the boyaux are trenches run in a zigzag direction along the capitals of the front of attack, and are intended exclusively for the circulation of the troops; they have no banquettes. the first parallel is about six hundred yards from the place, and consequently beyond the reach of grape. it is constructed by the _simple sap_. after the first night, the guards, instead of advancing in front of the work, are placed in the trenches. the second parallel (b) is made some three hundred or three hundred and fifty yards from the place, and being much exposed to grape, the _flying-sap_ is employed in its construction. batteries (h) are established between the first and second parallels to silence the fire of the demi-lunes of the collateral bastions, and others (i) near the second parallel, to enfilade the faces of the front of attack. these are armed in part with mortars and in part with heavy siege-pieces. the works are now gradually pushed forward to the third parallel, (c), which is constructed about sixty yards from the salients of the place. as the operations of the besiegers are here greatly exposed to musketry fire, the trenches are constructed by the _full-sap_. the third parallel, having to contain the guards of the trenches, and being of less development than the two preceding, is made much wider. the second parallel now contains the reserve, and the first parallel becomes the dépôt of materials. _demi-parallels_ (g) are frequently established between the second and third, to be occupied by detachments of guards. the operations of defence during this period are so directed as to harass the workmen in the trenches and retard the advance of the works of attack. garrison pieces of long range and large howitzers are brought forward on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes of attack, so as to fire in ricochet along the capitals on which the boyaux must be pushed: light and fire-balls are thrown out as soon as it becomes dark, to light up the ground occupied by the besiegers, thus exposing them to the fire of the work and to the attacks of the sortie parties. these parties are composed of light troops who charge the guards and compel the workmen to abandon their sapping tools and stand upon the defence. they are most effective when the besiegers commence the second parallel, as the guards in the first parallel are not so immediately at hand to protect the workmen. when the sortie detachment has driven these workmen from the trenches, instead of pursuing them into the first parallel, it will display itself in battle order to cover the engineer troops, (who should always accompany the detachment in this enterprise,) while they fill up the trenches and destroy the implements of the besiegers. when the guards of the trenches appear in force, the detachment will retire in such a way, if possible, as to draw the enemy within range of the grape and musketry of the collateral works. these sorties, if successful, may be frequently repeated, for they tend very much to prolong the siege. the best time for making them is an hour or two before day, when the workmen and guards are fatigued with the labors of the night. while the besiegers are establishing their enfilading batteries, a strong fire of solid shot and shells will be concentrated on the points selected for their construction. the garrison will also labor during this period to put the work into a complete state of defence: constructing all necessary palisadings, traverses, blindages, barriers; and strengthening, if necessary, the covering of the magazines. _third period._--after the completion of the third parallel, the crowning of the covered way may be effected by storm, by regular approaches, or (if the work is secured by defensive mines) by a subterranean warfare. in the first case stone mortar-batteries are established in front of the third parallel, which, on a given signal, will open their fire in concert with all the enfilading and mortar batteries. when this fire has produced its effect in clearing the outworks, picked troops will sally forth and carry the covered way with the bayonet, sheltering themselves behind the traverses until the sappers throw up a trench some four or five yards from the crest of the glacis, high enough to protect the troops from the fire of the besieged. it may afterwards be connected with the third parallel by boyaux. when the covered way is to be crowned by regular approaches, a _double sap_ is pushed forward from the third parallel to within thirty yards of the salient of the covered way; the trench is then extended some fifteen or twenty yards to the right or left, and the earth thrown up high enough to enable the besiegers to obtain a plunging fire into the covered way, and thus prevent the enemy from occupying it. this mound of earth is termed a _trench cavalier_, (o). boyaux are now pushed forward to the crowning of the covered way and the establishing of breach batteries, (j). descents are then constructed into the ditches, and as soon as these batteries have made a breach into the walls of the bastions and outworks, the boyaux are pushed across the ditches and lodgments effected in the breaches. the demi-lune is first carried; next the demi-lune redoubt and bastion; and lastly, the interior retrenchments and citadel. in some cases the breaches are carried by assault, but the same objection is applicable here as in the storming of the covered way; _time is gained, but at an immense expense of human life._ if the place is defended by mines it will be necessary for the besiegers to counteract the effects of these works by resorting to the slow and tedious operations of a subterranean warfare. in this case a fourth trench is formed in front of the third parallel; shafts are sunk in this, about six yards apart, for establishing overcharged mines; as soon as the galleries of the besieged are destroyed by the explosion of these mines, the covered way is attacked by storm; other mines are established on the _terre-plain_ of the covered way to destroy the entrance to the galleries, and thus deprive the besieged of the use of their entire system of mines. the measures of defence during this period must embrace every thing calculated to retard the works of the besiegers. this may be most effectually accomplished by maintaining a constant fire of grape and musketry on the heads of the sap, and throwing grenades, shells, &c., into the trenches, to harass and destroy the workmen. as the musketry fire of the besiegers now becomes very destructive to the artillerists at the guns, strong musket-proof blinds are arranged to mask the mouths of the embrasures when the guns are not in battery, and also sloping blindages to cover the men when serving at the pieces. the possession of the outworks should be disputed inch by inch, and when the besiegers have reached the ditch of the body of the place, sorties, and every species of projectile, should be employed to drive off the sappers, and to retard the construction of their works. in fine, all the resources of the engineer's art should be put in requisition for the defence of the breach, and the final assault should be vigorously resisted by the bayonet, and by a well-sustained fire from all the collateral works. with respect to the relative strength of the opposing forces it may be well to remark, that if the fortress is properly constructed the garrison will be able to resist a besieging army _six times_ as numerous as itself. such is the estimate of the best engineers.[ ] [footnote : a good knowledge of the several subjects discussed in this chapter may be derived from the writings of vauban, cormontaigne, and noizet de st. paul, on the attack and defence of places and field fortification; the several _manuels_ used in the french service on sapping, mining, and pontoniering; col. pasley's experiments on the operations of a siege, sapping, mining, &c.; douglas's work on military bridges; macauley's work on field fortification; and professor mahan's _treatise on field fortification._ this last is undoubtedly the very best work that has ever been written on field fortification, and every officer going into the field should supply himself with a copy. the following are recommended as books of reference on subjects discussed in the three preceding chapters. _mémorial pour la fortification permanente et passagère._ cormontaigne. _défense des places._ cormontaigne. _attaque des places._ cormontaigne. _attaque des places._ vauban. _traité des mines._ vauban. _mémorial pour la castrametation et la fortification passagère._ lafitte-clavé. _exercice sur les fortifications._ davigneau. _mémorial de l'officier du genie._ a periodical of rare merit, containing most valuable military and scientific matter. it is conducted by officers of the french corps of engineers. it has already reached its fourteenth number, each number forming a volume. _traité complet de fortification._ noizet de st. paul. _traité d'art militaire et de la fortification._ gay de vernon. _art de la guerre._ rogniat. _essai général de fortification, &c._ bousmard. _aide-mémoire portatif à l'usage des officiers du génie._ laisné. a very valuable and useful book. _aide-mémoire de l'ingénieur militaire._ grivet. _cours d'art militaire._ laurillard fallot. _cours de fortification, &c._ lavart. _le livre de la guerre._ perrot. _journaux des siéges dans la péninsule._ belmas. _journal of sieges in spain._ john jones. both of the above are works of great value. _cours d'art militaire et de fortification militaire._ françois. _architettura militare._ marchi. _essai sur la fortification._ baltard. _la fortification._ bar-le-duc. _elémens de fortification._ bellaire. _la science des ingénieurs._ bélidor. _l'art universel des fortifications._ bitainvieu. _nouvelle manière de fortifier les places._ blondel. _les sept siéges de lille._ brun lavaine. _défense des places fortes._ carnot. _mémoire sur la fortification._ carnot. _défense de saragosse._ cavallero. _mémoires sur la fortification._ choumara. _nouvelle fortification._ coehorn. _théorie de la fortification._ cugnot. _des fortifications,_ &c. &c. darçon. _relation de la defense de dantzik._ d'artois. _les fortifications._ deville. _péribologie._ dilich. _de la fortification permanente._ dufour. a work of merit. _essai sur la défense des états par les fortifications._ duviviet. _attaque et défense des places du camp de st. omer. _l'école de la fortification._ fallois. _introduction à la fortification._ de fer. _précis de la défense de valenciennes._ ferrand. _traité théorique,_ &c. foissac-latour. _examen detaillé,_ &c. foissac-latour. _les ouvrages militaires de fosse. _instruction sur la fortification,_ &c. gaillard. _mémoires pour l'attaque et défense d'une place._ goulon. _siége of peschiera._ henin. _journal du siége de philisbourg. _précis du siége de dantzick._ kirgener. _deuxième défense de badajos._ lamare. _fortification, et l'attaque et défense des places._ lebloud. _oeuvres de lefebvre. _l'architecture des forteresses._ mandar. _traité sur l'art des siéges._ mazeroy. _la sûreté des états par le moyen des forteresses._ maigret. _défense d'ancone._ mangourit. _fortification._ marolois. _siege de turin._ mengin. _recherches sur l'art défensif,_ &c. michaloz. _la fortification de campagne,_ &c. miller. _l'art défensif,_ &c. montalembert. _journaux des siéges de flandre. _relations des siéges en europe,_ &c, musset-fathay. a very valuable and interesting work. _relation du siége de metz. _relation du siége d'anvers. _les siéges de jaffa et de st. jean d'acre. _les siéges de saragosse et de tortose._ rogniat. _siége de dantzick._ sainte-susanne. _mémoire sur la fortification permanente.--_séa. _le siége de constantine._ _elémens de fortification._ trincano. _des places fortes._ valazé. _essay on military bridges._douglas. a valuable work. _guide du pontonier._ drieu. _mémoire sur la guerre souterraine._ contèle. _traité des mines._ etienne. _traité de l'art du mineur._ geuss. _traité de fortification souterraine._ gillot. _traité pratique et théorique des mines._ lebrun. _nouveau traité des mines,_ &c. prudhomme. _manuel du sapeur._ used in the french service. _manuel du mineur._ " "" _manuel du pontonier. " "" _essay on field fortifications._ pleydell. _elements of field fortifications._ lochee. _rélation du siége de grave et mayence._ _siéges de génes._ thiébault. _traité de fortification souterraine._ mouze. _militairische mittheilungen._ xilander. _die befestigung der statten._ hauser. _abhandlung über die befestigungskunst,_&c. hauser _versuch über die verschanzungskunst._ muller. _course of elementary fortification. _pasley. this is a work of much detail--useful, no doubt, to an uneducated engineer soldier, but to an officer at all acquainted with his profession, it must seem ridiculously minute. to the above list might be added a long list of books on that branch of the engineer's art called _constructions_; but as this part of the profession is, in some degree, common both to the civil and military engineer, it is not deemed necessary to include works of this character in a list of books strictly military.] chapter xv. military education appointment and promotion. with the romans, six years' instruction was required to make a soldier; and so great importance did these ancient conquerors of the world attach to military education and discipline, that the very name of their army was derived from the verb _to practise._ modern nations, learning from experience that military success depends more upon skill and discipline than upon numbers, have generally adopted the same rule as the romans; and nearly all of the european powers have established military schools for the education of their officers and the instruction of their soldiers. france, which has long taken the lead in military science, has six military schools for the instruction of officers, containing in all more than one thousand pupils, and numerous division and regimental schools for the sub-officers and soldiers. prussia maintains some twelve general schools for military education, which contain about three thousand pupils, and also numerous division, brigade, garrison, and company schools for practical instruction. austria has some fifty military schools, which contain in all about four thousand pupils. russia has thirty-five engineer and artillery technical schools, with about two thousand pupils; twenty-five military schools for the noblesse, containing eight thousand seven hundred pupils; _corps d'armee_ schools, with several thousand pupils; regimental schools, with eleven thousand pupils; and brigade-schools, with upwards of one hundred and fifty-six thousand scholars;--making in all about two hundred thousand pupils in her military schools! england has five military schools of instruction for officers, number of pupils not known; a military orphan school, with about twelve thousand pupils; and numerous dépôt and regimental schools of practice. the smaller european powers--belgium, sardinia, naples, spain, portugal, denmark, sweden, wurtemberg, bavaria, baden, have each several military schools, with a large number of pupils. it is seen from these statistics, that the european powers are not so negligent in educating their officers, and in instructing and disciplining their soldiers, as some in this country would have us believe. washington, hamilton, knox, pickering, and others, learning, by their own experience in the war of the american revolution, the great necessity of military education, urged upon our government, as early as , the importance of establishing a military academy in this country, but the subject continued to be postponed from year to year till . in , the subaltern grade of _cadet_ was created by an act of congress, the officers of this grade being attached to their regiments, and "furnished at the public expense with the necessary books, instruments, and apparatus" for their instruction. but this plan of educating young officers at their posts was found impracticable, and in his last annual message, dec. th, , washington urged again, in strong language, the establishment of a military academy, where a regular course of military instruction could be given. "whatever argument," said he, "may be drawn from particular examples, superficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince that the art of war is both comprehensive and complicated; that it demands much previous study; and that the possession of it in its most improved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of a nation." the subject was however postponed from time to time, till march, , when a bill was passed establishing the _military academy_. it was at first on a small scale, and its course of instruction meager and deficient. it gradually became enlarged, but lingered along, with no great improvement, till , when capt. patridge was dismissed from the superintendency, and col. thayer put in charge. from this period we date the commencement of the success and reputation which the military academy has since enjoyed. this institution, as now organized, consists of one cadet from each congressional district, and a few at large, making an average of two hundred and thirty-seven. the course of instruction is four years, after which time the cadet is sent to his regiment or corps, with higher rank if there are vacancies, but if there are no vacancies, he goes as a cadet, with the brevet rank of the next higher grade. the examination for admission to the institution is a very limited one, being confined to the elementary branches of an english education. the annual course at the academy is divided into two distinct periods, the first extending from june till september, and the second from september to the following june. during the first period, the cadets leave their barracks and encamp in tents, and are made subject to the police and discipline of an army in time of war. in addition to the thorough and severe course of practical exercises and drills in the different arms during these three summer months of each year, they are made to perform the same tours of guard-duty, night and day, as is required of the common soldier in time of actual war. this continues till the first of september of each year, when the cadets return to their barracks, and for the remaining nine months devote themselves to the prescribed course of scientific and military studies, intermixed with military exercises and practical operations in the laboratory and on the field. to test the progress of the cadets in their studies, there are held semi-annual public examinations. these examinations are strict and severe, and all who fail to come up to the fixed standard are obliged to withdraw from the institution, to allow some one else from the same district to make the trial. during their course of studies the cadets, as warrant-officers of the army, draw pay barely sufficient to defray their necessary expenses. the allowance to each is twenty-six dollars per month, but none of this is paid to the cadet, but is applied to the purchase of books, fuel, lights, clothing, board, &c. this institution furnishes each year to the army about forty subaltern officers, thoroughly instructed in all the theoretical and practical duties of their profession. after completing this course, the cadet is usually promoted from the grade of warrant-officer to that of a commissioned officer, and is immediately put on duty with his regiment or corps. this system of appointment to the army has produced the most satisfactory results, and has received the commendation of our best military men, and the approbation of all our presidents and most able statesmen. nevertheless, it has occasionally met with strong opposition; this opposition springing in part from a want of proper information respecting the character and working of the system, and in part from the combined efforts of those who from negligence or incapacity have failed to pass their examinations for promotion, and of those who, from a conscious want of qualifications or merit, feel assured that they cannot obtain commissions in the army so long as this system of merit, as fixed by examination, shall exist. hence the effort to destroy the military academy and to throw the army entirely open to _political_ appointment. several legislative bodies, acting under these combined influences, have passed resolutions, giving various objections to the military academy, and recommending that it be abolished. the objections made by the legislatures of tennessee, ohio, connecticut, new hampshire, and maine, are mostly founded on false information, and may be readily answered by reference to the official records of the war-office. but it is not the present object to enter into a general discussion of the charges against that institution, except so far as they are connected with the importance of military education, and the rules of military appointment and promotion. it has been alleged by many of the opponents of the west point academy, that military instruction is of little or no advantage to a general;--that in the wars of napoleon, and in the american revolution, and the american war of , armies were generally led to victory by men without a military education, and unacquainted with military science;--and that in the event of another war in this country, we must seek our generals in the ranks of civil life, rather than among the graduates of our military academy. the objection here made to military education will hold with equal force against education in any other profession. we sometimes find men who have become eminent in the pulpit and at the bar, or in medicine and the sciences, without ever having enjoyed the advantages of an education in academic or collegiate halls, and perhaps even without that preliminary instruction usually deemed necessary for professional pursuits. shall we therefore abolish all our colleges, theological seminaries, schools of law and medicine, our academies and primary schools, and seek for our professional men among the uneducated and the ignorant? if professional ignorance be a recommendation in our generals, why not also in our lawyers and our surgeons? if we deem professional instruction requisite for the care of our individual property and health, shall we require less for guarding the honor and safety of our country, the reputation of our arms, and the lives of thousands of our citizens? but in reality, were not these men to whom we have alluded eminent in their several professions _in spite of,_ rather than _by means of_ their want of a professional education? and have not such men, feeling the disadvantages under which they were forced to labor, been almost without exception the advocates of education in others? but is it true that most of the generals of distinction in the more recent wars were men destitute of military education,--men who rose from the ranks to the pinnacle of military glory, through the combined influence of ignorance of military science and contempt for military instruction? let us glance at the lives of the most distinguished of the generals of the french revolution, for these are the men to whom reference is continually made to prove that the military academy is an unnecessary and useless institution, the best generals being invariably found in the ranks of an army, and _not_ in the ranks of military schools. facts may serve to convince, where reasoning is of no avail. napoleon himself was a pupil of the military schools of brienne and paris, and had all the advantages of the best military and scientific instruction given in france. dessaix was a pupil of the military school of effiat, with all the advantages which wealth and nobility could procure. davoust was a pupil of the military school of auxerre, and a fellow-pupil with napoleon in the military school of paris. kleber was educated at the military school of bavaria. eugene beauharnais was a pupil of st. germain-en-loye, and had for his military instructor the great captain of the age. his whole life was devoted to the military art. berthier and marmont were both sons of officers, and, being early intended for the army, they received military educations. lecourbe had also the advantages of a military education before entering the army. pichegru and duroc were pupils of the military school of brienne. drouet was a pupil of the artillery school. foy was first educated in the college of soissons, and afterwards in the military schools of la fère and chalons. carnot, called the "organizer of french victory," received a good early education, and was also a pupil of the engineer school of mézières. several of the distinguished french generals at first received good scientific and literary educations in the colleges of france, and then acquired their military instruction in the subordinate grades of the army; and by this means, before their promotion to responsible offices, acquired a thorough practical instruction, founded on a basis of a thorough preliminary education. such was suchet, a pupil of the college of lisle-barbe; lannes, a pupil of the college of lectoure; and mortier, who was most carefully educated at cambrai; lefebvré and murat were both educated for the church, though the latter profited but little by his instruction; moreau and joubert were educated for the bar; massena was not a college graduate, but he received a good preliminary education, and for several years before he entered the army as an officer, he had enjoyed all the advantages afforded by leisure and affluent circumstances; ney, though poor, received a good preliminary education, and entered a notary's office to study a profession. hoche was destitute of the advantages of early education, but, anxious to supply this deficiency, he early distinguished himself by his efforts to procure books, and by his extraordinary devotion to military studies. by several years devoted in this way to professional studies and the practical duties of a subordinate grade in the army, hoche acquired a military knowledge which early distinguished him among the generals of the french revolution. soult and gouvion-saint-cyr, being of parents in limited circumstances, had not the advantages of extensive education, but close and diligent application, an ardent ambition, and strong and powerful intellect, combined with long years of service in the practical operations of the field, at length enabled these men to overcome all obstacles, and force their way to the higher walks of their professions. but both knew from experience the advantages of military instruction, and the importance of professional education in the army, and they have consequently both been the warmest friends and strongest advocates of the military schools of france. the polytechnic school was established too late to furnish officers for any of the earlier wars of napoleon; but in his last campaigns he began to reap the advantages of an institution which had been under his fostering care, and bertrand, dode, duponthon, haxo, rogniat, fleury, valazé, gourgaud, chamberry, and a host of other distinguished young generals, fully justified the praises which the emperor lavished on his "_poulet aux oeufs d'or"_--the hen that laid him golden eggs! in our own revolutionary war, generals washington, hamilton, gates, schuyler, knox, alexander, (lord stirling,) the two clintons, the lees, and others, were men of fine education, and a part of them of high literary and scientific attainments; washington, gates, charles lee, the clintons, and some others, had considerable military experience even before the war: nevertheless, so destitute was the army, generally, of military science, that the government was under the necessity of seeking it in foreigners--in the la fayettes, the kosciuskos, the steubens, the de kalbs, the pulaskis, the duportails--who were immediately promoted to the highest ranks in our army. in fact the officers of our scientific corps were then nearly all foreigners. but, say the opponents of the academy, military knowledge and education are not the only requisites for military success; youthful enterprise and efficiency are far more important than a mere acquaintance with military science and the military art: long service in garrison, combined with the indolent habits acquired by officers of a peace-establishment, so deadens the enterprise of the older officers of the army, that it must inevitably result, in case of war, that military energy and efficiency will be derived from the ranks of civil life. we are not disposed to question the importance of youthful energy in the commander of an army, and we readily admit that while seeking to secure to our service a due degree of military knowledge, we should also be very careful not to destroy its influence by loading it down with the dead weights of effete seniority. but we do question the wisdom of the means proposed for supplying our army with this desired efficiency. minds stored with vast funds of professional knowledge, and the rich lore of past history; judgments ripened by long study and experience; with passions extinguished, or at least softened by the mellowing influence of age--these may be best suited for judges and statesmen, for here there is time for deliberation, for the slow and mature judgment of years. but for a general in the field, other qualities are also required. not only is military knowledge requisite for _directing_ the blow, but he must also have the military energy necessary for _striking_ that blow, and the military activity necessary for parrying the attacks of the enemy. a rapid _coup d'oeil_ prompt decision, active movements, are as indispensable as sound judgment; for the general must _see_, and _decide_, and _act_, all in the same instant. accordingly we find that most great generals of ancient and modern times have gained their laurels while still young. philip of macedon ascended the throne at the age of twenty-two, and soon distinguished himself in his wars with the neighboring states. at the age of forty-five he had conquered all greece. he died at forty-seven. alexander the great had defeated the celebrated theban band at the battle of cheronea, and gained a military reputation at the age of eighteen. he ascended the throne of his father philip before twenty, and at twenty-five had reached the zenith of his military glory, having already conquered the world. he died before the age of thirty-two. julius caesar commanded the fleet sent to blockade mitylene, where he greatly distinguished himself before the age of twenty-two. he soon after held the important offices of tribune, quæstor, and edile. he had completed his first war in spain, and was made consul at rome before the age of forty. he twice crossed the rhine, and conquered all gaul, and had twice passed over to britain, before the age of forty-five; at fifty-two he had won the field of pharsalia, and attained the supreme power. he died in the fifty-sixth year of his age, the victor of five hundred battles, and the conqueror of a thousand cities. hannibal joined the carthaginian army in spain at twenty-two, and was made commander-in-chief at twenty-six. victorious in spain and france, he crossed the alps and won the battle of cannæ before the age of thirty-one. scipio africanus, (the elder,) at the age of sixteen distinguished himself at the battle of ticinus; at twenty was made edile, and soon after pro-consul in spain; at twenty-nine he won the great battle of zama, and closed his military career. scipio africanus (the younger) also distinguished himself in early life; at the age of thirty six he had conquered the carthaginian armies and completed the destruction of carthage. gengis-khan succeeded to the domain of his father at the age of thirteen, and almost immediately raised an army of thirty thousand men, with which he defeated a numerous force of rebels, who had thought to take advantage of his extreme youth to withdraw from his dominion. he soon acquired a military reputation by numerous conquests, and before the age of forty had made himself emperor of mogul. charlemagne was crowned king at twenty-six, conquered aquitania at twenty-eight, made himself master of france and the greater part of germany at twenty-nine, placed on his brows the iron crown of italy at thirty-two, and conquered spain at thirty-six. gonsalvo de cordova, the "great captain," entered the army at fifteen, and before the age of seventeen had acquired a brilliant military reputation, and was knighted by the king himself on the field of battle; at forty-one he was promoted over the heads of older veterans and made commander-in-chief of the army in italy. henry iv. of france was placed at the head of the huguenot army at the age of sixteen, at nineteen he became king of navarre; at forty he had overthrown all his enemies, placed himself on the throne of france, and become the founder of a new dynasty. montecuculi, at the age of thirty-one, with two thousand horse, attacked ten thousand swedes and captured all their baggage and artillery; at thirty-two he gained the victory of triebel, at forty-nine defeated the swedes and saved denmark, and at fifty-three defeated the turks at the great battle of st. gothard. in his campaigns against the french at a later age, he made it his chief merit, "not that he conquered, but that he was not conquered." saxe entered the army at the early age of twelve, and soon obtained the command of a regiment of horse; at twenty-four he became _maréchal-de-camp_, at forty-four marshal of france, and at forty-nine gained the celebrated victory of fontenoy. he died at the age of fifty-four. vauban entered the army of condé as a cadet at the age of seventeen, at twenty was made a lieutenant, at twenty-four he commanded two companies, at forty-one was a brigadier, at forty-three a _maréchal-de-camp_, and at forty-five commissaire-général of all the fortifications of france. at the age of twenty-five he had himself conducted several sieges, and had assisted at many others. turenne entered the army before the age of fourteen; he served one year as a volunteer, four years as a captain, four years as a colonel, three years as a major-general, five years as a lieutenant-general, and became a marshal of france at thirty-two. he had won all his military reputation by the age of forty. prince maurice commanded an army at the age of sixteen, and acquired his military reputation in very early life. he died at fifty-eight. the great condé immortalized his name at the battle of rocroi, in which, at the age of twenty-two, he defeated the spaniards. he had won all his great military fame before the age of twenty-five. prince eugene of savoy was a colonel at twenty-one, a lieutenant-field-marshal at twenty-four, and soon after, a general-field-marshal. he gained the battle of zenta at thirty-four, and of blenheim at forty-one. at the opening of the war of , he again appeared at the head of the army at the advanced age of sixty-nine, but having lost the vigor and fire of youth, he effected nothing of importance. peter the great of russia was proclaimed czar at ten years of age; at twenty he organized a large army and built several ships; at twenty-four he fought the turks and captured asoph; at twenty-eight he made war with sweden; at thirty he entered moscow in triumph after the victory of embach, and the capture of noteburg and marienburg; at thirty-one he began the city of st. petersburg; at thirty-nine he was defeated by the turks and forced to ransom himself and army. his latter years were mostly devoted to civil and maritime affairs. he died at the age of fifty-five. charles the xii. of sweden ascended the throne at the age of fifteen, completed his first successful campaign against denmark at eighteen, overthrew eighty thousand russians at narva before nineteen, conquered poland and saxony at twenty-four, and died at thirty-six. frederick the great of prussia ascended the throne at twenty-eight, and almost immediately entered on that career of military glory which has immortalized his name. he established his reputation in the first silesian war, which he terminated at the age of thirty. the second silesian war was terminated at thirty-three; and at forty-three, with a population of five millions, he successfully opposed a league of more than one hundred millions of people. prince henry of prussia served his first campaign as colonel of a regiment at sixteen; at the age of thirty-one he decided the victory of prague, and the same year was promoted to the command of a separate army. the military reputation he acquired in the seven years' war was second only to that of frederick. cortes had effected the conquest of mexico, and completed his military career, at the age of thirty-six. sandoval, the most eminent of his great captains, died at the age of thirty-one. he had earned his great renown, and closed his military achievements, before the age of twenty-five. pizarro completed the conquest of peru at thirty-five, and died about forty. lord clive began his military career at twenty-two, and had reached the zenith of his military fame at thirty-five; he was raised to the peerage at thirty-six, and died at fifty. hastings began his military service at about twenty-five, and became governor of bengal at forty. napoleon was made a lieutenant at seventeen, a captain at twenty, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, and commander-in-chief of the army of italy at twenty-six. all his most distinguished generals were, like him, young men, and they seconded him in his several campaigns with all the energy and activity of youthful valor and enthusiasm. dessaix entered the army at fifteen; at the opening of the war he quickly passed through the lower grades, and became a general of brigade before the age of twenty-five, and a general of division at twenty-six; he died before the age of thirty-two, with a reputation second only to that of napoleon. kleber did not enter the army till later in life, but he quickly passed through the subordinate grades, and was made a general of brigade at thirty-eight, a general of division at forty, and general-in-chief of an army at forty-one: he died at forty-six. on his death, and in napoleon's absence, ménau, aged and inefficient, succeeded by right of seniority to the command of the army of egypt. its utter ruin was the almost immediate consequence. massena first entered the army at seventeen, but soon married a rich wife, and retired to civil life. he returned to the army at the opening of the revolution, and in two years, before the age of thirty-five, was promoted to the rank of general of division. he immediately acquired that high reputation which he sustained through a long career of military glory. soult became a sub-lieutenant at twenty-two, a captain at twenty-four; the following year he passed through the several grades of _chef-de-bataillon_, colonel, and general of brigade, and became general of division at twenty-nine. davoust was a sub-lieutenant at seventeen, a general of brigade at twenty-three, and general of division at twenty-five. eugene beauharnais entered the army at a very early age. he became _chef-de-bataillon_ at nineteen, colonel at twenty-one, general of brigade at twenty-three, and viceroy of italy at twenty-five. he soon proved himself one of napoleon's ablest generals. at twenty-eight he commanded the army of italy, and at thirty-one gained great glory in the russian campaign, at the head of the fourth _corps d'armée._ gouvion-saint-cyr enured the army at the beginning of the revolution, and passing rapidly through the lower grades, became a general of brigade at twenty-nine, and a general of division at thirty. suchet became a _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty, general of brigade at twenty-five, major-general of brune's army at twenty-seven, and general of division and of a _corps d'armée_ at twenty-eight. oudinot became a captain at twenty-three, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, and general of division at twenty-eight. ney was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-six, general of brigade at twenty-seven, and general of division at twenty-nine. lannes was a colonel at twenty-seven, general of brigade at twenty-eight, and very soon after general of division. joubert became adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of brigade at twenty-six, general of division at twenty-eight, and general-in-chief of the army of italy at twenty-nine. he died at thirty. victor was a _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-seven, general of brigade at twenty-nine, and general of division at thirty-two. murat was a lieutenant at twenty, and passing rapidly through the lower grades, he became a general of brigade at twenty-five, and a general of division at twenty-seven. mortier was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of brigade at thirty, and general of division at thirty-one. macdonald was a colonel at twenty-seven, a general of brigade at twenty-seven, and a general of division at thirty. marmont was a captain at twenty-one, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-two, general of brigade at twenty-four, inspector general at twenty-seven, and general-in-chief of an army at thirty-two. bernadotte was a colonel at twenty-eight, general of brigade at twenty-nine, and general of division at thirty. lefebvre was made a captain at the organization of the army in ; he became a general of brigade at thirty-eight, and general of division at thirty-nine. bessières entered the army at twenty-six, became a colonel at thirty, general of brigade at thirty-two, and general of division at thirty-four. he died at forty-seven. duroc was a captain at twenty-three, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-six, colonel and _chef-de-brigade_ at twenty-seven, and general of division at thirty. he died at forty-one. this list might be still further extended with the same results, but names enough have been given to show that the generals who assisted napoleon in his immortal campaigns were all, with scarcely an exception, _young men_, still burning with the fires of youthful ardor and enthusiasm. the grade of marshal was not created till after napoleon became emperor. on ascending the throne of the empire, he nominated to this rank eighteen of the most distinguished generals of france. some of these were generals of the earlier wars of the revolution, and had never served under him. others were younger men, several being only thirty-four, thirty-five, and thirty-six years of age. the mean age of all was forty-four. he afterwards made seven more marshals, whose mean age was forty-three. these appointments, however, were regarded as rewards for _past_ services, rather than as a grade from which service was expected, for several of the older marshals were never called into the field after their promotion. having noticed the ages of the principal generals who commanded in the armies of napoleon, let us look for a moment at those who opposed him. in the campaign of the enemy's forces were directed by beaulieu, then nearly eighty years of age; wurmser, also an octogenarian, and alvinzi, then over seventy: these had all three distinguished themselves in earlier life, but had now lost that youthful energy and activity so essential for a military commander. in the campaign of the general-in-chief of the austrian forces was melas, an old general, who had served some fifty years in the army; he had distinguished himself so long ago as the seven years' war, but he had now become timid and inefficient, age having destroyed his energy. in the campaign of the french were opposed by kutusof, then sixty, and mack, then fifty-three; the plan of operations was drawn up by still more aged generals of the aulic council. in the campaign of the french were opposed by the duke of brunswick, then seventy-one, hohenlohe, then sixty, and mollendorf, kleist, and massenbach, old generals, who had served under the great frederick,--men, says jomini, "exhumed from the seven years' war,"--"whose faculties were frozen by age,"--"who had been buried for the last ten years in a lethargic sleep." in the campaign of the french were opposed by kamenski, then eighty years of age, benningsen, then sixty, and buxhowden, then fifty-six. the allies now began to profit by their experience, and in the austrian army was led by the young, active, skilful, and energetic archduke charles; and this campaign, although the commander-in-chief was somewhat fettered by the foolish projects of the old generals of the aulic council, and thwarted by the disobedience of his brother, was nevertheless the most glorious in the austrian annals of the wars of the revolution. at the opening of the campaign of the emperor alexander, young, (only thirty-five,) active, intelligent, and ambitious, had remodelled his army, and infused into it his own energy and enthusiastic love of glory. he was himself at its head, and directed its operations. kutusof was for a short time the nominal commander-in-chief, and exhibited an activity unusual at his age, but he was surrounded by younger generals--barclay-de-tolley, and miloradowich, then forty-nine, wintzengerode, then forty-three, schouvalof, then thirty-five, and the archduke constantine, then thirty-three,--generals who, at the heads of their corps, and under the young emperor and his able staff of young officers, in the two succeeding campaigns, rolled back the waves of french conquest, and finally overthrew the french empire. wellington, who led the english in these campaigns, was of the same age as napoleon, and had been educated at the same time with him in the military schools of france. the austrians were led by schwartzenburg, then only about thirty, and the prussians by yorck, bulow, and blücher. the last of these was then well advanced in life, but all his movements being directed by younger men,--scharnhorst and gneisenau,--his operations partook of the energy of his able chiefs of staff. in the campaign of , napoleon was opposed by the combinations of wellington and gneisenau, both younger men than most of his own generals, who, it is well known, exhibited, in this campaign, less than in former ones, the ardent energy and restless activity which had characterized their younger days. never were napoleon's, plans better conceived, never did his troops fight with greater bravery; but the dilatory movements of his generals enabled his active enemies to parry the blow intended for their destruction. in the american war of , we pursued the same course as austria, prussia, and russia, in their earlier contests with napoleon, _i.e._, to supply our armies with generals, we dug up the beaulieus, the wurmsers, the alvinzis, the melases, the macks, the brunswicks, and the kamenskis of our revolutionary war; but after we had suffered sufficiently from the hulls, the armstrongs, the winchesters, the dearborns, the wilkinsons, the hamptons, and other veterans of the revolution, we also changed our policy, and permitted younger men--the jacksons, the harrisons, the browns, the mcreas, the scotts,[ ] the ripleys, the woods, the mccombs, the wools, and the millers--to lead our forces to victory and to glory. in the event of another war, with any nation capable of opposing to us any thing like a powerful resistance, shall we again exhume the veterans of former days, and again place at the head of our armies respectable and aged inefficiency; or shall we seek out youthful enterprise and activity combined with military science and instruction? the results of the war, the honor of the country, the glory of our arms, depend, in a great measure, upon the answer that will be given to this question. [footnote : scott had acquired his military reputation, and attained the rank of major-general at twenty-eight.] but it may be asked, how are we to secure this combination of military instruction and military energy; how are we to fill the higher grades of our army with young and active men possessing due military instruction and talent? the question is not a difficult one, and our government can easily attain the desired object, if it will only set at work honestly, disregarding all party prejudices and the mercenary and selfish interests of its own members and advisers. other governments have pointed out to us the way. it is this: let _merit_ be the main test for all appointments and promotions in the army. let one or more of the subordinate grades be thrown open to the youth of the whole country, without distinction as to birth, or wealth, or politics; let them be kept on probation in this subordinate grade, and be thoroughly instructed in all that relates to the military profession; after strict examination let them be promoted to the vacancies in the higher grades as rapidly as they shall show themselves qualified for the duties of those grades, merit and services being here as elsewhere the only tests. the first part of this rule is already accomplished by the military academy. one young man is selected from each congressional district, on an average, once in about two years, the selection being made by the representative of the district; these young men are made warrant officers in the army, and sent to a military post for instruction; frequent and strict examinations are instituted to determine their capacity and fitness for military service; after a probation of a certain length of time, the _best_ are selected for commission in the army, relative rank and appointments to corps being made strictly with reference to merit; birth, wealth, influence of political friends--all extraneous circumstances being excluded from consideration. what can be more truly and thoroughly democratic than this? what scheme can be better devised to supply our army with good officers, and to exclude from the military establishment the corrupting influence of party politics, and to prevent commissions in the army from being given to "the sons of wealthy and influential men, to the almost total exclusion of the sons of the poor and less influential men, regardless alike of qualifications and of merit?" unfortunately for the army and for the country this system ends here, and all further advancement is made by mere seniority, or by executive favoritism, the claims of merit having but little or no further influence. indeed, executive patronage is not infrequently permitted to encroach even upon these salutary rules of appointment, and to place relatives and political friends into the higher ranks of commissioned officers directly from civil life, "regardless alike of qualifications and of merit," while numbers "of sons of the poor and less influential men," who have served a probation of four or five years in military studies and exercises, and have proved themselves, in some thirty examinations made by competent boards of military officers, to be most eminently qualified for commissions, are passed by in utter neglect! our army is much more open to this kind of favoritism and political partiality, than that of almost any of the governments of europe, which we have been accustomed to regard as aristocratic and wholly unfriendly to real merit. in the prussian service, in time of peace, the government can appoint no one, even to the subordinate grade of ensign, till he has followed the courses of instruction of the division or brigade-school of his arm, and has passed a satisfactory examination. and, "no ensign can be promoted to a higher grade till after his promotion has been agreed to by the superior board or commission of examiners at berlin, and his name has been placed on the list of those whose knowledge and acquirements (_connaissances_) render them qualified (_aptes_) for the responsible duties of their profession. the nomination to the grade of second-lieutenant is not, even after all these conditions are fulfilled, left to the choice of the government. when a vacancy occurs in this grade, the subaltern officers present to the commandant of the regiment a list of three ensigns who have completed their course of study; the commandant, after taking the advice of the superior officers of the regiment, nominates the most meritorious of these three to the king, who makes the appointment." the government can appoint to the engineers and artillery only those who have been instructed as _élèves_ in the berlin school of cadets and the school of artillery and engineers, and these appointments must be made in the order in which the pupils have passed their final examination. in these corps the lieutenants and second captains can be promoted to a higher grade only after they have passed a satisfactory examination. no political influence, nor even royal partiality, can interfere with this rule. even in the arbitrary monarchies of austria and russia it is deemed necessary to subject all military appointments and promotions, in the peace establishments, to certain fixed rules. in the austrian army all sub-lieutenants must be taken from the military schools, or the specially-instructed corps of cadets and imperial guards; from this grade to that of captain all promotions are made by the commandants of regiments and corps on the advice of the other superior officers. above the grade of captain all nominations for promotion are made to the emperor by the aulic council, in the order of seniority of rank, except the claims of superior merit interfere. "in the russian army," says haillot, "no one, not even a prince of the imperial family, can reach the grade of officer till he has satisfactorily passed his several examinations, or finished the severe novitiate to which the cadets in the corps are subjected." promotion below the grade of colonel is made partly by seniority, and partly by merit; above that grade, by selection alone. in the british service, rank in the line of the army is obtained by purchase, and the higher grades are in this way filled with young men of energy and enterprise; but this efficiency is gained by injustice to the poor man, who is without the means of purchasing rank. in some respects it is preferable to our ruinous system of exclusive seniority and executive favoritism, but far more objectionable than that based on merit. wellington has recently said that the system of exclusive seniority would soon utterly destroy the efficiency of the army, by preventing young men from reaching the higher grades. "at first," says an officer of some distinction in the british navy, in speaking of promotions in that arm of service, "it certainly looks very hard to see old stagers grumbling away their existence in disappointed hopes; yet there can be little doubt that the navy, and, of course, the country at large, are essentially better served by the present system of employing active, young, and cheerful-minded officers, than they ever could be by any imaginable system by seniority. it must not be forgotten, indeed, that at a certain stage of the profession, the arrangement by which officers are promoted in turn is already made the rule, and has long been so: but, by a wise regulation, it does not come into operation before the rank of post-captain be attained. antecedent to this point, there must occur ample opportunities of weeding out those persons, who, if the rule of mere seniority were adopted, would exceedingly embarrass the navy list." we fully agree with this writer respecting the evils of a system of exclusive seniority, but not respecting the best means of remedying these evils. in england, where the wealthy and aristocratic classes govern the state, they may very well prefer a system of military appointment and promotion based exclusively on wealth and political influence; but in this country we are taught to consider _merit_ as a claim much higher than wealth, or rank, or privilege. the various changes in the rules of appointment and promotion in the french service, and the various results of these changes, both on the character of the army and the welfare of the state, are so instructive that we regret that our limits will not allow us to enter into a full discussion of them. we can give only a very brief outline. previous to the revolution, military appointment and promotion were wholly subject to the rules of nobility, certain grades in the army belonging of right to certain grades of the _noblesse_; merit and service being excluded from consideration. but the constituent assembly changed this order of things, and established the rule that three-fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by selection, _after a concours_, and the other quarter be appointed from the sub-officers, alternately by seniority and selection, without _concours_; the captains and lieutenants by seniority; the colonels and lieutenant-colonels two-thirds by seniority and one-third by selection; _maréchaux-de-camp_ and lieutenant-generals one-half by seniority and one-half by selection. in the grades were still further opened to selection, and in the turbulent times that followed, a part of them were even thrown open to election by the soldiers. but in the combined system of merit and seniority, with certain improvements, was restored. in and the wars that followed, _merit_ was the only qualification required, and bonaparte, moreau, and other young generals were actually placed in command of their seniors in rank. military talent and military services, not rank, were the recognised claims for promotion, the _baptism of blood_, as it was called, having equalized all grades. bonaparte, in leaving egypt, paid no attention to seniority of rank, but gave the command to kleber, who was then only a general of brigade, while menou was a general of division. everybody knows that on the death of kleber, general menou succeeded in the command; and that egypt, saved by the _selection_ of kleber, was lost by the _seniority_ of menou. napoleon formed rules for promotion, both for peace and war, based on merit. his peace regulations were much the same as the system of ; his field regulations, however, from the circumstances of the times, were almost the only ones used. the following extract from the _reglement de campagne_ of , (title xx.,) gives the spirit of this system:--"the next day after an action the generals of brigade will present to the generals of division the names of all such as have distinguished themselves in a particular manner; the generals of division will immediately report these to the commander-in-chief, and also the names of the generals and superior officers whose conduct has contributed most to secure success, so that the general-in-chief may immediately inform his majesty." on the restoration of the bourbons there were also restored many of the ancient privileges and claims of rank by the officers of the _maison militaire du roi,_ and court favoritism was substituted for merit and service. but the revolution of produced a different order of things. "the laws now regulate military promotion; the king can appoint or promote only in conformity to legal prescriptions; and even in the exercise of this prerogative, he is wise enough to restrain himself by certain fixed rules, which protect him from intrigues, and from the obsessions of persons of influence, and of party politicians." would that the same could always be said of the executive of this country in making appointments and promotions in the army. the existing laws and regulations of the french service differ slightly for different corps, but the general rule is as follows: no one can be appointed to the grade of officer in the army who has not graduated at one of the military schools, or has not served at least two years as a sub-officer in a _corps d'armée_. in time of peace, no one can be promoted to the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, (_chef-d'escadron_ and _chef-de-bataillon_,) till he has served two years in the next lower grade; no one can be made lieutenant-colonel till he has served four years, nor be made colonel till he has served three years, in the next lower grade; no one can be made _maréchal-de-camp_, lieutenant-general, or marshal of france, till he has served two years in the next lower grade. these numbers are all diminished one half in time of war. for the grades of first-lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of the promotions are by seniority, and one-third by selection; for the _chef-de-bataillon_ and _chef-d'escadron_, one-half by seniority and one-half by selection; for all the other grades by selection only. in time of war, one-half of the promotions to the grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by selection, and all the promotions to other grades in this way. for promotion by selection, a list of the authorized candidates for each grade is made out every year by inspectors, and boards of examiners appointed _ad hoc_, and the name, qualifications, and particular claim are given of each officer admitted to the _concours_. the recommendations of these inspectors and examiners are almost invariably followed by the government in its selections. this combined system of seniority and merit secures a gradual promotion to all, and at the same time enables officers of great talents and acquirements to attain the higher grades while still young and efficient. merit need not, therefore, always linger in the subaltern grades, and be held subordinate to ignorance and stupidity, merely because they happen to be endowed with the privileges of seniority. moreover, government is precluded from thrusting its own favorites into the higher grades, and placing them over the heads of abler and better men. if such a system of appointment were introduced into our army, and fixed by legal enactments, and no one were allowed to receive a commission till he had either distinguished himself in the field, or had passed an examination before a board of competent officers, we are confident that better selections would be made in the appointments from civil life than have been within the last ten years by the present system of political influence. it would scarcely be possible to make worse selections.[ ] and if the combined system of seniority and examination were pursued in promoting the subalterns already in service, it certainly would produce less injustice, and give greater efficiency to the army, than the present one of exclusive seniority and brevet rank, obtained through intrigue and political influence, or high military appointments bestowed as a reward for dirty and corrupt party services. as a military maxim, _secure efficiency, by limiting the privileges of rank; exclude favoritism, by giving the power of selection to boards of competent officers, totally independent of party politics_. such a system has been for some time pursued in the medical department of our army; it has produced the most satisfactory results; stupidity, ignorance, and aged inefficiency have been _overslaughed_, and will soon entirely disappear from that corps; they have been replaced by young men of activity, talent, character, intelligence, and great professional skill. is it less important to have competent military officers to command where the lives of thousands, the honor of our flag, the safety of the country depend upon their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competent surgeons to attend the sick and the wounded? [footnote : to show the working of this system of political appointments, we would call attention to a single fact. on the formation of an additional regiment of dragoons in , _thirty_ of its officers were appointed from civil life, and only _four_ from the graduates of the military academy. of those appointed to that regiment from civil life, _twenty-two_ have already been dismissed or resigned, (most of the latter to save themselves from being dismissed,) and only _eight_ of the whole _thirty_ political appointments are now left, their places having been mainly supplied by graduates of the military academy. in case of another increase of our military establishment, what course will our government pursue? will it again pass by the meritorious young officers of our army,--graduates of the military academy,--who have spent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifying themselves for the higher duties of their profession, and place over their heads civilians of less education and inferior character--men totally ignorant of military duties, mere pothouse politicians, and the base hirelings of party,--those who screech the loudest in favor of party measures, and degrade themselves the most in order to serve party ends?--and by thus devoting the army, like the custom-house and post-office, to political purposes, will it seek to increase that vast patronage of the executive which is already debasing individual morality, and destroying the national character? should any administration of the government be so unmindful of the interests and honor of the country as to again pursue such a course, it is to be hoped that the sword of political justice will not long slumber in its scabbard.] we wish to call particular attention to this subject. it deserves attention at all times, but at the present moment it more especially demands a close and candid consideration. the higher grades of our peace establishment are now filled with men so far advanced in life that, in case of an increase of the army, many of them must undoubtedly be either passed over, or put on a retired list. sooner or later some change of this kind will undoubtedly be made. it is demanded by the good of service, even in time of peace; and in time of war, it will be absolutely necessary to the success of our arms.[ ] but the great danger is that the change may be made for the worse--that all the appointments and promotions to the higher grades will be made through political influence, thus converting the army and navy into political engines. let proper measures be taken to prevent so dangerous a result; let executive patronage in the army be limited by wholesome laws, like those in france and prussia; and let military merit and services, as determined by boards of competent military officers, be the only recognised claims to appointment and promotion, thus giving to the poor and meritorious at least an equal chance with the man of wealth and the base hireling of party. in actual service the system of exclusive seniority cannot exist; it would deaden and paralyze all our energies. taking advantage of this, politicians will drive us to the opposite extreme, unless the executive authority be limited by wholesome laws, based on the just principles of _merit_ and _service_. [footnote : even at the present moment, in ordering troops to texas, where immediate and active service is anticipated, it is found necessary to break up regiments and send only the young and efficient officers into the field, leaving most of the higher officers behind with mere nominal commands. very many of the officers now in texas are acting in capacities far above their nominal grades, but without receiving the rank, pay, and emoluments due to their services.] but the importance of maintaining in our military organization a suitable system of military instruction is not confined to the exigencies of our actual condition. it mainly rests upon the absolute necessity of having in the country a body of men who shall devote themselves to the cultivation of military science, so as to be able to compete with the military science of the transatlantic powers. it is not to be expected that our citizen soldiery, however intelligent, patriotic, and brave they may be, can make any very great progress in military studies. they have neither the time nor opportunities for such pursuits, and if they can acquire a practical acquaintance with elementary tactics--the mere alphabet of the military art--it is as much as can reasonably be expected of them. as a general rule, the militia are individually more capable and intelligent than the men who compose a regular army. but they must of necessity be inferior in practical professional knowledge. technical education is necessary in every pursuit of life. it is possible that the lawyer may succeed in some particular cases without a knowledge of law, but he will probably have few clients if he remain ignorant of the laws and precedents that govern the courts. the unlearned chemist may succeed in performing some single experiment, but his progress will be slow and uncertain if he neglect to make himself familiar with the experiments and discoveries of his predecessors. learning, when applied to agriculture, raises it from a mere mechanical drudgery to the dignity of a science. by analyzing the composition of the soil we cultivate, we learn its capacity for improvement, and gain the power to stimulate the earth to the most bountiful production. how different the results attending the labors of the intelligent agriculturist, guided by the lamp of learning, from those of the ignorant drudge who follows the barren formula of traditional precepts! as applied to manufactures and the mechanical arts, learning develops new powers of labor, and new facilities for subsistence and enjoyment. personal comforts of every kind are greatly increased, and placed within the reach of the humbler classes; while at the same time the "appliances of art are made to minister to the demands of elegant taste, and a higher moral culture." as applied to commerce, it not only greatly increases the facilities for the more general diffusion of civilization and knowledge, but is also vastly influential in harmonizing the conflicting interests of nations. nor is learning less humanizing and pacific in its influence when applied to the military art. "during the dark ages which followed the wreck of the roman power, the military science by which that power had been reared, was lost with other branches of learning. when learning revived, the military art revived with it, and contributed not a little to the restoration of the empire of mind over that of brute force. then, too, every great discovery in the art of war has a life-saving and peace-promoting influence. the effects of the invention of gunpowder are a familiar proof of this remark; and the same principle applies to the discoveries of modern times. by perfecting ourselves in military science, paradoxical as it may seem, we are therefore assisting in the diffusion of peace, and hastening on the approach of that period when swords shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks." appendix. since the first edition of this work was published, two important wars have been commenced and terminated--that between the united states and the republic of mexico, and that between russia and the western powers of europe--and another is now being waged between france and austria, upon the old battle fields of northern italy. in issuing a new edition of these elements of military art and science, it is deemed proper to refer to these wars, and to apply the principles here discussed to the military operations carried on in mexico and in the crimea. it is proposed to do this in the form of notes to the several chapters. the war in italy being still undetermined, and the details of the several battles which have already been fought being but imperfectly known, it is obviously improper to attempt to criticize their strategic character or tactical arrangement. h.w.h. new york, _july_, . note to chapter ii.--strategy. in the invasion of mexico, the united states formed four separate armies, moving on _four distinct lines of operation:_ st. the "army of the west," under general kearny, moving from st. louis on new mexico and california; d. the "army of the centre," under general wool, moving from san antonio de bexar on chihuahua; d. the "army of occupation," on the rio grande, under general taylor, moving from corpus christi on matamoras, monterey, and saltillo; and th. the "main army," under general scott, moving from vera cruz on the capital of mexico. the army of the west, under general kearny, moved upon a separate and distinct line of operations, having no strategic relations to the other three; its objects were the conquest and occupation of new mexico and upper california. the first was readily accomplished; but the general then detached so large a force to operate on chihuahua after the diversion of wool's column, that his expedition to california must have utterly failed without the assistance of the naval forces in the pacific. the lines of taylor and wool were evidently ill chosen, being so distant as to afford the enemy an opportunity to take a central position between them. fortunately wool proceeded no further than monclova, and then turned off to occupy parras, thus coming under the immediate command of general taylor. the latter fought the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma, and sustained the siege of fort brown; then crossing the rio grande at matamoras, he captured monterey, and, forming a junction with wool, defeated the army of santa anna at buena vista. this battle ended the campaign, which, however brilliantly conducted, was entirely without strategic results. scott landed his army near the island of sacrificios without opposition, and immediately invested vera cruz, which surrendered after a short siege and bombardment. having thus secured his base, he immediately advanced to the city of puebla, meeting and defeating the army of santa anna at cerro gordo. remaining some time at puebla to reinforce his army, he advanced into the valley of mexico, and after the brilliant victories of contreras, churubusco, molino del rey, and chapultepec, captured the city and terminated the war. with respect to the double line of operations of taylor and scott it may be sufficient to remark, that santa anna, from his central position, fought, with the same troops, the battles of buena vista and cerro gordo. it should also be remarked, that the line of operations of the army of the rio grande was not approved by either scott or taylor, nor, it is believed, by any other officer of our army. scott's line of operations, however, was truly strategic, and in turning the mexican flank by lake chalco and the pedregal, he exhibited the skill of a great general. the war in the crimea, from the limited extent of the theatre of operations, afforded but little opportunity for the display of strategic skill on either side. nevertheless, the movements of both parties, prior to the investment and siege of sebastopol, are fair subjects for military criticism with respect to the plans of operation. when the allies landed their troops at the old fort, three plans were open for the consideration of the russian general: st. to destroy or close the harbors of balaklava, kamiesch, kazatch and strelitzka, and, garrisoning sebastopol with a strong force, to occupy with the rest of his army the strong plateau south of the city, and thus force the allies to besiege the strong works on the north. d. having closed the harbors on the south, and secured sebastopol from being carried by the assault of any detachment of the allies, to operate on their left flank, annoying and harassing them with his cossacks, and thus delay them many days in the difficult and precarious position which they would have occupied. d. to advance with his whole force and offer them battle at the alma. the last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted, and as the garrison of sebastopol, during the battle, consisted of only four battalions and the sailors of the fleet, it might, considering the weakness of its works, have been easily carried by a detachment of the allied forces. for the allies at the alma two plans presented themselves: st. to turn the russian left, cut him off from sebastopol, and occupy that city in force. d. to turn the russian right, and, throwing him back upon sebastopol, cut him off from all external succor. neither plan was fully carried out. the column of general bosquet turned the russian left and decided his retreat; but no strategic advantage was taken of the victory. the battle was fought on the th of september, and by noon of the th the allies had only advanced to the balbeck, a distance of a little more than ten miles in six days! on the th they regained their communication with the fleet at balaklava, without attempting to occupy sebastopol, and having exposed themselves to destruction by an ill-conducted flank march. fortunately for the allies, the russians failed to avail themselves of the advantages which the enemy had thus gratuitously afforded. the fleet having entered the open harbor of balaklava, the allies now commenced the labor of landing and moving up their siege material and of opening their trenches, while the russians prepared their fortifications on the south of sebastopol for resisting the operations of that gigantic siege which stands without a parallel in history. note to chapter iii.--fortifications. in the war between the united states and mexico, the latter had no fortifications on her land frontiers, and, with the single exception of vera cruz, her harbors were entirely destitute of defensive works. the americans, therefore, had no obstacles of this kind to overcome on three of their lines of operation; and, when scott had reduced vera cruz, his line of march was open to the capital. moreover, nearly every seaport on the gulf and pacific coast fell into our hands without a blow. had the landing of scott been properly opposed, and vera cruz been strongly fortified and well defended, it would have been taken only after a long and difficult siege. moreover, had the invading army encountered strong and well-defended fortifications on the line of march to mexico, the war would, necessarily, have been prolonged, and possibly with a different result. the russian fortifications in the baltic prevented the allies from attempting any serious operations in that quarter, and those in the black sea confined the war to a single point of the heracleidan chersonese. had russia relied exclusively upon her fleet to prevent a maritime descent, and left sebastopol entirely undefended by fortifications, how different had been the result of the crimean war. this subject will be alluded to again in the notes on sea-coast defences, and permanent fortifications. note to chapter iv.--logistics. the war in mexico exhibited, in a striking manner, our superiority over the enemy in this branch of the military art. no army was better supplied than ours in all matters of subsistence, clothing, medical and hospital stores, and in means of transportation. two points, however, are worthy of remark in this connection: st. the great waste of material, which resulted from the employment of raw troops under short enlistments, and commanded by officers appointed from civil life, who were without experience and destitute of military instruction; and, d. the immense expense of transportation, which was due in part to the above cause and in part to the employment, in the administrative departments, of civilians who were utterly ignorant of the rules and routine of military service. this war was conducted on the system of magazines and provisions carried in the train of the army, or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for, forced requisitions being seldom resorted to, and then in very moderate quantities. the wisdom of this plan was proved by the general good order and discipline of our troops, and the general good-will of the non-combatant inhabitants of the country which was passed over or occupied by the army. the war in the crimea proved most conclusively the vast superiority of the french administrative system over that of the english--of the military over a civil organization of the administrative corps of an army. the french troops before sebastopol were regularly, cheaply, and abundantly supplied with every requisite of provisions, clothing, munitions, medical stores, military utensils, and hospital and camp equipages; while the english army, notwithstanding an immense expenditure of money, was often paralyzed in its operations by the want of proper military material, and not unfrequently was destitute of even the necessaries of life. instead of profiting by this lesson, the recent tendency of our own government has been (especially in supplying the army in utah) to imitate the sad example of the english, and to convert the supplying of our armies into a system of political patronage to be used for party purposes. if fully carried out, it must necessarily result in the ruin of the army, the robbery of the treasury, and the utter corruption of the government. note to chapter v.--tactics. the war in mexico, from the small number of troops engaged, and the peculiar character of the ground in most cases, afforded but few opportunities for the display of that skill in the tactics of battle which has so often determined the victory upon the great fields of europe. nevertheless, the history of that war is not without useful lessons in the use which may be made of the several arms in the attack and defence of positions. the limit assigned to these notes will admit of only a few brief remarks upon these battles. the affairs of palo alto and resaca de la palma properly constitute only a single battle. in the first, which was virtually a cannonade, the lines were nearly parallel, and arista's change of front to an oblique position during the engagement, was followed by a corresponding movement on the part of general taylor. being made sensible of the superiority of the american artillery, the mexican general fell back upon the ravine of resaca de la palma, drawing up his troops in a concave line to suit the physical character of the ground. the americans attacked the whole line with skirmishers, and with dragoons supported by light artillery, and the charge of a heavy column of infantry decided the victory. general taylor's operations at monterey partook more of the nature of an attack upon an intrenched position than of a regular battle upon the field. no doubt worth's movement to the right had an important influence in deciding the contest, but the separation of his column from the main body, by a distance of some five miles, was, to say the least, a most hazardous operation. the mexicans, however, took no advantage of the opening to operate between the separate masses into which the american army was divided. the loss which the mexicans inflicted upon us resulted more from the strength of their position than from any skilful use of their defensive works. in the battle of buena vista, the efforts of santa anna were principally directed to turning the american left. if he had concentrated his masses more upon the centre at the plateau, the success gained in the early part of the contest would probably have been decisive. the american right at la angostura was made almost inaccessible by the deep ravines in its front, and the skilful use made of the artillery from this point enabled general taylor to gain the victory, even after his left had been completely turned, and a portion of the volunteers had actually fled from the field. the manner in which scott handled his troops in the various battles on his line of march from vera cruz to the capital, proved him to be one of the best generals of the age. at cerro gordo he so completely turned santa anna's left as to cut off his line of retreat, and nearly destroyed his army, the general himself barely escaping capture. the turning of valencia's position by the village of san geronimo, at the battle of contreras, and the charge by riley's columns of infantry, were movements well planned and admirably executed, as were also the rapid pursuit of santa anna to churubusco, and the flank and rear attacks by the brigades of pierce and shields. the victory of molino del rey was mostly won with the musket, without very material assistance from heavy artillery, and was one of the most brilliant but dearly bought achievements of the war. the assault upon chapultepec was preceded by a long and heavy cannonade, which produced a decided moral effect upon the enemy and greatly facilitated the assault. with respect to the battles of the crimean war, only that of the alma is subject to the tactical criticism of ordinary battles; those of balaklava, inkerman, and the tchernaya, were of the nature of sorties made to prevent an assault of the unfinished works of defence, and to prolong the operations of the siege. they must therefore be judged as such, and not according to the ordinary rules applicable to contests in the open field. at the battle of the alma the russians were attacked in position, the two lines of battle being nearly parallel. according to the original plan of attack, the turks and bosquet's division was to turn the russian left, while the main attack was made upon the centre. but, on account of the division of command in the allied army, there was no concert of action. the heavy column of bosquet probably decided the victory, although the battle was general throughout the whole line. the english army advanced in columns of brigades at deploying distances, its right connected with the french, and its left protected by a line of skirmishers, of cavalry and horse artillery. with respect to the formation and use of troops in the other battles, it may be remarked that the charge of the english light cavalry at balaklava was apparently without necessity or object, and led to its inevitable destruction. in the battle of inkerman the russians directed their main attack upon the english right and centre, with false attacks upon the french left and towards balaklava. but these false attacks, as is usual in such cases, were not conducted with sufficient energy and decision, and bosquet was thus enabled to perceive the real intentions of the enemy upon the english portion of the line and move to its assistance. moreover, the main body of the russians moved in too heavy and unwieldy masses, which exposed them to terrible losses, and rendered impossible a rapid and effective deployment of their numerical force. the same criticism is applicable to their formation at the battle of the tehernaya. note to chapter vi.--means of national defence. on the invasion of mexico by the united states, the former republic had a large army of tolerably good troops, though badly officered, still worse equipped, and almost destitute of proper military stores; but she was entirely wanting in two important elements of national defence--fortifications and a navy. her weakness was shown by the rapid and easy conquest of almost the entire country. we have already remarked that the fortifications of russia confined the theatre of war to a single point of the crimea, and limited the military operations of the allies to the prolonged and only partially successful siege of sebastopol. note to chapter vii.--sea-coast defences. allusion has already been made to the weakness of mexico, resulting from her want of sea-coast defences, as shown by the war between that republic and the united states. this would have been still more manifest had she possessed any thing like a commercial marine, exposed to capture by our naval forces. as it was, the mexican war afforded not a single contest between ships and forts, no opposition being made to the occupation of mexican ports by our naval force. the only coast defence, the castle of san juan d'ulica was not attacked, but after the bombardment and capture of vera cruz, it surrendered without a blow. the crimean war, on the contrary, exhibited in a most marked degree the importance of a well-fortified sea-coast. notwithstanding the immense force of the combined fleets of england and france, no naval attack was made upon either cronstadt or sebastopol, and the large naval force of russia proved utterly useless as a defence against a maritime descent. there was, indeed, a simulachre of a "naval cannonade" on the latter place on the th of october, , intended as a diversion of the attention and strength of the garrison from the land side, where the real struggle for predominance was going on between the besieged and the besiegers. the inutility of this attempt was so manifest that no serious naval attack was undertaken, notwithstanding that the allies were ready to bring to bear upon the antiquated and ill-armed russian works the most powerful naval armaments the world had ever seen. the results of this "simulachre of a naval cannonade," as it has been called, is worthy of note. the details are taken from major barnard's able pamphlet on "the dangers and defences of new york," and commander dahlgren's interesting and valuable work on "shells and shell guns." "the allied fleet consisted of french, british, and turkish ships-of-the-line (some few of which had auxiliary steam power), and a number of side-wheel steamers to tow these; and carried in all about , guns. it was opposed by about guns from the works. the fleet kept itself (in general) at a respectable distance (from to yards); too far to inflict any material injury with its armament ( -pounders, with a moderate proportion of -inch shell-guns) upon the works;--too far to receive much from the inefficient armament of the russian works." "the only exception to this remark applies to the detached english squadron under sir edmund lyons, consisting of the _agamemnon_, _sanspareil_, _london_, _arethusa_, and _albion_, the first-named of which vessels took a position at or yards from fort constantine, while the others stretched along at about the same distance from fort constantine, the 'wasp tower,' and 'telegraph battery.' dahlgren describes the result as follows:--" "the _agamemnon_ was very seriously maltreated, though not to such an extent as to impair her power of battery or engine. she was on fire several times; was struck by shot or shells; and, singular to say, only lost , while her second, just by, lost men. the _albion_ suffered still more, and in an hour was towed out crippled, and on fire in more than one place, with a loss of men. the crews of the _london_ and _arethusa_, fared rather better, but the ships nearly as ill; and they too remained in station but a little time after the _albion_. the _queen_ was driven off soon after she got into her new position, in great danger; and the _rodney_ had the bare satisfaction of getting aground and afloat after experiencing some damage." "the value of the small works on the cape and bluffs, was clearly defined in these results; being above the dense cloud of smoke that enveloped the ships and the lower forts, their aim was not embarrassed, while the seamen labored under the difficulty of firing, with an inconvenient elevation, at objects that they saw but seldom, and then but dimly and briefly. as a consequence, three line-of-battle ships and a frigate were driven off very shortly and in great peril, and a fourth badly cut up; while the _agamemnon_ lay opposed to one of the heaviest sea-forts with two tiers of casemates, and at the end of five-hours came off with comparatively little loss." "whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may have had (and we have so few details about these works that we can draw no sure conclusion from this mere naked statement of damages received by the vessels), it evidently was not for want of being _hit_ often enough (smoke or no smoke), that the _agamemnon_ escaped with so little injury. she 'was struck by shot and shells;' and it is only due to the inefficiency of the projectiles by which she was struck, that she was not destroyed." "with respect to the damages received by fort constantine, dahlgren says:--" "the distance of the _agamemnon_ and _sanspareil_ from fort constantine ( th october, ), was assumed to be about yards; lord raglan states it to have been rather less. these two ships could bring to bear about guns, and the firing from them probably lasted some four hours. there can be no doubt that it inflicted much damage, for the russian commander-in-chief-admits it in his official report; but not sufficient to impair the strength of the masonry, and far short of effecting a breach in it." "at bomarsund, the results were rather different:--three -pounders of cwt. (guns of inferior weight), were landed from a ship's spar deck, and placed in battery at yards from the north tower--the masonry of good quality and - / feet thick. in eight hours, the wall between two embrasures was cut through from top to bottom, offering a practicable breach, to effect which shot and shells were fired, being at the rate of one round from the battery in rather less than a minute; or, from each gun, one in - / minutes. the tower surrendered." "it seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able to accomplish fully that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do, the distances from the object being alike--particularly when it is considered that many of the latter were of greater calibre, and most of them employed much heavier charges where the calibres were similar. the guns of the ship, if fired at the same rate as those of the battery, which was not unusually rapid (one round in two and three-fourth minutes), would have discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shot and shells in the course of the four hours, supposing no interruption; a number which, if properly applied, would appear, from the results of three guns, to have been sufficient to breach the wall of the fort in fourteen places; whereas they did not effect a single breach, which is abundant proof of the lack of accuracy. they must either have been dispersed over the surface of the fort, or else missed it altogether, and this could have been due only to a want of the precision which was attained by the battery. the constantly preferred complaint of motion in the ships was not to be urged, because on the day of cannonading sebastopol, there was scarcely a breath of wind, and the ships were too large to be easily moved by the swell, unless very considerable. that the fort did no greater damage to the ships than it received from them, proves no more than that its fire was quite as illy directed, and the calibres too low. it is said that the _agamemnon_ was struck in the hull by two hundred and forty shot and shells, which must have been but a small portion of what was fired, though sufficient to be decisive, if, as already observed, the calibre had been heavier." here, then, a number of projectiles thrown from the ships, which were sufficient, had they been thrown from a land battery, according to the result at bomarsund, to produce fourteen practicable breaches, failed not only to produce a single breach, but even "to impair the strength of the masonry." the reason of this is obvious. that degree of precision of fire by which a breach is effected by a land battery is utterly unattainable from a floating structure, for the motion of the water, even in the calmest days, is quite sufficient to prevent accuracy of aim at an object at a distance, as in this case, of seven and eight hundred yards. with respect to the action of the shot and shells upon the _agamemnon_, it is to be remarked that we have as yet had no fair trial of the power of the fire of modern shell-guns of large calibre from land batteries against ships of war. the russians had some of them in their fleet, and at sinope, with their shell-guns, they blew up two turkish frigates _in fifteen minutes_. it does not appear that in the crimean war they had yet provided their fortifications with the modern armaments, for where shells were thrown from their sea-coast batteries, they were in every instance of inferior calibre. with respect to the naval attack upon kinburn, which has been referred to as showing the importance of floating batteries as an auxiliary to ships in reducing harbor defences, we have no official reports of the russians from which to derive accurate information of the strength of the works attacked. dahlgren, drawing his information from the official accounts of the "english and french admirals," describes the works and their location is follows:-- "the boug and the dnieper issue into a large basin, formed partly by the projection of the main shore, partly by a long narrow strip of sand-beach, which continues from it and takes a north-westerly direction until it passes the promontory of otchakov, where it terminates, and from which it is separated by the channel, whereby the waters of the estuary empty into the black sea." "the distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue and the point of otchakov, or the main shore opposite, is about two miles; but the water is too shoal to admit of the passage of large vessels of war, except in the narrow channel that runs nearest to the spit and its northern shore. here, therefore, are placed the works designed to command the entrance. they are three in number. near the extreme point of the spit is a covered battery built of logs, which are filled in and overlaid with sand,--pierced for eighteen guns, but mounting only ten." "advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt, connected with the spit battery by a covered way. this work, built of stone, and riveted with turf, is open, and said to be the most substantial of the three; it has eleven cannon, and within is a furnace for heating shot." "further on, and where the beach has widened considerably, is fort kinburn, a square bastioned work, extending to the sea on the south, and to the waters of the estuary on the north. it is casemated in part, though but few of these embrasures were armed,--its chief force being in the pieces _en barbette, _and some nine or ten mortars. the masonry, though solid, is represented by an eye-witness not to be bomb-proof, and so dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from the interstices, leaving the stone to disintegrate. the interior space was occupied by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly constructed and plastered over." "this fort is said to be armed with sixty pieces. the english admiral states, that all three of the works mounted eighty-one guns and mortars. the calibres are not given officially, but stated in private letters to be -pounders and -pounders." "the above description will quite justify the further remark as to these works:--" "they were inferior in every respect, and manifestly incapable of withstanding any serious operation by sea or land. the main fort was particularly weak in design, and dilapidated; all of them were indifferently armed and garrisoned." "so much for the works. as to the character of the armament brought to the assault, the same authority says:--" "the allied force was admirably adapted to the operation, embracing every description of vessel, from the largest to the smallest, and all propelled by steam. there were screw-liners, and like vessels of inferior class, side-wheel steamers, screw gunboats, floating-batteries, mortar-vessels, etc., each armed in what was considered the most approved manner. and this truly formidable naval force carried _besides_ 'some thousand troops' on board, all designed to attack these 'dilapidated' works of kinburn." "without going into the particulars, we simply give dahlgren's account of the affair:--" "the french floating-batteries (_devastation, lave_, and _tonnante_) steamed in to make their first essay, anchoring some six or seven hundred yards off the s.e. bastion of fort kinburn, and at . opened fire, supported by the mortar-vessels, of which six were english, by the gunboats, five french and six english, and by the steamer _odin_, ." "the heavy metal of the floating-batteries (said to be twelve -pounders on the broadside of each) soon told on the walls of the fort; and the vertical fire was so good that the french admiral attributed to it, in great part, the speedy surrender of the place. the gunboats also made good ricochet practice, which was noticed to be severe on the barbette batteries." "the russian gunners, in nowise daunted by this varied fire, plied their guns rapidly in return, directing their attention chiefly to the floating-batteries, which were nearest." "exactly at noon, the admirals steamed in with the _royal albert _, , _algiers_, , _agamemnon_, , and _princess royal_, , with the four french liners in close order, taking position in line, ranging n.w. and s.e., about one mile from the fort, in twenty-eight feet water." "at the same time, a squadron of steam-frigates, under rear-admirals stewart and pellion, dashed in through the passage to the basin, opening fire on the spit and central batteries in passing, and anchoring well inside of fort nicholaiev and otchakov. the attack seaward was completed by the _acre_, , _curaçoa_, , _tribune_, , and _sphynx_, , opening on the central battery; while the _hannibal_, , _dauntless_, , and _terrible_, , assailed that on the spit. to this storm of shot and shells, the russians could not reply long. in the spit battery, the sand falling through between the logs, displaced by shot and shells, choked the embrasures, and blocked up the guns. in the fort, the light wooden buildings were in flames at an early hour; then the walls began to crumble before the balls which came from every quarter, front, flank, and rear; and as the guns were disabled successively, the return became feeble, until few were in condition to be fired, the central redoubt alone discharging single guns at long intervals. the russian commander, however, made no sign of surrender; but the admirals, seeing that his fire had ceased, and further defence was unavailing, hoisted the white flag at . p.m., upon which the works were given up on honorable terms." "the garrison consisted of about fourteen hundred men; their loss is differently stated,--the french admiral says eighty wounded,--another, forty-three killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded." "the english suffered the least, having but two men wounded; besides two killed and two wounded in the _arrow_, by the bursting of her two -pounder lancaster guns." "the superiority of the allied vessels in number and calibre of ordnance was very decided; they must have had at least six hundred and fifty pieces in play, chiefly -pounders, and -inch shell guns, with a fair proportion of -pounders and mortars, besides the -pounders of the french floating batteries. to which the russians could only reply with eighty-one cannon and mortars, and no guns of heavier calibre than -pounders, while many were lower. the great disparity in offensive power was not compensated to the works by the advantage of commanding position, the russian fort and redoubt being upon nearly the same level with the ships' batteries, and also very deficient in proper strength. on the other hand, the depth of water did not allow the liners to approach nearer than one mile; and thus their fire was by no means so intense as it would have been at shorter range." "this was the sole occasion in which the floating batteries had an opportunity of proving their endurance; which was the question of most importance, as no one could doubt the effect of long -pounders, or -pounders, when brought within a few hundred yards of masonry, and able to retain the steadiness indispensable to a breaching fire." "no siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such power, for though the english had employed long -pounders at sebastopol, yet the distance from the objects exceeded a thousand yards; and the concentration of fire, so far as any opinion can be formed from the published statements, was far inferior to that of the thirty-six -pounders, in the broadsides of the three batteries anchored in close order." "they were hulled repeatedly by shot; one of them (the _devastation_), it is said, sixty-seven times, without any other effect on the stout iron plates than to dint them, at the most, one and a half inches,--still, there were ten men killed and wounded in this battery by shot and shell which entered the ports,--and the majority of damage to the french personnel (twenty-seven men) occurred in the three floating-batteries." major barnard, in commenting upon this affair, says that it "proves nothing, unless it be, that dilapidated, and ill-designed, and ill-constructed works, armed with inferior calibres, cannot contend against such an overwhelming array of force as was here displayed. * * * the fort of kinburn surrendered, _not because_ it was breached--not because the defenders were so far diminished by their losses as to be unable to protract the contest,--but simply because the guns and gunners, exposed in all possible ways, were put hors-du-combat, and the calibres (of the guns in kinburn) were incapable of doing any great damage to the vessels, at the distance they were stationed." the guns in the low _open_ batteries were exposed to a ricochet and vertical fire, to which latter the french admiral attributed, in good part, the surrender of the place. the buildings behind the batteries, built of wood, "slightly constructed and plastered over," were set on fire, and the heat and smoke must have rendered the service of the guns almost impracticable. nevertheless, out of a garrison of , , only were killed and wounded--a very small loss under all the circumstances. if the works had been well-constructed casemates, covering the men from the ricochet and vertical fires and the sharpshooters of the troops who invested the land fronts, the loss of the garrison would have been still less; and if they had been armed with heavier projectiles, much greater damage would have been inflicted upon the attacking force. with respect to the use of floating-batteries in this case, commander dahlgren very judiciously remarks:-- "the use that can be made of floating-batteries, as auxiliaries in attacking shore-works, must depend on further confirmation of their asserted invulnerability. it may be that the performance at kinburn answered the expectation of the french emperor as regards offensive power, for that is a mere question of the battering capacity of the heaviest calibres, which is undoubted; but the main issue, which concerns their endurance, cannot be settled by the impact of -pounder shot, fired at and yards. far heavier projectiles will in future be found on all seaboard fortifications; and the ingenuity of the artillerist may also be exerted more successfully than at kinburn. still, it is not to be doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable element in assailing forts, even if its endurance falls short of absolute invulnerability; and the defence will do well to provide against its employment." the works at bomarsund were taken by means of _land-batteries_, which breached the exposed walls of the towers and main works. an auxiliary fire was opened upon the water front by the fleet, but it produced very little effect. but after the work had been reduced, an experimental firing was made by the _edinburgh_, armed with the largest and most powerful guns in the british navy. in speaking of the effects of the siege batteries upon the walls of bomarsund, and the experimental fire of the _edinburgh_, sir howard douglas remarks:-- "this successful operation (of the land batteries) is very generally, but erroneously, stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships, and it is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do, and ought to attempt elsewhere." "but the results of the experimental firing at the remnant of the fort, which, unless the previous firing of the ships during the attack was absolutely harmless, must have been somewhat damaged, and moreover shaken by the blowing-up of the contiguous portions, do not warrant this conclusion, even should the attacking ships be permitted, like the _edinburgh_, to take up, quietly and coolly, positions within yards, and then deliberately commence and continue their firing, without being fired at! the firing of the _edinburgh_, at , yards, was unsatisfactory. shot and shells were fired, from the largest and most powerful guns in the british navy (viz., from the lancaster gun of cwt., with an elongated shell of lbs.;--from -pounders of cwt., and -pounders of cwt., solid shot guns;--from -inch shell guns of cwt., with hollow shot of lbs.;--from -inch shell guns of and cwt., with hollow shot of lbs.), and did but little injury to the work. at yards, shot, shells, and hollow shot were fired. a small breach was formed in the facing of the outer wall, of extremely bad masonry, and considerable damage done to the embrasures and other portions of the wall; but no decisive result was obtained--no practicable breach formed, by which the work might be assaulted, taken, and effectually destroyed, although shot and shells ( , lbs. of metal) were fired into the place, first at , , and then at yards." surely, this "naval attack," taken in connection with the true facts of the capture of kinburn, the abortive attempt of the british fleet in the pacific upon the russian works of petropauloski, is not calculated to affect the well established opinion of the ability of forts to resist maritime attacks. few are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of guns ashore over guns afloat; but some think that works of masonry are incapable of resisting the heavy and continuous fire which may now be brought against it by fleets and floating-batteries, and would therefore extend the area of the works and rely mainly upon earthen parapets, with guns in barbette. this conclusion they form from the results of the maritime attack on kinburn, and of the land-batteries on bomarsund. major barnard, in his valuable work on "the dangers and defences of new york," draws a very different conclusion from these attacks, and contends that they abundantly prove the capability of well-constructed stone masonry to resist the fire of ships and floating-batteries, if the latter are opposed by proper armaments in the forts; moreover, that they proved the superiority of casemated forts over low open batteries, with guns in barbette, in covering the garrison from the effects of a vertical and ricochet fire. unquestionably the masonry at bomarsund was poorly constructed; nevertheless, the fire of the shipping produced very little effect upon it. it is also equally certain that kinburn was taken, not by a breaching fire, but mainly by the effects of vertical and ricochet fires. with respect to our own system of sea-coast defences, it may be remarked, that, since this chapter was written, the works mentioned therein as having been commenced, have been gradually advanced towards completion, and that the acquisition of texas and california, and the settlement of oregon and washington territory, by greatly extending our line of maritime defence, have rendered necessary the fortification of other points. it should also be noted that while the value and necessity of these works are generally admitted, and while the general outline of the system is almost universally approved, many are of the opinion that the increased facilities for naval attacks, and the immense power of modern maritime expeditions, like that upon sebastopol, render it necessary to more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial ports of new york and san francisco--one the _key point_ of the atlantic, and the other of the pacific coast. perhaps the system adopted by our boards of engineers may be open to the objection that they have adopted _too many_ points of defence, without giving sufficient prominence to our great seaports, which are necessarily the strategic points of coast defence. however this may have been _at the time the system was adopted_, there can be no question that the relative strength of the works designed for the different points of our coast does not correspond to _the present_ relative importance of the places to be defended, and the relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of organizing the means of maritime attack. on this subject we quote from the work of major barnard:-- "while the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive system was planned, and our country has so increased in population, wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any impression by an invasion of our territory,--our great maritime places like new york, have, on the other hand, increased in even greater proportion, in every thing that could make them objects of attack." "the works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of new york could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be adequate at the present day." "the recent war of england and france against russia may illustrate my meaning; for it has taught us what to expect were either of these nations to wage war against the united states." "no invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest was made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive results would flow from such means. the war consisted exclusively in attacks upon maritime places--great seaports--seats of commercial and naval power. such places, by their vast importance to the well-being and prosperity of a nation--by the large populations and immense amount of wealth concentrated in them, and by their exposure to maritime attack, offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive results may be produced. cronstadt, sebastopol, sweaborg, kinburn, odessa, kertch, petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in succession or simultaneously objects of attack; while such as the first named became, indeed, the true seats of war." "around sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their resources, and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have turned the issue of the war. had it not been so decided _there_, cronstadt would have been the next field of combat,--for which, indeed, the allies had made the most enormous preparations." "is it not _certain_ that in future all war of maritime powers against the united states, will take a similar course? all territorial invasion being out of the question, it is against our _great_ seaports and strategic points of coast defence--such as new york, new orleans, and san francisco--pre-eminently new york,--that an enemy will concentrate his efforts. against these he will prepare such immense armaments, --against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack, which (unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system) shall _insure_ success." "the mere defense of the city against _ordinary fleets_, is no longer the question; but _through the defensive works to be here erected, the nation is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the resources of a great maritime power, aided by all that modern science and mechanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attack, can bring against them_; in short, in fortifying new york, _we are really preparing the battle-field on which the issue of future momentous contests is to be decided_." a few, however, object to the system at present adopted, on the ground that casemated works do not offer sufficient resistance to ships and floating-batteries, and that earthen works, covering a greater area, will accomplish that object much more effectually, while their longer land fronts will be more difficult of reduction by siege. it cannot be doubted that earthen batteries, with guns in barbette, can, as a general rule, be more easily taken by assault, that they are more exposed to vertical and ricochet firing, and more expose their gunners to be picked off by sharpshooters. moreover, they give but a very limited fire upon the most desirable point, as the entrance to a harbor. on the other hand, it has not been proved that masonry-casemated works, when properly constructed and properly armed, will not effectually resist a naval cannonade, whether from ships or floating-batteries. the results of recent wars, and of the west point experiments by general totten, would seem to prove them abundantly capable of doing this. against such proofs the mere _ad captandum_ assertion of their incapacity can have but little weight--certainly not enough to justify the abandonment of a system approved by the best military authorities of this country and europe, and sanctioned by long experience. major barnard, in speaking of the capacity of masonry casemated forts to resist the fire of a hostile armament, and of the propriety of abandoning them for earthen batteries in our system of coast defences, uses the following forcible language:--"when we bear in mind that the hostile 'floating batteries,' of whatever description, will themselves be exposed to the most formidable projectiles that can be thrown from shore batteries,--that when they choose to come to 'close quarters,' to attempt to breach, _their_ 'embrasures' present openings through which deluges of grape, canister, and musket balls can be poured upon the gunners; and consider what experience has so far shown, and reason has taught us, with regard to the casemate,--we need not be under apprehension that our casemated works will be battered down; nor doubt that they will, as they did in russia, answer the important purposes for which they were designed." "it only remains to show the _necessity_ of such works. it, in general, costs much less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet, than to build a masonry structure covered with bomb-proof arches, in which to mount it. all authorities agree that an open barbette battery (grivel's very forcible admission has been quoted), on a low site, and to which vessels can approach within or yards, is utterly inadmissible. it may safely be said, that in nine cases out of ten, the sites which furnish the efficient raking and cross fires upon the channels, are exactly of this character; and indeed it very often happens that there are _no others_." "when such sites _are_ found, it rarely happens that they afford room for sufficient number of guns in open batteries. hence the necessity of putting them tier above tier, which involves, of course, the casemated structure. such works, furnishing from their lower tier a low, raking fire, and (if of several tiers) a plunging fire from their barbettes, offer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be contrived, and afford to their gunners a degree of security quite as great as _can_ be given to men thus engaged." "on subjects which have a mere speculative importance, there is no danger in giving rein to speculation; but on those of such real and intense practical importance as the security against hostile aggression of the great city and port of new york, it is not admissible to set aside the experience of the past, or the opinions of the best minds who have devoted themselves to such subjects. a means of defence, sanctioned by its being confided in to protect the great ports of europe--which _has_ protected the great ports of russia against the most formidable naval armament that ever floated on the ocean, has a claim upon our confidence which mere criticism cannot diminish; and a claim to be adhered to in place of all new 'systems,' until time and trial shall have _necessitated_ (not merely justified) the change." "if, then, we refer to the practice of other nations, to find what has been judged necessary for the defence of important ports,--to experience, to find how such defensive systems have stood the test of actual trial,--we may draw useful conclusions with regard to what is now required to defend new york. we shall find at _sebastopol_--a narrow harbor, which owed its importance to its being the great naval dépôt of russia on the black sea--an array of guns, about of which were placed in five 'masonry-casemated' works (several of them of great size), and the remainder in open batteries. these defensive works fulfilled their object, and sustained the attack of the allied fleet, on the th of october, , without sensible damage." "the facility with which seaports are attacked by fleets--the enormous preparations required--the great risks encountered in landing a besieging army on the coast of a formidable enemy (while, for protection against the _former_ species of attack, costly works are necessary, and against the latter, field works and men can, in emergency, afford protection), naturally caused the russians to make these water defences their _first_ object. yet, though almost unprotected on the land side, sebastopol resisted, for a whole year, an attack on that quarter; and illustrated how, with plenty of men and material, an energetic and effectual _land defence_ may be improvised, where the _sea defence_ is provided for, as thoroughly as it was at that place." "let cronstadt be another example. great as was the importance of its defence to russia, it was not greater,--it was by no means _as great_, as that of new york to our own country. this port, and military and naval dépôt, was defended (in its main approach) by upwards of guns, of which were mounted in five 'masonry-casemated' works; the remainder in an open barbette battery, which enfiladed the main channel. this number is formidable in itself; yet the same number mounted in new york harbor would not afford anything like such a formidable defence as was found at cronstadt, owing to its great area, and long line of approach, compared with the latter." "_these works fulfilled their object._ they protected the great port and dépôt of cronstadt and the capital of the empire from invasion. for two successive years did the mighty armaments of france and england threaten; but they were overawed by the frowning array of 'casemated castles' which presented itself, and declined the contest." "let us turn our eyes now to the great naval dépôt of france. after the almost incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating a harbor facing the shores of her great rival, england, and an equally profuse expenditure in providing all that constitutes a great naval dépôt, we may suppose that the best means, without regard to cost, which the science of man could devise, would be employed here to make this great seat of naval power secure against the formidable means of attack possessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the assailant. the means there employed are (so far as regards mere _harbor_ defence) precisely the same (viz., casemated works in several tiers, combined with open batteries where the locations are favorable); and the application of means is the same as we have found so successful in russia,--the same which constitute the system of harbor defence of new york." captain mcclelland, in his official report to the war department, on the siege of sebastopol, uses language equally strong and pertinent:-- "the permanent defences of sebastopol against an attack by water, although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they were intended. indeed, the occurrences on the pacific, the baltic, and the black sea, all seem to establish beyond controversy, the soundness of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for the strongest fleet." "it is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:" " st. that our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least possible delay." " d. that mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an european war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose, and by long habit." "in the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of sebastopol would have been impossible. it is evident that the russians did not appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared to sustain a siege." "this same power of steam would enable european nations to disembark upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped around sebastopol. to resist such an attack, should it ever be made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists. to repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can bring to bear against it. an invading army of , or , men could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers; but when it comes to the case of more than , disciplined veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they cannot be handled, and are in their own way. we cannot afford a moscow campaign." "our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be, large enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase; and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. the militia and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective basis; instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all possible means taken to spread sound military information among them. in the vicinity of our sea-coast fortifications, it would be well to provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of instruction in heavy artillery, detailing officers of the regular artillery for instructors." on this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in the use of sea-coast batteries, we add the following quotation from major barnard's pamphlet:-- "one of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries, which has given color to the idea that they may be passed, or even _attacked_ with impunity, i conceive to be the want of _skill_ and _care_ in the use of the guns. the result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious throwing away of balls, and very little damage done. this has been, however, by no means a _peculiarity_ of coast defences. the same system of random firing has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms in land and of heavy ordnance in sea battles; nor has it occurred apparently to even the greatest masters of the art of war, to ask why, for one man wounded, or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull, so many thousands of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air." "but this question is _now_ asked, both in the use of the soldier's rifled musket, and in the management of ships' guns, as well as of artillery of all kinds." "it is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform certain motions on parade with the precision of an automaton. the same idea is now infused into all the departments of military and naval science, and is a _necessary_ result of the recent great improvements in the construction of arms. in short, the truth has at last become apparent that the old-fashioned system of random firing, though perhaps like the 'charge of the six hundred' at balaklava, 'bien magnifique, _n'est pas la guerre_.'" "it is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle to the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical effect. the _volunteers_ of our cities will constitute _mainly_, in time of war, the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast guns. in time of war, they will probably be exercised in these duties. but it is most desirable that we should have at _all times_ a body of gunners, practised in these exercises. the result would be, not only to give to our _citizens_, as well as citizen-soldiers, confidence in the defences provided for their security, but it would disseminate military knowledge, and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the different defensive works. to carry out this idea, it would be desirable that there should be at each considerable seaport town, a sufficient garrison of _artillery_ troops to aid in the instruction of the volunteers. in the present condition of the army _this_ cannot be hoped; but perhaps it might, at least, be found practicable to detail an artillery officer or two for the purpose." note to chapter viii.--our northern frontier defences. the author has seen nothing since this chapter was written to induce him to change the views therein expressed with respect to the superior strategic importance of the line of lake champlain, both as a line of military operations, and as a line of defence. the mutual commercial interests of the united states and the canadas render a war between the two countries less probable than formerly; nevertheless, such an event is by no means impossible, and common prudence should induce us to prepare in the best possible manner for such a contingency. note to chapters ix., x., xi. and xii.--army organization. since these chapters were written, several important changes have been made in our army organization. the rank of lieutenant-general (at least, by brevet) has been revived, the staff, administrative corps, infantry and cavalry have been increased, and a company of engineer troops organized. but this company is mainly employed at west point for instruction of the cadets in the several branches of military engineering, and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt in the system of education at the military academy. the want, however, of troops of this arm for the construction, care, and preservation of our permanent fortifications, and for the general duties of field engineering, still remains to be supplied. of all the arms of military organization, this one most requires instruction in time of peace; it cannot be supplied at the moment a war is declared. in speaking of our present army organization, as compared with those of the different european powers which he was sent to examine and report upon, captain mcclelland says:-- "our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of service, while the number of our engineer troops is ridiculously and shamefully small; it is, therefore, more than probable that in any future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct their own batteries, while the engineers will be sufficiently burdened by the construction of the other works of attack; we have now, at last, the germ of an artillery school of practice; i would then suggest, for the consideration of the secretary, the propriety of causing the artillery to construct their own batteries. the position and armament of siege batteries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and the artillery, the former having the preponderating voice, in order to secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the works of attack. this change," he says, "will require to be introduced into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in relation to the preparation of the fascines, gabions, platforms, and magazines, the dimensions of batteries, manner of arranging, working parties, etc." with regard to the suggestion of captain mcclellan, it is sufficient to remark, that it seeks to remedy one evil by introducing another equally as great and equally as objectionable. the defect in our present army organization is that one of its arms is too small for the duties which, from the very nature of military service, naturally and properly belong to it; and it surely is no remedy for this defect to permanently transfer a part of these duties to another arm. as well might it be said, if our artillery force were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in proportion to the infantry and cavalry, that the field batteries should be permanently transferred to those arms, and that light artillery tactics should be comprised in our infantry and cavalry manuals. there are certain duties which the military experience of ages has shown to properly and almost necessarily belong to each particular arm of an army organization, and every attempt to make one branch perform the appropriate duties of another has invariably destroyed its efficiency for either service. suppose our medical corps were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in proportion to our pay department, shall our paymasters perform the duties of surgery, and be instructed in the use of the scalpel and amputating instruments! this is, perhaps, an extreme case, but it serves to illustrate the principle. the defect referred to by captain mcclelland, and which has so often been pointed out by our best military men, cannot be obviated by any transfer or assignment, whether temporary or permanent, of the appropriate duties of one corps to another. indeed, such a measure would only tend to make this defect permanent, and to convert a temporary into a lasting evil. it can readily be remedied by legislative action, but in no other way. the executive action suggested would be deprecated by all. moreover, the evil is now so obvious and so generally admitted, that there can be little doubt that congress will soon perceive the importance of applying the only proper and effective remedy. note to chapter xiii.--permanent fortifications. although the general principles of the plan and arrangement of a permanent fortification, as established by the great masters of this branch of military science, remain the same; nevertheless, the vast improvements which have, within the last few years, been made in projectiles, require some changes in the details of defensive works of this character. these changes consist mainly in an increased thickness of stone and earthen parapets and of the covering of magazines, in the arrangement of embrasures, and in protecting the garrison from an enemy's sharpshooters. the introduction of heavier siege guns, and of heavier ordnance on ships of war, and especially on those propelled by steam, require much larger ordnance in forts designed for the defence of harbors. in the russian war, sweaborg was made to suffer from a distant bombardment which left her fortifications intact. these modifications in the arrangements and armaments of forts are absolutely necessary in order to restore the relative power of defence against the improvements made in the means of attack. they can very easily be introduced without changing the form or general character of the works, and they are really so very essential that, without them, a fort constructed or years ago, and well suited to the then existing state of the military art, will be likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siege batteries or well organized maritime attacks. some have gone much further in their estimate of the effect produced by the increased size and force of military projectiles, and boldly assert that masonry works of strong relief can no longer be used, and that the increased range of small arms requires an entire change of the bastioned front, with lines more extended. with respect to the effect of the increased range of small arms, it is very natural that a superficial observer should adopt the opinion that this improvement must be followed by an extension of the lines of a defensive military work; but a close study of the subject will probably lead to a different conclusion. such at least is the opinion of the ablest military engineers of europe. the lines of the bastioned front now generally in use, were really too long for a good defence with the arms in use at the time it was adopted; and, in theory, the "rampart gun" was to be relied upon for the defence of certain exposed points. but this weapon is no longer in use; its place, however, is better supplied by the increased range of the musket and rifle. the latter weapon is almost invaluable for defending the approaches to a permanent work. with respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege batteries, it has long been an established principle that all masonry exposed to the fire of land batteries should be masked by earthen works. the neglect of this rule caused the fall of bomarsund. those who so readily draw, from the results of that siege, the inference that the present mode of fortifying land fronts must be abandoned, exhibit their ignorance of military engineering. the facts do not justify their conclusions. with respect to sea fronts, which can be reached only by guns afloat, the case is very different. they are usually casemates of masonry, not masked by earthen works. whether the increased efficiency of projectiles thrown by ships and floating batteries now require a resort to this mode of protecting masonry on the water fronts of fortifications, is a question well worthy of discussion. this subject has already been alluded to in the note on sea-coast defences, and it is there shown that no facts have yet been developed which require or authorize any change in our present system. note to chapter xiv.--field engineering. as mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged, the war in that country afforded very little practice in that branch of engineering which is connected with the attack and defence of permanent works, particularly sapping and mining. the only operation resembling a siege was the investment and bombardment of vera cruz, and it is worthy of remark that if general scott had stormed that place, weak as it was, he must have lost a large number of his men, while from his trenches and batteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice of a single life. nor did either party in this war make much use of field works in the attack and defence of positions. nevertheless, no one can read the history of the war without appreciating the important influence which fort brown had upon general taylor's defence of the left bank of the rio grande. again if we compare our loss in other mexican battles with that which the americans sustained in their attacks upon monterey, churubusco, molino del key, and chapultepec,--places partially secured by field works--we shall be still more convinced of the value of temporary fortifications for the defence of military positions, although it was manifest that the mexicans neither knew how to construct nor how to defend them. nor was there much practice in this war in the use of military bridges, for, with the exception of the rio grande, our armies had no important rivers to cross. we must not, however, omit to note the important fact that general taylor was unable to take advantage of the victories of palo alto and resacade la palma to pursue and destroy the army of arista, _because_ he had no pontoon equipage to enable him to follow them across the rio grande. it should also be remarked that even a very small bridge equipage would have been of very great use in crossing other streams and ravines during the operations of this war. one of our cavalry officers writes:-- "on our march from matamaras to victoria and tampico, in and , we had infinite difficulty in bridging boggy streams (there being no suitable timber), and in crossing ravines with vertical banks; a few ways of the birago trestles would have saved us many days and a vast amount of labor. in the operations in the valley of mexico, our movements, checked as they so often were by impassable wet ditches and sometimes by dry ravines, would have been rendered so much more free and rapid by the use of the birago trestles, that our successes could have been gained at far less cost, and probably with more rapidity than they were." with regard to military reconnaissance, the splendid achievements of lee and others connected with the operations of general scott, proved the value and importance of this particular branch of field engineering. but field engineering, as a branch or arm of the military service, received its greatest development and most brilliant application in the crimean war, particularly in the siege of sebastopol, and the measures resorted to by general todtleben to defend that place against the attack of superior forces. a brief sketch of these defensive works may be of interest to the reader:-- when the allies reached balaklava, sebastopol was defended on the south side only by a loop-holed wall about four feet and a half thick, and from eighteen to twenty feet high, and a semicircular redoubt with two stories of loop-holes, and five guns in barbette. these works would have afforded some protection against a _coup-de-main_ by infantry and cavalry, but could have offered no very considerable obstacle to a combined attack of these arms with artillery. the russian engineer commenced his operations for strengthening this position by occupying the most important points in his line of defence with detached field works of sufficient relief to resist an assault, and generally closed at the gorge. these works were afterwards connected by re-entering lines of a weaker profile, which served to enfilade the ravines and to flank the advanced works. the old wall was strengthened with earth, and rifle-pits for sharpshooters were constructed at a considerable distance in front. the most important points of the main line of defence were: st. the flag-staff bastion. d. the central bastion. d. the malakoff. th. the redan. th. the little redan. the command of the first was about fifteen feet, its ditch thirty feet wide and from twelve to fifteen feet deep. a portion of the scarp was provided with palisades some ten feet high. the construction of the central bastion was similar to that of the flag-staff, but weaker in profile. the relief of the other works was still less. the command of the malakoff was about fourteen feet, its ditch eighteen feet wide and twelve feet deep. the thickness of parapet in these works was generally about eighteen feet, and the bombproofs were covered with timber eighteen inches thick and six feet of earth. the loop-holed walls connecting these works were covered by a rampart and parapet, or entirely replaced by a simple parapet. many of the embrasures were revetted with the common boiler iron ships' water-tanks filled with earth. the same material was sometimes used for traverses. rope mantelets were used to protect the artillerists at the pieces from rifle balls and small grape. great attention was given to the construction of bombproofs to cover the men from vertical firing. these were sometimes under the rampart and the second line of defence (where there was one), often under special traverses, or entirely under ground, and occasionally excavated in the solid rock. some had fireplaces and chimneys, and were well ventilated. interior slopes were revetted with gabions, crowned by fascines and sand bags. gabions were also employed to repair the damage caused by the enemy's artillery. abattis, military pits, caltrops and spikes, stuck through planks, and explosive machines were employed in front of different parts of the defences. mines were resorted to in front of the flag-staff bastion to retard the french approaches. they were made in rocky soil with craters from twelve to fifteen feet deep. the russian counter-approaches generally consisted of fleches, united by a simple trench. captain mcclelland, one of our officers sent to the crimea, from whose valuable report most of the foregoing details are gathered, adds the following remarks upon these works of defence:-- "from the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences of sebastopol, it will appear how little foundation there was for the generally-received accounts of the stupendous dimensions of the works, and of new systems of fortifications brought into play. the plain truth is, that these defences were simple temporary fortifications of rather greater dimensions than usual, and that not a single new principle of engineering was developed. it is true, that there were several novel minor details, such as the rope mantelets, the use of iron tanks, etc., but the whole merit consisted in the admirable adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality and circumstances of the case. neither can it be asserted that the plans of the various works were perfect. on the contrary, there is no impropriety in believing that if todtleben were called upon to do the same work over again, he would probably introduce better close flanking arrangements." "these remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from the reputation of the russian engineer. his labors and their results will be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monument of the value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the first rank of military engineers. but, in our admiration of the talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten that the inert masses which he raised would have been useless without the skilful artillery and heroic infantry who defended them. much stronger places than sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected. there can be no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege of sebastopol called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has ever yet occurred." we will now pass to the works of attack. when the allies decided that the works of sebastopol could not be carried by a simple cannonade and assault, but must be reduced by a regular siege, the first thing to be considered was to secure the forces covering the siege works from lateral sorties and the efforts of a relieving army. the field works planned for this purpose were not of any great strength, and many of them "were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some imminent danger had demonstrated their necessity." the french line of defence consisted of eight pentagonal redoubts, connected by an infantry parapet. the english seemed to attach but little importance to field works for the defence of their position; the terrible slaughter at inkerman was the natural consequence of this neglect. in describing the engineering operations of the allies at this siege. captain mcclelland says:-- "in regard to the detailed execution of the french attacks, little or nothing novel is to be observed. even when coolly examining the direction of their trenches, after the close of the siege, it was very rare that a faulty direction could be detected; they always afforded excellent cover, and were well defiladed; in some cases the excavation of the double direct sap was carried to the depth of six and a half feet in the solid rock! the execution of many of the saps and batteries was worthy of a school of practice. in the parallels, bombproofs were provided as temporary hospitals, offices for the generals on duty, etc. they did not use the sapper armor. the use of the sap-roller was often attempted, but it could be employed only during the latter part of the attack upon the malakoff, when the fire of the russian artillery was nearly extinguished by the mortars; before that, as soon as a sap-roller was placed in position--some thirty guns would be brought to bear upon it, the result being its immediate destruction. it may justly be said of the french approaches, that they admirably carried into practice their system of sapping. the technical skill and patient courage evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent approaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their corps of engineers." "with regard to the english, the case was different; it seemed as if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and perfected with so much care at chatham. whenever the ground was difficult, their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; a shallow excavation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front, appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases. they were often faulty in direction as well as in profile, being not unfrequently badly defiladed, or not gaining ground enough and entirely too cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the redan as they ought to have been before giving the assault. in too many cases the expression '_tâtonnement_ of the french would seem to convey the best idea of their operations. their batteries, however, were very well constructed. the magazines, platforms, etc., were usually similar to those adopted at chatham, although unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of. they employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but generally the flying-sap were employed." it may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the french approaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of the counterscarp of the malakoff, while the english had scarcely reached within two hundred and twenty-five yards of the ditch of the redan. this description of the operations of the english at the siege of sebastopol carries the professional reader directly back to their sieges in the spanish peninsula. it certainly is very strange that a great nation leading the van of civilization should, after such experience, have neglected to provide its army with a proper number of engineer officers and engineer troops, well instructed in the peculiar and difficult duties of that arm. what excuse can ever be offered for substituting human life for professional skill in the operations of a siege, when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace, and is always so necessary an element of a good military organization! while every one admits that the siege of sebastopol proved the immense importance of fieldworks against land attacks, some would conclude from the operations of that siege that good earthen works of a large development are better suited for the defence of a large city than permanent fortifications with masonry revetments, and which will necessarily have a less extended line of fire and less capacity for men and military stores. we quote the remarks of captain mcclelland on this point, and also make a short extract from the recently published journal of the siege of sebastopol by general niel. captain mcclelland says:-- "this would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy, which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. it was, that the siege of sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen) fortifications over those of a permanent nature. it is easy to show that it proved nothing of the kind; but that it only proved that temporary works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a longer defence than was generally supposed. they were attacked as field works never were before, and were defended as field works never had been defended. the main difference between properly constructed permanent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary works, is that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against assault, while the former always do. in addition, permanent works have a better command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully and perfectly planned. the masonry walls, which render an assault impossible, cannot be seen from the distance, and can be destroyed only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis, or the edge of the ditch; the earthen parapet alone being visible beyond that point, they may, until the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison are not harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an assault." "now, in the siege of sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers never reached the edge of the ditch; so that, had the fortification been a permanent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the siege remained to be undertaken, viz., the crowning of the covered way, the establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage of the ditch, and the assault of the breach; in other words, at the moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and fatal, the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced coming into play." "assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was under existing circumstances, the besiegers, on the th of september, would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way, the siege would certainly have extended into the winter; and it may even be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the southside." general neil remarks:-- "struck by the length of the siege of sebastopol, certain foreign officers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted scarps are not of incontestable utility in fortified places." "sebastopol, a vast retrenched camp, defended by field fortifications of strong profile, derived its principal strength from an armament such as could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal, and from a large army which always preserved its free communications with the interior of russia." "if the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps; if it had been necessary to breach these, and subsequently have been compelled to penetrate through difficult passages, in rear of which the heads of our columns would have met an army, sebastopol would have been an impregnable fortress." "when we compare, in effect, the works of attack at sebastopol with those of an ordinary siege, we will see that on the th of september, , the day of the last assault, we had only executed, after the greatest effort, the besieging works which precede the crowning of the covered way; we had not then, as yet, entered upon that period of the works of a siege which is the most difficult and the most murderous; and there was no occasion to engage ourselves in them, since the ditches and parapets of the enceinte were not insurmountable, as the sequel has proved." "the difficulty consisted in conquering the russian army upon a position prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification." "our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the besieged works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our artillery had forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute, behind his numerous blindages; to have gone further would have been inviting the initiative in the attack on the part of the russian army." "the absence of scarp walls, which would have secured the place from escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence; for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges of the works, strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault, which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement of the siege." "finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were decimated night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the drawbridges of revetted places; they were, then, a permanent threat for the besiegers, who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly invaded by the greater part of the russian army." "neither side, consequently, was in a position analogous to that which is presented in the siege of a fortified place, protected from insult by good masonry scarps.'" (note to page .) and again, page , the same authority remarks: "now, it (the russian army) is no longer able to escape from the concentric fires of our batteries; for, _not being protected by masonry scarps_, it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in order to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced'" note to chapter xv.--military education, &c. with regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will, perhaps, be sufficient to remark that the mexican war incontestably proved the value of the west point military academy; for the superior efficiency of properly-educated officers over those who had been appointed from civil life without any knowledge of the profession they were called upon to practice, fully satisfied the country of the importance of that institution, and even silenced the clamors of the few who refused to be convinced. the recent abortive attempt to give efficiency to our navy by means of a retired list, has, it is feared, destroyed for a time all hopes of introducing this very necessary measure into our military service; although it is very certain that without this we can never have our system of promotion placed upon an effective and satisfactory basis, which shall give efficiency to the army by rewarding merit, while it prevents injustice by closing the avenues of political favoritism. the mexican war also most abundantly proved that our objections to the system of military appointment were well founded, and it is hoped that the more recent abuses of that system will call public attention to the necessity of a change; for if military office continue to be conferred for partisan services, it will soon destroy the integrity as well as the efficiency of our army. explanation of plates figs. , , .--used to illustrate the strategic relations of the armies a and b. fig. .--line of operations directed against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, as was done by napoleon in the marengo campaign. fig. .--napoleon's plan of campaign in , for the army of the rhine, and the army of reserve. fig. shows the plan adopted by napoleon in the campaign of , to preserve his communications. fig. illustrates the same thing in the campaign of . fig. .--interior and central line of operations. fig. represents a camp of a grand division of an army. the distance from the front row of tents to the line of camp-guards should be from to feet; thence to the line of posts, from to feet; thence to the line of sentinels, from to feet. in many cases, the line of posts between the camp-guards and sentinels may be dispensed with. the distance between battalions will be from to feet; and the same between squadrons and batteries. fig. .--details of encampment for a battalion of infantry. the width of company streets will depend upon the strength of a company, and will be so arranged that the front of the camp shall not exceed the length of the battalion, when drawn up in line of battle. this width will be from to feet. the distance between the tents of each row will be or feet; the distance between the tents of one company and those of another, from to feet. fig. is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. a single company encamping alone, would be arranged in the same way as an entire squadron. the horses are picketed in two lines parallel to the tents, and at a distance from them of about feet. the forage is placed between the tents. a squadron of two companies will occupy a front of about feet. the fires, or company kitchens, should be or feet in rear of the non-commissioned officers' tents. fig is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companies of foot engineers. [the plan of encampment for artillery, as given in the "instruction of u.s. field artillery, horse and foot," may be employed where a single battery encamps by itself, or where only the skeleton of companies is maintained; but it will be found exceedingly inconvenient, where a full battery, with a large train, encamps on the same line with other troops. the plan we have given is that which is employed in most european services.] fig. .--in this plan for mounted artillery and engineers, the fires are so arranged as to expose the ammunition as little as possible to the sparks from the kitchens. fig. .--simple parallel order of battle. .--parallel order, with a crochet on the flank. .--parallel order, reinforced on a wing. .--parallel order, reinforced on the centre. .--simple oblique order. .--oblique order, reinforced on the assailing wing. .--perpendicular order. .--concave order. .--convex order. .--order by echelon on a wing. .--order by echelon on the centre. .--combined order of attack. .--formation of infantry by two deployed lines. , .--- arrangements corresponding to depth of column. .--formation by squares. .--mixed formation of three battalions. .--deep formation of heavy columns. .--formation in columns by brigade. .--formation of two brigades of cavalry, by the mixed system. .--passage of the sound by the british fleet, in . .--attack on copenhagen. .--attack on algiers. .--attack on san juan d'ulloa. .--attack on st. jean d'acre. .--plan of a regular bastioned front of a fortification. .--section of do. do. .--tenaillons. fig. .--demi-tenaillons, with a bonnet. .--a horn-work. .--a crown-work. .--a redan. .--a lunette. .--a mitre or priest-cap. .--a bastioned fort. .--vertical section of a field intrenchment. .--simple sap. .--flying sap. .--full sap. .--crater of a military mine. .--plan of the attack of a regular bastioned work. [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] sun tzu on the art of war the oldest military treatise in the world translated from the chinese by lionel giles, m.a. ( ) [this is the basic text of sun tzu on the art of war. it was extracted from mr. giles' complete work as titled above. the commentary itself, which, of course includes this work embedded within it, has been released as project gutenberg's ebook # .] i. laying plans . sun tzu said: the art of war is of vital importance to the state. . it is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. . the art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. . these are: ( ) the moral law; ( ) heaven; ( ) earth; ( ) the commander; ( ) method and discipline. , . the moral law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger. . heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. . earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. . the commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness. . by method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure. . these five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. . therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:-- . ( ) which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the moral law? ( ) which of the two generals has most ability? ( ) with whom lie the advantages derived from heaven and earth? ( ) on which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? ( ) which army is stronger? ( ) on which side are officers and men more highly trained? ( ) in which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? . by means of these seven considerations i can forecast victory or defeat. . the general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! the general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed! . while heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. . according as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans. . all warfare is based on deception. . hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. . hold out baits to entice the enemy. feign disorder, and crush him. . if he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. if he is in superior strength, evade him. . if your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. . if he is taking his ease, give him no rest. if his forces are united, separate them. . attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. . these military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand. . now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. the general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! it is by attention to this point that i can foresee who is likely to win or lose. ii. waging war . sun tzu said: in the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. such is the cost of raising an army of , men. . when you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. if you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. . again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain. . now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. . thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. . there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. . it is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. . the skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. . bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. thus the army will have food enough for its needs. . poverty of the state exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. . on the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away. . when their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions. , . with this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. . hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. one cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store. . now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. . therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. the captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. . this is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength. . in war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. . thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril. iii. attack by stratagem . sun tzu said: in the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. so, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. . hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. . thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. . the rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. the preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. . the general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. such are the disastrous effects of a siege. . therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. . with his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. this is the method of attacking by stratagem. . it is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. . if equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. . hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force. . now the general is the bulwark of the state; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the state will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the state will be weak. . there are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:-- . ( ) by commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. this is called hobbling the army. . ( ) by attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. this causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. . ( ) by employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. this shakes the confidence of the soldiers. . but when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. this is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away. . thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: ( ) he will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. ( ) he will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. ( ) he will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks. ( ) he will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. ( ) he will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign. . hence the saying: if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. if you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. if you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. iv. tactical dispositions . sun tzu said: the good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. . to secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. . thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. . hence the saying: one may know how to conquer without being able to do it. . security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. . standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. . the general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete. . to see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. . neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole empire says, "well done!" . to lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. . what the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. . hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. . he wins his battles by making no mistakes. making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. . hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. . thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory. . the consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. . in respect of military method, we have, firstly, measurement; secondly, estimation of quantity; thirdly, calculation; fourthly, balancing of chances; fifthly, victory. . measurement owes its existence to earth; estimation of quantity to measurement; calculation to estimation of quantity; balancing of chances to calculation; and victory to balancing of chances. . a victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. . the onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. v. energy . sun tzu said: the control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. . fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. . to ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. . that the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. . in all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. . indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as heaven and earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more. . there are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. . there are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. . there are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. . in battle, there are not more than two methods of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. . the direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. it is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination? . the onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course. . the quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. . therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision. . energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger. . amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. . simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. . hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. . thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. he sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. . by holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. . the clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals. hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy. . when he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. for it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. . thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. so much on the subject of energy. vi. weak points and strong . sun tzu said: whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. . therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. . by holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. . if the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move. . appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected. . an army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not. . you can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.you can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked. . hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack. . o divine art of subtlety and secrecy! through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. . you may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. . if we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. all we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. . if we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. all we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way. . by discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. . we can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few. . and if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits. . the spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. . for should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. if he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. . numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us. . knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. . but if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. how much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred li apart, and even the nearest are separated by several li! . though according to my estimate the soldiers of yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. i say then that victory can be achieved. . though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success. . rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. . carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. . in making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. . how victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. . all men can see the tactics whereby i conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. . do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. . military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. . so in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. . water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. . therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. . he who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. . the five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. there are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing. vii. maneuvering . sun tzu said: in war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. . having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. . after that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. the difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. . thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation. . maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. . if you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. on the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. . thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. . the stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. . if you march fifty li in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal. . if you march thirty li with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive. . we may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. . we cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors. . we are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. . we shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides. . in war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. . whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances. . let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest. . in raiding and plundering be like fire, in immovability like a mountain. . let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt. . when you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery. . ponder and deliberate before you make a move. . he will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. such is the art of maneuvering. . the book of army management says: on the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags. . gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point. . the host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. this is the art of handling large masses of men. . in night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army. . a whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. . now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp. . a clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. this is the art of studying moods. . disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of retaining self-possession. . to be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength. . to refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying circumstances. . it is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. . do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen. . do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. do not interfere with an army that is returning home. . when you surround an army, leave an outlet free. do not press a desperate foe too hard. . such is the art of warfare. viii. variation in tactics . sun tzu said: in war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces . when in difficult country, do not encamp. in country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. in hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. in desperate position, you must fight. . there are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed. . the general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. . the general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account. . so, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the five advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men. . hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together. . if our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. . if, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune. . reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. . the art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable. . there are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: ( ) recklessness, which leads to destruction; ( ) cowardice, which leads to capture; ( ) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; ( ) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame; ( ) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble. . these are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war. . when an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. let them be a subject of meditation. ix. the army on the march . sun tzu said: we come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys. . camp in high places, facing the sun. do not climb heights in order to fight. so much for mountain warfare. . after crossing a river, you should get far away from it. . when an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. it will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack. . if you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross. . moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. so much for river warfare. . in crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay. . if forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. so much for operations in salt-marches. . in dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and on your rear, so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. so much for campaigning in flat country. . these are the four useful branches of military knowledge which enabled the yellow emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. . all armies prefer high ground to low and sunny places to dark. . if you are careful of your men, and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, and this will spell victory. . when you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the ground. . when, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides. . country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, should be left with all possible speed and not approached. . while we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear. . if in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking. . when the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position. . when he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance. . if his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait. . movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. the appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. . the rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. . when there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry. when it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. a few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping. . humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance. violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat. . when the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. . peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. . when there is much running about and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. . when some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. . when the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food. . if those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst. . if the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. . if birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. clamor by night betokens nervousness. . if there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak. if the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. if the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary. . when an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined to fight to the death. . the sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. . too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. . to begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. . when envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. . if the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. . if our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. what we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. . he who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them. . if soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless. if, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless. . therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. this is a certain road to victory. . if in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. . if a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual. x. terrain . sun tzu said: we may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: ( ) accessible ground; ( ) entangling ground; ( ) temporizing ground; ( ) narrow passes; ( ) precipitous heights; ( ) positions at a great distance from the enemy. . ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible. . with regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. then you will be able to fight with advantage. . ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling. . from a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. but if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. . when the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground. . in a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. . with regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. . should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. . with regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. . if the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away. . if you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be to your disadvantage. . these six are the principles connected with earth. the general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them. . now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. these are: ( ) flight; ( ) insubordination; ( ) collapse; ( ) ruin; ( ) disorganization; ( ) rout. . other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the flight of the former. . when the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is insubordination. when the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse. . when the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or not he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin. . when the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganization. . when a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be rout. . these are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post. . the natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general. . he who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. he who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated. . if fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding. . the general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. . regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death. . if, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose. . if we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. . if we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. . if we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory. . hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. . hence the saying: if you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know heaven and know earth, you may make your victory complete. xi. the nine situations . sun tzu said: the art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: ( ) dispersive ground; ( ) facile ground; ( ) contentious ground; ( ) open ground; ( ) ground of intersecting highways; ( ) serious ground; ( ) difficult ground; ( ) hemmed-in ground; ( ) desperate ground. . when a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. . when he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground. . ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground. . ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. . ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it first has most of the empire at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways. . when an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. . mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground. . ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. . ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground. . on dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. on facile ground, halt not. on contentious ground, attack not. . on open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. on the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. . on serious ground, gather in plunder. in difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. . on hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. on desperate ground, fight. . those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear; to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. . when the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep them in disorder. . when it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still. . if asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, i should say: "begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." . rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. . the following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: the further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. . make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. . carefully study the well-being of your men, and do not overtax them. concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. keep your army continually on the move, and devise unfathomable plans. . throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. if they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. . soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. if there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. if they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. if there is no help for it, they will fight hard. . thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be trusted. . prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. . if our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to longevity. . on the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks. but let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a chu or a kuei. . the skillful tactician may be likened to the shuai-jan. now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found in the chung mountains. strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both. . asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, i should answer, yes. for the men of wu and the men of yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. . hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground . the principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach. . how to make the best of both strong and weak--that is a question involving the proper use of ground. . thus the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. . it is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. . he must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them in total ignorance. . by altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. by shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose. . at the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. he carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. . he burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going. . to muster his host and bring it into danger:--this may be termed the business of the general. . the different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. . when invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion. . when you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. when there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. . when you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. when you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. . when you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. when there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. . therefore, on dispersive ground, i would inspire my men with unity of purpose. on facile ground, i would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army. . on contentious ground, i would hurry up my rear. . on open ground, i would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. on ground of intersecting highways, i would consolidate my alliances. . on serious ground, i would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. on difficult ground, i would keep pushing on along the road. . on hemmed-in ground, i would block any way of retreat. on desperate ground, i would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives. . for it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger. . we cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. we are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. we shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides. . to be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince. . when a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy's forces. he overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him. . hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. he carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. . bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue orders without regard to previous arrangements; and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a single man. . confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design. when the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy. . place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. . for it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory. . success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose. . by persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief. . this is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. . on the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries. . be stern in the council-chamber, so that you may control the situation. . if the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. . forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. . walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. . at first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you. xii. the attack by fire . sun tzu said: there are five ways of attacking with fire. the first is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. . in order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. . there is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration. . the proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the sieve, the wall, the wing or the cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind. . in attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments: . ( ) when fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, respond at once with an attack from without. . ( ) if there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack. . ( ) when the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. . ( ) if it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favorable moment. . ( ) when you start a fire, be to windward of it. do not attack from the leeward. . a wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls. . in every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days. . hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. . by means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings. . unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation. . hence the saying: the enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources. . move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. . no ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. . if it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are. . anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. . but a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. . hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. this is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact. xiii. the use of spies . sun tzu said: raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the state. the daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. there will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. as many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor. . hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. this being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height of inhumanity. . one who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. . thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. . now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. . knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men. . hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: ( ) local spies; ( ) inward spies; ( ) converted spies; ( ) doomed spies; ( ) surviving spies. . when these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. this is called "divine manipulation of the threads." it is the sovereign's most precious faculty. . having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district. . having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy. . having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes. . having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy. . surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp. . hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. none should be more liberally rewarded. in no other business should greater secrecy be preserved. . spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. . they cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness. . without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports. . be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business. . if a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told. . whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. . the enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. thus they will become converted spies and available for our service. . it is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. . it is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. . lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions. . the end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy. hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality. . of old, the rise of the yin dynasty was due to i chih who had served under the hsia. likewise, the rise of the chou dynasty was due to lu ya who had served under the yin. . hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. spies are a most important element in water, because on them depends an army's ability to move. [end - sun tzu on the art of war, text-only] none transcriber's note: there is no author cited on the book's title page; however, the book's spine shows "a field officer" page numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed in curly braces, e.g. { }. they have been located where page breaks occurred in the original book. for its index, a page number has been placed only at the start of that section. footnotes have been renumbered sequentially and moved to the end of their respective chapters. the book's index has a number of references to footnotes, e.g. the "(_note_)" entry under "boer war." in such cases, check the referenced page to see which footnote(s) are relevant. lectures on land warfare a tactical manual for the use of infantry officers an examination of the principles which underlie the art of warfare, with illustrations of the principles by examples taken from military history, from the _battle of thermopylae_ b.c. , to the _battle of the sambre_ november - , london william clowes and sons, ltd. jermyn street, s.w. first printed march, {vii} preface the lectures in this volume are based upon the official text-books issued by the imperial general staff and upon the works of recognised authorities on the art of warfare. the aim of the author is to examine the principles which underlie the art of warfare, and to provide illustrations from military history of the _successes_ which have attended knowledge and intelligent application of text-book principles, and of the _disasters_ which have accompanied ignorance or neglect of the teaching provided by the text-books. the "dry bones" of the official publications are clothed with materials which may be supplemented at will by the student of military history, and the lectures may thus, it is hoped, be of assistance to infantry officers, either in the course of their own studies, or as a convenient groundwork upon which the instruction of others may be based. the scope of the work may be gathered from the table of contents and from the index, and it will be seen that the general principles underlying the art of warfare are included in the scheme, while advantage has been taken of the revision of the official text-books to incorporate in the lectures the lessons gained from the experience of leaders in the great war. upwards of citations are made of "battle incidents," and, as an example of the author's methods, attention may perhaps be directed to the reinforcement of the text-book principle of co-operation and mutual support by the citation of an instance, on the grand {viii} scale, by army corps (during the _first battle of the marne_), and on the minor scale, by tanks, bombers, aircraft, and riflemen (during the _first battle of the somme_); to the successful application of established principles by the advanced guard commander at _nachod_, and to the neglect of those principles by "jeb" stuart at _evelington heights_, and by the prussian advanced guard commanders in ; and to the value of musketry training by instancing the successes achieved at the _heights of abraham_, at _bunker hill_, _coruña_, and at _fredericksburg_, which were repeated during the _retreat from mons_ and at the _second battle of the somme_. while every effort has been made to achieve accuracy in citation, and to avoid ambiguity or error in the enunciation of principles, the author will be very grateful if his readers will notify to him (at the address of the publishers) any inaccuracies or omissions which may come under their notice. london, march, . {ix} table of contents pages chronological list of battles cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv-xvii publications cited in the lectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix the art of warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - principles of war--popular fallacies--authorities quoted in support of fixed principles (gen. b. taylor, c. s. army; marshal foch; marshal haig)--necessity for study (gen. sir e. b. hamley; marshal french; marshal foch; napoleon)--"common sense" (abraham lincoln and jefferson davis; general grant)--"higher ranks" fallacy (col. henderson; gen. sir e. b. hamley)--necessity for study proved (col. henderson). strategy and tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - definitions--theatre of operations the kingdom of strategy; field of battle the province of tactics--tactics subservient to strategy (lord roberts's advance; first battle of somme; first battle of cambrai; gen. lew wallace at the monocacy; marshal grouchy at wavre)--moral--idiosyncracies of leaders (napoleon at austerlitz; wellington at sauroren; lee and jackson _versus_ abraham lincoln)--national moral (foch, quoted)--discipline and mobility (battle of hastings)--marching power (stonewall jackson)--time--weather--health--human nature (fabius and roman people; mcclellan and his government; thomas at nashville; roberts in south africa)--the spirit of france ("nous sommes trahis" of and cheers of the poilus in )--great britain--america--lord roberts's previous warning ("germany strikes when germany's hour has struck")--col. henderson on moral of british and american troops--"the contemptible little army"--the new armies (tribute from marshal haig endorsed by marshal foch)--changes in methods of warfare--value of official text-books. the battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - the battle is the "only argument" of war--characteristics of the battle (issue uncertain; human factor; value of reserves; superiority at point of attack)--lee's "partial attacks" at malvern hill of no avail--phases of the battle--information and the initiative (salamanca; first battle of the marne; battle of baccarat)--development of the battle (surprise; "like a bolt from the blue" as at chancellorsville or first battle of cambrai; marshal foch on value of surprise)--the decisive blow--arbela. {x} how battles are influenced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - commander's influence by his orders and by his employment of reserves--subordinates must "bring to fruit the scheme of the higher command"--the "fog of battle"--information--co-operation (on grand scale at first battle of the marne; on minor scale at gneudecourt)--fire tactics--value of withholding fire (heights of abraham; bunker hill; fredericksburg; retreat from mons)--enfilade and reverse fire (the bluff in ypres salient)--movement--advancing under fire--withdrawing under fire in "delaying action"--holding on (untimely surrender at soissons; stubborn defence at first and second battles of ypres; trônes wood; bourlon village; polygon wood; givenchy)--covering fire--fire and movement inseparably associated. types of battle action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - three distinct systems--the defensive battle seldom effects positive results (gettysburg; fredericksburg)--the offensive battle (marlborough; frederick the great; napoleon; wellington; grant; franco-prussian war; battle of blenheim described)--the defensive-offensive battle (marengo; austerlitz; dresden; vittoria; orthez; toulouse; waterloo; final battles of the great war; battle of waterloo described)--opportunities for "restoring" the battle (antietam)--chancellorsville a great defensive-offensive battle--passing from the "guard" to the "thrust" (second battle of the marne). the attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - culminating point of all manoeuvres--quick decision required or "position warfare" will supervene--second battle of the somme--methods of attack--two plans--decisive blow on pre-determined spot or in direction ascertained by fighting--strength of the attack--disposition of the troops--forward body, supports and local reserves--general reserve--the commander's plans--the position of assembly (banks's single column defeated by forrest in red river valley)--the attacking force (st. privat; plevna)--the decisive attack--advantages and disadvantages of frontal and flank attacks--decisive attack must be followed up (gettysburg; chattanooga)--detailing the units--artillery in attack (verneville; colenso; mobility and protection of modern artillery)--cavalry in attack (appomattox and paardeberg; ramadie; bagdadieh; gaines's mill; gettysburg; first battle of cambrai; battle of amiens; second battle of le cateau; archangel front; battle of the sambre)--royal engineers--medical arrangements--supply--commander's position--battle reports--reorganisation and pursuit ("success must be followed up until the enemy's power is ruined.") formation of infantry for the attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . - the platoon (square and diamond formations; ground scouts; flank scouts; behind a barrage)--the platoon commander ("appreciating the situation")--the company--the company commander--the battalion--the battalion commander (personal examples; monchy le preux; battle of cambrai; second battle of the somme). {xi} defensive action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - counter-attack the soul of defence--reasons for adopting defensive attitude (chancellorsville)--defensive-offensive battles (marengo, austerlitz, and waterloo)--obligatory defensive--(nachod; thermopylae; horatius codes; second battle of the somme; rorke's drift; le quesnoy)--voluntary occupation for future use (salamanca; soissons; hal and tubize)--delaying action--the offensive spirit--defence in modern warfare--inventions have strengthened the defence (quotations from marshals foch and french and from "f. s. r.")--position warfare and its characteristics--entrenchments (torres vedras)--defensive systems--choosing a position (framework of artillery and machine guns filled in with defensive posts manned by infantry)--the outpost zone--the battle position--the "semi-permanent" system--pill-boxes and concrete forts--common characteristics of defensive action--the active defence--position must suit plans--must not be too extensive or too narrow (condé-mons-binche line; retreat from mons; ypres)--field of fire--flanks--cover--artillery positions--depth--lateral communications--lines of withdrawal--changes of base (retreat from mons; seven days' battle; campaign in the wilderness)--luring victorious enemy away from battlefield (grouchy at wavre)--line for decisive counter-attack (ramillies; belgians behind river gette)--dividing the troops--troops to hold the position--rôle of local reserves (talavera; fredericksburg)--general reserve for decisive counter-attack (spottsylvania)--artillery positions--division into sectors--position of general reserve (second battle of the somme)--position and action of the cavalry (roliça, chancellorsville; gettysburg; sadowa; rezonville; balaclava; first battle of le cateau; retreat from mons; cugny; no german cavalry available in second battle of the somme to counteract defensive action of british squadrons)--rallying place--reorganisation and pursuit after decisive counter-attack. protection and reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - marshal foch on "surprise"--detachments provided to protect main body--close connection between protection and reconnaissance--radius of reconnoitre increased by aircraft--position warfare (air photographs; observation posts; patrols; raiding parties; entrenchments; box respirators; camouflage)--manoeuvre warfare (protection from aircraft; advanced guard; flank guard; rear guard; outposts). the advanced guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - "i never expected it" a disgraceful admission--every moving force requires a guard--strength (numbers employed depend upon size of force protected and tactical situation; strategical advanced guard enables tactical advanced guard to be reduced)--distance--in advances (dash and resolution required but interests of main body paramount)--in retreats--training must be realistic--tactical principles (vanguard for reconnaissance; main guard for resistance; communication essential; error at sulphur springs; success at fredericksburg and first battle of the marne; false tactics of prussian advanced guards in - ; excellent work at nachod)--advanced guard problems (seven examples, including "jeb" stuart at evelington heights). {xii} flank attacks and flank guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - vulnerability of flanks and necessity for guards--who furnishes them--tactics similar to those prescribed for advanced guards--lines of communications--convoys--raids on the lines of communications (gen. turner ashby; "jeb" stuart; stonewall jackson's skill; col. madritov's raid; sannah's post; ramdam). the rear guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - nature of rear guard work--strength--composition-- distribution--distance--tactical principles (rear party watches; main guard fights for time; sannah's post)--training--eye for ground (napoleon; gen. r. e. lee)--examples of rear guard work (first battle of le cateau and the retreat from mons; second battle of the somme; les boeufs; le quesnoy; roliça; coruña; value of musketry; bristow station; j. v. moreau). outposts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - outposts prevent interference with plans and provide security by observation and resistance--strength--observation (aircraft; mobile patrols; outpost companies)--resistance (infantry, artillery, and machine guns; sentry groups, piquets, supports, and reserves)--distance (effective fire of various arms the controlling factor)--outpost commander--information and orders--the outpost line of resistance--the outpost company (piquets, supports, detached posts, reserves; the piquet commander; patrols; sentry groups)--day and night work--disasters through neglect of tactical principles (chateau of chambord; tweefontein)--battle outposts (broenbeek; fredericksburg). tactical reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - reconnaissance for attack--intelligence officers--reconnaissance by raids--position warfare--reconnaissance for defence--position warfare. night operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - reason for operations by night (secrecy; frederick the great's coat)--night marches (direction; protection; secrecy; connection)--"rules of thumb"--night advances (surprise; direction; position of deployment; connection)--night assaults (first battle of the somme; serre hill; vimy ridge; messines-wytschaete; villers brétonneux; morlancourt; spottsylvania)--limitations of night assaults--smoke and its advantages and disadvantages--successful and unsuccessful night assaults (rappahannock station--peiwar kotal--tel-el-kebir; stormberg; magersfontein)--position of deployment--distinguishing badges, etc.--watchword--precautions against checks--secrecy--"rules of thumb." {xiii} fighting in close country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - restrictions on view and on movement--advantages for attack against defence--savage warfare (isandhlwana; rorke's drift; tofrik; toski; teutoberger wald)--civilised warfare (villages and woods attract troops; gravelotte; spicheren; worth; the wilderness; sedan; defence of bazeilles; noisseville)--attack on woods (tanks; gauche; villers guislain; messines)--advancing from captured position--defence of woods--fighting patrols--attack on villages (tanks; light mortars)--defence of villages (delaying action; providing a "funnel"). characteristics of the various arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . - close combination of all arms required--infantry (extent and limitations of mobility; the decisive arm in battle; the rifle and bayonet; the lewis gun; ranges of rifles and machine guns; grenades; hand grenades; rifle grenades; light mortars; machine guns)--mounted troops (cavalry; mounted rifles; cyclists)--artillery--light artillery (pack guns; pack howitzers; horse artillery: field guns; field howitzers)--light guns against aircraft and tanks--medium artillery--(medium guns; medium howitzers)--heavy artillery (heavy guns; heavy howitzers)--super-heavy artillery (super-heavy guns; super-heavy howitzers)--table of artillery ranges--mortars and light mortars--royal engineers--tanks--aircraft (aeroplanes; kite balloons)--gas--smoke. operation orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - orders should be written when possible--should be "fool proof"--ambiguity to be avoided--the enemy are . . . my intention is . . . you will--initiative not to be hampered. index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - {xv} chronological table of battles pages defence of sublician bridge (legendary) pass of thermopylae (b.c. ) battle of arbela (b.c. ) ------ cannae (b.c. ) defeat of varus by arminius (a.d. ) - battle of stamford bridge (sept. , ) ------ hastings (oct. , ) - ------ blenheim (aug. , ) - ------ ramillies (may , ) , ------ malplaquet (sept. , ) ------ leuthen (dec. , ) heights of abraham (sept. , ) battle of bunker hill (june , ) ------ ettlingen (july - , ) ------ marengo (june , ) , ------ hohenlinden (dec. , ) ------ austerlitz (dec. , ) - , , , ------ jena (oct. , ) ------ roliça (aug. , ) , ------ coruña (jan. , ) - ------ talavera (july - , ) lines of torres vedras (oct.-nov. ) - battle of salamanca (july , ) , ------ vittoria (june , ) ------ sauroren (july , ) ------ dresden (aug. - , ) , ------ orthez (feb. , ) defence of soissons (march , ) , battle of toulouse (april , ) ----- quatre bras (june , ) ------ ligny (june , ) , , - ------ waterloo (june , ) , - , , ------ wavre (june - , ) , ------ balaclava (oct. , ) shenandoah valley campaign ( ) , , , battle of mcdowell (may , ) ------ cross keys (june , ) seven days' battle (june-july, ) , battle of gaines's mill (june , ) , ------ malvern hill (july - , ) , - , , , {xvi} battle of evelington heights (july , ) - ------ bull run ( ) (aug. , ) ------ antietam (sept. , ) , , ------ fredericksburg (nov. , ) , , , , , , - ------ chancellorsville (may - , ) , , , , , ------ gettysburg (july - , ) , , , - , ------ sulphur springs (oct. , ) ------ bristow station (oct. , ) ------ rappahannock station (nov. , ) ------ chattanooga (nov. , ) - ------ pleasant hill (april, ) ------ the wilderness (may , ) , , , , - , - , ------ monocacy (july , ) ------ nashville (dec. - , ) ------ appomattox (april , ) , ------ nachod (june , ) , , ------ sadowa (july , ) ------ spicheren (aug. , ) - , ------ worth (aug. , ) , , ------ colombey (aug. , ) - ------ rezonville (aug. , ) ------ gravelotte (aug. , ) ------ verneville (aug. , ) ------ st. privat (aug. , ) ------ noisseville (aug. , ) ------ sedan (sept. , ) , ------ metz (oct. , ) ------ chambord (dec. , ) ------ plevna (dec. , ) ------ peiwar kotal (dec. , ) ------ isandhlwana (jan. , ) , ------ rorke's drift (jan. , ) - , ------ tel-el-kebir (sept. , ) - ------ tofrik (march , ) ------ toski (aug. , ) ------ adowa (feb. , ) ------ stormberg (dec. , ) ------ magersfontein (dec. - , ) ------ colenso (dec. , ) ------ ramdam (feb. , ) ------ paardeberg (feb. , ) , ------ sannah's post (march , ) , ------ tweefontein (dec. , ) ------ the yalu (may , ) - the great war battle of le gateau (aug. ) ------ river gette (aug. ) condé-mons-binche (aug. - , ) battle of charleroi (aug. , ) ------ baccarat (aug. , ) retreat from mons (aug. ) , , - , , , , {xvii} first battle of the marne (sept. ) - , - , , first battle of ypres (oct. -nov. , ) , , - , second battle of ypres (april -may , ) , , defence of verdun (feb.-aug. ) , battle of ypres salient (march , ) first battle of the somme (july -nov. , ) , , , , , , , , , - battle of serre hill (feb. - , ) - ------ messines (june , ) , , chemin des dames (april-july, ) battle of vimy (april , ) ------ arras (april -june , ) monchy le preux (april , ) third battle of ypres (sept. , ) - , battle of broenbeek (oct. , ) first battle of cambrai (nov. , ) , , , , , the piave line (italy) (nov. , ) second battle of the somme (march -april , ) , , , - , , , , , , , , - , battle of villers-brétonneux (april - , ) ------ morlancourt (june , ) second battle of the marne (july , ) battle of amiens (aug. - , ) , ------ bapaume (aug. -sept. , ) ------ havrincourt and epehy (sept. - , ) second battle of cambrai (sept. -oct. , ) , battle of flanders (sept. -oct. , ) second battle of le cateau (oct. - , ) , , battle of the selle (oct. - , ) ------ sambre (nov. - , ) , , armistice day (nov. , ) , mesopotamia battle of ramadie (sept. - , ) ------ bagdadieh (march , ) - north russia archangel province (aug.-sept. ) - {xix} publications cited in the lectures "field service regulations," parts i. and ii. "infantry training," parts i. and ii. clery, major-general sir c. f., k.c.b.: "minor tactics." creasy, sir edward: "fifteen decisive battles at the world." foch, maréchal ferdinand: "principles of war." french of ypres, field-marshal earl, k.p.: " ." grant, general ulysses s., united states army: "memoirs." haig of bemersyde, field-marshal earl, k.t.: "sir d. haig's dispatches." haking, lieut.-general sir r. c. b., g.b.e.: "staff bides, etc." hamley, general sir e. b., k.c.b.: "operations of war." henderson, colonel g. f. r., c.b.: "stonewall jackson." "the science of war." napier, sir william francis patrick, k.c.b.; "history of the peninsular war." "ole luk-oie." _see_ swinton. swinton, major-general e. d., c.b.: "the green curve." taylor, general r., confederate states army: "destruction and reconstruction." { } lectures on land warfare the art of warfare "the art of war, like every other art, possesses its theory, its principles; otherwise, it would not be an art."--marshal foch. the art of war, like any other art, is based upon certain fixed principles, and there is no short cut which hurries the student to his goal. the long and laborious line of study is the only safe way, and there are many pitfalls to be avoided on the road. one of these pitfalls is dug by those who maintain, whenever a new war breaks out, that all previous warlike knowledge must be thrown on the scrap-heap and attention paid only to the problems of the hour. another is the alluring trap that warfare is "merely a matter of common sense"; and a third is the oft-expressed idea that knowledge is required of the general, and that compliance with orders is sufficient for the subaltern officer. knowledge of principles essential.--with regard to the first of these difficulties, the opinions of recognised authorities on the art of warfare may be consulted. "the cardinal principles on which the art of war is based are few and unchangeable, resembling in this the code of morality; but their application varies with the theatre of the war, the genius and temper of the people engaged, and the kind of arms employed" (general r. taylor, c.s. army). "although the manifold inventions of modern times have given to warfare { } a wider scope and fresh materials, it remains obedient to the same laws as in the past; but it applies these laws with means more numerous, more powerful, and more delicate" (marshal foch). "this war has given us no new principles; but different mechanical appliances--and in particular the rapid improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes, the use of immense numbers of machine guns and lewis guns, the employment of vast quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous expansion of artillery, and the provision of great masses of motor transport--have introduced new problems of considerable complexity concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and services. much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already working" (marshal haig). the laws of war are not in themselves difficult to understand, but their successful application on the field of battle requires that they should be carefully studied and considered in all their aspects. "the mind can only be trained to this by close study of campaigns, and by the solution of definite problems on maps and on the ground" (general sir e. b. hamley). "a lifelong experience of military study and thought has taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of troops must be instinctive. i know that in putting the science of war into practice it is necessary that its main tenets should form, so to speak, part of one's flesh and blood. in war there is little time to think, and the right thing to do must come like a flash--it must present itself to the mind as perfectly _obvious_" (marshal french). the same idea is expressed by the generalissimo of the largest victorious force that was ever controlled by one mind. "generally speaking, grave situations partially obscure even a bright intellect. it is therefore with a fully equipped mind that one ought to start in order to make war or even to understand { } war. no study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one _can_ in order to apply what one knows. in order to _do_ even a little one has to know a great deal, and to know it well. . . . the right solution imposes itself; namely, the application, according to circumstances, of fixed principles. . . . incapacity and ignorance cannot be called extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all" (marshal foch); and in the words of napoleon's own maxim: "the only way to learn the art of war is to read and _re-read_ the campaigns of the great captains." the "common-sense" fallacy.--the fallacy that warfare is "merely a matter of common sense" has been exposed by colonel g. f. r. henderson, in his contrast of the conduct of the american civil war of - , when it was controlled by president lincoln and his cabinet in washington, and when it was handed over without reserve to a professional soldier in the field (general grant). few mortals have possessed "common sense" in greater abundance than abraham lincoln, and yet he permitted interference with his generals' plans, which were frequently brought to nought by such interference, and but for a like hindrance of the confederate generals by jefferson davis this well-intentioned "common sense" would have been even more disastrous. "men who, aware of their ignorance, would probably have shrunk from assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no hesitation whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army" (henderson, "stonewall jackson"). in june, , the confederate armies were scattered from strasburg (in the valley) to fredericksburg (in spottsylvania); general hooker, commanding the army of the potomac in the field, begged to be allowed to attack lee's corps in detail. success was certain, but permission was refused. the one and only idea of the federal government was to keep the army of the potomac between lee and the federal capital. { } the "higher ranks" fallacy.--the same writer has also protested vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the field is confined to the higher ranks. "every officer in charge of a detached force or flying column, every officer who for the time being has to act independently, every officer in charge of a patrol, is constantly brought face to face with strategical considerations; and success or failure, even where the force is insignificant, will depend upon his familiarity with strategical principles" ("the science of war"). in the same way, general sir e. b. hamley, in "the operations of war explained," points out that a commander who cannot look beyond the local situation is not competent to command a detachment, however small. in addition, it must be remembered that superior knowledge of the art of war, thorough acquaintance with duty, and large experience, seldom fail to command submission and respect. troops fight with marked success when they feel that their leader "knows his job," and in every army troops are the critics of their leaders. the achievements of jackson's forces in the _shenandoah valley campaign_ of were almost superhuman, but under stonewall jackson the apparently impossible tasks were undertaken and achieved. general ewell, one of jackson's commanders, stated that he shivered whenever one of stonewall's couriers approached him. "i was always expecting him to order me to assault the north pole! but, if he _had_ ordered, we should have done it!" the necessity for study.--it is not pretended by any sane writer that study alone will make a perfect officer, for it is universally recognised that no amount of theoretical training can supply the knowledge gained by direct and immediate association with troops in the field; nor is it claimed that study will make a dull man brilliant, or confer resolution and rapid decision on one who is timid and irresolute by nature. but "the quick, { } the resolute, the daring, deciding and acting rapidly, as is their nature, will be all the more likely to decide and act correctly in proportion as they have studied the art they are called upon to practise" ("the science of war"). theory, applied to the profession of arms, is to some a word of most obnoxious sound, but it is obnoxious only to those who refuse to listen to the advice, or to take warning from the practice, of napoleon, of wellington, of foch, and of many of the most famous generals of history. "a man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of napoleon's warfare would hardly fail in all circumstances to make his enemy's communications his first objective; and if wellington's tactical methods had become a second nature to him it would be strange indeed if he were seduced into delivering a purely frontal attack. . . . the same tactical principles regulate the combat of a large force and a small, and it is the thorough grasp of the principles, combined with courage and coolness, that makes a capable leader, whether of a platoon or an army corps" ("the science of war"). { } strategy and tactics definitions.--strategy and tactics have often been treated by non-military writers as if they were independent branches of the soldier's profession, but while they may indeed be separately defined it will be found in practice that they cannot be separately considered. the theatre of operations is the kingdom of strategy, the province of tactics is the field of battle, but when the battlefield is reached it so far transcends in importance every other point in the theatre of operations that no _tactical_ end is worth aiming at in preference to striking with all available strength at the field force of the enemy, and this, it will be seen, is the goal of all _strategical_ combinations. "strategy must ever be striving for tactical success; tactics must ever keep in mind the strategical situation and must constantly aim at creating fresh strategical opportunities. tactics without strategy resembles a man without legs; strategy without tactics is like a man without arms" (general sir e. b. hamley). "to seek out the enemy's armies--the centre of the adversary's power--in order to beat and destroy them; to adopt, with this sole end in view, the direction and tactics which will lead to it in the quickest and safest way: such is the whole mental attitude of modern war. no strategy can henceforth prevail over that which aims at ensuring tactical results, victory by fighting" (marshal foch). local successes on the _field of battle_ often have effects that are felt throughout the _theatre of operations_. lord roberts's advance on pretoria relieved the pressure on kimberley in the west and on ladysmith in the east, and these centres are upwards of miles apart. _the { } first battle of the somme_ (july , ) not only relieved the pressure on verdun but held in position large enemy forces which would otherwise have been employed against our allies in the east. general byng's surprise attack at cambrai (november , ) was followed by a determined counter-attack by the germans on november , which appeared to nullify the results achieved from november to ; but "there is evidence that german divisions intended for the italian theatre were diverted to the cambrai front, and it is probable that the further concentration of german forces against italy was suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period, when our allies were making their first stand on the piave line" (sir d. haig's dispatches). a tactical defeat may sometimes be risked to serve a strategic end. in june, , general hunter was operating with a federal army in the shenandoah valley, and owing to shortage of supplies was forced to fall back. in so doing he uncovered the national capital, and general early was sent by the confederate commander-in-chief to capture washington. general grant took immediate steps to protect the capital by the dispatch of troops, and to further this end, general lew wallace,[ ] on his own initiative, confronted early's corps at the _monocacy_ on july , . he met the enemy and was defeated, but he delayed early's corps until the troops sent by grant were in position. "if early had been but one day _earlier_ he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements i had sent. general wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him, a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory" (grant's "memoirs"). a tactical success may be not only useless, but actually inopportune, if it is out of accord with the plans of the higher command. on the morning of june , , marshal grouchy was in { } pursuit of the prussians whom napoleon had defeated on june at ligny. although urged "to march to the sound of the cannon" (at waterloo), grouchy pushed on eastwards, where he found thielmann's prussian corps of , men holding the passage across the dyle at wavre. the _battle of wavre_ was begun at p.m. on june , and by a.m. on the next day grouchy was victorious. but his victory was barren. his tactical achievement was useless to the higher command and had exposed his own force to considerable danger. as he sat down to pen a vainglorious dispatch to the emperor, he received the news that napoleon was a fugitive and the imperial army defeated and scattered. grouchy's feeble and false manoeuvres had permitted blücher to join forces with wellington. to the emperor's dismay it was the prussians who came from the eastward to the sound of the cannon: "c'est les prussiens qui viennent!" moral.--it is seen that strategy may be defined as the art of concentrating troops at the required strength, at the required time, at the required place, for the purpose of overthrowing the enemy's main armies; while tactics may be defined as the art of arranging and handling troops so concentrated for the purpose of defeating the enemy when encountered. but although strategy may be considered as the art of bringing an opponent to battle, and tactics as the art of defeating him in action, there are excluded from these definitions many considerations which influence a commander in the field. the art of war does not commence with a strategical reconnaissance from the air, or the saddle, to ascertain whether, and if so in what locality and in what strength, hostile troops are being concentrated. from information so obtained, the physical force of an enemy may indeed be determined; but "in war (said napoleon) moral force is to the physical (that is, to numbers and { } armament) as three to one," and upwards of a hundred years later the same idea has again been expressed. "to understand war you must go beyond its instruments and materials; you must study in the book of history, conscientiously analysed, armies, troops in movement and in action, with their needs, their passions, their devotions, their capacities of all kinds. that is the essence of the subject, that is the point of departure for a reasonable study of the art of war" (marshal foch). and while dealing with moral force it must be remembered that the moral force of opposing leaders of nations or of armies is at least as important as that of the nations or armies themselves, for a war is a struggle between human intelligences rather than between masses of men. "there have been soldiers' battles but never a soldiers' campaign" ("the science of war"). "it was not the roman legions which conquered gaul, it was caesar. it was not the french army which reached the weser and the inn, it was turenne" (napoleon). a commander must, therefore, take into account the character, the moral fibre, as well as the ability and the means at the disposal of his adversary. he must project his mind to his adversary's council chamber, and putting himself in his place must conjecture how a man of that character and of that ability will act under the given circumstances. history supplies many examples of mental activity of this kind.[ ] napoleon predicted the impetuous onset of the russian left wing against his right at _austerlitz_, dec. , , because he knew the temperament of the tsar alexander. at austerlitz, the most brilliant of all his battles, napoleon had , troops and was confronted by , austrians and russians drawn up on the heights of pratzen. his plan was to draw the weight of the russian attack against his right--which was so disposed as to invite the headstrong and { } self-confident tsar "to administer a lesson in generalship to napoleon"--and then to launch a superior attack against the heights, which contained a village and a knoll, the key to the position; and finally to hurl his general reserve in a decisive counter-attack on the russians when they were involved in battle with his right wing. when the rattle of musketry and booming of the guns showed that his right was engaged, napoleon launched murat, bernadotte, and soult against the allied centre; when soult was master of the village and the knoll, and as the broken remnants of the enemy's centre were streaming down the reverse slopes of the pratzen ridge, the french centre wheeled round to the right and threw itself upon the flank and rear of the russians, who were still heavily engaged in their original attack. these operations were completely successful and over , of the opposing armies were accounted for. wellington defeated soult at sauroren in the pyrenees (july , ) by taking advantage of a minor incident. he had ridden forward to see the disposition of the french forces, and as his men cheered him all along the line, he turned to his staff and said, "soult is a very cautious commander. he will delay his attack to find out what those cheers mean; that will give time for the sixth division to arrive and i shall beat him"--and the event turned out exactly as he had predicted. generals r. e. lee and t. j. jackson frequently played upon the nervousness of president lincoln for the safety of washington, and by threatening to cross the potomac induced him to withdraw troops that were advancing against richmond. national moral.--the moral fibre of the nation and of the troops must also be taken into consideration. "the common theory that, in order to win, an army must have superiority of rifles and cannon, better bases, more wisely chosen positions, is radically false. for it leaves out of account the most important part of the { } problem, that which animates it and makes it live, man--with his moral, intellectual, and physical qualities" (marshal foch). discipline and morality.--the discipline, courage, and endurance of the troops, as well as the cause for which they are fighting, are at least of equal importance to their armament and numbers. "if their discipline and leading be defective, providence seldom sides with the big battalions . . . and troops that cannot march are untrustworthy auxiliaries" ("the science of war"). "an army which cannot march well is almost certain to be outmanoeuvred. a general whose strategy is based upon time calculations that are rendered inaccurate by the breakdown of the marching power of his troops runs grave risk of disaster. it is therefore necessary that the question of marching should be studied, not only by generals and staff officers, but by regimental officers and men. it is on the latter that the hardships and exertions fall, and their cheerful endurance can best be ensured by teaching them the great results attainable by an army which can move faster and further than its adversary, as well as the dangers incurred by an army which allows itself to be out-marched. . . . superior mobility alone enabled frederick the great to move 'like a panther round an ox' so as to place his army across the enemy's flank. the discipline of his troops enabled him to apply the principles of combination" (general sir e. b. hamley). "nothing compensates for absence of discipline; and the constant watchfulness that is necessary in war, even when danger seems remote, can only be secured by discipline, which makes of duty a habit" (general r. taylor, c.s. army). at the _battle of hastings_ (oct. , ) lack of discipline and disobedience of orders changed the fate of the english nation and brought about the norman conquest. harold, the english king, had defeated the forces of harold hadraade, { } king of norway, at stamford bridge in yorkshire (sept. , ). four days later, duke william of normandy landed in pevensey bay, with , horse and foot. harold hastened south to meet him with troops exhausted by battle and marching. after halting six days in london to collect reinforcements, the english force entrenched itself on the hill of sautlache and awaited attack. the normans were unable to penetrate the abattis, but they gained the victory which changed the whole history of the english race by the stratagem of a feigned retreat. harold's undisciplined auxiliaries, contrary to direct orders (which were obeyed by the "regular" troops in the centre), swarmed out of the palisades in pursuit of the fleeing normans, who suddenly turned about and penetrated the english lines mingled with the discomfited auxiliaries. had the "irregulars" shown the same sense of discipline as the "regulars" there had been no norman conquest. with regard to marching, general t. j. jackson once observed, in reply to an allusion to his severe marching, that "it is better to lose one man in marching than five in fighting." acting on this principle he invariably surprised his enemy, the most notable instances being his surprise of milroy at mcdowell, of banks and fremont in the valley, of mcclellan's right at gaines's mill, of pope at the second manassas, and his last and greatest of hooker at chancellorsville. time.--time is often a supreme factor in warfare, and the superior mobility of troops will gain for their commander a great strategical advantage. reserves are of little value if they cannot be concentrated at the right spot at the right moment, and steamships, railways, and mechanical transport thus play an important part in war. the mobility of infantry is often the deciding factor in battle, and campaigns have been won by the legs of soldiers as much as by their arms. { } weather.--the weather is an important factor in war, and its influence appears to have increased in modern times. mists and fogs militate against observation by aircraft, and poor visibility interferes with the work of artillery. roads are broken up by the weight of modern traffic, and in a shelled area the craters become impassable after a few days rain, making the supply of food, stores and ammunition a serious problem. such conditions multiply the difficulties of attack, as the ground of the encounter consists principally of hastily dug trenches which become running streams of mud; and they assist the defence, as the pursuit is delayed, while the ground behind the defending force is less liable to be churned up by shell fire. the bad weather of september, , caused a delay in the allied advance against sailly-saillesel and le transloy and made it necessary to abandon the plan at the moment when previous successes seemed to have brought it within the grasp of the commanders. as the season advanced and the bad weather continued the plans of the allies had to be reduced, and the brilliant successes already achieved afforded some indication of what might have been accomplished had the weather permitted the plans to be carried out as originally intended. health.--"wars may be won or lost by the standard of health and moral of the opposing forces. moral depends to a very large extent upon the feeding and general well-being of the troops. badly supplied troops will invariably be low in moral, and an army ravaged by disease ceases to be a fighting force. the feeding and health of the fighting forces are dependent upon the rearward services, and so it may be argued that with the rearward services rests victory or defeat" (marshal haig). human nature.--human nature is affected by discipline, fear, hunger, confidence in or distrust of leaders, and by a variety of other influences, and human { } nature is more important than armament and numbers. "no great deeds have ever been performed by an army in which the qualities of courage and steadfast endurance are wanting" (general sir e. b. hamley), and the steadfast endurance of a nation and of its leaders is also a factor of supreme importance. time occupied in preparation for battle, or in manoeuvring for the "weather gauge," is seldom wasted; but it involves the risk of a weak-kneed executive yielding to popular clamour. against the strategical and tactical genius of hannibal, quintus fabius maximus invoked the aid of time to afford him opportunities to strike. his "fabian tactics" have become proverbial, and earned for him at the time the opprobrious epithet "cunctator," which the epigram[ ] of ennius has immortalised in his honour. popular clamour led to a division of authority with varro, and to the disaster of _cannae_ (b.c. ). general g. b. mcclellan was recalled from the army of the potomac on account of his failure to convert the drawn battle of the _antietam_ (sept. , ) into a victory, and the army was handed over to general burnside, who suffered defeat at _fredericksburg_ (dec. , ) with terrible slaughter. "but the stout heart of the american nation quickly rallied, and inspired by the loyal determination of abraham lincoln the united states turned once more to their apparently hopeless task" (colonel g. f. r. henderson). mcclellan's forte was organisation, and although at first slow in the field, he had assembled and trained a magnificent fighting force, with which he was "feeling his way to victory." he suffered defeat indeed at _gaines's mill_ (june , ), the first act in the drama of the _seven days' battle around richmond_. day after day he fell back through swamp and forest, battling with lee's victorious troops. but there was no further disaster. under the most adverse and dispiriting circumstances the army of the potomac fairly held their own until { } they reached the impregnable position of malvern hill. there mcclellan turned at bay and repulsed with heavy slaughter the disjointed attacks of the army of northern virginia. he had withdrawn his army intact and had effected a change of base, unknown to the confederate general staff, from the york river to the james. this proved his strategic power, as did the dispositions at _malvern hill_ (july , ) his tactical ability, and his work was accomplished in spite of the intrigues of politicians and the opposition of the executive, and in face of the military genius of generals r. e. lee and t. j. jackson. at the antietam he forced the confederates to give battle, and although tactically indecisive, the engagement caused the withdrawal of lee's army into virginia. mcclellan's successors were far less competent, and the magnificent army of the potomac met with frequent disasters, until it formed the solid nucleus of the forces of general meade, which inflicted upon lee his first defeat and saved the union at _gettysburg_ (july - , ), and finally under grant, in conjunction with the armies of the west, crushed the life out of the confederacy at _appomattox_. general g. h. thomas, in command of the u.s. army of the cumberland, refused battle with the confederates in nashville until he had prepared cavalry and made every other arrangement for pursuit. constancy of purpose was the salient feature of thomas's military character. he would not fight until he was ready. the civil authorities urgently demanded that he should advance. so great was the tension that grant finally sent general j. a. logan to supersede thomas; but before logan arrived thomas had won the _battle of nashville_ (dec. - , ), the most crushing victory of the war. lord roberts landed in cape town on jan. , , and popular expectation was degenerating into impatience when a co-ordinated advance of french's cavalry and the sixth and ninth infantry divisions { } resulted in the relief of beleagured cities distant from the field of battle, and in the surrender on the field of cronje's force at _paardeberg_ (feb. , ), on the anniversary of majuba. the spirit of france.--in all calculations on which a declaration of war is based the moral fibre of the actual and potential enemy nations is fully considered. it is difficult to imagine that the headquarters staff of the german and austrian armies failed to bring under review the moral of the nations against whom their armies were to be launched in july, . the spirit of france had shown no signs of deterioration, but was to be quelled by a rapid advance through neutral territories, to bring about a bewildered collapse, as in , before the russian mobilisation was complete, and "nous sommes trahis" was again to be heard from the disheartened troops. but the calm determination of the commander and his generals in the dark days of august, , prevented the bewildered collapse, and the _defence of verdun_ from february to august, , and the cheers of the _poilus_, as they recaptured the _chemin des dames_ in april-july, , replaced the capitulation of sedan and of metz and the "nous sommes trahis" of . great britain.--britain was not expected to take an active part in the struggle, and if she did the affairs of ireland, the suffragette movement, and the general decadence of the nation would prevent a whole-hearted prosecution of the war. a small force only could be sent to europe; it would be swallowed up in the "bewildered collapse," and no reinforcements could be spared. the extent of the miscalculation is shown in mr. lloyd george's speech in the house of commons on july , , in which the prime minister stated that the british empire had put , , men under arms, had raised , , , pounds in taxes and loans, and had suffered upwards of , , casualties on land and { } sea. it was also shown that during the last two years of the war the british armies had borne the brunt of the heaviest fighting on the western front in france and at the same time had destroyed the armed forces of the turkish empire in the east. the risk of compelling britain to take part was undertaken, and the first great strategical blunder of the war was committed. america.--in the third year of the war america had gradually been brought into the arena, and a further miscalculation arrayed the hundred millions of a free and united nation against the autocracies of central europe. lord roberts.--other brains than german had considered the possibility of an armed conflict in europe. for many years lord roberts had advocated universal military service in the united kingdom, as a procedure beneficial in itself, and imperative on account of the clear intentions of the headquarters staff of the german army. "germany strikes when germany's hour has struck," was his warning note, and although apparently unheeded by the nation, his warning was not without effect upon the training of the regular army. colonel henderson.--military writers in the united kingdom had also considered the possibility of a conflict with the armed forces of germany, and in all their treatises the moral of the nation was passed under review. colonel g. f. r. henderson, in "the science of war," had even envisaged a struggle in which not only the troops of britain and the overseas dominions but those of the united states would take part, and his estimate of the moral of the race on both sides of the atlantic, and in both hemispheres, was fully justified by the events of the war. colonel henderson found in the race something more than toughness in its moral fibre, for he adds, "tactical ability is the birthright of { } our race. . . . in a conflict on the vastest scale (the american civil war) the tactics of the american troops, at a very early period, were superior to those of the prussians in . in strategy, controlled as it was on both sides by the civil governments and not by the military chiefs, grave errors were committed, but on the field of battle the racial instinct asserted itself. nor were the larger tactical manoeuvres even of an improvement on those of the american campaigns. . . . but in , skobeleff, the first of european generals to master the problem of the offensive, knew the american war 'by heart,' and in his successful assaults on the turkish redoubts he followed the plan of the american generals on both sides, when attempting to carry such positions; to follow up the assaulting columns with fresh troops, without waiting for the first column to be repulsed." after the civil war, general forrest, a cavalry leader of the confederate states army, was asked to what he attributed his success in so many actions. he replied: "well, i reckon i got there first with the most men," thereby stating in a nutshell the key to the art of war. "at nachod, the austrian commander had numbers on his side, yet he sent into action part only of his forces, and it was by numbers that he was beaten" (marshal foch). with regard to the moral of the race colonel henderson makes this emphatic statement: "in the last nine months of the american civil war, time and again, according to all precedent, one side or the other ought to have been whipped, but it declined to be anything of the sort. the losses show this. this was due in no small measure to the quality which the troops on both sides inherited from the stock that furnished his infantry to the duke of wellington. never to know when they were beaten was a characteristic of both north and south." the contemptible little army.--in place of the general decadence of the british race, upon which the german staff appear to have relied, this characteristic { } quality of endurance was exhibited by french's "contemptible little army" during the _retreat from mons_ in august, , at the _first battle of ypres_ (october , ), and at the _second battle of ypres_ (april , ). of his "contemptible little army" marshal french writes in his book, " ": "the british army had indeed suffered severely, and had performed a herculean task in reaching its present position in such fighting form, and its _moral_ had withstood the ordeal. i think the germans were probably justified in doubting our offensive powers, but the thing they forgot was the nation from which we spring." the new armies.--from to the new armies, raised, equipped, and trained during the war, and representing the empire in arms, displayed the same inherent quality, and disproved for ever the charge of decadence that had been brought against the british race. "that these troops should have accomplished so much under such conditions, and against an army and a nation whose chief concern for so many years had been preparation for war, constitutes a feat of which the history of our nation records no equal. . . . troops from every part of the british isles and from every dominion and quarter of the empire, whether regulars, territorials, or men of the new armies, have borne a share in the battle. . . . among all the long roll of victories borne on the colours of our regiments, there has never been a higher test of the endurance and resolution of our infantry. they have shown themselves worthy of the highest traditions of our race, and of the proud records of former wars" (sir d. haig's dispatch, december , ). "our new and hastily trained armies have shown once again that they are capable of meeting and beating the enemy's best troops, even under conditions which favoured his defence to a degree which it required the greatest endurance, determination, and heroism to { } overcome" (sir d. haig's dispatch, december , ). "it is no disparagement of the gallant deeds performed on other fronts to say that, in the stubborn struggle for the line of hills which stretches from wytschaete to passchendaele, the great armies that to-day are shouldering the burden of our empire have shown themselves worthy of the regiments which, in october and november of , made ypres take rank for ever amongst the most glorious of british battles" (sir d. haig's dispatch, december , ). "the british infantryman has always had the reputation of fighting his best in an uphill battle, and time and again in the history of our country, by sheer tenacity and determination of purpose, has won victory from a numerically superior foe. thrown once more upon the defensive by circumstances over which he had no control, but which will not persist, he has shown himself to possess in full measure the traditional qualities of his race" (sir d. haig's dispatch, july , ). "throughout this long period of incessant fighting against greatly superior numbers the behaviour of all arms of the british forces engaged was magnificent. what they achieved is best described in the words of the french general (maistre) under whose orders they came, who wrote of them: 'they have enabled us to establish a barrier against which the hostile waves have beaten and shattered themselves. cela aucun des témoins français ne l'oubliera'" (sir d. haig's dispatch, december , ). after four years of fighting, at the close of a defensive campaign of the utmost severity, protracted by the efforts of the enemy from march -july , , the new armies passed from the guard to the thrust. they were everywhere victorious, and in nine pitched battles they captured upwards of , prisoners and , guns. "in order to estimate the ardour and endurance of these troops during this final stage, it will be enough to mention the dates and importance of the main events-- { } "_battle of amiens_ (aug. - ) in which the iv. army took , prisoners and more than guns. "_battle of bapaume_ (aug. -sept. ) iii. army and left wing of iv. army: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of the scarpe_ (aug. -sept. ) i. army: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of haerincourt and epéhy_ (sept. - ) iv. and iii. armies: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of cambrai and the hindenburg line_ (sept. -oct. ) iv., iii., and i. armies. ended in the breaking of the hindenburg line and in the capture of , prisoners and guns. "_battle of flanders_ (sept. -oct. ) ii. army: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of le cateau_ (oct. - ) iv., iii., and i. armies: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of the selle_ (oct. - ) iv. and iii. armies: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of the sambre_ (nov. - ) iv., iii., and i. armies: , prisoners, guns." (marshal foch.) changes in method.--the principles which underlie the art of war would thus appear to be based on constant factors, but the methods of their application are susceptible to change, for in their application the principles are subject to the influence of successive inventions. gunpowder abolished the bow and arrow and the knight in armour; the bayonet affixed to the musket superseded the pike; the rifle outranged the musket; the breech-loader and the magazine attachment progressively increased the rate of fire; smokeless powder rendered a firing line almost invisible; the flat trajectory of the small-arms bullet increased the danger-zone in an advance; the increased power, mobility, and accuracy of the field gun[ ] rendered certain { } formations obsolete in the attack; the general advance in the rate and accuracy of fire from rifles, machine guns, and artillery made attack on a strongly organised position possible only when surprise in the time and place of the thrust neutralises the advantages of the defence, or when an overwhelming barrage of shells and bullets covers the advance and smothers the enemy's resistance. the advent of a third service, by the addition of the air to the sea and land services, increased the facilities for reconnaissance[ ] and added to the difficulties of concealing movement during the hours of daylight. these and similar influences have brought about changes in certain respects, amongst which the most pronounced is the increased use of field entrenchments, and tactical methods have been evolved to meet the necessities of the case, or modified to suit the new requirements.[ ] but no inventions can shift the burden of war from the shoulders of the infantryman. "despite the enormous development of mechanical invention in every phase of warfare, the place which the infantryman has always held as the main substance and foundation of an army is as secure to-day as in any period of history. the infantryman remains the backbone of defence and the spearhead of the attack. at no time has the reputation of the british infantryman been higher, or his achievement more worthy of his renown. . . . immense as the influence of mechanical devices may be, they cannot by themselves decide a campaign. their true _rôle_ is that of assisting the infantryman. . . . they cannot replace him. only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won" (sir d. haig's dispatches). { } the text-books.--changes in tactical methods are recorded from time to time in circulars issued by the general staff, to be embodied eventually in the official text-books. these text-books ("infantry training" and "field service regulations") are the foundation upon which the study of infantry tactics should be based, and of these books colonel g. f. r. henderson has left behind him the following opinion: "that portion of our own text-books which refers to infantry in attack and defence is merely the essence of tactics. there is no single sentence that is not of primary importance, no single principle laid down that can be violated with impunity, no single instruction that should not be practised over and over again." after four years of warfare, in which the principles enunciated in the text-books had been put to the most searching of all tests (_i.e._ practical application in war), the general staff of the army was able to preface a list of its recent publications with the following exhortation: "it must be remembered that the principles laid down in field service regulations and in infantry training are still the basis of all sound knowledge." at the close of the final victorious campaign, marshal haig emphasised the truth of this claim: "the longer the war lasted the more emphatically has it been realised that our original organisation and training were based on correct principles. the danger of altering them too much, to deal with some temporary phase, has been greater than the risk of adjusting them too little. . . . the experience gained in this war alone, without the study and practice of lessons learned from other campaigns, could not have sufficed to meet the ever-changing tactics which have characterised the fighting. there was required also the sound basis of military knowledge supplied by our training manuals and staff colleges." [ ] author of "ben hur." [ ] for an example in military fiction, see _the second degree_ in "the green curve." [ ] "unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem." [ ] the term "field gun" was limited to the -pounder until the _boer war_, when heavy guns were used as mobile artillery. in the great war, mechanical transport brought into the field of battle guns of the largest calibre. quick-firing field guns were first used by the abyssinians against the italians at the battle of adowa (february , ). [ ] reconnoitring balloons were first used by the army of the potomac at the battle of fredericksburg (december , ). aeroplanes were used in warfare for the first time in , during the italo-turkish campaign in tripoli, north africa. [ ] heavily armoured cars, known as "tanks," were introduced during the first battle of the somme, september , . { } the battle "theoretically, a well conducted battle is a decisive attack successfully carried out."--marshal foch. "the art of war, in order to arrive at its aim (which is to impose its will upon the enemy), knows but one means, the destruction of the adversary's organised forces. so we arrive at the battle, the only argument of war, the only proper end that may be given to strategical operations, and we begin by establishing the fact that to accomplish the aim of war the battle cannot be purely defensive. the results of a defensive battle are exclusively negative; it may check the enemy in his march; it may prevent him from achieving his immediate aim; but it never leads to his destruction, and so is powerless to achieve the wished-for victory. therefore, every defensive battle must terminate with an offensive action or there will be no result" (marshal foch). characteristics of the battle.--no two battles are precisely similar, but there are certain characteristics common to every battle. in the first place, the issue is almost always uncertain, for events which no human sagacity could provide against may occur to defeat the wisest plans. the best chances, therefore, are on the side of the commander who is provided with sufficient means to achieve his object, who forms his plans with the greatest sagacity, and executes them with the greatest ability. decisive success has followed the combinations of great commanders, and in the long run victory pays homage to knowledge of the principles which underlie the art of war. { } in the second place, the human factor always plays its part in battle. troops lacking in discipline are liable to panic in face of a sudden disaster, and even the best troops are liable to become unsteady if their flank is gained. in the third place, a comparatively small body of fresh troops thrown into action at the right moment against greater numbers, if the latter are exhausted by fighting, may achieve a success out of all proportion to their numbers. for this reason a prudent commander will endeavour to retain under his control some portion of his reserves, to be thrown in after his adversary has exhausted his own reserve power. to be superior at the point of attack is the art of warfare in a nutshell, and for this reason attacks on separate points of a position must be properly synchronised to be effective. the unbeaten enemy will otherwise possess a mobile reserve with which to reinforce threatened points. the attacks must be so timed that he throws them in piecemeal or fails to reach the point mainly threatened. mcclellan's position with the army of the potomac on _malvern hill_ (july , ) was a desperate position to attack in front, but it could have been turned on the right. the hill dominated the ground to the north, and also the road on which lee's army of northern virginia was approaching, and was crowned with numerous heavy guns, against which lee's artillery was powerless. it was lee's intention to open with an attack by a division, supported by two brigades, on the right of the position, and when this force was at grips with the army of the potomac, to assault the centre with a bayonet charge. about p.m. the sound of cheering was heard near the right of the position, and mistaking this for the signal, general d. h. hill launched the attack on the centre. the first line of defence was carried, but the northern army was unoccupied in the other parts of the line, and reinforcements quickly { } beat off the attack with heavy loss. after this attack had failed, magruder's division arrived in position and the attack on the right flank was delivered with similar results. both attacks were carried out with superb courage, but partial blows of this nature are without the first elements of success, and mcclellan's movements were not again molested. phases of the battle.--there are three principal phases of every battle. information must be obtained by observation and by fighting; advantage must be taken of information so obtained to strike where the blow or blows will be most effective; success obtained by fighting must be developed until the enemy is annihilated. _information and the initiative_.--much work requires to be done in the air and on the land before the rival armies come face to face. aircraft and the independent cavalry (advanced mounted troops and fast tanks detached from divisions for the purpose), endeavour to ascertain whether, and if so in what locality and in what strength, troops are being concentrated by the enemy. from information so obtained the headquarters staff are able to conjecture the intentions and aims of the enemy, and the extent to which their own intentions and aims have been perceived by the enemy. after the enemy is encountered this information is at the service of the commander of the troops, but it will generally require to be supplemented by fighting. on each side the commander will be striving to obtain the _initiative_, to impose his will upon his opponent, for the commander who loses the initiative is compelled to conform to the plans and movements of his adversary, instead of bringing into operation plans and movements better suited to his own purposes. each is scheming to obtain or retain the liberty of manoeuvre, in the same way as, in the days of sailing ships, a naval commander strove to get the "weather gauge" in every encounter. the initiative won by the strategy of one commander { } is sometimes wrested from him by the tactics of his adversary. this was exemplified at the _battle of salamanca_ (july , ). wellington, the generalissimo of the anglo-portuguese forces, had decided to withdraw behind the river tormes to the stronghold ciudad rodrigo, and had dispatched his train to that centre. the french commander (marmont), in his eagerness to intercept wellington's line of retreat, moved part of his force to the heights of miranda, thus threatening wellington's right and rear, but leaving a gap of two miles between the detached force and his main army. wellington noted the fresh disposition of marmont's army through his telescope, and exclaiming, "that will do!" he abandoned all idea of the withdrawal which had been forced upon him by marmont's previous manoeuvres, and hurled part of his force against the detached body (which was defeated before marmont could send assistance) and at the same time barred the progress of the main army, which was forced to leave the field. wellington afterwards declared, "i never saw an army receive such a beating." if the spanish general in alliance with wellington had not, contrary to the most explicit instructions, evacuated the castle of alba de tormes (which commanded the fords over which the french retreated), "not one-third of marmont's army would have escaped" (napier). as at salamanca, where the liberty of manoeuvre which had been won by the strategy of marmont was wrested from him by the tactics of wellington, so at the final phase of the _first battle of the marne_ (september, ), the initiative was regained by tactical adroitness. rapidity of action was the great german asset, while that of russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. to obtain a quick decision the germans went to every length. of the main routes for the invasion of france chosen for their armies, two led through the neutral territories of luxemburg and belgium, and only one through france, and their advance there broke { } down, almost at the first, at the only point where it was legitimately conducted, for the german armies failed to pierce the french front at the gap of charmes (vosges), and their defeat at the _battle of baccarat_ (august , ) led to the decisive defeat at the first battle of the marne. they then abandoned, for the moment, all hopes of a quick decision in a war of manoeuvre and retiring to their prepared lines of defence on the aisne, relied upon methodically prepared and regularly constructed trench systems, and upon the hand grenade, the trench mortar, and the other weapons of close combat, for superiority in a long campaign of trench siege warfare, which endured until the collapse of russia in freed for an offensive movement on the requisite scale in upwards of , , men. at the _first battle of the marne_, the five german armies, which were following up the franco-british left and centre, were extended from amiens to verdun, but on september , , the german i. army (general von kluck) was so placed by the impetuosity of the march that a wide gap separated it from the remainder of the german forces. to the north-west of paris a new french army, collected from the metropolitan garrison and from the south-eastern frontier, had been assembled and pushed out in motor transports by the zeal and intelligence of the military governor of paris (general gallieni); and to avoid this menace to his flank and line of communications, and to regain touch with the other german armies, one of which (under the crown prince) was unsuccessfully engaged in battle, general von kluck adopted the extremely hazardous course of a flank march, across the front of the franco-british left wing. upon receiving intelligence of this manoeuvre from the air service in paris, general joffre, seeing the opportunity of gaining the initiative, ordered an advance to the attack on september , and the first battle of the marne, which resulted from this order, changed the character of the fighting on the { } western front. the decisive blow was strategical rather than tactical. it was delivered on a battlefield of , square miles, and involved, throughout that area, a struggle of six great armies, numbering in all , troops, against a similar number of armies of at least equal strength. no counter-attack on such a scale had previously been delivered in any campaign, and the scarcely interrupted advance of the german armies received a permanent check, while the strategic aim of the german staff, namely, the speedy annihilation in the field of the franco-british armies, had to be definitely abandoned. development of the battle.--the "atmosphere" of battle is thus depicted in "the science of war": "when two armies are face to face and one is superior in numbers to the other, the commander of the smaller army is confronted by two problems. if the superior army is not yet concentrated, or is so distributed that the different parts cannot readily support each other, it may be defeated in detail. if the superior army is already concentrated, its commander may be induced, by one means or another, to make detachments, and thus to be weak everywhere. the first problem is solved by rapidity of manoeuvre, surprise marches, secrecy, feints to bewilder the adversary in his concentration, and action on unexpected lines. the second, by skilful threatening of points for the defence of which the adversary will detach forces; by concealment of his dispositions; and by drawing the adversary into terrain where part only of his superior forces can be employed." "the power of striking 'like a bolt from the blue' is of the greatest value in war. surprise was the foundation of almost all the great strategical combinations of the past, as it will be of those to come. the first thought and the last of the great general is to outwit his adversary and to strike where he is least expected. to what federal soldier did it occur on the { } morning of _chancellorsville_ (may - , ) that lee, confronted by , northerners, would detach stonewall jackson with more than half his own force of , to attack his adversary in the rear" ("the science of war"). surprise was the chief cause of success in the _first battle of cambrai_ (november , ) when general sir julian byng launched the iii. army at dawn against the highly organised defensive position known as the "hindenburg line." the wire entanglements in front of this position were exceptionally deep, and had not been broken by gun-fire. behind them the germans were resting in apparent security and such information as they were able to obtain by raiding reconnaissances was not corroborated by the fierce and prolonged artillery bombardment which was at that time regarded as the inseparable prelude to an attack in force. the advance was preceded by battalions of tanks, with infantry in close support, and was followed by cavalry, to round up fugitives and disorganise reinforcements. the artillery had previously been strengthened and was directed against the support and reserve lines, to prevent the germans from massing for counter-attacks and to break up their formations. aircraft carried out reconnaissance during the battle from a low altitude and harassed the defenders with fire action. an advance was made into the strongest part of the german defensive system on a twenty-mile front to a depth of five miles, and secured upwards of , prisoners, guns, and considerable quantities of stores and materials, and although after-events neutralised the initial successes, the advance of november , , will ever remain an example of the value of surprise in war. "surprise strikes with terror even those who are by far the stronger. a new weapon of war may ensure it, or a sudden appearance of a force larger than the adversary's, or a concentration of forces upon a point at which the adversary is not ready instantaneously to parry the blow. but if the methods { } be various, the aim is always to produce the same moral effect upon the enemy--terror--by creating in him at the swift apparition of unexpected and incontestably powerful means, the sentiment of impotence, the conviction that he cannot conquer--that is to say, that he is conquered. and this supreme blow of unexpected vigour need not be directed upon the whole of the enemy's army. for an army is an animate and organised being, a collection of organs, of which the loss even of a single one leads to death" (marshal foch). at almost any period of the battle, and in almost every phase of fighting, surprise can be brought about by a sudden and unexpected outburst of effective machine gun or other form of fire. "a sudden effective fire will have a particularly demoralising effect on the enemy; it is often advantageous, therefore, to seek for surprise effects of this sort by temporarily withholding fire" ("infantry training, "). the decisive blow.--the preparatory action and the development usually take the form of a converging movement of separated forces, so timed as to strike the adversary's front and flank simultaneously, in order to threaten the enemy's line of communications, for the line of supply is as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. "perhaps no situation is more pitiable than that of a commander who has permitted an enemy to sever his communications. he sees the end of his resources at hand, but not the means to replenish them" (general sir e. b. hamley). the decisive blow will be delivered by the general reserve, which will be secretly concentrated and launched as secretly as possible; and the commander of the whole force will so distribute his troops that about half his available force can be kept in hand for this decisive blow, on a part of the enemy's front if sufficient penetration has been effected, or on a flank. the point chosen becomes the vital { } point, and success there means success at all points. once routed, the enemy must be relentlessly pursued and prevented from regaining order and moral. a battle was fought in the year b.c. , nearly , years ago, at arbela,[ ] in mesopotamia, the eastern theatre of operations in the great war of - , and it deserves study to show the eternal nature of the main principles which underlie the art of war. alexander the great invaded the territories of darius, king of the medes and persians, with the strategic aim of defeating his adversary's main armies in a decisive battle. the macedonian forces were preceded by an advanced guard of cavalry, and from information obtained by the vanguard, alexander was made aware of the strength and position of the persian forces. by a careful reconnaissance of the ground in company with his corps commanders, alexander was able to forestall a projected movement, and by advancing in two lines of battle in such a way that his troops could at any moment be thrown into a compact figure fringed with spears, which formed an impenetrable hedge against cavalry, he found a remedy for the disadvantages of the ground, which afforded no protection to either of his flanks. after advancing in these two lines alexander manoeuvred his troops into a phalanx, or wedge-shaped figure, and this wedge he drove into the masses of the enemy to force the wings asunder. in spite of local reverses in parts of the field, the depth and weight of the main attack carried it through the enemy's forces: the survivors were captured or dispersed, and the victory was complete. [ ] the site of this battle was probably gaugamela, about miles from the present arbil, which is miles from mosul, on the baghdad road. { } how battles are influenced once troops are launched in battle their success or failure depends upon such influences as the commander can bring to bear, upon the co-operation of his subordinate commanders, and upon the moral and training of the troops engaged. the commander's influence is shown, first in his orders for the operations, and later by the method in which he employs the forces retained in his hand for the decisive blow. personal control, by the commander, of troops committed to battle, is not only impossible but should be unnecessary, as such control and leading is the function of his subordinates, who should be fully acquainted with his intentions and must be trusted to carry them into execution. other, and more important, duties have to be undertaken by the commander, and it is essential that he should not allow his attention to be diverted from his main object by local incidents, which are matters for his subordinates to deal with. "a sound system of command is based upon three facts: an army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders from headquarters; the man on the spot is the best judge of the situation; intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value than mechanical obedience" ("the science of war"). a campaign resolves itself into a struggle between human intelligences. each commander will endeavour to defeat his adversary in battle, and his principal weapon is his general reserve. if he can exhaust the reserve power of his adversary, while maintaining his own intact, he can proceed to victory at his own time, and he will endeavour to exhaust the hostile reserves by causing { } them to be thrown in piecemeal, in ignorance of the spot where the decisive blow is to fall. during the campaign on the western front in the allies were able to conserve their strength throughout the attacks from march to july , and when they passed from the guard to the thrust they extended their front of attack from day to day, calculating correctly that this gradual extension would mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall, and would cause him to throw in his reserves piecemeal. "the subordinate commanders must bring to fruit with all the means at their disposal the scheme of the higher command, therefore they must, above all, understand that thought and then make of their means the use best suited to circumstances--of which, however, they are the only judge. . . . the commander-in-chief cannot take the place of his subordinates--he cannot think and decide for them. in order to think straight and to decide rightly it would be necessary for him to see through their eyes, to look at things from the place in which they actually stand, to be everywhere at the same moment" (marshal foch). students of military history will remember that the prussian commander-in-chief and his chief staff officer, during the highly successful campaign of - , did not come within sound of the guns until five pitched battles had been fought by their subordinate commanders. outside the fog of battle, with its absorbing interests and distractions, the commander can retain his sense of proportion[ ] and can decide where and when he will make his final effort. news of the battle reaches him from his immediate subordinates, and from the accounts of successes and failures he is able to judge the weaknesses and strength of his own and his adversary's dispositions, to use part of his reserves as reinforcements, { } if he must, or to husband them with confidence in the success of the operations, until the time comes for him to launch them for the final blow. information.--in order that the commander's influence may be exerted to the best advantage it is essential that all vital information should reach him promptly, and that his orders should be communicated without delay. subordinate commanders must keep their superiors and commanders of neighbouring units regularly informed as to the progress of the battle, and of important changes in the situation as they occur. runners, who can be trusted to carry a verbal message or written order, are attached to each unit engaged and to its headquarters. higher units than battalions can usually depend on the signal service for intercommunication, but whenever necessary, a supply of runners and mounted orderlies must be available for their use. this ensures co-operation, and enables mutual support to be rendered. information received must be transmitted at once to all whom it concerns, and orders received from superiors must be communicated without delay to commanders of all units affected. co-operation.--"co-operation when in contact with the enemy is no easy matter to bring about. there are, however, three means of overcoming the difficulty: constant communication between the units; thorough reconnaissance of the ground over which the movements are to be made; clear and well-considered orders" ("the science of war"). each commander who issues orders for attack or defence should assemble his subordinate commanders, if possible in view of the ground over which the troops are to operate, explain his orders, and satisfy himself that each subordinate understands his respective task. "combination depends on the efficiency of the chain of control connecting the brain of the commander through all grades down to the { } corporal's squad; on the intelligence of subordinate leaders in grasping and applying the commander's plans; on the discipline which ensures intelligent obedience to the directing will; and on the mobility which gives rapid effect to that will, and permits advantage to be taken of fleeting opportunities. every fresh development in the means of transmitting orders and information rapidly, permits of an extension of the commander's influence, and makes more perfect combination possible and over wider areas" (general sir e. b. hamley). even when, and particularly when, forces are engaged in battle, reconnaissance must be carried on and information gained must be communicated at once. it will frequently happen that a suitable moment for the decisive attack, or decisive counter-stroke, will be found only after long and severe fighting. systematic arrangements for obtaining, sifting, and transmitting information throughout the battle are therefore of the highest importance. information must be gained not only by troops and aircraft actually engaged, but by supports and reserves, who will often be able to see what is invisible to the forward troops. in such cases, more than in any other, information must be communicated at once. by intelligent observation superintending commanders can co-operate with one another, can anticipate situations as they develop, and decide at the time what steps will be necessary to meet them. a general reconnaissance will be in progress during every modern battle by observers in aircraft and in observation balloons. in addition, local reconnaissance by means of patrols and scouts will usually discover an opening that might otherwise be lost, and may warn a commander of an intended movement against him, which might otherwise develop into a disagreeable surprise. co-operation and mutual support were developed in their highest form by the allied corps commanders in the _first battle of the marne_ (august-september, ). { } in this campaign close on , , troops were engaged on both sides, and the corps commanders, particularly those of the french vi. army (manoury), iii. army (sarrail), and the military governor of paris (gallieni), were continuously in touch with one another, and frequently rendered assistance, unasked, by fire and by movement. co-operation of a novel kind was exhibited on a minor scale during the first battle of the somme. an attack was launched on _gueudecourt_ (september , ) by the st division, and a protecting trench was captured as a preliminary to the larger movement. a tank, followed up by infantry bombers, proceeded along the parapet of the trench firing its machine guns, while an aeroplane swooped over the trench firing its lewis guns. the survivors in the trench surrendered, and the garrison was collected by supporting infantry, who advanced in response to signals from the aeroplane. fire tactics.--it has already been noted that the battle is the only argument of war; it is also the final test of training, and on the battlefield no part of the syllabus is more severely tested than that devoted to _musketry_. the fire tactics of an army, its combination of fire and movement, the direction and control by the leaders and the fire discipline of the rank and file, make for success or failure on the field of battle. the fire must be directed by the fire unit commander against an objective chosen with intelligence and accurately defined; it must be controlled by the sub-unit commander, who must be able to recognise the objectives indicated, to regulate the rate of fire, and to keep touch with the state of the ammunition supply. fire discipline must be maintained, so that there is the strictest compliance with verbal orders and signals, and application on the battlefield of the habits inculcated during the training period. the time when fire is to be opened is often left to the discretion of the fire-unit commander, but, generally speaking, fire should be opened by an { } attacking force only when a further advance without opening fire is impossible; and even in defence, when access to the ammunition reserve is likely to be far easier than in an attack, withholding fire until close range is reached is generally more effective than opening at a longer range. the tactical value of a withering fire at close range from a hitherto passive defender has again and again been proved in battle. on the _heights of abraham_ (september , ) general wolfe had assembled his troops and he awaited montcalm's attack. not a shot was fired by the defenders until the attacking force was within forty paces, and three minutes later a bayonet charge into the broken foe swept the french helplessly before it. at the _battle of bunker hill_ (june , ) the american colonists inflicted a loss of per cent. on the assaulting british force, by reserving their fire "until the badges and buttons of the tunics could be clearly identified." at the _battle of fredericksburg_ (december , ) general meagher's irish brigade of the u.s. army of the potomac assaulted marye's hill, , strong. the defending confederates reserved their fire until the assailants were yards from their position and drove them off with a loss of out of the , . in august, , the british regular army, during the _retreat from mons_, reserved their fire until the germans arrived at the most deadly point of their rifles' trajectory, and again and again drove off all except the dead and mortally wounded. throughout the great war, troops fully trained in the british system of musketry and using the short magazine lee enfield rifle, proved beyond dispute the values of the system and of the weapon. in a review of the methods adopted to check the great german offensive in the spring of , a circular issued by the general staff states: "rapid rifle fire was the decisive factor in these operations. the men had confidence in their rifles and knew how to use them." superiority of fire can only be gained by the close { } co-operation of the artillery and infantry at every stage of the battle, and unless infantry co-operate, the artillery is not likely to produce any decisive effect. long-range machine-gun fire is an important auxiliary to the artillery in covering and supporting the advance of attacking infantry. enfilade fire, the most telling of all, is more easily brought to bear than of old owing to the increase in the effective range and in the rate of fire. supports and local reserves will usually co-operate most effectively with forward troops by bringing fire to bear upon the flank of such bodies of the enemy as are holding up a movement by frontal fire. during the counter-attack for the recapture of _the bluff_, in the ypres salient (march , ) by troops of the rd and th divisions, the right and centre gained their objectives. the left attacking party, at the first attempt, failed to reach the german trenches, but those who had penetrated to the german line on the right realised the situation and brought a lewis gun to bear on the enemy's line of resistance, completely enfilading his trenches, and thus enabling the left company to reach its goal. movement.--the influence of movement is inseparable from that of fire, as it enables fire to be opened and is a means of escaping the full effects of fire; while it is often possible to move one unit only in conjunction with the fire of another. it can also be used to relieve one unit from the effects of fire concentrated upon it by moving another unit against the enemy. a steady and rapid advance of troops has the twofold effect of closing to a range from which an ascendency in the fire-fight can be secured, and also of reducing the losses of the advancing force, for if the troops remained stationary in the open under heavy fire, at a known range, the losses would clearly be greater than if they advanced, and would be suffered without gaining ground towards the objective, while the closer the { } assaulting line gets to the objective, and the steadier its advance, the less confidence will the enemy have in their power to stem the advance, and the fewer casualties will be suffered in consequence. no "sealed pattern" is laid down as to the movement and formation of infantry under fire, but certain definite principles are put forward in the text-books. where security is the first need, as in the case of protecting forces (advanced, flank, or rear guards), movement should be effected by bounds from one tactical position to another under covering fire from supporting troops; where the objective is the primary consideration, security must be subordinated to the need of reaching the objective. against artillery fire, or long-range infantry fire, the formation recommended by the text-books is small shallow columns, each on a narrow front, such as platoons in fours or sections in file, arranged on an irregular front, so that the range from the enemy's guns to each is different. troops coming suddenly under such fire will avoid casualties more easily by moving forward and outwards in this way rather than by remaining under such cover as may be improvised in a position the exact range of which is obviously known to the enemy. against effective machine-gun or rifle fire deployment into line, or into "arrowhead" formation with the flanks thrown well back, is preferable to a single line extended at so many paces interval, as it is scarcely more vulnerable and is infinitely easier to control. in retiring, losses are generally heavier than in advancing, or in maintaining a fire-fight from the position gained until a diversion by supporting troops enables a further bound to be made. the enemy is generally able to deliver a well-directed stream of lead against retiring troops, mainly because he is less harassed by the return fire. retirements must therefore be carried out on the principle of alternate bounds under covering fire of co-operating bodies, which withdraw, in their turn, under covering fire from the troops they have protected. { } such alternate retirements are the essence of rear-guard tactics, but, although certain other phases of battle action justify the withdrawal of troops, it must always be remembered that a position held against counter-attack is better than a position captured by assault, for it is a position that does not require to be assaulted. it is often impossible to predict the value of resistance at a particular point, and the fate of a nation may depend upon a platoon commander's grit in holding on at all costs. in the campaign of , brigadier-general moreau was sent to the _fortress of soissons_, with instructions to hold the town. his garrison consisted of about , all arms, with guns. at . a.m. on march , the fortress was bombarded by winzingerode's russians and bülow's prussians, and at p.m. an assault was delivered. this was easily repulsed and a counter-attack threw back the assailants to their own lines. the bombardment was resumed until p.m., when the garrison had a total loss of killed and wounded. during the night the besiegers sent a flag of truce to moreau, and on march that general capitulated with all the honours of war "in order to preserve , fighting men for the emperor." his action cost napoleon his throne, for had moreau held out the emperor would have crushed his most implacable foe, blücher (who escaped from the toils in which he was enmeshed, _viâ_ the bridge at soissons), and the campaign would have been at an end. if moreau had exhausted all the means of defence, as the regulations of war ordain, he could certainly have held out for another hours, and as heavy firing was audible in the vicinity it should have been clear to him that help was at hand. at the _first battle of ypres_ (october -november , ) the regular army of the united kingdom, at the outset, was filling so extensive a gap in the defensive line, that in many parts there was but one rifle for yards of front, and there were neither local nor general reserves. the { } assaulting german forces greatly outnumbered the defenders and brought up machine guns and artillery in overpowering strength. the british artillery was not only overweighted but was so short of ammunition that marshal french was compelled to limit their daily number of rounds. but the line was held, and a counter-attack, headed by the nd battalion of the worcestershire regiment, on october , with the bayonet, restored the line at _gheluvelt_, at the most critical moment of the battle, and the germans did not get through the defences. this stubborn resistance threw the germans behind their entrenchments, and the "advance to calais" was stemmed by french's "contemptible little army." at the _second battle of ypres_ (april -may , ) surprise in the time and nature of the attack, by the secret concentration of forces and the introduction of poison gas, gained an initial advantage for the germans and left the british flank uncovered. a canadian division counter-attacked on the german flank, and by may the allies had regained many of the captured positions. during the first battle of the somme troops of the royal west kent and the queen's regiments effected a lodgment in _trônes wood_ (july , ). they maintained their position all night in the northern corner of the wood, although completely surrounded by the enemy, and assisted in the final capture and clearance of the wood at a.m. the next day. similar instances occurred in _bourlon village_ (november - , ) when parties of the th east surrey regiment held out in the south-east corner of the village, during a german counter-attack, and maintained their position until touch was re-established with them hours later; and in a group of fortified farms south of _polygon wood_ (september , ) during the third battle of ypres, when two companies of the argyll and sutherland highlanders held out all night, although isolated from the rest of the rd and th divisions, until a renewed attack { } cleared the district of hostile forces. on april , , during the germans' desperate endeavours to break through the investing allies' lines, the ruins of _givenchy_ were held by the th west lancashire (territorial) division, and the right edge of the neck through which von arnim and von quast hoped to extend, in order to widen the wedge into the valley of the lys, was firmly held, while the left edge (the messines ridge) was recaptured by a counter-attack by the th division. the centre of the line was also stoutly held by the guards' and other divisions, many of which had suffered heavy losses in the v. army during the german attack in the last week of march. after days of the most stubborn fighting (march -april , ) of which the _attack on the lys_ had formed part, marshal sir d. haig issued an order of the day emphasising the value of holding each position at all costs. "every position must be held to the last man. there must be no retirement. . . . the safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment. . . . victory will belong to the side which holds out longest." sir d. haig's after-order, on april , (st. george's day), awarded special praise to the troops under his command. the number of divisions employed by the germans from march to april , , against the british alone was (approximately , , troops), and many of them were thrown in twice or three times. "in resisting the heavy blows which such a concentration of troops has enabled the enemy to direct against the british army, all ranks, arms, and services have behaved with a gallantry, courage, and resolution for which no praise can be too high" (haig's dispatch). covering fire.--the energetic and determined support of the infantry by fire is the main duty of machine-gun units throughout the whole course of the battle. in the attack, machine-gun platoons, lewis gun sections, { } or rifle sections detailed to give covering fire, must take care to select as targets those bodies of the enemy whose fire is chiefly checking the advance. machine-gun platoons are sometimes brigaded, and at others left to battalion commanders, and their action after a temporary success in providing covering fire may depend upon their tactical distribution at the time. infantry platoons detailed to give covering fire must join in the advance as soon as their own fire ceases to be effective in aiding the forward troops, unless definite orders to the contrary have been received. fire and movement.--it is thus seen that fire and movement are inseparably associated, and judiciously employed in combination they enable infantry to achieve its object in battle, to bring such a superiority of fire to bear as to make an advance to close quarters possible, so that the enemy may be induced to surrender or may be overwhelmed by a bayonet assault; and to prepare by similar means for further advances, until the enemy is entirely hemmed in or completely routed. [ ] in fiction, this point (that the generalissimo must not allow his sense of proportion to be distorted by local successes or reverses) is clearly brought out in _the point of view_, a story in "the green curve" by ole-luk-oie (general swinton). { } types of battle action a battle must practically always be of the nature of attack and defence, but the attitude originally assumed by either of the opposing forces may be reversed during an engagement. a vigorous counter-attack by an army offering battle in a defensive position may throw the adversary on the defensive, while an assailant may fight a delaying action in one part of the field, although in another part his action may be essentially offensive. there are three distinct systems of battle action: the entirely defensive; the entirely offensive; and the combined, or defensive-offensive system. the defensive battle has seldom effected positive results, except, perhaps, at _gettysburg_ (july - , ), where meade permitted lee to break his forces against a strong position, with the result that the army of northern virginia had to withdraw, and the invasion of the north came to an end. it must, however, be borne in mind that general lee was badly served by his subordinate, and general meade's success was largely due to this factor. on the second day of gettysburg (july , ), general j. b. hood's st division of general j. longstreet's i. army corps was deploying round the left of the federal army south of the round tops. he saw a chance to strike and requested permission from longstreet. hood's plan was the only one which gave a reasonable chance of decisive victory with the troops available. longstreet, in obedience to the letter of his orders, but contrary to their spirit, refused to sanction hood's advance. longstreet's failure to seize a fleeting opportunity sounded the death-knell of the confederate cause. { } burnside was defeated at _fredericksburg_ (december - , ) by purely defensive tactics, but lee had intended to follow up his victory by a decisive counter-blow, which burnside escaped by extricating the army of the potomac before the blow fell. success, even to the limited degree achieved by meade or lee, seldom follows the adoption of purely defensive tactics. "there is no such thing as an 'impregnable position,' for any position the defence of which is merely passive is bound to be carried at last by a manoeuvring enemy" (marshal foch). the offensive battle.--the entirely offensive system has been employed by many of the greatest commanders, including marlborough at _blenheim_ (august , ), _ramillies_ (may , ), and _malplaquet_ (september , ); frederick the great, notably at _leuthen_ (december , ); napoleon, wellington, and grant, as also by the prussian generals at almost every engagement in the campaigns of and - . the disadvantage of the system is that lack of success may entail not only a local disaster but the wreck and annihilation of the whole army. at the _battle of blenheim_ (august , ), marlborough, "the greatest captain of his age," had concentrated his forces with those of prince eugene of savoy the previous day and commanded an army of , men with guns. he was confronted by the joint armies of marshal tallard and the elector of bavaria, amounting to , men with guns. it was necessary for marlborough to attack before villeroy joined the enemy, or to withdraw until a more favourable opportunity presented itself. the right flank of his opponents rested on high hills, which were protected by detached posts, and the left flank on the danube, while opposite the centre was the marshy valley of the river nebel, with several branches running through the swampy ground. marlborough decided that a battle { } was absolutely necessary and he attacked the next day. like hannibal, he relied principally on his cavalry for achieving his decisive success, and this predilection was known to the opposing commanders. he attacked the enemy's right and left wings, and when heavily engaged with varying fortunes launched his decisive attack against the centre, where the difficulties of the ground caused it to be least expected. marlborough lost , killed and , wounded. the vanquished armies were almost destroyed, at least , being accounted for, with , killed, , wounded and missing, and , prisoners. the defensive-offensive battle.--the defensive-offensive system consists in taking up a position which the enemy must attack, and in delivering a decisive counter-stroke when the adversary has exhausted his strength. this system has been employed in almost every campaign. by such means napoleon achieved his classic victories of _marengo_ (june , ), _austerlitz_ (december , ), and _dresden_ (august , ); and wellington his peninsular victories at _vittoria_ (june , ), _orthez_ (february , ), and _toulouse_ (april , ), in addition to his final triumph at _waterloo_ (june , ); and it was the method adopted by marshal foch in the decisive campaign of , which endured from march until the armistice in november. at the _battle of waterloo_ (june , ), the decisive counter-stroke was delivered, in accordance with wellington's pre-arranged plan, by a force coming from a distance to the scene of action. on the morning of june , when wellington resolved to make a stand at waterloo, he was aware that the prussians, who were mostly young troops, had been beaten at ligny; that napoleon had, before that battle, over , men, and that he himself had, all told, , , of whom , , including the king's german legion, were { } british. yet he withdrew from quatre bras with the full determination of standing at waterloo and of fighting napoleon's army, if marshal blücher would come to his assistance with one army corps. napoleon attacked on june with , men and guns, against wellington's , men with guns, at a.m., but he was unable to shift the line or break through the squares. at . p.m. one of blücher's corps was delivering the promised counter-attack against napoleon's line of communications. soon after p.m. wellington and blücher met at la belle alliance, napoleon's headquarters before the battle, and the pursuit was in full swing. opportunities for restoring the battle and for turning impending defeat into a crushing victory are frequently offered during an engagement. general lee's thin lines at _antietam_ or _sharpsburg_ (september , ), slowly fed by men jaded by heavy marching, were sorely pressed, but there was a lull in the federal attack when hooker's advance was checked. had general mcclellan at that moment thrown in "his last man and his last horse" in a vigorous reinforcing attack, _antietam_ would not have been a drawn battle, and lee would not have retired at his leisure into virginia. lee's great victory at _chancellorsville_ (may - , ), although marred by the accident which deprived him of stonewall jackson, was a striking instance of the success of the defensive-offensive system at the hands of a great commander, who defeated , troops with less than half that number, by a containing defence with , men and a decisive counter-stroke with the remainder. but while this combined system is regarded by most authorities as the best, when circumstances warrant its adoption, it is the highest test of generalship to seize the right moment to pass from the guard to the thrust. this is the problem which confronted marshal foch, the generalissimo of the allied forces, during the great { } german offensive movement on the western front in . the defensive _rôle_ endured from march until july , , and although many local counter-attacks were made along the whole battle front, the allies did not pass from the guard to the thrust until the decisive counter-stroke was commenced in the _second battle of the marne_ (july , ) on a front of miles from fontenoy to belleau, which drove the germans back across the marne on july . the second battle of the marne (july , ).--the great german offensive of march-june, , was renewed on july , when the artillery preparation opened shortly after midnight and troops were poured across the marne in small boats and over pontoon bridges. the attack was not unexpected. adequate reserves were ready and in place, and a heavy counter-bombardment on the german troops in their positions of assembly, close to their front-line trenches, caused heavy casualties. the germans succeeded in penetrating the french and american positions in parts of the -mile front to a maximum depth of miles south-west of reims, but on the plains of champagne little progress was made and the attack lost its momentum. during the attack of march , , the advance was not held up until it was within striking distance of its ultimate objective, and the offensive on the aisne in may, , secured an advance of miles. captured documents showed that the attack of july east of reims was intended to reach the marne at eperney and chalons, an advance of miles. a feature of the earlier days of the battle was a spirited counter-attack near fossoy (on the extreme left of the german forces) by a division of the american army which thrust the germans behind their first line and captured upwards of , prisoners, the ground regained in the river bend being consolidated and held by the american division. the battle continued for three days before the german { } attack was brought to a standstill, and at . a.m. on july a counter-attack by the french, american, and italian forces changed the whole aspect of the campaign, and led to the final triumph of the allies and to the downfall of the central powers. { } the attack "surprise is at all times the assailant's strongest weapon."--"field service regulations," vol. ii. ( ). the aim of every commander who possesses the power of manoeuvre is to seek out the enemy and destroy his organised forces. the attack is the culminating point of all manoeuvres to this end, and every commander will endeavour to achieve his aim by a sudden and unexpected assault on a part of the enemy's defences. the achievement of this aim is only possible when a commander has assembled a sufficient force for his purpose, and has obtained, by reconnaissance and by fighting, information as to the vulnerability of the hostile position. the commander will then endeavour to break the enemy's formation so suddenly as to disconcert all his plans; to retain a compact force with which to follow up the blow without giving the enemy a moment's breathing space; to drive a wedge into the heart of his disordered masses, forcing his wings asunder; and to pursue and annihilate the scattered forces of the enemy. "unless a decision is quickly obtained in the opening weeks of a modern campaign the opposing armies tend to become immobile, chiefly owing to the great power conferred on the defence by modern armaments. the armies will then be distributed in great depth, and the attackers are faced with the necessity of breaking through not one position only, but a series of positions, extending back to a depth of several miles" ("infantry training, "). penetration, followed by the sundering of the franco-british armies, was clearly the intention of the german { } high command in the _second battle of the somme_, which opened on march , . the german armies had entrenched themselves after the first battle of the marne (september, ), and for months had been confronted by the allied nations of britain, france, and belgium, reinforced at the close by portuguese troops and by the national army of the united states. within the investing lines of the western front the german armies were besieged, the barrier reaching from the belgian coast to the frontier of switzerland, while the armies of austria-hungary were similarly penned in by the army of italy, from switzerland to the adriatic. the internal collapse of russia, in , enabled von hindenburg to assume the offensive, with upwards of , , men released from the eastern front, and part of this reserve power was projected, with the austro-hungarian armies, in a fierce attack on the italian lines. the success of this manoeuvre continued until reinforcements were dispatched from other parts of the allied lines, and a diversion in the region of cambrai by the british iii. army, under sir julian byng (november , ), prevented the dispatch of further german reserve power to the italian front, and necessitated a counter-thrust in france. the battlefields of france again resumed their importance as the vital point in the theatre of operations, and in the spring of , profiting by the improved positions and prospects in the west, ludendorff attempted to break through the investing lines on a -mile front. the attack was heralded by a terrific bombardment, and culminated in a desperate thrust against the british armies north and south of the river somme, the points of penetration aimed at being the british right, where it was linked up with the french on the river oise, in the neighbourhood of la fère, and the british line of communications in the neighbourhood of amiens. the whole british line opposite the thrust was hurled back and the territory regained by the franco-british { } advance on the somme in july, , was recaptured by the german armies. but this was not a battle for towns or territory, as the german hammer blows were intended to drive a wedge between the british and french armies, to roll up the british flank northwards to the sea-coast and the french flank southwards to paris, and to capture the main line of communication between these northern and southern armies. by skilful reinforcement of threatened points, marshal haig frustrated the primary object of the attack, and by the aid of the french armies the whole line fell back, disputing the ground with the utmost resolution, and maintaining the line without losing touch between the south and north. the german wedge was thrust in, but every attempt to effect a breach and to pour through the line was frustrated by the allies. during the battle the french and british armies became intermingled, and to preserve unity of control a generalissimo was appointed in the person of general foch, who had commanded the french ix. army at the first battle of the marne in september, , and the french armies of the somme during the advance in july, . general pershing, commanding the army of the united states, gave a free hand to the generalissimo to incorporate american troops wherever they might be needed in the field, and marshal haig and general retain remained in command of the british and french armies. methods of attack.--the object of every attack is to break down the enemy's resistance by the weight and direction of fire and to complete his overthrow by assault, by the delivery of a decisive blow with as large a portion as possible of the attacking force against a selected point or portion of the enemy's position. the term "decisive attack" does not imply that the influence of other attacks is indecisive, but rather that it is the culmination of gradually increasing pressure relentlessly applied to the enemy from the moment when contact with him is first obtained. { } two plans of attack.--there are two plans of attack. in the first, the direction in which the decisive blow is to be delivered is determined beforehand; an adequate force is detailed and pushed forward for this purpose, and at the same time another part of the force is detailed to attack another portion of the enemy's position, to keep his attention there, to pin his troops in position, to prevent him sending reinforcements to the part mainly threatened, and ultimately to drive home with the successful assault of the main attack. the rest of the force is small and is retained in general reserve to meet emergencies. in the second plan, a general action is developed by a part of the attacking force and the remainder is retained in general reserve, to be thrown in when the opportunity arrives, at the right time and in the right place. in this case, the "remainder" is not less than half the available force. the first plan can be adopted when the commander of the attacking force has definite information as to the extent of the enemy's position, when he knows where its flanks rest and when he knows the approximate strength of the forces arrayed against him. it must also be possible, without undue risk, to divide the attacking force into parties of such strength that neither can be overwhelmed by the enemy in detail, and it is to be noted that in the case of a serious check there is only a small general reserve to restore the battle. the second plan can be adopted when information is incomplete, and owing to the strong force retained by the commander in general reserve, the situation can be exploited and developed by fighting without undue risk. strength of the attack.--it must always be remembered that a commander can never be too strong when making an attack, for he can never be perfectly sure of what force he may encounter, or at what moment the adversary may make a counter-attack. an attack { } on an enemy presupposes a superiority of force at the place where the attack is made, for war is but the art of being stronger than the enemy at the right place at the right time, and for an attack to have a reasonable hope of success the attackers, at the point where the penetration takes place, must be superior. disposition of the troops.--each phase of the attack will normally require three separate bodies of troops for its execution: a _forward body_ to seek out for, and when located attack, the enemy along the whole front of the sector allotted to it and by relentless pressure to wear down the enemy's resistance in order to discover the weak portions of the defence; _supports_ to penetrate the weak portions of the defence and forthwith to attack the flanks and rear of those portions of the defence which are holding up the attack; with local reserves for dealing with local counter-attacks; and a _general reserve_ by means of which the commander exploits success or retrieves failure. the forward body, the supports, and the local reserves.--the paramount duty of all leaders in the firing line is to get their troops forward, and if every leader is imbued with the determination to close with the enemy, he will be unconsciously assisting his neighbour also, for, as a rule, the best method of supporting a neighbouring unit is to advance. but an attack is often held up by well-directed machine-gun fire, and by determined and well-trained riflemen in concealed or well-prepared positions. the tactics to be pursued under these circumstances are thus outlined in "infantry training, ": "when forward troops are held up by the enemy's organised fire at close ranges they must keep him pinned to his ground and absorb his attention by maintaining a vigorous fire and working their way closer when opportunity offers. it will be the duty of the supports to turn the flank of, and enfilade, that portion of the enemy's defences where a garrison is opposing { } the forward body. to achieve this, supports may have to quit their direct line of advance and follow in the wake of a neighbouring unit, which is able to advance. it must constantly be borne in mind that pressure should be brought on the enemy by supporting troops in places where the attack is progressing rather than where it is held up, never by the mere reinforcement or thickening up of a line of troops who have been unable to advance. there must be no slackening of pressure, meanwhile, by the forward troops who are temporarily held up, or the defenders will be able to turn their attention to the flanking attacks which are being directed against them." the local reserves are for local counter-attacks by fire or movement against similar efforts by the local reserves of the enemy. in modern campaigns this work is effectively carried out by the overhead fire of machine guns distributed in depth, and the mobile local reserves may thus consist of smaller units detached for the purpose by the forward body or by the supports. during the great german offensive in the spring of the _attacks on the somme and the lys_ were constantly held up by the vigour and tenacity of the franco-british defence, and to meet the necessities of the case the following instructions were issued by the german general staff: "if the assaulting troops are held up by machine-gun fire they are to lie down and keep up a steady rifle fire, while supports in the rear and on the flank try to work round the flanks and rear of the machine-gun nests which are holding up the attack. meanwhile, the commander of the battalion which is responsible for the attack is to arrange for artillery and light trench-mortar support, and should protect his own flanks from machine-gun fire by means of smoke." the general reserve.--in a modern campaign against civilised troops it will seldom, or never, happen that the efforts of the forward body, supports, and local reserves will annihilate the enemy and so prevent him from regaining cohesion and fighting power. even if { } every part of the position against which an assault is delivered is captured and held, the enemy will not, by that means alone, cease to exist as a fighting force, and if he is permitted to withdraw with a semblance of order and moral the work of the attacking force will be of little avail. the destruction of the enemy and not the mere capture of the ground of the encounter is the ultimate aim of the commander. he will, therefore, accept the best available opportunity for the destruction of the enemy by overwhelming them in some part of the battlefield during the successful operations of his attacking force. it may, however, happen that the efforts of the attacking force are generally unsuccessful and the enemy may be on the point of gaining the upper hand. by means of the general reserve the commander exploits the success or retrieves the failure of the attacking force. the commander will have selected some point or position in the enemy's defensive system against which he can direct his decisive attack. this point cannot, as a rule, be determined until it has been revealed by the successes of the forward body and the supports, and when it has been selected it must be struck unexpectedly and in the greatest possible strength. while, therefore, the forward body, supports, and local reserves must be adequate in numbers for the task allotted to them, a commander will generally retain about half his available force for the delivery of the decisive attack, and when this decisive blow has been delivered the reserve will carry on the pursuit of the beaten enemy until such time as other infantry, or cavalry, or tanks, have caught up and passed them. if the attacking troops fail to obtain their objective the commander has at his disposal the means of relieving exhausted troops and of dealing with the "decisive counter-attack" of the enemy. the commander's plans.--once troops are committed to the assault the commander is powerless to divert them to another purpose. his control is exercised in { } the correct interpretation or adaptation of his original plan by his subordinate commanders. before launching his troops to the attack in accordance with the decisions arrived at from information received, the commander will assemble his subordinates and the representatives of co-operating arms or formations in order that his plans may be explained. this conference should be held at such a time as will enable his subordinates to explain their _rôle_ to the sub-unit commanders. wherever possible the conference should be preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the ground over which the attack is to be made, otherwise a map of the district concerned must be substituted for the actual view. the commander will be influenced in his plans by the state of the campaign at the time of the decision to attack. in the opening stages of a campaign in a thickly populated country, and generally throughout a campaign in less settled districts, a war of manoeuvre will lead to the "encounter battle," and the objective to be aimed at will be limited only by the power of endurance of his troops, the weather conditions, and the possibility of supplying his victorious troops with ammunition and food. under other conditions, the objective will be subject to further limitations, as the defensive position will be organised in great depth, and while effective penetration will thus be more difficult to achieve it must, of necessity, be accompanied by widening in proportion to its depth in order that space for manoeuvre and facility for communication may be secured. the infantry attack will be conducted on the same lines in both forms of battle, but the greater the organisation of the defensive position the more limited will be the depth to which the attack can be carried on and the greater difficulty will there be in launching reserves in pursuit. the position of assembly.--a column in march formation will very rarely move to its attack position, or "jumping-off place," from column of route except { } where there are concealed lines of approach to the spot. a position of assembly will therefore be assigned, and this will be chosen with a view to cover for the troops and facilities for the issue of food and hot drink, the distribution of ammunition and the filling of water bottles. as a general rule, it is left to the battalion commander to select positions of assembly for each of his companies. when large bodies of troops are assembled with a view to immediate action, it must always be remembered that large forces cannot be moved by a single road if all arms are to be brought into action at the right moment. in april, , general banks, with , u.s. troops, moved from grand ecore to _pleasant hill_ in the red river valley. although lateral roads existed, his column marched on one main road only, and twenty miles separated his front and rear. as he came into action with general forrest, of the confederate army, the head of his column was defeated and thrown back again and again by forces inferior in total strength, but superior on the field of the encounter. had general banks used two or more parallel roads, which were available for his use, the confederates on the spot would have been quickly overpowered. the attacking force.--the commander must decide against which portion or portions of the hostile position, or along which lines of advance, his fire attack shall be developed. as the object of this movement is to pin the enemy to his position, to wear down his resistance generally, and particularly at the point where the decisive attack is to be delivered, as well as to effect a lodgment in the position, it is clear that the greater the extent of the objective the better, and one or both flanks should be threatened if possible. but whenever a fire attack is developed it must be in sufficient strength to occupy the enemy's attention fully and it must be carried through with vigour once begun. one { } to three rifles per yard of the objective to be assailed is generally regarded as the requisite strength of the forward body, supports, and local reserves. at _st. privat_ (august , ) a first and second line made a frontal attack and came under fire of the french chassepots, to which their own shorter-ranged rifles could make no effective reply. the lines pressed on, but were ultimately brought to a standstill through lack of reinforcements, which could have been sent up against the flank of the fire position which was holding up the attack, under cover of the fire of the troops in position, and would thus have carried the forward body to the assault. equally unsuccessful was osman pasha's attempt to break through the investing lines at _plevna_ (december , ). with , troops he pierced the russian lines, and another resolute effort would have carried the sortie through the investing forces. but the , supports could not get out of the town as the bridges and gates were blocked with fugitives and wagons. the decisive attack.--the commander must also decide the point and direction of the decisive attack. this will be made on a part of the front or on a flank, and it may be predetermined in accordance with information concerning the hostile dispositions, or it may have to be ascertained by further fighting. the advantages of a _frontal attack_ are that, if successful, the enemy's force is broken in two parts, the separated wings may be driven back in divergent directions and overwhelmed in detail, and a decisive victory is thus obtained. the disadvantages are that the force assaulting a part of the enemy's front draws upon itself the concentrated fire of the whole hostile line, and unless the fire attack can master this fire the decisive blow will be held up, while an unsuccessful frontal attack invites the enemy to advance and to envelop the assailants. the advantages of a _flank attack_ are that { } the enemy's line of retreat is threatened, and only the threatened flank can concentrate its fire on the assailant. the disadvantages of a flank attack are that the enveloping troops have to face a similar danger on their own outer flank, for upon this point the defender will almost certainly direct his counter-stroke, and for this reason a decisive blow on the enemy's flank must be followed up by strong reserves. the flank chosen for attack will be that which affords the best opportunities for converging fire from the supporting artillery, which gives the best line of advance for the infantry, and where success will have the most decisive results, the last depending mainly on the extent to which the enemy's line of retreat is threatened. where the various requisites are in conflict, the flank affording the greatest advantages for converging fire from the artillery will be chosen. nothing destroys the moral of men in action so speedily and effectually as a flank attack, and except by this method good infantry will seldom be beaten. a decisive attack, to be completely successful, must be followed up by fresh troops before the assaulting waves have been checked. lee had crossed the potomac and desired "to defeat the last army of the federals in the east and drive the northern government from washington." the battle of _gettysburg_ lasted three days (july - , ). on the first, the army of northern virginia was uniformly successful; on the second, the fortunes of battle swayed to and fro; on the third, lee decided to make a napoleonic decisive attack with half his available troops against meade's centre. but the spirited attack of the first , , after penetrating the line, was checked, and the remaining , did not arrive in support, so that the attack died down, was repulsed, and withdrew in disorder. at _chattanooga_ (november , ) grant's decisive attack was successful, although delivered against a part of the position which appeared to be impregnable, on account of the strength of the attack, through { } distribution in depth; , men were hurled against the entrenchments in three lines, and the support of the third line carried the waves of the attack through the defences. detailing the units.--the commander will detail the units for carrying out the fire attack, which will generally require one to three rifles per yard of the objective. this force will be placed under a definite commander, who will distribute it into a forward body to develop the attack in the firing line; supports, to enable the forward body to assault the position; and local reserves to maintain or restore the advantages gained, their main function being to repel counter-attacks by similar bodies of the enemy and to maintain the offensive spirit. the commander will also detail the units for carrying out the decisive attack, which will require three to five rifles per yard of the portion of the position against which it is projected. this force, under a definite commander, is distributed for the attack in depth, so that the strength and weight of the blow carries it home against all opposition. the force is retained by the commander of the whole attacking troops, to be thrown in at the right time and in the right place. it also remains in hand to restore the battle in case of an unexpected check, or to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the troops if it is desired to break off the engagement. the artillery.--the position of the artillery will be settled in consultation with the artillery commander, the decision resting on the objects in view, which are, to assist the infantry in its advance by keeping down hostile gun and rifle fire--therefore, in the initial stages, a commanding position is required; during the decisive stage concentration on the objective of the decisive blow is required; and after the successful assault guns may be required to be hurried forward to repel { } counter-attacks, to break down protracted opposition, and to complete the rout by harassing the fleeing enemy. when the attack is directed against a position the defence of which is known to have been elaborately organised, a pre-arranged covering fire in the form of an artillery barrage, lifted in successive stages as the attack advances, may require to be organised some time before the attack is launched. it will be necessary to detail an escort for the guns, unless the distribution of the troops for the attack already provides such protection. at the _battle of verneville_ (august , ) the th prussian corps artillery had been pushed forward against the french position at armandvillers-folie. the fire of the french infantry caused a loss of officers and other ranks, and one battery was disabled, before the guns were withdrawn. there was no infantry escort to keep the attacking riflemen at a distance. at the _battle of colenso_ (december , ) two batteries of field artillery advanced into action without an escort, and without previous reconnaissance unlimbered on a projecting spit of land in a loop of the tugela river. frontal fire from hidden trenches on the opposite bank and enfilade fire from a re-entrant flank killed all the horses and the greater part of the personnel, and although the utmost gallantry was shown by all ranks ten of the twelve guns were left in boer hands. infantry regimental officers and battalion commanders must be acquainted with the amount of ammunition carried by their accompanying artillery, in order that ammunition may not be wasted by calling for fire on targets of secondary importance. all reserves, whether they have been specially detailed or not for the purpose, must of their own accord make every effort to assist in getting forward guns and ammunition. one of the outstanding lessons of the war of - is the possibility of placing even the heaviest artillery close behind the infantry fighting line owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction and to the security against { } counter-attack provided by the deadly fire of the magazine rifles and machine guns of their escort, and of the lewis guns allotted to the batteries themselves. the cavalry.--the opportunities for cavalry action in an attack depend upon the character of the defensive operations. against a highly organised defensive position there will be no openings for mounted troops until a wide penetration gives space for manoeuvre. before the attack during an "encounter battle" the cavalry will have been out on reconnaissance in front of the attacking force; during the attack they may be called on to assist by dismounted fire action, and by local counter-strokes as mounted troops (against cavalry, or against infantry disorganised by the breakdown of a movement), but must not be allowed to impair their speed or freshness; after the successful assault the pursuit is their special duty, not necessarily on the heels of the enemy, but on lines parallel to their retreat, to hamper his movements, to round up stragglers, and to threaten their communications. generally speaking, such a position as is required will be found on a flank, or slightly in advance of a flank of the attacking force. "cavalry make it possible for a general to adopt the most skilful of all manoeuvres, the converging attack, and properly handled, as at _appomattox_ or _paardeberg_, to bring about the crowning triumph of grand tactics, the hemming in a force so closely that it has either to attack at a disadvantage or to surrender" (henderson). in the mesopotamian campaign a surprise attack of general sir s. maude's forces on september - , , against the turkish forces assembling near _ramadie_, miles north-west of baghdad, was converted into the surrender of the turkish commander and about , all arms by the enveloping tactics of the anglo-indian cavalry division. a similar manoeuvre on march , , by the cavalry of the mesopotamian field force (commanded at that time by general sir w. r. marshall, { } who succeeded after general maude's death from cholera), resulted in the surrender of over , turks, including a divisional commander, miles north-west of hit. the prisoners were fugitives from the battle of _baghdadieh_, and the cavalry were astride their communications. "on the morning of the armistice (november , ) two british cavalry divisions were on the march east of the scheldt, and before orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line miles in front of our infantry outposts. there is no doubt that, had the advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's disorganised retreat would have been turned into a rout" (sir d. haig's dispatches). the absence of cavalry at the critical moment has often decided the issue of a campaign. after the action of _gaines's mill_ (june , ) general j. e. b. stuart was dispatched by lee with the confederate cavalry on a false scent to white house, south of the york river, to which base lee believed mcclellan to be retreating. but mcclellan had shifted his base to harrison's landing, on the james river, and the confederate cavalry did not regain touch with the army of the potomac until july , two days after the failure of lee's attack on malvern hill. had stuart been available with his cavalry throughout that critical period mcclellan's huge trains would have fallen an easy prey to the confederate horsemen, and the roads through the forests and swamps to malvern hill could have been blocked. absence of cavalry before the first day of _gettysburg_ (july , ) hampered the confederate leaders, and lack of information caused them to act with unnecessary caution when boldness would have carried everything before them. general stuart had once more been sent away on a raiding expedition. after the victorious attack of general early's division a handful of general buford's u.s. cavalry enabled the defeated st corps of meade's army to save their guns and to retire unmolested. a thousand { } confederate sabres would have brushed buford aside, and july would have been disastrous to the national cause. during the german offensive of march-july, , "even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions might have driven a wedge between the french and british armies. their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (sir d. haig's dispatches). during the _battle of cambrai_ (november , ) a squadron of the fort garry horse crossed the scheldt canal, and after capturing a german battery and dispersing a large body of infantry, maintained itself by rifle fire in a sunken road until nightfall, when it withdrew to the british lines with its prisoners. during the _battle of amiens_ (august - , ) the cavalry were concentrated behind the battle front by a series of night marches, and on the first day of the battle they advanced miles from their position of assembly. throughout the battle they rendered most gallant and valuable service. during the second _battle of le cateau_ (october - , ) cavalry were instrumental in harassing the enemy in his retreat and preventing him from completing the destruction of the railway, and when the infantry were held up by heavy machine-gun fire from cattigny wood and clary "a dashing charge by the fort garry horse gained a footing in cattigny wood and assisted our infantry to press forward. further east, dragoon guards and canadian cavalry were instrumental in the capture of hennechy, reumont, and troisvilles" (sir d. haig's dispatches). in the early stages of the campaign in _north russia_ (august-september, ) a handful of cavalry on either bank of the north dwina river could have kept the bolshevik forces constantly on the run, and could have prevented the successive reorganisation of their demoralised forces, which the slower progress of the pursuing infantry was unable to accomplish. a few squadrons of cavalry could have dispersed the whole { } bolshevik force in the archangel province. tanks are usefully employed in the pursuit, as artillery, the only effective enemy of the tank, is unlikely to remain in action with the rearward troops of a disorganised enemy; and a new terror has been added to the pursuit by the advent of self-propelled, man-carrying aircraft, armed with machine guns and bombs, and possibly even with light quick-firing artillery. during the final stages of the victorious _allied advance_ in november, , the retreating german armies were continuously harassed from the air. "throughout the day (november , ) the roads, packed with the enemy's troops and transport, afforded excellent targets to our airmen, who took full advantage of their opportunities, despite the unfavourable weather. over guns, which bombs and machine-gun fire from the air had forced the enemy to abandon, were captured by a battalion of the th division in the field near le presau" (sir d. haig's dispatches). the royal engineers.--the position and employment of the royal engineers will be determined by the commander who issues orders for the attack, and as the main function of this corps in the attack is the removal or bridging of obstacles to the advance, and the strengthening of the position when captured, the royal engineers will probably remain with the troops to which the decisive attack is entrusted. medical arrangements.--the position of hospitals and clearing stations will be settled in consultation with the s.m.o. aid posts and advanced dressing stations will be established under battalion arrangements in connection with the medical officer of the units concerned. supply.--the position of the train, with its reserve supplies of ammunition and of food for men and horses, will depend upon facilities for communication with the attacking force and upon security against artillery fire { } or surprise attack from the air or land. the position will probably be well in rear, and at the junction of roads leading forward to the attacking troops. rations will be brought up to units under arrangements by the commanders of the battalion or other units concerned. the commander's position.--the position of the commander who issues the orders for the attack must be fixed, and must be made known to subordinate commanders, as it will be the place to which reports will be sent. in the case of a small force the commander will generally stay with the general reserve; if the force is fairly large, and composed of all arms, he will probably be on the main artillery position; but in the case of a large force he should be well out of reach of the distraction of local incidents. if the commander of a large force moves from his stated position he must leave a senior officer of his staff to represent him on the spot and to forward urgent communications to him in his changed position. in the case of a small force a commander who vacates his stated position must arrange to leave a runner in the position stated as his headquarters, in order that messages may reach him without delay. battle reports.--the successful exploitation of success depends largely on the accuracy of the information gained by the commander from all parts of the battlefield. reports are required from all who have information to impart and they should be made out on previously prepared message cards, stating the exact position of the sender at the time of the report; the progress made by the unit under the command of the sender, or by neighbouring or other units whose action has been observed; the degree of the enemy's resistance; enemy movements; and the plans of the officer making the report and the method to be adopted in carrying out such plans. { } reorganisation and pursuit.--once a successful assault has been delivered, subordinate commanders must immediately regain control of their commands, and must see that the fleeing enemy is pursued by fire, while local reserves follow up and secure the position against counter-attack. superior commanders must take steps to organise the pursuit, to cut off the enemy's line of retreat, and to complete his overthrow. no victory is ever complete if the enemy is permitted to retire unmolested from the field of battle, and given time to recover order and moral. "never let up in a pursuit while your troops have strength to follow" was a favourite maxim of stonewall jackson. the pursuit is the task of the infantry until it is taken over by aircraft, cavalry, and tanks, and the limits to which the infantry will carry the pursuit will be fixed by the commander, who will bear in mind the principle that "success must be followed up until the enemy's power is ruined" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). if the fruits of victory are to be secured the work must be put in hand whilst the enemy is still reeling under the shock of defeat. a few hours' delay gives him time to recover his equilibrium, to organise a rearguard, and to gain several miles on his rearward march. in modern warfare motor transport may enable the comparatively immobile infantry to achieve the mobility of cavalry, if arrangements for embussing them have previously been made, and in a few hours infantry may thus be transported beyond the reach of pursuit. { } formation of infantry for the attack "only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won."--marshal haig. the formations in which infantry move to the attack must be such as will enable them to achieve their object by the combination of fire and movement. for this purpose, the forward troops must be furnished with supports belonging to the same unit as themselves, in order that a connected leading may produce a joint action of the whole. the platoon.--the smallest unit which can be divided into independent bodies, each capable of fire and movement, is the platoon, the four sections of which can pin the enemy to his position by fire and can manoeuvre round his flanks. the normal distribution of the platoon for the attack is either the square or the diamond formation. in the _square formation_, two sections are forward covering the frontage allotted to the platoon, and the remaining two sections are in support, in such formation as may keep them in readiness for instant manoeuvre with due regard to the avoidance of unnecessary loss. in the _diamond formation_, one section leads to reconnoitre and to pin down the enemy, while the remaining three sections are held in readiness to manoeuvre for the decisive attack at the point in the enemy's defence which offers the best prospect of success. the diamond formation is that best suited to an attack in an encounter battle, when the nature of the enemy's dispositions are imperfectly known. it possesses the great advantage of preserving { } the power of manoeuvre for three-quarters of the platoon until the action of the leading section has developed the situation. in each case (except when the attack is launched against a highly organised defensive position), the forward sections will be preceded by _ground scouts_, to find the most covered line of advance and the best fire positions, and to guard against ambush. these ground scouts advance until checked, when they remain in observation until joined by the leading sections. during the early stages of the attack in an encounter battle _flank scouts_ may be required until such time as the deployment of the platoon renders them unnecessary. against a highly organised defensive system platoons may not be able to advance to the attack without a barrage, and it is essential that all movements should conform exactly to the timing of the barrage and that the troops should keep under the back edge of the shrapnel curtain, so as to deliver their assault before the enemy has time to bring rifles and machine guns into play. under such circumstances, ground scouts must be dispensed with. such a position will not be attacked without careful previous reconnaissance and the lines of advance will have been chosen beforehand. the square formation will be that usually adopted for attacks on highly organised defensive positions, with the two rifle sections forward and the two lewis-gun sections in support. the lewis-gun sections are thus able to protect the flanks of the rifle sections, and to deal with isolated enemy machine guns, or concealed bodies of riflemen, which might come into action with reverse or enfilade fire after the forward sections have passed over the occupied ground. the platoon commander.--the platoon commander must explain the situation to his subordinates and point out the line of advance. he should usually move with the forward sections during the preparatory { } phase of an attack, and when the forward sections have been committed to the attack he should assume control of the supporting sections and move with them. if his platoon is in support, he will thus be with the forward sections before the platoon is involved in the fight. the success of infantry in the attack depends not only on dash, control, and leading, but upon the intelligent co-operation of support commanders, who must keep themselves acquainted with the course of the battle by intelligent observation and will thus possess an "appreciation of the situation" before involving their men in action, and can direct the supports to the right spot at the right time, to influence the battle by fire and by movement, without hesitation or delay. the company.--the normal distribution of the company, when acting with other companies of the battalion, is two platoons forward and two in support. to meet the expectation of a stubborn resistance, or to cover an unusually extensive frontage, three platoons may be forward, with one in support; and where information as to the enemy's dispositions is lacking, but strong opposition is unlikely, one platoon may be forward with three in support, thus enabling the company commander to use any or all the supports to influence the attack on obtaining information as to the point in the enemy's position which offers the best prospect of success. when the frontage allotted to a company is above the normal, the leading platoons should not endeavour to cover the whole front, but gaps should be left between them; otherwise the men will be so widely extended as to deprive the leaders of the power of control. when a company is acting independently, the normal formation will be two platoons forward, with one in support, and one in reserve. the company commander.--the company commander will allot the tasks and the frontages of his { } platoons and give orders as to their distribution, and must state where he will be himself during the attack. his position will be determined by the necessity of keeping informed throughout the attack of the situation and of the progress of his platoons, and he is responsible that all essential information on these points is passed back to the battalion commander. he must also keep in touch with companies on his flanks, sending out patrols for this purpose, if necessary; and must use every opportunity afforded by the fire or smoke provided by other units or arms to get forward or round the enemy's flanks. he will use his supporting platoons to push through where the resistance is weak in order to turn the flank of those portions of the enemy which are holding up the advance. as soon as this temporary phase has been brought to a successful conclusion the company commander must reorganise his platoons and secure their advance on the objective. when the objective has been gained the position must be consolidated and patrols sent out to prevent surprise. the battalion.--the distribution of the battalion depends entirely upon the nature of the task allotted to it. where the enemy's dispositions are known and considerable resistance is anticipated in the earlier stages of the attack, the battalion will normally be distributed with two companies forward, one in support and one in reserve. the forward body should thus be strong enough to develop the attack to such a point that a decisive blow can be delivered by the supports against the main resistance, and the reserve company is in hand for the completing stages of the action or for stabilising the local battle. where the enemy's dispositions and the degree of resistance are still the subject of conjecture, one company only may be forward, with two in support, so that the main strength of the battalion will not be committed to any definite _rôle_ before it is needed and before the situation of the enemy is discovered. { } the battalion commander.--"the powers of personal control of a battalion commander upon the field of battle are limited, and success will depend, in a great measure, on the clearness of the orders which commit his leading companies to the attack" ("infantry training, "). the battalion commander should be supplied with any details concerning the enemy and of co-operating troops. he must understand his objective, the limits of his frontage, and the extent of help which he will receive from the other arms. in addition to such information as is supplied regarding the enemy's strength and dispositions, particularly with regard to wire (or other obstacles) and machine guns, he must ascertain the best positions of assembly for his companies, the best lines of approach to the objective, the most covered line of advance for his supports and reserves, and the best position for his own headquarters during each stage of the attack. in his orders for the attack he will reveal all information concerning the movements and dispositions of the enemy and of co-operating troops and arms; he will allot tasks to the companies and to the machine-gun platoon (if not brigaded) and will define the frontage of the forward companies; he will also detail the assembly positions, give compass-bearings for the advance, describe the action of other arms in support, make the necessary signalling arrangements, notify the zero hour, arrange for the synchronisation of watches, notify his own position before, during, and after the attack, and indicate the point to which reports are to be sent, notify the medical arrangements, and issue instructions as to the collection of stragglers, the escort and destination of prisoners, the supply of ammunition, and the equipment to be worn. the quartermaster will receive orders as to the bringing up of rations during the battle. before issuing to the attack a proportion of officers and other ranks will be detailed to remain behind, to replace casualties when the engagement is over. { } the position of the battalion commander will be chosen with a view to keeping in touch with the progress of the attack in all its stages and of influencing the fight by means of the reserves. personal control is difficult to exercise once troops are committed to the fight, but opportunities for rapid decision were frequently offered to battalion commanders in the great war, and seized with a success which transformed a check into a victory. in a battalion commander of the coldstream guards, seeing his command disorganised by fire and resistance, by personal example rallied and reorganised the waves of the attack and added the necessary momentum to the assault, which then reached its objective. on april , , the commander of a battalion of the royal newfoundland regiment witnessed the launching of a local counter-attack by the germans on the village of _monchy-le-preux_, and by a rapid advance with the fighting portion of his headquarters, staved off the attack until the arrival of reinforcements from the th brigade enabled it to be driven back in disorder. on november , , during the german counter-attack from fontaine notre dame to tadpole copse, in the northern sector of the _cambrai_ zone, the germans forced their way into our foremost positions, and opened a gap between the / th and / th london regiments. local counter-attacks led by the two battalion commanders with all available men, including the personnel of their respective headquarters, once more restored the situation. in march, , during the most critical period of the german thrust at amiens, a battalion commander of the border regiment again and again, on horseback and on foot, personally restored the situation. { } defensive action "the soul of the defence is the counter-attack."--marshal foch. defensive action may be initiated by a commander in the field, or it may be imposed upon him by the enemy, and a commander may rely upon fortification to assist him in defeating the enemy, or he may employ manoeuvre to effect or to postpone a decision. a commander may desire to pin the enemy to an attack upon a fortified position, garrisoned by a portion only of his force, while he detaches another (and probably greater) portion to attack the enemy from an unexpected quarter. an outstanding example of this form of action is exhibited in the _battle of chancellorsville_ (may - , ), where lee kept at bay hooker's army of , with one-third of his force and detached stonewall jackson with , men to attack the federal rear. action of this kind is peculiarly effective, but it requires a secrecy which modern aircraft would almost certainly unveil, and if the manoeuvre failed to escape observation it would probably result in disaster both to the retaining force and to the detached troops. a different form of the combination of defence with manoeuvre is the defensive-offensive battle, with examples of which the history of warfare is amply supplied--marengo, austerlitz, and waterloo being typical battles of this nature. in this form of defensive action a commander invites the enemy to attack a well-chosen position, and after exhausting the enemy's strength and holding up the assault, the commander passes from the guard to the thrust and overwhelms { } the exhausted foe by an irresistible and sustained counter-attack with all the means at his disposal. a position is sometimes occupied as a matter of necessity, sometimes merely as a matter of tactical prudence. at _nachod_ (june , ) the prussian advanced guard hurriedly established a defensive position and kept at bay the whole austrian army, while the prussian army emerged in security from a defile and manoeuvred into battle array. the _pass of thermopylae_ was occupied in b.c. by , greeks under leonidas, king of sparta, to withstand the persian hosts of xerxes, and although the greek force was destroyed by an attack from the rear (through the disclosure of a secret path by a renegade in the persian service), the resistance offered to the "invincible" persians emboldened the greeks in their future encounters, and led to the ultimate defeat of the invaders. according to the legendary history of rome, horatius cocles and two companions defended the _sublician bridge_ over the tiber against lars porsena and the whole army of the etruscans. this legendary heroism was equalled or surpassed during the _second battle of the somme_ (march , ). "the bridges across the crozat and somme canals were destroyed, though in some cases not with entire success, it being probable that certain of them were still practicable for infantry. instances of great bravery occurred in the destruction of these bridges. in one case, when the electrical connection for firing the demolition charge had failed, the officer responsible for the destruction of the bridge personally lit the instantaneous fuse and blew up the bridge. by extraordinary good fortune he was not killed" (sir d. haig's dispatches). at _rorke's drift_ (january , ) a force of other ranks of the th regiment, under lieutenants chard and bromhead, with about hospital cases, drove off the repeated attacks of , zulus, part of cetewayo's army which had surprised and annihilated the garrison { } at _isandhlwana_ earlier the same day. an astounding feat of arms was performed by a small body of troops during the withdrawal of the british army in face of the overwhelming german attack at the _second battle of the somme_. a detachment of about officers and men of the st brigade, th division, was detailed to cover the withdrawal of their division at _le quesnoy_ (march , ). under the command of their brigade-major (captain e. p. combe, m.c.) the detachment successfully held the enemy at bay from early morning until p.m., when the eleven survivors withdrew under orders, having accomplished their task. there are many instances of the occupation of an area for an actual or potential tactical purpose. before the _battle of salamanca_ (july , ) a spanish force had been detached by wellington to cover a ford of the river tormes by occupying the castle of alba de tormes, but the force was withdrawn without wellington's knowledge, and marmont's defeated army retired unmolested over the ford to the fortress of valladolid. in the campaign of , napoleon placed a garrison of , in the _fortress of soissons_, but on march , , the garrison capitulated without exhausting all the means of defence as the regulations of war ordain, and the bridge at soissons enabled blücher and bülow to unite their forces across the river aisne. in the waterloo campaign, wellington stationed , men at _hal_ and _tubize_, miles from his right on the field of battle at waterloo, to repel a possible turning movement and to form a rallying point if his centre was broken, and with , men took up a position astride the nivelle-brussels and charleroi-brussels roads which met at mont st. jean. he was deprived of the services of this detachment and modern criticism has been directed against this disposition of his forces. it is, however, permissible to suggest that the security of his right flank, and the possession of a rallying point, inspired him with the confidence which enabled him to { } withstand the sustained attacks of napoleon until the arrival of blücher's corps permitted him to overwhelm his adversary. a further form of defensive action is the occupation of a series of extemporised positions and the orderly withdrawal to a further series before the actual assault of the enemy, resistance being combined with manoeuvre for the purpose of delaying the enemy's advance or of holding up his pursuit. delaying action of this kind is commonly employed in rearguard fighting, when the object to be gained is time rather than position, and the offensive action of the defender is limited to local counter-attacks at favourable or desperate moments. but the guiding principle in all defensive operations, including delaying action, must be that "when an enemy has liberty of manoeuvre, the passive occupation of a position, however strong, can rarely be justified, and always involves the risk of crushing defeat" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). the offensive spirit.--although there are many forms of defensive action the soul of the defence in every case is a vigorous offensive spirit. in the active defence, the decisive counter-attack, ending in the overthrow of the enemy, is the manoeuvre originally in view when the defensive _rôle_ is adopted. in the passive defence against superior numbers. local counter-attacks end with the recapture of a tactical point or the repulse of a determined assault, and in the delaying action they overwhelm by surprise fire or assault a detached force which has advanced with such rapidity as to enable the defenders, without undue risk, to cut off and annihilate the isolated enemy body. whatever the tactical situation, it is by the vigour of the offensive spirit alone that success may be achieved in the face of a determined enemy. modern warfare.--in modern warfare the defensive position plays a part of increasing importance, owing { } to the great power conferred on the defence by modern armaments. "machine guns and barbed wire permit the rapid organisation of defensive points of a value which cannot be disputed. in particular, they have given to a trench, or to a natural obstacle, a solidity which permits a front to be extended in a manner unsuspected before this war; they permit the prompt consolidation of a large system that is easy to hold" (marshal foch). "the modern rifle and machine gun add tenfold to the relative power of the defence as against the attack. it has thus become a practical operation to place the heaviest artillery in position close behind the infantry fighting line, not only owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction but also because the old dread of losing the guns before they could be got away no longer exists" (marshal french). it is thus possible to hold the forward positions of a highly organised defensive system with a minimum of exposure to loss, the extra strength of the position counterbalancing the reduction in numbers, but a preference for defensive action of this kind may generally be regarded as an admission that a victorious outcome of the campaign is not anticipated at the time of its adoption in the theatre in which it is employed. "it is of paramount importance that in those parts of a theatre of operations where a commander aims at decision a war of movement must never be allowed to lapse into position warfare so long as a further advance is possible. position warfare can never of itself achieve victory" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). however strong entrenchments may be they will not defeat the adversary's main armies, nor can they withstand indefinitely the attacks of a determined and well-armed enemy. it is scarcely even probable that an army behind entrenchments can by that means alone inflict such losses on its assailants as will enable the initiative, or liberty of manoeuvre, to be regained and the assailant's main armies to be defeated. the operations on both sides { } are in the nature of a siege, and however prolonged the siege, the advantage will be gained in the long run by superiority of aggressive action in the air and over and under the ground. in addition to the absence of opportunity for the grand offensive there are two further points of difference between defensive action in position warfare and the defence in a war of manoeuvre. the first of these is the inevitable absence of flanks to be assailed, as the operations necessitate a connected line of strong points from sea to sea, or from the sea to the impassable barrier of neutral territory. mounted troops are therefore doomed to inaction in their most important sphere, until the lines have been breached and the enemy is forced to retreat, and the opportunities for delivering flank attacks are meanwhile confined to the infantry, and will be due to irregularities in the alignment of the strong points, upon which enfilade fire may be brought to bear. the second point of difference is the abundance of time at the disposal of commanders for developing and rehearsing elaborate systems of attack and defence, and for obtaining detailed plans of the hostile works, through continuous reconnaissance by the air service. in most countries there must be, of necessity, a prolonged period of inactivity on both sides in a position war, owing to the severity of winter conditions, or to the occurrence of the rainy season, and during that period it will seldom be possible to penetrate the enemy's main defences on such a scale as to bring about the grand offensive. but this is a period of inactivity in appearance rather than in fact, for no defensive system is ever perfect, no strong point but needs further consolidation, new trenches are constantly constructed or improved, and fresh areas are covered with wire entanglements. guns of all calibres, underground mines and light mortars are ever at work, demolishing, wounding, and killing, while lachrymatory and asphyxiating shell-fire is to be expected at all times. on a smaller scale, snipers on both sides have a daily bag, and { } observers are ever at their posts noting every change, however insignificant, and every new piece of work; "listening posts" are detecting hostile plans, while patrols are collecting information and raiding parties are reconnoitring, destroying defences, and inflicting losses, it being the first principle of a raid that it should result in greater losses to the enemy than to the troops which carry it out. entrenchments.--entrenchments have been employed in the defence from the earliest times. the roman walls in britain, the great wall of china, the earthworks in the russian war of - , in the american civil war of - , in the russo-turkish war of , and the russo-japanese war of - are notable examples. but in no war previous to that of - have they played so important a part. one of the most famous series of entrenchments in previous wars were those constructed in by colonel r. fletcher, of the royal engineers, at _torres vedras_. these fortifications extended for miles and contained closed works, mounting guns, and behind these lines wellington amassed stores and reinforcements until the retreat of masséna enabled him to resume the initiative. in front of these lines everything that could support the french armies had been removed; behind them wellington's forces were well provided in every respect. on october , , masséna was confronted by the entrenchments, the existence of which had been kept a profound secret, while their strength prevented them from being carried by assault. before the end of october a portuguese spy wrote to wellington: "heaven forgive me if i wrong the french in believing they have eaten my cat" (napier). during the night of november - , masséna broke up his camp and withdrew. but it was not the lines of torres vedras which won back the peninsula. spain and portugal were saved by the bold march northwards { } to vittoria. "in six weeks wellington marched, with , men, miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove , veteran french troops from spain" (napier). defensive systems.--"whether it is the intention of the commander to resume the offensive at an early date or whether it is likely that the defensive system will be occupied for a considerable period, the principles on which the construction of all defences should be undertaken are the same. all defensive systems should be planned from the outset in such a way that they can easily be adapted to the requirements of a prolonged defence. the ground must be thoroughly reconnoitred and should at the first be divided into a series of tactical posts and defended localities. these posts should be self-supporting, but should be so sited that the garrisons mutually support each other by fire. the gaps between the posts must be covered by the fire of the garrison of the posts, and machine guns may also be sited to bring fire to bear from positions in rear and to the flanks" ("infantry training, "). this principle must govern the choice of the position to be defended as well as the organisation of the position for defence, and troops detailed for the defence of an area must continue to improve the defensive arrangements in that area until such time as the offensive is resumed. choosing a position.--the framework of the modern defence consists of artillery and machine guns; into this framework are fitted the defence posts or defended localities garrisoned by infantry, who are responsible for holding their ground at all costs and for inflicting the greatest possible loss on the enemy. a commander will require a position which affords elasticity for increasing the resistance as the attackers penetrate the defences, and depth will thus be essential. he will require a position wide enough to prevent the whole of his front being masked by a retaining attack of a part of the { } enemy's forces while a strong flank attack is simultaneously delivered; and in a war of manoeuvre he will require facilities for the decisive counter-attack. the depth of the position will develop automatically in a war of position, but it must always be sufficient to enable troops to assemble in rear of the forward position before moving up and to afford rest to troops when withdrawn from the front line. the width of the position will generally depend upon the strength of the defending force, the guiding principle being to keep about half the force in general reserve; if, therefore, the remainder of the force is insufficient for the purpose of holding the defences the position is too wide for the tactical requirements of the active defence. in position warfare, however, a defensive system must necessarily be extended beyond the limits that are practicable in the active defence, and the numbers available for the garrison are supplemented by denying ground to the attack by means of obstacles, the removal of which is prevented by machine-gun and rifle fire. the outpost zone.--for the active defence of a position the defensive system will consist of an outpost zone and a battle position. the outpost zone is garrisoned by a protective force which keeps a constant watch on the enemy and absorbs the first shock of the attack, watch being kept by means of well-concealed sentry posts on the line of observation, supported by a chain of small self-contained defensive posts, while resistance is offered by a series of self-contained, mutually supporting defence posts on the outpost line of resistance. the battle position.--the battle position will be established in the area in which the commander decides to fight out the battle and break the enemy's attack. it therefore forms the keystone of the whole defensive position and must be organised in depth to afford elasticity for defensive action. "in principle, in order to protect { } the battle position from being obliterated by a preliminary bombardment, it should be beyond effective range of the enemy's mortars" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). the semi-permanent system.--when a campaign is prolonged in any area without decisive results a war of position may be developed by one or both of the combatants. in such cases the outpost zone is developed into an intricate trench system, with protective avenues leading from front to rear and with deep dugouts to protect the garrison from artillery fire. the battle position will probably coincide with the outpost zone, the trenches being used for the purposes of observation until the fire positions are manned to resist an assault. in parts of the line on the western front of the great war, "pill-box" forts, constructed of concrete, took the place of continuous lines of trenches. these machine-gun forts were garrisoned, according to size, by groups from to strong, and were echeloned in plan, to sweep all approaches, and together to command with their mutually supporting fire the whole area over which they were spread, the intervening ground being entangled with wire so placed as to invite attacking troops into places where flanking fire may be poured into them. the advantages of the pill-box system over the continuous line of strong points are principally defensive. fewer men are required for them than for the trench systems, and there is less liability of loss from artillery fire. but there are certain grave disadvantages. well-directed artillery fire is liable to destroy some of the pill boxes, and a direct hit from a heavy gun will possibly put a larger fort out of action, thus crippling the defence by the removal of a peg on which the whole scheme depends. supports and reserves are necessarily far in rear and must be brought up through the open to repel successful attacks, while a defensive scheme { } composed entirely on the pill-box plan is less suitable for aggressive action than entrenchments, there being fewer facilities for assembling troops prior to the attack. common characteristics.--whatever the system of defence or phase of warfare, every commander must guard his flanks and keep in touch with neighbouring units. he must always be ready to assist a neighbouring commander by enfilade fire or by a relieving counter-attack; or to throw back a defensive flank in the event of a neighbouring post being captured by the enemy. each post, occupied for the defence (except in delaying actions, where manoeuvre takes the place of a settled resistance), forms a self-contained centre of resistance, capable of all-round fire, and the duty of the garrison is to defend the area allotted to it to the last man and the last round. the active defence.--the active defence may be considered according to the reason which prompted the commander of the force to occupy the position. it may have been deliberately chosen as a position which the enemy must attack, and in the hope of delivering during that attack a crushing and decisive counter-blow; or it may have been chosen of necessity, to meet an attack by deployment on the ground of the encounter, with the same hope of delivering a decisive counter-stroke when the opportunity arrives. there is little difference in the steps to be taken by the commander, as in the first case a general reserve is specially detailed for the counter-stroke; and in the second, the position will be held with as few troops as the tactical situation permits, in order to provide as large a general reserve as possible for the grand offensive. a commander will be influenced by many considerations in his choice of a defensive position:-- (i) _the position must suit the plan of operations_; it must be "in the enemy's way," and this the commander must be able to judge from the map. it is { } to be noted that to bar the enemy's way it is not always essential to get astride his lines of advance, as a position on parallel lines, threatening his flank and rear, cannot be ignored by the enemy, unless he is strong enough to detach a part of his force to mask the defender's position, while he proceeds to his objective with his main army. "it was a mistake to assume that in order to cover turin one had to stand astride the road leading to that town; the armies united at dego would have covered turin, because they would have stood on the flank of the road leading to that town" (napoleon). (ii) _the position must not be too extensive_ for the troops at the disposal of the commander, and this will be governed by the extent of the line to be actually held. it will consist of a series of mutually supporting tactical points, which can be held as "pivots on which to hinge the defence of the position," and the object must be to obtain the maximum of fire effect on all ground over which the enemy can advance with the minimum of exposure to his fire. a rough-and-ready rule is that unless one rifle per yard of the frontage occupied can be supplied by the "troops to hold the position" (which should not exceed one-half the available force) then the position is too extensive and should be narrowed. on the other hand, too narrow a front may enable the enemy to develop, early in the engagement, strong flank attacks, which may make the position untenable before the time is ripe for the assumption of the offensive. the _condé-mons-binche_ line held on august - , , by sir j. french's army (i. corps, general sir d. haig; ii. corps, general sir h. l. smith-dorrien) had a total width of miles, and the troops at disposal, including general sir e. h. h. allenby's cavalry division, consisted of about , all arms. the frontage actually held did not exhaust half this force at the rate of one rifle per yard, and a position in rear had also been selected, between jerlain and maubeuge, with a frontage of miles. the _retreat from mons_ was { } due not to the excessive width of frontage, but to the success of the german attack on the french v. corps at charleroi (august , ), which left the right flank of the british army "in the air," while two german corps were working round the left flank. the british iii. corps (general sir w. p. pulteney) did not arrive until the retreat was in full swing. at the _first battle of ypres_ (october , ) many parts of the line were held with one rifle for yards, and there were no supports or local or general reserves. yet the line was not only maintained but a counter-attack at gheluvelt thrust the attacking germans behind their entrenchments. (iii) _there must be a clear field of fire_ to prevent the enemy approaching unmolested within effective range, and particularly within close range, from which the enemy will endeavour to establish an ascendency in the fire-fight. (iv) _the flanks must be secure_, or at least as strong as possible. a flank resting on a deep river or a marsh may be regarded as secure, and a flank extending to the sea, or to the boundary of a neutral state. a flank on high ground which commands all approaches and provides means of distant observation may be called strong. it is a great advantage if one flank can be posted so strongly as to compel the enemy to make his main attack on the other, as this will enable the defender to forecast the direction of the decisive attack and to dispose his general reserve to meet and overwhelm it. (v) _there should be facilities for cover_ on the position and concealed avenues of approach from the rear. a crest affords cover on the reverse slopes and woods provide concealment, while time enables artificial means to be adopted. tactical cover can be provided by cavalry and advanced troops in the early stages of manoeuvre-battle, and in removing this cover the troops can withdraw in such a way as to lure the enemy on { } to a false position. they can also induce premature deployments by the enemy, and movements across the front of the real position. (vi) _there should be good artillery positions_ to provide effective fire on all hostile avenues of approach, and counter-battery work on hostile artillery positions. there should also be firm ground and good roads for the movement of guns, and an absence of landmarks for the enemy to range on. guns of the heaviest calibre take part in all modern battles, their disposition being settled in conference with the artillery commander. a battery of field artillery requires yards frontage for its six guns, and there is usually an interval of yards between batteries. (vii) _there must be depth_ to allow for the disposal and movement of the supports and reserves, and for manoeuvres to recapture the forward defences, or to issue to the counter-attack. (viii) _there must be good lateral and frontal communication_ in order that any part of the line can be quickly reinforced. a position astride an unfordable stream, or high ridge or deep ravine should therefore be avoided. at the _battle of dresden_ (august , ) the allies were encamped on the left bank of the elbe. their forces were posted on the heights, but the position was cut transversely by a deep ravine, so that the left wing was isolated from the centre and right. this vicious disposition did not escape the penetrating eye of napoleon, who attacked their isolated wing with superior forces and routed it completely, with the capture of , prisoners, before any assistance could arrive. the task of creating lateral communications, if none exist, is of the utmost importance, as they enable a commander to achieve the primary object of every military manoeuvre, to meet the enemy with superior forces at the desired point. (ix) _there should be good lines of withdrawal_, and these should be horizontal, or only slightly oblique, to { } the main position, and not parallel with the general alignment. this is a point of the first importance, for if the lines of communication lead straight to the rear a force that is overwhelmed by the attack can withdraw to selected positions and towards its base, if it can keep the line intact and prevent its flanks being turned. a wide base, with alternative lines of approach, is of the greatest value, and when there is undue risk of the lines of communication to a base being intercepted, an alternative base, with lines of withdrawal thereto from the unexposed flank, is an acceptable safeguard, as the defence can be protracted while the withdrawing force concentrates upon the changed base. such a change of base was effected by marshal french during the _retreat from mons_, and amongst many historical examples may be quoted general mcclellan's transfer of the _army of the potomac_ from the york to the james river in july, , during the _seven days' battle around richmond_. general grant changed his base no fewer than five times during the _campaign in the wilderness_ (may, ), from washington to orange and alexandria railroad, then to fredericksburg on the rappahannock, then to port royal, further east on that river, then to white house on the pamunkey (a branch of the york river), and finally to the james river. "his army was always well supplied, even his enormous numbers of wounded were carried straight away to the base and thence to washington, without any difficulty, and he had no obstacles whatever to fight against as regards either feeding his army or keeping up the supply of ammunition" (henderson). in withdrawing a defeated wing it may even be advantageous to rally the troops at a point distant from the field of battle, and to cause the pursuer, uncertain as to the direction of the retreat, to make detachments which can be overthrown by sudden counter-attacks, or to lure a pursuer from the field where their presence is required, as grouchy was lured after napoleon's defeat of the prussians at ligny { } (june , ). the object of napoleon's attack on the allies was the separation of wellington's anglo-belgian force from the prussian army under blücher, and after the defeat of the latter at ligny the emperor directed marshal grouchy to pursue the prussians and to drive them eastwards. grouchy conducted a leisurely pursuit and engaged an insignificant part of the prussian army (_the battle of wavre_, june - , ), while the main body of the prussians moved westwards and assisted in the overthrow of napoleon at waterloo. (x) _there should be favourable ground and a good line of advance for the decisive counter-attack_. in order, therefore, to overthrow the enemy, a position should not be chosen behind an impassable feature which neither side can cross. at _ramillies_ (may , ), one wing of the enemy was posted behind a marsh, where it was both unassailable and unable to attack. marlborough, therefore, ignored that wing entirely, and bringing his whole force against the remaining wing, won easily a decisive victory. the only occasions when an impassable feature is welcome are in the passive defence of a small force against overwhelming odds (as was seen in august, , when the belgians occupied a position behind the _river gette_), and in the delaying action of a rear-guard fighting for time for the main body to get away. in such cases a decisive counter-attack is not contemplated. occupation of a defensive position.--the framework of the _defence_ is provided by artillery and machine-gun fire; the backbone of the _offence_ is the infantry. the commander will _divide the troops_ into (a) _troops to hold the position_, and (b) _general reserve_, the golden rule being to make (a) as small as the tactical situation permits in order that (b) may be as large as possible, and its work absolutely decisive. under no circumstances { } should the general reserve be much below half the available force. of these two portions, the _troops to hold the position_ consist of infantry occupying a series of mutually supporting tactical strong points, not necessarily continuous, and of irregular alignment so as to cover with the defender's fire not only the ground over which the enemy can advance, but the front and flanks of neighbouring strong points. this line will be strengthened, as and when necessary, by throwing in the supports, and it will be assisted at critical moments by the local reserves, which, coming up unseen, will deliver local counter-attacks on the assaulting enemy, and will thus restore the battle at threatened points by relieving the pressure on the front line. their work completed they will be rallied and withdrawn again into local reserve, and it is highly important that they should be kept well under control, or their successful efforts may be neutralised by local reserves of the attacking force. at _talavera_ (july , ) a portion of the british force followed up the repulsed french columns too far, and being in turn broken and driven back, was pursued closely by the enemy and retired in disorder to the position. at the battle of _fredericksburg_ (december , ) two brigades emerged from the confederate position and drove meade's division of the army of the potomac out of their lines. but they rushed on with reckless impetuosity and were finally driven back with heavy loss. local counter-attacks keep alive an offensive spirit in the defenders, exhaust the enemy's powers, draw his reserves into the battle, and thus prepare the opportunity for the decisive counter-attack. the local reserves of flank sections should usually be echeloned in rear of the flank, which can thus be protected at need by determined counter-attacks on the flank of the enveloping force. _the general reserve is for the decisive counter-attack_ and is held for this purpose in the hands of the { } commander of the whole force, in order that it may be used to crush and overthrow the enemy's main attack. the opportunity for this effort is generally obtained only when the enemy has thrown into action his own general reserve for the decisive attack, and has received a check. a bold and resolute counter-attack at that moment is bound to achieve a decisive success. but the assumption of the _grand offensive should not be confined to the general reserve alone_. commanders of sections of the defence who are permitted by the local situation to do so, must at once join in the decisive counter-attack, unless express orders to the contrary have been received; and any definite success obtained must be the signal for the whole force to press the enemy with the utmost vigour. this opportunity will be fleeting, and there must be no delay in seizing it. every preparation must therefore be made in anticipation of the opportunity so that a pre-arranged plan may be put into execution. "to initiate a counter-attack on a large scale without due time for preparation, co-ordination, and movement of troops is to court failure, with heavy casualties and resulting demoralisation" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). that the soul of the defence is the counter-attack was shown at the battle of _spottsylvania_ (may , ). general hancock's corps (from grant's combined armies) had assaulted and captured part of lee's entrenchments in the wilderness of virginia; , men had assaulted and captured the salient, taking , prisoners; they then pressed forward, and sweeping everything before them, drove a wedge right into the confederate position. "but lee, recognising the weakness of the salient, had caused another line of entrenchments to be constructed about half a mile in rear. by this second line the federals were suddenly brought up. the confusion was very great, the battalions had intermingled in the excitement of the charge, and the officers could neither make their orders { } heard nor form their men for another rush. lee threw in his reserves. he made a tremendous counter-attack. every single battalion he could collect was ordered to attack, and the vigour of the blow was such that the whole of these , men were driven back beyond the first line of entrenchments, and the confederates recaptured their first position" (henderson). _he will select positions for the artillery_, in consultation with the commander of that arm, the objects in view being: to command lines of approach so that the assailant may be shelled and forced to deploy early and so to indicate his plan of attack; to delay the advance; to combine with the infantry in the close defence of the main position; to support local counter-attacks; to destroy hostile batteries by counter-battery work; and to combine eventually in the decisive counter-attack. the increased mobility of guns of the heaviest calibre owing to motor traction, and the increased defensive power of the protective quick-firing small arms, enable guns to be placed close behind the infantry firing line without undue risk of capture. _he will divide the position into sectors_, each garrisoned by a distinct unit, under a definite commander. the mutually supporting tactical points (farmsteads, villages, woods, ridges, knolls, etc.) will usually be held in groups, under group commanders, with definite subordinate commanders, and the group commander will probably control the local reserves of that group, with which he can assist any of the units in times of need. the units from which such groups are formed will usually be complete sections. _he will decide the position of the general reserve_. this will be the locality best suited for the advance to the decisive counter-attack, if it is to be delivered from a distance; or near the point where the enemy's decisive attack is expected, if it is intended to hurl the general reserve into the flank and rear of the enemy's main { } attack while it is heavily engaged with the troops holding the position. as surprise is essential to success, the position of the general reserve should be concealed as long as possible. the position of the general reserve will depend upon the ascertained intentions of the enemy. at the _second battle of the somme_ (march , ) the intentions of the german commander were ascertained during the first day's fighting. "as by this time (_i.e._ the evening of march ) it had become clear that practically the whole of the enemy's striking force had been committed to this one battle, my plans already referred to for collecting reserves from other parts of the british front were put into immediate execution. by drawing away local reserves and thinning out the front not attacked, it was possible to reinforce the battle by eight divisions before the end of the month" (sir d. haig's dispatches). _he must decide the position_, and to some extent the action, of the cavalry. before defensive action in a war of manoeuvre the cavalry have been out on reconnaissance, and during the early stages they have endeavoured to lure the assailants on to a false position. during the battle they will frustrate the efforts of opposing mounted troops, will protect a vulnerable flank, and will assist generally by dismounted fire action. after the victorious counter-attack they will emerge in pursuit. in case of a reverse they will delay the enemy's victorious advance by fire action and by mounted tactics to protect the withdrawing forces from the depredations of hostile cavalry. a position near a flank will usually be occupied. there have been many examples of protection by cavalry of a force that has been worsted. after the _combat of roliça_ (august , ) general delaborde retreated by alternate masses, protecting his movements by short, vigorous charges of cavalry. at _chancellorsville_ (may , ), and on the first day of _gettysburg_ (july , ), a handful of united states { } cavalry held up the pursuit and staved off disaster. at _königgratz_ (_sadowa_), (july , ), the charges of the austrian cavalry drove back the prussian horse and enabled benedek's defeated troops to get back in safety. at _rezonville_ (august , ) von bredow's cavalry brigade was ordered to charge the french batteries and their infantry escort, in order to give some breathing time for the hard-pressed prussian infantry. the charge was successful and the time was gained, but as at _balaclava_ (october , ) there were few survivors from "von bredow's todtenritt" (death ride). after the battle of _le cateau_ (august , ) and during the _retreat from mons_, the british cavalry, under general allenby, effectively held off the enemy and enabled the british troops to move unmolested. during the great german offensive in the spring of the withdrawal of the troops at _cugny_ (march , ) was made possible by a brilliant mounted charge by a squadron of the th cavalry brigade, which broke through the german line, taking over prisoners, and sabring a large number of the enemy. during the retreat in that area units of the nd and rd cavalry divisions proved so effective in delaying the enemy's advance that other units were horsed during the progress of the battle in order to increase the supply of cavalry. "without the assistance of mounted troops, skilfully handled and gallantly led, the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from breaking through the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded ground before the french reinforcements had had time to arrive. . . . the absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the battle. had the german command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the french and british armies. their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (sir d. haig's dispatches). { } _he must select a rallying place_ in rear of the main position from which to recapture the front line, as general lee recovered the "salient" in the wilderness of virginia. _he must arrange for the reorganisation_ of his victorious forces and for the pursuit and complete overthrow of the enemy. { } protection and reconnaissance "surprise consists in the hard fact that the enemy suddenly appears in considerable numbers without his presence having been known to be so near for want of information; and without it being possible to assemble against him for want of protection."--marshal foch. every commander of a force, however large or small, is responsible for the protection of his command against surprise, and a force can only be regarded as secure from surprise when protection is furnished in every direction from which interference is possible. detachments are therefore provided by every commander, their duty being to warn him if hostile forces are discovered in the vicinity of such forces, and to gain time, at all risks and at any sacrifice, for the commander of the troops they protect to carry out his plans unimpeded by the enemy. "a mission of protection does not necessarily imply a defensive attitude, it will often be better performed by an offensive" (marshal foch). there is the closest connection between reconnaissance and protection. it is only by finding out the location, strength and movements of the enemy that a commander can decide how best to protect his troops, and the forces he employs to protect his troops against surprise will very largely prevent the enemy finding out his own strength and dispositions. detailed and timely information about the enemy and the theatre of operations is a necessary factor in war and the value of the information depends on whether it can reach the authorities in time to be of use. facilities for reconnaissance have been enormously increased by the introduction of man-carrying, self-propelled aircraft. before their introduction reconnaissance { } at a distance from the forward troops was limited by the speed and endurance of the cavalryman's horse, and by the skill of the cavalry scout in penetrating the preventive screen of hostile cavalry, and in escaping the net spread out to catch him on the return journey. his radius of operations was comparatively small, that of the aërial observer is practically unlimited, as his machine will carry him over the hostile area, and unless he is driven down by opposing aircraft, or crippled by defensive fire from the ground, he returns in a comparatively short space of time to his base, with his budget of news, and may bring with him a series of photographs. position warfare.--when opposing forces are entrenched at no great distance from one another, photographs taken from the air lead to the discovery of new works from which the intentions of the enemy can be predicted. on the western front in the great war, photographs taken from the air revealed the construction in the german training area of actual sectors of british trenches in facsimile, thus indicating the rehearsal of an attack on a definite part of the line. hostile aircraft are prevented from carrying out similar observational journeys, the resistance of defending squadrons is overcome, and whenever a favourable target is presented, casualties are caused by bullets and bombs. observers report all suspicious movements and changes in trench construction, and from photographs taken at daily intervals maps of hostile trenches are constructed and revised. infantry patrols and raiding parties are sent out by night and by day, and information is gleaned from the uniforms and badges of captured prisoners as to the distribution of hostile troops, while changes in the plan of trenches, in the siting of wire entanglements, or in the emplacements of guns and mortars are duly noted. in addition, troops in observation posts, in or ahead of the front line, in favourable and unsuspected { } localities, are constantly observing the enemy, and sentries over all posts containing troops are ready at all times of the day and night to alarm the local garrisons. resistance is afforded by a series of mutually supporting strong points, sufficiently garrisoned by troops who guard against surprise and hold their ground against attack. entrenchments, with dug-outs and shelters, provide protection from fire, and barbed wire entanglements prevent unbroken rushes by the enemy, and entice him into openings that are swept by rifle and machine-gun fire. box respirators and other appliances nullify the effects of gas, and camouflage disguises the position of trenches, troops, guns, and dumps, and so screens them from observation and direct bombardment, while it provides unsuspected means of observing the enemy's movements. manoeuvre warfare.--in a war of manoeuvre the steps taken to obtain security against surprise vary with the situation of the troops. hostile aircraft flying high from the ground are dealt with by counter-attack by armed aeroplanes, but as aërial fighting requires space for manoeuvre hostile machines flying within , feet of the ground must be dealt with by machine gun, lewis gun, or concentrated rifle fire, except in cases where it is essential to conceal from the enemy that a certain position or locality is occupied, and where the troops are so well hidden as to escape detection unless they open fire. movement is easily detected by low-flying aeroplanes, and in fair weather troops can be recognised as hostile or friendly by an observer at feet, while movements of formed bodies on a road are visible at , feet. troops remaining stationary in shaded places may easily escape observation, and if small bodies in irregular formation lie face downwards they are difficult to detect, even in the open. when a force is in movement, detachments move with it to afford protection in every direction from which interference { } is possible; and when a force is at rest, detachments with similar duties secure it from disturbance and keep off attack until it can be met or developed without disadvantage. these phases are dealt with under the headings of "the advanced guard," "flank attacks and flank guards," "the rear guard," and "outposts." { } the advanced guard "fabius, the saviour of rome, used to say that a commander could not make a more disgraceful excuse than to plead, 'i never expected it.' it is, in truth, a most shameful reason for any soldier to urge. imagine everything, expect everything."--seneca, "_de ira._" every moving body of troops must be protected by detachments, the force detached to precede the advance being known as an advanced guard, and when a body of troops so protected halts, the responsibility for protection during the halts remains with the troops which have been protecting the march until they are relieved, the commander of the advanced guard exercising his discretion as to halting at once or moving forward to occupy a position which may be of more tactical advantage. strength.--the strength of this guard depends on the proximity of the enemy, but it must always be strong enough to brush aside slight opposition, so that the advance of the force it is covering may not be delayed by small hostile forces, and to resist the enemy, when encountered in strength, for such time as will enable the force it is covering to prepare to meet or deliver an attack. no general rule as to the numerical strength of an advanced guard can be given, as the number of troops required depends almost entirely upon the tactical situation and the country through which the protected force is passing. it should, however, whenever possible be composed of a complete unit or formation under its own commander, and it is found in practice that an advanced guard will seldom be less than one-eighth or more than a quarter of the whole { } force. when a large force is advancing in several columns on parallel roads it will be preceded by a "strategical advanced guard," which protects the front and flanks of all the columns. the "tactical advanced guard" provided by each column may then be reduced in strength. distance.--the distance at which it moves ahead of the force it is covering depends upon the nature of the country through which the force is moving, upon the strength of the main body, and upon the tactical situation, but it must always be sufficient to enable the main body to deploy, to get into battle formation--unmolested by the enemy's artillery, if required to do so. it is clear, therefore, that the larger the main body the greater the distance must be, as more time will be required for deployment. the advanced guard of a brigade of infantry, with artillery, would move at a distance of to miles between the main guard and the main body, with the mounted patrols of the vanguard to miles ahead of the main body. these mounted patrols would discover the presence of an enemy, and with the supports of the vanguard would feel for his strength and ascertain his dispositions. the main guard would either assist in brushing him away or would resist, in the best available position, any attempts to attack the main body while the latter formed up for battle. in advances.--infantry forming part of an advanced guard to a force advancing must always act with dash and resolution, but their action must always be regulated by the one motive of complying with the intentions of the commander of the force they are covering. any action contemplated by the advanced guard commander must therefore be considered from the point of view of its effects upon the plans of the commander of the main body, but if these plans are not known, the guiding principle will be _to regulate his action solely in the interests { } of the force he is covering_, and by driving in the advanced troops of the enemy he will obtain information which will assist his superior in coming to a decision, without interfering with his liberty of action, whereas hesitation and delay may give the initiative to the enemy. for this reason, a wide turning movement by the advanced guard troops is seldom possible, as time is thereby lost and the front of the main body is uncovered. "the ruling factor should be the discovery of some tactical locality held by the enemy, the capture of which will compel his whole line to fall back. if this point can be discovered the whole energies of the advanced guard should be directed against it alone, and elsewhere a defensive attitude should be adopted, to avoid surprise of or interference with the main body" (general r. c. b. haking). it must always be assumed that the enemy will have taken all the necessary steps to protect himself and to hamper reconnaissance by an adversary. if, therefore, hostile troops are known to be in a certain locality, opposition must be expected before that locality is reached, and study of the map should enable the advanced guard commander to determine the approximate neighbourhood in which opposition may be expected. in retreats.--while it is clear that a force advancing towards the enemy must always be preceded by an advanced guard it must not be forgotten that a force withdrawing from the enemy must also be so protected, even when it is moving in or towards friendly territory. such a force will not only prevent the main body being surprised by an energetic enemy, pursuing swiftly and getting round to attack where he is least expected, but will also prevent the main body being delayed by obstacles, and can delay the pursuit by preparing bridges, etc., for demolition, which can be completed by the rear guard when the main body has passed over { } them. it can also reconnoitre the route to be followed, so that the main body can proceed without delay. training.--in formulating any scheme for the exercise of troops in advanced guard work all officers and other ranks should be made to understand the nature of the scheme, and should be informed (a) whether the force is advancing or retreating, whether it is moving before or after action with the enemy, and whether it is in a friendly or a hostile country; (b) what is known of the enemy; (c) the direction and objective of the march; (d) the general intentions of the commander of the main body; and (e) the general instructions issued to the commander of the advanced guard. "unless such exercises are carried out in a practical manner, young officers and inexperienced n.c.o.'s will get the impression that an advanced guard consists merely of a procession of small bodies of infantry, strung out at fixed intervals on a single road. it is of the highest importance that the training should be carried out on the lines that would be adopted in action" (g.h.q. circular). tactical principles.--"speed of advance is the first consideration when not in contact with the enemy. hence an advanced guard will move on a narrow front along roads and other channels of communication, with such distances between advanced and supporting bodies as to avoid possibility of surprise. when in contact with, or in the vicinity of, the enemy, security and speed of advance are equal considerations. hence the advanced guard should move by bounds on a broad fighting front across country" ("infantry training, "). before an advanced guard commander moves off in compliance with his instructions he will take certain steps in accordance with these tactical principles. he will divide his troops into two portions, known as the _vanguard_ and the _main guard_, and as the duties of the { } vanguard are reconnaissance in general, as well as the protection in particular of the main guard, it will contain a large proportion of mobile troops, with infantry for assault and resistance, and engineers for clearing the way through or over obstacles. aircraft, in advance of the vanguard, not only increase the area under search and expedite the discovery of the enemy, but prevent surprise and assist the advanced guard as a whole by close co-operation in feeling for and fighting the enemy when encountered. "in order to reconnoitre one must compel the enemy to show himself wherever he may be. to this end he has to be attacked until the extent of his position has been clearly defined. but the attack is made with the intention not to bring on an action. the skirmishing lines will advance, but they must be able to disengage themselves at a given moment. pressure is exercised from a distance without allowing the forces exerting that pressure to become tied up" (marshal foch). the duty of the main guard is resistance, that is to say, fighting. it will therefore consist mainly of infantry, with artillery and machine guns, and the troops will move in the order in which they will come into action. the vanguard will be preceded by scouts, special attention being paid to roads and tracks parallel with the advance. this screen is followed by the remainder of the vanguard, in collected formation, until it is in contact with or in the vicinity of the enemy, with protection at all times against local surprise. the main guard follows, in touch with the vanguard, and with local protection. both portions have definite commanders, and the commander of the whole advanced guard will probably move with the supports of the vanguard. the commander will also determine the _relative distances_ between the vanguard and the main guard, these being regulated by the strength of the advanced guard, and being based upon the necessity of one part supporting the other. the distance of the { } advanced guard ahead of the main body may have been mentioned in the operation orders, but if it is left to the discretion of the advanced guard commander he will be guided solely by the interests of the force he is covering, and his decision will be influenced by the nature of the country (whether it is open, or intersected by woods, hedges, sunken roads, etc., which make observation even by aircraft a matter of great difficulty) and by the tactical situation, such distance being chosen as will suit these conditions, while admitting the fulfilment of the objects in view, viz.:--to obtain information concerning the enemy and to prevent hostile reconnaissance; to prevent surprise and delay; and to enable the main body to deploy into battle formation without interruption by the enemy's fire. it is also the duty of the commander to ensure _communication_ between the various parts of the advanced guard and between that force and the main body, by arranging for mounted orderlies and cyclists, signallers and connecting files, in addition to the contact patrols furnished by the air service, and to such telegraphic and telephonic communication as can be provided in the field by the signals. this is of the first importance, as the action of the commanders of the advanced guard and of the main body will depend on information received, and not only must information be gained by every available means, but it must also be communicated without delay to all concerned while it is fresh and before it becomes stale. it must also be remembered that negative information (_e.g._ that such and such a village has been thoroughly searched and no trace of the enemy found) is at least of equal value to positive information. the repetition or confirmation of information already sent are also of importance, as it is clearly of value to a commander to know positively that the enemy is still absent, or still present, at a certain time in a certain locality. in the american civil war, during an encounter battle between { } advanced troops, the commander of the cavalry of the united states army held up the confederate advanced troops. a sharp fight took place at _sulphur springs_ (october , ) and the united states cavalry commander became so absorbed in the battle that he failed to send information to headquarters, and general meade did not learn that he was in contact with the army of northern virginia until late in the afternoon. in the campaign of _fredericksburg_, general r. e. lee, with the army of northern virginia, was confronted by general burnside, with the army of the potomac. on november , , a patrol of confederate cavalry discovered burnside's troops moving eastwards, and another patrol brought news the same day that gunboats and transports had entered acguia creek on the potomac. these two pieces of information, collected at points miles distant from one another, gave lee an insight into his opponent's design. information gained by aircraft on september and , , and communicated immediately to general joffre, led to the discovery of the flank march across the franco-british front by the german i. army, and to the decisive counter-attack at the _first battle of the marne_ (september , ). the advanced guard commander must be careful how he becomes seriously engaged, and must avoid any enterprise not strictly in accordance with the known intentions of the commander of the main body. the tendency to independent action of this kind, which militates against the success of the best laid plans, was very observable in the early battles of the franco-prussian war of - . actions were hastily entered on by advanced guards, maintained with varying success by the gradual arrival of reinforcements, and finally concluded with barren results and losses in excess of those inflicted. at the _battle of spicheren_ (august , ) the advanced guard of the th prussian division commenced the battle, which had to { } be sustained for three hours by battalions against . during the next three hours more battalions arrived, and at the conclusion of the battle only battalions and batteries in all had come into action against a whole french corps, and there were two french corps within reach of the one engaged. had these "marched to the sound of the cannon," as napoleon would have marched, the th prussian division would have been unable to extricate itself without complete disaster. at the _battle of worth_ (august , ) the prussian crown prince had expressed his intention not to engage the french on that day. yet the advanced guard of the v. corps brought on a battle into which the bavarian corps was perforce drawn. the crown prince sent word for the action to be discontinued, but the advanced troops were so seriously involved in the battle that reinforcements had to be sent into action. although tactically successful the battle was out of accord with the settled plans of the commander-in-chief. in the same way the advanced guard of the vii. prussian corps, contrary to the letter and the spirit of the orders of the commander of the i. army, precipitated an action at _colombey_ (august , ). other troops were drawn into the fight, and finally the whole of the i. army was engaged in a battle which its commander not only disapproved but had expressly forbidden. the battle had no tactical or strategical results, and heavy losses were sustained on both sides. "precipitate action of this kind prevents the troops being engaged in the most advantageous manner. for when a small force is engaged against a larger one it becomes necessary, as reinforcements arrive, to move them up to support some point already hard pressed, and the whole force is thus used up and disseminated, instead of being employed collectively where an effective blow may be struck. thus the direction of the fight is surrendered to the enemy, as at spicheren and colombey. the french positions were so strong that the german { } reinforcements as they arrived were frittered away in support of troops already engaged, and the state of the latter during the action was frequently very critical. at colombey the battle resolved itself into a desperate struggle along the front of the french position, where the prussians made little impression, while their losses considerably exceeded those inflicted on the french" (clery). it is thus seen that the commander of the advanced guard must limit his aggressive action in accordance with his instructions and with the tactical and strategical requirements of the force he is covering. but his action in _protecting_ the main body is unfettered by any considerations of prudence, and must ever be vigorous and resolute, any risks being taken that ensure the safety of the main body. on the morning of the _battle of nachod_ (june , ) the advanced guard of general steinmetz's v. corps (of the army of the crown prince of prussia) was in bivouacs on a plateau, after emerging from a long and narrow defile through which the main body must march to the open country beyond. about a.m. the cavalry of the vanguard was checked by the advanced troops of the vi. austrian corps. it was imperative that the prussian advanced guard should hold the plateau until the main body had extricated itself from the defile. by the rapid and accurate fire of the infantry and horse artillery, and the co-operation of the cavalry against the austrian squadrons, the thin line was maintained for more than three hours. less than battalions of infantry, with squadrons of cavalry and batteries of light artillery, kept in check battalions, squadrons, and batteries. had the advanced guard suffered itself to be driven back on the main body in the defile a disaster could scarcely have been avoided, and owing to the steadfast endurance of the advanced guard the main body was able to drive the austrian corps from the field. advanced guard problems.--the advanced guard commander must be able to appreciate without delay { } the situation which confronts his force, and to solve the problem before him with regard solely to the interests of the force he is covering. (a) if the vanguard is held up by the enemy who is ascertained to be inferior in strength to the advanced guard, the commander will transmit information to the main body and will attack vigorously to disperse the enemy, in order that the movements of the main body may not be delayed. a fire attack would be organised on the front of the enemy, supported by close-range artillery fire, and a turning movement with lewis guns and rifles on one or both flanks. if the enemy held to a covered position they could be ejected by rifle bombers or light mortars from a flank, while artillery and machine guns prevented aimed fire at the attacking force. (b) if fire is opened on the vanguard and definite information as to the strength and dispositions of the enemy cannot be ascertained, such information as had been gained would be transmitted and a bold procedure would be adopted in order that the information might be supplemented as quickly as possible. the commander would reinforce his vanguard with infantry from the main guard, and should be able to force the enemy to disclose his position and strength, but unless ordered to do so would take care not to become so involved in action that the main body would be compelled to come up and extricate them. (c) if the enemy is encountered when the advanced guard commander knows that it is the intention of his superior to deliver an attack the information would be transmitted with an outline of the steps taken in seizing and securing all tactical points that will be of service to the main body. the advanced guard would work on a wider front than would otherwise be used by a force of that strength, and the artillery would be posted with a view to its position being adopted as the main artillery position. { } (d) if, under similar circumstances, the intention not to be drawn into a decisive engagement is known by the advanced guard commander he would limit his activities to reconnaissance of the enemy's position and numbers, and while hampering the enemy and preventing him from finding out particulars concerning the main body, he must take care not to become involved in a general engagement. (e) a case may easily occur in which vigorous action is demanded, whether the commander of the main body intends to attack at once or to defer an engagement. such a situation would arise if the vanguard discovered the approach of the enemy towards a ridge or other position of tactical advantage, and if the advanced guard commander could, by a rapid advance, forestall the enemy in the occupation of such a position, his failure to do so, or hesitation in waiting for explicit orders to do so, would be a grave neglect of duty. (f) in the american civil war a tactical blunder of another kind, due to the impetuosity of the commander of the independent cavalry of the army of northern virginia, prevented the southern commander from obtaining a great strategical advantage over the army of the potomac. the latter force had been withdrawn by general mcclellan, after the seven days' battle around richmond, to a secure position at malvern hill, where the assaults of the army of northern virginia were beaten back with heavy losses. mcclellan continued the withdrawal and had reached harrison's landing on the james river. the independent cavalry of the southern army had previously been dispatched on a false scent, but at a.m. on july touch was regained with the northern forces, which were sighted from _evelington heights_ (july , ), a commanding ridge within two miles of the bivouacs of the army of the potomac, which was resting in apparent security, with inadequate precautions against surprise. general j. e. b. stuart, the confederate cavalry commander, { } reached evelington heights with , sabres and carbines and one light howitzer, and the whole army of the potomac, , all arms, was in bivouacs in full view from the heights, and it was clear that his presence was not suspected. the nearest column of the force he was covering was six miles away, and there remained about ten hours of daylight. it is easy to see, after the event, that this was a case where "silence is golden." stuart should have sent the information to lee and to every column commander, urging them to press on at all speed, while he occupied the heights with his dismounted men with the determination to hold his position with fire action, if discovered, until the arrival of one or more columns of the army of northern virginia. but he failed to appreciate the situation, and forgetting the larger question, he seized the opportunity to spread panic in the ranks of the army of the potomac, and opened fire with his one light howitzer. the northerners recovered from the panic caused by this unexpected attack, when it was realised that only one gun was in action against them, and attacked and captured the heights, and were strongly entrenched there before the nearest confederate column arrived. (g) among the examples of advanced guard work in marshal foch's "principles of war" is a problem for a battalion as the advanced guard of a brigade. "what is the problem the battalion commander has to solve? it consists in preparing for the brigade to go into action against an enemy who may debouch from bettwiller. what does the brigade require for such an action? it requires the _space_ necessary for the full employment of its forces, and the _time_ necessary for their arrival and deployment. in order to achieve that double task the battalion commander orders his troops to occupy _the whole space necessary_, and places them in points where they may hold on for the _necessary time_." { } flank attacks and flank guards "a man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of napoleon's warfare would hardly fail to make his enemy's communications his first objective."---col. g. f. r. henderson. the flanks are the most vulnerable points of an army, for an attack upon these points subjects the defenders to enfilade fire, and is delivered by troops arrayed in attack formation against an enemy that is not in a position to repel the attack. the consequences of a successful flank attack are so far-reaching that every effort will be made by a commander to bring about such a consummation in order that he may sever his adversary's communications, bring him to the end of his resources, and deprive him of the means of replenishing them. if, therefore, there is any possibility of a column on the march being attacked in flank a force must be detached to protect that flank, and if both flanks are exposed to attack both must be similarly protected. the flank is the most vulnerable part of a moving column, and an attack driven home upon that part has every prospect of success, for it will be delivered by a force that is distributed in depth against a force that is protracted in width after changing front to meet the attack, and the absence of depth in the defending force will deprive the defence of the principal source of strength in resisting attack. an independent column is liable to attack on either of its flanks, unless the nature of the country through which it is passing provides security for one or the other in the form of an impenetrable feature (such as a wide, { } trackless marsh), or an impassable barrier (such as a neutral frontier). the outer columns of a force moving on parallel routes will have an exposed flank, while their inner flank is protected by maintaining touch with the neighbouring column. flank guards may be furnished by the main body, or by the advanced guard, and this point will be made clear in the orders for the operations. their composition, strength, and distribution, and the interval at which they move on the flank of the main body, are similar to those of an advanced guard, while their action under all circumstances is governed by the same tactical considerations, the principle underlying every action of a flank guard commander being compliance with the known intentions of the commander of the main body, and the sacrifice of the interests of the flank guard to preserve the interests of the main body. the same duties of reconnaissance and protection have also to be carried out, and communication with the main body has to be maintained. for the purposes of reconnaissance and communication aircraft are even more effective than in advanced guard work, while observation patrols supplement and confirm the reports of aërial observers. the work of protection varies with the nature of the country through which the guard and the main body are moving at the particular time. in open country the flank guard may be keeping pace with the main body at a regularly maintained interval, and on parallel lines. in close country, and in hilly or mountainous districts, it may be necessary to occupy a successive series of tactical positions on the exposed flank, any of which can be reinforced and held at need to safeguard the passage of the main body. in order that the whole column may be protected, from the head of the main body to the train in rear, unbroken touch must be maintained both with the advanced and the rear guard, and incursions between these forces and itself must be prevented by the flank guard. { } in addition to the protection of a column on the march, flank guard work is of the highest importance on the lines of communications and in the protection of convoys. on the _lines of communications_ raids from the air or land may always be expected in manoeuvre warfare, and one flank is usually more vulnerable than the other. a _convoy_, when parked, is liable to attack from any quarter; and when on the march it may be assailed from any direction, especially when the adversary can detach mounted troops, or infantry rendered mobile by motor transport, or raiding bodies carried in aircraft. frequently, however, one flank only of the lines of communications is vulnerable owing to the geographical or tactical situation, and the work of protecting traffic or convoys on the lines of communications is flank guard work, with due precautions against surprise from all quarters, the main guard remaining with the convoy and securing its safe arrival at its destination, rather than seeking an encounter with the enemy. the most efficient way to protect a convoy is to piquet the road daily with troops sent out from posts on the line; but when it is necessary to send a convoy by a route which cannot be protected in this way a special escort must be provided. the commander of an escort will not engage the enemy if his task can be accomplished without fighting. if fighting is inevitable the enemy should be engaged as far from the convoy as possible, and it will not be halted and parked, except as a last resort. in the case of mechanical transport the whole of the escort will be carried in motor vehicles, and except where parallel roads are in existence, little can be done to secure flank protection while on the move. a portion of such escort will move with the convoy and a portion will be sent ahead to secure any bridges or defiles which have to be passed, the outlet of any defile being secured before the convoy is permitted to enter the defile. in the case of a horsed convoy the escort will usually consist of infantry, with a proportion { } of mobile troops. small advanced and rear guards will be detailed and sufficient men will be posted along the column to ensure order and easy communication. the remainder of the escort will usually move on that flank from which attack is most likely. the far-ranging raid on the lines of communications was a notable feature of the american civil war. it was freely employed on both sides and was often harmful to the object of the attack and usually profitable to the raiders, especially to those of the south, by reason of the replenishment of stores. general turner ashby, the dashing cavalry leader in the shenandoah valley, was a constant source of terror to the northern generals, and his death while protecting the movements to _cross keys_ (june , ) was a terrible blow to stonewall jackson, who employed his mounted troops with more skill than any other commander, confederate or federal. general r. e. lee possessed a great cavalry leader in j. e. b. stuart, "but cool-headed as he was, lee appears to have been fascinated by the idea of throwing a great body of horsemen across his enemy's communications, spreading terror among his supply trains, cutting his telegraphs and destroying his magazines. yet in hardly a single instance did such expeditions inflict more than temporary discomfort on the enemy; and the confederate armies were led more than once into false manoeuvres for want of the information which only the cavalry could supply. lee at _malvern hill_ and _gettysburg_, and, on the side of the north, hooker at _chancellorsville_, and grant at _spottsylvania_, owed defeat in great measure to the absence of their mounted troops on raiding excursions. in the valley, on the contrary, success was made possible because jackson kept his cavalry to its legitimate duty" (henderson "stonewall jackson"). in the russo-japanese war a column of cossacks, under colonel madritov, made a bold raid on the communications of the japanese i. army in the last days of april, . the raid involved a { } ride of miles and was carried out in entire ignorance of the imminent attack upon general zasulich's force by the japanese i. army at the _battle of the yalu_ (may , ). on arrival at his objective colonel madritov found nothing to attack, as the base of the japanese i. army had been shifted from the korean frontier to a shorter sea base at the yalu mouth. on his return he found his general in disordered flight, and had his small force been available at the battle of the yalu it could have protected the retreat to hamatan and feng-hwang-cheng. raids and attacks outside the centre of operations, however daring, have no permanent value. in the south african war a disaster to a convoy at _sannah's post_, or _koorn spruit_ (march , ), was caused by the absence of precautions in front of a retreating force, the wagons being permitted to enter a defile (the spruit crossed the road at right-angles and was held by the boers) before the exit had been secured. earlier in the same campaign a convoy of wagons was lost at _ramdam_ (february , ). an ambushed force of boers killed all the transport animals and the wagons were abandoned. no escort had been provided for the convoy, which entered the ambushed area without previous reconnaissance. throughout the south african war the activities of de wet emphasised the vulnerability of the lines of communications. where the tactical situation permits, arrangements should be made to protect the lines of communications by offensive action. an engagement may be invited in a suitable position, the protecting troops holding the raiders with a delaying action while reinforcements are summoned to converge on the battlefield for the purpose of surrounding and exterminating the raiders. { } the rear guard a rear guard is essential to a force advancing in order to pick up the stragglers, to keep off marauders, and to prevent surprise by an energetic enemy who may detach a force for a surprise attack on the rear of the advancing column. but its most important work is the protection of a retreating force, and this work will vary in difficulty with the freshness and enterprise of the enemy and the spirit and determination of the force that is being pursued. generally speaking, rear guard fighting against an unexhausted enemy is the most difficult and most dangerous of all military enterprises. when a rear guard halts to fight it is being separated every minute from the main body, which is moving away from it, while every minute brings reinforcements to the enemy. the work requires great tactical skill, as it is the duty of the commander to delay pursuit by occupying positions from which he withdraws at the last moment, without becoming involved in a general engagement, from the meshes of which it may be necessary for the main body to return and extricate him. the work also requires great moral courage, as it is the duty of the commander to risk the loss of his force if by so doing he is adopting the only means of saving the main body. strength.--the strength of the rear guard will depend upon the energy, strength, and closeness of the pursuit, the condition of the main body (and whether it is withdrawing voluntarily or upon compulsion after an unsuccessful engagement) and upon the nature of the country, but it will generally amount to not less than { } one-fifth or more than one-third of the whole force, and will be selected, as a rule, from those who have been least severely engaged. composition.--its composition depends upon the work to be performed, and this calls for detachments of all arms of the land service, in addition to _aircraft_, which can prevent surprise by reconnaissance over the hostile area and can harass the pursuing columns by day and by night by fire-action with lewis guns and bombs. _mounted troops_ are required to extend the area watched and to prolong the resistance by reason of their superior mobility, in addition to their counter-action as cavalry. _artillery_ are required to open long-range fire on the enemy's columns and so to cause delay by deployment; and to concentrate upon them while in, or emerging from, a defile. _infantry_ and _machine-gun platoons_ are required for prolonged fire-fights and local counter-attacks, during which sudden bursts of machine and lewis-gun fire will do the greatest execution. _engineers_ provide sappers for the creation of obstacles and traps, and for the demolition of bridges and viaducts. _mechanical transport_ may be required to add to the mobility of the infantry. the _medical service_ is called upon to provide attention and ambulances for the wounded and for the sick and worn-out troops. distribution.--the rear guard is divided into two parts--the rear party and the main guard. the _rear party_ consists, like the vanguard of the advanced guard, of patrols and supports; the rest of the force forms the _main guard_, and marches in the order in which the troops are required, viz.: artillery (with escort), mounted troops (if any remain over from the rear party), infantry, medical services and ambulances, and the sappers of the royal engineers. the guns can thus open fire whenever required, and the sappers, who are furthest away from the pursuit, will have the longer time to prepare obstacles and demolitions, the { } latter being completed by the rear party. communication must always be secured and maintained between the rear party and the main guard, and between the rear guard and the main body. distance.--the distance at which the rear guard works is governed by the duty it has to perform, viz.: to permit the withdrawal of the main body to be carried out without interruption by the enemy, and to effect this it will usually be necessary for the machine gun and infantry platoons of the main guard to keep within effective range of positions from which hostile artillery might molest the main body. the commander will probably remain with this part of his force, as its work is of the highest importance; in any case his position must be made known and there should be definite commanders of the rear party and the main guard. but while the distance separating the rear guard from the main body must be sufficient, it must not be too great, or the enemy may penetrate between it and the main body, and not only will the rear guard be cut off and liable to destruction but it will cease to protect the main body. tactical principles.--the tactical work of a rear guard is carried out according to the following principles:-- _the rear party watches_, and it must watch _all_ the roads and tracks by which the pursuing force can advance, and is responsible that the enemy does not get round the flanks (which may or may not be specially protected by flank guards). reconnaissance by aircraft for the discovery of intended outflanking movements is probably of greater value in rear guard work than in any other military action. the rear party also resists the hostile advanced troops as long as possible, withdrawing before it is outflanked. "an outflanking manoeuvre is specially convenient when attacking a rear guard, for the latter cannot fulfil its mission once it has been turned" (marshal foch). { } _the main guard fights for time_. if the withdrawal is more or less unmolested, or if such pursuit as is offered can be dealt with by the rear party, the main guard can continue its march, taking care not to close in on the main body; and while falling back it can demolish bridges, create obstacles, prepare ambushes, and so on, employing all devices (within the laws of war) for delaying the enemy. when hotly pursued it must gain time at all costs for the army it is covering, and must not allow itself to be driven back on to the main body; or it will hamper that force and cease to protect it. time can be gained by compelling the enemy to halt to reconnoitre a position, by making him deploy into attack formation, and by making him go out of his way in order to envelop a flank. but before an attack reaches a position in such strength as to ensure success, and before the enveloping force can achieve its object, sub-divisions of the main guard will withdraw in succession under covering fire from those still in the line, which also withdraw in their turn under covering fire from the sub-divisions in their new positions, to tactical points further back, from which again they cover the withdrawal of the forces which had protected their own movement. certain points must be noted about the positions chosen for these successive fire-fights, and the choice of the positions is so difficult that an experienced staff officer should be specially detailed for the work, positions chosen must be in the enemy's way and the lines of withdrawal to them must not converge; they must be easy to defend and difficult to attack; the flanks must be secure from direct attack and effective enfilade fire, necessitating a wide detour (and consequent gain of time from the enemy) before they can be threatened; long-range artillery fire on the lines of approach should be possible in order to delay and break up the enemy's advance; and each position chosen for the next line of resistance should be unseen by the { } pursuing enemy, and sufficiently far away from the line last occupied to induce him to resume his march formation. this will necessitate a repetition on the part of the enemy of all the stages of the attack--the discovery and the report on the position, the decision to attack, and the deployment into attack formation. it will often be of advantage for a rear guard to take up a delaying position one or two hours before dark, as the enemy will then have to attack with darkness approaching and may wish to defer the attack until daylight, thus gaining several hours for the protected force. "the first position taken up by a rear guard after an unsuccessful fight must be held longer, as a rule, than the subsequent positions, because when once the defeated army has got well away along the roads and has regained some semblance of organisation, the march continues without interruption unless some obstacle has to be crossed" (general haking, "staff rides"). it can also be noted that as it is seldom the intention of the rear guard commander to deliver a decisive counter-attack, he can detail a very large proportion of his force to hold the successive positions, with local reserves, for purely local counter-attacks; and for the same reason, an obstacle in front of his position (which would make that position unsuitable for the active defence, as it would prevent the advance of the general reserve to the decisive counter-attack) is most welcome in the delaying action of a rear guard fighting for time for its main body. when at length a line of resistance is evacuated, the heavy artillery will be withdrawn first to move to a distant fire position, then the slow moving infantry and the light artillery (under the protective fire of the aircraft and mobile troops), and last the cavalry and other mobile troops, who by reason of their superior mobility, can hang on to the last and can protect the flanks of the rear guard as they fall back, before { } resuming their work as a rear party, observing and resisting the advanced troops of the pursuing force. during a close pursuit the rear guard commander will be called upon to exercise all his faculties and to exert all his tactical ability in handling his command. one of the most anxious times before him will be when the main body is passing through a defile, as such a passage will not only delay its march but will make its columns particularly vulnerable and helpless. in the case of defiles napoleon's maxim must be borne in mind: "it is contrary to the principles of war to let one's parks and heavy artillery enter a defile if the other end is not held also." at _sannah's post_ (march , ) the train was permitted to enter a defile caused by the banks of the koorn river without the previous occupation of that defile, and all the wagons were captured. this not only emphasises the necessity for an advanced guard in retreat, but points to the need of tactical knowledge on the part of the rear guard commander, especially in mountainous country or in terrain cut up by woods and marshes, where the train is liable to cause delays, as the withdrawing force is compelled to march in a long drawn column. extra time must be gained by the main guard to enable the main body to emerge from the defile. the rear guard commander must therefore adapt his plans to suit the country through which the main body has to pass, as well as the country in which he will himself fight delaying actions. a good map and ability to use it, and close co-operation with the main body, must be determining factors for success or failure. training.--when troops are being exercised in rear guard work opportunities should be taken to explain the difficulties of choosing suitable positions, of withdrawing from them when involved in battle, of the paramount necessity for mutual support, and of accepting { } any risk that may be required to safeguard the main body. stress should be laid upon the importance of fire tactics (the judicious combination of fire and movement), the greatest of all factors in a successful rear guard battle, and upon the ability to read and understand a map, an essential qualification in all movements of troops and indispensable in rear guard fighting. from the map a platoon commander must be able to predict the probable line of the enemy's advance against the line of resistance as well as the best route to be taken when, at length, he withdraws his platoon to another fire position in rear; while he must be prepared to throw his platoon in local counter-attack on the flank or rear of an assaulting party that has become detached from its supports and therefore affords a fleeting opportunity for a local fighting success, and a rapid advance for this purpose along a route unseen to the foe, a speedy reorganisation after victory, and a rapid withdrawal to the point of issue, or to a line in rear, can best be achieved by use of the map and reconnaissance of the ground of the encounter. eye for ground.--one of the secrets of napoleon's extraordinary successes was his "eye for ground." "it was not until i went to jena and austerlitz that i really grasped what an important part an eye for ground like napoleon's, or blindness as to ground like his opponent's at both those battles, may play in grand tactics, that is, the art of generalship" (colonel g. f. r. henderson, "the science of war"). the same was true of general r. e. lee, particularly in the wilderness campaign, when it was not only the entrenchments but the natural features of the ground on which he relied in his defensive tactics. "his eye for ground must have been extraordinary. the campaign was fought over a very large area, an area of very close country, with few marked natural features; and yet in the midst of woods, jungles, and streams, with very little time at his disposal, he always seems to have selected positions than which none could have been stronger" (colonel g. f. r. henderson, "the science of war"). examples of rear guard work.--during the retreat from mons the rear guard of the ii. corps of the british expeditionary force delayed the pursuit by the daring and devotion of its cavalry and artillery, and by subordinating its plans to the interests of the main body enabled the corps commander (general sir h. smith-dorrien) not only to throw off the pursuit but to effect a junction with the other wing of the british army. the retreat took place after the first _battle of le cateau_ (august , ), and during the period of the retreat the insecurity of the british army through the breakdown of a co-operating force rendered it liable to disaster. but the moral of marshal french and his commanders, the stubborn fighting instincts of the british race, and the excellence of the musketry training of the regular army in times of peace, prevented the retreat from becoming a rout. the care taken in training the troops in fire tactics, and particularly in reloading with "eyes on the mark and butts to the shoulder," was most abundantly justified. the accuracy and volume of the rifle fire deceived the enemy as to the nature of the troops employed against them, and the dismounted troops and infantry with their rifles were reported as "battalions of machine gunners." during the _second battle of the somme_ (march, ), the british iii, and v. armies fought a series of rear guard battles, and the enemy's advance was made at a very heavy cost. "units retreated stubbornly from one position to another as they found them turned and threatened with isolation; but at many points fierce engagements were fought, and whenever the enemy attempted a frontal attack he was beaten off with loss" (sir d. haig's dispatches). the machine gun proved its effectiveness again and again during the british { } withdrawal, and twelve machine guns of the rd division, posted in _les boeufs_ (march , ), held up the enemy's advance from morval at a critical period, and enabled the division to reach the position assigned to it. the losses inflicted on the enemy by machine-gun and rifle and lewis-gun bullets were so heavy that by march von below's xvii. army was described in german dispatches as "quite exhausted." during the same battle a detachment of about officers and other ranks, under the command of the brigade-major of the st brigade, held the enemy at bay from early morning until p.m. at _le quesnoy_ (march , ) and enabled the th division to retire to its destined position. at the _combat of roliça_ (august , ) the french general delaborde was outnumbered by the anglo-portuguese forces under sir a. wellesley, and being driven from his first and second positions he withdrew to the mountains. during his retreat "he brought every arm into action at the proper time . . . and retreated by alternative masses, protecting his movements by short, vigorous charges of cavalry . . . and he fell back, disputing the ground, to quinta de bugagliera" (napier). in december, , and january, , general sir john moore withdrew to coruña before the armies of napoleon (and when the emperor returned to madrid, before those of marshal soult). "he conducted his long and arduous retreat with sagacity, intelligence, and fortitude" (napier), and it is interesting to note that as in the retreat from mons in and at the second battle of the somme in , so in the rear-guard actions which preceded the embarkation of sir john moore's army, the musketry of the british troops was the deciding factor: "the english muskets were all new, the ammunition fresh; and whether from the peculiar construction of the muskets, the physical strength and coolness of the men, or all combined, { } the english fire is the most destructive known" (napier). at _bristow station_ (october , ) during general meade's campaign in northern virginia (after his defeat of general lee at gettysburg, july - , ), a surprise attack by stuart's cavalry and infantry from general rode's division caused the withdrawal of the federal troops. general warren covered the retirement and eventually withdrew his own forces unmolested after beating off several attacks with close-range musket fire. jean victor moreau, one of the greatest generals of the french republic, became a general of division at the age of , and by his skill in extricating his forces from apparently certain disaster established in retreat a far greater reputation for generalship than his brilliant victories secured for him. in the spring of he defeated latour at _rastatt_ and the archduke charles at _ettlingen_, and drove the austrians back to the danube, but owing to the defeat and retreat of jourdan he was compelled to regain the rhine in a desperate and apparently hopeless effort. yet he not only preserved his army intact but brought with him over , prisoners. in he again saved his army from destruction when hard pressed by the russians and austrians in italy. retreat was by no means his only or favourite manoeuvre, as he subsequently gained victory after victory over the austrians in the campaign of , drove them back behind the river inn, and won the decisive victory of _hohenlinden_ (december , ), where the austrians and their bavarian allies lost , men and guns against a total loss of , on the side of the french. { } outposts opposing forces come into conflict through the encounter of the advanced guards of moving columns; through the approach of a pursuing force to the rear guard of a retreating enemy; through the attack of a moving force on an enemy in position; and through the renewal of an engagement which has died down between opposing forces. every commander will endeavour to prevent interference with his plans and future movements, and while striving to surprise and outwit the enemy he will exert every endeavour to prevent the application of this vital principle by the enemy. the commander of a force that is at rest will require security for that force in order that its rest may be undisturbed, and he will require the security to be assured in order that his plans for the overthrow of the enemy may be developed. he will, therefore, detach a portion of his force to ensure this security by observation, to prevent the secret occupation of localities the hostile possession of which will interfere with his plans; and by resistance to hostile movements he will secure the rest of the main body. the force detailed to protect troops at rest is known as outposts, and their duty is to preserve the security of the main body. outposts protect the main body from surprise by observation, and if attacked they gain time by resistance until the commander of the main body can put his plans into execution by the occupation of the position in which he intends to receive attack. observation is carried out by aircraft, by patrols (mobile troops by day and infantry by night), and by sentries; resistance is provided by sentry groups and by troops { } in defensive positions, called the piquets, which have other troops as supports. in certain cases a local reserve and a general reserve are also provided. strength.--work in the outpost line is most exhausting. not a man or a horse should be employed there if their services can be dispensed with, and although the number of troops allotted for the work depends almost entirely upon the nature of the country and the tactical situation, it is laid down in the text-books that if an unnecessarily large proportion of the whole force is so employed the force will suffer in efficiency. it can also be seen that although the work is of the first importance and fraught with the greatest difficulties, it is clearly possible for a comparatively small body of troops to carry it out. observation requires intelligence and vigilance rather than numbers; resistance can be provided by the delaying action on a wide front of small numbers of skilled troops with the relative advantage conferred upon them in defence by machine guns and small arms, and with the assurance of support from their main body close at hand. observation.--a force can only be regarded as secure from surprise when every body of the enemy within striking distance is so closely watched that it can make no movement by night or day without its becoming known immediately to the observers of the outposts. by day the outpost commander will carry out reconnaissance some distance ahead of his position by means of aircraft and patrols of mounted troops and cyclists, while the commander of each outpost company keeps the approaches to the position under observation by sentries, so posted as to see and hear unobserved by a hostile force. by night, the aircraft and mounted troops are unable to render much assistance as moving patrols, and the work of reconnaissance and observation falls upon the platoons of the outpost companies. { } resistance.--for the purposes of resistance the outpost commander will rely upon his infantry and upon such artillery and machine guns as may be allotted to him, and if the area he is occupying is that in which the commander of the main body will meet attack the outposts will be provided with a greater proportion of artillery and machine guns. resistance is offered by the entrenchment of each sentry group in an all-round post, and depth and elasticity are given to the defence by the establishment of entrenched piquets in selected, mutually supporting positions commanding with their fire every avenue of approach, covering the flanks of neighbouring piquets, and so arranged in plan as to bring converging fire upon the enemy as he advances to the attack. these piquet positions will be strengthened, when required, by the supports, who will either assist in manning the defences of the piquets or will occupy similarly prepared defensive posts on the flank. local reserves may sometimes be required for local counter-attacks, and in certain cases a general reserve is provided. the degree of resistance to be offered by the sentry groups depends on the tactical situation and will be specified by the outpost commander. in certain cases the sentry groups are permitted in face of a heavy attack to fall back to the piquets, but if they do so they must be warned of the danger of arriving headlong on the piquet only just ahead of the enemy. in consequence of this danger such retirements are rarely permissible at night. the piquets are generally posted on the outpost line of resistance, in which case they hold their positions to the last man and the last round, until further orders are received from the commander of the force protected. distance.--the distance of the outpost position from the troops protected is regulated by the time the latter will require to prepare for action and by the importance of preventing the enemy's field artillery from { } approaching within effective range of the ground on which these troops will deploy if attacked. heavy guns and mortars, although motor traction gives them great mobility, are unlikely to accompany the enemy's advanced guard, and preparation to withstand or prevent their fire will not usually be required from outpost troops. the effective range of shrapnel is , yards, the limit of the effective range of machine guns is , yards, and of lewis guns and rifles the effective limit is , yards. the position on which the main body will deploy will thus be protected from the shrapnel of field artillery, if the possible fire-positions of that arm are brought under effective fire from machine guns , yards from the position of deployment, with lewis guns and rifles about yards further forward. on the other hand, especially in the case of small forces (against which artillery will not be likely to be sent), the distance must not be such as would permit of the outposts being cut off, or as would necessitate the employment of an undue proportion of men on outpost duty. the outpost commander.--before halting, a commander should first decide on his dispositions in case of attack, and then arrange the quartering of his command and the general position of the outposts. in the case of a small independent force the commander of the force will usually himself detail the whole of the outpost troops, and will either retain the command in his own hand or appoint an officer to command them, in such a case the disposition of the troops will probably be that of a perimeter camp, preparation being made against attack from all directions. in the case of large bodies outpost troops will usually consist of all arms, and a definite commander will always be appointed. this commander will, when necessary, divide the outpost line into sectors, delegating responsibility for the holding of each sector to the commander of a subordinate unit or formation, and defining the limits { } of sectors by distinctive features such as trees, cottages, or streams. the tops of hills or the bottoms of valleys are not suitable as tactical boundaries, and roads should be inclusive to one or other sector, for a road used as a boundary may be neglected by one of the commands it divides under the impression that it is the duty of the other command to patrol it. information and orders.--the outpost commander must have definite information on the following points:-- i. what is known of the enemy and information concerning friendly bodies of troops working against the enemy. ii. the intentions of the commander of the force he is protecting, where the main body will rest and the period it will stay there, and whether it is intended to engage the enemy if he advances, and if so on what position. iii. the general line of the outposts, the troops at disposal for the work, and whether there are other troops on the left and right. iv. the hour at which the outposts are to be relieved and the place to which reports are to be sent. after receiving the above information he will give such orders as are immediately necessary for protection against surprise. he will then allot the task of observation to his mobile troops and will decide on a line of resistance for the outpost troops. he will co-ordinate his arrangements with those of neighbouring outpost commanders and will ensure that no ground on his flanks remains unwatched. the outpost commander will then issue orders to his subordinate commanders on the following points:-- ( ) information concerning the enemy and his own troops so far as they affect the outposts. ( ) the general line to be occupied and his frontage and limits of each subordinate commander. ( ) the distribution of the mobile troops, artillery, and machine guns. { } ( ) instructions as to the degree of resistance to be offered and the general line of the outpost line of resistance. ( ) special arrangements by night. ( ) regulations as to smoking, fires, and cooking. ( ) the hour at which the outposts will be relieved. ( ) the place to which reports are to be sent. ( ) instructions as to the accommodation of the reserves (if any are provided) and whether the supports (and reserves, if any) may take off accoutrements, etc. when he receives information that the outposts are in position, he will transmit the information to the commander who appointed him. the outpost line of resistance.--retirements under fire to a supporting line are dangerous, especially at night. as a general rule, therefore, the piquets should be posted on the outpost line of resistance. co-operation, intercommunication, and the exercise of command will be facilitated by placing the piquets along well-defined natural features, or in the vicinity of roads. but the tactical situation may demand that the line adopted should afford facilities for a most stubborn resistance as well as facilities for observation, and the former necessity will far outweigh the latter. if the force is likely to remain halted for several days, especially if the operations are likely to lapse into position warfare, commanding ground is of great value to the artillery, and the outpost line of resistance will probably develop into the outpost zone of a defensive position. on the other hand, if halted for only one night, artillery will not be largely employed, and commanding ground is not essential. the outpost company.--the outpost company is the outpost infantry unit, the company commander providing piquets, supports, and detached posts as required. upon receiving his orders the commander will move his command, with due precautions against { } surprise, to the allotted ground where the men will be halted under cover. before proceeding to the part of the line assigned to him the commander of the outpost company will detail a force to precede his advance and cover his operations, and the force so pushed forward will not be withdrawn until his piquets have entrenched themselves. by the map he can decide the number of piquets he will require, in accordance with the number of roads to be watched, the facilities for resistance, and the requirements for patrolling. the extent of frontage allotted to an outpost company depends upon the number of avenues of approach (roads and tracks, and open, unfenced country) to be watched, and under ordinary circumstances a frontage up to , or , yards may be allotted to a company with platoons at fighting strength. each piquet should consist of a complete unit and should be posted on a good defensive position. the support (or supports, if more than one is detailed for the company frontage) should also be composed of a complete unit, and should generally be posted to yards in rear of the piquets, with good lines of approach to each. _detached posts_ may be required, to watch an extreme flank, or to occupy a position in front of the sentry line, where the enemy might otherwise collect unseen for the attack or initiate steps for hostile reconnaissance. a further use is to deal with traffic through the line, where a main road has no piquet upon it. the outpost company commander must inform his piquet commander, and his immediate superior, of his position, as all reports received by the piquets require to be sent to him, and his superior commander will need to keep in communication with him at all times. the first duty of a piquet commander (who is almost invariably a platoon commander) is to consolidate his position by entrenchment and by all available means, and to prepare a range card, so that the enemy may not approach without heavy loss; and if the piquet has a support ordered to reinforce it in case { } of attack, the entrenchments must be constructed to accommodate the supporting troops (including the sentry groups thrown out, if these have been ordered to withdraw to the piquet in case of a heavy attack). the commander must impress on all men of his piquet the importance of gaining a clear mental picture of their surroundings while daylight lasts, so that they may the more easily find their way about by night. on his way to the position the piquet commander will decide from the map what roads he has to watch and where sentries will need to be posted, and he will provide from his platoon, patrols and sentries (with the necessary reliefs for the patrols), will detail the various duties, and will make the necessary sanitary arrangements. his sentries should be posted as expeditiously as possible, and his patrols sent out at once. the number of patrols to be furnished depends upon the nature of the country, and as each patrol requires two reliefs, their number should not be greater than circumstances demand. the duties of infantry patrols are to search the ground and buildings, etc., for about , yards in front of the sentry line, to find out whether the enemy is there or not, and if the enemy is found to be close at hand to watch his movements and report frequently. the number of sentry groups depends upon the nature of the country and the height of the line of observation, but between them the groups must be answerable for the whole of the ground in front of their piquet (up to its junction on the left and right with neighbouring piquets). a sentry group consists of men under a n.c.o. ( on duty and off), and groups are usually posted not more than yards from their piquet, and hold their ground unless ordered to withdraw. if invisible from their piquet a connecting sentry should be posted by the piquet commander. sentry groups required for night dispositions only will not be posted until after dark. in order to prevent the men of the piquet being unnecessarily disturbed at night the n.c.o. and { } men of each relief must be made to bivouac together, apart from other reliefs and from the remainder of the piquet. a sentry will always be posted over the piquet, to watch the sentry groups and connecting sentries, and ready to alarm the piquet at any moment of need. patrols consist as a rule of a complete unit of to men under a n.c.o., and should be formed of men trained as scouts, although it will sometimes be possible to use only single scouts for this purpose, owing to the vigilance of the enemy. standing patrols may also have to be furnished, if required to watch some special point, particularly at night, or at the junction of roads converging towards the piquet line, at cross roads, etc., when they are out of sight of the sentries. the piquet will stand to arms, every man in his allotted place, an hour before dawn, and will remain alert until the patrols (which are invariably sent out about that time) have reported absence of movement by the enemy. outposts are generally relieved at dawn, so that the force is doubled at the hour of danger. all troops in the outpost line must entrench themselves, if posted as sentries, or in the piquet or support positions, and must be ready at any moment to resist a sudden attack. a detachment of royal engineers will usually be available to superintend the consolidation of the main position. day and night work.--by day, the work of an outpost line will consist in reconnaissance of the approaches for some miles by the aircraft and mounted troops and cyclists, while infantry, with artillery and machine guns, hold the line of resistance. by night, the mounted troops will be withdrawn, except such "cossack posts" (standing patrols of mounted troops) and "vedettes" (mounted sentries), as it may be deemed necessary to leave established in front of the line, while aircraft will have much difficulty in discerning movement. the whole work of observation and resistance therefore falls on the infantry, who may be in their day { } position or may be withdrawn to the reverse slope of a ridge, in order to obtain a sky line by night upon which to train their rifles. neglect of the principles of war is almost inevitably followed by disaster, and protection is the first of the tactical principles. during the later stages of the franco-prussian war a french force of the strength of a brigade was billeted in the _chateau of chambord_ (december , ), which stands in a large park, near blois. no outpost precautions were taken, and the chateau was captured by two companies of prussian infantry. the minor disasters suffered by british arms in the south african war were almost entirely due to neglect of the warnings contained in the official text-books. in spite of the established superiority of the boers in mobility and vigilance the most elementary precautions against surprise were frequently neglected. at _tweefontein_ (december , ) a force of yeomanry was surprised in an unprotected camp by a mobile force of boers, and heavy losses were suffered. the mystic atmosphere of christmas eve was insufficient protection against the militancy of christian de wet. battle outposts.--when a battle dies down at night, or when the forces are in close proximity and a battle is imminent, the whole of the troops must be kept in readiness for instant action. protection by outposts in the normal formation is generally impossible and can only be provided by patrols, who keep touch with the enemy without causing unnecessary alarms or looking for purposeless encounters, and by sentries over the forward troops, which take the place of the piquets. the troops must be ready at any moment to repel attacks with bullets and bayonets. unless otherwise ordered, the patrols should refrain altogether from aggressive action and should confine their operations to secret observation of the enemy. it is, however, essential that touch with the enemy { } should be maintained as advances, withdrawals, and other surprise movements, are usually prepared and often carried out under cover of darkness when hostile troops are within striking distance. in the american civil war, by losing touch with the northern army, the southern army permitted it to escape although it had been very severely mauled. during the third battle of ypres (july -november , ) the allies renewed the attack on a six-mile front from zonnebeke to langemarck (the junction of the franco-british armies in flanders). this action, known as the _battle of broenbeck_, or _brombeek_ (october , ), was marked by the successful repulse of counter-attacks by the st battalion royal newfoundland regiment through the correct employment of battle outposts. germans massing for the counter-attack in taube farm were pinned by lewis-gun and rifle fire, while a message sent to the supporting artillery caused the annihilation of the enemy; another attacking force was destroyed by lewis-gun and rifle fire, before it was launched. a defensive flank was also formed under heavy fire, and from this flank a further counter-attack was similarly dealt with. the casualties of the newfoundlanders throughout this battle were killed, missing, and wounded out of a total strength of all ranks, and the losses inflicted by them probably exceeded . after the _battle of fredericksburg_ (december , ) the army of the potomac under gen. burnside eluded the vigilance of gen. r. e. lee, who had defeated it on december , . burnside withdrew (december , ) across the potomac to stafford heights with the whole of his army, under cover of a heavy storm. if special orders had been given by the outpost commanders for constant and vigorous patrolling, and if scouts had been instructed to penetrate the federal lines from time to time at all risks, burnside could have been attacked at a disadvantage while on the move and should have been driven into the potomac. { } during the battle itself a confederate brigade was surprised in its own front line through failure to patrol a triangular wood which jutted out in front of the position and screened the brigade on the left with which touch was not maintained. at all times of action with enemy forces all ground to the front or flank must be kept under close observation, or surprise may lead to disaster. { } tactical reconnaissance reconnaissance during battle has been dealt with under "influences on the battle" and in other lectures, and owing to the close connection between the two subjects a number of points concerning reconnaissance in general have been noted in dealing with protection. it has also been seen that observation by aircraft, patrols, and sentries is essential to protection both in position warfare and the war of manoeuvre, and that reconnaissance is the essence of protection. there remain, however, two forms of reconnaissance that have not yet been considered, namely: the reconnaissance of a position with a view to attacking it, and the reconnaissance of an unoccupied position with a view to occupying it for defence. reconnaissance for attack.--the first of these is the constant duty of all commanders in the line during position warfare, and it is carried out by patrols and raiding parties, who provide information which supplements the photographs and reports of the air service, and enables a commander to arrive at a decision. in a war of manoeuvre reconnaissance by the air service is equally important, and it is supplemented by the work of the patrols of the advanced guard, but principally by that of specially selected intelligence officers, working in conjunction with, or independent of, the vanguard. such officers would be in possession of information which it might not be possible to reveal to the commander of the patrols of the vanguard, and their special training would give an added value to their report. the chief { } points to be ascertained concerning a hostile position are:-- i. the extent of the position occupied. ii. weak points of the position. iii. points, the capture of which would facilitate enfilade or reverse fire, and would thus render the rest of the position untenable. iv. best line of attack. v. supporting positions, for covering, converging, enfilade, and traversing fire. it should be possible to gather this information without alarming the enemy, or giving notice of impending attack. information on further points can be gained by fighting, and _reconnaissance by raids_ is a common feature of position warfare. by such means additional information can be gained, as to:-- vi. names of regiments holding the position, judged from identity discs, badges, buttons, etc. vii. whether preparations are being made for an attack (discoverable by ear as well as eye), or bombardment, etc. (from examination of shell dumps, etc.). viii. position of machine guns (pill-boxes or other), mortars, etc. ix. condition of intervening ground and of the wire entanglements. x. effects of recent bombardments. xi. moral of the enemy. reconnaissance for occupation.--in the reconnaissance of a position with a view to occupying it for the purposes of receiving attack, the points to be noted are:-- i. the best line for the establishment of a series of mutually supporting tactical points to be held by the infantry. { } ii. the best means of protecting the flanks. iii. the best position for the artillery and machine guns. iv. the tactical key to the position. v. the line from which attack may be expected. vi. the best line for the counter-attack. vii. the positions for the supports and reserves. and, additionally, in the case of a war of manoeuvre:-- viii. the best position for the cavalry. ix. alternative positions in rear from which, after reorganisation, to recapture the front line, with the best line of withdrawal to them. additional information would be required in position warfare as to the best lines for avenues communicating from the old to the new position, and as to the time required to consolidate the new position against attack (including the conversion of the parados into parapet, etc.). { } night operations there are several reasons why darkness is preferable to daylight in certain military operations. secrecy is usually the aim of all movement, and the increased power of observation due to the advent of the air service has caused an increase in the necessity for certain movements being made during the hours of darkness. in all night operations (except marches undertaken by night to avoid the heat of the day) surprise is the main object; secrecy of preparation is therefore essential, and steps must be taken to prevent discovery of the intended movement, and to prevent the information leaking out through the indiscretion of subordinates. orders will be communicated beforehand only to those officers from whom action is required, and until the troops reach the position of assembly no more should be made known to them than is absolutely necessary. it may even be advisable, in order to deceive spies, that misleading orders should originally be given out. secrecy of intention as well as of preparation is essential. frederick the great is reported to have said, "if i thought my coat knew my plans i would burn it!" night marches.--night marches are the movement of columns in march formation, and their object may be merely to avoid the heat of the day; but they are also one of the chief means by which a commander can outwit, deceive, and surprise the enemy--the principal aim of the strategist--by outflanking his position, by anticipating him in the occupation of a locality, or by eluding him by the secret withdrawal of a force which appeared to be in a situation favourable to his plans. { } forces may also be secretly concentrated to decide the issue of a battle that is imminent, or of a battle that has begun in daylight. long marches of this nature rarely culminate in an attack, and when shorter movements are made with such an object in view, the "march" may be said to terminate when the position of assembly is reached, and from that point to become an "advance" or an "assault." there are certain essentials to success:-- i. _direction_ towards the objective must always be maintained. the route must therefore be reconnoitred beforehand, and marked by the advanced guard during the march, and if there are any intricacies in the route, such as deviations from a well-defined road, local guides should be secured. across open country a general direction can be maintained by means of the stars, and when these are not visible, by the compass. (see chapter viii., "manual of map reading.") ii. _protection_ against surprise attacks must be provided by advanced, flank, and rear guards, but (except in the obvious case of columns of mounted troops only) mounted troops will not be employed in this service. the advanced guard will be small, and will usually consist of patrols within yards of the column, followed by connecting files, with the rest of the advanced guard in collective formation. the rear guard will also be smaller and nearer than during a daylight march. flanks will usually be protected by small bodies holding tactical positions, posted by the advanced guard, and withdrawn by the rear guard. iii. _secrecy_ must be maintained, and orders issued as late as possible, and the preparations carried on without ostentation. the march { } itself must be conducted in absolute silence and without lights of any kind. care must be taken to prevent or muffle sounds, and horses likely to neigh must be left with the train. in the case of a march to elude the enemy, outposts will remain in position until daylight and will be secretly withdrawn, to rejoin the column at the first opportunity, and bivouac fires, etc., will be kept burning. iv. _connection_.--every commander must have and must maintain a fixed place in the column, and an orderly officer must be detached from each unit to headquarters, so that instructions may be conveyed to such commanders at all times. units must be closed up, and the usual distances lessened or dispensed with, and connection must be maintained between units and their sub-divisions. the pace should be uniform, but not more than miles an hour can be expected on a dark night, including halts. the time and periods of halts should be arranged before starting, and units must regain any distance lost before halting. after crossing or clearing an obstacle the column should advance its own length and then be halted until reported to be closed up again, and staff officers should be detailed to superintend these matters. in addition to these general principles there are certain axioms, which must become "rules of thumb" with all concerned:-- an officer must march in rear of each unit. all ranks must be informed what to do in case of alarm or attack. fire will not be opened without orders. magazines will be charged, but no cartridge placed in the chamber. there must be absolute silence, no smoking, no lights. { } when halted, men may lie down in their places, but must not quit the ranks. night advances.--night advances are the movement of deployed troops to gain ground towards the hostile position with a view to delivering an assault at dawn. they may take place as a preliminary to an engagement, or to continue one already begun with increased prospects of success. in the first case they are usually the sequel to a night march, and in either case they are generally followed by an attack at dawn. surprise is the main object, even when they are undertaken for the purpose of gaining ground difficult to cross in daylight, from which to renew an engagement, as frequently happens during a campaign in a war of manoeuvre, while such advances are common features of position warfare. in any case the ground won must be consolidated immediately, as a counter-attack at or before dawn may always be expected, and if the ground offers difficulties for entrenching, the necessary materials must be carried by the troops. successive advances of this nature may enable the troops to reach a jumping-off place for the final assault, and such advances may be made on successive nights, the ground won being defended meanwhile against counter-attacks. unless troops are already deployed for the advance, a position of assembly will need to be selected, with a further position of deployment; but these positions sometimes coincide. the deployment will be, as a rule, into shallow columns on a narrow frontage at deploying intervals, in order that the final deployment of the leading columns into the forward troops of the attack may take place without delay when the moment for the assault arrives. on reaching the objective of the advance these columns would deploy into line, and each unit would entrench itself on the new position. as it is essential for success that _direction_ should be maintained and _connection_ preserved, the ground over which the advance is to be made must be { } examined beforehand and landmarks noted, and touch must be kept by means of ropes or any available device. care must also be taken in consolidating the position that the entrenchments have a general alignment towards the enemy and that they are so sited as to protect from enfilade fire. night assaults.--night assaults are delivered by troops already deployed into attack formation. it is an established tactical principle that "when the conditions of the fire-fight are likely to be favourable, it is probably better to accept the inevitable casualties that must result from a struggle for fire supremacy, rather than adopt the undoubted hazards of a night assault." these conditions are frequently so unfavourable in position warfare, owing to the strength of consolidated positions and to the increasing accuracy and density of artillery fire, that assaults are made of necessity in the hours of darkness, in preference to those of daylight. during the _battle of the somme_ (july - , ) a night advance was made by seven divisions on a front of about miles. the troops moved out in the early hours of july , for a distance of about , yards, and lined up in the darkness below a crest some to yards from the enemy's trenches. their advance was covered by strong patrols and their correct deployment had been ensured by white tapes laid out on the ground earlier in the night of july - . the whole movement was carried out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case. the assault was delivered at . a.m., when there was just sufficient light to be able to distinguish friend from foe at short range, and along the whole front attacked the troops were preceded by an effective artillery barrage. they swept over the enemy's first-line trenches and consolidated their position in the defences beyond. on the night of february - , , the nd division attacked and captured , yards of trench { } line at the foot of the _serre hill_. the division formed up after dark and the attack began at . p.m., the objective was captured, and at a.m. a determined counter-attack was repulsed. the capture of the _vimy ridge_ by canadian troops was due to an assault launched some time before dawn on april , : and the british victory of messines (june , ) to an assault launched at . a.m. in the latter case the wytschaete-messines position, "one of the germans' most important strongholds on the western front, consisted of forward defences with an elaborate and intricate system of well-wired trenches and strong points, forming a defensive belt over a mile in depth, and the germans had omitted no precautions to make the position impregnable" (sir d. haig's dispatches). nineteen deep mines under this position were fired at . a.m., and this was the signal for the assault, which was immediately successful and was carried out under intense artillery protecting fire. by nightfall of june the whole position had been recaptured, heavy losses inflicted, and over , prisoners taken at a comparatively slight cost, by the ii. army, under general sir h. c. o. plumer. during the german offensive in a counter-attack by three brigades was launched by night against the village of _villers brétonneux_. the attack was launched at p.m. on the night of april - . by daybreak the village was surrounded, and by the afternoon it was entirely recaptured with upwards of , prisoners. among the offensive operations which preceded the general advance of the allies in july, , was a highly successful night attack by the nd australian division, on a front of about miles, south of _morlancourt_ (june , ). at . a.m. on may , , one of general ulysses grant's corps, under general hancock, assaulted "the salient," part of general robert lee's entrenchments in the wilderness of virginia (_spottsylvania_). , men were assembled and a night advance was made, { } directed by compass, on an unusually dark and stormy night, with part of the line of the advance densely wooded. the assault was ordered for a.m., but a dense fog delayed the signal until . a.m. when the order was given, one of the divisions had some difficulty in making its way through a wood and marsh, but contrived to keep up with the others, and reached the abattis at the same time. the assault resulted in the capture of , prisoners and inflicted losses with the bayonet of over , , with a total loss to the assailants of about , . this manoeuvre consisted of a night march by compass of a whole corps to a position of assembly within , yards of the hostile outposts, of an advance before dawn, and of a final assault of , troops. the captured salient was afterwards retaken by the confederates by a decisive counter-attack, rendered possible by the provision, in rear of the salient, of a second line of entrenchments (see _battle of spottsylvania_). owing to the risks of confusion and the limitations imposed on the attacking movement, night assaults do not now carry the same comparative advantages over daylight attacks as was the case before the introduction of _smoke_. hence they will be restricted to attacks on a very limited objective, as in the case of raids or attempts to capture special tactical localities. but by employing smoke only two elements of surprise can be achieved. the _direction_ and _weight_ of the blow are concealed, but the appearance of smoke will warn the enemy to expect an attack, and the _time_ of the blow is thus revealed. smoke will probably be employed extensively in modern warfare and, except against an ill-trained and undisciplined enemy, assaults by night will generally be undertaken to gain tactical points, to drive in advanced troops and outposts, to capture advanced and detached posts, to rush an isolated force guarding a bridge or defile, and in carrying out enterprises of a similar nature, in order to gain advantages { } for further operations in daylight. when more important assaults are made, a larger force than a brigade will seldom be thrown against a single objective, although a series of objectives may be simultaneously attacked with success over a wide front. a night assault was delivered by two federal brigades on the confederate bridgehead at _rappahannock station_ (november , ). one of the brigades was ultimately repulsed, but the other penetrated the confederate position and cut off the retreat. upwards of , of the defenders were captured or killed, and the small remnant evacuated the bridgehead. in the second afghan war, general sir f. roberts marched up to the high passes leading out of the kurram into the interior of afghanistan, with a column of , all ranks and guns. he was opposed by the amir's force of about , men with guns at _peiwar kotal_ (december , ). sir f. roberts detached the greater part of his force to occupy the heights on the flank of the afghan position and attacked at daylight. the night march and subsequent attack were completely successful. the enemy was defeated with great loss and all his guns captured, the british losses being killed and wounded. _tel-el-kebir_ was an example of a night march in battle formation of a force of , infantry, , cavalry, and guns, to attack an entrenched position at dawn, the object being to surprise the enemy and to cross the danger zone without exposing the assaulting troops to a prolonged fire action. it resulted in a victory which decided the egyptian campaign, and added the nile valley to the british empire. sir garnet wolesley's force advanced in four columns marching abreast, with its left resting on the railway, and was successfully carried out, the troops reaching a position, varying from to yards distance from the objective, the assault being delivered at the conclusion of the march. the egyptian army, under arabi pasha, fought steadily, and again and again renewed the fight, after falling back { } within their entrenchments, but their flank was turned and the whole position captured. the british loss was only all ranks, and the egyptians lost upwards of , killed and wounded, the remaining , being dispersed or captured. a daylight advance and assault of so strong a position could not have been successfully carried through at so small a cost to the attacking troops. in the south african war there were two examples of the unsuccessful night attack. major-general gatacre essayed a night march followed by a night attack upon the boers' position at _stormberg_ (december , ), but he was misled by his guides in unknown ground and was himself surprised by the boers and forced to retire with a loss of over officers and other ranks. on the following day lord methuen delivered an attack upon cronje's position between the upper modder river and the kimberley road. in a night attack on _magersfontein hill_ (december , ) the highland brigade came under heavy fire while still in assembly formation and lost its brigadier (a. g. wauchope) and officers and other ranks. in the later stages of the south african war, however, night marches followed by raids were employed with marked success, particularly in the eastern transvaal in november and december, . except when the assaulting troops are already in position, it will be necessary to choose positions of assembly and of deployment, and to precede the advance in the preliminary stages by lines of scouts, ahead and on the flanks, within yards of the following troops. on arrival at the jumping-off place these advanced scouts will await the arrival of the assaulting force, and they should be directed to mark the ground for the various units. a scout from each forward platoon can thus mark the inner flank on which his platoon will rest, and the direction of the whole line will be assured. the troops will usually advance, during the earlier { } stages, in shallow columns on narrow frontages, at deploying intervals, and may maintain this formation until the halted line of scouts is reached. owing to the frequent necessity for halts to correct intervals, etc., and the inherent difficulties of movements by night in open formations, no greater rate than mile an hour can be counted on. when several objectives are in view a corresponding series of positions of assembly and deployment will be required, and care must be taken that the various advancing forces do not converge. owing to the difficulty of recognition, a distinguishing mark will usually be worn by the troops engaged, a watchword will usually be adopted and made known to all ranks, and the commander and staff should wear easily distinguishable badges. if hostile patrols are encountered it is essential that they should be silenced, and any one encountered who is deficient of the badge and ignorant of the watchword should be similarly treated. the risk of an assault being held up by unforeseen obstacles must also be provided against, and engineers or pioneer infantry should be present for removing such obstacles. if fire is opened by the enemy it is clear that all hope of surprise has vanished, and the troops must then press on at all costs; for if they advance as rapidly as possible they have a reasonable prospect of achieving their object, whereas a halt will increase the enemy's power of resistance, and withdrawal will almost certainly end in disaster. in order that secrecy may be observed, details of the assault will usually be withheld from all except superior commanders from whom action is required, until the position of assembly is reached; but before the troops leave that position all ranks must be made to understand the objective in general, the particular task of the unit, and the formation to be adopted at the position of deployment. in addition to this information, and to a knowledge of the general tactical principles involved, { } there are certain axioms which must become "rules of thumb" with all ranks:-- fire must not be opened without orders. magazines must be charged but no cartridge placed in the chamber. until daylight the bayonet only to be used. absolute silence to be maintained until the signal for the assault is given. no smoking; no lights. if obstacles are encountered each man will lie down in his place until they are removed. if hostile fire is opened, all ranks must press on at once with the utmost spirit and determination and overpower the enemy with the bayonet. { } fighting in close country close country has a marked influence on tactics owing to the restrictions it imposes on view and on movement. forest, jungle, and bush, mountains and ravines, rivers and streams are natural obstacles, while cultivation adds woods and plantations, fences and hedges, high growing crops, farm houses, villages and towns, with sunken roads below the surface of the adjoining land, and civilisation brings in its train a network of railways and canals with embankments and bridges, and the natural difficulties of close country are thereby increased. the obstruction to movement is more or less constant, except in "continental" climates, where frost and snow render movement possible in winter over the deepest rivers or marshes, and over roads and tracks which are scarcely practicable in the summer season. the obstruction to view is greater when trees and hedges are in leaf than when the leaves have fallen. when the advantages and disadvantages of fighting in close country are weighed in the balance there appears to be a distinct tendency in favour of the attack over the defence. an attacking force can usually obtain cover in the early stages of the action and loss can therefore be avoided in approaching the objective, while the screening of its movements and dispositions generally enables the attacking force to surprise the defence as to the direction and weight of the blow to be delivered. troops fighting in close country are often unable to see what is going on around them, and the "sense of security" is lessened by the knowledge that a flank may be successfully assailed without warning. this favours the { } attack more than the defence, as the counter-attack, which is the soul of all defensive operations, requires previous organisation to be thoroughly effective. savage warfare.--in savage warfare the inherent difficulties of fighting in close country are often increased by the disparity of numbers on the side of the civilised troops and by the fanatical courage of the savages. discipline, self-reliance, vigilance, and judgment in the application of the principles of war, are required to overcome these added difficulties. a vigorous offensive, strategical as well as tactical, is _always_ the best method of conducting operations in savage warfare, and for the purpose of protection vigilance must be exercised to an even greater degree than in any other form of warfare. at _isandhlwana_ (january , ) the british camp at the foot of isandhlwana hill was surprised and overwhelmed by a zulu army, , strong, and almost the whole of the garrison killed; and yet in the evening of the same day all ranks ( sick being included in that number) beat off the repeated attacks of , zulus at _rorke's drift_. in the operations after the fall of khartoum a desert column under major-general sir j. mcneill was surprised in dense bush while constructing a zeriba at _tofrik_ (march , ), but after twenty minutes' fierce fighting the mahdist arabs were driven off with more than , killed. in the operations in upper egypt against the invading mahdists a vigorous strategical and tactical offensive led to the _battle of toski_ (august , ) and resulted in the defeat and complete destruction of the invaders, with but slight loss to the anglo-egyptian force under general sir f. w. grenfell. at the beginning of the christian era three well-disciplined roman legions were decoyed into the fastnesses of the _teutoberger wald_ (a.d. ) and there attacked and annihilated by the cherusci, a saxon tribe, under their king arminius, and this defeat of quintilius varus is included by sir edward creasey among the { } "fifteen decisive battles of the world." fighting in close country against more or less savage tribes is frequently the task of british troops in east and west africa, while the indian frontier constantly requires to be defended by expeditions against tribal levies in hilly and mountainous districts. in "field service regulations" (part ii.), , the peculiarities of various savage races by whom the outposts of the british empire are liable to be assailed are carefully noted. in civilized warfare.--the military history of europe and america abounds with accounts of fierce fighting in close country. in all ages woods and villages play an important part in war. they form natural magnets for troops operating in their neighbourhood. the fact of their being easily visible, and named on maps, causes them to be adopted as objectives in the attack or as boundaries in the defence, and in all operations troops are instinctively drawn towards them in search of cover, or to obtain water, supplies, and shelter. their situation is also likely to make them of tactical importance, as woods are frequently on the slopes of hills and may be occupied in a defensive scheme to force an assailant to deploy before reaching the main position, while villages are naturally situated on roads, which must be guarded as they are the normal avenues of approach for all troops. in position warfare the wood and the village are of the highest importance, and whenever they are situated along the alignment, or near the front, of a defensive position, they may always be assumed to be occupied and strongly organised as part of a series of mutually supporting tactical points. the names of woods, large and small, and of the most insignificant villages, were of everyday occurrence in reports on the fighting on the western front in the great war as the scene of furious encounters, of attacks and counter-attacks, and there are references to copses, woods, and forests in marshal haig's dispatches. it { } appears, however, to be generally admitted that close country in general, and woods and villages in particular, favour delaying action rather than a protracted defence, and in position warfare the advantages are therefore in favour of the attack on account of the facilities offered for surprise through the concealment of movement. there are many instances of successful delaying action in woods and villages. some of the characteristics of such fighting were exemplified in the franco-prussian war. at the _battle of gravelotte_ (august , ) the bois de vaux, on the left of the french position, induced marshal bazaine to mass his reserves on that flank, as it appeared to invite attack; whereas he was defeated by a turning movement on the _other_ flank. during an attack through the bois de vaux a prussian infantry battalion became so scattered that all cohesion was lost, a common danger in wood fighting. at the earlier _battle of spicheren_ (august , ), however, two battalions maintained their order and cohesion in pfaffen wood, and by moving through it in narrow columns were able to debouch in good order. a tendency to loss of discipline through loss of control was exemplified at the same battle. other prussian troops had captured gifert wood and the officers were unable to organise an attack on a further position through the reluctance of the troops to leave the shelter of the wood. at the _battle of worth_ (august , ) two french battalions held up the attack of , prussians for over an hour in the niederwald, although no fortifications were employed; the difficulty of debouching from a captured wood was then experienced by the prussians, as the farther edge was kept under heavy fire by french troops in the neighbouring elsasshausen copse. a decisive counter-attack cannot usually be organised in such warfare, although lee managed to employ , troops for that purpose with complete success at the _battle of the wilderness_ (may - , ). local { } counter-attacks, however, are the normal incidents of defensive operations in woods, and in the niederwald, at the _battle of worth_, several spirited counter-attacks were made by the th french regiment. villages are even more attractive to troops than woods, and they figure in all battles as local centres of resistance. one of the most spirited defences of a village took place at the _battle of sedan_ (september , ) when a heroic struggle was maintained by french marine infantry in the village of _bazeilles_, and after the white flag had been hoisted over the fortress of sedan the fight was stubbornly maintained at the village of balan, the second line of defence of the bazeilles position. visitors to the battlefield of sedan are shown a little inn with the title, _a la dernière cartouche_, in commemoration of the struggle. a highly successful night attack was made by the french on the village of _noisseville_ (august , ), the normal difficulties of defending the village being increased by the surprise and the darkness. the attack on woods.--the opening stages of the attack on a wood resemble those in the attack on any other position, but once the outer fringe is gained the potential advantages offered by the narrow field of view and fire must be exploited to the full and surprise at weak points must be achieved. flank attacks are exceptionally deadly under these circumstances, as they may succeed before the other defending troops are aware of the threatened attack, but the utmost precaution is necessary to avoid traps, and scouts must precede all movement, while advances must be made by rapid bounds to avoid aimed fire at close range. supports and reserves must follow close to the forward troops in order to preserve cohesion and to afford immediate help. machine guns and light mortars are of very great value to give close support, the latter taking the place of artillery and inflicting losses on { } stockaded defenders. small woods should usually be attacked from the flanks under heavy fire from artillery until the attack turns inwards, while machine guns and lewis guns are posted to prevent reinforcements reaching the wood and to cut off the retreat of the defenders. during the german counter-attacks at cambrai (november -december , ) _tanks_ were effectively employed in wood and village fighting, and were in a great measure responsible for the capture of _gauche wood_, acting in co-operation with dismounted indian cavalry of the th cavalry division and with the guards' division; but although they reached the outskirts of _villers guislain_ they were forced to withdraw, as the supporting infantry were unable to co-operate owing to the fire of the enemy's machine guns. at the _battle of messines_ (june , ) a tank enabled the infantry to proceed with the advance by overcoming the machine guns posted in fanny's farm. generally speaking, however, tanks are unable to manoeuvre in woods, owing to the many insuperable obstructions, and their sphere of usefulness is limited by the availability of rides or other cleared avenues of approach. during the fighting for the interior of the wood "reconnaissance during battle" is of the highest importance, and the flanks of the attacking force will need to be specially guarded, on account of the liability to counter-attack. touch must also be kept, to avoid loss of direction. in the _advance from the captured position_ great tactical skill is required, and if the defenders have established a fire position within close range it may only be possible to issue from the wood when co-operating troops have cleared or neutralised that position. it may even be necessary to hold the rear edge against counter-attack and to debouch, after reorganisation, from both flanks or from the opposite edge, to advance in two bodies against the flanks of the fire position under harassing fire from the troops in the further edge. if the fire position is to be carried by direct assault, or if { } it can be got under control and the advance is to be continued, the successful troops must be reorganised within the wood (care being taken to avoid concentration in salients) and must deploy before advancing, to bound forward in one rush until clear of the wood. defence of a wood.--the outer edge of a wood is particularly vulnerable, but some portions of it must of necessity be occupied for purposes of observation and resistance (particularly at night), while the unoccupied portions are heavily entangled and made subject to enfilade fire from the occupied positions, machine and lewis guns being particularly suitable for the defensive positions, in concealed and strengthened emplacements. the perimeter should be divided into sections garrisoned by complete units under definite commanders. lines of defence must also be established in the interior, and lateral communications opened up through the trees, with easily distinguished marks to direct troops issuing to counter-attacks, and time will be saved by making several tracks rather than one wide road. the second line of defence should contain an all-round defensive position from which all avenues of approach can be swept by machine and lewis guns, and this position should also provide facilities for sorties to counter-attack. if the wood is too far from the outpost zone of the defence to serve as a factor in the scheme steps must be taken to neutralise the advantages offered to an attacking force in a concealed avenue of approach, either by the use of gas, or by bringing such a fire on the exits from the wood that a debouching enemy may suffer heavy loss or annihilation. in most cases, an attacking force will be harassed, and a show of opposition will be made, in such a wood by _fighting patrols_, and obstacles can be placed in the near edge, with entanglements outside, so planned as to induce the attacking force to collect in lanes enfiladed by machine guns. { } the attack on villages.--there are three phases in the attack on a village as in the attack on a wood. in the fight for the outer edge, the front will probably be harassed by a fire attack, while one or both flanks are assaulted by all four sections of the platoon, under cover of fire from machine guns and lewis guns. the second phase may require reorganisation before the attack on the village itself, during which, reconnaissance, co-operation, and dispatch of information, are of the highest importance. all captured points must be immediately consolidated and the attack must be prosecuted with the utmost vigour. troops must be trained to enter buildings from the rear, and to advance along the right edge of roads, close to the walls and buildings there, to make hostile fire difficult without undue exposure. light mortars and rifle bombs, which can be fired into windows partially barricaded, or to fall behind street barricades, are an important adjunct to the rifle and bayonet, and machine guns and lewis guns will have many opportunities in assisting or repelling a counter-attack and of keeping down the enemy's fire from a commanding position at the end of a street. _the tank_ is at its best in this form of warfare, as it can surmount or demolish almost any street barricade, and can be followed up at once by the infantry, but it must always be regarded as an auxiliary to the infantry, and not as a principal. in the third phase, the advance from the captured village, while the supports are "mopping up" such of the garrison as have survived the capture, previous reorganisation and deployment will probably be as essential as in wood fighting, and during all the phases of the struggle in woods and villages sudden counter-attacks must always be expected and local reserves to repel them must be provided. in issuing from the village, rapid bounds to points from which the fire positions in rear can be brought under control will also be required. { } defence of a village.--it is difficult to avoid the inclusion of villages in a scheme of defence on account of the facilities afforded for water, cover, and shelter, but while villages assist in the delaying action they are liable to become "shell traps" in a prolonged defence, unless there is good cellarage accommodation, while the local effect of a bursting shell is also increased. there are certain principles common to all defensive action in village fighting:-- ( ) the garrison should consist of a definite unit or formation under a definite commander. ( ) the forward troops should be posted in front of the edge of the village, partly because of the vulnerability of the actual edge to artillery fire but mainly to prevent the attack from establishing itself in the forward buildings. in the case of a small village it will often be advantageous to occupy positions on the flanks commanding the edge by fire, with a view to enticing the attack into the "funnel" thus provided. ( ) supports and reserves must be centralised in order that they may be readily available for instantaneous local counter-attacks, by which means alone a village can be defended against a determined enemy. ( ) houses should be loopholed and windows sand-bagged, while house-to-house communication must be improvised to increase the defenders' power of manoeuvre. ( ) the interior of the village should be defended by the cross fire of machine guns and lewis guns, but while churches and halls, and the inner edge of village greens and of squares, should be prepared for determined resistance, such places should not be occupied as billets, owing to the risk of loss from artillery bombardment. ( ) the natural difficulties of maintaining control in village fighting require to be counteracted by increased effort and vigilance on the part of all leaders, and special arrangements must be made for collecting information in report centres, the position of which must be made known to all ranks in the defending force. { } characteristics of the various arms "the full power of an army can be exerted only when all its parts act in close combination, and this is not possible unless the members of each arm understand the characteristics of the other arms. each has its special characteristics and functions, and is dependent on the co-operation of the others" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). "an intelligent understanding of 'the other man's job' is the first essential of successful co-operation."--marshal haig. infantry "infantry is the arm which in the end wins battles" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). the speed with which infantry can advance, and the distance which can be covered in one day, are the only limits to the striking power of well-trained infantry. in the great war these limits were largely removed by the use of mechanical transport, and this means of transportation will be used increasingly in modern warfare, in order to bring fresh troops into or near the scene of action, or to expedite the removal of exhausted troops from the battlefield. against these natural limits to mobility are the compensating advantages of the power of infantry to move into and over almost any ground by day or by night, and the rapidity with which trained infantrymen can find or improvise cover. the main object of battle is to close with the enemy and to destroy him by killing or capture, and it is this power to close with the enemy which makes infantry the decisive arm in battle. the rifle and bayonet.--the rifle is the principal infantry weapon, and the british "short-magazine { } lee-enfield" rifle is the best rifle in action. a trained rifleman can fire aimed shots in a minute, reloading with the butt in the shoulder and eyes on the mark. with the bayonet affixed the rifle is the principal weapon of close combat for delivering or repelling an assault, and in night assaults infantry depend entirely upon the bayonet. the entrenching tool, carried by all other ranks, is an invaluable adjunct to the rifle bullet and to the bayonet. in a war of manoeuvre, when infantry are frequently compelled to improvise defences on the field of battle, by night as well as by day, the value of the entrenching tool can scarcely be exaggerated. in position warfare, and in the organisation of an area for prolonged defence in a war of manoeuvre, heavier tools and materials of all kinds are available for the consolidation of the defences, but for the rapid construction of temporary defences by day or by night the entrenching tool alone has been proved to be highly effective. when troops are "digging themselves in" at night with this weapon care must be taken that some system is adopted to obtain a more or less regular line facing in the right direction. by the extension of the men of an infantry section at arm's length facing the enemy, and by moving the two men on each flank two paces outwards, and the two centre men two paces backwards, and then causing the section to dig "on the line of their toes," there will result (even on the darkest night) a short fire trench with a central traverse. this sectional trench can be connected at the first opportunity with trenches dug by other sections similarly extended. during the _retreat from mons_ (august-september, ) the "contemptible little army," under marshal french, frequently obtained, by means of the entrenching tool alone, shelter from bullets, and a system of fire trenches which cost the pursuing germans hundreds of lives and materially delayed their movements. { } the lewis gun.--the lewis gun is an automatic rifle, firing the same ammunition as the s.-m.-l.-e. rifle, and two lewis-gun sections are included in each infantry platoon. the rate of fire is increased by the automatic action of the gun, the maximum rate permitting a drum of rounds to be fired in less than ten seconds, while one or two rounds only may be fired if so required. the mobility of the lewis-gun sections is the same as that of other sections of the infantry platoon. ranges of rifles and machine guns _close_ range. up to yards. _effective_ range. over yards up to , yards. _long_ range. over , yards up to , yards. grenades.--hand grenades and rifle grenades are adjuncts to the rifle and bayonet and the lewis gun. their principal use is in clearing fortified posts, especially in position warfare. the _hand grenade_, or bomb thrown by hand, is limited in range by the skill and strength of the thrower, and to yards may be regarded as the maximum distance. the _rifle grenade_ is effective up to about yards, and is generally employed to provide a local barrage or to search cover. in the latter case, a high angle of descent is used as with mortars or howitzers. light mortars.--the _light mortar section_ is an integral part of every infantry battalion, and although sometimes brigaded for special purposes the sections normally work with their own battalions. a section of light mortars, firing -lb. bombs, consists of officer and other ranks, and requires horses and g.s. limbered wagon. owing to the high angle of descent the bombs can be fired behind, and can search, high cover, while the mortars themselves are not very conspicuous objects and can be { } readily moved for short distances, while they "come into action" in seconds. the comparatively slow flight of the bombs, however, enables the enemy to discover the location of the mortars, and necessitates the use of expedients to avoid counter-artillery fire. a maximum rate of to rounds a minute can be maintained for two or three minutes, if ammunition is available, and at an angle of degrees a range of yards can be obtained. machine guns.--"the principal characteristic of the machine gun is its power of delivering a concentrated volume of fire which can be sustained almost indefinitely, subject to limitations of ammunition supply. the ease with which the gun can be concealed in action and its fire controlled enable advantage to be taken of surprise effect" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). the _machine-gun platoon_ is an integral part of every infantry battalion, but in attack machine guns are frequently grouped for the purpose of providing overhead or other covering fire, while in defence they form, with the artillery, the framework into which the defensive dispositions are fitted, and by reason of their fire-power machine guns enable a commander to economise in the number of infantry allotted to a purely defensive _rôle_. the ranges are those given above for rifles and lewis guns, and the rate of fire is about times that of a rifle, while , to , rounds may be fired continuously at a moment of need. mounted troops cavalry.--the principal characteristic of cavalry is its mobility. this enables it to attack unexpectedly; to defend with determination while retaining the power to break off an action more easily than infantry; to gain information and to afford protection at a considerable distance from the force protected; and to confirm { } and exploit the success obtained in battle. "cavalry is capable, if required, of undertaking most operations for which infantry would usually be employed, but the demands made by the care of horses reduce the number of rifles which can actually be placed in action; and it therefore lacks depth in comparison with similar infantry formations" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). the cavalry arms are the lance and sword for mounted action; horse artillery usually work with cavalry, and the arms employed by cavalry for dismounted action are the rifle, the machine gun, and the hotchkiss rifle. examples of the employment of cavalry in modern warfare are given throughout the "lectures." mounted rifles.--the characteristics and methods of employment of mounted rifles are similar to those of cavalry, with the exception that they are not equipped for mounted action. mounted rifles, like cavalry, enable a commander to extend his attack or defence in a manner that is most bewildering to infantry, and attempts by infantry to outflank a defending force of mounted rifles are generally frustrated by the mobility of the defending force, as was exemplified in the south african war of - . cyclists.--under favourable conditions cyclists possess greater mobility than cavalry, and they can develop greater fire-power, as no horse-holders are required. they are, however, dependent upon roads, they are vulnerable on the move, they cannot fight without dismounting, and they must return to their bicycles after action; whereas cavalry horse-holders can meet dismounted troopers at a prearranged spot. artillery "the _rôle_ of artillery is to assist the other arms in breaking down opposition, and to afford all possible { } support to the infantry, with whom the eventual decision rests" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). all classes of artillery are included in modern military operations. motor traction enables the heaviest guns to be brought to the battlefield and to be removed when a commander decides to withdraw from battle, while the increase in the defensive power of obstacles and small arms fire, combined with the increase in mobility afforded by motor traction, enables all but super-heavy artillery (which require a railway mounting) to be placed close behind the infantry in attack and defence. it is, however, obvious that the closest support can be given by the guns that are weakest in shell-power, on account of the superiority in mobility possessed by the lighter guns. in modern warfare a great proportion of the work of artillery is carried out, of necessity, in the hours of darkness, owing to the frequency of movement by night to avoid aërial observation, and to the consequent use of indirect artillery fire to inflict losses during such movements. the artillery personnel therefore requires to be relieved with greater frequency than in the days before the use of aircraft. the growth of artillery during the war was symbolical of the continual changes in the methods of warfare, its numbers and power increasing out of all proportion to the experience of previous wars. "the pieces of light and medium artillery with which we took the field in august, , were represented at the date of the armistice by , guns and howitzers of all natures, including pieces of the heaviest calibre" (sir d. haig's dispatches). "from the commencement of our offensive in august, , to the conclusion of the armistice some , tons of artillery ammunition were expended by the british armies on the western front. for the fortnight from august to september , our daily average expenditure exceeded { } , tons, while for the three days of the crucial battle on september , , and (_second battle of cambrai_) nearly , tons of ammunition were fired by our artillery" (sir d. haig's dispatches). in the table of artillery ranges on p. , the effective ranges of light artillery firing h.e. shell are based on the use of no. fuse. "the invention of a new fuse known as ' ,' which was first used at the _battle of arras_ (april -june , ), enabled wire entanglements to be easily and quickly destroyed, and so modified our methods of attacking organised positions. by bursting the shell the instant it touched the ground, and before it had become buried, the destructive effect of the explosion was greatly increased. it became possible to cut wire with a far less expenditure of time and ammunition, and the factor of surprise was given a larger part in operations" (sir d. haig's dispatches). artillery is classed under the designations light, medium, heavy, and super-heavy. light guns.--_pack guns_, with a calibre of . inches, are weakest in shell-power, but they possess a mobility greater than any other artillery and can be moved in country which would present insuperable obstacles to wheeled traffic. _pack howitzers_, with a calibre of . inches, are particularly valuable in close country, the high angle of descent enabling the attack or defence to search the steepest cover. _horse artillery guns_, firing a -pound shell, are the most mobile of all wheeled artillery and are normally employed with mounted troops. all ranks of the royal horse artillery are mounted, and its mobility is scarcely less than that of cavalry. _field guns_, with a calibre of inches, firing an -pound shell, are the principal artillery weapon of a field army. although inferior in mobility to pack or horse artillery, they have greater shell-power and afford the principal support to infantry in closing with or repelling the enemy. their power to inflict casualties { } by enfilade fire with shrapnel makes them specially suitable in the defence, and the accuracy of modern weapons enables them to co-operate in the attack with covering fire, under the protection of which infantry may advance unimpeded to the assault. in addition to their normal functions, and to their employment in counter-battery work, they can be employed in the reduction of defences by bombardment with high explosive shells, in neutralising an area by the use of gas shells, or in providing artificial cover by the production of _smoke_. _field howitzers_, with a calibre of . inches, have increased offensive power and practically the same mobility as field guns. light guns are the principal weapons for protection against _aircraft_ and for defence against _tanks_. the tank is powerless against artillery, and its most effective enemy is light artillery. during the _first battle of the somme_ a new terror was added to the british attack by the introduction of the tank, which surmounted inequalities in the ground, crushed the wire defences, and crossed the trenches. although accompanied by infantry, it was regarded as an all-conquering and decisive factor. at one period of the battle, however, a number of tanks were placed out of action by a single field gun, manned and fired with the greatest gallantry by a single german artillery officer, who fired point-blank at each tank as it surmounted the crest of a rise. infantry were in close support, and a single lewis-gun section could have prevented the use of the field gun. medium guns.--medium guns, firing a -pound shell, are principally employed in counter-battery work and in fulfilling the functions of -pound field guns at a greater range and with greater force. _medium howitzers_ occupy the same relative position, their offensive power being greater than that of the field howitzer. { } heavy guns.--heavy guns of -inch calibre, firing a shell of pounds, are used against targets beyond the range of light and medium guns, and with greater effect. _heavy howitzers_, of -inch or . -inch calibre, are principally employed against covered batteries and strong defences, or for destroying wire entanglements with instantaneous fuses. super-heavy guns.--super-heavy guns of a calibre of . inches and upwards are usually carried on railway mountings, and while they possess a high muzzle velocity, considerable shell-power, and a high degree of mobility (which enables them to come into action in any part of the battlefield where suitable rails have been laid), their arc of fire is very restricted and their "life" is short. _super-heavy howitzers_, of -inch or -inch calibre, possess similar advantages and disadvantages to super-heavy guns. their normal use is the destruction of permanent defences, the breaking down of bridges, etc. the -inch weapon is also used on tractor-drawn mountings and is highly effective in counter-battery work. the table on p. is based upon particulars given on p. of "field service regulations," vol. ii. ( ). royal engineers "all arms are responsible for the construction of their own works of defence. it is the duty of the royal engineers to assist them by engineer reconnaissances, plans, advice, technical supervision, provision of materials and the construction of works requiring special technical skill. . . . although trained as fighting troops, engineers should be regarded as reserves to be used only as a last resource; casualties in their ranks are not easy to replace, and they may become needlessly involved in the fighting and lost for work which may have an important bearing on the operations" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). { } table of artillery ranges weapon effective range (yds.) _light artillery_ h.e. shell shrapnel pack guns ( . in.) , , pack howitzers ( . in.) , horse artillery guns ( pr.) , , field guns ( pr.) , , field howitzers ( . in.) , _medium artillery_ medium guns ( pr.) , -- medium howitzers ( in.) , _heavy artillery_ heavy guns ( in.) / , heavy howitzers ( in.) , -- " " ( . in) , _super-heavy artillery_ super-heavy guns ( . in.) , -- " " ( in.) , -- " " ( in.) , -- super-heavy howitzers ( in.) , " " ( in) , weapon maximum range (yds.) _light artillery_ h.e. shell shrapnel pack guns ( . in.) , , pack howitzers ( . in.) , horse artillery guns ( pr.) , , field guns ( pr.) , , field howitzers ( . in.) , _medium artillery_ medium guns ( pr.) , , medium howitzers ( in.) , _heavy artillery_ heavy guns ( in.) / , / , heavy howitzers ( in.) , " " ( . in) , _super-heavy artillery_ super-heavy guns ( . in.) , , " " ( in.) , , " " ( in.) , -- super-heavy howitzers ( in.) , " " ( in) , the maximum range of _medium mortars_ is , yards; of _light mortars_ yards. { } carey's force.--during the _second battle of the somme_ "a mixed force, including details, stragglers, schools personnel, tunnelling companies, army troops companies, field survey companies, and canadian and american engineers, had been got together and organised by major-gen. p. g. grant, the chief engineer to the v. army. on march these were posted by general grant, in accordance with orders given by the v. army commander, on the line of the old amiens defences between mezières, marcelcave, and hamel. subsequently, as general grant could ill be spared from his proper duties, he was directed to hand over command of his force to major-gen. g. g. s. carey. except for general carey's force there were no reinforcements of any kind behind the divisions, which had been fighting for the most part since the opening of the battle. . . . on march our line from marcelcave to the somme was manned by carey's force, with the st cavalry division in close support. . . . on march the greater part of the british front south of the somme was held by carey's force, assisted by the st cavalry division and such troops of the divisions originally engaged as it had not yet been found possible to withdraw. in rear of these troops, a few of the divisions of the v. army were given a brief opportunity to reassemble" (sir d. haig's dispatches). tanks tanks are moving fortresses containing light artillery, machine guns, and rifles, and while capable of inflicting heavy losses by fire they can also destroy obstacles, weapons, and personnel. their garrisons are protected against the fire of small arms and from shrapnel bullets, but they are very vulnerable to other forms of artillery fire. their mobility and radius of action are governed by the amount of petrol carried and by the physical endurance of the crew, but except over deep cuttings, { } broad streams, swamps, very heavily shelled ground, rocky and mountainous country, or in thick woods they can move without difficulty. "the power of delivering successful surprise attacks against almost any type of defences is one of the most important advantages of the use of tanks in large numbers" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). during the _first battle of the somme_ (september -november , ) "our new heavily armoured cars, known as 'tanks,' now brought into action for the first time, successfully co-operated with the infantry, and coming as a surprise to the enemy rank and file, gave valuable help in breaking down their resistance. . . . these cars proved of great value on various occasions, and the personnel in charge of them performed many deeds of remarkable valour" (sir d. haig's dispatches). aircraft two classes of aircraft are used in the field. aeroplanes, which are self-propelled and have an almost unlimited radius of action; and kite balloons, which, in favourable weather, can be towed by a lorry and can be moved frequently without loss of efficiency. aeroplanes are of the greatest value for reconnaissance and inter-communication, and not only obtain, and return to their base with, information of the highest value, but facilitate personal reconnaissance of the battlefield by commanders and staff officers. their offensive and defensive action is also very great and the moral effect of their offensive action is of the highest value. although aeroplane squadrons are mobile units they lose efficiency if the units are moved too frequently. the action of aircraft in various phases of fighting is dealt with throughout the lectures. kite balloons carry two observers, who can remain in telephonic communication with the ground up to a { } height of , feet. inflated balloons can be moved in favourable weather at a maximum speed of miles an hour while at a height of about feet. their extreme vulnerability to artillery fire prevents their use close to the battle front. gas "the advisability of employing gas as a military weapon is a matter for consideration by the authorities concerned before a campaign begins. once authorised, however, and assuming that weather conditions are favourable, gas may be expected to play a part in every action. . . . the different methods in which gas can be employed make it a weapon which can be used by all arms, thus _artillery_ deal with gas shells, _infantry_ with light mortar gas bombs, _aircraft_ with aërial gas bombs, and _engineers_ with all methods of use that call for special manipulation" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). gas was introduced by the germans during the _second battle of ypres_ (april -may , ), and the numerous experiments and trials necessary before gas can be used, and the great preparations which have to be made for its manufacture, show that its employment was not the result of a desperate decision, but had been prepared for deliberately. during the _first battle of the somme_ (september -november , ) "the employment by the enemy of gas and liquid flame as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways to protect our troops from their effects, but also to devise means to make use of the same instruments of destruction. . . . since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar methods, it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the evidence of prisoners, of documents captured, and of our own observation, that the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the means of protection adopted by us { } have proved thoroughly effective" (sir d. haig's dispatches). smoke smoke can be discharged from _artillery_ shells, artillery or _infantry_ mortar bombs, infantry rifle grenades, smoke candles, _aircraft_ bombs, _engineers'_ stationary generators, or the exhaust pipe of _tanks_. it is used to conceal movement for the purposes of surprise or for reducing casualties, and can be so employed as to impose night conditions on the enemy while one's own troops retain the natural visibility; but while the weight and direction of an intended blow may thus be hidden from the enemy a warning is given of the time of its delivery. it is possible, however, to mystify, as well as to surprise, the enemy by the use of smoke, and its strategical and tactical value will ensure its adoption in modern warfare. in the closing battles of the great war "the use of smoke shells for covering the advance of our infantry and masking the enemy's positions was introduced and employed with increasing frequency and effect" (sir d. haig's dispatches). { } operation orders combatant officers of every rank are required to issue orders of some kind or other, and orders for operations should always be committed to paper when circumstances permit. the object of an operation order is to bring about a course of action in accordance with the intentions of the commander, and with full co-operation between all units. operation orders of a complicated nature are unlikely to be required from the pen of infantry officers in the junior ranks, and the rules for drafting orders are stated in detail in the official text-books, for the use of officers of the ranks that will be required to issue them. the general principles underlying orders of all kinds are that they should be "fool proof," and it has been remarked that the writer of orders should always remember that at least one silly ass will try to misunderstand them. they must, therefore, be void of all ambiguity, and while containing every essential piece of information, and omitting everything that is clearly known already to the recipients, they should be confined to facts, and conjecture should be avoided. "an operation order must contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more. it should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself, and, especially in the case of large forces, will only enter into details when details are absolutely necessary. any attempt to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance anything which he, with a fuller knowledge of local conditions, should be better able to decide on the spot, is likely to cramp his initiative in dealing with unforeseen developments, and will be avoided. in { } particular, such expressions as 'will await further orders' should be avoided" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). apart from the standing rules as to the printing of names of places in block type, including a reference to the map used, dating and signing the orders, numbering the copies, and stating the time and method of issue, etc., the general tenour of all operation orders will always be: _the enemy are. . . . my intention is. . . . you will. . . ._ in other words, all that is known about the enemy, and of our own troops, that is essential for the purposes of the order, should be revealed; then the general intention of the commander who issues the orders; then the part in the operations that is to be played by the recipient. but the method of attaining the object will be left to the utmost extent possible to the recipient, with due regard to his personal characteristics. "it is essential that subordinates should not only be able to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief orders or instructions, but should also be able to take upon themselves, whenever necessary, the responsibility of departing from, or of varying, the orders they may have received" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). { } index active defence, the, - adowa, battle of, (_note_) advanced guard, the, - distance, information, - in advances, in retreats, - , main guard, - nachod, night, problems, - strategical, strength of, - tactical, tactics of, - , - training, vanguard, - advances, night, - advancing under fire, - aërial observation, (_note_) , - photographs, aircraft, characteristics of, , , - advanced guard, communication by, , , flank guard, gas, outposts, - , position warfare, - protection by, , - protection from, pursuit by, , rear guard, , reconnaissance by, , , , , - , , smoke, alexander the great, allenby, general viscount, g.c.b., , america and the great war, american attack at fossoy, american civil war, , (_see also_ battles by name.) amiens, battle of, , , antietam, battle of, , , appomattox, battle of, , "appreciation of the situation," arabi pasha, arbela, battle of, archangel province, - archduke charles, argyll and sutherland highlanders, - armandvillers-folie, armies, the new, - arminius, victory of, - armistice day, , army, contemptible little, - of north virginia, , - of the cumberland, of the potomac, , - , arras, battle of, art of warfare, - artillery, characteristics of, - barrage, development of, - effective range, escorts, - gas shells, growth of, - heavy, , in attack, - , in defence, , in retreat, , light, - medium, mobility of, - outpost, , pack, positions, ranges, smoke shells, super-heavy, , ashby, gen. turner, c.s.a., assaults by night, - assembly, position of, - , attack, the, - aircraft in, artillery in, - battalion in, - cavalry, - close country, - company in, - co-operation, - , - , decisive, - , - disposition of troops, engineers, fire, flank, formation for, - forward body, - frontal, - general reserve, - holding, , , , , , , , local reserve, - medical arrangements, methods of, opening fire, - platoon in, - reconnaissance for, - smoke, strength of, - supply, - supports, - two plans of, villages, woods, - attacking force, the, - austerlitz, battle of, - , , australians at morlancourt, avenues, communicating, baccarat, battle of, bagdadieh, battle of, - balaclava charge, balloons, observation by, , - banks, gen., u.s.a., bapaume, battle of, barrage, the, base, the, , battalion in attack, - battle, the, - characteristics of, - decisive blow, - development of the, - influences on the, - information, - initiative, - outposts, - phases of the, - position, the, - reports, the defensive, - the defensive-offensive, - the encounter, the offensive, - types of, - bavaria, elector of, bayonet, the, - in night operations, bazaine, maréchal, bazeilles, defence of, benedek, marshal, bernadotte, marshal, blenheim, battle of, - blücher, marshal, , , , bluff, the (ypres), boer war, (_note_) bois de vaux, bombs, light mortar, - (_see also_ grenades.) border regiment, bourlon village, bristow station, british efforts, - , - moral, - broenbeek, bromhead, lieut., bülow, general von, bunker hill, battle of, burnside, gen., u.s.a., , , , - byng of vimy, gen. lord, g.c.b., , cambrai, first battle of, , - , , , , second battle of, , camouflage, canadian cavalry, engineers, infantry at vimy, canadians at ypres, cannae, battle of, carey, maj.-gen. g. g. s., c.b., carey's force, cattigny wood, cavalry, characteristics of, - cossack posts, in attack, - in defence, - in pursuit, - , in retreat, - , , - mesopotamian campaign, - outposts, protection by, - , raids by, - reconnaissance by, , , , - , , - vedettes, cetewayo, - chambord, chateau de, chancellorsville, battle of, , , , , , changes in warfare, - characteristics of the various arms, - chard, lieut., charleroi, battle of, chattanooga, battle of, - chemin des dames, civilised warfare, - clery, lieut.-gen. sir c. f. (_quoted_): advanced guard tactics, - close country, fighting in, - coldstream guards, colenso, battle of, colombey, battle of, combe, capt. e. p., m.c., commander, battalion, - company, - outpost company, - piquet, - platoon, - , - commander's influence, - orders, - plans, - position, "common sense" fallacy, , communication, , , - communications, lateral, lines of, - company in attack, - outpost, - condé-mons-binche line, connection by night, "contemptible little army," the, - , convoys, - co-operation, - , coruña, - cossack posts, counter attack, decisive, , , - local, , , , , cover, - , covering fire, - cronje, gen. (paardeberg), cross keys, battle of, crown prince of prussia ( ), ( ), crozat canal, cugny, cumberland, army of the, cyclists, characteristics of, davis, jefferson, day outposts, - daylight and night attacks, decisive attack, the, - , - counter attack, , , - defence in close country, - of villages, of woods, defensive action, - , battle, - flank, system, defensive-offensive battle, - defiles, definitions, - delaborde, général, , delaying action, , - , - deployment, position of, - depth of a position, detached posts, , de wet, , diamond formation, direction by night, discipline, value of, - dresden, battle of, , early, general., c.s. army, east surrey regiment, embussing point, encounter battle, , engineers, royal, characteristics, gas, smoke, entrenching tool, entrenchments, - , , epehy, battle of, ettlingen, battle of, eugène of savoy, evelington heights, - fabius maximus, , fallacies exposed, - fanny's farm, field artillery, characteristics of, - of battle, - of fire, fighting in close country, - fire attack, - and movement, covering, - opening, , - , , overhead, tactics, - flame projectors, flanders, battle of, flank attacks, , - guard tactics, guards, - , scouts, flanks in defence, security of, fletcher, col. sir r., bart., foch, maréchal, , - , (_quoted_):-- advanced guard tactics, , art of war, british victories in , - defence in modern warfare, definitions, fully equipped mind, - human factor in war, - moral, nachod, outflanking a rear guard, principles of war, - protection by attack, soul of the defence, subordinate commanders, surprise, - , well conducted battle, fog of battle, fontenoy-belleau attack, formations for the attack, - forrest, general, c. s. army, , fort garry horse, forward body, the, - fossoy, american attack at, france, spirit of, franco-prussian war, , - (_see also_ battles by name.) frederick the great, , , fredericksburg, battle of, , , , , , , french of ypres, field-marshal earl, k.p., - , - , , , (_quoted_):-- "contemptible little army," defence in modern warfare, necessity for study, frontage of outpost company, frontal attack, - gaines's mill, battle of, , gallieni, général, , gas, , , , - gatacre, maj.-gen. sir w. f., k.c.b., gaugamela, (note) general reserve, in attack, - in defence, - , - george, rt. hon. d. lloyd-, o.m. (_quoted_): british efforts, - , - gette river, gettysburg, battle of, , , , - , - , , gheluvelt, , gifert wood, givenchy, grant, maj.-gen. p. g., c.b., grant, general u. s., u.s.a., , , , , - , , , - gravelotte, battle of, "green curve," the, , grenades, hand and rifle, grenfell, gen. sir f. w., k.c.b., grouchy, maréchal, - , - ground, eye for, - scouts, guards' division, , , gueudecourt, haerincourt and epehy, battle of, haig of bemersyde, field-marshal earl, k.t., (_quoted_):-- artillery, - canal bridges, carey's force, cavalry in defence, cavalry in the war, - fuse no. , gas, - hang on! health and moral, infantry the backbone, new armies, - "other man's job," principles of war, rearward services, reserves in , rifle and bayonet, smoke, surprise, tanks, haking, lieut.-gen. sir r. c. b., g.b.e. (_quoted_):-- advanced guards, rear guards, hal and tubize, hamley, gen. sir e. b., k.c.b. (_quoted_):-- communications, co-operation, - courage, definitions, "higher ranks" fallacy, mobility, study required, hancock, gen., u.s.a., hand grenades, hannibal, harold ii., king, - harrison's landing, hastings, battle of, - health and moral, heavy artillery, , heights of abraham, henderson, col. g. f. r., c.b. (_quoted_):-- abraham lincoln, atmosphere of battle, - british and american troops, - cavalry, "common sense" fallacy, co-operation, - discipline, eye for ground, - flank attacks, grant's bases, soldiers' battles, sound system of command, spottsylvania, - study necessary, - value of text-books, hennechy, "higher ranks" fallacy, hill, gen. d. h., c.s. army, - hindenburg, marshal von, hindenburg line, battle of the, , hohenlinden, battle of, hood, gen. j. b., c.s. army, hooker, gen., u.s.a., , , , horatius cocles, horse artillery, characteristics of, , hotchkiss rifles, howitzers, , , , human nature in war, - hunter, gen., u.s.a., infantry, characteristics of, - information in battle, - , , - initiative, the, - , - intelligence officers, - isandhlwana, - , italo-turkish campaign, (_note_) jackson, gen. t. j., c.s. army, ("stonewall" jackson), , , , , , joffre, maréchal, , jourdan, maréchal, kimberley, relief of, kite balloons, - königgratz, battle of, koorn spruit, , ladysmith, relief of, la fère, lancashire territorials, le cateau, first battle of, , second battle of, , lee, general r. e., c.s. army, , , , , , , , - , , , , , - , , - , - leonidas, le quesnoy, les boeufs, - leuthen, battle of, lewis guns, characteristics of, liberty of manoeuvre, - , , - , , - , , light mortars, - , ligny, battle of, , , - lincoln, abraham, , , lines of communications, - of observation, , of resistance, , local reserves, attack, - defence, , outposts, , rear guards, logan, gen. j. a., u.s.a., london regiment, longstreet, gen. j., c.s. army, losses reduced by movement, - ludendorff, lys, attack on the, , mcclellan, gen. j. b., u.s.a., - , - , , , , machine guns, characteristics of, in attack, - , in close country, - in defence, - , in outposts, , in retreats, - range of, mcneill, maj.-gen. sir j., k.c.b., madritov, colonel, - magersfontein, battle of, mahdist arabs, main guard (advanced guard), (rear guard), - maistre, general (_quoted_):-- british valour, malplaquet, battle of, malvern hill, battle of, , - , , - , manassas, battles of, manoeuvre, liberty of, - manoury, général, map reading, , , marches, night, - marching power of troops, - marengo, battle of, , marlborough, duke of, - , marmont, maréchal, , marne, first battle of the, - , - , , , second battle of the, - marshall, gen. sir w. r., k.c.b., - marye's hill, masséna, maréchal, maude, gen. sir s., k.c.b., mcdowell, battle of, meade, gen., u.s.a., , , , , , meagher's irish brigade, mechanical transport, - , , medical arrangements (attack), mesopotamia, , - message cards, messines, battle of, , methods of attack, methuen, field-marshal lord, g.c.b., mobility, value of, - , monchy-le-preux, monocacy, battle of, mons, retreat from, , , - , , , - , moore, gen. sir j., k.c.b., - moral, - moreau, brig.-gen., général j. v., morlancourt, mortars, , , - , mounted troops, characteristics of, - movement and fire, - in close country, murat, maréchal, musketry, - , - nachod, battle of, , napier, sir w. f. p. (_quoted_):-- rear guards, - torres vedras, - napoleon, emperor, , , - , , , , , , , (_quoted_):-- caesar and turenne, c'est les prussiens, moral force, - read and re-read, to cover turin, nashville, battle of, national moral, - new armies, the, - newfoundland regiment, the royal, , niederwald, - night advances, - assaults, - entrenching, marches, - operations, - outposts, - nile valley, noisseville, norman conquest, - observation, line of, , posts, obstacles, offensive battle, the, - spirit, operation orders, - orders, - orthez, battle of, osman pasha, outpost zone, the, , outposts, - aircraft, artillery, battle outposts, - cavalry, , commander, - company, - day, - distance, frontage, information, - line of observation, , line of resistance, , machine guns, , night, - observation by, , orders, - outpost company, - outpost zone, patrols, , - piquets, position warfare, , reconnaissance by, reserves, resistance by, , sentry groups, - strength, withdrawal of, paardeberg, battle of, , pack artillery, characteristics of, , passive defence, patrols, fighting, from outposts, , - raiding, peiwar kotal, battle of, penetration by attack, - pétain, maréchal, pfaffen wood, phalanx, the, photographs, aërial, piave line, the, pill-box forts, - pioneer infantry, piquets, platoon in attack, - in defence, pleasant hill, plevna, battle of, plumer, field-marshal lord, g.c.b., polygon wood, - position, choice of a, - defensive, - warfare, - , - , , , - , , potomac, army of the, - , - , , principles of warfare, - protection and reconnaissance, - by night, pulteney, gen. sir w. p., k.c.b., pursuit, , quatre bras, battle of, quebec, queen's regiment, raids, , , rallying place, ramadie, battle of, ramdam, ramillies, battle of, , range cards, ranges of artillery, of small arms, of mortars, rappahannock station, rastatt, rear guard, - aircraft, artillery, cavalry, composition, distance, distribution, - examples, - infantry, main guard, - machine guns, mechanical transport, medical arrangements, night, positions, - rear party, - royal engineers, strength, - tactics, , , - training, - reconnaissance and protection, - , by raids, during battle, for attack, - for defence, - intelligence officers, - tactical, - reorganisation after attack, and pursuit, report centres, reports, battle, on positions, - reserve, general, in attack, - in defence, - outposts, local, - , , , , , resistance, line of, , retiring under fire, - retreat from mons, , - , , , - , lines of, - tactics in, - reumont, rezonville, rifle, the british, , - rifle grenade, the, roberts, field-marshal earl, k.g., - , (_quoted_):-- "germany strikes," roliça, combat at, , roman walls, rorke's drift, - , royal engineers, characteristics of, , defence, horse artillery, in attack, , outposts, retreats, west kent regiment, runners, russia, collapse of, north (campaign), - russian war of - , russo-japanese war, , - russo-turkish war, , sadowa, battle of, st. privat, battle of, salamanca, battle of, , salient, the ( ), , (ypres), sambre, battle of the, sannah's post, , sarrail, général, sauroren, battle of, savage warfare, - scarpe, battle of the, scouts (platoon), secrecy, , - , , , , - , - sectors of defence, sedan, battle of, selle, battle of the, semi-permanent defences, - seneca _quoted_: (surprise), sentry groups, , - serre hill, - seven days' battle, the, , sharpsburg, battle of, , , shenandoah valley campaign, , , , signals, , "silence is golden," skobeleff, general michael dimitrievitch, smith-dorrien, gen. sir h. l., g.c.b., , smoke, , - , , snipers, soissons, fortress of, , soldiers' battles, somme, first battle of the, , , , - , , , - second battle of the, - , , - , , , , , - , soult, maréchal, , south african war, - . (_see also_ battles by name.) spicheren, battle of, - , spottsylvania, battle of, - , , - square formation in attack, stafford heights, stamford bridge, battle of, stormberg, strategical advanced guard, strategy defined, , and tactics, - stuart, gen. j. e. b., c.s. army ("jeb" stuart), , - , , . study, necessity for, - , - sublician bridge, sulphur springs, super-heavy artillery, , supply, , supports in attack, - , in close country, defence, outposts, - surprise, value of, , - , , fire, , historical examples, , , , - , , , tactical advanced guard, reconnaissance, - tactics and strategy, - definition of, , subservient to strategy, - tadpole copse, talavera, battle of, tallard, maréchal, tanks, characteristics of, , - in close country, , , , taube farm, taylor, gen. r., c.s. army (_quoted_):-- cardinal principles, discipline, tel-el-kebir, battle of, - territorial troops, , teutoberger wald, - text-books, value of, theatre of operations, - thermopylae, battle of, thielmann's corps (wavre), thomas, gen. g. h., u.s.a., time, value of, tofrik, battle of, torres vedras, lines of, - toski, battle of, toulouse, battle of, trench warfare, - trenches, fire, troisvilles, trônes wood, tubize and hal, tweefontein, types of battle action, - valley campaign, the, , , , vanguard, the, - varus, defeat of, - vedettes, verdun, defence of, verneville, battle of, view, in close country, village fighting, - , - balan, bazeilles, bourlon, givenchy, noisseville, villers-guislain, villers-brétonneux, villages, attack on, defence of, vimy ridge, visibility from air, vittoria, battle of, , von below, general, von bredow's "todtenritt," von kluck, general, wallace, gen. lew, u.s.a., warfare, art of, - savage, - warren, gen., u.s.a., watchword at night, waterloo, battle of, , - , , - , - wauchope, brig-gen. a. g., wavre, battle of, , weather, wellington, field-marshal duke of, k.g., , , , , - , - , wilderness, battle of the, - , , - , william the conqueror, wire, wolfe, gen. james, wolseley, field-marshal viscount, k.p., - wood fighting, - bois de vaux, elsasshausen copse, gauche, gifert, niederwald, - pfaffen, polygon, - tadpole copse, trônes, woods, attack on, - defence of, worcestershire regiment, worth, battle of, , - wytschaete ridge, , yalu, battle of the, ypres, first battle of, , , - , second battle of, , , , third battle of, , zero hour, zulu war, - none none manual of military training (second, revised edition) by colonel james a. moss united states army (officially adopted by one hundred and five [ ] of our military schools and colleges.) intended, primarily, for use in connection with the instruction and training of cadets in our military schools and colleges and of company officers of the national army, national guard, and officers' reserve corps; and secondarily, as a guide for company officers of the regular army, the aim being to make efficient fighting companies and to qualify our cadets and our national army, national guard and reserve corps officers for the duties and responsibilities of company officers in time of war. [illustration] price $ . general agents george banta publishing company army and college printers menasha--wisconsin _copyright _ _by_ jas. a. moss first edition first impression (october, ) , second impression (september, ) , third impression (march, ) , fourth impression (july, ) , fifth impression (february, ) , sixth impression (april, ) , second edition first impression (may, ) , second impression (august, ) , third impression (november, ) , ------- total , publishers and general distributers george banta publishing co., menasha, wis. other distributers (order from nearest one) =boston, mass.= the harding uniform and regalia co., school st. =chicago, ill.= a. c. mcclurg & co. =columbus, ohio.= the m. c. lilley & co. =fort leavenworth, kan.= u. s. cavalry association. book dept., army service schools. =fort monroe, va.= journal u. s. artillery. =kalamazoo, mich.= henderson-ames co. =new york.= baker & taylor co., th ave. army and navy coöperative co., east nd st. ridabock & co., west th st. warnock uniform co., west th st. =philadelphia, pa.= jacob reed's sons, chestnut. =portland, ore.= j. k. gill co. =san antonio, tex.= frank brothers alamo plaza. =san francisco, cal.= b. pasquale co., - post st. =washington, d. c.= army and navy register, eleventh st. n. w. meyer's military shops, f. st. n. w. u. s. infantry association, union trust bldg. philippine islands: philippine education co., manila, p. i. hawaiian islands: hawaiian news co., honolulu, h. t. canal zone: post exchange, empire, c. z. note in order to learn thoroughly the contents of this manual it is suggested that you use in connection with your study of the book the pamphlet, "questions on manual of military training," which, by means of questions, brings out and emphasizes every point mentioned in the manual. "questions on manual of military training" is especially useful to students of schools and colleges using the manual, as it enables them, as nothing else will, to prepare for recitations and examinations. the pamphlet can be gotten from the publishers, geo. banta publishing co., menasha, wis., or from any of the distributers of "manual of military training." price cts., postpaid. prefatory not only does this manual cover all the subjects prescribed by war department orders for the junior division, and the basic course, senior division, of the reserve officers' training corps, but it also contains considerable additional material which broadens its scope, rounding it out and making it answer the purpose of a general, all-around book, complete in itself, for training and instruction in the fundamentals of the art of war. the company is the _basic fighting tactical unit_--it is the foundation rock upon which an army is built--and the fighting efficiency of a company is based on systematic and thorough training. this manual is a presentation of military training as manifested in the training and instruction of a company. the book contains all the essentials pertaining to the training and instruction of company officers, noncommissioned officers and privates, and the officer who masters its contents and who makes his company proficient in the subjects embodied herein, will be in every way qualified, _without the assistance of a single other book_, to command with credit and satisfaction, in peace and in war, a company that will be an _efficient fighting weapon_. this manual, as indicated below, is divided into a prelude and nine parts, subjects of a similar or correlative nature being thus grouped together. prelude. the object and advantages of military training. part i. drills, exercises, ceremonies, and inspections. part ii. company command. part iii. miscellaneous subjects pertaining to company training and instruction. part iv. rifle training and instruction. part v. health and kindred subjects. part vi. military courtesy and kindred subjects. part vii. guard duty. part viii. military organization. part ix. map reading and sketching. a schedule of training and instruction covering a given period and suitable to the local conditions that obtain in any given school or command, can be readily arranged by looking over the table of contents, and selecting therefrom such subjects as it is desired to use, the number and kind, and the time to be devoted to each, depending upon the time available, and climatic and other conditions. it is suggested that, for the sake of variety, in drawing up a program of instruction and training, when practicable a part of each day or a part of each drill time, be devoted to theoretical work and a part to practical work, theoretical work, when possible, being followed by corresponding practical work, the practice (the _doing_ of a thing) thus putting a clincher, as it were, on the theory (the explaining of a thing). the theoretical work, for example, could be carried on in the forenoon and the practical work in the afternoon, or the theoretical work could be carried on from, say, to : a. m., and the practical work from : to : or a. m. attention is invited to the completeness of the index, whereby one is enabled to locate at once any point covered in the book. acknowledgment the author wishes to acknowledge the assistance received in the revision of this manual in the form of suggestions from a large number of officers on duty at our military schools and colleges, suggestions that enabled him not only to improve the manual in subject-matter as well as in arrangement, but that have also enabled him to give our military schools and colleges a textbook which, in a way, may be said to represent the consensus of opinion of our professors of military science and tactics as to what such a book should embody in both subject-matter and arrangement. suggestions received from a number of professors of military science and tactics show conclusively that local conditions as to average age and aptitude of students, interest taken in military training by the student body, support given by the school authorities, etc., are so different in different schools that it would be impossible to write a book for general use that would, in amount of material, arrangement and otherwise, just exactly fit, in toto, the conditions, and meet the requirements of each particular school. therefore, the only practical, satisfactory solution of the problem is to produce a book that meets _all_ the requirements of the strictly military schools, where the conditions for military training and instruction are the most favorable, and the requirements the greatest, and then let other schools take only such parts of the book as are necessary to meet their own particular local needs and requirements. "manual of military training" is such a book. [illustration: (signature) jas. a. moss] camp gaillard, c. z., march , . table of contents prelude object and advantages of military training par. no. =object of:= setting-up exercises, calisthenics, facings - and marchings, saluting, manual of arms, school of the squad, company drill, close order, extended order, ceremonies, discipline--=advantages:= handiness, self-control, loyalty, orderliness, self-confidence, self-respect, training eyes, teamwork, heeding law and order, sound body. part i chapter i. =infantry drill regulations=--definitions-- - general remarks--general rules for drills and formations-- orders, commands, and signals--school of the soldier-- school of the squad--school of the company--school of the battalion--combat--leadership--combat reconnaissance--fire superiority--fire direction and control--deployment-- attack--defense--meeting engagements--machine guns-- ammunition supply--mounted scouts--night operations-- infantry against cavalry--infantry against artillery-- artillery supports--minor warfare--ceremonies--inspections-- muster--the color--manual of the saber--manual of tent pitching--appendices a and b. chapter ii. =manual of the bayonet=--nomenclature and - description of the bayonet--instruction without the rifle--instruction with the rifle--instruction without the bayonet--combined movements--fencing exercises--fencing at will--lessons of the european war--the "short point"-- the "jab." chapter iii. =manual of physical training=--methods-- - commands--setting-up exercises--rifle exercises. chapter iv. =signaling=--general service code--wigwag-- - the two-arm semaphore code--signaling with heliograph, flash lanterns, and searchlight--sound signals--morse code. part ii company command chapter i. =government and administration of a - company=--duties and responsibilities of the captain and the lieutenants--devolution of work and responsibility--duties and responsibilities of the first sergeant and other noncommissioned officers--contentment and harmony--efficacious forms of company punishment--property responsibility--books and records. chapter ii. =discipline=--definition--methods of - attaining good discipline--importance--sound discipline-- punishment--general principles. part iii miscellaneous subjects pertaining to company training and instruction chapter i. =general principles of company training and - instruction=--object of training and instruction--method and progression--individual initiative--the human element-- art of instruction on the ground--ocular demonstration. chapter ii. =general common sense principles of applied - minor tactics=--art of war defined--responsibilities of officers and noncommissioned officers in war--general rules and principles of map problems, terrain exercises, the war game, and maneuvers--estimating the situation-- mission. chapter iii. =general plan of instruction in map problems - for noncommissioned officers and privates--instruction in delivering messages.= chapter iv. =the service of information=--general - principles of patrolling--sizes of patrols--patrol leaders--patrol formations--messages and reports-- suggestions for gaining information about the enemy-- suggestions for the reconnaissance of various positions and localities--demolitions--problems in patrolling. chapter v. =the service of security=--general - principles--advance guard--advance guard problems-- flank guards--rear guard--outposts--formation of outposts--outguards--flags of truce--detached posts-- examining posts--establishing the outpost--outpost order--intercommunication--outpost problems. chapter vi. =the company on outpost=--establishing the outpost. chapter vii. =the company in scouting and patrolling= - --requisites of a good scout--eyesight and hearing-- finding way in strange country--what to do when lost-- landmarks--concealment and dodging--tracking--the mouse and cat contest--flag stealing contest. chapter viii. =night operations=--importance--training - of the company--individual training--collective training--outposts. chapter ix. =field engineering=--bridges--corduroying-- - tascines--hurdles--brush revetment--gabions--other revetments--knots--lashings. chapter x. =field fortifications=--object-- - classification--hasty intrenchments--lying trench-- kneeling trench--standing trench--deliberate intrenchments--fire trenches--traverses--trench recesses; sortie steps--parados--head cover--notches and loopholes--cover trenches--dugouts--communicating trenches--lookouts--supporting points--example of trench system--location of trenches--concealment of trenches-- dummy trenches--length of trench--preparation of foreground--revetments--drainage--water supply-- latrines--illumination of the foreground--telephones-- siege works. chapter xi. =obstacles=--object--necessity for - obstacles--location--abatis--palisades--fraises-- cheveaux de frise--obstacles against cavalry--wire entanglements--time and materials--wire fence--military pits or trous de loup--miscellaneous barricades-- inundations--obstacles in front of outguards--lessons from the european war--wire cheveaux de frise--guarding obstacles--listening posts--automatic alarms--search lights. chapter xii. =trench and mine warfare=--asphyxiating - gases--protection against gases--liquid fire-- grenades--bombs--aerial mines--winged torpedoes--bombs from air-craft--protection against hand grenades-- tanks--helmets--masks--periscopes--sniperscopes--aids to firing--mining--countermining. chapter xiii. =marches=--marching principal occupation - of troops in campaign-physical training hardening new troops--long marches not to be made with untrained troops--a successful march--preparation--starting-- conduct of march--rate--marching capacity--halts-- crossing bridges and fords--straggling and elongation of column--forced marches--night marches--no compliments paid on march--protection on march--fitting of shoes and care of feet. chapter xiv. =camps=--selection of camp sites-- - desirable camp sites--undesirable camp sites--form and dimensions of camps--making camp--retreat in camp-- parade ground--windstorms--making tent poles and pegs fast in loose soil--trees. chapter xv. =camp sanitation=--definition--camp - expedients--latrines--urinal tubs--kitchens--kitchen pits--incinerators--drainage--avoiding old camp sites-- changing camp sites--bunks--wood--water--rules of sanitation--your camp, your home. chapter xvi. =individual cooking=--making fire-- - recipes--meats--vegetables--drinks--hot breads-- emergency ration. chapter xvii. =care and preservation of clothing and - equipment=--clothing--pressing--removing stains-- shoes--cloth equipment--washing--shelter tent--mess outfit--leather equipment--points to be remembered. chapter xviii. =care and description of the rifle= - --importance--care of bore--how to remove fouling--care of mechanism and various parts--how to apply oil--army regulation paragraphs about rifle--nomenclature of rifle. part iv rifle training and instruction object and explanation of our system of instruction-- - individual instruction--theory of sighting--kinds of sights--preliminary drills--position and aiming drills-- deflection and elevation correction drills--gallery practice--range practice--use of sling--designation of winds--zero of rifle--estimating distances--wind-- temperature--light--mirage--combat practice--fire discipline--technical principles of firing--ballistic qualities of the rifle--cone of fire--shot group--center of impact--beaten zone--zone of effective fire-- effectiveness of fire--influence of ground--grazing fire--ricochet shots--occupation of ground--adjustment of fire--determination of range--combined sights-- auxiliary aiming points--firing at moving targets-- night firing--fire direction and control--distribution of fire--individual instruction in fire distribution-- designation of targets--exercises in ranging, target designation communication, etc. part v care of health and kindred subjects chapter i. =care of the health=--importance of good - health--germs--the five ways of catching disease-- diseases caught by breathing in germs--diseases caught by swallowing germs--disease caught by touching germs-- diseases caught from biting insects. chapter ii. =personal hygiene=--keep the skin clean-- - keep the body properly protected against the weather-- keep the body properly fed--keep the body supplied with fresh air--keep the body well exercised--keep the body rested by sufficient sleep--keep the body free of wastes. chapter iii. =first aid to the sick and injured= - --objectof teaching first aid--asphyxiation by gas-- bite of dog--bite of snake--bleeding--broken bones (fractures)--burns--bruises--cuts--dislocations-- drowning--electric shock--fainting--foreign body in eye, in ear--freezing--frost bite--headache--heat exhaustion-- poison--sprains--sunburn--sunstroke--wounds--improvised litters. part vi military courtesy and kindred subjects chapter i. =military deportment and appearance-- - personal cleanliness--forms of speech--delivery of messages.= chapter ii. =military courtesy=--its importance--nature - of salutes and their origin--whom to salute--when and how to salute--usual mistakes in saluting--respect to be paid the national anthem, the colors and standards. part vii guard duty importance--respect for sentinels--classification of - guards--general rules--the commanding officer--the officer of the day--the commander of the guard--sergeant of the guard--corporal of the guard--musicians of the guard--orderlies and color sentinels--privates of the guard--countersigns and paroles--guard patrols-- compliments from guards--general rules concerning guard duty--stable guards--troop stable guards--reveille and retreat gun--formal guard mounting--informal guard mounting. part viii military organization composition of infantry, cavalry and field artillery units up to and including the regiment. part ix map reading and sketching chapter i. =map reading=--definition of map--ability to - read a map--scales--methods of representing scales-- construction of scales--scale problems--scaling distances from a map--contours--map distances--slopes-- meridians--determination of positions of points on map-- orientation--conventional signs--visibility. chapter ii. =military sketching=--the different methods - of sketching--location of points by intersection-- location of points by resection--location of points by traversing--contours--form lines--scales--position sketching--outpost sketching--road sketching--combined sketching--points for beginners to remember. prelude the object and advantages of military training = . prelude.= we will first consider the object and advantages of military training, as they are the natural and logical prelude to the subject of military training and instruction. object = . the object of all military training is to win battles.= everything that you do in military training is done with some immediate object in view, which, in turn, has in view the _final_ object of winning battles. for example: = . setting-up exercises.= the object of the setting-up exercises, as the name indicates, is to give the new men the _set-up_,--the bearing and carriage,--of the military man. in addition these exercises serve to loosen up his muscles and prepare them for his later experiences and development. = . calisthenics.= calisthenics may be called the big brother, the grown-up form, of the setting-up exercise. the object of calisthenics is to develop and strengthen all parts and muscles of the human body,--the back, the legs, the arms, the lungs, the heart and all other parts of the body. first and foremost a fighting man's work depends upon his physical fitness. to begin with, a soldier's mind must always be on the alert and equal to any strain, and no man's mind can be at its best when he is handicapped by a weak or ailing body. the work of the fighting man makes harsh demands on his body. it must be strong enough to undergo the strain of marching when every muscle cries out for rest; strong enough to hold a rifle steady under fatigue and excitement; strong enough to withstand all sorts of weather, and the terrible nervous and physical strain of modern battle; and more, it must be strong enough to resist those diseases of campaign which kill more men than do the bullets of the enemy. hence the necessity of developing and strengthening every part and muscle of the body. = . facings and marchings.= the object of the facings and marchings is to give the soldier complete control of his body in drills, so that he can get around with ease and promptness at every command. the marchings,--the military walk and run,--also teach the soldier how to get from one place to another in campaign with the least amount of physical exertion. every man knows how to walk and run, but few of them how to do so without making extra work of it. one of the first principles in training the body of the soldier is to make each set of muscles do its own work and save the strength of the other muscles for their work. thus the soldier marches in quick time,--walks,--with his legs, keeping the rest of his body as free from motion as possible. he marches in double time,--runs,--with an easy swinging stride which requires no effort on the part of the muscles of the body. the marchings also teach the soldier to walk and run at a steady gait. for example, in marching in quick time, he takes steps each minute; in double time, he takes per minute. furthermore, the marchings teach the soldier to walk and run with others,--that is, in a body. = . saluting.= the form of salutation and greeting for the civilian consists in raising the hat. the form of salutation and greeting for the military man consists in rendering the military salute,--a form of salutation which marks you as a member of the fraternity of men-at-arms, men banded together for national defense, bound to each other by love of country and pledged to the loyal support of its symbol, the flag. for the full significance of the military salute see paragraph . = . manual of arms.= the rifle is the soldier's fighting weapon and he must become so accustomed to the _feel_ of it that he handles it without a thought,--just as he handles his arms or legs without a thought,--and this is what the manual of arms accomplishes. the different movements and positions of the rifle are the ones that experience has taught are the best and the easiest to accomplish the object in view. = . school of the squad.= the object of squad drill is to teach the soldier his first lesson in _team-work_,--and team-work is the thing that wins battles. in the squad the soldier is associated with seven other men with whom he drills, eats, sleeps, marches, and fights. the squad is the unit upon which all of the work of the company depends. unless the men of each squad work together as a single man,--unless there is _team-work_,--the work of the company is almost impossible. = . company drill.= several squads are banded together into a company,--the basic fighting unit. in order for a company to be able to comply promptly with the will of its commander, it must be like a pliable, easily managed instrument. and in order to win battles a company on the firing line must be able to comply promptly with the will of its commander. the object of company drill is to get such team-work amongst the squads that the company will at all times move and act like a pliable, easily managed whole. = . close order.= in close order drill the strictest attention is paid to all the little details, all movements being executed with the greatest precision. the soldiers being close together,--in _close order_,--they form a compact body that is easily managed, and consequently that lends itself well to teaching the soldier habits of attention, precision, team-work and instant obedience to the voice of his commander. in order to control and handle bodies of men quickly and without confusion, they must be taught to group themselves in an orderly arrangement and to move in an orderly manner. for example, soldiers are grouped or formed in line, in column of squads, column of files, etc. in close order drill soldiers are taught to move in an orderly manner from one group or formation to another; how to stand, step off, march, halt and handle their rifles all together. this practice makes the soldier feel perfectly at home and at ease in the squad and company. he becomes accustomed to working side by side with the man next to him, and, unconsciously, both get into the habit of working together, thus learning the first principles of _team-work_. = . extended order.= this is the fighting drill. modern fire arms have such great penetration that if the soldiers were all bunched together a single bullet might kill or disable several men and the explosion of a single shell might kill or disable a whole company. consequently, soldiers must be scattered,--_extended out_,--to fight. in extended order not only do the soldiers furnish a smaller target for the enemy to shoot at, but they also get room in which to fight with greater ease and freedom. the object of extended order drill is to practice the squads in team-work by which they are welded into a single fighting machine that can be readily controlled by its commander. = . parades, reviews, and other ceremonies.= parades, reviews and other ceremonies, with their martial music, the presence of spectators, etc., are intended to stimulate the interest and excite the military spirit of the command. also, being occasions for which the soldiers dress up and appear spruce and trim, they inculcate habits of tidiness,--they teach a lesson in cleanliness of body and clothes. while it is true it may be said that parades, reviews and other ceremonies form no practical part of the fighting man's training for battle, they nevertheless serve a very useful purpose in his general training. in these ceremonies in which soldiers march to martial music with flags flying, moving and going through the manual of arms with perfect precision and unison, there results a concerted movement that produces a feeling such as we have when we dance or when we sing in chorus. in other words, ceremonies are a sort of "get-together" exercise which pulls men together in spite of themselves, giving them a shoulder-to-shoulder feeling of solidity and power that helps to build up that confidence and spirit which wins battles. = . discipline.= by discipline we mean the _habit_ of observing all rules and regulations and of obeying promptly all orders. by observing day after day all rules and regulations and obeying promptly all orders, it becomes second nature,--a fixed habit,--to do these things. of course, in the army, like in any other walk of life, there must be law and order, which is impossible unless everyone obeys the rules and regulations gotten up by those in authority. when a man has cultivated the habit of obeying,--when obedience has become second nature with him,--he obeys the orders of his leaders instinctively, even when under the stress of great excitement, such as when in battle, his own reasoning is confused and his mind is not working. in order to win a battle the _will_ of the commander as expressed through his subordinates down the line from the second in command to the squad leaders, must be carried out by everyone. hence the vital importance of prompt, instinctive obedience on the part of everybody, and of discipline, which is the mainspring of obedience and also the foundation rock of law and order. and so could we go on indefinitely pointing out the object of each and every requirement of military training, for there is none that has no object and that answers no useful purpose, although the object and purpose may not always be apparent to the young soldier. _and remember that the final object of all military training is to win battles._ advantages of military training the following are the principal advantages of military training: = . handiness.= the average man does one thing well. he is more or less apt to be clumsy about doing other things. the soldier is constantly called upon to do all sorts of things, and he has to do all of them well. his hands thus become trained and useful to him, and his mind gets into the habit of making his hands do what is required of them,--that is to say, the soldier becomes handy. handy arms are a valuable asset. = . self-control.= in the work of the soldier, control does not stop with the hands. the mind reaches out,--control of the body becomes a habit. the feet, legs, arms and body gradually come under the sway of the mind. in the position of the soldier, for instance, the mind holds the body motionless. in marching, the mind drives the legs to machine-like regularity. in shooting, the mind assumes command of the arms, hands, fingers and eye, linking them up and making them work in harmony. control of the body, together with the habit of discipline that the soldier acquires, leads to control of the mind,--that is, to _self-control_. self-control is an important factor in success in any walk of life. = . loyalty.= loyalty to his comrades, to his company, to his battalion, to his regiment becomes a religion with the soldier. they are a part of his life. their reputation is his; their good name, his good name; their interests, his interests,--so, loyalty to them is but natural, and this loyalty soon extends to loyalty in general. when you say a man is loyal the world considers that you have paid him a high tribute. = . orderliness.= in the military service order and system are watchwords. the smooth running of the military machine depends on them. the care and attention that the soldier is required to give at all times to his clothes, accouterments, equipment and other belongings, instill in him habits of orderliness. orderliness increases the value of a man. = . self-confidence and self-respect.= self-confidence is founded on one's ability to do things. the soldier is taught to defend himself with his rifle, and to take care of himself and to do things in almost any sort of a situation, all of which gives him confidence in himself,--_self-confidence_. respect for constituted authority, which is a part of the soldier's creed, teaches him respect for himself,--_self-respect_. self-confidence and self-respect are a credit to any man. = . eyes trained to observe.= guard duty, outpost duty, patrolling, scouting and target practice, train both the eye and the mind to observe. power of observation is a valuable faculty for a man to possess. = . teamwork.= in drilling, patrolling, marching, maneuvers and in other phases of his training and instruction, the soldier is taught the principles of team-work,--coöperation,--whose soul is _loyalty_, a trait of every good soldier. teamwork,--coöperation,--leads to success in life. = . heeding law and order.= the cardinal habit of the soldier is obedience. to obey orders and regulations is a habit with the soldier. and this habit of obeying orders and regulations teaches him to heed law and order. the man who heeds law and order is a welcome member of any community. = . sound body.= military training, with its drills, marches, and other forms of physical exercise, together with its regular habits and outdoor work, keeps a man physically fit, giving him a sound body. a sound body, with the physical exercise and outdoor life of the soldier, means good digestion, strength, hardiness and endurance. a sound body is, indeed, one of the greatest blessings of life. the trained soldier = .= look at the trained soldier on the following page; study him carefully from top to bottom, and see what military training does for a man. [illustration: the trained soldier what do you think of him, eh?] part i drills, exercises, ceremonies and inspections chapter i infantry drill regulations (to include changes no. , aug. , .) definitions (the numbers following the paragraphs are those of the drill regulations, and references in the text to certain paragraph numbers refer to these numbers and not to the numbers preceding the paragraphs.) (note.--company drills naturally become monotonous. the monotony, however, can be greatly reduced by repeating the drills under varying circumstances. in the manual of arms, for instance, the company may be brought to open ranks and the officers and sergeants directed to superintend the drill in the front and rear ranks. as the men make mistakes they are fallen out and drilled nearby by an officer or noncommissioned officer. or, the company may be divided into squads, each squad leader drilling his squad, falling out the men as they make mistakes, the men thus fallen out reporting to a designated officer or noncommissioned officer for drill. the men who have drilled the longest in the different squads are then formed into one squad and drilled and fallen out in like manner. the variety thus introduced stimulates a spirit of interest and rivalry that robs the drill of much of its monotony. it is thought the instruction of a company in drill is best attained by placing special stress on squad drill. the noncommissioned officers should be thoroughly instructed, practically and theoretically, by one of the company officers and then be required to instruct their squads. the squads are then united and drilled in the school of the company.--author.) definitions = . alignment:= a straight line upon which several elements are formed, or are to be formed; or the dressing of several elements upon a straight line. [illustration: fig. note.--the line a-b, on which a body of troops is formed or is to be formed, or the act of dressing a body of troops on the line, is called an alignment.--author.] = . base:= the element on which a movement is regulated. = . battle sight:= the position of the rear sight when the leaf is laid down. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . center:= the middle point or element of a command. (see figs. , and .) (the designation "center company," indicates the right center or the actual center company, according as the number of companies is even or odd.--par. .) = . column:= a formation in which the elements are placed one behind another. (see figs. , , .) = . deploy:= to extend the front. in general to change from column to line, or from close order to extended order. = . depth:= the space from head to rear of any formation, including the leading and rear elements. the depth of a man is assumed to be inches. (see figs. , , .) = . distance:= space between elements in the direction of depth. distance is measured from the back of the man in front to the breast of the man in rear. the distance between ranks is inches in both line and column. (see figs. , , .) [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . element:= a file, squad, platoon, company, or larger body, forming part of a still larger body. = . file:= two men, the front-rank man and the corresponding man of the rear rank. the front-rank man is the file leader. a file which has no rear-rank man is a blank file. the term file applies also to a single man in a single-rank formation. = . file closers:= such officers and noncommissioned officers of a company as are posted in rear of the line. for convenience, all men posted in the line of file closers. = . flank:= the right or left of a command in line or in column; also the element on the right or left of the line. (see figs. , and .) = . formation:= arrangement of the elements of a command. the placing of all fractions in their order in line, in column, or for battle. = . front:= the space, in width, occupied by an element, either in line or in column. the front of a man is assumed to be inches. front also denotes the direction of the enemy. (see figs. , and ). = . guide:= an officer, noncommissioned officer, or private upon whom the command or elements thereof regulates its march. = . head:= the leading element of a column. (see figs. , and .) = . interval:= space between elements of the same line. the interval between men in ranks is inches and is measured from elbow to elbow. between companies, squads, etc., it is measured from the left elbow of the left man or guide of the group on the right, to the right elbow of the right man or guide of the group on the left. (see fig. .) = . left:= the left extremity or element of a body of troops. = . line:= a formation in which the different elements are abreast of each other. (see figs. and .) = . order, close:= the formation in which the units, in double rank, are arranged in line or in column with normal intervals and distances. = . order, extended:= the formation in which the units are separated by intervals greater than in close order. = . pace:= thirty inches; the length of the full step in quick time. = . point of rest:= the point at which a formation begins. specifically, the point toward which units are aligned in successive movements. = . rank:= a line of men placed side by side. = . right:= the right extremity or element of a body of troops. = .= note. in view of the fact that the word "echelon" is a term of such common usage, the following definition is given: by echelon we mean a formation in which the subdivisions are placed one behind another, extending beyond and unmasking one another either wholly or in part.--author. [illustration: battalion in echelon: companies unmasking wholly] [illustration: battalion in echelon: companies unmasking in part] introduction = . object of military training.= success in battle is the ultimate object of all military training; success may be looked for only when the training is intelligent and thorough. ( ) = . commanding officers accountable for proper training of organizations; field efficiency; team-work.= commanding officers are accountable for the proper training of their respective organizations within the limits prescribed by regulations and orders. ( ) the excellence of an organization is judged by its field efficiency. the field efficiency of an organization depends primarily upon its effectiveness as a whole. thoroughness and uniformity in the training of the units of an organization are indispensable to the efficiency of the whole; it is by such means alone that the requisite team-work may be developed. = . simple movements and elastic formations.= simple movements and elastic formations are essential to correct training for battle. ( ) = . drill regulations a guide; their interpretation.= the drill regulations are furnished as a guide. they provide the principles for training and for increasing the probability of success in battle. ( ) in the interpretation of the regulations, the spirit must be sought. quibbling over the minutiae of form is indicative of failure to grasp the spirit. = . combat principles.= the principles of combat are considered in pars. - . they are treated in the various schools included in part i of the drill regulations only to the extent necessary to indicate the functions of the various commanders and the division of responsibility between them. the amplification necessary to a proper understanding of their application is to be sought in pars. - . ( ) = . drills at attention, ceremonies, extended order, field exercises and combat exercises.= the following important distinctions must be observed: (a) drills executed at =attention= and the ceremonies are =disciplinary exercises= designed to teach precise and soldierly movement, and to inculcate that prompt and subconscious obedience which is essential to proper military control. to this end, smartness and precision should be exacted in the execution of every detail. such drills should be frequent, but short. (b) the purpose of =extended order drill= is to teach the =mechanism= of deployment of the firing, and, in general, of the employment of troops in combat. such drills are in the nature of disciplinary exercises and should be frequent, thorough, and exact, in order to habituate men to the firm control of their leaders. extended order drill is executed =at ease=. the company is the largest unit which executes extended order drill. (c) =field exercises= are for instruction in the duties incident to campaign. assumed situations are employed. each exercise should conclude with a discussion, on the ground, of the exercise and principles involved. (d) the =combat exercise, a form of field exercise= of the company, battalion, and larger units, consists of the =application of tactical principles= to assumed situations, employing in the execution the appropriate formations and movements of close and extended order. combat exercises must simulate, as far as possible, the battle conditions assumed. in order to familiarize both officers and men with such conditions, companies and battalions will frequently be consolidated to provide war-strength organizations. officers and noncommissioned officers not required to complete the full quota of the units participating are assigned as observers or umpires. the firing line can rarely be controlled by the voice alone; thorough training to insure the proper use of prescribed signals is necessary. the exercise should be followed by a brief drill at attention in order to restore smartness and control. ( ) = . imaginary, outlined and represented enemy.= in field exercises the enemy is said to be =imaginary= when his position and force are merely assumed; =outlined= when his position and force are indicated by a few men; =represented= when a body of troops acts as such. ( ) general rules for drills and formations = . arrangement of elements of preparatory command.= when the =preparatory= command consists of more than one part, its elements are arranged as follows: ( ) for movements to be executed successively by the subdivisions or elements of an organization: (a) description of the movement; (b) how executed, or on what element executed. (for example: = . column of companies, first company, squads right. . march.=--author.) ( ) for movements to be executed simultaneously by the subdivisions of an organization: (a) the designation of the subdivisions; (b) the movement to be executed. (for example: = . squads right. . march.=--author.) ( ) = . movements executed toward either flank explained toward but one flank.= movements that may be executed toward either flank are explained as toward but one flank, it being necessary to substitute the word "left" for "right," and the reverse, to have the explanation of the corresponding movement toward the other flank. the commands are given for the execution of the movements toward either flank. the substitute word of the command is placed within parentheses. ( ) = . any movement may be executed from halt or when marching unless otherwise prescribed.= any movement may be executed either from the halt or when marching, unless otherwise prescribed. if at a halt, the command for movements involving marching need not be prefaced by =forward=, as = . column right (left), . march=. ( ) = . any movement may be executed in double time unless specially excepted.= any movement not specially excepted may be executed in double time. if at a halt, or if marching in quick time, the command =double time= precedes the command of execution. ( ) = . successive movements executed in double time.= in successive movements executed in double time the leading or =base= unit marches in =quick time= when not otherwise prescribed; the other units march in =double time= to their places in the formation ordered and then conform to the gait of the leading or base unit. if marching in double time, the command =double time= is omitted. the leading or base unit marches in =quick time=; the other units continue at double time to their places in the formation ordered and then conform to the gait of the leading or base unit. ( ) = . to hasten execution of movement begun in quick time.= to hasten the execution of a movement begun in quick time, the command: = . double time, . march=, is given. the leading or base unit continues to march in quick time, or remains at halt, if already halted; the other units complete the execution of the movement in double time and then conform to the gait of the leading or base unit. ( ) = . to stay execution of movement when marching, for correction of errors.= to stay the execution of a movement when marching, for the correction of errors, the command: = . in place, . halt=, is given. all halt and stand fast without changing the position of the pieces. to resume the movement the command: = . resume, . march=, is given. ( ) = . to revoke preparatory command or begin anew movement improperly begun.= to revoke a preparatory command, or, being at a halt, to begin anew a movement improperly begun, the command, =as you were=, is given, at which the movement ceases and the former position is resumed. ( ) = . guide.= unless otherwise announced, the guide of a company or subdivision of a company in line is =right=; of a battalion in line or line of subdivisions or of a deployed line, =center=; of a rank in column of squads, toward the side of the guide of the company. to march with guide other than as prescribed above, or to change the guide: =guide (right, left, or center).= in successive formations into line, the guide is toward the point of rest; in platoons or larger subdivisions it is so announced. the announcement of the guide, when given in connection with a movement follows the command of execution for that. exception: = . as skirmishers, guide right (left or center), . march.= ( ) = . turn on fixed and moving pivots.= the turn on the fixed pivot by subdivisions is used in all formations from line into column and the reverse. the turn on the =moving pivot= is used by subdivisions of a column in executing changes of direction. ( ) = . partial changes of direction.= partial changes of direction may be executed: by interpolating in the preparatory command the word =half, as column half right (left), or right (left) half turn=. a change of direction of ° is executed. by the command: =incline to the right (left).= the guide, or guiding element, moves in the indicated direction and the remainder of the command conforms. this movement effects slight changes of direction. ( ) = . line of platoons, companies, etc.= the =designations line of platoons, line of companies, line of battalions=, etc., refer to the formations in which the platoons, companies, battalions, etc., each in column of squads, are in line. ( ) = . full distance in column of subdivisions; guide of leading subdivision charged with step and direction.= full distance in column of subdivisions is such that in forming line to the right or left the subdivisions will have their proper intervals. in column of subdivisions the guide of the leading subdivision is charged with the step and direction; the guides in rear preserve the trace, step, and distance. ( ) = . double rank, habitual close order formation; uniformity of interval between files obtained by placing hand on hip.= in close order, all details, detachments, and other bodies of troops are habitually formed in double rank. to insure uniformity of interval between files when falling in, and in alignments, each man places the palm of the left hand upon the hip, fingers pointing downward. in the first case, the hand is dropped by the side when the next man on the left has his interval; in the second case, at the command front. ( ) = . posts of officers, noncommissioned officers, and special units; duties of file closers.= the posts of officers, noncommissioned officers, special units (such as band or machine-gun company), etc., in the various formations of the company, battalion, or regiment, are shown in plates. in all changes from one formation to another involving a change of post on the part of any of these, posts are promptly taken by the most convenient route as soon as practicable after the command of execution for the movement; officers and noncommissioned officers who have prescribed duties in connection with the movement ordered, take their new posts when such duties are completed. as instructors, officers and noncommissioned officers go wherever their presence is necessary. as file closers it is their duty to rectify mistakes and insure steadiness and promptness in the ranks. ( ) = . special units have no fixed posts except at ceremonies.= except at ceremonies, the special units have no fixed places. they take places as directed; in the absence of directions, they conform as nearly as practicable to the plates, and in subsequent movements maintain their relative positions with respect to the flank or end of the command on which they were originally posted. ( ) [illustration] = . general, field and staff officers habitually mounted; formation of staff; drawing and returning saber.= general, field, and staff officers are habitually mounted. the staff of any officer forms in single rank, paces in rear of him, the right of the rank extending pace to the right of a point directly in rear of him. members of the staff are arranged in order from right to left as follows: general staff officers, adjutant, aids, other staff officers, arranged in each classification in order of rank, the senior on the right. the flag of the general officer and the orderlies are paces in rear of the staff, the flag on the right. when necessary to reduce the front of the staff and orderlies, each line executes =twos right or fours right=, as explained in the cavalry drill regulations, and follows the commander. when not otherwise prescribed, staff officers draw and return saber with their chief. ( ) = . mounted officer turns to left in executing about; when commander faces about to give commands, staff and others stand fast.= in making the about, an officer, mounted, habitually turns to the left. when the commander faces to give commands, the staff, flag, and orderlies do not change position. ( ) = . saluting when making and receiving reports; saluting on meeting.= when making or receiving official reports, or on meeting out of doors, all officers will salute. military courtesy requires the junior to salute first, but when the salute is introductory to a report made at a military ceremony or formation, to the representative of a common superior (as, for example, to the adjutant, officer of the day, etc.), the officer making the report, whatever his rank, will salute first; the officer to whom the report is made will acknowledge by saluting that he has received and understood the report. ( ) = . formation of mounted enlisted men for ceremonies.= for ceremonies, all mounted enlisted men of a regiment or smaller unit, except those belonging to the machine-gun organizations, are consolidated into a detachment; the senior present commands if no officer is in charge. the detachment is formed as a platoon or squad of cavalry in line or column of fours; noncommissioned staff officers are on the right or in the leading ranks. ( ) = . post of dismounted noncommissioned staff officers for ceremonies.= for ceremonies, such of the noncommissioned staff officers as are dismounted are formed paces in rear of the color, in order of rank from right to left. in column of squads they march as file closers. ( ) = . post of noncommissioned staff officers and orderlies other than for ceremonies.= other than for ceremonies, noncommissioned staff officers and orderlies accompany their immediate chiefs unless otherwise directed. if mounted, the noncommissioned staff officers are ordinarily posted on the right or at the head of the orderlies. ( ) = . noncommissioned officer commanding platoon or company, carrying of piece and taking of post.= in all formations and movements a noncommissioned officer commanding a platoon or company carries his piece as the men do, if he is so armed, and takes the same post as an officer in like situation. when the command is formed in line for ceremonies, a noncommissioned officer commanding a company takes post on the right of the right guide after the company has been aligned. ( ) orders, commands, and signals = . when commands, signals, and orders are used.= =commands= only are employed in drill at attention. otherwise either a =command, signal, or order= is employed, as best suits the occasion, or one may be used in conjunction with another. ( ) = . instruction in use of signals; use of headdress, etc., in making signals.= =signals= should be freely used in instruction, in order that officers and men may readily know them. in making arm signals, the saber, rifle, or headdress may be held in the hand. ( ) = . fixing of attention; a signal includes command of preparation and of execution.= officers and men fix their attention at the first word of command, the first note of the bugle or whistle, or the first motion of the signal. a signal includes both the preparatory command and the command of execution; the movement commences as soon as the signal is understood, unless otherwise prescribed. ( ) = . repeating orders, commands and signals; officers, platoon leaders, guides and musicians equipped with whistles; whistles with different tones.= except in movements executed at =attention=, commanders or leaders of subdivisions repeat orders, commands, or signals whenever such repetition is deemed necessary to insure =prompt= and correct execution. officers, battalion noncommissioned staff officers, platoon leaders, guides, and musicians are equipped with whistles. the major and his staff will use a whistle of distinctive tone; the captain and company musicians a second and distinctive whistle; the platoon leaders and guides a third distinctive whistle. ( ) = . limitation of prescribed signals; special prearranged signals.= prescribed signals are limited to such as are essential as a substitute for the voice under conditions which render the voice inadequate. before or during an engagement special signals may be agreed upon to facilitate the solution of such special difficulties as the particular situation is likely to develop, but it must be remembered that simplicity and certainty are indispensable qualities of a signal. ( ) orders = . orders defined; when employed.= in these regulations an =order= embraces instructions or directions given orally or in writing in terms suited to the particular occasion and not prescribed herein. =orders= are employed only when the =commands= prescribed herein do not sufficiently indicate the will of the commander. orders are more fully described in paragraphs to , inclusive. ( ) commands = . command defined.= in these regulations a =command= is the will of the commander expressed in the phraseology prescribed herein. ( ) = . kinds of commands; how given.= there are two kinds of commands: the =preparatory= command, such as =forward=, indicates the movement that is to be executed. the command of =execution=, such as =march=, =halt=, or =arms=, causes the execution. =preparatory= commands are distinguished by =italics=; those of execution by =capitals=. where it is not mentioned in the text who gives the commands prescribed, they are to be given by the commander of the unit concerned. the =preparatory= command should be given at such an interval of time before the command of =execution= as to admit of being properly understood; the command of =execution= should be given at the instant the movement is to commence. the tone of command is animated, distinct, and of a loudness proportioned to the number of men for whom it is intended. each =preparatory= command is enunciated distinctly, with a rising inflection at the end, and in such manner that the command of =execution= may be more energetic. the command of =execution= is firm in tone and brief. ( ) = . battalion and higher commanders repeat commands of superiors; battalion largest unit executing movement at command of its commander.= majors and commanders of units larger than a battalion repeat such commands of their superiors as are to be executed by their units, facing their units for that purpose. the battalion is the largest unit that executes a movement at the command of execution of its commander. ( ) = . facing troops and avoiding indifference when giving commands.= when giving commands to troops it is usually best to face toward them. indifference in giving commands must be avoided as it leads to laxity in execution. commands should be given with spirit at all times. ( ) bugle signals = . bugle signals that may be used on and off the field of battle.= the authorized bugle signals are published in part v of these regulations. the following bugle signals may be used off the battlefield, when not likely to convey information to the enemy: =attention:= troops are brought to attention. =attention to orders:= troops to fix their attention. =forward, march:= used also to execute quick time from double time. =double time, march.= =to the rear, march:= in close order, execute =squads right about=. =halt.= =assemble, march.= the following bugle signals may be used on the battlefield: =fix bayonets.= =charge.= =assemble, march.= these signals are used only when intended for the entire firing line; hence they can be authorized only by the commander of a unit (for example, a regiment or brigade) which occupies a distinct section of the battlefield. exception: =fix bayonet.= (see par. .) the following bugle signals are used in exceptional cases on the battlefield. their principal uses are in field exercises and practice firing. =commence firing:= officers charged with fire direction and control open fire as soon as practicable. when given to a firing line, the signal is equivalent to =fire at will=. =cease firing:= all parts of the line execute =cease firing= at once. these signals are not used by units smaller than a regiment, except when such unit is independent or detached from its regiment. ( ) whistle signals = . attention to orders.= a =short blast= of the whistle. this signal is used on the march or in combat when necessary to fix the attention of troops, or of their commanders or leaders, preparatory to giving commands, orders, or signals. when the firing line is firing, each squad leader suspends firing and fixes his attention at a =short blast= of his platoon leader's whistle. the platoon leader's subsequent commands or signals are repeated and enforced by the squad leader. if a squad leader's attention is attracted by a whistle other than that of his platoon leader, or if there are no orders or commands to convey to his squad, he resumes firing at once. =suspend firing.= a =long blast= of the whistle. all other whistle signals are prohibited. ( ) arm signals = .= the following arm signals are prescribed. in making signals either arm may be used. officers who receive signals on the firing line "repeat back" at once to prevent misunderstanding. [illustration] =forward, march.= carry the hand to the shoulder; straighten and hold the arm horizontally, thrusting it in the direction of march. this signal is also used to execute quick time from double time. [illustration] =halt.= carry the hand to the shoulder; thrust the hand upward and hold the arm vertically. =double time, march.= carry the hand to the shoulder; rapidly thrust the hand upward the full extent of the arm several times. [illustration] =squads right, march.= raise the arm laterally until horizontal; carry it to a vertical position above the head and swing it several times between the vertical and horizontal positions. [illustration] =squads left, march.= raise the arm laterally until horizontal; carry it downward to the side and swing it several times between the downward and horizontal positions. [illustration] =squads right about, march= (if in close order) or, =to the rear, march= (if in skirmish line). extend the arm vertically above the head; carry it laterally downward to the side and swing it several times between the vertical and downward positions. [illustration] =change direction or column right (left), march.= the hand on the side toward which the change of direction is to be made is carried across the body to the opposite shoulder, forearm horizontal; then swing in a horizontal plane, arm extended, pointing in the new direction. [illustration] =as skirmishers, march.= raise both arms laterally until horizontal. [illustration] =as skirmishers, guide center, march.= raise both arms laterally until horizontal; swing both simultaneously upward until vertical and return to the horizontal; repeat several times. [illustration] =as skirmishers, guide right (left), march.= raise both arms laterally until horizontal; hold the arm on the side of the guide steadily in the horizontal position: swing the other upward until vertical and return it to the horizontal; repeat several times. [illustration] =assemble, march.= raise the arm vertically to full extent and describe horizontal circles. [illustration] =range or change elevation.= to announce range, extend the arm toward the leaders or men for whom the signal is intended, fist closed; by keeping the fist closed battle sight is indicated; [illustration] by opening and closing the fist, expose thumb and fingers to a number equal to the hundreds of yards; [illustration] to add yards describe a short horizontal line with forefinger. [illustration] =to change elevation=, indicate the =amount of increase or decrease= by fingers as above; point upward to indicate increase and downward to indicate decrease. [illustration] =what range are you using?= or =what is the range?= extend the arms toward the person addressed, one hand open, palm to the front, resting on the other hand, fist closed. [illustration] =are you ready?= or =i am ready.= raise the hand, fingers extended and joined, palm toward the person addressed. [illustration] =commence firing.= move the arm extended in full length, hand palm down, several times through a horizontal arc in front of the body. =fire faster.= execute rapidly the signal, "commence firing." =fire slower.= execute slowly the signal, "commence firing." [illustration] =swing the cone of fire to the right, or left.= extend the arm in full length to the front, palm to the right (left); swing the arm to right (left), and point in the direction of the new target. [illustration] [illustration] =fix bayonet.= simulate the movement of the right hand in "fix bayonet." (see par. .) [illustration] =suspend firing.= raise and hold the forearm steadily in a horizontal position in front of the forehead, palm of the hand to the front. =cease firing.= raise the forearm as in =suspend firing= and swing it up and down several times in front of the face. [illustration] =platoon.= extend the arm horizontally toward the platoon leader; describe small circles with the hand. (see par. .) [illustration] =squad.= extend the arm horizontally toward the platoon leader; swing the hand up and down from the wrist. (see par. .) =rush.= same as =double time=. ( ) = . use of signals "platoon" and "squad."= the signals =platoon= and =squad= are intended primarily for communication between the captain and his platoon leaders. the signal platoon or squad indicates that the platoon commander is to cause the signal which follows to be executed by platoon or squad. =note.=--the following signals, while not prescribed, are very convenient: =combined sights.= extend the arm toward the leaders for whom the signal is intended, hand open and turn hand rapidly from right to left a number of times. then indicate ranges in the manner prescribed, giving the mean of the two ranges. (for example: if the combined sights are and , indicate a range of yards. the leaders who give the oral commands, give the command, "range and ," whereupon every man in the front rank, before deployment, fixes his sight at , and every man in the rear rank, before deployment, fixes his sight at .) =company.= bring the hand up near the shoulder and then thrust to the front, snapping fingers in usual way; repeat several times. =contract fire.= extend both arms horizontally, fingers extended, arms parallel, palms facing each other; bring hands together =once=, and hold them so and look at the leader concerned. =disperse fire.= bring hands together, fingers extended, pointing in direction of leader concerned, arms extended horizontally; swing arms outward once, and hold them so and look at the leader concerned. =platoon column.= raise both arms vertically, full length, arms parallel, fingers joined and extended, palms to the front. =prepare to rush.= cross the arms horizontally several times. =squad column.= raise both arms vertically from elbows, elbows at side of body, fingers joined and extended, palms to the front.--author. ( ) flag signals = . signal flags carried by company musicians; description of flags.= the signal hags described below are carried by the company musicians in the field. in a regiment in which it is impracticable to make the permanent battalion division alphabetically, the flags of a battalion are as shown; flags are assigned to the companies alphabetically, within their respective battalions, in the order given below. first battalion: company a. red field, white square. company b. red field, blue square. company c. red field, white diagonals. company d. red field, blue diagonals. second battalion: company e. white field, red square. company f. white field, blue square. company g. white field, red diagonals. company h. white field, blue diagonals. third battalion: company i. blue field, red square. company k. blue field, white square. company l. blue field, red diagonals. company m. blue field, white diagonals. =note.=--an analysis of the above system of signal flags will show: . the color of the field indicates the battalion and the colors run in the order that is so natural to us all, viz: =red=, =white= and =blue=. hence =red= field indicates the =first= battalion; =white= field, the =second=; =blue= field, the =third=. . the =squares= indicate the first two companies of each battalion, and the =diagonals=, the second two. hence, +-----------+----------------+ | companies | indicated by | |-----------+----------------+ | a | e | i | squares | | b | f | k | | |-----------+----------------+ | c | g | l | diagonals | | d | h | m | | +-----------+----------------+ . the colors of the squares and diagonals in combination with those of the fields, run in the order that is so natural to us all, viz.: =red=, =white= and =blue=, the color of any given field being, of course, omitted from the squares and diagonals, as a white square for instance, would not show on a white field, nor would a blue diagonal show on a blue field. for example, with a =red= field we would have =white= and =blue= for the square and diagonal colors; with a =white= field, =red= and =blue= for the square and diagonal colors; with a =blue= field, =red= and =white= for the square and diagonal colors. . from what has been said, the following table explains itself: +-----------+-------+-----+---------+-----------+ | battalion | field | co. | squares | diagonals | +-----------+-------+-----+---------+-----------+ | first | red | a | white | | | | | b | blue | | | | | c | | white | | | | d | | blue | +-----------+-------+-----+---------+-----------+ | second | white | e | red | | | | | f | blue | | | | | g | | red | | | | h | | blue | +-----------+-------+-----+---------+-----------+ | third | blue | i | red | | | | | k | white | | | | | l | | red | | | | m | | white | +-----------+-------+-----+---------+-----------+ note how the square and diagonal colors always follow in the natural order of =red=, =white=, and =blue=, with the color of the field omitted.--author. ( ) = . signal flags used to mark assembly point of company, etc.= in addition to their use in visual signaling, these flags serve to mark the assembly point of the company when disorganized by combat, and to mark the location of the company in bivouac and elsewhere, when such use is desirable. ( ) = . signals used between firing line and reserve or commander in rear.= ( ) for communication between the firing line and the reserve or commander in the rear, the subjoined signals (signal corps codes) are prescribed and should be memorized. in transmission, their concealment from the enemy's view should be insured. in the absence of signal flags, the headdress or other substitute may be used. (see par. for the semaphore code and par. for the general service, or international morse code.) ( ) ---------------+---------------------------+---------------------------- letter of | if signaled from the rear | if signaled from the firing alphabet | to the firing line | line to the rear ---------------+---------------------------+---------------------------- a m | ammunition going forward. | ammunition required. | | c c c | charge (mandatory at all | am about to charge if no | times). | instructions to the | | contrary. | | c f | cease firing. | cease firing. | | d t | double time or "rush." | double time or "rush." | | f | commence firing. | commence firing. | | f b | fix bayonets. | fix bayonets. | | f l | artillery fire is causing | artillery fire is causing | us losses. | us losses. | | g | move forward. | preparing to move forward. | | h h h | halt. | halt. | | k | negative. | negative. | | l t | left. | left. | | o | what is the (r. n. etc.)? | what is the (r. n. etc.)? (ardois and | interrogatory. | interrogatory. semaphore | | only.) | | ---------------| | (all methods | what is the (r. n. etc.)? | what is the (r. n. etc.)? but ardois | interrogatory. | interrogatory. and semaphore.)| | | | p | affirmative. | affirmative. | | r | acknowledgment. | acknowledgment. | | r n | range. | range. | | r t | right. | right. | | s s s | support going forward. | support needed. | | s u f | suspend firing. | suspend firing. | | t | target. | target. ---------------+---------------------------+---------------------------- for the semaphore signals, see par. . school of the soldier = . duties of instructor.= the instructor explains briefly each movement, first executing it himself if practicable. he requires the recruits to take the proper positions unassisted and does not touch them for the purpose of correcting them, except when they are unable to correct themselves. he avoids keeping them too long at the same movement, although each should be understood before passing to another. he exacts by degrees the desired precision and uniformity. ( ) = . grouping of recruits according to proficiency.= in order that all may advance as rapidly as their abilities permit, the recruits are grouped according to proficiency as instruction progresses. those who lack aptitude and quickness are separated from the others and placed under experienced drill masters. ( ) instruction without arms = a. formation of squad for preliminary instruction.= for preliminary instruction a number of recruits, usually not exceeding three or four, are formed as a squad in single rank. ( ) position of the soldier, or attention = .= heels on the same line and as near each other as the conformation of the man permits. feet turned out equally and forming an angle of about °. =knees straight without stiffness.= hips level and drawn back slightly; body erect and resting equally on hips; chest lifted and arched; shoulders square and falling equally. arms and hands hanging naturally, thumb along the seam of the trousers. head erect and squarely to the front, chin drawn in so that the axis of the head and neck is vertical; eyes straight to the front. weight of the body resting equally upon the heels and balls of the feet. ( ) the rests = .= being at a halt, the commands are: =fall out; rest; at ease=; and, = . parade, . rest=. at the command =fall out=, the men may leave the ranks, but are required to remain in the immediate vicinity. they resume their former places, at attention, at the command =fall in=. at the command =rest= each man keeps one foot in place, but is not required to preserve silence or immobility. at the command =at ease= each man keeps one foot in place and is required to preserve silence but =not= immobility. ( ) [illustration] = . . parade, . rest.= carry the right foot inches straight to the rear, left knee slightly bent; clasp the hands, without constraint, in front of the center of the body, fingers joined, left hand uppermost, left thumb clasped by the thumb and forefinger of the right hand; preserve silence and steadiness of position. ( ) = .= to resume the attention: = . squad, . attention.= the men take the position of the soldier. ( ) eyes right or left = . . eyes, . right (left), . front.= [illustration] at the command =right=, turn the head to the right oblique, eyes fixed on the line of eyes of the men in, or supposed to be in, the same rank. at the command =front=, turn the head and eyes to the front. ( ) facings = . to the flank: . right (left), . face.= raise slightly the left heel and right toe; face to the right, turning on the right heel, assisted by a slight pressure on the ball of the left foot; place the left foot by the side of the right. left face is executed on the left heel in the corresponding manner. =right (left) half face= is executed similarly, facing °. "to face in marching" and advance, turn on the ball of either foot and step off with the other foot in the new line of direction; to face in marching without gaining ground in the new direction, turn on the ball of either foot and mark time. ( ) = .= to the rear: = . about, . face.= carry the toe of the right foot about a half foot-length to the rear and slightly to the left of the left heel without changing the position of the left foot; face to the rear, turning to the right on the left heel and right toe; place the right heel by the side of the left. ( ) salute with the hand = . . hand, . salute.= [illustration] raise the right hand smartly till the tip of the forefinger touches the lower part of the headdress or forehead above the right eye, thumb and fingers extended and joined palm to the left, forearm inclined at about °, hand and wrist straight; =at the same time look toward the person saluted=. (=two=) drop the arm smartly by the side. ( ) (for rules governing salutes, see "military courtesy," chapter xi, part ii.) steps and marchings = . steps and marchings begin with left foot.= all steps and marchings executed from a halt, except right step, begin with the left foot. ( ) = . length and cadence of full step; indicating cadence.= the length of the full step in quick time is inches, measured from heel to heel, and the cadence is at the rate of steps per minute. the length of the full step in double time is inches; the cadence is at the rate of steps per minute. the instructor, when necessary, indicates the cadence of the step by calling =one, two, three, four=, or =left, right=, the instant the left and right foot, respectively, should be planted. ( ) = . steps and marchings and movements involving marchings habitually executed in quick time.= all steps and marchings and movements involving march are executed in =quick time= unless the squad be marching in =double time=, or =double time= be added to the command; in the latter case double time is added to the preparatory command. example: = . squad right, double time, . march= (school of the squad). ( ) quick time = .= being at a halt, to march forward in quick time: = . forward, . march.= at the command =forward=, shift the weight of the body to the right leg, left knee straight. at the command =march=, move the left foot smartly straight forward inches from the right, sole near the ground, and plant it without shock; next in like manner, advance the right foot and plant it as above; continue the march. the arms swing naturally. ( ) = .= being at a halt, or in march in quick time, to march in double time: = . double time, . march.= if at a halt, at the first command shift the weight of the body to the right leg. at the command =march=, raise the forearms, fingers closed, to a horizontal position along the waist line; take up an easy run with the step and cadence of double time, allowing a natural swinging motion to the arms. if marching in quick time, at the command march, given as either foot strikes the ground, take one step in quick time, and then step off in double time. ( ) to resume the quick time: = . quick time, . march.= at the command =march=, given as either foot strikes the ground, advance and plant the other foot in double time; resume the quick time, dropping the hands by the sides. ( ) to mark time = .= being in march: = . mark time, . march.= at the command =march=, given as either foot strikes the ground, advance and plant the other foot; bring up the foot in rear and continue the cadence by alternately raising each foot about inches and planting it on line with the other. being at a halt, at the command march, raise and plant the feet as described above. ( ) the half step = . . half step, . march.= take steps of inches in quick time, inches in double time. ( ) =forward=, =half step=, =halt=, and =mark time= may be executed one from the other in quick or double time. to resume the full step from half step or mark time: = . forward, . march.= ( ) side step = .= being at a halt or mark time: = . right (left) step, . march.= carry and plant the right foot inches to the right; bring the left foot beside it and continue the movement in the cadence of quick time. the side step is used for short distances only and is not executed in double time. if at order arms, the side step is executed at trail without command. ( ) back step = .= being at a halt or mark time: = . backward, . march.= take steps of inches straight to the rear. the back step is used for short distances only and is not executed in double time. if at order arms, the back step is executed at trail without command. ( ) to halt = .= to arrest the march in quick or double time: = . squad, . halt.= at the command =halt=, given as either foot strikes the ground, plant the other foot as in marching; raise and place the first foot by the side of the other. if in double time, drop the hands by the sides. ( ) to march by the flank = .= being in march: = . by the right (left) flank, . march.= at the command =march=, given as the right foot strikes the ground, advance and plant the left foot; then face to the right in marching and step off in the new direction with the right foot. ( ) to march to the rear = .= being in march: = . to the rear, . march.= at the command =march= given as the right foot strikes the ground advance and plant the left foot; turn to the right about on the balls of both feet and immediately step off with the left foot. if marching in double time, turn to the right about, taking four steps in place, keeping the cadence, and then step off with the left foot. ( ) change step = .= being in march: = . change step, . march.= at the command =march=, given as the right foot strikes the ground, advance and plant the left foot; plant the toe of the right foot near the heel of the left and step off with the left foot. the change on the right foot is similarly executed, the command march being given as the left foot strikes the ground. ( ) manual of arms = . instruction of recruit in use of rifle, manual of arms, etc.= as soon as practicable the recruit is taught the use, nomenclature, and care of his rifle. (see "the care, description, and management of the rifle," chapter xiv, part ii.); when fair progress has been made in the instruction without arms, he is taught the manual of arms; instruction without arms and that with arms alternate. ( ) = . rules governing carrying of piece.= the following rules governing the carrying of the piece: first. =piece habitually carried without cartridges in chamber or magazine.= the piece is not carried with cartridges in either the chamber or the magazine except when specifically ordered. when so loaded, or supposed to be loaded, it is habitually carried locked; that is, with the =safety lock= turned to the "safe." at all other times it is carried unlocked, with the trigger pulled. second. =inspection of pieces when troops are formed and when dismissed.= whenever troops are formed under arms, pieces are immediately inspected at the commands: = . inspection, . arms, . order (right shoulder port), . arms=, which are executed as explained in pars. - . a similar inspection is made immediately before dismissal. if cartridges are found in the chamber or magazine they are removed and placed in the belt. third. =cut-off habitually turned "off."= the cut-off is kept turned "off" except when cartridges are actually used. fourth. =bayonet habitually not carried fixed.= the bayonet is not fixed (see par. ), except in bayonet exercise, on guard, or for combat. fifth. ="fall in" executed at order; "attention" resumed at order.= fall in is executed with the piece at the order arms. =fall out=, =rest=, and =at ease= are executed as without arms, as explained in par. . on resuming =attention= the position of order arms is taken. sixth. =if at order, pieces brought to right shoulder at command "march"; execution of movements at trail; piece brought to trail in certain movements executed from order.= if at the order, unless otherwise prescribed, the piece is brought to the right shoulder at the command march, the three motions corresponding with the first three steps. movements may be executed at the trail by prefacing the preparatory command with the words =at trail=; as, = . at trail, forward, . march=; the trail is taken at the command =march=. when the facings, alignments, open and close ranks, taking interval or distance, and assemblings are executed from the order, raise the piece to the trail while in motion and resume the order on halting. seventh. =piece brought to order on halting.= the piece is brought to the order on halting. the execution of the order begins when the halt is completed. eighth. =holding disengaged hand in double time.= a disengaged hand in double time is held as when without arms. ( ) = . rules governing manual of arms.= the following rules govern the execution of the manual of arms: first. =position of left hand at balance.= in all positions of the left hand at the balance (center of gravity, bayonet unfixed) the thumb clasps the piece; the sling is included in the grasp of the hand. second. =positions of piece "diagonally across the body."= in all positions of the piece "diagonally across the body" the position of the piece, left arm and hand are the same as in port arms. (see par. .) [illustration] third. =next to last motion in resuming order from any position; piece to strike ground gently.= in resuming the order from any position in the manual, the motion next to the last concludes with the butt of the piece about inches from the ground, barrel to the rear, the left hand above and near the right, steadying the piece, fingers extended and joined, forearm and wrist straight and inclining downward, all fingers of the right hand grasping the piece. to complete the order, lower the piece gently to the ground with the right hand, drop the left quickly by the side, and take the position of order arms. allowing the piece to drop through the right hand to the ground, or other similar abuse of the rifle to produce effect in executing the manual is prohibited. fourth. =cadence of motions; at first attention to be paid to details of motion.= the cadence of the motions is that of quick time; the recruits are first required to give their whole attention to the details of the motions, the cadence being gradually acquired as they become accustomed to handling their pieces. the instructor may require them to count aloud in cadence with the motions. fifth. =execution of manual "by the numbers."= the manual is taught at a halt and the movements are for the purpose of instruction, divided into motions and executed in detail; in this case the command of =execution= determines the prompt execution of the first motion, and the commands, =two, three, four=, that of the other motions. to execute the movements in detail, the instructor first cautions: =by the numbers=; all movements divided into motions are then executed as above explained until he cautions: =without the numbers=; or commands movements other than those in the manual of arms. sixth. =regular positions assumed without regard to previous positions; carrying rifle in any position.= whenever circumstances require, the regular positions of the manual of arms and the firings may be ordered without regard to the previous position of the piece. under the exceptional conditions of weather or fatigue the rifle may be carried in any manner directed. ( ) [illustration] = . position of order arms standing:= the butt rests evenly on the ground, barrel to the rear, toe of the butt on a line with toe of, and touching, the right shoe, arms and hands hanging naturally, right hand holding the piece between the thumb and fingers. ( ) = .= being at order arms: = . present, . arms.= [illustration] with the right hand carry the piece in front of the center of the body, barrel to the rear and vertical, grasp it with the left hand at the balance, forearm horizontal and resting against the body. (=two=) grasp the small of the stock with the right hand. ( ) = .= being at order arms: = . port, . arms.= [illustration] with the right hand raise and throw the piece diagonally across the body, grasp it smartly with both hands; the right, palm down, at the small of the stock: the left, palm up, at the balance; barrel up, sloping to the left and crossing opposite the junction of the neck with the left shoulder; right forearm horizontal; left forearm resting against the body; the piece in a vertical plane parallel to the front. ( ) = .= being at present arms: = . port, . arms.= carry the piece =diagonally across= the body and take the position of port arms. ( ) = .= being at port arms: = . present, . arms.= carry the piece to a vertical position in front of the center of the body and take the position of present arms. ( ) = .= being at present or port arms: = . order, . arms.= let go with the right hand; lower and carry the piece to the right with the left hand: regrasp it with the right hand just above the lower band; let go with the left hand, and take the next to the last position in coming to the order. (=two=) complete the order. ( ) = .= being at order arms: = . right shoulder, . arms.= [illustration] with the right hand raise and throw the piece diagonally across the body; carry the right hand quickly to the butt, embracing it, the heel between the first two fingers. (=two=) without changing the grasp of the right hand, place the piece on the right shoulder, barrel up and inclined at an angle of about ° from the horizontal, trigger guard in the hollow of the shoulder, right elbow near the side, the piece in a vertical plane perpendicular to the front; carry the left hand, thumb and fingers extended and joined, to the small of the stock, tip of the forefinger touching the cocking piece, wrist straight and elbow down. (=three=) drop the left hand by the side. ( ) = .= being at right shoulder arms: = . order, . arms.= press the butt down quickly and throw the piece diagonally across the body, the right hand retaining the grasp of the butt. (=two=), (=three=) execute order arms as described from port arms. ( ) = .= being at port arms: = . right shoulder, . arms.= change the right hand to the butt. (=two=), (=three=) as in right shoulder arms from order arms. ( ) = .= being at right shoulder arms: = . port, . arms.= press the butt down quickly and throw the piece diagonally across the body, the right hand retaining its grasp of the butt. (=two=) change the right hand to the small of the stock. ( ) = .= being at right shoulder arms: = . present, . arms.= execute port arms. (=three=) execute present arms. ( ) = .= being at present arms: = . right shoulder, . arms.= execute port arms. (=two=), (=three=), (=four=) execute right shoulder arms as from port arms. ( ) = .= being at port arms: = . left shoulder, . arms.= [illustration] carry the piece with the right hand and place it on the left shoulder, barrel up, trigger guard in the hollow of the shoulder; at the same time grasp the butt with the left hand, heel between first and second fingers, thumb and fingers closed on the stock. (=two=) drop the right hand by the side. = .= being at left shoulder arms: = . port, . arms.= grasp the piece with the right hand at the small of the stock. (=two=) carry the piece to the right with the right hand, =regrasp= it with the left, and take the position of port arms. =left shoulder arms= may be ordered directly from the order, right shoulder or present, or the reverse. at the command =arms= execute port arms and continue in cadence to the position ordered. ( ) = .= being at order arms: = . parade, . rest.= [illustration] carry the right foot inches straight to the rear, left knee slightly bent; carry the muzzle in front of the center of the body, barrel to the left; grasp the piece with the left hand just below the stacking swivel, and with the right hand below and against the left. = .= being at parade rest: = . squad, . attention.= resume the order, the left hand quitting the piece opposite the right hip. ( ) = .= being at order arms: = . trail, . arms.= [illustration] raise the piece, right arm slightly bent, and incline the muzzle forward so that the barrel makes an angle of about ° with the vertical. when it can be done without danger or inconvenience to others, the piece may be grasped at the balance and the muzzle lowered until the piece is horizontal; a similar position in the left hand may be used. ( ) = .= being at trail arms: = . order, . arms.= lower the piece with the right hand and resume the order. ( ) rifle salute = .= being at right shoulder arms: = . rifle, . salute.= [illustration] carry the left hand smartly to the small of the stock, forearm horizontal, palm of hand down, thumb and fingers extended and joined, forefinger touching end of cocking piece; look toward the person saluted. (=two=) drop left hand by the side; turn head and eyes to the front. ( ) being at order or trail arms: = . rifle, . salute.= [illustration] carry the left hand smartly to the right side, palm of the hand down, thumb and fingers extended and joined, forefinger against piece near the muzzle; look toward the person saluted. (=two=) drop the left hand by the side; turn the head and eyes to the front. for rules governing salutes, see "military courtesy," chapter xi, part ii. the bayonet = .= being at order arms: = . fix, . bayonet.= if the bayonet scabbard is carried on the belt: execute parade rest; grasp the bayonet with the right hand, back of hand toward the body; draw the bayonet from the scabbard and fix it on the barrel, glancing at the muzzle; resume the order. if the bayonet is carried on the haversack: draw the bayonet with the left hand and fix it in the most convenient manner. ( ) = .= being at our arms: = . unfix, . bayonet.= if the bayonet scabbard is carried on the belt: execute parade rest; grasp the handle of the bayonet firmly with the right hand, pressing the spring with the forefinger of the right hand; raise the bayonet until the handle is about inches above the muzzle of the piece; drop the point to the left, back of the hand toward the body, and, glancing at the scabbard, return the bayonet, the blade passing between the left arm and the body; regrasp the piece with the right hand and resume the order. if the bayonet scabbard is carried on the haversack: take the bayonet from the rifle with the left hand and return it to the scabbard in the most convenient manner. if marching or lying down, the bayonet is fixed and unfixed in the most expeditious and convenient manner and the piece returned to the original position. =fix= and =unfix= bayonet are executed with promptness and regularity but not in cadence. (for unfixing bayonet with krag rifle, see par. .) ( ) = . charge bayonet.= whether executed at halt or in motion, the bayonet is held toward the opponent as in the position of =guard= in the manual for bayonet exercise. exercises for instruction in bayonet combat are prescribed in the manual for bayonet exercise. ( ) the inspection [illustration] = .= being at order arms: = . inspection, . arms.= at the second command take the position of port arms. (=two=) seize the bolt handle with the thumb and forefinger of the right hand, turn the handle up, draw the bolt back, and glance at the chamber. having found the chamber empty, or having emptied it, raise the head and eyes to the front. (for inspection of arms with krag rifle see par. .) ( ) = .= being at inspection arms: = . order (right shoulder, port), . arms.= at the preparatory command push the bolt forward, turn the handle down, pull the trigger, and resume =port arms=. at the command =arms=, complete the movement ordered. (to execute with krag rifle see par. .) ( ) to dismiss the squad = .= being at halt: = . inspection, . arms, . port, . arms, . dismissed.= ( ) school of the squad = . grouping into squads.= soldiers are grouped into squads for purposes of instruction, discipline, control, and order. ( ) = . composition of squad; object of squad movements.= the squad proper consists of a corporal and seven privates. the movements in the school of the squad are designed to make the squad a fixed unit and to facilitate the control and movement of the company. if the number of men grouped is more than and less than , they are formed as a squad of files, the excess above being posted as file closers. if the number grouped is greater than , or more squads are formed and the group is termed a platoon. for the instruction of recruits, these rules may be modified. ( ) = . squad leader; his post.= the corporal is the squad leader, and when absent is replaced by a designated private. if no private is designated, the senior in length of service acts as leader. the corporal, when in ranks, is posted as the left man in the front rank of the squad. when the corporal leaves the ranks to lead his squad, his rear rank man steps into the front rank, and the file remains blank until the corporal returns to his place in ranks, when his rear rank man steps back into the rear rank. ( ) = . preservation of integrity of squads in battle.= in battle officers and sergeants endeavor to preserve the integrity of squads; they designate new leaders to replace those disabled, organize new squads when necessary, and see that every man is placed in a squad. men are taught the necessity of remaining with the squad to which they belong and, in case it be broken up or they become separated therefrom, to attach themselves to the nearest squad and platoon leaders, whether these be of their own or of another organization. ( ) = . certain movements executed by squad as in school of the soldier.= the squad executes the =halt= (see par. ), =rests= (see par. - ), =facings= (see pars. - ), =steps and marchings= (see pars. - ), and the =manual of arms= (see pars. - ), as explained in the school of the soldier. ( ) to form the squad = .= to form the squad the instructor places himself paces in front of where the center is to be and commands: =fall in.= the men assemble at attention, pieces at the order, and are arranged by the corporal in double rank, as nearly as practicable in order of height from right to left, each man dropping his left hand as soon as the man in his left has his interval. the rear rank forms with distance of inches. the instructor then commands: =count off.= at this command all except the right file execute eyes right, and beginning on the right, the men in each rank count =one, two, three, four=; each man turns his head and eyes to the front as he counts. pieces are then inspected. ( ) alignments = .= to align the squad, the base file or files having been established: = . right (left), . dress, . front.= at the command front, given when the ranks are aligned, each hip (whether dressing to the right or left); each man, except the base file, when on or near the new line executes =eyes right=, and taking steps of or inches, places himself so that his right arm rests lightly against the arm of the man on his right, and so that his eyes and shoulders are in line with those of the men on his right; the rear rank men cover in file. the instructor verifies the alignment of both ranks from the right flank and orders up or back such men as may be in rear, or in advance, of the line; only the men designated move. at the command =dress= all men place the left hand upon the man turns his head and eyes to the front and drops his left hand by his side. in the first drills the basis of the alignment is established on, or parallel to, the front of the squad; afterwards, in oblique directions. whenever the position of the base file or files necessitates a considerable movement by the squad, such movement will be executed by marching to the front or oblique, to the flank or backward, as the case may be, without other command, and at the trail. ( ) = .= to preserve the alignment when marching: =guide right (left).= the men preserve their intervals from the side of the guide, yielding to pressure from that side and resisting pressure from the opposite direction; they recover intervals, if lost, by gradually opening out or closing in; they recover alignment by slightly lengthening or shortening the step; the rear-rank men cover their file leaders at inches. in double rank, the front-rank man on the right, or designated flank, conducts the march; when marching faced to the flank, the leading man of the front rank is the guide. ( ) to take intervals and distances = .= being in line at a halt: = . take interval, . to the right (left), . march, . squad, . halt.= [illustration] being in line at a halt. = . take interval, . to the right (left)= [illustration] at the second command the rear-rank men march backward steps and halt; = . march= [illustration] at the command =march= all face to the right and the leading man of each rank steps off; the other men step off in succession, each following the preceding man at paces, rear-rank men marching abreast of their file leaders. = . squad, . halt= [illustration] at the command =halt=, given when all have their intervals, all halt and face to the front. ( ) [illustration: (at intervals)] = . being at intervals, to assemble the squad:= = . assemble, to the right (left), . march.= [illustration: (assemble)] the front-rank man on the right stands fast, the rear rank man on the right closes to inches. the other men face to the right, close by the shortest line, and face to the front. ( ) [illustration: (assembled)] = .= being in line at a halt and having counted off: = . take distance, . march, . squad, . halt.= [illustration] at the command =march= no. of the front rank moves straight to the front; nos. , , and of the front rank and nos. , , , and of the rear rank, in the order named, move straight to the front, each stepping off so as to follow the preceding man at paces. the command =halt= is given when all have their distances. in case more than one squad is in line, each squad executes the movement as above. the guide of each rank of numbers is right. ( ) = .= being at distances, to assemble the squad: = . assemble, . march.= [illustration] no. of the front rank stands fast; the other numbers move forward to their proper places in line. ( ) to stack and take arms [illustration] = .= being in line at a halt: =stack arms.= each =even= number of the =front= rank grasps his piece with the left hand at the upper band [illustration] and rests the butt between his feet, barrel to the front, muzzle inclined slightly to the front and opposite the center of the interval on his right, the thumb and forefinger raising the stacking swivel; each =even= number of the =rear= rank then passes his piece, barrel to the rear, to his file leader, who grasps it between the bands with his right hand [illustration] and throws the butt about feet in advance of that of his own piece and opposite the right of the interval, the right hand slipping to the upper band, the thumb and forefinger raising the stacking swivel, which he engages with that of his own piece; [illustration] each =odd= number of the =front= rank raises his piece with the right hand, carries it well forward, barrel to the front; the left hand, guiding the stacking swivel, [illustration] engages the lower hook of the swivel of his own piece with the free hook of that of the even number of the rear rank; he then turns the barrel outward into the angle formed by the other two pieces and lowers the butt to the ground, =to the right= and =against the toe= of his right shoe. the stacks made, the loose pieces are laid on them by the =even= numbers of the front rank. when each man has finished handling pieces, he takes the position of the soldier. ( ) = .= being in line behind the stacks: =take arms.= (see preceding illustration.) the loose pieces are returned by the =even= numbers of the =front= rank; each even number of the front rank grasps his own piece with the left hand, the piece of his rear rank man with his right hand, grasping both between the bands; each =odd= number of the =front= rank grasps his piece in the same way with the right hand; disengages it by raising the butt from the ground and then turning the piece to the right, detaches it from the stack; each =even= number of the front rank disengages and detaches his piece by turning it to the left, [illustration] and, then passes the piece of his rear-rank man to him, and all resume the order. ( ) should any squad have nos. and blank files, no. rear rank takes the place of no. rear rank in making and breaking the stack; the stacks made or broken, he resumes his post. pieces not used in making the stacks are termed =loose pieces=. pieces are never stacked with the bayonet fixed. ( ) the oblique march = .= for the instruction of recruits, the squad being in column or correctly aligned, the instructor causes the squad to face half right or half left, points out to the men their relative positions, and explains that these are to be maintained in the oblique march. ( ) = . right (left) oblique, . march.= [illustration] each man steps off in a direction ° to the right of his original front. he preserves his relative position, keeping his shoulders parallel to those of the guide (the man on the right front of the line or column), and so regulates his steps that the ranks remain parallel to their original front. at the command =halt= the men halt faced to front. to resume the original direction: = . forward . march.= the men half face to the left in marching and then move straight to the front. if at =halfstep= or =mark time= while obliquing, the oblique march is resumed by the commands: = . oblique, . march.= ( ) to turn on moving pivot = .= being in line: = . right (left) turn, . march.= [illustration] the movement is executed by each rank successively and on the same ground. at the second command, the pivot man of the front rank faces to the right in marching and takes the half step; the other men of the rank oblique to the right until opposite their places in line, then execute a second right oblique and take the half step on arriving abreast of the pivot man. all glance toward the marching flank while at half step and take the full step without command as the last man arrives on the line. =right (left) half turn= is executed in a similar manner. the pivot man makes a half change of direction to the right and the other men make quarter changes in obliquing. ( ) to turn on fixed pivot = .= being in line, to turn and march: = . squad right (left), . march.= [illustration] at the second command, the right flank man in the front rank faces to the right in marching and marks time; the other front rank men oblique to the right, place themselves abreast of the pivot, and mark time. in the rear rank the third man from the right, followed in column by the second and first, move straight to the front [illustration] until in rear of his front-rank man, [illustration] when all face to the right in marching and mark time; the other number of the rear rank moves straight to the front four paces and places himself abreast of the man on his right. men on the new line glance toward the marching flank while marking time and, as the last man arrives on the line, both ranks execute =forward, march=, without command. ( ) = .= being in line, to turn and halt: = . squad right (left), . march, . squad, . halt.= the third command is given immediately after the second. the turn is executed as prescribed in the preceding paragraph except that all men, on arriving on the new line, mark time until the fourth command is given, when all halt. the fourth command should be given as the last man arrives on the line. ( ) = .= being in line, to turn about and march: = . squad right (left) about, . march.= at the second command, the front rank twice executes squad right initiating the second squad right when the man on the marching flank has arrived abreast of the rank. in the rear rank the third man from the right, followed by the second and first in column, moves straight to the front until on the prolongation of the line to be occupied by the rear rank; changes direction to the right; moves in the new direction until in rear of his front-rank man, when all face to the right in marching, mark time, and glance toward the marching flank. the fourth man marches on the left of the third to his new position; as he arrives on the line, both ranks execute =forward, march=, without command. ( ) = .= being in line, to turn about and halt: = . squad right (left) about, . march, . squad, . halt.= the third command is given immediately after the second. the turn is executed as prescribed in the preceding paragraph except that all men, on arriving on the new line, mark time until the fourth command is given, when all halt. the fourth command should be given as the last man arrives on the line. ( ) to follow the corporal [illustration: (in line)] = .= being assembled or deployed, to march the squad without unnecessary commands, the corporal places himself in front of it and commands: =follow me.= [illustration: (as skirmishers)] if in line or skirmish line, no. of the front rank follows in the trace of the corporal at about paces; the other men conform to the movements of no. , guiding on him and maintaining their relative positions. [illustration: (in column)] if in column, the head of the column follows the corporal. ( ) to deploy as skirmishers [illustration] = .= being in any formation, assembled: = . as skirmishers, . march.= the corporal places himself in front of the squad, if not already there. moving at a run, the men place themselves abreast of the corporal at half-pace intervals, nos. and on his right, nos. and on his left, rear rank men on the right of their file leaders, extra men on the left of no. ; all then conform to the corporal's gait. [illustration] when the squad is acting alone, skirmish line is similarly formed on no. of the front rank, who stands fast or continues the march, as the case may be; the corporal places himself in front of the squad when advancing and in rear when halted. [illustration] when deployed as skirmishers, the men march at ease, pieces at the trail unless otherwise ordered. the corporal is the guide when in the line; otherwise no. front rank is the guide. ( ) = .= the normal interval between skirmishers is one-half pace, resulting practically in one man per yard of front. the front of a squad thus deployed as skirmishers is about paces. ( ) to increase or diminish intervals = .= if assembled, and it is desired to deploy at greater than the normal interval; or if deployed, and it is desired to increase or decrease the internal: = . as skirmishers, (so many) paces, . march.= intervals are taken at the indicated number of paces. if already deployed, the men move by the flank toward or away from the guide. ( ) the assembly = .= being deployed: = . assemble. . march.= the men move toward the corporal and form in their proper places. if the corporal continues to advance, the men move in double time, form, and follow him. the assembly while marching to the rear is not executed. ( ) kneeling and lying down = .= if standing: =kneel.= half face to the right; carry the right toe about foot to the left rear of the left heel; kneel on right knee, sitting as nearly as possible on the right heel; left forearm across left thigh; piece remains in position of order arms, right hand grasping it above lower band. ( ) [illustration] = .= if standing or kneeling: =lie down.= [illustration] kneel, but with right knee against left heel: [illustration] carry back the left foot and lie flat on the belly, inclining body about ° to the right [illustration] piece horizontal, barrel up, muzzle off the ground and pointed to the front; elbows on the ground; left hand at the balance, right hand grasping the small of the stock opposite the neck. this is the position of order arms, lying down. ( ) = .= if kneeling or lying down: =rise.= if kneeling, stand up, faced to the front, on the ground marked by the left heel. if lying down, raise body on both knees; stand up, faced to the front, on the ground marked by the knees. ( ) = .= if lying down: =kneel.= raise the body on both knees; take the position of kneel. ( ) = .= in double rank, the positions of kneeling and lying down are ordinarily used only for the better utilization of cover. when deployed as skirmishers, a sitting position may be taken in lieu of the position kneeling. ( ) loadings and firings = .= the commands for loading and firing are the same whether standing, kneeling, or lying down. the firings are always executed at a halt. when kneeling or lying down in double rank, the rear rank does not load, aim, or fire. the instruction in firing will be preceded by a command for loading. loadings are executed in line and skirmish line only. ( ) = .= pieces having been ordered loaded are kept loaded without command until the command =unload=, or =inspection arms=, fresh clips being inserted when the magazine is exhausted. (to execute with krag rifle see par. .) ( ) = .= the aiming point or target is carefully pointed out. this may be done before or after announcing the sight setting. both are indicated before giving the command for firing, but may be omitted when the target appears suddenly and is unmistakable; in such case battle sight is used if no sight setting is announced. ( ) = .= the target or aiming point having been designated and the sight setting announced, such designation or announcement need not be repeated until a change of either or both is necessary. troops are trained to continue their fire upon the aiming point or target designated, and at the sight setting announced, until a change is ordered. ( ) = .= if the men are not already in the position of load, that position is taken at the announcement of the sight setting; if the announcement is omitted, the position is taken at the first command for firing. ( ) = .= when deployed, the use of the sling as an aid to accurate firing is discretionary with each man. ( ) to load = .= being in line or skirmish line at halt: = . with dummy (blank or ball) cartridges, . load.= [illustration] at the command load each front-rank man or skirmisher faces half right and carries the right foot to the right, about foot, to such position as will insure the greatest firmness and steadiness of the body; raises, or lowers, the piece and drops it into the left hand at the balance, the left thumb extended along the stock, muzzle at the height of the breast, and turns the cut-off up. [illustration] with the right hand he turns and draws the bolt back, [illustration] takes a loaded clip and inserts the end in the clip slots, places the thumb on the powder space of the top cartridge, the fingers extending around the piece and tips resting on the magazine floor plate; forces the cartridges into the magazine by pressing down with the thumb; without removing the clip, thrusts the bolt home, turning down the handle; turns the safety lock to the "=safe=," [illustration] and carries the hand to the small of the stock. [illustration] each rear rank man moves to the right front, takes a similar position opposite the interval to the right of his front rank man, muzzle of the piece extending beyond the front rank and loads. a skirmish line may load while moving, the pieces being held as nearly as practicable in the position of =load=. [illustration] if kneeling or sitting, the position of the piece is similar; if kneeling, the left forearm rests on the left thigh; [illustration] if sitting the elbows are supported by the knees. [illustration] if lying down, the left hand steadies and supports the piece at the balance, the toe of the butt resting on the ground, the muzzle off the ground. for reference, these positions (standing, kneeling, and lying down) are designated as that of =load=. (for krag rifle as prescribed in .) ( ) = .= for instruction in loading: = . simulate, . load.= executed as above described except that the cut-off remains "off" and the handling of cartridges is simulated. the recruits are first taught to =simulate= loading and firing; after a few lessons dummy cartridges may be used. later, blank cartridges may be used. ( ) the rifle may be used as a single loader by turning the magazine "off." the magazine may be filled in whole or in part while "off" or "on" by pressing cartridges singly down and back until they are in the proper place. the use of the rifle as a single loader is, however, to be regarded as exceptional. (explained for krag rifle in par. .) ( ) to unload = . unload.= take the position of load, turn the safety lock up and move bolt alternately back and forward until all the cartridges are ejected. after the last cartridge is ejected the chamber is closed by first thrusting the bolt slightly forward to free it from the stud holding it in place when the chamber is open, pressing the follower down and back to engage it under the bolt and then thrusting the bolt home; the trigger is pulled. the cartridges are then picked up, cleaned, and returned to the belt and the piece is brought to the order. (explained in par. for krag rifle.) ( ) to set the sight = . range, eleven hundred (eight-fifty, etc.)=, or =battle sight=. the sight is set at the elevation indicated. the instructor explains and verifies sight settings. ( ) to fire by volley = . . ready, . aim, . squad, . fire.= [illustration] at the command =ready= turn the safety lock to the "ready"; [illustration] at the command =aim= raise the piece with both hands and support the butt firmly against the hollow of the right shoulder, right thumb clasping the stock, barrel horizontal, left elbow well under the piece, right elbow as high as the shoulder; incline the head slightly forward and a little to the right, cheek against the stock, [illustration] left eye closed, right eye looking through the notch of the rear sight so as to perceive the object aimed at, second joint of the forefinger resting lightly against the front of the trigger and taking up the slack; top of front sight is carefully raised into, and held in, the line of sight. [illustration] each rear-rank man aims through the interval to the right of his file leader and leans slightly forward to advance the muzzle of his piece beyond the front rank. [illustration] in aiming kneeling, the left elbow rests on the left knee, point of elbow in front of kneecap. [illustration] in aiming sitting, the elbows are supported by the knees. [illustration] in aiming, lying down, raise the piece with both hands; rest on both elbows and press the butt firmly against the right shoulder. at the command =fire= press the finger against the trigger; fire without deranging the aim and without lowering or turning the piece; lower the piece in the position of =load= and load. ( ) to continue the firing: = . aim, . squad, . fire.= each command is executed as previously explained. =load= (from magazine) is executed by drawing back and thrusting home the bolt with the right hand, leaving the safety lock at the "ready." ( ) to fire at will = . fire at will.= each man, independently of the others, comes to the =ready=, aims carefully and deliberately at the aiming point or target, =fires=, =loads=, and continues the firing until ordered to =suspend= or =cease firing=. ( ) = .= to increase (decrease) the rate of fire in progress the instructor shouts: =faster (slower).= men are trained to fire at the rate of about three shots per minute at effective ranges and five or six at close ranges, devoting the minimum of time to loading and the maximum to deliberate aiming. to illustrate the necessity for deliberation, and to habituate men to combat conditions, small and comparatively indistinct targets are designated. ( ) to fire by clip = . clip fire.= executed in the same manner as =fire at will=, except that each man, after having exhausted the cartridges then in the piece, =suspends firing=. (for krag rifle see par. .) ( ) to suspend firing = .= the instructor blows a =long blast= of the whistle and repeats same, if necessary, or commands: =suspend firing.= firing stops; pieces are held, loaded and locked, in a position of readiness for instant resumption of firing, rear sights unchanged. the men continue to observe the target or aiming point, or the place at which the target disappeared, or at which it is expected to reappear. this whistle signal may be used as a preliminary to =cease firing=. ( ) to cease firing = . cease firing.= firing stops; pieces not already there are brought to the position of load; those not loaded, are loaded; sights are laid, pieces are locked and brought to the order. =cease firing= is used for long pauses, to prepare for changes of position, or to steady the men. (for krag rifle see par. .) ( ) commands for suspending or ceasing fire may be given at any time after the preparatory command for firing whether the firing has actually commenced or not. ( ) the use of cover = . individual instruction; things to be impressed upon the recruit.= the recruit should be given careful instruction in the individual use of cover. ( ) it should be impressed upon him that, in taking advantage of natural cover, he must be able to fire easily and effectively upon the enemy; if advancing on an enemy, he must do so steadily and as rapidly as possible; he must conceal himself as much as possible while firing and while advancing. while setting his sight he should be under cover or lying prone. = . practice in simulated firing from behind hillocks, trees, etc.; firing around right side of concealment.= to teach him to fire easily and effectively, at the same time concealing himself from the view of the enemy, he is practiced in simulated firing in the prone, sitting, kneeling, and crouching positions, from behind hillocks, trees, heaps of earth or rocks, from depressions, gullies, ditches, doorways, or windows. he is taught to fire around the right side of his concealment whenever possible, or, when this is not possible, to rise enough to fire over the top of his concealment. when these details are understood, he is required to select cover with reference to an assumed enemy and to place himself behind it in proper position for firing. ( ) = . evil of remaining too long in one place; advancing from cover to cover by running, crawling, etc.= the evil of remaining too long in one place, however good the concealment, should be explained. he should be taught to advance from cover to cover, selecting cover in advance before leaving his concealment. it should be impressed upon him that a man running rapidly toward an enemy furnishes a poor target. he should be trained in springing from a prone position behind concealment, running at top speed to cover and throwing himself behind it. he should also be practiced in advancing from cover to cover by crawling, or by lying on the left side, rifle grasped in the right hand, and pushing himself forward with the right leg. ( ) = . action when fired on while acting independently.= he should be taught that, when fired on while acting independently, he should drop to the ground, seek cover, and then endeavor to locate his enemy. ( ) = . proper advance and effectiveness of fire of greater importance than cover.= the instruction of the recruit in the use of cover is continued in the combat exercises of the company, but he must then be taught that the proper advance of the platoon or company and the effectiveness of its fire is of greater importance than the question of cover for individuals. he should also be taught that he may not move about or shift his position in the firing line except the better to see the target. ( ) observation = . importance of observation; training of recruit.= the ability to use his eyes accurately is of great importance to the soldier. the recruit should be trained in observing his surroundings from positions and when on the march. he should be practiced in pointing out and naming military features of the ground; in distinguishing between living beings; in counting distant groups of objects or beings; in recognizing colors and forms. ( ) = . training in mechanism of firing line and estimating distance.= in the training of men in the mechanism of the firing line, they should be practiced in repeating to one another target and aiming point designations and in quickly locating and pointing out a designated target. they should be taught to distinguish, from a prone position, distant objects, particularly troops, both with the naked eye and with field glasses. similarly, they should be trained in estimating distances. ( ) school of the company = . captain responsible for instruction of officers and noncommissioned officers.= the captain is responsible for the theoretical and practical instruction of his officers and noncommissioned officers, not only in the duties of their respective grades, but in those of the next higher grades. ( ) = . formation of company in double rank, according to height; division into squads.= the company in line is formed in double rank with the men arranged, as far as practicable, according to height from right to left, the tallest on the right. the original division into squads is effected by the command: =count off=. the squads, successively, from the right, count off as in the school of the squad, as explained in par. , corporals placing themselves as nos. of the front rank. if the left squad contains less than six men, it is either increased to that number by transfers from other squads or is broken up and its members assigned to other squads and posted in the line of file closers. these squad organizations are maintained, by transfers if necessary, until the company becomes so reduced in numbers as to necessitate a new division into squads. no squad will contain less than six men. ( ) = . division of company into platoons.= the company is further divided into two, three or four platoons, each consisting of not less than two, nor more than four squads. in garrison or ceremonies the strength of platoons may exceed four squads. ( ) = . designation of squads and platoons.= at the formation of the company the platoons or squads are numbered consecutively from right to left and these designations do not change. for convenience in giving commands and for reference, the designations, =right, center, left=, when in line, and =leading, center, rear=, when in column, are applied to platoons or squads. these designations apply to the actual right, left, center, head, or rear, in whatever direction the company may be facing. the =center squad= is the middle or right middle squad of the company. the designation "so-and-so's" squad or platoon may also be used. ( ) = . assignment of platoons; assignment of guides.= platoons are assigned to the lieutenants and noncommissioned officers, in order of rank, as follows: , right; , left; , center (right center); , left center. [illustration: plate ii] the noncommissioned officers next in rank are assigned as guides, one to each platoon. if sergeants still remain, they are assigned to platoons as additional guides. when the platoon is deployed, its guide, or guides, accompany the platoon leader. during battle, these assignments are not changed; vacancies are filled by noncommissioned officers of the platoon, or by the nearest available officers or noncommissioned officers arriving with reënforcing troops. ( ) = . post of first sergeant, quartermaster sergeant and musicians.= the first sergeant is never assigned as a guide. when not commanding a platoon, he is posted as a file closer opposite the third file from the outer flank of the first platoon; and when the company is deployed he accompanies the captain. the quartermaster sergeant, when present, is assigned according to his rank as a sergeant. enlisted men below the grade of sergeant, armed with the rifle are in ranks unless serving as guides; when not so armed they are posted in the line of file closers. musicians, when required to play, are at the head of the column. when the company is deployed, they accompany the captain, and perform the duties laid down in par. . ( ) = . certain movements executed by company and by platoon as prescribed in schools of the soldier and the squad.= the company executes the =halt=, =rests=, =facings=, =steps=, and =marchings=, =manual of arms=, =loadings=, and =firings=, takes =intervals= and =distances= and =assembles=, =increases= and =diminishes intervals=, resumes =attention=, =obliques=, resumes the direct march, preserves alignments, =kneels=, =lies down=, =rises=, =stacks=, and =takes arms=, as explained in the schools of the soldier and the squad, substituting in the commands =company= for =squad=. the same rule applies to platoons, detachments, details, etc., substituting their designation for =squad= in the commands. in the same manner these execute the movements prescribed for the company, whenever possible, substituting their designation for =company= in the commands. ( ) = . depleted company led as platoon.= a company so depleted as to make division into platoons impracticable is led by the captain as a single platoon, but retains the designation of company. the lieutenants and first sergeant assist in fire control; the other sergeants place themselves in the firing line as skirmishers. ( ) close order rules = . platoon guides.= the guides of the right and left, or leading and rear, platoons, are the right and left, or leading and rear, guides, respectively, of the company when it is in line or in column of squads. other guides are in the line of =file closers=. in platoon movements the post of the platoon guide is at the head of the platoon, if the platoon is in column, and on the guiding flank if in line. when a platoon has two guides their original assignment to flanks of the platoon does not change. ( ) = . guides of a column of squads; changing guides and file closers to opposite flank.= the guides of a column of squads place themselves on the flank opposite the file closers. to change the guides and file closers to the other flank, the captain commands: = . file closers on left (right) flank; . march.= the file closers dart through the column; the captain and guides change. in the column of squads, each rank preserves the alignment toward the side of the guide. ( ) = . file closers do not execute loadings or firings; execution of manual of arms and other movements.= men in the line of file closers do not execute the loadings or firings. guides and enlisted men in the line of file closers execute the manual of arms during the drill unless specially excused, when they remain at the order. during ceremonies they execute all movements. ( ) = . action of guides in taking intervals and distances.= in taking intervals and distances, unless otherwise directed, the right and left guides, at the first command, place themselves in the line of file closers, and, with them, take a distance of paces from the rear rank. in taking intervals, at the command =march=, the file closers face to the flank and each steps off with the file nearest him. in assembling the guides and file closers resume their position in line. ( ) = . repetition of commands by platoon leaders in platoon drill.= in movements executed simultaneously by platoons (=as platoons right or platoons, column right=), platoon leaders repeat the preparatory command (=platoon right=, etc.), applicable to their respective platoons. the command of execution is given by the captain only. ( ) to form the company = .= at the sounding of the assembly the first sergeant takes position paces in front of where the center of the company is to be, faces it, draws saber, and commands: =fall in.= the right guide of the company places himself, facing to the front, where the right of the company is to rest, and at such point that the center of the company will be paces from and opposite the first sergeant; the squads form in their proper places on the left of the right guide, superintended by the other sergeants, who then take their posts. the first sergeant commands: =report.= remaining in position at the order, the squad leaders, in succession from right, salute and report: =all present=; or, =private(s) ---- absent.= the first sergeant does not return the salutes of the squad leaders; he then commands: = . inspection, . arms, . order, . arms=, faces about, salutes the captain, reports: =sir, all present or accounted for=, or the names of the unauthorized absentees, and, without command, takes his post. if the company can not be formed by squads, the first sergeant commands: = . inspection, . arms, . right shoulder, . arms=, and calls the roll. each man, as his name is called, answers here and executes order arms. the sergeant then effects the division into squads and reports the company as prescribed above. the captain places himself paces in front of the center of, and facing, the company in time to receive the report of the first sergeant, whose salute he returns, and then draws saber. the lieutenants take their posts when the first sergeant has reported and draw saber with the captain. the company, if not under arms, is formed in like manner omitting reference to arms. ( ) = .= for the instruction of platoon leaders and guides, the company, when small, may be formed in single rank. in this formation close order movements only are executed. the single rank executes all movements as explained for the front rank of a company. ( ) to dismiss the company = .= being in line at a halt, the captain directs the first sergeant: =dismiss the company.= the officers fall out; the first sergeant places himself faced to the front, paces to the front and paces from the nearest flank of the company, salutes, faces toward opposite flank of the company and commands: = . inspection, . arms, . port, . arms, . dismissed.= ( ) alignments = .= the alignments are executed as prescribed in the school of the squad, the guide being established instead of the flank file. the rear-rank man of the flank file keeps his head and eyes to the front and covers his file leader. at each alignment the captain places himself in prolongation of the line, paces from and facing the flank toward which the dress is made, verifies the alignment, and commands: =front.= platoon leaders take a like position when required to verify alignments. ( ) movements on the fixed pivot = .= being in line, to turn the company: = . company right (left), . march, . company, . halt;= or, = . forward, . march.= at the second command the right-flank man[ ] in the front rank faces to the right in marching and marks time; the other front-rank men oblique to the right, place themselves abreast of the pivot, and mark time; in the rear rank the third man from the right, followed in column by the second and first, moves straight to the front until in rear of his front-rank man, when all face to the right in marching and mark time; the remaining men of the rear rank move straight to the front paces, oblique to the right, place themselves abreast of the third man, cover their file leaders, and mark time, the right guide steps back, takes post on the flank, and marks time. [illustration] the fourth command is given when the last man is pace in rear of the new line. the command =halt= may be given at any time after the movement begins; only those halt who are in the new position. each of the others halts upon arriving on the line, aligns himself to the right, and executes =front= without command. ( ) = .= being in line, to form column of platoons, or the reverse: = . platoons right (left), . march, . company, . halt=; or, = . forward, . march.= [illustration: from line to column of platoons.] executed by each platoon as described for the company. before forming line the captain sees that the guides on the flank toward which the movement is to be executed are covering. this is effected by previously announcing the guide to that flank. ( ) = .= being in line, to form column of squads, or the reverse; or, being in line of platoons, to form column of platoons, or the reverse: = . squads right (left), . march=; or, = . squads right (left), . march, . company, . halt=. [illustration: from line to column of squads.] [illustration: from line of platoons to column of platoons.] executed by each squad as described in the school of the squad. if the company or platoons be formed in line toward the side of the file closers, they dart through the column and take posts in rear of the company at the second command. if the column of squads be formed from line, the file closers take posts on the pivot flank, abreast of and inches from the nearest rank. ( ) movements on the moving pivot = .= being in line, to change direction: = . right (left) turn, . march, . forward, . march.= [illustration] executed as described in the school of the squad, except that the men do not glance toward the marching flank and that all take the full step at the fourth command. the right guide is the pivot of the front rank. each rear-rank man obliques on the same ground as his file leader. ( ) = .= being in column of platoons, to change direction: = . column right (left), . march.= [illustration] at the first command the leader of the leading platoon commands: =right turn.= at the command =march= the leading platoon turns to the right on moving pivot; its leader commands: = . forward, . march=, on completion of the turn. rear =platoons= march squarely up to the turning point of the leading platoons =and turn= at command of their leaders. ( ) = .= being in column of squads, to change direction: = . column right (left), . march.= [illustration] at the second command the front rank of the leading squad turns to the right on moving pivot as in the school of the squad; the other ranks, without command turn successively on the same ground and in a similar manner. ( ) = .= being in column of squads, to form line of platoons or the reverse: = . platoons, column right (left), . march.= [illustration: from column of squads to line of platoons.] executed by each platoon as described for the company. ( ) = .= being in line, to form column of squads and change direction: = . squads right (left), column right (left), . march=; or, = . right (left) by squads, . march.= in the first case the right squad initiates the =column right= as soon as it has completed the =squad right=. [illustration: squads right column right.] in the second case, at the command =march=, the right squad marches =forward=; the remainder of the company executes =squads right=, =column left=, and follows the right squad. the right guide, when he has posted himself in front of the squad, takes four short steps, then resumes the full step; the right quad conforms. ( ) [illustration: right by squads.] = .= being in line, to form line of platoons: = . squads right (left), platoons, column right (left), . march=; or, = . platoons, right (left) by squads, . march=. [illustration: from line to line of platoons.] executed by each platoon as described for the company in the preceding paragraph. ( ) facing or marching to the rear = .= being in line, line of platoons, or in column of platoons or squads, to face or march to the rear: = . squads right (left) about, . march=; or, = . squad right (left) about, . march; . company, . halt.= executed by each squad as described in the school of the squad. if the company or platoons be in column of squads, the file closers turn about toward the column, and take their posts; if in line, each darts through the nearest interval between squads. ( ). = .= to march to the rear for a few paces: = . about, . face, . forward, . march.= if in line, the guides place themselves in the rear rank, now the front rank; the file closers, on facing about, maintain their relative positions. no other movement is executed until the line is faced to the original front. ( ) on right (left) into line = .= being in column of platoons or squads, to form line on right or left: = . on right (left) into line, . march, . company, . halt, . front.= [illustration: from column of platoons to line on right.] at the first command the leader of the leading unit commands: =right turn.= the leaders of the other units command: =forward=, if at a halt. at the second command the leading unit turns to the right on moving pivot. the command halt is given when the leading unit has advanced the desired distance in the new direction; it halts; its leader then commands: =right dress.= [illustration: from column of squads to line on right.] the units in rear continue to march straight to the front; each, when opposite the right of its place in line, executes right turn at the command of its leader; each is halted on the line at the command of its leader, who then commands: =right dress.= all dress on the first unit in line. if executed in double time, the leading squad marches in double time until halted. ( ) front into line = .= being in column of platoons or squads, to form line to the front: = . right (left) front into line, . march, . company, . halt, . front.= at the first command the leaders of the units in rear of the leading one command: =right oblique.= if at a halt, the leader of the leading unit commands: =forward.= at the second command the leading unit moves straight forward; the rear units oblique as indicated. the command =halt= is given when the leading unit has advanced the desired distance; it halts; its leader then commands: =left dress.= each of the rear units, when opposite its place in line, resumes the original direction at the command of its leader; each is halted on the line at the command of its leader, who then commands: =left dress.= all dress on the first unit in line. ( ) = .= being in column of squads to form column of platoons, or being line of platoons, to form the company in line: = . platoons, right (left) front into line, . march, . company, . halt, . front.= [illustration: from column of squads to line to the front.] [illustration: from column of platoons to line to the front.] executed by each platoon as described for the company. in forming the company in line, the dress is on the left squad of the left platoon. if forming column of platoons, platoon leaders verify the alignment before taking their posts; the captain commands =front= when the alignments have been verified. when =front into line= is executed in double time the commands for halting and aligning are omitted and the guide is toward the side of the first unit in line. ( ) at ease and route step = .= the column of squads is the habitual column of route, but =route step= and =at ease= are applicable to any marching formation. ( ) to march at route step: = . route step, . march.= sabers are carried at will or in the scabbard; the men carry their pieces at will, keeping the muzzles elevated; they are not required to preserve silence, nor to keep the step. the ranks cover and preserve their distance. if halted from route step, the men stand =at rest=. ( ) to march at ease: = . at ease, . march.= the company marches as in route step, except that silence is preserved; when halted, the men remain =at ease=. ( ) marching at route step or at ease: = . company, . attention.= at the command =attention= the pieces are brought to the right shoulder and the cadenced step in quick time is resumed. ( ) to diminish the front of a column of squads = .= being in column of squads: = . right (left) by twos, . march.= [illustration] at the command =march= all files except the two right files of the leading squad execute =in place halt=; the two left files of the leading squad oblique to the right when disengaged and follow the right files at the shortest practicable distance. the remaining squads follow successively in like manner. ( ) = .= being in column of squads or twos: = . right (left) by file, . march.= [illustration] at the command =march=, all files execute =in place halt= except the right file of the leading two or squad. the left file or files of the leading two or squad oblique successively to the right when disengaged and each follows the file on its right at the shortest practicable distance. the remaining twos or squads follow successively in like manner. ( ) being in column of files or twos, to form column of squads; or, being in column of files, to form column of twos: = . squads (twos), right (left) front into line, . march.= at the command =march=, the leading file or files halt. the remainder of the squad, or two, obliques to the right and halts on line with the leading file or files. the remaining squads or twos close up and successively form in rear of the first in like manner. [illustration] this diagram illustrates a squad executing =left= front into line. the movement described in this paragraph will be ordered =right= or =left=, so as to restore the files to their normal relative positions in the two or squad. ( ) the movements prescribed in the three preceding paragraphs are difficult of execution at attention and have no value as disciplinary exercises. ( ) extended order rules for deployment = . designation of base squads.= the command =guide right= (=left= or =center=) indicates the base squad for the deployment; if in line it designates the actual =right= (=left= or =center=) squad; if in column the command =guide right (left)= designates the =leading= squad, and the command =guide center= designates the =center= squad, as laid down in par. . after the deployment is completed, the guide is =center= without command, unless otherwise ordered. ( ) = . action of squad leaders at preparatory command for forming skirmish line.= at the preparatory command for forming skirmish line, from either column of squads or line, each squad leader (except the leader of the base squad, when his squad does not advance) cautions his squad, =follow me= or =by the right (left) flank=, as the case may be; at the command march, he steps in front of his squad and leads it to its place in line, as explained in par. . ( ) = . point on which base squad marches.= having given the command for forming skirmish line, the captain, if necessary, indicates to the corporal of the base squad the point on which the squad is to march; the corporal habitually looks to the captain for such directions. ( ) = . deployment of the squads.= the base squad (par. ) is deployed as soon as it has sufficient interval. the other squads are deployed as they arrive on the general line; each corporal halts in his place in line and commands or signals, as =skirmishers= (executed as prescribed in par. ); the squad deploys and halts abreast of him. if tactical considerations demand it, the squad is deployed before arriving on the line. ( ) = . alignment of deployed lines; deployed line faces to front on halting.= deployed lines preserve a general alignment toward the guide, as prescribed in par. . within their respective fronts, individuals or units march so as best to secure cover or to facilitate the advance, but the general and orderly progress of the whole is paramount. on halting, a deployed line faces to the front (direction of the enemy) in all cases and takes advantage of cover, the men lying down if necessary. ( ) = . certain movements in extended order executed by same commands as in close order.= the company in skirmish line =advances, halts=, moves =by the flank=, or =to the rear, obliques=, resumes =the direct march=, passes from =quick to double time= and the reverse by the same commands and in a similar manner as in close order; if at a halt, the movement by =the flank= or =to the rear= is executed by the same commands as when marching. =company right (left, half right, half left)= is executed as explained for the front rank (in par. ) skirmish intervals being maintained. (see par. .) ( ) = . deployment of platoons and detachments.= a platoon or other part of the company is deployed and marched in the same manner as the company, substituting in the commands, =platoon= (=detachments=, etc.), for =company=. ( ) deployments (see pars. - .) = .= being in line, to form skirmish line to the front: = . as skirmishers, guide right (left or center), . march.= [illustration] if marching, the corporal of the base squad moves straight to the front; when that squad has advanced the desired distance, the captain commands: = . company, . halt.= if the guide be =right (left)=, the other corporals move to the =left (right)= front, and, in succession from the base, place their squads on the line; if the guide be center, the other corporals move to the right or left front, according as they are on the right or left of the center squad, and in succession from the center squad place their squads on the line. if at a halt, the base squad is deployed without advancing; the other squads may be conducted to their proper places by the flank; interior squads may be moved when squads more distant from the base have gained comfortable marching distance. ( ) = .= being in column of squads, to form skirmish line to the front: = . as skirmishers, guide right (left or center), . march.= [illustration: guide right.] [illustration: guide center (marching).] [illustration: guide center (at a halt).] if marching, the corporal of the base squad deploys it and moves straight to the front; if at a halt, he deploys his squad without advancing. if the guide be =right (left)=, the other corporals move to the =left (right) front=, and, in succession from the base, place their squads on the line; if the guide be =center=, the corporals in front of the center squad move to the right (if at a halt, to the right rear), the corporals in rear of the center squad move to the left front, and each, in succession from the base, places his squad on the line. the column of twos or files is deployed by the same commands and in like manner. ( ) = . deployment in an oblique direction.= the company in line or in column of squads may be deployed in an oblique direction by the same commands. the captain points out the desire direction; the corporal of the base squad moves in the direction indicated; the other corporals conform. ( ) = . deployment to flank or rear.= to form skirmish line to the flank or rear the line or the column of squads is turned by squads to the flank or rear and then deployed as described. ( ) = . increasing or decreasing intervals.= the intervals between men are increased or decreased as described in the school of the squad, as explained in par. , adding to the preparatory command, =guide right (left or center)= if necessary, as explained in par. . ( ) the assembly = .= the captain takes his post in front of, or designates, the element on which the company is to assemble and commands: = . assemble, . march.= if in skirmish line the men move promptly toward the designated point and the company is reformed in line. if assembled by platoons, these are conducted to the designated point by platoon leaders, and the company is reformed in line. platoons may be assembled by the command: = . platoons, assemble, . march.= executed by each platoon as described for the company. one or more platoons may be assembled by the command: = . such platoon (s), assemble, . march.= executed by the designated platoon or platoons as described for the company. ( ) the advance = . methods of advancing.= the advance of a company into an engagement (whether for attack or defense) is conducted in close order, preferably column of squads, until the probability of encountering hostile fire makes it advisable to deploy. after deployment, and before opening fire, the advance of the company may be continued in skirmish line or other suitable formation, depending upon circumstances. the advance may often be facilitated, or better advantage taken of cover, or losses reduced by the employment of the =platoon= or =squad columns=, as laid down in pars. - , or by the use of a =succession of thin lines=, as explained in par. . the selection of the method to be used is made by the captain or major, the choice depending upon conditions arising during the progress of the advance. if the deployment is found to be premature, it will generally be best to assemble the company and proceed in close order. patrols are used to provide the necessary security against surprise. ( ) = .= being in skirmish line: = . platoon columns, march.= [illustration] the platoon leaders move forward through the center of their respective platoons; men to the right of the platoon leader march to the left and follow him in file; those to the left march in like manner to the right; each platoon leader thus conducts the march of his platoon in double column of files; platoon guides follow in rear of their respective platoons to insure prompt and orderly execution of the advance. ( ) = .= being in skirmish line: = . squad columns, . march.= [illustration] each squad leader moves to the front; the members of each squad oblique toward and follow their squad leader in single file at easy marching distances. ( ) = .= platoon columns are profitably used where the ground is so difficult or cover so limited as to make it desirable to take advantage of the few favorable routes; no two platoons should march within the area of burst of a single shrapnel[ ]. =squad columns= are of value principally in facilitating the advance over rough or brush-grown ground; they afford no material advantage in securing cover. ( ) = .= to deploy platoon or squad columns: = . as skirmishers, . march.= skirmishers move to the right or left front and successively place themselves in their original positions on the line. ( ) [illustration] = .= being in platoon or squad columns: = . assemble, . march.= [illustration: assembly made on right platoon.] [illustration: assembly made on right squad.] the platoon or squad leaders signal =assemble=. the men of each platoon or squad, as the case may be, advance and, moving to the right and left, take their proper places in line, each unit assembling on the leading element of the column and re-forming in line. the platoon or squad leaders conduct their units toward the element or point indicated by the captain, and to their places in line; the company is reformed in line. ( ) = .= being in skirmish line, to advance by a succession of =thin lines=: = . (such numbers), forward, . march.= the captain points out in advance the selected position in front of the line occupied. the designated number of each squad moves to the front; the line thus formed preserves the original intervals as nearly as practicable; when this line has advanced a suitable distance (generally from to yards, depending upon the terrain and the character of the hostile fire), a second is sent forward by similar commands, and so on at irregular distances until the whole line has advanced. upon arriving at the indicated position, the first line is halted. successive lines, upon arriving, halt on line with the first and the men take their proper places in the skirmish line. ordinarily each line is made up of one man per squad and the men of a squad are sent forward in order from right to left as deployed. the first line is led by the platoon leader of the right platoon, the second by the guide of the right platoon, and so on in order from right to left. the advance is conducted in quick time unless conditions demand a faster gait. the company having arrived at the indicated position, a further advance by the same means may be advisable. ( ) = . use and purpose of advance in succession of thin lines.= the advance in a succession of thin lines is used to cross a wide stretch swept, or likely to be swept, by artillery fire or heavy, long-range rifle fire which cannot profitably be returned. its purpose is the building up of a strong skirmish line preparatory to engaging in a fire fight. this method of advancing results in serious (though temporary) loss of control over the company. its advantage lies in the fact that it offers a less definite target, hence is less likely to draw fire. ( ) = . improvised formations.= the above are suggestions. other and better formations may be devised to fit particular cases. the best formation is the one which advances the line farthest with the least loss of men, time, and control. ( ) the fire attack = . advance of firing line; advance by rushes.= the principles governing the advance of the firing line in attack are considered in the school of the battalion. (see par. - .) when it becomes impracticable for the company to advance as whole by ordinary means, it advances by rushes. ( ) = . advancing by rushes.= being in skirmish line: = . by platoon (two platoons, squad, four men, etc.), from the right (left), . rush.= the platoon leader on the indicated flank carefully arranges the details for a prompt and vigorous execution of the rush and puts it into effect as soon as practicable. if necessary, he designates the leader for the indicated fraction. when about to rush, he causes the men of the fraction to cease firing and to hold themselves flat, but in readiness to spring forward instantly. the leader of the rush (at the signal of the platoon leader, if the latter be not the leader of the rush) commands: follow me, and running at top speed, leads the fraction to the new line, where he halts it and causes it to open fire. the leader of the rush selects the new line if it has not been previously designated. the first fraction having established itself on the new line, the next like fraction is sent forward by its platoon leader, without further command of the captain, and so on successively, until the entire company is on the line established by the first rush. if more than one platoon is to join in one rush, the junior platoon leader conforms to the action of the senior. a part of the line having advanced, the captain may increase or decrease the size of the fractions to complete the movement. ( ) = . rush of company as whole led by captain.= when the company forms a part of the firing line, the rush of the company as a whole is conducted by the captain, as described for a platoon in the preceding paragraph. the captain leads the rush; platoon leaders lead their respective platoons; platoon guides follow the line to insure prompt and orderly execution of the advance. ( ) = . advance by crawling or otherwise.= when the foregoing method of rushing, by running, becomes impracticable, any method of advance that =brings the attack closer to the enemy=, such as crawling, should be employed. for regulations governing the charge, see paragraphs and . ( ) (all rushes should be made with life and ginger, and all the men should start together. all rushes should be made under covering fire, and when a unit rushes forward the adjoining unit or units make up for the loss of fire thus caused by increasing the rate of their fire. a unit commander about to rush forward, will not do so until he sees that the adjoining unit or units have started to give him the protection of their covering fire and, if necessary, he will call to them to do so. each unit must be careful not to advance until the last unit that rushed forward has had time to take up an effective fire. when sights have to be adjusted at the conclusion of a rush, the men should do so in the prone position even though it be necessary for the men to kneel for firing. the same as the men who rush should start simultaneously from the prone position, so should they stop simultaneously, all men dropping down to the ground together, wherever they may be, at the command "down," given by the unit commander when the leading men have reached the new position. the slower members who drop down in rear will crawl up to the line after the halt. so that the slower members may not be crowded out of the line, and also to prevent bunching, the faster men should leave room for them on the line.--author.) the company in support (being part of a battalion) = . formations adopted by support.= to enable it to follow or reach the firing line, the support adopts suitable formations, following the principles explained in paragraphs - . the support should be kept assembled as long as practicable. if after deploying a favorable opportunity arises to hold it for some time in close formation, it should be reassembled. it is redeployed when necessary. ( ) = . support controlled by major: size of reënforcement; captain on look out for major's signals.= the movements of the support as a whole and the dispatch of reënforcements from it to the firing line are controlled by the major. a reënforcement of less than one platoon has little influence and will be avoided whenever practicable. (see par. .) the captain of a company in support is constantly on the alert for the major's signals or commands. ( ) = . reënforcement to join firing line deployed as skirmishers and occupy existing intervals.= a reënforcement sent to the firing line joins it deployed as skirmishers. the leader of the reënforcement places it in an interval in the line, if one exists, and commands it thereafter as a unit. if no such suitable interval exists, the reënforcement is advanced with increased intervals between skirmishers; each man occupies the nearest interval in the firing line, and each then obeys the orders of the nearest squad leader and platoon leader. ( ) = . promptness in reënforcing firing line.= a reënforcement joins the firing line as quickly as possible without exhausting the men. ( ) = . original platoon divisions to be maintained; duties of officers and sergeants upon joining firing line.= the original platoon division of the companies in the firing line should be maintained and should not be broken up by the mingling of reënforcements. upon joining the firing line, officers and sergeants accompanying a reënforcement take over the duties of others of like grade who have been disabled, or distribute themselves so as best to exercise their normal functions. conditions will vary and no rules can be prescribed. it is essential that all assist in mastering the increasing difficulties of control. ( ) the company acting alone = . employed according to principles of battalion acting alone.= in general, the company, when acting alone, is employed according to the principles applicable to the battalion acting alone as laid down in pars. - ; the captain employs platoons as the major employs companies, making due allowance for the difference in strength. the support may be smaller in proportion or may be dispensed with. ( ) = . protection against surprise.= the company must be well protected against surprise. combat patrols on the flanks are especially important as explained in par. . each leader of a flank platoon details a man to watch for the signals of the patrol or patrols on his flank. ( ) fire = . issuing of ammunition and loading of pieces before deployment; firings in close order.= ordinarily pieces are loaded and extra ammunition is issued before the company deploys for combat. in close order the company executes the firings, as prescribed in pars. - , at the command of the captain, who posts himself in rear of the center of the company. usually the firings in close order consist of saluting volleys only. (see par. for volley firing.) ( ) = . firing controlled by platoon leaders.= when the company is deployed, the men execute the firings at the command of their platoon leaders; the latter give such commands as are necessary to carry out the captain's directions, and, from time to time, add such further commands as are necessary to continue, correct, and control, the fire ordered. ( ) = . use of signals during firing.= the voice is generally inadequate for giving commands during fire and must be replaced by signals of such character that proper fire direction and control is assured. (see par. for signals; pars. - for fire direction and pars. - for fire control.) to attract attention, signals must usually be preceded by the whistle signal (short blast). a fraction of the firing line about to rush should, if practicable, avoid using the long blast signal as an aid to cease firing. (see par. .) officers and men behind the firing line can not ordinarily move freely along the line, but must depend on mutual watchfulness and the proper use of the prescribed signals. all should post themselves so as to see their immediate superiors and subordinates. ( ) = . duties of musicians.= the musicians assist the captain by observing the enemy, the target, and the fire-effect, by transmitting commands or signals, and by watching for signals. (for posts of musicians see par. .) ( ) = . blank cartridges.= firing with blank cartridges at an outlined or represented enemy (par. ) at distances less than yards is prohibited. ( ) = . effect of fire and influence of ground.= the effect of fire and the influence of the ground in relation thereto, and the individual and collective instruction in marksmanship, are treated in the small-arms firing manual. ( ) ranges = . classification.= for convenience of reference, ranges are classified as follows: to yards, close range. to , yards, effective range. , to , yards, long range. , yards and over, distant range. ( ) = . determination of distance to target.= the distance to the target must be determined as accurately as possible and the sights set accordingly. aside from training and morale, this is the most important single factor in securing effective fire at the longer ranges. ( ) = . method of determining the range; estimators.= except in a deliberately prepared defensive position, the most accurate and only practicable method of determining the range will generally be to take the mean of several estimates. five or six officers or men, selected from the most accurate estimators in the company, are designated as _range estimators_ and are specially trained in estimating distances. whenever necessary and practicable, the captain assembles the range estimators, points out the target to them, and adopts the mean of their estimates. the range estimators then take their customary posts. ( ) classes of firing = . volley firing=, as explained in par. , has limited application. in defense it may be used in the early stages of the action if the enemy presents a large compact target. it may be used by troops executing =fire of position=, as set forth in par. . when the ground near the target is such that the strike of bullets can be seen from the firing line, =ranging volleys= may be used to correct the sight setting. in combat, volley firing is executed habitually by platoon. ( ) = . fire at will=, as explained in par. , is the class of fire normally employed in attack or defense. ( ) = . clip fire= (see par. .) has limited application. it is principally used: . in the early stages of combat, to steady the men by habituating them to brief pauses in firing. . to produce a short burst of fire. ( ) the target = . assignment of target by major; change of target to be avoided; hostile firing line usual target.= ordinarily the major will assign to the company an objective in attack or sector in defense; the company's target will lie within the limits so assigned. in the choice of target, tactical considerations are paramount; the nearest hostile troops within the objective or sector will thus be the usual target. this will ordinarily be the hostile firing line; troops in rear are ordinarily proper targets for artillery, machine guns, or, at times, infantry employing fire of position, as set forth in par. . change of target should not be made without excellent reasons therefor, such as the sudden appearance of hostile troops under conditions which make them more to be feared than the troops comprising the former target. ( ) = . distribution of fire; allotment of target to platoon leaders.= the distribution of fire over the entire target is of special importance. the captain allots a part of the target to each platoon, or each platoon leader takes as his target that part which corresponds to his position in the company. men are so instructed that each fires on that part of the target which is directly opposite him. ( ) = . all parts of target equally important.= all parts of the target are equally important. care must be exercised that the men do not slight its less visible parts. a section of the target not covered by fire represents a number of the enemy permitted to fire coolly and effectively. ( ) = . use of aiming points in case of invisible targets.= if the target can not be seen with the naked eye, platoon leaders select an object in front of or behind it, designate this as the _aiming target_, and direct a sight setting which will carry the cone of fire into the target. ( ) fire direction[ ] = . impracticability in combat of commanding company directly.= when the company is large enough to be divided into platoons, it is impracticable for the captain to command it directly in combat. his efficiency in managing the firing line is measured by his ability to enforce his will through the platoon leaders. having indicated clearly what he desires them to do, he avoids interfering except to correct serious errors or omissions. ( ) = . captain directs the fire.= the captain =directs= the fire of the company or of designated platoons. he designates the target, and, when practicable, allots a part of the target to each platoon, as prescribed in par. . before beginning the fire action he determines the range, as explained in par. , announces the sight setting, as prescribed in par. , and indicates the class of fire to be employed (see par. ) and the time to open fire. thereafter, he observes the fire effect (see pars. - ), corrects material errors in sight setting, prevents exhaustion of the ammunition supply, as explained in par. - , and causes the distribution of such extra ammunition as may be received from the rear. ( ) fire control = . platoon the fire unit.= in combat, the platoon is the fire unit. from to rifles are as many as one leader can control effectively. ( ) = . special duties of platoon leaders.= each platoon leader puts into execution the commands or directions of the captain, having first taken such precautions to insure correct sight setting and clear description of the target or aiming target as the situation permits or requires; thereafter, he gives such additional commands or directions as are necessary to exact compliance with the captain's will. he corrects the sight setting when necessary. he designates an aiming target when the target can not be seen with the naked eye. ( ) = . general duties of platoon leaders; duties of platoon guides and squad leaders.= in general, =platoon leaders= observe the target and the effect of their fire and are on the alert for the captain's commands or signals; they observe and regulate the rate of fire, as laid down in par. . the =platoon guides= watch the firing line and check every breach of fire discipline. (see pars. - .) =squad leaders= transmit commands and signals when necessary, observe the conduct of their squads and abate excitement, assist in enforcing fire discipline and participate in the firing. ( ) = . importance of fire control.= the best troops are those that submit longest to fire control. loss of control is an evil which robs success of its greatest results. to avoid or delay such loss should be the constant aim of all. fire control implies the ability to stop firing, change the sight setting and target, and resume a well directed fire. ( ) fire discipline = . what fire discipline implies.= "fire discipline implies, besides a habit of obedience, a control of the rifle by the soldier, the result of training, which will enable him in action to make hits instead of misses. it embraces taking advantage of the ground; care in setting the sight and delivery of fire; constant attention to the orders of the leaders, and careful observation of the enemy; an increase of fire when the target is favorable, and a cessation of fire when the enemy disappears; economy of ammunition." (see pars. - .) (small-arms firing manual.) in combat, shots which graze the enemy's trench or position and thus reduce the effectiveness of his fire have the approximate value of hits; such shots only, or actual hits, contribute toward fire superiority. fire discipline implies that, in a firing line without leaders, each man retains his presence of mind and directs effective fire upon the proper target. ( ) = . rate of fire.= to create a correct appreciation of the requirements of fire discipline, men are taught that the rate of fire, as prescribed in par. , should be as rapid as is consistent with accurate aiming; that the rate will depend upon the visibility, proximity, and size of the target; and that the proper rate will ordinarily suggest itself to each trained man, usually rendering cautions or commands unnecessary. in attack the highest rate of fire is employed at the halt preceding the assault, and in pursuing fire. (see pars. - .) ( ) = . position fire in advance by rushes.= in an advance by rushes, as explained in par. , leaders of troops in firing positions are responsible for the delivery of heavy fire to cover the advance of each rushing fraction. troops are trained to change slightly the direction of fire so as not to endanger the flanks of advanced portions of the firing line. ( ) = . action in defense, when target disappears.= in defense, when the target disappears behind cover, platoon leaders suspend fire, as prescribed in par. , prepare their platoons to fire upon the point where it is expected to reappear, and greet its reappearance instantly with vigorous fire. ( ) school of the battalion = . battalion a tactical unit; duties and responsibilities of major.= the battalion being purely a tactical unit, the major's duties are primarily those of an instructor in drill and tactics and of a tactical commander. he is responsible for the theoretical and practical training of the battalion. he supervises the training of the companies of the battalion with a view to insuring the thoroughness and uniformity of their instruction. in the instruction of the battalion as a whole, his efforts will be directed chiefly to the development of tactical efficiency, devoting only such time to the mechanism of drill and to the ceremonies as may be necessary in order to insure precision, smartness, and proper control. ( ) = . movements explained for battalion of four companies.= the movements explained herein are on the basis of a battalion of four companies; they may be executed by a battalion of two or more companies, not exceeding six. ( ) = . arrangement of companies in formations.= the companies are generally arranged from right to left according to the rank of the captains present at the formation. the arrangement of the companies may be varied by the major or higher commander. after the battalion is formed, no cognizance is taken of the relative order of the companies. ( ) = . designation of companies.= in whatever direction the battalion faces, the companies are designated numerically from right to left in line, and from head to rear in column, =first company=, =second company=, etc. the terms =right= and =left= apply to actual right and left as the line faces; if the about by squads be executed when in line, the right company becomes the left company and the right center becomes the left center company. the designation center company indicates the right center or the actual center company according as the number of companies is even or odd. ( ) = . post of special units.= the band and other special units, when attached to the battalion, take the same post with respect to it as if it were the nearest battalion. ( ) close order rules = . repetition of commands by captains.= captains repeat such preparatory commands as are to be immediately executed by their companies, as =forward=, =squads right=, etc.; the men execute the commands =march=, =halt=, etc., if applying to their companies, when given by the major. in movements executed in route step or at ease the captains repeat the command of execution, if necessary. captains do not repeat the major's commands in executing the manual of arms, nor those commands which are not essential to the execution of a movement by their companies, as =column of squads=, =first company=, =squads right=, etc. in giving commands or cautions captains may prefix the proper letter designations of their companies, as =a company, halt=; =b company, squads right=, etc. ( ) = . captains repeating command for guide.= at the command =guide center (right or left)=, captains command: =guide right or left=, according to the positions of their companies. =guide center= designates the left guide of the center company, as explained in d sec. par. . ( ) [illustration: plate iii] = . position of captains in dressing companies; action of guides in dressing.= when the companies are to be dressed, captains place themselves on that flank toward which the dress is to be made, as follows: the battalion in line: besides the guide (or the flank file of the front rank, if the guide is not in line) and facing to the front. the battalion in column of companies: two paces from the guide, in prolongation of and facing down the line. each captain, after dressing his company, commands: =front=, and takes his post. the battalion being in line and unless otherwise prescribed, at the captain's command =dress= or at the command =halt=, when it is prescribed that the company shall dress, the guide on the flank away from the point of rest with his piece at right shoulder, dresses promptly on the captain and the companies beyond. during the dress he moves, if necessary, to the right and left only; the captain dresses the company on the line thus established. the guide takes the position of order arms at the command =front=. ( ) = . certain movements executed as in schools of the soldier, squad and company.= =the battalion executes the halt= (see par. ), =rests= (see pars. - ), =facings= (see par. ), =steps= and =marchings= (see pars. - ), =manual of arms= (see pars. - ), resumes =attention= (see par. ), =kneels= (see pars. - ), =lies down= (see par. ), =rises= (see par. ), =stacks= and =takes arms= (see pars. - ), as explained in the schools of the soldier and squad, substituting in the commands =battalion= for =squad=. the battalion executes =squads right (left)= (see par. ), =squads right (left) about= (see par. ), =route step= and =at ease= (see par. ), and =obliques= and resumes the =direct march= (see pars. - ), as explained in the school of the company. ( ) = . certain movements executed as in school of the company.= the battalion in column of platoons, squads, twos, or files changes direction. (see pars. - ); in column of squads, forms column of twos or files and re-forms columns of twos or squads, as explained in the school of the company. (see pars. - .) ( ) = . simultaneous execution by companies or platoons of movements in school of the company.= when the formation admits of the simultaneous execution by companies or platoons of movements in the school of the company the major may cause such movement to be executed by prefixing, when necessary, =companies (platoons)= to the commands prescribed therein: as = . companies, right front into line, . march.= to complete such simultaneous movements, the commands =halt= or =march=, if prescribed, are given by the major. the command =front=, when prescribed, is given by the captains. (see par. .) ( ) = . execution of loadings and firings by battalion.= the battalion as a unit executes the loadings and firings only in firing saluting volleys. the commands are as for the company, substituting =battalion= for =company=. at the first command for loading, captains take post in rear of the center of their respective companies. at the conclusion of the firing, the captains resume their posts in line. on other occasions, when firing in close order is necessary, it is executed by company or other subdivision, under instructions from the major, as prescribed in pars. - . ( ) to form the battalion = . for purposes other than ceremonies:= the battalion is formed in column of squads. the companies having been formed, the adjutant posts himself so as to be facing the column, when formed, and paces in front of the place to be occupied by the leading guide of the battalion; he draws saber; =adjutant's call= is sounded or the adjutant signals =assemble=. the companies are formed, at attention, in column of squads in their proper order. each captain, after halting his company, salutes the adjutant; the adjutant returns the salute and, when the last captain has saluted, faces the major and reports: =sir, the battalion is formed.= he then joins the major. ( ) = . for ceremonies or when directed:= the battalion is formed in line. the companies having been formed, the adjutant posts himself so as to be paces to the right of the right company when line is formed, and faces in the direction in which the line is to extend. he draws saber; =adjutant's call= is sounded; the band plays if present. the right company is conducted by its captain so as to arrive from the rear, parallel to the line; its right and left guides precede it on the line by about paces, taking post facing to the right at order arms, so that their elbows will be against the breasts of the right and left files of their company when it is dressed. the guides of the other companies successively prolong the line to the left in like manner and the companies approach their respective places in line as explained for the right company. the adjutant, from his post, causes the guides to cover. when about pace in rear of the line, each company is halted and dressed to the right against the arms of the guides. (see par. .) the band, arriving from the rear, takes its place in line when the right company is halted; it ceases playing when the left company has halted. when the guides of the left company have been posted, the adjutant, moving by the shortest route, takes post facing the battalion midway between the post of the major and the center of the battalion. the major, staff, noncommissioned staff, and orderlies take their posts, as prescribed in pars. ; - . when all parts of the line have been dressed, and officers and others have reached their posts, the adjutant commands: = . guides, . posts, . present, . arms.= at the second command guides take their places in the line. (plate ii, page .) the adjutant then turns about as explained in par. , and reports to the major: =sir, the battalion is formed=, as prescribed in par. ; the major directs the adjutant: =take your post, sir=; draws saber and brings the battalion to the =order=. the adjutant takes his post, passing to the right of the major. ( ) to dismiss the battalion = . dismiss your companies.= staff and noncommissioned staff officers fall out; each captain marches his company off and dismisses it, as laid down in par. . ( ) to rectify the alignment = .= being in line at a halt, to align the battalion: = . center (right or left), . dress.= the captains dress their companies successively toward the center (right or left) guide of the battalion, each as soon as the captain next toward the indicated guide commands: =front.= the captains of the center companies (if the dress is =center=) dress them without waiting for each other. ( ) = .= to give the battalion a new alignment: = . guides center (right or left) company on the line, . guides on the line, . center (right or left), . dress, . guides, . posts.= at the first command, the designated guides place themselves on the line, as prescribed in par. , facing the center (right or left). the major establishes them in the direction he wishes to give the battalion. at the second command, the guides of the other companies take posts, facing the center (right or left), so as to prolong the line. at the command =dress=, each captain dresses his company to the flank toward which the guides of his company face, taking the positions prescribed in par. . at the command =posts=, given when all companies have completed the dress, the guides return to their posts. (plate ii, page .) ( ) to rectify the column = .= being in column of companies, or in close column, at a halt, if the guides do not cover or have not their proper distances, and it is desired to correct them, the major commands: = . right (left), . dress.= captains of companies in rear of the first place their right guides so as to cover at the proper distance; each captain aligns his company to the right and commands: =front.= (see par. .) ( ) on right (left) into line = .= being in column of squads or companies: = . on right (left) into line, . march, . battalion, . halt.= being in column of squads: at the first command, the captain of the leading company commands; =squads right.= if at a halt each captain in rear commands: =forward.= at the second command, the leading company marches in line to the right; the companies in rear continue to march to the front and form successively on the left, each, when opposite its place, being marched in line to the right. [illustration: from column of squads to line on right.] [illustration: from column of companies to line on right.] the fourth command is given when the first company has advanced the desired distance in the new direction; it halts and is dressed to the right by its captain (par. ); the others complete the movement, each being halted pace in rear of the line established by the first company, and then dressed to the right. being in column of companies: at the first command, the captain of the first company commands: =right turn.= if at a halt, each captain in rear commands: =forward.= each of the captains in rear of the leading company gives the command: = . right turn=, in time to add, = . march=, when his company arrives opposite the right of its place in line. the fourth command is given and the movement completed as explained above. whether executed from column of squads or column of companies, each captain places himself so as to march beside the right guide after his company forms line or changes direction to the right. if executed in double time, the leading company marches in double time until halted. ( ) front into line = .= being in column of squads or companies: = . right (left) front into line, . march.= being in column of squads: at the first command, the captain of the leading company commands: =column right=; the captain of the companies in rear: =column half right.= at the second command the leading company executes =column right=, and, as the last squad completes the change of direction, is formed in line to the left, as prescribed in par. , halted and dressed to the left. (see par. .) each of the companies in rear is conducted by the most convenient route to the rear of the right of the preceding company, thence to the right, parallel to and pace in rear of the new line; when opposite its place, it is formed in line to the left, halted, and dressed to the left. [illustration: from column of squads to line to the front.] [illustration: from column of companies to line to the front.] being in column of companies: if marching, the captain of the leading company gives the necessary commands to halt his company at the second command; if at a halt the leading company stands fast. at the first command, the captain of each company in rear commands: =squads right=, or =right by squads=, and after the second command conducts his company by the most convenient route to its place in line, as described above. whether executed from column of squads or column of companies, each captain halts when opposite, or at the point, where the left of his company is to rest. ( ) to form column of companies successively to the right or left = .= being in column of squads: = . column of companies, first company, squads right (left), . march.= [illustration] the leading company executes =squads right= and moves forward. the other companies move forward in column of squads and successively march in line the right on the same ground as the leading company and in such manner that the guide covers the guide of the preceding company. ( ) to form column of squads successively to the right or left = .= being in column of companies (plate iii, page ): = . column of squads, first company, squads right (left), . march.= [illustration] the leading company executes =squads right= and moves forward. the other companies move forward in column of companies and successively march in column of squads to the right on the same ground as the leading company. ( ) to change direction = .= being in column of companies or close column. (plate iii, page ); = . column right (left), . march.= [illustration] the captain of the first company commands: =right turn.= the leading company turns to the right on moving pivot, the captain adding: = . forward, . march=, upon its completion. the other companies march squarely up to the turning point; each changes direction by the same commands and means as the first and in such manner that the guide covers the guide of the preceding company. ( ) = .= being in line of companies or close line. (plate iii, page ): = . battalion right (left), . march, . battalion, . halt.= [illustration] the right company changes direction to the right, as prescribed in par. ; the other companies are conducted by the shortest line to their places abreast of the first. the fourth command is given when the right company has advanced the desired distance in the new direction; that company halts; the others halt successively upon arriving on the line. ( ) = .= being in column of squads, the battalion changes direction by the same commands and in the manner prescribed for the company, as explained in par. . ( ) mass formations [illustration: from line.] = a.= being in column of squads, to form a line of columns of companies or company subdivisions, facing in any desired direction, at any desired interval, on the right or left of the leading element of the battalion: = . line of companies (half companies, platoons), at (so many) paces, guide right (left), . march, . battalion, . halt.= [illustration: from line of companies.] the leading company (or subdivision) marches in the direction previously indicated by the major until the command halt is given and then halts. each succeeding company (or subdivision) marches by the most direct route to its place at the prescribed intervals on the left (right) of the next preceding company (or subdivision), halting when it is abreast of the leading element of the battalion. [illustration: from column of squads.] if the battalion be in any formation other than column of squads, the major indicates the desired direction to the leading element. the entire command forms column of squads and executes a movement in conformity with the principles indicated above. ( - / ) [illustration: from column of companies.] = .= being in line, line of companies, or column of companies. (plate iii, page ): = . close on first (fourth) company, . march.= if at a halt, the indicated company stands fast; if marching, it is halted; each of the other companies is conducted toward it and is halted in proper order in close column. if the battalion is in line, companies form successively in rear of the indicated company; if in column of squads, companies in rear of the leading company form on the left of it. in close column formed line on the first company, the left guides cover; formed on the fourth company, right guides cover. if formed on the leading company, the guide remains as before the formation. in close line, the guides are halted abreast of the guide of the leading company. the battalion in column closes on the leading company only. ( ) (in closing from line of companies and in extending from close line, the companies other than the base one, may be moved either by the commands, (a) = . squads, right (left), . march=; (b) = . right (left) oblique, . march=; (c) = . forward, . march=; (d) = . squads left (right) . march=; (e) = . company, . halt=; or, (a) = . by the right (left) flank, . march=; (b) = . company, . halt=; (c) = . left (right), . face=; or if at a halt by the commands, (a) = . right (left), . face=; (b) = . at trail, . forward, . march=; (c) = . company, . halt=; (d) = . left (right), . face.= in some commands it is customary to use one method while in other commands another is used. for the sake of uniformity all companies of a given command should use the same method.--author.) to extend the mass = .= being in close column or in close line; = . extend on first (fourth) company, . march.= [illustration: from close column.] being in close line: if at a halt, the indicated company stands fast; if marching, it halts; each of the other companies is conducted away from the indicated company and is halted in its proper order in line of companies. being in close column, the extension is made on the fourth company only. if marching, the leading company continues to march; companies in rear are halted and successively resume the march in time to follow at full distance. if at halt, the leading company marches; companies in rear successively march in time to follow at full distance. close column is not extended in double time. (see author's note, par. .) ( ) = .= being in close column: = . right (left) front into line, . march.= executed as from column of companies, as explained in par. . ( ) = .= being in close column: = . column of squads, first (fourth) company, squads right (left), . march.= the designated company marches in column of squads to the right. each of the other companies executes the same movement in time to follow the preceding company in column. ( ) = .= being in close line: = . column of squads, first (fourth) company, forward, . march.= [illustration: from close line.] the designated company moves forward. the other companies (halting if in march) successively take up the march and follow in column. ( ) route step and at ease = .= the battalion marches in =route step= and =at ease= as prescribed in the school of the company. (see par. .) when marching in column of companies or platoons, the guides maintain the trace and distance. in route marches the major marches at the head of the column; when necessary, the file closers may be directed to march at the head and rear of their companies. ( ) assembly = .= the battalion being wholly or partially deployed, or the companies being separated: = . assemble, . march.= the major places himself opposite to or designates the element or point on which the battalion is to assemble. companies are assembled, as explained in par. , and marched to the indicated point. as the companies arrive the major or adjutant indicates the formation to be taken. ( ) combat principles orders = .= the following references to orders are applicable to attack or defense: ( ) = . use of prescribed commands; "tactical orders," "orders" and "commands."= in extended order, the company is the largest unit to execute movements by prescribed commands or means. the major, assembling his captains if practicable, directs the disposition of the battalion by means of =tactical orders=. he controls its subsequent movements by such =orders= or =commands= as are suitable to the occasion. ( ) = . major's order making disposition of battalion for combat; base company in attack.= in every disposition of the battalion for combat the major's order should give subordinates sufficient information of the enemy, of the position of supporting and neighboring troops, and of the object sought to enable them to conform intelligently to the general plan. the order should then designate the companies which are to constitute the =firing line= and those which are to constitute the =support=. in attack, it should designate the direction or the objective, the order and front of the companies on the firing line, and should designate the right or left company as base company. in defense, it should describe the front of each company and, if necessary, the sector to be observed by each, as prescribed in - . ( ) = . reconnaissance and protection of flanks.= when the battalion is operating alone, the major provides for the reconnaissance and protection of his flanks; if part of a larger force, the major makes similar provisions, when necessary, without orders from higher authority, unless such authority has specifically directed other suitable reconnaissance and protection. ( ) = . issue of extra ammunition when battalion is deployed.= when the battalion is deployed upon the initiative of the major, he will indicate whether extra ammunition shall be issued; if deployed in pursuance of orders of higher authority, the major will cause the issue of extra ammunition, unless such authority has given directions to the contrary. (for ammunition supply see pars. - .) ( ) deployment (see pars. - ; - .) = .= the following principles of deployment are applicable to attack or defense. ( ) = . avoiding premature deployment.= a premature deployment involves a long, disorganizing and fatiguing advance of the skirmish line, and should be avoided. a greater evil is to be caught by heavy fire when in dense column or other close order formation; hence advantage should be taken of cover in order to retain the battalion in close order formation until exposure to heavy hostile fire may reasonably be anticipated. ( ) = . depth of deployment and density of firing line; companies and detachments conducted to their places by their commanders.= the major regulates the depth of the deployment and the extent and density of the firing line, subject to such restrictions as a senior may have imposed. companies or designated subdivisions and detachments are conducted by their commanders in such manner as best to accomplish the mission assigned to them under the major's orders. companies designated for the firing line march independently to the place of deployment, form skirmish line, and take up the advance. they conform, in general, to the base company, as prescribed in par. . ( ) = . division of battalion into firing line and support.= the commander of a battalion, whether it is operating alone or as part of a larger force, should hold a part of his command out of the =firing line=. by the judicious use of this force, the major can exert an influence not otherwise possible over his firing line and can control, within reasonable limits, an action once begun. so, if his battalion be assigned to the =firing line=, the major will cause one, two, or three companies to be deployed on the firing line, retaining the remaining companies or company as a support for that firing line. the division of the battalion into firing line and support will depend upon the front to be covered and the nature and anticipated severity of the action. ( ) = . size of support.= if the battalion be part of a larger command, the number of companies in the firing line will generally be determinable from the regimental commander's order; the remainder constitutes the support, as prescribed in par. . if the battalion is acting alone, the support must be strong enough to maintain the original fire power of the firing line, to protect the flanks, and to perform the functions of a reserve, whatever be the issue of the action, as explained in par. . ( ) = . position of support.= if the battalion is operating alone, the support may, according to circumstances, be held in one or two bodies and placed behind the center, or one or both flanks of the firing line, or echeloned beyond a flank. if the battalion is part of a larger force, the support is generally held in one body. ( ) = . distance between firing line and support.= the distance between the firing line and the supporting group or groups will vary between wide limits; it should be as short as the necessity for protection from heavy losses will permit. when cover is available, the support should be as close as to yards; when such cover is not available, it should not be closer than yards. it may be as far as yards in rear if good cover is there obtainable and is not obtainable at a lesser distance. ( ) = . placing entire battalion or regiment in firing line at beginning.= in exceptional cases, as in a meeting engagement, it may be necessary to place an entire battalion or regiment in the firing line at the initial deployment, the support being furnished by other troops. such deployment causes the early mingling of the larger units, thus rendering leadership and control extremely difficult. the necessity for such deployment will increase with the inefficiency of the commander and of the service of information. ( ) fire = . major apportions target.= fire direction and fire control are functions of company and platoon commanders, as laid down in pars. - . the major makes the primary apportionment of the target--in defense, by assigning sectors of fire, in attack, by assigning the objective. in the latter case each company in the firing line takes as its target that part of the general objective which lies in its front. ( ) = . major indicates where or when fire fight begins.= the major should indicate the point or time at which the fire fight is to open. he may do this in his order for deployment or he may follow the firing line close enough to do so at the proper time. if it be impracticable for him to do either, the senior officer with the firing line, in each battalion, selects the time for opening fire. ( ) attack (see pars. - .) = . battalion the attack unit.= the battalion is the =attack unit=, whether operating alone or as part of a larger unit. ( ) = . advance of battalion acting as one of several in firing line.= if his battalion be one of several in the firing line, the major, in executing his part of the attack, pushes his battalion forward as vigorously as possible within the front, or section, assigned to it. the great degree of independence allowed to him as to details demands, in turn, the exercise of good judgment on his part. better leadership, better troops, and more favorable terrain enable one battalion to advance more rapidly in attack than another less fortunate, and such a battalion will insure the further advance of the others. the leading battalion should not, however, become isolated; isolation may lead to its destruction. ( ) = . close in on enemy as much as possible before opening fire.= the deployment having been made, the firing line advances without firing. the predominant idea must be to close with the enemy as soon as possible without ruinous losses. the limited supply of ammunition and the uncertainty of resupply, the necessity for securing fire superiority in order to advance within the shorter ranges, and the impossibility of accomplishing this at ineffective ranges, make it imperative that fire be not opened as long as the advance can be continued without demoralizing losses. the attack which halts to open fire at extreme range (over , yards) is not likely ever to reach its destination. every effort should be made, by using cover or inconspicuous formations, or by advancing the firing line as a whole, to arrive within yards of the enemy before opening fire. (for expenditure of ammunition see pars. - ; for advancing the attack see par. .) ( ) = . fire to be directed against the hostile infantry.= except when the enemy's artillery is able to effect an unusual concentration of fire, its fire upon deployed infantry causes losses which are unimportant when compared with those inflicted by his infantry; hence the attacking infantry should proceed to a position as described above, and from which an effective fire can be directed against the hostile infantry with a view to obtaining fire superiority. the effectiveness of the enemy's fire must be reduced so as to permit further advance. the more effective the fire to which the enemy is subjected the less effective will be his fire. ( ) = . the further advance of the firing line; size of rushing units.= occasionally the fire of adjacent battalions, or of infantry employing fire of position, as explained in par. , or of supporting artillery, as explained in pars. - , will permit the further advance of the entire firing line from this point, but it will generally be necessary to advance by rushes, as laid down in par. , of fractions of the line. the fraction making the rush should be as large as the hostile fire and the necessity for maintaining fire superiority will permit. depending upon circumstances, the strength of the fraction may vary from a company to a few men. the advance is made as rapidly as possible without losing fire superiority. the smaller the fraction which rushes, the greater the number of rifles which continue to fire upon the enemy. on the other hand, the smaller the fraction which rushes the slower will be the progress of the attack. ( ) = . size of rushing units.= enough rifles must continue in action to insure the success of each rush. frequently the successive advances of the firing line must be effected by rushes of fractions of decreased size; that is, advances by rushes may first be made by company, later by half company or platoon, and finally by squads or files; but no =subsequent opportunity= to =increase= the rate of advance, such as better cover or a decrease of the hostile fire, should be overlooked. ( ) = . the rush begun by a flank unit.= whenever possible, the rush is begun by a flank fraction of the firing line. in the absence of express directions from the major, each captain of a flank company determines when an advance by rushes (par. ) shall be attempted. a flank company which inaugurates an advance by rushes becomes the base company, if not already the base. an advance by rushes having been inaugurated on one flank, the remainder of the firing line conforms; fractions rush successively from that flank and halt on the line established by the initial rush. the fractions need not be uniform in size; each captain indicates how his company shall rush, having due regard to the ground and the state of the fire fight. ( ) = . fractions to advance under covering fire.= a fraction about to rush is sent forward when the remainder of the line is firing vigorously; otherwise the chief advantage of this method of advancing is lost. the length of the rush will vary from to yards, depending upon the existence of cover, positions for firing, and the hostile fire. ( ) = . subsequent advances.= when the entire firing line of the battalion has advanced to the new line, fresh opportunities to advance are sought as before. ( ) = . prearranged methods of advancing by rushes prohibited.= two identical situations will never confront the battalion; hence at drill it is prohibited to arrange the details of an advance before the preceding one has been concluded, or to employ a fixed or prearranged method of advancing by rushes. ( ) = . post of the major.= the major posts himself so as best to direct the reënforcing of the firing line from the support. when all or nearly all of the support has been absorbed by the firing line, he joins, and takes full charge of, the latter. ( ) = . size of reënforcements.= the reënforcing of the firing line by driblets of a squad or a few men has no appreciable effect. the firing line requires either reënforcement or a strong one. generally one or two platoons will be sent forward under cover of a heavy fire of the firing line. ( ) = . two methods of reënforcing the firing line.= to facilitate control and to provide intervals in which reënforcements may be placed, the companies in the firing line should be kept closed in on their centers as they become depleted by casualties during the advance. when this is impracticable reënforcements must mingle with and thicken the firing line. in battle the latter method will be the rule rather than the exception, and to familiarize the men with such conditions the combat exercises of the battalion should include both methods of reënforcing. occasionally, to provide the necessary intervals for reënforcing by either of these methods, the firing line should be thinned by causing men to drop out and simulate losses during the various advances. under ordinary conditions the depletion of the firing line for this purpose will be from one-fifth to one-half of its strength. ( ) = . fixing bayonets.= the major or senior officer in the firing line determines when bayonets shall be fixed and gives the proper command or signal. it is repeated by all parts of the firing line. each man who was in the front rank prior to deployment, as soon as he recognizes the command or signal, suspends firing, quickly fixes his bayonet, and immediately resumes firing; after which the other men suspend firing, fix bayonets, and immediately resume firing. the support also fixes bayonets. the concerted fixing of the bayonet by the firing line at drill does not simulate battle conditions and should not be required. it is essential that there be no marked pause in the firing. bayonets will be fixed generally before or during the last, or second last, advance preceding the charge. ( ) = . the charge.= subject to orders from higher authority, the major determines the point from which the charge is to be made. (see pars. - regarding the charge.) the firing line having arrived at that point and being in readiness, the major causes the =charge= to be sounded. the signal is repeated by the musicians of all parts of the line. the company officers lead the charge. the skirmishers spring forward shouting, run with bayonets at charge, and close with the enemy. the further conduct of the charging troops will depend upon circumstances; they may halt and engage in bayonet combat or in pursuing fire, as explained in par. ; they may advance a short distance to obtain a field of fire or to drive the enemy from the vicinity; they may assemble or reorganize, etc. if the enemy vacates his position every effort should be made to open fire at once on the retreating mass, reorganization of the attacking troops being of secondary importance to the infliction of further losses upon the enemy and to the increase of his confusion, as set forth in pars. - . in combat exercises the major will assume a situation and terminate the assault accordingly. ( ) defense = . tactical unit best suited to defensive action.= in defense, as in attack, the battalion is the tactical unit best suited to independent assignment. defensive positions are usually divided into sections and a battalion assigned to each. ( ) = . trenches.= the major locates such fire, communicating, and cover trenches and obstacles as are to be constructed. he assigns companies to construct them and details the troops to occupy them. (see "field fortifications," chapter xvi, part iii.) ( ) = . reënforcement of firing line.= the major reënforces the firing line in accordance with the principles applicable to and explained in connection with, the attack, in pars. - , maintaining no more rifles in the firing line than are necessary to prevent the enemy's advance. ( ) = . opening fire.= the supply of ammunition being usually ample, fire is opened as soon as it is possible to break up the enemy's formation, stop his advance or inflict material loss, but this rule must be modified to suit the ammunition supply. ( ) = . fixing bayonets.= the major causes the firing line and support to fix bayonets when an assault by the enemy is imminent. captains direct this to be done if they are not in communication with the major and the measure is deemed advisable. fire alone will not stop a determined, skillfully conducted attack. the defender must have equal tenacity; if he can stay in his trench or position and cross bayonets, he will at least have neutralized the hostile first line, and the combat will be decided by reserves. ( ) = . support to cover withdrawal.= if ordered or compelled to withdraw under hostile infantry fire or in the presence of hostile infantry, the support will be posted so as to cover the retirement of the firing line ( ) = . support in case of battalion acting alone.= when the battalion is operating alone, the support must be strong and must be fed sparingly into the firing line, especially if a counter-attack is planned. opportunities for counter-attack should be sought at all times, as explained in pars. - . ( ) combat introduction = . scope of subject of combat tactics in this book.= part ii of these regulations treats only of the basic principles of combat tactics as applied to infantry and to the special units, such as machine guns and mounted scouts, which form a part of infantry regiments and battalions. the combat tactics of the arms combined are considered in field service regulations. ( ) = . demands of modern combat upon infantry; complicated maneuvers impracticable; success dependent upon leadership, etc.= modern combat demands the highest order of training, discipline, leadership, and morale on the part of the infantry. complicated maneuvers are impracticable; efficient leadership and a determination to win by simple and direct methods must be depended upon for success. ( ) = . duties and quality of infantry.= the duties of infantry are many and difficult. all infantry must be fit to cope with all conditions that may arise. modern war requires but one kind of infantry--good infantry. ( ) = . offensive necessary for decisive results; use of ground, fire efficiency, etc.; local success.= the infantry must take the offensive to gain decisive results. both sides are therefore likely to attempt it, though not necessary at the same time or in the same part of a long battle line. in the local combats which make up the general battle the better endurance, use of ground, fire efficiency, discipline, and training will win. it is the duty of the infantry to win the local successes which enable the commanding general to win the battle. ( ) = . requisites of infantry; trained to bear heaviest burdens; good infantry can defeat vastly superior infantry of poor quality.= the infantry must have the tenacity to hold every advantage gained, the individual and collective discipline and skill needed to master the enemy's fire, the determination to close with the enemy in attack, and to meet him with the bayonet in defense. infantry must be trained to bear the heaviest burdens and losses, both of combat and march. good infantry can defeat an enemy greatly superior in numbers, but lacking in training, discipline, leadership, and morale. ( ) = . fixed forms and instructions covering all cases impossible; study and practice necessary; purposes of practical and theoretical instruction.= it is impossible to establish fixed forms or to give general instructions that will cover all cases. officers and noncommissioned officers must be so trained that they can apply suitable means and methods to each case as it arises. study and practice are necessary to acquire proper facility in this respect. theoretical instruction can not replace practical instruction; the former supplies correct ideas and gives to practical work an interest, purpose, and definiteness not otherwise obtainable. ( ) = . exercises in extended order to be in nature of combat exercises; all combat exercises to be conducted under assumed tactical situations.= after the mechanism of extended order drill has been learned with precision in the company, every exercise should be, as far as practicable, in the nature of a maneuver (combat exercise) against an =imaginary=, =outlined=, or =represented= enemy. company extended order drill may be conducted without reference to a tactical situation, but a combat exercise, whatever may be the size of the unit employed, should be conducted under an assumed tactical situation. ( ) = . effective method of conducting combat exercises.= an effective method of conducting a combat exercise is to outline the enemy with a few men equipped with flags. the umpire or inspector states the situation, and the commander leads his troops with due regard to the assumptions made. changes in situation, the results of reconnaissance, the character of artillery fire, etc., are made known to the commander when necessary by the umpire or inspector, who, in order to observe and influence the conduct of the exercise, remains in rear of the firing line. from this position he indicates, with the aid of prearranged signals, the character of the fire and movements of the hostile infantry. these signals are intended for the men outlining the enemy. these men repeat the signals; all officers and men engaged in the exercise and in sight of the outlined enemy are thus informed of the enemy's action, and the exercise is conducted accordingly. assistant umpires, about one for each company in the firing line, may assist in indicating hostile fire and movements and in observing the conduct of the exercise. an outlined enemy may be made to attack or defend. situations should be simple and natural. during or after the exercise the umpire or inspector should call attention to any improper movements or incorrect methods of execution. he will prohibit all movements of troops or individuals that would be impossible if the enemy were real. the slow progress of events to be expected on the battlefield can hardly be simulated, but the umpire or inspector will prevent undue haste and will attempt to enforce a reasonably slow rate of progress. the same exercise should not be repeated over the same ground and under the same situation. such repetitions lead to the adoption of a fixed mode of attack or defense and develop mere drill masters. fixed or prearranged systems are prohibited. ( ) leadership general considerations = . what constitutes art of leadership.= the art of leadership consists of applying sound tactical principles to concrete cases on the battlefield. self-reliance, initiative, aggressiveness, and a conception of team-work are the fundamental characteristics of successful leadership. ( ) = . basis of success; adherence to original plan.= a correct grasp of the situation and a definite plan of action form the soundest basis for a successful combat. a good plan once adopted and put into execution should not be abandoned unless it becomes clear that it can not succeed. afterthoughts are dangerous, except as they aid in the execution of details in the original plans. ( ) = . avoid combats offering no chance of valuable results.= combats that do not promise success or some real advantage to the general issue should be avoided; they cause unnecessary losses, impair the morale of one's own troops, and raise that of the enemy. ( ) = . avoid complicated maneuvers.= complicated maneuvers are not likely to succeed in war. all plans and the methods adopted for carrying them into effect must be simple and direct. ( ) = . order and cohesion necessary.= order and cohesion must be maintained within the units if success is to be expected. ( ) = . officers to be true leaders.= officers must show themselves to be true leaders. they must act in accordance with the spirit of their orders and must require of their troops the strictest discipline on the field of battle. ( ) = . units not to be broken up.= the best results are obtained when leaders know the capacity and traits of those whom they command; hence in making detachments units should not be broken up, and a deployment that would cause an intermingling of the larger units in the firing line should be avoided. ( ) = . leading deployed troops difficult; necessity for training, discipline and close order.= leading is difficult when troops are deployed. a high degree of training and discipline and the use of close order formations to the fullest extent possible are therefore required. ( ) = . avoidance of unnecessary hardship; limit of endurance exacted when necessary.= in order to lighten the severe physical strain inseparable from infantry service in campaign, constant efforts must be made to spare the troops unnecessary hardship and fatigue; but when necessity arises, the limit of endurance must be exacted. ( ) = . fighting troops not to carry back wounded.= when officers or men belonging to fighting troops leave their proper places to carry back, or to care for, wounded during the progress of the action, they are guilty of skulking. this offense must be repressed with the utmost vigor. ( ) = . complete equipment usually carried into action.= the complete equipment of the soldier is carried into action unless the weather or the physical condition of the men renders such measure a severe hardship. in any event, =only the pack[ ] will be laid aside=. the determination of this question rests with the regimental commander. the complete equipment affords to men lying prone considerable protection against shrapnel. ( ) = . post of commander; use of reserve in case of victory; when firing line is controlled by commander.= the post of the commander must be such as will enable him to observe the progress of events and to communicate his orders. subordinate commanders, in addition, must be in position to transmit the orders of superiors. before entering an action, the commander should be as far to the front as possible in order that he personally may see the situation, order the deployment, and begin the action strictly in accordance with his own wishes. during the action, he must, as a rule, leave to the local leaders the detailed conduct of the firing line, posting himself either with his own reserve or in such a position that he is in constant, direct, and easy communication with it. a commander takes full and direct charge of his firing line only when the line has absorbed his whole command. when their troops are victorious, all commanders should press forward in order to clinch the advantage gained and to use their reserves to the best advantage. ( ) = . latitude allowed subordinates.= the latitude allowed to officers is in direct proportion to the size of their commands. each should see to the general execution of his task, leaving to the proper subordinates the supervision of details, and interfering only when mistakes are made that threaten to seriously prejudice the general plan. ( ) teamwork = . latitude allowed subordinates; success depends on coördination of subordinates.= the comparatively wide fronts of deployed units increase the difficulties of control. subordinates must therefore be given great latitude in the execution of their tasks. the success of the whole depends largely upon how well each subordinate coördinates his work with the general plan. a great responsibility is necessarily thrown upon subordinates, but responsibility stimulates the right kind of an officer. ( ) = . initiative of subordinates; general plan to be furthered.= in a given situation it is far better =to do any intelligent thing= consistent with the aggressive execution of the general plan, than to search hesitatingly for the ideal. this is the true rule of conduct for subordinates who are required to act upon their own initiative. a subordinate who is reasonably sure that his intended action is such as would be ordered by the commander, were the latter present and in possession of the facts, has enough encouragement to go ahead confidently. he must possess the loyalty to carry out the plans of his superior and the keenness to recognize and to seize opportunities to further the general plan. ( ) = . but one supreme will in a battle; subordinates to coöperate.= independence must not become license. regardless of the number of subordinates who are apparently supreme in their own restricted spheres, there is but one battle and but one supreme will to which all must conform. every subordinate must therefore work for the general result. he does all in his power to insure coöperation between the subdivisions under his command. he transmits important information to adjoining units or to superiors in rear and, with the assistance of information received, keeps himself and his subordinates duly posted as to the situation. ( ) = . deviation from orders.= when circumstances render it impracticable to consult the authority issuing an order, officers should not hesitate to vary from such order when it is clearly based upon an incorrect view of the situation, is impossible of execution, or has been rendered impracticable on account of changes which have occurred since its promulgation. in the application of this rule the responsibility for mistakes rests upon the subordinate, but unwillingness to assume responsibility on proper occasions is indicative of weakness. superiors should be careful not to censure an apparent disobedience where the act was done in the proper spirit and to advance the general plan. ( ) = . intermingling of units; duties of officers and guides.= when the men of two or more units intermingle in the firing line, all officers and men submit at once to the senior. officers and platoon guides seek to fill vacancies caused by casualties. each seizes any opportunity to exercise the functions consistent with his grade, and all assist in the maintenance of order and control. every lull in the action should be utilized for as complete restoration of order in the firing line as the ground or other conditions permit. ( ) = . separated officers and noncommissioned officers placing themselves under nearest higher commander.= any officer or noncommissioned officer who becomes separated from his proper unit and can not rejoin must at once place himself and his command at the disposal of the nearest higher commander. ( ) anyone having completed an assigned task must seek to rejoin his proper command. failing in this, he should join the nearest troops engaged with the enemy. = . duty of separated soldiers.= soldiers are taught the necessity of remaining with their companies, but those who become detached must join the nearest company and serve with it until the battle is over or reorganization is ordered. ( ) orders = . orders for deployment; combat orders of divisions and brigades usually written.= commands are deployed and enter the combat by the orders of the commander to the subordinate commanders. the initial combat orders of the division are almost invariably written; those of the brigade are generally so. the written order is preferable and is used whenever time permits. if time permits, subsequent orders are likewise written, either as field orders or messages. ( ) = . combat orders of regiments and smaller units; verbal messages.= the initial combat orders of regiments and smaller units are given verbally. for this purpose the subordinates for whom the orders are intended are assembled, if practicable, at a place from which the situation and plan can be explained. subsequent orders are verbal or in the form of verbal or written messages. verbal messages should not be used unless they are short and unmistakable. ( ) = . initial combat orders; personal reconnaissance.= the initial combat order of any commander or subordinate is based upon his definite plan for executing the task confronting him. whenever possible the formation of the plan is preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the terrain and a careful consideration of all information of the enemy. ( ) = . composition of combat orders.= the combat order gives such information of the enemy and of neighboring or supporting friendly troops as will enable subordinates to understand the situation. the general plan of action is stated in brief terms, but enough of the commander's intentions is divulged to guide the subsequent actions of the subordinates. clear and concise instructions are given as to the action to be taken in the combat by each part of the command. in this way the commander assigns tasks, fronts, objectives, sectors or areas, etc., in accordance with his plan. if the terms employed convey definite ideas and leave no loopholes, the conduct of subordinates will generally be correspondingly satisfactory. such miscellaneous matter relating to special troops, trains, ammunition, and future movements of the commander is added as concerns the combat itself. combat orders should prescribe communication, reconnaissance, flank protection, etc., when some special disposition is desired or when an omission on the part of a subordinate may reasonably be feared. ( ) = . encroaching upon functions of subordinates prohibited; orders to be definite.= when issuing orders, a commander should indicate clearly =what= is to be done by each subordinate, but not =how= it is to be done. he should not encroach upon the functions of a subordinate by prescribing details of execution unless he has good reason to doubt the ability or judgment of the subordinate, and cannot substitute another. although general in its terms, an order must be definite and must be the expression of a fixed decision. ambiguity or vagueness indicates either a vacillation or the inability to formulate orders. ( ) = . orders generally given subordinates through their immediate superiors.= usually the orders of a commander are intended for, and are given to, the commanders of the next lower units, but in an emergency commander should not hesitate to give orders directly to any subordinate. in such case he should promptly inform the intermediate commander concerned. ( ) communication = . communication, how maintained.= communication is maintained by means of staff officers, messengers, relay systems, connecting files, visual signals, telegraph, or telephone. ( ) = . lines of communication established by signal corps.= the signal corps troops of the division establish lines of information from division to brigade headquarters. the further extension of lines of information in combat by signal troops is exceptional. ( ) = . lines of communication established by regiment; orderlies carry signal flags.= each regiment, employing its own personnel, is responsible for the maintenance of communication from the colonel back to the brigade and forward to the battalions. for this purpose the regiment uses the various means which may be furnished it. the staff and orderlies, regimental and battalion, are practiced in the use of these means and in messenger service. orderlies carry signal flags. ( ) = . communication between firing line and major or colonel; company musicians carry signal flags.= connection between the firing line and the major or colonel is practically limited to the prescribed flag, arm, and bugle signals. other means can only be supplemental. company musicians carry company flags and are practiced in signaling. ( ) = . communication by artillery with firing line by means of staff officers or through agents.= the artillery generally communicates with the firing line by means of its own staff officers or through an agent who accompanies some unit in or near the front. the infantry keeps him informed as to the situation and affords any reasonable assistance. when the infantry is dependent upon the artillery for fire support, perfect coördination through this representative is of great importance. ( ) combat reconnaissance = . importance of combat reconnaissance; avoidance of deployment on wrong lines.= combat reconnaissance is of vital importance and must not be neglected. by proper preliminary reconnaissance, deployments on wrong lines, or in a wrong direction, and surprises may generally be prevented. ( ) = . protection of troops by proper reconnaissance.= troops deployed and under fire can not change front, and thus they suffer greatly when enfiladed. troops in close order formation may suffer heavy losses in a short time if subjected to hostile fire. in both formations troops must be protected by proper reconnaissance and warning. ( ) = . difficulty of reconnaissance depends on extent of enemy's screen; strength of reconnoitering parties.= the difficulty of reconnaissance increases in proportion to the measures adopted by the enemy to screen himself. the strength of the reconnoitering party is determined by the character of the information desired and the nature of the hostile screen. in exceptional cases as much as a battalion may be necessary in order to break through the hostile screen and enable the commander or officer in charge to reconnoiter in person. a large reconnoitering party is conducted so as to open the way for small patrols, to serve as a supporting force or rallying point for them, and to receive and transmit information. such parties maintain signal communication with the main body if practicable. ( ) = . each separate column to protect itself by reconnaissance.= each separate column moving forward to deploy must reconnoiter to its front and flank and keep in touch with adjoining columns. the extent of the reconnaissance to the flank depends upon the isolation of the columns. ( ) = . reconnaissance before attacking.= before an attack a reconnaissance must be made to determine the enemy's position, the location of his flanks, the character of the terrain, the nature of the hostile field works, etc., in order to prevent premature deployment and the resulting fatigue and loss of time. it will frequently be necessary to send forward a thin skirmish line in order to induce the enemy to open fire and reveal his position. ( ) = . extent of reconnaissance.= it will frequently be impossible to obtain satisfactory information until after the action has begun. the delay that may be warranted for the purpose of reconnaissance depends upon the nature of the attack and the necessity for promptness. for example, in a meeting engagement, and sometimes in a holding attack, the reconnaissance may have to be hasty and superficial, whereas in an attack against an enemy carefully prepared for defense there will generally be both time and necessity for thorough reconnaissance. ( ) = . reconnaissance in defense.= in defense, reconnaissance must be kept up to determine the enemy's line of advance, to ascertain his dispositions, to prevent his reconnaissance, etc. patrols or parties posted to prevent hostile reconnaissance should relieve the main body of the necessity of betraying its position by firing on small bodies of the enemy. ( ) = . duration of reconnaissance; protection of flanks.= reconnaissance continues throughout the action. a firing or skirmish line can take care of its front, but its flanks are especially vulnerable to modern firearms. the moral effect of flanking fire is as great as the physical effect. hence, combat patrols to give warning or covering detachments to give security are indispensable on exposed flanks. this is equally true in attack or defense. ( ) = . responsibility of infantry commanders for reconnaissance; surprise unpardonable.= the fact that cavalry patrols are known to be posted in a certain direction does not relieve infantry commanders of the responsibility for reconnaissance and security. to be surprised by an enemy at short range is an unpardonable offense. ( ) = . commander of flank battalion responsible for security of his flank.= the commander of a battalion on a flank of a general line invariably provides for the necessary reconnaissance and security on that flank unless higher authority has specifically ordered it. in any event, he sends out combat patrols as needed. where his battalion is on a flank of one section of the line and a considerable interval lies between his battalion and the next section, he makes similar provision. ( ) = . patrols established by battalion commanders.= battalion commanders in the first line establish patrols to observe and report the progress or conduct of adjoining troops when these can not be seen. ( ) fire superiority purpose and nature (see par. ) = . success in battle dependent upon fire superiority.= in a decisive battle success depends on gaining and maintaining fire superiority. every effort must be made to gain it early and then to keep it. attacking troops must first gain fire superiority in order to reach the hostile position. over open ground attack is possible only when the attacking force has a decided fire superiority. with such superiority the attack is not only possible, but success is probable and without ruinous losses. defending troops can prevent a charge only when they can master the enemy's fire and inflict heavy losses upon him. ( ) = . volume and accuracy necessary to obtain fire superiority.= to obtain fire superiority it is necessary to produce a heavy volume of accurate fire. every increase in the effectiveness of the fire means a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of the enemy's fire. the volume and accuracy of fire will depend upon several considerations: =(a) the number of rifles employed.= on a given front the greatest volume of fire is produced by a firing line having only sufficient intervals between men to permit the free use of their rifles. the maximum density of a firing line is therefore about one man per yard of front. =(b)= the =rate= of fire affects its volume; an excessive rate reduces its accuracy. =(c) the character of the target influences both volume and accuracy.= larger dimensions, greater visibility, and shorter range increase the rate of fire; greater density increases =the effect=. =(d) training and discipline= have an important bearing on the rate or volume of fire, but their greatest influence is upon accuracy. the firing efficiency of troops is reduced by fatigue and adverse psychological influences. =(e) fire direction and control improve collective accuracy.= the importance of fire direction increases rapidly with the range. control exerts a powerful influence at all ranges. ( ) fire direction and control opening fire = . long range fire, when effective.= beyond effective ranges important results can be expected only when the target is large and distinct and much ammunition is used. long range fire is permissible in pursuit on account of the moral effect of any fire under the circumstances. at other times such fire is of doubtful value. ( ) = . opening fire in attack.= in attack, the desire to open fire when losses are first felt must be repressed. considerations of time, target, ammunition, and morale make it imperative that the attack withhold its fire and press forward to a first firing position close to the enemy. the attacker's target will be smaller and fainter than the one he presents to the enemy. ( ) = . opening fire in defense.= in defense, more ammunition is available, ranges are more easily determined, and the enemy usually presents a larger target. the defender may therefore open fire and expect results at longer ranges than the attacker, and particularly if the defenders intend a delaying action only. if the enemy has a powerful artillery, it will often be best for the defending infantry to withhold its fire until the enemy offers a specially favorable target. vigorous and well-directed bursts of fire are then employed. the troops should therefore be given as much artificial protection as time and means permit, and at an agreed signal expose themselves as much as necessary and open fire. ( ) = . opening fire in unexpected, close encounters.= in unexpected, close encounters a great advantage accrues to the side which first opens rapid and accurate fire with battle sight. ( ) use of ground = . requisites of ground for cover.= the position of the firers must afford a suitable field of fire. the ground should permit constant observation of the enemy, and yet enable the men to secure some cover when not actually firing. troops whose target is for the moment hidden by unfavorable ground, either move forward to better ground or seek to execute cross fire on another target. ( ) = . skillful use of ground reduces visibility.= the likelihood of a target being hit depends to a great extent upon its visibility. by skillful use of ground, a firing line may reduce its visibility without loss of fire power. sky lines are particularly to be avoided. ( ) choice of target = . target to be chosen.= the target chosen should be the hostile troops most dangerous to the firers. these will usually be the nearest hostile infantry. when no target is specially dangerous, that one should be chosen which promises the most hits. ( ) = . target not to be changed except for good reason.= frequent changes of target impair the fire effect. random changes to small, unimportant targets impair fire discipline and accomplish nothing. attention should be confined to the main target until substantial reason for change is apparent. ( ) = . flanking fire to be delivered when opportunity offers.= an opportunity to deliver flanking fire, especially against artillery protected in front by shields, is an example warranting change of target and should never be overlooked. such fire demoralizes the troops subjected to it, even if the losses inflicted are small. in this manner a relatively small number of rifles can produce important results. ( ) the range = . importance of correct sight setting.= beyond close range, the correct setting of the rear sight is of primary importance, provided the troops are trained and well in hand. the necessity for correct sight setting increases rapidly with the range. its importance decreases as the quality of the troops decrease, for the error in sight setting, except possibly at very long ranges, becomes unimportant when compared with the error in holding and aiming. ( ) = . determination of ranges.= in attack, distances must usually be estimated and corrections made as errors are observed. mechanical range finders and ranging volleys are practicable at times. in defense, it is generally practicable to measure more accurately the distances to visible objects and to keep a record of them for future use. ( ) distribution of fire and target = . purpose of fire superiority; distribution of fire and target.= the purpose of fire superiority is to get hits whenever possible, but at all events to keep down the enemy's fire and render it harmless. to accomplish this the target must be covered with fire throughout its whole extent. troops who are not fired upon will fire with nearly peacetime accuracy. the target is roughly divided and a part is assigned to each unit. no part of the target is neglected. in attack, by a system of overlapping in assigning targets to platoons, the entire hostile line can be kept under fire even during a rush. (pars. - .) ( ) observation = . observation of target.= the correctness of the sight setting and the distribution of fire over the target can be verified only by careful observation of the target, the adjacent ground, and the effect upon the enemy. ( ) = . observation determines whether fire fight is being properly conducted.= observation only can determine whether the fire fight is being properly conducted. if the enemy's fire is losing in accuracy and effect, the observer realizes that his side is gaining superiority. if the enemy's fire remains or becomes effective and persistent, he realizes that corrective measures are necessary to increase either volume or accuracy, or both. ( ) discipline = . what discipline accomplishes.= discipline makes good direction and control possible and is the distinguishing mark of trained troops. ( ) = . communication on firing line by means of signals.= the discipline necessary in the firing line will be absent unless officers and noncommissioned officers can make their will known to the men. in the company, therefore, communication must be by simple signals which, in the roar of musketry, will attract the attention and convey the correct meaning. ( ) expenditure of ammunition = . use of ammunition in attack.= in attack the supply is more limited than in defense. better judgment must be exercised in expenditure. ordinarily, troops in the firing line of an attack can not expect to have that day more ammunition than they carry into the combat, except such additions as come from the distribution of ammunition of dead and wounded and the surplus brought by reënforcements. ( ) = . true economy in expenditure of ammunition.= when a certain fire effect is required, the necessary ammunition must be expended without hesitation. several hours of firing may be necessary to gain fire superiority. true economy can be practiced only by closing on the enemy, as explained in par. , before first opening fire, and thereafter suspending fire when there is nothing to shoot at. ( ) supporting artillery = . artillery fire principal aid of infantry.= artillery fire is the principal aid to the infantry in gaining and keeping fire superiority, not only by its hits, but by the moral effect it produces on the enemy. ( ) = . functions of artillery fire in attack and defense.= in attack, artillery assists the forward movement of the infantry. it keeps down the fire of the hostile artillery and seeks to neutralize the hostile infantry by inflicting losses upon it, destroying its morale, driving it to cover, and preventing it from using its weapons effectively. in defense, it ignores the hostile artillery when the enemy's attack reaches a decisive stage and assists in checking the attack, joining its fire power to that of the defending infantry. ( ) = . fire of artillery over friendly troops.= troops should be accustomed to being fired over by friendly artillery and impressed with the fact that the artillery should continue firing upon the enemy until the last possible moment. the few casualties resulting from shrapnel bursting short are trifling compared with those that would result from the increased effectiveness of the enemy's infantry fire were the friendly artillery to cease firing. casualties inflicted by supporting artillery are not probable until the opposing infantry lines are less than yards apart. ( ) = . when no longer safe for artillery to fire over friendly troops.= when the distance between the hostile infantry lines becomes so short as to render further use of friendly artillery inadvisable, the commander of the infantry firing line, using a preconcerted signal,[ ] informs the artillery commander. the latter usually increases the range in order to impede the strengthening of the enemy's foremost line, as explained in pars. - . ( ) fire of position = . fire of position, when used.= infantry is said to execute fire of position when it is posted so as to assist an attack by firing over the heads, or off the flank, of the attacking troops and is not itself to engage in the advance; or when, in defense, it is similarly posted to augment the fire of the main firing line. machine guns serve a like purpose, as set forth in par. . in a decisive action, fire of position should be employed whenever the terrain permits and reserve infantry is available. ( ) deployment = . formation of troops before and during deployment.= troops are massed preparatory to deployment when the nature of their deployment can not be foreseen or it is desirable to shorten the column or to clear the road. otherwise, in the deployment of large commands, whether in march column, in bivouac, or massed, and whether forming, for attack or for defense, they are ordinarily first formed into a line of columns to facilitate the extension of the front prior to deploying. the rough line or lines of columns thus formed enable troops to take advantage of the terrain in advancing and shorten the time occupied in forming the firing line. ( ) = . action of brigade and regimental commanders in deployment of division.= in deploying the division, each brigade is assigned a definite task or objective. on receipt of his orders, the brigade commander conducts his brigade in column or in line of regiments, until it is advisable that it be broken into smaller columns. he then issues his order, assigning to each regiment its task, if practicable. in a similar manner the regimental commanders lead their regiments forward in column, or in line of columns, until the time arrives for issuing the regimental order. it is seldom advisable to break up the battalion before issuing orders for its deployment. ( ) = . personal reconnaissance before deployment.= each subordinate commander, after receiving his order for the action, should precede his command as far as possible, in order to reconnoiter the ground personally, and should prepare to issue his orders promptly. ( ) = . each commander to guard his command against surprise.= each commander of a column directs the necessary reconnaissance to front and flanks; by this means and by a judicious choice of ground he guards against surprise. ( ) = . premature formation of firing line to be avoided.= the premature formation of the firing line causes unnecessary fatigue and loss of time, and may result in a faulty direction being taken. troops once deployed make even minor changes of direction with difficulty, and this difficulty increases with the length of the firing line. ( ) = . rectification of deployment in wrong direction.= in the larger units, when the original deployment is found to be in the wrong direction, it will usually be necessary to deploy the reserve on the correct front and withdraw and assemble the first line. ( ) = . number of troops to be deployed in beginning.= to gain decisive results, it will generally be necessary to use all the troops at some stage of the combat. but in the beginning, while the situation is uncertain, care should be taken not to engage too large a proportion of the command. on the other hand, there is no greater error than to employ too few and to sacrifice them by driblets. (for division of the battalion in attack see - .) ( ) = . dense, well-directed, and controlled line of heavy fire gives fire superiority.= when it is intended to fight to a decision, fire superiority is essential. to gain this, two things are necessary: a heavy fire and a fire well-directed and controlled. both of these are best obtained when the firing line is as dense as practicable, while leaving the men room for the free use of their rifles. if the men are too widely separated, direction and control are very difficult, often impossible, and the intensity of fire is slight in proportion to the front occupied. ( ) = . density of man per yard; occupation of only sections of long lines.= in an attack or stubborn defense the firing line should have a density of one man per yard of front occupied. where the tactical situation demands the holding of a line too long to be occupied throughout at this density, it is generally better to deploy companies or platoons at one man per yard, leaving gaps in the line between them, than to distribute the men uniformly at increased intervals. ( ) = . use of thin firing line.= a relatively thin firing line may be employed when merely covering the movements of other forces; when on the defensive against poor troops; when the final action to be taken has not yet been determined; and, in general, when fire superiority is not necessary. ( ) = . length of firing line employed by whole force; strength of supports and reserves; density of charging line.= the length of the firing line that the whole force may employ depends upon the density of the line and the strength in rear required by the situation. supports and reserves constitute the strength in rear. in a decisive attack they should be at least strong enough to replace a heavy loss in the original firing line and to increase the charging line to a density of at least one and one-half men per yard and still have troops in rear for protection and for the other purposes mentioned above. ( ) = . strength of reserve; troops deployed varying from to men per yard.= in the original deployment the strength of the reserve held out by each commander comprises from one-sixth to two-thirds of his unit, depending upon the nature of the service expected of the reserve. a small force in a covering or delaying action requires very little strength in rear, while a large force fighting a decisive battle requires much. therefore, depending upon circumstances, the original deployment, including the strength in rear, may vary from to men per yard. against an enemy poorly disciplined and trained, or lacking in morale, a thinner deployment is permissible. ( ) = . density of whole deployment varies with size of command.= the density of the whole deployment increases with the size of the command, because the larger the command the greater the necessity for reserves. thus, battalion acting alone may attack two men per yard of front, but a regiment, with three battalions, may only double the front of the one battalion. ( ) = . division of battle line into battle districts and density of deployment therein.= by the assignment of divisions or larger units to parts of a line of battle several miles long, a series of semi-independent battle, or local combat, districts are created. the general deployment for a long line of battle comprising several battle districts is not directly considered in these regulations. the deployments treated of herein are those of the infantry within such districts. the density of deployment in these districts may vary greatly, depending upon the activity expected in each. within these battle districts, as well as in smaller forces acting alone, parts of the line temporarily of less importance may be held weakly, in order to economize troops and to have more at the decisive point. ( ) = . extent of front occupied by a unit depends upon security of flanks.= the front that a unit may occupy when deployed depends also upon whether its flanks are secured. if both flanks are secured by other troops, the unit may increase its front materially by reducing its reserve or supports. if only one flank is so secured, the front may still be somewhat increased, but the exposed flank must be guarded by posting the supports or reserve toward that flank. natural obstacles that secure the flanks have practically the same effect upon deployment. ( ) = . regiments, battalions, and companies deployed side by side.= except when assigned as supports or reserve, regiments in the brigade, battalions in the regiment, and companies in the battalion are, when practicable, deployed side by side. ( ) = . battalions furnish firing line and supports; larger units furnish reserves; employment of reserve.= in the deployment, battalions establish the firing line, each furnishing its own support. in each unit larger than the battalion a reserve is held out, its strength depending upon circumstances. in general, the reserve is employed by the commander to meet or improve conditions brought about by the action of the firing line. it must not be too weak or too split up. it must be posted where the commander believes it will be needed for decisive action, or where he desires to bring about such action. when necessary, parts of it reënforce or prolong the firing line. ( ) attack (for the battalion in attack, see pars. - ) = . fire superiority means success; how to obtain fire superiority.= an attack is bound to succeed if fire superiority is gained and properly used. to gain this superiority generally requires that the attack employ more rifles than the defense; this in turn means a longer line, as both sides will probably hold a strong firing line. ( ) = . when frontal attack may be successful.= with large forces, a direct frontal attack gives the attacker little opportunity to bring more rifles to bear. however, if the enemy is unduly extended, a frontal attack may give very decisive results. ( ) = . when turning movements are allowable.= owing to the difficulty of control and the danger of the parts being defeated in detail, wide turning movements are seldom allowable except in large forces. ( ) = . advantages of enveloping attack.= if the attack can be so directed that, while the front is covered, another fraction of the command strikes a flank more or less obliquely (an enveloping attack), the advantages gained are a longer line and more rifles in action; also a converging fire opposed to the enemy's diverging fire. ( ) = . envelopment of both flanks.= an envelopment of both flanks should never be attempted without a very decided superiority in numbers. ( ) = . enveloping attacks result in local frontal attacks; advantage of envelopment.= the enveloping attack will nearly always result locally in a frontal attack, for it will be met by the enemy's reserve. the advantage of envelopment lies in the longer concentric line, with its preponderance of rifles and its converging fire. ( ) = . coöperation between frontal and enveloping attacks; the two attacks to be deployed considerable distance from hostile positions.= coöperation between the frontal and enveloping attacks is essential to success. both should be pushed vigorously and simultaneously, and ordinarily both should move simultaneously to the charge; but at the final stage of the attack conditions may sometimes warrant one in charging while the other supports it with fire. the envelopment of a flank is brought about with difficulty when made by troops already deployed in another direction or by their reserves. the two attacks should be deployed at a suitable distance apart, with the lines of attack converging in rear of the hostile position. the troops that are to make the enveloping attack should deploy in the proper direction at the start and should be given orders which enable them to gain their point of deployment in the most direct and practical manner. the enveloping attack is generally made the stronger, especially in small forces. ( ) deployment for attack = . distance from hostile position at which deployment is made; foreground to be cleared of hostile detachments before deployment.= where open terrain exposes troops to hostile artillery fire it may be necessary to make the deployment miles or more from the hostile position. the foreground should be temporarily occupied by covering troops. if the enemy occupies the foreground with detachments, the covering troops must drive them back. ( ) = . moving well forward and deploying at night.= to enable large forces to gain ground toward the enemy, it may sometimes be cheaper and quicker in the end to move well forward and to deploy at night. in such case the area in which the deployment is to be made should, if practicable, be occupied by covering troops before dark. the deployment will be made with great difficulty unless the ground has been studied by daylight. the deployment gains little unless it establishes the firing line well within effective range of the enemy's main position. (see night operations, par. - .) ( ) = . each unit deploys on its direction line; intervals between battalions on firing line.= each unit assigned a task deploys when on its direction line, or opposite its objective, and when it has no longer sufficient cover for advancing in close order. in the firing line, intervals of to yards should be maintained as long as possible between battalions. in the larger units it may be necessary to indicate on the map the direction or objective, but to battalion commanders it should be pointed out on the ground. ( ) = . post of reserve; reserve charged with flank protection.= the reserve is kept near enough to the firing line to be on hand at the decisive stage. it is posted with reference to the attack, or to that part of the attacking line, from which the greater results are expected; it is also charged with flank protection, but should be kept intact. supports are considered in paragraphs to , inclusive, and to , inclusive. ( ) advancing the attack = . firing line to advance as far as possible before opening fire.= the firing line must ordinarily advance a long distance before it is justified in opening fire. it can not combat the enemy's artillery, and it is at a disadvantage if it combats the defender's long-range rifle fire. hence it ignores both and, by taking full advantage of cover and of the discipline of the troops, advances to a first firing position at the shortest range possible, as explained in par. . formations for crossing this zone with the minimum loss are considered in paragraphs to , inclusive. these and other methods of crossing such zones should be studied and practiced. ( ) = . invisibility best protection while advancing.= the best protection against loss while advancing is to escape the enemy's view. ( ) = . advance of battalions.= each battalion finds its own firing position, conforming to the general advance as long as practicable and taking advantage of the more advanced position of an adjacent battalion in order to gain ground. the position from which the attack opens fire is further considered in paragraphs - , inclusive. ( ) = . infantry moving to the attack passing through deployed artillery.= it will frequently become necessary for infantry moving to the attack to pass through deployed artillery. this should be done so as to interfere as little as possible with the latter's fire, and never so as to cause that fire to cease entirely. as far as practicable, advantage should be taken of intervals in the line, if any. an understanding between artillery and infantry commanders should be had, so as to effect the movement to the best advantage. ( ) = . advanced elements of firing line not to open fire on main hostile position.= in advancing the attack, advanced elements of the firing line or detachments in front of it should not open fire except in defense or to clear the foreground of the enemy. fire on the hostile main position should not be opened until all or nearly all of the firing line can join in the fire. ( ) the fire attack (see pars. - .) = . fire superiority sought at first firing position, and to be maintained until charging point is reached; size of rushing units.= at the first firing position the attack seeks to gain fire superiority. this may necessitate a steady, accurate fire a long time. the object is to subdue the enemy's fire and keep it subdued so that the attacking troops may advance from this point to a favorable place near the enemy from which the charge may be made. hence, in the advance by rushes, sufficient rifles must be kept constantly in action to keep down the enemy's fire; this determines the size of the fraction rushing. ( ) = . futility of advancing without fire superiority.= to advance without fire superiority against a determined defense would result in such losses as to bring the attack to a standstill or to make the apparent success barren of results. ( ) = . signs that fire superiority has been gained.= diminution of the enemy's fire and a pronounced loss in effectiveness are the surest signs that fire superiority has been gained and that a part of the firing line can advance. ( ) = . retiring under fire in daylight suicidal; intrenching.= the men must be impressed with the fact that, having made a considerable advance under fire and having been checked, it is suicidal to turn back in daylight. if they can advance no farther, they must intrench and hold on until the fall of darkness or a favorable turn in the situation develops. intrenching is resorted to only when necessary. troops who have intrenched themselves under fire are moved forward again with difficulty. ( ) = . supports and reserves occupying trenches vacated by firing line, to improve same.= supports and reserves occupying intrenchments vacated by the firing line should improve them, but they must not be held back or diverted from their true missions on this account. ( ) = . greater detail of conduct of fire attack.= paragraphs to , inclusive, deal more in detail with the conduct of the fire attack. ( ) the charge (see pars. - ) = . what fire superiority accomplishes; psychological moment for charge determined by tactical instinct.= fire superiority beats down the enemy's fire, destroys his resistance and morale, and enables the attacking troops to close on him, but an actual or threatened occupation of his position is needed to drive him out and defeat him. the psychological moment for the charge can not be determined far in advance. the tactical instinct of the responsible officer must decide. ( ) = . when, and distance over which charge should be made.= the defenders, if subjugated by the fire attack, will frequently leave before the charge begins. on the other hand, it may be necessary to carry the fire attack close to the position and follow it up with a short dash and a bayonet combat. hence the distance over which the charge may be made will vary between wide limits. it may be from to yards. the charge should be made at the earliest moment that promises success; otherwise the full advance of victory will be lost. ( ) = . charge to be made with approval of commander of attacking line; battalion commanders signal commander of line when ready to charge; charge to be made simultaneously.= the commander of the attacking line should indicate his approval, or give the order, before the charge is made. subordinate commanders, usually battalion commanders, whose troops are ready to charge, signal that fact to the commander. it may be necessary for them to wait until other battalions or other parts of the line are ready or until the necessary reserves arrive. at the signal for the charge the firing line and nearby supports and reserves rush forward. (see pars. and .) the charge is made simultaneously, if possible, by all the units participating therein, but once committed to the assault, battalions should be pushed with the utmost vigor and no restraint placed on the ardor of charging troops by an attempt to maintain alignment. ( ) = . charge not to be made without sufficient troops; reserves give impetus; avoiding too dense a mass.= before ordering the charge the commander should see that enough troops are on hand to make it a success. local reserves joining the firing line in time to participate in the charge give it a strong impetus. too dense a mass should be avoided. ( ) = . line to be strengthened by prolongation.= the line should be strengthened by prolongation, if practicable, and remaining troops kept in formation for future use; but rather than that the attack should fail, the last formed body will be sent in, unless it is very apparent that it can do no good. ( ) = . additional force for pursuit.= to arrive in the hostile position with a very compact firing line and a few formed supports is sufficient for a victory, but an additional force kept well in hand for pursuit is of inestimable value. ( ) = . premature charge to be avoided; charging without authority from the rear.= a premature charge by a part of the line should be avoided, but if begun, the other parts of the line should join at once if there is any prospect of success. under exceptional conditions a part of the line may be compelled to charge without authority from the rear. the intention to do so should be signaled to the rear. ( ) = . confidence in ability to use bayonet.= confidence in their ability to use the bayonet gives the assaulting troops the promise of success. ( ) = . pursuing fire; disordered units not to pursue.= if the enemy has left the position when the charging troops reach it, the latter should open a rapid fire upon the retreating enemy, if he is in sight. it is not advisable for the mixed and disordered units to follow him, except to advance to a favorable firing position or to cover the reorganization of others. ( ) = . pursuing troops; reorganization of charging line; preparations to meet counter-attack.= the nearest formed bodies accompanying or following the charge are sent instantly in pursuit. under cover of these troops order is restored in the charging line. if the captured position is a part of a general line or is an advanced post, it should be intrenched and occupied at once. the exhaustion of officers and men must not cause the neglect of measures to meet a counter-attack. ( ) = . steps to be taken when attack receives temporary setback.= if the attack receives a temporary setback and it is intended to strengthen and continue it, officers will make every effort to stop the rearward movement and will reëstablish the firing line in a covered position as close as possible to the enemy. ( ) = . steps to be taken if attack is abandoned.= if the attack must be abandoned, the rearward movement should continue with promptness until the troops reach a feature of the terrain that facilitates the task of checking and reorganizing them. the point selected should be so far to the rear as to prevent interference by the enemy before the troops are ready to resist. the withdrawal of the attacking troops should be covered by the artillery and by reserves, if any are available. (see night operations, pars. - .) ( ) pursuit = . full fruits of victory reaped by pursuit.= to reap the full fruits of victory a vigorous pursuit must be made. the natural inclination to be satisfied with a successful charge must be overcome. the enemy must be allowed no more time to reorganize than is positively unavoidable. ( ) = . parts played in pursuit by reserve, artillery, and charging troops.= the part of the reserve that is still formed or is best under control is sent forward in pursuit and vigorously attacks the enemy's main body or covering detachments wherever found. the artillery delivers a heavy fire upon the retreating enemy; the disordered attacking troops secure the position, promptly reform and become a new reserve. ( ) = . strengthening of position captured, if section of general line.= if the captured position is a section of the general line, the breach should be heavily occupied, made wider, and strongly secured by drawing on all reserves in the vicinity. ( ) = . pursuit by parallel roads.= after the pursuit from the immediate battlefield, pursuit by parallel roads is especially effective where large commands are concerned. ( ) = . artillery and cavalry in pursuit.= artillery and cavalry are very effective in pursuit. ( ) attack of fortifications = . modifications of attack in case of fortifications.= few modifications enter into the problem of attacking fortifications. such as are to be considered relate chiefly to the greater time and labor of advancing, the more frequent use of darkness and the use of hand grenades to augment the fire. ( ) = . approaching charging point under cover of darkness.= if the enemy is strongly fortified and time permits, it may be advisable to wait and approach the charging point under cover of darkness. the necessary reconnaissance and arrangements should be made before dark. if the charge is not to be made at once, the troops intrench the advanced position, using sand bags if necessary. before daylight the foreground should be cleared of obstacles. ( ) = . charging without fire preparation.= if the distance is short and other conditions are favorable, the charge may be made without fire preparation. if made, it should be launched with spirit and suddenness at the break of day. (see night operations pars. - .) ( ) = . advancing to charging point by sapping.= in siege operations troops are usually advanced to the charging point by sapping. this method, however, presupposes that an early victory is not necessary, or that it is clearly inadvisable to attempt more direct methods. ( ) holding attack = . requisites of the holding attack.= the holding attack must be vigorous enough to hold the enemy in position and must present a front strong enough to conceal the secondary nature of the attack. the holding attack need have comparatively little strength in rear, but conceals the fact by a firing line not distinguishable from that of a decisive attack. ( ) = . post and strength of supports and reserves.= supports and reserves are kept at short distances. their strength is less if the object is merely to hold the enemy fast than if the object is, in addition, to compel him to use up reserves. ( ) = . holding attacks developing into decisive attacks.= holding attacks which may later develop into decisive attacks should be correspondingly strong in rear. ( ) = . feint attacks.= all feint attacks should employ dense firing lines. their weakness is in rear and is concealed. ( ) defense positions and intrenchments = . requirements of a good defensive position.= the first requirement of a good position is a clear field of fire and view to the front and exposed flanks to a distance of to yards or more. the length of front should be suitable to the size of the command and the flanks should be secure. the position should have lateral communication and cover for supports and reserves. it should be one which the enemy can not avoid, but must attack or give up his mission. a position having all these advantages will rarely, if ever, be found. the one should be taken which conforms closest to the description. ( ) = . utilization of natural cover; construction of fieldworks and obstacles.= the natural cover of the position should be fully utilized. in addition, it should be strengthened by fieldworks and obstacles. the best protection is afforded by deep, narrow, inconspicuous trenches. if little time is available, as much as practicable must be done. that the fieldworks may not be needed should not cause their construction to be omitted, and the fact that they have been constructed should not influence the action of a commander, if conditions are found to be other than expected. ( ) = . construction of communicating and cover trenches, head cover, etc.= when time and troops are available the preparations include the necessary communicating and cover trenches, head cover, bombproofs, etc. the fire trenches should be well supplied with ammunition. the supports are placed close at hand in cover trenches when natural cover is not available. ( ) = . dummy trenches.= dummy trenches frequently cause the hostile artillery to waste time and ammunition and to divert its fire. ( ) = . location, extent, garrison, etc., of fieldworks.= the location, extent, profile, garrison, etc., of fieldworks are matters to be decided by the infantry commanders. officers must be able to choose ground and properly intrench it. (see "field fortifications," chapter xvi, part iii.) ( ) = . outlining trace of trenches in combat exercises.= in combat exercises, when it is impracticable to construct the trenches appropriate to the exercise, their trace may be outlined by bayonets, sticks, or other markers, and the responsible officers required to indicate the profile selected, method and time of construction, garrisons, etc. ( ) deployment for defense = . density of whole deployment.= the density of the whole deployment depends upon the expected severity of the action, the character of the enemy, the condition of the flanks, the field of fire, the terrain, and the available artificial or natural protection for the troops. ( ) = . density of firing line.= if exposed, the firing line should be as dense in defense as in attack. if the firing line is well intrenched and has a good field of fire, it may be made thinner. weaker supports are permissible. for the same number of troops the front occupied on the defensive may therefore be longer than on the offensive, the battalions placing more companies in the firing line. ( ) = . strength in rear to be increased when change from defensive to offensive is contemplated.= if it is intended only to delay the enemy, a fairly strong deployment is sufficient, but if decisive results are desired, a change to the offensive must be contemplated and the corresponding strength in rear provided. this strength is in the reserve, which should be as large as the demands of the firing line and supports permit. even in a passive defense the reserve should be as strong as in the attack; unless the flanks are protected by other means. ( ) = . post of supports; cover for supports.= supports are posted as close to the firing line as practicable and reinforce the latter according to the principles explained in the attack. when natural cover is not sufficient for the purpose, communicating and cover trenches are constructed. if time does not permit their construction, it is better to begin the action with a very dense firing line and no immediate supports than to have supports greatly exposed in rear. ( ) = . post of reserve.= the reserve should be posted so as to be entirely free to act as a whole, according to the developments. the distance from firing line to reserve is generally greater than in the attack. by reason of such a location the reserve is best able to meet a hostile enveloping attack; it has a better position from which to make a counter attack; it is in a better position to cover a withdrawal and permit an orderly retreat. the distance from firing line to reserve increases with the size of the reserve. ( ) = . post of reserve when situation is no longer in doubt.= when the situation is no longer in doubt, the reserve should be held in rear of the flank which is most in danger or offers the best opportunity for counter attack. usually the same flank best suits both purposes. ( ) = . detaching part of reserve to protect opposite flank.= in exceptional cases, on broad fronts, it may be necessary to detach a part of the reserve to protect the opposite flank. this detachment should be the smallest consistent with its purely protective mission. ( ) = . assignment of front to units.= the commander assigns to subordinates the front to be occupied by them. these, in turn, subdivide the front among their next lower units in the firing line. ( ) = . division of extended position into sections.= an extended position is so divided into sections that each has, if practicable, a field of fire naturally made distinct by the terrain. unfavorable and unimportant ground will ordinarily cause gaps to exist in the line. ( ) = . size of units occupying sections; battalions to be kept intact.= the size of the unit occupying each section depends upon the latter's natural strength, front, and importance. if practicable, battalions should be kept intact and assigned as units to sections or parts of sections. ( ) = . adjoining sections or machine guns to cover dead space.= where important dead space lies in front of one section, an adjoining section should be instructed to cover it with fire when necessary, or machine guns should be concealed for the like purpose. ( ) = . advanced posts and other dispersion to be avoided.= advanced posts, or any other form of unnecessary dispersion, should be avoided. ( ) = . position itself not fully occupied until infantry attack begins.= unless the difficulty of moving the troops into the position be great, most of the troops of the firing line are held in rear of it until the infantry attack begins. the position itself is occupied by a small garrison only, with the necessary outguards or patrols in front. ( ) = . fire alone unable to stop attack.= fire alone can not be depended upon to stop the attack. the troops must be determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary. ( ) = . steps to be taken if night attack is expected.= if a night attack or close approach by the enemy is expected, troops in a prepared position should strengthen the outguards and firing line and construct as numerous and effective obstacles as possible. supports and local reserves should move close to the firing line and should, with the firing line, keep bayonets fixed. if practicable, the front should be illuminated, preferably from the flanks of the section. ( ) = . short range fire and bayonet in night attack.= only short range fire is of any value in resisting night attacks. the bayonet is the chief reliance. (see night operations pars. - .) ( ) counter attack = . passive defense; only offensive wins.= the passive defense should be assumed only when circumstances force it. only the offensive wins. ( ) = . active defense seeks favorable decision; counter attack necessary.= an active defense seeks a favorable decision. a favorable decision can not be expected without counter attack. ( ) = . protection of flanks by natural obstacles necessary in passive defense position.= a passive defense in a position whose flanks are not protected by natural obstacles is generally out of the question. ( ) = . post of troops for counter attack.= where the defense is assumed with a view to making a counter attack, the troops for the counter attack should be held in reserve until the time arrives for such attack. the defensive line should be held by as few troops as possible in order that the force for the offensive may be as large as possible. the force for the counter attack should be held echeloned in rear of the flank which offers it the greatest advantage for the proposed attack. ( ) = . manner of making counter attack.= the counter attack should be made vigorously and at the proper time. it will usually be made: by launching the reserve against the enemy's flank when his attack is in full progress. this is the most effective form of counter attack. straight to the front by the firing line and supports after repulsing the enemy's attack and demoralizing him with pursuing fire. or, by the troops in rear of the firing line when the enemy has reached the defensive position and is in disorder. ( ) = . minor counter attacks.= minor counter attacks are sometimes necessary in order to drive the enemy from important positions gained by him. ( ) delaying action = . the important considerations in a delaying action.= when a position is taken merely to delay the enemy and to withdraw before becoming closely engaged, the important considerations are: the enemy should be forced to deploy early. the field of fire should therefore be good at distances from to , yards or more; a good field of fire at close range is not necessary. the ground in rear of the position should favor the withdrawal of the firing line by screening the troops from the enemy's view and fire as soon as the position is vacated. ( ) = . thin firing line answers purpose; purposes of supports and reserve.= a thin firing line using much ammunition will generally answer the purpose. supports are needed chiefly to protect the flanks. the reserve should be posted well in rear to assist in the withdrawal of the firing line. ( ) = . value of artillery.= artillery is especially valuable to a delaying force. ( ) meeting engagements = . characteristics of meeting engagements.= meeting engagements are characterized by the necessity for hasty reconnaissance, or the almost total absence of reconnaissance; by the necessity for rapid deployment, frequently under fire; and usually by the absence of trenches or other artificial cover. these conditions give further advantages to the offensive. ( ) = . general action on meeting enemy.= the whole situation will usually indicate beforehand the proper general action to be taken on meeting the enemy. ( ) = . meagerness of information; qualities of commander to be relied upon.= little fresh information can be expected. the boldness, initiative, and determination of the commander must be relied upon. ( ) = . meeting engagement affords ideal opportunity to certain commanders.= a meeting engagement affords an ideal opportunity to the commander who has intuition and quick decision and who is willing to take long chances. his opponent is likely to be overcautious. ( ) = . the mission determines method of attack.= the amount of information that the commander is warranted in awaiting before taking final action depends entirely upon his mission. one situation may demand a blind attack; another may demand rapid, partial deployment for attack, but careful and time-consuming reconnaissance before the attack is launched. ( ) = . advantage accrues to side deploying the faster.= a great advantage accrues to the side which can deploy the faster. the advantage of a close-order formation, favoring rapid deployment, becomes more pronounced with the size of the force. ( ) = . advantages of first troops to deploy.= the first troops to deploy will be able to attack with longer firing lines and weaker supports than are required in the ordinary case. but if the enemy succeeds in deploying a strong defensive line, the attack must be strengthened accordingly before it is wasted. ( ) = . things to be done by the leading troops.= if the situation warrants the advance, the leading troops seek to deploy faster than the enemy, to reach his flanks, check his deployment, and get information. in any event, they seek to cover the deployment of their own troops in rear--especially the artillery--and to seize important ground. ( ) = . post of commander of long column meeting enemy; function of advance guard; action of column.= the commander of a long column which meets the enemy should be with the advance guard to receive information promptly and to reconnoiter. if he decides to fight, the advance guard must hold the enemy while the commander formulates a plan of action, issues the necessary orders, and deploys the main body. meantime, the column should be closing up, either in mass or to form line of columns, so that the deployment, when determined upon, may be made more promptly. ( ) = . action of advance guard prior to receipt of orders.= the action of the advance guard, prior to the receipt of orders, depends upon the situation. whether to attack determinedly or only as a feint, or to assume the defensive, depends upon the strength of the advance guard, the terrain, the character of the hostile force encountered, and the mission and intentions of the commander of the whole. ( ) = . main body should be used as a whole and not put into action piecemeal.= if the enemy is beforehand or more aggressive, or if the advance guard is too weak, it may be necessary to put elements of the main body into action as fast as they arrive, in order to check him. this method should be avoided; it prevents the formation and execution of a definite plan and compels piecemeal action. the best results are obtained when the main body is used as a whole. ( ) withdrawal from action = . withdrawal generally effected at heavy cost; rear guard and distance to be placed between enemy and defeated troops.= the withdrawal of a defeated force can generally be effected only at a heavy cost. when it is no longer possible to give the action a favorable turn and the necessity for withdrawal arises, every effort must be made to place distance and a rear guard between the enemy and the defeated troops. ( ) = . use of artillery, machine guns, and cavalry.= artillery gives especially valuable assistance in the withdrawal. the long-range fire of machine guns should also be employed. cavalry assists the withdrawal by charging the pursuing troops or by taking flank positions and using fire action. ( ) = . use of reserve to check the pursuit.= if an intact reserve remains, it should be placed in a covering position, preferably on a flank, to check the pursuit and thus enable the defeated troops to withdraw beyond reach of hostile fire. the covering position of the reserve should be at some distance from the main action, but close enough to bring the withdrawing troops quickly under the protection of its fire. it should have a good field of fire at effective and long ranges and should facilitate its own safe and timely withdrawal. ( ) = . part of line to be withdrawn first; retreating troops to be gotten under control as soon as possible.= if the general line is divided, by terrain or by organization, into two or more parts, the firing line of the part in the least danger from pursuit should be withdrawn first. a continuous firing line, whose parts are dependent upon one another for fire support, should be withdrawn as a whole, retiring by echelon at the beginning of the withdrawal. every effort must be made to restore the organizations, regain control, and form column of march as soon as the troops are beyond the reach of hostile fire. as fast as possible without delaying the march, companies, and the larger units should be reformed, so that the command will again be well in hand. ( ) = . action taken by commander; selection of rendezvous point.= the commander of the whole, having given orders for withdrawal, should go to the rear, select a rendezvous point, and devote himself to the reorganization of his command. the rendezvous point is selected with regard to the natural channels of movement approximately straight to the rear. it should be distant from the battlefield and should facilitate the gathering and protection of the command. ( ) summary = .= . avoid combats that offer no chance of victory or other valuable results. . make every effort for the success of the general plan and avoid spectacular plays that have no bearing on the general result. . have a definite plan and carry it out vigorously. do not vacillate. . do not attempt complicated maneuvers. . keep the command in hand; avoid undue extension and dispersion. . study the ground and direct the advance in such a way as to take advantage of all available cover and thereby diminish losses. . never deploy until the purpose and the proper direction are known. . deploy enough men for the immediate task in hand; hold out the rest and avoid undue haste in committing them to the action. . flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the terrain. . in a decisive action, gain and keep fire superiority. . keep up reconnaissance. . use the reserve, but not until needed or a very favorable opportunity for its use presents itself. keep some reserve as long as practicable. . do not hesitate to sacrifice the command if the result is worth the cost. . spare the command all unnecessary hardship and exertion. ( ) machine guns = . machine guns are weapons of emergency.= machine guns must be considered as weapons of emergency. their effectiveness combined with their mobility renders them of great value at critical, though infrequent, periods of an engagement. ( ) = . machine guns to be used for short periods, when opportunities present themselves.= when operating against infantry only, they can be used to a great extent throughout the combat as circumstances may indicate, but they are quickly rendered powerless by efficient field artillery and will promptly draw artillery fire whenever they open. hence their use in engagements between large commands must be for short periods and at times when their great effectiveness will be most valuable. ( ) = . machine guns attached to advance guard; use in meeting engagements.= machine guns should be attached to the advance guard. in meeting engagements they will be of great value in assisting their own advance, or in checking the advance of the enemy, and will have considerable time to operate before hostile artillery fire can silence them. care must be taken not to leave them too long in action. ( ) = . use of machine guns with rear guard.= they are valuable to a rear guard which seeks to check a vigorous pursuit or to gain time. ( ) = . machine guns in attack; fire of position.= in attack, if fire of position is practicable, they are of great value. in this case fire should not be opened by the machine guns until the attack is well advanced. at a critical period in the attack, such fire, if suddenly and unexpectedly opened, will greatly assist the advancing line. the fire must be as heavy as possible and must be continued until masked by friendly troops or until the hostile artillery finds the machine guns. ( ) = . machine guns in defense.= in the defense, machine guns should be used in the same general manner as described above for the attack. concealment and patient waiting for critical moments and exceptional opportunities are the special characteristics of the machine-gun service in decisive actions. ( ) = . machine guns as part of reserve; use in covering withdrawal.= as part of the reserve, machine guns have special importance. if they are with the troops told off to protect the flanks, and if they are well placed, they will often produce decisive results against a hostile turning movement. they are especially qualified to cover a withdrawal or make a captured position secure. ( ) = . machine guns not to form part of firing line of attack.= machine guns should not be assigned to the firing line of an attack. they should be so placed that fire directed upon them is not likely to fall upon the firing line. ( ) = . effectiveness of machine guns against skirmish line, except when lying down or crawling.= a skirmish line can not advance by walking or running when hostile machine guns have the correct range and are ready to fire. machine-gun fire is not specially effective against troops lying on the ground or crawling. ( ) = . silencing of machine guns by infantry.= when opposed by machine guns without artillery to destroy them, infantry itself must silence them before it can advance. an infantry command that must depend upon itself for protection against machine guns should concentrate a large number of rifles on each gun in turn and until it has silenced it. ( ) _in addition to the above, which the infantry drill regulations gives on the subject of machine guns, the following, based on the use of machine guns in the european war, is given:_ = . machine guns essentially automatic rifles.= they are essentially automatic rifles, designed to fire the ordinary rifle cartridge and capable of delivering a stream of small bullets at a rate of as high as per minute. experience in the european war has determined that the rate of shots per minute is the desirable maximum. their ranges are the same as for the rifle. the fire of a machine gun has been estimated as equal to that of men. = . mounts.= machine guns are usually mounted on tripods or wheels. the weight of certain types is such that they can readily be carried by the soldier from one point to another. = . methods of transportation.= while machine guns are usually designed to be carried or packed, they are easily adapted to various methods of transportation. in the european war we find them mounted on sleds during the winter campaign; on specially designed motor cycles with side cars and accompanied by other motor cycles carrying ammunition; on wheels; on wagons; on armored automobiles; aeroplanes; and finally in the powerful "tanks" of the english. = . concealment.= machine guns while usually considered as _weapons of emergency_ have been used in attack and defense in the european war in all stages. their mobility and deadly effect have made them of great value. once their position is discovered they are quickly put out of action by artillery. owing to this fact the armies in europe have used alternative positions and have used every means to conceal the guns. hedges, walls, and pits are used and every effort is used to conceal the flame of discharge. this is usually accomplished by keeping the muzzle well in rear of its cover or loop hole. machine guns almost invariably betray their positions as soon as they enter into action. the present tendency seems to be to hold them concealed and place them into position in the trenches or emplacements at the moment of combat. extraordinary means have been resorted to in hiding the guns until they are needed. in the german line, dugouts underground were constructed to conceal the machine guns and crews. often they permitted the first line of the attack to pass over them and then appeared in rear and opened a deadly fire on the backs of the troops. = . use in villages.= in villages, machine guns were used with terrible effect, firing from cellars or windows. the only successful method of destroying them was with hand grenades and even this was costly. = . location on the defense.= on the _defense_ machine guns should be mounted in salients and at points where cross fire can be obtained. this makes it more difficult for the enemy to locate the guns. frontal fire is not so often successful. = . location in attack.= in the _attack_ it is accepted that machine guns must cover the infantry at short and long ranges while other machine guns must accompany the attacking troops to hold the positions or trenches gained. the second or third line would seem to be the best position for machine guns when accompanying troops. [illustration: machine gun emplacement: section aa] [illustration: machine gun emplacement: plan with cover removed] = . economy of men.= owing to its rapid and effective fire, and the comparative ease with which it can be concealed, the machine gun permits a great economy of men on a front and the concentrating of the forces thus freed for use in other parts of the field. this was done on a large scale on the russian front by the germans in . they constructed miles of wire entanglements in front of positions occupied with an enormous number of machine guns and comparatively few men. the main forces were thus free to be transported wherever danger threatened. in this manner the germans replaced men by machine guns and wire and were able to cope successfully with the immense russian armies. the above plate shows a typical machine gun emplacement, constructed in the field. many elaborate emplacements have been constructed in the european war, using steel and concrete, but for a hasty cover in the field the simple emplacement shown in the figure is recommended. (note.--for a more detailed study of machine guns, see subject xi, machine guns in action, school of musketry, fort sill, oklahoma, and combined cavalry and infantry drill regulations for automatic machine rifle, cal. , , war department, .) ammunition supply = . method of supplying ammunition to combat train.= the method of supply of ammunition to the combat trains is explained in field service regulations. ( ) = . combat train and the major's responsibility for its proper use; a rendezvous for each brigade.= the combat train is the immediate reserve supply of the battalion, and the major is responsible for its proper use. he will take measures to insure the maintenance of the prescribed allowance at all times. in the absence of instructions, he will cause the train to march immediately in rear of his battalion, and, upon separating from it to enter an engagement, will cause the ammunition therein to be issued. when emptied, he will direct that the wagons proceed to the proper rendezvous to be refilled. ordinarily a rendezvous is appointed for each brigade and the necessary number of wagons sent forward to it from the ammunition column. ( ) = . destination of combat wagons when refilled.= when refilled, the combat wagons will rejoin their battalions, or, if the latter be engaged, will join or establish communication with the regimental reserve. ( ) = . company commanders' responsibility for ammunition in belts; ammunition of dead and wounded.= company commanders are responsible that the belts of the men in their companies are kept filled at all times, except when the ammunition is being expended in action. in the firing line the ammunition of the dead and wounded should be secured whenever practicable. ( ) = . ammunition in bandoleers and rounds in right pocket section.= ammunition in the bandoleers will ordinarily be expended first. thirty rounds in the right pocket section of the belt will be held as a reserve, to be expended only when ordered by an officer. ( ) = . ammunition sent forward with reënforcements; men not to be sent back from firing line for ammunition.= when necessary to resupply the firing line, ammunition will be sent forward with reënforcements, generally from the regimental reserve. ( ) men will never be sent back from the firing line for ammunition. men sent forward with ammunition remain with the firing line. = . replenishment of ammunition after engagement.= as soon as possible after an engagement the belts of the men and the combat wagons are resupplied to their normal capacities. ammunition which can not be reloaded on combat wagons will be piled up in a convenient place and left under guard. ( ) mounted scouts = . scouts to be trained in patrolling and reconnaissance; their use.= the mounted scouts should be thoroughly trained in patrolling and reconnaissance. they are used for communication with neighboring troops, for patrolling off the route of march, for march outposts, outpost patrols, combat patrols, reconnaissance ahead of columns, etc. their further use is, in general, confined to escort and messenger duty. they should be freely used for all these purposes, but for these purposes only. ( ) = . use of mounted scouts for reconnoitering.= when infantry is acting alone, or when the cavalry of a mixed command has been sent to a distance, the mounted scouts are of special importance to covering detachments and should be used to make the reconnaissance which would otherwise fall to cavalry. ( ) = . scouts to be used in reconnaissance in preference to other troops; use for dismounted patrolling.= in reconnaissance, scouts should be used in preference to other troops as much as possible. when not needed for mounted duty, they should be employed for necessary dismounted patrolling. ( ) = . training of battalion staff officers in patrolling.= battalion staff officers should be specially trained in patrolling and reconnaissance work in order that they may be available when a mounted officer's patrol is required. ( ) night operations = . purposes of night operations.= by employing night operations troops make use of the cover of darkness to minimize losses from hostile fire or to escape observation. night operations may also be necessary for the purpose of gaining time. control is difficult and confusion is frequently unavoidable. it may be necessary to take advantage of darkness in order to assault from a point gained during the day, or to approach a point from which a daylight assault is to be made, or to effect both the approach and the assault. ( ) = . practice in offensive and defensive operations; simple formations.= offensive and defensive night operations should be practiced frequently in order that troops may learn to cover ground in the dark and arrive at a destination quietly and in good order, and in order to train officers in the necessary preparation and reconnaissance. only simple and well-appointed formations should be employed. troops should be thoroughly trained in the necessary details--e. g., night patrolling, night marching, and communication at night. ( ) = . ground to be studied by day and night, cleared of hostile detachments, etc.; preparation of orders; distinctive badges.= the ground to be traversed should be studied by daylight and, if practicable, at night. it should be cleared of hostile detachments before dark, and, if practicable, should be occupied by covering troops. orders must be formulated with great care and clearness. each unit must be given a definite objective and direction, and care must be exercised to avoid collision between units. whenever contact with the enemy is anticipated, a distinctive badge should be worn by all. ( ) = . secrecy of preparations; unfriendly guides; fire action to be avoided, relying upon bayonet.= preparations must be made with secrecy. when the movement is started, and not until then, the officers and men should be acquainted with the general design, the composition of the whole force, and should be given such additional information as will insure coöperation and eliminate mistakes. during the movement every precaution must be taken to keep secret the fact that troops are abroad. unfriendly guides must frequently be impressed. these should be secured against escape, outcry, or deception. fire action should be avoided in offensive operations. in general, pieces should not be loaded. men must be trained to rely upon the bayonet and to use it aggressively. ( ) = . night marches; advance and rear guards.= long night marches should be made only over well-defined routes. march discipline must be rigidly enforced. the troops should be marched in as compact a formation as practicable, with the usual covering detachments. advance and rear guard distances should be greatly reduced. they are shortest when the mission is an offensive one. the connecting files are numerous. ( ) = . night advance followed by attack by day.= a night advance made with a view to making an attack by day usually terminates with the hasty construction of intrenchments in the dark. such an advance should be timed so as to allow an hour or more of darkness for intrenching. an advance that is to terminate in an assault at the break of day should be timed so that the troops will not arrive long before the assault is to be made; otherwise, the advantage of partial surprise will be lost, and the enemy will be allowed to reënforce the threatened point. ( ) = . night attacks, when employed; they require trained troops; compact formations; value of bayonet.= the night attack is ordinarily confined to small forces, or to minor engagements in a general battle, or to seizure of positions occupied by covering or advanced detachments. decisive results are not often obtained. poorly disciplined and untrained troops are unfit for night attacks or for night operations demanding the exercise of skill and care. troops attacking at night can advance close to the enemy in compact formations and without suffering loss from hostile artillery or infantry fire. the defender is ignorant of the strength or direction of the attack. a force which makes a vigorous bayonet charge in the dark will often throw a much larger force into disorder. ( ) = . reconnaissance; attack to be a surprise.= reconnaissance should be made to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to study the terrain to be traversed. officers who are to participate in the attack should conduct this reconnaissance. reconnaissance at night is especially valuable. features that are distinguishable at night should be carefully noted, and their distances from the enemy, from the starting point of the troops, and from other important points should be made known. preparations should have in view as complete a surprise as possible. an attack once begun must be carried to its conclusion, even if the surprise is not as complete as was planned or anticipated. ( ) = . time of making attack depends upon object sought.= the time of night at which the attack should be made depends upon the object sought. if a decisive attack is intended, it will generally yield the best results if made just before daylight. if the object is merely to gain an intrenched position for further operations, an earlier hour is necessary in order that the position gained may be intrenched under cover of darkness. ( ) = . formation; use of bayonet; preparations to repel counter attack.= the formation for attack must be simple. it should be carefully effected and the troops verified at a safe distance from the enemy. the attacking troops should be formed in compact lines and with strong supports at short distances. the reserve should be far enough in rear to avoid being drawn into the action until the commander so desires. bayonets are fixed, pieces are not loaded. darkness causes fire to be wild and ineffective. the attacking troops should march steadily on the enemy without firing, but should be prepared and determined to fight vigorously with the bayonet. in advancing to the attack the aim should be to get as close as possible to the enemy before being discovered, then trust to the bayonet. if the assault is successful, preparations must be made at once to repel a counter attack. ( ) = . measures taken by defense to resist night attacks.= on the defense, preparations to resist night attacks should be made by daylight whenever such attacks are to be feared. obstacles placed in front of a defensive position are especially valuable to the defense at night. many forms of obstacles which would give an attacker little concern in the daytime become serious hindrances at night. after dark the foreground should be illuminated whenever practicable and strong patrols should be pushed to the front. when it is learned that the enemy is approaching, the trenches are filled and the supports moved close to the firing line. supports fix bayonets, but do not load. whenever practicable and necessary, they should be used for counter attacks, preferably against a hostile flank. the defender should open fire as soon as results may be expected. this fire may avert or postpone the bayonet combat, and it warns all supporting troops. it is not likely that fire alone can stop the attack. the defender must be resolved to fight with the bayonet. ordinarily fire will not be effective at ranges exceeding yards. a white rag around the muzzle of the rifle will assist in sighting the piece when the front sight is not visible. see pars. , , , , . ( ) infantry against cavalry = . cavalry charge against infantry usually futile.= a cavalry charge can accomplish little against infantry, even in inferior numbers, unless the latter are surprised, become panic-stricken, run away, or can not use their rifles. ( ) = . measures to check charges from front and flank.= a charge from the front is easily checked by a well directed and sustained fire. if the charge is directed against the flank of the firing line, the supports, reserves, or machine guns should stop it. if this disposition is impracticable, part of the line must meet the charge by a timely change of front. if the flank company, or companies, in the firing line execute =platoons right=, the successive firing lines can ordinarily break a charge against the flank. if the cavalry line passes through the firing line, the latter will be little damaged if the men retain their presence of mind. they should be on the watch for succeeding cavalry lines and leave those that have passed through to friendly troops in rear. ( ) = . standing position best to meet charge.= men standing are in the best position to meet a charge, but other considerations may compel them to meet it lying prone. ( ) = . rifle fire main dependence of infantry.= in a mêlée, the infantryman with his bayonet has at least an even chance with the cavalryman, but the main dependence of infantry is rifle fire. any formation is suitable that permits the free use of the necessary number of rifles. ordinarily there will be no time to change or set sights. fire at will at battle sight should be used, whatever the range may be. it will usually be unwise to open fire at long ranges. ( ) = . meeting of cavalry charge by infantry in column.= an infantry column that encounters cavalry should deploy at once. if attacked from the head or rear of the column, and if time is pressing, it may form a succession of skirmish lines. infantry, by deploying or yards in rear of an obstacle, may check cavalry and hold it under fire beyond effective pistol range. in any situation, to try to escape the issue by running is the worst and most dangerous course the infantry can adopt. ( ) = . infantry attacking dismounted cavalry.= in attacking dismounted cavalry, infantry should close rapidly and endeavor to prevent remounting. infantry which adopts this course will not be seriously checked by delaying cavalry. every effort should be made to locate and open fire on the led horses. ( ) infantry against artillery = . frontal attack against artillery usually futile; use of machine guns.= a frontal attack against artillery has little chance of succeeding unless it can be started from cover at comparatively short range. beyond short range, the frontal fire of infantry has little effect against the artillery personnel because of their protective shields. machine guns, because their cone of fire is more compact, will have greater effect, but on the other hand they will have fewer opportunities, and they are limited to fire attack only. as a rule, one's own artillery is the best weapon against hostile artillery. ( ) = . flank attack against artillery effective.= artillery attacked in flank by infantry can be severely damaged. oblique or flank fire will begin to have decisive effect when delivered at effective range from a point to one side of the artillery's line of fire and distant from it by about half the range. artillery is better protected on the side of the caisson. ( ) = . action against guns out of ammunition.= guns out of ammunition, but otherwise secure against infantry attack, may be immobilized by fire which will prevent their withdrawal, or by locating and driving off their limbers. or they may be kept out of action by fire which will prevent the receipt of ammunition. ( ) = . action against artillery limbering or coming into action; wheel horses best targets.= artillery when limbered is helpless against infantry fire. if caught at effective range while coming into action or while limbering, artillery can be severely punished by infantry fire. in attacking artillery that is trying to escape, the wheel horses are the best targets. ( ) artillery supports = . purpose of artillery support, usually consisting of infantry.= the purpose of the artillery support is to guard the artillery against surprise or attack. artillery on the march or in action is ordinarily so placed as to be amply protected by the infantry. infantry always protects artillery in its neighborhood. ( ) = . detailing of supports.= the detail of a support is not necessary except when the artillery is separated from the main body or occupies a position in which its flanks are not protected. the detail of a special support will be avoided whenever possible. ( .) = . formation of support on march.= the formation of an artillery support depends upon circumstances. on the march it may often be necessary to provide advance, flank, and rear protection. the country must be thoroughly reconnoitered by patrols within long rifle range. ( ) = . formation and location of support in action.= in action, the formation and location of the support must be such as to gain and give timely information of the enemy's approach and to offer actual resistance to the enemy beyond effective rifle range of the artillery's flanks. it should not be close enough to the artillery to suffer from fire directed at the artillery. in most cases a position somewhat to the flank and rear best fulfills these conditions. ( ) = . support charged only with protection of artillery.= the support commander is charged only with the protection of the artillery. the tactical employment of each arm rests with its commander. the two should coöperate. ( ) minor warfare = . what minor warfare embraces; regular operations.= minor warfare embraces both regular and irregular operations. regular operations consist of minor actions involving small bodies of trained and organized troops on both sides. the tactics employed are in general those prescribed for the smaller units. ( ) = . irregular operations.= irregular operations consist of actions against unorganized or partially organized forces, acting independent or semi independent bodies. such bodies have little or only crude training and are under nominal and loose leadership and control. they assemble, roam about, and disperse at will. they endeavor to win by stealth or by force of superior numbers, employing ambuscades, sudden dashes or rushes, and hand-to-hand fighting. ( ) troops operating against such an enemy usually do so in small units, such as platoons, detachments, or companies, and the tactics employed must be adapted to meet the requirements of the situation. frequently the enemy's own methods may be employed to advantage. in general, such operations should not be undertaken hastily; every preparation should be made to strike suddenly and to inflict the maximum punishment. = . march and bivouac formations to admit of rapid action in any direction.= in general, the service of information will be insufficient; adequate reconnaissance will rarely be practicable. march and bivouac formations must be such as to admit of rapid deployment and fire action in any direction. ( ) = . formation in open country.= in the open country, where surprise is not probable, troops may be marched in column of squads preceded, within sight, by a squad as an advance party. ( ) = . formation in close country.= in close country, where surprise is possible, the troops must be held in a close formation. the use of flank patrols becomes difficult. occasionally, an advance party--never less than a squad--may be sent out. in general, however, such a party accomplishes little, since an enemy intent on surprise will permit it to pass unmolested and will fall upon the main body. under such conditions, especially when the road or trail is narrow, the column of twos or files is a convenient formation, the officers placing themselves in the column so as to divide it into nearly equal parts. if rushed from a flank, such a column will be in readiness to face and fire toward either or both flanks, the ranks being back to back; if rushed from the front, the head of the column may be deployed, the rest of the column closing up to support it and to protect its flanks and rear. in any event, the men should be taught to take some form of a closed back to back formation. ( ) = . dividing column on march into two or more separate detachments.= the column may often be broken into two or more approximately equal detachments separated on the march by distances of to yards. as a rule the detachments should not consist of less than men each. with this arrangement of the column, it will rarely be possible for an enemy to close simultaneously with all of the detachments, one or more being left unengaged and under control to support those engaged or to inflict severe punishment upon the enemy when he is repulsed. ( ) = . selection of site for camp or bivouac; protection.= the site for camp or bivouac should be selected with special reference to economical and effective protection against surprise. double sentinels are posted on the avenues of approach, and the troops sleep in readiness for instant action. when practicable, troops should be instructed in advance as to what they are to do in case of attack at night. ( ) = . night operations frequently advisable.= night operations are frequently advisable. with the small forces employed, control is not difficult. irregular troops rarely provide proper camp protection, and they may frequently be surprised and severely punished by a properly conducted night march and attack. ( ) ceremonies general rules for ceremonies = . order in which troops are arranged for ceremonies; commander faces command; subordinates face to front.= the order in which the troops of the various arms are arranged for ceremonies is prescribed by army regulations. when forming for ceremonies the companies of the battalion and the battalions of the regiment are posted from right to left in line and from head to rear in column, in the order of rank of their respective commanders present in the formation, the senior on the right or at the head. the commander faces the command; subordinate commanders face to the front. ( ) = . saluting by lieutenant colonel and staffs.= at the command present arms, given by the colonel, the lieutenant colonel, and the colonel's staff salute; the major's staff salute at the major's command. each staff returns to the carry or order when the command =order arms= is given by its chief. ( ) = . formation of companies, battalion and regiment.= at the =assembly= for a ceremony companies are formed on their own parades and informally inspected, as prescribed in par. . at =adjutant's call=, except for ceremonies involving a single battalion, each battalion is formed on its own parade, reports are received, and the battalion presented to the major, as laid down in par. . at the second sounding of adjutant's call the regiment is formed. ( ) reviews general rules = . indication of points where column changes direction; flank to pass paces from reviewing officer; post of reviewing officer and others.= the adjutant posts men or otherwise marks the points where the column changes direction in such manner that its flank in passing will be about paces from the reviewing officer. the post of the reviewing officer, usually opposite the center of the line, is indicated by a marker. officers of the same or higher grade, and distinguished personages invited to accompany the reviewing officer, place themselves on his left; their staffs and orderlies place themselves respectively on the left of the staff and orderlies of the reviewing officer; all others who accompany the reviewing officer place themselves on the left of his staff, their orderlies in rear. a staff officer is designated to escort distinguished personages and to indicate to them their proper positions, as prescribed in par. . ( ) = . riding around the troops; saluting the color; reviewing officer returns only salute of commanding officer of troops.= while riding around the troops, the reviewing officer may direct his staff, flag and orderlies to remain at the post of the reviewing officer, or that only his personal staff and flag shall accompany him; in either case the commanding officer alone accompanies the reviewing officer. if the reviewing officer is accompanied by his entire staff, the staff officers of the commander place themselves on the right of the staff of the reviewing officer. the reviewing officer and others at the reviewing stand salute the color as it passes; when passing around the troops, the reviewing officer and those accompanying him salute the color when passing in front of it. the reviewing officer returns the salute of the commanding officer of the troops only. those who accompany the reviewing officer do not salute. ( ) = . saluting by staffs.= in passing in review, each staff salutes with its commander. ( ) = . turning out of column by commanding officer of troops and staff.= after saluting the reviewing officer, the commanding officer of the troops turns out of the column, takes post on the right of the reviewing officer, and returns saber; the members of his staff accompanying him take post on the right of the reviewing officer's staff and return saber. when the rear element of his command has passed, without changing his position, the commanding officer of the troops salutes the reviewing officer; he and the members of his staff accompanying him then draw saber and rejoin his command. the commanding officer of the troops and the members of his staff are the only ones who turn out of the column. ( ) = . turning out of column by commanding officer of troops and staff.= if the person reviewing the command is not mounted, the commanding officer and his staff on turning out of the column after passing the reviewing officer dismount preparatory to taking post. in such case, the salute of the commanding officer, prior to rejoining his command, is made with the hand before remounting. ( ) = . salute by regimental color.= when the rank of the reviewing officer entitles him to the honor, each regimental color salutes at the command =present arms=, given or repeated by the major of the battalion with which it is posted; and again in passing in review. ( ) = . the band.= the band of an organization plays while the reviewing officer is passing in front of and in rear of the organization. each band, immediately after passing the reviewing officer, turns out of the column, takes post in front of and facing him, continues to play until its regiment has passed, then ceases playing and follows in rear of its regiment; the band of the following regiment commences to play as soon as the preceding band has ceased. while marching in review but one band in each brigade plays at a time, and but one band at a time when within paces of the reviewing officer. ( ) = . the national air, to the color, march, flourishes or ruffles,--when played.= if the rank of the reviewing officer entitles him to the honor, the band plays the prescribed =national air=, or the field music sounds =to the color=, =march=, =flourishes= or =ruffles= when arms are presented. when passing in review at the moment the regimental color salutes, the musicians halted in front of the reviewing officer, sound =to the color=, =march=, =flourishes= or =ruffles=. ( ) = . modifications of the review.= the formation for review may be modified to suit the ground, and the =present arms= and the ride around the line by the reviewing officer may be dispensed with. ( ) = . when post of reviewing officer is on left of column.= if the post of the reviewing officer is on the left of the column, the troops march in review with the guide left; the commanding officer and his staff turn out of the column to the left, taking post as prescribed above, but to the left of the reviewing officer; in saluting, the captains give the command: = . eyes, . left.= ( ) = . cadence at which troops pass in review.= except in the review of a single battalion, the troops pass in review in quick time only. ( ) = . reviews of brigades or larger commands; action of battalions after passing reviewing officer.= in reviews of brigades or larger commands, each battalion, after the rear has passed the reviewing officer paces, takes the double time for yards in order not to interfere with the march of the column in rear; if necessary, it then turns out of the column and returns to camp by the most practicable route; the leading battalion of each regiment is followed by the other units of the regiment. ( ) = . standing "at ease," "rest," etc., in review of brigade or larger command.= in a brigade or larger review a regimental commander may cause his regiment to stand =at ease=, =rest=, or =stack arms= and =fall out= and =resume attention=, so as not to interfere with the ceremony. ( ) = . review by inspector junior to commanding officer.= when an organization is to be reviewed before an inspector junior in rank to the commanding officer, the commanding officer receives the review and is accompanied by the inspector, who takes post on his left. ( ) battalion review = . presenting battalion to reviewing officer; passing around battalion; battalion passing in review at quick time.= the battalion having been formed in line, the major faces to the front; the reviewing officer moves a few paces toward the major and halts; the major turns about and commands: = . present, . arms=, and again turns about and salutes. the reviewing officer returns the salute; the major turns about, brings the battalion to order arms, and again turns to the front. the reviewing officer approaches to about paces from the major, the latter salutes, takes post on his right, and accompanies him around, the battalion. the band plays. the reviewing officer proceeds to the right of the band, passes in front of the captain to the left of the line and returns to the right, passing in rear of the file closers and the band. (see par. .) on arriving again at the right of the line, the major salutes, halts, and when the reviewing officer and staff have passed, moves directly to his post in front of the battalion, faces it, and commands: = . pass in review, . squads right, . march.= at the first command the band changes direction if necessary, and halts. at the third command, given when the band has changed direction, the battalion moves off, the band playing; without command from the major the column changes direction at the points indicated, and column of companies at full distance is formed successively to the left at the second change of direction; the major takes his post paces in front of the band immediately after the second change; the band having passed the reviewing officer, turns to the left of the column, takes post in front of and facing the reviewing officer, and remains there until the review terminates. the major and staff salute, turn the head as in =eyes right=, and look toward the reviewing officer when the major is paces from him; they return to the carry and turn the head and eyes to the front when the major has passed paces beyond him. without facing about, each captain or special unit commander, except the drum major, commands: = . eyes=, in time to add, = . right=, when at paces from the reviewing officer, and commands =front= when at paces beyond him. at the command =eyes= the company officers armed with the saber execute the first motion of present saber; at the command =right= all turn head and eyes to the right, the company officers complete =present saber=, and the noncommissioned officers armed with the saber execute the first motion of present saber; at the command =front= all turn head and eyes to the front, and officers and noncommissioned officers armed with the saber resume the carry saber; without arms in hand, the first motion of the hand salute is made at the command =right=, and the second motion not made until the command =front=. noncommissioned staff officers, noncommissioned officers in command of subdivisions, and the drum major salute, turn the head and eyes, return to the front, resume the carry or drop the hand, at the points prescribed for the major. officers and dismounted noncommissioned officers in command of subdivisions, with arms in hand, render the rifle or saber salute. guides charged with the step, trace, and direction do not execute =eyes right=. if the reviewing officer is entitled to a salute from the color the regimental color salutes when at paces from him, and is raised when at paces beyond him. the major, having saluted, takes post on the right of the reviewing officer, returns saber and remains there until the rear of the battalion has passed, then salutes and rejoins his battalion. the band ceases to play when the column has completed its second change of direction after passing the reviewing officer. ( ) = . passing in review at double time.= when the battalion arrives at its original position in column, the major commands: = . double time, . march.= the band plays in double time. the battalion passes in review as before, except that in double time the command =eyes right= is omitted and there is no saluting except by the major when he leaves the reviewing officer. the review terminates when the rear company has passed the reviewing officer: the band then ceases to play, and, unless otherwise directed by the major, returns to the position it occupied before marching in review, or is dismissed; the major rejoins the battalion and brings it to =quick time=. the battalion then executes such movements as the reviewing officer may have directed, or is marched to its parade ground and dismissed. marching past in double time may, in the discretion of the reviewing officer, be omitted; the review terminates when the major rejoins his battalion. ( ) = . major and staff may be dismounted.= at battalion review the major and his staff may be dismounted in the discretion of the commanding officer. ( ) parades general rules = . position assumed by reviewing officer and staff while band is sounding off.= if dismounted, the officer reviewing the parade, and his staff, stand at parade rest, with arms folded, while the band is sounding off; they resume attention with the adjutant. if mounted, they remain at attention. ( ) = . reports by captains and majors.= at the command =report=, given by a battalion adjutant, the captains in succession from the right salute and report: =a= (or =other=) =company=, =present= or =accounted for=; or =a= (or =other=) =company, (so many) officers= or =enlisted men absent=, and resume the order saber; at the same command given by the regimental adjutant, the majors similarly =report= their battalions. ( ) battalion parade = . at adjutant's call= the battalion is formed in line, as explained in par. , but not presented. lieutenants take their posts in front of the center of their respective platoons at the captain's command for dressing his company on the line, as explained in par. . the major takes post at a convenient distance in front of the center and facing the battalion. the adjutant from his post in front of the center of the battalion, after commanding: = . guides, . posts=, adds: = . parade, . rest=; the battalion executes parade rest. the adjutant directs the band: =sound off.= the band, playing in quick time, passes in front of the line of officers to the left of the line and back to its post on the right, when it ceases playing. at evening parade, when the band ceases playing, =retreat= is sounded by the field music and, following the last note and while the flag is being lowered, the band plays the =star spangled banner=. just before the last note of retreat, the adjutant comes to attention and, as the last note ends commands: = . battalion, . attention, . present, . arms=, and salutes retaining that position until the last note of the national anthem. he then turns about and reports: =sir, the parade is formed.= the major directs the adjutant: =take your post, sir.= the adjutant moves at a trot (if dismounted, in quick time), passes by the major's right, and takes his post. the major draws saber and commands: = . order, . arms=, and adds such exercises in the manual of arms as he may desire. officers, noncommissioned officers commanding companies or armed with the saber, and the color guard, having once executed order arms, remain in that position during the exercises in the manual. the major then directs the adjutant: =receive the reports, sir.= the adjutant, passing by the major's right, advances at a trot (if dismounted, in quick time) toward the center of the line, halts midway between it and the major, and commands: =report.= (see par. .) the reports received, the adjutant turns about, and reports: =sir, all are present or accounted for=; or =sir, (so many) officers or enlisted men are absent=, including in the list of absentees those from the band and field music reported to him by the drum major prior to the parade. the major directs: =publish the orders, sir.= the adjutant turns about and commands: =attention to orders=; he then reads the orders, and commands: = . officers, . center, . march.= at the command =center=, the company officers carry saber and face to the center. at the command =march=, they close to the center and face to the front; the adjutant turns about and takes his post. the officers having closed and faced to the front, the senior commands: = . forward, . march.= the officers advance, the band playing; the left officer of the center or right center company is the guide, and marches on the major; the officers are halted at paces from the major by the senior, who commands: = . officers, . halt.= they halt and salute, returning to the carry saber with the major. the major then gives such instructions as he deems necessary, and commands: = . officers, . posts, . march.= at the command =posts=, company officers face about. at the command =march=, they step off with guide as before, and the senior commands: = . officers, . halt=, so as to halt paces from the line; he then adds: = . posts, . march.= at the command =posts=, officers face outward and, at the command =march=, step off in succession at paces distance, resume their posts and order saber; the lieutenants march directly to their posts in rear of their companies. the music ceases when all officers have resumed their posts. the major then commands: = . pass in review, . squads right, . march=, and returns saber. the battalion marches according to the principles of review; when the last company has passed, the ceremony is concluded, as explained in pars. ; . the band continues to play while the companies are in march upon the parade ground. companies are formed in column of squads, without halting, and are marched to their respective parades by their captains. when the company officers have saluted the major, he may direct them to form line with the staff, in which case they individually move to the front, passing to the right and left of the major and staff, halt on the line established by the staff, face about, and stand at attention. the music ceases when the officers join the staff. the major causes the companies to pass in review under the command of their first sergeants by the same commands as before. the company officers return saber with the major and remain at attention. ( ) escorts escort of the color = . by a company.= the regiment being in line or line of masses, the colonel details a company, other than the color company, to receive and escort the national color to its place. during the ceremony the regimental color remains with the color guard at its post with the regiment. the band moves straight to its front until clear of the line of field officers, changes direction to the right, and is halted; the designated company forms column of platoons in rear of the band, the color bearer or bearers between the platoons. the escort then marches without music to the colonel's office or quarters and is formed in line facing the entrance, the band on the right, the color bearer in the line of file closers. the color bearer, preceded by the first lieutenant and followed by a sergeant of the escort, then goes to obtain the color. when the color bearer comes out, followed by the lieutenant and sergeant, he halts before the entrance, facing the escort; the lieutenant places himself on the right, the sergeant on the left of the color bearer; the escort presents arms, and the field music sounds =to the color=; the first lieutenant and sergeant salute. arms are brought to the order; the lieutenant and sergeant return to their posts; the company is formed in column of platoons, the band taking post in front of the column; the color bearer places himself between the platoons; the escort marches in quick time, with guide left, back to the regiment, the band playing; the march is so conducted that when the escort arrives at paces in front of the right of the regiment, the direction of the march shall be parallel to its front; when the color arrives opposite its place in line, the escort is formed in line to the left; the color bearer, passing between the platoons, advances and halts paces in front of the colonel. the color bearer having halted, the colonel, who has taken post paces in front of the center of the regiment, faces about, commands: = . present, . arms=, resumes his front, and salutes; the field music sounds to the color; and the regimental color bearer executes the color salute at the command =present arms=. the colonel then faces about, brings the regiment to the order, at which the color bearer resumes the carry and takes his post with the color company. the escort presents arms and comes to the order with the regiment, at the command of the colonel, after which the captain forms it again in column of platoons, and, preceded by the band, marches it to its place, passing around the left flank of the regiment. the band plays until the escort passes the left of the line, when it ceases playing and returns to its post on the right, passing in rear of the regiment. the regiment may be brought to a rest when the escort passes the left of the line. ( ) = . by a battalion.= escort of the color is executed by a battalion according to the same principles. ( ) escorts of honor = .= escorts of honor are detailed for the purpose of receiving and escorting personages of high rank, civil or military. the troops for this purpose are selected for their soldierly appearance and superior discipline. the escort forms in line, opposite the place where the personage presents himself, the band on the flank of the escort toward which it will march. on the appearance of the personage, he is received with the honors due to his rank. the escort is formed into column of companies, platoons or squads, and takes up the march, the personage and his staff or retinue taking positions in rear of the column; when he leaves the escort, line is formed and the same honors are paid as before. when the position of the escort is at a considerable distance from the point where the personage is to be received, as for instance, where a courtyard or wharf intervenes, a double line of sentinels is posted from that point to the escort, facing inward; the sentinels successively salute as he passes and are then relieved and join the escort. an officer is appointed to attend him and bear such communication as he may have to make to the commander of the escort. ( ) funeral escort = . composition and strength, formation, presenting arms, marching, etc.= the composition and strength of the escort are prescribed in army regulations. the escort is formed opposite the quarters of the deceased; the band on that flank of the escort toward which it is to march. upon the appearance of the coffin, the commander commands: = . present, . arms=, and the band plays an appropriate air; arms are then brought to the order. the escort is next formed into column of companies, platoons, or squads. if the escort be small, it may be marched in line. the procession is formed in the following order: = . music, . escort, . clergy, . coffin and pallbearers, . mourners, . members of the former command of the deceased, . other officers and enlisted men, . distinguished persons, . delegations, . societies, . civilians.= officers and enlisted men (nos. and ), with side arms, are in the order of rank, seniors in front. the procession being formed, the commander of the escort puts it in march. the escort marches slowly to solemn music; the column having arrived opposite the grave, line is formed facing it. the coffin is then carried along the front of the escort to the grave; arms are presented, the music plays an appropriate air; the coffin having been placed over the grave, the music ceases and arms are brought to the order. the commander next commands: = . parade, . rest.= the escort executes =parade rest=, officers and men inclining the head. when the funeral services are completed and the coffin lowered into the grave, the commander causes the escort to resume attention and fire three rounds of blank cartridges, the muzzles of the pieces being elevated. when the escort is greater than a battalion, one battalion is designated to fire the volley. a musician then sounds =taps=. the escort is then formed into column, marched in quick time to the point where it was assembled, and dismissed. the band does not play until it has left the inclosure. when the distance to the place of interment is considerable, the escort, after having left the camp or garrison, may march =at ease= in quick time until it approaches the burial ground, when it is brought to attention. the music does not play while marching =at ease=. in marching at attention, the field music may alternate with the band in playing. ( ) = . funeral of general officer; playing national air, sounding ruffles, etc., as honor.= when arms are presented at the funeral of a person entitled to any of the following honors, the band plays the prescribed =national air=, or the field music sounds to the =color=, =march=, =flourishes=, or =ruffles=, according to the rank of the deceased, after which the band plays an appropriate air. the commander of the escort, in forming column, gives the appropriate commands for the different arms. ( ) = . funeral of mounted officer or soldier.= at the funeral of a mounted officer or enlisted man, his horse, in mourning caparison, follows the hearse. ( ) = . when hearse, cavalry, and artillery are unable to enter cemetery.= should the entrance of the cemetery prevent the hearse accompanying the escort till the latter halts at the grave, the column is halted at the entrance long enough to take the coffin from the hearse, when the column is again put in march. the cavalry and artillery, when unable to enter the inclosure, turn out of the column, face the column, and salute the remains as they pass. ( ) = . escorting remains from quarters to church before funeral services.= when necessary to escort the remains from the quarters of the deceased to the church before the funeral service, arms are presented upon receiving the remains at the quarters and also as they are borne into the church. ( ) = . instructions to clergyman and pallbearers.= the commander of the escort, previous to the funeral, gives the clergyman and pallbearers all needful directions. ( ) company inspection = .= being in line at a halt: = . open ranks, . march.= at the command =march= the front rank executes =right dress=; the rear rank and the file closers march backward steps, halt, and execute right dress; the lieutenants pass around their respective flanks and take post, facing to the front, paces in front of the center of their respective platoons. the captain aligns the front rank, rear rank, and file closers, takes post paces in front of the right guide, facing to the left, and commands: = . front, . prepare for inspection.= at the second command the lieutenants carry saber; the captain returns saber and inspects them, after which they face about, order saber, and stand at ease; upon the completion of the inspection they carry saber, face about, and order saber. the captain may direct the lieutenants to accompany or assist him, in which case they return saber and, at the close of the inspection, resume their posts in front of the company, draw and carry saber. having inspected the lieutenants, the captain proceeds to the right of the company. each man, as the captain approaches him, executes =inspection arms=. the captain takes the piece, grasping it with his right hand just above the rear sight, the man dropping his hands. the captain inspects the piece, and, with the hand and piece in the same position as in receiving it, hands it back to the man, who takes it with the left hand at the balance and executes =order arms=. as the captain returns the piece, the next man executes =inspection arms=, and so on through the company. should the piece be inspected without handling, each man executes =order arms= as soon as the captain passes to the next man. [illustration: plate vi] the inspection is from right to left in front, and from left to right in the rear, of each rank and of the line of file closers. when approached by the captain, the first sergeant executes =inspection saber=. enlisted men armed with the pistol execute =inspection pistol= by drawing the pistol from the holster and holding it diagonally across the body, barrel up, and inches in front of the neck, muzzle pointing up and to the left. the pistol is returned to the holster as soon as the captain passes. upon completion of the inspection, the captain takes post facing to the left in front of the right guide and on line with the lieutenants and commands: = . close ranks, . march.= at the command =march= the lieutenants resume their posts in line; the rear rank closes to inches, each man covering his file leader; the file closers close to paces from the rear rank. ( ) = . inspection of quarters or camp.= if the company is dismissed, rifles are put away. in quarters, headdress and accouterments are removed, and the men stand near their respective bunks; in camp, they stand covered, but without accouterments, in front of their tents. if the personal field equipment has not been inspected in ranks and its inspection in quarters or camp is ordered, each man will arrange the prescribed articles on his bunk, if in quarters or permanent camp, or in front of his half of the tent, if in shelter tent camp, in the same relative order as directed in paragraph . the captain, accompanied by the lieutenants, then inspects the quarters or camp. the first sergeant precedes the captain and calls the men to attention on entering each squad room or on approaching the tents; the men stand at attention, but do not salute. ( ) = . when inspection includes examination of equipment.= if the inspection is to include an examination of the equipment while in ranks, the captain, after closing ranks, causes the company to stack arms, to march backward until paces in rear of the stacks and to take intervals. he then commands: = . unsling equipment, . open packs.= at the first command each man unslings his equipment and places it on the ground at his feet, haversack to the front, end of the pack foot in front of toes. at the second command, pack carriers are unstrapped, packs removed and unrolled, the longer edge of the pack along the lower edge of the cartridge belt. each man exposes shelter-tent pins; removes meat can, knife, fork, and spoon from the meat-can pouch, and places them on the right of the haversack, knife, fork, and spoon in the open meat can; removes the canteen and cup from the cover and places them on the left side of the haversack; unstraps and spreads out haversack so as to expose its contents; folds up the carrier to uncover the cartridge pockets; opens same; unrolls toilet articles and places them on the outer flap of the haversack; places underwear carried in pack on the left half of the open pack, with round fold parallel with front edge of pack; opens first-aid pouch and exposes contents to view. special articles carried by individual men, such as flag kit, field glasses, compass, steel tape, notebook, etc., will be arranged on the right half of the open pack. each man then resumes the attention. plate vi (page ) shows the relative position of all articles except underwear and special articles. the captain then passes along the ranks and file closers, as before, inspects the equipment, returns to the right, and commands: =close packs.= each man rolls up his toilet articles and underwear, straps up his haversack and its contents, replaces the meat can, knife, fork, and spoon, and the canteen and cup; closes cartridge pockets and first-aid pouch; restores special articles to their proper receptacles; rolls up and replaces pack in carrier, and, leaving the equipment in its position on the ground, resumes the attention. all equipments being packed, the captain commands: =sling equipment.= the equipments are slung and belts fastened. the captain then causes the company to assemble and take arms. the inspection is completed as already explained. ( ) = . when the inspector is other than the captain.= should the inspector be other than the captain, the latter, after commanding =front=, adds =rest=, and faces to the front. when the inspector approaches, the captain faces to the left, brings the company to attention, faces to the front, and salutes. the salute acknowledged, the captain carries saber, faces to the left, commands: =prepare for inspection=, and again faces to the front. the inspection proceeds as before; the captain returns saber and accompanies the inspector as soon as the latter passes him. ( ) battalion inspection = . inspection may precede or follow review; the inspection up to time the companies are inspected.= if there be both inspection and review, the inspection may either precede or follow the review. the battalion being in column of companies at full distance, all officers dismounted, the major commands: = . prepare for inspection, . march.= at the first command each captain commands: =open ranks.= at the command =march= the ranks are opened in each company, as in the inspection of the company, as prescribed in par. . the field musicians join their companies. the drum major conducts the band to a position paces in rear of the column, if not already there, and opens ranks. the major takes post facing to the front and paces in front of the center of the leading company. the staff takes post as if mounted. the color takes post paces in rear of the staff. field and staff officers senior in rank to the inspector do not take post in front of the column, but accompany him. the inspector inspects the major, and, accompanied by the latter, inspects the staff officers. the major then commands: =rest=, returns saber, and, with his staff, accompanies the inspector. if the major is the inspector he commands: =rest=, returns saber, and inspects his staff, which then accompanies him. the inspector, commencing at the head of the column, then makes a minute inspection of the color guard, the noncommissioned staff, and the arms, accouterments, dress and ammunition of each soldier of the several companies in succession, and inspects the band. the adjutant gives the necessary commands for the inspection of the color guard, noncommissioned staff, and band. the color guard and noncommissioned staff may be dismissed as soon as inspected. ( ) = . inspection of the companies.= as the inspector approaches each company, its captain commands: = . company, . attention, . prepare for inspection=, and faces to the front; as soon as inspected he returns saber and accompanies the inspector. the inspection proceeds as in company inspection, as explained in pars. - . at its completion the captain closes ranks and commands: =rest.= unless otherwise directed by the inspector, the major directs that the company be marched to its parade and dismissed. ( ) = . when inspection lasts long time.= if the inspection will probably last a long time the rear companies may be permitted to stack arms and fall out; before the inspector approaches, they fall in and take arms. ( ) = . the band.= the band plays during the inspection of the companies. when the inspector approaches the band the adjutant commands: =prepare for inspection.= as the inspector approaches him each man raises his instrument in front of the body, reverses it so as to show both sides, and then returns it. company musicians execute inspection similarly. ( ) = . inspection of quarters or camp.= at the inspection of quarters or camp the inspector is accompanied by the captain, followed by the other officers or by such of them as he may designate. the inspection is conducted as described in the company inspection, as laid down in pars. - . muster regimental, battalion, or company muster = . inspection and review; muster rolls; lists of absentees.= muster is preceded by an inspection, and, when practicable, by a review. the adjutant is provided with the muster roll of the field, staff, and band, the surgeon with the hospital roll; each captain with the roll of his company. a list of absentees, alphabetically arranged, showing cause and place of absence, accompanies each roll. ( ) = . calling the names; verifying presence of absentees.= being in column of companies at open ranks, each captain, as the mustering officer approaches, brings his company to right shoulder arms, and commands: =attention to muster.= the mustering officer or captain then calls the names on the roll; each man, as his name is called, answers =here= and brings his piece to order arms. after muster, the mustering officer, accompanied by the company commanders and such other officers as he may designate, verifies the presence of the men reported in hospital, on guard, etc. ( ) = . muster of company on company parade.= a company may be mustered in the same manner on its own parade ground, the muster to follow the company inspection. ( ) the color = . meaning of "color;" army regulations.= the word "color" implies the national color; it includes the regimental color when both are present. the rules prescribing the colors to be carried by regiments and battalions on all occasions are contained in army regulations. ( ) = . where the colors are kept; "cased" defined.= in garrison the colors, when not in use, are kept in the office or quarters of the colonel, and are escorted thereto and therefrom by the color guard. in camp the colors, when not in use, are in front of the colonel's tent. from reveille to retreat, when the weather permits, they are displayed uncased; from retreat to reveille and during inclement weather they are cased. colors are said to be cased when furled and protected by the oil cloth covering. ( ) = . regimental and national colors--salutes by.= the regimental color salutes in the ceremony of escort of the color, and when saluting an officer entitled to the honor, but in no other case. if marching, the salute is executed when at paces from the officer entitled to the salute; the carry is resumed when paces beyond him. the national color renders no salute. ( ) the color guard = . composition of color guard; carrying of regimental and national colors.= the color guard consists of two color sergeants, who are the color bearers, and two experienced privates selected by the colonel. the senior color sergeant carries the national color; the junior color sergeant carries the regimental color. the regimental color, when carried, is always on the left of the national color, in whatever direction they may face. ( ) = . formation and marching of color guard.= the color guard is formed and marched in one rank, the color bearers in the center. it is marched in the same manner and by the same commands as a squad, substituting, when necessary, guard for squad. ( ) = . color company defined; color guard remains with it.= the color company is the center or right center company of the center or right center battalion. the color guard remains with that company unless otherwise directed. ( ) = . post of color guard in various formations.= in line, the color guard is in the interval between the inner guides of the right and left center companies. in line of columns or in close line, the color guard is midway between the right and left center companies and on line with the captains. in column of companies or platoons, the color guard is midway between the color company and the company in rear of the color company and equidistant from the flanks of the column. in close column, the color guard is on the flank of the color company. in column of squads, the color guard is in the column between the color company and the company originally on its left. when the regiment is formed in line of masses for ceremonies, the color guard forms on the left of the leading company of the center (right center) battalion. it rejoins the color company when the regiment changes from line of masses. ( ) = . in battle color guard joins reserve.= the color guard, when with a battalion that takes the battle formation, joins the regimental reserve, whose commander directs the color guard to join a certain company of the reserve. ( ) = . loadings, firings, manual of arms, and movements by color guard.= the color guard executes neither loadings nor firings; in rendering honors, it executes all movements in the manual; in drill, all movements unless specially excused. ( ) to receive the color = . receiving the color by color guard.= the color guard, by command of the senior color sergeant, presents arms on receiving and parting with the color. after parting with the color, the color guard is brought to order arms by command of the senior member, who is placed as the right man of the guard. ( ) = . receiving the color by color company.= at drills and ceremonies, excepting escort of the color, the color, if present, is received by the color company after its formation. the formation of the color company completed, the captain faces to the front; the color guard, conducted by the senior sergeant, approaches from the front and halts at a distance of paces from the captain, who then faces about, brings the company to the =present=, faces to the front, salutes, again faces about and brings the company to the =order=. the color guard comes to the =present= and =order= at the command of the captain, and is then marched by the color sergeant directly to its post on the left of the color company. ( ) = . escorting color to office or quarters of colonel.= when the battalion is dismissed the color guard escorts the color to the office or quarters of the colonel. ( ) manual of the color = .= at the =carry=, the heel of the pike rests in the socket of the sling; the right hand grasps the pike at the height of the shoulder. at the =order=, the heel of the pike rests on the ground near the right toe, the right hand holding the pike in a vertical position. at =parade rest=, the heel of the pike is on the ground, as at the =order=; the pike is held with both hands in front of the center of the body, left hand uppermost. the =order= is resumed at the command =attention=. the left hand assists the right when necessary. the =carry= is the habitual position when the troops are at a shoulder, port, or trail. the =order= and =parade rest= are executed with the troops. =the color salute:= being at a carry, slip the right hand up the pike to the height of the eye, then lower the pike by straightening the arm to the front. ( ) manual of the saber = . drawing saber; position of carry saber dismounted; unhooking scabbard before mounting; on foot carrying scabbard hooked up.= = . draw, . saber.= at the command =draw=, unhook the saber with the thumb and first two fingers of the left hand, thumb on the end of the hook, fingers lifting the upper ring; grasp the scabbard with the left hand at the upper band, bring the hilt a little forward, seize the grip with the right hand, and draw the blade inches out of the scabbard, pressing the scabbard against the thigh with the left hand. at the command =saber=, draw the saber quickly, raising the arm to its full extent, to the right front, at an angle of about ° with the horizontal, the saber, edge down, in a straight line with the arm; make a slight pause and bring the back of the blade against the shoulder, edge to the front, arm nearly extended, hand by the side, elbow back, third and fourth fingers back of the grip; at the same time hook up the scabbard with the thumb and first two fingers of the left hand, thumb through the upper ring, fingers supporting it; drop the left hand by the side. =this is the position of carry saber dismounted.= officers and noncommissioned officers armed with the saber unhook the scabbard before mounting; when mounted, in the first motion of =draw saber= they reach with the right hand over the bridle hand and without the aid of the bridle hand draw the saber as before; the right hand at the carry rests on the right thigh. on foot the scabbard is carried hooked up. ( ) = . holding of saber in publishing orders, etc.; use of saber knot.= when publishing orders, calling the roll, etc., the saber is held suspended from the right wrist by the saber knot; when the saber knot is used it is placed on the wrist before drawing saber and taken off after returning saber. ( ) = . presenting saber from carry or order; execution of the salute in rendering honors.= being at the order or carry: = . present, . saber= (or =arms=). at the command =present=, raise and carry the saber to the front, base of the hilt as high as the chin and inches in front of the neck, edge to the left, point inches farther to the front than the hilt, thumb extended on the left of the grip, all fingers grasping the grip. at the command =saber=, or =arms=, lower the saber, point in prolongation of the right foot and near the ground, edge to the left, hand by the side, thumb on left of grip, arm extended. if mounted, the hand is held behind the thigh, point a little to the right and front of the stirrup. in rendering honors with troops, officers execute the first motion of the salute at the command =present=, the second motion at the command =arms=; enlisted men with the saber execute the first motion at the command arms and omit the second motion. ( ) = . coming to order from carry; executing order or carry from present, depending upon command; coming to order saber when arms are brought to order.= being at a carry: = . order, . saber= (or =arms=). drop the point of the saber directly to the front, point on or near the ground, edge down, thumb on back of grip. being at the =present saber=, should the next command be =order arms=, officers and noncommissioned officers armed with the saber =order saber=; if the command be other than =order arms=, they execute =carry saber=. when arms are brought to the order, the officers or enlisted men with saber drawn =order saber=. ( ) = . position of saber in giving commands, etc.; bringing saber to carry from order.= the saber is held at the carry while giving commands, marching at attention, or changing position in quick time. when at the order, sabers are brought to the carry when arms are brought to any position except the =present= or =parade rest=. ( ) = . parade rest from order.= being at the order: = . parade, . rest.= take the position of parade rest except that the left hand is uppermost and rests on the right hand, point of saber on or near the ground in front of the center of the body, edge to the right. at the command =attention=, resume the order saber and the position of the soldier. ( ) = . position of saber at double time.= in marching in double time the saber is carried diagonally across the breast, edge to the front; the left hand steadies the scabbard. ( ) = . on duty under arms sabers to be drawn and returned without command; commands given with saber drawn.= officers and noncommissioned officers armed with the saber, on all duties under arms draw and return saber without waiting for command. all commands to soldiers under arms are given with the saber drawn. ( ) = . returning saber from carry.= being at a carry: = . return, . saber.= at the command =return=, carry the right hand opposite to and inches from the left shoulder, saber vertical, edge to the left; at the same time unhook and lower the scabbard with the left hand and grasp it at the upper band. at the command =saber= drop the point to the rear and pass the blade across and along the left arm; turn the head slightly to the left, fixing the eyes on the opening of the scabbard, raise the right hand, insert and return the blade; free the wrist from the saber knot (if inserted in it), turn the head to the front, drop the right hand by the side; hook up the scabbard with the left hand, drop the left hand by the side. officers and noncommissioned officers armed with the saber, when mounted, return saber without using the left hand; the scabbard is hooked up on dismounting. ( ) = . enlisted men with saber drawn at inspection.= at inspection enlisted men with the saber drawn execute the first motion of =present saber= and turn the wrist to show both sides of the blade, resuming the carry when the inspector has passed. ( ) [illustration] shelter tents = .= being in line or in column of platoons, the captain commands: =form for shelter tents.= the officers, first sergeant, and guides fall out; the cooks form a file on the flank of the company nearest the kitchen, the first sergeant and right guide fall in, forming the right file of the company; blank files are filled by the file closers, or by men taken from the front rank; the remaining guide, or guides, and file closers form on a convenient flank. before forming column or platoons, preparatory to pitching tents, the company may be redivided into two or more platoons, regardless of the size of each. ( ) = .= the captain then causes the company to take intervals as described in the school of the squad (see par. .), and commands: =pitch tents.= at the command =pitch tents=, each man steps off obliquely to the right with the right foot and lays his rifle on the ground, the butt of the rifle near the toe of the right foot, muzzle to the front, barrel to the left, and steps back into his place; each front-rank man then draws his bayonet and sticks it in the ground by the outside of the right heel. equipments are unslung, packs opened, shelter half and pins removed; each man then spreads his shelter half, small triangle to the rear, flat upon the ground the tent is to occupy, the rear-rank man's half on the right. the halves are then buttoned together; the guy loops at both ends of the lower half are passed through the buttonholes provided in the lower and upper halves; the whipped end of the guy rope is then passed through both guy loops and secured, this at both ends of the tent. each front-rank man inserts the muzzle of his rifle under the front end of the ridge and holds the rifle upright, sling to the front, heel of butt on the ground, beside the bayonet. his rear-rank man pins down the front corners of the tent on the line of bayonets, stretching the tent taut; he then inserts a pin in the eye of the front guy rope and drives the pin at such a distance in front of the rifle as to held the rope taut; both men go to the rear of the tent, each pins down a corner, stretching the sides and rear of the tent before securing; the rear-rank man then inserts an intrenching tool, or a bayonet in its scabbard, under the rear end of the ridge inside the tent, the front-rank man pegging down the end of the rear guy ropes; the rest of the pins are then driven by both men, the rear-rank man working on the right. the front flaps of the tent are not fastened down, but thrown back on the tent. as soon as the tent is pitched each man arranges his equipment and the contents of his pack in the tent and stands at attention in front of his own half on line with the front guy-rope pin. to have a uniform slope when the tents are pitched, the guy ropes should all be of the same length. in shelter-tent camps, in localities where suitable material is procurable, tent poles may be improvised and used in lieu of the rifle and bayonet or intrenching tool as supports for the shelter tent. ( ) = .= when the pack is not carried, the company is formed for shelter tents, as prescribed in par. , intervals are taken, arms are laid aside or on the ground, the men are dismissed and proceed to the wagon, secure their packs, return to their places, and pitch tents as heretofore described, in par. . ( ) = .= double shelter tents may be pitched by first pitching one tent as heretofore described, then pitching a second tent against the opening of the first, using one rifle to support both tents, and passing the front guy ropes over and down the sides of the opposite tents. the front corner of one tent is not pegged down, but is thrown back to permit an opening into the tent. ( ) single sleeping bag = .= spread the poncho on the ground, buttoned end at the feet, buttoned side to the left; fold the blanket once across its short dimension and lay it on the poncho, folded side along the right side of the poncho; tie the blanket together along the left side by means of the tapes provided; fold the left half of the poncho over the blanket and button it together along the side and bottom. (for the position, number, and length of tapes with which blankets should be provided, see par. ii, g. o. ; w. d. ' --author.) ( ) double sleeping bag = .= spread one poncho on the ground, buttoned end at the feet, buttoned side to the left; spread the blankets on top of the poncho; tie the edges of the blankets together with the tapes provided; spread a second poncho on top of the blankets, buttoned end at the feet, buttoned side to the right; button the two ponchos together along both sides and across the end. ( ) to strike shelter tents = .= the men standing in front of their tents: =strike tents.= equipments and rifles are removed from the tent; the tents are lowered, packs made up, and equipments slung, and the men stand at attention in the places originally occupied after taking intervals. ( ) to pitch all types of tents, except shelter and conical wall = .= to pitch all types of army tents, except shelter and conical wall tents: mark line of tents by driving a wall pin on the spot to be occupied by the right (or left) corner of each tent. for pyramidal tents the interval between adjacent pins should be about feet, which will give a passage of two feet between tents. spread tripod on the ground where the center of tent is to be, if tripod is used. spread the tent on the ground to be occupied, door to the front, and place the right (or left) front wall loop over the pin. the door (or doors, if more than one) being fastened and held together at the bottom, the left (or right) corner wall loop is carried to the left (or right) as far as it will go and a wall pin driven through it, the pin being placed in line with the right (or left) corner pins already driven. at the same time the rear corner wall loops are pulled to the rear and outward so that the rear wall of the tent is stretched to complete the rectangle. wall pins are then driven through these loops. each corner pin should be directly in rear of the corresponding front corner pin, making a rectangle. unless the canvas be wet, a small amount of slack should be allowed before the corner pins are driven. according to the size of the tent one or two men, crawling under the tent if necessary, fit each pole or ridge or upright into the ring or ridge pole holes, and such accessories as hood, fly, and brace ropes are adjusted. if a tripod be used an additional man will go under the tent to adjust it. the tent steadied by the remaining men, one at each corner guy rope, will then be raised. if the tent is a ward or storage type, corner poles will now be placed at the four corners. the four corner guy ropes are then placed over the lower notches of the large pins driven in prolongation of the diagonals at such distance as to hold the walls and ends of the tent vertical and smooth when the guy ropes are drawn taut. a wall pin is then driven through each remaining wall loop and a large pin for each guy rope is driven in line with the corner guy pins already driven. the guy ropes of the tent are placed over the lower notches, while the guy ropes of the fly are placed over the upper notches, and are then drawn taut. brace ropes when used, are then secured to stakes or pins suitably placed. ( ) conical wall tent = .= drive the door pin and center pin feet inches apart. using the hood lines, with center pin as center, describe two concentric circles with radii feet inches and feet inches. in the outer circle drive two door guy pins feet apart. at intervals of about feet drive the other guy pins. in other respects conical tents are erected practically as in the case of pyramidal tents, as explained in par. . ( ) to strike common, wall, pyramidal, and conical wall tents = . strike tents.= the men first remove all pins except those of the four corner guy ropes, or the four quadrant guy ropes in the case of the conical wall tent. the pins are neatly piled or placed in their receptacle. one man holds each guy, and when the ground is clear the tent is lowered, folded, or rolled and tied, the poles or tripod and pole fastened together, and the remaining pins collected. ( ) to fold tents = . for folding common, wall, hospital, and storage tents:= spread the tent flat on the ground, folded at the ridge so that bottoms of side walls are even, ends of tents forming triangles to the right and left; fold the triangular ends of the tent in toward the middle, making it rectangular in shape; fold the top over about inches; fold the tent in two by carrying the top fold over clear to the foot; fold again in two from the top to the foot; throw all guys on tent except the second from each end; fold the ends in so as to cover about two-thirds of the second cloths; fold the left end over to meet the turned-in edge of the right end, then fold the right end over the top, completing the bundle; tie with two exposed guys. =for folding pyramidal tents:= the tent is thrown toward the rear and the back wall and roof canvas pulled out smooth. this may be most easily accomplished by leaving the rear corner wall pins in the ground with the wall loops attached, one man at each rear-corner guy, and one holding the square iron in a perpendicular position and pulling the canvas to its limit away from the former front of the tent. this leaves the three remaining sides of the tent on top of the rear side, with the door side in the middle. now carry the right-front corner over and lay it on the left-rear corner. pull all canvas smooth, throw guys toward square iron, and pull bottom edges even. then take the right-front corner and return to the right, covering the right-rear corner. this folds the right side of the tent on itself, with the crease in the middle and under the front side of the tent. next carry the left-front corner to the right and back as described above; this, when completed, will leave the front and rear sides of the tent lying smooth and flat and the two side walls folded inward, each on itself. place the hood in the square iron which has been folded downward toward the bottom of tent, and continue to fold around the square iron as a core, pressing all folds down flat and smooth, and parallel with the bottom of the tent. if each fold is compactly made and the canvas kept smooth, the last fold will exactly cover the lower edge of the canvas. lay all exposed guys along the folded canvas except the two on the center-width, which should be pulled out and away from bottom edge to their extreme length for tying. now, beginning at one end, fold toward the center on the first seam (that joining the first and second widths) and fold again toward the center so that the already folded canvas will come to within about three inches of the middle width. then fold over to the opposite edge of middle width of canvas. then begin folding from opposite end, folding the first width in half, then making a second fold to come within about or inches of that already folded, turn this fold entirely over that already folded. take the exposed guys and draw them taut across each other, turn bundle over on the under guy, cross guys on top of bundle drawing tight. turn bundle over on the crossed guys and tie lengthwise. when properly tied and pressed together this will make a package by by inches, requiring about , cubic inches to store or pack. stencil the organization designation on the lower half of the middle width of canvas in the back wall. ( ) warning calls = . first call, guard mounting, full dress, overcoats, drill, stable, water,= and =boots and saddles= precede the =assembly= by such interval as may be prescribed by the commanding officer. =mess, church, and fatigue=, classed as service calls, may also be used as warning calls. =first call= is the first signal for formation for roll call and for all ceremonies except guard mounting. =guard mounting= is the first signal for guard mounting. the field music assembles at =first call= and =guard mounting=. in a mixed command, =boots and saddles= is the signal to mounted troops that their formation is to be mounted; for mounted guard mounting or mounted drill, it immediately follows the signal =guard mounting= or drill. when full dress or overcoats are to be worn, the =full dress= or =overcoat= call immediately follows =first call=, =guard mounting=, or =boots and saddles=. ( ) formation calls = . assembly:= the signal for companies or details to fall in. =adjutant's call:= the signal for companies to form battalion; also for the guard details to form for guard mounting on the camp or garrison parade ground; it follows the =assembly= at such interval as may be prescribed by the commanding officer. it is also used as a signal for the battalions to form regiment, following the first =adjutant's call= at such interval as the commanding officer may prescribe. =to the color:= is sounded when the color salutes. ( ) alarm calls = . fire call:= the signal for the men to fall in, without arms, to extinguish fire. =to arms:= the signal for the men to fall in, under arms, on their company's parade grounds as quickly as possible. =to horse:= the signal for mounted men to proceed under arms to their horses, saddle, mount and assemble at a designated place as quickly as possible. in extended order this signal is used to remount troops. ( ) service calls = . tattoo, taps, mess, sick, church, recall, issue, officers', captains', first sergeants', fatigue, school=, and =the general=. =the general= is the signal for striking tents and loading wagons preparatory to marching. =reveille= precedes the =assembly= for roll call; =retreat= follows the =assembly=, the interval between being only that required for formation and roll call, except when there is parade. =taps= is the signal for extinguishing lights; it is usually preceded by =call to quarters= by such interval as prescribed by army regulations. =assembly, reveille, retreat, adjutant's call, to the color, the flourishes, ruffles=, and the =marches= are sounded by all the field music united; the other calls, as a rule, are sounded by the musician of the guard or orderly musician; he may also sound the =assembly= when the musicians are not united. the morning gun is fired at the first note of =reveille=, or, if marches be played before =reveille=, it is fired at the commencement of the first march. the evening gun is fired at the last note of =retreat=. ( ) appendix a war department, office of the chief of staff, washington, december , . the infantry drill regulations, , have been prepared for the use of troops armed with the united states magazine rifle, model . for the guidance of organizations armed with the united states magazine rifle, model , the following alternative paragraphs are published and will be considered as substitute paragraphs for the corresponding paragraphs in the text: (in part), , , , , , , , and . by order of the secretary of war: leonard wood, major general, chief of staff. =note.= the paragraph numbers , , , etc., given above, follow the paragraphs below. = .= * * * third. the cut-off is kept turned down, except when using the magazine. ( ) * * * * * = .= being at order arms: = . unfix, bayonet.= if the bayonet scabbard is carried on the belt: take the position of parade rest, grasp the handle on the bayonet firmly with the right hand, press the spring with the forefinger of the left hand, raise the bayonet until the handle is about inches above the muzzle of the piece, drop the point to the left, back of hand toward the body, and glancing at the scabbard, return the bayonet, the blade passing between the left arm and body; regrasp the piece with the right hand and resume the order. if the bayonet scabbard is carried on the haversack: take the bayonet from the rifle with the left hand and return it to the scabbard in the most convenient manner. if marching or lying down, the bayonet is fixed and unfixed in the most expeditious and convenient manner and the piece returned to the original position. fix and unfix bayonet are executed with promptness and regularity, but not in cadence. ( ) = .= being at order arms: = . inspection, . arms.= at the second command, take the position of port arms. (=two.=) with the right hand open the magazine gate, turn the bolt handle up, draw the bolt back and glance at the magazine and chamber. having found them empty, or having emptied them, raise the head and eyes to the front. ( ) = .= being at inspection arms: = . order (right shoulder, port), . arms.= at the preparatory command, push the bolt forward, turn the handle down, close the magazine gate, pull the trigger, and resume port arms. at the command =arms=, complete the movement ordered. ( ) = .= pieces being loaded and in the position of load, to execute other movements with the pieces loaded: = . lock, . pieces.= at the command =pieces= turn the safety lock fully to the right. the safety lock is said to be at the "ready" when turned to the left, and at the "safe" when turned to the right. the cut-off is said to be "on" when turned up and "off" when turned down. ( ) = .= being in line or skirmish line at halt: = . with dummy (blank or ball) cartridges, . load.= at the command =load= each front-rank man or skirmisher faces half right and carries the right foot to the right, about one foot, to such position as will insure the greatest firmness and steadiness of the body; raises or lowers the piece and drops it into the left hand at the balance, left thumb extended along the stock, muzzle at the height of the breast. with the right hand he turns and draws the bolt back, takes a cartridge between the thumb and first two fingers and places it in the receiver; places palm of the hand against the back of the bolt handle; thrusts the bolt home with a quick motion, turning down the handle, and carries the hand to the small of the stock. each rear-rank man moves to the right front, takes a similar position opposite the interval to the right of his front-rank man, muzzle of the piece extending beyond the front rank, and loads. a skirmish line may load while moving, the pieces being held as nearly as practicable in the position of load. if kneeling or sitting, the position of the piece is similar; if kneeling, the left forearm rests on the left thigh; if sitting, the elbows are supported by the knees. if lying down, the left hand steadies and supports the piece at the balance, the toe of the butt resting on the ground, the muzzle off the ground. for reference, these positions (standing, kneeling, and lying down) are designated as that of =load=. ( ) = . fill magazine.= take the position of load, if not already there, open the gate of the magazine with the right thumb, take five cartridges from the box or belt, and place them, with the bullets to the front, in the magazine, turning the barrel slightly to the left to facilitate the insertion of the cartridges; close the gate and carry the right hand to the small of the stock. to load from the magazine the command =from magazine= will be given preceding that of =load=; the =cut-off= will be turned up on coming to the position of =load=. to resume loading from the belt the command from belt will be given preceding the command =load=; the =cut-off= will be turned down on coming to the position of =load=. the commands =from magazine= and =from belt=, indicating the change in the manner of loading, will not be repeated in subsequent commands. the words =from belt= apply to cartridge box as well as belt. in loading from the magazine care should be taken to push the bolt fully forward and turn the handle down before drawing the bolt back, as otherwise the extractor will not catch the cartridge in the chamber, and jamming will occur with the cartridge following. to fire from the magazine, the command =magazine fire= may be given at any time. the cut-off is turned up and an increased rate of fire is executed. after the magazine is exhausted the cut-off is turned down and the firing continued, loading from the belt. =magazine fire= is employed only when, in the opinion of the platoon leader or company commander, the maximum rate of fire becomes necessary. ( ) = . unload.= all take the position of load, turn the =cut-off= up, if not already there, turn the safety lock to the left, and alternately open and close the chamber until all the cartridges are ejected. after the last cartridge is ejected the chamber is closed and the trigger pulled. the cartridges are then picked up, cleaned, and returned to the box or belt, and the piece brought to the order. ( ) = . clip fire.= turn the cut-off up; =fire at will= (reloading from the magazine) until the cartridges in the piece are exhausted; turn the cut-off down; fill magazine; reload and take the position of =suspend firing=. ( ) = . cease firing.= firing stops; pieces not already there are brought to the position of load, the cut-off turned down if firing from magazine, the cartridge is drawn or the empty shell is ejected, the trigger is pulled, sights are laid down, and the piece is brought to the order. =cease firing= is used for long pauses to prepare for changes of position or to steady the men. ( ) appendix b war department, office of the chief of staff, washington, december , . paragraphs , , , , , , , and , infantry drill regulations, , apply only to troops equipped with the infantry equipment, model . for troops equipped under general orders, no. , war department, , and orders amendatory thereof, the alternative paragraphs published herewith will govern. by order of the secretary of war: leonard wood, major general, chief of staff. note. the paragraph numbers , , etc., given above, follow the paragraphs below. = .= if the inspection is to include an examination of the blanket rolls, the captain, before dismissing the company and after inspecting the file closers, directs the lieutenants to remain in place, closes ranks, stacks arms, dresses the company back to four paces from the stacks, takes intervals, and commands: = . unsling, . packs, . open, . packs.= at the second command, each man unslings his roll and places it on the ground at his feet, rounded end to the front, square end of shelter half to the right. at the fourth command, the rolls are untied, laid perpendicular to the front with the triangular end of the shelter half to the front, opened, and unrolled to the left; each man prepares the contents of his roll for inspection and resumes the attention. the captain then returns saber, passes along the ranks and file closers as before, inspects the rolls, returns to the right, draws saber and commands: = . close, . packs.= at the second command each man, with his shelter half smoothly spread on the ground with buttons up and triangular end to the front, folds his blanket once across its length and places it upon the shelter half, fold toward the bottom edge one-half inch from the square end, the same amount of canvas uncovered at the top and bottom. he then places the parts of the pole on the side of the blanket next the square end of shelter half, near and parallel to the fold, end of pole about inches from the edge of the blanket; nests the pins similarly near the opposite edge of the blanket and distributes the other articles carried in the roll; folds the triangular end and then the exposed portion of the bottom of the shelter half over the blanket. the two men in each file roll and fasten first the roll of the front and then of the rear rank man. the file closers work similarly two and two, or with the front rank man of a blank file. each pair stands on the folded side, rolls the blanket roll closely and buckles the straps, passing the end of the strap through both keeper and buckle, back over the buckle and under the keeper. with the roll so lying on the ground that the edge of the shelter half can just be seen when looking vertically downward, one end is bent upward and over to meet the other, a clove hitch is taken with the guy rope first around the end to which it is attached and then around the other end, adjusting the length of rope between hitches to suit the wearer. as soon as a file completes its two rolls each man places his roll in the position it was in after being unslung and stands at attention. all the rolls being completed, the captain commands: = . sling, . packs.= at the second command the rolls are slung, the end containing the pole to the rear. the company is assembled, takes arms, and the captain completes the inspection as before. ( ) = .= being in line or in column of platoons, the captain commands: =form for shelter tents.= the officers, first sergeant, and guides fall out; the cooks form a file on the flank of the company nearest the kitchen, the first sergeant and right guide fall in, forming the right file of the company; blank files are filled by the file closers or by men taken from the front rank; the remaining guide or guides, and file closers form on a convenient flank. before forming column of platoons, preparatory to pitching tents, the company may be redivided into two or more platoons, regardless of the size of each. ( ) = .= the captain then causes the company to take intervals as described in the school of the squad, and commands: =pitch tents.= at the command =pitch tents=, each man steps off obliquely to the right with the right foot and lays his rifle on the ground, the butt of the rifle near the toe of the right foot, muzzle to the front, barrel to the left, and steps back into his place; each front-rank man then draws his bayonet and sticks it in the ground by the outside of the right heel. all unsling and open the blanket rolls and take out the shelter half, poles, and pins. each then spreads his shelter half, triangle to the rear, flat upon the ground the tent is to occupy, rear-rank man's half on the right. the halves are then buttoned together. each front-rank man joins his pole, inserts the top in the eyes of the halves, and holds the pole upright beside the bayonet placed in the ground; his rear-rank man, using the pins in front, pins down the front corners of the tent on the line of bayonets, stretching the canvas taut; he then inserts a pin in the eye of the rope and drives the pin at such distance in front of the pole as to hold the rope taut. both then go to the rear of the tent; the rear-rank man adjusts the pole and the front-rank man drives the pins. the rest of the pins are then driven by both men, the rear-rank man working on the right. as soon as the tent is pitched each man arranges the contents of the blanket roll in the tent and stands at attention in front of his own half on line with the front guy rope pin. the guy ropes, to have a uniform slope when the shelter tents are pitched, should all be of the same length. ( ) = .= when the blanket roll is not carried, intervals are taken as described above; the position of the front pole is marked with a bayonet and equipments are laid aside. the men then proceed to the wagon, secure their rolls, return to their places, and pitch tents as heretofore described. ( ) = .= to pitch double shelter tent, the captain gives the same commands as before, except =take half interval= is given instead of =take interval=. in taking interval, each man follows the preceding man at paces. the captain then commands: =pitch double tents.= the first sergeant places himself on the right of the right guide and with him pitches a single shelter tent. only the odd numbers of the front rank mark the line with the bayonet. the tent is formed by buttoning together the square ends of two single tents. two complete tents, except one pole, are used. two guy ropes are used at each end, the guy pins being placed in front of the corner pins. the tents are pitched by numbers and , front and rear rank; and by numbers and , front and rear rank; the men falling in on the left are numbered, counting off if necessary. all the men spread their shelter halves on the ground the tent is to occupy. those of the front rank are placed with the triangular ends to the front. all four halves are then buttoned together, first the ridges and then the square ends. the front corners of the tent are pinned by the front-rank men, the odd number holding the poles, the even number driving the pins. the rear-rank men similarly pin the rear corners. while the odd numbers steady the poles, each even number of the front rank takes his pole and enters the tent, where, assisted by the even number of the rear rank, he adjusts the pole to the center eyes of the shelter halves in the following order: ( ) the lower half of the front tent; ( ) the lower half of the rear tent; ( ) the upper half of the front tent; ( ) the upper half of the rear tent. the guy ropes are then adjusted. the tents having been pitched, the triangular ends are turned back, contents of the rolls arranged, and the men stand at =attention=, each opposite his own shelter half and facing out from the tent. ( ) footnotes: [ ] no. of the first squad. [ ] ordinarily about yards wide. [ ] by fire direction is meant prescribing and generally directing the firing.--author. [ ] the "pack" includes blanket, poncho, and shelter tent. [ ] with a -foot white and red regimental signal flag. chapter ii manual of the bayonet (the numbers following the paragraphs are those of the manual of the bayonet, u. s. army.) = .= the infantry soldier relies mainly on fire action to disable the enemy, but he should know that personal combat is often necessary to obtain success. therefore, he must be instructed in the use of the rifle and bayonet in hand-to-hand encounters. ( ) = .= the object of this instruction is to teach the soldier how to make effective use of the rifle and bayonet in personal combat; to make him quick and proficient in handling his rifle; to give him an accurate eye and a steady hand; and to give him confidence in the bayonet in offense and defense. when skill in these exercises has been acquired, the rifle will still remain a most formidable weapon at close quarters should the bayonet be lost or disabled. ( ) = .= efficiency of organizations in bayonet fighting will be judged by the skill shown by individuals in personal combat. for this purpose pairs or groups of opponents, selected at random from among recruits and trained soldiers, should engage in assaults, using the fencing equipment provided for the purpose. ( ) = .= officers and specially selected and thoroughly instructed noncommissioned officers will act as instructors. ( ) = .= instruction in bayonet combat should begin as soon as the soldier is familiar with the handling of his rifle and will progress, as far as practicable, in the order followed in the text. ( ) = .= instruction is ordinarily given on even ground, but practice should also be had on uneven ground, especially in the attack and defense of intrenchments. ( ) = .= these exercises will not be used as a calisthenic drill. ( ) = .= the principles of the commands are the same as those given in paragraphs , , and . intervals and distances will be taken as in paragraphs and , except that, in formations for bayonet exercises, the men should be at least four paces apart in every direction. ( ) = .= before requiring soldiers to take a position or execute a movement for the first time, the instructor executes the same for the purpose of illustration, after which he requires the soldiers to execute the movement individually. movements prescribed in this manual will not be executed in cadence as the attempt to do so results in incomplete execution and lack of vigor. each movement will be executed correctly as quickly as possible by every man. as soon as the movements are executed accurately, the commands are given rapidly, as expertness with the bayonet depends chiefly upon quickness of motion. ( ) = .= the exercises will be interrupted at first by short and frequent rests. the rests will be less frequent as proficiency is attained. fatigue and exhaustion will be specially guarded against as they prevent proper interest being taken in the exercises and delay the progress of the instruction. rests will be given from the position of order arms in the manner prescribed in infantry drill regulations. ( ) the bayonet nomenclature and description = .= the bayonet is a cutting and thrusting weapon consisting of three principal parts, viz, the blade, guard, and grip. ( ) [illustration: fig. ] = .= the blade has the following parts: edge, false edge, back, grooves, point, and tang. the length of the blade from guard to point is inches, the edge . inches, and the false edge . inches. length of the rifle, bayonet fixed, is . inches. the weight of the bayonet is pound; weight of rifle without bayonet is . pounds. the center of gravity of the rifle, with bayonet fixed, is just in front of the rear sight. ( ) i. instruction without the rifle = .= the instructor explains the importance of good footwork and impresses on the men the fact that quickness of foot and suppleness of body are as important for attack and defense as is the ability to parry and deliver a strong point or cut. ( ) = .= all foot movements should be made from the position of _guard_. as far as practicable, they will be made on the balls of the feet to insure quickness and agility. no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the length of the various foot movements; this depends entirely on the situations occurring in combat. ( ) = .= the men having taken intervals or distances, the instructor commands: = . bayonet exercise, . guard.= at the command =guard=, half face to the right, carry back and place the right foot about once and a half its length to the rear and about inches to the right, the feet forming with each other an angle of about °, weight of the body balanced equally on the balls of the feet, knees slightly bent, palms of hands on hips, fingers to the front, thumbs to the rear, head erect, head and eyes straight to the front. ( ) = .= to resume the attention, = . squad, . attention.= the men take the position of the soldier and fix their attention. ( ) = . advance.= advance the left foot quickly about once its length follow immediately with the right foot the same distance. ( ) = . retire.= move the right foot quickly to the rear about once its length, follow immediately with the left foot the same distance. ( ) = . . front, . pass.= place the right foot quickly about once its length in front of the left, advance the left foot to its proper position in front of the right. ( ) = . . rear, . pass.= place the left foot quickly about once its length in rear of the right, retire the right foot to its proper position in rear of the left. the passes are used to get quickly within striking distance or to withdraw quickly therefrom. ( ) = . . right, . step.= step to the right with the right foot about once its length and place the left foot in its proper relative position. ( ) = . . left, . step.= step to the left with the left foot about once its length and place the right foot in its proper relative position. these steps are used to circle around an enemy, to secure a more favorable line of attack, or to avoid the opponent's attack. better ground or more favorable light may be gained in this way. in bayonet fencing and in actual combat the foot first moved in stepping to the right or left is the one which at the moment bears the least weight. ( ) ii. instruction with the rifle = .= the commands for and the execution of the foot movements are the same as already given for movements without the rifle. ( ) = .= the men having taken intervals or distances, the instructor commands: = . bayonet exercise, . guard.= at the second command take the position of guard (see par. ); at the same time throw the rifle smartly to the front, grasp the rifle with the left hand just below the lower band, fingers between the stock and gun sling, barrel turned slightly to the left, the right hand grasping the small of the stock about inches in front of the right hip, elbows free from the body, bayonet point at the height of the chin. ( ) (see fig. ) = . . order, . arms.= bring the right foot up to the left and the rifle to the position of order arms, at the same time resuming the position of attention. ( ) = .= during the preliminary instruction, attacks and defenses will be executed from guard until proficiency is attained, after which they may be executed from any position in which the rifle is held. ( ) attacks = . . thrust.= thrust the rifle quickly forward to the full length of the left arm, turning the barrel to the left, and direct the point of the bayonet at the point to be attacked, butt covering the right forearm. at the same time straighten the right leg vigorously and throw the weight of the body forward and on the left leg, the ball of the right foot always on the ground. guard is resumed immediately without command. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] the force of the thrust is delivered principally with the right arm, the left being used to direct the bayonet. the points at which the attack should be directed are, in order of their importance, stomach, chest, head, neck, and limbs. ( ) = . . lunge.= executed in the same manner as the thrust, except that the left foot is carried forward about twice its length. the left heel must always be in rear of the left knee. guard is resumed immediately without command. guard may also be resumed by advancing the right foot if, for any reason, it is desired to hold the ground gained in lunging. in the latter case, the preparatory command =forward= will be given. each method should be practiced. ( ) = . . butt, . strike.= straighten right arm and right leg vigorously and swing butt of rifle against point of attack, pivoting the rifle in the left hand at about the height of the left shoulder, allowing the bayonet to pass to the rear on the left side of the head. guard is resumed without command. the points of attack in their order of importance are, head, neck, stomach, and crotch. ( ) [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . . cut, . down.= execute a quick downward stroke, edge of bayonet directed at point of attack. guard is resumed without command. ( ) = . . cut, . right (left).= with a quick extension of the arms execute a cut to the right (left), directing the edge toward the point attacked. guard is resumed without command. the cuts are especially useful against the head, neck, and hands of an enemy. in executing left cut it should be remembered that the false, or back edge, is only . inches long. the cuts can be executed in continuation of strokes, thrusts, lunges, and parries. ( ) = .= to direct an attack to the right, left, or rear the soldier will change front as quickly as possible in the most convenient manner, for example: = . to the right rear, . cut, . down;= = . to the right, . lunge;= = . to the left, . thrust=, etc. whenever possible the impetus gained by the turning movement of the body should be thrown into the attack. in general this will be best accomplished by turning on the ball of the right foot. these movements constitute a change of front in which the position of guard is resumed at the completion of the movement. ( ) = .= good judgment of distance is essential. accuracy in thrusting and lunging is best attained by practicing these attacks against rings or other convenient openings, about inches in diameter, suitably suspended at desired heights. ( ) [illustration: fig. .] = .= the thrust and lunges at rings should first be practiced by endeavoring to hit the opening looked at. this should be followed by directing the attack against one opening while looking at another. ( ) = .= the soldier should also experience the effect of actual resistance offered to the bayonet and the butt of the rifle in attacks. this will be taught by practicing attacks against a dummy. ( ) = .= dummies should be constructed in such a manner as to permit the execution of attacks without injury to the point or edge of the bayonet or to the barrel or stock of the rifle. a suitable dummy can be made from pieces of rope about feet in length plaited closely together into a cable between and inches in diameter. old rope is preferable. bags weighted and stuffed with hay, straw, shavings, etc., are also suitable. ( ) [illustration: fig. .] defenses = .= in the preliminary drills in the defenses the position of guard is resumed, by command, after each parry. when the men have become proficient, the instructor will cause them to resume the position of guard instantly without command after the execution of each parry. ( ) = . . parry, . right.= keeping the right hand in the guard position, move the rifle sharply to the right with the left arm, so that the bayonet point is about inches to the right. ( ) = . . parry, . left.= move the rifle sharply to the left front with both hands so as to cover the point attacked. ( ) = . . parry, . high.= raise the rifle with both hands high enough to clear the line of vision, barrel downward, point of the bayonet to the left front. when necessary to raise the rifle well above the head, it may be supported between the thumb and forefinger of the left hand. this position will be necessary against attacks from higher elevations, such, as men mounted or on top of parapets. ( ) [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . . low parry, . right (left).= carry the point of the bayonet down until it is at the height of the knee, moving the point of the bayonet sufficiently to the right (left) to keep the opponent's attacks clear of the point threatened. = .= these parries are rarely used, as an attack below the waist leaves the head and body exposed. ( ) [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = .= parries must not be too wide or sweeping, but sharp, short motions, finished with a jerk or quick catch. the hands should, as far as possible, be kept in the line of attack. parries against =butt strike= are made by quickly moving the guard so as to cover the point attacked. ( ) = .= to provide against attack from the right, left, or rear the soldier will change front as quickly as possible in the most convenient manner, for example, = . to the left rear, . parry, . high;= = . to the right, . parry, . right=, etc. these movements constitute a change of front in which the position of guard is resumed at the completion of the movement. in changing front for the purpose of attack or defense, if there is danger of wounding a comrade, the rifle should first be brought to a vertical position. ( ) iii. instruction without the bayonet = . . club rifle, swing.= being at order arms at the preparatory command quickly raise and turn the rifle, regrasping it with both hands between the rear sight and muzzle, barrel down, thumbs around the stock and toward the butt; at the sane time raise the rifle above shoulder farthest from the opponent, butt elevated and to the rear, elbows slightly bent and knees straight. each individual takes such position of the feet, shoulders, and hands as best accords with his natural dexterity. =swing.= tighten the grasp of the hands and swing the rifle to the front and downward, directing it at the head of the opponent and immediately return to the position of =club rifle= by completing the swing of the rifle downward and to the rear. repeat by the command. =swing.= the rifle should be swung with sufficient force to break through any guard or parry that may be interposed. being at =club rifle=, order arms is resumed by command. the use of this attack against dummies or in fencing is prohibited. ( ) [illustration: fig. ] = .= the position of club rifle may be taken from any position of the rifle prescribed in the manual of arms. it will not be taken in personal combat unless the emergency is such as to preclude the use of the bayonet. ( ) iv. combined movements = .= the purpose of combined movements is to develop more vigorous attacks and more effective defenses than are obtained by the single movements; to develop skill in passing from attack to defense and the reverse. every movement to the front should be accompanied by an attack, which is increased in effectiveness by the forward movement of the body. every movement to the rear should ordinarily be accompanied by a parry and should always be followed by an attack. movements to the right or left may be accompanied by =attacks= or =defenses=. ( ) = .= not more than three movements will be used in any combination. the instructor should first indicate the number of movements that are to be combined as =two movements= or =three movements=. the execution is determined by one command of execution, and the position of guard is taken upon the completion of the last movement only. examples =front pass and lunge.= =right step and thrust.= =left step and low parry right.= =rear pass, parry left and lunge.= =lunge and cut right.= =parry right and parry high.= =butt strike and cut down.= =thrust and parry high.= =parry high and lunge.= =advance, thrust and cut right.= =right step, parry left and cut down.= =to the left, butt strike and cut down.= =to the right rear, cut down and butt strike.= ( ) = .= attacks against dummies will be practiced. the approach will be made against the dummies both in quick time and double time. ( ) v. practical bayonet combat = .= the principles of practical bayonet combat should be taught as far as possible during the progress of instruction in bayonet exercises. ( ) = .= the soldier must be continually impressed with the extreme importance of the offensive due to its moral effect. should an attack fail, it should be followed immediately by another attack before the opponent has an opportunity to assume the offensive. keep the opponent on the defensive. if, due to circumstances, it is necessary to take the defensive, constantly watch for an opportunity to assume the offensive and take immediate advantage of it. ( ) = .= observe the ground with a view to obtaining the best footing. time for this will generally be too limited to permit more than a single hasty glance. ( ) = .= in personal combat watch the opponent's eyes if they can be plainly seen, and do not fix the eyes on his weapon nor upon the point of your attack. if his eyes can not be plainly seen, as in night attacks, watch the movements of his weapon and of his body. ( ) = .= keep the body well covered and deliver attacks vigorously. the point of the bayonet should always be kept as nearly as possible in the line of attack. the less the rifle is moved upward, downward, to the right, or to the left, the better prepared the soldier is for attack or defense. ( ) = .= constantly watch for a chance to attack the opponent's left hand. his position of guard will not differ materially from that described in paragraph . if his bayonet is without a cutting edge, he will be at a great disadvantage. ( ) = .= the butt is used for close and sudden attacks. it is particularly useful in riot duty. from the position of port arms a sentry can strike a severe blow with the butt of the rifle. ( ) = .= against a man on foot, armed with a sword, be careful that the muzzle of the rifle is not grasped. all the swordsman's energies will be directed toward getting past the bayonet. attack him with short stabbing thrusts, and keep him beyond striking distance of his weapon. ( ) = .= the adversary may attempt a greater extension in the thrust and lunge by quitting the grasp of his piece with the left hand and advancing the right as far as possible. when this is done, a sharp parry may cause him to lose control of his rifle, leaving him exposed to a counter-attack, which should follow promptly. ( ) = .= against odds a small number of men can fight to best advantage by grouping themselves so as to prevent their being attacked from behind. ( ) = .= in fighting a mounted man armed with a saber every effort must be made to get on his near or left side, because here his reach is much shorter and his parries much weaker. if not possible to disable such an enemy, attack his horse and then renew the attack on the horseman. ( ) = .= in receiving night attacks the assailant's movements can be best observed from the kneeling or prone position, as his approach generally brings him against the sky line. when he arrives within attacking distance rise quickly and lunge well forward at the middle of his body. ( ) vi. fencing exercises = .= fencing exercises in two lines consist of combinations of thrusts, parries, and foot movements executed at command or at will, the opponent replying with suitable parries and returns. ( ) = .= the instructor will inspect the entire fencing equipment before the exercise begins and assure himself that everything is in such condition as will prevent accidents. ( ) = .= the men equip themselves and form in two lines at the order, facing each other, with intervals of about paces between files and a distance of about paces between lines. one line is designated as number ; the other, number . also as attack and defense. ( ) = .= the opponents being at the order facing each other, the instructor commands: =salute.= each man, with eyes on his opponent, carries the left hand smartly to the right side, palm of the hand down, thumb and fingers extended and joined, forearm horizontal, forefinger touching the bayonet. (two) drop the arm smartly by the side. this salute is the fencing salute. all fencing exercises and all fencing at will between individuals will begin and terminate with the formal courtesy of the fencing salute. ( ) = .= after the fencing salute has been rendered the instructor commands: = . fencing exercise, . guard.= at the command =guard= each man comes to the position of =guard=, heretofore defined, bayonets crossed, each man's bayonet bearing lightly to the right against the corresponding portion of the opponent's bayonet. the position is known as the engage or engage right. ( ) = .= being at the =engage right: engage left=. the attack drops the point of his bayonet quickly until clear of his opponent's rifle and describes a semicircle with it upward and to the right; bayonets are crossed similarly as in the engaged position, each man's bayonet bearing lightly to the left against the corresponding portion of the opponent's bayonet. ( ) = .= being at =engage left: engage right=. the attack quickly drops the point of his bayonet until clear of his opponent's rifle and describes a semicircle with it upward and to the left and =engages=. ( ) = .= being =engaged: engage left and right=. the attack =engages left= and then immediately =engages right=. ( ) = .= being =engaged left: engage right and left=. the attack =engages right= and then immediately =engages left=. ( ) = . . number one, engage right (left); . number two, counter.= number one executes the movement ordered, as above; number two quickly drops the point of his bayonet and circles it upward to the original position. ( ) = .= in all fencing while maintaining the pressure in the engage, a certain freedom of motion of the rifle is allowable, consisting of the play, or up-and-down motion, of one bayonet against the other. this is necessary to prevent the opponent from divining the intended attack. it also prevents his using the point of contact as a pivot for his assaults. in changing from one engage to the other the movement is controlled by the left hand, the right remaining stationary. ( ) = .= after some exercise in =engage=, =engage left=, and =counter=, exercises will be given in the =assaults=. ( ) assaults = .= the part of the body to be attacked will be designated by name as head, neck, chest, stomach, legs. no attacks will be made below the knees. the commands are given and the movements for each line are first explained thoroughly by the instructor; the execution begins at the command =assault=. number one executes the attack, and number two parries; conversely, at command, number two attacks and number one parries. ( ) = .= for convenience in instruction assaults are divided into =simple attacks=, =counter-attacks=, =attack on the rifle=, and =feints=. ( ) simple attacks = .= success in these attacks depends on quickness of movement. there are three simple attacks--the =straight=, the =disengagement=, and the =counter disengagement=. they are not preceded by a feint. ( ) = .= in the =straight= the bayonet is directed straight at an opening from the engaged position. contact with the opponent's rifle may, or may not, be abandoned while making it. if the opening be high or low, contact with the rifle will usually be abandoned on commencing the attack. if the opening be near his guard, the light pressure used in the engage may be continued in the attack. example: being at the =engage right=, = . number one=, at neck (head, chest, right leg, etc.), =thrust; . number two, parry right; . assault.= ( ) = .= in the =disengagement= contact with the opponent's rifle is abandoned and the point of the bayonet is =circled under= or =over= his bayonet or rifle and directed into the opening attacked. this attack is delivered by one continuous spiral movement of the bayonet from the moment contact is abandoned. example: being at the =engage right=, = . number one=, at stomach (left chest, left leg, etc.), =thrust, . number two, parry left= (etc.); = . assault.= ( ) = .= in the =counter disengagement= a swift attack is made into the opening disclosed while the opponent is attempting to change the engagement of his rifle. it is delivered by one continuous spiral movement of the bayonet into the opening. example: being at the =engage right=, = . number two, engage left; . number one=, at chest, =thrust; . number two, parry left; . assault.= number two initiates the movement, number one thrusts as soon as the opening is made, and number two then attempts to parry. ( ) = .= a =counter-attack= or =return= is one made instantly after or in continuation of a parry. the parry should be as narrow as possible. this makes it more difficult for the opponent to recover and counter parry. the counter-attack should also be made at, or just before, the full extension of the opponent's attack, as when it is so made, a simple extension of the arms will generally be sufficient to reach the opponent's body. example: being at =engage=, = . number two=, at chest, =lunge; . number one, parry right=, and at stomach (chest, head, etc.), =thrust; . assault.= ( ) attacks on the rifle = .= these movements are made for the purpose of forcing or disclosing an opening into which an attack can be made. they are the =press=, the =beat=, and the =twist=. ( ) = .= in the =press= the attack quickly presses against the opponent's bayonet or rifle with his own and continues the pressure as the attack is delivered. example: being at the =engage=, = . number one, press=, and at chest, =thrust; . number two, parry right; . assault.= ( ) = .= the attack by =disengagement= is particularly effective following =the press=. example: being at the =engage=, = . number one, press=, and at stomach, =thrust; . number two, low parry left; . assault.= ( ) = .= the =beat= is an attack in which a sharp blow struck against the opponent's rifle for the purpose of forcing him to expose an opening into which an attack immediately follows. it is used when there is but slight opposition or no contact of rifles. example: being at the =engage=, = . number one, beat= and at stomach (chest, etc.), =thrust; . number two, parry left; . assault.= ( ) = .= in the =twist= the rifle is crossed over the opponent's rifle or bayonet and his bayonet forced downward with a circular motion and a straight attack made into the opening. it requires superior strength on the part of the attack. example: being at the =engage=, = . number one, twist=, and at stomach, =thrust; . number two, low parry, left; . assault.= ( ) feints = .= feints are movements which threaten or simulate attacks and are made with a view to inducing an opening or parry that exposes the desired point of attack. they are either single or double, according to the number of such movements made by the attack. ( ) = .= in order that the attack may be changed quickly, as little force as possible is put into a feint. example: being at the =engage=, = . number one, feint= head =thrust= at stomach, =lunge; . number two, parry right and low parry right; . assault.= number one executes the feint and then the attack. number two executes both parries. ( ) = .= in double feints first one part of the body and then another is threatened and a third attacked. example: being at the =engage=, = . number one, feint straight thrust= at chest; =disengagement= at chest; at stomach, =lunge; . number two, parry right, parry left,= and =low parry left; . assault.= ( ) = .= an opening may be offered or procured by opposition, as in the =press= or =beat=. ( ) = .= in fencing exercises every feint should at first be parried. when the defense is able to judge or divine the character of the attack the feint is not necessarily parried, but may be nullified by a counter feint. ( ) = .= a =counter feint= is a feint following the opponent's feint or following a parry of his attack and generally occurs in combined movements. ( ) combined movements = .= when the men have become thoroughly familiar with the various foot movements, parries, guards, attacks, feints, etc., the instructor combines several of them and gives the commands in quick succession, increasing the rapidity and number of movements as the men become more skillful. opponents will be changed frequently. . example: being at the =engage=, = . number one, by disengagement= at chest, =thrust; . number two, parry left, right step= (left foot first), and =lunge; . assault.= . example: being at =engage left=, = . number one, press and lunge; . number two, parry right, left step,= and =thrust; . assault.= . example: being at the =engage=, = . number one, by disengagement= at chest, =thrust; . number two, parry left, front pass=, and at head =butt strike; . number one, right step; . assault.= ( ) = .= examples and are typical of movements known as =cross counters=, and example no. of movements known as =close counters=. ( ) = .= a =chancery= is an attack by means of which the opponent is disarmed, which causes him to lose control of his rifle, or which disables his weapon. ( ) = .= when the different combinations are executed with sufficient skill the instructor will devise series of movements to be memorized and executed at the command assault. the accuracy and celerity of the movements will be carefully watched by the instructor, with a view to the correction of faulty execution. ( ) = .= it is not intended to restrict the number of movements, but to leave to the discretion of company commanders and the ingenuity of instructors the selection of such other exercises as accord with the object of the drill. ( ) vii. fencing at will = .= as satisfactory progress is made the instructor will proceed to the exercises at will, by which is meant assaults between two men, each endeavoring to hit the other and to avoid being hit himself. fencing at will should not be allowed to degenerate into random attacks and defenses. ( ) = .= the instructor can supervise but one pair of combatants at a time. frequent changes should be made so that the men may learn different methods of attack and defense from each other. ( ) = .= the contest should begin with simple, careful movements, with a view to forming a correct opinion of the adversary; afterwards everything will depend on coolness, rapid and correct execution of the movements and quick perception of the adversary's intentions. ( ) = .= continual retreat from the adversary's attack and frequent dodging to escape attacks should be avoided. the offensive should be continually encouraged. ( ) = .= in fencing at will, when no commands are given, opponents facing each other at the position of order arms, salute. they then immediately and simultaneously assume the position of guard, rifles engaged. neither man may take the position of guard before his opponent has completed his salute. the choice of position is decided before the salute. ( ) = .= the opponents being about two paces apart and the fencing salute having been rendered, the instructor commands, = . at will, . assault=, after which either party has the right to attack. to interrupt the contest the instructor will command =halt=, at which the combatants will immediately come to the order. to terminate the contest the instructor will command, = . halt, . salute=, at which the combatants will immediately come to the order, salute, and remove their masks. ( ) = .= when men have acquired confidence in fencing at will, one opponent should be required to advance upon the other in quick time at =charge bayonet=, from a distance not to exceed yards, and deliver an attack. as soon as a hit is made by either opponent the instructor commands, =halt=, and the assault terminates. opponents alternate in assaulting. the assailant is likewise required to advance at double time from a distance not exceeding yards and at a run from a distance not exceeding yards. ( ) = .= the instructor will closely observe the contest and decide doubtful points. he will at once stop the contest upon the slightest indication of temper. after conclusion of the combat he will comment on the action of both parties, point out errors and deficiencies and explain how they may be avoided in the future. ( ) [illustration: fig. ] = .= as additional instruction, the men may be permitted to wield the rifle left handed, that is on the left side of the body, left hand at the small of the stock. many men will be able to use this method to advantage. it is also of value in case the left hand is wounded. ( ) = .= after men have fenced in pairs, practice should be given in fencing between groups, equally and unequally divided. when practicable, intrenchments will be used in fencing of this character. in group fencing it will be necessary to have a sufficient number of umpires to decide hits. an individual receiving a hit is withdrawn at once from the bout, which is decided in favor of the group having the numerical superiority at the end. the fencing salute is not required in group fencing. ( ) rules for fencing at will = .= . hits on the legs below the knees will not be counted. no hit counts unless, in the opinion of the instructor, it has sufficient force to disable. . upon receiving a hit, call out "hit." . after receiving a fair hit a counter-attack is not permitted. a position of engage is taken. . a second or third hit in a combined attack will be counted only when the first hit was not called. . when it is necessary to stop the contest--for example, because of breaking of weapons or displacement of means of protection--take the position of the order. . when it is necessary to suspend the assault for any cause, it will not be resumed until the adversary is ready and in condition to defend himself. . attacks directed at the crotch are prohibited in fencing. . stepping out of bounds, when established, counts as a hit. ( ) suggestions for fencing at will = .= when engaging in an assault, first study the adversary's position and proceed by false attacks, executed with speed, to discover, if possible, his instinctive parries. in order to draw the adversary out and induce him to expose that part of the body at which the attack is to be made, it is advisable to simulate an attack by a feint and then make the real attack. ( ) = .= return attacks should be frequently practiced, as they are difficult to parry, and the opponent is within easier reach and more exposed. the return can be made a continuation of the parry, as there is no previous warning of its delivery, although it should always be expected. returns are made without lunging if the adversary can be reached by thrusts or cuts. ( ) = .= endeavor to overcome the tendency to make a return without knowing where it will hit. making returns blindly is a bad habit and leads to instinctive returns--that is, habitual returns with certain attacks from certain parries--a fault which the skilled opponent will soon discover. ( ) = .= do not draw the rifle back preparatory to thrusting and lunging ( ) = .= the purpose of fencing at will is to teach the soldier as many forms of simple, effective attacks and defenses as possible. complicated and intricate movements should not be attempted. ( ) hints for instructors = .= the influence of the instructor is great. he must be master of his weapon, not only to show the various movements, but also to lead in the exercises at will. he should stimulate the zeal of the men and arouse pleasure in the work. officers should qualify themselves as instructors by fencing with each other. ( ) lessons of the european war = . modification of our system of bayonet combat suggested.= the above gives, in toto, the system of bayonet exercises and combat at present prescribed by the war department in the =manual of the bayonet=. however, the use of the bayonet in the present european war, which has given that weapon an importance and prominence heretofore unheard of, suggests, as indicated below, certain modifications of our system. (a) _attack not to be directed against chest._ the attack should be directed at the adversary's neck or stomach, and not against his chest; for, if the bayonet is driven into the chest, there will probably be difficulty in withdrawing it, and while your bayonet is being so held, imbedded in your adversary's chest, you are at the mercy of any other enemy soldier free to strike you. (b) _mêlée on parapet._ when the first wave of an attacking line reaches the enemy's trench, it is usually met outside the trench, the mêlée taking place on the parapet, and fortunate is the man who is skilled in handling his bayonet. such a man has a much greater chance to live through the mêlée than the one who is not skillful in using his bayonet. in the excitement and confusion of this mêlée the greatest possible care must be taken not to stab some of your own men in the back. (c) _position of feet._ the british have been teaching their men to keep both feet pointing toward the enemy instead of having the right foot turned to the right, as in our system. note the position of the feet in figs. - . (d) _the "short point" (or "short thrust") and the "jab."_ there are two attacks used by european troops which we might learn with profit. they are the "short point" (or "short thrust") and the "jab." position of guard [illustration: fig. ] (e) _the short point (or short thrust)._ the _short point_ (or _short thrust_) is taken from the position of guard (fig. ), by slipping the left hand up to the grip of the bayonet, grasping it and the barrel, as shown in this figure: [illustration: fig. ] the rifle is then drawn back to the fullest extent of the right arm, thus: [illustration: fig. ] and a vigorous thrust is made at the objective (fig. ), immediately after which the bayonet is withdrawn vigorously, the left hand relaxed and the position of guard (fig. ) is resumed by pushing the rifle smartly forward until the left hand is in its proper place. it should be practiced on sand bags or other targets in positions at the height of the rifle, above it and below it. (f) _the jab._ the jab is taken from the first position of the "short point" (fig. ), by slipping the right hand up to the left as the rifle is drawn back to make the "short thrust" (fig. ). [illustration: fig. ] then make a vigorous _upward_ thrust (fig. ) which should be aimed at the adversary's throat. [illustration: fig. ] this may be practiced combined with the short thrust or the ordinary thrust. it may also be practiced with a run toward the target. it is a useful attack at close quarters. (g) _the butt._ the rifle butt is used with great effect at close quarters, the blows being directed against an adversary's jaw or in the region of the heart. (h) _tripping adversary._ the men are taught how to trip up an enemy and how to use their knees in throwing their opponents off their balance. (i) _withdrawing the bayonet._ after driving the bayonet into an opponent, then the first consideration is to get it out of his body. this may be done by slipping the left hand up to the bayonet grip and exerting a _vigorous_ pull, which is immediately followed by a return to the position of guard. (j) _points in training._ in the first stages of training, special attention is paid to a firm grip and proper handling of arms; then the greatest attention is given to "direction" when thrusting, lunging, and parrying. until these essentials have been thoroughly mastered, quickness should not be insisted upon. confidence comes after continued practice, and quickness and vigor will come with confidence. after the men are taught to make all the attacks as individuals they should be given practice in them as groups. sandbags with discs marked on them to provide targets are used in instructing the british armies. these bags are suspended from trees or trestles, or are put into trenches or pits, and are also placed on the ground. an excellent scheme is used in teaching the men what the shock of a charge is like. the men are divided into two or more groups and are equipped with fencing outfits. one group is designated as the defense and is placed in trenches. the other groups are the attackers. they may be sent forward in waves or in one line. to make their advance more realistic they have to get over or around obstacles. to take in all phases the attackers are made stronger than the defense and the defense retires--whereupon the attackers endeavor to disable them by thrusting at the kidneys. likewise the defense is made strong enough to drive off the offense. in the charge the men are taught to run at the "high port" (the rifle is held as in "port arms," but is carried well above the head). the rifle is brought down to guard just before the enemy is met. appendix d september , infantry drill regulations, . paragraphs , , , , , , , , infantry drill regulations, , apply only to troops armed with the united states rifle, model . for troops armed with the united states rifle, model (enfield), the alternative paragraphs published herewith will govern. by order of the secretary of war: = .= the following rules govern the carrying of the piece: first. the piece is not carried with cartridges in either the chamber or the magazine except when especially ordered. when so loaded, or supposed to be loaded, it is habitually carried locked; that is, with safety lock turned to the "=safe.=" at all other times it is carried unlocked, with the trigger pulled. second. whenever troops are formed under arms, pieces are immediately inspected at the commands: = . inspection, . arms, . order (right shoulder port), . arms.= a similar inspection is made immediately before dismissal. if cartridges are found in the chamber or magazine they are removed and placed in the belt. third. the bayonet is not fixed except in bayonet exercise, on guard, or for combat. fourth. =fall in= is executed with the piece at the order arms. =fall out=, =rest=, and =at ease= are executed as without arms. on resuming attention the position of order arms is taken. fifth. if at the order, unless otherwise prescribed, the piece is brought to the right shoulder, at the command =march=, the three motions corresponding with the first three steps. movements may be executed at the trail by prefacing the preparatory command with the words =at trail=; as = . at trail, forward, . march.= the trail is taken at the command =march=. when the facings, alignments, open and close ranks, taking interval or distance, and assemblings are executed from the order, raise the piece to the trail while in motion and resume the order on halting. sixth. the piece is brought to the order on halting. the execution of the order begins when the halt is completed. seventh. a disengaged hand in double time is held as when without arms. = .= being at order arms: = . unfix, . bayonet.= if the bayonet scabbard is carried on the belt: execute parade rest; grasp the handle of the bayonet firmly with the right hand, pressing the spring with the forefinger of the left hand; raise the bayonet until the handle is about inches above the muzzle of the piece; the point to the left, back of the hand toward the body, and glancing at the scabbard, return the bayonet, the blade passing between the left arm and the body; regrasp the piece with the right hand and resume the order. if the bayonet scabbard is carried on the haversack: take the bayonet from the rifle with the left hand and return it to the scabbard in the most convenient manner. if marching or lying down, the bayonet is fixed and unfixed in the most expeditious and convenient manner and the piece returned to the original position. fix and unfix bayonet are executed with promptness and regularity, but not in cadence. = .= being at inspection arms: = . order (right shoulder, port), . arms.= at the preparatory command press the follower down with the fingers of the left hand, then push the bolt forward just enough to engage the follower, raise the fingers of the left hand, push the bolt forward, turn the handle down, pull the trigger, and resume =port arms=. at the command =arms=, complete the movement ordered. to load = .= being in line or skirmish line at halt: = . with dummy (blank or ball) cartridges, . load.= at the command =load= each front rank man or skirmisher faces half right and carries the right foot to the right, about foot, to such a position as will insure the greatest firmness and steadiness of the body; raises or lowers the piece and drops it into the left hand at the balance, left thumb extended along the stock and muzzle at the height of the breast. with the right hand he turns and draws the bolt back, takes a loaded clip and inserts the end in the clip slots, places the thumb on the powder space at the top cartridge, the fingers extending around the piece and tips resting on the magazine floor plate; forces the cartridges into the magazine by pressing down with the thumb; without removing the clip, thrusts the bolt home, turning down the handle; turns the safety lock to the "safe" and carries the hand to the small of the stock. each rear rank man moves to the right front, takes a similar position opposite the interval to the right of his front rank man, muzzle of the piece extending beyond the front rank, and loads. a skirmish line may load while moving, the pieces being held as nearly as practicable in the position of load. if kneeling or sitting, the position of the piece is similar; if kneeling, the left forearm rests on the left thigh; if sitting, the elbows are supported by the knees. if lying down, the left hand steadies and supports the piece at the balance, the toe of the butt resting on the ground, the muzzle off the ground. for reference, these positions (standing, kneeling, and lying down) are designated as that of =load=. = .= for purposes of simulating firing, = . simulate, . load=, raise the bolt handle as in the preceding paragraph, draw the bolt back until the cocking piece engages, then close the bolt, and turn the bolt handle down. the recruits are first taught to simulate loading and firing; after a few lessons dummy cartridges are used. later, blank cartridges may be used. omit last paragraph. = . unload:= take the position of load, turn the safety lock up and move the bolt alternately backward and forward until all the cartridges are ejected. after the last cartridge is ejected the chamber is closed by pressing the follower down with the fingers of the left hand, to engage it under the bolt, and then thrusting the bolt home. the trigger is pulled. the cartridges are then picked up, cleaned, and returned to the belt and the piece is brought to the order. = .= [last paragraph]. to continue the firing: = . aim, . squad, . fire.= each command is executed as previously explained. =load= is executed by drawing back and thrusting home the bolt with the right hand, leaving the safety lock at the "ready." = . cease firing:= firing stops; pieces are loaded and locked; the sights are laid down and the piece is brought to the order. cease firing is used for long pauses to prepare for changes of position or to steady the men. company inspection = .= being in line at halt: = . open ranks, . march.= at the command =march= the front rank executes right dress; the rear rank and the file closers march backward steps, halt, and execute right dress; the lieutenants pass around their respective flanks and take post, facing to the front, paces in front of the center of their respective platoons. the captain aligns the front rank, rear rank, and file closers, takes post paces in front of the right guide, facing to the left and commands: = . front, . prepare for inspection.= at the second command the lieutenants carry saber; the captain returns saber and inspects them, after which they face about, order saber, and stand at ease; upon the completion of the inspection they carry saber, face about, and order saber. the captain may direct the lieutenants to accompany or assist him, in which case they return saber and, at the close of the inspection, resume their posts in front of the company, draw and carry saber. having inspected the lieutenants, the captain proceeds to the right of the company. each man, as the captain approaches him executes =inspection arms=. the captain takes the piece, grasping it with his right hand just below the lower band, the man dropping his hands; the captain inspects the piece, and, with the hand and piece in the same position as in receiving it, hands it back to the man, who takes it with the left hand at the balance and executes =order arms=. as the captain returns the piece the next man executes =inspection arms=, and so on through the company. should the piece be inspected without handling, each man executes =order arms= as soon as the captain passes to the next man. the inspection is from right to left in front, and from left to right in rear of each rank and of the line of file closers. when approached by the captain the first sergeant executes =inspection saber=. enlisted men armed with the pistol execute =inspection pistol= by drawing the pistol from the holster and holding it diagonally across the body, barrel up, and inches in front of the neck, muzzle pointing up and to the left. the pistol is returned to the holster as soon as the captain passes. upon completion of the inspection the captain takes post facing to the left in front of the right guide and on line with the lieutenants and commands: = . close ranks, . march.= at the command march the lieutenants resume their posts in line; the rear rank closes to inches, each man covering his file leader; the file closers close to paces from the rear rank. chapter iii manual of physical training (extracts) methods = .= in the employment of the various forms of physical training it is necessary that well-defined methods should be introduced in order that the object of this training may be attained in the most thorough and systematic manner. whenever it is possible this work should be conducted out of doors. in planning these methods the following factors must be considered: (_a_) the condition and physical aptitude of the men. (_b_) the facilities. (_c_) the time. the question of the _physical aptitude_ and _general condition_, etc., of the men is a very important one, and it should always determine the nature and extent of the task expected of them; never should the work be made the determining factor. in general, it is advisable to divide the men into three classes, viz., the recruit class, the intermediate class, and the advanced class. the work for each class should fit the capabilities of the members of that class and in every class it should be arranged progressively. _facilities_ are necessarily to be considered in any plan of instruction, but as most posts are now equipped with better than average facilities the plan laid down in this manual will answer all purposes. _time_ is a decidedly important factor, and no plan can be made unless those in charge of this work know exactly how much time they have at their disposal. during the suspension of drills five periods a week, each of minutes duration, should be devoted to physical training; during the drill period a -minute drill in setting-up exercises should be ordered on drill days. the time of day, too, is important. _when possible, these drills should be held in the morning about two hours after breakfast, and at no time should they be held immediately before or after a meal._ insist upon accurate and precise execution of every movement. by doing so those other essential qualities, besides strength and endurance--activity, agility, gracefulness, and accuracy--will also be developed. exercises which require activity and agility, rather than those that require strength only, should be selected. it should be constantly borne in mind that these exercises are the means and not the end; and if there be a doubt in the mind of the instructor as to the effect of an exercise, it is always well to err upon the side of safety. _underdoing is rectifiable; overdoing is often not._ the object of this work is not the development of expert gymnasts, but the development of physically sound men by means of a system in which the chances of bodily injury are reduced to a minimum. when individuals show a special aptitude for gymnastics they may be encouraged, within limits, to improve this ability, but never at the expense of their fellows. the drill should be made as attractive as possible, and this can best be accomplished by employing the mind as well as the body. the movements should be as varied as possible, thus constantly offering the men something new to make them keep their minds on their work. a movement many times repeated presents no attraction and is executed in a purely mechanical manner, which should always be discountenanced. short and frequent drills should be given in preference to long ones, which are liable to exhaust all concerned, and exhaustion means lack of interest and benefit. all movements should be carefully explained, and, if necessary, illustrated by the instructor. the lesson should begin with the less violent exercises, gradually working up to those that are more so, then gradually working back to the simpler ones, so that the men at the close of the drill will be in as nearly a normal condition as possible. when one portion of the body is being exercised, care should be taken that the other parts remain quiet as far as the conformation of the body will allow. the men must learn to exercise any one part of the body independent of the other part. everything in connection with physical training should be such that the men look forward to it with pleasure, not with dread, for the mind exerts more influence over the human body than all the gymnastic paraphernalia that was ever invented. exercise should be carried on as much as possible in the open air; at all times in pure, dry air. never exercise the men to the point of exhaustion. if there is evidence of panting, faintness, fatigue, or pain, the exercise should be stopped at once, for it is nature's way of saying "too much." by constant practice the men should learn to breathe slowly through the nostrils during all exercises, especially running. a fundamental condition of exercise is unimpeded respiration. proper breathing should always be insisted upon; "holding the breath" and breathing only when it can no longer be held is injurious. every exercise should be accompanied by an unimpeded and, if possible, by an uninterrupted act of respiration, the inspiration and respiration of which depends to a great extent upon the nature of the exercise. inhalation should always accompany that part of an exercise which tends to elevate and distend the thorax--as raising arms over head laterally, for instance; while that part of an exercise which exerts a pressure against the walls of the chest should be accompanied by exhalation, as for example, lowering arms laterally from shoulders or overhead. if after exercising, the breathing becomes labored and distressed, it is an unmistakable sign that the work has been excessive. such excessiveness is not infrequently the cause of serious injury to the heart and lungs or to both. in cases where exercise produces palpitation, labored respiration, etc., it is advisable to recommend absolute rest, or to order the execution of such exercises as will relieve the oppressed and overtaxed organ. leg exercises slowly executed will afford great relief. by drawing the blood from the upper to the lower extremities they equalize the circulation, thereby lessening the heart's action and quieting the respiration. _never exercise immediately after a meal_; digestion is more important at this time than extraneous exercise. _never eat or drink immediately after exercise_; allow the body to recover its normal condition first, and the most beneficial results will follow. if necessary, pure water, not too cold, may be taken in small quantities, but the exercise should be continued, especially if in a state of perspiration. never, if at all possible, allow the underclothing to dry on the body. muscular action produces an unusual amount of bodily heat; this should be lost gradually, otherwise the body will be chilled; hence, after exercise, never remove clothing to cool off, but, on the contrary, wear some wrap in addition. in like manner, be well wrapped on leaving the gymnasium. cold baths, especially when the body is heated, as in the case after exercising violently, should be discouraged. in individual instances such baths may appear apparently beneficial, or at least not injurious; in a majority of cases, however, they can not be used with impunity. tepid baths are recommended. when impossible to bathe, the flannels worn while exercising should be stripped off; the body sponged with tepid water, and then rubbed thoroughly with coarse towels. after such a sponge the body should be clothed in clean, warm clothing. flannel is the best material to wear next to the body during physical drill, as it absorbs the perspiration, protects the body against drafts and, in a mild manner, excites the skin. when the conditions permit it the men may be exercised in the ordinary athletic costume, sleeveless shirt, flappers, socks, and gymnasium shoes. commands--setting-up exercises commands = .= there are two kinds of commands: the preparatory indicates the movement to be executed. the command of execution causes the execution. in the command: = . arms forward, . raise=, the words =arms forward= constitute the preparatory command, and =raise= the command of execution. preparatory commands are printed in =bold face=, and those of execution in =capitals=. the tone of command is animated, distinct, and of a loudness proportioned to the number of men for whom it is intended. the various movements comprising an exercise are executed by commands and, unless otherwise indicated, the continuation of an exercise is carried out by repeating the command, which usually takes the form of numerals the numbers depending upon the number of movements, that an exercise comprises. thus, if an exercise consists of two movements, the counts will be one, two; or if it consists of eight movements, the counts will be correspondingly increased; thus every movement is designated by a separate command. occasionally, especially in exercises that are to be executed slowly, words rather than numerals are used, and these must be indicative of the nature of the various movements. in the continuation of an exercise the preparatory command is explanatory, the command of execution causes the execution and the _continuation is caused by a repetition of numerals_ denoting the number of movements required, or of words describing the movements if words are used. the numerals or words preceding the command =halt= should always be given with a rising inflection on the first numeral or word of command of the last repetition of the exercise in order to prepare the men for the command =halt=. for example: = . arms to thrust, . raise, . thrust arms upward, . exercise, one, two, one, two, one, halt=; the rising inflection preparatory to the command halt being placed on the "one" preceding the "=halt=." each command must indicate, by its tone, how that particular movement is to be executed; thus, if an exercise consists of two movements, one of which is to be energized, the command corresponding to that movement must be emphasized. judgment must be used in giving commands, for rarely is the cadence of two movements alike; and a command should not only indicate the cadence of an exercise, but also the nature of its execution. thus, many of the arm exercises are short and snappy; hence the command should be given in a smart tone of voice, and the interval between the commands should be short. the leg exercises can not be executed as quickly as those of the arms; therefore, the commands should be slightly drawn out and follow one another in slow succession. the trunk exercises, owing to the deliberateness of execution, should be considerably drawn out and follow one another in slow succession. the antagonistic exercises, where one group of muscles is made to antagonize another, tensing exercises, the commands are drawn still more. in these exercises words are preferable to numerals. in fact it should be the object of the instructor to convey to the men, by the manner of his command, exactly the nature of the exercise. all commands should be given in a clear and distinct tone of voice, articulation should be distinct, and an effort should be made to cultivate a voice which will inspire the men with enthusiasm and tend to make them execute the exercises with willingness, snap, and precision. it is not the volume, but the quality, of the voice which is necessary to successful instruction. the position of attention = .= this is the position an unarmed dismounted soldier assumes when in ranks. during the setting-up exercises, it is assumed whenever the command attention is given by the instructor. having allowed his men to rest, the instructor commands: = . squad, . attention.= figs. a and b. [illustration: fig. a] [illustration: fig. b] the words =class=, =section=, or =company= may be substituted for the word "squad." at the command =attention=, the men will quickly assume and retain the following position: heels on same line and as near each other as the conformation of the man permits. feet turned out equally and forming an angle of about degrees. knees straight without stiffness. the body erect on the hips, the spine extended throughout its entire length. the shoulders falling naturally, are forced back until they are square. chest arched and slightly raised. the arms hang naturally; thumbs along seams of trousers; back of hands out and elbows turned back. head erect, chin drawn in so that the axis of the head and neck is vertical; eyes straight to the front and, when the nature of the terrain permits it, fixed on an object at their own height. too much attention can not be given to this position, and instructors are cautioned to insist that the men accustom themselves to it. as a rule, it is so exaggerated that it not only becomes ridiculous, but positively harmful. the men must be taught to assume a natural and graceful position, one from which all rigidity is eliminated and from which action is possible without first relaxing muscles that have been constrained in an effort to maintain the position of attention. in other words, coördination rather than strength should be depended upon. in the position described the weight rests principally upon the balls of the feet, the heels resting lightly upon the ground. the knees are extended easily, but never locked. the body is now inclined forward until the front of the thighs is directly over the point of the toes; the hips are square and the waist is extended by the erection of the entire spine, but never to such a degree that mobility of the waist is lost. in extending the spine, the chest is naturally arched and the abdomen is drawn in, but never to the extent where it interferes with respiration. in extending the spinal column, the shoulders must not be raised, but held loosely in normal position and forced back until the points of the shoulders are at right angles with an anterior-posterior plane running through the shoulders. the chin should be square; i. e., horizontal and forced back enough to bring the neck in a vertical plane; the eyes fixed to the front and the object on which they are fixed must be at their own height whenever the nature of the terrain permits it. when properly assumed, a vertical line drawn from the top of the head should pass in front of the ear, just in front of the shoulder and of the thigh, and find its base at the balls of the feet. all muscles should be contracted only enough to maintain this position, which at all times should be a lithesome one, that can be maintained for a long period without fatigue--one that makes for activity and that is based upon a correct anatomical and physiological basis. instructors will correct the position of attention of every man individually and they will ascertain, when the position has been properly assumed, whether the men are "on their toes," i. e., carrying the weight on the balls of the feet, whether they are able to respire properly, and whether they find a strain across the small of the back, which should be as flat as possible. this should be repeated until the men are able to assume the position correctly without restraint or rigidity. at the command =rest= or =at ease= the men, while carrying out the provisions of the drill regulations, should be cautioned to avoid assuming any position that has a tendency to nullify the object of the position of attention; standing on leg for instance; allowing the shoulders to slope forward; drooping the head; folding arms across chest, etc. the weight should always be distributed equally upon both legs; the head, trunk, and shoulders remain erect and the arms held in a position that does not restrict the chest or derange the shoulders. the positions illustrated here have been found most efficacious. figs. c. and d. [illustration: fig. c] [illustration: fig. d] formations = .= the men form in a single or double rank, the tallest men on the right. the instructor commands: = . count off.= at this command, all except the right file execute "=eyes right=" and, beginning on the right, the men in each rank count , , , ; each man turns his head and eyes to the front as he counts. the instructor then commands: = . take distance, . march, . squad, . halt.= at the command =march=, no. of the front rank moves straight to the front; nos. , , and of the front and nos. , , , and of the rear rank in the order named move straight to the front, each stepping off, so as to follow the preceding man at four paces; the command halt is given when all have their distances. if it is desired that a less distance than four paces be taken, the distance desired should be indicated in the preparatory command. the men of the squad may be caused to cover no. front rank by command cover. the instructor then commands: = . right (left), . face, . cover.= at these commands the men face in the direction indicated and cover in file. to assemble the squad the instructor commands: = . right (left), . face, . assemble, . march.= after facing and at command march, no. of the front rank stands fast, the other members of both ranks resuming their original positions, or for convenience in the gymnasium they may be assembled to the rear, in which case the assemblage is made on no. of the rear rank. unless otherwise indicated, the guide is =always right=. special training = .= in addition to the regular squad or class work instructors should, when they notice a physical defect in any man, recommend some exercise which will tend to correct it. the most common physical defects and corresponding corrective exercises are noted here. drooping head = .= exercise the muscles of the neck by bending, turning, and circling the head, muscles tense. round and stooped shoulders = .= stretch arms sideward from front horizontal, turning palms upward, muscles tense. swing arms forward and backward, muscles relaxed. circle arms forward and backward slowly, energize backward motion, muscles tense; forward motion with muscles relaxed. circle shoulders backward, move them forward first, then raise them, then move them backward as far as possible in the raised position, muscles tense, and then lower to normal position, muscles relaxed. weak back = .= bend trunk forward as far as possible and erect it slowly. bend trunk forward, back arched and head thrown back. bend trunk sideward, without moving hips out of normal position, right and left. lie on floor, face down, and raise head and shoulders. weak abdomen = .= circle trunk right or left. bend trunk backward or obliquely backward. bend head and trunk backward without moving hips out of normal plane. lie on floor, face up, and raise head and shoulders slightly; or to sitting position or raise legs slightly; or to a vertical position. _to increase depth and width of chest_ arm stretchings, sideward and upward, muscles tense. same, with deep inhalations. arm swings and arm circles outward, away from the body. raise extended arms over head laterally and cross them behind the head. breathing exercises in connection with arm and shoulder exercises. starting positions = .= in nearly all the arm exercises it is necessary to hold the arms in some fixed position from which the exercises can be most advantageously executed, and to which position the arms are again returned upon completing the exercise. these positions are termed =starting positions=; and though it may not be absolutely necessary to assume one of them before or during the employment of any other portion of the body, it is advisable to do so, since they give to the exercise a finished, uniform, and graceful appearance. in the following positions, at the command =down=, resume the =attention=. practice in assuming the starting position may be had by repeating the commands of execution, such as =raise, down=. = .= while the exercises given below have been grouped for convenient reference, into arm exercises, trunk exercises, leg exercises, etc., one entire group _must not_ be given and then the next and so on. _always bear in mind that the best results are obtained when those exercises which affect the extensor muscles chiefly are followed by those affecting the flexors; i. e., flexion should always be followed by extension, or vice versa. it is also advisable that a movement requiring a considerable amount of muscular exertion should be followed by one in which this exertion is reduced to a minimum. as a rule, especially in the setting-up exercises, one portion of the body should not be exercised successively; thus, arm exercises should be followed by a trunk exercise, and that in turn by a leg, shoulder, and neck exercise._ arm exercises = .= intervals having been taken and attention assumed, the instructor commands: = . arms forward, . raise, . arms, . down.= fig. . [illustration: fig. ] at the command =raise=, raise the arms to the front smartly, extended to their full length, till the hands are in front of and at the height of the shoulders, palms down, fingers extended and joined, thumbs under forefingers. at =arms, down=, resume position of attention. = . arms upward . raise, . arms, . down.= fig. . [illustration: fig. ] at the command =raise=, raise the arms from the sides, extended to their full length, with the forward movement, until they are vertically overhead, backs of hands turned outward, fingers as in . this position may also be assumed by raising the arms laterally until vertical. the instructor cautions which way he desires it done. = . arms backward, . cross, . arms, . down.= fig. . [illustration: fig. ] at the command =cross=, the arms are folded across the back; hands grasping forearms. = . arms to thrust, . raise, . arms, . down.= fig. . [illustration: fig. ] at the command =raise=, raise the forearms to the front until horizontal, elbow forced back, upper arms against the chest, hands tightly closed, knuckles down. = . hands on hips, . place, . arms, . down.= fig. . [illustration: fig. ] at the command =place=, place the hands on the hips, the finger tips in line with trouser seams; fingers extended and joined, thumbs to the rear, elbows pressed back. _combination of arm exercises_ = . arms to thrust, . raise, . thrust arms forward; swing them sideward, forward, and back to position.= four counts; repeat to times. the arms are thrust forward, then relaxed and swung sideward, then forward and finally brought back to position, pressing elbows well to the rear; execute moderately fast; exhale on the first and third and inhale on the second and fourth counts. setting-up exercises = .= as has been stated previously, the setting-up exercises form the basis upon which the entire system of physical training in the service is founded. therefore too much importance can not be attached to them. through the number and variety of movements they offer it is possible to develop the body harmoniously with little if any danger of injurious results. they develop the muscles and impart vigor and tone to the vital organs and assist them in their functions; they develop endurance and are important factors in the development of smartness, grace, and precision. they should be assiduously practiced. the fact that they require no apparatus of any description makes it possible to do this out of doors or even in the most restricted room, proper sanitary conditions being the only adjunct upon which their success is dependent. no physical training drill is complete without them. they should always precede the more strenuous forms of training, as they prepare the body for the greater exertion these forms demand. at the discretion of instructors these exercises may be substituted by others of a similar character. instructors are cautioned, however, to employ all the parts of the body in every lesson and to suit the exercise as far as practicable to the natural function of the particular part of the body which they employ. in these lessons only the preparatory command is given here; the command of execution, which is invariably =exercise=, and the commands of continuance, as well as the command to discontinue, having been explained are omitted. every preparatory command should convey a definite description of the exercise required; by doing so long explanations are avoided and the men will not be compelled to memorize the various movements. recruit instruction _first series_ position of attention, from =at ease= and =rest=. starting position, figs. to . trunk exercises = . . hands on hips, . place, . quarter bend trunk forward.= two counts; repeat to times, fig. . [illustration: fig. ] the trunk is inclined forward at the waist about ° and then extended again; the hips are as perpendicular as possible; execute slowly; exhale on first and inhale and raise chest on second count. by substituting the words _half_ or _full_ for the word quarter in the command, the half bend, fig. , and full bend exercise can be given. [illustration: fig. ] = . hands on hips, . place, . bend trunk backward.= two counts; repeat to times, fig. . [illustration: fig. ] the trunk is bent backward as far as possible; head and shoulders fixed; knees extended; feet firmly on the ground; hips as nearly perpendicular as possible; in recovering care should be taken not to sway forward; execute slowly; inhale on first and exhale on second count. = . hands on hips, . place, . bend trunk sideward, right or left.= two counts; repeat to times, fig. . [illustration: fig. ] the trunk, stretched at the waist, is inclined sideward as far as possible; head and shoulders fixed; knees extended and feet firmly on the ground; execute slowly; inhale on first and exhale on second count. if an additional exercise is desired, by commanding: =circle trunk right or left= a combination of the above trunk exercises is obtained. leg exercises = . . hands on hips, . place, . quarter bend knees.= two counts; repeat to times, fig. . [illustration: fig. ] the knees are flexed until the point of the knee is directly over the toes; whole foot remains on ground; heels closed; head and body erect; execute moderately fast, emphasizing the extension; breathe naturally. by substituting the words _half_ or _full_ for the word quarter in the command the half bend and full bend, fig. , exercises can be given. [illustration: fig. ] = . hands on hips, . place, . raise knee.= two counts; repeat to times. fig. . [illustration: fig. ] the thigh and knee are flexed until they are at right angles, thigh horizontal: toes depressed; the right knee is raised at =one= and the left at =two=; trunk and head erect; execute in cadence of quick time; breathe naturally. shoulder exercise = . . arms to thrust, . raise, . move shoulders forward, up, back, and down.= four counts; repeat to times. the shoulders are relaxed and brought forward; in that position they are raised: then they are forced back without lowering them; and then they are dropped back to position; execute slowly; exhale on the first; inhale on the second and third and exhale on the last count. neck exercise = . . arms to thrust, . raise, . turn head right, or left.= two counts; repeat to times, fig. . [illustration: fig. ] the head, chin square, is turned to the right, or left as far as possible, muscles of the neck being stretched; shoulders remain square; execute slowly: breathe naturally. to vary this exercise the head may be _bent forward and to the rear_ by substituting the proper commands. breathing exercise = . . breathing exercise, . inhale, . exhale.= at =inhale= the arms are stretched forward overhead and the lungs are inflated; at =exhale= the arms are lowered laterally and the lungs deflated; execute slowly; repeat four times. toe exercise = . . arms backward, . cross, . rise on toes.= two counts; repeat to times, fig. . [illustration: fig. ] the body is raised smartly until the toes and ankles are extended as much as possible; heels closed; head and trunk erect; in recovering position heels are lowered gently; breathe naturally. combination exercise = .= this exercise brings into play practically all of the muscles that have been used in the preceding exercises. = . leaning rest in four counts.= repeat to times, figs. , . [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] at =one= knees are bent to squatting position, hands on the ground between knees; at =two= the legs are extended backward to the leaning rest; at =three= the first position is resumed, and at =four= the position of attention; hands should be directly under shoulders; back arched; knees straight; head fixed; execute moderately fast; breathe naturally. walking and marching = .= the length of the full step in quick time is inches, measured from heel to heel, and the cadence is at the rate of steps per minute. proper posture and carriage have ever been considered very important in the training of soldiers. in marching, the head and trunk should remain immobile, but without stiffness; as the left foot is carried forward the right forearm is swung forward and inward obliquely across the body until the thumb, knuckles being turned out, reaches a point about the height of the belt plate. the upper arm does not move beyond the perpendicular plane while the forearm is swung forward, though the arm hangs loosely from the shoulder joint. the forearm swing ends precisely at the moment the left heel strikes the ground; the arm is then relaxed and allowed to swing down and backward by its own weight until it reaches a point where the thumb is about the breadth of a hand to the rear of the buttocks. as the right arm swings back, the left arm is swung forward with the right leg. the forward motion of the arm assists the body in marching by throwing the weight forward and inward upon the opposite foot as it is planted. the head is held erect; body well stretched from the waist; chest arched; and there should be no rotary motion of the body about the spine. as the leg is thrown forward the knee is smartly extended, the heel striking the ground first. the instructor having explained the principles and illustrated the step and arm swing, commands: = . forward, . march=--and to halt the squad he commands: = . squad, . halt.= in executing the setting-up exercises on the march the cadence should at first be given slowly and gradually increased as the men become more expert; some exercises require a slow and others a faster pace; it is best in these cases to allow the cadence of the exercise to determine the cadence of the step. the men should march in a single file at proved intervals. the command that causes and discontinues the execution should be given as the left foot strikes the ground. on the march, to discontinue the exercise, command: = . quick time, . march=, instead of =halt=, as when at rest. all of the arm, wrist, finger, and shoulder exercises, and some of the trunk and neck, may be executed on the march by the same commands and means as when at rest. the following leg and foot exercises are executed at the command march; the execution always beginning with the left leg or foot. . = . on toes, . march.= . = . on heels, . march.= . = . on right heel and left toe, . march.= . = . on left heel and right toe, . march.= . = . on toes with knees stiff, . march.= . = . swing extended leg forward, ankle high, . march.= . = . swing extended leg forward, knee high, . march.= . = . swing extended leg forward, waist high, . march.= . = . swing extended leg forward, shoulder high, . march.= . = . raise heels, . march.= . = . raise knees, thigh horizontal, . march.= . = . raise knees, chest high, . march.= . = . circle extended leg forward, ankle high, . march.= . = . circle extended leg forward, knee high, . march.= . = . circle extended leg forward, waist high, . march.= . = . swing extended leg backward, . march.= . = . swing extended leg sideward, . march.= . = . raise knee and extend leg forward, . march.= . = . raise heels and extend leg forward, . march.= double timing = .= the length of the step in double time is inches; the cadence is at the rate of steps per minute. to march in double time the instructor commands: = . double time, . march.= if at a halt, at the first command shift the weight of the body to the right leg. at the command =march= raise the forearms, fingers closed; to a horizontal position along the waist line; take up an easy run with the step and cadence of double time, allowing a natural swinging motion to the arms inward and upward in the direction of the opposite shoulder. in marching in quick time, at the command =march=, given as either foot strikes the ground, take one step in quick time, and then step off in double time. when marching in double time and in running the men breathe as much as possible through the nose, keeping the mouth closed. a few minutes at the beginning of the setting-up exercises should be devoted to double timing. from lasting only a few minutes at the start it may be gradually increased, so that daily drills should enable the men at the end of five or six months to double time or minutes without becoming fatigued or distressed. after the double time the men should be marched for several minutes at quick time; after this the instructor should command: = . route step, . march.= in marching at route step, the men are not required to preserve silence nor keep the step; if marching at proved intervals, the latter is preserved. to resume the cadence step in quick time, the instructor commands: = . squad, . attention.= great care must be exercised concerning the duration of the double time and the speed and duration of the run. the demands made upon the men should be increased gradually. when exercise rather than distance is desired, the running should be done on the balls of the feet, heels raised from the ground. double timing exercises while the men are double timing the instructor may vary the position of the arms by commanding: . = . arms forward, . raise.= . = . arms sideward, . raise.= . = . arms upward, . raise.= . = . hands on hips, . place.= . = . hands on shoulders, . place.= . = . arms forward, . cross.= . = . arms backward, . cross.= at the command =down=, the double-time position for the arms and hands is resumed. rifle exercises = .= the object of these exercises, which may also be performed with wands or bar bells, is to develop the muscles of the arms, shoulders, and back so that the men will become accustomed to the weight of the piece and learn to wield it with that "handiness" so essential to its successful use. when these exercises are combined with movements of the various other parts of the body, they serve as a splendid, though rather strenuous, method for the all-round development of the men. as the weight of the piece is considerable, instructors are cautioned to be reasonable in their demands. far better results are obtained if these exercises are performed at commands than when they are grouped and performed for spectacular purposes. all the exercises start from the starting position, which is the low extended arm horizontal position in front of the body, arms straight; the right hand grasping the small of the stock and the left hand the barrel; the knuckles turned to the front and the distance between the hands slightly greater than the width of the shoulders. fig. . [illustration: fig. ] this position is assumed at the command: = . starting, . position=; at the command =position= the piece is brought to the port and lowered to the front horizontal snappily. to recover the position of order, command: = . order, . arms=; the piece is first brought to the port and then to the order. rifle drill combination the following exercises consist of four movements, the third position always corresponding to the first position and the fourth to the starting position. when performed as a musical drill, the instructions laid down in that lesson are applicable here. all exercises begin and end with the first or starting position. fig. . the form of command is, for example: (being at the starting position) = . first group, . first, exercise=; = . second group, . third, exercise=; etc., etc. first group = .= _first exercise_ counts - . raise piece to bent arm front horizontal, shoulder high, and stride forward right, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . face to the left on both heels and extend piece upward, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. = .= _second exercise_ - . raise piece to extended high horizontal, and stride sideward right, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . bend right knee and lower piece to left horizontal, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. = .= _third exercise_ - . raise piece to high side perpendicular on the left, left hand up, and stride backward right, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . face about on heels and swing piece down and up to high side perpendicular on the right, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. = .= _fourth exercise_ - . raise piece to extended high horizontal, and stride obliquely forward right, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . face about on heels and lower piece to horizontal on shoulders; fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. second group = .= _first exercise_ - . lower piece to front extended horizontal and bend trunk forward, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . lunge obliquely forward right and raise piece to right oblique, left hand at shoulder, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. = .= _second exercise_ - . raise piece to high perpendicular on the left, left hand up, and bend trunk sideward right, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . lunge sideward right and swing piece down and up to right high perpendicular, right hand up, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. = .= _third exercise_ - . raise piece to high extended arm horizontal and bend trunk backward, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . lunge forward right, and swing piece to side horizontal, left hand to the rear, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. = .= _fourth exercise_ - . raise piece to right high perpendicular and side step position left, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . lunge sideward left and swing piece to left high perpendicular, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. third group = .= _first exercise_ - . raise piece to front bent horizontal, arms crossed, left over right; lunge sideward right and bend trunk sideward right, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . extend right knee and bend trunk to the left, bending left knee and recrossing arms, left over right, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. = .= _second exercise_ - . raise piece to bent arm horizontal; face right and lunge forward right and bend trunk forward, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . raise trunk and turn to the left on both heels and extend piece overhead, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. = .= _third exercise_ - . raise piece to left high horizontal; lunge forward right, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . bend trunk forward and swing piece to extended low horizontal, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. = .= _fourth exercise_ - . raise piece to high extended horizontal and hop to side straddle position, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . bend trunk forward and swing piece to extended low horizontal, left hand between legs, right hand forward, fig. ; [illustration: fig. ] - . resume first position; - . resume starting position. repeat left, right, left. gymnastic contests = .= these exercises are those in which the benefits are lost sight of in the pleasure their attainment provides, which in the case of these contests is the vanquishing of an opponent. the men are pitted against each other in pairs; age, height, weight, and general physical aptitude being the determining factors in the selection. in the contests in which superiority is dependent upon skill and agility no restrictions need be placed upon the efforts of the contestants; but in those that are a test of strength and endurance it is well to call a contest a "draw," when the men are equally matched and the contest is likely to be drawn out to the point of exhaustion of one or both contestants. it is recommended that these contests be indulged in once or twice a month and then at the conclusion of the regular drill. contests that require skill and agility should alternate with those that depend upon force and endurance. in order to facilitate the instruction a number of pairs should be engaged at the same time. . cane wrestling: the cane to be about an inch in diameter and a yard long, ends rounded. it is grasped with the right hand at the end, knuckles down, and with the left hand, knuckles up, inside of and close to the opponent's right hand. endeavor is then made to wrest the cane from the opponent. loss of grip with either hand loses the bout. . cane twisting. same cane as in . contestants grasp it as in , only the knuckles of both hands are up, and the arms are extended overhead. object: the contestants endeavor to make the cane revolve in their opponent's hand without allowing it to do so in their own. the cane must be forced down. . cane pulling: contestants sit on the ground, facing each other, legs straight and the soles of the feet in contact. the cane is grasped as in but close to the feet. object: to pull the opponent to his feet. the legs throughout the contest must be kept rigid. . "bucked" contest: contestants sit on the ground "bucked"; i. e., the cane is passed under the knees, which are drawn up, and the arms passed under the cane with the fingers laced in front of the ankles. object: to get the toes under those of the opponent and roll him over. . single pole pushing: contestants grasp end of pole, feet long and inches thick, and brace themselves. object: to push the opponent out of position. . double pole pushing: the poles are placed under the arms close to the arm pits, ends projecting. object: same as in . . double pole pulling: position as in but standing back to back. object: to pull the opponent out of position. . "cock fight": contestants hop on one leg with the arms folded closely over the chest. object: by butting with the fleshy part of the shoulder without raising the arms, or by dodging to make the opponent change his feet or touch the floor with his hand or other part of his body. . one-legged tug of war: contestants hop on one leg and grasp hands firmly. object: to pull the opponent forward or make him place the raised foot on the floor. . the "siege": one contestant stands with one foot in a circle inches in diameter, the other foot outside, and the arms folded as in . two other contestants, each hopping on one leg, endeavor to dislodge the one in the circle by butting him with the shoulder. the besieged one is defeated in case he raises the foot in the circle, or removes it entirely from the circle. the besiegers are defeated in case they change feet or touch the floor as in . as soon as either of the latter is defeated his place is immediately filled, so that there are always two of them. the besieged should resort to volting, ducking, etc., rather than to depend upon his strength. . one-armed tug: contestants stand facing each other; right hands grasped, feet apart. object: without moving feet, to pull the opponent forward. shifting the feet loses the bout. . "tug royal": three contestants stand facing inward and grasp each other's wrists securely with their feet outside a circle about three feet in diameter. object: by pulling or pushing to make one of the contestants step inside of the circle. . indian wrestling: contestants lie upon the ground face up, right shoulders in close contact, right elbows locked; at one the right leg is raised overhead and lowered, this is repeated at two, and at three the leg is raised quickly and locked with the opponent's right leg. object: to roll him over by forcing his leg down. . medicine ball race. teams of five or six men are organized and a track for each team is marked out. this track consists of marks on the floor or ground at distances of yards. on each of these marks stands a man with legs apart, the team forming a column of files. at "ready," "get set," the contestants prepare for the race, and at "go," the first man in the column rolls a medicine ball, which he has on the floor in front of him, through his legs to no. , he in turn rolls it to , etc., when it reaches the last man he picks it up and runs to the starting place with it and, the others all having shifted back one mark, the rolling is repeated. this continues until the first man brings the ball back to the starting place and every man is in his original position. the ball should be kept rolling: each man, as it comes to him, pushing it on quickly. any ball about inches in diameter will answer; it may be made of strong cloth and stuffed with cotton waste. chapter iv signaling signals and codes _general service code. (international morse code.)_ = .= used for all visual and sound signaling, radiotelegraphy, and on cables using siphon recorders, used in communicating with navy. a · - b - · · · c - · - · d - · · e · f · · - · g - - · h · · · · i · · j · - - - k - · - l · - · · m - - n - · o - - - p · - - · q - - · - r · - · s · · · t - u · · - v · · · - w · - - x - · · - y - · - - z - - · · numerals · - - - - · · - - - · · · - - · · · · - · · · · · - · · · · - - · · · - - - · · - - - - · - - - - - punctuation period · · · · · · comma · - · - · - · interrogation · · - - · · the more important conventional flag signals for communication between the firing line and the reserve or commander in rear. in transmission, their concealment from the enemy's view should be insured. in the absence of signal flags the headdress or other substitute may be used. (see par. for the signals.) wigwag _signaling by flag, torch, hand lantern, or beam of searchlight (without shutter)_[ ] = .= . there is one position and there are three motions. the position is with flag or other appliance held vertically, the signalman facing directly toward the station with which it is desired to communicate. the first motion (the dot) is to the right of the sender, and will embrace an arc of °, starting with the vertical and returning to it, and will be made in a plane at right angles to the line connecting the two stations. the second motion (the dash) is a similar motion to the left of the sender. the third motion (front) is downward directly in front of the sender and instantly returned upward to the first position. this is used to indicate a pause or conclusion. . the beam of the searchlight, though ordinarily used with the shutter like the heliograph, may be used for long-distance signaling, when no shutter is suitable or available, in a similar manner to the flag or torch, the first position being a vertical one. a movement of the beam ° to the right of the sender indicates a dot, a similar movement to the left indicates a dash; the beam is lowered vertically for front. . to use the torch or hand lantern, a footlight must be employed as a point of reference to the motion. the lantern is more conveniently swung out upward to the right of the footlight for a dot, to the left for a dash, and raised vertically for front. . to call a station, make the call letter until acknowledged, at intervals giving the call or signal of the calling station. if the call letter of a station is unknown, wave flag until acknowledged. in using the searchlight without shutter throw the beam in a vertical position and move it through an arc of ° in a plane at right angles to the line connecting the two stations until acknowledged. to acknowledge a call, signal "acknowledgment (or) i understand (----front)" followed by the call letter of the acknowledging station. _notes on wig-wagging_ . in order to avoid the flag wrapping itself about the staff, stand facing the receiving station, with feet apart. hold the staff with the left hand at butt and right hand inches from end. in moving flag to the right, bring it down with an outward and inward sweep, and then return it to the vertical. when the tip is farthest down the staff inclines to the right front and as the flag is brought upward it is swept inward and upwards and as it approaches the vertical position it sweeps forward slightly. in moving to the left the motion is similar,--at the lowest point the staff inclines to the left front. a combination of right and left is made with a figure-of-eight motion. in making "front" the flag is lowered and moved very slightly to the left front and then swept slightly to the right front, making a figure-of-eight. the body should be twisted and bent at the waist in making the light and left motions. care should be exercised in keeping the flag in front of the body in making "front," the figure-of-eight is necessarily very flat. do not make letters in a careless slipshod manner. the two-arm semaphore code (see plates i and ii) = .= semaphore signaling may be done with or without flags. without flags it is rarely dependable beyond yards. in sending stand with feet apart, squarely facing the receiver. in making letters which require the use of both arms on the same side of body, twist the body to that side and bend at waist, so as to throw both arms well away from body. but be careful to keep arms in plane of original position of body. when a letter repeats--bring both hands (if a two-armed letter) to chest after first, then make second. do not try to send rapidly so as to exhibit your ability. remember that the receiver's ability determines the speed to be used. anyone can send faster than he himself can receive. if you want to display your skill have some one send rapidly to you. in receiving, if you miss a letter--let it go and get the others. if you miss a word signal--"o" (waving flags or arms) and signal the last word you have received. _rapidity_ is secondary to _accuracy_. take the positions for the various letters _accurately_. the horizontal position should not incline upward nor downward. in making an "l," for example, if the left arm is midway between its proper position and the horizontal it is difficult to tell whether it is l or m. in making d, j, k, p, t, and v, the arm in the vertical position should be brought exactly in front of the body by carrying the shoulder in almost under the chin, twisting the elbow in until it is directly before the eyes, and the forearm held in the vertical position with the palm to the rear. when so done there is no possibility of this position being mistaken for any other. "manila milkman" may be sent without changing the position of the right hand. in making i, be sure to twist body well to the right in order that the left arm may be seen in the upper slanting position to the right. city and similar words may be so made. d may be made with either hand. be sure how next letter is made before moving hands. make no false motions. acquire accuracy; then try for speed. "chop-chop." the "chop-chop" signal is made by placing _both_ arms at the right horizontal (that is, by bringing the _left_ arm up to the position of the _right_ arm as in the figure for letter "b"), and then moving each up and down, several times, in opposite direction, making a cutting motion. end of word. after each word the "interval" signal is made. end of sentence. after each sentence the chop signal is made twice. end of message. at the end of a message the chop signal is made three times. error. signal "a" several times quickly, followed by interval; then repeat the word. to break in. signal "attention." numerals. numbers are always preceded by the signal, "numerals." after "numerals" has been signaled, everything that follows will be numbers until "interval" is signaled, after which what follows will be letters. [illustration: the two-arm semaphore code plate i] [illustration: the two-arm semaphore code plate ii] _signaling with heliograph, flash lantern, and searchlight (with shutter)_[ ] = .= . the first position is to turn a steady flash on the receiving station. the signals are made by short and long flashes. use a short flash for dot and a long steady flash for dash. the elements of a letter should be slightly longer than in sound signals. . to call a station, make the call letter until acknowledged, at intervals the call or signal of the calling station. . if the call letter of a station be unknown, signal a series of dots rapidly made until acknowledged. each station will then turn on a steady flash and adjust. when the adjustment is satisfactory to the called station, it will cut off its flash, and the calling station will proceed with its message. . if the receiver sees that the sender's mirror needs adjustment, he will turn on a steady flash until answered by a steady flash. when the adjustment is satisfactory, the receiver will cut off his flash and the sender will resume his message. . to break the sending station for other purposes, turn on a steady flash. _sound signals_[ ] = .= . sound signals made by the whistle, foghorn, bugle, trumpet, and drum may be used in a fog, mist, falling snow, or at night. they may be used with the dot and dash code. . in applying the code to whistle, foghorn, bugle, or trumpet, one short blast indicates a dot and one long blast a dash. with the drum, one tap indicates a dot and two taps in rapid succession a dash. although these signals can be used with a dot and dash code, they should be so used in connection with a preconcerted or conventional code. _morse code. (american morse code)_[ ] = .= used only by the army on telegraph lines, on short cables, and on field lines, and on all commercial lines in the united states. a · - b - · · · c · · · d - · · e · f · - · g - - · h · · · · i · · j - · - · k - · - l -- m - - n - · o · · p · · · · · q · · - · r · · · s · · · t - u · · - v · · · - w · - - x · - · · y · · · · z · · · · & · · · · numerals · - - · · · - · · · · · - · · · · · - - - - · · · · · · - - · · - · · · · - · · - --- punctuation period · · - - · · comma · - · - interrogation - · · - · footnotes: [ ] extracts from signal book, united states army. [ ] extracts from signal book, united states army. part ii company command chapter i the government and administration of a company = . the proper performance of the duty of company commander, like the proper performance of any other duty, requires work and attention to business.= the command of a company divides itself into two kinds of duty: government and administration. the government includes the instruction, discipline, contentment, and harmony of the organization, involving, as it does, esprit de corps, rewards, privileges, and punishments. the administration includes the providing of clothing, arms, ammunition, equipage, and subsistence; the keeping of records, including the rendition of reports and returns; and the care and accountability of government and company property, and the disbursement of the company fund. system and care are prerequisites of good administration. the efficient administration of a company greatly facilitates its government. the captain = .= with regard to his company the captain stands in the same light as a father to a large family of children. it is his duty to provide for their comfort, sustenance, and pleasure; enforce strict rules of obedience, punish the refractory and reward the deserving. he should be considerate and just to his officers and men and should know every soldier personally and make him feel that he so knows him. he should by word and act make every man in the company feel that the captain is his protector. the captain should not be indifferent to the personal welfare of his men, and when solicited, being a man of greater experience, education, and information, he should aid and counsel them in such a way as to show he takes an interest in their joys and sorrows. when any men are sick he should do everything possible for them until they can be taken care of by the surgeon. he can add much to the comfort and pleasure of men in the hospital by visiting them from time to time and otherwise showing an interest in their condition. in fact, one of the officer's most important duties is to look after the welfare of his men--to see that they are well fed, well clothed and properly cared for in every other way--to see that they are happy and contented. the officer who does not look after the welfare of his men to the best of his ability, giving the matter his earnest personal attention, neglects one of the principal things that the government pays him to do. the soldier usually has a decided feeling for his captain, even though it be one of hatred. with regard to the higher grade of officers, he has respect for them according to regulations; otherwise, for the most part, he is indifferent. at the very most, he knows whether his post or regimental commander keeps him long at drill, and particularly whether he has any peculiar habits. the average soldier looks upon his captain as by far the most important personage in the command. there is no other position in the army that will give as much satisfaction in return for an honest, capable and conscientious discharge of duty, as that of captain. there is a reward in having done his full duty to his company that no disappointment of distinction, no failure, can deprive him of; his seniors may overlook him in giving credits, unfortunate circumstances may defeat his fondest hopes, and the crown of laurel may never rest upon his brow, but the reward that follows upon the faithful discharge of his duty to his company he can not be deprived of by any disaster, neglect or injustice. he is a small sovereign, powerful and great, within his little domain. = . devolution of work and responsibility.= the company commander should not attempt to do all the work--to look after all the details in person--he should not try to command directly every squad and every platoon. the successful company commander is the one who distributes work among his subordinates and organizes the help they are supposed to give him. by war department orders, army regulations and customs of the service, the lieutenants and noncommissioned officers are charged with certain duties and responsibilities. let every one of them carry the full load of their responsibility. the company commander should not usurp the functions of his subordinates--he should not relieve them of any of their prescribed or logical work and responsibility. on the contrary, he should give them more, and he should see that they "deliver the goods." skill in distributing work among subordinates is one of the first essentials of leadership, as is the ability to get work out of them so that they will fill their functions to the full within the limits of their responsibility. not only does devolution of work and responsibility cause subordinates to take more interest in their work (it makes them feel less like mere figure-heads), but it also teaches them initiative and gives them valuable experience in the art of training and handling men. furthermore, it enables the company commander to devote more time to the larger and more important matters connected with the discipline, welfare, training, instruction and administration of the company. the captain who allows his lieutenants to do practically nothing makes a mistake--he is doing something that will rob his lieutenants of all initiative, cause them to lose interest in the company, and make them feel like nonentities--like a kind of "fifth wheel"--it will make them feel they are not, in reality, a part of the company--it will prevent them from getting a practical, working knowledge of the government and administration of a company. by allowing his lieutenants to participate to the greatest extent possible in the government and administration of the company, and by not hampering and pestering them with unnecessary instructions about details, the captain will get out of his lieutenants the very best that there is in them. the captain should require results from his lieutenants, and the mere fact that a lieutenant is considered inefficient and unable to do things properly, is no reason why he should not be required to do them. the captain is by army regulations responsible for the efficiency and instruction of his lieutenants regarding all matters pertaining to the company, and he should require them to perform all their duties properly, resorting to such disciplinary measures as may be considered necessary. the lieutenant who can not, or who will not, perform his duties properly is a drag on the company, and such a man has no business in the army, or in the organized militia. the lieutenant = .= to be able to perform well the duties of captain when the responsibility falls upon him, should be the constant study and ambition of the lieutenant. he is the assistant of the captain and should be required by the captain to assist in the performance of all company duties, including the keeping of records and the preparation of the necessary reports, returns, estimates and requisitions. the captain should give him lots to do, and should throw him on his own responsibility just as much as possible. he should be required to drill the company, attend the daily inspection of the company quarters, instruct the noncommissioned officers, brief communications, enter letters in the correspondence book, make out ration returns, reports, muster and pay rolls, etc., until he shows perfect familiarity therewith. whenever told to do a thing by your captain, do it yourself or see personally that it is done. do not turn it over to some noncommissioned officer and let it go at that. if your captain wants some noncommissioned officer to do the thing, he himself will tell him to do it--he will not ask you to do it. it is customary in the army to regard the company as the property of the captain. should the lieutenant, therefore, be in temporary command of the company he should not make any changes, especially in the reduction or promotion of noncommissioned officers without first having consulted the captain's wishes in the matter. it is somewhat difficult to explain definitely the authority a lieutenant exercises over the men in the company when the captain is present. in general terms, however, it may be stated the lieutenant can not make any changes around the barracks, inflict any punishment or put men on, or relieve them from, any duty without the consent of the captain. it is always better if there be a definite understanding between the captain and his lieutenants as to what he expects of them, how he wishes to have certain things done and to what extent he will sustain them. if the lieutenant wants anything from the company in the way of working parties, the services of the company artificer or company clerk, the use of ordnance stores or quartermaster articles, he should always speak to the captain about the matter. the captain and the lieutenants = .= the company officers should set an example to their men in dress, military bearing, system, punctuality and other soldierly qualities. it should be remembered that the negligence of superiors is the cue for juniors to be negligent. if the men of a company are careless and indifferent about saluting and if they are shabby and lax in their dress, the company commander is to blame for it--company officers can always correct defects of this kind, if they will only try. the character and efficiency of officers and the manner in which they perform their duties are reflected in the conduct and deportment of their men. of course, courage is a prerequisite quality for a good officer, and every officer should seek to impress his men that he would direct them to do nothing involving danger that he would not himself be willing to do under similar circumstances. if a company officer be ignorant of his duties, his men will soon find it out, and when they do they will have neither respect for, nor confidence in, him. company officers should take an active interest in everything that affects the amusement, recreation, happiness and welfare of their men. an officer just joining a company should learn without delay the names of all the men. a roll of the organization should be gotten and studied. while an officer can gruffly order a soldier to do a thing and have his orders obeyed, it should be remembered that, as a rule, human nature, especially american human nature, responds best to an appeal to pride, fairness, justice, reason, and the other nobler instincts of man. it is only in rare instances that the average man will give the best there is in him under coercion or pressure of authority. there are but few men who have not some good in them, and this good can generally be gotten at, if one only goes about it in the right way. study your men and try to arouse in them pride and interest in their work. the soldier first learns to respect, then to honor and finally to love the officer who is strict but just; firm but kind--and this is the officer who will draw out of his men the very best there is in them. = .= treat your men like men, and remember there is nothing that will so completely take the spirit out of a man as to find fault with him when he is doing his best. young officers sometimes run to one of two extremes in the treatment of their men--they either, by undue familiarity, or otherwise, cultivate popularity with the men; or they do not treat them with sufficient consideration--the former course will forfeit their esteem; the latter, ensure their dislike, neither of which result is conducive to commanding their respect. treat your soldiers with proper consideration, dignity, and justice--remember they are members of your profession, the difference being one of education, rank, command, and pay--but they are men, like yourself, and should be treated as such. under no circumstances should you ever swear at a soldier--not only is this taking a mean, unfair advantage of your position, but it is also undignified, ungentlemanly, and unmilitary. it is even more improper for you to swear at a soldier than it is for a superior to swear at you--in the latter case the insult can be properly resented; in the former, it must be borne in humiliating silence. remember, that if by harsh or unfair treatment you destroy a man's self-respect, you at the same time destroy his usefulness. familiarity is, of course, most subversive of discipline, but you can treat your men with sympathetic consideration without being familiar with them. in dealing with enlisted men, do not use the same standard of intellect and morals that apply in the case of officers. and remember, too, that a thing that may appear small and trivial to an officer may mean a great deal to an enlisted man--study your men, learn their desires, their habits, their way of thinking, and then in your dealings with them try to look at things from their standpoint also. in other words in your treatment of your men be just as human as possible. the treatment of soldiers should be uniform and just, and under no circumstances should a man be humiliated unnecessarily or abused. reproof and punishment must be administered with discretion and judgment, and without passion; for the officer who loses his temper and flies into a tantrum has failed to obtain his first triumph in discipline. he who can not control himself can not control others. every officer should study himself carefully, he should analyze himself, he should place himself under a microscopic glass, so as to discover his weak points--and he should then try with his whole might and soul to make these weak points strong points. if, for instance, you realize that you are weak in applied minor tactics, or that you have no "bump of locality," or that you have a poor memory, or that you have a weak will, do what you can to correct these defects in your make-up. remember "stonewall" jackson's motto: "a man can do anything he makes up his mind to do." the progress company, chicago, ill., publishes "mind power," "memory," "the will," "the art of logical thinking" (all by w. w. atkinson), and several other books of a similar nature, that are both interesting and instructive. "the power of the will," by haddock, for sale by albert lewis pelton, meriden, conn., is an excellent book of its kind. the first sergeant = .= it has been said the captain is the proprietor of the company and the first sergeant is the foreman. under supervision of the captain, he has immediate charge of all routine matters pertaining to the company. in some companies in the regular army, it is customary for soldiers, except in cases of emergency, to get permission from the first sergeant to speak to the company commander at any time. in other organizations soldiers who wish to speak to the company commander away from the company quarters must first obtain the first sergeant's permission, but it is not necessary to get this permission to speak to the company commander when he is at the barracks. the first sergeant is sometimes authorized to place noncommissioned officers in arrest in quarters and privates in confinement in the guardhouse, assuming such action to be by order of the captain, to whom he at once reports the facts. however, with regard to the confinement of soldiers by noncommissioned officers, attention is invited to the army regulations on the subject. the noncommissioned officers =(the status, duties, etc., of noncommissioned officers are covered in greater detail in noncommissioned officers' manual, by the author. general agents: george banta publishing co., menasha, wis.)= = .= the efficiency and discipline of a company depend to such an extent on the noncommissioned officers that the greatest care and judgment should be exercised in their selection. they should be men possessing such soldierly qualities as a high sense of duty, cheerful obedience to orders, force of character, honesty, sobriety and steadiness, together with an intelligent knowledge of drills, regulations, and orders. they should exact prompt obedience from those to whom they give orders, and should see that all soldiers under them perform their military duties properly. they must not hesitate to reprove them when necessary, but such reproof must not be any more severe than the occasion demands. the company officers must sustain the noncommissioned officers in the exercise of their authority, except, of course, when such authority is improperly or unjustly exercised. if they do wrong, they should be punished the same as the privates, but if it be simply an error of judgment they should merely be admonished. a noncommissioned officer should never be admonished in the presence of privates. judicious praising of noncommissioned officers in the presence of privates is not only gratifying to the noncommissioned officer, but it also tends to enhance the respect and esteem of the privates for him. in addition to dividing the company into squads, each squad being under a noncommissioned officer as required by the army regulations, the company should also be divided into sections, each section being in charge of a sergeant. the squads and sections should, as far as possible, be quartered together in barracks, and the chiefs of squads and the chiefs of sections should be held strictly responsible for the conduct, dress, cleanliness, and the care of arms of the members of their respective squads and sections. not only does this throw the corporals and the sergeants upon their own responsibility to a certain extent, but it also impresses upon them the importance of their position, and gets the privates in the habit of realizing and appreciating the authority exercised by noncommissioned officers. when practicable, the noncommissioned officers should have separate rooms or tents, and should mess together at tables separate from the privates; for, everything that conduces to familiarity with inferiors tends to lower the dignity of the noncommissioned officers' position. throw your noncommissioned officers upon their own responsibility--throw them into deep water, so to speak, where they will either have to swim or sink. you can never tell what a man can really do until you have given him a chance to show you--until you have put him on his mettle--until you have tried him out. and very often men who seem to have nothing in them, men who have never before been thrown upon their own responsibility, will surprise you. do all you can to make your noncommissioned officers realize and appreciate the importance of their position. consult them about different matters--get their opinions about various things. when going through the barracks at saturday morning inspection, for instance, as you come to the different squads, have the squad leaders step to the front and follow you while you are inspecting their respective squads. if you find anything wrong with a man's bunk, speak to the squad leader about it. also ask the squad leaders various questions about their squads. not only does such treatment of noncommissioned officers make them appreciate the importance, responsibility and dignity of their position, but it also gives them more confidence in themselves and raises them in the eyes of the privates. noncommissioned officers should always be addressed by their titles, by both officers and soldiers. noncommissioned officers are forbidden by regulations to act as barbers, or as agents for laundries, or in any other position of a similar character. everything possible should be done by the company officers to instruct the noncommissioned officers properly in their duties.[ ] so far as the company is concerned, the noncommissioned officers are expected to assist the company commander in carrying out his own orders and those of his superiors--they should see that all company orders are obeyed and that the known wishes of the captain are carried out. if, for instance, the captain should tell the first sergeant that the men in the company may play cards among themselves, but that noncommissioned officers are not to play with privates and that men from other companies are not allowed to take part in, or to be present at the games, then it is the duty of the first sergeant to see that these instructions are carried out--it is his duty to make frequent inspections of the tables at which the men may be playing to see that no noncommissioned officers are playing and that no outsiders are present. the first sergeant who confined himself to publishing the order to the company and then doing nothing more, would be neglectful of his proper duty. noncommissioned officers clothed in the proper uniform of their grade are on duty at all times and places for the suppression of disorderly conduct on the part of members of the company in public places. men creating disorder will be sent to their quarters in arrest and the facts reported to the company commander without delay. noncommissioned officers can do much to prevent the commission of offenses by members of their commands, both when on and when off duty, and such prevention is as much their duty as reporting offenses after they are committed; in fact, it is much better to prevent the offense than to bring the offender to trial. company commanders should drill their noncommissioned officers thoroughly in the principles of discipline. = . noncommissioned officers authorized to confine enlisted men.= a company or detachment commander may delegate to his noncommissioned officers the authority to confine enlisted men in the guardhouse and to place them in arrest in quarters, provided the case is immediately reported to the company or detachment commander, who confirms the act of the noncommissioned officer and adopts it as his own.--w. d. decision, december, . = . reduction and resignation.= a noncommissioned officer should never be reduced to ranks, except for grave and sufficient reasons. nothing demoralizes the noncommissioned officers of a company so much and upsets discipline to such an extent as the feeling that upon the slightest pretext or fancy one is to be sent back to the ranks, to associate with the privates he has been required to discipline. in some regiments noncommissioned officers are permitted to send in formal resignations, while in other regiments they are not, but, with the approval of the company commander, they may ask for reduction, giving proper, satisfactory and specific reasons. of course, resignations submitted in a spirit of accepted insubordination or pique should not be considered, nor should they ever be in substitution for deserved disciplinary punishment. if a noncommissioned officer has good reasons for requesting reduction and the granting of the request would not result in detriment to the company, there is no reason why his application should not be favorably considered. however, in such a case, the noncommissioned officer should consult his company commander before submitting his request in writing. it is thought the preponderance of custom is against considering formal resignations. contentment and harmony = .= the officers of the company should do everything possible to make the organization contented and harmonious. contentment and harmony are not only conducive to good discipline and efficiency, but they also make the government of the company easy and reduce desertions to a minimum. the showing of favoritism on the part of the captain is always a cause of great dissatisfaction amongst the soldiers in the company. soldiers do not care how strict the captain is, just so he is fair and impartial, treating all men alike. = . the mess.= the captain should give the mess his constant personal attention, making frequent visits to the kitchen and dining-room while the soldiers are at meals so as to see for himself what they are getting, how it is served, etc. it is not saying too much to state that, in time of peace, a good mess is the real basis of the contentment of a company. ascertain what the soldiers like to eat and then gratify their appetites as far as practicable. be careful that the cook or the mess sergeant doesn't fall into a rut and satiate the soldiers day after day with the same dishes. give the ration your personal attention--know yourself what the company is entitled to, how much it is actually getting, what the savings amount to, etc. = . library and amusement room.= a library and an amusement room, supplied with good books, magazines, papers, a billiard or pool table, and a phonograph, are a source of much pleasure and contentment. = . athletic apparatus.= a judicious investment of the company fund in baseballs, bats, dumb bells, indian clubs, boxing gloves and other athletic goods, and the encouragement of baseball, basketball, quoits, etc., are in the interest of harmony and happiness. rewards and privileges = .= . deny all passes and requests for privileges of men whose conduct is not good, and on the other hand grant to men whose conduct is good, as many indulgences as is consistent with discipline. . judicious praise in the presence of the first sergeant, a few noncommissioned officers, or the entire company, depending upon circumstances, very often accomplishes a great deal. after the according of such praise, let your action toward the man show that his good conduct is appreciated and that it has raised him in your estimation, and make him feel you are keeping your eye on him to see whether he will continue in his well doing. . publication of commendatory orders, desirable special duty details, etc. . promotion, and extra duty details which carry extra pay. . meritorious conduct of importance should be noted in the soldier's military record and also on his discharge. . at the weekly company inspection, each chief of squad picks out the neatest and cleanest man in his squad--the captain then inspects the men so selected, the neatest and cleanest one being excused from one or two tours of kitchen police, or some other disagreeable duty; or given a two days' pass. note: some officers do not think that good conduct should be especially rewarded, but that if all soldiers be held strictly accountable for their actions by a system of strict discipline, good conduct attains its own reward in the immunities it enjoys. = . company punishment.= it is neither necessary nor desirable to bring every dereliction of duty before a court-martial for trial. in fact, the invariable preferring of charges for minor[ ] offenses will, as a rule, injure rather than help the discipline of a command. the th article of war states, "the commanding officer of any detachment, company, or higher command may, for minor offenses not denied by the accused, impose disciplinary punishments upon persons of his command without the intervention of a court-martial, unless the accused demands trial by court-martial." the disciplinary punishments authorized may include admonition, reprimand, withholding of privileges, extra fatigue, and restriction to certain specified limits, but shall not include forfeiture of pay or confinement under guard. (par. , manual for courts-martial.) some efficacious forms of company punishment = .= . extra fatigue under the company supply sergeant or the noncommissioned officer in charge of quarters, cleaning up around and in the company quarters, scrubbing pots, scouring tin pans, polishing stoves, cutting wood, policing the rears, cutting grass, pulling weeds, polishing the brass and nickel parts in the water closets and bath rooms, washing and greasing leather, cleaning guns, boiling greasy haversacks, and in camp, digging drains and working around slop holes. if the work be done well the offender may be let off sooner--if the work be not done well, he may be tried for it. . men may not be allowed to leave the immediate vicinity of the barracks for periods ranging from one to ten days, during which time they are subject to all kinds of disagreeable fatigue, and required to report to the n. c. o. in charge of quarters at stated hours. . breaking rocks for a given number of days. for every man so punished, a private of the same company is detailed as a sentinel and for every four men a corporal is detailed in addition--the idea being to cause every man in each organization to take an interest in preventing his own comrades from violating rules and regulations. . when two soldiers get into a row that is not of a serious nature, a good plan is to set them at work scrubbing the barrack windows--one on the outside and one on the inside, making them clean the same pane at the same time. they are thus constantly looking in each other's faces and before the second window is cleaned they will probably be laughing at each other and part friends rather than nursing their wrath. . confinement to barracks, reporting to the noncommissioned officer in charge of quarters once every hour, from reveille to, say, p. m. note: some company commanders follow, for moral effect, the practice of publishing to their companies all summary court convictions of soldiers belonging to the organization. withholding of privileges . withholding of passes and of credit at the post exchange. . withholding of furloughs. = . control of drunken and obscene men.= in order to control drunken and obscene men, they have been bucked and gagged until sufficiently sober to regain self-control and quiet down. the use of a cold water hose in such cases has been known to accomplish good results. great care and judgment, however, should be exercised and no more force used than is absolutely necessary. it may also be said that persistently filthy men have been washed and scrubbed. = .= saturday morning and other company inspections are intended to show the condition of the organization regarding its equipment, military appearance and general fitness for service, and the condition of the quarters as regards cleanliness, order, etc. usually everyone except the guard, one cook, and others whose presence elsewhere can not be spared, are required to attend inspections, appearing in their best clothes, their arms and accouterments being shipshape and spick and span in every respect. a man appearing at inspection with arms and equipments not in proper shape, especially if he be a recruit or if it be his first offense, may be turned out again several hours later, fully armed and equipped, for another inspection, instead of being tried by summary court. property responsibility = .= special attention should be given to the care and accountability of all company property. . all property (tents, axes, spades, chairs, hatchets, etc.) should be plainly marked with the letter of the company. . keep a duplicate copy of every memorandum receipt given for property, and when such property is turned in or another officer's memorandum receipt is given covering the property, don't fail to get your original memorandum from the quartermaster. . see that the quartermaster gives you credit for all articles turned in, or property accounted for on statement of charges, proceedings of a surveying officer or otherwise. . have a settlement with the quartermaster at the end of every quarter as required by army regulations, taking an inventory of all property held on memorandum receipt and submitting to the quartermaster a statement of charges and a certified list of the china and glassware unavoidably broken during the quarter. . keep an account of all articles issued to the men, turned in to the quartermaster, condemned, expended, lost, stolen or destroyed. . worn out and unserviceable, property that is beyond repair in the company should be submitted to the action of a surveying officer, the survey reports (form no. , a. g. o.) being prepared in triplicate, and submitted to the commanding officer, who will appoint a surveying officer. no property that can be repaired in the company should ever be submitted to the action of a surveying officer or inspector. in this connection company commanders and supply sergeants should be thoroughly familiar with ordnance department pamphlet no. and g. o. , , the two covering the care, repair and disposition of unserviceable ordnance equipment. . property that is to be submitted to the action of a surveying officer or an inspector should always first be carefully examined by the responsible officer in person, who should be prepared to give all necessary information in regard to it. the property should be arranged in the order of enumeration in the survey or the inventory report, and should be arranged in rows of five, ten, or some other number, so that the numbers of the various articles can be counted at a glance. the army regulations require that the responsible officer shall be present at the inspection of property by a regular inspector. he should also be present when property is acted on by a surveying officer. . all company property (ordnance, quartermaster, signal and engineer) except the litter (medical department) is gotten from the unit supply officer on memorandum receipt. the litter is gotten from the surgeon on memorandum receipt. settlements are required to be made quarterly with the officers concerned, and also when relinquishing command. company paperwork = . scope of subject.= to cover in full the subject of company paperwork would require more space than it is practicable to spare in a manual of this nature, and consequently only brief reference is made herein to the principal books, records and papers connected with the administration of a company. the subject of company paperwork, as well as army administration in general, is covered in full in _army paperwork_, published by geo. banta publishing co., menasha, wis. price $ . , postpaid. in connection with company paperwork, it may be remarked that now-a-days no company office is complete without a typewriter. for all-around field and garrison work the corona, which is used throughout the army, is recommended. not only is it less bulky and lighter than other machines, but it is simpler of construction and will stand harder usage. the corona folding stand adds very much to the convenience of the machine for field use. = . morning report.= which shows, at the hour the report is submitted, the exact condition of the company as to the number of officers and men present for duty, sick, absent, etc. all changes since the last report (the day before) are shown by name, under "remarks," on the right-hand page, and by number on the left-hand page. in case of no change since last report, note, "no change," under, "remarks," and also on the left-hand page. (see model given below.) [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] note. the numbers , , , , , etc., entered by hand on the left in model, and which show the number of days from each printed number (date) to the end of the month, are entered the beginning of each month, and are a convenience in showing at once the number of rations to be added or deducted in the case of men joining or leaving the company. = . daily sick report.= on which are entered the names of all enlisted men requiring medical attention and such of the company officers as may be excused from duty because of illness. the report is signed each day by the surgeon and the company commander, and shows whether or not the sickness was incurred in line of duty. [illustration: fig. ] = . duty roster.= on which is kept a record of all details for guard duty, kitchen police, and other details for service in garrison and in the field, except the authorized special and extra duty details. for instructions regarding the keeping of roster, see, "details and rosters," manual of interior guard duty and the model and instructions on the form itself. = . files of orders.= a file will be kept of all orders issued by the company commander. files will also be kept of all orders and instructions received from higher authority. = . company fund book.= in which are entered all receipts to, and expenditures from, the company fund, together with the monthly proceeding of the company council of administration, and a list of property, with cost thereof, purchased from the company fund. the model in the front of the book shows how the account is to be kept. = . correspondence book, with index.= in which is entered a brief of each item of correspondence in respect to which a record is necessary, and a notation of the action taken thereon. = . document file=, being the original documents or communications when these are retained, and carbon, letter press, or other copies of letters, indorsements, or telegrams sent in regard to the same, all of which are filed according to serial numbers. = . delinquency record=, in which are noted the disciplinary punishments awarded by the company commander in compliance with the provisions of army regulations. = . property responsibility.= two loose-leaf books in which are listed, in one all articles of quartermaster property, and in the other, all articles of ordnance property, issued each soldier for his personal use. = . service record.= (formerly known as "descriptive list.") one for each member of the company, in which is kept a full description of him, including date of enlistment, personnel description, record of deposits, trial by court-martial, record of vaccination, clothing account, etc. = . descriptive card of public animals.= to be kept in organizations supplied with public animals. = . retained copies of rolls, returns, etc.= retained copies of the various rolls, reports, and returns (property and other) that are required by orders and regulations. = . memorandum receipts=, showing all articles of ordnance quartermaster, and other property that may be held on memorandum receipt, with date of receipt, from whom received, etc. the company commander has a quarterly settlement with the staff officers concerned. = . abstract record of memorandum receipts.= for keeping a record of property issued on memorandum receipt, in connection with the unit accountability equipment. = . record of rifles=, showing the number of the rifle, the arsenal where made, date of receipt, to whom issued, and number of shots fired each target season. (note. geo. banta publishing co., menasha, wis., print an excellent card for this purpose.) = . summary court records.= commanding officers are required to furnish organization commanders with true copies of all summary court records relating to men of their organizations, which papers form a part of the records of the organization. = . statement of clothing charged to enlisted men.= when clothing is drawn individually from the quartermaster, the individual clothing slips are entered on the statement of clothing charged to enlisted men, which is filed with the requisition to which it pertains. = . abstract of clothing.= all individual clothing slips are entered on this abstract as the issues are made, the total quantities and money values being determined and the abstract completed at the end of month or when the organization leaves the vicinity of the issuing quartermaster for an extended period. at the close of period covered, the organization commander compares his copy of the abstract with the quartermaster's copy, and it is then filed with the individual clothing slips and statement of clothing charged to enlisted men. = . record of size of clothing.= a record of the sizes of clothing of every man in the company as ascertained by measurement. = . company target records.= an individual record is kept for each man of the company and for every officer firing, on which are entered the record rifle practice and the qualification for each target season. a similar record is kept in the case of those required to fire with the pistol. records are also kept of the company combat firing and the proficiency test, and of the combat practice. the combat practice records are kept until the close of the following target season, when they may be destroyed. = . company return.= on the first day of each month a company return for the preceding month is submitted to regimental headquarters. the return gives by name all changes since rendition of last return in the case of officers, and by number all changes in the case of enlisted men, and shows the condition of the company at midnight of the last day of the month for which rendered. all officers, present and absent, are accounted for by name, and under "record of events," is given a brief statement of the duties performed by the company during the month, including marches made, actions in which engaged, etc. see next page for a "model" company return. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . ration return.= in addition to rations, on this form are obtained soap, candles, matches, toilet paper, rock salt, vinegar for animals, flour for paste in target practice, towels, and ice, the allowances of which are prescribed in the army regulations. the best way to show how a ration return is prepared is to give a "model" and then explain how the figures thereon were obtained. the figures in the above "model" were obtained as follows: (a) the enlisted strength of co. "h," th inf., present and absent according to the morning report of feb. / , was (b) deduct from the above the number of men absent according to the morning report of feb. / , and for whom rations will not, therefore, be drawn for any part or for the whole of the month of march, the number of men absent being (assumed) as follows: on furlough on detached service absent sick absent in confinement present sick in hospital attached to and rationed with the band --------- balance (c) add the number of men attached to the company for rations, which (it is assumed) consists of two general prisoners --------- total that is to say, we have men for whom one ration per day must be drawn for the month of march, that is to say, days. hence, the total number of rations will be, × = rations. (d) additions and deductions must be made as follows: _additions_ for the men who were attached to the company for rations and who joined during the month of february, from absent sick, furlough, detached service, etc., and which (let us assume) the "plus" column of "rations" on the company morning report for february shows to be _deductions_ for the men who left the company during the month of february, on account of being sent to the hospital sick, going on furlough, etc., and which (let us assume) the "minus" column of "rations" on the company morning report for february shows to be leaving us (a "net correction") to be _added_ of --------- and making the total number due the company for the month of march extra issues the army regulations fixes the maximum allowance of soap, toilet paper, matches, etc., the commanding officer being authorized, if he so desires, to determine the allowances, with the prescribed maximum. the allowances are based either on so much per ration, per so many rations, or per organization. in the case of candles and matches the allowance is left entirely to the commanding officer. [illustration: fig. : "model" ration return] _example_ (see "model" ration return above) _soap._ allowance is . for each ration or lbs. to rations. . × = . , i. e., the company is entitled to lbs. of soap for the month of march. _toilet paper._ allowance is sheets for every rations, ÷ = +, that is, the company is entitled to packages of toilet paper. _matches._ allowance of matches for lighting fires and lights, for which fuel and the illumination supplies are issued, is such as the commanding officer may order as necessary. _flour._ allowance of flour for paste used in target practice is lbs. for each troop or company for the practice season. footnotes: [ ] silicate roll blackboards, which are perfectly flexible and can be rolled tightly, like a map, without injury, may be obtained from the new york silicate book slate co., vesey st., new york. they are made in various sizes, about the most convenient for use in noncommissioned officers' schools is no. , three by four feet--price $ . [ ] for example, noisy or disorderly conduct in quarters, failure to salute officers, slovenly dressed at formations, rifle equipments not properly cleaned at inspection or other formations, overstaying pass, short absences without leave and absences from formations (especially for first offense). chapter ii discipline = . definition.= discipline is not merely preservation of order, faithful performance of duty, and prevention of offenses--in other words, discipline is not merely compliance with a set of rules and regulations drawn up for the purpose of preserving order in an organization. this is only one phase of discipline. in its deeper and more important sense discipline may be defined as the habit of instantaneous and instinctive obedience under any and all circumstances--it is the habit whereby the very muscles of the soldier instinctively obey the word of command, so that under whatever circumstances of danger or death the soldier may hear that word of command, even though his mind be too confused to work, his muscles will obey. it is toward this ultimate object that all rules of discipline tend. in war, the value of this habit of instantaneous and instinctive obedience is invaluable, and during the time of peace everything possible should be done to ingrain into the very blood of the soldier this spirit, this habit, of instantaneous, instinctive obedience to the word of command. = . methods of attaining good discipline.= experience shows that drill, routine, military courtesy, attention to details, proper rewards for good conduct, and invariable admonition or punishment of all derelictions of duty, are the best methods of attaining good discipline--that they are the most effective means to that end. = . importance.= history shows that the chief factor of success in war is discipline, and that without discipline no body of troops can hold their own against a well-directed, well-disciplined force. = . sound system.= we must bear in mind that what may be considered a sound system of discipline at one epoch or for one nation, may be inapplicable at another epoch or for another nation. in other words, sound discipline depends upon the existing state of civilization and education, the political institutions of the country, the national trait and the national military system. for example, the system of discipline that existed in the days of frederick the great, and which, in modified form, exists today in certain european armies, whereby the soldier was so inured to a habit of subjection that he became a sort of machine--a kind of automaton. such a system of discipline, while answering admirably well its purpose at that time and for those nations, would not do at all in this day and generation, and with a people like ours, in whom the spirit of personal freedom and individual initiative are born. of course, the discipline that will insure obedience under any and all conditions--the discipline that will insure prompt and unhesitating obedience to march, to attack, to charge--is just as important today as it was a thousand years ago, but we can not attain it by the machine-making methods of former times. the system we use must be in keeping with the national characteristics of our people and the tactical necessities of the day, the latter requiring individual initiative. according to the old system, the company commander imposed his will upon a body of submissive units; under the new system the company commander, backed by authority and greater knowledge, leads obedient, willing units, exacting ready obedience and loyal coöperation. the company commander used to drive; now he leads. = . means of attaining and maintaining such discipline.= . explain to the men the importance of discipline and its value on the field of battle, and give the reasons that makes it necessary to subject soldiers to restrictions that they were not subjected to in civil life. . do not impose unnecessary restrictions or hardships on your men, nor issue orders that have no bearing on their efficiency, health, cleanliness, orderliness, etc. . demand a high standard of excellence in the performance of all duties whatsoever, and exact the utmost display of energy. a system of discipline based on the above principles develops habits of self-control, self-reliance, neatness, order, and punctuality, and creates respect for authority and confidence in superiors. = . punishment.= in maintaining discipline, it must be remembered the object of punishment should be two-fold: (a) to prevent the commission of offenses, and (b) to reform the offender. punishment should, therefore, in degree and character depend upon the nature of the offense. punishment should not be debasing or illegal, and the penalty should be proportionate to the nature of the offense. if too great, it tends to arouse sympathy, and foster friends for the offender, thus encouraging a repetition of the offense. a distinction, therefore, should be made between the deliberate disregard of orders and regulations, and offenses which are the result of ignorance or thoughtlessness. in the latter case the punishment should be for the purpose of instruction and should not go to the extent of inflicting unnecessary humiliation and discouragement upon the offender. general principles = .= in the administration of discipline the following principles should be observed. . everyone, officers and soldiers, should be required and made to perform their full duty. if the post commander, for instance, requires the company commanders to do their full duty, they will require their noncommissioned officers to do their full duty, and the noncommissioned officers will in turn require the men to do the same. . subordinates should be held strictly responsible for the proper government and administration of their respective commands, and all changes or corrections should be made through them. . subordinates should have exclusive control of their respective commands, and all orders, instructions and directions affecting their commands should be given through them. . if, in case of emergency, it be not practicable to make certain changes or corrections, or to give certain orders, instructions or directions, through the subordinates, they should be notified at once of what has been done. . after a subordinate has been placed in charge of a certain duty, all instructions pertaining thereto should be given through him, and all meddling and interfering should be avoided. interference by superiors relieves the subordinate of responsibility, and causes him to lose interest, become indifferent, and do no more than he is obliged to do. . the certainty of reward for, and appreciation of, meritorious conduct, should equal the certainty of punishment for dereliction of duty. . it is the duty of an officer or noncommissioned officer who gives an order to see that it is obeyed; carrying out orders received by him does not end with their perfunctory transmission to subordinates--this is only a small part of his duty. he must personally see that the orders so transmitted are made effective. . the treatment of soldiers should be uniform and just, and under no circumstances should a man be humiliated unnecessarily or abused. reproof and punishment must be administered with discretion and judgment, and without passion; for an officer or noncommissioned officer who loses his temper and flies into a tantrum has failed to obtain his first triumph in discipline. he who can not control himself can not control others. . punishment should invariably follow dereliction of duty, for the frequency of offenses depends, as a general rule, on the degree of certainty with which their commission is attended with punishment. when men know that their derelictions and neglects will be observed and reproved, they will be much more careful than they would be otherwise--that's human nature. a strict adherence to the above general principles will instill into the minds of those concerned, respect for authority and a spirit of obedience. part iii miscellaneous subjects pertaining to company training and instruction chapter i general principles of company training and instruction[ ] = . object of training and instruction.= the object of training and instructing a company is to thoroughly knit together its different parts, its various elements (individuals, squads and platoons), into a complete, homogeneous mass, a cohesive unit, that will under any and all conditions and circumstances respond to the will of the captain--a cohesive unit that knows how to march, that knows how to live properly in camp, that knows how to fight and that can be readily handled tactically on the field of battle. in short, the object of training and instruction is to make out of the company an efficient, wieldy fighting weapon, to be manipulated by the captain. there is but one way this object can be obtained, and that is by work, work, work--and then more work--by constant care, attention and pains--by coöperation, by team work, among the officers, the noncommissioned officers and the privates. = . method and progression.= arrangement is an essential of sound teaching. training and instruction in order to be easily understood and readily assimilated--in order to give the greatest results in the shortest time--must be carried on according to a methodical and progressive plan. each subject or subjects upon a knowledge of which depend the proper understanding and mastering of another, should be studied and mastered before taking up the other subject, and the elementary and simpler aspects of a given subject must be mastered before taking up the higher and more difficult phases of the subject, which means that individual training and instruction must precede, and provide a sound foundation for, collective training and instruction--that is to say, for the higher tactical training and instruction of the company as a unit. these basic, fundamental principles of successful training and instruction apply to practical as well as theoretical training. for instance, in the subject of entrenchments we would first instruct the men individually in the use of the tools and in the construction and use of the trenches, after which we would pass on to the tactical use of entrenchments by the company. also, in training and instructing the company in fire discipline, we would first explain to the men the power and tactical value of the rifle, and instruct them in their duties on the firing line as regards adjustment of sights, attention to commands, economy of ammunition, etc.; we would explain to the platoon commanders and guides their duties as regards control of fire, enforcement of fire discipline, etc., after which we would practice the company as a unit in fire action, and fire control, ending up with an exercise showing the tactical application of the rules and principles explained. and again, in the training and instruction of the company in the attack, we would first train and instruct the company in all the formations and operations that naturally precede an attack (patrolling, outposts, advance guard, rear guard), and also in those that form an inherent part of an attack (extended order, field firing, use of cover, etc.). = . program.= the training and instruction of a company, whether practical or theoretical, should be carried on in accordance with a fixed, definite program, in which the subjects are arranged in a natural, progressive order. = . simultaneous instruction and training.= the next question that presents itself is: should instruction and training in each branch be completed before proceeding to the next, or should instruction and training be carried on simultaneously in two or more different subjects, as one, for example, are taught mathematics, french and history at the same time, a different hour of the day being devoted to each subject? in other words, should we, for instance, devote one hour of the day to attack, one hour to defense, and one hour to the service of security, thus preventing the soldier from getting weary of doing the same thing that whole day? our answer is: st. if the instruction and training is being given on the ground where the application of the principles of any given subject is varied so much by the type of the ground and the nature of the situation, each type of ground affording a different solution of the problem, it is thought the best results can be obtained by finishing each subject before proceeding to the next, thus not losing the "atmosphere" of one subject by switching to the next, and also confusing the minds of the men with different principles. nd. however, if the instruction and training be theoretical and the time available each day be several hours, better results can be obtained by studying two or more subjects simultaneously. this would also be the case if the work be practical, but if it be such that the type of the ground and the nature of the situation will not of themselves afford variety in the application of the same principles. = . responsibility.= the army regulations and war department orders hold the company commander responsible for the training and instruction of the company. the subject is a most important one and should receive serious thought and study. before admonishing one of your men for not knowing a subject, always ask yourself, "have i made an effort to teach it to him?" = . interest.= special effort should be made to make the training and instruction of the company interesting, so that the work will not become monotonous and irksome, and thus cause the men to lose interest and get stale. to accomplish this, these points should be borne in mind: _variety._ inject variety into the work. do not keep the men too long at one thing. _clearness._ every exercise, lesson or lecture should have in view a well-defined object, the meaning and importance of which must be explained to, and understood by, the men at the beginning of the exercise, lesson or lecture. in other words, at the beginning, explain the main, governing idea of the subject, and then take pains to explain in a simple, conversational way each phase as you come to it. give the reasons for everything. you can not expect men to take an interest in things the meaning of which they do not understand and the reason for which they do not see. make sure by asking questions of different ones as you go along that your explanations are understood. _thoroughness._ every lecture, talk, drill or exercise should be carefully planned and arranged beforehand. remember, that the men who are going to listen to your talk--the men who are going to go through the exercise--have the right to expect this of you, and you have no right to compel them to listen to lots of disconnected, half-baked statements, or make them go through a disjointed exercise or drill. in the case of tactical exercises always, if practicable, visit and examine the terrain beforehand. of course, all this will mean work--additional work--but remember the government pays you to work. _reality._ make all practical work as real as possible--do not permit the commission of absurdities--do not let men do things which manifestly they would not be able to do in actual practice--and you yourself be sure to make your exercises and tactical scheme as like real conditions of warfare as possible. = . individual initiative.= the effective range and great power of modern firearms cause troops in battle to be spread out over large areas, thus decentralizing control over men and operations, and consequently increasing the value and importance of individual initiative. the company commander should, therefore, practice, accustom and encourage the privates, noncommissioned officers and lieutenants in the development and exercise of individual initiative and responsibility. this should be borne in mind in all training and instruction. officers, noncommissioned officers and privates must not "lay down" just because they have no specific orders. remember, the one thing above all others that counts in war, is =action, initiative=. indeed, 'tis better to have acted and lost than never to have acted at all. listen to what the chief of staff of the army has to say about this in the preface to the field service regulations: "officers and men of all ranks and grades are given a certain independence in the execution of the tasks to which they are assigned and are expected to show initiative in meeting the different situations as they arise. every individual, from the highest commander to the lowest private, must always remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error in the choice of means." = . determination and individual intelligence.= while the value of discipline can hardly be overestimated, there are two other factors in battle that are fully as important, if not more so, and they are, =determination= to win, and =individual intelligence=, which, in war, as in all other human undertakings, almost invariably spell success. therefore, make these two factors one of the basic principles of the instruction and training of the company, and do all you can to instill into your men a spirit of determination, and to develop in them individual intelligence. every human being has in his soul a certain amount of determination, even though it be only enough to determine upon the small things of life. some people are born with more determination than others, but it is a mistake to suppose that a man must remain through life with the same amount of determination that he brought into it. the attributes of the human mind, such as determination, bravery, ambition, energy, etc., are all capable of improvement and also of deterioration. it is essential therefore, for us to endeavor by all means in our power to improve our strength of character--our determination. it is, of course, useless for us to learn the art of war if we have not sufficient determination, when we meet the enemy, to apply the principles we have studied. there is no reason, however, why every officer, noncommissioned officer and private should not improve his determination of character by careful training in peace. it can only be done by facing the difficulties, thoroughly understanding the dangers, and asking ourselves repeatedly whether we are prepared to face the ordeal in war. let us not think, in a vague sort of a way, that in war we shall be all right and do as well as most people. we know that we are not gifted with tremendous personal courage, and we know that, whatever happens, we shall not run away. but that is not enough. we must train ourselves to understand that in the hour of trial we can harden our hearts, that we can assume the initiative, and retain it by constant advance and constant attack; unless we can fill our hearts with the determination to win, we can not hope to do our full duty on the field of battle and acquit ourselves with credit. = . the human element.= no system of training and instruction that does not take into account human nature, can be thoroughly effective. the human element probably enters into war more than it does into any other pursuit. the old idea of turning a human being into a machine, by means of discipline, and making him dread his captain more than the enemy, died long ago, especially with the american people. in modern war success depends to a great extent upon the initiative, the individual action of the soldier and this action is greatly influenced by the soldier's state of mind at the moment, by the power that can be exercised over his mind by his comrades and those leading him. the company commander should, therefore, study the characteristics of the human mind with the object of ascertaining how he can influence the men under his command, so that in battle those human attributes which are favorable to success, may be strengthened and those which are favorable to defeat may be weakened. of the former, courage, determination, initiative, respect, cheerfulness, comradeship, emulation and esprit de corps, are the principal ones; of the latter, fear, surprise, disrespect, and dejection, are the leading ones. by means of good, sound discipline, we can create, improve and foster the qualities mentioned that are favorable to success, and we can eliminate to a considerable extent, if not entirely, those that are detrimental to success. = . fear.= the emotion of fear acts more powerfully upon the feelings of the individual soldier than any other emotion, and it is also probably the most infectious. fear in a mild form is present in every human being. nature wisely put it there, and society could not very well get along without it. for example, we stop and look up and down a crowded street before starting to cross, for fear of being run over; in going out in the cold we put on our overcoats, for fear of catching cold. in fact, we hardly do anything in life without taking a precaution of some kind. these are all examples of reasonable fear, which, within bounds is a perfectly legitimate attribute of a soldier in common with other human beings. for example, we teach the men to take advantage of cover when attacking, and we dig trenches when on the defense, in both cases for fear of being shot by the enemy. it is the unreasoning type of fear that plays havoc in war, and the most deadly and common form of it is a vague, indefinite, nameless dread of the enemy. if the average man was to analyze his feelings in war and was to ask himself if he were actually afraid of being killed, he would probably find that he was not. the ordinary soldier is prepared to take his chance, with a comfortable feeling inside him, that, although no doubt a number of people will be killed and wounded, he will escape. if, then, a man is not unreasonably afraid of being killed or wounded, is it not possible by proper training and instruction to overcome this vague fear of the enemy? experience shows that it is. if a soldier is suffering from this vague fear of the enemy, it will at least be a consolation to him to know that a great many other soldiers, including those belonging to the enemy, are suffering in a similar manner, and that they are simply experiencing one of the ordinary characteristics of the human mind. if the soldier in battle will only realize that the enemy is just as much afraid of him as he is of the enemy, reason is likely to assert itself and to a great extent overcome the unpleasant feelings inside him. general grant, in his memoirs, relates a story to the effect that in one of his early campaigns he was seized with an unreasonable fear of his enemy, and was very much worried as to what the enemy was doing, when, all at once, it dawned upon him that his enemy was probably worrying equally as much about what he, grant, was doing, and was probably as afraid as he was, if not even more so, and the realization of this promptly dispelled all of his, grant's, fear. confidence in one's ability to fight well will also do much to neutralize fear, and if a soldier knows that he can shoot better, march better, and attack better, than his opponent, the confidence of success that he will, as a result, feel will do much to dispel physical fear. by sound and careful training and instruction make your men efficient and this efficiency will give them confidence in themselves, confidence in their rifles, confidence in their bayonets, confidence in their comrades and confidence in their officers. the physical methods of overcoming fear in battle are simply to direct the men's minds to other thoughts by giving them something for their bodies and limbs to do. it is a well-known saying that a man in battle frequently regains his lost courage by repeatedly firing off his rifle, which simply means that his thoughts are diverted by physical movements. this is no doubt one of the reasons why the attack is so much more successful in war than the defense, because in the attack the men are generally moving forward and having their minds diverted by physical motion from this vague dread of the enemy. = . courage.= courage, like all other human characteristics, is very infectious, and a brave leader who has no fear of the enemy will always get more out of his men than one who is not so well equipped in that respect. however, it is a well-known fact that a man may be brave far above his fellows in one calling or occupation, and extremely nervous in another. for example, a man may have greatly distinguished himself in the capture of a fort, who would not get on a horse for fear of being kicked off. courage of this kind is induced chiefly by habit or experience--the man knows the dangers and how to overcome them, he has been through similar experiences before and he has come out of them with a whole skin. this type of courage can be developed by careful training during peace, and it can be increased by self-confidence--by so training the soldier that he knows and feels he will know what to do in any emergency which may arise, and how to do it; he will not be surprised by the unexpected event, which invariably occurs, and he will understand others besides himself are being troubled by unpleasant feelings, which it is his duty as a man and a soldier to overcome. = . surprise.= surprise may be said to be the mother of a panic, which is the worst form of fear. in such a case unreasoning fear sometimes turns into temporary insanity. panic is most infectious, but, on the other hand, a panic can often be averted or stayed by the courageous action of one or more individuals, who can thus impose their will on the mass and bring the people to a reasonable state of mind. =teach every man in the company that when surprised the only hope of success is to obey at once and implicitly the orders of his immediate commander.= surprises in war are not limited to the ordinary acceptance of the term, such as a sudden attack from an unexpected direction. the soldier who goes into battle, for instance, and hears the whiz of a bullet, or sees a shell burst in front of him, is surprised if he has not been taught in peace that these things have to be faced, and that for one bullet that hurts anyone thousands have to be fired. similarly, a man sees a comrade knocked over; the horrors of war are immediately brought to him, and his courage begins to ebb--he has been surprised, because he has not realized in peace that men are bound to be killed in war. the whole atmosphere of the battlefield is a surprise to the average soldier with no previous experience--the enemy is everywhere, behind every bush, and lurking in every bit of cover, the air is full of bullets, and any advance towards the formidable-looking position held by the enemy is suicidal. however, if the soldier is properly trained and instructed in peace, he will not be greatly surprised at his novel surroundings; he will know that the enemy is not everywhere, and that one bullet sounds much more dangerous than it really is. a bullet sounds quite close when it is fifty yards away, and there is a popular saying that a man's weight in lead is fired for every man that is killed in war. = . respect.= it is a mistake to imagine that all that is required from a soldier is respect to his officers and noncommissioned officers. self-respect is fully as important. a soldier is a human being; if he possesses self-respect he will respect all that is good in his comrades, and they will respect all that is good in him. a man who respects himself knows how to respect other people. these are the men that form the backbone of the company, and are the best material on which to work in order to raise the general standard of courage in battle. from a purely military point of view, it is absolutely necessary for an officer, noncommissioned officer, or private to possess some marked military qualifications in order to gain respect from others. this respect engenders confidence in others. self-respect in the individual can be encouraged, not by fulsome praise, but by a quiet appreciation of the good military qualities displayed by him, and by making use of those qualities whenever an opportunity occurs. for example, if a soldier is seen to do a good piece of scouting or patrolling, the first opportunity should be taken to give him a similar task, if possible in a more responsible position or on a more important occasion. knowledge is a powerful factor in creating respect, and is probably second only to determination of character. it is essential, therefore, that all officers and noncommissioned officers should have a thorough knowledge of their duties--that they should be "on to their jobs." = . cheerfulness.= cheerfulness is a valuable military asset in war, and like all other characteristics of the human being, is very infectious, and in times of depression, such as during a long siege, or after the failure of an attack, it does more than anything else to restore the fighting power of the men. = . contentment.= contentment amongst troops in war is dependent upon these main factors: good leading, good food, and sufficient shelter and sleep. of these, good leading is by far the most important, because it has been proved time and again that badly fed and badly quartered troops, who have suffered great hardships, will still be content and will fight in the most gallant and vigorous manner, provided they are well led. although good leading emanates in the first instance from the highest military authorities, a great deal depends upon the company officers and noncommissioned officers. a good leader as a rule is careful of the comforts of his men; he obtains the best food and best shelter available, he does not wear out the men by unnecessary movements or unnecessary work, either in the field or in camp, and consequently when he does order them to do anything they know at once that it is necessary and they do it cheerfully. = . comradeship.= comradeship is a very valuable military characteristic. what a world of meaning there is in the words, "me and my bunkie." a soldier may have many acquaintances and a number of friends, but he has but one "bunkie." in times of great danger two men who are "bunkies" will not shirk so easily as two independent men. the best in one man comes out to the surface and dominates any bad military points in the other. they can help each other in countless ways in war, and if one is unfortunately killed or wounded, the other will probably do his best to get even with the enemy at the earliest possible opportunity. this spirit may not be very christianlike, but it is very human and practical, and helps to win battles, and to win battles is the only reason why soldiers go to war. art of instruction on the ground = . advantages.= whenever practicable, training and instruction should, in whole or in part, be imparted on the ground, as this gives the instruction a practical aspect that is most valuable, and enables the soldier to grasp and apply principles that he would not otherwise understand. knowledge that a man can not apply has no value. = . different methods.= instruction on the ground may be given according to one of these three methods: _ st method._ by means of a talk or lecture prepare the minds of the men for the reception and retention of the subject to be explained later on the ground. in other words, first explain the principles of the subject and then put a "clincher" on the information thus imparted by taking the men to some suitable ground, assuming certain situations and then by quizzing different men see how they would apply the principles just explained in the talk or lecture. for example, after a lecture on the selection of fire-positions take the men to some suitable nearby place and explain to them that the company is attacking toward that house and is being fired upon from that direction. then continue: =captain:= remember what i told you about the selection of good fire-positions during the advance. we want to use our rifles with effect, so we must be able to see the position of the enemy. on the other hand, we want to avoid being hit ourselves, if possible; so, we would like to get as much cover as possible. now, smith, do you think where we are at present standing is a good place for a fire-position? =smith:= no, sir. =captain:= why not? =smith:= we can see the enemy from here, but he can see us better than we can see him, and can hit us easier than we can hit him. =captain:= jones, can you choose a better place, either to the front or rear of where we are now standing? =jones:= i would choose a position along that row of bushes, about fifty yards to the front. =captain:= why? =jones:= because, etc., etc. twenty minutes' instruction in this manner, after a lecture, will firmly fix in the brains of the men the principles explained in the lecture. it is a good plan to repeat the salient points of the lecture in the questions, as was done in the first question asked above, or to do so in some other way. if a man can not give an answer, or choose a suitable place, explain the requirements again and help him to use his common sense. _ d method._ by practicing the men on the ground in the subject about which the talk or lecture was delivered. _ d method._ this may be called the ocular demonstration method, which consists in having a part of the company go through the exercise or drill, while the rest of the company observes what is being done. this method is illustrated by the following example: = . attack.= the company commander has just delivered a talk to the company on the second stage of the attack, and has marched the company to a piece of ground suitable for practicing this particular operation, and which the company commander has himself visited beforehand (the ground should always be visited beforehand by the company commander, who should be thoroughly familiar with it. if possible, ground suitable for practicing the operation in question should always be selected.) the operation should begin about yards from the enemy's position. after pointing out the enemy's position to the company, the particular part of his line it is intended to assault and the direction the company is to advance, the company commander would then proceed something like this: "we are part of a battalion taking part in a battle, and there are companies to our right and left, with a support and reserve in our rear. so far we have been advancing over ground that is exposed to hostile artillery fire (or not exposed to hostile artillery fire, according to the actual country). we have just come under the enemy's infantry fire also, and consequently we must change our method of advancing. our immediate object is to get forward, without expending more ammunition than is absolutely necessary, to a position close enough to the enemy to enable us to use our rifles with such deadly effect that we will be able to gain a superiority of fire. now, is this place sufficiently close for the purpose? no, it is not--it's entirely too far away. is that next ridge just in front of us close enough? no, it is not; it is at least , yards from the enemy's position. as a rule, we must get from eight to six hundred yards from the enemy's position before the real struggle for superiority of fire begins. "the following are the main points to which attention must be paid during this part of the advance: " . we must halt in good fire position from which we can see and fire at the enemy, and from which we can not be seen very clearly. " . we must advance very rapidly over any open ground that is exposed to the enemy's artillery or rifle fire. " . we must find halting places, if possible under cover, or under the best cover available, so as to avoid making our forward rushes so long that the men will get worn out, and begin to straggle long before they get close enough to the enemy to use their rifles with deadly effect. " . whenever possible, company scouts should be sent on ahead to select fire-positions." of course, the above points will have been explained already in the lecture, but this short summary is given in order to focus the minds of the men upon the action that must be taken by the privates, and squad leaders and the platoon commanders. we now take one platoon and the remainder of the company looks on. the platoon commander is reminded that he is under artillery and infantry fire, and is then directed to advance, in proper formation, to the first fire-position available. we will suppose there is a gentle slope up to the next ridge or undulation of the ground, and that there are no obstructions to the view except those afforded by the ground itself. the platoon now advances, the captain remaining with the rest of the company, pointing out mistakes as well as good points, and asking the men questions, such as: =captain:= corporal smith, should the whole platoon have gone forward together, or would it have been better to advance by squads? =corporal smith:= i think it should have advanced by squads. =captain:= no, it was all right to advance as they did. at this distance the enemy's infantry fire would not be very deadly, the platoon is well extended as skirmishers, it would take considerably longer to go forward to the next position by successive squads and we want to advance at this stage as rapidly as possible; for, the longer we took, the longer would the men be exposed to fire, and consequently the greater would be the number of casualties. =captain:= sergeant jones, why did the platoon advance at a run when moving down the slope, and begin to walk just before reaching the foot of the slope? =sergeant jones:= because the slope is exposed and it was necessary to get over it as quickly as possible. they began to walk just before reaching the foot of the slope, because they struck dead ground and were covered from the enemy's fire by the ridge in front. =captain:= corporal adams, shouldn't the platoon have halted when it reached cover, so as to give the men a rest? =corporal adams:= no, sir; the men had not run very far and walking gave them sufficient rest. it would have been an unnecessary loss of time to halt. =captain:= harris, why did that man run on ahead as soon as the platoon halted? =pvt. harris:= so he could creep up the crest of the ridge and lie down in exactly the spot that is the best fire-position--that is, where he can just see to fire over the crest and where the enemy can not see him. =captain:= yes, that's right. all the men in the platoon might not stop at the best fire-position and in the hurry and excitement of the moment the platoon commander might also fail to do so, but if a man goes forward and lies down, the whole platoon knows that they must not go beyond him. individual men who, owing to slight undulations of ground, may not be able to fire when they halt in line with this man, can creep up until they can see. others who, for the same reason as regards the ground, find that if they get up on a line with the man they will be unduly exposed, will halt before that time. =captain:= sergeant roberts, is it necessary for another platoon to provide covering fire during the advance of the platoon? =sergeant roberts:= no sir. at this range the enemy's infantry fire would not be very effective, and it is important to husband our ammunition for the later stages of the attack. having asked any other questions suggested by the situation or the ground, the captain will then take the rest of the company forward over the ground covered by the platoon, halting at the place where the platoon changed its pace from a rush to a walk, so that the men can see for themselves that cover from fire has been reached. he will then move the rest of the company forward and tell them to halt and lie down in what each man considers to be the best fire-position, not necessarily adopting the same position as that chosen by the leading platoon. the platoon commanders will then go along their platoons and point out any mistakes. the leading platoon will now join the company and another platoon will be deployed in the fire position, the platoon commander being directed to advance to the next fire-position. as we are now about , yards from the enemy's position the question will again arise as to whether covering fire is necessary. if the enemy's rifle fire were heavy and accurate it might be necessary, but it should be avoided if possible, on account of the expenditure of ammunition. we will suppose that the ground falls gently towards the enemy and is very exposed to view for about yards, and half this distance away there is a low bank running parallel to the front of the attack and with a small clump of three or four trees on the bank directly in front of the platoon. four hundred yards away is the bottom of the valley covered with bushes and shrubs. on the far side the ground rises with small undulations and low foot hills to the high ground occupied by the enemy. there appears to be no marked fire-position which will afford any cover except the bank yards away. the second platoon advances in the same manner as did the first and the captain with the commanders of the remaining platoons will continue to ask questions and point out what has been done right or wrong by the leading platoon. the first question which will arise is whether the platoon can reach the fire position offered by the bank in one rush, and secondly, whether the bank is a good fire-position. a former question will again crop up as to whether the whole platoon should go forward at once or whether the advance should be made by squads. a hundred and fifty yards is a long way to advance without a halt, and if a halt is made on such exposed ground fire must be opened. probably three advances, each of about fifty yards, would be made, covering fire being provided by the other platoons, which will be occupying the fire-position which the leading platoon has just left. this covering fire would not endanger the leading platoon as it would be delivered from just behind the crest and the leading platoon would be over the crest and out of sight and therefore out of fire from the platoon in rear. the selection of a fire-position during this advance would depend upon very minute folds of the ground, or very low bushes, grass, etc., which might give a certain amount of cover from view, and therefore make it difficult for the enemy to aim or range accurately. we will suppose that the leading platoon has halted to fire about fifty yards in front, the remaining platoons, in turn, should then be taken forward, examining the ground very carefully as they go, and each platoon commander asked to halt his platoon in what he considers to be the best place. the possibility of using a scout to select a fire-position would be considered, and a fire-position selected by one platoon would be compared with that selected by another. the third platoon would then lead during the advance to the next fire-position, and so on with the fourth platoon, if necessary, until the bank was reached. the bank will afford a good deal of material for discussion. is it a good fire-position or is it not, should it be occupied as such or should it be avoided altogether? if we ask an artillery officer his opinion about the matter, he will tell us that by means of the clump of trees the defenders' artillery will be able to range with absolute accuracy on that bank. the direction of the bank is parallel to their front, and therefore they can fire at any part of it for some distance right and left of the clump without materially altering their range, and if any infantry occupy the bank they can bring a very deadly fire to bear against them. there appears to be no doubt, from an artillery point of view, that our platoon should avoid occupying it and get out of its neighborhood as rapidly as possible. there is another drawback as regards the bank: it is some yards from the enemy's position and may be expected to be under an effective rifle fire. it is no doubt a good mark for the enemy, and, now we come to the crux of the whole matter; his artillery and infantry fire might not do us much damage so long as we remain behind the bank, but they might make it very unpleasant for us directly we try to leave this cover and advance further. before finally deciding what to do we must consider human nature, which is entirely in favor of halting behind the bank, and if allowed to remain there long, will be opposed to leaving it. we cannot hope to gain superiority of fire over the enemy at a range of yards, so that a long halt at the bank is out of the question. but it appears to be an extraordinary thing, when we are searching everywhere for cover, that we should be doubtful about occupying such good cover when we find it. if we decide not to occupy it, the logical conclusion is that, when preparing a position for defense, we should construct a good fire-position for the attack some yards away, which is the last thing we should think of doing. there is no doubt about it, that with badly-trained troops such a fire-position would be liable to become a snare, and that if they once occupied it, there would be great difficulty in getting them forward again, and probably the attack would be brought to a standstill at a critical time. the answer appears to be found in the simple solution of good training. we must teach our men that when they get into such positions they must use the cover afforded, but for no longer than any other fire-position, and that they must get into the habit in peace of looking upon such localities with suspicion, and with the knowledge that they are not suitable for lengthy occupation in war, if the battle is to be won. we now come to a still more difficult question of training, namely, how far can the company get forward from the bank without being compelled to stop in order to gain superiority of fire over the defense? in war we want to get as close as possible; the moral effect on the defense is greater, our fire is more effective, and we are likely to gain our object more rapidly. in peace there is no fire to stop us, and we move forward to ridiculous positions which we could not possibly reach in war without first gaining superiority of fire. the result of this is that we try to do the same thing when first we go to war, and we are stopped, probably much further back than we should have been if we had studied the question in peace. even on the most open ground we must get to within yards of the enemy, and if the ground affords any cover in front, the exposed space must be rushed and the more forward position gained. having pointed out this difficulty to the company during the previous lecture, and reminded them of it on the ground, we can now extend the whole company and move forward from the bank, using covering fire and letting each platoon commander decide how far he can get to the front after a series of rushes, the company acting as a whole. the captain can then go down the line and discuss with each platoon the position it has reached. whilst he is doing this, the remaining platoons can be trained in fire direction and control, which should be carefully watched and criticized by the platoon commanders. one platoon, owing to the nature of the ground in front of it, can get forward further than other platoons, and this should be brought home to each platoon, so as to avoid the possibility of playing the game of follow your leader, and one platoon halting merely because another has halted. if there is still time available, and the ground is suitable, the company can be moved to a flank to choose a similar fire-position where the ground is more favorable to an advance, and where the company could get within yards of the enemy, or even less, before it would be absolutely necessary to stop in order to gain superiority of fire. if there is still time available, and the ground is suitable, the whole operation can be carried out in the opposite direction or in some other direction, and the platoons can thus be trained to appreciate that fire-positions which are good in one place are bad in another. = . defense.= demonstrations in defense can be carried out in a similar manner, the captain explaining to the company the general line of defense to be taken up, the portion allotted to the company, and the probable direction of the enemy's attack. the coöperation of the artillery and infantry will have been pointed out in the previous lecture: how some part of the enemy's advance will be dealt with by artillery alone, some part by both artillery and infantry, and some part by infantry alone. this can now be pointed out to the men on the ground. having considered the assistance provided by the artillery, the next point to decide upon is the exact position of the fire trench. the best way to proceed is to allot a certain portion of the front occupied by the company to each platoon and to let the platoon commanders take charge of the operations. the platoon commander can direct one of his squads to select a position for the trench, and that squad can lie down there. the remaining squads will then select a position in turn. if two squads select the same they can lie down together. the platoon commander will then fall in his platoon, and make them lie down in the most retired position chosen; he will ask the squad leader why the squad chose that locality in preference to any other, why they did not go ten yards further forward or ten yards further back; and he will explain to the whole platoon the advantages and disadvantages of selecting this locality. he will then move the whole platoon forward to the next position chosen by another squad and deal with that locality. finally, he will select the position he thinks the best, giving his reasons why he has decided upon it, and place the whole platoon on it. when all the platoons have decided upon their line of defense, the captain will move the whole company in turn from the ground occupied by one platoon to that occupied by another, asking the platoon commander in each case to explain why the position was chosen in preference to any other. he will give his decision as regards each platoon, and he will finally arrange for the position to be occupied by the whole company. one platoon, for some good reason, may have chosen a place which it would not be safe to occupy, owing to the fire of another platoon on the flank. another platoon may have chosen a place which was very good as regards the field of fire in a direction which was already adequately defended by another platoon, but which had a bad field of fire over ground which no other platoon could fire upon. the company commander would adjust all these matters, and in the end one or more platoons might not be placed in the best position as regards their own particular front, but in the best as regards the whole company. having decided upon the exact site of the trenches and the general distribution of fire, the next matter to consider is the amount of clearing that is necessary, and the position and nature of any obstacles which may be required. each platoon commander having been allotted a definite fire zone, can point out to his platoon what clearance is necessary; he can then ask each squad, as before, to choose the position for the obstacle. the company commander can then take the whole company to the position occupied by each platoon and tell the platoon commander to explain what ground they propose to clear, where they propose to place their obstacle, the material available for its construction, and in every case the reason why the decision has been arrived at. if digging is permitted, the trenches will now be constructed, and care will be taken that they are actually finished. it is far better to work overtime than to construct trenches which would be of little use in war and could not be properly defended. it is the exception rather than the rule to see trenches properly finished, fit for occupation, and capable of resisting a heavy attack. if the trenches cannot be dug the company can be taken to another part of the same position, where the ground in front is totally different, and the exercise can be repeated, the platoon and company commanders pointing out why a fire trench which was well sited in the first case would be badly sited if a similar position was selected in the second case. = . outpost.= we can now turn to the method of training the company in outpost duty, making use of the same system of demonstration. having pointed out to the company the locality where the main body is bivouacked, the fighting position which the main body will occupy in case a heavy attack is made against the outposts, and the general line of the outposts, the company commander will indicate on the ground the extent of front which is to be guarded by his company, stating whether imaginary companies continue the position on one or both flanks. he will point out the possible avenues of approach from the direction of the enemy to that portion of the position to be occupied by the company, and state from which direction the enemy is most likely to advance and why. the first point to decide is the number of outguards and their exact position. in war this would always be done by the company commander, but if it is desired to give the junior officers of the company some instruction in this important detail, they should be sent out before the company arrives on the ground to reconnoiter the position and make their decisions. the exact siting of the trenches for the outguards, the construction of obstacles, and the clearance of the foreground having been decided upon and the positions selected for each outguard discussed, and a definite site selected, the next question to decide is the number and position of the sentries. the platoon commander would then take each scheme in turn, visit with the whole platoon each position selected for the sentry, and decide finally what it would be best to do, giving, as usual, his reasons. having decided upon the positions of the sentries, and their line of retreat, so as not to mask the fire of the outguard, the next matter to consider would be the number of patrols that are required, and the particular areas of ground that must be examined by them periodically. the necessary trenches, obstacles, etc., would then be constructed. finally, the whole company should be assembled, marched to the position chosen for each outguard and the reasons for selecting the position explained by the company commander. the company should then be told off as an outpost company, and divided into outguards, supports, if any, and the necessary sentries over arms, patrols, etc., and marched to their respective posts. if there is still time available each platoon commander can reconnoiter the ground for suitable positions for his outguards by night, take the outguards there, explain why the change of position is desirable, and direct the outguard commanders with their outguards to select positions for the sentries, following the same procedure as by day. although it is quite correct to select positions for night outposts during daylight, when possible, they should never be definitely occupied by the company before dark, when the forward movement could not be observed by the enemy. to practice night outposts by day is bad instruction, outguards and sentries are placed in positions which appear ridiculous to the ordinary mind, and the men get confused ideas on the subject. when it is desired to practice day and night outposts as an advanced exercise it is advisable to commence work in the afternoon, establish the day outposts, reconnoiter for the night outposts, make the change after dark and construct the necessary trenches, obstacles, etc., after dark. it is, however, extremely important that the patrols should get to know their way about the country in front during the daylight, when possible, so that they will have some practice in recognizing land marks by night. it frequently occurs, when training the company in outpost duties, that periods elapse during which the outguards are doing nothing. these opportunities should be taken to instruct the men in their duties when ordered to patrol to the front, the same system of demonstration being employed. for instance, the officer or noncommissioned officer commanding a piquet can select three men, point out certain ground in front which the sentries cannot see and which must be examined by a patrol, and proceed to instruct the whole picket in the best manner of carrying out this work. we will suppose that the patrol is working by day and that the ground to be visited is behind a small hill some yards in front of the sentry. the commander of the picket will then explain to the men that the first object of the patrol is to reach the ground to be examined without being seen by any hostile patrols which may be moving about in front. before proceeding further it is necessary for the patrol to decide upon the best line of advance. the various lines of advance will be discussed and the patrol asked to decide which they would select. three other men can then be asked to give their opinion, and so on until all the men of the picket have expressed their views. the commander of the picket will then state which he considers the best line and give his reasons. the next matter to decide is the method of advance to be adopted by the patrol. are the three men to march past the sentry in one body and walk straight over the hill in front? if they do this there may be a hostile patrol hiding just behind the crest, watching the movements of our patrol, and directly the latter reach the hill they will be covered by the rifles of the hostile patrol at a few yards' range and will be captured or shot. if the patrol is not to advance in one body how is it to act? there is plenty of time available, so that there are no objections to deliberate methods. the patrol should advance from cover to cover with one man always going forward protected by the rifles of the remaining two men who have halted in a good position to fire on any enemy that can fire on the leading man. the leading man having readied the cover in front will signal back all clear, and the two men in the rear will join him. they will then make their next advance in a similar manner. by looking at the hill the patrol can make a good guess at the locality which a hostile patrol would select if it was on the hill. it would be a place where it could get a good view towards our outpost line, and where the patrol could not be seen itself from the outpost line. if the hill was quite bare with nothing but grass on it and flat round top, the best place for the enemy's patrol would be exactly on the top just behind the crest. in such a position he could not be seen by any sentry to the right or left of our picket. for example, if the hostile patrol chose a place on the side of the bare slope of the hill and looked over the crest line it would not be seen by our sentry, but it might be seen by another one on the flank. the object of our patrol would be to approach the hill, not direct from the outguard, but either from the left or right of the hill and thus come on the flank of the enemy's patrol if he was there. the whole picket can then be taken out to the front and follow the movements of the patrol from cover to cover until the hill is reached. the next step will be to ascertain if there is any one on the top of the hill. if the hill is perfectly bare with a somewhat convex slope, it would be best for the three men to extend to about twenty yards interval and move forward together, prepared to drop on the first sign of the enemy, so that they can creep up and open fire on him without exposing themselves. three men with magazine rifles extended in this manner, opposed to a hostile patrol collected in one party, should be able to deal with the latter without much difficulty. their fire would be converging, and coming from different directions would confuse the hostile patrol, especially if the advance was made from a flank. the men of the patrol when creeping up the hill should avoid exposing themselves in the direction of the ground behind the hill, if possible, because they want to examine that ground later on, and if seen by the enemy they might fall into an ambuscade. if it is impossible to avoid being seen from the ground beyond, it would be best for the patrol to retire as though they were going back to the outposts, and then move round the flank of the hill and advance to the ground beyond from an unexpected direction. all this would be considered by the officer or noncommissioned officer commanding the picket, together with many other points. sufficient has been said to explain how this system of demonstration can be worked in connection with any class of operation in the field. it is certainly slow, and takes a long time, but no one is ever idle and every one is constantly learning something fresh, for the simple reason that, although one may know every detail of the subject, the ground constantly differs and requires to be dealt with in a common sense and skillful manner. the men are interested throughout, and one morning spent on this kind of work is worth several days of practice in the ordinary manner. it should be remembered that this system of demonstration is only required to teach the men their work; when they have once learned it and thoroughly understand the necessary details they must be practiced in it, the company or platoon commander indicating what has been well done, what has been badly done, and what requires improvement. (see "outposts," par. .) other examples of the ocular demonstration method = .= the following illustrations will suggest other examples of the employment of the ocular demonstration method of instruction: =the advantages and disadvantages of close and extended order.= send a lieutenant or a noncommissioned officer with two or three squads of the older soldiers some distance to the front of the company, and have them advance toward the company, first in close order and then in extended order. by =ocular demonstration= show the men who are watching the approach of the company how easy it would be even for the poorest shots to land bullets in the thick of a closed body, but how much of a less distinct target the extended order offers and how many spaces there are in the skirmish line for the bullets to pass through; also, how much more easily cover can be employed and the rifle used in the extended order. let them see also how much more difficult it is for the officers and noncommissioned officers to maintain control over the movements of troops in extended order, and the consequent necessity and duty of every soldier, when in extended order, doing all he can, by attention and exertion, to keep order and help his officers and noncommissioned officers to gain success. = . the use of cover.= send a lieutenant or noncommissioned officer with a couple of squads of old soldiers a few hundred yards to the front and have them advance on the company as if attacking, first without taking advantage of cover and then taking advantage of all available cover, the part of the company that is supposed to be attacked lying down and aiming and snapping at the approaching soldiers. then reverse the operation--send the defenders out and have them advance on the former attackers. explain that the requisites of good cover are: ability to see the enemy; concealment of your own body; ability to use the rifle readily. then have a number of men take cover and snap at an enemy in position, represented by a few old soldiers. point out the defects and the good points in each case. = . practice in commanding mixed squads.= in order to practice noncommissioned officers in commanding mixed firing squads, and in order to drill the privates in banding themselves together and obeying the orders of anyone who may assume command, it is good training for two or more companies to practice reënforcing each other by one company assuming a given fire-position and the other sending up reënforcements by squads, the men being instructed to take positions anywhere on the firing line where they may find an opening. however, explain to the men that whenever possible units should take their positions on the firing line as a whole, but that in practice it is very often impossible to do this, and that the drill is being given so as to practice the noncommissioned officers in commanding mixed units on the firing line and also to give the privates practice in banding themselves into groups and obeying the command of any noncommissioned officer who may be over them. = . operating against other troops.= there is no better way of arousing interest, enthusiasm, and pride in training troops than by creating a feeling of friendly rivalry and competition amongst the men, and the best way to do this is to have one part of the company operate against the other in all such practical work as scouting, patrolling, attacking, etc. whenever practicable, blank ammunition should be used. one of the sides should wear a white handkerchief around the hat or some other distinguishing mark. =the troops that are sent out must be given full and explicit instructions as to just exactly what they are to do, so that the principles it is intended to illustrate may be properly brought out.= footnotes: [ ] this chapter is based on "company training," by general haking, british army, which is the best book the author has ever seen on the subject of company training. "field training of a company of infantry," by major craufurd, british army, an excellent little book, was also consulted. chapter ii general common sense principles of applied minor tactics[ ] = .= to begin with, you want to bear in mind that there is nothing difficult, complicated or mysterious about applied minor tactics--it is just simply the application of plain, every-day, common horse sense--the whole thing consists in familiarizing yourself with certain general principles based on common sense and then applying them with common sense. whatever you do, don't make the mistake of following blindly rules that you have read in books. = .= one of the ablest officers in the army has recently given this definition of the art of war: one-fifth is learned from books; one-fifth is common sense; three-fifths is knowing men and how to lead them. the man who would be successful in business must understand men and apply certain general business principles with common sense; the man who would be a successful hunter must understand game and apply certain general hunting principles with common sense, and even the man who would be a successful fisherman must understand fish and apply certain general fishing principles with common sense. and so likewise the man who would lead other men successfully in battle must understand men and apply certain general tactical principles with common sense. of course, the only reason for the existence of an army is the possibility of war some day, and everything the soldier does--his drills, parades, target practice, guard duty, schools of instruction, etc.--has in view only one end: the preparation of the soldier for the field of battle. = .= while the responsibilities of officers and noncommissioned officers in time of peace are important, in time of battle they are much more so: for then their mistakes are paid for in human blood. what would you think of a pilot who was not capable of piloting a boat trying to pilot a boat loaded with passengers; or, of an engineer who was not capable of running a locomotive trying to run a passenger train? you would, of course, think him a criminal--but do you think he would be more criminal than the noncommissioned officer who is not capable of leading a squad in battle but who tries to do so, thereby sacrificing the lives of those under him? you can, therefore, appreciate the importance, the necessity, of every officer and noncommissioned officer doing everything that he possibly can during times of peace to qualify himself for his duties and responsibilities during times of war. if we are going to have a good army we must have good regiments; to have good regiments we must have good battalions; to have good battalions we must have good companies--but to have good companies we must have efficient company officers and noncommissioned officers. as stated before, everything in the life of the soldier leads to the field of battle. and so it is that in the subject of minor tactics all instruction leads to the battle. first we have map problems; then terrain exercises; next the war game; after that maneuvers, and finally the battle. = . map problems and terrain exercises.= in the case of map problems you are given tactical problems to solve on a map; in the case of terrain exercises you are given problems to solve on the ground. (the word "terrain," means earth, ground.) these are the simplest forms of tactical problems, as you have only one phase of the action, your information is always reliable and your imaginary soldiers always do just exactly what you want them to do. = . war game.= next comes the war game, which consists of problems solved on maps, but you have an opponent who commands the enemy--the phases follow one another rapidly and the conditions change--your information is not so complete and reliable. however, your men being slips of cardboard or beads, they will, as in the case of your imaginary soldiers in the map problems and terrain exercises, go where you wish them to and do what you tell them to do--they can't misunderstand your instructions and go wrong--they don't straggle and get careless as real soldiers sometimes do. map problems, terrain exercises and war games are but aids to maneuvers--their practice makes the maneuvers better; for you thus learn the principles of tactics and in the simplest and quickest way. = . maneuvers.= in the case of the maneuver the problem is the same as in the war game, except that you are dealing with real, live men whom you can not control perfectly, and there is, therefore, much greater chance for mistakes. = . the battle.= a battle is only a maneuver to which is added great physical danger and excitement. general rules and principles that must be applied in map problems, terrain exercises, the war game and maneuvers = .= everything that is done must conform in principle to what should be done in battle--otherwise your work is wasted--your time is thrown away. in solving map problems and in the war game, always form in your mind a picture of the ground where the action is supposed to be taking place--imagine that you see the enemy, the various hills, streams, roads, etc., that he is firing at you, etc.--and don't do anything that you would not be able to do if you were really on the ground and really in a fight. whether it be a corporal in command of a squad or a general in command of an army, in the solution of a tactical problem, whether it be a map problem, a terrain exercise, a war game, maneuver or battle, he will have to go through the same operation: st. estimate the situation; d. decide what he will do; d. give the necessary orders to carry out his decision. at first these three steps of the operation may appear difficult and laborious, but after a little practice the mind, which always works with rapidity in accustomed channels, performs them with astonishing quickness. the child beginning the study of arithmetic, for example, is very slow in determining the sum of and , but later the answer is announced almost at sight. the same is true in tactical problems--the process may be slow at first, but with a little practice it becomes quick and easy. = . estimating the situation.= this is simply "sizing up the situation," finding out what you're "up against," and is always the first thing to be done. it is most important, and in doing it the first step is to determine your mission--what you are to do, what you are to accomplish--the most important consideration in any military situation. consider next your own forces and that of the enemy--that is, his probable strength and how it compares with yours. consider the enemy's probable mission[ ] and what he will probably do to accomplish it. consider the geography of the country so far as it affects the problem--the valleys to cross, defiles to pass through, shortest road to follow, etc. now, consider the different courses open to you with the advantages and disadvantages of each. you must, of course, in every case know what you're up against before you can decide intelligently what you're going to do. in making your plan always bear in mind not only your own mission, but also the general mission of the command of which you form a part, and this is what nine men out of ten forget to do. = . the decision.= it is important that you should come to a clear and correct decision--that you do so promptly and then execute it vigorously. the new japanese field service regulations tell us that there are two things above all that should be avoided--inaction and hesitation. "to act resolutely even in an erroneous manner is better than to remain inactive and irresolute"--that is to say do something. you are now ready to come to a decision, which is nothing more or less than a clear, concise determination of what you're going to do and how you're going to do it. frederick the great, expressed the same idea in fewer words: "don't haggle." having settled on a plan, push it through--don't vacillate, don't waver. make your plan simple. no other has much show. complicated plans look well on paper, but in war they seldom work out. they require several people to do the right thing at the right time and this under conditions of excitement, danger and confusion, and, as a result, they generally fail. = . the order.= having completed your estimate of the situation and formed your plan, you are now ready to give the orders necessary to carry it out. you must first give your subordinates sufficient information of the situation and your plan, so that they may clearly understand their mission. the better everyone understands the whole situation the better he can play his part. unexpected things are always happening in war--a subordinate can act intelligently only if he knows and understands what his superior wants to do. always make your instructions definite and positive--vague instructions are sometimes worse than none. your order, your instructions, must be clear, concise and definite--everyone should know just exactly what he is to do. a few general principles = .= the man who hunts deer, moose, tigers and lions, is hunting big game, but the soldier operating in the enemy's territory is hunting bigger game--he's hunting for human beings--but you want to remember that the other fellow is out hunting for you, too; he's out "gunning" for you. so, don't fail to be on the alert, on the lookout, all the time, if you do he'll "get the drop" on you. remember what frederick the great said: "it is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be taken by surprise." do not separate your force too much; if you do, you weaken yourself--you take the chance of being "defeated in detail"--that is, of one part being defeated after another. remember the old saying: "in union there is strength." undue extension of your line (a mistake, by the way, very often made) is only a form of separation and is equally as bad. while too much importance can not be attached to the proper use of cover, you must not forget that sometimes there are other considerations that outweigh the advantages of cover. good sense alone can determine. a certain direction of attack, for instance, may afford excellent cover but it may be so situated as to mean ruin if defeated, as where it puts an impassable obstacle directly in your rear. and don't forget that you should always think in advance of what you would do in case of defeat. what is it, after all, that gives victory, whether it be armies or only squads engaged? it's just simply inflicting on the enemy a loss which he will not stand before he can do the same to you. now, what is this loss that he will not stand? what is the loss that will cause him to break? well, it varies; it is subject to many conditions--different bodies of troops, like different timbers, have different breaking points. however, whatever it may be in any particular case it would soon come if we could shoot on the battlefield as we do on the target range, but we can not approximate it. there are many causes tending to drag down our score on the battlefield, one of the most potent being the effect of the enemy's fire. it is cited as a physiological fact that fear and great excitement cause the pupil of the eye to dilate and impair accuracy in vision and hence of shooting. it is well established that the effectiveness of the fire of one side reduced proportionately to the effectiveness of that of the other. bear in mind then these two points--we must get the enemy's breaking point before he gets ours, and the more effective we make our fire the less effective will be his. expressed in another way--to win you must gain and keep a fire superiority. this generally means more rifles in action, yet a fire badly controlled and directed, though great in volume, may be less effective than a smaller volume better handled. the firing line barring a few exceptional cases, then, should be as heavy as practicable consistent with the men's free use of their rifles. this has been found to be about one man to the yard. in this way you get volume of fire and the companies do not cover so much ground that their commanders lose their power to direct and control. if it becomes necessary to hold a line too long for the force available, it is then better to keep the men close together and leave gaps in the line. the men are so much better controlled, the fire better directed, the volume the same, and the gaps are closed by the cross fire of parties adjacent. footnotes: [ ] in the preparation of the first part of this chapter, extracts of words and of ideas, were made from a paper on applied minor tactics read before the st. louis convention of the national guard of the united states in , by major j. f. morrison, general staff, u. s. army. [ ] the word "_mission_" is used a great deal in this text. by your "_mission_" is meant your business, what you have been told to do, what you are trying to accomplish. chapter iii general plan of instruction in map problems for noncommissioned officers and privates--instruction in delivering messages =(the large wall map to be used for this instruction can be obtained from the george banta publishing co., menasha, wis., at a cost of $ . .)= [illustration: elementary map] = .= the noncommissioned officers and the privates of the squad, section, platoon or company are seated in front of the instructor, who, with pointer in hand, is standing near the map on the wall. the instructor assumes certain situations and designates various noncommissioned officers to take charge of squads for the purpose of accomplishing certain missions; he places them in different situations, and then asks them what they would do. he, or the noncommissioned officer designated to perform certain missions, designates certain privates to carry messages, watch for signals, take the place of wounded noncommissioned officers, etc. for example, the instructor says: "the battalion is marching to watertown (see elementary map in pocket at back of book) along this road (indicating road): our company forms the advance guard; we are now at this point (indicating point). corporal smith, take your squad and reconnoiter the woods on the right to see if you can find any trace of the enemy there, and rejoin the company as soon as you can. corporal jones, be on the lookout for any signals that corporal smith may make." corporal smith then gives the command, "= . forward, . march=," and such other commands as may be necessary. =instructor:= now, when you reach this point (indicating point), what do you see? (corporal smith holds his rifle horizontally above his head.) =corporal jones:= captain, corporal smith signals that he sees a small body of the enemy. =corporal smith:= =lie down. range, . . ready; . aim; . squad; . fire. . forward; double time; . march=, etc. the noncommissioned officers and the privates who are thus designated to do certain things must use their imagination as much as possible. they must look at the map and imagine that they are right on the ground, in the hostile territory; they must imagine that they see the streams, hills, woods, roads, etc., represented on the map, and they must not do anything that they could not do if in the hostile territory, with the assumed conditions actually existing. = .= the general idea of this system of instruction is to make the noncommissioned officers and the privates think, to make them use common sense and initiative in handling men in various situations, in getting out of difficulties. by thus putting men on their mettle in the presence of their comrades and making them bring into play their common sense and their powers of resourcefulness, it is comparatively easy to hold the attention of a whole squad, section, platoon or company, for those who are not actually taking part in the solution of a particular problem are curious to see how those who are taking part will answer different questions and do different things--how they will "pan out." = .= everything that is said, everything that is done, should, as far as practicable, be said and done just as it would be said and done in the field. the commands should be actually given, the messages actually delivered, the reports actually made, the orders and instructions actually given, the signals actually made, etc., just the same as they would be if the operations were real. of course, sometimes it is not practicable to do this, and again at other times it would be advisable not to do so. if, for instance, in the solution of a problem there were a great many opportunities to give commands to fire, to make signals, to deliver messages, etc., and if these things were actually done every time, it would not only become tiresome but it would also delay the real work and instruction. common sense must be used. just bear this in mind: in the solution of map problems the noncommissioned officers and the privates are to be given proper and sufficient instruction in giving commands, making signals, sending and delivering messages, making reports, etc., the instructor using his common sense in deciding what is proper and sufficient instruction. in carrying out this feature of the instruction it would be done thus, for instance: instead of a platoon leader saying, "i would give the order for the platoon (two, three or four squads) to fire on them," he would say, for instance, "i would then give the command, '=at line of men. range, . fire at will=,' and would continue the firing as long as necessary." should the instructor then say, for instance, "very well; the enemy's fire has slackened; what will you do now?" the platoon leader would answer, for instance, "i would signal: = . by squads from the right; . rush.=" instead of saying, for instance, "i would advance my squad to the top of this hill at double time," the squad leader should say, "i would give the command: '= . forward, double time; . march=,' and upon reaching the top of this hill, i would command, '= . squad; . halt=,' cautioning the men to take advantage of cover." instead of saying, "i would signal back that we see the enemy in force," the squad leader should take a rifle and make the signal, and if a man has been designated to watch for signals, the man would say to the captain (or other person for whom he was watching for signals): "captain, corporal smith has signaled that he sees the enemy in force." instead of saying, "i would send a message back that there are about twenty mounted men just in rear of the jones' house; they are dismounted and their horses are being held by horseholders," say, "smith, go back and tell the captain (or other person) there are about twenty mounted men just in rear of the jones' house. they are dismounted and their horses are being held by horseholders." private smith would then say to the captain (or other person), "captain, corporal harris sends word there are about twenty men just in the rear of the jones' house. they are dismounted and their horses are being held by horse holders." = .= for problems exemplifying this system of instruction, see par. . the instruction may be varied a little by testing the squad leaders in their knowledge of map reading by asking, from time to time during the solution of the problem, such questions as these: =captain:= corporal smith, you are standing on lone hill (see elementary map), facing north. tell me what you see? =corporal:= the hill slopes off steeply in front of me, about eighty feet down to the bottom land. a spur of the hill runs off on my right three-fourths of a mile to the north. another runs off on my left the same distance to the west. between these two spurs, down in front of me, is an almost level valley, extending about a mile to my right front, where a hill cuts off my view. to my left front it is level as far as i can see. a quarter of a mile in front of me is a big pond, down in the valley, and i can trace the course of a stream that drains the pond off to the northwest, by the trees along its bank. just beyond the stream a railroad runs northwest along a fill and crosses the stream a mile and a half to the northwest, where i can see the roofs of a group of houses. a wagon road runs north across the valley, crossing the western spur of this hill yards from lone hill. it is bordered by trees as far as the creek. another road parallels the railroad, the two roads crossing near a large orchard a mile straight to my front. =captain:= can you see the chester pike where the railroad crosses it? =corporal:= no, sir. =captain:= why? =corporal:= because the hill " ," about yards from lone hill, is so high that it cuts off my view in that direction of everything closer to the spur " " than the point in the salem-boling road, where the private lane runs off east to the gray house. =captain:= sergeant jones, in which direction does the stream run that you see just south of the twin hills? =sergeant:= it runs south through york, because i can see that the northern end starts near the head of a valley and goes down into the open plain. also it is indicated by a very narrow line near the twin hills which becomes gradually wider or heavier the further south it goes. furthermore, the fact that three short branch streams are shown joining together and forming one, must naturally mean that the direction of flow is towards the one formed by the three. =captain:= sergeant harris, does the road from the mason farm to the welsh farm run up or down hill? =sergeant:= it does both, sir. it is almost level for the first half mile west of the mason farm; then, as it crosses the contour marked and a second marked , it runs up hill, rising to forty feet above the valley, yards east of the mason farm. then, as it again crosses a contour marked and a second marked , it goes down hill to the welsh farm. that portion of the road between the points where it crosses the two contours marked , is the highest part of the road. it crosses this hill in a "saddle," for both north and south of this summit on the road are contours marked and even higher. =captain:= corporal wallace, you are in salem with a patrol with orders to go to oxford. there is no one to tell you anything about this section of the country and you have never been there before. you have this map and a compass. what would you do? =corporal:= i would see from my map and by looking around me that salem is situated at the crossing of two main roads. from the map i would see that one leads to boling and the other was the one to take for oxford. also, i would see that the one to boling started due north out of salem and the other, the one i must follow, started due west out of salem. taking out my compass, i would see in what direction the north end of the needle pointed; the road running off in that direction would be the one to boling, so i would start off west on the other. =captain:= suppose you had no compass? =corporal:= i would look and see on which side of the base of the trees the moss grew. that side would be north. or, in this case, i would probably not use a compass even if i had it; for, from the map, i know that the road i wish to start off on crosses a railroad track within sight of the crossroads and on the opposite side of the crossroads from the church shown on the map; also, that the boling road is level as far as i could see on the ground, while the chester pike crosses the spur of sandy ridge, about a half mile out of the village. =captain:= go ahead, corporal, and explain how you would follow the proper route to oxford. =corporal:= i would proceed west on the chester pike, knowing i would cross a good sized stream, on a stone bridge, about a mile and a half out of salem; then i would pass a crossroad and find a swamp on my right, between the road and the stream. about a mile and a half from the crossroad i just mentioned, i would cross a railroad track and then i would know that at the fork of the roads one-quarter of a mile further on i must take the left fork. this road would take me straight into oxford, about a mile and three-quarters beyond the fork. =captain:= sergeant washington, do the contours about a half mile north of the maxey farm, on the salem-boling road, represent a hill or a depression? =sergeant:= they represent a hill, because the inner contour has a higher number , than the outer, marked . they represent sort of a leg-of-mutton shaped hill about feet higher than the surrounding low ground. variety and interest may be added to the instruction by assuming that the squad leader has been killed or wounded and then designate some private to command the squad; or that a man has been wounded in a certain part of the body and have a soldier actually apply his first aid packet; or that a soldier has fainted or been bitten by a rattlesnake and have a man actually render him first aid. = .= the privates may be given practical instruction in delivering messages by giving them messages in one room and having them deliver them to someone else in another room. it is a good plan to write out a number of messages in advance on slips of paper or on cards, placing them in unsealed envelopes. an officer or a noncommissioned officer in one room reads one of the messages to a soldier, then seals it in an envelope and gives it to the soldier to hand to the person in another room to whom he is to deliver the message. the latter checks the accuracy of the message by means of the written message. of course, this form of instruction should not be given during the solution of map problems by the men. (for model messages, see par. .) the same slips or cards may be used any number of times with different soldiers. a soldier should never start on his way to deliver a message unless he understands thoroughly the message he is to deliver. chapter iv the service of information (based on the field service regulations.) patrolling = . patrols= are small bodies of infantry or cavalry, from two men up to a company or troop, sent out from a command at any time to gain information of the enemy and of the country, to drive off small hostile bodies, to prevent them from observing the command or for other stated objects, such as to blow up a bridge, destroy a railroad track, communicate or keep in touch with friendly troops, etc. patrols are named according to their objects, reconnoitering, visiting, connecting, exploring, flanking patrols, etc. these names are of no importance, however, because the patrol's orders in each case determine its duties. = .= the size of a patrol depends upon the mission it is to accomplish; if it is to gain information only, it should be as small as possible, allowing two men for each probable message to be sent (this permits you to send messages and still have a working patrol remaining); if it is to fight, it should be strong enough to defeat the probable enemy against it. for instance, a patrol of two men might be ordered to examine some high ground a few hundred yards off the road. on the other hand, during the recent war in manchuria a japanese patrol of mounted men, to accomplish its mission marched , miles in the enemy's country and was out for days. = . patrol leaders.= (=a=) patrol leaders, usually noncommissioned officers, are selected for their endurance, keen eyesight, ability to think quickly and good military judgment. they should be able to read a map, make a sketch and send messages that are easily understood. very important patrols are sometimes lead by officers. the leader should have a map, watch, field glass, compass, message blank and pencils. (=b=) the ability to lead a patrol correctly without a number of detailed orders or instructions, is one of the highest and most valuable qualifications of a noncommissioned officer. since a commander ordering out a patrol can only give general instructions as to what he desires, because he cannot possibly forsee just what situations may arise, the patrol leader will be forced to use his own judgment to decide on the proper course to pursue when something of importance suddenly occurs. he is in sole command on the spot and must make his decisions entirely on his own judgment and make them instantly. he has to bear in mind first of all his mission--what his commander wants him to do. possibly something may occur that should cause the patrol leader to undertake an entirely new mission and he must view the new situation from the standpoint of a higher commander. (=c=) more battles are lost through lack of information about the enemy than from any other cause, and it is the patrols led by noncommissioned officers who must gather almost all of this information. a battalion or squadron stands a very good chance for defeating a regiment if the battalion commander knows all about the size, position and movements of the regiment and the regimental commander knows but a little about the battalion; and this will all depend on how efficiently the patrols of the two forces are led by the noncommissioned officers. = .= patrols are usually sent out from the advance party of an advance guard, the rear party of a rear guard, the outguards of an outpost, and the flank (extreme right or left) sections, companies or troops of a force in a fight, but they may be sent out from any part of a command. the commander usually states how strong a patrol shall be. = . orders or instructions=--(=a=) the orders or instructions for a patrol must state clearly whenever possible: . where the enemy is or is supposed to be. . where friendly patrols or detachments are apt to be seen or encountered and what the plans are for the body from which the patrol is sent out. . what object the patrol is sent out to accomplish; what information is desired; what features are of special importance; the general direction to be followed and how long to stay out in case the enemy is not met. . where reports are to be sent. (=b=) it often happens that, in the hurry and excitement of a sudden encounter or other situation, there is no time or opportunity to give a patrol leader anything but the briefest instructions, such as "take three men, corporal, and locate their (the enemy's) right flank." in such a case the patrol leader through his knowledge of the general principles of patrolling, combined with the exercise of his common sense, must determine for himself just what his commander wishes him to do. = . inspection of a patrol before departure.= whenever there is time and conditions permit, which most frequently is not the case, a patrol leader carefully inspects his men to see that they are in good physical condition; that they have the proper equipment, ammunition and ration; that their canteens are full, their horses (if mounted) are in good condition, not of a conspicuous color and not given to neighing, and that there is nothing about the equipment to rattle or glisten. the patrol leader should also see that the men have nothing with them (maps, orders, letters, newspapers, etc.) that, if captured, would give the enemy valuable information. this is a more important inspection than that regarding the condition of the equipment. whenever possible the men for a patrol should be selected for their trustworthiness, experience and knack of finding their way in a strange country. = . preparing a patrol for the start.= the patrol leader having received his orders and having asked questions about anything he does not fully understand, makes his estimate of the situation (see par. .) he then selects the number of men he needs, if this has been left to him, inspects them and carefully explains to them the orders he has received and how he intends to carry out these orders, making sure the men understand the mission of the patrol. he names some prominent place along the route they are going to follow where every one will hasten if the patrol should become scattered. for example: an infantry company has arrived at the town of york (see elementary map). captain a, at p. m., calls up corporal b and three men of his squad. =captain a:= corporal, hostile infantry is reported to be at oxford. nothing else has been heard of the enemy. the company remains here tonight. you will take these three men and reconnoiter about two miles north along this road (indicates the valley pike) for signs of a hostile advance in this direction. stay out until dusk. corporal c has been sent out that road (points east along the county road). send messages here. do you understand? =corporal b:= yes, sir; i am to--(here he practically repeats captain a's orders, the three men listening). is corporal c to cover that hill (points toward twin hills)? =captain a:= no; you must cover that ground. move out at once, corporal. (corporal b quickly glances at the men and sees that they have their proper equipment.) =corporal b= (to his men): you heard the captain's orders. we will make for that hill (points to twin hills). jones, i want you to go yards in advance of me; williams, follow me at yards; smith, you'll stay with me. jones, you'll leave this road after crossing the creek and march on that clump of trees. i want both you and williams to be on the alert and watch me every minute for signals. in case we become scattered, make for that hill (points to twin hills). =private jones:= corporal, shall i keep yards from you or will you keep the correct distance? =corporal b:= you keep the correct distance from me. forward, jones. of course, the patrol leader makes all these preparations if he has time; but, as we have said before, there will be a great many occasions when he is required to start out so promptly that he will not have any time for the inspection described and he will have to make an estimate of the situation and give his detailed orders to the members of his patrol as they start off. = . co-ordination before departure.= every member of a patrol should notice for himself the direction taken and all landmarks that are passed, and every man should keep his eyes and ears open all the time. before leaving an outpost position or other place to which it is to return, the patrol commander should "co-ordinate" himself--he should see where he is with respect to certain mountains, high buildings and other prominent objects, and after the patrol has left, he should frequently turn his head around and see what the starting point looks like from where he is. this will help him to find his way back without difficulty. the principles of patrolling = .= paragraphs to describe the methods of leading a patrol--the points a patrol leader should fully understand. in other words, they state the principles of patrolling. when you first study this chapter, simply read over these principles without trying to memorize any of them. whenever one of the principles is applied in the solution of any of the problems on patrolling given in this book you will generally find the number of the paragraph which states that principle enclosed in brackets. turn back and study the paragraph referred to until you thoroughly understand its meaning and you feel sure that you know how to apply that principle whenever the occasion might arise in actual patrolling. try to impress its common sense meaning (never the mere words) on your mind, so that when a situation arises requiring the sort of action indicated in the principle, you will not fail to recognize it. [illustration: figure ] = . formation of patrols.= (=a=) figure gives some examples of various ways of forming patrols. these are merely examples for the purpose of giving a general idea of the arrangement of the men. in practice common sense must dictate to the patrol leader the best formation in each case. (=b=) in very small patrols the leader is usually in advance where he can easily lead the patrol, though not always (see e, figure .) the distance between men depends upon the character of the country and the situation. in l, figure , it might be anywhere from to yards from the leading man to the last, the distance being greater in level or open country. some such formation as g, figure , could be used in going through high brush, woods, or over very open country. (=c=) the men must be so arranged that each man will be within signaling distance of some member of the patrol and the escape of at least one man, in case of surprise, is certain. it must be remembered that the patrol may have to march a long distance before it is expected that the enemy will be encountered, or it may have a mission that requires it to hurry to some distant point through very dangerous country. in such cases the patrol will probably have to follow the road in order to make the necessary speed, and it will not be possible for flankers to keep up this rate marching off the road. the formation in such cases would be something like those shown in f, ii and o. marching off the road is always slow work, so when rapidity is essential, some safe formation for road travel is necessary, as in f, l and o. if, from the road the country for, say one-half mile on each side, can be seen, there is absolutely no use in sending out flankers a few hundred yards from the road. use common sense. = . rate of march.= (=a=) patrols should advance quickly and quietly; be vigilant and make all practicable use of cover. if rapid marching is necessary to accomplish the mission, then little attention can be paid to cover. (=b=) returning patrols, near their own lines, march at a walk, unless pressed by the enemy. a patrol should not, if possible, return over its outgoing route, as the enemy may have observed it and be watching for its return. = . halts.= a patrol should be halted once every hour for about ten minutes, to allow the men to rest and relieve themselves. whenever a halt is made one or two members of the patrol must advance a short distance ahead and keep a sharp lookout to the front and flanks. = . action upon meeting hostile patrol.= if a patrol should see a hostile patrol, it is generally best to hide and let it go by, and afterwards look out for and capture any messenger that may be sent back from it with messages for the main body. and when sent back yourself with a message, be careful that the enemy does not play this trick on you--always keep your ears and eyes open. = . scattered patrols.= a scattered patrol reassembles at some point previously selected; if checked in one direction, it takes another; if cut off, it returns by a detour or forces its way through. as a last resort it scatters, so that at least one man may return with information. occasionally it is advisable for the leader to conceal his patrol and continue the reconnaissance with one or two men; in case of cavalry the leader and men thus detached should be well mounted. if no point of assembly was previously agreed upon, it is a good general rule to reassemble, if possible, at the last resting place. = . return by different route.= a patrol should always make it a rule to return by a different route, as this may avoid its being captured by some of the enemy who saw it going out and are lying in wait for it. = . guard against being cut off.= when out patrolling always guard against being cut off. always assume that any place that affords good cover is held by the enemy until you know that it is not, and be careful not to advance beyond it without first reconnoitering it; for, if you do, you may find yourself cut off when you try to return. = . night work.= patrols far from their commands or in contact with the enemy, often remain out over night. in such cases they seek a place of concealment unknown to the inhabitants, proceeding thereto after nightfall or under cover. opportunities for watering, feeding and rest must not be neglected, for there is no assurance that further opportunities will present themselves. when necessary the leader provides for subsistence by demand or purchase. = . civilians:= in questioning civilians care must be taken not to disclose information that may be of value to the enemy. strangers must not be allowed to go ahead of the patrol, as they might give the enemy notice of its approach. patrol leaders are authorized to seize telegrams and mail matter, and to arrest individuals, reporting the facts as soon as possible. = . patrol fighting.= (=a=) a patrol sent out for information never fights unless it can only get its information by fighting or is forced to fight in order to escape. this principle is the one most frequently violated by patrol leaders, particularly in peace maneuvers. they forget their mission--the thing their commander sent them out to do--and begin fighting, thus doing harm and accomplishing no important results. (=b=) a patrol sent out to drive off hostile detachments has to fight to accomplish its mission. sometimes a patrol has orders both to gain information and to drive back hostile patrols. in this case it may be proper to avoid a fight at one moment and to seek a fight at another. the patrol leader must always think of his mission when deciding on the proper course to follow, and then use common sense. = . signals.= the following should be clearly understood by members of a patrol: =enemy in sight in small numbers:= hold the rifle above the head horizontally. =enemy in force:= same as preceding, raising and lowering the rifle several times. =take cover:= a downward motion of the hand. other signals may be agreed upon before starting, but they must be simple and familiar to the men; complicated signals must be avoided. signals must be used cautiously, so as not to convey information to the enemy. the patrol leader should see that all his men thoroughly understand that whenever they are away from the center of the patrol they must look to the nearest man for signals at least once every minute. it should never be necessary for the patrol leader to call to a man in order to get his attention. all movements of men at a distance should be regulated by signals and the men should constantly be on the lookout for these signals. = . messages.= (=a=) the most skillful patrol leading is useless unless the leader fully understands when to send a message and how to write it. (=b=) a message, whether written or verbal, should be short and clear, resembling a telegram. if it is a long account it will take too much time to write, be easily misunderstood, and if verbal, the messenger will usually forget parts of it and confuse the remainder. (=c=) always state when and where things are seen or reported. if haste is required, do not use up valuable moments writing down the day of the month, etc. these data are essential as a matter of future record for formal telegrams and should be put in patrol messages only when time is abundant, but never slight the essential points of information that will give valuable help to your chief. always try to put yourself in his place--not seeing what you see and read your message--and then ask yourself, what will he want to know? (=d=) the exact location of the enemy should be stated; whether deployed, marching or in camp, his strength, arm of the service (cavalry, infantry or artillery), and any other detail that you think would be valuable information for your chief. in giving your location do not refer to houses, streets, etc., that your chief in the rear has no knowledge of. give your direction and distance from some point he knows of or, if you have a map like his, you can give your map location. (=e=) be sure your message is accurate. this does not mean that something told you should not be reported, but it should be reported, not as a fact, but as it is--a statement by somebody else. it is well to add any information about your informant, such as his apparent honesty, the probability of his having correct information, etc.--this may help your chief. (=f=) a message should always end with a short statement of what you are going to do next. for example: "will remain in observation," "will continue north," "will work around to their rear," etc. time permitting, the bearer of a verbal message should always be required to repeat it before leaving. (=g=) the following is a reproduction of a message blank used in field service. the instructions on the envelope are also given. a patrol leader will usually be furnished with a pad of these blanks: [illustration] the heading "from" is filled in with the _name_ of the detachment sending the information, as "officer's patrol, th cav". messages sent on the same day from the same source to the same person are numbered consecutively. the address is written briefly, thus, "commanding officer, outpost, st brigade". in the signature the writer's surname only and rank are given. this blank is four and a half by eight inches, including the margin on the left for binding. the back is ruled in squares and provided with scales for use in making simple sketches explanatory of the message. it is issued by the signal corps in blocks of forty with duplicating sheets. the regulation envelope is three by five and one fourth inches and is printed as follows: [illustration] model messages = . . verbal.= "four hostile infantrymen one mile north of our camp, moving south. i will continue north." = . verbal.= "about one hundred hostile infantrymen two miles north of our camp at two o'clock, marching south. will observe them." = . verbal.= "long column of troops marching west in sandy creek valley at two o'clock. will report details later." = . verbal.= "just fired on by cavalry patrol near baker's pond. will work to their rear." = . written.= patrol from support no . lone hill, mch. , - a. m., no. . c. o., support no. . see hostile troop of cavalry halted at x-roads, one mile s. of our outguards. nothing else in sight. will remain here in observation. james, corporal. = . written= (very hurriedly). lone hill, - , no . c. o., support no. . column of about hostile cavalry trotting north towards hostile troop of cavalry now halted at x-roads one mile south of our outguards. will remain here. james, cpl. = . written.= patrol from th inf., s. e. corner boling woods, apl. , - p. m., no. . adjutant, th inf., near baker house. extreme right of hostile line ends at r. r. cut n. e. of baker's pond. entrenchments run s. from cut along crest of ridge. line appears to be strongly held. can see no troops in rear of line. will reconnoiter their rear. smith, sergeant. = . written= (from cavalry patrol far to front). patrol from tr. b, th cav., boling, june, , a. m., no. . to c. o., tr. b, th cav., s. on chester pike. no traces of enemy up to this point. telegraph operator here reports wires running north from boling were cut somewhere at - a. m. inhabitants appear friendly. will proceed north. jones, sergeant. = . written= (from cavalry patrol far to front). patrol from tr b, th cav., oxford, july, , - a. m., no. . to c. o., st sq. th cav., on valley pike, s. of york. bearer has canteen found in road here, marked " cav.--iii corps." inhabitants say no enemy seen here. they appear hostile and unreliable. no telegraph operator or records remain here. roads good macadam. water and haystacks plentiful. will move rapidly on towards chester. lewis, sergeant. patrol from support no. , on ry. / mi. n. of county road, aug. , - p. m., no. . c. o., support no. , near maxey house. r. r. crosses creek here on -foot steel trestle. hostile detachment is posted at n. end. strength unknown. creek ft. deep by ft. wide, with steep banks, ft. high. flows through meadow land. scattered trees along banks. r. r. approaches each end of trestle on -foot fill. r. r. switch to n. e. yds. s. of bridge. (see sketch on back.) i will cross creek to n. of bridge. brown, corporal. = .= a message should be sent as soon as the enemy is first seen or reported. of course, if the enemy is actually known to be in the vicinity and his patrols have been seen, etc., you must by all means avoid wasting your men by sending them back with information about small hostile patrols or other things you know your chief is already aware of and did not specifically tell you to hunt for. if you have properly determined in your own mind what your mission is then you will have no trouble in deciding when to send messages. for example, suppose your orders are "to reconnoiter along that ridge and determine if the enemy is present in strength," and you sight a patrol of eight men. you would waste no time or men sending back any message about the patrol, for your mission is to find out if strong bodies of the enemy are about. but suppose that while working under the above orders you located a hostile battalion of infantry--a large body of troops. in this case you would surely send a detailed message, as your mission is to determine if the enemy was present in strength. again, suppose that while moving towards the ridge indicated by your chief in his orders, you saw his force suddenly and heavily fired on from a new and apparently unexpected quarter, not a great distance from you, but not on the ridge referred to. you know or believe none of your patrols are out in that neighborhood. in this case you should realize instantly, without any order, that your mission had changed and you should hasten to discover the size and position of this new enemy and send the information back to your chief, first notifying him of your intended change of direction. never forget your mission in the excitement of leading your own little force. = . absence of the enemy.= it is frequently just as important to send a message to your chief that the enemy is not in a certain locality as it is to report his actual whereabouts. you must determine from your mission when this is the case. for example, if you were ordered "to patrol beyond that woods and see if any hostile columns are moving in that direction," and on reaching the far side of the woods you had a good view of the country for some distance beyond, it would be very important to send a message back telling your chief that you could see, say, one-half mile beyond the woods and there was no enemy in sight. this information would be of the greatest importance to him. he might feel free to move troops immediately from that vicinity to some more dangerous place. you would then continue your reconnaissance further to the front. suggestions for gaining information about the enemy = . enemy on the march.= (=a=) the patrol should observe the march of the column from a concealed position that hostile patrols or flankers are not apt to search (avoid conspicuous places). always try to discover if one hostile detachment is followed by another--if what can be seen appears to be an advance guard of a larger body not yet in view. the distance between the detachments, their relative size, etc., is always important. (=b=) =estimating strength of column.= the strength of a column may be estimated from the length of time it takes to pass a selected point. as infantry in column of squads occupies half a yard per man, cavalry one yard per horse and artillery in single file twenty yards per gun or caisson (ammunition wagon), a selected point would be passed in one minute by infantry; cavalry (at a walk); cavalry at a trot and guns or caissons. if marching in columns of twos, take one-half of the above figures. (=c=) =dust.= the direction of march, strength and composition (infantry, cavalry or artillery) of a column can be closely estimated from the length and character of the cloud of dust that it makes. dust from infantry hangs low; from cavalry it is higher, disperses more quickly, and, if the cavalry moves rapidly, the upper part of the cloud is thinner; from artillery and wagons, it is of unequal height and disconnected. the effect of the wind blowing the dust must be considered. (=d=) =trail of column.= evenly trodden ground indicates infantry; prints of horseshoes mean cavalry and deep and wide wheel tracks indicate artillery. if the trail is fresh, the column passed recently; if narrow, the troops felt secure and were marching in column of route; if broad they expected an action and were prepared to deploy. a retreating army makes a broad trail across fields, especially at the start. always remember that the smallest or most insignificant things, such as the number of a regiment or a discarded canteen or collar ornament, may give the most valuable information to a higher commander. for example, the markings on a discarded canteen or knapsack might prove to a general commanding an army that a certain hostile division, corps, or other force was in front of him when he thought it had not been sent into the field. the markings on the canteen would convey little or no meaning to the patrol leader, but if he realized his duty he would take care to report the facts. cavalry patrols working far ahead of the foot troops should be most careful to observe and report on such details. (=e=) =reflection of weapons.= if brilliant, the troops are marching toward you, otherwise they are probably marching away from you. =enemy in position.= (=a=) if an outpost line, the patrol locates the line of sentinels, their positions, the location and strength of the outguards and, as far as possible, all troops in rear. the location of the flanks of the line, whether in a strong or weak position, is of the utmost importance. places where the line may be most easily penetrated should be searched for and the strength and routes of the hostile patrols observed. as outposts are usually changed at dawn this is the best time to reconnoiter their positions. (=b=) a hostile line of battle is usually hard to approach, but its extent, where the flanks rest and whether or not other troops are in rear of these flanks, should be most carefully determined. information as to the flanks of any force, the character of the country on each flank, etc., is always of the greatest importance, because the flanks are the weakest portions of a line. in attacking an enemy an effort is almost always made to bring the heaviest fire or blow to bear on one of his flanks. naturally all information about this most vulnerable part of an enemy is of great importance. = . prisoners.= when a patrol is ordered to secure prisoners they should be questioned as soon as captured, while still excited and their replies can in a way be verified. their answers should be written down (unknown to them) and sent back with them as a check on what they may say on second thought. prisoners should always be questioned as to the following points: what regiment, brigade, division, etc., they belong to; how long they have been in position, on the march, etc.; how much sickness in their organization; whether their rations are satisfactory; who commands their troops, etc. always try to make the prisoners think the questions are asked out of mere curiosity. = . camp noises.= the rumble of vehicles, cracking of whips, neighing of horses, braying of mules and barking of dogs often indicate the arrival or departure of troops. if the noise remains in the same place and new fires are lighted, it is probable that reënforcements have arrived. if the noise grows more indistinct, the troops are probably withdrawing. if, added to this, the fires appear to be dying out, and the enemy seems to redouble the vigilance of the outposts, the indications of retreat are strong. = . abandoned camps.= (=a=) indications are found in the remains of camp fires. they will show, by their degree of freshness, whether much or little time elapsed since the enemy left the place, and the quantity of cinders will give an indication of the length of time he occupied it. they will also furnish a means of estimating his force approximately, ten men being allowed to each fire. (b) other valuable indications in regard to the length of time the position was occupied and the time when it was abandoned may be found in the evidence of care or haste in the construction of huts or shelters, and in the freshness of straw, grain, dung or the entrails of slaughtered animals. abandoned clothing, equipments or harness will give a clue to the arms and regiments composing a retreating force. dead horses lying about, broken weapons, discarded knapsacks, abandoned and broken-down wagons, etc., are indications of the fatigue and demoralization of the command. bloody bandages lying about, and many fresh graves, are evidences that the enemy is heavily burdened with wounded or sick. = . flames or smoke.= if at night the flames of an enemy's camp fires disappear and reappear, something is moving between the observer and the fires. if smoke as well as flame is visible, the fires are very near. if the fires are very numerous and lighted successively, and if soon after being lighted they go out it is probable the enemy is preparing a retreat and trying to deceive us. if the fires burn brightly and clearly at a late hour, the enemy has probably gone, and has left a detachment to keep the fires burning. if, at an unusual time, much smoke is seen ascending from an enemy's camp, it is probable that he is engaged in cooking preparatory to moving off. if lines of smoke are seen rising at several points along a railway line in the enemy's rear, it may be surmised that the railroad is being destroyed by burning the crossties, and that a retreat is planned. = . limits of vision.= (a) on a clear day a man with good vision can see: at a distance of to miles, church spires and towers; at a distance of to miles, windmills; at a distance of - / miles, chimneys of light color; at a distance of , yards, trunks of large trees; at a distance of , yards, single posts; at yards the panes of glass may be distinguished in a window. (b) troops are visible at , yards, at which distance a mounted man looks like a mere speck; at , yards infantry can be distinguished from cavalry; at , yards a line of men looks like a broad belt; at yards the files of a squad can be counted, and at yards the movements of the arms and legs can be plainly seen. (c) the larger, brighter or better lighted an object is, the nearer it seems. an object seems nearer when it has a dark background than when it has a light one, and closer to the observer when the air is clear than when it is raining, snowing, foggy or the atmosphere is filled with smoke. an object looks farther off when the observer is facing the sun than when he has his back to it. a smooth expanse of snow, grain fields or water makes distances seem shorter than they really are. suggestions for the reconnaissance of various positions and localities = .= cross roads should be reconnoitered in each direction for a distance depending on how rapidly the patrol must continue on, how far from the main road the first turn or high point is, etc. the main body of the patrol usually remains halted near the crossroads, while flankers do the reconnoitering. = . heights.= in reconnoitering a height, if the patrol is large enough to admit of detaching them, one or two men climb the slope on either flank, keeping in sight of the patrol, if possible. in any case, one man moves cautiously up the hill, followed by the others in the file at such distance that each keeps his predecessor in view. = . defiles.= on approaching a defile, if time permits, the heights on either side are reconnoitered by flankers before the patrol enters. if the heights are inaccessible or time is urgent, the patrol passes through, in single file at double time. the same method is adopted in reconnoitering a railroad cut or sunken road. = . bridges and fords.= at a bridge or ford, the front of the patrol is contracted so as to bring all the men to the passage. the leading patrolers cross first and reconnoiter the far side to prevent the possibility of the enemy surprising the main body of the patrol as it is crossing the bridge. the patrol then crosses rapidly, and takes up a proper formation. a bridge is first examined to see that it is safe and has not been tampered with by the enemy. = . woods.= the patrol enters a wood in skirmishing order, the intervals being as great as may be consistent with mutual observation and support on the part of the members of the patrol. on arriving at the farther edge of the wood, the patrol remains concealed and carefully looks about before passing out to open ground. when there is such a growth of underbrush as to make this method impracticable, and it is necessary to enter a wood by a road, the road is reconnoitered as in case of defile, though not usually at double time. = . enclosures.= in reconnoitering an enclosure, such as a garden, park or cemetery, the leading patrolers first examine the exterior, to make sure that the enemy is not concealed behind one of the faces of the enclosure. they then proceed to examine the interior. great care is taken in reconnoitering and entering an enclosure to avoid being caught in a confined or restricted space by the enemy. = . positions.= in approaching a position, but one man advances (one is less liable to be detected than two or more), and he crawls cautiously toward the crest of the hill or edge of the wood or opening of the defile, while the others remain concealed in the rear until he signals them to advance. = . houses.= when a house is approached by a patrol, it is first reconnoitered from a distance, and if nothing suspicious is seen, it is then approached by one or two men, the rest of the party remaining concealed in observation. if the patrol is large enough to admit of it, four men approach the house, so as to examine the front and back entrances at the same time. only one man enters the door, the others remaining outside to give the alarm, should a party of the enemy be concealed in the house. the patrol does not remain in the vicinity of the house any longer than necessary, as information relative to its numbers and movements might be given to the enemy, if a hostile party should subsequently visit the place. farmhouses are searched for newspapers and the inhabitants questioned. if necessary to go up to a building, wood or hill, where an enemy is likely to be concealed, run for the last couple of hundred yards, having your rifle ready for instant use, and make for some point that will afford you cover when you get close up. in the case of a building, for instance, you would make for one of the corners. such a maneuver would probably be disconcerting to anyone who might be lying in wait for you, and would be quite likely to cause them to show themselves sooner than they intended, and thus give you a chance to turn around and get away. if they fired on you while you were approaching at a run, they would not be very likely to hit you. = . villages.= (=a=) in approaching a small village one or two men are sent in to reconnoiter and one around each flank, but the main body does not enter until the scouts have reported. in small patrols of three to six men so much dispersion is not safe and only one section of the village can be reconnoitered at a time. (=b=) if the presence of the enemy is not apparent, the patrol enters the village. a suitable formation would be in single file at proper distance, each man being on the opposite side of the street from his predecessor, thus presenting a more difficult target for hostile fire and enabling the men to watch all windows. (=c=) if the patrol is strong enough, it seizes the postoffice, telegraph office and railroad stations, and secures all important papers, such as files of telegrams sent and received, instructions to postmasters, orders of town mayor, etc., that may be there. if the patrol is part of the advance guard, it seizes the mayor and postmaster of the place and turns them over to the commander of the vanguard with the papers seized. (=d=) while searching a village sentinels are placed at points of departure to prevent any of the inhabitants from leaving. tall buildings and steeples are ascended and an extensive view of the surrounding country obtained. (=e=) at night a village is more cautiously approached by a small party than by day. the patrol glides through back alleys, across gardens, etc., rather than along the main street. if there are no signs of the enemy, it makes inquiry. if no light is seen, and it seems imprudent to rouse any of the people, the patrol watches and captures one of the inhabitants, and gets from him such information as he may possess. (=f=) the best time for the patrol to approach a village is at early dawn, when it is light enough to see, but before the inhabitants are up. it is dangerous in the extreme for a small patrol to enter a village unless it is certain that it is not occupied by the enemy, for the men could be shot down by fire from the windows, cellarways, etc., or entrapped and captured. as a rule large towns and cities are not entered by small patrols, but are watched from the outside, as a small force can not effectively reconnoiter and protect itself in such a place. facts which should be obtained by patrols regarding certain objects = . roads.= their direction, their nature (macadamized, corduroy plank, dirt, etc.), their condition of repair, their grade, the nature of crossroads, and the points where they leave the main roads; their borders (woods, hedges, fences or ditches), the places at which they pass through defiles, cross heights or rivers, and where they intersect railroads, their breadth (whether suitable for column of fours or platoons, etc.). = . railroads.= their direction, gauge, the number of tracks, stations and junctions, their grade, the length and height of the cuts, embankments and tunnels. = . bridges.= their position, their width and length, their construction (trestle, girder, etc.), material (wood, brick, stone or iron), the roads and approaches on each bank. = . rivers and other streams.= their direction, width and depth, the rapidity of the current, liability to sudden rises and the highest and lowest points reached by the water, as indicated by drift wood, etc., fords, the nature of the banks, kinds, position and number of islands at suitable points of passage, heights in the vicinity and their command over the banks. = . woods.= their situation, extent and shape; whether clear or containing underbrush; the number and extent of "clearings" (open spaces); whether cut up by ravines or containing marshes, etc.; nature of roads passing through them. = . canals.= their direction, width and depth; condition of tow-paths; locks and means of protecting or destroying them. = . telegraphs.= whether they follow railroads or common roads; stations, number of wires. = . villages.= their situation (on a height, in a valley or on a plain); nature of the surrounding country; construction of the houses, nature (straight or crooked) and width of streets; means of defense. = . defiles.= their direction; whether straight or crooked; whether heights on either side are accessible or inaccessible; nature of ground at each extremity; width (frontage of column that can pass through). = . ponds and marshes.= means of crossing; defensive use that might be made of them as obstacles against enemy; whether the marshy grounds are practicable for any or all arms. = . springs and rivulets.= nature of approaches; whether water is drinkable and abundant. = . valleys.= extent and nature; towns, villages, hamlets, streams, roads and paths therein; obstacles offered by or in the valley, to the movement of troops. = . heights.= whether slopes are easy or steep; whether good defensive positions are offered; whether plateau is wide or narrow; whether passages are easy or difficult; whether the ground is broken or smooth, wooded or clear. suggestions for patrols employed in executing demolition (destruction or blocking of bridges, railroads, etc.) = . patrols never execute any demolition unless specifically ordered to do so.= demolition may be of two different characters: temporary demolition, such as cutting telegraph wires in but a few places or merely burning the flooring of bridges, removing a few rails from a track, etc., and permanent demolition, such as cutting down an entire telegraph line, completely destroying bridges, blowing in tunnels, etc. only temporary demolition will be dealt with in this book. = . telegraph line.= to temporarily disable telegraph lines, connect up different wires close to the glass insulators, wrap a wire around all the wires and bury its ends in the ground (this grounds or short circuits the wire), or cut all the wires in one or two places. = . railroads.= to temporarily disable railroads remove the fish plates (the plates that join the rails together at the ends) at each end of a short section of track, preferably upon an embankment, then have as many men as available raise the track on one side until the ties stand on end and turn the section of track so that it will fall down the embankment; or, cut out rails by a charge of dynamite or gun cotton placed against the web and covered up with mud or damp clay. eight to twelve ounces of explosive is sufficient. or blow in the sides of deep cuts or blow down embankments. bridges, culverts, tunnels, etc., are never destroyed except on a written order of the commander-in-chief. = . wagon road.= (=a=) bridges can be rendered temporarily useless by removing the flooring, or, in the case of steel bridges, by burning the flooring (if obtainable, pour tar or kerosene on flooring), particularly if there is not time to remove it. short culverts may sometimes be blown in. a hastily constructed barricade across a bridge or in a cut of trees, wagons, etc, may be sufficient in some cases where only the temporary check of hostile cavalry or artillery is desired. (=b=) the road bed may be blocked by digging trenches not less than thirty feet wide and six feet deep, but as this would take a great deal of time patrols would rarely be charged with such work. = . report on return of patrol.= on returning the patrol leaders should make a short verbal or written report, almost always the former, briefly recounting the movements of the patrol, the information obtained of the enemy, a description of the country passed over and of friendly troops encountered. of course, this is not practicable when the situation is changing rapidly and a returning patrol is immediately engaged in some new and pressing duty. model reports of patrol leaders = . . verbal.= =patrol leader= (corporal b): sir, corporal b reports back with his patrol. =captain a:= i received two messages from you, corporal. what else did you discover? =corporal b:= that was a regiment of infantry, sir, with one battalion thrown out as advance guard. the main body of two battalions went into bivouac at the crossroads and the advance guard formed an outpost line along the big creek two miles south of here. =captain a:= give me an account of your movements. =corporal b:= we followed this main road south to the creek, where we avoided a mounted patrol moving north on the road at - p. m., and then reconnoitered the valley from a ridge west of the road. we followed the ridge south for half a mile to a point where we could see a road crossing the valley and the main road at right angles, three miles south of here. there we halted, and at : what seemed to be the point and advance party (about forty men) of an infantry advance guard appeared, marching north up this road, the head at the crossroad. i then sent you message no. by private brown. in fifteen minutes three companies had appeared yards in rear of the advance party, and i could see a heavy, low column of dust about one-half mile further to the rear. message no. was then sent in by privates baker and johnson, and to avoid several hostile patrols, i drew off further to the northwest. the advance guard then halted and established an outpost line along the south of the creek, two miles from here. the cloud of dust proved to be two more battalions and a wagon train. these two battalions went into bivouac on opposite sides of this road at the crossroads and sent out strong patrols east and west on the crossroad. five wagons went forward to the outpost battalion and the reserve built cook fires. as private rush, here, was the only man i had left, we started back, sketching the valley, ridge and positions of the main body and outpost. here is the sketch, sir. the fields are all cut crops or meadow. we sighted two foot patrols from the outpost, moving north about a mile from here, one following the road and one further east. i did not see any of our patrols. that is all, sir. = . written.= =report of sergeant wm. james' patrol of five men= support no. , outpost of th inf., near dixon, aug. , - to p. m. the patrol followed the timber along the creek for one mile s. from our outguards and leaving the creek bottom moved / mile s. e. to the wooded hill (about ft. high), visible from our lines. from this hill top the valley to the east (about one mile wide) could be fairly well observed. no signs of the enemy were seen and a message, no. , was sent back by private russel. a wagon road runs n. and s. through the valley, bordered by four or five farms with numerous orchards and cleared fields. both slopes of the valley are heavily wooded. the patrol then moved s. w., until it struck the macadam pike which runs n. and s., through our lines. proceeding s. yds. on this pike to a low hill a farmer, on foot, was met. said he lived one mile further s.; was looking for some loose horses; that four hostile cavalrymen, from the east, stopped at his farm at noon, drank some milk, took oats for their horses, inquired the way to dixon and rode off in that direction within fifteen minutes. he said they were the first hostiles he had seen; that they told nothing about themselves, and they and their horses looked in good condition. farmer appeared friendly and honest. the patrol then returned to our lines following the pike about two miles. road is in good condition, low hedges and barbed wire fences, stone culverts and no bridges in the two miles. bordering country is open and gently rolling farming country and all crops are in. a sketch is attached to this report. none of our patrols was seen. respectfully submitted, wm. james, sergeant, co. a, th infy. problem in patrol leading and patrolling = .= in studying or solving tactical problems on a map you must remember that unless you carefully work out your own solution to the problem before looking at the given solution, you will practically make no progress. it is best, if your time permits, to write out your solutions, and when you read over the given solutions, compare the solution of each point with what you thought of that same point when you were solving the problem, and consider why you did just what you did. without this comparison much of the lasting benefit of the work is lost. in some of these problems both the problem and solutions are presented in dialogue form so as to give company officers examples of the best method of conducting the indoor instruction of their men in minor tactics. it also gives an example of how to conduct a tactical walk out in the country, simply looking at the ground itself, instead of a map hanging on the wall. the enlarged elementary map referred to in par. , is supposed to be used in this instruction as well as in the war games. problem no. . (infantry) = .= the elementary map (scale inches to the mile) being hung on the wall, about two sergeants and two squads of the company are seated in a semicircle facing it, and the captain is standing beside the map with a pointer (a barrack cleaning rod makes an excellent pointer). =captain:= we will suppose that our company has just reached the village of york. the enemy is reported to be in the vicinity of boling and oxford (he points out on the map all places as they are mentioned). we are in the enemy's country. corporal james, i call you up at p. m. and give you these orders: "nothing has been seen of the enemy yet. our nearest troops are three miles south of here. take four men from your squad and reconnoiter along this road (county road) into the valley on the other side of that ridge over there (points to the ridge just beyond the cemetery), and see if you can discover anything about the enemy. report back here by o'clock. i am sending a patrol out the valley pike." now, corporal, state just what you would do. =corporal james:= i would go to my squad, fall in privates amos, barlow, sharp and brown; see that they had full canteens; that their arms were all right; that they were not lame or sick and i would have them leave their blanket rolls, haversacks and entrenching tools with the company. (par. .) i would then give these orders (par. ); "we are ordered out on patrol duty. nothing has been seen of the enemy yet. our nearest troops are three miles south of here. we are ordered to reconnoiter along this road into the valley on the other side of that ridge, and see if we can discover anything about the enemy. another patrol is going up the valley pike. reports are to be sent here. in case we are scattered we will meet at the woods on the hill over there (indicates the clump of trees just west of mills' farm). "i will go ahead. amos, follow about fifty yards behind me. barlow, you and sharp keep about yards behind amos, and brown will follow you at half that distance. all keep on the opposite side of the road from the man ahead of you." (par. .) =captain:= all right, corporal, now describe what route you will follow. =corporal james:= the patrol will keep to the county road until the crest of the ridge near the stone wall is reached, when what i see in the valley beyond will decide my route for me. =captain:= how about the woods west of the stone walls? =corporal james:= if i did not see anyone from our patrol on the valley pike reconnoitering there, i would give barlow these orders just after we have examined the cemetery, when the patrol would have temporarily closed up somewhat: "barlow, take sharp and examine that little woods over there. join us at the top of this hill." i would then wave to brown to close up and would proceed to the hill top. =captain:= barlow what do you do? =private barlow:= i would say, "sharp, out straight across for that woods. i will follow you." i would follow about yards behind him. when he reached the edge of the woods i would signal him to halt by holding up my left hand. after i had closed up to about fifty yards i would say to him, "go into the woods and keep me in sight." i would walk along the edge of the woods where i could see sharp and the corporal's patrol on the road at the same time. =captain:= that is all right, barlow. corporal, you should have instructed amos or brown to keep close watch on barlow for signals. =corporal james:= i intended to watch him myself. =captain:= no, you would have enough to do keeping on the alert for what was ahead of you. now describe how you lead the patrol to the top of the hill, by the stone wall. =corporal james:= when i reached the crest i would hold up my hand for the patrol to halt and would cautiously advance and look ahead into the valley. if i saw nothing suspicious i would wave to the men to close up and say, "amos, go to that high ground about yards over there (indicates the end of the nose made by the -foot contour just north of the east end of the stone wall), and look around the country." i would keep brown behind the crest, watching barlow's movements. =captain:= now, corporal, amos reaches the point you indicated and barlow and sharp join you. what do you do? =corporal james:= can i see the steel bridge over sandy creek? =captain:= no, it is three-fourths of a mile away and the trees along the road by smith's hide it. you can see the cut in the road east of the bridge and the smith house, but the crossroads are hidden by the trees bordering the roads. you see nothing suspicious. it is a clear, sunny afternoon. the roads are dusty and the trees in full foliage. the valley is principally made up of fields of cut hay, corn stubble and meadow land. =corporal james:= does private amos give me any information? =captain:= no, he makes you no signals. you see him sitting behind a bush looking northwest, down the valley. =corporal james:= i would say, "barlow, head straight across to where that line of trees meets the road (indicates the point where the lane from mills' farm joins the chester pike). sharp, keep about fifty yards to my right rear." i would follow barlow at yards and when i had reached the bottom land i would wave to amos to follow us. =captain:= how about brown? =corporal james:= i had already given him his orders to follow as rear guard and he should do so without my telling him. =captain:= amos, what do you do when you see the corporal wave to you? =private amos:= i would go down the hill and join him. =captain:= no, you could do better than that. you are too far from the corporal for him to signal you to do much of anything except stay there or join him. you should join him, but you should not go straight down to him. you should head so as to strike the mills' lane about yards east of the house and then go down the lane, first looking along the stone wall. in this way you save time in reconnoitering the ground near the mills' farm and protect the patrol against being surprised by an enemy hidden by the line of trees, or the wall along the lane. you are not disobeying your orders but just using common sense in following them out and thinking about what the corporal is trying to do. now, corporal, why didn't you go to the smith house and find out if the people there had seen anything of the enemy? =corporal james:= you said we were in the enemy's country, sir, so i thought it best to avoid the inhabitants until i found i could not get information in any other way. i intended first to see if i could locate any enemy around here, and if not, to stop at houses on my return. in this way i would be gone before the people could send any information to the enemy about my patrol. =captain:= barlow reaches the chester pike where the mills' lane leaves it. you are about yards in his rear. sharp is yards off to your right rear, amos yards to your left rear and brown yards behind you. just as barlow starts to climb over the barbed wire fence into the chester pike you see him drop down on the ground. he signals, "enemy in sight." tell me quickly what would you do? =corporal james:= i would wave my hand for all to lie down, and i would hasten forward, stooping over as i ran, until i was about twenty yards from him, when i would crawl forward to the fence, close by him. just before i reached him i would ask him what he saw. =captain:= he replies, "there are some hostile foot soldiers coming up this road." =corporal james:= i would crawl forward and look. =captain:= you see three or four men, about yards north of you, coming up the chester pike. they are scattered out. =corporal james:= i would say, "crawl into the lane, keep behind the stone wall, watch those fellows, and work your way to that farm" (indicates the mills' farm). i would start towards the mills' farm myself, under cover of the trees along the lane and would wave to the other men to move rapidly west, towards the hills. =captain:= why didn't you try to hide near where you were and allow the hostile men to pass? =corporal james:= there does not seem to be any place to hide near there that a patrol would not probably examine. =captain:= what is your plan now? =corporal james:= i want to get my patrol up to that small woods near the mills' farm, but i hardly expect to be able to get them up to that point without their being seen. in any event, i want them well back from the road where they can lie down and not be seen by the enemy when he passes. =captain:= you succeed in collecting your patrol in the woods without their being seen, and you see four foot soldiers in the road at the entrance to the land. one man starts up the lane, the others remaining on the road. =corporal james:= i say, "brown, go through these woods and hurry straight across to york. you should be able to see the village from the other side of the woods. report to the captain that a hostile patrol of four foot men is working south up the valley, two miles northeast of york. we will go further north. repeat what i have told you." (par. .) =captain:= why didn't you send this message before? =corporal james:= because we were moving in the same direction that the messenger would have had to go, and, by waiting a very few minutes, i was able to tell whether it was a mere patrol or the point of an advance guard. =captain:= do you think it correct to send a messenger back with news about a small patrol? =corporal james:= ordinarily it would be wrong, but as nothing has been seen of the enemy until now, this first news is important because it proves to the captain that the enemy really is in this neighborhood, which it seems to me is a very important thing for him to know and what my mission required me to do. (par. .) =captain:= what are you going to do now, corporal? =corporal james:= we have traveled about two miles and stopped frequently, so it must be about o'clock. it is one and one-third miles back to york, where i should arrive about o'clock. it would take me twenty-five minutes to go from here to york, so i have about thirty-five minutes left before o'clock. this will permit me to go forward another mile and still be able to reach york on time. it is two-thirds of a mile to the mason farm, and if the hostile patrol appears to be going on, i will start for that point. did anyone at the mills' farm see us? =captain:= no, but tell me first why you do not go along this high ground that overlooks the valley? =corporal james:= because our patrol that started out the valley pike is probably near twin hills and i want to cover other country. the orchard at mason's would obstruct my view from the hills. =captain:= the hostile patrol goes on south. describe briefly your next movements. =corporal james:= i lead my patrol over to mason's and, concealing two of the men so that both roads and the house can be watched, i take one man and reconnoiter around the farm yard and go up to the house to question the inhabitants. (par. .) =captain:= you find one woman there who says some other soldiers, on foot, passed there a few minutes ago, marching south. she gives you no other information about the enemy or country. =corporal james:= i would send amos over to see how deep and wide sandy creek is (par. .) when he returned i would take the patrol over to twin hills, follow the ridge south to the stone wall on the county road, watching the valley for signs of the hostile patrol, and follow the road back to york; then make my report to the captain, telling him where i had gone, all i had seen, including a description of the country. if i had not been hurried, i would have made a sketch of the valley. i can make a rough one after i get in. (par. .) =captain:= suppose on your way back you saw hostile troops appearing on the county road, marching west over sandy ridge. would you stay out longer or would you consider that you should reach oxford by o'clock? =corporal james:= i would send a message back at once, and remain out long enough to find out the strength and probable intention of the new enemy. =captain (to one platoon of his troop of cavalry):= we will suppose that this troop has just ( a. m.) arrived in boling (elementary map) on a clear, dry, summer day. the enemy is supposed to be near salem and we have seen several of his patrols this morning on our march south to boling. sergeant allen, i call you up and give you these instructions: "take corporal burt's squad (eight men) and reconnoiter south by this road (indicates the boling-morey house road) to salem. i will take the troop straight south to salem and you will join it there about : . it is four and one-half miles to salem. start at once." (you have no map.) =sergeant allen:= i would like to know just what the captain wishes my patrol to do. (par. .) =captain:= we will suppose that this is one of the many occasions in actual campaign where things must be done quickly. where there is no time for detailed orders. you know that the troop has been marching south towards salem where the enemy is supposed to be. you also know we have seen several of his patrols. i have told you what the troop is going to do, and from all this you should be able to decide what your mission is in this case. we will, therefore, consider that there is no time to give you more detailed orders, and you have to decide for yourself. of course, if you had failed to hear just what i said, then, in spite of the necessity for haste, i would repeat my instructions to you. (par. .) =sergeant allen:= i would ride over to corporal burt's squad and lead it out of the column to the road leading to the morey house, and say, "the troop is going on straight south to salem, four and one-half miles away. this squad will reconnoiter south to salem by this road, joining the troop there about : . in case we become separated, make for salem. corporal, take brown and form the point. i will follow with the squad about yards in rear. regulate your gait on me after you get your distance. move out now at a trot." (par. .) after corporal burt had gotten yards out i would say, "carter, move out as connecting file." i would then say, "downs, you will follow about yards behind us as rear guard." when carter had gone yards down the road i would order, "= . forward; . trot; . march=," and ride off at the head of the four remaining men (in column of twos.) (par. .) =captain:= sergeant, tell me briefly what is your estimate of the situation--that is, what sort of a proposition you have before you and how you have decided to handle it. =sergeant allen:= as the enemy is supposed to be near salem and we have already seen his patrols, i expect to encounter more patrols and may meet a strong body of the enemy, on my way to salem. as i have no map, i cannot tell anything about the road, except that it is about four and one-half miles by the direct road the troop will follow, therefore my route will be somewhat longer. i have been given an hour and fifteen minutes in which to make the trip, so, if i move at a trot along the safer portions of the road. i will have time to proceed very slowly and cautiously along the dangerous portions. my patrol will be stretched out about yards on the road, which should make it difficult for the enemy to surprise us and yet should permit my controlling the movements of the men. (par. .) i consider that my mission is to start out on this road and find my way around to salem in about an hour and, particularly, to get word across to the captain on the other road of anything of importance about the enemy that i may learn. =captain:= very well. when you reach the cut in the road across the south nose of hill , your point has almost reached the morey house. do you make any change in your patrol? =sergeant allen:= i order, "= . walk, . march=," and watch to see if the connecting file observes the change in gait and comes to a walk. =captain:= suppose he does not come to a walk? =sergeant allen:= i would say, "smith, gallop ahead and tell carter to walk and to keep more on the alert." =captain:= corporal burt, you reach the road fork at morey's. what do you do? =corporal burt:= i say, "brown, wait here until carter is close enough to see which way you go and then trot up to me." i would walk on down the road. =captain:= wouldn't you make any inspection of the morey house? =corporal burt:= not unless i saw something suspicious from the road. i would expect the main body of the patrol to do that. =captain:= don't you make any change on account of the woods you are passing? =corporal burt:= no, sir. it has very heavy underbrush and we would lose valuable time trying to search through it. a large force of the enemy would hardly hide in such a place. =captain:= sergeant allen, you reach the road fork. what do you do? =sergeant allen:= i would have two men go into the morey house to question anyone they found there. i would order one of the other two men to trot up (north) that road yards and wait until i signaled to him to return. with the other man i would await the result of the inspection of the morey house. corporal burt should have gone ahead without orders to the cut in the road across long ridge, leaving brown half way between us. (pars. to .) =captain:= you find no one at the morey house. =sergeant allen:= i would signal the man to the north to come in. i would then order two men to "find a gate in the fence and trot up on that hill (indicating long ridge), and look around the country and join me down this road." (par. .) i would then start south at a walk, halting at the cut to await the result of the inspection on the country from the hill. =captain:= foster, you and lacey are the two men sent up on long ridge. when you reach the hilltop you see four hostile cavalrymen trotting north on the valley pike, across the railroad track. =private foster:= i signal like this (enemy in sight), and wait to see if they go on north. (par. .) do i see anything else behind or ahead of them? =captain:= you see no other signs of the enemy on any road. everything looks quiet. the hostile cavalrymen pass the baker house and continue north. =private foster:= i would then take lacey, trot down the ridge to sergeant allen, keeping below the crest and report, "sergeant, we saw four hostile mounted men trotting north on the road about three-quarters of a mile over there (pointing), and they kept on north, across that road (pointing to the brown-baker-oxford road). there was nothing else in sight." i would then tell him what the country to the south looked like, if he wanted to know. =captain:= sergeant allen, what do you do now? =sergeant allen:= i would continue toward the brown house at a trot. i would send no message to you as you already know there are hostile patrols about and therefore this information would be of little or no importance to you. (par. .) =captain:= you arrive at brown's house. =sergeant allen:= i would send two men in to question the people and i would continue on at a walk. i would not send any one up the road towards oxford as foster has already seen that road. =captain:= you should have sent a man several hundred yards out the farm lane. (par. .) if he moved at a trot it would only have taken a very short time. continue to describe your movements. =sergeant allen:= i would halt at the railroad track until i saw my two men coming on from the brown house. i would then direct the other two men who were with me to go through the first opening in the fence to the west and ride south along that ridge ( --lone hill--twin hills' ridge) until i signaled them to rejoin. i would tell them to look out for our troop over to the east. if there were a great many fences i would not send them out until we were opposite the southern edge of that woods ahead of us. there i would send them to the high ground to look over the country, and return at once. =captain:= there are a great many fences west of the road and practically none east of the road to sandy creek. just as you arrive opposite the southern edge of those woods and are giving orders for the two men to ride up the hill, you hear firing in the direction of bald knob. in the road at the foot of the south slope of bald knob, where the trail to the quarry starts off, you can see quite a clump of horses. you see nothing to the west of your position or towards mason's. what do you do? =sergeant allen:= i signal "rally" to carter and downs. if there is a gate nearby i lead my men through it. if not, i have them cut or break an opening in the fence and ride towards the railroad fill at a fast trot, having one man gallop ahead as point. when we reach the fill, the point having first looked beyond it, i order, "=dismount=. lacey, hold the horses. = . as skirmishers along that fill, . march.=" when corporal burt, brown, carter and downs come up lacey takes their horses and they join the line of skirmishers. captain, what do i see from the fill? =captain:= there appear to be about twenty or thirty horses in the group. the firing seems to come from the cut in the road just north of the horses and from the clump of trees by the quarry. you can also hear firing from a point further north on the road, apparently your troop replying to the fire from bald knob. you see nothing in the road south of the horses as far as hill , which obstructs your view. what action do you take? =sergeant allen:= i order, "=at the feet of those horses. range, . clip fire.=" =captain:= what is your object in doing as you have done? =sergeant allen:= i know the captain intended to go to salem with the troop. from the fact that he is replying to the hostile fire i judge he still wishes to push south. i was ordered to reconnoiter along this road, but now a situation has arisen where the troop is being prevented or delayed in doing what was desired and i am in what appears to be a very favorable position from which to give assistance to the troop and enable them to push ahead. i am practically in rear of the enemy and within effective range of their lead horses. i therefore think my mission has at least temporarily changed and i should try and cause the twenty or thirty hostile troopers to draw off (par. ). besides, i think it is my business to find out what the strength of this enemy is and whether or not he has reinforcements coming up from salem, and send this information to the captain. from my position i can still watch the chester pike. =captain:= after you have emptied your clips you see the enemy running down out of the cut and from among the trees mount their horses and gallop south. what do you do? =sergeant allen:= i would send foster across the creek above the trestle (south of trestle), to ride across to that road (pointing towards the cut on bald hill) and tell the captain, who is near there, that about thirty men were on the hill and they have galloped south, and that i am continuing towards salem. i would have foster repeat the message that i gave him. i would then trot back to the chester pike and south to mason's, taking up our old formation. =captain:= you see nothing unusual at mason's and continue south until you reach the cross roads by the smith farm. corporal burt and private brown are near the stone bridge south of smith's; private carter is half way between you and corporal burt; and private downs is yards north of smith's. you have three men with you. what do you do? =sergeant allen:= what time is it now? =captain:= it is now : a. m. =sergeant allen:= i would say, "lacey, take jackson and gallop as far as that cut in the road (points east) and see if you can locate the enemy or our troop in the valley beyond. i will wave my hat over my head when i want you to return." i would then say to private moore, "gallop down to corporal burt and tell him to fall back in this direction yards, and then you return here bringing the other two men with you." i would then await the result of private lacey's reconnaissance, sending carter to the turn in the road yards west of the cross roads. =captain:= lacey, what do you do? =private lacey:= i order jackson, "follow yards behind me and watch for signals from sergeant allen," and i then gallop across the steel bridge and half way up the hill. i then move cautiously up to the cut and, if the fences permit, i ride up on the side of the cut, dismounting just before reaching the crest of the ridge, and walk forward until i can see into the valley beyond. =captain:= you see no signs of the enemy in the valley, but you see your own troop on the road by the gibbs farm with a squad in advance in the road on hill . =private lacey:= i look towards sergeant allen to see if he is signaling. i make no signals. =captain:= what do you do, sergeant? =sergeant allen:= i wave my hat for private lacey to return. i wave to private downs to join me and when private lacey arrives i signal "assemble" to corporal burt and then say, "lacey, join corporal burt and tell him to follow me as rear guard. martin, join carter and tell him to trot west. we will follow. you stay with him." after he got started i would order, "follow me. = . trot; . march.=" =captain:= when private carter reaches the crest of the ridge about one-half mile west of smith's he signals, "enemy in sight in large numbers," and he remains in the road with martin fifty yards in rear. (par. .) =sergeant allen:= i order, "= . walk; . march.= = . squad; . halt=," and gallop up to private carter, dismount just before reaching the crest, give my horse up to private martin, and run forward. =captain:= carter points out what appears to be a troop of cavalry standing in the road leading north out of york, just on the edge of the town. you see about four mounted men yards out of york on your road, halted, and about the same number on the valley pike near where it crosses the first stream north of york. what do you do? =sergeant allen:= i wait about three minutes to see if they are going to move. =captain:= they remain halted, the men at york appear to be dismounted. =sergeant allen:= i write the following message: hill / mile n. e. of york, a. m. captain x: a hostile troop of cavalry is standing in road at york (west of salem) with squads halted on n. and n. e. roads from york. nothing else seen. will remain in observation for the present. allen, sgt. (pars. and .) i would give the message to martin, who had previously brought my horse up close in rear of the crest, and would say to him, "take this message to the captain, straight across to the road the troop is on, and turn south towards salem if you do not see them at first. take lacey with you. tell him what you have seen. he knows where the troop is." i would have carter hold my horse, and watch the remainder of the patrol for signals, while i observed the enemy. =captain:= at the end of five minutes the hostile troop trots north on the valley pike, the patrol on your road rides across to the valley pike and follows the troop. =sergeant allen:= i would wait until the troops had crossed the creek north of york and would then face my patrol east and trot to the cross roads at smith's, turn south and continue to salem, sending one man to ride up on sandy ridge, keeping the patrol in sight. =captain:= we have carried out the problem far enough. it furnishes a good example of the varying situations a patrol leader has to meet. good judgment or common sense must be used in deciding on the proper course to follow. you must always think of what your chief is trying to do and then act in the way you think will best help him to accomplish his object. if you have carefully decided just what mission you have been given to accomplish, you cannot easily go wrong. in handling a mounted patrol you must remember that if the men become widely separated in strange country, or even in country they are fairly familiar with, they are most apt to lose all contact with each other or become lost themselves. problem no. . (infantry) = . captain (to one platoon of his company):= we will suppose it is about half an hour before dawn. one platoon of the company is deployed as skirmishers, facing north, in the cut where the county road crosses sandy ridge. it is the extreme right of a line of battle extending west along the line of the county road. the fight was not commenced. this platoon is resting in a wheat field between the railroad and the foot of the slope of sandy ridge, yards south of the county road. sergeant allen, i call you up and give you these instructions: "the enemy's line is off in that direction (pointing northwest). take six men and work north along the railroad until it is light enough to see; then locate the hostile line and keep me informed of their movements. i will be in this vicinity. you have a compass. start at once." describe briefly the formation of your patrol while it is moving in the dark. =sergeant allen:= one man will lead. a second man will follow about fifteen yards in rear of him. i will follow the second man at the same distance with three more men, and the last man will be about twenty yards in rear of me. all will have bayonets fixed, loaded and pieces locked. one short, low whistle will mean, =halt=, two short whistles will mean, =forward=, and the word "sandy" will be the countersign by which we can identify each other. =captain:= very well. we will suppose that you reach the steel trestle over sandy creek just at dawn and have met no opposition and heard nothing of the enemy. on either side of sandy creek are fields of standing corn about six feet tall. in the present dim light you can only see a few hundred yards off. =sergeant allen:= the patrol being halted i would walk forward to the leading man (brown) and say, "brown, take carter and form the point for the patrol, continuing along this railroad. we will follow about yards in rear." i would then rejoin the main body of the patrol and order the man in rear to follow about yards in rear of us. when the point had gained its distance i would move forward with the main body, ordering one man to move along the creek bank (west bank), keeping abreast of us until i signaled to him to come in. =captain:= just as you reach the northern end of the railroad fill your point halts and you detect some movement in the road to the west of you. it is rapidly growing lighter. =sergeant allen:= i would move the main body by the left flank into the corn, signaling to the man following the creek to rejoin, and for the rear guard to move off the track also. i would expect brown to do the same, even before he saw what we had done. i would then close up on the point until i could see it and, halting all the patrol, i would order foster to take lacey and work over towards the road to see what is there and to report back to me immediately. =captain:= in a few minutes foster returns and reports, "the enemy is moving south in the road and in the field beyond, in line of squads or sections. a hostile patrol is moving southeast across the field behind us. we were not seen." (note: this situation could well have been led up to by requiring private foster to explain how he conducted his reconnaissance and having him formulate his report on the situation as given.) =sergeant allen:= i would then work my patrol closer to the road, keeping foster out on that flank, and prepare to follow south in rear of the hostile movement. =captain:= the information you have gained is so important that you should have sent a man back to me with a verbal message, particularly as you are in a very dangerous position, and may not be able to send a message later. while you have not definitely located the left of the enemy's line, you have apparently discovered what appears to be a movement of troops forward to form the left of the attacking line. your action in turning south to follow the troops just reported, is proper, as you now know you are partly in rear of the hostile movement and must go south to locate the hostile flank that your mission requires you to report on. you men must picture in your minds the appearance of the country the sergeant is operating through. his patrol is now in a field of high standing corn. unless you are looking down between the regular rows of corn you can only see a few yards ahead of you. the road has a wire fence and is bordered by a fairly heavy growth of high weeds and bushes. the ground is dry and dusty. sergeant, how do you conduct your movement south? =sergeant allen:= as my patrol is now in a very dangerous neighborhood and very liable to be caught between two hostile lines, with a deep creek between our present position and our platoon, i think it best to move cautiously southeast until i reach the creek bank (i cannot see it from where i now am), and then follow the creek south. i think i am very apt to find the enemy's left resting on this creek. besides, if i do not soon locate the enemy, i can hold the main body of my patrol close to the creek and send scouts in towards the road to search for the enemy. it will also be much easier to send information back to the platoon from the creek bank, as a messenger can ford it and head southeast until he strikes the railroad and then follow that straight back to our starting point. it would thus be very difficult for him to get lost. =captain:= you move southeast and strike the creek bank just south of the railroad trestle. you now hear artillery fire off to the west and a rifle fire to the southwest which gradually increases in volume. you see a high cloud of dust hanging over the road on the hill west of mason's and south of this road on the north slope of the northern-most knoll of the twin hills, you can occasionally see the flash of a gun, artillery being discharged. there seems to be no rifle firing directly in your front. =sergeant allen:= i hurriedly write the following message: at ry. trestle mi. n. of platoon, : a. m. captain x: can see arty. firing from position on n. slope of knoll on high ridge to w. of me, and / mi. s. of e. and w. road. hostile line is s. of me. have not located it. will move s. allen, sgt. (par. .) i hand this to private smith and say to him. "carry this quickly to the captain. follow the railroad back until you cross a wagon road. our platoon should be to the west of the track just beyond the road." i also read the message to smith and point out the hostile artillery. i have considered that i sent a message before telling about the hostile advance. i then continue south, moving slowly and with great caution. i instruct the remaining four men that in case we are surprised to try to cross the creek and follow the railroad back to the platoon. =captain:= your information about the hostile artillery position was important and should have been sent in, provided you think your description of the hostile position was sufficiently clear to be understood by an observer within your own lines. there is some question as to the advisability of your remaining on the west bank of the creek. still you would not be able to tell from where you were what direction the creek took, so you probably would remain on the west bank for the present. you continue south for about yards and your leading man halts, comes back to you, and reports that the corn ahead is broken and trampled, showing it has been passed over by foot troops. about the same time you hear rifle fire to your immediate front. it sounds very close. =sergeant allen:= i say, "cross this creek at once," and when we reach the other bank and the patrol forms again, we move slowly south, all the men keeping away from the creek bank, except myself, and i march opposite the two men constituting the main body. =captain:= about this time you detect a movement in the corn across the creek in rear of the place you have just left. you think it is a body of troops moving south. the firing in front seems to be delivered from a point about two or three hundred yards south of you and you can hear heavy firing from off in the direction of your company, a few bullets passing overhead. there are scattered trees along the creek and some bushes close to the edge. =sergeant allen:= i would conceal myself close to the bank, the patrol being back, out of sight from the opposite bank, and await developments. =captain:= sergeant, your patrol is in a dangerous position. the enemy will very likely have a patrol or detachment in rear and beyond his flank. this patrol would probably cross the railroad trestle and take you in rear. you should have given the last men in your patrol particular instructions to watch the railroad to the north. it would have been better if you had sent one man over to the railroad, which is only a short distance away, and had him look up and down the track and also make a hurried survey of the country from an elevated position on the fill. i also think it would be better not to await developments where you now are, but to push south and make sure of the position of the left of the enemy's firing line, later you can devote more time to the movements in rear of the first line. you are taking too many chances in remaining where you are. i do not mean that you should leave merely because you might have some of your men killed or captured, but because if this did occur you would probably not be able to accomplish your mission. later you may have to run a big chance of sacrificing several of your men, in order to get the desired information, which would be entirely justifiable. tell me how your men are arranged and what your next movement would be. =sergeant allen:= i have four men left, i am close to the stream's bank, under cover; two men are about yards further away from the stream; private brown is up stream as far off as he can get and still see the other two men, and private foster is down stream the same distance. both brown and foster are well back from the stream. the two men in the middle, the main body of the patrol, make their movements conform to mine, and brown and foster regulate their movements on the main body. i will move south until i can locate the enemy's advance line. =captain:= when you are opposite the mason house, brown comes back to you, having signaled halt, and reports he can see the enemy's firing line about yards ahead on the other side of the stream, and that a small detachment is crossing the stream just beyond where he was. what do you do? =sergeant allen:= i creep forward with brown to verify his report. the remainder of the patrol remains in place. =captain:= you find everything as brown reported. you see that the firing line extends along the southern edge of the cornfield, facing an uncultivated field covered with grass and frequent patches of weeds two or three feet high. you cannot determine how strong the line is, but a heavy fire is being delivered. you cannot see the detachment that crossed the creek south of you because of the standing corn. =sergeant allen:= i crawl back to the main body, leaving brown, and write the following message: / mi. n. of platoon, : a. m. captain x: enemy's left rests on creek / mile to your front, along s. edge of cornfield. creek is ft. deep by ft. wide. hostile patrols have crossed the creek. will watch their rear. allen, sgt. i give this to private james and say, "go over to the railroad (pointing), then turn to your right and follow the track until you cross a wagon road. our platoon is just beyond that, on this side of the track. give this message to the captain. hurry." =captain:= you should have either read the message to james or had him read it. you should also have cautioned him to watch out for that hostile detachment. it might be better to send another man off with a duplicate of the message, as there is quite a chance that james may not get through and the message is all-important. james, you get back to the wagon road here (pointing) and find yourself in the right of your battle line, but cannot locate me or the company right away. =private james:= i would show the note to the first officer i saw in any event, and in this case, i would turn it over to the officer who appeared to be in command of the battalion or regiment on the right of the line, telling him what company the patrol belonged to, when we went out, etc. =captain:= what do you do, sergeant? =sergeant allen:= i start to move north a short distance in order to find out what reënforcements are in rear of the hostile line. =captain:= after you have moved about yards you are suddenly fired into from across the creek, and at the same time from the direction of the railroad trestle. your men break and run east through the corn and you follow, but lose sight of them. when you cross the railroad fill you are fired on from the direction of the bridge. you finally stop behind the railroad fill on the quarry switch, where two of your men join you. =sergeant allen:= i would start south to rejoin the company and report. =captain:= that would be a mistake. it would require a long time for a second patrol to make its way out over unknown ground, filled with hostile patrols, to a point where they could observe anything in rear of the hostile flank. you are now fairly familiar with the ground, you also know about where the hostile patrols are and you have two men remaining. after a brief rest in some concealed place nearby, you should start out again to make an effort to determine the strength of the troops in rear of the hostile flank near you, or at least remain out where you could keep a sharp lookout for any attempted turning movement by the enemy. should anything important be observed you can send back a message and two of you remain to observe the next developments before returning. the information you might send back and the additional information you might carry back, would possibly enable your own force to avoid a serious reverse or obtain a decided victory. your work would be very hazardous, but it is necessary, and while possibly resulting in loss of one or two of your men, it might prevent the loss of hundreds in your main force. chapter v the service of security (based on the field service regulations.) general principles = . the service of security= embraces all those measures taken by a military force to protect itself against surprise, annoyance or observation by the enemy. on the march, that portion of a command thrown out to provide this security is called an advance, flank or rear guard, depending on whether it is in front, to the flank or in rear of the main command; in camp or bivouac, it is called the outpost. the principal duties of these bodies being much the same, their general formations are also very similar. there is ( ) the cavalry covering the front; next ( ) a group ( men to a platoon) or line of groups in observation; then ( ) the support, or line of supports, whose duty is to furnish the men for the observation groups and check an enemy's attempt to advance until reinforcements can arrive; still farther in rear is ( ) the reserve. in small commands of an infantry regiment or less there usually will not be any cavalry to cover the front, and the reserve is generally omitted. even the support may be omitted and the observation group or line of groups be charged with checking the enemy, in addition to its regular duties of observation. but whatever the technical designation of these subdivisions, the rearmost one is always in fact a reserve. for example, if the command is so small that the subdivision formally designated as the reserve is omitted, the rear element (squad or platoon or company, etc.) is used as a reserve. as this text deals principally with small commands and only those larger than a regiment usually have the subdivision termed the reserve, this distinction between the element in the field service regulations called the reserve and the actual reserve, must be thoroughly understood. the arrangements or formations of all detachments thrown out from the main force to provide security against the enemy, are very flexible, varying with every military situation and every different kind of country. the commander of such a detachment must, therefore, avoid blindly arranging his men according to some fixed plan and at certain fixed distances. acquire a general understanding of the principles of the service of security and then with these principles as a foundation use common sense in disposing troops for this duty. advance guard = . definition and duties.= an advance guard is a detachment of a marching column thrown out in advance to protect the main column from being surprised and to prevent its march from being delayed or interrupted. (the latter duty is generally forgotten and many irritating, short halts result, which wear out or greatly fatigue the main body, the strength of which the advance guard is supposed to conserve.) in detail the duties of the advance guard are: . to guard against surprise and furnish information by reconnoitering to the front and flanks. . to push back small parties of the enemy and prevent their observing, firing upon or delaying the main body. . to check the enemy's advance in force long enough to permit the main body to prepare for action. . when the enemy is met on the defenses, seize a good position and locate his lines, care being taken not to bring on a general engagement unless the advance guard commander is authorized to do so. . to remove obstacles, repair the road, and favor in every way possible the steady march of the column. = . strength:= the strength of the advance guard varies from one-ninth to one-third of the total command. the larger the force the larger in proportion is the advance guard, for a larger command takes relatively longer to prepare for action than a small one. for example, a company of men would ordinarily have an advance guard of from one to two squads, as the company could deploy as skirmishers in a few seconds. on the other hand, a division of , men would ordinarily have an advance guard of about , men, all told, as it would require several hours for a division to deploy and the advance guard must be strong enough to make a stubborn fight. = . composition.= the advance guard is principally composed of infantry, preceded if possible, by cavalry well to the front. when there is only infantry, much more patrolling is required of the front troops than when cavalry (called "advance cavalry") is out in advance. this book does not deal with large advance guards containing artillery and engineers. machine guns, however, will be frequently used in small advance guards to hold bridges, defiles, etc. = . distance from main body.= the distance at which the advance guard precedes the main body or the main body follows the advance guard depends on the military situation and the ground. it should always be great enough to allow the main body time to deploy before it can be seriously engaged. for instance the advance guard of a company, say squad, should be to yards in advance of the company. the distance from the leading man back to the principal group of the squad should generally be at least yards. this, added to the distance back to the main body or company, makes a distance of from to yards from the leading man to the head of the main body. examples: command. advance guard. distance (yds.). patrol of squad men to section of squads men to inf. platoon of men squad to cav. platoon of men men to inf. company of men to squads to cav. troop of men / platoon to inf. battalion / to company to cav. squadron / to troop to these are not furnished as fixed numbers and distances, but are merely to give the student an approximate, concrete idea. = . connecting files.= it should be remembered that between the advance guard and the main body, and between the several groups into which the advance guard is subdivided, connecting files are placed so as to furnish a means of communicating, generally by signals, between the elements (groups) of the column. there should be a connecting file for at least ever, yards. for example, suppose the advance guard of a platoon is yards in front of the main body. in ordinary rolling country, not heavily wooded, a connecting file would be placed half way between the two elements-- yards from each one. it is generally wiser to use two men together instead of one, because this leaves one man free to watch for signals from the front while the other watches the main body. however, in very small commands like a company, this is not practicable, as the extra man could not be spared. formation of advance guards. = . subdivisions.= the advance guard of a large force like a brigade or division is subdivided into a number of groups or elements, gradually increasing in size from front to rear. the reason for this is that, as has already been explained, a larger group or force requires longer to deploy or prepare to fight than a smaller one, therefore the small subdivisions are placed in front where they can quickly deploy and hold the enemy temporarily in check while the larger elements in rear are deploying. the number of these subdivisions decreases as the strength of the advance guard decreases, until we find the advance guard of a company consists of one or two squads, which naturally cannot be subdivided into more than two groups; and the advance guard of a squad composed of two men, which admits of no subdivision. =distance to next element in rear.= =advance cavalry= to miles {=advance party= {=point= to yds. =support= {(=furnishes patrols=) {=advance party proper= to yds. {=support proper= to yds. =reserve= (usually omitted in small commands) yds. to mile the distances vary principally with the size of the command--slightly with the character of the country. the advance cavalry is that part of the advance guard going in front of all the foot troops. it is generally one to five miles in advance of the infantry of the advance guard, reconnoitering at least far enough to the front and flanks to guard the column against surprise by artillery fire-- , yards. = . support.= (=a=) the support constitutes the principal element or group of all advance guards. it follows the advance cavalry, when there is any, and leads the advance guard when there is no cavalry. the support of a large command is subdivided within itself in much the same manner as the advance guard as a whole is subdivided. it varies in strength from one-fourth to one-half of the advance guard. = . (b) advance party.= as the support moves out it sends forward an advance party several hundred yards, the distance varying with the nature of the country and size of the command. for example, the advance party of a support of one company of men, would ordinarily be composed of one section of three squads, and would march about yards in advance of the company in open country, and about yards in wooded country. the advance party sends out the patrols to the front and flanks to guard the main body of the support from surprise by effective rifle fire. patrols are only sent out to the flanks to examine points that cannot be observed from the road. as a rule they will have to rejoin some portion of the column in rear of the advance party. as the advance party becomes depleted in strength in this manner, fresh men are sent forward from the main body of the support to replace those who have fallen behind while patrolling. when there is advance cavalry, much less patrolling is required of the infantry. (=c=) the point is a patrol sent forward by the advance party to yards. when the advance party is large enough the point should ordinarily consist of a complete squad, commanded by an officer or experienced noncommissioned officer. it is merely a patrol in front of the column and takes the formation described for patrols. (=d=) the commander of the support ordinarily marches with the advance party. he should have a map and control of the guide, if any is present. he sees that the proper road is followed; that guides are left in towns and at crossroads; that bridges, roads, etc., are repaired promptly so as not to delay the march of the column and that information of the enemy is promptly sent back to the advance guard commander; he verifies the correctness of this information, if possible. = .= (=a=) a thorough understanding of the arrangement of the support and the duties of the leaders of its subdivisions--point, flank patrols, advance party and main body (of the support)--is of the greatest importance to a noncommissioned officer. for example, the ignorance of one noncommissioned officer leading the advance party of a column of troops six miles long can cause the entire column to be delayed. if he halts because a few shots are fired at his men, and conducts a careful reconnaissance before attacking (instead of pushing right in on the enemy, forcing him to fall back quickly, if a weak detachment; or, to disclose his strength, if strong), the entire column, six miles long, is halted, the march interrupted, valuable time lost, and what is more important, the men irritated and tired out. (=b=) the leader of the point must understand that as the principal duty of an advance guard is to secure the safe and uninterrupted march of the main body, he is the first man to discharge this duty. if, for example, his squad receives a volley of shots from some point to the front, he cannot take the time and precautions the commander of a large body would take to reconnoiter the enemy's position, determine something about his strength, etc., before risking an attack. if he did he would not be securing the uninterrupted march of the main body. he has to deploy instantly and press the enemy hard until the hostile opposition disappears or the advance party comes up and its commander takes charge. the point will lose men in this way, but it is necessary, for otherwise one small combat patrol could delay the march time after time. (=c=) the same problem must be met in much the same manner by the leader of the advance party. in this case there is more time to think, as the point, being in advance, will have begun the fight before the advance party arrives; but the leader of the advance party must use his men freely and quickly to force the enemy to "show his hand," thus preventing small harassing or combat detachments from delaying the march. (=d=) as the subdivisions of the advance guard become larger their leaders act with increasing caution, for as soon as it develops that the enemy in front is really present in some strength, then a halt becomes obligatory and a careful reconnaissance necessary. (=e=) the leader of every subdivision must always start a reconnaissance the instant the enemy develops. he may, as in the case of the point, only send one man around to discover the enemy's strength; or, if the leader of the main body of the support, he may send an entire squad. in almost every case the instant he has given his orders for deploying and firing at or rushing the enemy, he sends out his man or men to work around to a position permitting a view of the hostile force. every noncommissioned officer should impress this on his memory so that he will not forget it in the excitement of a sudden engagement. (=f=) no attempt should be made to subdivide the advance guard of a small force into all the elements previously described. for example, the advance guard of a squad is simply a point of one or two men; the advance guard of a company is usually no more than a squad acting as a point, the squad actually having several men from to yards in advance, who really constitute a point for the squad; the advance guard of a battalion would usually consist of a company or less distributed as an advance party proper and a point. the advance guard of a regiment would have no reserve--if, for example, a battalion were used as the advance guard of a regiment, there would be only a support, which would be distributed about as follows: a support proper of about three companies and an advance party (point included) of about one company. [illustration: fig. ] = . reserve.= an advance guard large enough to have a reserve would be distributed as follows: [illustration: fig. ] the distance z would be greater than y and y would be greater than x. for example, a regiment acting as the advance guard of a brigade would, under ordinary conditions, be distributed about as follows: [illustration: fig. ] as only large commands have a reserve, which would always be commanded by an officer, noncommissioned officers need not give this much consideration, but it must be understood that while this fourth subdivision of the advance guard is the only one officially termed reserve, the last subdivision of any advance guard actually is a reserve, no matter what its official designation. the advance guard of a cavalry command adopts formations similar to those described above, except that the distances are increased because of the rapidity with which the command can close up or deploy. an advance party with a few patrols is usually enough for a squadron, and precedes it from to , yards. = . reconnaissance.= in reconnaissance the patrols are, as a rule, small (from two to six men). the flanking patrols, whether of the advance cavalry or of the advance party, are sent out to examine the country wherever the enemy might be concealed. if the nature of the ground permits, these patrols march across country or along roads and trails parallel to the march of the column. for cavalry patrols this is often possible; but with infantry patrols and even with those that are mounted, reconnaissance is best done by sending the patrols to high places along the line of march to overlook the country and examine the danger points. these patrols signal the results of their observations and, unless they have other instructions, join the columns by the nearest routes, other patrols being sent out as the march proceeds and as the nature of the country requires. deserters, suspicious characters and bearers of flags of truce (the latter blindfolded), are taken to the advance guard commander. = . advance guard order.= on receipt of the order for a march designating the troops for the advance guard, the commander of the latter makes his estimate of the situation; that is, he looks at the map or makes inquiries to determine what sort of a country he must march through and the nature of the roads; he considers what the chances are of encountering the enemy, etc., and then how he should best arrange his advance guard to meet these conditions, and what time the different elements of his advance guard must start in order to take their proper place in the column. he then issues his order at the proper time--the evening before if possible and he deems it best, or the morning of the march. the order for a large advance guard would ordinarily be written; for a small command it would almost invariably be verbal, except that the commander or leader of each element should always make written notes of the principal points, such as the road to be followed, time to start, distances, etc. advance guard problems problem no. . (infantry) = . captain (to one platoon of his company):= we will assume that our battalion camped last night at oxford (elementary map) in the enemy's country. it is now sunrise, : a. m.; camp has been broken and we are ready to march. the officers have returned from reporting to the major for orders and i fall in the company and give the following orders: "a regiment of the enemy's cavalry is thought to be marching towards salem from the south. our battalion will march at once towards salem to guard the railroad trestle over sandy creek, following this road (pointing southeast along the road out of oxford) and the chester pike which is one and three-quarters miles from here. "this company will form the advance guard. "sergeant adams, you will take corporal baker's squad and form the point, followed by the remainder of the company at about yards. patrols and connecting files will be furnished by the company. "the company wagon will join the wagons of the battalion. "i will be with the company. "move out at once." the weather is fine and the roads are good and free from dust. it is august and nearly all the crops are harvested. bushes and weeds form a considerable growth along the fences bordering the road. sergeant, give your orders. =sergeant adams:= st squad, = . right, . face, . forward, . march.= corporal baker, take carter (baker's rear rank man) and go ahead of the squad about yards. move out rapidly until you get your distance and then keep us in sight. i would then have the two leading men of the rest of the squad follow on opposite sides of the road, as close to the fence as possible for good walking. this would put the squad in two columns of files of three men each, leaving the main roadway clear and making the squad as inconspicuous as possible, without interfering with ease of marching or separating the men. [par. (c).] what sort of crops are in the fields on either side of the road? =captain:= the field on the right (south) is meadow land; that on the left, as far as the railroad, is cut hay; beyond the railroad there is more meadow land. =sergeant adams:= i would have told corporal baker to wait at the cross roads by the baker house for orders and-- =captain:= if you were actually on the ground you probably could not see the cross roads from oxford. in solving map problems like these do not take advantage of seeing on the map all the country that you are supposed to go over, and then give orders about doing things at places concerning which you would not probably have any knowledge if actually on the ground without the map. besides, in this particular case, it was a mistake to have your point wait at the cross roads. if there was any danger of their taking the wrong road it would be a different matter, but here your mission requires you to push ahead. (par. .) the major is trying to get south of the trestle towards salem before the cavalry can arrive and destroy it. =sergeant adams:= i would march steadily along the road, ordering the last man to keep a lookout to the rear for signals from the connecting file (par. a), and i would direct one of the leading men to watch for signals from corporal baker. =captain:= you should have given the direction about watching for signals earlier, as this is very important. you also should have ordered two men to follow along the timber by the creek to your south until you signaled for them to come in. the trees along the creek would obstruct your view over the country beyond the creek. =sergeant adams:= but i thought, captain, that the patrolling was to be done by the company. =captain:= yes, the patrolling is to be done by the company, but the creek is only a quarter of a mile, about yards, from the road you are following and the men sent there are merely flankers, not a patrol. you have eight men under your command and you are responsible for the ground within several hundred yards on either side of your route of march. long ridge is almost too far for you to send your men, because they would fall far behind in climbing and descending its slopes, but it would not be a great mistake if you sent two men there. as long ridge affords an extended view of the valley through which the chester pike runs, a patrol should go up on it and remain there until the battalion passes, and this would be more than the leading squad could be expected to attend to. the creek is almost too far from the road in places, but as it is open meadow land you can keep the men within easy touch of you and recall them by signal at any moment you desire. in this work you can see how much depends on good judgment and a proper understanding of one's mission. corporal baker, explain how you would move out with carter. =corporal baker:= we would alternate the walk and double time until we had gotten about yards ahead of the squad. i would then say, "carter, walk along this side of the road (indicates side), keeping on the lookout for signals from the squad. i will go about fifty yards ahead of you." i would keep to the opposite side of the road from carter, trying to march steadily at the regular marching gait, and keeping a keen watch on everything in front and to the flanks. =captain:= very good. when you arrive at the cross roads you see a man standing in the yard of the baker house. =corporal baker:= i would not stop, but would continue on by the cross roads, as i have no time to question the man and the sergeant will want to do that. i would call to him and ask him if he had seen any of the enemy about and how far it was to the chester pike. if anything looked suspicious around the house or barnyard, i would investigate. =captain:= sergeant, you arrive at the cross roads, and see the corporal and carter going on ahead of you. =sergeant adams:= i would have already signaled to the two men following the creek to come in and would send a man to meet them with the following order: "tell davis to move along the railroad fill with evans, keeping abreast of us. then you return to me." i would then say, "fiske, look in that house and around the barn and orchard and then rejoin me down this road (pointing east)." i would have the civilian join me and walk down the road with me while i questioned him. =captain:= do you think you have made careful arrangements for searching the house, etc., by leaving only one man to do the work? =sergeant adams:= i have not sufficient men nor time enough to do much more. i simply want to make sure things are reasonably safe and i thought that a couple of men from the main body of the advance guard would do any careful searching, questioning, etc., that might be deemed necessary. i must not delay the march. =captain:= that is right. you learn nothing from the civilian and he does not arouse any suspicion on your part. you continue along the road. the fields to the north of the road are in wheat stubble; the ground to the south, between your road and the railroad, is rough, rocky grass land with frequent clumps of bushes. davis and evans, your right flankers on the railroad fill, are just approaching the cut; fiske has rejoined; corporal baker and his men are about yards from the road forks at brown's, and you and your four men are yards in their rear, at the turn of the road. at this moment a half dozen shots are fired down the road in your direction from behind the wall along the edge of the orchard on the brown farm. this firing continues and your two leading men are lying down at the roadside returning the fire. tell me quickly just what you are going to do? =sergeant adams:= i order my four men to deploy as skirmishers in that field (pointing to the rough ground south of the road); i go under the fence with the men and lead them forward at a fast run, unless the fire is very heavy. =captain= (interrupting the sergeant): davis, you had just reached the cut on the railroad when this happened. what do you do? =private davis:= i take evans forward with me at a run through the cut. what do i see along the chester pike or sandy creek? =captain:= you see no sign of the enemy any place, except the firing over the wall. =private davis:= i run down the south side of the fill and along towards the road with evans to open fire on the enemy from their flank, and also to see what is in the orchard. i will probably cross the road so that i can see behind the stone wall. =captain:= that's fine and shows how you should go ahead at such a time without any orders. there is usually no time or opportunity at such a moment for sending instructions and you must use common sense and do something. generally it would have been better to have tried to signal or send word back that there was nothing in sight along the road or in the valley, but in this particular case you could probably do more good by going quickly around in rear as you did, to discover what was there and assist in quickly dislodging whatever it was. if there had been no nose of the ridge to hide you as you came up and a convenient railroad fill to hurry along behind as you made for the road, your solution might have been quite different. sergeant, continue with your movements. =sergeant adams:= i would attempt to rush the wall. if the fire were too heavy, i would open fire (at will) with all my men, and, if i seemed to get a little heavier fire than the enemy's, i would start half of my men forward on a rush while the others fired. i would try to rush in on the enemy with as little delay as possible, until it developed that he had more than a small detachment there. i assumed it was a delaying patrol in front of me, and as my mission requires me to secure the uninterrupted march of the main body, i must not permit any small detachment to delay me. if, however, it proves to be a larger force, for instance, the head of an advance guard, i will lose some men by plunging in, but as i understand it, that is the duty of the point. then again, if it be the head of a hostile advance guard, i will want to rush them out of their favorable position under cover of the stone wall, buildings and orchard, before any more of their force can come up. this would give the favorable position to our force; by acting too cautiously we would lose the valuable moments in which the enemy's reënforcements (next elements of the advance guard) were coming up, with this desirable position being weakly held by a small part of the enemy. =captain:= that is all correct. what messages would you have sent? =sergeant adams:= up to the present time i would not have sent any. i could not have sent any. i could not afford to take the time to send a man back, nor could i spare the man. besides, all i could say was that we were fired on, and you should be able to see and hear that from where the company is. =captain:= about the time you reached the position of corporal baker the firing ceases, and when you reach the wall you see five mounted men galloping northeast up farm lane. the brown farm appears to be deserted. =sergeant adams:= i would turn to one of the men and say, "run back to the captain and tell him we were fired on from this orchard by a mounted patrol of five men who are galloping off up a lane to the northeast. i am going south." when he had repeated the message i would start south down the chester pike, directing corporal baker to follow this road south and to tell davis to follow the high ridge west of the road, going through the clump of woods just ahead. i would send one man as a left flanker to follow the west bank of sandy creek. this would leave me with two men, one watching for signals from the front and along sandy creek, the other from davis and from the rear. i would expect to see a patrol from the company moving across towards boling woods. had i not been mixed up in a fight as i approached the brown farm i would have sent two men as left flankers across country to the cut on the chester pike on the western edge of the boling woods. =captain:= very good. that is sufficient for this problem. all of you should have caught the idea of the principal duties of the point and flankers of an advance guard. you must watch the country to prevent being surprised and you must at the same time manage to push ahead with the least possible delay. the point cannot be very cautious so far as concerns its own safety, for this would mean frequent halts which would delay the troops in rear, but it must be cautious about reconnoitering all parts of the ground near the road which might conceal large bodies of the enemy. the leader of the point must be careful in using his men or he will get them so scattered that they will become entirely separated and he will lose all control of them. as soon as the necessity for flankers on one side of the line of march no longer exists, signal for them to rejoin and do not send them out again so long as you can see from the road all the country you should cover. problem no. . (infantry) = . captain (to one platoon of his company):= let us assume that this platoon is the advance party of an advance guard, marching through salem along the chester pike [par. (b)]. one squad is yards in front, acting as the point. the enemy is thought to be very near, but only two mounted patrols have been seen during the day. the command is marching for chester. the day is hot, the roads are good but dusty, and the crops are about to be harvested. sergeant adams, explain how you would conduct the march of the advance party, beginning with your arrival at the cross roads in salem. =sergeant adams:= the platoon would be marching in column of squads and i would be at the head. two pairs of connecting files would keep me in touch with the point. (par. .) i would now give this order: "corporal smith, take two men from your squad and patrol north along this road (pointing up the tracy-maxey road) for a mile and then rejoin the column on this road (chester pike), to the west of you." i would then say to private barker, "take carter and cut across to that railroad fill and go along the top of that (sandy) ridge, rejoining the column beyond the ridge. corporal smith with a patrol is going up this road. keep a lookout for him." when we reached the point where the road crosses the south nose of sandy ridge and i saw the valley in front of me with the long high ridge west of sandy creek, running parallel to the chester pike and about yards west of it, i would give this order: "corporal davis, take the three remaining men in corporal smith's squad, cross the creek there (pointing in the direction of the barton farm) go by that orchard, and move north along that high ridge, keeping the column in sight. make an effort to keep abreast of the advance guard, which will continue along this road." i gave corporal davis the remaining men out of corporal smith's squad because i did not want to break up another squad and as this is, in my opinion, a very important patrol, i wanted a noncommissioned officer in charge of it. unless something else occurs this will be all the patrols i intend sending out until we pass the steel railroad trestle over sandy creek. =captain:= your point about not breaking up a squad when you could avoid it by using the men remaining in an already broken squad, is a very important one. take this particular case. you first sent out two pairs of connecting files between the advance party and your point--four men. this leaves a corporal and three men in that squad. if we assume that no patrols were out when we passed through salem, this corporal and two of his men could have been sent up the tracy-maxey road, leaving one man to be temporarily attached to some squad. from the last mentioned squad you would pick your two men for the sandy ridge patrol and also the corporal and three men for the barton farm, etc., patrol. this would leave three men in this squad and you would have under your immediate command two complete squads and three men. as the patrols return, organize new squads immediately and constantly endeavor to have every man attached to a squad. this is one of your most important duties, as it prevents disorder when some serious situation suddenly arises. also it is one of the duties of the detachment commander that is generally overlooked until too late. the direction you sent your three patrols was good and their orders clear, covering the essential points, but as you have in a very short space of time, detached nine men, almost a third of your advance party, don't you think you should have economized more on men? =sergeant adams:= the sandy ridge patrol is as small as you can make it--two men. i thought the other two patrols were going to be detached so far from the column that they should be large enough to send a message or two and still remain out. i suppose it would be better to send but two men with corporal davis, but i think corporal smith should have two with him. =captain:= yes, i agree with you, for you are entering a valley which is, in effect, a defile, and the tracy-maxey road is a very dangerous avenue of approach to your main body. but you must always bear in mind that it is a mistake to use one more man than is needed to accomplish the object in view. the more you send away from your advance party, the more scattered and weaker your command becomes, and this is dispersion, which constitutes one of the gravest, and at the same time, most frequent tactical errors. to continue the problem, we will suppose you have reached the stone bridge over sandy creek; the point is at the cross roads by the smith house; you can see the two men moving along sandy ridge; and corporal davis' patrol is just entering the orchard by the barton farm. firing suddenly commences well to the front and you hear your point reply to it. =sergeant adams:= i halt to await information from the point. =captain:= that is absolutely wrong. you command the advance party of an advance guard; your mission requires you to secure the uninterrupted march of the main body; and at the first contact you halt, thus interrupting the march (par. ). the sooner you reach the point, the better are your chances for driving off the enemy if he is not too strong, or the quicker you find out his strength and give your commander in the rear the much desired information. =sergeant adams:= then i push ahead with the advance party, sending back the following message-- =captain= (interrupting): it is not time to send a message. you know too little and in a few minutes you will be up with the point where you can hear what has happened and see the situation for yourself. then you can send back a valuable message. when but a few moments delay will probably permit you to secure much more detailed information, it is generally best to wait for that short time and thus avoid using two messengers. when you reach the cross roads you find six men of the point deployed behind the fence, under cover of the trees along the county road, just west of the chester pike, firing at the stone wall along the mills' farm lane. the enemy appears to be deployed behind this stone wall, from the chester pike west for a distance of fifty yards, and his fire is much heavier than that of your point. you think he has at least twenty rifles there. you cannot see down the chester pike beyond the enemy's position. your patrol on sandy ridge is midway between the and knolls, moving north. the ground in your front, west of the road, is a potato field; that east of the road as far as the swamp, is rough grass land. =sergeant adams:= i give order, "corporal gibbs, deploy your squad to the right of the pike and push forward between the pike and the swamp. corporal hall (commands the point), continue a heavy fire. here are six more men for your squad." i give him the four connecting files and two of the three men in the advance party whose squad is on patrol duty. "corporal jackson, get your squad under cover here. lacey, run back to the major and tell him the point has been stopped by what appears to be twenty of the enemy deployed behind a stone wall across the valley yards in our front. i am attacking with advance party." =captain:= corporal davis (commands patrol near barton farm), you can hear the firing and see that the advance is stopped. what do you do? =corporal davis:= i would head straight across for the clump of woods on the ridge just above the mills' farm, moving as rapidly as possible. =captain:= that is all right. sergeant, corporal hall's squad keeps up a heavy fire; corporal gibb's squad deploys to the right of the pike, rushes forward about yards, but is forced to lie down by the enemy's fire, and opens fire. corporal gibbs, what would your command for firing be? =corporal gibbs:= =at the bottom of that wall. battle sight. clip fire.= =captain:= why at the bottom of the wall? =corporal gibbs:= the men are winded and excited and will probably fire high, so i gave them the bottom of the wall as an objective. =captain:= the enemy's fire seems as heavy as yours. sergeant, what do you do? =sergeant adams:= i give this order. "corporal jackson, deploy your squad as skirmishers on the left of corporal hall's squad and open fire." what effect does this additional fire have on the enemy? =captain:= his bullets seem to go higher and wider. you appear to be getting fire superiority over him. =sergeant adams:= if i do not see any signs of the enemy being reënforced, dust in the road behind his position, etc., i take immediate command of the squads of corporals hall and jackson, and lead them forward on a rush across the potato field. =captain:= corporal gibbs, what do you do when you see the other two squads rush? =corporal gibbs:= i order, =fire at will=, and urge the men to shoot rapidly in order to cover the advance. =captain:= sergeant adams' squads are forced to halt after advancing about yards. =corporal gibbs:= i keep up a hot fire until they can resume their firing, when i lead my squad forward in a rush. =captain:= what do you do, sergeant? =sergeant adams:= i would have the corporals keep up a heavy fire. by this time i should think the support would be up to the cross roads. =captain:= it is, but have you given up your attack? =sergeant adams:= if it looks as if i could drive the enemy out on my next rush, i do so, but otherwise i remain where i am, as i have no reserve under my control and the action has gotten too serious for me to risk anything more when my chief is practically on the ground to make the next decision. he should have heard something about what is on the pike behind the enemy, from the patrol on sandy ridge. =captain:= your solution seems correct to me. why did you send corporal gibbs' squad up between the pike and the swamp? =sergeant adams:= it looked as if he would strike the enemy from a better quarter; there appeared to be better cover that way, afforded by the turn in the road, which must have some weeds, etc., along it, and the swamp would prevent him from getting too far separated from the remainder of the advance party. =captain:= the sergeant's orders for the attack were very good. he gave his squad leaders some authority and attached his extra men to a squad. he did not attempt to assume direct control of individual men, but managed the three squads and made the squad leaders manage the individual men. this is the secret of successful troop leading. his orders were short, plain and given in proper sequence. problem no. (infantry) (see fort leavenworth map in pocket at back of book.) [illustration: map of fort leavenworth, kas. and vicinity] = .= situation. a blue battalion, in hostile country, is in camp for the night, august - , at sprong (ja'). at : p. m., august th, lieutenant a, adjutant gives a copy of the following order to sergeant b: st battalion, st infantry, sprong, kansas, aug., ' . field orders no. . . the enemy's infantry is six miles east of fort leavenworth. his cavalry patrols were seen at f (qg') today. our regiment will reach frenchman's (oc') at noon tomorrow. . the battalion will march tomorrow to seize the rock island bridge (q) at fort leavenworth. . (a) the advance guard, consisting of st platoon co. a and mounted orderlies b, c, and d, under sergeant b, will precede the main body at yards. (b) the head of the main body will march at : a. m., from via the (jc')-- (jg') -- (lm')--fort leavenworth (om') road. . the baggage will follow close behind the main body under escort of corporal d and one squad, co. b. . send reports to head of main body. c, major, comdg. copies to the company commanders, to sergeant b and corporal d. =a. required, .= give sergeant b's estimate of the situation. (the estimate of the military situation includes the following points: . his orders or mission and how much discretion he is allowed. . the ground as it influences his duty. . the position, strength and probable intentions of the enemy. . sergeant b's decision.) =answer.= . the size of the advance guard, its route and the distance it is to move in front of the main body are prescribed by major c. sergeant b is free to divide up the advance as he sees fit, to use the various parts so as to best keep open the way of the main body, maintain the distance of yards in front of it, and protect it from surprise by the enemy. . the ground may be such as to make easy or to hinder reconnaissance, such as hills or woods; to impede or hasten the march, such as roads, streams, defiles; to offer good or poor defensive positions; to offer good or poor opportunities for an attack. sergeant b sees from his map that the ground is rolling and open as far as kern (ji') with good positions for reconnaissance and for defense or attack. there is a bridge over salt creek (ig') which has steep banks and will be a considerable obstacle if the bridge has been destroyed. from this creek to kern the advance would be under effective fire from hancock hill (ki'), so that these heights must be seized before the main body reaches (jg'). beyond kern the heavy woods make reconnaissance difficult and must be treated somewhat like a defile by the point. (par. .) . there is little to fear from the main body of the enemy which is - / miles farther from the rock island bridge than we are, but we know the enemy has cavalry. the size of the cavalry force is not known, and may be sufficient to cause us considerable delay, especially in the woods. the enemy's evident intention is to keep us from seizing the bridge. . having considered all these points, sergeant b comes to the following decision: ... (before reading the decision as contained in the following paragraph, make one of your own.) =answer:= to have only an advance party with which to throw forward a point of men yards to the front and send out flankers, as needed (par. ); to send the three mounted orderlies well to the front of the point to gain early information of the enemy, especially on hancock hill (ji') and the ridge to the north of (jj'). =required, .= sergeant b's order. (par. .) =answer.= given verbally to the platoon and mounted orderlies, at : p. m. "the enemy's cavalry patrols were seen at f (qh') today; no hostile infantry is on this side of the missouri river. the battalion will move tomorrow to fort leavenworth, leaving (ja') at : a. m. "this platoon and orderlies b, c, and d will form the advance guard, and will start from the hedge yards east of at : a. m. via the (jc')-- (jg')-- (lm') road. "the point, corporal smith and men of his squad, will precede the remainder of the advance guard at yards. "i will be with the advance party. privates x and y will act as connecting files with the main body." the flankers will be sent out from time to time by sergeant b as necessary. =required, .= the flankers sent out by sergeant b between (ja') and (jg'). =answer.= a patrol of men is sent to hill southeast of (ja'), thence by moss (kc') and taylor (lc') houses to hill east of taylor, thence to join at (jg'). two men are sent from the advance party as it passes hill . (ie') to the top of this hill to reconnoiter to the front and northeast. these men return to the road and join after the advance party has reached salt creek. two men are sent ahead of the advance party at a double time take position on "hill northeast of j. e. daniels" place (jf') and reconnoiter to the northeast and east. =reasons.= the patrol sent out on the south moves out far enough to get a good view from the hills which an enemy could observe or fire into the column. there is no necessity of sending out flankers north of the road at first, because from the road itself a good view is obtained. hills . and give splendid points for observing all the ground to the north and east. (don't send flankers out unless they are necessary.) =required, .= when the advance party reaches j. e. daniels' house (je') a civilian leaves the house and starts toward . what action does sergeant b take? =required, .= when the advance party reaches salt creek bridge (jg') the point signals "enemy in sight," and private h reports that he saw about or mounted men ride up to the edge of the woods at kern, halt a moment, and disappear. what action does sergeant b take? =answer.= he at once sends a message back by private h stating the facts. he then orders the advance party to move forward, hastens up to the point and directs it to continue the march, seeking cover of fences and ravines and hill top. =required, .= when the point reaches schroeder (jh') it receives fire from the orchard at kern. what action is taken? =answer.= the men in the point are moved rapidly down the hill and gain shelter in the ravines leading toward kern. two squads are rapidly placed in line along the ridge west of schroeder and under cover of their fire the remainder of the advance party run down the hill at yards distance to join the point. a squad of this force is then hurried forward to the kern house. here the squad is stopped by fire and sergeant b deploys two more squads which advance by rushes and drive out the enemy, found to be cavalrymen. the squads left at schroeder now join at double time and the advance party moves forward, without having delayed the march of the main body. problem no. (infantry) = . situation:= a blue force of one regiment of infantry has outposts facing south on the line pope hill (sm')--national cemetery (pk')--e (qh'). a red force is reported to have reached soldiers' home ( miles south of leavenworth) from the south at : o'clock this morning. corporal a is directed by sergeant b, in command of the left support at rabbit point (tn'), to take out a patrol toward the waterworks and south along the esplanade (xo') to the terminal bridge. =required, .= give sergeant b's orders to corporal a. =answer.= "the enemy, strength unknown, was at soldiers' home at : o'clock this morning. another patrol will advance along grant avenue (tm'). "our outposts will remain here for the day. "select from the first section a patrol and reconnoiter this road (farragut avenue) as far as the waterworks (vn'), thence by esplanade to the terminal bridge, and report on the ground in our front. when you reach the terminal bridge return if no enemy is seen. "send reports here." =required, .= how many men does corporal a select, and why? (par. .) =answer.= five men are taken because the patrol is to reconnoiter, not to fight, and on account of the distance to go and lack of information of the enemy, or messages may have to be sent. =required, .= what equipment should corporal a have? (par. .) =required, .= state the points to be noted by corporal a in selecting his patrol and what inspection does he make? (par. .) =answer.= he selects privates c, d, e, f and g, on account of their bravery, attention to duty and discretion. he directs them to carry one meal in their haversacks, full canteen and fifty rounds of ammunition. he then inspects them as to their physical condition, sees that they have proper equipment and that nothing to rattle or glisten is carried. =required, .= what does corporal a next do? (par. .) =answer.= he gives them their instructions as follows: "the enemy, strength unknown, was at soldiers' home (about three miles south of leavenworth) at o'clock this morning. there will be a friendly patrol along that road (pointing to grant avenue). we are to reconnoiter along this road and down toward that bridge (pointing). be very careful not to be seen, take advantage of all cover, and keep in touch with c and myself on this road at the point of the patrol. in case we get separated meet at the waterworks (vn')." he then explains the signals to be used, and moves the patrol in, close order out along the road until it passes the sentinel at the bridge xv (un'), to whom he gives the direction to be taken by the patrol. =required, .= upon leaving xv, what formation would the patrol take, and reasons for same. (par. .) =answer.= corporal a and private c form the point on the road leading southwest of the waterworks; private d moves on the left overlooking the railroad; private e moves promptly up corral creek (um') to the top of grant hill (um') to observe the country toward the southwest; private f moves about yards in rear of the point, followed at yards by private g. corporal a forms his patrol as stated because of the necessity of getting a view from the hill on each side. only one man is sent out on each side because they can be plainly seen by the patrol on the road, and no connecting file is necessary. the distances taken along the road assure at least one man's escape, and corporal a is in front to get a good view and to signal the flankers. problem no. (infantry) = . situation:= the head of the patrol is now at the bridge, xvi (un') northwest of the waterworks. private e has reached the top of grant hill and signals the enemy in sight; the patrol halts and corporal a moves out to meet private e who is coming down toward the patrol. he says he saw three mounted men ride up to grant and metropolitan avenues (wm') from the south and after looking north a moment move west. =required, .= corporal a's action. (pars. and .) =answer.= corporal a at once writes the following message and sends it back by private e: "no. patrol, company b, farragut avenue, northwest of waterworks, may, ' , : a. m. to commander blue left support, rabbit point. three mounted reds, seen by private e, just now reconnoitered at grant and metropolitan avenues; they are moving west on metropolitan avenue; the patrol will continue toward the terminal bridge. a, corporal." =reasons.= the message is sent because this is the first time the enemy has been seen, and they have not been reported north of soldiers' home before. the message should state who saw the enemy, and the man seeing them should always carry the message telling of the facts. the patrol would not allow this small hostile patrol to stop its advance, but would proceed on its route cautiously to avoid being seen, and to see if the red cavalrymen are followed by others of the enemy. =required, .= give the method of reconnoitering the buildings at the waterworks and coal mine. (par. .) =answer.= private d carefully examines the east side of the enclosures and buildings, while private c examines the west side. the remainder of the patrol halts concealed in the cut west of the north enclosure, until c and d signal no enemy in sight, whereupon the patrol moves forward along the road (xv-- rd st.), c and d advancing rapidly between the buildings to the town where they join the patrol. =required, .= give the route followed by e from grant hill to edge of leavenworth. =answer.= he moves down the east slope of grant hill to the ravine just east of the old r. r. bed (um'), being careful to keep concealed from the direction of leavenworth. he moves up the ravine, keeping a sharp lookout to the front, and moving rapidly until abreast, if he has fallen behind. he takes the branch ravine lying just west of circus hill (vm'), and moves up to its end. here he halts and makes careful inspection of metropolitan avenue and the street south into the city. being sure the coast is clear, he darts across the narrow ridge south of circus hill to the ravine to the east and then joins the patrol. he reports to corporal a any indication of the enemy he may have seen. problem no. (infantry) = . situation:= a blue force holds fort leavenworth (om') in hostile country. outposts occupy the line salt creek hill (gh')-- (ij')--sheridan's drive, (mi') against the reds advancing from the northwest. at : p. m., june th, sergeant a is given the following orders by captain b, commanding the support: "the enemy will probably reach kickapoo late today. our outposts extend as far north as salt creek hill. there were six of our men prisoners at (de') this afternoon at o'clock, being held by home guards at kickapoo. take ---- men from the company and move to kickapoo, recapture the prisoners and gain all the information you can of the enemy north of there." =required, .= how many men does captain b name, and why? (par. .) =answer.= thirty men are assigned. =reason.= this is twice as many as the enemy holding the prisoners, and to secure secrecy no larger force than is absolutely necessary should be taken. this force will allow men to surround the enemy while the remainder rush them. =required, .= give the order of sergeant a to his patrol. (see th requirement. problem .) =required, .= what route will the patrol take? =answer, = (jj')-- (ij')--salt creek hill (gh')--and along the edge of the woods east of the m. p. r. r. (fg') as far as the bridge opposite kickapoo hill--thence up kickapoo hill toward (de'). =reasons.= since the patrol's orders do not require any reconnaissance before reaching kickapoo the shortest and most practical route is chosen. the route as far as salt creek hill lies behind our outpost line and is thus protected. the main roads are avoided because they will be carefully watched by the enemy. the edge of the woods east of the m. p. ry. (beginning about ff') gives good cover and by moving to the bridge the patrol can probably sneak close in on the enemy and capture them by surprise. problem no. (infantry) = . situation:= the patrol reaches the top of kickapoo hill (cd'). sergeant a and private c move cautiously to the top and see the six prisoners in the cemetery (cd') just west of kickapoo hill, and a red sentinel at each corner. just west of the cemetery are about more reds. no others are visible. =required, .= what decision does sergeant a make and what does he do? =answer.= he decides to capture the enemy by surprise. he leaves private c to watch and, moving cautiously back to his patrol, makes the following dispositions: corporal d with men to move up to private c and cover the enemy, remaining concealed. he takes the remainder of the patrol with fixed bayonets around the northeast slope of kickapoo hill in the woods and moves up the ravine toward . when his detachment arrives within about yards of the enemy, they charge bayonet and rush them. corporal d's party at the same time rush in from the opposite side. (note: the enemy are demoralized by the surprise and are captured without a shot being fired.) =required, .= what action does sergeant a now take? =answer.= he causes the enemy to be kept apart while he and his noncommissioned officers question them separately. he then questions the blue prisoners, and furnishing them the guns taken from the reds, sends them and the captured reds back to our line under corporal d, with a written message giving the information secured from his questions. (par. .) =required, .= what does he then do? =answer.= places his main body in concealment at the cemetery (cd') and sends a patrol under corporal h via - - and one under corporal f via - - west to learn further of the enemy in execution of the second part of his orders. the patrol under corporal h sends back the following message: "no. patrol, company a, st infantry, june, ' ; : p. m. commander expeditionary patrol at : a column of infantry is moving east about mile west of schweizer (aa'); about yards in front of this body is another small body with to men yards still farther east. it took the main body min., sec. to pass a point on the road. i remain in observation. h, corporal." =required, .= the size of the command reported by corporal h and its formation. (par. .) =answer.= one battalion infantry ( men), preceded by section at advance guard. the advance guard having only advance party and point, - / minutes × = men in the main body, leaving about men for the advance men for the advance guard. problem no. (infantry) = . general situation:= a blue force of one regiment of infantry has outposts facing south on the line pope hill (sm'), national cemetery (qk')--e (qi'). a red force moving north reached soldiers' home at o'clock this morning. =special situation:= corporal b is chosen by sergeant a, commander of the right support at the national cemetery, to take a patrol south as far as th street (yf') and metropolitan avenue (wh'), to report on the ground along the route, and to reconnoiter the enemy. a friendly patrol moves along sheridan's drive (i)--atchison hill (rg')--southwest hill (ue'), and one on prison lane (rk'). =required, .= sergeant a's orders, verbatim (that is, word for word). = .= give the various details attended to by corporal b before he moves out with his patrol. = .= what is the formation of the patrol when its point is at e (qh')? = .= when the patrol reaches (ug'), how are the intersecting roads reconnoitered? = .= four mounted men are seen riding west at a walk at (wb'). what action does corporal a take? = .= describe the ground passed over by the patrol. problem no. (infantry) = . situation:= the enemy is moving east toward frenchman (oc') and is expected to reach there early tomorrow. a company at (uj') forms the left support of an outpost in hostile country, on the line (vj')--national cemetery (qj'). at p. m. sergeant a is ordered to take a patrol of men and go to frenchman and destroy the bridge there, and remain in observation in that vicinity all night. =required, .= his orders to the patrol. = .= the route the patrol will follow, and its formation crossing the atchison hill--government hill ridge. = .= give the conduct of the patrol from atchison hill (rg')--government hill (tf') to its position at the bridge at frenchman. =general situation:= a blue squadron is camped for the night at waterworks (vn'), fort leavenworth, and has outposts on the line xiv (un')--grant hill (um')--prison hill (wk'). a red force is reported to be advancing from the north on kickapoo (cb'). problem no. (cavalry) = . special situation:= lieutenant a, commanding the left support on prison hill, at p. m., directs sergeant jones to take a patrol of men from his platoon and move via atchison cross (ug') to the vicinity of kickapoo and secure information of any enemy that may be in that locality. another patrol is to go via fort leavenworth (ol'). =required, .= the order given by lieutenant a, verbatim. (pars. and .) =answer.= "sergeant jones, the enemy is north of kickapoo, moving on that place. this squadron will remain here tonight; sergeant b will take a patrol through fort leavenworth. "select a patrol of men from your platoon and move out via frenchman's (oc') toward kickapoo. "secure any information you can of the enemy in that locality. "report on the condition of the bridges between here and (fd'). "you may have to stay out over night. "send messages here." sergeant jones selects five good men, directs them to take one cooked ration each and canteen full of water. he inspects the men and horses carefully; sees that no horse of conspicuous color or that neighs is taken. explains the orders to his men, etc., as was done in the infantry patrol. =required, .= what route does the patrol take, and why? =answer.= metropolitan avenue (w)-- (vj')-- (vj')-- (ug')--frenchman (oc')-- (jc')-- (ec'). =reasons.= the enemy is distant and kickapoo, the objective of the patrol, is seen from the map, which sergeant jones has, to be over an hour's ride at a walk and trot. it is not at all probable that the enemy will be met until the patrol reaches the vicinity of kickapoo and sergeant jones decides to take the shortest and best road though it is a main highway, instead of sheridan's drive (j) of the f (qg')-- (jg') lane. it is always well for a patrol to avoid main highways when the enemy is near, especially in hostile country, but here the time saved more than justifies the use of the direct route. problem no. (cavalry) = .= same situation as problem . =required, .= the formation and conduct of the patrol as far as frenchman's. =answer.= sergeant jones determines to move at a walk and trot ( miles per hour) in order to reach the vicinity of kickapoo and take up a position of observation before night. sergeant jones and private b are in the lead, men about yards to the rear, the remaining men about yards in the rear of these. they move out at a trot along the road until atchison cross is reached. the two cross roads are reconnoitered without halting the patrol, inasmuch as from the cross roads a good view is had north and south. from atchison cross to (sf') the patrol moves at a walk, being up a slope from to degrees. usually such a place would be rushed through, but the distance of the enemy makes this unnecessary. no scouting is done off the road through the woods, because of the distance of the enemy. on reaching the top of the hill the patrol is halted while sergeant jones moves up to the high ground south of the road at the crest, and in concealment searches with his glasses the road as far as frenchman's, especially the village beyond g (qf'). seeing no signs of the enemy he moves the patrol down the hill at a walk until the cut is passed and there takes a fast trot, so as to avoid being long in a position where they could be seen from the direction of kickapoo. the same formation and gait are maintained as far as gauss' (pd'), where a walk is taken to rest the horses and to gain opportunity to see if any enemy are holding the bridge at frenchman's. =situation:= just as the patrol comes to a walk sergeant jones sees what appears to be a dismounted patrol moving south over the ridge about yards north of frenchman's. he can see three men. =required, .= action taken by sergeant jones. =answer.= the patrol is moved into the orchard just off the road, while sergeant jones moves quickly to the top of the hill and, concealed by the trees, examines the road north to see if the men are followed by others forming a part of a larger patrol or column. he finds the three men are not followed. =required, .= what does he do next? =answer.= he determines to capture the patrol by surprise. he has the horses led over south of the orchard hill so as not to be visible to the enemy. he then distributes his men along the north edge of the orchard, himself nearest the bridge, men yards back along the road toward g (qf'), then men yards farther along toward g. as the third man comes opposite him, sergeant jones cries "halt," which is the signal for the other parties to similarly hold up their men. =reasons.= sergeant jones might either capture the hostile patrol or let it pass, and then proceed on his road. since they are the first enemy seen and there is such a good chance to capture them, and as they may furnish definite information of the enemy's main force, he decides as stated. there is an objection in capturing them that he will have to send one or two men to take them to camp. the patrol is placed as described above so as to have the two men opposite each of the enemy, except for sergeant jones, who is alone. by thus covering each man of the hostile patrol by two of our men, they will at once see the folly of an effort to escape and no shot need be fired. one man is holding the horses. problem no. (cavalry) = .= same situation as problem . =required:= . what action does sergeant jones take before leaving the vicinity of frenchman's? . give the formation and conduct of the patrol after leaving here. . give the report submitted by sergeant jones under his instructions in regard to bridges. (par. .) at : p. m. (it is dark at : ) the patrol reaches (jc'). . give the route followed from here and the disposition of the patrol made for the night. problem no. (cavalry) = . situation:= the missouri river is the boundary between hostile countries. a blue separate brigade ( regiments infantry, squadron cavalry, battery field artillery) is moving from winchester ( miles west of leavenworth) to seize the rock island bridge (q) across the missouri river at fort leavenworth. the cavalry squadron is camped at lowemont, miles west of leavenworth, for night june - . at p. m. sergeant jones is directed to take a patrol of six men and move via the rock island bridge into missouri and gain information of the enemy reported to be now just east of the river. =required, .= give the formation of the patrol when it first comes on the map. =required, .= give the conduct of the patrol from mottin's (oa') to g (qf'). at frenchman's, sergeant jones met a farmer coming from fort leavenworth, who said about hostile cavalry were seen just east of the missouri about p. m., moving towards the terminal bridge (z). =required, .= action of sergeant jones. (does he hold the man? does he send a message? does he change his plans or direction of march?) the patrol reaches the top of the hill, sheridan's drive--government hill (tf'). =required, .= what action does sergeant jones take before proceeding east? flank guards = .= the flanks of a column are ordinarily protected by the advance guard, which sends out patrols to carefully examine the country on both sides of the line of march. in some cases, however, the direction of march of the column is such that there is a great danger of the enemy's striking it in flank and some special provision is necessary to furnish additional security on the threatened flank. this is done by having a detachment, called a flank guard, march off the exposed flank. the flank guard usually follows a road, parallel to the one on which the column is marching and at least , yards (effective rifle range) beyond it. if hostile artillery is feared this distance is much greater. the flank guard regulates its march so as to continue abreast of the advance guard of the main column. it takes a formation similar to an advance guard, does most of its patrolling to the front and on the exposed flank, and keeps in constant touch with the main column by means of mounted or dismounted messengers. in case the enemy is encountered the flank guard drives him off if practicable or takes up a defensive position, protecting the march of the main column, and preventing the enemy from disturbing the latter's march. rear guard = . definition and duties.= a rear guard is a detachment of a marching column following in rear to protect the main column from being surprised and to prevent the march from being delayed or interrupted. when the main column is marching toward the enemy the rear guard is very small and its duties relatively unimportant. it is principally occupied in gathering up stragglers. when the main column is marching away from the enemy (retreating) the rear guard is all important. it covers the retreat of the main body, preventing the enemy from harassing or delaying its march. = . strength.= the strength of a rear guard is slightly greater than that of an advance guard, as it cannot expect, like the latter, to be reinforced in case it is attacked, as the main column is marching away from it and avoiding a fight. = . form of order.= the rear guard commander, on the receipt of the retreat order, issues a rear guard order, according to the form given in the field service regulations. the distance of a rear guard from the main body and its formation are similar to those of an advance guard. the elements corresponding to the advance cavalry, the point, and the advance party of an advance guard are termed the rear cavalry, rear point and rear party, respectively. the support and reserve retain the same designations. a rear guard formed during an engagement to cover the withdrawal or retreat of the main body, may first be compelled to take up a defensive position behind which the main body forms up and moves off. it may be forced to withdraw from this position by successive skirmish lines, gradually forming up in column on the road as it clears itself from fighting contact with the enemy. the rate of march of the rear guard depends upon that of the main body. the main body may be much disorganized and fatigued, necessitating long halts and a slow marching rate. = . action of the rear guard.= the withdrawal of defeated troops is delayed, if possible, until night. if it becomes necessary to begin a retreat while an engagement is in progress, the rear guard is organized and takes up a defensive position generally behind the fighting line; the latter then falls back and assembles under cover of the rear guard. the rear cavalry gives away before the enemy's pursuit only when absolutely necessary, maintains communication with and sends information to the rear guard commander, and pays special attention to the weak points in the retreat, namely, the flanks. it makes use of every kind of action of which it is capable, according to the situation, and unless greatly outnumbered by hostile cavalry, it causes considerable delay to the enemy. when the enemy is conducting an energetic pursuit the rear guard effects its withdrawal by taking up a succession of defensive positions (that is, where the nature of the ground enables the rear guard to defend itself well) and compelling the enemy to attack or turn them. (it should be understood that these successive defensive positions must, in the case of a large force, be from two to four miles apart and in the case of a small force at least one-half mile apart--not a few hundred yards as is frequently attempted in peace maneuvers.) when the enemy's dispositions for attack are nearly completed, the rear guard begins to fall back, the cavalry on the flanks being usually the last to leave. the commander designates a part of the rear guard to cover the withdrawal of the remainder; the latter then falls back to a new position in rear, and in turn covers the withdrawal of the troops in front. these operations compel the enemy continually to deploy or make turning movements, and constantly retard his advance. the pursuit may be further delayed by obstacles placed in the enemy's path; bridges are burned or blown up; boats removed or destroyed; fords and roads obstructed; tracks torn up; telegraph lines cut, and houses, villages, woods and fields fired. demolitions and obstructions are prepared by engineers, assisted, if necessary, by other troops detailed from the reserve, and are completed by the mounted engineers of the rear party at the last moment. the instructions of the supreme commander govern in the demolition of important structures. outposts (see "outpost," par. ) = . definition and duties.= outposts are detachments thrown out to the front and flanks of a force that is in camp or bivouac, to protect the main body from being surprised and to insure its undisturbed rest. in fact, an outpost is merely a stationary advance guard. its duties, in general, are to _observe_ and _resist_--to observe the enemy, and to resist him in case of attack. specifically its duties are: (=a=) to observe toward the front and flanks by means of stationary sentinels and patrols, in order to locate the enemy's whereabouts and learn promptly of his movements, thus making it impossible for him to surprise us. (=b=) to prevent the main body from being observed or disturbed. (=c=) in case of attack, to check the enemy long enough to enable the main body to prepare for action and make the necessary dispositions. = . size.= the size of the outpost will depend upon many circumstances, such as the size of the whole command, the nearness of the enemy, the nature of the ground, etc. a suitable strength for an outpost may vary from a very small fraction to one-third of the whole force. however, in practice it seldom exceeds one-sixth of the whole force--as a rule, if it be greater, the efficiency of the troops will be impaired. for a single company in bivouac a few sentinels and patrols will suffice; for a large command, a more elaborate outpost system must be provided. the most economical form of outpost is furnished by keeping close contact with the enemy by means of outpost patrols, in conjunction with resisting detachments on the avenues of approach. troops at a halt are supposed to be resting, night or day, and the fewer on outpost the more troops will there be resting, and thus husbanding their strength for approaching marches and encounters with the enemy. outpost duty is about the most exhausting and fatiguing work a soldier performs. it is, therefore, evident that not a man or horse more than is absolutely necessary should be employed, and that the commander should use careful judgment in determining the strength of the outpost, and the chiefs of the various outpost subdivisions should be equally careful in disposing their men so as to permit the greatest possible number to rest and sleep undisturbed, _but at the same time always considering the safety of the main body as the chief duty_. = . composition.= the composition of the outpost will, as a rule, depend upon the size and composition of the command, but a mixed outpost is composed principally of infantry, which is charged with the duty of local observation, especially at night, and with resisting the enemy, in case of attack, long enough for the main body to prepare for action. the cavalry is charged with the duty of reconnaissance, and is very useful in open country during the day. artillery is useful to outposts when its fire can sweep defiles or large open spaces and when it commands positions that might be occupied by hostile artillery. machine guns are useful to command approaches and check sudden advances of the enemy. engineers are attached to an outpost to assist in constructing entrenchments, clearing the field of fire, opening communication laterally and to the rear. the outpost should be composed of complete organizations. for example, if the outpost is to consist of one company, do not have some of the platoons from one company and the others from another, and if it is to consist of one battalion, do not have some of the companies from one battalion and others from another, etc. formation of outposts = . subdivisions.= as in the case of an advance guard, the outpost of a large force is divided into elements or parts, that gradually increase in size from front to rear. these, in order from the main body, are the reserve, the line of supports, the line of outguards, and the advance cavalry, and their formation, as shown by the drawing on the preceding page, may be likened to an open hand, with the fingers apart and extended, the wrist representing the main body, the knuckles the line of supports, the first joints the line of outguards, the second joints the line of sentinels and the finger tips the advance cavalry. [illustration: fig. ] in case of attack each part is charged with holding the enemy in check until the larger element, next in rear, has time to deploy and prepare for action. = . distances between the subdivisions.= the distances separating the main body, the line of supports, the line of outguards, the line of sentries and the advance cavalry, will depend upon circumstances. there can be no uniformity in the distance between supports and reserves, nor between outguards and supports, even in the same outpost. the avenues of approach and the important features of the ground will largely control the exact positions of the different parts of the outposts. the basic principle upon which the distances are based, is: _the distance between any two parts of the outpost must be great enough to give the one in rear time to deploy and prepare for action in case of attack, and the distance of the whole outpost from the main body must, in the case of small commands, be sufficiently great to hold the enemy beyond effective rifle range until the main body can deploy, and, in case of large commands, it must be sufficiently great to hold the enemy beyond effective artillery range until the main body can deploy._ it is, therefore, evident that the distances will be materially affected not only by the size of the main body, but also by the nature of the cover afforded by the ground. the following is given merely as a very general guide, subject to many changes: distance to next element in rear. advance cavalry to miles supports {sentinels (furnished by outguard) to yds. (generally {outguards (furnished by support) to yds. two or {support proper furnishes majority to yds. more) of patrols. reserve (usually omitted in small commands) / to miles = . advance cavalry.= the advance cavalry is that part of the outpost sent out in front of all foot troops. it generally operates two to six miles beyond the outpost infantry, reconnoitering far to the front and flanks in order to guard the camp against surprise by artillery fire and to give early information of the enemy's movements. after dusk the bulk of the cavalry usually withdraws to a camp in rear of the outpost reserve, where it can rest securely after the day's hard work and the horses can be fresh for the next day. several mounted patrols are usually left for the night at junctions or forks on the principal roads to the front, from one to four miles beyond the infantry line of observation. = . supports.= the _supports_ constitute a line of _supporting_ and _resisting_ detachments, varying in size from a half a company to a battalion. in outposts consisting of a battalion or more the supports usually comprise about one-half of the infantry. supports are numbered numerically consecutively from right to left and are placed at the more important points on the outpost line, on or near the line on which resistance is to be made in case of attack. as a rule, roads exercise the greatest influence on the location of supports, and a support will generally be placed on or near a road. each support has assigned to it a definite, clearly-defined section of front that it is to cover, and the support should be located as centrally as possible thereto. = . outguards.= the outguards constitute the line of small detachments farthest to the front and nearest to the enemy, and their duty is to maintain uninterrupted observation of the ground in front and on the flanks; to report promptly hostile movements and other information relating to the enemy; to prevent unauthorized persons from crossing the line of observation; to drive off small parties of the enemy, and to make temporary resistance to larger bodies. for convenience outguards are classified as pickets, sentry squads, and cossack posts. they are numbered consecutively from right to left in each support. = .= _a picket_ is a group consisting of two or more squads, ordinarily not exceeding half a company, posted in the line of outguards to cover a given sector. it furnishes patrols and one or more sentinels, double sentinels, sentry, squads, or cossack posts for observation. pickets are placed at the more important points in the line of outguards, such as road forks. the strength of each depends upon the number of small groups required to observe properly its sector. = .= _a sentry squad_ is a squad posted in observation at an indicated point. it posts a double sentinel in observation, the remaining men resting near by and furnishing the reliefs of sentinels. in some cases it may be required to furnish a patrol. = .= _a cossack post_ consists of four men. it is an observation group similar to a sentry squad; but employs a single sentinel. at night, it will sometimes be advisable to place some of the outguards or their sentinels in a position different from that which they occupy in the daytime. in such case the ground should be carefully studied before dark and the change made at dusk. however, a change in the position of the outguard will be exceptional. = .= _sentinels_ are generally used singly in daytime, but at night double sentinels will be required in most cases. sentinels furnished by cossack posts or sentry squads are kept near their group. those furnished by pickets may be as far as yards away. every sentinel should be able to communicate readily with the body to which he belongs. sentinel posts are numbered consecutively from right to left in each outguard. sentry squads and cossack posts furnished by pickets are counted as sentinel posts. if practicable, troops on outpost duty are concealed and all movements made so as to avoid observation by the enemy; sentinels are posted so as to have a clear view to the front and, if practicable (though it is rarely possible), so as to be able, by day, to see the sentinels of the adjoining outguards. double sentinels are posted near enough to each other to be able to communicate easily in ordinary voice. sentinels are generally on duty two hours out of six. for every sentinel and for every patrol there should be at least three reliefs; therefore, one-third the strength of the outguards gives the greatest number of men that should be on duty as sentinels and patrols at one time. skillful selection of the posts of sentinels increases their field of observation. high points, under cover, are advantageous by night as well as by day; they increase the range of vision and afford greater facilities for seeing lights and hearing noises. observers with good field glasses may be placed on high buildings, on church steeples or in high trees. glittering objects on uniform or equipment should be concealed. it is seldom necessary to fix bayonets, except at night, in dense fog, or in very close country. reliefs, visiting patrols, and inspecting officers, approach sentinels from the rear, remaining under cover if possible. = . reserve.= the reserve forms a general support for the line of resistance. it is, therefore, centrally located near the junction of roads coming from the direction of the enemy, and in concealment if practicable. of the troops detailed for outpost duty, about one-half of the infantry, generally all of the artillery, and the cavalry not otherwise employed, are assigned to the reserve. if the outpost consists of less than two companies the reserve may be omitted altogether. the arms are stacked and the equipments (except cartridge belts) may be removed. roads communicating with the supports are opened. when necessary, the outpost order states what is to be done in case of attack, designates places of assembly and provides for interior guards. interior guards are posted in the camp of the reserve or main body to maintain order, and furnish additional security. additional instructions may be given for messing, feeding, watering, etc. in the vicinity of the enemy or at night a portion of the infantry may be required to remain under arms, the cavalry to hold their horses (cinches loosened), and the artillery to remain in harness, or take up a combat position. in case of alarm, the reserve prepares for action without delay, and word is sent to the main body. in combat, the reserve reinforces the line of resistance, and if unable to check the enemy until the arrival of the main body, delays him as much as possible. the distance of the reserve from the line of resistance varies, but is generally about half a mile; in outposts of four companies or less this distance may be as small as yards. = . patrols.= instead of using outguards along the entire front of observation, part of this front may be covered by patrols only. these should be used to cover such sections of the front as can be crossed by the enemy only with difficulty and over which he is not likely to attempt a crossing after dark. in daylight much of the local patrolling may be dispensed with if the country can be seen from the posts of the sentinels. however, patrols should frequently be pushed well to the front unless the ground in that direction is exceptionally open. patrols must be used to keep up connection between the parts of the outpost except when, during daylight, certain fractions or groups are mutually visible. after dark this connection must be maintained throughout the outpost except where the larger subdivisions are provided with wire communication. the following patrols are usually sent out from the main bodies of the supports: (=a=) patrols of from three men to a squad are sent along the roads and trails in the direction of the enemy, for a distance of from one to five miles, depending on how close the enemy is supposed to be, whether or not there is any advance cavalry out, and how long the outpost has been in position. the extreme right and left supports send patrols well out on the roads to the flanks. these patrols generally operate continuously as soon as one returns from the front, or possibly even before it returns, another goes out in the same general direction to cover the same country. frequently a patrol is sent out along a road to the front for two or three miles with orders to remain out until some stated time--for example, p. m., dusk or dawn. it sends in important information, and remains out near the extremity of its route, keeping a close watch on the surrounding country. an effort should always be made to secure and maintain contact with the enemy, if within a reasonable distance, in order that his movements or lack of movement may be constantly watched and reported on. the usual tendency is towards a failure to send these patrols far enough to the front and for the patrol leader to overestimate the distance he has traveled. a mile through strange country with the ever-present possibility of encountering the enemy seems three miles to the novice. at night the patrols generally confine their movements to the roads, usually remaining quietly on the alert near the most advanced point of their route to the front. the majority of such patrols are sent out to secure information of the enemy--reconnoitering patrols--and they avoid fighting and hostile patrols, endeavoring to get in touch with the enemy's main force. other patrols are sometimes sent out to prevent hostile detachments from approaching the outposts; they endeavor to locate the hostile patrols, drive them back, preventing them from gaining any vantage point from which they can observe the outpost line. these are called combat patrols and have an entirely different mission from reconnoitering patrols. (=b=) patrols of from two men to a squad, usually two men, are sent from the support around the line of its outguards, connecting with the outguards of the adjacent supports, if practicable. these are "visiting patrols," and they serve to keep the outguards of a support in touch with it and with each other; to keep the commander of a support in touch with his outguards and the adjacent supports; and to reconnoiter the ground between the outguards. since a hostile force of any size is practically forced to keep to the roads, there are rarely ever any supports and very few outguards posted off the roads, the intervals being covered by patrols, as just described. when going out a patrol will always inform the nearest sentinel of the direction it will take and its probable route and hour of return. = . detail for patrols.= since for every patrol of four men, twelve are required ( reliefs of men each), the importance of sending out just enough men and not one more than is actually needed, can readily be understood. as fast as one visiting patrol completes its round, another should usually be sent out, possibly going the rounds by a slightly different route or in the reverse direction. the same generally applies to the reconnoitering and combat patrols, though frequently they are sent out for the entire day, afternoon or night, and no d and d relief is required. three reliefs are required for the sentinel or sentinels at the post of the supports, so care should be taken to establish but one post, if it can do all that is required. it should not be considered that every man in the support should be on duty or on a relief for an outguard, a patrol or sentinel post. there should be as many men as possible in the main body of a support (this term is used to distinguish this body from the support proper, which includes the outguards and their sentinels) who only have no duty other than being instantly available in case of attack. = . flags of truce.= upon the approach of a flag of truce, the sentry will at once notify the commander of the outguard, who will in turn send word to the commander of the outpost and ask for instructions. one or more men will advance to the front and halt the party at such distance as to prevent any of them from overlooking the outposts. as soon as halted, the party will be ordered to face in the opposite direction. if permission is given to pass the party through the outpost line, they will be blindfolded and led under escort to the commander of the outpost. no conversation, except by permission of the outpost commander, is to be allowed on any subject, under any pretext, with the persons bearing the flag of truce. = . entrenchments and obstacles.= the positions held by the subdivisions of an outpost should generally be strengthened by the construction of entrenchments and obstacles, but conditions may render this unnecessary. = . concealment.= troops on outpost must keep concealed as much as is consistent with the proper performance of their duties; especially should they avoid the sky line. = . detached posts.= in addition to ordinary outguards, the outpost commander may detail from the reserve one or more detached posts to cover roads or areas not in general line assigned to the supports. in like manner the commander of the whole force may order detached posts to be sent from the main body to cover important roads or localities not included in the outpost line. detached posts may be sent out to hold points which are of importance to the outpost cavalry, such as a ford or a junction of roads; or to occupy positions especially favorable for observation, but too far to the front to be included in the line of observation; or to protect flanks of the outpost position. such posts are generally established by the outpost commander, but a support commander might find it necessary to establish a post practically detached from the rest of his command. they usually vary in strength from a squad to a platoon. the number and strength of detached posts are reduced to the absolute needs of the situation. = . examining posts.= an examining post is a small detachment, under the command of an officer or a noncommissioned officer, stationed at some convenient point to examine strangers and to receive bearers of flags of truce brought in by the outguards or patrols. though the employment of examining posts is not general in field operations, there are many occasions when their use is important; for example: when the outguards do not speak the language of the country or of the enemy; when preparations are being made for a movement and strict scrutiny at the outguards is ordered: at sieges, whether in attack or defense. when such posts, are used, strangers approaching the line of observation are passed along the line to an examining post. no one except the commander is allowed to speak to persons brought to an examining post. prisoners and deserters are at once sent under guard to the rear. = . cavalry outpost.= independent cavalry covering a command or on special missions, and occasionally the advance cavalry of a mixed command, bivouac when night overtakes them, and in such cases furnish their own outposts. the outposts are established, in the main, in accordance with the foregoing principles, care being taken to confine outpost work to the lowest limits consistent with safety. no precaution, however, should be omitted, as the cavalry is generally in close proximity to the enemy, and often in territory where the inhabitants are hostile. the line of resistance is occupied by the supports, the latter sending out the necessary outguards and patrols. each outguard furnishes its own vedettes (mounted sentinels), or sentinels. due to the mobility of cavalry, the distances are generally greater than in an outpost for a mixed command. an outguard of four troopers is convenient for the day time, but should be doubled at night, and at important points made even stronger. the sentinels are generally dismounted, their horses being left with those of the outguards. mounted cavalry at night can offer little resistance; the supports and outguards are therefore generally dismounted, the horses being under cover in rear, and the positions are strengthened by intrenchments and obstacles. by holding villages, bridges, defiles, etc., with dismounted rifle fire, cavalry can greatly delay a superior force. there should always be easy communication along the line of resistance to enable the cavalry to concentrate at a threatened point. a support of one squadron covers with its outposts a section rarely longer than two miles. as such a line is of necessity weak, the principal reliance is placed on distant patrolling. if threatened by infantry, timely information enables the threatened point to be reinforced, or the cavalry to withdraw to a place of safety. if there is danger from hostile cavalry, the roads in front are blocked at suitable points, such as bridges, fords, defiles, etc., by a succession of obstacles and are defended by a few dismounted men. when compelled to fall back these men mount and ride rapidly to the next obstacle in rear and there take up a new position. as the march of cavalry at night is, as a rule, confined to roads, such tactics seriously delay its advance. in accordance with the situation and the orders they have received, the support commanders arrange for feeding, watering, cooking, resting and patrolling. during the night the horses of the outguards remain saddled and bridled. during the day time cinches may be loosened, one-third of the horses at a time. feeding and watering are done by reliefs. horses being fed are removed a short distance from the others. independent cavalry generally remains in outpost position for the night only, its advance being resumed on the following day; if stopped by the enemy, it is drawn off to the flanks upon the approach of its own infantry. establishing the outpost = .= the outpost is posted as quickly as possible, so that the troops can the sooner obtain rest. until the leading outpost troops are able to assume their duties, temporary protection, known as the _march outpost_, is furnished by the nearest available troops. upon receipt of the _halt order_ from the commander of the main column, the outpost commander issues the _outpost order_ with the least practicable delay. the _halt order_, besides giving the necessary information and assigning camp sites to the parts of the command, details the troops to constitute the outpost, assigns a commander therefor, designates the general line to be occupied, and, when practicable, points out the position to be held in case of attack. the _outpost order_ gives such available information of the situation as is necessary to the complete and proper guidance of subordinates; designates the troops to constitute the supports; assigns their location and the sector each is to cover; provides for the necessary detached posts; indicates any special reconnaissance that is to be made; orders the location and disposition of the reserve; disposes of the train if the same is ordered to join the outpost; and informs subordinates where information will be sent. in large commands it may often be necessary to give the order from the map, but usually the outpost commander will have to make some preliminary reconnaissance, unless he has an accurate and detailed map. generally it is preferable for the outpost commander to give verbal orders to his support commanders from some locality which overlooks the terrain. the time and locality should be so selected that the support commanders may join their commands and conduct them to their positions without causing unnecessary delay to their troops. the reserve commander should, if possible, receive his orders at the same time as the support commanders. subordinates to whom he gives orders separately should be informed of the location of other parts of the outpost. = .= after issuing the initial orders, the outpost commander inspects the outpost, orders the necessary changes or additions, and sends his superior a report of his dispositions. _the reserve_ is marched to its post by its commander, who then sends out such detachments as have been ordered and places the rest in camp or bivouac, over which at least one sentinel should be posted. connection must be maintained with the main body, the supports, and nearby detached posts. the supports march to their posts, using the necessary covering detachments when in advance of the march outpost. a support commander's order should fully explain the situation to subordinates, or to the entire command, if it be small. it should detail the troops for the different outguards and, when necessary, define the sector each is to cover. it should provide the necessary sentinels at the post of the support, the patrols to be sent therefrom, and should arrange for the necessary intrenching. in posting his command the support commander must seek to cover his sector (the front that he is to look after) in such manner that the enemy can not reach, in dangerous numbers and unobserved, the position of the support or pass by it within the sector intrusted to the support. on the other hand, he must economize men on observation and patrol duty, for these duties are unusually fatiguing. he must practice the greatest economy of men consistent with the requirements of practical security. as soon as the posting of the support is completed, its commander carefully inspects the dispositions and corrects defects, if any, and reports the disposition of his support, including the patrolling ordered, to the outpost commander. this report is preferably made by means of a sketch. by day the outpost will stack arms and the articles of equipment, except the cartridge belt and canteen, will be placed by the arms. at night the men will invariably sleep with their arms and equipment near them. in addition to the sentinel posted over the support, a part of the support, say one-third or one-fourth, should always be awake at night. each outguard is marched by its commander to its assigned station, and especially in the case of a picket, is covered by the necessary patrolling to prevent surprise. having reached the position, the commander explains the situation to his men and establishes reliefs for each sentinel, and, if possible, for each patrol to be furnished. besides these sentinels and patrols, a picket must have a sentinel at its post. the commander then posts the sentinels and points out to them the principal features, such as towns, roads, and streams, and gives their names. he gives the direction and location of the enemy, if known, and of adjoining parts of the outpost. he gives to patrols the same information and the necessary orders as to their routes and the frequency with which the same shall be covered. each patrol should go over its route once before dark. each picket should maintain connection by patrols with the outguards on its right and left. = . intercommunication.= it is most important that communication should be maintained at all times between all parts of the outpost, and between the outpost and the main body. this may be done by patrols, messengers, wire or signal. the commander of the outpost is responsible that proper communication be maintained with the main body, and the support commanders keep up communication with the outguards, with the adjoining supports and with the reserve. the commander of a detached post will maintain communication with the nearest outguard. = . changes for the night.= in civilized warfare, it is seldom necessary to draw the outpost closer to the main body at night in order to diminish the front; nor is it necessary to strengthen the line of observation, as the enemy's advance in force must be confined to the roads. the latter are therefore strongly occupied, the intervening ground being diligently patrolled. in very open country or in war with savage or semi-civilized people familiar with the terrain, special precautions are necessary. = . relieving the outpost.= ordinarily outposts are not kept on duty longer than twenty-four hours. in temporary camps or bivouac they are generally relieved every morning. after a day's advance the outpost for the night is usually relieved, the following morning when the support of the new advance guard passes the line of resistance. in retreat the outpost for the night usually forms the rear guard for the following day, and is relieved when it passes the line of observation of the new outpost. outguards that have become familiar with the country during the day time should remain on duty that night. sentinels are relieved once in two hours, or oftener, depending on the weather. the work of patrols is regulated by the support commander. commanders of the various fractions of an outpost turn over their instructions and special orders, written and verbal, to their successors, together with the latest information of the enemy, and a description of the important features of the country. when practicable the first patrols sent out by the new outposts are accompanied by members of the old outpost who are familiar with the terrain. when relieved the old outguards return to their supports, the supports to the reserve and the latter to the main body; or, if more convenient, the supports and reserves return to the main body independently, each by the shortest route. when relieved by an advance guard, the outpost troops ordinarily join their units as the column passes. evening and shortly before dawn are hours of special danger. the enemy may attack late in the day in order to establish himself on captured ground by intrenching during the night; or he may send forward troops under cover of darkness in order to make a strong attack at early dawn. special precaution is therefore taken at those hours by holding the outpost in readiness, and by sending patrols in advance of the line of observation. if a new outpost is to be established in the morning it should arrive at the outpost position at daybreak, thus doubling the outpost strength at that hour. outpost problems problem no. (infantry) = . lieutenant (to two squads of his company):= two battalions of our regiment have camped by baker's pond (elementary map) for the night. it is now p. m. on a rainy day in august. the enemy is thought to be about five miles to the south of us. our platoon is the left support of the outpost and is stationed at the road fork on the chester pike, by the mason house. the twin hills-lone hill ridge is taken care of by other troops. corporal baker, where do you think i should place outguards? =corporal baker:= one at the junction of the mills farm lane and the chester pike, and one at the steel railroad trestle over sandy creek. =lieutenant:= those positions are both too far from the support, almost a half mile, but they cover the two main avenues of approach and there is no good place for a position nearer the support. a position farther north of the mill's farm lane would have its view obstructed by the wall and trees along the lane and the wall would be a bad thing to leave unoccupied such a short distance to your front. so in this case, in spite of the excessive distances from the support, i think the two positions are well chosen. each should be an outguard of a squad, for in the day time, in addition to furnishing a sentinel to observe to the front, they should have some power of resistance, particularly at the trestle. at night they should each have one double sentinel post. this requires three reliefs of two men each, which, with the corporal, only leaves one extra man, who can be used as a messenger. corporal baker, i order you to take your squad and post it as outguard no. , at the junction of this (chester) pike and that farm lane (mills farm) in front. corporal davis' squad will be outguard no. , at the railroad trestle over there (pointing). friendly troops will be on the ridge to the east of your position. your meals will be cooked here and sent to you. explain how you post your squad. =corporal baker:= i order smith to double time yards to the front and act as point for the squad. i then march the squad down to its position, keeping smith about yards in front until i have arranged everything. i then post brown under cover of the trees along the lane where he can look down the road as far as possible and i tell him, "brown, you are to take post here, keeping a sharp lookout to the front and flanks. the enemy is thought to be about five miles south (pointing) of us. this is the chester pike. that creek over there is sandy creek. salem is about a mile and three-quarters down this pike in that (s. e.) direction. york is a mile and a half in that (s. w.) direction. our troops are on that ridge (twin hills) and a squad is at the trestle over there. it is outguard no. . you are in outguard no. . you know where we left our platoon. it is our support. signal smith to come in." i then have the squad pitch their shelter tents along the northern side of the wall, where they will be hidden to view from the front by the trees along the lane and the wall. i want the men to get shelter from the rain as soon as possible. i then instruct the men of the squad, in the same manner that i did brown; i notice the time, and detail davis as second relief and carter as third relief for brown's post. i then direct two men to take all the canteens and go over to that farm (mills) and fill them, first questioning the people about the enemy and about the country around here. i also direct these two men to get some straw or hay for bedding in the shelter tents, and instruct them to return with as little delay as possible. i wait until they return and order two other men to go down to the cross roads, question the people there, look the ground over and return here. i caution them not to give any information about our force or the outguard. i would see that the sentinel's position was the best available and that the men had as comfortable quarters as possible, without being unduly exposed to view and without interfering with their movements in case of attack. they would keep their rifles at their sides at all times and not remove their equipments. after dark i put two men on post at the same time. to do this i arrange three reliefs of two men each. they are posted in pairs for two hours at a time. if no patrol from the support appeared within a half hour after i first took position i would send a messenger back to you to see if everything was all right and tell you what i had done. =lieutenant:= i think the two men sent to the crossroads should have been started out before sending anyone to the mills house as this was a more important point. the field service regulations state that outguards do not patrol to the front, but what you did was entirely correct. you were securing yourself in your position and should be familiar with your immediate surroundings. you should have told the crossroads patrol to determine how much of an obstacle sandy creek was. i suppose you assumed the swamp was impassable. the sentinel in this case is, i suppose, across the lane from the outguard about ten or fifteen yards in advance. after dark the double sentinel post should be posted on the pike about thirty yards in advance of the outguard. very frequently it would not be wise to put up your shelter tents on outguard. but here, considering the rain and the protection the trees and wall furnish, it was wise to do so. the noncommissioned officer in charge of an outguard should be very precise in giving his orders and in making his arrangements, details, etc. the discipline must be strict; that is, the men must be kept under absolute control, so that in case of sudden attack there will be no chance of confusion and the outguard commander will have his men absolutely in hand and not permit any independent action on their part. this is often not the case, owing to the familiar relations that usually exist in our army between a corporal and the members of his squad. we will not have time to go into the arrangements for outguard no. other than to say that the conditions there are somewhat different from those corporal baker has had to deal with. the outguard should be posted on the west bank of sandy creek and the sentinel at the southeastern end of the trestle. a skirmish trench should be dug down the western slope of the fill west of the creek, and extended across the track by throwing up a parapet about two and one-half feet high, slightly bent back towards the northeast so as to furnish cover from fire from the east bank of the creek, north of the trestle. the shelter tents could be pitched as "lean tos" against the western slope of the fill, and hidden by bushes and branches of trees. (note: the details of commanding this outguard, its action in case of attack, what should be done with a passing countryman, etc., can be profitably worked out in great detail.) problem no. = . lieutenant (to six squads):= we will take the same situation as we had in problem , with squad outguards as before. sergeant adams, you have command of the platoon and have sent out the two outguards. explain your arrangements for the support. =sergeant adams:= i have the men fall out by squads and rest on the side of the road while i look the ground over. i then tell sergeant barnes, "you will have immediate charge of the guard, cooking, visiting patrols, etc., here at the support. detail three men from corporal evan's squad as first, second and third relief for the sentinel over the support post your sentinel at the road fork and give him the necessary instructions as to the outguards, the adjacent support which is on this road (pointing west) on top of that ridge, etc. i will give you further instructions later." i then fall in the remainder of the support (one sergeant, one cook, four corporals and twenty-seven privates, three squads being intact and one man on duty as sentinel) and have shelter tents pitched under cover of the orchard and mason house. while this is being completed i select a line for a trench, about thirty-five yards long, behind the fence on the east and west road and extending east of the chester pike about fifteen yards, slightly bent back towards the northeast. no trench in the road. i then say to sergeant foss, "take graves' squad and construct a shelter trench along this line (indicating) having the parapet concealed. cut the fences so as to furnish easy access." i then say to corporal evans, "take three men from your squad and, as a reconnoitering patrol, cross the trestle there (pointing), and follow that road (pointing to the boling-salem road) into salem, reconnoitering that village. then take up a position on that ridge (pointing to sandy ridge) and remain out until dusk. send me a message from sandy ridge with a sketch and description of the country." i assume that corporal evans is familiar with the information about the enemy, the location of our outguards, etc. selecting five men from corporal geary's squad and the remaining man of corporal evans' squad (three having been detailed for sentinel duty, and three sent out on patrol duty with corporal evans), i turn them over to sergeant barnes, saying, "here are six men to furnish three reliefs for a visiting patrol of two men. have this patrol visit outguard no. and cross the trestle, going south down the east bank of the creek; thence recross the creek at the road bridge, visiting outguard no. ; thence across to the adjacent outguard of the support on our left, which is somewhere on that ridge (pointing to the twin hills-lone hill ridge); and thence to the starting point. have them locate that support on their first trip. you can reverse the route and make such minor changes from time to time as you think best. report to me after they have completed the first round. make arrangements for sending supper to the outguards. take two men from corporal jackson's squad to carry it out. be careful that the cook fire is not visible. i am going out to visit outguard no. and then no. . you will have charge until i return." the men have stacked arms in front of the tents and have removed all equipment but their belts. i would now visit the outguards, taking a man with me, and see if they are properly located. i would instruct the outguard commanders as to what to do in case of attack, in case strangers approach, point out their line of retreat in case of necessity, etc. i would make a sketch of the position and send it, with a description of my dispositions, to the commander of the outpost. =lieutenant:= your arrangements and dispositions appear satisfactory. you should have been more prompt in sending corporal evans out with his patrol. why didn't you send a patrol towards york, or south along the chester pike? =sergeant adams:= i considered that the support on my right would cover that ridge (twin hills-lone hill), and that the route i laid out for corporal evans would cover the chester pike and the country east of sandy creek at the same time, thus avoiding the necessity for two patrols. =lieutenant:= that seems reasonable, but you should have given some specific orders about reporting on the width, depth, etc., of sandy creek, which might prove a very valuable or dangerous obstacle. you can readily see how quickly a command becomes broken up and depleted in strength, and how important it is to make only such detachments as are necessary. it looks as if your outguards might have been made smaller considering the size of your platoon ( squads), but i think the squad outpost is so much better than one not composed of a complete unit, that it is correct in this case. with corporal evans' patrol of three men, the visiting patrol requiring six men, the sentinel post requiring three men, sergeant barnes, and the two outguards, you have thirty men actually on duty or detailed for duty, out of fifty-one. of course, the men constituting the outguards, the man detailed for the visiting patrol and support sentinel, have approximately two hours on duty and four hours off duty, so they get some rest. furthermore, you should have a three-man patrol watching the crossroads at salem during the night, corporal evans' patrol having returned. this patrol should be relieved once during the night, at a previously stated hour, which means six more men who do not get a complete night's rest. =sergeant adams:= isn't salem rather far to the front to send a patrol at night? =lieutenant:= yes, it is, but unless you touch the crossroads there you would have to have two patrols out, one near maxey's farm and one on the chester pike. as it is you are leaving the road from york to the crossroads in front of outguard no. uncovered, but you should find that this is covered by a patrol from the adjacent support. the cross roads in front of outguard no. is the natural place for a stationary, night patrol, but it is so close to the outguard that the benefit derived from a patrol there would be too small to justify the effort. (note: further details of the duties of this support can be gone into. the messages should be written, and patrols carried through their tour of duty with the resulting situations to be dealt with; the sentinels tested as to their knowledge of their duties, etc. also note carefully the manner in which the support commander uses his noncommissioned officers for carrying out his intentions, and thus avoids the most objectionable and inefficient practice of dealing directly with the privates.) problem no. (infantry) = .= (see fort leavenworth map in pocket at back of book.) =situation:= a blue force, companies a and b, st infantry, under captain a, in hostile country, is covering the rock island bridge and camped for the night, april - , on the south slope of devin ridge (rm'). the enemy is moving northward from kansas city ( miles south of leavenworth). at : p. m. captain a receives a message from colonel x at beverly ( miles east of rock island bridge, (qo')), stating that two or three companies of hostile infantry are reported five miles south of leavenworth at : p. m. no enemy is west of leavenworth. captain a decides to place one platoon on outpost. =required, .= captain a's order. =answer.= verbally: "two or three red companies were five miles south of leavenworth at : p. m. today. no enemy is west of leavenworth. we will camp here. st platoon, 'a' company, under sergeant a, will form the outpost, relieving the advance guard ( d platoon co. a). the line, pope hill (sm')--rabbit point (tn') will be held. detached posts will be placed on hill , west of merritt hill (rl'), and on engineer hill (ql'). in case of attack the outpost line will be held. "the baggage will be at the main camp. "messages will reach me on devin ridge (rm')." issued verbally to officers and sergeant a. =required, .= give verbatim (word for word) the order issued by sergeant a. =answer.= "two companies of the enemy were five miles south of leavenworth at : p. m. today. our camp is to be here. this platoon will be the outpost on the line, rabbit point (im')--pope hill (sm'). "the right support, st section, less squad, under sergeant b, will take position north of pope hill and cover the following front: the ravine (xix--merritt hill) west of grant avenue to the ravine about midway between grant avenue and rabbit point (tn'). "the left support, d section, less squad under sergeant h, will take position on north slope of rabbit point and will cover the following front: the ravine midway between grant avenue and rabbit point to missouri river. "corporal d, you will take the eight men of your squad and form a detached post on engineer hill (qk'). "corporal e, take your squad and form a detached post on hill west of merritt hill (rl'). "if attacked hold your front. each support and detached post will entrench. "send messages to me at right support." the outpost moves out, each support and detached post separately, without throwing out covering patrols, because the advance guard is now holding the front. there is no reserve. =required, .= what does sergeant a do now? =required, .= what does sergeant b do as soon as he reaches pope hill? (note: during the remainder of the afternoon one man up in a tree on grant avenue will be the only observing post necessary for this support. at night an outguard would be placed on grant avenue with continuous patrols along the front, because the open ground furnishes easy approach to the enemy. a post of four men might also be placed on the bridge over corral creek (um').) =required, .= the location of supports and the main body of detached post on engineer hill. =required, .= what patrolling would be done from the left support? chapter vi the company on outpost (establishing the outpost) = .= we will now apply some of the general principles of outposts (see par. ) to a company taking up its position on the line of outposts. let us suppose that our battalion has been detailed for outpost duty. in order to understand more fully the duties and functions of the company commander, we will first consider what the major does. to begin with, he and the battalion will have been detailed for outpost duty before the march was completed, and he will have been told, amongst other things, what is known of the enemy and also what is known of other bodies of our own troops, where the main body will halt, the general position to be occupied by the outpost, and what the commander intends doing in case of attack. the major verbally designates, say, two companies, as the reserve, and the other two companies, including our own, as the support. he places the senior officer of the reserve companies in command of the reserve and tells him where he is to go, and he indicates the general line the outpost is to occupy and assigns the amount of front each of the other companies is to cover. the limits of the sector so assigned should be marked by some distinctive features, such as trees, buildings, woods, streams, etc., as it is important that each company should know the exact limits of its frontage. he tells the company commanders what he knows of the enemy and of our own troops so far as they affect the outposts, he indicates the line of resistance and how much resistance is to be afforded in case of attack, states whether intrenchments and obstacles are to be constructed, gives instructions about lighting fires and cooking, and states where he can be found. upon receiving his orders from the major, the company commander, _with a proper covering detachment_, moves to the locality allotted him and as he arrives upon the ground he is to occupy, he sends out, as temporary security, patrols or skirmishers, or both, a short distance in front of the general position the outguards will occupy, holding the rest of the company back under cover. if practicable, the company commander should precede the company and make a rapid examination of the ground. he then sends out _observation groups_, varying in size from four men to a platoon, generally a squad, to watch the country in the direction of the enemy. these groups constitute the _outguards_, and are just sufficient in number to cover the front of the supports, and to connect where necessary with the outguards of adjoining supports. the company commander next selects a defensive position on the general line of resistance, from which not only can he command the approaches, but where he can also give assistance to the adjoining supports; he then gives instructions in regard to the intrenchments and obstacles, after which he makes a more careful reconnaissance of the section assigned him; corrects the position, of the outguards, if necessary; gives them instructions as to their duties in case of attack or when strangers approach their posts; tells them the number (if any) of their post, the number of the outguard and support and the numbers of the adjoining outguards and supports; points out lines of retreat in case they are compelled to fall back to the support, cautioning the men not to mask the fire of the support; he tells them the names of all villages, rivers, etc., in view, and the places to which the wagon roads and the railroads lead; selects, if necessary, places for additional posts to be occupied at night and during fog; sees that suitable connections are made between him and the adjoining outguards, and between his support and the adjoining supports; and questions subordinate commanders to test their grasp of the situation and knowledge of their duties, and on returning to the support he sends a report with a _sketch_ to the outpost commander, showing the dispositions made. after the line of observation has been established, the support stacks arms and the men are permitted to remove their equipments, except cartridge belts. one or more sentinels are posted over these supports, and they guard the property and watch for signals from the outguards. fires are concealed as much as possible and the messing is done by reliefs. mounted messengers ordinarily do not unsaddle; they rest, water and feed as directed. after the major has received reports from both company commanders, he will himself visit the outguards and supports and make such changes as he may deem necessary, immediately after which he will submit to the commander of the troops a written report, accompanied by a combined sketch showing the positions of the different parts of the outpost. the major might begin his inspection of the line of outguards before receiving the reports of the company commanders. in training and instructing the company in outpost work, it is always best to send out a few patrols and scouts an hour or two in advance, with definite instructions as to what they are to do, and have them operate against the company as hostile scouts and patrols. if the rest of the company know that patrols and scouts are operating in their front, and will try to work their way through the outpost line, they will naturally take a keener interest in their work. exercises of this kind create a feeling of rivalry between the scouts and patrols, who, on the one hand, are trying to work their way through the line of outposts, and the outguards and patrols, who, on the other hand, are trying to prevent them from so doing. it makes the work much more _human_. chapter vii the company in scouting[ ] and patrolling = .= the general principles of patrolling are explained in par. ; so we need not repeat them here. many of the principles of scouting are, in reality, nothing but the fundamentals of patrolling, and the main function of scouting, _reconnoitering_, is also the function of a certain class of patrols. so, we see that scouting and patrolling are inseparably connected, and the importance of training the members of the company in the principles of scouting is, therefore, evident. = . requisites of a good scout.= a man, to make a good scout, should possess the following qualifications:-- have good eyesight and hearing; be active, intelligent and resourceful; be confident and plucky; be healthy and strong; be able to swim, signal, read a map, make a rough sketch, and, of course, read and write. = . eyesight and hearing.= to be able to use the eye and the ear quickly and accurately is one of the first principles of successful scouting. quickness and accuracy of sight and hearing are to a great extent a matter of training and practice. the savage, for instance, almost invariably has quick eyesight and good hearing, simply from continual practice. get into the habit of seeing, _observing_, things--your eyesight must never be resting, but must be continually glancing around, in every direction, and _seeing_ different objects. as you walk along through the country get into the habit of noticing hoof-prints, wheel-ruts, etc., and observing the trees, houses, streams, animals, men, etc., that you pass. practice looking at distant objects and discovering objects in the distance. on seeing distant signs, do not jump at a conclusion as to what they are, but watch and study them carefully first. get into the habit of listening for sounds and of distinguishing by what different sounds are made. = . finding your way in a strange country.= the principal means of finding one's way in a strange country are by map reading, asking the way, the points of the compass and landmarks. _map reading._ this, of course, presupposes the possession of a map. the subject of map reading is explained in pars. to . _asking the way._ in civilized countries one has no trouble in finding his way by asking, provided, of course, he speaks the language. if in a foreign country, learn as soon as you can the equivalent of such expressions as "what is the way to ----?" "where is ----?" "what is the name of this place?," and a few other phrases of a similar nature. remember, however, that the natives may sometimes deceive you in their answers. _points of the compass._ a compass is, of course, the best, quickest and simplest way of determining the directions, except in localities where there is much iron, in which case it becomes very unreliable. for determining the points of the compass by means of the north star and the face of a watch, see par. . the points of the compass can also be ascertained by facing the sun in the morning and spreading out your arms straight from the body. before you is east; behind you, west; to your right, south; to your left, north. [illustration] the points of the compass can be determined by noting the limbs and bark of trees. the bark on the north side of trees is thicker and rougher than that on the south side, and moss is most generally found near the roots on the north side. the limbs and branches are generally longer on the south side of the trees, while the branches on the north are usually knotty, twisted and drooped. the tops of pine trees dip or trend to the north. = . lost.= in connection with finding your way through strange country, it may be said, should you find you have lost your way, do not lose your head. keep cool--try not to let your brains get into your feet. by this we mean don't run around and make things worse, and play yourself out. first of all, sit down and think; cool off. then climb a tree, or hill, and endeavor to locate some familiar object you passed, so as to retrace your steps. if it gets dark and you are not in hostile territory, build a good big fire. the chances are you have been missed by your comrades and if they see the fire, they will conclude you are there and will send out for you. also, if not in hostile territory, distress signals may be given by firing your rifle, but don't waste all your ammunition. if you find a stream, follow it; it will generally lead somewhere--where civilization exists. the tendency of people who are lost is to travel in a circle uselessly. remember this important rule: _always notice the direction of the compass when you start out, and what changes of direction you make afterwards._ = . landmarks.= landmarks or prominent features of any kind are a great assistance in finding one's way in a strange country. in starting out, always notice the hills, conspicuous trees, high buildings, towers, rivers, etc. for example, if starting out on a reconnaissance you see directly to the north of you a mountain, it will act as a guide without your having to refer to your compass or the sun. if you should start from near a church, the steeple will serve as a guide or landmark when you start to make your way back. when you pass a conspicuous object, like a broken gate, a strangely shaped rock, etc., try to remember it, so that should you desire to return that way, you can do so by following the chain of landmarks. on passing such landmarks always see what they look like from the other side; for, that will be the side from which you will first see them upon the return, trip. _the secret of never getting lost is to note carefully the original direction in which you start, and after that to note carefully all landmarks._ get in the habit of doing this in time of peace--it will then become second nature for you to do it in time of war. it may sometimes be necessary, especially in difficult country, such as when traveling through a forest, and over broken mountains and ravines, for you to make your own landmarks for finding your way back by "blazing" (cutting pieces of bark from the trees), breaking small branches off bushes, piling up stones, making a line across a crossroad or path you did not follow, etc. = . concealment and dodging.= both in scouting and patrolling it must be remembered not only that it is important you should get information, but it is also fully as important that the enemy should not know you have the information--hence, the necessity of hiding yourself. and remember, too, if you keep yourself hidden, not only will you probably be able to see twice as much of what the enemy is doing, but it may also save you from being captured, wounded or killed. should you find the enemy has seen you, it is often advisable to pretend that you have not seen him, or that you have other men with you by signaling to imaginary comrades. as far as possible, keep under cover by traveling along hedges, banks, low ground, etc. if moving over open country, make your way as quickly as possible from one clump of trees or bushes to another; or, from rocks, hollows or such other cover as may exist, to other cover. as soon as you reach new cover, look around and examine your surroundings carefully. do not have about you anything that glistens, and at night be careful not to wear anything that jingles or rattles. and remember that at night a lighted match can be seen as far as yards and a lighted cigarette nearly yards. in looking through a bush or over the top of a hill, break off a leafy branch and hold it in front of your face. in selecting a tree, tower or top of a house or other lookout place from which to observe the enemy from concealment, always plan beforehand how you would make your escape, if discovered and pursued. a place with more than one avenue of escape should be selected, so that if cut off in one direction you can escape from the other. for example, should the enemy reach the foot of a tower in which you are, you would be completely cut off, while if he reached a house on whose roof you happened to be, you would have several avenues of escape. although trees make excellent lookout places, they must, for the same reasons as towers, be used with caution. in this connection it may be remarked unless one sees foot marks leading to a tree, men are apt not to look up in trees for the enemy--hence, be careful not to leave foot marks. when in a tree, either stand close against the trunk, or lie along a large branch, so that your body will look like a part of the trunk or branch. in using a hill as a lookout place, do not make the common mistake of showing yourself on the skyline. reach the top of the hill slowly and gradually by crouching down and crawling, and raise your head above the crest by inches. in leaving, lower your head gradually and crawl away by degrees, as any quick or sudden movement on the skyline is likely to attract attention. and, remember, just because you don't happen to see the enemy that is no sign that he is not about. at maneuvers and in exercises soldiers continually make the mistake of exposing themselves on the skyline. at night confine yourself as much as possible to low ground, ditches, etc. this will keep you down in the dark and will enable you, in turn, to see outlined against the higher ground any enemy that may approach you. at night especially, but also during the day, the enemy will expect you along roads and paths, as it is easier to travel along roads and paths than across country and they also serve as good guides in finding your way. as a rule, it is best to use the road until it brings you near the enemy and then leave it and travel across country. you will thus be able better to avoid the outposts and patrols that will surely be watching the roads. practice in time of peace the art of concealing yourself and observing passers-by. conceal yourself near some frequented road and imagine the people traveling over it are enemies whose numbers you wish to count and whose conversation you wish to overhear. select a spot where they are not likely to look for you, and which has one or more avenues of escape; choose a position with a background that matches your clothes in color; keep quiet, skin your eyes; stretch your ears. a mounted scout should always have wire cutters when operating in a country where there are wire fences. = . tracking.= by "tracking" we mean following up footmarks. the same as the huntsman tracks his game so should we learn how to track the enemy. one of the first things to learn in tracking is the pace at which the man or horse was traveling when the track was made. a horse walking makes pairs of footmarks, each hind foot being close to the impression of the forefoot. at a trot the tracks are similar, but the pairs of footmarks are farther apart and deeper, the toe especially being more deeply indented than at the walk. at a canter there are two single footmarks and then a pair. at a gallop the footmarks are single and deeply indented. as a rule, the hind feet are longer and narrower than the forefeet. in case of a man walking, the whole flat of the foot comes equally on the ground, the footmarks usually about inches apart. if running, the toes are more deeply indented in the ground, and the footmarks are considerably farther apart than when walking. note the difference between footmarks made by soldier's shoes and civilian's shoes, and those made by men and those made by women and children. study the difference between the tracks by a gun, a carriage, an escort wagon, an automobile, a bicycle, etc., and the direction in which they were going. in addition to being able to determine the pace of tracks, it is most important that you should be able to tell how old they are. however, ability to do this with any degree of accuracy, requires a vast amount of practice. a great deal depends on the kind and the state of the ground and the weather. for example, if on a dry, windy day you follow a certain track over varying ground, you will find that on light sandy soil, for instance, it will look old in a very short time, because any damp earth that may have been kicked up from under the surface will dry very quickly to the same color as the rest of the surface, and the edge of the footmark will soon be rounded off by the breeze blowing over the dry dust. the same track in damp ground will look much fresher, and in damp clay, in the shade of trees, a track which may be a day old will look quite fresh. the following are clues to the age of tracks: spots of rain having fallen on them since they were made, if, of course, you know when the rain fell; the crossing of other tracks over the original ones; the freshness or coldness of the droppings of horses and other animals (due allowance being made for the effect of the sun, rain, etc.), and, in the case of grass that has been trodden down, the extent to which it has since dried or withered. having learned to distinguish the pace and age of tracks, the next think to do is to learn how to follow them over all kinds of ground. this is a most difficult accomplishment and one that requires a vast amount of practice to attain even fair proficiency. in tracking where it is difficult to see the track, such as on hard ground, or in the grass, note the direction of the last foot-print that you can see, then look on ahead of you a few yards, say, or , in the same direction, and, in grass, you will probably see the blades bent or trodden, and, on ground, you will probably see stones displaced or scratched--or some other small sign which otherwise would not be noticed. these indistinct signs, seen one behind the other, give a track that can be followed with comparative ease. if you should lose the track, try to find it again by placing your handkerchief, hat, or other object on the last footmark you noticed, and then work around it in a wide circle, with a radius of, say, , , or yards, choosing the most favorable ground, soft ground, if possible. if with a patrol, only one or two men should try to find the onward track; for, if everyone starts in to find it, the chances are the track will be obliterated with their footmarks. in trying to find the continuation of a track this way, always place yourself in the enemy's position, look around the country, imagine what you would have done, and then move out in that direction and look for his tracks in soft ground. practice in order to learn the appearance of tracks, get a suitable piece of soft ground, and across this have a man walk and then run, and have a horse walk, trot, canter and gallop. the next day make similar tracks alongside the first ones and then notice the difference between the two. also, make tracks on ordinary ground, grass, sand, etc., and practice following them up. finally, practice tracking men sent out for the purpose. the work will probably be very difficult, even disheartening at first, but you will gradually improve, if you persevere. above all things, get into the habit of seeing any tracks that may be on the ground. when out walking, when going through exercises at maneuvers, and at other times, always notice what tracks are on the ground before you, and study them. the following exercises in scouting and patrolling afford excellent practice and training: = . the mouse and cat contest.= . a section of country three or four miles square, with well-defined limits, is selected. the boundaries are made known to all contestants and anyone going outside of them will be disqualified. . two patrols of eight men each are sent out as "mice." they occupy any positions they may wish within the boundaries named, and conceal themselves to watch for hostile patrols. . half an hour later two other squads, wearing white bands around their hats, or having other distinguishing marks, are sent out as "cats" to locate, if possible, and report upon the position of the "mice." . an hour is fixed when the exercise shall end, and if within the given time the "cats" have not discovered the "mice," the "mice" win. . the "cats" will write reports of any "mice" patrols they may see. _rules_ . an umpire (officer or noncommissioned officer) goes with each patrol and his decisions as to capture and other matters are the orders of the company commander. the umpires must take every possible precaution to conceal themselves so as not to reveal the position of the patrols with which they are. each umpire will carry a watch, all watches being set with that of the company commander before the exercise commences. . any "cat" patrol coming within yards of a "mouse" patrol, without seeing the "mice," is considered captured. . when the time is up, the umpires will bring in the patrols and report to the company commander. = . flag-stealing contest.= . a section of country of suitable size, with well-defined limits, is selected, the boundaries being made known to the contestants. . the contestants are divided into two forces of about men each, and each side will establish three cossack posts along a general line designated by the company commander, the two positions being selected facing each other and being a suitable distance apart. the men not forming part of the cossack posts will be used as reconnoitering patrols. . about three quarters of a mile in rear of the center of each line of outposts four flags will be planted, in line, about yards apart. . the scouts and patrols of each force will try to locate the outposts of the other force, and then to work their way around or between them, steal the flags and bring them back to their own side. they will endeavor to prevent the enemy from doing the same. . one scout or patrol will not carry away more than one flag at a time, and will have to return to their side safely with the flag before they can come back and capture another. . scouts may work singly or in pairs. any scout or patrol coming within yards of a stronger hostile party, or cossack post, will be considered as captured, if seen by the enemy, and if carrying a captured flag at the time, the flag will not count as having been captured. of course, if a scout or patrol can pass within yards of the enemy without being discovered, it may do so. . an umpire (officer or noncommissioned officer) will be with each cossack post, each patrol, and at the position of the flags. . the hour when the exercise ends will be designated in advance and at that hour the umpires will bring in the cossack posts and patrols. the same requirements regarding watches obtains as in the mouse and cat contest. . at the conclusion of the contest the commander of each side will hand in to the company commander all sketches and reports made by his men. . points will be awarded as follows: each flag captured, . for each sketch and hostile report of the position of a cossack post, . for each report of movements of a hostile patrol, . the side getting the greatest number of points will win. . umpires may penalize the contestants for a violation of the rules. the same contest may be carried out at night, substituting lighted japanese lanterns for the flags. footnotes: [ ] the best book on scouting that the author has ever seen, is baden-powell's "aids to scouting," which was consulted in the preparation of this chapter. chapter viii night operations = . importance.= because of the long range and great accuracy of modern fire arms, there has been in recent years a marked increase in the practice of night operations, such operations being of common occurrence not only for massing troops under cover of darkness in favorable positions for further action, but also for actually assaulting positions. read carefully pars. , , , , , - . training of the company = .= night movements are amongst the most difficult operations of war, and, therefore require the most careful, painstaking and thorough training and instruction of troops in all matters pertaining thereto. the history of night fighting shows that in most cases defeat is due to disorganization through panic. it is said that in daylight the moral is to the physical as three is to one. that being the case, it is hard to say what the ratio is at night, when a general atmosphere of mystery, uncertainty and fear of surprise envelops the operations, and, of necessity affects the nerves of the men. the vital importance, therefore, of accustoming troops as much as we can in peace to the conditions that will obtain in night fighting, cannot be overestimated. the following outline shows the subjects in which individual and collective instruction and training should be given: individual training = . general.= the first thing to be done is to accustom the soldier to darkness and to teach him to overcome the nervousness which is natural to the average man in darkness. the best way to do this is to begin by training him in the use of his powers of vision and hearing under conditions of darkness, which are strange to him. the company should be divided into squads for this instruction. = . vision.= take several men to ground with which they are familiar. have them notice the different appearance which objects present at night; when viewed in different degrees of light and shade; the comparative visibility of men under different conditions of dress, background, etc.; the ease with which bright objects are seen; the difference between the visibility of men standing on a skyline and those standing on a slope. post the men in pairs at intervals along a line which the instructors will endeavor to cross without being seen. the instructors should cross from both sides, so as to compel observation in both directions. have a man (later, several) walk away from the rest of the men and when he is about to disappear from view, halt him, and estimate the distance. send a man (later, several) outside the field of vision, to advance on the rest of the men. halt him when he enters the field of vision and estimate the distance. send a number of men outside the limit of vision and then let them advance on the rest of the men, using cover and seeing how near they can approach unobserved. = . hearing.= place a number of men a few yards apart and make them guess what a noise is caused by, and its approximate position. the rattle of a meat can, the movement of a patrol, the working of the bolt of a rifle, the throwing down of accouterments, low talking, etc., may be utilized. take special pains to impress upon the men the penetrating power of the human voice, and the necessity of preserving absolute silence in night operations. have blank cartridges fired and teach the men to judge their direction and approximate distance away. = . finding bearings.= show the men how to determine the points of the compass from the north star. the big dipper constellation looks like this: [illustration: fig. ] the north star is on the prolongation of a line joining the two "pointing" stars, and at above five times the distance between the two stars. at another time have those same men individually locate the north star. using this star as a guide, practice the men moving in different directions, by such commands as, "smith, move southeast." "jones, move northwest," etc. to test a man's ability to keep a given direction when moving in the darkness, choose a spot from which no prominent landmarks are visible, advance toward it accompanied by a man, from a distance not less than paces. while advancing the soldier must take his bearings. on arriving at the spot chosen the instructor will turn the soldier around rapidly two or three times and then have him continue to advance in the same direction as before. no prominent landmarks should be visible from the starting point. = . moving in the dark.= form four or five men in line with about one pace interval, the instructor being on one of the flanks. place some clearly visible mark, such as a lantern, for the instructor to march on. impress upon the men the importance of lifting their feet up high and bringing them to the ground quietly and firmly, and of keeping in touch with the guide and conforming to his movements without sound or signal. the pace should be slow and frequent halts should be made to test the promptness of the men in halting and advancing together. as the line advances, each man will in turn take his place on the flank and act as guide. the light on which the men are marching should be hidden from view at intervals, in order to test the ability of the men to maintain the original direction. later on, the number of men in a line may be increased considerably. the rougher the ground, the darker the night and the longer the line, the slower must the pace be and the more frequent the halts. after passing an obstacle men instinctively line up parallel to it, and consequently if the obstacle does not lie at right angles to the line of advance, the direction will be lost; so, be sure to guard against this. = . night fencing.= practice the men in charging in the dark against a white cloth or the dummy figure of a man. in the beginning have the figure in a fixed place, but later have the soldier charge seeking the figure, and not knowing just exactly where it is beforehand. = . night entrenching.= it is frequently necessary in time of war to dig trenches at night in front of the enemy, and while this work is easy in the moonlight, it is very difficult in the dark. bear in mind the following points: . the tendency is to make the trench too narrow; hence, guard against this. . be careful not to throw the earth too far or too near. . do not strike your neighbor's tools in working. . do not use the pick unless necessary, because it makes considerable noise. . do not scrape the tools together in order to get off the dirt; use a chip of wood or the toe of the shoe. . make as little noise as possible in digging and handling your tools. . if discovered by the enemy's searchlights, do not become excited or confused; simply lie down. . if attacked by the enemy, do not get rattled and throw your tools away--put them in some fixed place where they can be found again. = . equipment.= at first the men should be taken out without arms, but later on they should be trained to work in full equipment. teach every man what parts of his equipment are likely to make a noise under special circumstances, such as lying down, rising, crossing obstacles, etc., and instruct him how to guard against it. bayonets should always be fixed, but in order to avoid accidents the scabbard should be left on them. from the beginning of the training continually impress upon the men that it is absolutely criminal to fire without orders during a night operation and that the bayonet is the only weapon he can use with advantage to himself and safety to his comrades. = . night firing.= as a rule men fire too high in the dark. they must, therefore, be cautioned not to raise the rifle above the horizontal, or incline the upper part of the body to the rear. when the firing is stopped be sure to turn on the safety-lock. experience during the russo-japanese war taught the japanese the kneeling position is the most suitable for horizontal firing. the following method, to be conducted in daytime, may be employed in training the soldier to hold his rifle parallel to the ground while firing in the dark:--have each soldier, kneeling, close his eyes and bring his rifle to the position of aim, barrel parallel to the ground. with the rifle in this position, let him open his eyes and examine it. then have this done by squad, by command. when they become proficient in this movement, have them close their eyes and while the eyes are closed, put up a target and have them practice horizontal firing, opening their eyes each time after pulling the trigger and then examining the position of the piece. collective training at first practice squads, then the platoons and later the company in simple movements, such as squads right and left, right and left oblique, etc., gradually leading up to more complicated ones in close and extended order, such as right and left front into line, advancing in platoon and squad columns, charging the enemy, etc. as far as possible the movements should be executed by simple prearranged signals from the unit commanders. the signals, which must not be visible to the enemy, may be made with a white handkerchief or a white flag, if the night be not too dark; with an electric flashlight, a dark lantern or luminous disk. the light of the flashlight or lantern must be screened, so it cannot be seen by the enemy. the following signals are suggested: to advance: raise vertically the lantern or other object with which the signal is made. to halt: lower and raise the object several times. to lie down: bring the object down near the ground. to form squad columns: move the object several times to the right and left. to form platoon columns: describe several circles. as skirmishers: move the object front to rear several times. = . night marches.= in acting as an advance guard to a column, the company would send out a point a few yards ahead, which would be followed by the rest of the company. three or four scouts should be sent out a hundred yards or so ahead of the point. they should advance at a quick pace, keeping in the shadow on the side of the road, being constantly on the alert, using their ears even more than their eyes. they will halt to listen at crossroads and suspicious places, and move on again when they hear the company approaching. should the enemy be discovered, one of the scouts will return to warn the advance guard--the others will conceal themselves and watch. under no circumstances must the scouts ever fire, unless it be for the purpose of warning the company and there is no other way of doing so. the diagram on the opposite page is suggested as a good formation for a company acting as advance guard at night. a company marching alone would move in the same formation as when acting as advance guard, except that it would protect its rear with a few scouts. of course, the nature of the country and proximity and activity of the enemy, will determine the best formation to be used, but whatever the formation may be, always remember to cover well your front, rear and flanks, with scouts, whose distance away will vary with the light and nature of the country. _don't forget that protection in rear is very important._ [illustration: fig. ] the men must be warned against firing, smoking, talking, striking matches, making noise, etc. they should also be informed of the object in view, direction of the enemy, etc. in night marches the rests should not exceed five minutes; otherwise, many men will fall asleep. outposts careful training in outpost duty at night is very harassing, but, in view of its importance, should not be neglected. this instruction should be given with the greatest thoroughness, strictness and attention to detail. = . sentries challenging.= in challenging sentries must be careful to avoid any noise that would disclose their position. in fact, challenging by voice should be reduced to a minimum by arranging a system of signals by which the officers of the day, patrols, etc., can be recognized. the following signals, any one of which may be decided upon, which would be made first by the sentry and then answered by the approaching party, are suggested: clap the hands together twice; strike the ground twice with the butt of the rifle; strike the butt of the rifle twice with the hand; whistle softly twice. the replying signal would be the same as the sentry's signal, except that in case of the use of the butt of the rifle, an officer would reply by striking twice on his revolver holster. after repeating the signal once, if it is not answered, the sentry will challenge with the voice, but no louder than is necessary. in case of a patrol only one man will advance to be recognized after the signal has been answered. the sentry must always allow persons to approach fairly near before challenging. = . sentries firing.= anyone who has been through a campaign knows how nervous green sentries are, and how quick they are about firing. during the beginning of the philippine campaign the author heard of several cases where sentries fired on fire-flies several hundred yards away. never fire unless it be absolutely necessary to give an alarm, or unless you can clearly distinguish the enemy and are fairly certain of hitting him. in the french army in algeria, there is a rule that any sentry who fires at night must produce a corpse, or be able to show by blood marks that he hit the person fired at. if he can do neither, he is punished for giving a false alarm. = . marking of route from outguards to supports.= the route from the support to the outguards, and from pickets to their sentries, should, if necessary, be clearly marked with scraps of paper, green sticks with the bark peeled off, or in any other suitable way. = . readiness for action.= the supports should always be ready for action. the men must sleep with their rifles beside them and in such places that they will be able to fall in promptly in case of attack. some men have a way of sleeping with their blankets over their heads. this should not be allowed--the ears must always be uncovered. the commander, or the second in command, with several men, should remain awake. when the commander lies down he should do so near the sentry, which is always posted over the support. general = . connections.= it is of the greatest importance that proper connection be maintained between the different parts of a command engaged in night operations. it is astonishing with what facility units go astray and how difficult it is for them to find their way back where they belong. = . preparation.= it matters not what the nature of the night operation may be, the most careful preparation is necessary. success often depends upon the care and thoroughness with which the plans are made. all possible eventualities should be thought of and provided for as far as praticable. the first thing to do is to get as much information as possible about the ground to be covered and the position of the enemy, and care must be taken to see that the information is accurate. reconnaissance must be made by night as well as by day; for, ground looks very different at night from what it does during the day. chapter ix field engineering = .= the following, from the =engineer field manual=, together with the elements of field engineering covered in chapter xi, on =obstacles=, will give the company officer a good, working knowledge of those parts of field engineering for which he is most likely to have need. bridges = . dimensions and guard rail.= a roadway ft. wide in the clear should be provided to pass infantry in fours, cavalry two abreast, and military wagons in one direction; a width of ft. will suffice for infantry in column of twos, cavalry in single file, and field guns passed over by hand. the _clear width_ of roadway of an ordinary highway bridge should not be less than ft. for single track, or ft. for double track. the _clear head room_ in ordinary military bridges should not be less than ft. for wagons and cavalry; for highway bridges not less than ft. ramps at the ends of a bridge, if intended for artillery, should not be steeper than on . for animals, slopes steeper than on are inconvenient. if the bridges are high, hand rails should be provided. a single rope may suffice, or it may have brush placed upon it to form a screen. a guard rail should be provided along each side of the roadway, near the ends of the flooring planks. in hasty bridges it may be secured by a lashing or lashings through the planking to the stringer underneath. otherwise it may be fastened with spikes or bolts. = . spar bridges.=--this name is applied to bridges built of round timbers lashed together. intermediate points of support are provided by inclined frames acting as struts to transmit weight from the middle of the bridge to the banks. the single-lock and double-lock bridges with two and three spans of ft., respectively, are the ones of most utility. the first step in constructing a spar bridge is to measure the gap to be bridged and select the position of the footings on either bank. determine the distance from each footing to the middle point of the roadway if a single-lock, or the two corresponding points of a double-lock bridge. next determine and mark on each spar except the diagonals the places where other spars cross it. the marking may be done with chalk, or with an ax. if possible a convenient notation should be adopted. as, for example, in marking with chalk, a ring around the spar where the edge of the crossing spar will come, and a diagonal cross on the part which will be hidden by the crossing spar. a simple way to determine the length of spars is the following: take two small lines somewhat longer than the width of the gap, double each and lash the bights together. stretch them tightly across the gap so that the lashing comes at the middle as at _a_, fig. . release one end of each and stretch it to the footing on the same side as indicated by the dotted lines. mark each line at the footing _c_ or _c'_, and at the position chosen for the abutment sill, _b_ or _b'_. cut the lashing and take each piece of rope to its own side. the distances _ab_ and _ab'_ are the lengths between the transoms, and with ft. added give the length of road bearers required. the distances _ac_ and _ac'_ are the lengths of struts from butt to top of transom, and with ft added, give the total length of spars required. for a double lock bridge, a piece of rope of a length equal to the length of the middle bay replaces the lashing. if the banks are not parallel, a measurement should be taken on each side of the bridge. if desired, a section of the gap may be laid down on the ground in full size and the lengths of spars determined by laying them in place. this method, though given as standard by all authorities, requires more time and more handling of material than the other and gives no better results. the construction of a frame is shown in fig. , and the system of marking in fig. . the arrangement of frames to form a single lock bridge is shown in figs. and , and a double lock bridge in fig . [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . construction of single-lock bridges=, figs. , , and .--suitable for spans of ft. or less. the two frames lock together at the center of the span; their slope must not be more than on . the bridge can be erected by two or three noncommissioned officers and men, one-half on each side of the gap. heavy spars require more men. the footings at _a_ and _b_ must be firm, horizontal if possible, and at right angles to the axis of the bridge. in a masonry pier they may be cut out. in firm soil a simple trench will suffice. in yielding soil a plank or sill must be laid in the trench. the frames are made of such length as to give a slight camber to the bridge, which may be increased to allow for probable settlement of the footings. the inside dimension of one frame is made slightly greater than the outside dimension of the other, so that one frame may fall inside of the other when hauled into position. for a ft. roadway the standards of the narrow (inside) frame should be ft. ins. apart at the transom and ft. ins. at the ledger, in the clear, and the other (outside) frame ft. ins. wider throughout. a frame is constructed on each bank. the standards are laid on the ground in prolongation of the bridge, butts toward the bank. the ledgers are lashed on _above_ and the transoms _beneath_ the standards at the positions marked. the diagonal braces are lashed to the standards, two butts and one tip above the latter, and to each other. before the braces are lashed the frame must be square by checking the measurements of the diagonals. if necessary, pickets for the foot and guy ropes are driven, the former about paces from the bank and paces on each side of the axis of the bridge; the latter about paces from the bank and paces on each side of the axis. the foot ropes, _cc_, fig. , are secured by timber hitches to the butts of the standards and the back and fore guys, _dd_ and _ee_, to the tips the fore guys are passed across to the opposite bank. the guys of the _narrow_ frame should be _inside_ the guys and standards of the wide frame. the frames are put into position one after the other, or simultaneously if there are enough men. a man is told off to each foot rope and one to each back guy to slack off as required, two turns being taken with each of these ropes around their respective pickets. the other men raise the frame and launch it forward, assisted by the men at the fore guys, until the frame is balanced on the edge of the bank. the frame is then tilted until the butts rest on the footing, by slacking off the foot ropes and hauling on the fore guys, fig. . after the head of the frame has been hauled over beyond the perpendicular, it is lowered nearly into its final position by slacking off the back guys. when the two frames are in this position opposite each other, the narrow frame is further lowered until its standards rest upon the transom of the other. the wider (outer) frame is then lowered until the two lock into each other, the standards of each resting upon the transom of the other. the center or fork transom, figs. and , is then passed from shore and placed in the fork between the two frames. this forms the central support to receive a floor system of two bays, built as already described. the estimated time for construction of such a bridge is about one hour if the material is available and in position on both sides of the stream. the construction of the roadway requires about twenty minutes; forming footings in masonry about one hour. = . construction of double-lock bridge=, fig. .--suitable for spans not exceeding ft., and consisting of two inclined frames which lock into a connecting horizontal frame of two or more distance pieces, with cross transoms, dividing the gap to be bridged into three equal bays of about ft. the force required is two or three noncommissioned officers and to men; the time for construction, except roadway, about two and one-half hours; extra time to be allowed for difficult footings. the width of gap is measured, the position of footings determined, and the length of standards from butt to transom determined and marked as before. the inclined frames in this case are built of equal widths, launched as before, and held by guys just above their final position. two stringers are launched out from each bank to the main transom. the distance pieces, fig. , are put into position inside the standards, using tackle if necessary, and the road transoms are placed and lashed to the distance pieces at the places marked. both frames are now lowered until they jam. = . roadway of spar bridge.=--for infantry in fours crowded the transoms should have a diam. of not less than ins. for a span of ft. five stringers ft. ins. c. to c., and ins. diam. at the tip will suffice. if the sticks vary in size, the larger ones should be notched down on the transom so as to bring the tops in the same plane. the stringers should be long enough to overlap the transoms, and should be lashed together at each tip. the floor is held down by side rails over the outside stringers and lashed to them. if lumber can not be obtained, a floor may be made, of small spars, the interstices filled with brush, and the whole covered with loam or clay; figs. and . corduroy roads = . corduroying= is done by laying logs crosswise of the road and touching each other. the result will be better if the logs are nearly of the same size. the butts and tips should alternate. if the logs are large the spaces may be filled with smaller poles. the bottom tier of logs should be evenly bedded and should have a firm bearing at the ends and not ride on the middle. the filling poles, if used, should be cut and trimmed to lie close, packing them about the ends if necessary. if the soil is only moderately soft the logs need be no longer than the width of the road. in soft marsh it may be necessary to make them longer. the logs may be utilized as the wearing surface. in fact this is usually the case. they make a rough surface, uncomfortable for passengers and hard on wagons and loads, but the resistance to traction is much less than would be expected, and the roughness and slightly yielding surface make excellent footing for animals. surface corduroy is perishable and can last but a short time. in marshes, where the logs can be placed below the ground-water level, they are preserved from decay, and if any suitable material can be found, to put a thin embankment over them, a good permanent road may be made. any tough, fibrous material may be used to temporarily harden the surface of a road. hay or straw, tall weeds, corn and cane stalks have been used to good advantage. such materials should be laid with the fibers crosswise of the road, and covered with a thin layer of earth, thrown on from the sides; except in sand, when it is better to dig a shallow trench across the road, fill it with the material and then dig another trench just in front of and in contact with the first and throw the sand from it back onto the material in the first trench, etc. brush work = . a fascine= is a cylindrical bundle of brush, closely bound. the usual length is ft. and the diam. ins. when compressed. lengths of and ft., which are sometimes used, are most conveniently obtained by sawing a standard fascine into or pieces. the weight of a fascine of partially seasoned material will average lbs. fascines are made in a =cradle= which consists of five trestles. a =trestle= is made of two sticks about - / ft. long and ins. in diam, driven into the ground and lashed at the intersection as shown in fig. . in making a cradle, plant the end trestles ft. apart and parallel. stretch a line from one to the other over the intersection, place the others ft. apart and lash them so that each intersection comes fairly to the line. =to build a fascine=, straight pieces of brush, or ins. at the butt, are laid on, the butts projecting at the end ft. beyond the trestle. leaves should be stripped and unruly branches cut off, or partially cut through, so that they will lie close. the larger straighter brush should be laid on the outside, butts alternating in direction, and smaller stuff in the center. the general object is to so dispose the brush as to make the fascine of uniform size, strength, and stiffness from end to end. when the cradle is nearly filled, the fascine is compressed or =choked= by the =fascine choker=, fig. , which consists of bars ft. long, joined at ins. from the ends by a chain ft. long. the chain is marked at ins. each way from the middle by inserting a ring or special link. to use, two men standing on opposite sides pass the chain under the brush, place the short ends of the handles on top and pass the bars, short end first, across to each other. they then bear down on the long ends until the marks on the chain come together. chokers may be improvised from sticks and rope or wire. =binding= will be done with a double turn of wire or tarred rope. it should be done in places, ins. apart, the end binders ins. outside the end trestles. to bind a fascine will require ft. of wire. improvised binders may be made from rods of live brush, hickory or hazel is the best. place the butt under the foot and twist the rod to partially separate the fibers and make it flexible. a rod so prepared is called a =withe=. to use a withe, make a half turn and twist at the smaller end, fig. ; pass the withe around the brush and the large end through the eye. draw taut and double the large end back, taking half-hitches over its own standing part, fig. . when the fascine is choked and bound, saw the ends off square, ins. outside the end binders. after a cradle is made, men can make fascine per hour, with wire binding. withes require man more. =a fascine revetment= is made by placing the fascines as shown in fig. . the use of headers and anchors is absolutely necessary in loose soils only, but they greatly strengthen the revetment in any case. a fascine revetment =must always be crowned= with sods or bags. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = .= in all brush weaving the following terms have been adopted and are convenient to use: =randing.=--weaving a single rod in and out between pickets. =slewing.=--weaving two or more rods together in the same way. =pairing.=--carrying two rods together, crossing each other in and out at each picket. =wattling.=--a general term applied to the woven part of brush construction. = . a hurdle= is a basket work made of brushwood. if made in pieces, the usual size is ft. ins. by ft., though the width may be varied so that it will cover the desired height of slope. a hurdle is made by describing on the ground an arc of a circle of ft. radius and on the arc driving pickets, ins. apart, covering ft. out to out, fig. . brush is then woven in and out and well compacted. the concave side of a hurdle should be placed next the earth. it wraps less than if made flat. =in weaving the hurdle=, begin randing at the middle space at the bottom. reaching the end, twist the rod as described for a withe, but at one point only, bend it around the end picket and work back. start a second rod before the first one is quite out, slewing the two for a short distance. hammer the wattling down snug on the pickets with a block of wood and continue until the top is reached. it improves the hurdle to finish the edges with two selected rods paired, fig. . a pairing may be introduced in the middle, if desired, to give the hurdle extra endurance if it is to be used as a pavement or floor. if the hurdle is not to be used at once, or if it is to be transported, it must be sewed. the sewing is done with wire, twine, or withes at each end and in the middle, with stitches about ins. long, as shown in fig. . about ft. of wire is required to sew one hurdle. no. is about the right size, and a coil of lbs. will sew hurdles. three men should make a hurdle in hours, wattling and the third preparing the rods. = . continuous hurdle.=--if conditions permit the revetment to be built in place, the hurdle is made continuous for considerable lengths. the pickets may be larger; they are driven farther apart, or ins., and the brush may be heavier. the construction is more rapid. the pickets are driven with a little more slant than is intended and must be anchored to the parapet. a line of poles with wire attached at intervals of or pickets will answer. the wires should be made fast to the pickets after the wattling is done. they will interfere with the wearing if fastened sooner. two men should make yds. of continuous hurdle of ordinary height in one hour. = . brush revetment.=--pickets may be set as above described and the brush laid inside of them without weaving, being held in place by bringing the earth up with it. in this case the anchors must be fastened before the brush laying begins. the wires are not much in the way in this operation. = . gabion making.--a gabion= is a cylindrical basket with open ends, made of brush woven on pickets or stakes as described for hurdles. the usual size is ft. outside diam. and ft. ins. height of wattling. on account of the sharp curvature somewhat better brush is required for gabions than will do for hurdles. =the gabion form=, fig. , is of wood, ins. diam., with equidistant notches around the circumference, equal in number to the number of pickets to be used, usually to , less if the brush is large and stiff, more if it is small and pliable. the notches should be of such depth that the pickets will project to in. outside the circle. the pickets should be - / to - / ins. diam., ft. ins. long and sharpened, half at the small and half at the large end. =to make a gabion=, the form is placed on the ground, level or nearly so, and the pickets are driven vertically in the notches, large and small ends down, alternately. the form is then raised a foot and held by placing a lashing around outside the pickets, tightened with a rack stick, fig. . the wattling is randed or slewed from the form up. the form is then dropped down, the gabion inverted and the wattling completed. if the brush is small, uniform, and pliable, pairing will make a better wattling than randing. if not for immediate use, the gabion must be sewed as described for hurdles, the same quantity of wire being required. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] the gabion, when wattled and sewed, is completed by cutting off the tops of the pickets in. from the web, the bottom ins., the latter sharpened after cutting, and driving a carrying picket through the middle of its length and a little on side of the axis. see that the middle of this picket is smooth. three men should make a gabion in an hour. gabions may be made without the forms, but the work is slower and not so good. the circle is struck on the ground and the pickets driven at the proper points. the weaving is done from the ground up and the entire time of one man is required to keep the pickets in proper position. =if brush is scarce=, gabions may be made with ins. of wattling at each end, the middle left open. in filling, the open part may be lined with straw, grass, brush cuttings, or grain sacks, to keep the earth from running out. = . gabion revetment.=--the use of gabions in revetments is illustrated in fig. . if more than two tiers are used, the separating fascines should be anchored back. gabion revetments should be crowned with sods or bags. the advantages of the gabion revetment are very great. it can be put in place without extra labor and faster and with less exposure than any other. it is self-supporting and gives cover from view and partial cover from fire quicker than any other form. several forms of gabions of other material than brush have been used. sheet iron and iron and paper hoops are some of them. the iron splinters badly, is heavy, and has not given satisfaction. if any special materials are supplied the method of using them will, in view of the foregoing explanation, be obvious. = . timber or pole revetment.=--poles too large for use in any other way may be cut to length and stood on end to form a revetment. the lower ends should be in a small trench and have a waling piece in front of them. there must also be a waling piece or cap at or near the top, anchored back. fig. shows this form. = . miscellaneous revetments.=--any receptacles for earth which will make a stable, compact pile, as =boxes=, =baskets=, =oil or other cans=, may be used for a revetment. =barrels= may be used for gabions. =canvas= stretched behind pickets is well thought of in a foreign service. if the soil will make =adobe=, or sun-dried bricks, an excellent revetment may be made of them, but it will not stand wet weather. knots = .= =square= or =reef knot=, fig. , commonly used for joining two ropes of the same size. the standing and running parts of each rope must pass through the loop of the other in the same direction, i. e., from above down ward or vice versa; otherwise a _granny_, is made, which is a useless knot that will not hold. the reef knot can be upset by taking one end of the rope and its standing part and pulling them in opposite directions. with dry rope a reef knot is as strong as the rope; with wet rope it slips before the rope breaks, while a double sheet bend is found to hold. [illustration: fig. _square or reef_] = . two half hitches=, fig. , especially useful for belaying, or making fast the end of a rope round its own standing part. the end may be lashed down or seized to the standing part with a piece of spun yarn; this adds to its security and prevents slipping. this knot should never be used for hoisting a spar. [illustration: fig. _two half hitches_] = . clove hitch=, fig. , generally used for fastening a rope at right angles to a spar or at the commencement of a lashing. if the end of the spar is free, the hitch is made by first forming two loops, as in fig. , placing the right-hand loop over the other one and slipping the double loop (fig. ) over the end of the spar. if this can not be done, pass the end of the rope round the spar, bring it up to the right of the standing part, cross over the latter, make another turn round the spar, and bring up the end between the spar, the last turn, and the standing part, fig. . when used for securing guys to sheer legs, etc., the knot should be made with a long end, which is formed into two half hitches round the standing part and secured to it with spun yarn. [illustration: fig. _clove hitch_] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . timber hitch=, fig. , used for hauling and lifting spars. it can easily be loosed when the strain is taken off, but will not slip under a pull. when used for hauling spars, a half hitch is added near the end of the spar, fig. . [illustration: fig. _timber hitch_] [illustration: fig. _timber hitch and half hitch_] = . bowline=, fig. , forms a loop that will not slip. make loop with the standing part of the rope underneath, pass the end from below through the loop, over the part round the standing part of the rope, and then down through the loop _c_. the length of bight depends upon the purpose for which the knot is required. [illustration: fig. _bowline_] = . bowline on a bight=, fig. . the first part is made like the above, with the double part of a rope; then the bight _a_ is pulled through sufficiently to allow it to be bent past _d_ and come up in the position shown. it makes a more comfortable sling for a man than a single bight. [illustration: fig. _bowline on a bight_] = . sheep shank=, fig. , used for shortening a rope or to pass by a weak spot; a half hitch is taken with the standing parts around the bights. [illustration: fig. _sheep shank_] = . short splice.= to make a _short splice_, figs. , , , unlay the strands of each rope for a convenient length. bring the rope ends together so that each strand of one rope lies between the two consecutive strands of the other rope. draw the strands of the first rope along the second and grasp with one hand. then work a free strand of the second rope over the nearest strand of the first rope and under the second strand, working in a direction opposite to the twist of the rope. the same operation applied to all the strands will give the result shown by fig. . the splicing may be continued in the same manner to any extent (fig. ) and the free ends of the strands may be cut off when desired. the splice may be neatly tapered by cutting out a few fibers from each strand each time it is passed through the rope. rolling under a board or the foot will make the splice compact. [illustration: fig. _short splice_] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . long splice= (figs. , ).--unlay the strands of each rope for a convenient length and bring together as for a short splice. unlay to any desired length a strand, _d_, of one rope, laying in its place the nearest strand, _a_, of the other rope. repeat the operation in the opposite direction with two other strands, _c_ and _f_. fig. shows strands _c_ and _f_ secured by tying together. strands b and e are shown secured by unlaying half of each for a suitable length and laying half of the other in place of the unlayed portions, the loose ends being passed through the rope. this splice is used when the rope is to run through a block. the diameter of the rope is not enlarged at the splice. the ends of the strands should not be trimmed off close until the splice has been thoroughly stretched by work. [illustration: fig. _long splice_] [illustration: fig. ] = . eye splice= (figs. , , , ).--unlay a convenient length of rope. pass one loose strand, _a_, under one strand of the rope, as shown in fig. , forming an eye of the proper size. pass a second loose strand, _b_, under the strand of the rope next to the strand which secures _a_, fig. . pass the third strand, _c_, under the strand next to that which secures _b_, fig. . draw all taut and continue and complete as for a short splice. [illustration: fig. _eye splice_] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] lashings = . to lash a transom to an upright spar=, fig. , transom in front of upright.--a clove hitch is made round the upright a few inches below the transom. the lashing is brought under the transom, up in front of it, horizontally behind the upright, down in front of the transom, and back behind the upright at the level of the bottom of the transom and above the clove hitch. the following turns are kept outside the previous ones on one spar and inside on the other, not riding over the turns already made. four turns or more are required. a couple of frapping turns are then taken between the spars, around the lashing, and the lashing is finished off either round one of the spars or any part of the lashing through which the rope can be passed. the final clove hitch should never be made around the spar on the side toward which the stress is to come, as it may jam and be difficult to remove. the lashing must be well beaten with handspike or pick handle to tighten it up. this is called a square shears are laid alongside of each other with their butts on the ground, lashing. [illustration: fig. ] = . lashing for a pair of shears=, fig. .--the two spars for the points below where the lashing is to be resting on a skid. a clove hitch is made round one spar and the lashing taken loosely eight or nine times about the two spars above it without riding. a couple of frapping turns are then taken between the spars and the lashing is finished off with a clove hitch above the turns on one of the spars. the butts of the spars are then opened out and a sling passed over the fork, to which the block is hooked or lashed, and fore and back guys are made fast with clove hitches to the bottom and top spars, respectively, just above the each spar the distance from the butt to the center of the lashing. lay two of the spars parallel to each other with an interval a little greater fork, fig. . [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . to lash three spars together as for a gin or tripod.=--mark on than the diameter. rest their tips on a skid and lay the third spar between them with its butt in the opposite direction so that the marks on the three spars will be in line. make a clove hitch on one of the outer spars below the lashing and take eight or nine loose turns around the three, as shown in fig. . take a couple of frapping turns between each pair of spars in succession and finish with a clove hitch on the central spar above the lashing. pass a sling over the lashing and the tripod is ready for raising. [illustration: fig. ] = . holdfasts.=--to prepare a fastening in the ground for the attachment of guys or purchases, stout pickets are driven into the ground one behind the other, in the line of pull. the head of each picket except the last is secured by a lashing to the foot of the picket next behind, fig. . the lashings are tightened by rack sticks, the points of which are driven into the ground to hold them in position. the distance between the stakes should be several times the height of the stake above the ground. [illustration: fig. ] another form requiring more labor but having much greater strength is called a "_deadman_," and consists of a log laid in a transverse trench with an inclined trench intersecting it at its middle point. the cable is passed down the inclined trench, takes several round turns on the log, and is fastened to it by half hitches and marlin stopping, figs. , , . if the cable is to lead horizontally or inclined downward, it should pass over a log at the outlet of the inclined trench, fig. . if the cable is to lead upward, this log is not necessary, but the anchor log must be buried deeper. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] chapter x field fortifications = . object.= the object of field fortifications is two-fold. . to increase the fighting power of troops by enabling the soldier to use his weapons with the greatest possible effect. . to protect the soldier against the enemy's fire. = . how these objects are accomplished.= these objects are accomplished: . by means of shelters--trenches, redoubts, splinterproofs, etc., which protect the soldier from the enemy's fire. . by means of obstacles--wire entanglements, abatis, pits, etc., which delay the advance of the enemy. = . classification.= field fortifications are usually divided into three classes, =hasty intrenchments=, =deliberate intrenchments= and =siege works=. =nomenclature of the trench.= the following illustration shows the names of the various parts of the trench. [illustration: fig. ] = . hasty intrenchments= include trenches dug by troops upon the battlefield to increase their fighting power. they are usually constructed in the presence of the enemy and in haste and embrace three forms viz:--the =lying trench=, the =kneeling trench=, and the =standing trench=. = . lying trench.= (fig. .) this trench gives cover to a man lying down. when intrenching under fire the rifle trench can be constructed by a man lying down. he can mask himself from view in about to minutes and can complete the trench in to minutes. a good method is to dig a trench inches wide back to his knees, roll into it and dig inches wide alongside of it and down to the feet, then roll into the second cut and extend the first one back. conditions may require men to work in pairs, one firing while the other uses his intrenching tool. duties are exchanged from time to time until the trench is completed. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. a _intrenching under fire_] the height of the parapet should not exceed foot. this trench affords limited protection against rifle fire and less against shrapnel. = . kneeling trench.= (fig. .) time permitting the lying trench may be enlarged and deepened until the kneeling trench has been constructed. the width of the bottom should be - / feet--preferably feet--and the relief (distance from bottom of trench to top of parapet) is feet--the proper height for firing over in a kneeling position. [illustration: fig. ] = . standing trench= (fig. ) has a bottom width of to - / feet and a relief of - / feet which is the proper firing height for men of average stature. as this trench does not give complete cover to men standing in it a passage way should be constructed in rear of it not less than feet below the interior crest. this forms the complete trench (fig. ). figures - - show simple standing trenches used in the european war. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. simple standing trench, parapet suppressed] [illustration: fig. simple standing trench, rocky ground] [illustration: fig. narrow firing trench with parados] = . deliberate intrenchments= comprise trenches and works constructed by troops not in line of battle and are usually intended to enable a small force to resist a much larger one. it frequently happens that hasty intrenchments are developed into deliberate intrenchments and from this stage pass into the domain of siege works. = . fire trenches=,--the trenches which shelter the firing line,--are of different types. no fixed type can be prescribed. the type must be selected with due regard to the terrain, enemy, time, tools, soil, etc., but all should conform to the requirements of a good field of fire, and protection for the troops behind a vertical wall, preferably with some head or over head cover. the simplest form of fire trench is deep and narrow and has a flat concealed parapet (fig. ). when time will permit the simple trench should be planned with a view to developing it into a more complete form (figs. and ). in all trenches as soon as practicable a passage way-- feet wide at the bottom--should be provided, in rear of the firing step, for the men carrying supplies, ammunition, etc., and for the removal of the wounded. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] when the excavated earth is easily removed a fire trench without parapet may be the one best suited to the soil and other conditions affecting the conditions of profile (fig. ). the enemy's infantry as well as artillery will generally have great difficulty in seeing this trench. fig. shows a squad trench. fig. shows a fire trench provided with protection against shrapnel. this trench is used in the european war. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. protection against shrapnel] in the european war the aim in constructing fire trenches seems to be to minimize and localize artillery effect as far as possible. the main excavation along the front is a continuous, very deep, communication, not in itself prepared for active defense. the actual firing is done from banquettes or firing steps just to the front of the passage or from trenches dug as far as or feet in front of the main excavation and reached by short passages. figs and show the type of this construction. fig. shows a fire trench with parades and shelter. [illustration: fig. two methods for communication trenches in rear of firing trenches] [illustration: fig. communication trenches in rear of firing trenches recessed and traversed firing trench] [illustration: fig. trench shelter] = . traverses.= fire trenches are divided into sections or bays by means of traverses which intercept side or enfilade fire and limit the effect of shells, bombs or grenades, which burst inside of the trench. the traverses should be wide enough to screen the full width of the trench with a little to spare. the thickness of the traverse varies from to feet or more. six feet is the dimension generally found in the traverses in the trenches on the european battle fronts. = . trench recesses; sortie steps.= it will be noted that in some of the diagrams of the trenches now being used in the european war the berm has been eliminated entirely. the object being to bring the firer closer to the vertical wall thus giving him better protection from shrapnel fire. there have also been added to the trench, recesses for hand grenades. these recesses are similar to recesses dug in the front wall of the trench for ammunition. one form of recess is shown in (fig. ). in order to provide facilities for rapidly mounting from the trench to charge, sortie steps and stakes have been provided in some trenches as shown in (fig. ). [illustration: fig. _store recesses for water, hand-grenades, reserve ammunition, machine guns, range finders, blankets, etc._ (from _field entrenchments_--solano.)] = . parados.= instead of shrapnel, explosive shell is most frequently used in the european war. this necessitates the addition of a parados to the fire trench to protect against the back blast of high explosives. this is shown in (figs. and ). an interesting development in cover for the firing line is shown in dugouts constructed in the fire trenches in the european war. these dugouts are deep underground and shelter from to men each (fig. ). these dugouts will be discussed more in length under cover trenches. [illustration: fig. ] = . head cover= is the term applied to any horizontal cover which may be provided above the plane of fire. it is obtained by notching or loop-holing the top of the parapet so that the bottoms of the notches or loopholes are in the desired plane of fire. the extra height of parapet may be to inches and the loopholes may be to - / feet center to center. head cover is of limited utility. it increases the visibility of the parapet and restricts the field of fire. at close range the loopholes serve as aiming points to steady the enemy's fire and may do more harm than good at longer ranges. this is especially the case if the enemy can see any light through the loophole. he waits for the light to be obscured, when he fires, knowing there is a man's head behind the loophole. a background must be provided or a removable screen arranged so that there will be no difference in the appearance of the loophole whether a man is looking through it or not. head cover is advantageous only when the conditions of the foreground are such that the enemy can not get close up. = . notches and loopholes=, figs. - , are alike in all respects, except that the latter have a roof or top and the former have not. the bottom, also called =floor= or =sole=, is a part of the original superior slope. the sides, sometimes called =cheeks=, are vertical or nearly so. the plan depends upon local conditions. there is always a narrow part, called the =throat=, which is just large enough to take the rifle and permit sighting. from the throat the sides diverge at an angle, called the =splay=, which depends upon the field of fire necessary. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] the position of the throat may vary. if on the outside, it is less conspicuous but more easily obstructed by injury to the parapet and more difficult to use, since in changing aim laterally the man must move around a pivot in the plane of the throat. if the material of which the loophole is constructed presents hard surfaces, the throat should be outside, notwithstanding the disadvantages of that position, or else the sides must be stepped as in fig. . in some cases it may be best to adopt a compromise position and put the throat in the middle, fig. . figs. to show details and dimensions of a loophole of sand bags. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] a serviceable form of loophole consists of a pyramidal box of plank with a steel plate spiked across the small end and pierced for fire. fig. shows a section of such a construction. it is commonly known as the =hopper loophole=. the plate should be / in. thick, if of special steel; or / in., if ordinary metal. fig. shows the opening used by the japanese in manchuria and fig. that used by the russians. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] the construction of a notch requires only the introduction of some available rigid material to form the sides; by adding a cover the notch becomes a loophole. where the fire involves a wide lateral and small vertical angle, loopholes may take the form of a long slit. such a form will result from laying logs or fascines lengthwise on the parapet, supported at intervals by sods or other material, fig. , or small poles covered with earth may be used, fig. . [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . overhead cover.= this usually consists of a raised platform of some kind covered with earth. it is frequently combined with horizontal cover in a single structure, which protects the top and exposed side. the supporting platform will almost always be of wood and may vary from brushwood or light poles to heavy timbers and plank. it is better, especially with brush or poles, to place a layer of sods, grass down, or straw, or grain sacks over the platform before putting on the earth, to prevent the latter from sifting through. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] =the thickness of overhead cover= depends upon the class of fire against which protection is desired, and is sometimes limited by the vertical space available, since it must afford headroom beneath, and generally should not project above the nearest natural or artificial horizontal cover. for splinter proofs a layer of earth to ins. thick on a support of brush or poles strong enough to hold it up will suffice if the structure is horizontal. if the front is higher than the rear, less thickness is necessary; if the rear is higher than the front, more is required. for bombproofs a minimum thickness of ins. of timber and ft. of earth is necessary against field and siege guns, or ins. timber and ft. of earth against the howitzers and mortars of a heavy siege train, not exceeding inches in caliber. in determining the area of overhead cover to be provided, allow sq. ft. per man for occupancy while on duty only, or sq. ft. per man for continuous occupancy not of long duration. for long occupation to sq. ft. per man should be provided. it is not practicable to give complete cover to rifle positions that will successfully withstand the heavy artillery of today. the use of overhead cover is usually limited to that sufficient for protection against rifle fire, machine gun fire, and shrapnel. = . cover trenches= are constructed to provide safe cover for the supports or reinforcements of the fire trenches or to provide cooking and resting facilities for the garrison of the neighboring fire trenches. the important point in cover trenches is safety. they vary in design from the simple rectangular trenches to elaborately constructed trenches having overhead cover, kitchens, shelters, latrines, dressing stations, etc. cover trenches must not be mistaken for a secondary position, they are cover for the firing line, supports and reserves until they are required in the fire trenches. the cover trench requires a depth of at least feet to protect men standing. greater depths may be used when necessary. fig. is a section of an open cover trench and fig. of a closed one. this section may be used for a communicating trench. fig. shows a cover trench close to a fire trench. the character of overhead cover for trenches is shown in the diagrams under overhead cover. the distance of the cover trenches varies with the situation. the experience of the european war places the cover trenches from to yards in rear of the fire trenches. these trenches furnish shelter for at least / of the firing line and supports. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] the reserves are furnished yet more elaborate shelter, with plenty of room for the men to lie down and rest and when practicable, bathing facilities are provided. = . dugouts.= an elaborate system of dugouts has developed along the lines occupied by the troops in the european war. these dugouts are located from to feet below the ground and are reached by stairs in timbered passage ways. at the foot of the stairs a tunnel or corridor runs forward and on either side or at the end, rooms have been dug out varying in size. most of these rooms have been timbered and lined. many are electrically lighted. in some of these underground shelters, accommodations for several hundred men have been prepared with all of the necessary facilities for making them comfortable. it must be understood that such elaborate preparations can only be made when troops face each other in trenches where operations have developed into practically a siege. = . communicating trenches.= these trenches as the name implies are for the purpose of providing safe communication between the cover and fire trenches. they may be also constructed just in rear of a series of fire trenches to provide a means of communication from one to the other. communicating trenches also extend to the rear of the cover trenches and provide safe passage to fresh troops or supplies. these trenches are usually laid out in zig zag or curved lines (fig. ), to prevent enfilade fire from sweeping them. as a general rule excavated earth is placed on both sides of the trench to afford protection, the depth is usually from to feet. (fig. ) shows a typical communicating trench. [illustration: fig. _typical passage trench from supports to firing line._ (from _field entrenchments_--solano)] = . lookouts.= to enable the garrison of a trench to get the greatest amount of comfort and rest, a _lookout_ should be constructed and a sentinel stationed therein. the simplest form would consist of two sandbags placed on the parapet and splayed so as to give the required view, and carefully concealed. better forms may be constructed, with one side resting on the berm by using short uprights with overhead cover, a slit on all sides being provided for observation. at night, lookouts are usually posted at listening points located in or beyond the line of obstacles. these will be discussed under obstacles. = . supporting points.= in some cases small supporting points may have to be established close behind the general line of trenches for the purpose of breaking up a successful attack on the trenches and to aid in delivering a counter attack. these points are strongly entrenched and have all around wire entanglements and are garrisoned by from to picked men or by larger forces if the situation demand it. in some cases machine guns are added to the force in the supporting point. = . example of trench system.= having discussed trenches and obstacles somewhat in detail, let us take a combination of the whole showing a complete system such as is used today. (fig. ) is a good example. [illustration: fig. first line firing trench] beginning at the front we have the line of wire entanglements or obstacles with their listening posts x, for guarding them. connecting the listening posts to the fire trenches are the communicating trenches. the fire trenches are shown by the heavy black line running about feet in rear of the obstacles. note the many traverses shown by the indentations in the line. points marked m with arrows projecting to the flanks are machine guns, so located as to sweep the front of the position with a cross fire. points marked s are underground shelters for from to men. points marked s' are shelters for men. in rear of the firing trenches at a distance varying from to feet is the line of cover trenches. this line is connected with the fire trenches by the zig zagged line of communicating trenches. note that the latrines (l) and first aid stations (f) are just off from the communicating trenches, while the larger shelter for men (s') are near the cover trenches. as the note on the diagram shows, the trench requires men to occupy it with double that number in support. the trench has loopholes with spaces between provided with a higher banquette so that the whole parapet may be manned for firing. on the battlefields of europe today there are generally three lines of fire trenches. this permits the defender to fall back to a nd or rd prepared position in case he is driven out of his first trench. on a hill we find a fire trench near the foot of the slope, one just forward of the military crest, and the third on the reverse slope of the hill. in many instances the first line trenches consist of as many as four or five lines of trenches running in a general lateral direction and connected by deep narrow communicating trenches. the depth between the first and last of these trenches is, in some instances, not over a hundred yards. sign boards are necessary at short intervals to prevent the soldiers from getting lost. the effect of having so many alternative firing trenches is to make it extremely difficult for an enemy to advance from, or even to hold one of them, even when he gains a footing, as he would be swept by fire from the supporting trenches in rear and also by flanking fire from the adjacent trenches. = . location.= there are two things to be considered in locating trenches: ( ) the tactical situation, and ( ) the nature of the ground. the first consideration requires that the trenches be so located as to give the best field of fire. locating near the base of hills possesses the advantage of horizontal fire, but, as a rule, it is difficult to support trenches so located and to retreat therefrom in case of necessity. while location near the crest of hills--on the "military crest"--does not possess the advantage of horizontal fire, it is easier to support trenches so located and to retreat therefrom. depending upon circumstances, there are times when it will be better to intrench near the base of hills and there are other times when it will be better to intrench on the "military crest," which is always in front of the natural crest. the construction of trenches along the "military crest" does not give any "dead space"--that is, any space to the front that can not be reached by the fire of the men in the trenches. whether we should construct our trenches on high or low ground is a matter that should always be carefully considered under the particular conditions that happen to exist at that particular time, and the matter may be summarized as follows: the advantages of the high ground are:-- . we can generally see better what is going on to our front and flanks; and the men have a feeling of security that they do not enjoy on low ground. . we can usually reënforce the firing line better and the dead and wounded can be removed more easily. . the line of retreat is better. the disadvantages are:-- . the plunging fire of a high position is not as effective as a sweeping fire of a low one. . it is not as easy to conceal our position. the advantages of low ground, are:-- . the low, sweeping fire that we get, especially when the ground in front is fairly flat and the view over the greater part of it is uninterrupted, is the most effective kind of fire. . as a rule it is easier to conceal trenches on low ground, especially from artillery fire. . if our trenches are on low ground, our artillery will be able to find good positions on the hill behind us without interfering with the infantry defense. the disadvantages are:-- . as a rule it will be more difficult to reënforce the firing line and to remove the dead and wounded from the trenches. . on a low position there will usually be an increase of dead space in our front. . the average soldier acting on the defensive dreads that the enemy may turn his flank, and this feeling is much more pronounced on low ground than on high ground. should the enemy succeed in getting a footing on our flank with our trenches on top of the hill, it would be bad enough, but it would certainly be far worse if he got a footing on top of the hill, on the flank and rear, with our company on low ground in front. we, therefore, see there are things to be said for and against both high and low ground, and the most that can be said without examining a particular piece of ground is: our natural inclination is to select high ground, but, as a rule, this choice will reduce our fire effect, and if there is a covered approach to our fire trenches and very little dead ground in front of it, with an extensive field of fire, there is no doubt the lower ground is better. however, if these conditions do not exist to a considerable degree, the moral advantage of the higher ground must be given great weight, especially in a close country. the experience of the european war emphasizes the fact that the location of rifle trenches is today, just as much as ever, a matter of compromise to be determined by sound judgment on the part of the responsible officers. the siting of trenches so that they are not under artillery observation is a matter of great importance, but, it has yet to be proven that this requirement is more important than an extensive field of fire. there are many instances where to escape observation and fire from the artillery, trenches were located on the reverse slopes, giving only a limited field of fire. this restricted field of fire permitted the enemy to approach within a few hundred yards of the trench and robbed them of the concealment they had hoped to gain. the choice between a site in front, and one in rear of a crest, is influenced by local conditions which govern the effectiveness of our own and the enemy's fire. in general, the best location for effective fire trenches, lies between the military crest of rising ground and the lowest line from which the foreground is visible. if the position on the military crest is conspicuous, it is inadvisable. with regard to the nature of the ground, trenches should, if practicable, be so located as to avoid stony ground, because of the difficult work entailed and of the danger of flying fragments, should the parapet be struck by an artillery projectile. to locate the trace of the trenches, lie on the ground at intervals and select the best field of fire consistent with the requirements of the situation. trenches should be laid out in company lengths, if possible, and adjoining trenches should afford each other mutual support. the flanks and important gaps in the line should be protected by fire trenches echeloned in rear. = . concealment of trenches.= owing to the facilities for observation that the aeroplanes and other air craft afford, and to the accuracy and effect of modern artillery fire, every possible means should be taken to conceal trenches, gun implacements, and other works. the aim should be to alter the natural surface of the ground as little as possible and to present a target of the smallest possible dimensions. covering the parapet with brush or grass will afford temporary concealment. if the new earth can be sodded it aids greatly in concealing the trench. in some cases troops have gone to the extent of painting canvas to resemble the ground and have placed it over trenches, guns, etc. straw and grass placed in the bottom of trenches make them less conspicuous to air scouts. when trenches are dug on a fairly steep slope care must be used to conceal the back of the trench, which, being higher than the parapet, will stand out as a scar on the hillside. grass or brush may be used to conceal the back of the trench. = . dummy trenches.= may be constructed which attract the enemy's attention and draw his fire, or at least a part of it. the extent to which this method may be used may include the construction of dummy obstacles and guns, and even hats may be placed on the parapets. = . length of trench.= the usual minimum allowance of trench space is one yard per man, although in some tests, two feet was found sufficient for men to fire satisfactorily. ordinarily one squad will occupy the space between two traverses which experience has shown should be about feet apart. = . preparation of the foreground.= one of the first principles in improving the foreground is that an enemy attacking the trenches shall be continually exposed to fire especially in the last or yards. this requires a clearing of the foreground and a filling in of depressions or leveling of cover. dead space may be swept by fire of trenches specially located for that purpose. those features of the ground which obstruct the field of fire, restrict the view, or favor or the enemy's approach, should be removed as far as possible. on the other hand, features which favor the concealment of the trenches or increase the difficulty of the attack would better be left standing, especially when it is possible to fire through or over them. = . revetments.= by a revetment we mean a facing placed against the front or back wall of a trench to keep the earth in place. when trenches are to be occupied for any length of time, they must be revetted. there are many forms of revetments. sod revetments, stakes with brush behind them, stakes with planks, boards, or poles behind them and a common form seen in the trenches in europe chicken wire with brush or canvas behind it. = . drainage.= all trenches should be dug so as to drain in case of rain. in favorable locations the trench may be constructed to drain automatically, by constructing it with an incline to one end. under ordinary circumstances dry standing has to be provided in trenches by raising the foot level by the use of brush, boards, poles, etc. bailing will have to be resorted to in most cases to drain the trench. = . water supply.= at least / a gallon of water per man per day should be supplied. the supply is almost invariably liable to be contaminated, therefore, it should be sterilized by boiling or by treating. these are usually located just off from the communicating trenches. some form of receptacle should be used and all deposits covered with chemicals. = . latrines.= numerous latrines must be constructed in the trenches' earth. these receptacles are removed from time to time and emptied in pits dug for that purpose. urinal cans must also be provided and cared for in a similar manner. = . illumination of the foreground.= battlefield illumination is a necessity where night attacks may be expected, and also as a protection to the line of obstacles. portable searchlights have become an accepted part of every army. in addition to these, trenches must be supplied with reflector lights, star bombs, rockets and flares, arranged so that they can be put into action instantaneously when the enemy approaches. the foreground should be entirely illuminated, leaving the defenders in the shadow. if the light is too close to the defenders parapet, they are illuminated and become a good target. some flares will burn for minutes and may be thrown to the front as grenades, fired as rockets, shot from small mortars, or placed well to the front to be set off by trip wires close to the ground. the best light devised is one that can be fired well to the front from a small mortar and then hung suspended from an open parachute above the enemy. bonfires can be laid ready for lighting when no other means is at hand. whatever form of illumination is adopted, it should withstand bad weather conditions and prolonged bombardment. = . telephones.= when armies have been forced to trench warfare and time has permitted an elaborate system of trenches to be constructed, telephone communication is established as soon as possible. the central station, with the switch-board is located in a shelter in rear of the cover trenches and lines are run to all trenches, lookout stations and listening points. = . siege works.= comprise devices used by besiegers and besieged in attack and defense of strong fortifications and especially those devices enable troops to advance under continuous cover. chapter xi obstacles = . object.= the main objects in placing obstacles in front of the trenches are, to protect them from surprise, and to stop the enemy's advance or to delay him while under the defender's fire. = . necessity for obstacles.= it is evident that the present tendency is to reduce the number of men assigned to constant occupancy of the first line trenches. this is due to the effectiveness of rifle fire at close range, the destructive effect of shell and shrapnel, the infrequency of daylight attack on intrenched positions, and the severe strain on the men. the aim seems to be the placing here and there of a lookout or trench guards, who, when necessity demands can call help from the near by splinterproofs, dugouts, etc., before the enemy can make his way through the obstacles. it has been found from experience in the european war that as long as shells are directed at the trenches no danger of attack is feared but, when the shells are concentrated against the obstacles the trenches are manned and preparations are made to resist an assault. = . location.= obstacles must be so located that they will be exposed to the defenders' fire, and should be sheltered as far as possible from the enemy's artillery fire. they should be difficult to remove or destroy, should afford no cover for the enemy, and should not obstruct counter attacks. no obstacle should be more than yards from the defender's trench. care must be taken not to place them so close to the trench that hand grenades can be thrown into the trench from beyond the obstacle. obstacles may be placed in one, two or three lines. as far as possible they should be concealed so that they will not betray the location of the trench. = . kinds of obstacles.= the following are the most common kinds of obstacles:-- =abatis= consisting of trees lying parallel to each other with the branches pointing in the general direction of approach and interlaced. all leaves and small twigs should be removed and the stiff ends of branches pointed. abatis on open ground is most conveniently made of branches about feet long. the branches are staked or tied down and the butts anchored by covering them with earth. barbed wire may be interlaced among the branches. successive rows are placed, the branches of one extending over the trunks of the one in front, so as to make the abatis feet high and as wide as desired. it is better to place the abatis in a natural depression or a ditch, for concealment and protection from fire. if exposed to artillery, an abatis must be protected either as above or else by raising a glacis in front of it. fig. shows a typical form of abatis with a glacis in front. an abatis formed by felling trees toward the enemy, leaving the butt hanging to the stump, the branches prepared as before, is called =a slashing=, fig. . it gives cover, and should be well flanked. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . a palisade= is a man-tight fence of posts. round poles to inches in diameter at the large end are best. if the sticks run to inches, they may be split. if defended from the rear, palisades give some shelter from fire and the openings should be made as large as possible without letting men through. if defended from the flank, they may be closer, say to inches apart. the top should be pointed. a strand or two of barbed wire run along the top and stapled to each post is a valuable addition. palisading is best made up in panels of or feet length, connected by a waling piece, preferably of plank, otherwise of split stuff. if the tops are free, two wales should be used, both underground. if the tops are connected by wires, one will do. palisades should be planted to incline slightly to the front. as little earth should be disturbed in digging as possible, and one side of the trench should be kept in the desired plane of the palisade. if stones can be had to fit between the posts and the top of the trench, they will increase the stiffness of the structure and save time in ramming, or a small log may be laid in the trench along the outside of the posts. figs. and show the construction and placing of palisades. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . a fraise= is a palisade horizontal, or nearly so, projecting from the scarp or counterscarp. a modern and better form consists of supports at or feet interval, connected by barbed wire, forming a horizontal wire fence. fig. . [illustration: fig. ] = . cheveaux de frise= are obstacles of the form shown in fig. . they are usually made in sections of manageable length chained together at the ends. they are most useful in closing roads or other narrow passages, as they can be quickly opened for friendly troops. the lances may be of iron instead of wood and rectangular instead of round; the axial beam may be solid or composite. figs. and show methods of constructing cheveaux de frise with dimension stuff. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . a formidable obstacle against cavalry= consists of railroad ties planted at intervals of feet with the tops - / feet above the ground, and connected by a line of rails spiked securely to each, fig. . the rail ends should be connected by fish plates and bolted, with the ends of the bolts riveted down on the ends. figs. and show forms of heavy obstacles employed in manchuria by the russians and japanese, respectively. the former is composed of timber trestles, made in rear and carried out at night. the latter appears to have been planted in place. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . a wire entanglement= is composed of stakes driven in the ground and connected by wire, barbed is the best, passing horizontally or diagonally, or both. the stakes are roughly in rectangular or quincunx order, but slight irregularities, both of position and height should be introduced. in the =high entanglement= the stakes average feet from the ground, and the wiring is horizontal and diagonal, fig. . [illustration: fig. _high wire entanglement showing method of linking posts head to foot and foot to head. wire, plain or barbed, then festooned with barbed wire. bind wires where they cross. use broken bottles, crows feet, planks with spikes or fishhooks in conjunction with this entanglement._ (from _knowledge of war_--lake.)] =the low wire entanglement= has stakes averaging inches above the ground and the wire is horizontal only. this form is especially effective if concealed in high grass. in both kinds the wires should be wound around the stakes and stapled and passed loosely from one stake to the next. when two or more wires cross they should be tied together. barbed wire is more difficult to string but better when done. the most practicable form results from the use of barbed wire for the horizontal strands and smooth wire for the rest. this is the most generally, useful of all obstacles because of the rapidity of construction, the difficulty of removal, the comparatively slight injury from artillery fire, and its independence of local material supplies. = . time and materials.= one man can make sq. yds. of low and sq. yds. of high entanglement per hour. the low form requires feet of wire per sq. yd. and the high feet. no. is a suitable size. the smooth wire runs . ft. to the lb. a -lb. coil will make sq. yds. of low or sq. yds. of high entanglement. if barbed wire is used, the weight will be about - / times as much. = . wire fence.= an ordinary barbed-wire fence is a considerable obstacle if well swept by fire. it becomes more formidable if a ditch is dug on one or both sides to obstruct the passage of wheels after the fence has been cut. the fence is much more difficult to get through if provided with an apron on one or both sides, inclined at an angle of about °, as indicated in figs. and . this form was much used in south africa for connecting lines between blockhouses. when used in this way the lines of fence may be to yds. long, in plan like a worm fence, with the blockhouse at the reëntrant angles. fixed rests for rifles, giving them the proper aim to enfilade the fence, were prepared at the blockhouses for use at night. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] such a fence may be arranged in many ways to give an automatic alarm either mechanically or electrically. the mechanical forms mostly depend on one or more single wires which are smooth, and are tightly stretched through staples on the posts which hold them loosely, permitting them to slip when cut and drop a counterweight at the blockhouse, which in falling explodes a cap or pulls the trigger of a rifle. = . military pits= or =trous de loup= are excavations in the shape of an inverted cone or pyramid, with a pointed stake in the bottom. they should not be so deep as to afford cover to the skirmisher. two and one-half feet or less is a suitable depth. fig. shows a plan and section of such pits. [illustration: fig. ] they are usually dug in or rows and the earth thrown to the front to form a glacis. the rear row is dug first and then the next in front, and so on, so that no earth is cast over the finished pits. an excellent arrangement is to dig the pits in a checkerboard plan, leaving alternate squares and placing a stake in each of them to form a wire entanglement, fig. . one man can make pits on a -hour relief. [illustration: fig. ] = . miscellaneous barricades.= anything rigid in form and movable may be used to give cover from view and fire and to obstruct the advance of an assailant. boxes, bales and sacks of goods, furniture, books, etc., have been so used. the principles above stated for other obstacles should be followed, so far as the character of the materials will permit. the rest ingenuity must supply. such devices are usually called barricades and are useful in blocking the streets of towns and cities. = . inundations.= backing up the water of a stream so that it overflows a considerable area forms a good obstacle even though of fordable depth. if shallow, the difficulty of fording may be increased by irregular holes or ditches dug before the water comes up or by driving stakes or making entanglements. fords have frequently been obstructed by ordinary harrows laid on the bottom with the teeth up. the unusual natural conditions necessary to a successful inundation and the extent and character of the work required to construct the dams make this defense of exceptional use. it may be attempted with advantage when the drainage of a considerable flat area passes through a restricted opening, as a natural gorge, a culvert, or a bridge. open cribs filled with stones, or tighter ones with gravel or earth may form the basis of the obstruction to the flow of water. the usual method of tightening cracks or spaces between cribs is by throwing in earth or alternate layers of straw, hay, grass, earth, or sacks of clay. unless the flow is enough to allow considerable leakage, the operation will not be practicable with field resources. when the local conditions permit water to be run into the ditch of a parapet it should always be done. = . obstacles in front of outguards= should be low so they cannot be seen at night. a very simple and effective obstacle can be made by fastening a single strand of wire to the top of stout stakes about a foot high, and then placing another wire a little higher and parallel to, and about one yard in rear of, the first. the wires must be drawn tight, and securely fastened, and the stakes fairly close together, so that if the wire is cut between any two stakes the remainder will not be cut loose. any one approaching the enemy will trip over the first wire, and before he can recover himself he will be brought down by the second. in the absence of wire, small sapplings may be used instead. of course, they are not as good as wire, but it does not take much to trip up a man in the dark. [illustration: fig. ] lessons from the european war what follows is based on reports from the battle fronts in europe. = . wire entanglements.= the war in europe has proven that the wire entanglements are the most important and effective obstacle yet devised. owing to the intensity of the opposing fire and in many cases to the short distance between the opposing trenches, it has become necessary to construct all forms of obstacles in portable sections which are carried or rolled quickly into place, either by soldiers rushing out in day light and quickly staking the obstacles down or by placing the obstacles quietly at night. for placing wire entanglements at night, an iron post has been devised about / of an inch in diameter, with eyelets for attaching the wire. the lower inches is made as an auger, so that the posts can be quietly screwed into the ground at night and the wire attached. another method of placing wire entanglements is to make them in sections and roll them up. these sections are usually about feet long, the wire firmly fastened to the sharpened stakes. at a favorable moment the soldiers rush out, unrolling the sections as they go and with mauls quickly drive the stakes. loose ends of wire enable the sections to be bound together as placed. another form of wire entanglement is shown in (fig. ). triangular pyramids feet inches high are made of poles or timber. the pyramids are usually arranged in pairs with the wire on three faces so that, no matter if the obstacle is rolled over, a wire fence is presented. these obstacles are carried out and placed so as to break joints and are staked down as soon as possible. [illustration: fig. substitute for posts.] the wire used for entanglements is found more convenient to handle when wound on a stake a yard in length, in a sort of figure eight winding. special barbed wire of heavier material and barbs placed close together has been found much more effective than the commercial barbed wire. in some localities electrified wire has been used. in such cases the obstacle is charged in sections, so that, if one section is grounded it will not affect the others. = . wire cheveaux de frise.= two forms of this obstacle have appeared. both are portable. they consist of two or more wooden crosses fastened at their centers to a long pole and connected with each other by barbed wire. this obstacle retains its effectiveness when rolled over. (figs. and ) give an idea of their construction. the form shown in (fig. ) is often made small enough for individuals to carry. these are prepared in the trenches and used for throwing into one's own entanglements to make them more complex or may be carried when making an assault and thrown into the enemy's trenches to prevent movements from one part of the trench to another. the long stick projects out of the end to be used as a handle. [illustration: fig. wire cheveaux de frise] [illustration: fig. wire cheveaux de frise] = . guarding obstacles.= it has been found necessary to keep a constant watch over obstacles after they have been placed. = . listening posts.= one of the best methods is to post one or more men in listening posts in or beyond the line of obstacles. these listening posts are rifle pits with over head cover, fully protected from fire from the rear as well as front, and loop holes for observation and fire. they are connected with the fire trenches by means of a covered communication or even tunnels in some cases and are provided with some form of prompt communication with the firing trenches by telephone, bell or other means. the communicating trench or tunnel is provided with a strong door which may be closed to prevent an enemy from securing access to the fire trench, in case the lookout is surprised. pits with trap doors are also used to prevent an enemy from creeping up the tunnel to the fire trench. these lookouts can give early warning of the approach of an enemy, either for the purpose of assault or cutting through the obstacles. in many instances they have detected mining operations of the enemy by hearing the blows of picks under ground. = . automatic alarms.= many automatic alarms have been used to give warning of attack on the obstacles. these vary from the simple setting of a pistol or rifle, which is fired when the enemy attempts to cut through the entanglement, to intricate electrical alarms. = . searchlights.= searchlights have been provided so that, the instant an alarm is given the obstacles are flooded by a brilliant light and the enemy exposed to fire. chapter xii trench and mine warfare[ ] = . asphyxiating gases.= the asphyxiating gases employed may be divided into three general classes, viz: _suffocating gases_, the most common of which are carbonic and nitrogen. _poisonous gases_, under which head come carbon monoxide and cyanogen. _gases which affect the throat and bronchial tubes_, such as chlorine and bromine. the latter class is most commonly employed. the methods usually employed for liberating these gases are to have a plant some distance in rear of the trenches where the gas is stored under pressure and carried to the trenches through pipes, where it can be liberated towards the enemy's trenches when there is a favorable wind to carry it along; or, the gas may be carried in cylinders or other containers and liberated at the desired points. hand grenades or bombs are also employed which, upon bursting, liberate the gas or in some cases scatter acids or caustic soda. some of these bombs contain a chemical which when liberated affects the eyes, causing impaired vision. the germans employ several kinds of shell containing gases of different densities, one of heavy gas fired as a curtain to the rear to permit reinforcement of the trenches and another of lighter gas to demolish the trenches and destroy the firing line. as a general rule these gases are employed when the fire trenches of the opposing forces are close together though the shell containers may be used at long ranges. all of these gases being heavier than air lie close to the ground and flow over and down into the trenches. = . protection against gases.= the best protection against these gases, is a mask of some kind. the commonest form employed is a flexible mask that conforms to the head, is fitted with glass for seeing through, and has an arrangement of tubes and valves which require the wearer to inhale through his nose and exhale through his mouth. these masks have an absorbent composed of hyposulphite of sodium or of per cent of the nitrous thiosulphate and per cent of bicarbonate of soda. this absorbent placed so that air must be breathed through it, neutralizes the acids in the gases. soldiers are provided with these masks, sometimes with two of them, and are required to have them renewed every three months. trench sprays may be used to spray neutralizing liquid in the trenches to kill the gases. the _favorable conditions_ for the employment of gases are wind blowing toward the enemy's trenches and warm weather. _unfavorable conditions_ are rain, cold, and adverse winds. in some localities weather vanes placed in the direction of the enemy's trenches and arranged so that they may be watched at night give an indication of favorable winds and enable the defender to prepare for a gas attack. before the masks were provided bonfires were prepared of oil soaked materials which; when ignited, produced an intense heat and the resulting column of air diverted the gas clouds. = . liquid fire.= by use of hand or motor driven pumps, and a light grade of petroleum, columns of liquid fire may be squirted into the opposing trenches. if the oil should fail to remain lighted it may be fired by bursting hand grenades or throwing fire balls into the trenches. this means of attack is employed when opposing trenches are close together. as a defense measure ditches may be dug in front of the trenches and filled with a porous material which is then soaked with oil. heavy oils, being hard to ignite, are not dangerous to the defense, and will remain with little loss for a long time. to make sure of prompt ignition gas lines are laid in the ditches. when turned on the gas readily ignites and the resulting fire produces great heat. wire or barbed wire looped in the ditches and staked down makes this a formidable obstacle. = . grenades and bombs= are containers, designed to be thrown by hand, by a sling, fired as a rocket or from specially constructed mortars, or dropped from aerial craft. they burst by time or percussion fuses and may be improvised in a variety of forms and are most useful in close attack or defense. their effect is local but they are very demoralizing to men's nerves. = . hand grenades= are designed to be thrown by the hand and vary greatly in construction. in general, however, they consist of a container filled with bullets or pieces of iron or other metal in the center of which is a charge of high explosive which scatters the bullets or fragments with deadly effect. the three methods of discharging a hand grenade are: _by time fuse_ which is lighted by hand. about to seconds is the time from ignition until the grenade bursts. this does not give the defender time to pick up the bomb and throw it out of the trench. _by friction primer and fuse._ in this form of hand grenade a strap on the wrist with a short line attached with a hook on the end of it serves, when the hook is engaged in the ring of the grenade, to jerk the primer when the grenade is thrown. this automatically ignites the fuse which bursts the grenade in from to seconds. _by percussion._ in this form of grenade the charge is fired when the grenade strikes the ground or object at which it is thrown. in this form of grenade a safety pin holds the plunger from the cap. when the grenade is to be thrown the safety pin is withdrawn. as a general rule fuse burns at the rate of inch in and / seconds; however each lot of fuse should be tested. figs. and show two forms of improvised grenades. common cans, such as preserved fruits and vegetables are shipped in commercially, make good containers. the usual weight of a hand grenade is about - / pounds. [illustration: fig. hair brush bomb] [illustration: fig. hand grenade] = . other methods of throwing grenades.= many grenades have been designed to be fired from the ordinary rifle. this grenade has a rod which is inserted in the barrel of the rifle. a special charge of powder is used in the cartridge from which the bullet has been withdrawn. common slings, catapults, and other devises have been frequently used. = . aerial mines.= (fig. .) this form of grenade is very heavy, often weighing pounds and is fired from a trench mortar. [illustration: fig. _aerial mine_] = . winged torpedo.= (fig. .) this projectile is fitted with three winged vanes which steady its flight and greatly increase the accuracy. a rod fitted into its base enables it to be fired from a comparatively small trench, mortar. the torpedo weighs about pounds and the mortar pounds. the mortar, being light, can be carried from one part of the trench to another by two men. [illustration: fig. _winged torpedo_] the aerial mine and winged torpedo may be used effectively to beat down the enemy's defenses, destroying his sand bags and trenches, and cutting away wire entanglements and other obstacles. the winged torpedo having a greater range ( yards) and being more accurate, is the more effective. = . bombs from air-craft= are some form of high explosive bomb which burst on striking. another type of bomb used by aeroplanes consists of a container filled with steel darts. the bursting charge is fired by a fuse. the operator usually cuts the fuse so that the bomb will burst at a considerable altitude. the steel darts are scattered in all directions and have sufficient velocity to pass through a man or horse. = . protection against hand grenades.= (fig. .) for protection against hand grenades and bombs a screen of wire netting may be erected in front of the trenches and arranged at such a slope that most of the grenades passing over the screen will clear the trench while those striking the netting will roll away from the trench. this protection is very satisfactory for communications, machine gun emplacements, etc., but, is of doubtful value in fire trenches as it does not permit an easy offensive by the defenders. [illustration: fig. _bomb screen_] = . tanks.= the so-called "tanks," first used by the british armies in the battle of the somme in september, , are in reality armored caterpillar tractors carrying machine guns and capable of traversing rough ground, smashing down trees and entanglements, and passing across the ground between the opposing trenches over the shell holes made by the opposing artillery. the machinery, guns and crew are contained in an armored body and the two tractor belts extend to full length on either side, being so arranged that the tank can climb a steep slope. from the meager data obtainable it would appear that the tanks carry from to machine guns in armored projections built out from the sides. these are provided with revolving shields permitting two guns to fire in any direction at one time. the principle of the tractor is similar to that of those manufactured in the united states and used commercially in reclamation work. the addition of the armored body and guns makes the "military tank." these "tanks" have proven of great value in village fighting, by smashing down barricades and driving machine guns from their positions in cellars and houses. they have also been used with some success in destroying obstacles. the power of these new engines may be judged from their ability to smash down trees six inches in diameter and by means of cables to uproot trees as large as inches in diameter. these "tanks" are proof against rifle and machine gun fire, but are unable to withstand even light artillery. = . helmets.= steel helmets made their appearance in the european war in , as a protection to the soldier's head against rifle, machine gun and shrapnel fire. so successful were they that they are being furnished to all troops on the battlefield. already several millions have been supplied. where heretofore head wounds accounted for over per cent of the casualties in trench warfare, the percentage has been reduced by the wearing of helmets to about one half per cent. while the helmet does not afford complete protection against rifle and shrapnel fire, it has been found that hits result only in severe concussion, where before fatal wound resulted. these helmets are painted khaki color. = . masks.= steel masks for sentinels and snipers have been adopted by the germans. this mask covers the head and face with curved surfaces which deflect bullets. small eye holes permit a clear view of the target and a small section is omitted in the lower right side to permit bringing the rifle against the cheek in firing. = . periscopes.= periscopes have been universally adopted in trench warfare for observing the enemy while keeping completely under cover. it is a simple arrangement of two mirrors in a vertical tube. the upper reflects the image of the object to the lower mirror which in turn reflects it to the eye of the observer. by raising the top of the periscope above the parapet the soldier can watch the foreground while at the same time remaining completely concealed himself. a more elaborate periscope for the control of artillery fire has a collapsible tube which may be extended and elevated to a height of feet. = . sniperscope.= this is a combination of the periscope and rifle by means of which a soldier can aim and fire his piece at an object without exposing himself above the parapet. = . aids to firing.= rifles laid in notched boards placed in the parapet may be sighted and prepared for night firing, or a wire stretched just outside of the loophole on which the barrel of the rifle can rest when in the proper firing position to cover certain points, enables the soldier to fire effectively at night when it is too dark to aim. = . mining.= military mining consists of digging communications and chambers underground and placing therein charges of explosives and firing such charges. mining is slow and restricted in its application and therefore this method of attack is used against very strong points of the enemy's line,--a salient, a building, or other point,--held in great force. the aim in mine warfare is to make a sudden breach in the enemy's trench, destroy the flanking supports which could be used to stop this breach and then to take the trench by assault and organize it for defense before the enemy's forces, disorganized from the explosion, can recover. sometimes mines are placed in front of the trenches and exploded electrically when the enemy reaches them in attempting an assault. = . countermining.= the enemy, when mining operations are suspected, runs out tunnels to meet the opposing mine. sometimes listening galleries are driven underground and men posted to detect the sound of mining operations. once the direction of the opposing tunnel is discovered a charge of explosive is laid across its approach and fired at a moment when it will cause the most damage. footnotes: [ ] to those desiring to go into the subject of trench warfare in detail, the author would recommend "trench warfare," by himself. george banta publishing co., menasha, wis.; $ . . chapter xiii marches (based on infantry drill regulations and field service regulations) = . marching principal occupation of troops in campaign.= marching constitutes the principal occupation of troops in campaign and is one of the causes of heaviest loss. this loss, however, may be materially reduced by proper training and by carrying out strictly the rules regulating the conduct of marches, especially the rules of march discipline. = . physical training; hardening new troops.= by systematic and progressive physical exercises and actual marching, infantry can be accustomed to the fatigue of bearing arms and equipment. with new or untrained troops, the process of hardening the men to this work must be gradual. it should begin with ten-minute periods of vigorous setting-up exercises three times a day to loosen and develop the muscles. one march should be made each day with full equipment, beginning with a distance of or miles and increasing the distance daily as the troops become hardened, until a full day's march under full equipment may be made without exhaustion. = . long march not to be made with untrained troops.= a long march should not be made with untrained troops. if a long distance must be covered in a few days, the first march should be short, the length being increased each succeeding day. = . a successful march.= a successful march, whether in peace or war, is one that places the troops at their destination at the proper time and _in the best possible physical condition_. therefore, every possible effort, by exercising care and judgment, and by enforcing march discipline, must be made by all officers and noncommissioned officers to have the troops reach their destination in good physical condition,--"ready for business." preparation = . the commander.= the commander must give such instructions as will insure that the necessary preparations are made,--that the men and animals are in fit condition and that the men are properly equipped; that provision has been made for rations and ammunition; that the wagons are properly loaded; that the necessary arrangements have been made for caring for the sick, etc. = . organization commanders.= every organization commander is responsible that such of the above requirements as apply to his organization are complied with. = . filling canteens.= it is an invariable rule that all canteens must be filled before the march begins. starting = . time to start.= when practicable, marches begin in the morning, ample time being allowed for the men to breakfast, animals to feed, and the wagons or animals to be packed. the time for reveille, if different from the usual hour, should be announced the evening before. the exact hour for the start depends, of course, upon circumstances. however, as a rule, foot troops do not start before broad daylight; mounted troops, when practicable, about an hour after broad daylight. in order to avoid intense heat, especially in the tropics, and also, in the case of long marches, to avoid reaching destination after dark, an earlier start than usual must be made. both men and animals rest well in the early morning hours, and should not, therefore, have this rest interrupted unless there is some real necessity for it. starting at night or at an hour that will cause a part of the march to be made at night, should, if possible, be avoided, because of the difficulties and disadvantages of night marching. conduct of the march = . the rate of march.= the rate of march varies with the length of march, kind of troops, equipment carried, size of command, condition of troops, state of the weather, condition of roads, and other circumstances. however, whatever the rate may be it should be _uniform_, that is most important, as there is nothing that will irritate and tire a command more than a varying, un-uniform rate of march. the rate of march is regulated by the commander of the leading company or some one designated by him, who should give the matter special attention, _the rate being checked from time to time by a watch_. on a march of several days' duration the position of companies is ordinarily changed daily, so that each in turn leads. with trained troops, in commands of a regiment or less, marching over average roads, the rate should be from - / to miles per hour. with larger commands carrying full equipment, the rate will be from to - / miles per hour. assuming that the length of step of the average man is inches, the following rate-of-march table is deduced: +------------------------+-------+ | | miles | | steps per minute | per | | | hour | +------------------------+-------+ | ( / ) | | | | | | (in practice, ) | - / | | (in practice, ) | - / | | (in practice, ) | | +------------------------+-------+ [note. by remembering that ( / ) steps per minute gives mile per hour, the number of steps per minute necessary to give a rate of , - / , - / and miles per hour, is quickly and easily obtained by multiplying ( / ) by these numbers.] in hot, sultry weather, with the men carrying the full pack, the rate of march would naturally be considerably less than on a cool day, with the command not carrying the pack. it is most important that these and other considerations affecting the rate of march be constantly borne in mind by the officer in command of the column, who should indicate to the commander of the leading company the number of steps to be taken per minute. in indicating the number of steps to be taken per minute, it should be considered whether the men at the head of the leading company are the average, above the average, or below the average in height. a short man, for example, would probably have to take steps a minute to keep up with a tall man walking at the rate of steps per minute. = . marching capacity.= the average marching capacity of infantry is about miles a day, but in extensive operations, involving large bodies of troops, the average is about miles a day. small commands of seasoned infantry marching on good roads in cool weather can average about miles a day. = . halts.= a halt of minutes should be made after the first half or three quarters of an hour of marching to enable the men to attend to the calls of nature and adjust their clothing. judgment must be exercised in selecting the place for this halt; it should not be made in a village or other place where its object would be defeated. after the first halt a halt of minutes is made in each hour, that is, the troops march minutes and then halt . of course, the number and length of halts should be varied according to the weather, condition of the roads and the equipment carried by the men. in the tropics the best results are often obtained by marching minutes and halting . when the day's march will run well into the afternoon, a halt of about one hour should be made at noon and the men allowed to eat. places for long halts should be selected with care; woods, water and shade are desirable features. arms are stacked and equipments removed. halts should not be made in or near towns or villages unless to procure water or supplies, and when so made, the men remain in column, details being sent for whatever is necessary. in hot weather, especially in the tropics, it may be advisable in the case of long marches to halt for three or four hours during the hottest part of the day and finish the march in the late afternoon or early evening. as a general proposition, however, it is inadvisable to arrive at a strange place after nightfall or even late in the afternoon. = . crossing bridges and fords.= when a cause of delay,--for example, a damaged bridge,--is encountered, the troops in rear are notified of the minimum length of the delay; they then conduct themselves as at regular halts. in ascending or descending slopes, crossing streams or other obstacles, or passing through defiles requiring a reduction of front, every precaution is taken to prevent interruption of the march of the troops in rear. if the distances are not sufficient to prevent check, units are allowed to overlap; if necessary, streams are crossed at two or more places at the same time; in passing through short defiles the pace is accelerated and the exit cleared at once. if a company unit is delayed while crossing an obstacle, the head slackens the pace or halts until all of that unit has passed; it then resumes its place in the column, increasing the pace, if necessary. before attempting to cross with bodies of troops, careful examination is made of fords, boggy places, bridges of doubtful character, ice, etc., as the case may be. troops must never cross a bridge in cadence,--that is, the men must not be in step. in fording a deep stream with a swift current, the men cross on as broad a front as possible, marching abreast and holding hands. they should not look at the water, but at the opposite shore. if the ford is wide enough, mounted troops may cross at the same time on the upstream side, thus breaking the force of the current. fords that are at all difficult delay long columns unless the troops cross at several places at once. = . straggling and elongation of column.= the marching efficiency of an organization is judged by the amount of straggling and elongation of the column and the condition of the men at the end of the march. an officer of each company marches in its rear to prevent undue elongation and straggling. if there be only one officer with a company, the first sergeant performs this duty. no man should leave the ranks without permission. if necessary for a man to fall out on account of sickness, he should be given a permit to do so by the company commander or the officer at the rear of the company. this permit is presented to the surgeon, who will admit him to the ambulance, have him wait for the trains, or follow and rejoin his company at the first halt. it is the duty of all officers and noncommissioned officers to prevent straggling and elongation of the column. miscellaneous = . forced marches.= a forced march may be said to be a march of more than average length. forced marches seriously impair the fighting power of even the best troops, and should be undertaken only in cases of necessity. such marches are generally made by increasing the number of marching hours. for large columns of infantry marching long distances, increase of pace is seldom of value. = . night marches.= while night marches are some times made in very hot weather to avoid the heat of the day, they are generally made for the purpose of surprising the enemy, escaping observation by aeroplane, or for securing a favorable position from which to attack the enemy at dawn. moonlight and good roads are favorable for night marches. precaution must be taken that the proper road is followed and that contact between units is maintained, men being stationed, if necessary, to mark changes of direction. if necessary, guides are secured and charged with the duty of following the right road. when, due to unfavorable conditions, units cannot be kept well closed, men will be placed at forks and crossings of roads, especially on very dark nights. when in hostile territory, silence is maintained; articles of equipment are secured to prevent rattling, and smoking and talking are not permitted. also, under certain conditions villages and farmhouses are avoided on account of warning given by dogs. night marches impair the efficiency of a command and are never undertaken without good reason. = . compliments.= as a rule, troops on the march pay no compliments; individuals salute when they address, or are addressed by, a superior officer. = . protection on the march.= protection on the march is furnished by covering detachments known as advance guards, rear guards and flank guards. = . fitting of shoes and care of feet.= in view of the fact that the greater part of the infantry soldier's occupation in the field consists of marching, too much stress cannot be laid upon the importance of his paying special attention to the fitting of his shoes and the care of his feet. an infantryman with sore feet is like a lame duck trying to keep up with the rest of the flock. keep your feet clean. dirty feet invite blisters. an excellent preventative against sore feet is to wash them every night in hot (preferably salt) water and then dry them thoroughly. if this is not practicable, then mop them every evening with a wet towel and invigorate the skin with a good rubbing. keep the nails cut close. rubbing the feet with hard soap, grease, or oil of any kind, and putting ordinary talcum powder in the shoes before starting on a march, are very good to prevent sore feet. blisters should be pricked and the water let out, but the skin must never be removed. adhesive plaster on top of the blister will prevent the skin from being pulled off. in case of sore or blistered feet, considerable relief can be obtained by rubbing them with tallow from a lighted candle and a little whiskey or alcohol in some other form, and putting the socks on at once. a little alum in warm water is excellent for tender feet. the old soldier has learned from long experience in marching, to turn his socks inside out before putting them on thus putting the smooth side next to his skin and possible seams or lumps next to the shoe. the thickness of the sock protects the skin and helps prevent blisters. _under no circumstances should a soldier ever start on a march with a pair of new shoes._ each soldier should have on hand at all times two pair of serviceable shoes well broken in. remember that it is much better to prevent sore feet by taking the precautions outlined above, than it is to have to treat your feet after they have become sore. chapter xiv camps = . principles governing selection of camp sites.= the following basic principles govern in the selection of camp sites: (a) the water supply should be sufficient, pure, and accessible. (b) the ground should accommodate the command with as little crowding as possible, be easily drained, and have no stagnant water within yards. (c) there should be good roads to the camp and good interior communication. (d) camp sites should be so selected that troops of one unit need not pass through the camp grounds of another to reach their own camp. (e) wood, grass, forage, and supplies must be at hand or obtainable. (f) in campaign, tactical considerations come first in the selection of camp sites, capability of defense being especially considered, and, as a result, troops may have to camp many nights on objectionable ground. (g) however, sanitary considerations must always be given all the weight possible consistent with the tactical requirements. through no fault of their own, troops occupying an unsanitary site may suffer greater losses than in the battles of a long campaign. = . desirable camp sites.= the following conditions are desirable for camp sites: (a) porous soil, covered with stout turf and underlaid by a sandy or gravelly subsoil. (b) high banks of rivers, provided no marshes are near. (c) in cold weather, a southern exposure, with woods to the north to break the cold winds. (d) in warm weather, an exposure toward the prevailing winds, with site moderately shaded by trees. = . undesirable camp sites.= the following conditions are undesirable for camp sites: (a) clay soil, or where the ground water approaches the surface, such sites being damp and unhealthful. (b) alluvial, marshy ground, and ground near the base of hills, or near thick woods or dense vegetation are also damp. (c) ravines and depressions are likely to be unduly warm and to have insufficient or undesirable currents. (d) proximity to marshes or stagnant water is usually damp, and has mosquitoes, which transmit malaria, dengue fever and yellow fever. (e) old camp sites are dangerous, as they are often permeated by elements of disease which persist for considerable periods. (f) dry beds of streams are subject to sudden freshets. (g) in the tropics troops should not camp nearer than yards to native huts or villages because of danger from malarial infection. = . form and dimensions of camps.= the form and dimensions of camps depend upon the tactical situation and the amount and nature of ground available. however, in general, the form and dimensions of a regimental or battalion camp should conform as nearly as practicable to the diagram on the opposite page, and camps of all sizes should, as far as possible, conform to the principles, regarding arrangement, underlying the diagram given on the opposite page, which gives the general form, dimensions, and interior arrangements of a camp for a regiment of infantry at war strength. in certain cases, particularly in one-night halts in the presence of the enemy, camps must of necessity be contracted, while in other cases, where a more extended halt is contemplated and where tactical reasons will permit, better camp sanitation may be secured, and a more comfortable arrangement made by the expansion of camp areas. = . making camp.= the command should be preceded by the commanding officer or a staff officer, who selects the camp site, and designates, by planting stakes, the lines of tents, the positions of the sinks, guard tent, kitchens, picket line, etc. after the companies are marched to their proper positions and arms are stacked, the details for guard and to bring wood, water, dig sinks, pitch tents, handle rations, etc., should be made before ranks are broken. immediately upon reaching camp and before the men are allowed to go around, patrolling sentinels should be established to prevent men from polluting the camp site or adjoining ground before the sinks are constructed. sentinels should be posted over the water supply without delay. as soon as the tents have been pitched and the sinks dug, the camp should be inspected and all unnecessary sentinels relieved. the tents should be pitched and the sinks dug simultaneously. should the troops reach camp before the wagons, the companies may be divided into squads and set to work clearing the ground, gathering fire wood, collecting leaves, grass, etc., for beds, etc. the moment a command reaches camp its officers and men usually want to go here and there under all sorts of pretexts. no one should be allowed to leave camp until all necessary instructions have been given. enlisted men should not be permitted to leave camp without permission of their company commanders. sick call should be held as soon as practicable after the tents have been pitched. [illustration: fig. camp of a regiment of infantry, war strength] miscellaneous = . retreat.= in camp retreat formation should always be under arms, an officer being present with each company and inspecting the arms. = . parade ground.= in front of every camp of permanent nature, there should be a parade ground for drills and ceremonies. = . camping on fordable stream.= in camping for the night on a fordable stream that is to be crossed, cross before going into camp, unless there is some tactical reason for not doing so; for a sudden rise, or the appearance of the enemy, might prevent the crossing the next morning. = . windstorms.= whenever windstorms are expected, the tent pegs should be secured and additional guy ropes attached to the tents. tents may be prevented from blowing down by being made fast at the corners to posts firmly driven into the ground, or by passing ropes over the ridge poles and fastening them to pegs firmly set into the ground. = . making tent poles and pegs fast in loose soil.= if the soil be loose or sandy, stones or other hard material should be placed under the tent poles to prevent their working into the soil, thus leaving the tent slack and unsteady. when the soil is so loose that the pegs will not hold at all, fasten the guy ropes to brush, wood or rocks buried in the ground. = . trees sometimes dangerous.= while trees add very much to the comfort of a camp, care should be exercised not to pitch tents near trees whose branches or trunks might fall. chapter xv camp sanitation = . definition.= by "camp sanitation" is meant the adoption of measures to keep the camp in a healthy condition. these measures comprise: (a) the disposal, so as to render them harmless and prevent pollution, of all wastes, refuse and excreta from men and animals in suitable places provided therefor; (b) the care exercised in handling, preparing and serving food; (c) the adequacy of shelter for the men; (d) the maintenance of proper drainage; (e) the supply of water for bathing and washing, and the maintenance of a pure supply for drinking. = . camp expedients.= "camp-expedients" is the name given the mechanical means used to put into effect some of the measures, named above, connected with camp sanitation, and usually consist of latrines, kitchen sinks, urinal tubs, rock or earth incinerators, and drainage ditches. = . latrines.= the latrines must be dug immediately upon reaching camp--their construction must not be delayed until the camps have been pitched and other duties performed. the exact location of the latrines should be determined by the commanding officer, or by some officer designated by him, the following considerations being observed: . they should be so located as not to contaminate the water supply. . they should not be placed where they can be flooded by rain water from higher ground, nor should they be so placed that they can pollute the camp by overflow in case of heavy rains. . they should be as far from the tents as is compatible with convenience--if too near, they will be a source of annoyance; if too far, some men, especially at night, and particularly if affected with diarrhoea, will defecate before reaching the latrine. under ordinary circumstances, a distance of about yards is considered sufficient. latrines for the men are always located on the opposite side of the camp from the kitchens, generally one for each company unit and one for the officers of a battalion or squadron. they are so placed that the drainage or overflow can not pollute the water supply or camp grounds. when the camp is for one night only, straddle trenches suffice. in camp of longer duration, and when it is not possible to provide latrine boxes, as for permanent camps, deeper trenches should be dug. these may be used as straddle trenches or a seat improvised. when open trenches are used the excrement must be kept covered at all times with a layer of earth. in more permanent camps the trenches should be feet wide, feet deep, and feet long, and suitably screened. seats with lids are provided and covered to the ground to keep flies from reaching the deposits; urinal troughs discharging into trenches are provided. each day the latrine boxes are thoroughly cleaned, outside by scrubbing and inside by applying, when necessary, a coat of oil or whitewash. the pit is burned out daily with approximately gallon oil and pounds straw. when filled to within feet of the surface, such latrines are discarded, filled with earth, and their position marked. all latrines and kitchen pits are filled in before the march is resumed. in permanent camps and cantonments, urine tubs may be placed in the company streets at night and emptied after reveille. all latrines must be filled before marching. the following illustration shows a very simple and excellent latrine seat which can be made and kept in the company permanently for use in camps on the march: [illustration: fig. ] urinal troughs, made of muslin and coated with oil or paint, should discharge into the trenches. = . urinal tubs.= when obtainable, urinal tubs or cans should be placed in the company streets at night, their location being indicated by lighted lanterns, the tubs or cans being removed at reveille. = . kitchens.= camp kettles can be hung on a support consisting of a green pole lying in the crotches of two upright posts of the same character. a narrow trench for the fire, about foot deep, dug under the pole, not only protects the fire from the wind but saves fuel. [illustration: fig. ] a still greater economy of fuel can be effected by digging a similar trench in the direction of the wind and slightly narrower than the diameter of the kettles. the kettles are then placed on the trench and the space between the kettles filled in with stones, clay, etc., leaving the flue running beneath the kettles. the draft can be improved by building a chimney of stones, clay, etc., at the leeward end of the flue. [illustration: fig. ] four such trenches radiating from a common central chimney will give one flue for use whatever may be the direction of the wind. [illustration: fig. ] a slight slope of the flue, from the chimney down, provides for drainage and improves the draft. the lack of portable ovens can be met by ovens constructed of stone and covered with earth to better retain the heat. if no stone is available, an empty barrel, with one head out, is laid on its side, covered with wet clay to a depth of or more inches and then with a layer of dry earth equally thick. a flue is constructed with the clay above the closed end of the barrel, which is then burned out with a hot fire. this leaves a baked clay covering for the oven. a recess can be similarly constructed with boards or even brushwood, supported on a horizontal pole resting on upright posts, covered and burnt out as in the case of the barrel. when clay banks are available, an oven may be excavated therein and used at once. to bake in such ovens, first heat them and then close flues and ends. food must be protected from flies, dust, and sun. facilities must be provided for cleaning and scalding the mess equipment of the men. kitchens and the ground around them must be kept scrupulously clean. solid refuse should be promptly burned, either in the kitchen fire or in an improvised crematory. in temporary camps, if the soil is porous, liquid refuse from the kitchens may be strained through gunny sacking into seepage pits dug near the kitchen. flies must not have access to these pits. boards or poles, covered with brush or grass and a layer of earth may be used for this purpose. the strainers should also be protected from flies. pits of this kind, dug in clayey soil, will not operate successfully. all pits should be filled with earth before marching. as a precautionary measure against setting the camp on fire, all dry grass, underbrush, etc., in the immediate vicinity of the kitchen should be cut down. in case of a fire in camp, underbrush, spades, shovels, blankets, etc., are used to beat it out. gunny sacks dipped in water are the best fire fighters. burning away dried grass and underbrush around exterior of camp is a great protection against fire from outside. = . kitchen pits.= pits of convenient size should be constructed for the liquid refuse from the kitchens. solid refuse should be burned either in the kitchen fire or at some designated place, depending upon whether the camp is of a temporary or permanent nature. unless the camp be of a very temporary nature, the pits should be covered with boards or other material in order to exclude the flies. all pits should be filled in with earth before breaking camp. = . incinerators.= the incineration pit shown in the following diagram, affords an excellent, simple and economical way of disposing of camp waste and offal, tin cans and dish-water included: [illustration: fig. ] =description:= the pit is about - / feet long, - / feet wide and feet deep at one end and - / at the other. it is partially filled with stones, the larger ones on the bottom and the smaller on the top. at one end of the pit the stones extend a little above the surface, and slope gradually toward the other end until the fire pit is reached ten inches below the surface of the trench. over the fire pit, about five inches above the ground, is placed a crab or a piece of boiler iron, on which is boiled all the water for washing dishes, etc. the fire pit is only about one-half of the stone surface, as the radiated heat keeps the rest of the stones hot, causing all dish and slop water to evaporate quickly. any tin cans that may be thrown into the fire pit are removed after a short exposure to the heat and placed in a trench especially dug for the purpose. the company incinerator shown below was used with great success by some of our troops at texas city, texas. the rocks should not be too large. the men should be instructed to drop all liquid on the sides of the incinerator and throw all solid matter on the fire--the liquids will thus be evaporated and the solids burned. until the men learn how to use the incinerator properly, a noncommissioned officer should be detailed to supervise its use. [illustration: fig. ] = . drainage.= when camp is established for an indefinite period, drainage should be attended to at once. each tent should have a shallow trench dug around it and the company and other streets ditched on both sides, all the trenches and ditches connecting with a ditch that carries the water from the camp. all surface drainage from higher ground should be intercepted and turned aside. = . avoiding old camp sites.= the occupation of old camp sites is dangerous, since these are often permeated by elements of disease which persist for considerable periods. = . changing camp sites.= camp sites must be changed promptly when there is evidence of soil pollution or when epidemic disease threatens. also, a change of camp site is often desirable in order to secure a change of surroundings and to abandon areas that have become dusty and cut up. = . bunks.= place a number of small poles about seven feet long close together, the upper ends resting on a cross pole about six inches in diameter and the lower ends resting on the ground; or, the poles may be raised entirely off the ground by being placed on cross poles supported by forked stakes at the corners; on the poles place grass, leaves, etc. = . wood.= the firewood should be collected, cut and piled near the kitchen. dry wood is usually found under logs or roots of trees. if wagons are not heavily loaded it is sometimes a good plan to bring a few sticks of dry wood from the preceding camp, or to pick up good wood en route. = . water.= precautionary measures should always be taken to prevent the contamination of the water, and a guard from the first troops reaching camp should at once be placed over the water supply. if the water is obtained from a stream, places should be designated as follows for getting water: ( ) for drinking and cooking; ( ) for watering animals; ( ) for bathing and for washing clothing. the first designated place should be farthest up the stream; the others, in the order named, downstream. where two bodies of troops are to camp on the same stream one must not pollute the water to be used by the other. this can be arranged by the commanders agreeing upon a point where both commands will obtain their drinking water, upon a second point where animals will be watered, etc. if the stream be small, the water supply may be increased by building a dam. small springs may be dug out and each lined with a gabion, or a barrel or box with both ends removed, or with stones, the space between the lining and the earth being filled with puddled clay. a rim of clay should be built to keep out surface drainage. the same method may be used near swamps, streams, or lakes to increase or clarify the water supply. water that is not known to be pure should be boiled minutes; it should then be cooled and aerated by being poured repeatedly from one clean container to another, or it may be purified by apparatus supplied for the purpose. arrangements should be made for men to draw water from the authorized receptacles by means of a spigot or other similar arrangement. the dipping of water from the receptacles, or the use of a common drinking cup, should be prohibited. in the field it is sometimes necessary to sterilize or filter water. the easiest and surest way of sterilizing water is by boiling. boiled water should be aerated by being poured from one receptacle to another or by being filtered through charcoal or clean gravel. unless boiled water be thus aerated it is very unpalatable and it is with difficulty that troops can be made to drink it. filtration merely clarifies--it does not purify. the following are simple methods of filtration: . dig a hole near the source of supply so that the water may percolate through the soil before being used. . sink a barrel or box into the ground, the water entering therein through a wooden trough packed with clean sand, gravel or charcoal. . place a box or barrel in another box or barrel of larger size, filling the space between with clean sand, gravel, moss or charcoal, and piercing holes near the bottom of the outer barrel and near the top of the inner. the filter thus constructed is partly submerged in the water to be filtered. . bore a small hole in the bottom of a barrel or other suitable receptacle, which is partly filled with layers of sand, gravel, and, if available, charcoal and moss. the water is poured in at the top and is collected as it emerges from the aperture below. the amount of water used by troops is usually computed at the rate of five gallons for each man and ten gallons for each animal per day. = . rules of sanitation.= the following rules of sanitation are to be observed: men should not lie on damp ground. in temporary camps and in bivouac they raise their beds if suitable material, such as straw, leaves, or boughs can be obtained, or use their ponchos or slickers. in cold weather and when fuel is plentiful the ground may be warmed by fires, the men making their beds after raking away the ashes. when troops are to remain in camp for some time all underbrush is cleared away and the camp made as comfortable as possible. watering troughs, shelter in cold weather, and shade in hot, are provided for the animals, if practicable. the camp is policed daily after breakfast and all refuse matter burned. tent walls are raised and the bedding and clothing aired daily, weather permitting. tents must be kept clean and in order. the company street and the ground around the tents must be kept clean. food, slop water, rags, paper, empty tin cans, and other trash and refuse must not be thrown on the ground, but should be put in the box, can or other receptacle provided for the purpose or thrown into the incinerator. the food must be protected from flies, dust and sun. under no circumstances must the company street or any other part of the camp grounds be defiled by urinating or deficating thereon. the urinal tub and the latrine must invariably be used. when an open trench is used as a sink, each individual must always cover his excrement with dirt. if the sink is inclosed by a box with stool-covers, the covers must always be put down as soon as one is through using them so as to keep out the flies. however it is found in practice that men will not do this therefore it is a good plan to construct the covers so that they will close automatically when a man rises from the seat. kitchen garbage must be burned in a pit or incinerator, or put into _covered_ cans and hauled away. _the covers must be kept on the cans at all times_, so as to keep out the flies. horses are not to be ridden through camp except on the roadways. as soon as a tent is pitched it should be ditched. when it rains the guy ropes must be loosened to prevent the tent pegs from pulling out and the tent falling down. the body and the clothes should be cleaned daily as thoroughly as the means at hand will permit. in the morning wash the face and neck and don't fail to use your tooth brush afterward. in the continued absence of opportunity for bathing it is well to take an air bath and a moist or dry rub before getting into fresh underclothes. if the lack of opportunity to wash clothes continues for any length of time, soiled clothes and bedding must be frequently exposed to the sun and air. sunshine is a good germ killer. if there are mosquitoes in camp, mosquito bars must be used by men when asleep, and headnets by men on guard and other duty. also, if in a malarial country, about five grains of quinine should be taken daily, preferably just before supper. in localities where a pernicious form of malaria prevails, daily doses of ten grains of quinine should be given. in the tropics troops are require to camp at least yards away from all native huts or villages as a preventative measure against malaria. men are also prohibited from visiting these places at night for the same reason. clean your mess kit thoroughly after every meal, if practicable, washing same with soap and boiling water. the company cooks must keep everything in the kitchen and mess tent clean with hot water and soap. boil the utensils and dish rags, and be sure to throw all slops and garbage into the kitchen incinerator. rest and sleep are most important to preserve the health, so, keep the body rested by plenty of sleep. do not join idle parties going to walk the streets of the nearest town at nights, nor sit up late playing cards. observe in camp even with greater care than when in barracks the rules of health and personal hygiene. (see pars. - .) = . your camp, your home.= a soldier should always look upon his camp as his home, which it is for the time being. your tent is your bedroom; the company street, your sitting-room; the latrine, your toilet; the mess tent, your dining-room; the camp kitchen, your kitchen; the bathing facilities, your bathroom. and as you are careful about keeping your bedroom and the other rooms of your home in a clean and orderly condition, so should you do your share to keep your tent and the other parts of camp in a clean, sanitary condition. chapter xvi individual cooking = . importance of individual cooking.= it often happens in campaign that it is impossible to have the field ranges and cooking utensils accompany the troops, and in such case each man must cook his own food in his mess kit. also, it frequently happens that detachments operating away from their companies must do individual cooking. all food we eat should be properly cooked, if not, stomach or intestinal trouble will result. hence, the importance of every soldier learning how to cook in his mess kit the main components of the ration. = . fire.= remember that the best fire for cooking is a small, clear one, or better yet, a few brisk coals. dig a hole in the ground with your bayonet and make your fire in it with dry wood, starting it with paper, shavings, dry leaves or dry grass. if preferred the fire may be made between two small flat stones or bricks, care being taken to so place the stones that the draft will pass between them. the mess pan can be placed on the stones, across the fire, and the cup for boiling the coffee at the end away from the draft where it will get the most heat. this method will, as a rule, be necessary on rocky or stony ground. = . recipes.= the following recipes, which are based on the war department publication, "manual for army cooks," require the use of only the soldier's mess kit,--knife, fork, spoon, cup, and mess pan: meats = . bacon.= cut side of bacon in half lengthwise. then cut slices about five to the inch, three of which should generally be sufficient for one man for one meal. place in a mesa pan with about one-half inch of cold water. let come to a boil and then pour the water off. fry over a brisk fire, turning the bacon once and quickly browning it. remove the bacon to lid of mess pan, leaving the grease for frying potatoes, onions, rice flapjacks, etc., according to recipe. = . fresh meat.= _to fry._--to fry, a small amount of grease ( to spoonfuls) is necessary. put grease in mess pan and let come to a smoking temperature, then drop in the steak and, if about one-half inch thick, let fry for about one minute before turning--depending upon whether it is desired it shall be rare, medium, or well done. then turn and fry briskly as before. salt and pepper to taste. applies to beef, veal, pork, mutton, venison, etc. = . fresh meat.= _to broil._--cut in slices about inch thick, from half as large as the hand to four times that size. sharpen a stick or branch of convenient length, say from to feet long, and weave the point of the stick through the steak several times so that it may be readily turned over a few brisk coals or on the windward side of a small fire. allow to brown nicely, turning frequently. salt and pepper to taste. meat with considerable fat is preferred, though any meat may be broiled in this manner. = . fresh meat.= _to stew._--cut into chunks from one-half inch to inch cubes. fill cup about one-third full of meat and cover with about inch of water. let boil or simmer about one hour or until tender. add such fibrous vegetables as carrots, turnips, or cabbage, cut into small chunks, soon after the meat is put on to boil, and potatoes, onions, or other tender vegetables when the meat is about half done. amount of vegetables to be added, about the same as meat, depending upon supply and taste. salt and pepper to taste. applies to all fresh meats and fowls. the proportion of meat and vegetables used varies with their abundance and fixed quantities can not be adhered to. fresh fish can be handled as above, except that it is cooked much quicker, and potatoes, onions, and canned corn are the only vegetables generally used with it, thus making a chowder. a slice of bacon would greatly improve the flavor. may be conveniently cooked in mess pan or tin cup. fresh vegetables = . potatoes, fried.= take two medium-sized potatoes or one large one (about one-half pound), peel and cut into slices about one-fourth inch thick and scatter well in the mess pan in which the grease remains after frying the bacon. add sufficient water to half cover the potatoes, cover with the lid to keep the moisture in, and let come to a boil from fifteen to twenty minutes. remove the cover and dry as desired. salt and pepper to taste. during the cooking the bacon already prepared may be kept on the cover, which is most conveniently placed bottom side up over the cooking vegetables. = . onions, fried.= same as potatoes. = . potatoes, boiled.= peel two medium-sized potatoes or one large one (about one-half pound), and cut in coarse chunks of about the same size--say - / -inch cubes. place in mess pan and three-fourths fill with water. cover with lid and let boil or simmer for fifteen or twenty minutes. they are done when easily penetrated with a sharp stick. pour off the water and let dry out for one or two minutes over hot ashes or light coals. = . potatoes, baked.= take two medium-sized potatoes or one large one cut in half (about one-half pound.) lay in a bed of light coals, cover with same and smother with ashes. do not disturb for thirty or forty minutes, when they should be done. = . rice.= take two-thirds of a cup of water and bring to a boil. add spoonfuls of rice and boil until soft, that is, until it can be mashed by the fingers with but little resistance. this will require about minutes. add pinches of salt and, after stirring, pour off the water and empty the rice out on the lid of the mess pan. = . canned tomatoes.= one -pound can is generally sufficient for five men. _stew._ pour into the mess pan one man's allowance of tomatoes, add about two large hardtacks broken into small pieces, and let come to a boil. add salt and pepper to taste, or add a pinch of salt and one-fourth spoonful of sugar. _or_, having fried bacon, pour the tomatoes into the mess pan, the grease remaining, and add, if desired, two broken hardtacks. set over a brisk fire and let come to a boil. _or_, heat the tomatoes just as they come from the can, adding two pinches of salt and one-half spoonful of sugar if desired. _or_, especially in hot weather, eaten cold with hard bread they are very palatable. hot breads = . flapjack.= take spoonfuls of flour and one-third spoonful of baking powder and mix thoroughly (or dry mix in a large pan before issue, at the rate of pounds of flour and three half-pound cans of baking powder for men). add sufficient cold water to make a batter that will drip freely from the spoon, adding a pinch of salt. pour into the mess pan, which should contain the grease from fried bacon, or a spoonful of butter or fat, and place over medium hot coals sufficient to bake so that in from five to seven minutes the flapjack may be turned over by a quick toss of the pan. fry from five to seven minutes longer or until, by examination, it is found to be done. = . hoecake.= hoecake is made exactly the same as a flapjack by substituting _corn meal_ for _flour_. drinks = . coffee.= fill cup about two-thirds full of water and when it boils add, heaping spoonful of coffee, and let boil minutes. stir grains well when adding. add spoonful of sugar, if desired. let simmer ten minutes after boiling. settle with a dash of cold water or let stand for a few minutes. = . tea.= fill cup about two-thirds full of water and when it boils add / spoonful of tea, and let boil minutes. add spoonful of sugar, if desired. let stand or "draw" minutes. if allowed to stand longer, the tea will get bitter, unless separated from the grounds. = . cocoa.= fill cup about two-thirds full of water and when it boils add heaping spoonful of cocoa and let boil minutes. stir when adding until dissolved. add - / spoonful of sugar, if desired. let cool. (if available, milk should be used instead of water, and should be kept somewhat below the boiling point. a -pound can of evaporated milk with - / quarts of water will make gallon of milk of the proper consistency for making cocoa or chocolate.) = . chocolate.= same as cocoa, using cubic inch of chocolate. emergency ration = . emergency rations.= detailed instructions as to the manner of preparing the emergency ration are found on the label with each can. remember that even a very limited amount of bacon or hard bread, or both, taken with the emergency ration makes it far more palatable, and greatly extends the period during which it can be consumed with relish. for this reason it would be better to husband the supply of hard bread and bacon to use with the emergency ration when it becomes evident that the latter must be consumed, rather than to retain the emergency ration to the last extremity to be used exclusively for a longer period than two or three days. chapter xvii care and preservation of clothing and equipment = . general.= a soldier's clothing and equipment are issued to him by his government for certain purposes, and he has, therefore, no right to be in any way careless or neglectful of them. the importance that the government attaches to the proper care and preservation of the soldier's clothing and equipment, is shown by the fact that the matter is made the subject of one of the articles of war, the th, which prescribes that any soldier who, through neglect, loses or spoils his arms, clothing or accouterments shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct. clothing = .= every article of clothing in your hands should receive as much care and attention as you give your person. not only will your clothes last longer if properly cared for, but you will look neater and better dressed, which will add much to your military appearance. every soldier should have an a- whisk broom and no article of clothing should ever be worn without first being thoroughly brushed. = . pressing.= occasional pressing helps to preserve and freshen clothes,--it puts new life into the cloth. blue clothing and woolen olive drab when worn regularly should be pressed about once a week. in a company where there is an iron for general use there is no reason why every soldier should not press his own clothes. = . chevrons and stripes= can be cleaned by moistening a clean woolen rag with gasoline and rubbing the parts and then pressing with a hot iron. = . leggins.= when soiled, leggins must be washed. if the leggins are allowed to dry without being rung out, they will look better. = . service hat and the caps= require nothing but brushing. shirts, underwear, socks, etc., should be carefully folded and put away neatly. = . a special suit of clothing for inspections, parades, etc.= set aside your best suit of clothes for inspections, parades and other ceremonies. the uniform worn at these formations should not be worn around in the barracks,--every man has sufficient "second best" garments for barrack use. = . putting away.= uniforms should be dried thoroughly, brushed and properly folded before being put away. the number of folds should be reduced to a minimum. before uniforms are put away they should be carefully examined and any missing buttons, tears or stains should be attended to at once. lockers and other places in which clothing is kept must be free from dust. they should be wiped off occasionally with a cloth wrung out of soap suds. = . stains.= tailors usually remove stains with a rubber made by rolling tightly a piece of woolen cloth of some kind, about inches wide, until the roll is about an inch in diameter. rings in removing stains may be avoided by rubbing until very nearly dry. = . grease spots.= ordinarily benzine is a good stain remover in case of grease spots, but its use is more or less dangerous. it should be used in an open room or out of doors and never near a fire or lights. "carbona," which can be purchased in almost any drug store, is excellent for removing stains and it is perfectly safe. carbon tetrachloride (merck's) is much cheaper than "carbona" and about equally as good. it retails at c a pint at nearly all drug stores. grease spots can also be removed by placing a piece of brown paper, newspaper, blotting paper or other absorbent paper over the stain, and pressing with a hot iron. = . rust or ink stains= can be removed with a solution of oxalic acid. apply rapidly and rinse at once with plenty of fresh water; this is most important--otherwise it will probably discolor the material. = . sweat stains= can not be removed. however, the color can be partially restored and the material cleaned with a solution of ammonia and water-- / liquid ammonia, / water. = . the shine= that is sometimes left from pressing is caused by leaving the iron on too long or using an iron that is too hot. this shine, if the cloth is not scorched, can be removed by "sponging," i. e., by placing a piece of damp muslin cloth on the material and then applying the iron only long enough to steam the surface of the garment. = . grease and oil stains= on white trouser stripes can be removed with benzine, naptha or gasoline, applied with a stiff nail brush. stains of rust and ink can be removed by means of oxalic acid ( ounces of oxalic acid to pint of water--dissolves quickest in warm water) applied with cloth or brush, then rinsed thoroughly with plain water and sponge. after the stripes have dried, apply english pipe-clay, rubbing with the cake itself; then rub in uniformly with woolen cloth rubber--rub vigorously--then brush off surplus pipe-clay. = . paint spots.= turpentine will take out paint spots. = . gilt ornaments and gilt buttons= should be polished as often as necessary in order to keep them fresh and bright. use a button stick in cleaning buttons, so as not to soil the cloth. shoes (_instructions issued by the quartermaster general's office, june , ._) = . general care.= shoes should at all times be kept polished. by being so kept they are made more pliable and wear longer. shoes must withstand harder service than any other article worn, and more shoes are ruined through neglect than by wear in actual service. proper care should be taken in selecting shoes to secure a proper fit, and by giving shoes occasional attention much discomfort and complaint will be avoided. = . selection.= a shoe should always have ample length, as the foot will always work forward fully a half a size in the shoe when walking, and sufficient allowance for this should be made. more feet are crippled and distorted by shoes that are too short than for any other reason. a shoe should fit snug yet be comfortable over ball and instep, and when first worn should not lace close together over the instep. leather always stretches and loosens at instep and can be taken up by lacing. the foot should always be held firmly, but not too tightly in proper position. if shoes are too loose, they allow the foot to slip around, causing the foot to chafe; corns, bunions, and enlarged joints are the result. = . repairs.= at the first sign of break, shoes should be repaired, if possible. always keep the heels in good condition. if the heel is allowed to run down at the side, it is bad for the shoe and worse for the foot; it also weakens the ankle and subjects the shoe to an uneven strain, which makes it more liable to give out. shoes, if kept in repair, will give double the service and comfort. = . shoe dressing.= the leather must not be permitted to become hard and stiff. if it is impossible to procure a good shoe dressing[ ], neat's-foot oil or tallow are the best substitutes; either will soften the leather and preserve its pliability. leather requires oil to preserve its pliability, and if not supplied will become brittle, crack, and break easily under strain. inferior dressings are always harmful, and no dressing should be used which contains acid or varnish. acid burns the leather as it would the skin, and polish containing varnish forms a false skin which soon peels off, spoiling the appearance of the shoe and causing the leather to crack. paste polish containing turpentine should also be avoided. = . perspiration.= shoe becoming damp from perspiration should be dried naturally by evaporation. it is dangerous to dry leather by artificial heat. perspiration contains acid which is harmful to leather, and shoes should be dried out as frequently as possible. = . wet shoes.= wet or damp shoes should be dried with great care. when leather is subjected to heat, a chemical change takes place, although no change in appearance may be noted at the time. leather when burnt becomes dry and parched and will soon crack through like pasteboard when strained. this applies to leather both in soles and uppers. when dried the leather should always be treated with dressing to restore its pliability. many shoes are burned while on the feet without the knowledge of the wearer by being placed while wet on the rail of a stove or near a steam pipe. care should be taken while shoes are being worn never to place the foot where there is danger of their being burned. (note. to dry wet shoes, the last thing at night take a few handfuls of dry clean pebbles, heat them in meat can, kettle or campfire until very hot; place them in the shoes,--they will dry them out thoroughly in a few hours,--shake once in awhile. oats or corn may also be used, but they are not available always and pebbles usually are. now is an excellent time to grease or oil the shoes.--author.) = . keep shoes clean.= an occasional application of soap and water will remove the accumulation of old dressings and allow fresh dressing to accomplish its purpose. = . directions for polishing.= russet leather should be treated with great care. neither acid, lemon juice, nor banana peel should be used for cleaning purposes. only the best liquid dressing should be used and shoes should not be rubbed while wet. = . liquid dressing.= care should be taken in using liquid dressing. apply only a light coat and _allow this to dry into the leather before rubbing_ with a cloth. too much dressing is wasteful. equipment (_instructions issued by the ordnance department in pamphlet no. , july , ._) cloth equipment = . general.= all cloth equipment should be brushed frequently with a stiff bristle brush. a dry scrub brush may be used. it should be washed only under the direction and supervision of an officer. during ordinary garrison duty it should rarely be necessary to wash the equipment. when the equipment becomes soiled a light local washing will frequently be sufficient, but when dirty it should unhesitatingly be given a good thorough washing,--otherwise it may be expected that it will become unsanitary and rot. during field service it is to be expected that the equipment will become soiled much more rapidly. always on return to garrison from field service and as opportunity offers in the field, equipment should be thoroughly washed. = . instructions for washing cloth equipment.= (a) _preparation of soap solution._ dissolve in nine cups of hot water one cake of h. & h. soap or a substitute which is issued by the ordnance department. one cup of this solution is sufficient to clean the entire cloth and web equipment of one man. one cake per squad is a liberal allowance. the h. & h. soap issued by the ordnance department is made especially for washing cloth fabrics liable to fade. if for any reason this soap is not obtainable, a good laundry soap (ivory or equal) may be used, but in no case should the yellow soap issued by the quartermaster corps be used. (b) _brushing._ brush the equipment thoroughly to remove all dust and mud before washing. (c) _washing._ spread the belt, haversack, etc., on a clean board or rock and apply the soap solution with a scrub brush. when a good lather appears, wash off with clear water. in the case of a bad grease spot the direct application of soap to the brush will ordinarily be sufficient to remove it. (d) _drying. always dry washed equipment in the shade._ the sun will bleach the fabric. on return from a march in the rain, dry the equipment in the shade, if practicable. = . shelter tent.= the shelter tent is cleaned and cared for as prescribed above for the cloth equipment. when practicable always dry your shelter tent before folding and packing it. (author.) mess outfit = . knife.= the knife blade is made of tempered steel, and when put away for a long period should be covered with a light coating of oil to prevent rust. keep your knife clean by washing in soap and water after every meal. do not use the blade as a pry. if the point is broken, grind the blade down to a new point. = . fork.= keep your fork clean by washing with hot water and soap after every meal. never use the prongs of your fork for prying open tops of cans, extracting corks, etc. don't permit your knife, fork or spoon to remain in vinegar or other foodstuffs for a long period, as verdigris will form. this corrodes the metal and is poisonous. = . spoon.= keep your spoon clean by washing with soap and water after every meal. = . meat can.= do not carry meat of any kind or other greasy substance in the meat can for a long period, as it will corrode the aluminum. if the rivets securing the hinge to the meat can become loose, a few blows with a hammer or hand ax on the outside ends of the rivets, the heads of the rivets being backed up on a piece of metal, will tighten them. if the hinge pin becomes loose, a nail can be used to replace it, the nail being cut with a service wire cutter and the ends of the nail headed over slightly with a few blows of a hammer. = bacon can.= the interior of the bacon can should always be kept clean and free from hardened grease or dirt by frequent washings with soar and water. if the cover becomes loose on the body of the can, the upper half of the body may be bent out until the cover is again tight. if the cover is too tight, a slight amount of flattening with a hammer on the edge of the cover, resting on a wooden block, will usually extend the cover sufficiently. = . condiment can.= when not in use, always remove the contents. many cans have been ruined by neglecting to do this. see that the threaded ends do not become rusty. the can should be disassembled at all inspections, so that the inspecting officer may see that no rust is present. = . cup.= the cup is made of aluminum and excessive heat damages aluminum. in using the cup for cooking never allow the contents to evaporate entirely. in other words, never hold an empty cup over a fire. keep your cup clean with hot water and soap,--preferably h & h soap. = . canteen.= although as a rule, only soap and water should be used in cleaning aluminum, a little sand can be used to advantage in cleaning the canteen. particular attention must be taken to see that canteens are properly cleaned after they have been filled with coffee, milk or any other fluid containing organic matter. being made of aluminum the canteen is easily dented, and care must be taken to prevent this. when not actually in use the canteen should habitually be emptied and the cup left off to dry. intrenching tools = . pick mattock.= if the blade of the mattock is deformed, it should be straightened in a vise. in the field, cracked handles of pick mattocks, shovels, and hand axes should be wrapped with cord. = . shovel.= do not use the side edges of the shovel blade as a mattock, for this will deform the blade. if the blade becomes bent, straighten it with a hammer on a block of wood. keep your intrenching tool free from rust, being especially careful that no rust gets into the sockets. leather equipment = . general.= because of the value of leather equipment and its rapid deterioration if neglected, the proper care of leather is most important. = . materials.= two agents are necessary to the proper cleaning of leather,--a _cleaning agent_ and an _oiling agent_. the _cleaning agent_ issued by the ordnance department is castile soap; the _oiling agents_ are neat's-foot oil and harness soap.[ ] the soap cleans the surface of the leather, and removes from the surface pores of the leather, dirt, sweat, and other foreign matter, so that the oil can more readily penetrate the pores and saturate the fibers, thus making the leather pliable and elastic. = . cleaning.= daily, or as often as used, leather equipment should be wiped off with a cloth slightly dampened in water, merely to remove mud, dust or other foreign substances. this daily care will do much to maintain the appearance of the equipment, but it is, however, insufficient of itself to properly preserve it. leather should never be cleaned by immersing in water or holding under a hydrant. at intervals of from one to four weeks, depending upon the circumstances, it is essential that the equipment be thoroughly cleaned in accordance with the following instructions: (a) separate all parts, unbuckle straps, remove all buckles, loops, etc., where possible. (b) wipe off all surface dust and mud with a damp (not wet) sponge. after rinsing out the sponge, a lather is made by moistening the sponge in clear water, squeezing it out until nearly dry, and rubbing it vigorously upon castile soap. when a thick, creamy lather is obtained, thoroughly clean each piece of the equipment without neglecting any portion. each strap should be drawn its entire length through the lathered sponge so as to actually remove the salt, sweat, and dirt from each leather piece. (c) after again rinsing the sponge make a thick lather as described above with the saddle soap. go over each separate piece, thoroughly working the lather well into every part of the equipment, remembering that its action is that of a dressing. (d) after the leather has been allowed to become partially dry, it should be rubbed vigorously with a soft cloth to give it the neat, healthy appearance that is desired. = . oiling.= if the foregoing instructions have been carefully followed, the appearance should now be perfect, and if the leather is soft and pliable nothing further is required. it will be found, however, that it will be necessary from time to time to apply a little oil. it is not practicable, owing to different conditions of climate and service, to prescribe definitely the frequency of oiling. it has been found that during the first few months of use a set of new equipment should be given at least two applications of oil per month. thereafter it is entirely a matter of judgment, as indicated by the appearance and pliability of the leather. frequent, light applications are of more value than infrequent heavy applications. = . new equipment.= before using, perfectly new equipment should in all cases be given a light application of neat's-foot oil; soap is unnecessary because the leather is clean. the application of oil is important because leather equipment frequently remains a considerable time in an arsenal or depot and in spite of periodical inspections and dubbing it is probably too dry for severe service. = . how to apply oil.= the quantity of oil to be used can not be definitely prescribed. if not enough oil is used, the leather will be stiff and brittle; if too much is used, it will soil the clothing and accumulate dirt. the leather should, therefore, be saturated with sufficient oil to be soft and pliable without excess sufficient to cause it to exude. in applying the oil the following general instructions should govern: (a) the oil should be applied to the flesh side of the equipment where practicable when the leather is clean and still damp after washing (about half dry), because it penetrates more uniformly when applied from the flesh side, and when the leather is damp. if the leather is dry it will absorb the oil like blotting paper, preventing proper distribution. (b) the oil should be applied with an oiled rag or cotton waste by long, light, quick strokes--light strokes, so that the pressure applied may not squeeze out an excess of oil; quick strokes, so that the leather may not absorb an undue amount of oil. the endeavor should be to obtain a light, even distribution. (c) after applying the oil the leather equipment should be allowed to stand for hours, if practicable, in a warm dry place. it should then be rubbed with a dry cloth to remove any unabsorbed oil. points to be remembered = .= therefore, from what has been said, the following points must be remembered: (a) keep leather clean. (b) keep leather pliable by frequent applications of oil. (c) use only materials furnished by the ordnance department. _shoe polishes_, etc., are almost invariably injurious. (d) _dry all leather wet from whatever cause, in the shade_; never in the sun or close to a steam radiator, furnace, or boiler. (e) leather should habitually be stored in a cool, dry place, _without artificial heat_. footnotes: [ ] "viscol" is the best oil for softening all kinds of leather that the author knows of. it is made by the viscol co, east cambridge, mass., and can be obtained from the post exchange. [ ] propert's harness soap is excellent. however, since the european war its issue has been discontinued by the ordnance department. "viscol," obtainable from the post exchange, is the best oil for softening all kinds of leather that the author knows of. chapter xviii care and description of the rifle care = . importance.= the care of his rifle should be the soldier's first thought; for, if he would have it take care of him in time of danger, he must take care of it at all times. _it is a generally recognized fact that more rifles become inaccurate and unserviceable by the lack of care than by firing._ the instructions for taking care of the rifle are few and simple. learn them well and _apply them constantly_--it only requires a little care and patience. you will be well repaid for it. it may some day save your life. = . care of bore requires work.= the bore of the rifle is manufactured with the greatest care in order that a high degree of accuracy may be obtained, and it should, therefore, be properly cared for. the proper care of the bore requires conscientious, careful work, but it pays well in reduced labor of cleaning and in prolonged accuracy life of the rifle, and better results in target practice. = . how to clean the bore.= with the cleaning rod the bore must always be cleaned from the breech--never from the muzzle. cleaning from the muzzle is liable to wear and otherwise injure the mouth of the barrel, which is easily injured and thus the piece rendered inaccurate. first, remove the bolt from the rifle, place the muzzle on the floor, a board, or piece of canvas, and do not remove it therefrom while the cleaning rod is in the bore. never place the muzzle on the bare ground, lest dirt should get into it. (note. of course, if a rack is provided for cleaning rifles, it should be used instead of placing the muzzle on the floor.) to clean the bore use patches of rag, preferably canton flannel, cutting them into squares of such size that they may easily run through the barrel. = . what care of the bore consists of.= briefly stated, the care of the bore consists of removing the fouling resulting from firing to obtain a chemically clean surface, and then coating this surface with a film of oil to prevent rusting. = . kinds of fouling.= the fouling which results from firing is of two kinds--the _powder fouling_, from the burning of the powder; and the _metal fouling_, from the nickel scraped off the bullet as it passes through the bore. the _powder fouling_ is highly corrosive, that is, it causes rust and eats into the metal, and it must, therefore, be removed as soon as possible. the _metal fouling_ itself will not cause rust, but it may cover the powder fouling and thus prevent the cleaning material from getting at the powder fouling, which, as stated before, will eat into the metal. when metal fouling accumulates in noticeable quantities it reduces the accuracy of the rifle. = . how to remove powder fouling.= powder fouling may be readily removed by scrubbing the bore with the soda solution (hot) furnished by the ordnance department, but this solution has no effect on the metal fouling. it is, therefore, necessary to remove all metal fouling before we are sure that all powder fouling has been removed and that the bore may be safely oiled. ordinarily, after firing a barrel in good condition, the metal fouling is so slight as to be hardly perceptible, and is easily removed by solvents. however, due to the accumulation of metal fouling, pitting (little hollows in the metal) or the presence of dust, or other abrasives (substances that cause the metal to wear away by rubbing), the fouling may occur in clearly visible flakes or patches and be much more difficult to remove. = . how to remove metal fouling.= after scrubbing out the bore with the soda solution, plug it from the breech with a cork at the front end of the chamber or where the rifling begins. slip one of the -inch sections of rubber hose over the muzzle down to the sight and fill with the standard ordnance department solution to at least one-half inch above the muzzle of the barrel. let it stand for minutes, then pour out the solution, remove the hose and breech plug, and swab out thoroughly with soda solution to neutralize and remove all trace of ammonia and powder fouling. wipe the barrel clean, dry, and oil. with few exceptions, one application is sufficient, but if all fouling is not removed, repeat the operation. hoppe's nitro solvent no. will accomplish the same result even better and quicker and with much less labor. = . how to proceed in cleaning the bore.= to clean the bore after firing, proceed as follows: swab out the bore with soda solution to remove powder fouling. a convenient way to do this is to insert the muzzle of the rifle into the can containing the solution and with the cleaning rod inserted from the breech, pump the barrel full a few times. remove and dry with a couple of patches of cloth. examine to see whether any patches of metal fouling are in evidence, and if so, then remove same as explained above. if no metal fouling is in evidence, then swab out with the swabbing solution. the amount of swabbing required with the swabbing solution can be determined only by experience assisted by the color of the patches of cloth. ordinarily a couple of minutes' work is sufficient. dry thoroughly, and oil with -in-one. as a measure of safety a patch should _always_ be run through the bore on the next day and the bore examined to insure that cleaning has been properly done. the bore should then be oiled again with -in-one. = . necessity for preventing formation of pits.= it is a fact recognized by all that a highly polished steel surface rusts much less easily than one which is roughened; also that a barrel which is pitted fouls much more rapidly than one which is smooth. every effort, therefore, should be made to prevent the formation of pits, which are merely enlarged rust spots, and which not only affect the accuracy of the piece but also increase the labor of cleaning. =if swabbing solution or standard metal fouling solution is not available=, the barrel should be scrubbed as already described, with the soda solution, dried, and oiled with a light oil. at the end of hours it should again be cleaned, when it will usually be found to have "sweated." usually a second cleaning is sufficient, but to insure safety it should be again examined at the end of a few days, before final oiling. of course, the swabbing solution should always be used, if available, for it must be remembered that =each "puff" when the bore "sweats" is an incipient rust pit=. what has just been said contemplates the use of the solutions furnished by the ordnance department. however, the same result will be obtained with less labor by using hoppe's nitro powder solvent no. , which is sold by all post and camp exchanges, and which the author, as the result of experience, highly recommends. = . how to oil a barrel.= the proper method of oiling a barrel is as follows: wipe the cleaning rod dry; select a clean patch of cloth and smear it well with sperm or warmed cosmic oil, being sure that the cosmic has soaked into the patch well; scrub the bore with patch, finally drawing the patch smoothly from the muzzle to the breech, allowing the cleaning rod to turn with the rifling. the bore will be found now to be smooth and bright so that any subsequent rust or "sweating" can be easily detected by inspection. (by "sweating" is meant, rust having formed under the coating of metal fouling where powder fouling was present, the surface is puffed up.) = . care of the chamber.= the chamber of the rifle is often neglected because it is not readily inspected. care should be taken to see that it is cleaned as thoroughly as the bore. a roughened chamber delays greatly the rapidity of fire, and not infrequently causes shells to stick. = . the bolt.= to clean the bolt, remove; clean all parts thoroughly with an oily rag; dry, and before assembling _lightly_ oil the firing pin, the barrel of the sleeve, the striker, the well of the bolt, and all cams. = . the sights.= both the front and rear sights should be cared for just as you would care for the works of your watch. if the sights are injured, the rifle will not shoot as aimed. the front sight cover issued by the ordnance department protects the front sight. = . the magazine.= the magazine should be kept clean and covered with a thin coat of oil. = . the stock.= the stock should receive a light coat of raw linseed oil once a month, or after any wetting from rain, dew, etc. the oil should be thoroughly rubbed in with the hand. = . care of the mechanism.= when the rifle has been wet or exposed to unfavorable climatic conditions, the bolt should be withdrawn and all working parts carefully wiped with a dry cloth, and then gone over with an oily rag. the same thing should be done after firing. all working parts should habitually be _lightly_ oiled with a thin-bodied oil, such as " -in-one." = . the care of all metal parts.= all metal parts of the rifle should be kept clean and free from rust. = . cams and bearings.= all cams and bearings must be kept constantly oiled. = . how to apply oil.= do not pour or squirt oil on the rifle. put a few drops on a piece of clean cloth, preferably cotton, and rub with the cloth, thereby avoiding the use of an unnecessary amount. cams and bearings can be oiled this way. however, if the oiler is used instead because of greater ease in reaching them, oil them _lightly_. to soak with oil accomplishes no more than to cover with a light coating--it merely results in excessive, undesirable smearing and a waste of oil. remember = .= . it is easier to prevent than to remove rust. . to remove rust, apply oil with a rag, and let it stand for a while so as to soften the rust; then wipe with a dry rag. . emery paper or a burnisher must never be used in removing rust, for it also removes the bluing. however, an ordinary rubber eraser will be found very serviceable for removing rust. . to prevent rust and dirt in the bore, run a rag through at least once each day. . never, under any circumstances, put away a rifle that has been fired or exposed to bad weather, without first cleaning it. . never lay your rifle flat on the ground. not only is there danger of dirt or other foreign matter getting into the bore, but a vehicle may run over it, or some one may step on the sight. always rest it up _securely_ against something. on the target range it is well for every soldier to have a short wood or metal fork, on which to rest his rifle. . in coming to the order from any position, always bring the rifle to the ground _gently_. army regulations regarding the rifle = .= _are enlisted men allowed to take their arms apart?_ no; not unless they have the permission of a commissioned officer, and even then only under proper supervision and in the manner prescribed in the descriptive pamphlet issued by the ordnance department. (a. r. .) (except when repairs are needed, the following named parts should never be dismounted by the soldier, and whenever they are taken apart they should be removed only by the company mechanic, or someone else familiar with the handling of tools and delicate mechanism: bolt stop, cut off, safety lock, sleeve lock, front sight, front sight movable stud, lower band, upper band, and stacking swivel screws.) (unless the screw driver is handled carefully and with some skill the screws are sure to be injured either at the head or thread. the soldier may dismount the bolt and magazine mechanism for the purpose of cleaning them, but he is not permitted to do any further dismounting without the authority of a commissioned officer.) _is the polishing of blued and browned parts permitted?_ no, and rebluing, rebrowning, putting any portion of an arm in fire, removing a receiver from a barrel, mutilating any part by fire or otherwise, and attempting to beautify or change the finish, are prohibited. however, the prohibition of attempts to beautify or change the finish of arms is not construed as forbidding the application of raw linseed oil to the wood parts of arms. this oil is considered necessary for the preservation of the wood, and it may be used for such polishing as can be given when rubbing in one or more coats when necessary. the use of raw linseed oil only is allowed for redressing and the application for such purpose of any kind of wax or varnish, including heelball, is strictly prohibited. (army regulations .) _is the use of tompions[ ] in small arms permitted?_ no, it is prohibited by regulations. (army regulations .) _should pieces be unloaded before being taken to quarters or tents?_ yes, unless it is otherwise ordered. they should also be unloaded as soon as the men using them are relieved from duty. (army regulations .) _should a loaded or unloaded rifle or revolver ever be pointed at anyone in play?_ no, under no circumstances whatsoever. _a soldier should never point a rifle or revolver at a person unless he intends to shoot him._ description = . nomenclature of the rifle.= the illustrations on this page and those on the two following pages give the nomenclature of the rifles, with which every soldier should be familiar. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] the bolt (fig. ) consists of the _handle_, a; _sleeve_, b; _safety lock_, c; _cocking piece_, d; _safety lug_, e; _extractor_, f; _extractor collar_, g; _locking lugs_, h; _extractor tongue groove_, i; and _gas escape hole_, j. [illustration: fig. ] = . rear-sight leaf; drift slide; wind gauge.= the illustration on the opposite page shows the _rear sight leaf_ (raised), the _drift slide_ (e), and the _wind gauge_ (f, l.). it is most important that the soldier be thoroughly familiar with the use of these parts, for otherwise it is impossible for him to sight correctly and use his rifle properly. the leaf is graduated from to yards. the lines that extend the whole way across the two branches of the leaf, mark yard divisions; those that extend about half way across, mark yard divisions, and the shorter lines mark yard divisions. the _even_ numbers ( , , , etc.) on the _left_ branch of the leaf, indicate , , , etc, yards. the _odd_ numbered hundreds of yards ( , , , etc.) are on the _right_ branch of the leaf. _the numbers rest on top of the lines to which they refer._ so, if you want to fire at a target yards away, set the rear sight at ; , yards, at ; , yards, at , etc. with the fly leaf up, ranges from to yards can be obtained through the _peep hole_, k; from to through the lower _peep notch_, j; and from to yards through the upper _peep notch_, g. there is a horizontal line on the drift slide, across the _peep hole_, k. if the _peep hole_ sight is used the sight is set by this horizontal line, which is set opposite the proper graduation (line across branch of leaf). if the _peep notch_, j, is used, the sight is set by the short horizontal line--that is, on a line with the top of the notch. if the _peep notch_, g, is used, the sight is set by the top of the _slide_, c, which is set on the proper graduation. care must be taken not to use one of the _peep notches_ when the sight has been set for the _peep hole_, or not to do the reverse, without first changing the sight. the _sighting notch_, a, used when the range is yards, is hardly ever used, because the rifle is very, very seldom, if ever, fired at that range. by _battle sight_ we mean the position of the rear sight with the leaf down, and it corresponds to a sight setting of yards. the notch, h, that is used when the leaf is down is called the _battle sight notch_. the battle sight is the only one used in _rapid fire_. in unexpected, close encounters the side that first opens a rapid and accurate fire has a great advantage over the other. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] footnotes: [ ] wooden stoppers or plugs that are put into the muzzles of rifles and other arms to keep out dirt and water. part iv rifle training and instruction (based on small-arms firing manual) = . object of system of instruction.= the object of the system of rifle training and instruction employed in our army is two-fold: . _to make of individuals, shots who in battle will make hits instead of misses._ . _to make of organizations, pliable, manageable machines, capable of delivering in battle a volume of effective fire._ = . to make of individuals shots who in battle will make hits instead of misses.= this is accomplished by individual training and instruction whereby the skill of the soldier as a rifleman is so developed as to be up to the capabilities of his rifle, which is probably the best and most accurate rifle in the world,--that is to say-- _effort is made to so develop the shooting skill of the soldier that he will be able to make his rifle do the things that it is capable of doing._ to accomplish this end the soldier is put through a course of individual instruction that divides itself into three main phases or stages, viz:-- . _preliminary drills._ by means of preliminary drills in the form of sighting drills; position and aiming drills; and deflection and correction elevation drills, he is taught the theoretical, fundamental principles of shooting. . _gallery practice._ having been taught the theoretical, fundamental principles of shooting by means of the preliminary drills mentioned in the proceeding paragraph, the soldier is then shown how to apply them in a simple, elementary way by being put through a course of gallery practice with the . cal. gallery practice rifle, using reduced charges. this practice may be called the _transitory_ phase or period of individual instruction, during which the soldier passes from his acquisition of the theoretical, fundamental principles of shooting to their application to actual firing, on the target range, with the regulation army rifle. . _range practice._ having gone through the course in gallery practice, the soldier then fires on the target range, applying and putting into practice, with the regulation army rifle; the theoretical principles of shooting taught him during the preliminary drills, and in the application and practice of which he was also instructed during the gallery practice. = . other instruction.= while the above phases embody the principal subjects in which a soldier is trained and instructed in developing his skill in shooting, he is also instructed in other matters that are necessary to round out and complete his skill in marksmanship,--for example, the care of the rifle, estimating distances, the effect of light, wind, and temperature, etc. = . to make of organizations pliable, manageable machines, capable of delivering in battle a volume of effective fire.= this is accomplished by _collective_ training and instruction, in which a number of soldiers (for example, a squad, platoon, or company), under command of a leader, fire, under assumed tactical situations, at targets which simulate the appearance of an enemy under conditions approaching those found in war. this kind of training and instruction is called, "combat practice." in combat practice the individual is trained in firing as part of a tactical unit,--that is to say, in coöperation with others,--and the commanders of the tactical units are taught how to direct and control the fire of their units,[ ] obtaining the maximum efficiency of fire by coördination of the skill and efforts of all the individuals of the unit. program of instruction = .= the following outline of the program of instruction gives a sort of bird's-eye view of the system: . individual instruction { (a) theory of sighting. (the trajectory; { the line of sight; sighting or aiming.) . sights and sighting. { (b) kinds of sights. (open; peep; battle.) { (c) kinds of sight. (that is, amount of { front sight taken.) (normal; fine; full.) { (a) sighting drills. (importance and purpose; { point of aim; triangle of sighting.) { (verifying the triangle; causes of errors.) { (b) position and aiming drills. (objects . preliminary drills. { [ ]; position exercise; aiming exercise; { trigger-squeeze exercise; rapid-fire exercise; { kneeling, sitting down, and prone.) { (c) deflection and elevation correction { drills. . gallery practice. (object and importance.) . range practice. (instruction practice; range practice.) . other instruction. (use of sling; designation of winds; zero of rifle; estimating distances [with the eye, by trial shots, and by trial volleys]; wind; temperature; light; mirage; care of rifle, etc.) individual instruction sights and sighting _theory of sighting_ = . the trajectory.= as the bullet passes through the air it makes a curved line something like this: [illustration: fig. ] this curved line is called the _trajectory_. the resistance of the air and the force of gravity (the force that pulls all bodies toward the earth) are the two things that make the path of the bullet a curved line, just the same as they make the path of the baseball thrown by the player a curved line. the resistance of the air holds the bullet back and the force of gravity pulls it down, so that the two acting together make the bullet's path curved. the longer the range the more will the path of the bullet (the trajectory) be curved, as shown by the following drawing: [illustration: fig. ] = . sighting or aiming.= now, on the rifle there are two "sights,"--the _front sight_ and the _rear sight_,--which enable the rifleman to regulate the path of the bullet, as the ball player regulates the path of the ball. if the ball player wants distance, he throws the ball high (raises the path, the trajectory), using his eye and guesswork, and likewise if the rifleman wants to shoot at a distant target, he, too, shoots the bullet high (that is, he raises the muzzle of his rifle), but he doesn't have to depend upon guesswork. it is all worked out for him by experts and all he need do is to set the _rear sight_ for the proper range,--that is, for the distance the object is from him. aiming or sighting a rifle consists in bringing into line three objects: _the target_, a, _the front sight_, b, and _the rear sight_, c. [illustration: fig. ] the rifle is so made and the sights placed on it in such a way that when the piece is held in such a position that the _target_, the _front sight_ and the _rear sight_ are in line, and the trigger is pulled (squeezed) the bullet will strike the _target_. you raise the muzzle of the piece by raising the rear sight,--that is, raising the rear sight has the effect of raising the muzzle, for the higher you raise the rear sight the higher must you raise the muzzle in order to see the front sight and get it in line with the object aimed at and the rear sight. this is shown in the following illustrations: [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. a] the rear sight, c, the front sight, b, and the bull's eye, a, are all on a line with the eye, d, the rear sight being set for yards. suppose we wanted to shoot at instead of yards. we would raise the slide up to ( yards) on the sight leaf. in order to see the bull's eye through the notch sight at , we must raise the eye to the position, d. we now have the rear sight, the bull's eye and the eye in line, but we must bring the front sight in line with them, which is done by raising the muzzle of the piece, giving the result shown in fig. a. = . line of sight.= with the open sight the line of sight is determined by a point on the middle line of the notch of the rear sight and the top of the front sight. with the peep sight, the line of sight is determined by the _center_ of the peep and the top of the front sight. kinds of sights = .= (see fig. , par. , giving rear sight leaf in detail.) the different kinds of sights are as follows: (a) =open sight.= by _open sight_ is meant the use of any one of the _sighting notches_. to use the open sight: . look through the sighting notch at the target. (fig. .) [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] . bring the top of the front sight _on a line with the top and in the center_ of the sight notch, _the top of the front sight being just under the bull's eye_. because of its wide field of view and its readiness in getting a quick aim with it, the open sight is the one that is generally used in the later stages of battle, or when fire is to start immediately. (b) =peep sight.= by _peep sight_ is meant the use of the _peep hole_ in the drift slide. to use the peep sight: . look through the peep hole at the target. (fig. .) [illustration: fig. ] . bring the top of the front sight to the _center_ of the peep hole, _the top of the front sight being just under the bull's eye_. (fig. ) [illustration: fig. _correct_] _be sure to get the top of front sight_, as in fig. , _and not the bull's eye_, as in fig. , _in center of the peep hole_. [illustration: fig. _incorrect_] =advantage of the peep sight.= the advantage of the peep sight over the open sight is due to the fact that it is easier to center the top of the front sight in the peep hole and thus get the same amount of front sight each time. for example you know at once, without measuring, that the dots in the circles, fig. , are not centered, and that the one in the circle in fig. , is. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] after a little practice, in looking through the peep hole the eye almost automatically centers the top of the front sight. =disadvantage of the peep sight.= the disadvantage of the peep sight is that its limited field of view and lack of readiness in getting a quick aim with it limit its use to those stages of the combat when comparative deliberation will be possible. (c) =battle sight.= by _battle sight_ we mean the position of the rear sight with the leaf down. there is a sighting notch on the top of the leaf, or rather on top of the leaf slide which works up and down the leaf. the battle sight is the only sight used in _rapid fire_. in unexpected, close encounters the side that first opens a rapid and accurate fire has a great advantage over the other. again, a soldier on patrol generally has no time to set his sight, if suddenly attacked at close range. the battle sight, may, therefore be called the _emergency sight_,--the _handy_, _quick sight_. the soldier should, therefore, become thoroughly familiar with the use of this sight. [illustration: fig. _battle sight_] the _sighting notch_ in the slide with the rear sight leaf down, is the same height as is the sighting in the drift slide when the rear sight leaf is raised and set at yards. that is to say, _battle sight_ is equivalent to a sight setting of yards. therefore, in shooting with battle sight at objects nearer than yards you must aim lower. kinds of sight = .= (amount of front sight taken) (a) =normal sight.= the amount of front sight taken in figs. and , is called the _normal_ sight and is the one that the soldier should always use, either with the open notch or peep sight, as it is the only sight which assures the taking of the same amount of front sight every time. in other words it assumes a greater degree of _uniformity_ in sighting, which is one of the most important factors in shooting. by uniformity in sighting is meant taking the same amount of sight each time. if you take _less_ than the amount of front sight used in the normal sight, it will, of course, have the effect of _lowering_ the muzzle of the piece, and consequently you will hit a point _lower_ than if you had used the normal sight. on the other hand, if you take _more_ than the amount of front sight used in the normal sight, it will, of course, have the effect of raising the muzzle and consequently you will hit a point _higher_ than if you had used the normal sight. (b) =fine sight.= although occasionally a man will be found who can get good results by using the fine sight, the average man cannot, and this form of sighting is, therefore, to be avoided. [illustration: fig. _fine sight_] (c) =full sight.= the so-called _full sight_ must be avoided under all circumstances. it is merely mentioned and shown here to point out a fault that must be carefully avoided. the objections to its use are the same as in the case of the fine sight,--that is, lack of uniformity in the amount of sight taken. [illustration: fig. _full sight_] = . what the rifleman looks at when he fires.= the eye can be focused accurately upon objects at only one distance at a time; all other objects we see will be more or less blurred and fuzzy looking, depending upon their distance from the object upon which our eye is focused. the rifleman who attains proficiency _focuses his eye on the target while aiming_, but he glances at one sight and then the other to see that they are aligned properly, then back at the target, and at the instant of discharge _his eye is on the target_. preliminary drills = . sighting, position and aiming drills.= the importance of the following sighting, position and aiming drills cannot be overestimated. if they are carefully practiced, before firing a single shot at a target, you will have learned how to aim your piece correctly, hold your rifle steadily, squeeze the trigger properly, assume that position best adapted to the particular conformation of your body, and you will also have acquired the quickness and manual skill required for handling the piece in rapid fire. the sighting, position and aiming drills teach the fundamental principles of shooting, which are the foundation upon which marksmanship is built. _do not confine yourself to going through these drills only during drill hours, but go through them frequently at other times. the extent to which it will improve your shooting will more than repay you for your trouble._ sighting drills = . object.= the objects of the sighting drill are: . to show how to bring the rear sight, the front sight and the target into the same line,--that is, to show how to sight properly. . to discover and point out errors in sighting.--in other words, to discover the errors you make in sighting and show the reasons for same, so that you may be able to correct them properly. . to teach uniformity in sighting,--that is, to teach you how to take the same amount of sight each time,--to see every time the same amount of front sight when you look through the rear sight. =sighting rest for rifle.= a good sighting rest for a rifle may be made by removing the top from an empty pistol ammunition box, or a similar box, and then cutting notches in the ends of the box to fit the rifle closely. (fig. .) [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] place the rifle in these notches with the trigger guard close to and outside one end. at a convenient distance above the ground fasten a blank sheet of paper on a wall or on a plank nailed to a stake driven into the ground. three legs are fastened to the rest (or it may be placed on the ground without any legs), which is placed or feet from the blank sheet of paper. [illustration: fig. ] make sure that the piece is canted neither to the right nor left, and without touching the rifle or rest, sight the rifle near the center of the blank sheet of paper (fig. .) changes in the line of sight are made by changing the elevation and windage. a soldier acting as marker is provided with a pencil and a small rod bearing at one end a small piece of white cardboard, with a black bull's eye pierced in the center with a hole just large enough to admit the point of a lead pencil. [illustration: fig. ] the soldier sighting directs the marker to move the disk to the right, left, higher, or lower, until the line of aim is established when he commands, "mark," or "hold." at the command "mark," being careful not to move the disk, the marker records through the hole in the center the position of the disk and then withdraws it. at the command "hold," the marker holds the disk carefully in place without marking, until the position is verified by the instructor, and the disk is not withdrawn until so directed. = . point of aim.= always be sure to aim at a point just below the black bull's-eye,--that is, aim so that there will be a fine line of light between the bottom of the bull's-eye and the-top of the front sight (fig. ). this is important to insure uniformity in sighting,--that is, in order to make sure that you aim at the same place on the target each time. if the top of the front sight touches the bottom of the bull's-eye it is impossible to say just how much of the front sight is seen, and how far up into the bull's-eye you are. [illustration: fig. ] first sighting exercise = .= using the sighting rest for the rifle (fig. ) require each man to direct the marker to move the disk until the rifle is directed on the bull's-eye with the _normal_ sight and command, "hold." if aiming correctly the rear sight, the front sight and the bull's-eye will look as shown in fig. , above. the instructor then verifies this line of sight. errors, if any, will be pointed out to the soldier and another trial made. if he is still unable to sight correctly, he will be given as many more trials as may be necessary. sometimes a man does not know how to place the eye in the line of sight; he will look over or along one side of the notch of the rear sight and believe that he is aiming through the notch because he sees it at the same time that he does the front sight. again some men in sighting will look at the front sight and not at the object. repeat the above exercise, using the _peep_ sight. if aiming correctly, the rear sight, the front sight and the bull's-eye will look as shown in fig. . [illustration: fig. ] second sighting exercise = . the triangle of sighting.= using the sighting rest for the rifle as before (fig. ), direct the marker to move the disk until the rifle is directed on the bull's-eye with the _normal_ sight and command "mark," whereupon the marker, being careful not to move the disk, records through the hole in its center, the position of the disk, and withdraws it. then, being careful not to move the rifle or sights repeat the operation until three marks have been made. join the three points by straight lines. the shape and size of the triangle will indicate the nature of the variations made in sighting. [illustration: fig. ] for example, if you have taken the same aim each time, you will get a very small triangle something like this: [illustration: triangle] which resulted from taking each time this aim, for instance: [illustration: fig. ] a triangle like fig. results from not taking the same amount of front sight each time, as shown in fig. . [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] a triangle like fig. shows that the front sight was not in the middle of the notch each time, as shown in fig. . [illustration: fig. ] a triangle like fig. results from a combination of the two errors mentioned above,--that is, not taking the same amount of front sight each time and not having the front sight in the middle of the notch each time, as shown in fig. . [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] if any one of the sides of the triangle is longer than one-half inch, the exercise is repeated, each sight being verified by the instructor, who will call the soldier's attention to his errors, if any. the smaller the triangle, the better the sighting. = . verifying the triangle.= if the sides of the triangle are so small that they indicate regularity in sighting, mark the center of the triangle and then place the center of the bull's-eye on this mark. the instructor then examines the position of the bull's-eye with reference to the line of sight. if the bull's-eye is properly placed with reference to the line of sight, the soldier aims correctly and with uniformity. if the bull's-eye is not properly placed with reference to the line of sight, the soldier aims in a regular manner but with a constant error. = . causes of errors.= if the bull's-eye is directly above its proper position, the soldier has aimed high,--that is, he has taken too little front sight. if the bull's-eye is directly below its proper position, the soldier has aimed low,--that is, he has taken too much front sight. if the bull's-eye is directly to the right or left of its proper position, the soldier has not sighted through the center of the rear notch and over the top of the front sight. if to the _right_, the soldier has either sighted along the _left_ of the rear sight notch or the _right_ side of the front sight, or has committed both of these errors. if the bull's-eye is to the _left_ of its proper place, the soldier has probably-sighted along the _right_ of the rear sight notch, or to the _left_ of the front sight, or has committed both of these errors. if the bull's eye is diagonally above and to the right, the soldier has probably combined the errors which placed it too high and too far to the right. any other diagonal position would be produced by a similar combination of vertical and horizontal errors. after the above instruction has been given to one man, the line of sight will be slightly changed by moving the sighting rest or by changing the elevation and windage, and the exercises similarly repeated with other men. repeat the exercise, using the _peep_ sight. third sighting exercise = .= this exercise shows the effect of canting the piece. it is most important that in aiming the sights be kept vertical and the piece not be canted,--that is, that the barrel be not tilted over to the right or left. if the piece is canted to the right, the sights are lowered to the right and consequently the bullet will strike to the right and below the point aimed at, even though the rifle be otherwise correctly aimed and the sights correctly set. similarly if the piece is canted to the left the sights are lowered to the left, and consequently the bullet will strike to the left and low. this effect of canting the piece may be shown as follows: use the sighting rest with the rifle firmly held in the notches, the bolt removed. paste a black paster near the center of the bottom line of the target. sight the rifle on this mark, using about yards' elevation. then, being careful not to move the rifle, look through the bore and direct the marker to move the disk until the bull's-eye is in the center of the field of view and command, "mark." next, turn the rest (with the rifle) over ° to the right, on its side, and with the same elevation, sight on the same paster as above. then, being careful not to move the rifle, look through the bore and again direct the marker to move the disk until the bull's-eye is in the center of the field of view and command, "mark." not considering the fall of the bullet, the first mark represents the point struck with the sight vertical, the second mark represents the point struck, low and to the right, using the same elevation and the same point of aim, when the piece is canted ° to the right. different degrees of canting the piece can be represented by drawing an arc of a circle through the two marks with the paster as a center. the second mark will be at a point on this arc corresponding to the degree of canting the piece. it is important to know that this effect of canting increases with the distance from the target. fourth sighting exercise = .= this exercise is to show the advantage of blackened sights. in strong sunlight, make a triangle of sighting, using a rifle having sights worn bright. then, being careful not to move the rifle, blacken the sights and make another triangle. use dotted lines for the triangle with bright sights and full lines for the triangle made with blackened sights. the position and size of the two triangles will plainly show the advantage of using blackened sights. fifth sighting exercise = .= this exercise is to illustrate the importance of knowing the effects of varying degrees of light. in strong sunlight make a triangle of sighting. then, being careful not to move the piece, make another triangle, the target and the man sighting having first been shaded. the relative positions of the triangles will show the importance of knowing the effects of varying degrees of light. position and aiming drills = . object.= the object of the position and aiming drills are: . to so educate the muscles of the arm and body that the piece, during the act of aiming, shall be held without restraint, and during the operation of firing shall not be deflected from the target by any convulsive or improper movement of the trigger finger or of the body, arms, or hands. . they also establish between the hand and eye such prompt and intimate connection as will insure that the finger shall act upon the trigger, giving the final pressure at the exact moment when the top of the front sight is seen to be directed upon the mark. . if at the moment the piece is discharged, it is properly supported and correctly aimed, the mark will surely be hit. since any fairly intelligent man can be taught to aim correctly and to hold the sights aligned upon the mark with a fair amount of steadiness, it follows that bad shooting must necessarily arise from causes other than bad aiming. the chief of these causes is known to be the deflection given to the rifle when it is discharged, due to the fact that the soldier, at the moment of firing, instead of squeezing the trigger, _jerks_ it. this convulsive action is largely due to lack of familiarity with the methods of firing and to a constrained position of the muscles of the body, arm, and hands, which constrained position it is the object of the position and aiming drills to correct. = . general.= in order to correct any tendency to cant the piece, the rear sight is raised in all the exercises. place a black paster at which to aim on the wall opposite each man. the squad being formed in single rank, with an interval of one yard between files, the instructor directs the men to take the position of "ready," except that the position of the feet is such as to insure the greatest firmness and steadiness of the body. the instructor then cautions, "position and aiming drill." the exercise which is being taught should be repeated frequently and made continuous. the instructor prefaces the preparatory command by, "continue the motion," or "at will," and gives the command "halt" at the conclusion of the exercise, when the soldier returns to the position of "ready." or the soldier may be made to repeat the first and second motions by the command "one," "two," the exercise concluding with the command "halt." care must be taken by the instructor not to make the position and aiming drills tedious. thirty minutes daily should be spent in this practice during the period of preliminary instruction. after gallery practice is taken up, however, five or ten minutes daily should be sufficient for these exercises. in order that the instructor may readily detect and correct errors the squads for these drills should not consist of more than eight men. the instructor should avoid holding the squad in tiresome positions while making explanations or corrections. position exercise = .= the instructor commands: = . position, . exercise.= at the command, "_exercise_" without moving the body or eyes, raise the rifle smartly to the front of the right shoulder to the full extent of the left arm, elbow inclined downward, the barrel nearly horizontal, muzzle slightly depressed, heel of the butt on a line with the top of the shoulder. (fig. .) [illustration: fig. ] (two.) bring the piece smartly against the hollow of the shoulder, without permitting the shoulder to give way, and press the rifle against it, mainly with the right hand, only slightly with the left, the forefinger of the right hand resting lightly against the trigger, the rifle inclined neither to the right nor left. (three.) resume the position of ready. (fig. .) [illustration: fig. ] =remarks.= the instructor should especially notice the position of each soldier in this exercise, endeavoring to give to each man an easy and natural position. he should see that the men avoid drawing in the stomach, raising the breast, or bending the small of the back. the butt of the piece must be pressed firmly, but not too tightly, into the hollow of the shoulder and not against the muscles of the upper arm. if held too tightly, the pulsations of the body will be communicated to the piece; if too loosely, the recoil will bruise the shoulder. if only the heel or toe touches the hollow of the shoulder, the recoil may throw the muzzle down or up, affecting the position of the hit. while both arms are used to press the piece to the shoulder, the left arm should be used to direct the piece and the right forefinger must be left free to squeeze the trigger. [illustration: fig. ] aiming exercise = .= the instructor will first direct the sights to be adjusted for the lowest elevation and subsequently for the different longer ranges. the instructor commands: = . aiming. . exercise.= at the last command execute the first and second motion of the position exercise. (two.) bend the head a little to the right, the cheek resting against the stock, the left eye closed, the right eye looking through the notch of the rear sight at a point slightly below the mark. (fig. .) [illustration: fig. ] (three.) draw a moderately long breath, let a portion of it escape, then, with the lungs in a state of rest, slowly raise the rifle with the left hand, being careful not to incline the sight to either side, until the line of sight is directly on the mark; hold the rifle steadily directed on the mark for a moment; then, without command and just before the power to hold the rifle steadily is lost, drop the rifle to the position of "ready" and resume the breathing. = . remarks.= some riflemen prefer to extend the left arm. such a position gives greater control over the rifle when firing in a strong wind or at moving objects. it also possesses advantages when a rapid as well as accurate delivery of fire is desired. whatever the position, whether standing, kneeling, sitting, or prone, the piece should rest on the palm of the left hand, never on the tips of the fingers, and should be firmly grasped by all the fingers and the thumb. the eye may be brought to the line of sight either by lowering the head or by raising the shoulder; it is best to combine somewhat these methods; the shoulder to be well raised by raising the right elbow and holding it well to the front and at right angles to the body. if the shoulder is not raised, it will be necessary for the soldier to lower the head to the front in order to bring the eye into the line of sight. lowering the head too far to the front brings it near the right hand, which grasps the stock. when the piece is discharged, this hand is carried by the recoil to the rear and, when the head is in this position, may strike against the nose or mouth. this often happens in practice, and as a result of this blow often repeated many men become gun-shy, or flinch, or close their eyes at the moment of firing. much bad shooting, ascribed to other causes, is really due to this fault. raising the right elbow at right angles to the body elevates the right shoulder, and lifts the piece so that it is no longer necessary to incline the head materially to the front in order to look along the sights. as the length of the soldier's neck determines greatly the exact method of taking the proper position, the instructor will be careful to see that the position is taken without restraint. as changes in the elevation of the rear sight will necessitate a corresponding change in the position of the soldier's head when aiming, the exercise should not be held with the sight adjusted for the longer ranges until the men have been practiced with the sights as the latter would generally be employed for offhand firing. the soldier must be cautioned that while raising the line of sight to the mark he must fix his eyes on the mark and not on the front sight; the latter can then be readily brought into the line joining the rear-sight notch and mark. if this plan be not followed, when firing is held on the range at long distances the mark will generally appear blurred and indistinct. the front sight will always be plainly seen, even though the eye is not directed particularly upon it. the rifle must be raised slowly, without jerk, and its motion stopped gradually. in retaining it directed at the mark, care must be taken not to continue the aim after steadiness is lost; this period will probably be found to be short at first, but will quickly lengthen with practice. no effort should be made to prolong it beyond the time that breathing can be easily restrained. each soldier will determine for himself the proper time for discontinuing the aim. the men must be cautioned not to hold the breath too long, as a trembling of the body will result in many cases. some riflemen prefer, in aiming, to keep both eyes open but, unless the habit is fixed, the soldier should be instructed to close the left eye. trigger-squeeze exercise = .= the instructor commands: = . trigger squeeze. . exercise.= at the command =exercise=, the soldier executes the first motion of the aiming exercise. (two.) the second motion of the aiming exercise. (three.) draw a moderately long breath, let a portion of it escape, hold the breath and slowly raise the rifle with the left hand until the line of sight is on the mark, being careful not to incline the sights to either side. contract the trigger finger gradually, slowly and steadily increasing the pressure on the trigger, while the aim is being perfected; continue the gradual increase of pressure so that when the aim has become exact the additional pressure required to release the point of the sear can be given almost insensibly and without causing any deflection of the rifle. continue the aim a moment after the release of the firing pin, observe if any change has been made in the direction of the line of sight, and then resume the position of "ready," cocking the piece by raising and lowering the bolt handle. =remarks.= poor shooting is often the result of lack of proper coördination of holding the breath, the maximum steadiness of aim, and the squeeze of the trigger. by frequent practice in this exercise, each man may come to know the exact instant his firing pin will be released. he must be taught to hold the breath, bring the sights to bear upon the mark, and squeeze the trigger all at the same time. = . the trigger squeeze.= the trigger should be _squeezed_, not pulled, the hand being closed upon itself as a sponge is squeezed, the forefinger sharing in this movement. the forefinger should be placed as far around the trigger as to _press_ it with the second joint. by practice the soldier becomes familiar with the trigger _squeeze_ of his rifle, and knowing this, he is able to judge at any time, within limits, what additional _pressure_ is required for its discharge. by constant repetition of this exercise he should be able finally to _squeeze_ the trigger to a certain point beyond which the slightest movement will release the sear. having _squeezed_ the trigger to this point, the aim is corrected and, when true, the additional pressure is applied and the discharge follows. [illustration: fig. ] rapid-fire exercise = . object.= the object of this exercise is to teach the soldier to aim quickly and at the same time accurately in all the positions he will be called upon to assume in range practice. the instructor commands: = . rapid-fire exercise. . commence firing.= at the first command the first and second motions of the trigger-squeeze exercise are performed. at the second command, the soldier performs the third motion of the trigger-squeeze exercise, squeezing the trigger without disturbing the aim or the position of the piece, but at the same time without undue deliberation. he then without removing the rifle from the shoulder, holding the piece in position with the left hand, grasps the handle of the bolt with the right hand, rapidly draws back the bolt, closes the chamber, aims, and again squeezes the trigger. this movement is repeated until the trigger has been squeezed five times, when, without command, the piece is brought back to the position of "ready." when the soldier has acquired some facility in this exercise, he will be required to repeat the movement ten times, and finally, by using dummy cartridges, he may, by degrees, gain the necessary quickness and dexterity for the execution of the rapid fire required in range firing. = methods.= the methods of taking position, of aiming, and of squeezing the trigger, taught in the preceding exercises, should be carried out in the rapid-fire exercises, with due attention to all details taught therein; the details being carried out as prescribed except that greater promptness is necessary. in order that any tendency on the part of the recruit to slight the movements of aiming and of trigger squeeze shall be avoided, the rapid-fire exercises will not be taught until the recruit is thoroughly drilled and familiar with the preceding exercises. the recruit will be instructed that with practice in this class of fire the trigger can be squeezed promptly without deranging the piece. = . repetition.= if the recruit seems to execute the exercise hurriedly or carelessly, the instructor will require him to repeat it at a slower rate. = . manipulation of the breech mechanism.= to hold the piece to the position of the left hand should not be changed, but the left forearm with the proper facility, are learned only after much practice. some riflemen, especially men who shoot from the left shoulder, find it easier, in rapid firing, to drop the piece to the position of load after each shot. while at first trial this method may seem easier, it is believed that, with practice, the advantage of the former method will be apparent. position and aiming drill, kneeling = .= these exercises will be repeated in the kneeling position by causing the squad to kneel by the commands prescribed in the drill regulations. the exercises will be executed as prescribed for standing, except that the command "two" in the position exercise, the soldier will rest the left elbow on the left knee, the point of the elbow in front of the kneecap. the pasters for the kneeling exercise should be at - / feet from the floor or ground. =remarks.= frequent rests will be given during practice in these exercises kneeling, as the position, if long continued, becomes constrained and fatigues the soldier unnecessarily. in raising the rifle to the mark in the second and third exercises, the position of the left hand should not be changed, but the left forearm should be brought toward the body and at the same time the body bent slightly to the rear. when aiming kneeling there is, from the nature of the position, a tendency to press the butt of the rifle against the upper arm instead of against the hollow of the shoulder; this will necessitate inclining the head considerably to the right to get the line of sight, and by bringing the rifle so far to the rear will, if the thumb is placed across the stock, cause it to give by the recoil a blow upon the nose or mouth. these difficulties may be avoided by advancing the right elbow well to the front, at the same time raising it so that the arm is about parallel with the ground. the hollow of the shoulder will then be the natural place for the rifle butt, and the right thumb will be brought too far from the face to strike it in the recoil. some riflemen prefer, by bending the ankle, to rest the instep flat on the ground, the weight of the body coming more on the upper part of the heel; this obviates any tendency of the right knee to slip; or, by resting the right side of the foot on the ground, toe pointing to the front, to bring the weight of the body on the left side of the foot. these positions are authorized. = . choice of position.= in firing kneeling, the steadiness obtained depends greatly upon the position adopted. the peculiarities of conformation of the individual soldier exert when firing kneeling a greater influence than when firing either standing, sitting, or prone; the instructor should, therefore, carefully endeavor, noticing the build of each soldier, to place him in the position for which he is best adapted and which will exert the least tension or strain upon the muscles and nerves. it should be remembered, however, that without the rest of the left elbow on the knee this position possesses no advantage of steadiness over the standing position. = . kneeling position; when taken.= the kneeling position can be taken more quickly than either the sitting or the prone position. it is, therefore, the position naturally assumed when a soldier, who is standing or advancing, has to make a quick shot at a moving or disappearing object and desires more steadiness than can be obtained standing. position and aiming drill, sitting down = .= in many cases the men, while able to kneel and hold the piece moderately steady, can obtain in a sitting position much better results. all should, therefore, be instructed in aiming sitting down as well as kneeling. to practice the soldier in the preceding exercises in a sitting position, the squad being formed in a single rank, with an interval of one pace between files, the rifle should first be brought to "order arms"; the instructor then commands: _sit down._ at this command make a half face to the right and, assisted by the left hand on the ground, sit down, facing slightly to the right, the left leg directed toward the front, right leg inclined toward the right, both heels, but not necessarily the bottoms of the feet, on the ground, the right knee slightly higher than the left; body erect and carried naturally from the hips; at the same time drop the muzzle of the piece to the front, and to the position of the first motion of load, right hand upon the thigh, just in front of the body, the left hand slightly above, but not resting upon, the left leg. the exercise will be executed as heretofore prescribed, except that at the command "two" (position exercise) the soldier will rest the left elbow on the left knee, the point of the elbow in front of the kneecap, and the right elbow against the left or inside of the right knee, at the same time inclining the body from the hips slightly forward. for the aiming and trigger-squeeze exercises the pasters, used as aiming points, will be - / feet from the floor or the ground. to afford the men rest or on the completion of the kneeling or sitting down exercises the instructor will command _rise_, when the men rise, face to the front, and resume the "order arms." =remarks.= if the preceding position is carefully practiced, steadiness is quickly attained. the right leg should not be carried so far to the right as not to afford a good support or brace for the right elbow. this position may be modified, but, in general, not without impairing the steadiness of the man, by crossing the legs at the ankle, the outside of each foot resting upon the ground, body more erect, and the knees slightly more raised than in the previous position. position and aiming drill, prone = .= from the nature of the position it is not practicable to execute these exercises according to the method followed when standing or kneeling. instruction will, however, always be given with reference to the position, to the manner of assuming it, and to aiming and squeezing the trigger. for this purpose the squad being formed as specified above, in the position and aiming drill, sitting down (the black plasters therein mentioned being about inches from the ground), the squad will be brought to "order arms." then (the squad either standing or kneeling), the instructor commands: _lie down_, which will be executed as prescribed in the drill regulations; the legs may be spread apart and the toes turned out if found to give a steadier position. after the squad has taken the position as prescribed above, the legs should be inclined well to the left, and either crossed or separated as the soldier prefers or as his particular conformation appears to render most desirable, and the body at the same time inclined slightly to the right. with care and practice the soldier may acquire an easy position which he is able to assume with great facility. = .= being at "ready," the instructor then commands: = . trigger squeeze. . exercise.= at the latter command carry the left elbow to the front and slightly to the right, the left hand under the barrel at the balance, weight of the body mainly supported by the left elbow, the right resting lightly on the floor or ground. (two.) slide the rifle with the right hand through the left hand to the front until the left hand is a little in front of the trigger guard; at the same time raise the rifle with both hands and press it against the hollow of the shoulder. (three.) direct the rifle upon the mark and carry out the further details of aiming and squeezing the trigger as prescribed in the trigger-squeeze exercise. then resume the position, lying down. as soon as the men have acquired with accuracy the details of the position, they will be practiced, without the numbers, in aiming and squeezing the trigger at will; after which the rapid-fire exercise in the prone position will be practiced, the necessary skill and dexterity being acquired by degrees. to afford the men rest, or on completion of the exercise, the instructor will command: _rise_, which is executed as prescribed in the drill regulations. = . remarks.= the preceding position for firing lying down possesses in a greater degree than any other position the merit of adaptability to the configuration of the ground; it enables the soldier to deliver fire over low parapets or improvised shelters, thus making the best use of cover. the importance of training the soldier in firing from the other positions should not, however, be lost sight of, since from the prone position it will frequently be impossible to see the objective. back positions are not authorized. in the prone position, when aiming, the left elbow should be well under the barrel, the other elbow somewhat to the right, but not so far as to induce any tendency to slip on the floor or ground. the greater changes in elevation required in first directing the rifle on the object should be given by altering the position of the left hand under the barrel, the slighter changes only by advancing or withdrawing the shoulder. as the body does not yield to the recoil, as when firing standing or kneeling, the force of recoil, if the rifle is not properly held, may severely bruise the soldier. it is one of the objects of this exercise to so teach him that this will be prevented by assuming a correct position. care must be exercised that the butt is not brought against the collar bone. by moving the shoulder slightly to the front or rear, and by moving the right elbow from the body or toward it, each soldier may determine the position in which the shoulder gives to the butt of the rifle the easiest rest. this will probably be the one in which the force of the recoil will be least felt. the soldier should persist in this exercise until he obtains a position in which he feels no constraint, which will not subject him to bruises from recoil, and from which the mark appears plainly through the sights. having secured such a position, he must not change it when firing, as a variation in the points of support of the rifle, the distance of the eye from the rear sight, or the tension of the hold has a decided effect, especially at the longer ranges, upon the location of the point struck. =important.= the soldier should be encouraged to go through these exercises frequently at other than drill hours, care being taken that, in the aiming and trigger-squeeze exercises, he always has some definite object for a mark. deflection and elevation correction drills (sight-setting drills) = . sight correction.= you may find when firing at a target that the first shot has missed the bull's-eye or figure. now, one of two things may be done in order to cause the second shot to hit the bull's-eye or figure: ( ) the point of aim may be changed, or ( ) the sights may be moved and the same point as before aimed at. in order to do accurate shooting it is necessary to have a well-defined mark at which to aim; consequently, except for very slight corrections, the method of moving the sights, involving changes in elevation and windage, is the one to be used. =exercises.= in order to give the soldier practice in making corrections in elevation and deflection (windage),--that is, in sight-setting,--proceed as follows: take an "a" target and rule it off with red vertical lines to represent range and black or blue horizontal lines to represent windage deviations, as in fig. . tell the men to set their sights (either peep or open) for yards, no windage. examine the sights (assisted by the lieutenants, noncommissioned officers and expert riflemen). [illustration: fig. ] then say, for example, "you have fired a shot at yards with your sights set as you now have them. the shot was marked here (pointing to 'p,' fig. ). change your sights so as to move the next shot into the bull's-eye,--considering that you take the same hold as you did the last time." (note. in this case the sight should be lowered yards and points of left windage should be taken.) repeat with different positions for "p" until the men all understand the method and the reasons. do same for yards, yards, and yards. see figs. , , and . [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] explain that in firing no change in sights should be made until the man is sure that his hold was good, and then change without hesitancy. the correct use of sights and their proper adjustment can thus be taught without firing a shot. this exercise will save much time and work on the range. =elevation.= as previously explained, raising the rear sight increases the range of the bullet and lowering it decreases the range. the amount of change which a given amount of elevation will cause in the point struck varies with the range and with the rifle and with the ammunition used. for example, generally and approximately, in order, at a range of yards, to change the point struck foot, the rear sight must be changed yards, while to change the point struck foot at yards it must be changed yards. that is to say, if you fired a shot at yards, and then with the same aim, hold and other conditions as before, you _raised_ your rear sight yards, the next shot would strike the target foot _above_ the first one, and if you _lowered_ the rear sight yards, the bullet would then strike the target foot _below_ the first one. if firing at yards, _raising_ the rear sight yards would cause the bullet to strike the target foot _higher_ and _lowering_ the rear sight yards would cause it to strike foot _lower_. the following table gives the approximate changes in the rear sight to move the point struck foot at ranges from to yards: +-----------------------------------+ | | correction in elevation | | range | necessary to change the | | | point struck foot | +---------+-------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | , | | +---------+-------------------------+ the score-books issued by the ordnance department contain elevation charts and all you have to do is to consult the chart of your score-book in order to get the amount of elevation necessary at any particular range in order to raise or lower your shots any desired distance. = . deflection (windage).= corrections in the deflection (side movement) of the bullet are made by means of the windage screw that moves the movable base, each division of the graduations on the rear end of the movable base being called a "point of windage." _one point of windage moves the point struck inches for each yards of range._ that is to say, at yards, point of windage moves the point struck inches; at yards, inches ( × ); at yards, inches ( × ), etc. consequently, if at yards the wind were carrying your bullets inches to the side, you would take two points of windage to get the bull's-eye, and if the wind were carrying your bullets inches to the side, you would take points of windage, irrespective of the rate at which the wind was blowing. again, if at yards the wind were carrying your bullets inches to the side, you would take point of windage, and if it were carrying your bullets inches to the side, you would take - / points, irrespective of the rate at which the wind was blowing. in using the wind gauge remember _windage is always taken in the direction from which the wind is coming (into the wind) and the bullet moves in the same direction that the rear sight moves,--that is, if the wind is coming from the right, you take right windage and the bullet will strike to the right. likewise if you move the rear sight to the left (take left windage), the bullet will strike to the left_. gallery practice = . object and importance.= after the soldier has been thoroughly instructed in sighting, and in the position, aiming, deflection, and elevation correction drills, he is exercised in firing at short ranges ( and feet) with the gallery practice rifle (. caliber). notwithstanding the value of the position and aiming drills, it is impossible to keep up the soldier's interest if these exercises are unduly prolonged. by gallery practice, however, the interest is easily maintained and further progress, especially in teaching the trigger squeeze, is made. many of the external influences, which on the range affect the firing, being absent, the soldier is not puzzled by results for which, at this stage of his education, he could not account were he advanced to firing with full charges. furthermore, as there is no recoil to induce nervousness or flinching, the soldier soon finds that he can make good scores, and this success is the surest stimulus to interest. not only to the beginner is gallery practice of value; to the good shot it is a means of keeping, to a certain extent, in practice, and practice in shooting, as much as in anything else, is essential. since it can be carried on throughout the year, gallery practice is of much value in fixing in the men the _habit of aimed fire_, than which nothing in his training is of more importance. range practice = .= having completed the gallery practice course, the soldier is then advanced to known-distance firing on the target range where he uses the service rifle, with service ammunition. this known-distance practice is divided into certain regular courses and special courses. the regular courses and special course a are for troops of the regular army. there is also a special course for the organized militia and volunteers and one for volunteer recruits. all the various courses are described in detail in the small-arms firing manual and anyone having occasion to use any of them should familiarize himself thoroughly therewith. other instruction = . use of sling.= after the soldier has been drilled in the proper standing, kneeling, sitting, and prone positions in the foregoing exercises, the use of the sling will be taught. adjustments and their advantages will be taught with the idea of noninterference with quickness and freedom of action. the trigger squeeze exercises will then be continued in the different positions, using the sling. = .= _description and adjustment._ the sling is made up of four parts: the long strap, a, forming the arm loop; the short strap, b; and the two keepers, c and d. at one end of each of the straps there is a metal claw, used for adjusting the straps. at the other end of the short straps there is a metal loop through which the longer strap is passed, thus connecting the two straps. [illustration: fig. ] to adjust the sling for firing, the claw of the short strap is disengaged and reëngaged in the proper holes of the short strap, such adjustment as may be necessary being also made in the long strap (the arm loop). = .= _what the sling does._ it does two things: ( ) it steadies the rifle, and ( ) helps to take up the recoil,--that is, to reduce the "kick." _its use._ there are a number of different methods of using the sling. experiment with different ones until you find and decide upon the method best suited to you. the sling should be used in all firing,--combat practice as well as at target practice. always adjust the sling so that it will be tight. have the arm loop no longer than is necessary to reach the middle of the small of the stock. when on the arm, have the lower end of the arm loop well up near the arm pit, with the keeper well pressed down so as to hold the loop fast. note the proper adjustments of the sling for the different firing positions,--that is, standing, sitting, kneeling, and prone, and mark the adjustments on the inside of the arm loop, "st" (standing), "si" (sitting), "k" (kneeling), and "p" (prone). it is sometimes advisable to sew a piece of rope to your shirt sleeve to keep the sling from slipping down. = . to put on the sling.= . put your left hand in the loop, twisting the sling to the left, a, fig. , and holding the rifle with the right hand as shown in the figure. twisting the sling to the left causes a flat surface instead of the cutting edge of the sling to rest against the wrist. [illustration: fig. ] . extend the arm on through the loop, (fig. ), bringing the loop well up near the pit of the arm, grasping the piece with the left hand, and pressing down keeper, a. [illustration: fig. ] . place left hand between the sling and piece, (fig. ), the hand being pressed well forward toward the upper sling swivel, a. notice how the back of the hand is resting against the flat of the sling. [illustration: fig. ] . come to the position of aim, fig. . pressure is applied to the sling by pressing forward the left hand, and holding the rifle to the shoulder with the right hand. remember that whatever pressure you apply must be the same for each shot. [illustration: fig. _right side view_] notice (figs. and ) how well forward the left hand is, and how the flat of the sling is resting against the wrist and back of hand. see how the short strap, c, (fig. ), of the sling is correctly loose. the thumb should be held along the stock as shown (a) in fig. . [illustration: fig. _left side view_] = . designation of winds.= winds are designated as " o'clock," " o'clock," " o'clock," etc., winds, depending on the direction _from_ which they come. imagine the firing point to be in the middle of the face of a clock and the target to be at o'clock; o'clock will be on your right, o'clock on your left, o'clock in your rear and in your front. a wind blowing _from_ your right to your left is called a o'clock wind; one blowing _from_ your rear is called a o'clock wind; one from your front, o'clock wind, etc. [illustration: fig. ] the score-books issued by the ordnance department have windage charts that have been carefully worked out and all you have to do is this: estimate the force of the wind in miles per hour, and determine the direction from which it comes (whether a o'clock wind, a o'clock wind, etc.). then look at the windage chart and see just how much windage you must take. the simplest and best rule for the beginner is for him to make his estimate and then ask an experienced shot what windage to use, checking this up with what he found on the windage chart. in this way he soon learns to estimate for himself. practice estimating the wind. ask a man who has been making 's and 's what windage _he_ used and check up with your own estimate. you can find out the direction of the wind by watching smoke, grass or the limbs of trees. throw up some small straws and watch which way they are blown, or wet your finger and hold it up. the wind cools the side it strikes. a o'clock wind slows up the bullet and a o'clock wind helps it along,--so, in the first case you would need more elevation and in the second less elevation. = . the zero of a rifle.= the twist of the bullet given by the rifling of the barrel causes the bullet to move to right, which movement, called "the drift," is compensated by having the slot in the rear sight for the drift slide, slope to the left. however, in some rifles the compensation is too great and in others it is not enough. that reading of the wind gauge necessary to overcome the drift of a rifle at a particular range is called the "zero" of that rifle for that range, and all allowances for wind should be calculated from this reading. the "zero" of a rifle is found by shooting it on a perfectly calm day. = . estimating distance.= ability to estimate distances correctly is an important part of a soldier's education. while it is true that fire on the battlefield will usually be by groups and the ranges will be given by officers, the battlefield is reached only after a long series of experiences in scouting, patrolling, and outpost duty, in which the soldier is frequently placed in positions where it is necessary that he shall determine for himself the range to be used in order that his fire may be effective. there are different methods of estimating the range (for example, by sound, trial shots, range-finding instruments, etc.), but the only ones that the average soldier need know are those of estimating distance by the eye and by trial shots. to estimate distance by the eye with accuracy, it is necessary to be familiar with the appearance, as to length, of a unit of measure which can be compared mentally with the distance which is to be estimated. the most convenient unit of length is yards. to impress upon the soldier the extent of a stretch of yards two posts yards apart, with short stakes between to mark each yards, should be placed near the barracks, or on the drill ground, and the soldier required to pace off the marked distance several times, counting his steps. he will thus learn how many of his steps make yards and will become familiar with the appearance of the whole distance and of its fractional parts. next a distance of more than yards will be shown him and he will be required to compare this distance with the -yard unit and to estimate it. having made his estimate, he will be required to verify its accuracy by pacing the distance. a few minutes each day should be spent in this practice, the soldier often being required to make his estimate by raising his rear-sight leaf and showing it to the instructor. after the first drills the soldier should be required to pace the distance only when the estimate is unusually inaccurate. the soldier should be taught that, in judging the distance from the enemy, his estimate may be corrected by a careful observation of the clearness with which details of dress, the movements of limbs or of the files in a line may be seen. in order to derive the benefit of this method, the soldier will be required to observe closely all the details noted above in single men or squads of men posted at varying distances, which will be measured and announced. although the standing and kneeling silhouettes used in field practice afford good objects upon which to estimate distances, the instructor should make frequent use of living figures and natural objects, as this is the class of targets from which the soldier will be compelled to estimate his range in active service. = . methods of estimating long distances by the eye.= the following methods are found useful: (_a_) the soldier may decide that the object cannot be more than a certain distance away nor less than a certain distance; his estimates must be kept within the closest possible limits and the mean of the two taken as the range. (_b_) the soldier selects a point which he considers the middle point of the whole distance, estimates this half distance and doubles it, or he similarly divides the distance into a certain number of lengths which are familiar to him. (_c_) the soldier estimates the distance along a parallel line, as a road on one side, having on it well-defined objects. (_d_) the soldier takes the mean of several estimates made by different persons. this method is not applicable to instruction. = . determination of distance by trial shots or volleys.= if the ground is so dry or dusty that the fall of the bullets is visible to the naked eye or through a field glass, distance may be determined by using a number of trial shots or volleys. in the case of individual trial shots, the soldier sets his sight at the estimated range, watching to see where the bullet strikes,--or some other man, with or without field glasses, may watch to see where it strikes. if the bullet strikes beyond the target, the estimated sight setting is decreased; if it falls short, the sight setting is increased. in case of volleys, the sights are set at the estimated range and a volley is fired. if it appears to strike a little short of the mark, an increase in elevation of yards is used for the next volley. when we have the target inclosed between two volleys, we take the mean of the estimated ranges for the correct range. for example, if the first estimated range were and the second , the correct range would be . = . appearance of objects: how modified by varying conditions of light; difference of level, etc.= during instruction the men should be taught the effect of varying conditions of light and terrain upon the apparent distance of an object. _objects seem nearer_-- (_a_) when the object is in a bright light. (_b_) when the color of the object contrasts sharply with the color of the background. (_c_) when looking over water, snow, or a uniform surface like a wheat field. (_d_) when looking from a height downward. (_e_) in the clear atmosphere of high altitudes. _objects seem more distant_-- (_a_) when looking over a depression in the ground. (_b_) when there is a poor light or a fog. (_c_) when only a small part of the object can be seen. (_d_) when looking from low ground upward toward higher ground. = . effect of heat and cold.= heat causes shots to strike high, and cold causes them to strike low. therefore, if you shot on a warm day and made 's, and recorded temperature and other conditions in your score-book, you would know on looking at your score sheets that you should raise your elevation, if you were firing on a cold day. = . effect of moisture.= dampness causes shots to strike high and dryness causes them to strike low. therefore, on damp days take lower elevations than on dry days. = . effect of light.= light affects the aiming without the beginner knowing it. it does not, however, affect the travel of the bullet. a dark target causes a tendency to aim farther below the bull's-eye than if the target were bright. therefore, use higher elevations with dark targets. as it gets darker, higher elevations should be used. if you _always aim carefully and correctly_ the light will have little effect on your aiming,--that is, if your eyesight is good. if you are shooting in a dull light and a bright sun comes out, say on your right, there is a tendency to move the front sight to the opposite (left) side of the rear sight notch, since the near (right) edge is shaded and obscured somewhat. therefore / to / windage into the sun (right in this case) should be taken to overcome this. in using battle sight, hold higher for a bright light. we also raise our sights if a strong sun comes out. therefore, we have this rule: _move your rear sight into the sun, just as you do for a wind,--and raise your elevation._ = . mirage= gives a wavering appearance to the target. it is heated air that is moving. it is sometimes called "heat waves." with the wind between and miles an hour on clear, hot days the waves can be seen moving across the target. when there is no wind or a light six o'clock wind, the waves go straight up, or "boil." _never fire when the mirage is boiling_,--wait for it to move from one side to the other and then take windage to correct for it. = . summary of temperature, light and moisture effects:= _raise elevation for_-- dull target shooting in the sun hot gun dirty gun cold day bright or shining sight cloudy day o'clock wind _lower elevation for_-- bright target target in sun cold gun clean gun hot day moist day full sights o'clock wind = . firing with bayonet fixed.= in firing with bayonet fixed usually a lower point on the target will be struck, corresponding to a reduction of about yards in the range. = . care of rifle.= since the accuracy of a soldier's rifle has a most important bearing on his shooting, and since the proper care of a rifle affects its accuracy, the care of the rifle is an important subject in which every soldier should be thoroughly instructed. the subject is fully covered in the preceding chapter. (chapter xv, part i). collective instruction (combat practice) = . general scheme.= while individual instruction is most important, it is not everything. the maximum effect of fire in battle is obtained when a command, as a whole, is a pliable, manageable, effective instrument in the hands of a commander who can use it intelligently and efficiently. therefore, the two objects to be obtained are: . to make the command a pliable, manageable, effective instrument in the hands of its commander. . to train and instruct the commander so that he will know how to use this instrument in an intelligent and efficient manner. = . to make the fire unit a pliable, manageable, efficient instrument.= in order that a unit may be a pliable, manageable, efficient instrument in the hands of its commander, he must be able to control the unit absolutely,--that is to say, not only must the individuals composing the unit be so trained that they will respond at once, even in the din and confusion of battle, to the will of the commander, as expressed by his orders, but they must also be so instructed and disciplined that they can, as individual parts of the unit, perform their functions efficiently. this is accomplished by _fire discipline_. = . fire discipline.= by _fire discipline_ is meant a habit of obedience, a control of the rifle, and a display of intelligence, all the result of training, which will enable the soldier in action to make hits instead of misses. it embraces taking advantage of the ground; care in setting the sight and delivery of fire, including proper fire distribution; constant attention to the orders of the leaders and careful observation of the enemy; an increase of fire when the target is favorable, and a cessation of fire when the enemy disappears; economy of ammunition. = . to train and instruct the commander to use the unit with intelligence and efficiency.= in order to handle the unit with intelligence and efficiency, utilizing to the greatest extent possible the power of all the rifles under his command, not only must the commander be able to control the unit, having it respond at once to his every command, but he must also know tactics, and be thoroughly familiar with the technical principles of infantry fire. = . combat exercises.= a combat exercise consists of the application of tactical principles to certain assumed battle situation, in the execution of which are employed the appropriate formations and movements of close and extended order drill, and in which, as a rule, ball cartridges are used in firing at the targets. by means of combat exercises, the unit commanders are trained and instructed in applying tactical principles, in controlling and directing the fire of their units and the men are trained and instructed in fire discipline. the tactical principles applicable to combat exercises are covered in the infantry drill regulations, under the headings of "_fire_" and "_combat_." = . technical principles of firing.= the technical principles of firing are given in detail in the small-arms firing manual, a summary of which is given below under the headings of, _the effect of fire_, _the influence of the ground_, and _the adjustment of fire_. the effect of fire = . ballistic qualities of the rifle.= the accuracy of a rifle, the flatness of its trajectory, and its disabling power,--that is, the power it has to disable the enemy,--are called its _ballistic qualities_. the accuracy of the u. s. springfield rifle, caliber . , model of , is very high,--probably superior to that of any other military rifle. the flatness of trajectory is dependent upon the muzzle velocity, and, to some extent, upon the form of the bullet. our bullet is pointed and the muzzle velocity is feet per second, which is a very high muzzle velocity. two rifles of different type may be equally accurate, but the accuracy of the one having the flatter trajectory will, naturally, be less affected by slight errors in sight setting. again, another advantage of the rifle with the flatter trajectory is that it holds more ground under its fire. for example, take our service rifle: at a range of yards, the bullet, at the highest point in its trajectory or line of flight, is feet above the line of sight. it is, therefore, apparent that if the bottom of an object feet or greater, is aimed at, it would be struck if it were anywhere under yards. now, take a rifle with a very curved trajectory, say one whose bullet, at the highest point of the trajectory corresponding to a range of yards, is feet above the line of sight. there will be a large extent of ground between the target and the rifle that is not danger space for a target feet above the line of sight. hence, we see that the rifle with the flatter trajectory is better. the continuous danger space afforded by the flat trajectory of our service rifle enables us to adopt a universal sight for all ranges up to yards,--that is, the battle sight, which is the rear sight ready for use when the sight leaf is laid down. = . cone of fire or cone of dispersion.= if a body of soldiers fire at the same target the bullets will not, of course, follow the same path, but will be scattered. this is due to differences in sights, parts of the rifle, ammunition, and to a greater extent, to the individual errors of the soldiers in aiming and firing. the trajectories or paths of the bullets considered together form a horn-shaped figure or cone, called the _cone of fire_ or cone of dispersion. (see fig. .) [illustration: fig. ] = . shot group and center of impact.= if the _cone of fire_ be intercepted by a target (for example, a o, fig. ) at right angles to the axis of the cone, the shot holes will make a pattern or group called the _shot group_, the holes being the thickest approximately in the center of the group, called the _center of impact_. from this point in all directions the density of the grouping decreases progressively,--at first gradually, then more rapidly, out to the limits of the group. naturally, the size of the cone of fire and of the shot group vary with the skill of those firing, good shots making a small cone and small group, and poor shots a large cone and large group. = . beaten zone.= the intersection of the cone of dispersion with the surface of the ground is called the _beaten zone_. if the surface of the ground is horizontal, the form of the _beaten zone_ is that of an ellipse with its longer axis in the direction of the line of fire, as shown in fig. . [illustration: fig. ] in view of the fact that at the long ranges the angle of fall of the bullets is much greater than at short ranges, it follows that at short ranges the elliptical figure (beaten zone) is much more elongated than at long ranges. in other words, the longer the range, the shorter is the depth of the beaten zone. this is shown in fig. . = . uncertainty and ineffectiveness of long-range fire.= it follows from what has been said, that as the range increases the length of the beaten zone decreases,--that is, a less depth of ground is held under fire. that being the case, if an error is made in sight setting due, for example, to an incorrect estimate of the range, the proportionate loss of fire effect due to misplacement of the center of impact will be greater as the beaten zone is less,--that is, as the range is greater. furthermore, the difficulty of exact range determination increases with the distance, the two influences combining to make long-range fire uncertain and usually ineffective. = . zone of effective fire.= that portion of the ground which contains the best per cent of the shots in the beaten zone, is called the _zone of effective fire_. effectiveness of fire = . factors involved.= the effectiveness of fire depends upon these three factors: ( ) the percentage of hits made; ( ) the number of targets hit; ( ) the time of execution. that is to say, the effectiveness of fire is determined by the number of enemies disabled or targets hit in a given time. = . percentage of hits.= by the percentage of hits is meant the proportion of all the bullets fired that hit the targets. for example, if bullets are fired and hit the targets, then the percentage of hits is . the percentage of hits depends upon the dispersion, and this is influenced by the precision of the arm, the range, the visibility of the target, the atmospheric conditions, the training and instruction of the troops, and upon their physical and moral state at the time. in addition, the percentage of hits also depends upon the character of the ground as favoring ricochet hits, upon the correct estimation of the range and the proper designation of the target. = . number of targets hit.= the number of targets hit,--that is, the distribution of fire,--may be affected by varying degrees of visibility, as men instinctively choose the more conspicuous marks as aiming points. under any circumstances, a poor distribution of the hits made will be due to an absence of proper instructions from the leaders; or, in other words, to poor control, or else to a want of understanding or lack of obedience on the part of the men. = . time of execution.= the time of execution is important in that the gaining of fire superiority is dependent less upon obtaining high percentages of hits than upon making an absolutely large number of hits in a unit of time. there is necessarily a limit to the rapidity of fire which, if exceeded, will result in some loss of accuracy. with targets of a fair degree of visibility, the following may be taken as standard rates of fire for troops who have been given suitable training in target practice: yards } yards } shots per minute. yards } yards } yards } . shots per minute. yards } yards } yards } shots per minute. , yards } greater ranges, shots per minute. the rates given should not exclude higher rates of fire in the case of large and conspicuous targets. on the other hand, when objectives, or marks used as aiming points, are very indistinct, the requirement of correct aiming imposes rates of fire somewhat lower than the standard rates given even for well-instructed men. with imperfectly trained men who have not fully acquired the habit of using aimed fire only, and who are lacking in the manual dexterity required for executing the standard rates of fire, the maximum rate can not well exceed six shots per minute without incurring the danger of lapsing into unaimed fire. fatigue and exhaustion, the results of marches or prolonged firing, have a detrimental influence and tend to lower the rates of effective fire. influence of ground = . defilade.= if we will consider a bullet just grazing the top of an impenetrable obstacle (like "a," fig. ), the space from the top of such obstacle to where the bullet strikes the ground (space b e, fig. ) will be protected from fire. such space is called, "_defiladed space_." its extent will, of course, depend on the height of the obstacle, the curvature of the trajectory and the slope of the ground in rear of the obstacles. [illustration: fig. ] between b and d, a soldier standing would be completely protected; between d and e, he would be only partially protected. to obtain complete protection between d and e the soldier would have to assume the kneeling or prone position, depending on how far away from d he was. by cover is meant effective defilade from the enemy's fire. by concealment is meant screening from view but not necessarily protection from fire. = . rising and falling ground.= the influence of the ground upon the effect of fire is at once seen by studying fig. . if the ground rises, as shown by b o and a o, the depth of the beaten zone (and consequently the effect of fire) decreases. on the other hand, if the ground falls (up to a certain point), the depth of the beaten zone (and consequently the effect of fire) increases. = . depth of beaten zone affects only targets having depth.= it should be remembered that depth of beaten zone can affect only targets which have depth. on a target in the form of a line,--a line of skirmishers, for example,--the depth of the beaten zone has no effect one way or the other. if such a target, however, is backed up by supports and reserves, the depth of the beaten zone may have a decided effect on them, depending upon their distance in rear of the line forming the target and the slope of the ground in rear of such target. in this connection, attention is invited to fig. , which shows how in the case of a fire delivered from a height at a target on a horizontal plane beneath, the beaten zone is shortened and consequently the fire effect decreased. [illustration: fig. ] an example of increasing the depth of beaten zone is seen in fig. , which shows a fire delivered from low ground at a target on the edge of a plateau or crest of a ridge from which the ground slopes to the rear. [illustration: fig. ] = . grazing fire.= shots which pass over a crest with an angle of fall conforming, or nearly conforming, to the slope of the ground beyond the edge of the crest (as shown in fig. ), are called _grazing shots_ and fire so delivered is called _grazing fire_. = . diminution or increase in fire effect due to rising and falling ground.= in connection with the diminution or increase in fire effect due to rising and falling ground, attention is invited to the following: . if the ground slopes upward to the rear from a firing line, the supports may be placed closer without increasing the danger from fire aimed at the firing line. . when the ground slopes down and to the rear from the firing line forming the target, the supports must be posted at a greater distance in rear, unless the slope is so much greater than the angle of fall of the hostile bullets that a defiladed space is created in which no bullets strike, in which case the supports may be brought up close to the crest. . on ground rising with respect to the line of sight, column targets (i. e., having depth) will suffer greater losses than lineal targets. . on ground falling with respect to the line of sight, the reverse slope of hills or the level grounds of plateaus, line targets will suffer the greater losses. = . ricochet shots.= when a bullet strikes any surface and is deflected it is called a _ricochet shot_. not only do bullets that ricochet usually tumble after striking, but they are also mutilated, so that wounds inflicted by ricochet hits are usually severe. the most favorable ground for ricochets is a smooth, hard, horizontal surface, the aim being low, the chance of ricochets in sand is very slight. = . occupation of ground.= the question of the occupation of ground presents these two aspects: . what firing positions may be chosen which will tend to increase the losses of the enemy? . what positions may be chosen and formations adopted to minimize our own losses? the selection of a defensive position presents this question: _shall it be near the crest or well down the slope?_ a position well down the slope _advantages:_ . the depth of the beaten zone for fire delivered from the position is increased and the upper portion of the cone of fire will include the supports and reserves advancing to reënforce the hostile firing line. that is to say, the fire will be a _grazing fire_. . it eliminates dead spaces that might otherwise exist at the bottom of the slope. . the hostile fire being directed against a point well down the slope, the high ground in rear will interpose as a defilade and intercept the upper portion of the cone of fire which might otherwise take effect on the supports and reserves behind the crest. _disadvantages:_ . it makes withdrawal difficult in case it becomes necessary to fall back. . it is difficult to reënforce the firing line. a position near the crest _advantages:_ . it favors observation of the enemy. . it makes withdrawal easy in case it becomes necessary to fall back. . it is easy to reënforce the firing line by the supports advancing from behind the crest. _disadvantages:_ . the depth of the beaten zone is decreased and consequently the cone of fire will probably not include the supports and reserves advancing to reënforce the hostile firing fire. in other words, the fire will be a _plunging fire_. . it is likely to result in dead spaces at the bottom of the slope. . it affords a good target for the hostile artillery. whether or not a position near the crest or a position down the slope should be chosen, depends, in each case, upon circumstances. for instance in a rear guard action, where a determined stand is not contemplated, a position near the crest would be occupied. on the other hand, if a determined stand were contemplated, the terrain offered good opportunity for the delivery of an effective grazing fire, and we had reason to believe that we were going to be subjected to heavy artillery fire, a position at the foot of the slope would be selected. however, it may be said that, in general, a defensive position should be near the bottom of the slope. = . gentle reverse slopes.= from the point of view of avoiding losses, all gentle reverse slopes are dangerous and are to be avoided when possible. when necessary to traverse or to occupy such ground, precautions must be taken to protect the reserves or other bodies of troops by placing them on the flanks; by disposing them in formations with a narrow front; by causing them to lie down; by the construction of suitable shelter, and by avoiding useless movements. adjustment of fire = . fire at stationary targets.= the correct adjustment of fire is attained by causing the center of impact to fall on the center of the target. this is the problem constantly presented in combat firing. the two important elements entering into this problem are, ( ) the commander and ( ) the troops. when a body of troops has aimed correctly at the target indicated, with the elevation ordered and has fired with steadiness, it has done all that can be expected of it, but that is not sufficient; for, if the commander, by giving the wrong sight-setting, for example, has failed to cause the center of impact to fall on the center, of the target, the result may be nothing. hence the vital importance of knowing and announcing the correct range. it is known that good shots make a small group and poor shots a large group, average shots making a group of intermediate size. it is frequently stated that troops composed of good shots are not so effective in collective firing as poorer shots. how is this possible? the explanation is simple. the shot group of the good shots is small and if misplaced by an error in range estimation few hits result while the shot group of poorer shots, being larger, is not so much affected by the same error in range estimation, will cover the ground, and probably hit more figures. this, of course, is _only true_ when a considerable error has been made in estimating the range. as battle targets are mostly line targets, a displacement to the right or left does not amount to much, but an error in depth (range), as stated before, is serious. thus we, see that the _correct determination of the range_ is very important. = . determination of range.= the range may be determined, with only a small error, by a range finder. there are several other methods, as, for instance, by trial shots,--the dust thrown up by the bullet showing whether the range is too short or too great,--by sound, by the appearance of objects, etc., but except in deliberately prepared defensive positions, estimating by eye will be the most practicable method of estimating the range. for all practical purposes a very satisfactory result will be obtained by taking the average estimates of several trained men. in observing the effect of the fire the ground may be wet, or covered with turf, sod or brush in which no signs of striking shots can be seen. by careful use of good field glasses some indication of the place where the shots are going, may be obtained. the actions of the enemy may often indicate whether the fire is effective or not. = . combined sights.= all other means failing, _combined sights_ may be resorted to. by this is meant firing part of the troops with sights set at one range and part with a range greater or less by yards or more. this increases the beaten zone and will generally assure a certain amount of fire effect. this method is seldom used under yards. = . auxiliary aiming points.= it frequently happens that the target is so well concealed that it is invisible. in this case some well defined object in front or behind it must be used as an _aiming target_, and the range given so that the beaten zone will include the actual target at its center. = . fire at moving targets.= in firing at a moving enemy, a beaten zone must be established immediately in front, his forward movement into this zone completing the adjustment of fire. due to the chance of overestimating the range, a sight-setting must be taken _well under_ the estimated range (usually about yards against advancing infantry). when the fire becomes effective, as may be judged by the actions and movements of the enemy, the rate of fire should be quickened in order to increase the effect of the fire. frequent changes of sight not only cause a loss of time, but they also multiply chances of error in sight-setting. changes in sight-setting against advancing infantry should not be less than yards at a time, that is to say, when the enemy has passed through the zone of effective fire, the sight should be lowered yards and the operation repeated until the battle-sight zone is reached, when the rear-sight leaf is thrown down and no other sight manipulation is made. against skirmish lines advancing by rushes, the sight-setting should not be changed during a rush, but it should be done at the halts, so that the greater vulnerability of the targets presented during the rush may be taken advantage of. against retreating infantry, use the estimated range, and when the target appears to have passed beyond the zone of effective fire, add yards to the sight-setting. against attacking cavalry, due to the rapidity of the advance, there will not usually be time for sight manipulation other than throwing down the rear-sight leaf, so that the battle should be resorted to at all ranges. in firing at a target moving across the line of fire it is desirable, on account of the confusion caused thereby, to hit the head of the column. it is necessary, therefore, to hold to the front a distance sufficient to allow for the time of flight and the rate of march. this will be accomplished by the observance of the following rough rules: . against infantry, hold against the head of the marching column; . against cavalry at a trot, hold to the front yard for every yards of range; and at a gallop, yards for every yards of range. = . night firing.= in night firing it is almost impossible to adjust the fire by ordinary means. in night attacks the purpose of the offensive is to gain rapidly and quietly a position where the issue may be decided in a hand to hand encounter, or a position from which the superiority of fire may be gained at daylight. for the offensive, therefore, fire action is a subordinate consideration. on the defensive, when a night attack is apprehended, preparations should be made to sweep with fire the ground immediately in front over which the assailant must advance. special arrangements may sometimes be made for resting rifles on the parapet, so that the ground in front will be suitably covered. a solid support is necessary for maintaining the proper direction of the pieces during firing. for this purpose notched boards or timbers are convenient. the arrangements should be such that the operations of loading and firing may be performed without removing the rifles from the support. searchlight illumination may reveal the position and movements of the enemy sufficiently well to permit the use of the sights. in night operations of small parties fire may be well directed when a bright, well-defined light, such as a camp fire, is presented as an aiming point. in such a case a slight illumination of the front sight is required. fire direction and control = . general.= as stated before in substance, the maximum effect of fire can be gotten only by instructed and disciplined troops under a commander capable of directing and controlling their fire properly. the fire of a company may be likened to spraying water from a hose, and as the fireman can shift his stream of water from one point to the other with certainty, being able to direct and control it with promptness and accuracy, so should the company commander be able to switch the cone of fire of his company from one target to another, having it at all times under direction and control. in other words, as the pliable, manageable hose responds to the will of the fireman, so should the company be so trained and instructed that it will respond to the will of the company commander on the firing line, in the midst of the noise and confusion of battle. no one except a man who has been in battle can realize how great are the noise and confusion, and how necessary and important are coöperation, team-work, discipline, and communication, in order for a company commander to control and direct the fire of the company--there must be absolute coöperation, team-work, and communication between all parts of the company--between the captain and the platoon leaders, the platoon leaders and the squad leaders, and the squad leaders and the members of their squads. each and every man must know and do his part and endeavor all he can to keep in touch with and help the others. now, the foundation of team-work and coöperation, is communication--communication between the company commander and the men on the firing line--the means by which, the medium _through_ which he will make known his will to the men on the firing line. as stated before, because of the noise and confusion on the firing line this is no easy matter. the ideal way would be for the company commander to control the company by communicating direct with every man on the firing line, as graphically shown on the following page: [illustration: fig. ] however, in the noise and confusion of battle it would be utterly impossible for all the men to hear the captain's voice. experience shows that from to rifles are as many as one leader can control. the captain, must, therefore, control the company through the platoon commanders--that is to say, he _actually directs_ the fire and the platoon commanders, assisted by the squad leaders, _actually control_ it. in other words, the captain communicates with the men on the firing line, he makes his will known to them, through his platoon commanders, as graphically shown in this diagram: [illustration: fig. ] however, in order for our system of communication to be successful, each and every man, as stated above, must know and do his part and endeavor all he can to help the others. if this is done, then the different parts and elements of the company will dove-tail and fit into one another, resulting in a complete, homogeneous whole, in the form of an efficient, pliable, manageable instrument in the hands of the company commander. and this is the object, the result, sought by practice and instruction in field firing, and which will be obtained if the captain, the platoon leaders, the squad leaders, the file closers, the musicians, and the privates, will perform the following duties and functions: = . the captain.= (_fire direction._) the captain _directs_ the fire of the company or of designated platoons. he designates the target, and, when practicable, allots a part of the target to each platoon. before beginning the fire action he determines the range, announces the sight setting, and indicates the class of fire to be employed, and the time to open fire. thereafter, he observes the fire effect, corrects material errors in sight setting, prevents exhaustion of the ammunition supply, and causes the distribution of such extra ammunition as may be received from the rear. (i. d. r. .) having indicated clearly what he desires the platoon leaders to do, the captain avoids interfering, except to correct serious errors or omissions. (i. d. r. .) = . the platoon leaders.= (_fire direction._) in combat the platoon is the _fire unit_. (i. d. r. .) each platoon leader puts into execution the commands or directions of the captain, having first taken such precautions to insure correct sight setting and clear description of the target or aiming point as the situation permits or requires; thereafter, he gives such additional commands or directions as are necessary to exact compliance with the captain's will. he corrects the sight setting when necessary. he designates an aiming point when the target cannot be seen with the naked eye. in general, _platoon leaders_ observe the target and the effect of their fire and are on the alert for the captain's commands or signals; they observe and regulate the rate of fire. (i. d. r. .) = . the guides= watch the firing line and check every breach of fire discipline. = . the squad leaders= transmit commands and signals when necessary, observe the conduct of their squads and abate excitement, assist in enforcing fire discipline and participate in the firing. every squad leader should place himself just a little in advance of the rest of his squad and by occasionally glancing to the right and left, observe how the men of their squads are doing--whether they are firing at the proper objective, if the sights are apparently properly adjusted, if they are firing too rapidly, etc. after each shot the squad leader should look toward his platoon leader, and then glance to his right and left to observe his men, and then load and fire again. = . the musicians= assist the captain by observing the enemy, the target, and the fire effect, by transmitting commands or signals, and by watching for signals. (i. d. r. .) = . the privates= will take advantage of cover, exercise care in setting the sights and delivering fire; be on the constant lookout for orders from their leaders; always aim deliberately; observe the enemy carefully, increasing the fire when the target is favorable and ceasing firing when the enemy disappears; not neglect a target because it is indistinct; not waste ammunition, but be economical with it; if firing without a leader to retain their presence of mind and direct an efficient fire upon the proper target. = . distribution of fire.= the distribution of fire over the entire target is of the greatest importance; for, a section of the target not covered by fire represents a number of the enemy permitted to fire coolly and effectively. so, remember that all parts of the target are equally important, and care must be taken that the men do not neglect its less visible parts. the captain allots a part of the target to each platoon, or each platoon leader takes as his target that part which corresponds to his position in the company. every man is so instructed that he will fire on that part of the target which is directly opposite him. if the target cannot be seen with the naked eye, platoon leaders select an object in front of or behind it, designate this as the aiming point, and direct a sight-setting which will carry the fire into the target. the men aim at the good aiming point or line, but with such an increased or decreased sight-setting, as the case may be, that the bullets will fall on the target instead of on the aiming point. distribution of fire is assured by dividing the whole target assigned the company into definite parts or sectors, and allotting these parts or sectors to the various platoons. and, of course, the whole of the target must be kept under fire while the company is advancing. this may be accomplished by one of two methods: = . overlapping method.= in this method each sector (target) is covered by more than one fire unit. for example, in a company of four platoons the entire company sector would be divided in two parts, the right part being covered by the first and second platoons and the left part by the third and fourth platoons. when the first platoon ceases fire to advance, the second platoon would replace the lost rifles by firing faster. with three platoons the company sector would be divided into two parts, one being assigned to each flank platoon and the whole company sector to the center platoon. when the first platoon advanced, the center platoon would cover its target, both the center and third platoons increasing their rate of fire. with two platoons, each would cover the whole company sector. = . switch method.= the company is divided into a number of parts, one less than the number of platoons in the company. one platoon is designated as the "switch," and swings into fire automatically into that sector from which the fire of its assigned unit is withdrawn. for example, with four platoons, and platoon rushes to start from the right, the company sector is divided into three parts assigned to the first, second and third platoons, the fourth being the "switch." when number ceases fire to advance, no. fires at no. 's target; when no. ceases to fire, no. fires at no. 's target, then at no. 's target, and finally no. advances. = . individual instruction in fire distribution.= every man should be thoroughly drilled, instructed and trained always to _fire at that part of the hostile target which corresponds to the position he occupies in his platoon_. that is to say, if on the right of his platoon, he fires at the right (as he faces it) of the hostile target; if in the right center of his platoon, he fires at the right center (as he faces it) of the target, and so on. this is represented by the following diagram, the points a', b', c', etc., representing the parts of the hostile target at which the men occupying the positions a, b, c, etc., in their platoon, would fire: [illustration: fig. ] = . designation of target.= it is very important that the commanders should be able to describe the objectives to be attacked and the sectors[ ] to be defended, and that individual soldiers should be able to understand and transmit to other soldiers such descriptions. within the squad, target designation implies ability on the part of the squad leader to understand and transmit to his squad the target designation received from his platoon leader, and also ability on his own part to designate a target intelligently; within the platoon, target designation implies ability on the part of the platoon leader to understand the company commander's designation of the target and to transmit that designation to his platoon in such manner as to insure an equal distribution of its fire within the sector assigned to it; within the company, target designation implies ability on the part of the company commander to designate the targets into which the company sector is divided in such manner that the platoon leaders will have no trouble in understanding him. it also implies ability on the part of the company commander to change the objectives or sectors of his platoons, and his ability to cover the whole target of the company during a forward movement of a part of the company, by the so-called "switch" or the "overlapping" method, or by any other method which is practicable and accomplishes the desired end. targets should be designated in a concise, prompt, unmistakable manner, but, as we all know, it is not always an easy matter to describe the location of an object, especially if the object be not conspicuous or readily recognized. this is due to two reasons: first, the unit commander is likely to indulge in vague talk instead of accurate description, and, second, even if correct terms are used, it is more than likely that all members of the firing line will not be able to grasp the idea, because the commander will be using expressions which, although understood by himself (in some cases perhaps due to the fact that he is looking at the objective), they will not be clear to the men. the secret of prompt, accurate and concise designation of a target lies in the use of simple words and terms with which both the unit commander and the men on the firing line are thoroughly familiar. of course, if the target be distinct and clearly defined, it can easily be designated by name, as for example, "that battery on the hill just in front of us," "cavalry to our right front," etc. generally the designation of a target, if not conspicuous nor readily recognized, will include: . a statement of what the target is, or its appearance (shape, color, size, etc.) . where the target is with reference to some easily recognized reference point. . how wide the company sector is. the following systems of target designation are used at the school of musketry. each has its limitations, defects and advantages, under various conditions of ground, etc. a wise selection of one or a combination of two or more, is a material factor in efficiency. = . horizontal clock face system.= (used with visible, distinct targets.) system example . announce direction. "at one o'clock." . announce range. "range ." . announce objective. "a troop of cavalry dismounted." [illustration: fig. ] procedure: . all look along the line pointing toward one o'clock of a horizontal clock face whose center is at the firing point, and whose o'clock mark is directly perpendicular to the front of the firing line. . all look at a point about yards away on the one o'clock line, and . at yards on the one o'clock line find the objective. = . vertical clock face system.= (used with small or indistinct targets.) system example . announce the general direction "to our right front" (or "at two of the reference point. o'clock"). . designate as a reference point "a stone house with two chimneys." the most prominent object in the zone indicated. . announce the position of the "at three o'clock." target with respect to the reference point. . announce the range. "range ." . announce the objective. "a hostile patrol of four men." [illustration: fig. ] procedure: . all men look to their right front (or along the two o'clock line). . the reference point (stone house) is found in the indicated direction. . a clock face (vertical) is imagined centered on the reference point, and the men look along the line leading from the clock center through three o'clock, and . yards from the firing point. . find the hostile patrol. = a. finger system.= (used with indistinct or invisible targets and to define sectors.) (by one "finger" we mean the amount of frontage that one finger, held vertically, will cover, the arm being extended horizontally to its full length. in the average case this amount of frontage covered is about / of the range. for instance, at a range of yards, one "finger" will cover fifty yards of the sector the same result will be obtained by using the rear-sight leaf in the position of aiming.) [illustration: fig. ] system example . announce direction to "to our right front, at yards." reference point as in the vertical clock face system. . announce reference point. "a stone house with two chimneys." . announce angular distance and "four o'clock, three fingers." direction from the reference point to the target. . announce range. "range ." . announce objective. "a skirmish line alongside of the fence, length about two fingers, right at the dark bush." [illustration: fig. ] procedure: the reference point is found as explained, and the vertical o'clock line upon which the target will be found. the soldiers who do not see the target will extend the aim to its _full extent_ palm of the hand upward, finger held vertically with one side of the hand "against" the reference point. the target will be found on the four o'clock line, and touching the third finger, at yards distance, its right flank at the bush and its left flank about yards farther to the right. the following case will illustrate more concretely the use of the "finger" system: there is a red house about / mile to our front, and to the right of this house and a hundred yards or so to its rear, there is a line of trenches that can be seen with the aid of field glasses, but the trenches are difficult to locate with the unaided eye. there is no prominent landmark in the direction of this line of trenches, or on either flank, except the red house mentioned. the company commander locates the flanks of the line of trenches through his field glasses; he then extends his arm forward horizontally its full length, palm up, raises the fingers of his hand and, sighting on the line of trenches, finds that the trench line has a length of four "finger widths," and that the flank of the line nearest the red house is three "finger widths" from it. he decides to divide the line into two sections of two "fingers" each, and assign one section to each of his two platoons. he then calls his platoon leaders (and range finders, if necessary), and says, for instance: "center of objective, five to the right of that red house, first platoon, two fingers; second platoon, two fingers." the two platoon leaders then estimate the range and give the company commander their estimates independently. the company commander also estimates the range, and taking the average, then announces the range, say yards, after which the platoon leaders return to their platoons, and give, for instance, these instructions: "the target is a line of trenches four 'fingers' long, and about yards away; the center of the target is five 'fingers' to the right of that red house, at about o'clock. we are to fire at the two fingers on the right of the center and the second platoon will look after the two fingers on the left of the center." (the leader of the second platoon gives similar instructions.) every man in the platoon figures out the platoon objective and endeavors to fix it with respect to some features of the ground so that he will be able to pick it up promptly after his platoon starts to advance. after fixing well in his mind the platoon objective, he figures out what part of it belongs to his squad, and then selects that portion of the squad objective corresponding to his position in the squad. if during the advance, his particular portion of the target should become hidden from view, he will fire on the nearest portion of the trench line, returning to his own part as soon as it becomes visible. = b. communication.= after the company has been committed to the fire fight, verbal commands cannot be heard, and it is well nigh impossible even to secure attention to signals. it is, therefore, most important that we should train and practice the company as much as possible during time of peace in the rapid and accurate transmission of orders and signals along the firing line. matter upon which a commander would need to communicate with his subordinates, in addition to tactical orders, would generally be confined to: (a) changes of elevation and deflection. (b) changes in the apportionment of the target among the subdivisions. (c) changes within the limits of the sector, or objective. (d) changes in the rate of fire. (e) and rarely change of target from one within to one without the limits of the objective or sector. = . procedure.= the following is given merely as a concrete example of the procedure that might be followed in certain ring exercises--it will not, of course, apply to all cases; it is merely given as a concrete illustration of what might actually be done under certain conditions. _company commander._ on receiving his instructions from the officer in charge of the exercise, the company commander returns to his company, keeping track of the changing aspect of his target as he does so. arriving at the center of his company, he is met by his platoon leaders, and range finders, who have assembled in his absence. the company commander says: "the target is a line of skirmishers, visible in part. it may be seen between us and that long line of green bushes which begins one finger to the right of that red water tower at o'clock and it extends well beyond the bushes both to the right and to the left." (at this point the range finders begin their estimation and the captain pauses until the senior range finder, or other designated person automatically announces the average estimate of the range, saying for example, "range .") the captain then resumes, saying: "the sector assigned to this company is three fingers long and extends from that group one finger to the right of the water tower, to a point four fingers to the right of the tower. each platoon will cover the entire company sector. range ten-fifty and eleven-fifty. fire at will at my signal. posts." _platoon leaders._ the platoon leaders then hasten to the center of their platoons and "put into execution the commands and directions of the captain, having first taken such precautions to insure a correct sight-setting and clear description of the aiming point as the situation permits or requires" (par. i. d. r.), by saying: _target:_ the target is a line of skirmishers about yards to our front, only parts of which are visible. _reference point:_ that long line of bushes about yards to our left front. the company sector is three fingers long and lies between us and that reference point, extending one-half finger beyond each end of the bushes. _aiming point:_ the bottom of the line of bushes. _range:_ and . as soon as the range is announced each front rank man sets his sight at and each rear rank man at . squad leaders assure themselves that sights are set and that the men of their squads understand the aiming point and sector and then raise their hand as a signal that all are ready. similarly, the platoon leaders raise their hands to show that all of the squads are ready, and when the captain sees that all of his platoons are ready, he signals to begin firing. at the captain's signal, each platoon leader commands: "_fire at will._" firing then begins at a rate of about shots per minute (par. , i. d. r.). = . points to be borne in mind.= bear in mind the following points in the solution of field firing problems: . combine sights should, as a rule, be used where the estimated range is yards or more, the two ranges being yards on each side of the estimated range, the even numbers firing at one range, the odd numbers at the other. . when aiming points are chosen they should be clearly described. bushes, bunches of lines of grass, fence posts, etc., should not be designated as aiming points when clear and more definite aiming points are available. the choice of the best of several possible aiming points is of great importance. . have some system of simple signals whereby you may know when all your men are ready to begin firing. otherwise, you may begin the firing before some of your men have their sights set and before they understand the sector and point of aim. for example, let each squad leader raise his right hand when his squad is ready, and each platoon leader his right hand when his platoon is ready. . platoon leaders must always be sure to designate a definite aiming point. remember that in the case of an indistinct target, the company commander describes the target to the platoon leaders, and they in turn announce the aiming point. having seen and located the target, the platoon leader must examine the terrain at, in front of and behind the target, and choose the aiming point for his men. he must then determine the proper sight-setting for that particular aiming point. he then announces both aiming point and range. . instead of describing a sector as, for example, extending so many yards (or so many "fingers") north from the reference point, it is better to describe it as extending from the reference point northward for a definite distance, as "to that tall red house." the last method is the best, because it leaves no room for guessing on the part of subordinates. so, remember it is always best, when possible, to define the limits of sectors physically, as, extending, for example, from "that house to that windmill," etc. . when acting as part of the battalion, always be sure to designate someone (usually one of the musicians) to watch for signals from the battalion commander, and don't fail to repeat back all signals. [illustration: fig. ] . in advancing by rushes, always allow sufficient time between rushes to recover the loss in fire caused by the cessation of fire. in other words, the next rear unit should not start forward until the one that has just advanced has resumed an effective fire. . remember that in all field firing problems the distribution of hits has big weight. consequently, it should be definitely understood beforehand, that, in the absence of any target designation by the company commander, each platoon leader will look after the sector corresponding to his front, and that each man will fire at the part of the sector corresponding to his front. should the targets in a given sector disappear, then the platoon leader covering that sector will at once switch his fire to the adjoining sector until the reappearance of the targets in his own sector. for example, let us suppose the company sector, a-b (the company being on the defense and not advancing) is divided into four parts a-b, b-c, c-d and d-e. platoon no. would look after everything that appeared in d-e; no. , after everything that appeared in c-d; no. , everything that appeared in b-c; and no. , after everything that appeared in a-b. should the target suddenly disappear from d-e, then no. would switch his fire over to c-d, and keep it there until the target reappeared in d-e, and if the targets disappeared from c-d, before reappearing in d-e, then both no. , and no. , would switch their fire cones to a-c. = . exercises.= the following exercises for the elementary training of individuals and squads were used with success by the troops mobilized on the texas border: targets . the target will be represented by individual soldiers. . with reference to their visibility, the battlefield will present three classes of targets: (a) those which are visible throughout. (b) those which are visible in part. (c) those which are invisible, but whose location might be described. targets will be arranged to simulate one of the classes enumerated. instruction will begin with simple exercises in which the target presented is plainly visible, and represents only the objective of the unit undergoing instruction. it should progress to the more difficult exercises in which the target is invisible and the line of figures is prolonged to include the objective of units on the right or left. . the limits of indistinct targets may be shown to unit commanders by the use of company flags. these flags, however, will be withdrawn from sight before a description of the target or estimate of the range is attempted, and before anyone but the commander of the unit undergoing instruction sees their location. . at the conclusion of each exercise in which flags are used to mark the limits of the target or its subdivisions, they should be displayed, in order that any existing errors may be readily pointed out. . to determine proficiency in target designation, the instructor will provide a sufficient number of rifles, placed on sand bags or other suitable rests, and require those charged with fire direction and control to sight them at the limits of their objective. an inspection by the instructor will at once detect errors. similarly, in those exercises in which all the members of the firing unit participate, the percentage of rifles aimed at the correct target may be determined. . in these exercises no method of communication will be permitted that could not be used under the conditions assumed in the problem. exercise no. --ranging object: to train the individual to set his sight quickly and accurately for the announced range and windage; and to accustom leaders to the giving of windage data. situation: the company is formed in single rank at the ready with rear sight set at zero and the slide screw normally tight. action: the range and windage are announced, sights are set accurately in accordance therewith and as rapidly as may be, each man coming to port arms immediately upon completing the operation. time: time is taken from the last word of the command. standard: sights should be correctly set within seconds. note: of the two elements, time and accuracy, accuracy is the more important. par. , i. d. r., implies complete use of the rear sight, that is, utilization of the wind gauge, and sight setting to the least reading of the rear sight leaf, i. e., yards. sight setting therefore in this exercise should include, more often than not, "fractional ranges" and windage data. exercise no. --ranging object: to familiarize officers and noncommissioned officers in the use of an auxiliary aiming point. situation: two men with the company flags are stationed to mark the enemy's invisible position. this position should be suitably located with reference to a practicable aiming point. action: the markers are signaled to display their flags. an officer or noncommissioned officer is called up and the enemy's position is pointed out. the flags are then withdrawn and the officer or noncommissioned officer selects an auxiliary aiming point and gives his commands for firing at that point. exercise no. --target designation object: to train the individual soldier to locate a target, from a description solely. to do so quickly and accurately and fire thereon with effect, and to train officers and noncommissioned officers in concise, accurate and clear description of targets. situation: the men are so placed as not to be able to see to the target. the instructor places himself so as to see the objective. action: the instructor, to one man at a time, describes the objective, and directs him to fire one simulated round. the man immediately moves so as to see the target, locates it, estimates the range and fires one simulated shot. standard: for ranges within battle sight, time seconds; beyond battle sight, time seconds. not more than % error in the estimation of the range. objective correctly located. note: arrangements made so that the description of the target is heard by only the man about to fire. after firing the man will not mingle with those waiting to fire. exercise no. --target designation object: to train the squad leader in promptly bringing the fire of his squad to bear effectively upon the target presented. to train the individuals of a squad to fire effectively from orders of the squad leader and automatically to obtain effective dispersion. situation: the squad is deployed, the squad leader being in the firing line. position prone. a sighting rest is provided for each rifle. action: upon the appearance of the target the squad leader gives the necessary orders for delivering an effective fire. the men under these orders sight their rifles and then rise. the instructor then examines the position and sighting of each rifle. time: time is taken from the appearance of the target until the last man has risen. target: a squad of men to outline a partially concealed enemy emerges from cover, advances a short distance and lies down. standard: % of the rifles should be sighted in conformity with the orders of the squad leader and should evenly cover the whole front of the objective. the squad leader's estimate of the range should not be in error over %. note: the squad leader should not, in general, be allowed to divide the target into sectors but to obtain distribution by training the men to fire at that portion of the objective directly related to the position they occupy in their own line. the exercise should be repeated with the squad leader in rear of the squad and not firing. as to this, it is to be noted that musketry school experiments prove that in small groups the directed fire of say seven ( ) rifles is more effective than the partially undirected fire of eight rifles obtained when the group leader is himself firing. exercise no. --communication object: to teach prompt and accurate transmission of firing data without cessation of fire, and also to teach automatic readjustment of fire distribution. situation: a squad deployed in the prone position and with sighting rests, is firing at a designated target. action: a squad with sights set at zero is deployed and brought up at the double time into the intervals of the firing line and halted. the firing data is transmitted to them without cessation of fire. at the command =rise=, given seconds after the command =halt=, the first squad rises and retires a short distance to the rear. at the same time, the supports cease fire and adjust their rifles in the rests so as to be aimed at the target as they understand it. they then rise and their rifles are examined by the instructor for range and direction. standard: % of the rifles should be sighted according to the transmitted data and aimed according to the principles of fire distribution. target: one target equal to a squad front, which is increased to two squads prior to the arrival of the supports in the firing line. note: this exercise should be repeated with the supporting squad reënforcing on a flank. to determine whether the original squad is able to keep its assigned sector during an advance, this exercise should be repeated, the supports being thrown in after a series of short advances by the original squad. care should be exercised to prevent the transmission of firing data in a manner under which service conditions would be impracticable. (see exercise no. .) exercise no. --communication object: to train the squad leader in receiving and transmitting instructions by visual signals alone. situation: a squad with its leader in the firing line is deployed in the prone position firing at will. action: the instructor, without sound or other cautionary means, signals (visually) to the squad leader at various intervals to, first: change elevation. swing the fire to the right or left. suspend the firing. etc., etc. the squad leader, upon receiving a signal, causes his squad to execute it without verbal command, or exposing himself. time: no specified time limit. standard: the squad leader should fire with his squad, but after each shot should look towards his platoon leader for any signal, then observe the fire and conduct of his men, then, after glancing again at his platoon leader, fire again. this the squad leader should do without exposing himself. by lying about a head's length ahead of his men he can see his squad front. in transmitting orders he can accomplish it by nudging the men on his right and left and signaling to them with his hand. note: this exercise is essential to prepare men for the deafening noise of a heavy action when speech or sound signals are largely futile. exercise no. --fire discipline object: to train men to carry out strictly the fire orders given them, and to refrain from starting, repeating or accepting any change therefrom without direct orders from a superior. situation: a squad deployed in the prone position. action: while the squad is firing at an indistinct but specified target, another and clearly visible target appears in the vicinity of the first target but not in the same sector. upon the appearance of this second target, the instructor sees that the men continue firing at the assigned target. the corporal should check any breach of fire discipline. note: variations of this exercise should be given to test the fire discipline of the men in other phases, such as rate of fire (par. , i. d. r.), etc. footnotes: [ ] the subjects of fire control and fire direction are coveted in pars. - ; - . [ ] in attack the target is called "objective"; in the defense, "sector." part v care of health and kindred subjects chapter i care of the health = . importance of good health.= good health is just as necessary to an army as rifles and ammunition. not only does every sick man take away one rifle from the firing line, but in addition he becomes a care and a burden on the hands of the army. indeed, it is fully as important for a soldier to take care of his health as it is for him to take care of his rifle and ammunition. the importance of doing everything possible to look after one's health is shown by the fact that in every war so far, many more men have died from disease than were killed in battle or died from wounds. in our civil war, for instance, for every man on the union side who was killed in battle or died from wounds, two died from disease. in the spanish american war the proportion was to - / . to do all that he can to keep in good health is a duty that the soldier owes his country. = . germs.= diseases are caused by little, tiny live animals or plants called _germs_. they are so small that you require a magnifying glass to see them. the following illustrations show the typhoid and malarial germs as seen through a magnifying glass: [illustration: fig. _typhoid germs_ _malarial germs_] the different ways of catching disease = . five ways of catching disease.= there are only five ways to catch disease: . by breathing in the live germs. . by swallowing the live germs. . by touching the live germs. . by having the live germs stuck into the skin by insects that bite. . by inheritance from parents. diseases caught by breathing in the germs = . the more common diseases.= the following are some of the more common diseases caught by breathing in the germs: colds, diphtheria, tonsilitis, grippe, scarlet fever, pneumonia, and consumption. the germs that cause these diseases grow well in the dark, warm, moist lining of the nose, throat, windpipe and lungs, and they are coughed or sneezed out or blown out and float in tiny bubbles in the air or fall to dry into dust which is blown about with the wind, and so are breathed in, or they may be transferred directly by kissing invalids and sick children. = . how to avoid breathing in sickness.= do not visit sick people or a house where the children are sick. do not let other people cough or sneeze over your food or in your face. do not allow others to spit on the floor of your squadron or tent. do not do these things yourself. blow your nose into a handkerchief that can be boiled or into a piece of paper that can be burned. [illustration: fig. _distributing sickness_] put your hand before your face when you cough or sneeze. rinse out the nose with hot, weak salt water at night and especially if you have been inhaling dust. brush the teeth after each meal and before going to bed. do not pick the nose with the finger nails; it makes sore spots in which germs grow. on dusty hikes tie a handkerchief across the nose and mouth. never sweep the floor with a dry broom. use a damp mop and so pick the germs up and carry them out instead of driving them up in the air as dust. diseases caught by swallowing the germs = . the more common diseases.= the following are some of the more common diseases caught by swallowing the germs: typhoid fever, dysentery, cholera, and ptomaine poisoning. = . water as a distributer of disease.= impure water is one of the most common distributers of disease that there is. therefore, water from sources unknown or soiled by sewage, should be avoided as deadly and should not be used, _unless boiled_, for drinking, brushing the teeth or rinsing mess kits. you can not always tell polluted water by its appearance, smell or taste. unless from a sewer or drain, it may look clear and sparkling, with no smell and have a pleasant taste, so, water that is not known to be pure should not be drunk. = . vegetables as a distributer of disease.= in some localities the inhabitants use the streams for all purposes; drinking, washing clothes, bathing, washing vegetables and table utensils and as a sewer. when kitchen gardens are irrigated with such water the germs are to be found on the cabbages, beets, etc. = . food, fruit, cigarettes, and drinking cups as distributers of disease.= germs may be smeared on the hands and thus transferred to articles of food, fruit, cigarettes, or drinking cups, especially in public places, so that he who buys at the public stands may have disease handed to him with his purchase. = . the fly as a disease carrier.= the ordinary fly is one of the worst and filthiest transmitters of disease in existence. flies carry germs from privies, latrines, spitoons, and sick rooms to the food on your table, by means of their smeared feet, in their spit or in their specks. [illustration: fig. ] = . the dog as a distributer of disease.= dogs are often distributers of disease. they use their tongues for toilet paper and afterwards lick their coat or the hands of their friends. petting dogs or letting them lick your hand is dangerous. [illustration: fig. '_nice doggie_' (and "nice doggie" may be giving him some disease)] = . how to avoid swallowing disease.= do not drink water that is not known to be safe. if you have no one to ask and are traveling, it is safer to drink tea or coffee, because they have been made from boiled water, or to drink bottled mineral waters. in the field boil your drinking water. boiled germs are dead and will not grow. they are, therefore, harmless. [illustration: fig. _boiling water to kill germs_] beware of water from wells, farm pumps ponds, cisterns, water coolers and barrels, especially in railroad cars, stations, and ferry boats. do not drink lemonade, soft drinks, or milk from peddlers. beware of the public drinking cup. [illustration: fig. _next!_ (what germs will he leave on the cup?)] always wash your hands before going to meals and before putting things into your mouth, especially after going to the toilet or handling animals. do not adopt strange dogs and do not pet dogs. before eating fruit or raw vegetables, wash and peel them unless picked from the tree by yourself. do not eat food that is spoiled, smells or tastes badly or is flyblown or maggoty or full of bugs. do not eat food which is not sufficiently cooked. all smoked, dried or salt meats or fish, such as ham, bacon, sausage, dried beef, bloaters, salt mackerel or codfish, must be well cooked, as they may contain "measles" or other worm eggs. cooking kills the egg. do not eat food exposed on public stands to dust, flies, dirty hands, dirty water, dirty cans, or dirty glasses and buckets. do not allow flies to breed in dirt or other filth around the house, nor allow them to walk on your food. this is possible by burning, burying or otherwise removing the dirt or filth, and by using fly traps, "swatters" and fly paper. do not wet lead pencils with your spit. [illustration: fig. _swallowing sickness_] do not wet your fingers with spit when you deal cards or turn over pages of books or magazines. keep the teeth brushed and the mouth clean. have decayed teeth repaired at once. decayed teeth drop out and they cause abscesses, which may destroy the jaw bone or cause brain fever. old snags give the stomach the germs of rotting, which cause dyspepsia. diseases caught by touching the germs = . the more common diseases.= the following are some of the more common diseases caught by touching the germs: ringworm, mange, barber's itch, sore eyes, boils, carbuncles, lockjaw, small pox, chancroid, syphilis, and gonorrhoea (clap). = . ringworm, mange, and barber's itch.= these diseases are carried from person to person by finger nails and hands and from dirty water to those who bathe in it or have their underwear washed in it. = . lockjaw.= the germs of lockjaw are found in manure and in soil fertilized with it; hence, a bullet which passes through such soil before wounding carries these germs into the wound. any wound soiled with such dirt will be infected. also, wounds made by toy pistols and fire-crackers often contain lockjaw germs. = . chancroid, syphilis, and gonorrhoea (clap).= these are diseases whose germs are usually caught from prostitutes and whores, or from husbands who have caught the germs from prostitutes and whores. they are called "venereal diseases," after venus, the roman goddess of lustful love, but they are very often caught in other ways than in sexual intercourse, and by innocent persons. =the chancroid plant= causes a very nasty sore, the _chancroid_, which often destroys much flesh and causes buboes. the germ can be carried on the fingers to any part of the body. when the chancroid is healed and the bubo becomes a scar the disease is cured. the _syphilis_ germ will grow first where it is rubbed in, causing a hard ulcer, called a chancre, and after that it travels through the entire body. no place is sacred to its destructive power and it lives as long as the patient does. it is the cause of much insanity, palsy, apoplexy, deafness, blindness and early death. in mothers it causes miscarriages and in children it causes stillbirths, freaks, deformities, feeble minds and idiots; also, deaf and dumb, palsied, stunted, sickly and criminal conditions. a syphilitic person is always dangerous although apparently well. he often has a sore mouth and his spit is as dangerous as that of a mad dog. the bite of such a man will develop a chancre and any pipe, cup, or tooth pick which he uses, or his kiss, will give syphilis. a syphilitic tattooer who wets his needles and his india ink with spit will put a chancre into the skin with the picture. the instruments of cheap advertising dentists and of quack doctors or ignorant nurses can carry these germs from one person to another. so can the razors and caustic stick of barbers who are careless. =the clap plant= likes to grow in the linings of the openings of the body where it is dark and warm and moist where it causes a catarrhal discharge called _clap_, which is easily smeared on hands, towels, handkerchiefs or by actual contact. it grows well in the eyelids, causing great damage and often blindness. many babies get the clap plant into the eyes during birth, from the mother, and unless treated within a few minutes after birth, have sore eyes and go blind,--a terrible calamity to the child and the family. if you have clap the germs can be carried on your hands to your eyes. the clap plant also grows well in the cavities of the joints, causing rheumatism and crippling; it grows in the heart, causing valvular heart disease, which is incurable, and also in the generative organs of men and women, causing self-made eunuchs and childless wives. it is the cause of most of the severe abdominal diseases of women requiring the use of the knife to cut out the diseased part. the venereal diseases cause more misery than any others and most of the doctors would have to go into other professions to earn their living if these diseases did not exist. when a young man is "sowing his wild oats" he is really planting in his own body the syphilis and clap plants, and the harvest will be greater than any other crop. he will reap it in days of bedridden misery, and possible sudden death. he will reap it in bitter hours by the bedside through the illness and death of his wife or in her long years of ill health. he will reap it in little white coffins, idiot babies; blind, deaf and dumb, sickly and stunted children. and it will cost him lost wages and hospital and doctor fees. yes, the wild oats crop is a bumper crop. king solomon was wise when he warned his son against the harlot, "for her end is bitter." the best way to avoid venereal diseases is to keep away from lewd women, and live a clean moral life. it is said by medical authorities that sexual intercourse is not necessary to preserve health and manly vigor, and that the natural sexual impulse can be kept under control by avoiding associations, conversations, and thoughts of a lewd character. however, persons who will not exercise self-control in this matter can greatly lessen the risks of indulgence by the prompt use, immediately upon return to camp or garrison, of the prophylaxis prescribed by war department orders and which all soldiers are required to take after exposing themselves to the danger of venereal infection. men who immediately after intercourse urinate and wash the private parts thoroughly with soap and water will lessen the chances of infection. drunkenness greatly increases the risk of infection. should one be so unfortunate as to contract venereal disease, he should see a first-class, reputable physician at once, the sooner the better. it is a fatal mistake to try to conceal venereal disease by not seeing a doctor, he who does so is taking a most dangerous chance of ruining himself physically for life. = . how to avoid diseases caught by touching the germs.= keep your skin clean with soap and water. do not bathe or wash your clothes in dirty water, have them boiled when laundered. do not go barefoot, even in barracks. do not use towels or toilet articles of other people, especially in public wash-rooms unless they furnish a fresh towel for you. do not sleep in houses left empty by the enemy unless ordered to do so. do not sleep in native shacks in the tropics. do not rub the eyes with dirty hands. when dirt gets in have a doctor get it out. if you have clap, do not rub your eyes with your hands, and wash your hands well with soap and water after taking treatment or passing water. do not handle dogs or cats, especially strange or sickly ones. do not clean the ears with sticks or straws,--have a doctor do it for you. do not have cheap, advertising dentists fix your teeth. have the army dentist fix them and see him at least once every six months,--or see a good civilian dentist. do not have pictures tattooed on your skin. do not smoke other men's pipes. do not handle or touch wounds with anything but a first aid package. beware of chipped drinking glasses in cafés, restaurants and other places. the slightest cut from such a glass whoso clipped part has been in contact with the mouth of a syphilitic person will give you syphilis. seek good companions like your mother and sister. keep away from john barleycorn. he always wants to turn you over to a harlot. whores and prostitutes are all diseased and will give you germs that will live to give diseases to you, your wife and your children, forty years from now. keep away from them. diseases caught from biting insects = . the more common diseases.= the following are some of the more common diseases caught from the bites of certain insects: malaria, yellow fever, and dengue fever. the germs of malaria, yellow fever and dengue fever live in the blood, and are sucked up into the blood by mosquitoes when they bite. malaria germs, however, will develop only in the mosquito called, _anopheles_. yellow fever germs will develop only in the mosquito called, _stegomyia_. dengue fever germs will develop in the mosquito called _culex_ and in _anopheles_. after a period of development in these mosquitoes the germs will find their way to the spit glands, and are injected into the person whom the mosquito bites. (note. male mosquitoes cannot bite.) _absolutely the only way that malaria, yellow and dengue fevers can possibly be caught is from mosquitoes._ [illustration: fig. _the malaria mosquito_ (she stands on her head)] [illustration: fig. _culex the mosquito_ (she is humpbacked)] = . how to avoid malaria, yellow and dengue fevers.= to avoid these diseases, which are carried by mosquitoes, we screen all houses with fine wire screens and use mosquito nets on the beds. also, under certain conditions we take daily doses of quinine in malarious regions. we kill the mosquitoes. to do this we must know their habits. mosquitoes all lay eggs in water. these hatch out as _wigglers_ or _larvae_, which have to come to the top frequently to breathe. in about twelve days or longer they turn into _tumblers_ or _pupas_, which in a few days longer come to the top when their backs split open and the mosquito comes out and flies away. [illustration: fig. _the eggs_ _the larvae_ _the pupa_ _the mosquito leaving the pupa skin_] _the malaria mosquito_ is domestic like the chicken and lives around in houses hiding in the grass, bushes or dark corners and comes out to bite at night. when a settlement is abandoned the malaria mosquito moves away also. she rarely flies far from home and is not found much beyond yards from a house. she lays her eggs in running clear water preferably, but she will accept water in hollow trees, between the leaves of lilies or air plants or in vases of flowers, or in cisterns and water butts. [illustration: fig. _catching malaria_] [illustration: fig. _on guard_ (no mosquito bites for him)] _the yellow fever mosquito_ is domestic like the house cat. she hangs around the house and rarely flies as far as the next house even, preferring to travel on a visitor's coat. she will bite in the day time and will lay her eggs in any little collection of water in the house, the eaves trough, the water barrel, old tin cans or bottles, pitchers, vases or the refrigerator drip. _the dengue_ mosquito is a marsh and town mosquito. she flies far and well and will breed in any sort of water, even brackish. _to kill mosquitoes_-- catch them in the house; empty all water from tin cans, old barrels, etc; cover with wire all cisterns and water barrels; fill in all puddles and drain off marshes; put oil on all pools and streams to choke the wrigglers; cut down grass and bushes around houses. chapter ii personal hygiene = .= the knowledge of taking care of the body is called _personal hygiene_, the principal rules of which are as follows: . keep the skin clean. . keep the body properly protected against the weather. . keep the body properly fed. . keep the body supplied with fresh air. . keep the body well exercised without exhaustion. . keep the body rested by sufficient sleep. . keep the body free of wastes. sanitation is the practice of the laws of hygiene. = . rule . keep the skin clean.= a dirty body invites sickness. small troubles such as chafing, sore feet, saddle boils, sore eyes, felons, whitlows, earache, toothache, carbuncles, fleas, lice and ringworms, are all caused by lack of cleanliness, and they put men on sick report. owing to excessive perspiration a daily bath with soap is desirable in summer and in the tropics, the year around. at least a weekly bath should always be taken when possible. when not possible to bathe, take a good rub daily with a dry towel. keep your feet clean with soap and water and put on dry socks before sleeping at night. soiled socks should be washed and hung up to dry over night. keep your finger nails trimmed short with scissors or knife. never bite them off. keep them cleaned and keep your hands washed, especially at meal times. underwear must be washed in clean water, hot when possible and when soiled change as soon as possible. do not bathe or wash your clothes in dirty water. bathing in water containing much alkali (hard water) or fine sand or mud will make the skin smart or chafe easily and cause sore eyes. the hair of the head should be kept well-trimmed. = . rule . keep the body properly protected from the weather.= clothing of the soldier is worn as a protection. too much causes sweating and exhaustion on the march and too little causes chills and frost bite. be careful to rebutton the clothing in winter time after attending to nature's calls. cold fingers may make you careless, but the cold is merciless and may cause a bad frost bite. the first feeling of frost bite is numbness and the first sign is a marble whiteness. frost attacks first the nose, ears, cheeks, fingers and toes. sun glare and snow blindness may be prevented by colored goggles or a handkerchief tied across the face with a small slit for the eyes or by greasing the face and eyelids and rubbing in charcoal around the eyes. = . rule . keep the body properly fed.= your company mess is sufficient for your needs and is wholesome, provided it is well chewed. large lumps of food take a longer time to digest than small particles do, and so they tire the stomach and also cause constipation, gas and indigestion with headache. do not eat food left behind in strange houses or by the enemy, nor food that smells or looks badly. if haversack rations are issued to you, do not eat them all at the first meal, but make a division for each meal. stuffing will make you sick on a hike and later, hunger will drive you to eat things you would not touch at other times. before starting on the day's hike drink all the water you can and fill your canteen with water only. be sure your canteen does not leak. after starting, do not drink anything until the end of the hike. do not eat ice or snow to quench thirst. it will make you more thirsty. do not drink large quantities of cold spring water when heated,--it will give you a very bad bellyache. do not drink whiskey or beer, especially in the field. it will weaken you and favor heat exhaustion, sunstroke, frost bite and other serious troubles. alcohol muddles the mind and clouds thoughts, and so causes a feeling of carelessness and silliness that may ruin some military plan, or give the whole thing away to the enemy and with it the lives of yourself and your comrades. the soldier who drinks alcohol will be among the first to fall out exhausted. if you use tobacco, do not chew or smoke while marching. tobacco is only a dope and increases the work of the heart. a cup of hot coffee is a good stimulant. = . rule . keep the body supplied with fresh air.= the brain, kidneys and other internal organs require oxygen (a part of the air) continually, and if deprived of it for five minutes, the body will die. therefore, it is easy to see that we must continually get plenty of fresh air into the lungs to supply the blood which carries the oxygen throughout the body. except in winter time when steam-heated barracks are filled with sleeping men, it is not, as a rule, difficult to get all the fresh air we need. the air in a dormitory should smell sweet and clean, even though warm. fresh air should be continually admitted in a way that will not throw a draft on any of the sleepers. it is much better to sleep in a cold room with fresh air than in a hot stuffy one. fresh air not only prevents consumption, but it will cure mild cases of consumption without other medicines. = . rule . keep the body well exercised without exhaustion.= exercise is absolutely necessary to good health. lack of exercise of any set of muscles will cause them to grow flabby and weak. outdoor sports are the best form of exercise, because they use all the body muscles, and are in the open clear air. exhaustion, on the other hand, not only weakens the muscles of the body, but it also lessens the vital forces and powers to resist germs. = . rule . keep the body rested by sufficient sleep.= give the body enough sleep. eight hours of uninterrupted sleep are enough for the average man, and you should always have that much in every twenty-four hours. remember your comrades need it also; so, if you come in after taps, do not make a racket with slamming doors, heavy tramping, talking or whistling. and in camp be careful not to fall over tent ropes or step on other sleepers. do not drink coffee at night,--it will keep you awake and rob your body of needed rest. when on the march take advantage of every halt to rest your body. as soon as the command is given to fall out, select, if possible, a dry place on the side of the road to sit or lie on. if carrying the pack, loosen it and rest back on it, in a sitting or lying position. if the march has been a long one, lie flat on your back and raise the feet in the air. this is a quick way to remove the heavy dragged feeling of the feet and legs and to rest the heart, because the blood runs out of the legs into the body. = . rule . keep the body free of wastes. get into the habit of emptying the bowels at a certain hour each day.= immediately after breakfast is a good time. this is a habit that can be cultivated just like any other habit. cultivate it. it will do much to keep you in good health. always empty the bowels and bladder, especially the bowels, whenever you have the least desire to do so. do not allow a little personal inconvenience or laziness to prevent you from doing this. the wastes from the bowels and bladder, especially the bowels, are poisons that should always be expelled from the body just as soon as possible. the free drinking of water flushes the bladder and helps to loosen the bowels. a glass of hot water soon after reveille will not only help to loosen the bowels, but it will also benefit the stomach and flush out the bladder. some people drink a big glass of water, either hot or cold, every morning before breakfast. proper physical exercise and eating ripe or cooked fruits will also do much to keep the bowels open. pressing and rubbing _downward_ with the left hand on the lower _left_ side of the belly will do much to induce a movement of the bowels. most constipation comes from swallowing food in large chunks, drinking large quantities of cold liquids with the meals and eating heavy articles of diet, such as beans, fried pork, hot bread. do not get into the habit of using laxatives to keep the bowels open. their continued use is injurious. use the natural means suggested above. the constant moderate use of alcohol injures the kidneys and when they become too weak to work and throw off the waste, a deadly disease, called "bright's disease," results. chapter iii first aid to the sick and injured = . object of teaching first aid.= the object of teaching first aid, or early assistance of the injured or sick, is not only to enable one person to help another, but also in some measure to help himself, until a surgeon or other thoroughly trained person can be seen. it is a mistake to think you must know many things to be helpful, it is only necessary to know a few simple things, _but you must understand them clearly and be able to do them well_. = . asphyxiation (suffocation) by gas.= asphyxiation by gas is treated the same as in the case of drowning, omitting, of course, the operation of getting the water out of the body. = . bite of dog.= } either requires immediate and heroic treatment. =bite of snake.= } _lose no time._ . prevent the poison from traveling toward the heart and brain by putting on at once a tourniquet between the wound and the heart. . suck the wound and be sure to spit out the poison and rinse the mouth afterward. it is safe, if you have no cuts or sores on the lips or in the mouth. . enlarge the wound with a knife (in the direction of the bone, not across) to make it bleed more freely, and again suck the wound. . apply to the wound any strong acid or caustic, such as carbolic acid, lime, wood ashes or tincture of iodine, or burn it with a hot iron. telegraph wire will do. . wash out the wound with hot water and pack with equal parts of baking soda and salt, and apply a bandage. . then, in the case of a snake bite, loosen the tourniquet little by little, taking about half an hour so as to permit any poison that may remain in the wound to be _gradually_ absorbed by the blood. in the case of a dog bite, the tourniquet is loosened at once. after the tourniquet has been removed, the patient must rest quietly for several hours. if he feel faint, he may have a stimulant,--alcohol, coffee or tea,--_but do not give the stimulant before the poison has been removed from the wound_, because stimulants increase the heart beats and thereby hurry the poison into the blood. if the dog is not mad (rabid), the wound does not need treatment different from any other kind of a wound. when bitten by a snake, kill it, if possible, and have it shown to a doctor for examination. = . bleeding.= the following comparison between the blood and the water in a city will enable you to understand easily the question of bleeding: [illustration: fig. ] the {water } flows from a pump called {waterworks} through {_blood_} {_heart_ } {rigid pipes } called {watermains}. when there is {a leak } {_elastic tubes_} {_arteries_} {_bleeding_} the {plumber } stops the flow of the {water } by {_doctor_} {_blood_} {turning a key valve } between the {waterworks} and the {_pressing the blood tube shut_} {_heart_ } {leak } and then proceeds to repair the leak {_bleeding cut_} {by soldering }. he then turns on the {water } by {_by sewing or by bandaging_} {_blood_} {opening the valve in the water main }. {_removing pressure on the blood tube_} fig. shows where pressure with the thumb will squeeze the blood tube between the thumb and the bone. [illustration: fig. _pressure with thumb at checks bleeding of left side of chin cheek and jaw._ _pressure at stops bleeding from big blood tube on left side of head and neck and face._ _pressure at controls bleeding in arm pit and shoulder._ _pressure at checks bleeding in arm pit and anywhere down the arm and hand._ _pressure at stops bleeding of arm and hand._ _pressure at , on either leg, stops bleeding of leg and foot._] in addition to the pressure raise the leg or arm or head above the heart. this will slow the flow of the blood and lessen leakage. however, one cannot hold the thumb forever on the blood tube, so we make an artificial thumb, called a _tourniquet_, which is a pebble or other hard object wrapped in some soft material (to prevent injury to flesh), which is pressed down on the blood tube and held in place by a strip of any material which can be tied so as to keep up the pressure. a tourniquet, therefore, is like the valve in a water main. [illustration: fig. _the pebble_ _the pebble wrapped to protect the flesh_ _the bandage tied around over the pebble_ _the bandage twisted tightly by means of a windlass (stick) which is held by another bandage_ _this shows pressure applied by tourniquet (also called spanish windlass) instead of the hand and by direct pressure of the first aid packet_] the above diagrams show how a tourniquet is applied. [illustration: fig. _bandage to stop bleeding in arm_] [illustration: fig. _bandage to stop bleeding in foot_] when no one is around to assist you, sometimes it will be possible to plug the wound in your own body with the first aid packet or with your thumb or handkerchief. when the bleeding is slight, or is from the scalp or palm of the hand, or sole of the foot, direct pressure upon the wound itself with the pad of the first aid package will often be sufficient to stop the leak. nature when left alone stops the leaks with her own solder, called blood-clot, which forms in the cut ends of blood tubes and corks them or seals them up until a scar forms a permanent seal. [illustration: fig. _arm blown off at elbow_ notice: . bandage on stump. . tourniquet below to check bleeding. . arm held upright to lessen bleeding. . strap supports arm and also acts as a tourniquet.] = .= the dangers from a tourniquet are: . gangrene,--that is, the death of a limb caused by the lack of blood, which has been cut off by the tourniquet. by watching the toes and finger tips and loosening the tourniquet if they are becoming blue black and remain white when pinched, gangrene may be prevented. however, the wound should be plugged before loosening the tourniquet. . injury to nerves from pressure which may cause palsy (paralysis). however, that will generally pass off in a few days. = . broken bones (fractures).= a broken bone or fracture is known by pain in a particular place that hurts on movement or when touched. also, by a deformity or a movable lump, caused by the broken end of the bone. [illustration: fig. _compound fracture_] a broken bone should be handled with the greatest possible care. careless handling may cause the broken ends to pierce the flesh and stick out through the skin. this is called a =compound= fracture, and is serious, because it adds fuel to the fire by making a doorway for germs to enter, which may cause death or the loss of the limb. furthermore, careless handling may make the bones grow together in a bad position, causing a deformity. [illustration: fig. _break of upper arm bone. pulling the broken bones out of flesh and into place_ _treatment for break of upper arm bone_ . padding of grass. . splints put on front and back. . splints extend beyond elbow joint. . arm is supported by a sling. _treatment for break of both bones of lower arm_ . plenty of grass padding to protect the flesh. . the splints are put front and back and bound snugly. the hand is included. . the whole dressing is held up by a sling.] the best way to treat a broken leg or arm bone is as follows: (fig. .) pull until the ends come together. you can tell this by the relief the patient feels and by the limb assuming its proper length,--that is, the same length as the other side. = .= to keep the ends of the bones in place, fasten to the limb two boards or any other substance that will not bend. such boards or other substance are called splints. they act as artificial bones. all splints should be well padded with some soft material like raw cotton waste, grass (be sure the grass contains no biting insects), leaves, hay or excelsior, to prevent pressure of the soft flesh on the ends of the bones. [illustration: fig. _points to note:_ plenty of grass between the legs. plenty of grass between injured leg and splint. splint extends from arm pit to foot. the other leg is used for a splint. plenty of strapping to keep leg quiet.] when the thigh bone is broken, put a splint from the arm to the ankle and use the other leg as a splint. fasten them by bandages, belts, gun sling, etc., passed around the chest, waist, hips, knees and ankle. when an arm is put in a splint, hang the hand and forearm in a sling. it will give much relief. when the jaw is broken, the upper jaw makes a good splint. when the collar bone is broken this makes a good treatment: fig. . [illustration: fig. _broken collar bone_ the left collar bone is broken. therefore, pull both shoulders backward away from the breast bone (same action as for broken arm bone) and hold in position with bandage or straps. _broken collar bone (left side)_ when the shoulders are pulled back then the hand is bound close to the chest high up. this prevents it from flopping and so twisting the broken ends of the collar bone.] a broken rib is treated by putting a wide strap or bandage around the chest and drawing it tight while all the air is breathed out. [illustration: fig. _treatment for broken ribs, left side_ the patient breathes all the air out of the chest and at that moment the strap is buckled tightly. this prevents the broken ends of the ribs from tearing the flesh or the lungs. notice the roll of shirt which acts as a pad.] this keeps the rib quiet and the man will breathe with his belly instead of his chest. a broken skull usually makes a man unconscious and may cause death. it is recognized by a wound or swelling of the scalp and a dent in the skull. a doctor should be called at once. always examine an unconscious man for injury to the head. = . burns.= if clothing sticks to the burn, do not try to remove it, but cut around it. prick blisters at both ends with a perfectly clean needle, and remove the water by gentle pressure, being careful not to break the skin. a good application for a burn is carbolic acid dissolved in water (a teaspoonful in a pint of water), or tincture of iodine dissolved in water (one teaspoonful in a pint of water, to which is added as much salt as will cover a dime), or olive oil, vaseline or butter. lacking the remedies named above, ordinary _baking_ soda or flour may be dusted on the unbroken skin, or a cloth dampened with salt water that has been boiled, to which may be added the same amount of whiskey or brandy as there is water. another application for burns recommended by some, is the scraping of a raw potato, renewed when it feels hot. different burns should be treated as follows: =sunburn=,--treat with olive oil, vaseline or butter, or with a glycerine or witchhazel, applying with a dampened cloth. =quicklime or lye=,--treat with vinegar. =carbolic acid=,--treat with alcohol. =other acids=,--treat with baking powder or lime water. = . burning clothes=, particularly those of women and children, has been the unnecessary cause of many horrible deaths, either from ignorance of the proper means of extinguishing the flames, or from lack of presence of mind to apply them. a person whose clothing is blazing should ( ) immediately be made to lie down--be thrown if necessary. the tendency of flames is upward, and when the patient is lying down, they have not only less to feed upon, but the danger of their reaching the face, with the possibility of choking and of ultimate deformity is greatly diminished. ( ) the person should then be quickly wrapped up in a coat, shawl, rug, blanket or any similar article, preferably woolen, and never cotton, and the fire completely smothered by pressing and patting upon the burning points from the outside of the envelope. the flames having been controlled in this way, when the wrap is removed, great care should be taken to have the slightest sign of a blaze immediately and completely stifled. this is best done by pinching it but water may be used. any burns and any prostration by shock should be treated in the manner prescribed for them. = . bruises.= the best treatment for a bruise is heat. a hot brick or a bottle of hot water wrapped in cloth, towels wrung out of hot water, or even an electric light bulb, will give much relief. however, always remember this: never put the hot object on the bare skin--always wrap the source of heat in a thick cloth to hold the heat in and at the same time protect the skin. if not practicable to do this wrap the source of heat, then spread a towel over the skin before applying the hot object. if you use an electric bulb, watch it closely, as it will char and possibly set things on fire. the above treatment is also excellent for lumbago, stiff neck, and stiff muscles. a tub bath as hot as you can stand it is fine for refreshing tired, stiff muscles. it is also good for lumbago. = . chiggers.= apply kerosene oil. bacon is also excellent, and so is butter or lard with salt. = . choking. foreign body in the throat.= the common practice of slapping the back often helps the act of coughing to dislodge foreign bodies in the windpipe. if this does not succeed, have the patient lie over a chair with his head down low or hold him as in the first step to revive a drowning person and have him cough. when in either of these positions have some one slap him on the back so as to induce coughing. the above failing, give him a large amount of warm water with a little salt, mustard or baking soda in it, and then have him put his finger in his throat so as to induce vomiting which will often bring up the obstruction. in children, and even in adults, the expulsion of the body may be facilitated by lifting a patient up by the heels and slapping his back in this position. if none of the methods above described are successful, summon a physician, taking care to send him information as to the character of the accident, so that he may bring with him the instruments needed for removing the obstruction. = . cuts.= small cuts should be treated with tincture of iodine or washed with alcohol (bay rum or listerine will do) and bandage up. large wounds may be similarly cleaned and then closed by adhesive plaster. = . diarrhoea.= apply warm bandages to the belly. some woodsmen recommend the following: fire brown a little flour to which two teaspoonfuls of vinegar and one teaspoonful of salt are added; mix and drink. they claim this is a cure nine cases out of ten. a tablespoonful of warm vinegar and teaspoonful of salt will cure most severe cases. also, hot ginger ale or hot water containing a teaspoonful of witch hazel is good. repeat any of the above drinks about every hour. take a purgative, which will usually expel the offending cause, generally too much undigested food. = . dislocations.= the place where two bones come together is called a joint. when two bones forming a joint are knocked apart, it is called a _dislocation_, and the bones are said to be _out of joint_. the first sign of a dislocation is the accident. the second sign is immediate interference with the motion of the joint and awkwardness in using the limb. the third sign is deformity of the joint,--it looks queer when compared with the same joint on the other side. if you are unsuccessful after trying several times to replace a dislocation, get a doctor. if no doctor is available, make the man sick by having him drink some warm salt water and then put his finger in his throat. when he vomits the muscles and ligaments (tissue connecting the joints) will relax and you may be able to get the bone back in place. after replacing the bones put the joint at rest with a large compress and bandage. when uncertain as to whether you have to deal with a broken bone or a dislocated joint, give treatment for a broken bone, because rest and quiet for the injured part are good in either case. the following diagrams show the usual methods of replacing dislocations: [illustration: fig. _to put the arm bone back into the shoulder socket_ st move _rest your weight at elbow, pulling downward, until the muscles at the shoulder are tired and will stretch._ nd move _swing the elbow across, close to the chest, and place the hand on other shoulder._ rd move _keep the elbow close to the chest and bring the hand forward as if held out for a penny._ _this should twist the bone into the socket._ _relocating the jaw_ _when the jaw bone is out of place, the man cannot shut his mouth._ _put both thumbs (protected by a handkerchief) on the lower teeth and with the forefingers at the angles of the lower jaw push down in the back of the jaw._ _relocating thumb_ _when the thumb bone is dislocated it must be pushed into place--not pulled._ _relocating finger_ _pull the finger bone back into place._] = . drowning.= _rescuing._ approach the drowning man from behind, seizing him by the coat collar, or a woman by the back hair, and tow at arms length to boat or shore. do not let him cling around your neck or arms to endanger you. duck him until unconscious if necessary to break a dangerous hold upon you; but do not strike to stun him. a drowning person _does not_ come to the top three times before giving up. _reviving._ when a person is apparently drowned he is unconscious and not breathing because his lungs are full of water and his skin is blue and cold because no air is getting into his blood to redden it and warm it; _remember_ the heart does not stop until some time after the breathing stops. if we can get air into the blood and start breathing again before the heart stops we can save the patient's life. if we cannot get the breath started in time the heart stops and the patient is then dead. our problem then is this: . to get the water out of the lungs. . to get the air into the lungs and start the man breathing before the heart stops. emptying the lungs is precisely similar to emptying a bottle. the lungs are the bottle, the windpipe is the neck of the bottle and the cork of the bottle may be the tongue turned back in the throat or mud and leaves from bottom of the pool and bloody froth in the nostrils. we therefore-- . { pull out the cork. { =remove mud, mucus, etc., and pull the tongue forward.= [illustration: fig. _pulling out the cork_] . { turn the bottle neck down to pour out the contents. { =place the patient's head lower than his chest so the water { will run out.= [illustration: fig. ] then lay the patient on a blanket, if possible, and on his stomach, arms extended from his body beyond his head, face turned to one side so that the mouth and nose do not touch the ground. this position causes the tongue to fall forward of its own weight and so prevents it from falling back into the air passages. turning the head to one side prevents the face coming into contact with mud or water during the operation. kneel and straddle the patient's hips, facing his head. [illustration: fig. ] roll up or rip off the clothing so as to get at the bare back. locate the lowest rib, and with your thumbs extending in about the same direction as your fingers, place your spread hands so that your little finger curls over the lowest rib. _be sure to get the hands well away from the back bone_,--the nearer the ends of the ribs the hands are placed without sliding off, the better it is. then with your arms _held straight_, press down slowly and steadily on the ribs, bringing the weight of your body straight from your shoulders. _do not bend your elbows and shove in from the side._ release the pressure suddenly, removing the hands from the body entirely, and thus allowing the chest to fill with air. wait a couple of seconds, so as to give the air time to get into the blood. this is most important. repeat the pressure and continue doing so, slowly and steadily, pressing down at the rate of ordinary breathing. that is to say, _pressure and release of pressure (one complete respiration)_ should occupy about five seconds. guide yourself by your own deep, regular breathing, or by counting. keep up for at least one hour the effort to revive the patient; and much longer if there is any sign of revival by way of speaking, breathing, coughing, sneezing or gurgling sounds. do not stop working at the first signs of life, but keep it up until the patient is breathing well and is conscious. if you stop too soon he may stop breathing and die. persons have been revived after two hours of steady work, but most cases revive within about thirty minutes. if you are a heavy man, be careful not to bring too much force on the ribs, as you might break one of them. in the case of women or thin persons place a roll of clothing under them at the waist line before beginning the pressure. if you happen to be of light build and the patient is a large, heavy person, you will be able to apply the pressure better by raising your knees from the ground, and supporting yourself entirely on your toes and the heels of your hands, properly placed on the floating ribs of the patient. do not attempt to give liquids of any kind to the patient while he is unconscious, for he cannot swallow them. they will merely run into his windpipe and choke him, and furthermore, it will take up valuable time. however, after the patient has regained consciousness you may give him hot coffee or hot whiskey, punch or aromatic spirits of ammonia (a teaspoonful in water). then wrap up the patient warmly in hot blankets with hot water bottles, and take him to the nearest hospital or put him to bed and send for a doctor. why? because the dirty water in the lungs has damaged the lining and the patient is in danger of lung fever and needs care and nursing. aromatic spirits of ammonia may be poured on a handkerchief and held continuously within about three inches of the face and nose. if other ammonia preparations are used, they should be diluted or held farther away. try it on your own nose first. the above method of artificial respiration is also applicable in cases of electric shock, suffocation by gas and smoke. = . earache.= put a teaspoonful of salt into a quart of water and add teaspoonfuls of tea. boil it. as soon as it is cool enough to stand the finger, drip some into the nostrils until it falls into the throat. clear out the nose and throat by sniffing,--_do not blow_ the nose.--and then gargle with the rest of the remedy as hot as can be taken, holding each mouthful well back in the throat. this will often open up the tubes running from the ears to the throat, and relieve the pressure against the ear drum. in addition, a little hot oil may be dropped into the ear. repeat the treatment in one-half an hour if not successful first time. = . ear, foreign body in.= lay the head over, with the affected ear up, and pour in some warm oil or soap suds. this will float the thing up, unless it be a vegetable such as a grain of corn or a bean. turning the affected ear down and then jumping, jerking the head, or pounding it gently, may dislodge it. a little peroxide of hydrogen poured into the ear will often dislodge the substance, especially if it be wax. in case of an insect, a bright light held near the ear will often cause it to leave the ear to go to the light. = . electric shock.= failure of respiration following an electric shock by lightning or live wire is treated the same as in the case of drowning, omitting, of course, the operation of removing the water out of the lungs. do not try to pull a man away from a live wire until you have put on rubber overshoes or gotten a _wooden_ stick with which to get the wire away from him. otherwise you will yourself get a shock. = . eye, foreign body in.= close the eye for a few moments and allow the tears to fill the eye; upon opening it, the body may be washed out by them. never rub the eye. the foreign body can often be removed by keeping the eye open with one hand and splashing water into it with the other, or by dipping the eye into clean water while holding the eyelid open with the hand. if the body lies under the lower lid, make the patient look up, and at the same time press down upon the lid; the inner surface of the lid will be exposed, and the foreign body may be brushed off with the corner of a handkerchief. if the body lies under lid, ( ) grasp the lashes of the upper lid and pull it down over the lower, which should at the same time, with the other hand, be pushed up under the upper. upon repeating this two or three times, the foreign body will often be brushed out on the lower lid. [illustration: fig. ] ( ) if this fails, the upper lid should be turned up; make the patient shut his eye and look down; then with a pencil or some similar article press gently upon the lid at about the middle, and grasping the lashes with the other hand, turn the lid up over the pencil, when its inner surface will be seen, and the foreign body may readily be brushed off. [illustration: fig. ] if the body is firmly stuck in the surface of the eye, a careful attempt may be made to lift it out with the point of a needle. if not at once successful, do not try again, as you may injure the sight. lime, plaster or whitewash in the eye should be washed out with a very weak mixture of vinegar and water. acids in the eye may be washed with baking soda in water. olive oil will also afford relief. after the removal of a foreign body from the eye, a sensation as if of its presence often remains. people not infrequently complain of a foreign body when it has already been removed by natural means. sometimes the body has excited a little irritation, which feels like a foreign body. if this sensation remains over night, the eye needs attention, and a surgeon should be consulted; for, it should have passed away, if no irritating body is present. after the removal of an irritating foreign body from the eye, salt water should be poured into it, then butter, lard or olive oil may be used for a salve. = . fainting.= fainting is caused by the blood leaving the head. therefore, we must get the blood back into the head, which is done by placing the patient on his back, with the head lower than the rest of the body. if necessary, make, by digging, a slight depression in the ground for the head, neck and upper part of shoulders. also, the head may be placed lower than the rest of the body by putting a couple of folded blankets, or a few folded coats or any other suitable article under the body: also, by raising the feet by hand or otherwise. the clothing should be loosened by unbuttoning and the patient fanned. give him as much fresh air as possible,--so, do not let people crowd around him. mop the face and forehead with a handkerchief soaked in cold water. = . fish hook.= if a fish hook gets caught in the flesh, push it on through and when the end sticks out, break off the hook and pull it out the other way. put tincture of iodine on the wound and bandage. = . fits.= the man falls over suddenly unconscious in a convulsion, which continues until he is blue in the face, when he gradually quiets down and regains consciousness. he is liable to injure himself by the fall and by biting his tongue. put a stick or cork between his teeth and let him lie quietly undisturbed. don't try to hold him down or make him sit up. he will come to no harm on the floor and you cannot stop the fit. ammonia on a handkerchief held under the nose to smell will assist reviving consciousness. put him in the hospital at once. = . fracture.= see, "broken bones." = . freezing.= if a man is overcome by the cold, do not take him into a warm room, or heated tent. put him into a cool room without draughts and get a doctor at once. meanwhile loosen his clothing and rub arms and legs towards the heart with cold water and a towel or sponge, using pressure. when he revives give him hot drinks and wrap him up well in hot blankets and put him in the hospital. when freezing to death a man feels overcome with sleepiness and stupor. take a switch or stick and beat him unmercifully. remember that falling to sleep means death. = . frost-bite.= the best way to get frost-bitten is to have on damp clothing, such as wet shoes and socks or mittens. the first feeling of frost bite is numbness, and the first sign is marble whiteness. _treatment._ rub the frozen part briskly with snow or ice cold water, if the frost-bite has just occurred. if it has been frozen more than fifteen minutes, _rub very gently_ with snow, cold water or coal oil (kerosene). if you rub hard, it will break the frozen flesh. returning pinkness is a sign of thawing; if the parts turn a dark color, see a surgeon at once, for it means gangrene (death of the flesh). when thawed out apply plenty of oil, tallow or vaseline. if gangrene has set in and no doctor is available, then treat as a burn. by all means keep away from heat. to toast frost-bitten fingers or toes before a fire is liable to result in chilblains. = . headache.= among troops headache is usually due to intestinal indigestion, combined with a congestion of the stomach. take a tablespoonful of worcestershire sauce or drops of tobasco sauce in a tumbler of hot water as a drink and put a small piece of soap up into the bowel to cause a movement. = . heat exhaustion.= the man falls out in a faint while marching, or on fatigue or parade. he looks pale, his body is clammy and cold, his breathing is sighing and heart fluttering. _what is the matter?_ his heart is weak from poisons in the blood, usually alcohol, but often too much carbonic gas and too little oxygen. this occurs when men are soft-muscled: so, young soldiers, recruits and fat soldiers and especially those who drink alcohol, use drugs or smoke or chew tobacco while hiking, are the first to have it. _treatment._ loosen the man's clothing, remove his pack, lay him on his back in the shade, with head and shoulders lower than his hips and raise his feet in the air. this will make the blood flow to the heart and brain. if he has fainted, slap the bare chest with the hand or a wet towel and briskly rub the arms towards the heart. if he does not revive, apply hot bottles, or bricks to the chest and abdomen, and ammonia to the nose, as a smelling salt. do not give stimulants until he is conscious. he should ride in the ambulance, or go to the hospital. = . lightning.= a man struck by lightning is treated the same as in the case of drowning, omitting, of course, the operation of getting the water out of the lungs. = . nose, foreign body in.= if it cannot be sneezed out, lean the head back and pour a little oil into the nostril. then snift and blow the nose alternately. if this is not successful, take a lead pencil and try to push the object straight back into the throat. this must be done very gently. = . poison.= when poison has been swallowed, cause the patient to take a large quantity of luke-warm water and make him vomit by putting his finger in his throat. repeat this and then have him swallow the white of two eggs or some milk into which raw flour or corn-starch has been stirred. if you know he took bichloride of mercury, you may increase the amount of eggs and give one-half glass of weak lime water. if you know he took carbolic acid, give him alcohol (pure alcohol or in the form of gin or whiskey) and plenty of it in order to neutralize the acid. get a doctor as soon as possible, and save the vomit and poison not taken, for him to see. = . scalds.= apply at once common baking soda or olive oil and cover with a bandage. to sprinkle with flour is also good. = . scratches of cats and other animals.= apply tincture of iodine or wash with soap and water. = . shock.= in case of collapse following an accident, treat the accident; then treat as for fainting. apply hot plates, stones or bottles of hot water, or an electric light wrapped in towels over the stomach. wrap up warmly. keep the patient quiet, in the dark, and send for a doctor. = . snow or sun blindness.= smear the nose and face about the eyes with charcoal, and wear a cloth over the face with small holes for the eyes. = . sore throat.= gargling with hot strong tea or hot water and salt is often effective. listerine diluted in water and used as a gargle is also good. peroxide of hydrogen is a good gargle. = . spider bite.= apply a cloth dampened with alcohol or weak ammonia and water. = . suffocation by gas.= see "asphyxiation by gas." = . sprains.= the regular medical treatment is to plunge a sprained ankle, wrist or finger, into water as hot as can be borne at the start, and to raise the heat gradually thereafter to the limit of endurance. continue for half an hour, then put the joint in a hot wet bandage, reheat from time to time, and support the limb in an elevated position,--the leg on a chair or stool; the arm carried in a sling. in a day or two begin gently moving and kneading the joint, and rub with liniment, oil or vaseline. as a soothing application for sprains, bruises, etc., the virtues of witch hazel are well known. = . stings.= stings of bees, jelly fish and other stinging animals are treated with a very weak solution of ammonia in water applied as a lotion. or apply a very weak solution of carbolic acid in water, a strong solution of baking powder, a slice of crushed raw onion, a moist quid of tobacco, witch hazel, listerine, or a paste of clay. before applying any of these remedies, extract the sting, if left in the wound. also, work out as much of the poison as possible by massaging and sucking the wound. = . sunburn.= treat with witch hazel or listerine or vinegar well diluted with water. = . sunstroke.= in sunstroke the man has a blazing red face, dry, burning hot skin; agitated heart; snoring breathing; a high fever, and is unconscious and delirious. _what is the matter?_ the part of the brain which regulates the heat of the body is overcome by the heat and loses control,--the man is entirely too hot all the way through. _treatment._ first of all remove the pack and shoes and loosen the clothing. then souse the man, clothing and all, with water. lay him in the shade and fan him, keeping him covered and wet. this will cool him off without chilling too much. if possible, rub the chest and legs, but not the belly, with ice. = . wounds.= wounds may be made in every degree of size, from the jab of a splinter to the loss of a part of the body from shrapnel. no matter what form of the wound or the cause, we know the following fact to be of the utmost importance: a wound without germs in it will heal rapidly without pain, redness, heat, or pus and the patient will have no fever. he will eat his regular meals and act as though well. such wounds we see made by surgeons when operating. on the other hand, wounds infected with germs are painful, hot, angry, red, and swollen and form large quantities of pus or matter. pus is a mixture of germs, blood and the flesh that they have destroyed. this pus prevents wounds from healing and often burrows under the skin, forming abcesses which cause fever and chills, and the pus enters the blood causing delirium and death. our one aim in treating wounds is to keep out germs, and we accomplish this by means of the first aid packet. = . the first aid packet= consists of two gauze compresses sewed to two cotton bandages. they are sealed in wax paper. there are also two safety pins wrapped in wax paper. these articles are placed in an airtight metal case which protects them from contamination. now, the one important fact about this first aid packet is that the bandage compresses and safety pins have been _sterilized_,--that is, they contain no living germs of any kind. it is, therefore, perfectly safe to put on a wound, _provided the pad touches the wound before it touches anything else and provided that the wound has not been handled_. therefore, do not wash a fresh clean wound. [illustration: fig. _first aid packet_ after the removal of packet from tin can, open the wax paper and hold the package as shown. . left hand holds the wax paper. . right hand holds the bandage.] [illustration: fig. _first aid packet_ shake out packet with right hand so that the pad (or compress) does not touch anything until placed on the wound.] caution. have the wound ready before you open the packet. do not touch the gauze pad with anything. do not breathe on it, and be especially careful not to cough or sneeze over it. these things put germs on it which will grow in the wound. by observing these instructions you may save a man's life. by not observing them, you may cause his death, or cause him much pain and suffering. the life of a wounded man is often in the hands of the first one who attends him. it is said that since the adoption of the first aid packet by armies, it has done more than everything else to save the lives of those wounded in battle by preventing the infection of wounds. in an emergency a pad from any kind of cloth may be boiled for ten minutes to kill the germs, the water drained off to allow it to cool, and then placed on the wound. or, the pad may be held over a clear fire until it is fairly scorched; then let it cool. a little charring of the surface will do no harm. any kind of bandage may then be used to hold it in place. when a bullet strikes a man first, the wound is clean cut and germ free and it will heal rapidly. if, however, it strikes something first, and bounces off (ricochets) and then strikes a man, it will be knocked into an irregular shape and, therefore, cause a ragged wound with much bruising. what is more important, such a bullet will carry germs into the wound from the object struck, and almost surely some shreds of clothing. when a wound is infected it is extremely difficult to kill the germs (disinfect). such a wound, before applying the first aid dressing should be painted with a tincture of iodine, or alcohol or be well washed with boiled salt water. = .= the illustrations below show improvised litters. [illustration: fig. _litter made of one-half shelter tent, three shelter tent pins and one tent or other pole_ _litter made of two poles, two coats and one belt. the coats are buttoned and the sleeves turned inside out, the poles being run through the sleeves. the belt is used as a head rest_ _the coat litter in use_] part vi military courtesy and kindred subjects chapter i military deportment and appearance--personal cleanliness--forms of speech--delivery of messages, etc. = . military deportment and appearance.= the enlisted man is no longer a civilian but a soldier. he is, however, still a citizen of the united states and by becoming a soldier also he is in no way relieved of the responsibilities of a citizen; he has merely assumed in addition thereto the responsibilities of a soldier. for instance, if he should visit an adjoining town and become drunk and disorderly while in uniform, not only could he be arrested and tried by the civil authorities, but he could also be tried by the summary court at his post for conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. indeed, his uniform is in no way whatsoever a license for him to do anything contrary to law and be protected by the government. being a soldier, he must conduct himself as such at all times, that he may be looked upon not only by his superior officers as a soldier, but also by the public as a man in every way worthy of the uniform of the american soldier. whether on or off duty, he should always look neat and clean, ever remembering that in bearing and in conversation he should be every inch a soldier--shoes must be clean and polished at all times; no chewing, spitting, gazing about, or raising of hands in ranks--he should know his drill, his orders and his duties--he should always be ready and willing to learn all he can about his profession--he should never debase himself with drink. a soldier's uniform is more than a mere suit of clothes that is worn to hide nakedness and protect the body. the uniform of an army symbolizes its respectability, its honor, its traditions, and its achievements, just as the flag of a nation symbolizes its honor, dignity and history. always remember this, and remember, too, that the soldier who brings reproach upon his uniform is in the same class as the priest who brings dishonor upon his robes. it is not given to every man to wear the uniform of his country's army,--it is an honor and a privilege to do so, and no individual has a right to abuse this honor and privilege by bringing the uniform into disrepute through misbehavior. it should be remembered that the soldiers of a command can make the uniform carry distinction and respect, or they can make it a thing to be derided. the soldier should take pride in his uniform. a soldier should be soldierly in dress, soldierly in carriage, soldierly in courtesies. a civilian owes it to himself to be neat in dress. a soldier owes it to more than himself--he owes it to his comrades, to his company--he owes it to his country, for just so far as a soldier is slack so far does his company suffer; his shabbiness reflects first upon himself, then upon his company and finally upon the entire army. it is a fact known to students of human nature that just in proportion as a man is neatly and trimly dressed is he apt to conduct himself with like decency. the worst vagabonds in our communities are the tramps, with their dirty bodies and dirty clothes; the most brutal deeds in all history were those of the ragged, motley mobs of paris in the days of the french revolution; the first act of the mutineer has ever been to debase and deride his uniform. the man who misbehaves himself in uniform in public creates a bad impression of the whole command, as a result of which his comrades must suffer. remember that a man in the uniform of a soldier is conspicuous,--much more so than a civilian,--and consequently any misconduct on his part is more noticeable than if done in civilian clothes. the man who deliberately besmirches the uniform of his country's army by appearing in public drunk or by other misconduct, not only fouls his own nest, but he also dishonors the uniform worn by his self-respecting comrades. it is a well known fact that laxity in dress and negligence in military courtesy run hand in hand with laxity and negligence in almost everything else, and that is why we can always look for certain infallible symptoms in the individual dress, carriage and courtesies of soldiers. _should a soldier give care and attention to his dress?_ yes; not only should a soldier be always neatly dressed, but he should also be properly dressed--that is, he should be dressed as required by regulations. a soldier should always be neat and trim, precise in dress and carriage and punctilious in salute. under no circumstances should the blouse or overcoat be worn unbuttoned, or the cap back or on the side of the head. his hair should be kept properly trimmed, his face clean shaven or beard trimmed and his shoes polished, his trousers pressed, the garrison belt accurately fitted to the waist so that it does not sag, his leggins cleaned, his brass letters, numbers and crossed rifles polished, and his white gloves immaculate. _should a man ever be allowed to leave the post on pass if not properly dressed?_ no; never. the army regulations require that chiefs of squads shall see that such members of their squads as have passes leave the post in proper dress. _should a soldier ever stand or walk with his hands in his pockets?_ no; never. there is nothing more unmilitary than to see a soldier standing or walking with his hands in his pockets. the real soldier always stands erect. he never slouches. _is it permissible, while in uniform, to wear picture buttons, chains, watch charms, etc., exposed to view?_ no; it is not. _may the campaign hat or any other parts of the uniform be worn with civilian dress?_ no; this is prohibited by the uniform regulations, which especially states that when the civilian dress is worn it will not be accompanied by any mark or part of the uniform. _may a mixed uniform be worn--for example, a cotton olive drab at and woolen olive drab breeches?_ no; under no circumstances. when the company commander or any other officer sends for a soldier to report to him in the company office or any other place, the soldier must report in proper uniform. = . obedience.= _what is obedience?_ it is compliance with everything that is required by authority--it is the mainspring, the very soul and essence of all military duty. it is said a famous general once remarked every soldier should know three things--"first, _obedience_; second, _obedience_; third, _obedience_." cheerful, earnest and loyal obedience must be paid by all subordinates to the orders of their superiors. _a soldier should obey first and if aggrieved complain afterward._ all duty should be performed cheerfully and willingly. soldiers are sometimes required to perform duties that are not pleasant--for instance, doing guard duty on a cold, rainy night, when tired and sleepy; digging ditches or cleaning up dirt and filth that have accumulated around the barracks, kitchens, quarters, etc., scrubbing floors, polishing stoves, cleaning knives, forks, pots, etc. however, by doing everything required of him in a cheerful manner, a soldier will soon earn the respect of his comrades and the commendation of his officers. = . respect and obedience to noncommissioned officers.= in the orders and directions that they give, company noncommissioned officers represent the company commander, and they must be obeyed and respected at all times and under all circumstances. orders and regulations require that men respect and obey their noncommissioned officers, and discipline makes it imperative that they do so. it is not for a private to question in any way the fairness, justice, propriety or wisdom of an order received from a noncommissioned officer. when ordered by a noncommissioned officer to do a thing, whatever it may be, do it promptly and thoroughly, and then if you feel that you have been injured in any way, report the matter to your company commander, who will see that you receive justice. if the noncommissioned officer made a mistake, exceeded his authority, or treated you unfairly, he will be punished by the company commander. the company commander, and not the privates of the company, is to judge the conduct of his noncommissioned officers, who are directly responsible to him for every act of theirs. if every subordinate were to question the fairness, justice, propriety or wisdom of orders received from noncommissioned officers or other superiors, there would be no discipline, and the army would soon degenerate into a mob. remember, a soldier is supposed to obey _first_, and, if aggrieved, complain _afterward_. and remember, too, that the authority of noncommissioned officers is not confined to the drill ground, the barracks and the post or camp. whether you are on pass, in a theatre, in a streetcar, on a train on the street or anywhere else, if you receive an order from a noncommissioned officer you are to obey it just the same as if it were given you at drill or in barracks. = . forms of speech.= in speaking to an officer it is not proper for a soldier to say, "you, etc.," but the third person should always be used, as, for example, "_does the captain want his horse this morning?_"--do not say, "do you want your horse this morning?" "the lieutenant is wanted on the 'phone,"--not "you are wanted on the 'phone." in beginning a conversation with an officer, a soldier should use the third person in referring to himself instead of the pronouns "i" and "me." however, after the conversation has commenced, it is perfectly proper, and usual, for the soldier to use the pronouns "i" and "me," but an officer is _always_ addressed in the third person and never as "you." in speaking to an officer, an enlisted man should refer to another enlisted man by proper title, as, "_sergeant richards_," "_corporal smith_," "_private wilson_." privates and others should always address noncommissioned officers by their titles. for example, "_sergeant smith_," "_corporal jones_," etc., and not "_smith_," "_jones_," etc. when asked his name, a soldier should answer, for instance, "_private jones, sir_." when given an order or instructions of any kind by an officer, or noncommissioned officer, a soldier should always say, "_yes, sir_," thus letting the officer or noncommissioned officer know that the soldier understands the order or instructions. don't say, "very well, sir," or "all right, sir"; say, "_yes, sir_," it's the direct, military way of answering. short direct answers should be made in the form of, "_no, sir_," "_yes, sir_," "_i don't know, sir_," "_i will try, sir_," etc. do not use slang in speaking to an officer. never interrupt an officer while he is speaking. always wait until he is through talking before you begin to speak. after a soldier has finished a thing that he was ordered to do, he should always report to the officer who gave him the order. for example, "the captain's message to lieutenant smith has been delivered." if ordered to report to an officer for any purpose, do not go away without first ascertaining if the officer is through with you, as it often happens he has something else he would like to have you do. after having finished the work given in the beginning, report, for instance, "_sir, is the captain through with me?_" when an officer calls a soldier who is some distance away, the soldier should immediately salute, and say, "_yes, sir_," and, if necessary, approach the officer with a quickened step. if the officer is waiting on the soldier, the latter should take up the double time. always salute an officer when he leaves you after a conversation or at any other time. and always salute just as soon as the officer makes the first move to leave. don't wait until he has moved away several feet before saluting. miscellaneous = . how to enter an office.= in entering an office a soldier should give two or three knocks at the door (whether it be open or closed); when told to come in, enter, taking off the hat (if unarmed), close the door (if it was closed before you entered) and remain just inside the door until asked what is wanted; then go within a short distance of the officer, stand at attention, salute, and make known your request in as few words as possible. on completion, salute, face toward the door, and go out, being careful to close the door if it was closed when you entered. if it was not closed, leave it open. = . complaints to the captain.= complaints must never be made directly to the captain unless the soldier has the captain's permission to do so, or the first sergeant refuses to have the matter reported. if dissatisfied with his food, clothing, duties, or treatment, the facts should be reported to the first sergeant, with the request, if necessary, to see the captain. it is also customary for soldiers who wish to speak to the captain about anything to see the first sergeant first, and when speaking to the captain to inform him that they have the first sergeant's permission to do so. thus: "private smith has the first sergeant's permission to speak to the captain," etc. = . how the soldier is paid.= when your name is called, answer "here," step forward and halt directly in front of the paymaster, who will be directly behind the table; salute him. when he spreads out your pay on the table in front of you, count it quickly, take it up with your ungloved hand, execute a left or right face and leave the room and building, unless you wish to deposit, in which case, you will remain in the hall outside the payroom, until the company has been paid, when you enter the payroom. men wishing to deposit money with the paymaster, will always notify the first sergeant before the company is marched to the pay table. = . delivery of messages.= when an enlisted man receives a message, verbal or written, from an officer for delivery, he will, in case he does not understand his instructions, ask the officer to repeat them, saying, for instance, "sir, private smith does not understand; will the captain please repeat?" when he has received his instructions, and understands them, he will salute, and say: "yes, sir," execute an about face, and proceed immediately to the officer for whom the message is intended. he will halt three or four paces directly in front of the officer and _if the officer be junior to the officer sending the message_, he will say, "sir, captain smith presents his compliments," etc., and then deliver the message, or "the commanding officer presents his compliments to lieutenant smith and would like to see him at headquarters." he will salute immediately before he begins to address the officer and will hold his hand at the position of salute while he says, "sir, captain smith presents his compliments," or "the commanding officer presents his compliments to lieutenant smith." if the officer sending the message be junior to the one receiving it, the soldier will not present his compliments, but will say, for instance, "sir, lieutenant smith directed me to hand this letter to the captain," or "sir, lieutenant smith directed me to say to the captain," etc. as soon as the message has been delivered, the soldier will salute, execute an about face, and proceed at once to the officer who sent the message, and will similarly report to him, "sir, the lieutenant's message to captain smith has been delivered," and leave. before leaving an officer to whom you deliver a message always ascertain whether there is an answer. the compliments of a junior are never presented to a senior. for instance, never say to a captain that a lieutenant presents his compliments to him. = . appearance as witness.= the uniform is that prescribed. proceed to the courtroom and remain outside. when you are notified that you are wanted enter the room. then take off your cap and right hand glove, and raise your right hand above your head, palm to the front, to be sworn. after the judge-advocate reads the oath, say, "i do" or "so help me god." then sit down in the chair indicated by the judge-advocate. do not cross your legs, but sit upright. when asked, "do you know the accused? if, so, state who he is," answer, "i do; corporal john jones, co. 'b' st infantry." be sure you thoroughly understand every question before you start to reply, answering them all promptly, in a loud, distinct, deliberate voice, and confining your answers strictly to the questions asked and telling all you know. when the judge-advocate says, "that is all," arise, salute him, execute an about face, and leave the room. chapter ii military courtesy = . its importance.= some soldiers do not see the necessity for saluting, standing at attention, and other forms of courtesy, because they do not understand their significance--their object. it is a well-known fact that military courtesy is a very important part of the education of the soldier, and there are good reasons for it. general orders no. , division of the philippines, , says: "in all armies the manner in which military courtesies are observed and rendered by officers and soldiers, is the index to the manner in which other duties are performed." the army regulations tells us, "courtesy among military men is indispensable to discipline; respect to superiors will not be confined to obedience on duty, but will be extended on all occasions." [illustration] the nature of salutes and their origin the civilian salute = .= when a gentleman raises his hat to a lady he is but continuing a custom that had its beginning in the days of knighthood, when every knight wore his helmet as a protection against foes. however, when coming among friends, especially ladies, the knight would remove his helmet as a mark of confidence and trust in his friends. in those days failure to remove the helmet in the presence of ladies signified distrust and want of confidence--today it signifies impoliteness and a want of good breeding. the military salute = .= from time immemorial subordinates have always uncovered before superiors, and equals have always acknowledged each other's presence by some courtesy--this seems to be one of the natural, nobler instincts of man. it was not so many years ago when a sentinel saluted not only with his gun but by taking off his hat also. however, when complicated headgear like the bearskin and the helmet came into use, they could not be readily removed and the act of removing the hat was finally conventionalized into the present salute--into the movement of the hand to the visor as if the hat were going to be removed. every once in a while a man is found who has the mistaken idea that he smothers the american spirit of freedom, that he sacrifices his independence, by saluting his officers. of course, no one but an anarchist or a man with a small, shrivelled-up mind can have such ideas. manly deference to superiors, which in military life is merely recognition of constituted authority, does not imply admission of inferiority any more than respect for law implies cowardice. the recruit should at once rid himself of the idea that saluting and other forms of military courtesy are un-american. the salute is the soldier's claim from the very highest in the land to instant recognition as a soldier. the raw recruit by his simple act of saluting, commands like honor from the ranking general of the army--aye, from even the president of the united states. while the personal element naturally enters into the salute to a certain extent, when a soldier salutes an officer he is really saluting the office rather than the officer personally--the salute is rendered as a mark of respect to the rank, the position that the officer holds, to the authority with which he is vested. a man with the true soldierly instinct never misses an opportunity to salute his officers. as a matter of fact, military courtesy is just simply an application of common, every-day courtesy and common sense. in common, every-day courtesy no man with the instincts of a gentleman ever thinks about taking advantage of this thing and that thing in order to avoid paying to his fellow-man the ordinary, conventional courtesies of life, and if there is ever any doubt about the matter, he takes no chances but extends the courtesy. and this is just exactly what the man who has the instincts of a real soldier does in the case of military courtesy. the thought of "should i salute or should i not salute" never enters the mind of a soldier just because he happens to be in a wagon, in a postoffice, etc. in all armies of the world, all officers and soldiers are required to salute each other whenever they meet or pass, the subordinate saluting first. the salute on the part of the subordinate is not intended in any way as an act of degradation or a mark of inferiority, but is simply a military courtesy that is as binding on the officer as it is on the private, and just as the enlisted man is required to salute the officer first, so is the officer required to salute his superiors first. it is a bond uniting all in a common profession, marking the fact that above them there is an authority that both recognize and obey--the country! indeed, by custom and regulations, it is as obligatory for the ranking general of the army to return the salute of the recruit, as it is for the latter to give it. let it be remembered that the military salute is a form of greeting that belongs exclusively to the government--to the soldier, the sailor, the marine--it is the mark and prerogative of the military man and he should be proud of having the privilege of using that form of salutation--a form of salutation that marks him as a member of the profession of arms--the profession of napoleon, wellington, grant, lee, sherman, jackson and scores of others of the greatest and most famous men the world has ever known. the military salute is ours, it is ours only. moreover, it belongs only to the soldier who is in good standing, the prisoner under guard, for instance, not being allowed to salute. ours is a grand fraternity of men-at-arms, banded together for national defense, for the maintenance of law and order--we are bound together by the love and respect we bear the flag--we are pledged to loyalty, to one god, one country--our lives are dedicated to the defense of our country's flag--the officer and the private belong to a brotherhood whose regalia is the uniform of the american soldier, and they are known to one another and to all men, by an honored sign and symbol of knighthood that has come down to us from the ages--the military salute! whom to salute = . army officers.= all army officers are saluted by their juniors and by enlisted men. = . navy, marine corps, volunteer and national guard officers.= soldiers at all times and in all situations salute officers of the navy, marine corps, and national guard the same as they salute officers of the regular army. = . reserve corps officers.= although the subject is not at present (march, ) covered by orders or regulations, it goes without saying that soldiers would salute members of the officers' reserve corps _on active duty_ the same as they salute their own officers. = . foreign naval and military officers.= the manual of interior guard duty requires sentinels to salute foreign naval and military officers, but there are no instructions about other enlisted men saluting them. however, as an act of international courtesy, they should be saluted the same as our own officers. when and how to salute = . general rule.= day or night, covered or uncovered, whether either or both are in uniform or civilian clothes, salutes shall be exchanged between officers and enlisted men not in a military formation, nor at drill, work, games or mess, on every occasion of their meeting, passing near or being addressed, the junior in rank or the enlisted man saluting first. = . saluting when making and receiving reports.= when making or receiving official reports, or on meeting out of doors, all officers will salute. military courtesy requires the junior to salute first, but when the salute is introductory to a report made at a military ceremony or formation, to the representative of a common superior (as, for example, to the adjutant, officer of the day, etc.), the officer making the report, whatever his rank, will salute first; the officer to whom the report is made will acknowledge by saluting that he has received and understood the report. = . saluting distance.= saluting distance is that within which recognition is easy. in general, it does not exceed paces. as to the distance at which the salute should be made, the following is what has been the practice in the army: in approaching or passing each other within saluting distance, individuals or bodies of troops exchange salutes when at a distance of about paces. if they do not approach each other that closely, the salute is exchanged at the point of nearest approach. for instance, if the officer and soldier are approaching each other on the same sidewalk, the hand is brought up to the headdress when about paces from the officer. if they are on opposite sides of the street, the hand is brought up when about ten paces in advance of the officer. if the officer and soldier are not going in opposite directions and the officer does not approach within six paces, the salute is rendered when the officer reaches the nearest point to the soldier. if a soldier passes an officer from the rear, the hand is raised as he reaches the officer; if an officer passes a soldier from the rear, the soldier salutes just as the officer is about to pass him. = . officer entering room occupied by soldiers.= when an officer enters a room where there are several enlisted men, the word "attention" is given by someone who perceives him, when all rise, uncover, and remain standing at attention until the officer leaves the room or directs otherwise. = . at meals.= enlisted men at meals stop eating and remain seated at attention when an officer enters the room. = . when seated.= an enlisted man, if seated, rises on the approach of an officer, faces toward him, stands at attention, and salutes. standing he faces an officer for the same purpose. if the parties remain in the same place or on the same ground, such compliments need not be repeated. = . soldier indoors.= indoors, an unarmed enlisted man uncovers and stands at attention upon the approach of an officer. if armed with rifle, he renders the rifle salute at the order or trail. (note. according to custom, the term "indoors" is interpreted as meaning military offices barracks, quarters and similar places,--it does not mean such public places as stores, storehouses, riding halls, stables, post exchange buildings, hotels, places of amusement, and railway and steamboat stations. in such places an unarmed soldier renders the right hand salute.) = . officers approaching number of soldiers in open.= when an officer approaches a number of enlisted men out of doors, the word "attention" should be given by someone who perceives him, when all stand at attention and all salute. it is customary for all to salute at or about the same instant, taking the time from the soldier nearest the officer, and who salutes when the officer is six paces from him. = . at work.= soldiers actually at work do not cease work to salute an officer unless addressed by him. = . riding in wagon.= a soldier riding in a wagon should salute officers that he passes. he would salute without rising. likewise, a soldier driving a wagon should salute, unless both hands are occupied. = . passing officer on staircase.= it is customary for a soldier who is passed by an officer on a staircase to come to a halt and stand at attention. = . addressing or being addressed by an officer.= before addressing an officer, or when addressed by an officer, an enlisted man makes the prescribed salute with the weapon with which he is armed; or, if unarmed, with the right hand. he also makes the same salute after receiving a reply. = . how salutes are rendered in uniform.= in uniform, covered or uncovered, but not in formation, officers and enlisted men salute military persons as follows: with arms in hand, the salute prescribed for that arm (sentinels on interior guard duty excepted); without arms, the right-hand salute. = . rifle salute.= enlisted men out of doors and armed with the rifle, salute with the piece at the right shoulder; if indoors, the rifle salute is rendered at the order or trail. = . saber salute.= an enlisted man armed with the saber renders the saber salute, if the saber is drawn; otherwise he salutes with the hand. = . sentinels on post.= a soldier salutes with the "present arms" only when actually on post as a sentinel doing interior guard duty. at all other times when armed with the rifle he salutes with the prescribed rifle salute. the general rules and principles of saluting apply to sentinels on post doing interior guard duty, except, as just stated, they salute by presenting arms when armed with the rifle. however, they do not salute if it interferes with the proper performance of their duties. = . how salutes are rendered in civilian dress.= in civilian dress, covered or uncovered, officers and enlisted men salute military persons with the right-hand salute. = . saluting in military manner.= officers and enlisted men will render the prescribed salutes in a military manner. = . several officers together.= when several officers in company are saluted, all entitled to the salute shall return it. = . dismounting before addressing superior not mounted.= except in the field under campaign or simulated campaign conditions, a mounted officer or soldier dismounts before addressing a superior officer not mounted. = . man addressed in formation.= a man in formation shall not salute when directly addressed, but shall come to attention if at rest or at ease. = . in public places and conveyances.= in public conveyances, such as railway trains and street cars, and in public places, such as theaters, honors and personal salutes may be omitted when palpably inappropriate or apt to disturb or annoy civilians present. for instance, as a rule, it may be said that an enlisted man riding in a street car, or in the act of purchasing goods in a store, or eating in a restaurant, would not salute unless addressed by an officer. however, in case of a soldier occupying a seat in a crowded street or railway car, if he recognized a person standing to be an officer, it would be but an act of courtesy for him to raise, salute and offer the officer his seat. = . salutes by commanders of detachments or other commands.= commanders of detachments or other commands will salute officers of grades higher than the person commanding the unit, by first bringing the unit to attention and then saluting as prescribed,--that is, with arms in hand, the salute prescribed for that arm; without arms in hand, the right-hand salute. = . officer passing in rear of troops.= when an officer entitled to the salute passes in rear of a body of troops, the troops are brought to attention when he is opposite the post of the commander. = . bringing command to present arms or sabers before commander salutes.= if the command is in line at a halt (not in the field) and armed with the rifle, or with sabers drawn, it shall be brought to _present arms_ or _present sabers_ before its commander salutes in the following cases: when the national anthem is played, or when _to the color_ or _to the standard_ is sounded during ceremonies, or when a person is saluted who is its immediate or higher commander or a general officer, or when the national or regimental color is saluted. = . no compliments paid at drill, on march, etc.= salutes and honors, as a rule, are not paid by troops actually engaged in drill, on the march, or in the field under campaign or simulated campaign conditions. troops on the service of security pay no compliments whatever. = . no saluting at double time, trot or gallop.= salutes are not rendered when marching in double time or at the trot or gallop. the soldier must first come to quick time or walk before saluting. the question of gait applies to the person saluting and not to the one saluted,--so, a soldier would salute an officer passing in double time or at a trot or gallop. miscellaneous = . soldier walking with officer.= a soldier accompanying an officer walks on the officer's left and about one pace to his rear. = . prisoners do not salute.= prisoners do not salute officers. they merely stand at attention. in some commands it is customary for paroled prisoners and others who are not under the immediate charge of sentinels, to fold their arms when passing or addressing officers. = . unmilitary salutes.= it is very unmilitary to salute with the coat unbuttoned or with the hand in the pocket, or a cigarette, cigar or pipe in the mouth. = . headdress not raised in saluting.= the headdress must not be raised to ladies, but they must be given the military salute. (war dept. decision. august, .) = . caution.= in saluting, the hand or weapon is held in the position of salute until the salute has been acknowledged or until the officer has passed or has been passed. usual mistakes in saluting = .= the following are the mistakes usually made by soldiers in rendering salutes: . they do not begin the salute soon enough; often they do not raise the hand to the headdress until they are only a pace or two from the officer--the salute should always begin when at least six paces from the officer. . they do not turn the head and eyes toward the officer who is saluted--the head and eyes should always be turned toward the officer saluted and kept turned as long as the hand is raised. . the hand is not kept to the headdress until the salute is acknowledged by the officer--the hand should always be kept raised until the salute has been acknowledged, or it is evident the officer has not seen the saluter. . the salute is often rendered in an indifferent, lax manner--the salute should always be rendered with life, snap and vim; the soldier should always render a salute as if he _meant it_. respect to be paid the national anthem, the colors and standards = . the national anthem.= whenever the national anthem is played at any place when persons belonging to the military service are present, all officers and enlisted men not in formation shall stand at attention facing toward the music (except at retreat when they shall face toward the flag). if in uniform, covered or uncovered, or in civilian clothes, uncovered, they shall salute at the first note of the anthem, retaining the position of salute until the last note of the anthem. if not in uniform and covered, they shall uncover at the first note of the anthem, holding the headdress opposite the left shoulder and so remain until its close, except that in inclement weather the headdress may be held slightly raised. the same rules apply when "to the color" or "to the standard" is sounded as when the national anthem is played. = . national anthems of other nations.= the same marks of respect prescribed for observance during the playing of the national anthem of the united states shall be shown toward the national anthem of any other country when played upon official occasions. = . at retreat.= the flag will be lowered at the sounding of the last note of the retreat, and while the flag is being lowered the band will play the national anthem, or, if there be no band present, the field music will sound "to the color." when "to the color" is sounded by the field music while the flag is being lowered the same respect will be observed as when the national anthem is played by the band, and in either case officers and enlisted men out of ranks will face toward the flag, stand at attention, and render the prescribed salute. = . colors and standards.= officers and enlisted men passing the uncased color (or standard) will render honors as follows: if in uniform they will salute as described in par. ; if in civilian dress and covered, they will uncover, holding the headdress opposite the left shoulder with the right hand; if uncovered, they will salute with the right-hand salute. by "colors" and "standards" is meant the national flags and the regimental flags that are carried by regiments and separate battalions. the national flag may be of either silk or bunting; the regimental flag is always of silk. in the army regulations the word "color" is used in referring to regiments of infantry, the coast artillery and battalions of philippine scouts, while "standard" is used in reference to regiments of cavalry and field artillery. by _uncased_ colors and standards are meant colors and standards when not in their waterproof cases. by flag is meant the national emblem that waves from flag staffs and other stationary poles. they are always of bunting. part vii guard duty (to include changes no. , february , .) (the numbers following the paragraphs are those of the _manual of interior guard duty_.) = . importance.= guard duty is one of the soldier's most important duties, and in all armies of the world the manner in which it is performed is an index to the discipline of the command and the manner in which other duties are performed. upon the guard's vigilance and readiness for action depend not only the enforcement of military law and orders, but also the safety and protection of the post and the quelling of sudden disorder, perhaps even mutiny. the importance of guard duty is increased during times of war, when the very safety of the army depends upon the vigilance of the sentinels, who are required to watch that others may sleep and thus refresh themselves from the labors of the day. the sentinels are the guardians of the repose, quiet and safety of the camp. = . respect for sentinels.= respect for the person and office of a sentinel is as strictly enjoined by military law as that required to be paid to an officer. as it is expressed in the _manual of guard duty_, "all persons of whatever rank in the service are required to observe respect toward sentinels." invested as the private soldier frequently is, while on his post, with a grave responsibility, it is proper that he should be fully protected in the discharge of his duty. to permit anyone, of whatever rank, to molest or interfere with him while thus employed, without becoming liable to severe penalty, would clearly establish a precedent highly prejudicial to the interests of the service. (_davis' military law_). = . duty of sentinels.= a sentinel, in respect to the duties with which he is charged, represents the superior military authority of the command to which he belongs, and whose orders he is required to enforce on or in the vicinity of his post. as such he is entitled to the respect and obedience of all persons who come within the scope of operation of the orders, which he is required to carry into effect. over military persons the authority of the sentinel is absolute, and disobedience of his orders on the part of such persons constitutes a most serious military offence and is prejudicial in the highest degree to the interests of discipline. (_davis' military law_).--author. introduction = .= guards may be divided into four classes: exterior guards, interior guards, military police, and provost guards. ( ) = .= exterior guards are used only in time of war. they belong to the domain of tactics and are treated of in the _field service regulations_ and in the drill regulations of the different arms of the service. the purpose of exterior guards is to prevent surprise, to delay attack, and otherwise to provide for the security of the main body. on the march they take the form of advance guards, rear guards, and flank guards. at a halt they consist of outposts. ( ) = .= interior guards are used in camp or garrison to preserve order, protect property, and to enforce police regulations. in time of war such sentinels of an interior guard as may be necessary are placed close in or about a camp, and normally there is an exterior guard further out consisting of outposts. in time of peace the interior guard is the only guard in a camp or garrison. ( ) = .= military police differ somewhat from either of these classes. (see _field service regulations_.) they are used in time of war to guard prisoners, to arrest stragglers and deserters, and to maintain order and enforce police regulations in the rear of armies, along lines of communication, and in the vicinity of large camps. ( ) = .= provost guards are used in the absence of military police, generally in conjunction with the civil authorities at or near large posts or encampments, to preserve order among soldiers beyond the interior guard. ( ) interior guard classification = .= the various elements of an interior guard classified according to their particular purposes and the manner in which they perform their duties are as follows: (=a=) the main guard. (=b=) special guards: stable guards, park guards, prisoner guards, herd guards, train guards, boat guards, watchmen, etc. ( ) details and rosters = .= at every military post, and in every regiment or separate command in the field, an interior guard will be detailed and duly mounted. it will consist of such number of officers and enlisted men as the commanding officer may deem necessary, and will be commanded by the senior officer or noncommissioned officer therewith, under the supervision of the officer of the day or other officer detailed by the commanding officer. ( ) = .= the system of sentinels on fixed posts is of value in discipline and training because of the direct individual responsibility which is imposed and required to be discharged in a definite and precise manner. in order, however, that guard duty may not be needlessly irksome and interfere with tactical instruction, the number of men detailed for guard will be the smallest possible. commanding officers are specifically charged with this matter, and, without entirely dispensing with the system of sentinels on fixed posts will, as far as practicable in time of peace, replace such sentinels with watchmen. (see par. .) ( ) = .= at posts where there are less than three companies the main guard and special guards may all be furnished by one company or by detail from each company. where there are three or more companies, the main guard will, if practicable, be furnished by a single company, and, as far as practicable, the same organization will supply all details for that day for special guard, overseer, and fatigue duty. in this case the officer of the day, and the officers of the guard, if there are any, will, if practicable, be from the company furnishing the guard. ( ) = .= there will be an officer of the day with each guard, unless in the opinion of the commanding officer the guard is so small that his services are not needed. in this case an officer will be detailed to supervise the command and instruction of the guard for such period as the commanding officer may direct. ( ) = .= the detail of officers of the guard will be limited to the necessities of the service and efficient instruction; inexperienced officers may be detailed as supernumerary officers of the guard for purposes of instruction. ( ). = .= the strength of guards and the number of consecutive days for which an organization furnishes the guard will be so regulated as to insure privates of the main guard an interval of not less than five days between tours. the commanding officer = .= the commanding officer will exact a faithful, vigilant, and correct performance of guard duty in all of its details, giving his orders to the officer of the day, or causing them to be communicated to him with the least practicable delay. he will prescribe the strength of the guard, and the necessary regulations for guard, police, and fatigue duty. ( ) = .= the commanding officer receives the reports of the officers of the day immediately after guard mounting, at his office, or at some other place previously designated; carefully examines the guard report and remarks thereon (questioning the old officer of the day, if necessary, concerning his tour of duty), relieves the old officer of the day and gives the new officer of the day such instructions as may be necessary. ( ) the officer of the day = .= the officer of the day is responsible for the proper performance of duty by the guard with which he marches on and for the enforcement of all police regulations. he is charged with the execution of all orders of the commanding officer relating to the safety and good order of the post or camp. his actual tour begins when he receives the instructions of the commanding officer after guard mounting, and ceases when he has been relieved by the commanding officer. in case of emergency during the interval between guard mounting and reporting to the commanding officer, the senior officer of the day will give the necessary instructions for both guards. ( ) = .= in the absence of special instructions from the commanding officer, the officer of the day will inspect the guard and sentinels during the day and at night at such times as he may deem necessary. he will visit them at least once between o'clock midnight and daylight. ( ) he may prescribe patrols (par. ) and visits of inspection to be made by officers and noncommissioned officers of the guard whenever he deems it necessary. ( ) = .= he will see that the commander of the guard is furnished with the parole and countersign before retreat in case they are to be used, and will inform him of the presence in post or camp of any person entitled to the compliment. ( ) = .= in case of alarm of any kind he will at once take such steps as may be necessary to insure the safety of life and public property and to preserve order in the command, disposing his guard so as best to accomplish this result. ( ) = .= in the performance of his duties as officer of the day he is subject to the orders of the commanding officer only, except that in case of an alarm of any kind, and at a time of great danger, the senior line officer present is competent to give necessary orders to the officer of the day for the employment of the guard. ( ) = .= at the inspection and musters prescribed in _army regulations_, the officer of the day will be present at the post of the guard, but all commands to the guard will be given by the commander of the guard. ( ) both officers of the day together verify the prisoners and inspect the guardhouse and premises. ( ) = .= in the absence of special instructions, the old officer of the day will, at guard mounting, release all garrison prisoners whose sentences expire that day. if there are any prisoners with no record of charges against them, the old officer of the day will report that fact to the commanding officer who will give the necessary instructions. ( ) = .= the old officer of the day signs the report of the commander of the guard. he also enters on it such remarks as may be necessary. ( ) = .= the officers of the day then report to the commanding officer. on presenting themselves, both salute with the right hand, remaining covered. the old officer of the day, standing on the right of the new, then says: "=sir, i report as old officer of the day=," and presents the guard report. as soon as the commanding officer notifies the old officer of the day that he is relieved, the old officer of the day salutes the commanding officer and retires. the new officer of the day again salutes and says: "=sir, i report as new officer of the day=," and then receives his instructions. ( ) = .= the officer of the day will always keep the guard informed as to where he may be found at all hours of the day and night. ( ) commander of the guard = .= the commander of the guard is responsible for the instruction and discipline of the guard. he will see that all of its members are correctly instructed in their orders and duties, and that they understand and properly perform them. he will visit each relief at least once while it is on post, and at least one of these visits will be made between o'clock midnight and daylight. ( ) = .= he receives and obeys the orders of the commanding officer and the officer of the day, and reports to the latter without delay all orders to the guard not received from the officer of the day; he transmits to his successor all material instructions and information relating to his duties. ( ) = .= he is responsible under the officer of the day for the general safety of the post or camp as soon as the old guard marches away from the guardhouse. in case of emergency while both guards are at the guardhouse, the senior commander of the two guards will be responsible that the proper action is taken. ( ) = .= officers of the guard will remain constantly with their guards, except while visiting patrols or necessarily engaged elsewhere in the performance of their duties. the commanding officer will allow a reasonable time for meals. ( ) = .= a commander of a guard leaving his post for any purpose will inform the next in command of his destination and probable time of return. ( ) = .= except in emergencies, the commander of the guard may divide the night with the next in command, but retains his responsibility; the one on watch must be constantly on the alert. ( ) = .= when any alarm is raised in camp or garrison, the guard will be formed immediately. (par. .) if the case be serious, the proper call will be sounded, and the commander of the guard will cause the commanding officer and the officer of the day to be at once notified. ( ) = .= if a sentinel calls: "=the guard=," the commander of the guard will at once send a patrol to the sentinel's post. if the danger be great, in which case the sentinel will discharge his piece, the patrol will be as strong as possible. ( ) = .= when practicable, there should always be an officer or noncommissioned officer and two privates of the guard at the guardhouse, in addition to the sentinels there on post. ( ) = .= between reveille and retreat, when the guard had been turned out for any person entitled to the compliment (see pars. and ), the commander of the guard, if an officer, will receive the report of the sergeant, returning the salute of the later with the right hand. he will then draw his saber, and place himself two paces in front of the center of the guard. when the person for whom the guard has been turned out approaches, he faces his guard and commands: = . present, . arms=; faces to the front and salutes. when his salute is acknowledged he resumes the carry, faces about, and commands: = . order, . arms=; and faces to the front. if it be an officer entitled to inspect the guard, after saluting and before bringing his guard to an order, the officer of the guard reports: "=sir, all present or accounted for="; or, "=sir, (so and so) is absent="; or, if the roll call has been omitted: "=sir, the guard is formed=," except that at guard mounting the commanders of the guards present their guards and salute without making any report. between retreat and reveille, the commander of the guard salutes and reports, but does not bring the guard to a present. ( ) = .= to those entitled to have the guard turned out but not entitled to inspect it, no report will be made; nor will a report be made to any officer, unless he halts in front of the guard. ( ) = .= when a guard commanded by a noncommissioned officer is turned out as a compliment or for inspection, the noncommissioned officer, standing at a right shoulder on the right of the right guide, commands: = . present, . arms.= he then executes the rifle salute. if a report be also required, he will, after saluting, and before bringing his guard to an order, report as prescribed for the officer of the guard. (par. .) ( ) = .= when a guard is in line, not under inspection, and commanded by an officer, the commander of the guard salutes his regimental, battalion, and company commander, by bringing the guard to attention and saluting in person. for all other officers, excepting those entitled to the compliment from a guard (par. ), the commander of the guard salutes in person, but does not bring the guard to attention. when commanded by a noncommissioned officer the guard is brought to attention in either case, and the noncommissioned officer salutes. the commander of a guard exchanges salutes with the commanders of all other bodies of troops; the guard is brought to attention during the exchange. "=present arms=" is executed by a guard only when it has turned out for inspection or as a compliment, and at the ceremonies of guard mounting and relieving the old guard. ( ) = .= in marching a guard or a detachment of a guard the principles of paragraph apply. "=eyes right=" is executed only in the ceremonies of guard mounting and relieving the old guard. ( ) = .= if a person entitled to the compliment, or the regimental, battalion, or company commander, passes in rear of a guard, neither the compliment nor the salute is given, but the guard is brought to attention while such person is opposite the post of the commander. after any person has received or declined the compliment, or received the salute from the commander of the guard, official recognition of his presence thereafter while he remains in the vicinity will be taken by bringing the guard to attention. ( ) = .= the commander of the guard will inspect the guard at reveille and retreat, and at such other times as may be necessary, to assure himself that the men are in proper condition to perform their duties and that their arms and equipments are in proper condition. for inspection by other officers, he prepares the guard in each case as directed by the inspecting officer. ( ) = .= the guard will not be paraded during ceremonies unless directed by the commanding officer. ( ) = .= at all formations members of the guard or reliefs will execute inspection arms as prescribed in the drill regulations of their arm. ( ) = .= the commander of the guard will see that all sentinels are habitually relieved every two hours, unless the weather or other cause makes it necessary that it be done at shorter or longer intervals, as directed by the commanding officer. ( ) = .= he will question his noncommissioned officers and sentinels relative to the instructions they may have received from the old guard; he will see that patrols and visits of inspection are made as directed by the officer of the day. ( ) = .= he will see that the special orders for each post and member of the guard, either written or printed, are posted in the guardhouse, and, if practicable, in the sentry box or other sheltered place to which the member of the guard has constant access. ( ) = .= he will see that the proper calls are sounded at the hours appointed by the commanding officer. ( ) = .= should a member of the guard be taken sick, or be arrested, or desert, or leave his guard, he will at once notify the officer of the day. ( ) = .= he will, when the countersign is used (pars. to ), communicate it to the noncommissioned officers of the guard and see that it is duly communicated to the sentinels before the hour for challenging; the countersign will not be given to sentinels posted at the guardhouse. ( ) = .= he will have the details for hoisting the flag at reveille, and lowering it at retreat, and for firing the reveille and retreat gun, made in time for the proper performance of these duties. (see pars. , , , ). he will see that the flags are kept in the best condition possible, and that they are never handled except in the proper performance of duty. ( ) = .= he may permit members of the guard while at the guardhouse to remove their headdress, overcoats, and gloves; if they leave the guardhouse for any purpose whatever he will require that they be properly equipped and armed according to the character of the service in which engaged, or as directed by the commanding officer. ( ) = .= he will enter in the guard report a report of his tour of duty, and, on the completion of his tour, will present it to the officer of the day. he will transmit with his report all passes turned in at the post of the guard. ( ) = .= whenever a prisoner is sent to the guardhouse or guard tent for confinement, he will cause him to be searched, and will, without unnecessary delay, report the case to the officer of the day. ( ) = .= under war conditions, if anyone is to be passed out of camp at night, he will be sent to the commander of the guard, who will have him passed beyond the sentinels. ( ) = .= the commander of the guard will detain at the guardhouse all suspicious characters or parties attempting to pass a sentinel's post without authority, reporting his action to the officer of the day, to whom persons so arrested will be sent, if necessary. ( ) = .= he will inspect the guard rooms and cells, and the irons of such prisoners as may be ironed, at least once during his tour, and at such other times as he may deem necessary. ( ) = .= he will cause the corporals of the old and new reliefs to verify together, immediately before each relief goes on post, the number of prisoners who should then properly be at the guardhouse. ( ) = .= he will see that the sentences of prisoners under his charge are executed strictly in accordance with the action of the reviewing authority. ( ) = .= when no special prisoner guard has been detailed (par. ), he will, as far as practicable, assign as guards over working parties of prisoners sentinels from posts guarded at night only. ( ) = .= the commander of the guard will inspect all meals sent to the guardhouse and see that the quantity and quality of food are in accordance with regulations. ( ) = .= at guard mounting he will report to the old officer of the day all cases of prisoners whose terms of sentence expire on that day, and also all cases of prisoners concerning whom no statement of charges has been received. ( ) = .= the commander of the guard is responsible for the security of the prisoners under the charge of his guard; he becomes responsible for them after their number has been verified and they have been turned over to the custody of his guard by the old guard or by the prisoner guard or overseers. ( ) = .= the prisoners will be verified and turned over to the new guard without parading them, unless the commanding officer or the officer of the day shall direct otherwise. ( ) = .= to receive the prisoners at the guardhouse when they have been paraded and after they have been verified by the officers of the day, the commander of the new guard directs his sergeant to form his guard with an interval, and commands: = . prisoners, . right, . face, . forward, . march.= the prisoners having arrived opposite the interval in the new guard, he commands: = . prisoners, . halt, . left, . face, . right (or left), . dress, . front.= the prisoners dress on the line of the new guard. ( ) sergeant of the guard = .= the senior noncommissioned officer of the guard always acts as sergeant of the guard, and if there be no officer of the guard, will perform the duties prescribed for the commander of the guard. ( ) = .= the sergeant of the guard has general supervision over the other noncommissioned officers and the musicians and privates of the guard, and must be thoroughly familiar with all of their orders and duties. ( ) = .= he is directly responsible for the property under charge of the guard, and will see that it is properly cared for. he will make lists of articles taken out by working parties, and see that all such articles are duly returned. if they are not, he will immediately report the fact to the commander of the guard. ( ) = .= immediately after guard mounting he will prepare duplicate lists of the names of all noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates of the guard, showing the relief and post or duties of each. one list will be handed as soon as possible to the commander of the guard; the other will be retained by the sergeant. ( ) = .= he will see that all reliefs are turned out at the proper time, and that the corporals thoroughly understand, and are prompt and efficient in, the discharge of their duties. ( ) = .= during the temporary absence from the guardhouse of the sergeant of the guard, the next in rank of the noncommissioned officers will perform his duties. ( ) = .= should the corporal whose relief is on post be called away from the guardhouse, the sergeant of the guard will designate a noncommissioned officer to take the corporal's place until his return. ( ) = .= the sergeant of the guard is responsible at all times for the proper police of the guardhouse or guard tent, including the ground about them and the prison cells. ( ) = .= at "=first sergeant's call=" he will proceed to the adjutant's office and obtain the guard report book. ( ) = .= when the national or regimental colors are taken from the stacks of the color line, the color bearer and guard, or the sergeant of the guard, unarmed, and two armed privates as a guard, will escort the colors to the colonel's quarters, as prescribed for the color guard in the drill regulations of the arm of the service to which the guard belongs. ( ) = .= he will report to the commander of the guard any suspicious or unusual occurrence that comes under his notice, will warn him of the approach of any armed body, and will send to him all persons arrested by the guard. ( ) = .= when the guard is turned out, its formation will be as follows: the senior noncommissioned officer, if commander of the guard, is on the right of the right guide; if not commander of the guard, he is in the line of file closers, in rear of the right four of the guard; the next in rank is right guide; the next left guide; the others in the line of file closers, usually, each in rear of his relief; the field music, with its left three paces to the right of the right guide. the reliefs form in the same order as when the guard was first divided, except that if the guard consists of dismounted cavalry and infantry, the cavalry forms on the left. ( ) = .= the sergeant forms the guard, calls the roll, and, if not in command of the guard, reports to the commander of the guard as prescribed in drill regulations for a first sergeant forming a troop or company; the guard is not divided into platoons or sections, and, except when the whole guard is formed prior to marching off, fours are not counted. ( ) = .= the sergeant reports as follows: "=sir, all present or accounted for=," or "=sir, (so-and-so) is absent="; or if the roll call has been omitted, "=sir, the guard, is formed=." only men absent without proper authority are reported absent. he then takes his place, without command. ( ) = .= at night, the roll may be called by reliefs and numbers instead of names; thus, the first relief being on post: =second relief; no. ; no. =, etc.; =third relief, corporal; no. =, etc. ( ) = .= calling the roll will be dispensed with in forming the guard when it is turned out as a compliment, on the approach of an armed body, or in any sudden emergency; but in such cases the roll may be called before dismissing the guard. if the guard be turned out for an officer entitled to inspect it, the roll will, unless he directs otherwise, always be called before a report is made. ( ) = .= the sergeant of the guard has direct charge of the prisoners, except during such time as they may be under the charge of the prisoner guard or overseers, and is responsible to the commander of the guard for their security. ( ) = .= he will carry the keys of the guardroom and cells, and will not suffer them to leave his personal possession while he is at the guardhouse, except as hereinafter provided. (par. .) should he leave the guardhouse for any purpose, he will turn the keys over to the noncommissioned officer who takes his place. (par. .) ( ) = .= he will count the knives, forks, etc., given to the prisoners with their food, and see that none of these articles remain in their possession. he will see that no forbidden articles of any kind are conveyed to the prisoners. ( ) = .= prisoners when paraded with the guard, are placed in line in its center. the sergeant, immediately before forming the guard, will turn over his keys to the noncommissioned officer at the guardhouse. having formed the guard, he will divide it into two nearly equal parts. indicating the point of division with his hand, he commands: = . right (or left), . face, . forward, . march, . guard, . halt, . left (or right), . face.= if the first command be =right face=, the right half of the guard only will execute the movements: if =left face=, the left half only will execute them. the command =halt= is given when sufficient interval is obtained to admit the prisoners. the doors of the guardroom and cells are then opened by the noncommissioned officer having the keys. the prisoners will file out under the supervision of the sergeant, the noncommissioned officer, and sentinel on duty at the guardhouse, and such other sentinels as may be necessary; they will form in line in the interval between the two parts of the guard. ( ) = .= to return the prisoners to the guardroom and cells, the sergeant commands: = . prisoners, . right (or left), . face, . column right (or left), . march.= the prisoners, under the same supervision as before, return to their proper rooms or cells. ( ) = .= to close the guard, the sergeant commands: = . left (or right), . face, . forward, . march, . guard, . halt, . right (or left), . face.= the left or right half only of the guard as indicated, executes the movement. ( ) = .= if there be but few prisoners, the sergeant may indicate the point of division as above, and form the necessary interval by the commands: = . right (or left) step, . march, . guard, . halt=, and close the intervals by the commands: = . left (or right) step, . march, . guard, . halt.= ( ) = .= if sentinels are numerous, reliefs may, at the discretion of the commanding officer, be posted in detachments, and sergeants, as well as corporals, required to relieve and post them. ( ) corporal of the guard = .= a corporal of the guard receives and obeys orders from none but noncommissioned officers of the guard senior to himself, the officers of the guard, the officer of the day, and the commanding officer. ( ) = .= it is the duty of the corporal of the guard to post and relieve sentinels, and to instruct the members of his relief in their orders and duties. ( ) = .= immediately after the division of the guard into reliefs the corporals will assign the members of their respective reliefs to posts by number, and a soldier so assigned to his post will not be changed to another during the same tour of guard duty, unless by direction of the commander of the guard or higher authority. usually, experienced soldiers are placed over the arms of the guard, and at remote and responsible posts. ( ) = .= each corporal will then make a list of the members of his relief including himself. this list will contain the number of the relief, the name, the company, and the regiment of every member thereof, and the post to which each is assigned. the list will be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to the sergeant of the guard as soon as completed, the other to be retained by the corporal. ( ) = .= when directed by the commander of the guard, the corporal of the first relief forms his relief, and then commands: =call off.= commencing on the right, the men call off alternately =rear= and =front= rank, "=one=," "=two=," "=three=," "=four=," and so on; if in single rank, they call off from right to left. the corporal then commands: = . right, . face, . forward, . march.= the corporal marches on the left, and near the rear file, in order to observe the march. the corporal of the old guard marches on the right of the leading file, and takes command when the last one of the old sentinels is relieved, changing places with the corporal of the new guard. ( ) = .= when the relief arrives at six paces from a sentinel (see par. ), the corporal halts it and commands, according to the number of the post: =no. (--).= both sentinels execute port arms or saber; the new sentinel approaches the old, halting about one pace from him. (see par. .) ( ) = .= the corporals advance and place themselves, facing each other, a little in advance of the new sentinel, the old corporal on his right, the new corporal on his left, both at a right shoulder, and observe that the old sentinel transmits correctly his instructions. the following diagram will illustrate the positions taken: [illustration] r is the relief; a, the new corporal; b, the old; c, the new sentinel: d, the old. ( ) = .= the instructions relative to the post having been communicated, the new corporal commands, =post=; both sentinels then resume the right shoulder, face toward the new corporal and step back so as to allow the relief to pass in front of them. the new corporal then commands, = . forward, . march=; the old sentinel takes his place in rear of the relief as it passes him, his piece in the same position as those of the relief. the new sentinel stands fast at a right shoulder until the relief has passed six paces beyond him, when he walks his post. the corporals take their places as the relief passes them. ( ) = .= mounted sentinels are posted and relieved in accordance with the same principles. ( ) = .= on the return of the old relief, the corporal of the new guard falls out when the relief halts; the corporal of the old guard forms his relief on the left of the old guard, salutes, and reports to the commander of his guard: "=sir, the relief is present="; or "=sir, (so and so) is absent=," and takes his place in the guard. ( ) = .= to post a relief other than that which is posted when the old guard is relieved, its corporal commands: = . (such) relief, . fall in=; and if arms are stacked, they are taken at the proper commands. the relief is formed facing to the front, with arms at an =order=; the men place themselves according to the numbers of their respective posts, viz., =two=, =four=, =six=, and so on, in the =front rank=, and =one=, =three=, =five=, and so on, in the =rear rank=. the corporal, standing about two paces in front of the center of his relief, then commands: =call off.= the men call off as prescribed. the corporal then commands: = . inspection, . arms, . order, . arms=; faces the commander of the guard, executes the rifle salute, reports: "=sir, the relief is present=," or "=sir, (so and so) is absent="; he then takes his place on the right at order arms. ( ) = .= when the commander of the guard directs the corporal: "=post your relief=," the corporal salutes and posts his relief as prescribed (pars. to ); the corporal of the relief on post does not go with the new relief, except when necessary to show the way. ( ) = .= to dismiss the old relief, it is halted and faced to the front at the guardhouse by the corporal of the new relief, who then falls out; the corporal of the old relief then steps in front of the relief and dismisses it by the proper commands. ( ) = .= should the pieces have been loaded before the relief was posted, the corporal will, before dismissing the relief, see that no cartridges are left in the chambers or magazines. the same rule applies to sentinels over prisoners. ( ) = .= each corporal will thoroughly acquaint himself with all the special orders of every sentinel on his relief, and see that each understands and correctly transmits such orders =in detail= to his successor. ( ) = .= there should be at least one noncommissioned officer constantly on the alert at the guardhouse, usually the corporal whose relief is on post. this noncommissioned officer takes post near the entrance of the guardhouse, and does not fall in with the guard when it is formed. he will have his rifle constantly with him. ( ) = .= whenever it becomes necessary for the corporal to leave his post near the entrance of the guardhouse, he will notify the sergeant of the guard, who will at once take his place, or designate another noncommissioned officer to do so. ( ) = .= he will see that no person enters the guardhouse, or guard tent, or crosses the posts of the sentinels there posted without proper authority. ( ) = .= should any sentinel call for the corporal of the guard, the corporal will, in every case, at once and quickly proceed to such sentinel. he will notify the sergeant of the guard before leaving the guardhouse. ( ) = .= he will at once report to the commander of the guard any violation of regulations or any unusual occurrence which is reported to him by a sentinel, or which comes to his notice in any other way. ( ) = .= should a sentinel call: "=the guard=," the corporal will promptly notify the commander of the guard. ( ) = .= should a sentinel call: "=relief=," the corporal will at once proceed to the post of such sentinel, taking with him the man next for duty on that post. if the sentinel is relieved for a short time only, the corporal will again post him as soon as the necessity for his relief ceases. ( ) = .= when the countersign is used, the corporal at the posting of the relief during whose tour challenging is to begin gives the countersign to the members of the relief, excepting those posted at the guardhouse. ( ) = .= he will wake the corporal whose relief is next on post in time for the latter to verify the prisoners, form his relief, and post it at the proper hour. ( ) = .= should the guard be turned out, each corporal will call his own relief, and cause its members to fall in promptly. ( ) = .= tents or bunks in the same vicinity will be designated for the reliefs so that all the members of each relief may, if necessary, be found and turned out by the corporal in the least time and with the least confusion. ( ) = .= when challenged by a sentinel while posting his relief, the corporal commands: = . relief, . halt=; to the sentinel's challenge he answers "=relief=," and at the order of the sentinel he advances alone to give the countersign, or to be recognized. when the sentinel says, "=advance relief=," the corporal commands: = . forward, . march.= if to be relieved, the sentinel is then relieved as prescribed. ( ) = .= between retreat and reveille, the corporal of the guard will challenge all suspicious looking persons or parties he may observe, first halting his patrol or relief, if either be with him. he will advance them in the same manner that sentinels on post advance like parties (pars. to ), but if the route of a patrol is on a continuous chain of sentinels, he should not challenge persons coming near him unless he has reason to believe that they have eluded the vigilance of sentinels. ( ) = .= between retreat and reveille, whenever so ordered by an officer entitled to inspect the guard, the corporal will call: "=turn out the guard=," announcing the title of the officer, and then, if not otherwise ordered he will salute and return to his post. ( ) = .= as a general rule he will advance parties approaching the guard at night in the same manner that sentinels on post advance like parties. thus, the sentinel at the guardhouse challenges and repeats the answer to the corporal, as prescribed hereafter (par. ); the corporal, advancing at "=port arms=," says: "=advance (so and so) with the countersign=," or "=to be recognized=," if there be no countersign used; the countersign being correctly given, or the party being duly recognized, the corporal says: "=advance (so and so)="; repeating the answer to the challenge of the sentinel. ( ) = .= when officers of different rank approach the guardhouse from different directions at the same time, the senior will be advanced first, and will not be made to wait for his junior. ( ) = .= out of ranks and under arms, the corporal salutes with the rifle salute. he will salute all officers whether by day or night. ( ) = .= the corporal will examine parties halted and detained by sentinels, and if he has reason to believe the parties have no authority to cross sentinel's posts, will conduct them to the commander of the guard. ( ) = .= the corporal of the guard will arrest all suspicious looking characters prowling about the post or camp, all persons of a disorderly character disturbing the peace, and all persons taken in the act of committing crime against the government on a military reservation or post. all persons arrested by corporals of the guard, or by sentinels, will at once be conducted to the commander of the guard by the corporal. ( ) musicians of the guard = .= the musicians of the guard will sound call as prescribed by the commanding officer. ( ) = .= should the guard be turned out for national or regimental colors or standards, uncased, the field music of the guard will, when the guard present arms, sound, "=to the color=" or "=to the standard="; or, if for any person entitled thereto, the march, flourishes, or ruffles, prescribed in paragraphs , , and , a. r. ( ) orderlies and color sentinels = .= when so directed by the commanding officer, the officer who inspects the guard at guard mounting will select from the members of the new guard an orderly for the commanding officer and such number of other orderlies and color sentinels as may be required. ( ) for these positions the soldiers will be chosen who are most correct in the performance of duty and in military bearing, neatest in person and clothing, and whose arms and accouterments are in the best condition. clothing, arms, and equipments must conform to regulations. if there is any doubt as to the relative qualifications of two or more soldiers, the inspecting officer will cause them to fall out at the guardhouse and to form in line in single rank. he will then, by testing them in drill regulations, select the most proficient. the commander of the guard will be notified of the selection. ( ) = .= when directed by the commander of the guard to fall out and report, an orderly will give his name, company, and regiment to the sergeant of the guard, and, leaving his rifle in the arm rack in his company quarters, will proceed at once to the officer to whom he is assigned, reporting: "=sir, private ----, company ----, reports as orderly.=" ( ) = .= if the orderly selected be a cavalryman, he will leave his rifle in the arm rack of his troop quarters, and report with his belt on, but without side arms unless specially otherwise ordered. ( ) = .= orderlies, while on duty as such, are subject only to the orders of the commanding officer and of the officers to whom they are ordered to report. ( ) = .= when an orderly is ordered to carry a message, he will be careful to deliver it exactly as it was given to him. ( ) = .= his tour of duty ends when he is relieved by the orderly selected from the guard relieving his own. ( ) = .= orderlies are members of the guard, and their name, company, and regiment are entered on the guard report and lists of the guard. ( ) = .= if a color line is established, sufficient sentinels are placed on the color line to guard the colors and stacks. ( ) = .= color sentinels are posted only so long as the stacks are formed. the commander of the guard will divide the time equally among them. ( ) = .= when stacks are broken, the color sentinels may be permitted to return to their respective companies. they are required to report in person to the commander of the guard at reveille and retreat. they will fall in with the guard, under arms, at guard mounting. ( ) = .= color sentinels are not placed on the regular reliefs, nor are their posts numbered. in calling for the corporal of the guard, they call: "=corporal of the guard. color line.=" ( ) = .= officers or enlisted men passing the uncased colors will render the prescribed salute. if the colors are on the stacks, the salute will be made on crossing the color line or on passing the colors. ( ) = .= a sentinel placed over the colors will not permit them to be moved, except in the presence of an armed escort. unless otherwise ordered by the commanding officer, he will allow no one to touch them but the color bearer. he will not permit any soldier to take arms from the stacks, or to touch them, except by order of an officer or noncommissioned officer of the guard. if any person passing the colors or crossing the color line fails to salute the colors, the sentinel will caution him to do so, and if the caution be not heeded he will call the corporal of the guard and report the facts. ( ) privates of the guard = .= privates are assigned to reliefs by the commander of the guard, and to posts, usually, by the corporal of their relief. they will not change from one relief or post to another during the same tour of guard duty unless by proper authority. ( ) orders for sentinels = .= orders for sentinels are of two classes: general orders and special orders. general orders apply to all sentinels. special orders relate to particular posts and duties. ( ) = .= sentinels will be required to memorize the following: my general orders are: = . to take charge of this post and all government property in view.= = . to walk my post in a military manner, keeping always on the alert and observing everything that takes place within sight or hearing.= = . to report all violations of orders i am instructed to enforce.= = . to repeat all calls from posts more distant from the guardhouse than my own.= = . to quit my post only when properly relieved.= = . to receive, obey, and pass on to the sentinel who relieves me all orders from the commanding officer, officer of the day, and officers and noncommissioned officers of the guard only.= = . to talk to no one except in line of duty.= = . in case of fire or disorder to give the alarm.= = . to allow no one to commit a nuisance on or near my post.= = . in any case not covered by instructions to call the corporal of the guard.= = . to salute all officers, and all colors and standards not cased.= = . to be especially watchful at night, and, during the time for challenging, to challenge all persons on or near my post, and to allow no one to pass without proper authority.= ( ) regulations relating to the general orders for sentinels = .= no. : =to take charge of this post and all government property in view.= all persons, of whatever rank in the service, are required to observe respect toward sentinels and members of the guard when such are in the performance of their duties. ( ) = .= a sentinel will at once report to the corporal of the guard every unusual or suspicious occurrence noted. ( ) = .= he will arrest suspicious persons prowling about the post or camp at any time, all parties to a disorder occurring on or near his post, and all, except authorized persons, who attempt to enter the camp at night, and will turn over to the corporal of the guard all persons arrested. ( ) = .= the number, limits, and extent of his post will invariably constitute part of the special orders of a sentinel on post. the limits of his post should be so defined as to include every place to which he is required to go in the performance of his duties. no. : =to walk my post in a military manner, keeping always on the alert and observing everything that takes place within sight or hearing.= ( ) = .= a sentinel is not required to halt and change the position of his rifle on arriving at the end of his post, nor to execute =to the rear, march=, precisely as prescribed in the drill regulations, but faces about while walking, in the manner most convenient to him, and at any part of his post as may be best suited to the proper performance of his duties. he carries his rifle on either shoulder, and in wet or severe weather, when not in a sentry box, may carry it at a secure. ( ) = .= sentinels when in sentry boxes stand at ease. sentry boxes will be used in wet weather only, or at other times when specially authorized by the commanding officer. ( ) = .= in very hot weather, sentinels may be authorized to stand at ease on their posts, provided they can effectively discharge their duties in this position, but they will take advantage of this privilege only on the express authority of the officer of the day or the commander of the guard. ( ) = .= a mounted sentinel may dismount occasionally and lead his horse but will not relax his vigilance. no. : =to report all violations of orders i am instructed to enforce.= ( ) = .= a sentinel will ordinarily report a violation of orders when he is inspected or relieved, but if the case be urgent he will call the corporal of the guard, and also, if necessary, will arrest the offender. no. : =to repeat all calls from posts more distant from the guardhouse than my own.= ( ) = .= to call the corporal, or the guard, for any purpose other than relief, fire, or disorder (pars. and ), a sentinel will call, "=corporal of the guard, no. (--)=," adding the number of his post. in no case will any sentinel call, "=never mind the corporal="; nor will the corporal heed such call if given. no. : =to quit my post only when properly relieved.= ( ) = .= if relief becomes necessary, by reason of sickness or other cause, a sentinel will call, "=corporal of the guard, no. (--), relief=," giving the number of his post. ( ) = .= whenever a sentinel is to be relieved, he will halt, and with arms at a right shoulder, will face toward the relief when it is thirty paces from him. he will come to a port arms with the new sentinel, and in a low tone will transmit to him all the special orders relating to the post, and any other information which will assist him to better perform his duties. no. : =to receive, obey, and pass on to the sentinel who relieves me, all orders from the commanding officer, officer of the day, and officers and noncommissioned officers of the guard only.= ( ) = .= during this tour of duty a soldier is subject to the orders of the commanding officer, officer of the day, and officers and noncommissioned officers of the guard only; but any officer is competent to investigate apparent violations of regulations by members of the guard. ( ) = .= a sentinel will quit his piece on an explicit order from any person from whom he lawfully receives orders while on post; under no circumstances will he yield it to any other person. unless necessity therefor exists, no person will require a sentinel to quit his piece, even to allow it to be inspected. ( ) = .= a sentinel will not divulge the countersign (pars. to ) to anyone except the sentinel who relieves him, or to a person from whom he properly receives orders, on such person's verbal order given personally. privates of the guard will not use the countersign except in the performance of their duties while posted as sentinels. no. : =to talk to no one except in line of duty.= ( ) = .= when calling for any purpose, challenging, or holding communication with any person, a dismounted sentinel, armed with a rifle or saber, will take the position of "port" arms or saber. at night a dismounted sentinel, armed with a pistol, takes the position of raise pistol in challenging or holding communication. a mounted sentinel does not ordinarily draw his weapon in the daytime when challenging or holding conversation; but if drawn, he holds it at advance rifle, raise pistol, or port saber, according as he is armed with a rifle, pistol, or saber. at night, in challenging and holding conversation, his weapon is drawn and held as just prescribed, depending on whether he is armed with a rifle, pistol, or saber. no. : =in case of fire or disorder to give the alarm.= ( ) = .= in case of fire, a sentinel will call, "=fire no. (--)=," adding the number of his post; if possible, he will extinguish the fire himself. in case of disorder, he will call: "=the guard, no. (--)=," adding the number of his post. if the danger be great, he will, in either case, discharge his piece before calling. no. : =to salute all officers and all colors and standards not cased.= ( ) = .= when not engaged in the performance of a specific duty, the proper execution of which would prevent it, a member of the guard will salute all officers who pass him. this rule applies at all hours of the day or night, except in the case of mounted sentinels armed with a rifle or pistol, or dismounted sentinels armed with a pistol, after challenging. (see par. .) ( ) = .= sentinels will salute as follows: a dismounted sentinel armed with a rifle or saber, salutes by presenting arms; if otherwise armed, he salutes with the right hand. a mounted sentinel, if armed with a saber and the saber be drawn, salutes by presenting saber; otherwise he salutes in all cases with the right hand. ( ) = .= to salute, a dismounted sentinel, with piece at a right shoulder or saber at a carry, halts and faces toward the person to be saluted when the latter arrives within thirty paces. the limit within which individuals and insignia of rank can be readily recognized is assumed to be about paces, and, therefore, at this distance cognizance is taken of the person or party to be saluted. ( ) = .= the salute is rendered at paces; if the person to be saluted does not arrive within that distance, then when he is nearest. ( ) = .= a sentinel in a sentry box, armed with a rifle, stands at attention in the doorway on the approach of a person or party entitled to salute, and salutes by presenting arms according to the forgoing rules. if armed with a saber, he stands at a carry and salutes as before. ( ) = .= a mounted sentinel on a regular post halts, faces, and salutes in accordance with the foregoing rules. if doing patrol duty, he salutes, but does not halt unless spoken to. ( ) = .= sentinels salute, in accordance with the foregoing rules, all persons and parties entitled to compliments from the guard (pars. , and ): officers of the army, navy, and marine corps; military and naval officers of foreign powers; officers of volunteers, and militia officers when in uniform. ( ) = .= a sentinel salutes as just prescribed when an officer comes on his post; if the officer holds communication with the sentinel, the sentinel again salutes when the officer leaves him. during the hours when challenging is prescribed, the first salute is given as soon as the officer has been duly recognized and advanced. a mounted sentinel armed with a rifle or pistol, or a dismounted sentinel armed with a pistol, does not salute after challenging. he stands at advance rifle or raise pistol until the officer passes. ( ) = .= in case of the approach of an armed party of the guard, the sentinel will halt when it is about paces from him, facing toward the party with his piece at the right shoulder. if not himself relieved, he will, as the party passes, place himself so that the party will pass in front of him; he resumes walking his post when the party has reached paces beyond him. ( ) an officer is entitled to the compliments prescribed, whether in uniform or not. ( ) = .= a sentinel in communication with an officer will not interrupt the conversation to salute. in the case of seniors the officer will salute, whereupon the sentinel will salute. ( ) = .= when the flag is being lowered at retreat, a sentinel on post and in view of the flag will face the flag, and, at the first note of the "star spangled banner" or to the color will come to a present arms. at the sounding of the last note he will resume walking his post. no. : =to be especially watchful at night and during the time for challenging, to challenge all persons on or near my post, and to allow no one to pass without proper authority.= ( ) = .= during challenging hours, if a sentinel sees any person or party on or near his post, he will advance rapidly along his post toward such person or party and when within about yards will challenge sharply, "=halt. who is there?=" he will place himself in the best possible position to receive or, if necessary, to arrest the person or party. ( ) = .= in case a mounted party be challenged, the sentinel will call, "=halt. dismount. who is there?=" ( ) = .= the sentinel will permit only one of any party to approach him for the purpose of giving the countersign (pars. to ), or if no countersign be used, of being duly recognized. when this is done the whole party is advanced, i. e., allowed to pass. ( ) = .= in all cases the sentinel must satisfy himself beyond a reasonable doubt that the parties are what they represent themselves to be and have a right to pass. if he is not satisfied, he must cause them to stand and call the corporal of the guard. so, likewise, if he have no authority to pass persons with the countersign, or when the party has not the countersign, or gives an incorrect one. ( ) = .= a sentinel will not permit any person to approach so close as to prevent the proper use of his own weapon before recognizing the person or receiving the countersign. ( ) = .= when two or more persons approach in one party, the sentinel on receiving an answer that indicates that someone in the party has the countersign, will say, "=advance one with the countersign=," and, if the countersign is given correctly, will then say, "=advance (so and so)=," repeating the answer to his challenge. thus, if the answer be, "=relief (friends with the countersign, patrol, etc.)=," the sentinel will say, "=advance one with the countersign="; then, "=advance relief (friends, patrol, etc.)=." ( ) = .= if a person having the countersign approach alone, he is advanced to give the countersign. thus, if the answer be, "=friend with the countersign (or officer of the day, or etc.)=," the sentinel will say, "=advance, friend (or officer of the day, or etc.), with the countersign="; then, "=advance, friend (or officer of the day, or etc.)=." ( ) = .= if two or more persons approach a sentinel's post from different directions at the same time, all such persons are challenged in turn and required to halt and to remain halted until advanced. the senior is first advanced, in accordance with the foregoing rules. ( ) = .= if a party is already advanced and in communication with a sentinel, the latter will challenge any other party that may approach; if the party challenged be senior to the one already on his post, the sentinel will advance the new party at once. the senior may allow him to advance any or all of the other parties; otherwise, the sentinel will not advance any of them until the senior leaves him. he will then advance the senior only of the remaining parties, and so on. ( ) = .= the following order of rank will govern a sentinel in advancing different persons or parties approaching his post: commanding officer, officer of the day, officer of the guard, officers, patrols, reliefs, noncommissioned officers of the guard in order of rank, friends. ( ) = .= a sentinel will never allow himself to be surprised, nor permit two parties to advance upon him at the same time. ( ) = .= if no countersign be used, the rules for challenging are the same. the rules for advancing parties are modified only as follows: instead of saying "=advance (so and so) with the countersign=," the sentinel will say, "=advance (so and so) to be recognized=." upon recognition he will say, "=advance (so and so)=." ( ) = .= answers to a sentinel's challenge intended to confuse or mislead him are prohibited, but the use of such an answer as "=friends with the countersign=," is not to be understood as misleading, but as the usual answer made by officers, patrols, etc., when the purpose of their visit makes it desirable that their official capacity should not be announced. ( ) special orders for sentinels at the post of the guard = .= sentinels posted at the guard will be required to memorize the following: =between reveille and retreat to turn out the guard for all persons designated by the commanding officer, for all colors or standards not cased, and in time of war for all armed parties approaching my post, except troops at drill and reliefs and detachments of the guard.= =at night, after challenging any person or party, to advance no one but call the corporal of the guard, repeating the answer to the challenge.= ( ) = .= after receiving an answer to his challenge, the sentinel calls, "=corporal of the guard (so and so)=," repeating the answer to the challenge. he does not in such cases repeat the number of his post. ( ) = .= he remains in the position assumed in challenging until the corporal has recognized or advanced the person or party challenged, when he resumes walking his post, or, if the person or party be entitled thereto, he salutes and, as soon as the salute has been acknowledged, resumes walking his post. ( ) = .= the sentinel at the post of the guard will be notified by direction of the commanding officer of the presence in camp or garrison of persons entitled to the compliment (par. .) ( ) = .= the following examples illustrate the manner in which the sentinel at the post of the guard will turn out the guard upon the approach of persons or parties entitled to the compliment (pars. , , and ): "=turn out the guard, commanding officer="; "=turn out the guard, governor of a territory="; "=turn out the guard, national colors="; "=turn out the guard, armed party="; etc. at the approach of the new guard at guard mounting the sentinel will call "=turn out the guard, armed party=." ( ) = .= should the person named by the sentinel not desire the guard formed, he will salute, whereupon the sentinel will call "=never mind the guard=." ( ) = .= after having called "=turn out the guard=," the sentinel will never call "=never mind the guard=," on the approach of an armed party. ( ) = .= though the guard be already formed he will not fail to call "=turn out the guard=," as required in his special orders, except that the guard will not be turned out for any person while his senior is at or coming to the post of the guard. ( ) = .= the sentinels at the post of the guard will warn the commander of the approach of any armed body and of the presence in the vicinity of all suspicious or disorderly persons. ( ) = .= in case of fire or disorder in sight or hearing, the sentinel at the guardhouse will call the corporal of the guard and report the facts to him. ( ) countersigns and paroles = . seventy-seventh article of war.= any person subject to military law makes known the parole or countersign to any person not entitled to receive it according to the rules and discipline of war, or gives a parole or countersign different from that which he received, shall, if the offense be committed in time of war, suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. (see par. .) ( ) = .= the =countersign= is a word given daily from the principal headquarters of a command to aid guards and sentinels in identifying persons who may be authorized to pass at night. it is given to such persons as may be authorized to pass and repass sentinels' posts during the night, and to officers, noncommissioned officers, and sentinels of the guard. ( ) = .= the =parole= is a word used as a check on the countersign in order to obtain more accurate identification of persons. it is imparted only to those who are entitled to inspect guards and to commanders of guards. the parole or countersign, or both, are sent sealed in the form of an order to those entitled to them. ( ) = .= when the commander of the guard demands the parole, he will advance and receive it as the corporal receives the countersign. (see par. .) ( ) = .= as the communications containing the parole and countersign must at times be distributed by many orderlies, the parole intrusted to many officers, and the countersign and parole to many officers and sentinels, and as both the countersign and parole must, for large commands, be prepared several days in advance, there is always danger of their being lost or becoming known to persons who would make improper use of them; moreover, a sentinel is too apt to take it for granted that any person who gives the right countersign is what he represents himself to be; hence for outpost duty there is greater security in omitting the use of the countersign and parole, or in using them with great caution. the chief reliance should be upon personal recognition or identification of all persons claiming authority to pass. persons whose sole means of identification is the countersign, or concerning whose authority to pass there is a reasonable doubt, should not be allowed to pass without the authority of the corporal of the guard after proper investigation; the corporal will take to his next superior any person about whom he is not competent to decide. ( ) = .= the =countersign= is usually the name of a battle; the =parole=, that of a general or other distinguished person. ( ) = .= when they can not be communicated daily, a series of words for some days in advance may be sent to posts or detachments that are to use the same parole or countersign as the main body. ( ) = .= if the countersign be lost, or if a member of the guard desert with it, the commander on the spot will substitute another for it and report the case at once to headquarters. ( ) = .= in addition to the countersign, use may be made of preconcerted signals, such as striking the rifle with the hand or striking the hands together a certain number of times, as agreed upon. such signals may be used only by guards that occupy exposed points. they are used before the countersign is given, and must not be communicated to anyone not entitled to know the countersign. their use is intended to prevent the surprise of a sentinel. in the daytime signals such as raising a cap or a handkerchief in a prearranged manner may be used by sentinels to communicate with the guard or with each other. ( ) guard patrols = .= a guard patrol consists of one or more men detailed for the performance of some special service connected with guard duty. ( ) = .= if the patrol be required to go beyond the chain of sentinels, the officer or noncommissioned officer in charge will be furnished with the countersign, and the outposts and sentinels warned. ( ) = .= if challenged by a sentinel, the patrol is halted by its commander, and the noncommissioned officer accompanying it advances alone and gives the countersign. ( ) watchmen = .= enlisted men may be detailed as watchmen or as overseers over prisoners, and as such will receive their orders and perform their duties as the commanding officer may direct. ( ) compliments from guards = .= the compliment from a guard consists in the guard turning out and presenting arms. (see par. .) no compliments will be paid between retreat and reveille except as provided in paragraphs and , nor will any person other than those named in paragraph receive the compliment. ( ) = .= though a guard does not turn out between retreat and reveille as a matter of compliment, it may be turned out for inspection at any time by a person entitled to inspect it. ( ) = .= between reveille and retreat the following persons are entitled to the compliment: the president, sovereign or chief magistrate of a foreign country, and members of a royal family; vice-president; president and president pro tempore of the senate; american and foreign ambassadors; members of the cabinet; chief justice; speaker of the house of representatives; committees of congress officially visiting a military post; governors within their respective states and territories; governors general[ ]; assistant secretary of war officially visiting a military post; all general officers of the army; general officers of foreign services visiting a post; naval, marine, volunteer, and militia officers in the service of the united states and holding the rank of general officer; american or foreign envoys or ministers; ministers accredited to the united states: chargés d'affaires accredited to the united states; consuls general accredited to the united states; commanding officer of a coast artillery district, coast defense command, post, fort or camp; officer of the day. ( ) (c. m. i. g. d., no. , feb. , .) = .= the relative rank between officers of the army and navy is as follows: general with admiral, lieutenant general with the vice admiral, major general with rear admiral, brigadier general with commodore,[ ] colonel with captain, lieutenant colonel with commander, major with lieutenant commander, captain with lieutenant, first lieutenant with lieutenant (junior grade), second lieutenant with ensign. (a. r. .) ( ) = .= sentinels will not be required to memorize paragraph , and except in the cases of general officers of the army, the commanding officer, and the officer of the day, they will be advised in each case of the presence in camp or garrison of persons entitled to the compliment. ( ) = .= guards will turn out and present arms when the national or regimental colors or standards, not cased, are carried past by a guard or an armed party. this rule also applies when the party carrying the colors is at drill. if the drill is conducted in the vicinity of the guardhouse, the guard will be turned out when the colors first pass, and not thereafter. ( ) = .= in case the remains of a deceased officer or soldier are carried past, the guard will turn out and present arms. ( ) = .= in time of war all guards will turn out under arms when armed parties, except troops at drill and reliefs or detachments of the guard, approach their post. (see par. .) ( ) = .= the commander of the guard will be notified of the presence in camp or garrison of all persons entitled to the compliment, except general officers of the army, the commanding officer, and the officer of the day. members of the guard will salute all persons entitled to the compliment and all officers in the military or naval service of foreign powers, officers of the army, navy and marine corps, officers of volunteers, and officers of militia when in uniform. ( ) general rules concerning guard duty = . eighty-sixth article of war.= any sentinel who is found drunk or sleeping upon his post, or who leaves it before he is regularly relieved, shall, if the offense be committed in time of war, suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct; and if the offense be committed in time of peace, he shall suffer any punishment, except death, that a court-martial may direct. ( ) = .= all material instructions given to a member of the guard by an officer having authority will be promptly communicated to the commander of the guard by the officer giving them. ( ) = .= should the guard be formed, soldiers will fall in ranks under arms. at roll call, each man, as his name or number and relief are called, will answer "here," and come to an =order arms=. ( ) = .= whenever the guard or a relief is dismissed, each member not at once required for duty will place his rifle in the arms racks, if they be provided, and will not remove it therefrom unless he requires it in the performance of some duty. ( ) = .= without permission from the commander of the guard, members of the main guard, except orderlies, will not leave the immediate vicinity of the guard house. permission to leave will not be granted except in cases of necessity. ( ) = .= members of the main guard, except orderlies, will not remove their accouterments or clothing without permission from the commander of the guard. (par. .) ( ) guarding prisoners = .= the sentinel at the post of the guard has charge of the prisoners except when they have been turned over to the prisoner guard or overseers. (par. to and to .) (a) =he will allow none to escape.= (b) =he will allow none to cross his post leaving the guardhouse except when passed by an officer or noncommissioned officer of the guard.= (c) =he will allow no one to communicate with prisoners without permission from proper authority.= (d) =he will promptly report to the corporal of the guard any suspicious noise made by the prisoners.= (e) =he will be prepared to tell whenever asked how many prisoners are in the guardhouse and how many are out at work or elsewhere.= whenever prisoners are brought to his post returning from work or elsewhere, he will halt them and call the corporal of the guard, notifying him of the number of prisoners returning. thus: "=corporal of the guard, (so many) prisoners.=" he will not allow prisoners to pass into the guardhouse until the corporal of the guard has responded to the call and ordered him to do so. ( ) = .= whenever practicable special guards will be detailed for the particular duty of guarding working parties composed of such prisoners as cannot be placed under overseers. ( ) = .= the prisoner guard and overseers will be commanded by the police officer; if there be no police officer, then by the officer of the day. ( ) = .= the provost sergeant is sergeant of the prisoner guard and overseers, and as such receives orders from the commanding officer and the commander of the prisoner guard only. ( ) = .= details for prisoner guard are marched to the guardhouse and mounted by being inspected by the commander of the main guard, who determines whether all of the men are in proper condition to perform their duties and whether their arms and equipments are in proper condition, and rejects any men found unfit. ( ) = .= when prisoners have been turned over to the prisoner guard or overseers, such guards or overseers are responsible for them under their commander, and all responsibility and control of the main guard ceases until they are returned to the main guard. (par. .) ( ) = .= if a prisoner attempts to escape, the sentinel will call "=halt=." if he fails to halt when the sentinel has once repeated his call, and if there be no other possible means of preventing his escape, the sentinel will fire upon him. = .= on approaching the post of the sentinel at the guardhouse, a sentinel of the prisoner guard or an overseer in charge of prisoners will halt them and call, "=no. , (so many prisoners.)=" he will not allow them to cross the post of the sentinel until so directed by the corporal of the guard. ( ) = .= members of the prisoner guard and overseers placed over prisoners for work will receive specific and explicit instructions covering the required work; they will be held strictly responsible that the prisoners under their charge properly and satisfactorily perform the designated work. ( ) stable guards = .= under the head of stable guards will be included guards for cavalry stables, artillery stables and parks, mounted infantry stables, machine-gun organization stables and parks, and quartermaster stables and parks. where the words "troop" and "cavalry" are used they will be held to include all of these organizations. ( ) = .= when troop stable guards are mounted they will guard the stables of the cavalry. when no stable guards are mounted, the stables will be guarded by sentinels posted from the main guard, under the control of the officer of the day. the instructions given for troop stable guard will be observed as far as applicable by the noncommissioned officers and sentinels of the main guard when in charge of the stables. ( ) troop stable guards = .= troops stable guards will not be used except in the field, or when it is impracticable to guard the stables by sentinels from the main guard. ( ) = .= troop stable guards will be under the immediate control of their respective troop commanders; they will be posted in each cavalry stable, or near the picket line, and will consist of not less than one noncommissioned officer and three privates. stable guards are for the protection of the horses, stables, forage, equipments, and public property generally. they will in addition enforce the special regulations in regard to stables, horses, and parks. ( ) = .= sentinels of stable guards will be posted at the stables or at the picket lines when the horses are kept outside. the troop stable guard may be used as a herd guard during the day time or when grazing is practicable. ( ) = .= the troop stable guard, when authorized by the post commander, will be mounted under the supervision of the troop commander. it will be armed, at the discretion of the troop commander, with either rifle or pistol. ( ) = .= the tour continues for hours, or until the guard is relieved by a new guard. ( ) = .= the employment of stable guards for police and fatigue duties at the stables is forbidden; but this will not prohibit them from being required to assist in feeding grain before reveille. ( ) the troop stable guard will attend stables with the rest of the troop and groom their own horses, the sentinels being taken off post for the purpose. ( ) = .= neither the noncommissioned officer nor the members of the stable guard will absent themselves from the immediate vicinity of the stables except in case of urgent necessity, and then for no longer time than is absolutely necessary. no member of the guard will leave for any purpose without the authority of the noncommissioned officer of the guard. ( ) = .= the noncommissioned officer and one member of the stable guard will go for meals at the proper hour; upon their return the other members of the guard will be directed to go by the noncommissioned officer. ( ) = .= when the horses are herded each troop will furnish its own herd guard. ( ) = .= smoking in the stables or their immediate vicinity is prohibited. no fire or light, other than electric light or stable lanterns, will be permitted in the stables. a special place will be designated for trimming, filling, and lighting lanterns. ( ) noncommissioned officer of the troop stable guard = .= the noncommissioned officer receives his orders from his troop commander, to whom he will report immediately after posting his first relief, and when relieved will turn over all his orders to his successor. he instructs his sentinels in their general and special duties; exercises general supervision over his entire guard; exacts order and cleanliness about the guardroom; prevents the introduction of intoxicants into the guardhouse and stables; receives, by count, from his predecessor, the animals, horse equipments, and all property (both private and public) pertaining thereto; examines, before relieving his predecessor, all locks, windows, and doors, and should any be found insecure he will report the fact to his troop commander when he reports for orders. he will personally post and relieve each sentinel, taking care to verify the property responsibility of the sentinel who comes off post, and see that the sentinel who goes on post is aware of the property responsibility that he assumes. ( ) = .= that the noncommissioned officer may be more thoroughly informed of his responsibility, =all= horses returning, except those from a regular formation, will be reported to him. he will then notify the sentinel on post, and, in the absence of the stable sergeant, will see that the horses are promptly cared for. in case of abuse, he will promptly report to the troop commander. should the horse be the private property of an officer, he will report such abuse to the owner. ( ) = .= the noncommissioned officer will report any unusual occurrence during his tour direct to his troop commander. ( ) = .= horses and other property for which the noncommissioned officer is responsible will not be taken from the stables without the authority of the post or troop commander. ( ) = .= the noncommissioned officer must answer the sentinel's calls promptly. ( ) = .= in case of fire, the noncommissioned officer will see that the requirements of paragraph are promptly carried out. ( ) = .= whenever it becomes necessary for the noncommissioned officer to leave his guard, he will designate a member of it to take charge and assume his responsibility during his absence. ( ) sentinels of the troop stable guard = .= the sentinel in the discharge of his duties will be governed by the regulations for sentinels of the main guard whenever they are applicable--such as courtesies to officers, walking post in a soldierly manner, challenging, etc.; he will not turn out the guard except when ordered by proper authority. ( ) = .= the sentinel will receive orders from the commanding officer, the troop commander, and the noncommissioned officers of the stable guard only, except when the commanding officer directs the officer of the day to inspect the stable guard. ( ) = .= in the field and elsewhere when directed by the commanding officer the sentinel when posted will verify the number of horses for which he is responsible, and when relieved will give the number to his successor. ( ) = .= the sentinel will not permit any horse or equipments to be taken from the stables, except in the presence of the noncommissioned officer. ( ) = .= should a horse get loose, the sentinel will catch him and tie him up. if he be unable to catch the horse, the noncommissioned officer will at once be notified. in case a horse be cast, or in any way entangled, he will relieve him, if possible; if unable to relieve him, he will call the noncommissioned officer. sentinels are forbidden to punish or maltreat a horse. ( ) = .= when a horse is taken sick, the sentinel will notify the noncommissioned officer, who in turn will call the farrier, and see that the horse is properly attended to. ( ) = .= in case of fire the sentinel will give the alarm by stepping outside the stable and firing his pistol or piece repeatedly, and calling out at the same time, "=fire, stables, troop (----)=." as soon as the guard is alarmed, he will take the necessary precautions in opening or closing the doors so as to prevent the spreading of the fire and make it possible to remove the horses; he will drop the chains and bars, and, with the other members of the guard, proceed to lead out the horses and secure them at the picket line or such other place as may have been previously designated. ( ) = .= sentinels over horses, or in charge of prisoners, receive orders from the stable sergeant, so far as the care of the horses and the labor of prisoners are concerned. ( ) = .= in field artillery and machine-gun organizations, the guard for the stables has charge of the guns, caissons, etc., with their ammunition and stores, as well as the horses, harness, and forage. ( ) the flag = .= the lowering of the flag will be regulated as to be completed at the last note of "the star spangled banner" or "to the color." ( ) = .= when practicable, a detail consisting of a noncommissioned officer and two privates of the guard will raise or lower the flag. this detail wears side arms or, if the special equipments do not include side arms, then belts only. the noncommissioned officer, carrying the flag, forms the detail in line, takes his post in the center, and marches it to the staff. the flag is then securely attached to the halyards and rapidly hoisted. the halyards are then securely fastened to the cleat on the staff and the detail marched to the guardhouse. ( ) = .= when the flag is to be lowered, the halyards are loosened from the staff and made perfectly free. at retreat the flag is lowered at the last note of retreat. it is then neatly folded and the halyards made fast. the detail is then reformed and marched to the guardhouse, where the flag is turned over to the commander of the guard. the flag should never be allowed to touch the ground and should always be hoisted or lowered from the leeward side of the staff, the halyards being held by two persons. ( ) reveille and retreat gun = .= the morning and evening gun will be fired by a detachment of the guard, consisting, when practicable, of a corporal and two privates. the morning gun is fired at the first note of reveille, or, if marches be played before the reveille, it is fired at the beginning of the first march the retreat gun is fired at the last note of retreat. the corporal marches the detachment to and from the piece, which is fired, sponged out, and secured under his direction. ( ) guard mounting = .= guard mounting will be formal or informal as the commanding officer may direct. it will be held as prescribed in the drill regulations of the arm of the service to which the guard belongs; if none is prescribed, then as for infantry. in case the guard is composed wholly of mounted organizations, guard mounting may be held mounted. ( ) = .= when infantry and mounted troops dismounted are united for guard mounting, all details form as prescribed for infantry. ( ) formal guard mounting for infantry = .= formal guard mounting will ordinarily be held only in posts or camps where a band is present. ( ) = .= at the =assembly=, the men designated for the guard fall in on their company parade grounds as prescribed in paragraph . i. d. r. the first sergeant then verifies the detail, inspects it, replaces any man unfit to go on guard, turns the detail over to the senior noncommissioned officer, and retires. the band takes its place on the parade ground so that the left of its front rank shall be paces to the right of the front rank of the guard when the latter is formed. ( ) = .= at =adjutant's call=, the adjutant, dismounted, and the sergeant-major on his left, marches to the parade ground. the adjutant halts and takes post so as to be paces in front of and facing the center of the guard when formed; the sergeant-major continues on, moves by the left flank, and takes post, facing to the left, paces to the left of the front rank of the band; the band plays in quick or double time; the details are marched to the parade ground by the senior noncommissioned officers; the detail that arrives first is marched to the line so that, upon halting, the breast of the front-rank man shall be near to and opposite the left arm of the sergeant-major; the commander of the detail halts his detail, places himself in front of and facing the sergeant-major, at a distance equal to or a little greater than the front of his detail, and commands: = . right, . dress.= the detail dresses up to the line of the sergeant-major and its commander, the right front-rank man placing his breast against the left arm of the sergeant-major; the noncommissioned officers take post two paces in rear of the rear rank of the detail. the detail aligned, the commander of the detail commands: =front=, salutes, and then reports: "=the detail is correct=;" or "=so many sergeants, corporals, or privates are absent=;" the sergeant-major returns the salute with the right hand after the report is made; the commander then passes by the right of the guard and takes post in the line of noncommissioned officers in rear of the right file or his detail. should there be more than one detail, it is formed in like manner on the left of the one preceding; the privates, noncommissioned officers, and commander of each detail dress on those of the preceding details in the same rank or line; each detail commander closes the rear rank to the right and fills blank files, as far as practicable, with the men from his front rank. should the guard from a company not include a noncommissioned officer, one will be detailed to perform the duties of commander of the detail. in this case the commander of the detail, after reporting to the sergeant-major, passes around the right flank between the guard and the band and retires. ( ) = .= when the last detail has formed, the sergeant-major takes a side step to the right, draws sword, verifies the detail, takes post two paces to the right and two paces to the front of the guard, facing to the left, causes the guard to count off, completes the left squad, if necessary, as in the school of the company, and if there be more than three squads, divides the guard into two platoons, again takes post as described above and commands: = . open ranks, . march.= at the command march, the rear rank and file closers march backward four steps, halt, and dress to the right. the sergeant major aligns the ranks and file closers and again, taking post as described above, commands: =front=, moves parallel to the front rank until opposite the center, turns to the right, halts midway to the adjutant, salutes, and reports: "=sir, the details are correct=;" or, "=sir, (so many) sergeants, corporals, or privates are absent=;" the adjutant returns the salute, directs the sergeant-major: =take your post=, and then draws saber; the sergeant-major faces about, approaches to within two paces of the center of the front rank, turns to the right, moves three paces beyond the left of the front rank, turns to the left, halts on the line of the front rank, faces about, and brings his sword to the order. when the sergeant-major has reported, the officer of the guard takes post, facing to the front, three paces in front of the center of the guard, and draws saber. the adjutant then commands: = . officer (or officers) and noncommissioned officers, . front and center, . march.= at the command =center=, the officers carry saber. at the command =march=, the officer advances and halts three paces from the adjutant, remaining at the carry; the noncommissioned officers pass by the flanks, along the front, and form in order of rank from right to left, three paces in rear of the officer, remaining at the right shoulder; if there is no officer of the guard the noncommissioned officers halt on a line three paces from the adjutant; the adjutant then assigns the officers and noncommissioned officers according to rank, as follows: =commander of the guard, leader of first platoon, leader of second platoon, right guide of first platoon, left guide of second platoon, left guide of first platoon, right guide of second platoon=, and =file closers=, or, if the guard is not divided into platoons: =commander of the guard, right guide, left guide=, and =file closers=. the adjutant then commands: = . officer (or officers) and noncommissioned officers, . posts, . march.= at the command =posts=, all, except the officer commanding the guard, face about. at the command =march=, they take the posts prescribed in the school of the company with open ranks. the adjutant directs: =inspect your guard, sir=; at which the officer commanding the guard faces about, commands: =prepare for inspection=, returns saber, and inspects the guard. during the inspection, the band plays; the adjutant returns saber, observes the general condition of the guard, and falls out any man who is unfit for guard duty or does not present a creditable appearance. substitutes will report to the commander of the guard at the guardhouse. ( ) = .= the adjutant, when so directed, selects orderlies and color sentinels, as prescribed in paragraphs and , and notifies the commander of the guard of his selection. ( ) if there be a junior officer of the guard he takes post at the same time as the senior, facing to the front, paces in front of the center of the first platoon; in going to the front and center he follows and takes position on the left of the senior and is assigned as leader of the first platoon; he may be directed by the commander of the guard to assist in inspecting the guard. if there be no officer of the guard, the adjutant inspects the guard. a noncommissioned officer commanding the guard takes post on the right of the right guide, when the guard is in line; and takes the post of the officer of the guard, when in column or passing in review. ( ) = .= the inspection ended, the adjutant places himself about paces in front of and facing the center of the guard, and draws saber; the new officer of the day takes post in front of and facing the guard, about paces from the adjutant; the old officer of the day takes post paces to the right of and pace to the rear of the new officer of the day; the officer of the guard takes post paces in front of its center, draws saber with the adjutant and comes to the order; thereafter he takes the same relative positions as a captain of a company. the adjutant then commands: = . parade, . rest, . sound off=, and comes to the order and parade rest. the band, playing, passes in front of the officer of the guard to the left of the line, and back to its post on the right, when it ceases playing. the adjutant then comes to attention, carries saber, and commands: = . guard, . attention, . close ranks, . march.= the ranks are opened and closed as in paragraph , i. d. r. the adjutant then commands: = . present, . arms=, faces toward the new officer of the day, salutes, and then reports: =sir, the guard is formed.= the new officer of the day, after the adjutant has reported, returns the salute with the hand and directs the adjutant: =march the guard in review, sir.= the adjutant carries saber, faces about, brings the guard to an order, and commands: = . at trail, platoons (or guard) right, . march, . guard, . halt.= the platoons execute the movements; the band turns to the right and places itself paces in front of the first platoon. the adjutant places himself paces from the flank and abreast of the commander of the guard; the sergeant major, paces from the left flank of the second platoon. the adjutant then commands: = . pass in review, . forward, . march.= the guard marches in quick time past the officer of the day, according to the principles of review, and is brought to =eyes right= at the proper time by the commander of the guard; the adjutant, commander of the guard, leaders of platoons, sergeant-major, and drum major salute. the band, having passed the officer of the day, turns to the left out of the column, places itself opposite and facing him, and continues to play until the guard leaves the parade ground. the field music detaches itself from the band when the latter turns out of the column, and, remaining in front of the guard, commences to play when the band ceases. having passed paces beyond the officer of the day, the adjutant halts; the sergeant-major halts abreast of the adjutant and pace to his left; they then return saber, salute, and retire; the commander of the guard then commands: = . platoons, right by squads, . march=, and marches the guard to its post. the officers of the day face toward each other and salute; the old officer of the day turns over the orders to the new officer of the day. when the band is sounding off, and while the guard is marching in review, the officers of the day stand at parade rest with arms folded. they take this position when the adjutant comes to parade rest, resume the attention with him, again take the parade rest at the first note of the march in review, and resume attention as the head of the column approaches. the new officer of the day returns the salute of the commander of the guard and the adjutant, making one salute with the hand. ( ) = .= if the guard be not divided into platoons, the adjutant commands: = . at trail, guard right, . march, . guard, . halt=, and it passes in review as above; the commander of the guard is paces in front of its center; the adjutant places himself paces from the left flank and abreast of the commander of the guard; the sergeant covers the adjutant on a line with the front rank. ( ) informal guard mounting for infantry = .= informal guard mounting will be held on the parade ground of the organization from which the guard is detailed. if it is detailed from more than one organization, then at such place as the commanding officer may direct. ( ) = . at assembly=, the detail for guard falls in on the company parade ground. the first sergeant verifies the detail, inspects their dress and general appearance, and replaces any man unfit to march on guard. he then turns the detail over to the commander of the guard and retires. ( ) = . at adjutant's call=, the officer of the day takes his place paces in front of the center of the guard and commands: = . officer (or officers) and noncommissioned officers, . front and center, . march=; whereupon the officers and noncommissioned officers take their positions, are assigned and sent to their posts as prescribed in formal guard mounting. (par. .) the officer of the day will then inspect the guard with especial reference for its fitness for the duty for which it is detailed, and will select as prescribed in paragraphs , the necessary orderlies and color sentinels. the men found unfit for guard will be returned to quarters and will be replaced by others found to be suitable, if available in the company. if none are available in the company, the fact will be reported to the adjutant immediately after guard mounting. when the inspection shall have been completed, the officer of the day resumes his position and directs the commander of the guard to march the guard to its post. ( ) relieving the old guard = .= as the new guard approaches the guardhouse, the old guard is formed in line, with its field music paces to its right; and when the field music at the head of the new guard arrives opposite its left, the commander of the new guard commands: = . eyes, . right=; the commander of the old guard commands: = . present, . arms=; commanders of both guards salute. the new guard marches in quick time past the old guard. when the commander of the new guard is opposite the field music of the old guard, he commands: =front=; the commander of the old guard commands: = . order, . arms=, as soon as the new guard shall have cleared the old guard. the field music having marched paces beyond the field music of the old guard, changes direction to the right, and, followed by the guard, changes direction to the left when on a line with the old guard; the changes of direction are without command. the commander of the guard halts on the line of the front rank of the old guard, allows his guard to march past him, and when its rear approaches forms it in line to the left, establishes the left guide paces to the right of the field music of the old guard, and on a line with the front rank, and then dresses his guard to the left; the field music of the new guard is paces to the right of its front rank. ( ) = .= the new guard being dressed, the commander of each guard, in front of and facing its center, commands: = . present, . arms=, resumes his front, salutes, carries saber, faces his guard and commands: = . order, . arms.= should a guard be commanded by a noncommissioned officer, he stands on the right or left of the front rank, according as he commands the old or new guard, and executes the rifle salute. ( ) = .= after the new guard arrives at its post, and has saluted the old guard, each guard is presented by its commander to its officer of the day; if there be but one officer of the day present, or if one officer acts in the capacity of old and new officer of the day, each guard is presented to him by its commander. ( ) = .= if other persons entitled to a salute approach, each commander of the guard will bring his own guard to attention if not already at attention. the senior commander of the two guards will then command "= . old and new guards, . present, . arms.=" the junior will salute at the command "=present arms=" given by the senior. after the salute has been acknowledged, the senior brings both guards to the order. ( ) = .= after the salutes have been acknowledged by the officers of the day, each guard is brought to an order by its commander; the commander of the new guard then directs the orderly or orderlies to fall out and report, and causes bayonets to be fixed if so ordered by the commanding officer; bayonets will not then be unfixed during the tour except in route marches while the guard is actually marching, or when specially directed by the commanding officer. the commander of the new guard then falls out members of the guard for detached posts, placing them under charge of the proper noncommissioned officers, divides the guard into three reliefs, =first=, =second=, and =third=, from right to left, and directs a list of the guard to be made by reliefs. when the guard consists of troops of different arms combined, the men are assigned to reliefs so as to insure a fair division of duty, under rules prescribed by the commanding officer. ( ) = .= the sentinels and detachments of the old guard are at once relieved by members of the new guard; the two guards standing at ease or at rest while these changes are being made. the commander of the old transmits to the commander of the new guard all his orders, instructions, and information concerning the guard and its duties. the commander of the new guard then takes possession of the guardhouse and verifies the articles in charge of the guard. ( ) = .= if considerable time is required to bring in that portion of the old guard still on post, the commanding officer may direct that as soon as the orders and property are turned over to the new guard, the portion of the old guard at the guardhouse may be marched off and dismissed. in such a case, the remaining detachment or detachments of the old guard will be inspected by the commander of the new guard when they reach the guardhouse. he will direct the senior noncommissioned officer present to march these detachments off and dismiss them in the prescribed manner. ( ) = .= in bad weather, at night, after long marches, or when the guard is very small, the field music may be dispensed with. ( ) footnotes: [ ] the term "governors general" shall be taken to mean administrative officers under whom officers with the title of governor are acting. [ ] the grade of commodore ceased to exist as a grade on the active list of the navy of the united states on mar. , . by section of the act of mar. , , the nine junior rear admirals are authorized to receive the pay and allowances of a brigadier general of the army. part viii military organization = .= the tabulations that follow are based on the national defense act of june , , and on the tables of organization. composition of infantry units ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ regiment | battalions ( ) ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ each | each ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ colonel | major lt. colonel | st lieut., mounted majors | (battalion adjutant) captains | companies. st lieuts. | nd lieuts. | _attached_ -- | | battalion sergt. major -- | (from hdqrs. co.) hdqrs. co. | machine gun co. | supply co. | infantry cos., organized into | battalions of companies each | | _attached_ | | major, med. dept. | capts., or st lieuts., | med. dept. | chaplain | ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- companies -----------------+--------------------+-----------------+---------------- infantry ( ) | headquarters ( ) | machine gun ( ) | supply ( ) -----------------+--------------------+-----------------+---------------- captain | captain, mounted,| captain, mtd. | captain, mtd. st lieut. | (regtl. adjt.) | st lt., mtd. | nd lt., mtd. nd lieut. | | nd lts., mtd.|-- -- | regtl. sergt. |-- | | major, mounted. | |-- -- | batln. sergts. |-- | regtl. supply | major, mounted. | st sergt., | sergts., mtd. st sergt. | st sergt. | mtd. | st sergt., mess sergt. | (drum major) | mess sergt. | mtd. supply sergt.| color sergts. | supply sergt.,| mess sergt. sergts. | mess sergt. | mtd. | stable sergt. corpls. | supply sergt. | stable sergt.,| corpl., mtd. cooks | stable sergt. | mtd. | cook buglers | sergt. | horseshoer | saddler mechanic | cooks | sergeants | horseshoer pvts. ( st | horseshoer | corporals | wagoner for class) | band leader | cooks | each pvts. | asst. band leader| buglers | authorized --- | sergt. bugler | mechanic | wagon | band sergts. | pvts., st | of the field --- | band corpls. | class | and combat (the president | musicians, st | privates | train. may add | class |-- | sergts., | musicians, nd | | corpls., | class |-- | mechanic, pvts.| musicians, rd |(the president | st class and | class |may add | pvts.--total, )| pvts., st class,|sergts., | | mtd. |corpls., | | pvts, mtd. | mechanic, | |-- | pvts., st | | |class and | |-- |pvts.--total, | | | ) | -----------------+--------------------+-----------------+---------------- =transportation, orderlies, etc.= to hdqrs. co., riding horses; to machine gun co., riding horses and pack mules; to supply co., riding horses; to each battalion hdqrs., riding horses, wagon, draft mules, and mounted orderlies; to regtl. hdqrs., riding horses. composition of cavalry units ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ regiment | squadrons ( ) ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ each | each ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ colonel | major lt. colonel | st lieut., squadron adjutant majors | captains | troops st lieuts. | nd lieuts. | _attached_ -- | | squadron sergt. major -- | (from hdqrs. troop) | hdqrs. troop | machine gun troop | supply troop | troops organized into | squadrons of troops each | | _attached_ | | major, med. dept. | capts., or st lieuts., | med. dept. | chaplain | ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- troops -----------------+--------------------+-----------------+---------------- cavalry ( ) | headquarters ( ) | machine gun ( ) | supply ( ) -----------------+--------------------+-----------------+---------------- captain | captain, regtl. | captain | captain, st lieut. | adjt. | st lieut. | regtl. supply nd lieut. | regtl. sergeant | nd lieuts. | officer -- | major |-- | nd lieuts. | squadron sergts. | |-- -- | major |-- | | st sergt. | |-- st sergt. | (drum major) | st sergt. | mess sergt. | color sergts. | mess sergt. | regtl. supply supply sergt. | mess sergt. | supply sergt. | sergts. stable sergt. | supply sergt. | stable sergt. | st sergt. sergts. | stable sergt. | horseshoers | mess sergt. corpls. | sergt. | sergts. | stable sergt. cooks | cooks | corpls. | corpl. horseshoers | horseshoer | cooks | cook saddler | saddler | mechanic | horseshoer buglers | pvts. ( st class)| saddler | saddler pvts. ( st | pvts. | buglers | wagoner for class) | band leader | pvts. st | each pvts. | asst. band leader| class | authorized -- | sergt. bugler | pvts. | wagon of the | band sergts. |-- | field and -- | band corpls. | | combat train. | musicians, st |-- | (the president | class | | may add pvts. | musicians, nd |(the president | ( st class) and | class |may add | pvts.--total, | musicians, rd |sergts., | ) | class |corpls., | |-- |mechanic, pvt. | | | st class, | |-- |pvts.--total, )| | | | |(the president may | | | add sergts, | | | corpls., | | | horseshoer, pvts.| | | st class, | | | pvts.--total, ) | | -----------------+--------------------+-----------------+---------------- =transportation, orderlies, etc.= to each squadron hdqrs., or riding horses and orderlies; to each squadron; riding horses, wagon and draft mules. composition of field artillery units ------------------------+------------------------+----------------------- | battalion | battery regiment | (gun or howitzer) | (gun or howitzer) ------------------------+------------------------+----------------------- each | each | each ------------------------+------------------------+----------------------- colonel | major | captain lt. colonel | captain | st lieuts. captain | -- | nd lieuts. -- | | -- | -- | -- | | -- | batteries as follows: | hdqrs. co., | | st sergt. supply co., | mountain artillery | supply sergt. | battalions and light | stable sergt. and such number of | artillery gun or | mess sergt. guns and howitzer as | howitzer battalions | sergts. the president may | serving with the field | corpls. direct. | artillery or infantry | chief mechanic | divisions shall contain| saddler _attached_ | three batteries; horse | horseshoers | artillery battalions | mechanic major, med. dept. | and heavy field | buglers capts. or st | artillery gun or | cooks lieuts., med. dept. | howitzer battalions | pvts., st class chaplain | shall contain two | pvts. | batteries. | --- | | | | --- | | | | when no enlisted men | | of the quartermaster | | corps are attached for | | such positions there | | shall be added to each | | battery of mountain | | artillery: | | | | packmaster sergt., | | st class | | asst. packmaster | | sergt. | | cargador, corpl. | | | | (the president may add | | sergts., corpls., | | horseshoer, | | mechanics, bugler, | | pvts. st class, | | pvts.--total, ) ------------------------+------------------------+----------------------- ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ headquarters company of regt., of | battalions | supply ( ) regt. of batlns. ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ captain | captain st lieut. | st lieut. -- | -- | -- | -- | regtl. sergt. major | regtl. supply sergts. batln. sergts. major | st sergt. st sergt. | mess sergt. color sergts. | corpl. mess sergt. | cook supply sergt. | horseshoer stable sergt. | saddler sergts. | pvts. corpls. | wagoner for each authorized horseshoer | wagon of the field train. saddler | mechanic | when regt. consists of batlns. buglers | there shall be added nd lieut. cooks | ( ), regtl. supply sergt., pvts. st class | pvt., wagoner for each pvts. | additional authorized wagon of the band leader | field train. asst. band leader | sergt. bugler | (the president may add corpl., band sergts. | cook, horseshoer, band corpls. | saddler.--total, ) musicians, st class | musicians, nd class | supply co., of regt. of batlns. musicians, rd class | may have added, the same number as -- | given above for regt. of batlns. | -- | | when a regiment consists of three | battalions there shall be added to | hdqrs. co.: batln. sergt. major, | sergt., corpls., bugler, | pvt. st class, pvts.--total, .| | when no enlisted men of the | quartermaster corps are attached | for such positions there shall be | added to each mountain artillery | hdqrs. co., | | packmaster sergt., st class | asst. packmaster, sergt. | cargador, corpl.--total, . | | (the president may add sergts., | corpls., horseshoer, | mechanic, pvt. st class, | pvts.--total to a regiment of | battalions; and to a regiment of | battalions sergt., corpls., | horseshoer, mechanic, cooks, | pvts. st class, pvts.--total, | ) | ------------------------------------+------------------------------------ =transportation, orderlies, etc.= to battery hdqrs., riding horses; to each battery, riding horses, draft horses, battery wagon, store wagon, caissons and guns. part ix map reading and military sketching chapter i map reading = . definition of map.= a map is a representation on paper of a certain portion of the earth's surface. a military map is one that shows the things which are of military importance, such as roads, streams, bridges, houses, depressions, and hills. = . map reading.= by map reading is meant the ability to get a clear idea of the ground represented by the map,--of being able to _visualize_ the ground so represented. for some unknown reason, military map reading is generally considered a very difficult matter to master, and the beginner, starting out with this idea, seemingly tries to find it difficult. however, as a matter of fact, map reading is not difficult, if one goes about learning it in the right way,--that is, by first becoming familiar with scales, contours, conventional signs, and other things that go to make up map making. practice is most important in acquiring ability in map reading. practice looking at maps and then _visualizing_ the actual country represented on the map. = . scales.= in order that you may be able to tell the distance between any two points on a map, the map must be drawn to scale,--that is, it must be so drawn that a certain distance on the map, say, one inch, represents a certain distance on the ground, say, one mile. on such a map, then, two inches would represent two miles on the ground; three inches, three miles, and so on. therefore, we may say-- _the scale of a map is the ratio between actual distances on the ground and those between the same points as represented on the map._ = . methods of representing scales.= there are three ways in which the scale of a map may be represented: st. by words and figures, as inches = mile; inch = feet. d. by representative fraction (abbreviated r. f.), which is a fraction whose numerator represents units of distance on the map and whose denominator, units of distance on the ground. for example, r. f. = inch (on map)/ mile (on ground) which is equivalent to r. f. = / , since mile = , inches. so the expression, "r. f. / " on a map merely means that inch on the map represents , inches (or mile) on the ground. this fraction is usually written with a numerator , as above, no definite unit of inches or miles being specified in either the numerator or denominator. in this case the expression means that one unit of distance on the map equals as many of the same units on the ground as are in the denominator. thus, / means that inch on the map = , inches on the ground, foot on the map = , feet on the ground; yard on the map = , yards on the ground, etc. d. by graphical scale, that is, a drawn scale. a graphical scale is a line drawn on the map, divided into equal parts, each part being marked not with its actual length, but with the distance which it represents on the ground. thus: [illustration: fig. ] for example, the distance from to represents fifty yards on the ground; the distance from to , one hundred yards on the ground, etc. if the above scale were applied to the road running from a to b in fig. , it would show that the length of the road is yards. [illustration: fig. ] = . construction of scales.= the following are the most usual problems that arise in connection with the construction of scales: . having given the r. f. on a map, to find how many miles on the ground are represented by one inch on the map. let us suppose that the r. f. is / . solution now, as previously explained, / simply means that one inch on the map represents , inches on the ground. there are , inches in one mile. , goes into , three times--that is to say, , is / of , , and we, therefore, see from this that one inch on the map represents / of a mile on the ground, and consequently it would take three inches on the map to represent one whole mile on the ground. so, we have this general rule: to find out how many miles one inch on the map represents on the ground, divide the denominator of the r. f. by , . . being given the r. f. to construct a graphical scale to read yards. let us assume that / is the r. f. given--that is to say, one inch on the map represents , inches on the ground, but, as there are inches in one yard, , inches = , / yds. = . yds.--that is, one inch on the map represents . yds. on the ground. now, suppose about a -inch scale is desired. since one inch on the map = . yards on the ground, inches (map) = . × = , . yards (ground). in order to get as nearly a -inch scale as possible to represent even hundreds of yards, let us assume , yards to be the total number to be represented by the scale. the question then resolves itself into this: how many inches on the map are necessary to represent , yards on the ground. since, as we have seen, one inch (map) = . yards (ground), as many inches are necessary to show , yards as . is contained in , ; or / . = . inches. [illustration: fig. ] now lay off with a scale of equal parts the distance a-i (figure ) = . inches (about and - / tenths), and divided it into equal parts by the construction shown in figure, as follows: draw a line a-h, making any convenient angle with a-i, and lay off equal convenient lengths (a-b, b-c, c-d, etc.), so as to bring h about opposite to i. join h and i and draw the intermediate lines through b, c, etc., parallel to h-i. these lines divide a-i into equal parts, each yards long. the left part, called the extension, is similarly divided into equal parts, each representing yards. = . to construct a scale for a map with no scale.= in this case, measure the distance between any two definite points on the ground represented, by pacing or otherwise, and scale off the corresponding map distance. then see how the distance thus measured corresponds with the distance on the map between the two points. for example, let us suppose that the distance on the ground between two given points is one mile and that the distance between the corresponding points on the map is / inch. we would, therefore, see that / inch on the map = one mile on the ground. hence / inch would represent / of a mile, and - , or one inch, would represent × / = / = - / miles. the r. f. is found as follows: r. f. inch/( - / mile) = inch/( , × - / inches) = / . from this a scale of yards is constructed as above ( ). . to construct a graphical scale from a scale expressed in unfamiliar units. there remains one more problem, which occurs when there is a scale on the map in words and figures, but it is expressed in unfamiliar units, such as the meter (= . inches), strides of a man or horse, rate of travel of column, etc. if a noncommissioned officer should come into possession of such a map, it would be impossible for him to have a correct idea of the distances on the map. if the scale were in inches to miles or yards, he would estimate the distance between any two points on the map to be so many inches and at once know the corresponding distance on the ground in miles or yards. but suppose the scale found on the map to be one inch = strides (ground), then estimates could not be intelligently made by one unfamiliar with the length of the stride used. however, suppose the stride was inches long; we would then have this: since stride = inches, strides = , inches. but according to our supposition, inch on the map = strides on the ground; hence inch on the map = , inches on the ground, and we have as our r. f., inch (map)/ , inches (ground) = / . a graphical scale can now be constructed as in ( ). problems in scales = .= the following problems should be solved to become familiar with the construction of scales: =problem no. .= the r. f. of a map is / . required: . the distance in miles shown by one inch on the map; . to construct a graphical scale of yards; also one to read miles. =problem no. .= a map has a graphical scale on which . inches reads strides. . what is the r. f. of the map? . how many miles are represented by inch? =problem no. .= the leavenworth map in back of this book has a graphical scale and a measured distance of . inches reads , yards. required: . the r. f. of the map; . number of miles shown by inch on the map. =problem no. .= . construct a scale to read yards for a map of r. f. = / . . how many inches represent mile? = . scaling distances from a map.= there are four methods of scaling distances from maps: . apply a piece of straight edged paper to the distance between any two points, a and b, for instance, and mark the distance on the paper. now, apply the paper to the graphical scale, (fig. , par. ), and read the number of yards on the main scale and add the number indicated on the extension. for example: + = yards. . by taking the distance off with a pair of dividers and applying the dividers thus set to the graphical scale, the distance is read. . by use of an instrument called a map measurer, fig. , set the hand on the face to read zero, roll the small wheel over the distance; now roll the wheel in an opposite direction along the graphical scale, noting the number of yards passed over. or, having rolled over the distance, note the number of inches on the dial and multiply this by the number of miles or other units per inch. a map measurer is valuable for use in solving map problems in patrolling, advance guard, outpost, etc. [illustration: fig. ] . apply a scale of inches to the line to be measured, and multiply this distance by the number of miles per inch shown by the map. = . contours.= in order to show on a map a correct representation of ground, the depressions and elevations,--that is, the undulations,--must be represented. this is usually done by _contours_. conversationally speaking, a _contour_ is the outline of a figure or body, or the line or lines representing such an outline. in connection with maps, the word _contour_ is used in these two senses: . it is a projection on a horizontal (level) plane (that is, a map) of the line in which a horizontal plane cuts the surface of the ground. in other words, it is a line on a map which shows the route one might follow on the ground and walk on the absolute level. if, for example, you went half way up the side of a hill and, starting there, walked entirely around the hill, neither going up any higher nor down any lower, and you drew a line of the route you had followed, this line would be a _contour line_ and its projection on a horizontal plane (map) would be a _contour_. by imagining the surface of the ground being cut by a number of horizontal planes _that are the same distance apart_, and then projecting (shooting) on a horizontal plane (map) the lines so cut, the elevations and depressions on the ground are represented on the map. it is important to remember that the imaginary horizontal planes cutting the surface of the ground must be the same distance apart. the distance between the planes is called the _contour interval_. . the word _contour_ is also used in referring to _contour line_,--that is to say, it is used in referring to the line itself in which a horizontal plane cuts the surface of the ground as well as in referring to the projection of such line on a horizontal plane. an excellent idea of what is meant by contours and contour-lines can be gotten from figs. and . let us suppose that formerly the island represented in figure was entirely under water and that by a sudden disturbance the water of the lake fell until the island stood twenty feet above the water, and that later several other sudden falls of the water, twenty feet each time, occurred, until now the island stands feet out of the lake, and at each of the twenty feet elevations a distinct water line is left. these water lines are perfect contour-lines measured from the surface of the lake as a reference (or datum) plane. figure shows the contour-lines in figure projected, or shot down, on a horizontal (level) surface. it will be observed that on the gentle slopes, such as f-h (fig. ), the contours ( , ) are far apart. but on the steep slopes, as r-o, the contours ( , , , , ) are close together. hence, it is seen that contours far apart on a map indicate gentle slopes, and contours close together, steep slopes. it is also seen that the shape of the contours gives an accurate idea of the form of the island. the contours in fig. give an exact representation not only of the general form of the island, the two peaks, o and b, the stream, m-n, the saddle, m, the water shed from f to h, and steep bluff at k, but they also give the slopes of the ground at all points. from this we see that the slopes are directly proportional to the nearness of the contours--that is, the nearer the contours on a map are to one another, the steeper is the slope, and the farther the contours on a map are from one another, the gentler is the slope. a wide space between contours, therefore, represents level ground. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] the contours on maps are always numbered, the number of each showing its height above some plane called a datum plane. thus in fig. the contours are numbered from to using the surface of the lake as the datum plane. the numbering shows at once the height of any point on a given contour and in addition shows the contour interval--in this case feet. generally only every fifth contour is numbered. the datum plane generally used in maps is mean sea level, hence the elevations indicated would be the heights above mean sea level. the contours of a cone (fig. ) are circles of different sizes, one within another, and the same distance apart, because the slope of a cone is at all points the same. [illustration: fig. ] the contours of a half sphere (fig. ), are a series of circles, far apart near the center (top), and near together at the outside (bottom), showing that the slope of a hemisphere varies at all points, being nearly flat on top and increasing in steepness toward the bottom. [illustration: fig. ] the contours of a concave (hollowed out) cone (fig. ) are close together at the center (top) and far apart at the outside (bottom). [illustration: fig. ] the following additional points about contours should be remembered: (a) a water shed or spur, along with rain water divides, flowing away from it on both sides, is indicated by the higher contours bulging out toward the lower ones (f-h, fig. ). (b) a water course or valley, along which rain falling on both sides of it joins in one stream, is indicated by the lower contours curving in toward the higher ones (m-n, fig. ). (c) the contours of different heights which unite and become a single line, represent a vertical cliff (k, fig. ). (d) two contours which cross each other represent an overhanging cliff. (e) a closed contour without another contour in it, represents either in elevation or a depression, depending on whether its reference number is greater or smaller than that of the outer contour. a hilltop is shown when the closed contour is higher than the contour next to it; a depression is shown when the closed contour is lower than the one next to it. if the student will first examine the drainage system, as shown by the courses of the streams on the map, he can readily locate all the valleys, as the streams must flow through valleys. knowing the valleys, the ridges or hills can easily be placed, even without reference to the numbers on the contours. =for example:= on the elementary map, woods creek flows north and york creek flows south. they rise very close to each other, and the ground between the points at which they rise must be higher ground, sloping north on one side and south on the other, as the streams flow north and south, respectively (see the ridge running west from twin hills). the course of sandy creek indicates a long valley, extending almost the entire length of the map. meadow creek follows another valley, and deep run another. when these streams happen to join other streams, the valleys must open into each other. = . map distances (or horizontal equivalents).= the horizontal distance between contours on a map (called map distance, or m. d.; or horizontal equivalents or h. e.) is inversely proportional to the slope of the ground represented--that it to say, the greater the slope of the ground, the less is the horizontal distance between the contours; the less the slope of the ground represented, the greater is the horizontal distance between the contours. [illustration: fig. ] +-----------+--------+--------------+ | slope | rise | horizontal | | (degrees) | (feet) | distance | | | | (inches) | +-----------+--------+--------------+ | deg. | | | | deg. | | / = | | deg. | | / = | | deg. | | / = | | deg. | | / = | +-----------+--------+--------------+ it is a fact that inches horizontally on a degree slope gives a vertical rise of one foot; inches, two feet, inches, three feet, etc., from which we see that on a slope of degree, inches multiplied by vertical rises of foot, feet, feet, etc., gives us the corresponding horizontal distance in inches. for example, if the contour interval (vertical interval, v. i.) of a map is feet, then inches × equals inches, gives the horizontal ground distance corresponding to a rise of feet on a degree slope. to reduce this horizontal ground distance to horizontal map distance, we would, for example, proceed as follows: let us assume the r. f. to be / --that is to say, , inches on the ground equals inch on the map, consequently, inches on the ground equals / , equals . inch on the map. and in the case of degrees, degrees, etc., we would have: m. d. for ° = /( × ) = . inch; m. d. for ° = /( × ) = . inch, etc. from the above, we have this rule: to construct a scale of m. d. for a map, multiply by the contour interval (in feet) and the r. f. of the map, and divide the results by , , , , etc., and then lay off these distances as shown in fig. , par. a. formula m. d. (inches) = ( × v. i. (feet) × r. f.) / (degrees ( , , , , etc.)) = a. scale of map distances (or, scale of slopes).= on the elementary map, below the scale of miles and scale of yards, is a scale similar to the following one: [illustration: fig. ] the left-hand division is marked / °; the next division (one-half as long) °; the next division (one-half the length of the ° division) °, and so on. the / ° division means that where adjacent contours on the map are just that distance apart, the ground has a slope of / a degree between these two contours, and slopes up toward the contour with the higher reference number; a space between adjacent contours equal to the ° space shown on the scale means a ° slope, and so on. what is a slope of °? by a slope of ° we mean that the surface of the ground makes an angle of ° with the horizontal (a level surface. see fig. , par. ). the student should find out the slope of some hill or street and thus get a concrete idea of what the different degrees of slope mean. a road having a ° slope is very steep. by means of this scale of m. d.'s on the map, the map reader can determine the slope of any portion of the ground represented, that is, as steep as / ° or steeper. ground having a slope of less than / ° is practically level. = . slopes.= slopes are usually given in one of three ways: st, in degrees; d, in percentages; d, in gradients (grades). st. a one degree slope means that the angle between the horizontal and the given line is degree ( °). see fig. , par. . d. a slope is said to be , , , etc., per cent, when units horizontally correspond to a rise of , , , etc., units vertically. [illustration: fig. ] d. a slope is said to be one on one ( / ), two on three, ( / ), etc., when one unit horizontal corresponds to vertical; three horizontal correspond to two vertical, etc. the numerator usually refers to the vertical distance, and the denominator to the horizontal distance. [illustration: fig. ] degrees of slope are usually used in military matters; percentages are often used for roads, almost always of railroads; gradients are used of steep slopes, and usually of dimensions of trenches. = . effect of slope on movements= degrees or / inaccessible for infantry; degrees or / difficult for infantry; degrees or / inaccessible for cavalry; degrees or / inaccessible for artillery; degrees or / accessible for wagons. the normal system of scales prescribed for u. s. army field sketches is as follows: for road sketches, inches = mile, vertical interval between contours (v. i.) = ft.; for position sketches, inches = mile, v. i. = ft.; for fortification sketches, inches = mile, v. i. = ft. on this system any given length of m. d. corresponds to the same slope on each of the scales. for instance, . inch between contours represents a ° slope on the -inch, -inch and -inch maps of the normal system. figure , par. a, gives the normal scale of m. d.'s for slopes up to degrees. a scale of m. d.'s is usually printed on the margin of maps, near the geographical scale. = . meridians.= if you look along the upper left hand border of the elementary map (back of manual), you will see two arrows, as shown in fig. , pointing towards the top of the map. [illustration: fig. ] they are pointing in the direction that is north on the map. the arrow with a full barb points toward the north pole (the true north pole) of the earth, and is called the true meridian. the arrow with but half a barb points toward what is known as the magnetic pole of the earth, and is called the magnetic meridian. the magnetic pole is a point up in the arctic regions, near the geographical or true north pole, which, on account of its magnetic qualities, attracts one end of all compass needles and causes them to point towards it, and as it is near the true north pole, this serves to indicate the direction of north to a person using a compass. of course, the angle which the magnetic needle makes with the true meridian (called the magnetic declination) varies at different points on the earth. in some places it points east of the true meridian and in others it points west of it. it is important to know this relation because maps usually show the true meridian and an observer is generally supplied with a magnetic compass. fig. shows the usual type of box compass. it has cardinal points, n, e, s and w marked, as well as a circle graduated in degrees from zero to °, clockwise around the circle. to read the magnetic angle (called magnetic azimuth) of any point from the observer's position the north point of the compass circle is pointed toward the object and the angle indicated by the north end of the needle is read. [illustration: fig. ] you now know from the meridians, for example, in going from york to oxford (see elementary map) that you travel north; from boling to salem you must travel south; going from salem to york requires you to travel west; and from york to salem you travel east. suppose you are in command of a patrol at york and are told to go to salem by the most direct line across country. you look at your map and see that salem is exactly east of york. next you take out your field compass (figure , par. ), raise the lid, hold the box level, allow the needle to settle and see in what direction the north end of the needle points (it would point toward oxford). you then know the direction of north from york, and you can turn your right and go due east towards salem. having once discovered the direction of north on the ground, you can go to any point shown on your map without other assistance. if you stand at york, facing north and refer to your map, you need no guide to tell you that salem lies directly to your right; oxford straight in front of you; boling in a direction about halfway between the directions of salem and oxford, and so on. = . determination of positions of points on map.= if the distance, height and direction of a point on a map are known with respect to any other point, then the position of the first point is fully determined. the scale of the map enables us to determine the distance; the contours, the height; and the time meridian, the direction. thus (see map in pocket at back of book), pope hill (sm') is yards from grant hill (um') (using graphical scale), and it is feet higher than grant hill, since it is on contour and grant hill is on contour ; pope hill is also due north of grant hill, that is, the north and south line through grant hill passes through pope hill. therefore, the position of pope hill is fully determined with respect to grant hill. orientation = .= in order that directions on the map and on the ground shall correspond, it is necessary for the map to be oriented, that is, the true meridian of the map must lie in the same direction as the true meridian through the observer's position on the ground, which is only another way of saying that the lines that run north and south on the map must run in the same direction as the lines north and south on the ground. every road, stream or other feature on the map will then run in the same direction as the road, stream or other feature itself on the ground, and all the objects shown on the map can be quickly identified and picked out on the ground. methods of orienting a map st. by magnetic needle: if the map has a magnetic meridian marked on it as is on the leavenworth map (in pocket at back of book), place the sighting line, a-b, of the compass (fig. ) on the magnetic meridian of the map and move the map around horizontally until the north end of the needle points toward the north of its circle, whereupon the map is oriented. if there is a true meridian on the map, but not a magnetic meridian, one may be constructed as follows, if the magnetic declination is known: (figure ): place the true meridian of the map directly under the magnetic needle of the compass and then move the compass box until the needle reads an angle equal to the magnetic declination. a line in extension of the sighting line a'-b' will be the magnetic-meridian. if the magnetic declination of the observer's position is not more than ° or °, the orientation will be given closely enough for ordinary purposes by taking the true and magnetic meridians to be identical. d. if neither the magnetic nor the true meridian is on the map, but the observer's position on the ground is known: move the map horizontally until the direction of some definite point on the ground is the same as its direction on the map; the map is then oriented. for example, suppose you are standing on the ground at , q k' (fort leaven worth map), and can see the u. s. penitentiary off to the south. hold the map in front of you and face toward the u. s. penitentiary, moving the map until the line joining and the u. s. penitentiary (on the map) lies in the same direction as the line joining those two points on the ground. the map is now oriented. [illustration: fig. ] having learned to orient a map and to locate his position on the map, one should then practice moving over the ground and at the same time keeping his map oriented and noting each ground feature on the map as it is passed. this practice is of the greatest value in learning to read a map accurately and to estimate distances, directions and slopes correctly. true meridian = .= the position of the true meridian may be found as follows (fig. ): point the hour hand of a watch toward the sun; the line joining the pivot and the point midway between the hour hand and xii on the dial, will point toward the south; that is to say, if the observer stands so as to face the sun and the xii on the dial, he will be looking south. to point the hour hand exactly at the sun, stick a pin as at (a) fig. and bring the hour hand into the shadow. at night, a line drawn toward the north star from the observer's position is approximately a true meridian. [illustration: fig. ] the line joining the "pointers" of the great bear or dipper, prolonged about five times its length passes nearly through the north star, which can be recognized by its brilliancy. [illustration: fig. ] = . conventional signs.= in order that the person using a map may be able to tell what are roads, houses, woods, etc., each of these features are represented by particular signs, called conventional signs. in other words, conventional signs are certain marks or symbols shown on a map to designate physical features of the terrain. (see diagram, par. plate i and ii.) on the elementary map the conventional signs are all labeled with the name of what they represent. by examining this map the student can quickly learn to distinguish the conventional signs of most of the ordinary features shown on maps. these conventional signs are usually graphical representations of the ground features they represent, and, therefore, can usually be recognized without explanation. for example, the roads on the elementary map can be easily distinguished. they are represented by parallel lines (======). the student should be able to trace out the route of the valley pike, the chester pike, the county road, and the direct road from salem to boling. private or farm lanes, and unimproved roads are represented by broken lines (= = = =). such a road or lane can be seen running from the barton farm to the chester pike. another lane runs from the mills farm to the same pike. the small crossmarks on the road lines indicate barbed wire fences; the round circles indicate smooth wire; the small, connected ovals (as shown around the cemetery) indicate stone walls, and the zigzag lines (as shown one mile south of boling) represent wooden fences. near the center of the map, by the chester pike, is an orchard. the small circles, regularly placed, give the idea of trees planted in regular rows. each circle does not indicate a tree, but the area covered by the small circles does indicate accurately the area covered by the orchard on the ground. just southwest of boling a large woods (boling woods) is shown. other clumps of woods, of varying extent, are indicated on the map. the course of sandy creek can be readily traced, and the arrows placed along it, indicate the direction in which it flows. its steep banks are indicated by successive dashes, termed _hachures_. a few trees are shown strung along its banks. baker's pond receives its water from the little creek which rises in the small clump of timber just south of the pond, and the hachures along the northern end represent the steep banks of a dam. meadow creek flows northeast from the dam and then northwest toward oxford, joining woods creek just south of that town. york creek rises in the woods - / miles north of york, and flows south through york. it has a west branch which rises in the valleys south of twin hills. a railroad is shown running southeast from oxford to salem. the hachures, unconnected at their outer extremities, indicate the fills or embankments over which the track runs. notice the fills or embankments on which the railroad runs just northwest of salem; near the crossing of sandy creek; north of baker's pond; and where it approaches the outskirts of oxford. the hachures, connected along their outer extremities, represent the cut through which the railroad passes. there is only one railroad cut shown on the elementary map--about one-quarter of a mile northeast of baker's pond--where it cuts through the northern extremity of the long range of hills, starting just east of york. the wagon roads pass through numerous cuts--west of twin hills, northern end of sandy ridge, southeastern end of long ridge, and so on. the small t's along the railroad and some of the wagon roads, indicate telegraph or telephone lines. the conventional sign for a bridge is shown where the railroad crosses sandy creek on a trestle. other bridges are shown at the points the wagon roads cross this creek. houses or buildings are shown in oxford, salem, york and boling. they are also shown in the case of a number of farms represented--barton farm, wells farm, mason's, brown's, baker's and others. the houses shown in solid black are substantial structures of brick or stone; the buildings indicated by rectangular outlines are "out buildings," barns, sheds, etc. plates i and ii give the conventional signs used on military maps and they should be thoroughly learned. [illustration: plate i] [illustration: plate ii] in hasty sketching, in order to save time, instead of using the regulation conventional signs, very often simply the outline of the object, such as a wood, a vineyard, a lake, etc., is indicated, with the name of the object written within the outline, thus: [illustration: fig. ] such means are used very frequently in rapid sketching, on account of the time that they save. by reference to the map of fort leavenworth, the meaning of all its symbols is at once evident from the names printed thereon; for example, that of a city, woods, roads, streams, railroad, etc.; where no conventional sign is used on any area, it is to be understood that any growths thereon are not high enough to furnish any cover. as an exercise, pick out from the map the following conventional signs: unimproved road, cemetery, railroad track, hedge, wire fence, orchard, streams, lake. the numbers on the various road crossings have no equivalent on the ground, but are placed on the maps to facilitate description of routes, etc. often the numbers at road crossings on other maps denote the elevation of these points. visibility = .= the problem of visibility is based on the relations of contours and map distances previously discussed, and includes such matters as the determination of whether a point can or can not be seen from another; whether a certain line of march is concealed from the enemy; whether a particular area is seen from a given point. on account of the necessary inaccuracy of all maps it is impossible to determine exactly how much ground is visible from any given point--that is, if a correct reading of the map shows a certain point to be just barely visible, then it would be unsafe to say positively that on the ground this point could be seen or could not be seen. it is, however, of great importance for one to be able to determine at a glance, within about one contour interval, whether or not such and such a point is visible; or whether a given road is generally visible to a certain scout, etc. for this reason no effort is made to give an exact mathematical solution of problems in visibility further than would be useful in practical work with a map in the solution of map problems in patrolling. in the solution of visibility problems, it is necessary that one should thoroughly understand the meaning of profiles and their construction. a profile is the line supposed to be cut from the surface of the earth by an imaginary vertical (up and down) plane. (see fig. .) the representation of this line to scale on a sheet of paper is also called a profile. figure shows a profile on the line d--y (figure ) in which the horizontal scale is the same as that of the map (figure ) and the vertical scale is inch = feet. it is customary to draw a profile with a greater vertical than horizontal scale in order to make the slopes on the profile appear to the eye as they exist on the ground. consequently, always note especially the vertical scale in examining any profile; the horizontal scale is usually that of the map from which the profile is taken. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] a profile is constructed as follows: (fig. ): draw a line d'--y' equal in length to d--y on the map. lay off on this line from d' distances equal to the distances of the successive contours from d on the map. at each of these contour points erect a perpendicular equal to the elevation of this particular contour, as shown by the vertical scale ( , , , etc.) on the left. join successively these verticals by a smooth curve, which is the required profile. cross section paper with lines printed / inch apart horizontally and vertically simplifies the work of construction, by avoiding the necessity of laying off each individual distance. = . visibility problem.= to determine whether an observer with his eye at d can see the bridge at xx (figure ). by examining the profile it is seen that an observer, with his eye at d, looking along the line d--xx, can see the ground as far as (a) from (a) to (b), is hidden from view by the ridge at (a); (b) to (c) is visible; (c) to (d) is hidden by the ridge at (c). by thus drawing the profiles, the visibility of any point from a given point may be determined. the work may be much shortened by drawing the profile of only the observer's position (d) of the point in question, and of the probable obstructing points (a) and (c). it is evidently unnecessary to construct the profile from d to x, because the slope being concave shows that it does not form an obstruction. the above method of determining visibility by means of a profile is valuable practice for learning slopes of ground, and the forms of the ground corresponding to different contour spacings. visibility of areas = .= to determine the area visible from a given point the same method is used. first mark off as invisible all areas hidden by woods, buildings, high hills, and then test the doubtful points along lines such as d--xx, figure . with practice the noncommissioned officer can soon decide by inspection all except the very close cases. this method is a rapid approximation of the solution shown in the profile. in general it will not be practicable to determine the visibility of a point by this method closer than to say the line of sight pierces the ground between two adjoining contours. chapter ii military sketching (while this chapter presents the principal features of military sketching in a simple, clear manner, attention is invited to the fact that the only way that any one who has never done any sketching can follow properly the statements made, is to do so with the instruments and the sketching material mentioned at hand. in fact, the only way to learn how to sketch is to _sketch_.) = .= a military sketch is a rough map showing the features of the ground that are of military value. military sketching is the art of making such a military sketch. military sketches are of three kinds: position sketches, fig. ; outpost sketches; road sketches. all kinds of military sketches are intended to give a military commander detailed information of the ground to be operated over, when this is not given by the existing maps, or when there are no maps of the area. the general methods of sketching are: ( ) the location of points by intersection. ( ) the location of points by resection. = . location of points by intersection.= to locate a point by intersection proceed as follows: set up, level and orient the sketching board (par. ), at a, fig. . the board is said to be oriented when the needle is parallel to the sides of the compass trough of the drawing board, fig . (at every station the needle must have this position, so that every line on the sketch will be parallel to the corresponding line or direction on the ground.) assume a point (a) on the paper, fig. y, in such a position that the ground to be sketched will fall on the sheet. lay the ruler on the board and point it to the desired point (c), all the while keeping the edge of the ruler on the point (a), fig. y. draw an indefinite line along the edge. now move to (b), fig. x, plotted on the map in (b), fig. x, and having set up, leveled and oriented as at (a), fig. y, sight toward (c) as before. the intersection (crossing) of the two lines locates (c) on the sketch at (c), fig. x. [illustration: fig. ] = . locating points by resection.= a sketcher at an unknown point may locate himself from two visible known points by setting up and orienting his sketching board. he then places his alidade (ruler) so that it points at one of the known points, keeping the edge of the alidade touching the corresponding point on the sketch. he then draws a ray (line) from the point toward his eye. he repeats the performance with the other visible known point and its location on the map. the point where the rays intersect is his location. this method is called _resection_. however, local attractions for the compass greatly affect this method. = . the location of points by traversing.= to locate a point by traversing is done as follows: with the board set up, leveled and oriented at a, fig. y, as above, draw a line in the direction of the desired point b, fig. x, and then move to b, counting strides, keeping record of them with a tally register, fig. , if one is available. set up the board at b, fig. x, and orient it by laying the ruler along the line (a)-(b), fig. x, and moving the board until the ruler is directed toward a, fig. y, on the ground; or else orient by the needle as at a. with the scale of the sketcher's strides on the ruler, lay off the number of strides found from a, fig. y, to b, fig. x, and mark the point (b), fig. x. other points, such as c, d, etc., would be located in the same way. = . the determination of the heights of hills, shapes of the ground, etc., by contours.= to draw in contours on a sketch, the following steps are necessary: [illustration: fig. ] (a) from the known or assumed elevation of a located station as a, fig. y, (elevation ), the elevations of all hill tops, stream junctures, stream sources, etc, are determined. (b) having found the elevations of these critical points the contours are put in by spacing them so as to show the slope of the ground along each line such as (a)-(b), (a)-(c), etc., fig. y, as these slopes actually are on the ground. [illustration: (tally register)--fig. ] [illustration: (clinometer)--fig. ] to find the elevation of any point, say c (shown on sketch as c), proceed as follows: read the vertical angle with slope board, fig. , or with a clinometer, fig. . suppose this is found to be degrees; lay the scale of m. d.[ ] (ruler, fig. ) along (a)-(c), fig. y, and note the number of divisions of - degrees (minus °) between (a) and (c). suppose there are found to be - / divisions; then, since each division is feet, the total height of a above c is feet ( - / × ). c is therefore ft. elev. which is written at (c), fig. y. now looking at the ground along a-c, suppose you find it to be a very decided concave (hollowed out) slope, nearly flat at the bottom and steep at the top. there are to be placed in this space (a)-(c), fig. y, contours , , , and , and they would be spaced close at the top and far apart near (c), fig. y, to give a true idea of the slope. the above is the entire principle of contouring in making sketches and if thoroughly learned by careful repetition under different conditions, will enable the student to soon be able to carry the contours with the horizontal locations. = .= in all maps that are to be contoured some plane, called the _datum plane_, must be used to which all contours are referred. this plane is usually mean sea level and the contours are numbered from this plane upward, all heights being elevations above mean sea level. in a particular locality that is to be sketched there is generally some point the elevation of which is known. these points may be bench marks of a survey, elevation of a railroad station above sea level, etc. by using such points as the reference point for contours the proper elevations above sea level will be shown. in case no point of known elevation is at hand the elevation of some point will have to be assumed and the contours referred to it. skill in contouring comes only with practice but by the use of expedients a fairly accurate contoured map can be made. in contouring an area the stream lines and ravines form a framework or skeleton on which the contours are hung more or less like a cobweb. these lines are accurately mapped and their slopes determined and the contours are then sketched in. if the sketcher desires he may omit determining the slopes of the stream lines and instead determine the elevations of a number of critical points (points where the slope changes) in the area and then draw in the contours remembering that contours bulge downward on slopes and upward on streams lines and ravines. if time permits both the slopes of the stream lines and the elevation of the critical points may be determined and the resulting sketch will gain in accuracy. figs. , , , , and show these methods of determining and sketching in contours. [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] [illustration: fig. ] = . form lines.= it frequently happens that a sketch must be made very hastily and time will not permit of contouring. in this case form lines are used. these lines are exactly like contours except that the elevations and forms of the hills and depressions which they represent are estimated and the sketcher draws the form lines in to indicate the varying forms of the ground as he sees it. = . scales.= the army regulations prescribe a uniform system of scales and contour intervals for military maps, as follows: road sketches and extended positions; scale inches to a mile, vertical (or contour) interval, feet. position or outpost sketches; scale inches to a mile, vertical (or contour) interval, feet. this uniform system is a great help in sketching as a given map distance, par. a, represents the same degree of slope for both the inch to the mile or the inch to the mile scale. the map distances once learned can be applied to a map of either scale and this is of great value in sketching. construction of working scales = . working scale.= a _working scale_ is a scale used in making a map. it may be a scale for paces or strides or revolutions of a wheel. = . length of pace.= the length of a man's pace at a natural walk is about inches, varying somewhat in different men. each man must determine his own length of pace by walking several times over a known distance. in doing this be sure to take a natural pace. when you know your length of pace you merely count your paces in going over a distance and a simple multiplication of paces by length of pace gives your distance in inches. in going up and down slopes one's pace varies. on level ground careful pacing will give you distances correct to within % or less. the following tables give length of pace on slopes of degrees to degrees, corresponding to a normal pace on a level of . inches: +-------------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ |slopes | °| °| °| °| °| °| °| +-------------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ |length of step ascending | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | |length of step descending| . | . | . | . | . | . | . | +-------------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ for the same person, the length of step decreases as he becomes tired. to overcome this, ascertain the length of pace when fresh and when tired and use the first scale in the morning and the latter in the afternoon. the result of the shortening of the pace due to fatigue or going over a slope, is to make the map larger than it should be for a given scale. this is apparent when we consider that we take more paces in covering a given distance than we would were it on a horizontal plane and we were taking our normal pace. in going up or down a slope of or we actually walk units, but cover only in a horizontal direction. therefore, we must make allowance when pacing slopes. in counting paces count each foot as it strikes. in counting strides count only foot as it strikes. a stride is two paces. in practice it has been found that the scale of strides is far more satisfactory than a scale of paces. = . how to make a scale of paces.= having determined the length of our pace, any one of the following three methods may be used in making a working scale: _ st method._ the so-called "one thousand unit rule" method is as follows: multiply the r. f. (representative fraction) by the number of inches in the unit of measure multiplied by ; the result will be the length of line in inches necessary to show units. for example, let us suppose that we desire a graphic scale showing yards, the scale of the map being inches equal mile: multiply / (r. f.) by ( inches in yard, the unit of measure) by ,--that is, ( / ) × × = / = . inches. therefore, a line or graphic scale . inches in length will represent yards. if we desire a working scale of paces at inches to the mile, and we have determined that our pace is inches long, we would have ( / ) × × = / = . inches. we can now lay off this distance and divide it into ten equal parts, and each will give us a -pace division. _ nd method._ lay off yards; ascertain how many of your paces are necessary to cover this distance; multiply r. f. by , , , and divide by the number of paces you take in going yards. the result will be the length of line in inches which will show of your paces. _ rd method._ construct a scale of convenient length, about inches, as described in par. , to read in the units you intend to measure your distance with (your stride, pace, stride of a horse, etc.), to the scale on which you intend to make your sketch. for example, suppose your stride is inches long ( inch pace) and you wish to make a sketch on a scale of inches = mile. the r. f. of this scale is inches/ mile = inches/ inches = / . that is inch on your sketch is to represent inches on the ground. as you intend to measure your ground distances by counting your strides of inches length, inch on the sketch will represent as many of your strides on the ground as is contained into = strides. for convenience in sketching you wish to make your scale about inches long. since inch represents strides, inches will represent × = , strides. as this is an odd number, difficult to divide into convenient subdivisions of hundreds, fifties, etc., construct your scale to represent , strides, which will give it a length slightly in excess of inches-- . . lay off this length and divide it into ten main divisions of strides each, and subdivide these into stride divisions as explained in par. . = . position sketching.= the following are the instruments used in position sketching: . drawing board with attached compass (fig. ); . loose ruler, on board (fig. ); . rough tripod or camera tripod; . scale of m. d.'s (shown on ruler, fig. ); . scale of sketchers, strides or paces (at six inches to one mile), on ruler; . clinometer (not necessary if board has slope board, fig. ); . scale of hundreds of yards shown on ruler; . scale of paces. methods to be used ( ) select a base line,--that is, a central line / to / mile long in the area to be sketched. it should have at its ends some plainly marked objects, such as telegraph poles, trees, corners of buildings, etc., and from its ends, and intermediate points, a good view of the area should be possible. the base line selected should be capable of being measured. ( ) set up, level and orient the drawing board at one end of the base (a), fig. , y, for example. draw a meridian on the sheet parallel to the position of the magnetic needle. assume a point (a), fig. , y, corresponding to the ground point (a), , on the sheet, in such a position that the area to be sketched will lie on the sheet. ( ) sight at hilltops, stream junctures, stream heads, etc., to begin the locations of these points by intersection, labelling each ray so as to be able to identify it later. ( ) traverse to (b) and complete the locations by intersection as previously explained. if the base line is not accurately measured, the map will be correct within itself in all of its proportions, but its scale will not necessarily be the scale desired. ( ) draw the details of the country between a and b and in the vicinity of this line, using the conventional signs for roads, houses, etc. ( ) the lines from station (b), fig. , x, to any of the other located points may now be used as a new base line to carry the work over additional area. ( ) in case parts of the area are not visible from a base line, these parts are located by traversing as before explained. ( ) having learned by several repetitions the above steps, the sketcher will then combine contouring with his horizontal locations. = . outpost sketching.= the same instruments are used as in position sketching, and so are the methods the same, except that the sketcher cannot advance beyond the outpost line, toward the supposed position of the enemy. it is often possible to select a measurable base line well in rear of the line of observation,--for instance, along the line of resistance. secondary base lines may then be taken on or near the line of observation, from the extremities of which additional base lines may be selected, if necessary, and points toward the enemy's position located by intersection. details are sketched in as in position sketching. for obvious reasons, no traversing should be done along the line of observation. = . road sketching.= the following are the instruments used in road sketching: . drawing board or sketching case; . loose ruler; . scale of strides, or paces, if made dismounted; scale of time trotting or walking, if mounted; . scale of hundreds of yards, at three inches to mile; . scale of m. d.'s; . slope board (if clinometer is not available). methods to be used ( ) at station , fig. , orient the board as described in par. , holding the board in the hands, in front of the body of the sketcher, who faces toward station . [illustration: fig. ] ( ) important points in the vicinity, such as the railroad bridge, the stream juncture, hilltops, are sighted for intersections, lines drawn as shown and the sketcher traverses to station . ( ) at station he locates and draws in all details between station and , to include about yards on each side of the road. ( ) the traverse is then continued forward as described for and . ( ) after some practice of horizontal sketching, as just described, the sketcher will be able to take up contouring in combination. the methods are as described in the paragraph on contouring. ( ) when the traverse runs off the paper as at a, fig. , the following method is followed: reorient the board so that the road forward will lie across the long dimensions of the paper; draw a meridian parallel to the compass needle and assume a point on the new sheet corresponding to the last point (a) plotted on the first sheet. ( ) on completion of the sketch various sections will be pasted together, so that all the meridians are parallel. = . combined sketching.= let us suppose that we have the rectangle w, x, y, z, fig. , assigned to us to map and that we have been given four sketching parties, and that the locations and elevations of a and b have been previously determined by triangulation and are plotted to scale on our rectangle. a logical step would be to carefully plot the line a' b', and then the lines c' c" and c" d. if the area is densely wooded we run "line of level" by using the slope board or clinometer and by taking elevations at points arbitrarily selected. our lines will look something like this: [illustration: fig. ] each party will be given its rectangle with the traverses sketched in. they will each then run similar traverses over the other two sides of their area and then fill in. in this manner the whole work is tied up to the original lines. another method the line a b, fig. , is carefully plotted. each of the four sketching parties has two sketching groups. one group of party no. traverses line a' y; then the other group of the party traverses the line a" y'. the first group of party of no. accompanies them. the second group of party no. traverses the line c" d, accompanied by the first group of party no. ; the second group of party no. , and the first group of party no. traverse b" z', and the second group of party no. traverses b' z. when the first group of party no. arrives at y, it traverses y y'. the second group of party no. , arriving at y', cuts the sheet along traverse and gives the first group of party no. the part which shows their area; and then traverses toward y from y'. upon meeting the first group of party no. , they join forces and proceed to fill in their area. [illustration: fig. ] in the same manner areas w x a' b' are filled in. [illustration: fig. ] the method described above is useful in working over country which is densely wooded, and in which a general view cannot be obtained, for example, in mapping jungles. an additional article of the sketcher's equipment is a holder for his pencils, alidade, eraser, knife, pins, etc. this consists of a series of small pockets sewed on to a piece of canvas about inches by inches. this can be attached to the left breast of the sketcher's coat or shirt by means of two pins. in addition to keeping all of his implements in a handy place the holder prevents the loss of the several articles. nothing is so discouraging to the sketcher as to look for his pencil, eraser, knife or even alidade and find that he has left it several hundred yards back where he sat down last to sketch in details. by using the holder the sketcher gets into the habit of replacing articles after they are used and consequently always has them with him when needed. these holders ready made can be obtained from the secretary, army service schools at fort leavenworth, kansas. in sketching a good quality of paper should always be used as erasures will be frequent. a specially prepared paper that has the appearance of oiled paper can be obtained commercially and is excellent for sketching in damp weather. it has considerable resistance to rain. sheets of celluloid prepared for sketching are invaluable in sketching in the rain. these are a part of the equipment of the case of sketching instruments supplied battalions in the regular army. these sheets may be procured at most any dealers. points for beginners to remember = .= . always keep your pencils sharpened and have an eraser handy. no one but an expert can sketch with a dull pencil. . use hard pencils when learning to sketch-- h to h--and go over your work afterwards with a softer pencil-- h. . do not try to put down on your sketch a mass of small details that are too small to be shown on the scale at which you are sketching. for example, if you are making a sketch on a scale of inches = mile, do not try to show each house in a row of houses; simply indicate that there is a row of houses, by putting down several distinct conventional signs for houses in a row; nor should you try to show every little "cut" through which the road may run. only use about one sign to the inch of telegraph or telephone lines, for wire fences, etc. . when first practicing sketching only plot the route over which you walk, indicating it by a single line. when you can do this with facility, go back over one of these plotted routes and fill in the woods, houses, streams and the other large features. . the beginner should sketch the same ground several times over--at least three or four times. practice alone will make perfect. . always try to compare your finished sketch with an accurate map of the ground, if one is obtainable. try to practice on ground of which you can obtain a map. . make each course (the distance you go between points where the direction of your route changes) as long as possible. . do not try to contour until you are expert at making a sketch showing all the flat details (roads, streams, woods, houses, etc.). . never try to "sketch in" the contours until you have plotted the stream lines or the direction of the valleys, ravines, etc. the contours are fitted to or sketched around the drainage system; not the drainage system to the contours. . always "size up" ground before you sketch it; that is, take a general view of it, noticing the drainage system (the direction in which the streams flow or ravines run), the prominent hills and ridges, the direction the roads run, etc. . above all things, don't fake any part of your map. if the man using your map happens to strike the faked portion, he immediately condemns your whole map as incorrect. every other part may be highly accurate, but your whole map is discredited because the user strikes the bad part first. you will naturally put little faith in the man who has told you something you know to be untrue. you will always suspect him. so it is with maps. don't put down anything that you don't know to be correct. if any guess work is to be done, let the man using the map do it,--he knows that he is guessing and will be governed accordingly, but if you do the guessing, he doesn't know where the guessing begins and the accurate work leaves off. don't fudge. your name is on the map,--_don't have any questionable work hitched up to your name_. footnotes: [ ] sheets of working scales reading in paces, strides, minutes, etc, at a scale of and inches to the mile can be obtained at little cost from the secretary, army service schools, fort leavenworth, kansas index (the numbers refer to paragraphs) a par. no. abatis about face, how executed . about, . face, . forward, . march about, turning by mounted officer abstract of clothing abstract record of memorandum receipts adjustment of fire adjutant, formation of battalion ; adjutant of general officer, post of adjutant's call ; advance by crawling, etc. advance by rushes: commands company as whole led by captain position, fire when impossible for company to advance as a whole advance guard: commander with connecting files machine guns meeting engagement ; advance of: battalion acting as part of firing line company into an engagement - firing line advancing: improvised formations for in succession of thin lines ; the attack ; aerial mines aides, post of aim, commands for aiming and sighting aiming exercise aiming point aiming point: announced before or after range designations, practice in repeating once designated not changed unless ordered use alignment: battalion, rectifying ; command of captains in battalion drill at command guide right (left) company definition deployed lines preserve general alignment dressing companies in formation of battalion in line placing left hand on hip position of captain and platoon leaders in prolongation position of captains in dressing companies in battalion drill preservation while marching rules for guides in close order ; squad ammunition: bandoleers combat train and major's responsibility for ammunition in belts destination of combat wagons when refilled expenditure of ; for company, husbanding and distribution issue before deployment of battalion issue upon deployment of battalion men not to be sent back from firing line for ammunition of dead and wounded rendezvous for each brigade replenishment of ammunition after engagement sent forward with reinforcements supply ; - thirty rounds in right pocket section amusement room appearance of objects in firing appendices, infantry drill regulations - and pp. a b c d arm, disengaged, position at double time (eighth) arm signals ; arrangement of companies in battalion formation art of instruction on varied ground art of leadership art of war, definition artillery: action of infantry in case enemy has powerful artillery change of target by infantry warranted in case of flanking fire against artillery communication with firing line covering deployment of artillery in meeting engagement deployment of troops when exposed to hostile artillery effect on deployed infantry usually unimportant infantry against - infantry passing through deployed artillery in pursuit in withdrawal from action part played in pursuit ; supported by infantry - use against machine guns use in delaying action withdrawal of attacking troops covered by artillery artillery supports: charged only with protection of artillery detailing of supports formation and location in action formation on march purpose asphyxiating gases asphyxiation, first aid assemble from: deployment battalion company squad distances intervals platoon or squad columns assembled skirmishers not while marching to rear assembly: arm signals call point indicated by company flag as skirmishers: action of squad leaders at preparatory command deployment squad deployment in oblique direction deployment to flank or rear from a column of twos or files from platoon or squad column guide right (left or center) (being in column of squads) guide right (left or center) (being in line) rules for deployment - to increase or decrease intervals 'as you were' at ease: applicable to any marching formation extended order executed at ease (b) how executed to march with arms, executed as without arms (fifth) athletic apparatus, company attack: advancing - battalion in - company in - deployment for - enveloping ; feint fire attack - ; - flank - fortifications - frontal ; general principles - holding attack - machine guns opening fire pursuit - range ; the charge - unit, the battalion attention: command for drills at are disciplinary exercises (a) forced at first word of command note of bugle or whistle from parade rest from rest and at ease resumed at order (fifth) from route step or at ease position of at trail (command) (sixth) at will fire automatic alarms trenches auxiliary aiming points b back step (backward march) bacon can, care of balance position of left hand (first) ballistic qualities of rifle band: in reviews ; post of ; ; bandoleers ammunition in to be used first barricades base company in advancing by rushes base, definition base squad in deployment - ; - battalion: adjutant, formation of battalion ; advance close in on enemy as much as possible before opening fire advance when part of firing line advance of firing line alignment rectifying ; ammunition issue upon deployment arrangement of companies in battalion assembly from deployment attack principles - attack unit, the base company in attack battalion a tactical unit battalion right (left) bayonets order to fix given by major ; charge, the close on first (fourth) company close order drill - column rectifying column of companies, first company squads right (left) column of squads first company, squads right (left) column of squads first (fourth) company, squads right (left) (from close column) column of squads first (fourth) company forward (from close line) column right (left) ; combat principles - command for guides repeated by captain commands repeated by captains consolidation to provide war strength organizations (d) counter attack covering fire rushes made under defense defense opening fire deployment avoidance of premature companies and detachments taking their places depth of designation of base company designation of companies dismissing division of battalion into support and firing line dressing battalion ; dressing companies, action of guides dressing companies, position of captains extend on first (fourth) company file closers, post in route marches fire, delayed opening as long as possible fire fight, where and when to begin, indicated by major fire to be directed against hostile infantry firing line: advance companies to be kept closed in on center placing entire battalion or regiments into fix bayonets, ordered by major flanks, protection flank units to begin rush formations ; front occupied by - guides, action when companies are dressed guides, command for, repeated by captains hostile infantry target inspection - intervals between battalions on firing line largest unit executing movement at command of the commander loading and firing mass formations major: apportions target duties and responsibilities gives orders to charge gives order to fix bayonet ; his order making disposition of battalion for combat indicates where or when fire fight begins locates trenches and obstacles post during attack post in route march reënforces firing line (see "battalion commander") movements executed as in school of the company movements executed as in school of soldier, squad and company ; movements explained for four companies musicians repeat signals to charge musicians repeat signal to fix bayonet muster - on right (left) into line opening fire on defense order of companies parade plate showing formations positions of captains in dressing companies post of band and other special units post of major during attack reconnaissance rectifying column reënforcing firing line, two methods reënforcements size repetition of command by captains review - right (left) right (left) (center) dress ; right front (left) into line (from column of squads or companies) right front into line (from close column) rushes: advance made under covering fire begin by flank company prearranged methods prohibited subsequent to advancing rushing units, size ; school of simultaneous movements by companies or platoons size of reënforcements staff officers support: battalion acting alone in defense none at beginning position size to cover withdrawal tactical unit best suited for defense target, apportioned by major target, hostile infantry trenches located by major withdrawal covered by support battalion commanders: duty regarding reconnaissance - equipped with different tone of whistle responsibility regarding ammunition signal to rear when ready to charge see "major" under "battalion" battalion drill - battalion inspection - battalion parade battalion staff officers, training in patrolling and reconnaissance battle: integrity of squads in separated officers and others placing themselves under order of nearest higher commander ; battlefields, bugle signals used on battle order battle sight ; (c) bayonet: charge in combat confidence in fixing habitually not fixed (fourth) order to fix in combat given by major - position at charge unfixing when fixed in combat ; ; beaten zone bite of dog bite of snake blank cartridges, use bleeding, first aid books and records, company - bombs and grenades - bombs from air craft bore of rifle, care - ; ; bridges - brigade: commander, action in deployment review ; broken bones bruises, first aid brush work, field engineering bugle calls, explanation - bugle signals: communication between firing line and rear those used on and off battlefields bunks, camping burning clothes burns, first aid by platoon (squad, etc.), from right (left) rush "by the numbers" (fifth) by the right (left) flank, how executed by the right (left) flank in forming skirmish line c cadence of: manual of arms (fourth) marching calls: alarm formation service warning camps: camping on fordable stream desirable sites form and dimensions of camps making camp making tent poles and pegs fast in loose soil parade ground retreat in camp sanitation. see "camp sanitation" selection of site trees in camp undesirable sites windstorms see "camp sanitation" camp sanitation: avoiding old camp sites bunks camp expedients canteen, care changing camp site definition drainage incinerators kitchens kitchen pits latrines rules of sanitation urinal tubs water wood your camp, your home captain: directs the fire ; duties, etc. ; indicates point on which base squad marches in deployment leads depleted company as platoon leads company as whole in rushes position at alignment ; post during firings ; responsible for instruction care of: clothing equipment feet rifle shoes cartridges not to be carried in piece (first) cased colors, defined cat and mouse contest cavalry: infantry against - in pursuit in withdrawal from action patrols cease firing: bugle signal for how executed krag rifle center company, defined center, definition center of impact ceremonies: battalion parade battalion review escorts of-- funeral - honor the color - formation of battalion general rules - mounted enlisted men formed into detachment parades, general rules ; post of dismounted noncommissioned staff officers reviews, general rules - ceremonies and drills at attention teach precision, etc. (a) challenging on: guard outpost chancroid change elevation; signal for change of direction: battalion - company ; ; partial squad ; change step, how executed charge, the: additional force for pursuit avoiding too dense a mass battalion commanders signal commanders of line when ready to charge bayonet, confidence in ability to use charging without authority from rear counter attack, preparations to meet fire superiority, what it accomplishes line to be strengthened by prolongations not to be made without sufficient troops premature charges to be avoided psychological moment for charge determined by tactical instinct pursuing fire pursuing troops pursuit, disordered units not to participate in reorganization of charging line reserves give impetus to charge steps to be taken in case of temporary set back steps to be taken if attack is abandoned strength of charging line to be made simultaneously to be made with approval of commander of attacking line when and distance over which charge should be made without fire preparation charge bayonet charges, preferring cheerfulness, factor in training cheveaux de frise ; chiggers choking, first aid "chop-chop" signal clap classes of firing - clearness in instruction clip fire: how executed krag rifle use clock system of target designation ; clock system of wind designation close on first (fourth) company close order: advantage of formation battalion ; company double rank, habitual formation firings in necessity for close packs close range close ranks cloth equipment, care clothing, care of cohesion and order in combat cold, effect on shooting color: escort of ; manual of receiving - regimental saluting saluting in reviews with reserve in battle see "the color" color company: defined receiving the colors color guard: carrying of color composition escorting color to office or quarters of colonel formation and marching in battle joins reserve loadings and firings manual of the color manual of arms movements executed post in various formations receiving the color - remains with color company colors and standards column, definition column half right (left) columns of companies to form successively to right or left column of squads, first (fourth) company forward (from close line) column of squads, first (fourth) company, squads right (from close column) column of squads, first company, squads right (left) column of squads, habitual column of route ; column of subdivisions, full distance defined column, rectifying (battalion) column, right (left) (battalion) ; column, right (company) combat exercises: definition (d) effective method of conducting explained to be conducted under assumed tactical situations to be followed by brief drill at attention (d) combat, modern, demands upon infantry combats offering no chance of valuable results to be avoided combat patrols to protect flanks of company acting alone combat practice combat principles: battalion summary combat reconnaissance combat tactics, general combined sights combined sketching commander of the guard commanding officer accountable for training commanding officer, guard duty commands: battalion and higher commanders repeat commands of superiors battalion largest unit executing movement at command of its commander definition facing troops and avoiding indifference when giving commands for guides, repeated by captains at battalion drill how given ; loading and firing of executions preparatory ; repetition by: battalion and higher commanders captains at battalion drill leaders of subdivisions when necessary platoon leaders and platoon drill use in battalion combat when used commander's post in fight commence firing, bugle signal for common tents ; communication between firing line and reserve communicating trenches communication, how maintained, etc. - communication in fire control and direction (b) company: abstract of clothing abstract record of memorandum receipts acting alone ; arrangement in battalion formation ; arrangement of men according to height athletic apparatus base - books and records - captain, duties etc. ; center certain movements executed by company and platoons as prescribed in school of the soldier and the squad close order drill column right (being in column of squads) companies to be consolidated to provide war strength organizations (a) company attention, from route step or at ease company fund book company return company musicians carry company flags company right complete equipment carried into action completion of task, rejoining command after contentment and harmony correspondence book delinquency record depleted company led as platoon deployment as skirmishers ; ; deployment in oblique direction descriptive card of animals descriptive list designation in battalion formation devolution of work and responsibility division into platoons division into squads document file dressing drill duty roster establishing outpost extended order drill files of orders first sergeant duties first sergeant's report when company is formed flags ; ; formations in single rank formed in double rank forms of company punishment half right ; inspection - inspections, object of instruction. see "training and instruction" in support - largest unit executing extended order (b); library and amusement room lieutenants, duties, etc. ; lieutenants taking post when company is formed memorandum receipts mess morning report muster - noncommissioned officers noncommissioned officers confining enlisted men paperwork platoons, assignment platoons, designation property responsibility ; protection against surprise punishment ration return record of rifles record of size of clothing reduction and resignation of noncommissioned officers retained copies of rolls, etc. rewards and privileges right school of - sick report squads designation statement of clothing charged to enlisted men summary court records target records to be kept closed in on center on firing line to dismiss to form - training. see "training and instruction" treatment of soldiers trials by court martial withholding privileges compass, points of complaints to captain complicated maneuvers: impracticable to be avoided compliments from guards compliments not paid on marches composition of infantry and other units comradeship, factor in training concealment and dodging, training in condiment can, care cone of fire or dispersion conical wall tent connecting files at night consolidation of organizations to provide war strength (d) contentment and harmony in company contentment, factor in training contours ; cooking individual contract ; - conventional signs coöperation between frontal and enveloping attacks coöperation of subordinates corduroying corporal is squad leader corporal of the guard correction of errors, staying of execution of movements for - correspondence book counter attack: battalion general principles - preparations countermining countersigns and paroles counting, indicating cadence counting off ; courage cover: skirmishers take advantage of, on halting use - ; training in use of covering fire, rushes made under cover trenches crawling, advance of firing line cup, care "cut off" habitually turned off (third) cuts, first aid, courtesy. see "military courtesy" d daily sick report datum plane decreasing intervals defense: action when target disappears active defense battalion on counter attack: communicating and cover trenches head cover, etc., construction cover, utilization importance of counter-attack manner of making minor post of troops delaying action: important considerations purposes of support and reserve thin firing line to be used value of artillery deployment: advance posts and other dispersion to be avoided assignment of front to units battalions to be kept intact dead space to be covered by adjoining section or machine guns density ; division of positions into sections fire alone unable to stop attack; use of bayonet night attack, steps to be taken if expected position not to be fully occupied until infantry attack begins reserve, detaching part of, to protect opposite flank reserve posts ; sections, divisions of positions into size of units occupying sections short range fire and bayonet in night attack strength in rear to be increased when change from defensive to offensive is contemplated supports, post and cover dummy trenches field works: construction location, extent, garrison, etc. machine guns ; obstacles, construction opening fire ; passive position and intrenchments - requisites of defensive position trenches, outlining trace in combat exercises defilade deflection deflection and elevation connection drills deliberate intrenchments delinquency record delivery of messages ; density of firing line - ; deploy, definition deployed line, faces to front and takes advantage of cover on halting deployed lines, alignment deployed troops, leading difficult deployment: action of brigade and regimental commanders in deployment of division as skirmishes ; ; ; - battalion, depth of battalions furnish firing lines and support company, rules for companies and detachments taking their places dense, well directed and controlled fire gives fire superiority density of charging line density of one man per yard density of whole deployment varies with size of command division of battle line into battle districts each commander to guard his command against surprise extent of front occupied by unit depends upon security of flanks for attack: distance for hostile position at which deployment is made each unit to deploy on its own direction line foreground to be cleared of hostile detachments before deployment intervals between battalions moving well forward and deploying at night post of reserve reserve charged with flank protection formations of troops before and during in defense. see "deployment" under "defense" in oblique direction length of firing line employed by whole force mechanism taught by extended order (b) occupation of only sections of long lines of squads when company is deployed on wrong lines, avoided by reconnaissance orders for personal reconnaissance before deployment premature to be avoided ; rectification of deployments in wrong direction reserves, how employed reserves furnished by units larger than battalion rules for - side by side of regiments, battalions and companies strength of support and reserves ; supports furnished by battalion to flank or rear troops deployed vary from to men per yard use of thin firing lines when made deportment, military depth, definition descriptive card of animals descriptive list designation of: companies in battalion formation squads and platoons designation of targets - a designation of winds details and roster of guards details to be left to subordinates ; determination, factor in warfare deviation from orders devolution of work and responsibility diarrhoea diminish intervals directions given subordinates through immediate superiors discipline: definition general principles importance methods of attaining good discipline ; punishment sound system disciplinary exercises--drills at attention and ceremonies a discipline and training necessary discipline, fire ; ; dislocations, first aid dismissing: battalion company squad dismounted noncommissioned staff officers, posts ; dismounting, before addressing dismounted superior dismounting before saluting dismounted senior distance: between firing line and support between front and rear rank between units in column of subdivisions definition plates showing distances: battalion near, company near, taken by file closers in "take distance" and "take interval" distance taking: action of guides how executed distant range distance to target, determination of distribution of fire - distribution of fire and target ; ; division of battalion into firing line and support document file dog's bite do something double rank: company to be formed in habitual close order formation kneeling and lying down in rear rank loading and firing double sleeping bag double time: adding preparatory command any movement executed in, unless excepted cadence command for command for precedes command of execution dropping hands by side upon halting half step, length in successive movements, base unit marches in quick time position of disengaged hand ; to hasten movements begun in quick time to the rear drainage, camping, drainage of trenches draw saber dress, appearance dressing: battalion ; company companies, position of captain ; deployed lines drill at attention after combat exercises (d) squad (right or left) verify both ranks drill: battalion - company - squad - drills at attention and ceremonies designed to teach precision, etc. (a) drill regulations furnished as guide, providing principles for training, etc. drill regulations, interpretation of drowning drum major at battalion inspection dugouts, trenches dummy trenches duties of infantry, many and difficult duties of officers and noncommissioned officers in battle duty roster e earache ear, foreign body in echelon definition effect of fire effect of heat, light, etc. - effectiveness of fire effective range efficiency dependent upon thorough and uniform training elastic formations essential to correct battle training electric shock element, definition elevation, change of encroachment upon functions of subordinates endurance, limit of, exacted enemy--imaginary outlined and represented ; entrenching at night enveloping attack: advantages ; resulting in local frontal attack to be started at considerable distance from enemy envelopment of both flanks, when allowable equipment: carried into action display for inspection equipment, care of: cloth equipment: general instructions intrenching tools shelter tent washing clothing: grease spots ; ink stains leggins paint spots rust stains importance leather equipment: cleaning cleaning materials new equipment oiling ; points to be remembered mess outfit: bacon can canteen condiment can cup fork knife meat can spoon rifle shoes: care polishing ; ; repairing selection wet shoes equipment. see "care and preservation" errors staying execution of movement, for correction of ; escorts of: funeral - honor the color ; establishing outpost by company estimate of situation estimating distance - estimating distances, training in estimators of ranges exercises in fire control and direction extended order: certain movements executed as in close order company - company largest unit executing (b) company largest unit to execute movements by prescribed commands exercises to be in nature of combat exercise purpose (b) squad to be executed at ease (b) extended on first (fourth) company eye, foreign body in eyes left, when post of reviewing officer is on left of column eyes right: how executed battalion review ; eyesight in scouting eyes, use of f facings facing about to give commands, staff stands fast facing about, mounted officer turns to left facing troops when giving commands fainting, first aid "fall in" ; "fall in" executed at order (fifth) "fall out" "fall out" executed as without arms (fifth) falling in with hands on hips fascines ; faster, command for increasing rate of fire fear feet, care of feint attacks field efficiency of organization field engineering: bridges: double lock roadway of spar single lock spar brush work corduroying fascines ; gabions - hurdles knots: bowline clove hitch eye splice long splice sheep shank short splice square or reef timber hitch two-half hitches lashings - revetments ; field exercises, definition (c); field fortifications: classification communicating trenches concealment of trenches cover trenches deliberate intrenchments drainage dugouts dummy trenches example of trench system fire trenches hasty intrenchments head cover illumination of foreground kneeling trench latrines length of trench location of trenches lookouts loopholes and notches lying trench notches and loopholes object overhead cover parados preparation of foreground revetments siege works sortie steps standing trench supporting points telephones traverses trench recesses water supply field officers, habitually mounted file definition file closer: darting through column of squads execution of loadings and manual of arms on the right (left) flank post in column of squads post in route marches to correct mistakes files, advancing by files of orders, company fill magazine finding way in strange country fine sight (b) finger system of target designation (a) fire: by volley ; classes of ; ; - clip ; commands for ; ; delay opening as long as possible in deployment controlled by platoon leaders long range, when effective observation of ; opening in attack ; opening in defense purpose and nature ; rate of ; to be directed against hostile infantry fire action fire attack: fire superiority sought at first firing position and to be maintained until charging point is reached futility of advancing without fire superiority general principles ; intrenching retiring under fire suicidal signs that fire superiority has been gained size of rushing units supports and reserves occupying trenches vacated by firing line to improve same fire at will: how executed use fire control, company - fire direction, company ; fire control and direction: general considerations signals fire direction and control - fire discipline ; ; fire discipline, definition fire distribution ; - fire fight, where and when to begin, indicated by major fire of position: use of machine guns when used fire superiority: futility of advancing without purpose and nature signs that it has been gained sought at first firing position to be maintained until charging point is reached what it accomplishes fire trenches fire unit, platoon firing at night firing at stationary targets firing by sentries at night firing, classes of - firing line: advance - ; advance as far as possible before opening fire advanced elements not to open fire on main position companies to be kept closed in on center control by signals (d) controlled by commander when whole line has been absorbed density - furnished by battalion placing entire battalion or regiment into premature formation to be avoided reënforcement by major to advance as far as possible before opening fire firing line and support, division of battalion firings in close order firings and loadings, see "loadings and firings" first aid packet first aid to sick and injured first sergeant: accompanies captain when company is deployed assists in fire control in case of depleted company duties never assigned as guide post report when company is formed fish hook, first aid fits, first aid fix bayonets, how executed fix bayonet order, given by major fixed forms covering all cases impossible fixed pivot, turn on: company - squad when used flag: company signal carried by company musicians (now buglers) defined of general officers, post of ; respect paid to ; signals ; ; signaling to artillery to outline enemy flag-stealing contest flank: by the right, how executed definition ; deployment as skirmishers movements executed towards either, explained toward but one flank unit to begin rush flourishes at: funeral review fly, disease carrier folding tents follow me: in forming skirmish line in rushes to follow corporal footmarks, following forced marches fork, care form: column of companies column of squads for shelter tents formation calls formation definition formations for: advancing improvised support formation of: battalion ; company squad form lines forms of speech fortifications, attack - forward march: from half step, halt and mark time from halt from oblique pieces brought to right shoulder from order, at command (sixth) fractures fraise freezing, first aid front, definition front, extent of in deployment - front of: deployed battalion - deployed squad frontal attacks, when they may be successful front into line: battalion company frost-bite, first aid full distance, definition full sight (c) full step, length and cadence funeral escort - g gabions - gallery practice gangrene gases, asphyxiating general common sense principles of applied minor tactics: art of war, definition estimating the situation maneuvers ; map problems ; mission, defined noncommissioned officers, responsibilities in time of war orders, tactical, preparation terrain exercises ; war game ; general officers habitually mounted general plan to be furthered by subordinates general rules for: ceremonies - drills and formations - parades ; reviews - gentle reverse slopes germs gonorrhoea grazing fire grease spots, how removed ; grenades and bombs - ground, use of ; guard duty: challenging classification of guards commander of the guard commanding officer compliments from guard corporal of the guard countersigns and paroles details and roster duty of sentinels general rules concerning guard duty guarding prisoners guard mounting: formal informal guard patrols importance musicians of the guard officer of the day orderlies and color sentinels orders for sentinels paroles and countersigns privates of the guard relieving old guard respect for sentinels reveille and retreat gun sentinels of troops stable guard sentinels' orders sergeant of the guard special orders for sentinels at post of guard stable guards troop stable guards watchmen guard mounting: formal informal guard patrols guarding prisoners guide: announcing before executing platoons right (left) definition in deployment in successive formations right (left) what it is, unless otherwise announced when given in connection with movement, follows command of execution guides: alignment of battalion assignment to platoons battalion formed in line battalion marching in column of companies or platoons battalion parade close on first (fourth) company column of companies, first company, squads right column right (left) battalion dressing company when battalion is in line duties in battle duties in fire fight equipped with whistles execution of loading and manual of arms as file closers first sergeant never assigned as guide guide of leading subdivision charged with step and direction in column of subdivisions in successive formation guide is toward base manual of arms, execution by file closers partial changes of direction platoon guides platoon guides accompany leader when platoon is deployed positions shown in plates of company and battalion post in column of squads post of file closers in route marches rectifying column (battalion) repeating signals taking intervals and distances taking place in front rank at command about face to change guides to opposite flank guide center designate left guide of center company guide right (left) command h half step (command) halt: any movement executed from, unless otherwise prescribed firing executed at from half step and mark time how executed piece brought to the order (seventh) halting, skirmishers face to the front and take advantage of cover halts on marches hand: disengaged, position at double time ; (eighth) left, position at balance (first) on hip falling in with salute hand grenades harmony and contentment in company hasty intrenchments head, definition headache head cover, trenches health, care of: chancroid clap five ways of catching disease fly, disease carrier germs gonorrhoea importance malaria fever mosquito, carrier of disease syphilis vegetables, distributer of disease venereal disease water, distributer of disease yellow fever hearing at night hearing in scouting heat, effect on shooting heat exhaustion height, men to fall in according to heliographing helmets, steel hits, percentage holding attack - horizontal clock face system of target designation horizontal equivalents hostile infantry, target human element in training and instruction hurdles hygiene. see "personal hygiene" i illumination of foreground of trenches imaginary enemy, definition ; improvised formations for advancing incinerators, camp "incline to the right (left)" increasing intervals: company squad individual cooking: fire, how to make importance recipes - individual intelligence, factor in warfare infantry: against artillery: action against artillery limbering or coming into action action against guns out of ammunition flank attack frontal attack usually futile machine guns wheel horses best targets against cavalry: cavalry charge against infantry usually futile infantry attacking dismounted cavalry measures to check charges from front and flanks meeting of cavalry charge by infantry in column rifle fire main dependence of infantry standing position, best to meet charge demands upon it by modern combat duties many and difficult good infantry can defeat superior troops of poor quality modern war requires good infantry moving to attack, passing through deployed artillery requisites of good infantry trained to bear heaviest burdens infantry drill regulations influence of ground initial combat order initiative in warfare initiative of subordinates not to be hampered ; ; ink stains, how removed "in place halt" inspection: band ; battalion ; company - display of equipment equipment of pieces when troop are formed and when dismissed (second) pistol prepare for ; - ; quarters ; saber ; seniority at ; inspection and port arms when dismissing squad inspection arms from order inspection arms, krag rifle inspections, object of instruction: captain's responsibility for commanding officers accountable for in use of signals of battalion, major responsible for of recruits - (a); without arms (a) instruction given subordinates through immediate superiors instruction. see "training and instruction" integrity of squads in battle intelligence, factor in warfare interest in training and instruction intermingling of units in firing line interpretations of drill regulations, spirit to govern interval: action of guides in taking battalion in deployment ; between companies in deployment ; between files obtained by placing hands on hip between platoon columns between regiments in deployment between skirmishers definition increasing or decreasing between skirmishers ; of file closers in column of squads plates showing intervals: battalion near, company near, to take intrenching tools, care intrenchments: construction in action order of importance of operations in construction intrenchments. see "field fortifications" introduction - ; - inundations, trenches invisibility best protection while advancing j "jab," bayonet (d) k kitchen pits, camping kitchens, camp kneel: from lying down from standing position of piece to aim use of position kneeling trench knife, care of knots - knowledge of subordinates krag rifle (infantry drill regulations) l landmarks, observing largest unit executing extended order (b); lashings latitude allowed subordinates ; latrines, camping latrines in trenches leadership: general consideration - necessary to success in battle leading: company ; platoon ; ; rush squad ; ; ; ; leather equipment: cleaning cleaning materials oiling ; left arm, position when piece is "diagonally across the body" (second) left, definition left foot, stepping off with left hand, position at balance (first) left shoulder from: order port present right shoulder leggins, how cleaned length of steps - library, company lieutenants: assisting captain in fire control of depleted company assignment of platoons to duties, etc., ; fire control ; - intermingling of units in firing line leading in charges posts of rushes by platoons ; suspending fire when target disappears taking post when company is formed training lieutenant colonel: salute in ceremonies light, effect on shooting lightning, struck by line, definition line of platoons, companies, etc., definition line of skirmishers - ; - lines of information - liquid fire listening posts, trenches litters, improvised loaded pieces not to be carried (first) loading pieces before deployment loading, with krag rifle loadings and firings: aiming point: announced before or after range once designated, not changed unless ordered by battalion cease firing clip fire color guard does not execute commands ; - continuing the fire (command) execution by file closers fire at will fire faster (slower) firing: executed in line and skirmish line only instruction in, preceded by command to load rear rank kneeling or lying down firings executed at halt instruction in firing to be preceded by command for loading load: command position of, when taken rear rank, kneeling or lying down target: announced before or after range once designated, not changed unless ordered loadings executed in line and skirmish line only long whistle blast pieces once loaded, so kept until command to unload position of load, when taken range and command announcing sight setting, aiming point announced before or after simulate load (command) single loader, use of piece as sling, use when deployed suspend firing ; local successes necessary to general success location of trenches lock pieces long blast of whistle ; long range long-range fire long-range fire, when effective lookouts in trenches loopholes and notches loose pieces lost, what to do lying down ; ; lying down position, use lying trench m machine guns: concealment covering dead spaces on defensive covering withdrawal ; effectiveness against skirmish line fire of position ; in attack in defense in infantry attack against artillery in meeting engagements lessons of european war - location on defense methods of transportation not to form part of firing line of attack silencing of machine guns by infantry to be used for short periods use in villages weapons of emergency with advance guard with rear guard with reserve machine gun company: post in formations ; post when attached to battalion major: apportions target controls support duties and responsibilities as battalion commander duty regarding protection of flanks ; gives order to charge gives order to fix bayonets indicates where or when fire fight begins locates trenches and obstacles order making disposition of battalion for combat orders bayonets fixed on defense post during attack post in route march reënforces firing line responsibility regarding ammunition see "battalion commander" malarial fever maneuvers ; maneuvers effective method of conducting manual of: arms: "by the numbers" (fifth) cadence (fourth) carrying rifle in any position (sixth) executed by color guard general principles and the manual - regular positions assume without regard to previous ones (sixth) "without the numbers" (fifth) bugle - color - saber - tent pitching - the color manual of bayonet: bayonet combat combined movements fencing at will fencing exercises general remarks guard hints for instructors instruction with rifle instruction without bayonet instruction without rifle jab (d) lessons of european war nomenclature short point (d) map, definition map distances map problems ; map problems, instruction in map reading: contours conventional signs definition of map determination of positions of points on map horizontal equivalents map distances meaning of map reading meridians north star orientation problems in scales scale of map distances (a) scales - scaling distances from map slopes true meridian visibility problem map sketching. see "military map sketching" march: at funeral played as honor marches: a successful march at night care of feet and fitting of shoes compliments not paid on marches conduct on march crossing bridges and fords elongation of column fitting shoes and care of feet forced matches halts hardening new troops long march not to be made with new troops marching capacity marching, principal occupation of troops in campaign night marches no compliments paid on physical training preparation for march - protection on march rate of march starting on march straggling marching, any movement executed when, unless otherwise prescribed marching to rear, skirmishes, not assembled marchings and steps - mark time: executed from half step, halt and mark time how executed while obliquing masks, protection against gases mass formation, battalion meat can, care mechanism of deployment taught by extended order (b) meeting engagements: action of advance guard prior to receipt of order action of column action of the leading troops advantage accrues to side deploying the faster afford ideal opportunity to certain commanders boldness and determination of commander characteristics of first troops deploying have advantage function of advance guard general action machine guns, use main body not to be put into action piece meal meagerness of information mission determines method of attack post of commander memorandum receipts, company meridians mess, company mess outfit care messages, delivery messages, instruction in delivering metal fouling, removing from bore method in training and instruction military appearance and deportment military courtesy: colors and standards headdress not raised in saluting national anthem national anthems of other nations nature and origin of salutes ; prisoners do not salute soldier walking with officer unmilitary salutes usual mistakes in saluting when and how to salute: at meals at work bringing command to present before commander salutes commanders of detachments or other commands dismounting before addressing, superior not mounted general rule how to salute in uniform indoors in public places and conveyances man addressed in formation no compliments paid at drill, on march, etc. no saluting at double time, trot or gallop officer approaching number of soldiers in open officer entering room occupied by soldiers officer passing in rear of troops passing officer on staircase riding in wagon rifle salute saber salute saluting distance saluting in civilian dress saluting in military manner sentinels on post several officers together soldier addressing or being addressed by officer when making and receiving reports when seated whom to salute: army officers foreign, naval and military attaches navy, marine corps, volunteer and national guard officers reserve corps officers military map sketching: combined sketching contours datum plane different methods of sketching form lines kinds of military sketches location of points by intersection location of points by resection location of points by traversing outpost sketching points for beginners to remember position sketching road sketching scales ; military organization military pits military training object of mine warfare. see, "trench and mine warfare" minor warfare: camp or bivouac protection dividing marching column into two or more detachments formations in close country formation in open country irregular operations march and bivouac formations to admit of rapid action in any direction night operations frequently advisable regular operations selection of site for camp or bivouac what it embraces mirage mission, defined mistakes, staying execution of movement for correction of ; modern combat, demands upon infantry modern war requires good infantry moisture, effect on shooting morning report morse code mosquito, carrier of disease mounted enlisted men formed into a detachment for ceremonies mounted officer in making about face, turns to left mounted scouts: battalion staff officers, training in patrolling and reconnaissance dismounted patrolling how used post when attached to battalion to be trained in patrolling and reconnaissance use for reconnoitering ; mouse and cat contest movement, any executed in double time unless excepted movements: begun in quick time, hastened by command, "double time" executed toward either flank, explained toward but one flank general rules ; may be executed from halt or when marching moving pivot, turning on: company ; squad when used moving targets, firing at musicians: (now buglers) duties during firing equipped with whistles and repeating signals join their companies at battalion inspection post to carry signal flags ; to repeat signal to fix bayonet and charge ; musicians (now buglers) of the guard muster - n national air: at funeral playing as honor at review national anthem national color does not salute next to last motion in resuming order from any position (third) night firing night marches night operations: advance and rear guards approaching charging point under cover of darkness attack, time of making bayonet use ; ; challenging connections defense, measures taken to resist night attacks deployment at night equipment finding bearings fire action to be avoided fire not effective beyond yards formations ; ; hearing importance individual training marches marking route outguards to supports moving in dark night advance followed by attack by day night entrenching night fencing night firing night matches outposts practice in offensive and defensive operations preparation purposes readiness for action reconnaissance secrecy sentries firing surprise trained troops necessary training of company unfriendly guides vision white rag, tying around muzzle of rifle nomenclature of rifle noncommissioned officer commanding platoon or company carrying of piece and taking of post noncommissioned officers, post of noncommissioned officers to be obeyed and respected noncommissioned officers, company, duties noncommissioned officers confining men noncommissioned officers; instructions in map problems noncommissioned officers; reduction and resignation noncommissioned officers; responsibilities in time of war "normal" forms covering all cases impossible normal sight (a) north star nose, foreign body in notches and loopholes number of troops to be deployed in beginning "numbers, by the" (fifth) o obedience object of military training objective-- announced before or after range once designated not changed unless ordered oblique deployment as skirmishers oblique march - observation - observation of target and fire - obstacles: abatis against cavalry automatic alarms barricades cheveaux de frise ; fraise guarding obstacles in front of outguards inundations kinds lessons from european war listening posts location military pits necessity for object palisade search lights trous de loup wire entanglements ; ; wire fence obstacles located by major occupation of ground offensive necessary for decisive results office, how to enter officer of the day officers: posts of to be true leaders to comply with spirit of orders oil, use on rifle ; on right (left) into line: battalion company open packs open ranks open sight (a) opening fire on defense order: assumed in resuming attention from rest or at ease (fifth) piece brought to, upon halting (seventh) piece striking ground gently (third) position in next to last motion (third) position of piece at order and cohesion in combat order, close, definition order, extended, definition order from: inspection left shoulder port present right shoulder trail orderlies: carrying signal flags do not change position when commander faces about to give command posts of ; orders: battle brigade and division, usually written compliance with spirit of composition of combat order definition deployment deviation from encroaching upon functions of subordinates, prohibited given subordinates through immediate superiors reconnaissance to precede issuing of initial combat orders regiment, usually verbal repetition of to be definite use in battalion combat verbal when used ; orders, files of, company orders for sentinels orders, tactical preparation organization, military orientation outlined enemy ; ; ; outpost, establishing by company outpost sketching outposts at night overhead cover, trenches p pace, definition pack: close display of contents for inspection laid aside in action open packs, unslinging, old equipment paint spots, how removed palisade paperwork, company parade rest: with arms without arms parades: battalion general rules ; post of color guard ; parados paroles and countersigns partial changes of direction, commander of patrolling. see, "scouting and patrolling" payment of soldier peep sight (b) percentage of hits periscopes personal hygiene personal reconnaissance: deployment formation of plan physical training: commands double timing methods rifle exercises setting up exercises ; starting positions walking and marching piece: carrying in any position (sixth) "diagonally across the body" (second) loading before deployment not to be carried loaded (first) once loaded, so kept until command to unload rules governing carrying to strike ground gently in coming to order (third) use as single loader pitching tents plan: of battle preceded by personal reconnaissance of combat, adherence to original plates: battalion near, company near, equipment near, platoon column: assembly from deployment how executed use in advancing - platoon drill: assembling from deployment column right (left) (company being in column of platoon) extended order on right into line (being in column of platoons) platoons column right (left) (company being in column of squad) platoon light (left) platoons right (left) by squads (being in line) platoons right (left) front into line squads right about (being in line of platoons) squads right (left), platoons column right (left) (being in line) platoon guides: close order drill duties in fire fight platoon leader: allotment of target to control the fire in deployment duties on fire fight ; equipped with whistles of flank platoons when company acts alone positions in verifying alignments repeating commands platoon, the fire unit of platoons: advance into an engagement assignment designation division of company into point of aim point of rest, definition point on which base squad marches in deployment points of compass poison, first aid port arms from: inspection left shoulder order present right shoulder position and aiming drills position fire: advance by rushes when used position of: captain in dressing company load, when taken piece at order piece "diagonally across the body" (second) the soldier position sketching post of: band ; commander in fight color ; ; ; ; file closers in column of squads major during attack major in route order mounted enlisted men ; ; noncommissioned officer in command of troops noncommissioned staff officers ; officers, noncommissioned officers and special units (band and machine gun company) shown in plates ; reviewing officer special units ; ; staff officers powder fouling, removing from bore practical instruction, purpose precision taught by drill at attention (a) preliminary drills preparatory command: arrangements of elements to revoke what it indicates present arms from: left shoulder order port right shoulder present saber principles of combat, extent to which treated in part i prisoners do not salute privates of the guard privileges, awarding privileges, withholding program of training progression in training and instruction property, responsibility, company ; protection: by reconnaissance ; when battalion is acting alone when company is acting alone protection against surprise when company is acting alone punishment: awarding company ; pursuit: additional force for general principles ; pursuing fire troops used for q quartermaster sergeant (now supply sergeant) assignment at drill quibbling, avoiding, in interpreting drill regulations quick time: cadence from double time movements habitually executed in r range: classification - command announcing determining of ; ; finders importance of correct sight setting in attack ; in defense signal for announcing range, how determined range practice ranging volleys rank, definition rapid fire exercises rate of: fire ; ; ; quick and double time ration return ready reality in training rear guard, use of machines guns as part of rear marching, skirmishers, not assembled rear rank not loading nor firing kneeling or lying down rear sight, description rear, to the, how to execute reconnaissance: battalion acting alone combat - company acting alone company advancing into an engagement each commander to guard against surprise meeting engagement ; minor warfare night operations personal before deployment to precede formation of plan record of rifles record of size of clothing records, company - recruits, instruction - ; ; - rectifying column, (battalion) red bugs reduction and resignation of noncommissioned officers reënforcement of firing line by major reënforcements, size reënforcing firing line - ; regiment: interval in deployment lines of communication established by muster - regimental color: salutes by saluting reviewing officer regimental commander: action in deployment of division decide equipment carried into action rejoining command after completion of task repetition of: command for guides, by captains at battalion drill commands by captains at battalion drill orders, commands and signals ; report, first sergeant's when company is formed reports, saluting when making or receiving represented enemy, definition requisites of good scout reserve: captured position strengthened by reserves commander of troops in action habitually with reserve covering withdrawal of attacking troops deployment to enable withdrawal of faulty firing line enveloping attack ; fire of position in decisive action furnished by units larger than battalion gives impetus to charge how used in attack charged with flank protection in withdrawal from action machine guns as part of occupying trenches vacated by firing line to improve same of firing line, strength ; part played by, in pursuit post and strength in holding attack post of, in attack post of, in defense post of, in delaying action reduction of reserve in case of protected flanks regimental: ammunition sent from use of, in case of victory respect, factor in training respect for sentinels respect to noncommissioned officers responsibility, devolution of responsibility for proper training rest, executed as without arms (fifth) rests, the ; ; " . resume . march" retained copies of rolls, etc., company retiring under fire return saber reveille and retreat gun reverse slopes revetments ; ; reviews: band ; battalion - battalions, after passing reviewing officer brigades, or larger commands ; cadence at which troops pass in review commander faces command flank to pass paces from reviewing officer flourishes formation of companies, battalions and regiments general rules - march, played as honor national air, playing as honor order in which troops are arranged passing around line ; points where column changes direction post of reviewing officer on left of column post of reviewing officer and others reviewing officer returns only salute of commanding officer reviewing officer, post reviewing officer junior to commanding officer riding around troops ruffles salute by regimental color salute returned by reviewing officer salute by lieutenant colonel saluting by staff ; saluting the color standing "at ease" etc., in case of brigade or larger command subordinates face to front to the color turning out of column by commanding officer of troops ; revoking preparatory command rewards and privileges, company ricochet shots rifle, care and description: army regulations bore - ; description importance kinds of fouling oil, how to apply oiling barrel rear-sight leaf removing metal fouling removing powder fouling. see "piece" rifle exercises rifle salute at: order or trail right shoulder rifle training and instruction: adjustment of fire aiming exercise aiming point aiming and sighting appearance of objects auxiliary aiming points ballistic qualities of rifle battle sight (c) beaten zone center of impact clock system of target designation ; clock system of wind designation cold, effect on shooting collective instruction combat exercises combat practice combined sights communication in fire control and direction (b) cone of fire or dispersion defilade deflection deflection and elevation correction drills designation of targets - (a) designation of winds distribution of fire - effect of fire effect of heat, light, etc. ; effectiveness of fire estimating distance - exercises in fire control and direction finger system of target designation (a) fine sight (b) fire direction and control - fire discipline, definition fire distribution - firing at stationary targets full sight (c) gallery practice gentle reverse slopes grazing fire heat, effect on shooting hits, percentage horizontal clock face system of target designation individual instruction influence of ground light, effect on shooting location of trenches long range fire mirage moisture, effect on shooting moving targets, firing at night firing normal sight (a) object of system occupation of ground open sight (a) peep sight (b) percentage of hits point of aim position and aiming drills preliminary drills program of instruction range, how determined range practice rapid fire exercise rate of fire reverse slopes ricochet shots sighting and aiming shot group sighting drills ; sights, kinds of sling, use slopes gentle reverse stationary targets firing at target designation - (a) targets, number hit technical principles of firing trajectory trial shots, determination of range triangle of sighting trigger squeeze exercise vertical clock face system of target designation volleys, determination of range windage zero of rifle zone of effective fire right (left) about, squad right (left) by: file squads two's ; right, definition right (left, center) dress ; ; right face right (left) front into line from: close column column of platoons or squads (company) column of squads or companies column of two's right half face right (left) half turn: command squad right (left) oblique right shoulder from: inspection left shoulder order port present right shoulder, pieces brought to, from order at command "march" (sixth) right (left) step, how executed right (left) turn: company squad rise, how executed road sketching route march, post of major and file closers route step ruffles at: funeral review rules for: carrying piece (first) ceremonies - close order (battalion) - close order, company - deployment - drills and formations - execution of manual parades ; reviews - salutes steps and marchings - rushes: advances made under covering fire begun by flank company command for company as whole led by captain prearranged methods prohibited size of rushing units ; subsequent advancing use of position fire when impossible for company to advance as a whole rust, how removed s saber, manual of - safety lock ; salutes: hand returned by reviewing officer rifle saber ; with color see "honors and salutes" also "military courtesy" saluting: by lieutenant colonel in ceremonies by staffs in ceremonies mounted junior to dismount before saluting dismounted senior on marches regimental color the color in reviews when making or receiving reports saluting volleys fired in close order sapping, advancing to charging point scalds, first aid scale of map distances (a) scales - scales of maps - scaling distances from map school of the: battalion - company - soldier - squad - scouting and patrolling: eyesight and hearing cat and mouse contest concealment and dodging finding way in strange country flag stealing contest footmarks, following landmarks, observing lost, what to do mouse and cat contest points of compass requisites of good scouts "tracking" scouts; see, "mounted scouts" scratches, first aid search lights, trench warfare seeing at night semaphore signaling semi-blindness sentinel's orders sentinels, respect for sentries firing at night separated officers and others placing themselves under order of nearest higher commander ; sergeant of the guard service calls service of information: bridges, facts to be obtained about bridges, reconnoitering of buildings, reconnoitering of camp noises camps, abandoned canals, facts to be obtained about cross roads, how reconnoitered defiles, facts to be obtained about defiles, reconnoitering of demolitions enclosures, reconnoitering of facts to be obtained about various objects fords, reconnoitering of heights, facts to be obtained about heights, reconnoitering of houses, reconnoitering of indications to be noticed by patrols marches, facts to be obtained about patrolling: facts to be obtained about various objects by patrols civilians flames and smoke messages ; model reports night work patrol fighting principles of patrolling patrols: acting upon meeting hostile patrols by whom furnished coördination before departure definition formation guarding against being cut off halts inspection before departure leaders orders and instructions preparation for starting prisoners to be captured problems - rate of march report on return returning by different route scattered patrols signals size ponds, facts to be obtained about positions, reconnoitering of railroads: demolitions facts to be obtained about reconnaissance of positions rivers, facts to be obtained about roads, facts to be obtained about signs to be noticed by patrols springs, facts to be obtained about suggestions for gaining information about the enemy suggestions for reconnaissance of positions telegraph line, demolition telegraphs, facts to be obtained about valleys, facts to be obtained about villages, facts to be obtained about villages, reconnoitering of vision limits of wagon roads, demolition woods, facts to be obtained about woods, reconnoitering of service of security: advance guard, general principles - advance guard order - advance guard problems - general principles outposts: advance cavalry cavalry outpost changes for the night communication between subdivision composition concealment cossack post definition and duties - detached posts distances between subdivisions entrenchments establishing the outpost examining posts flags of truce formation intercommunication obstacles outguards outpost order patrols - pickets problems ; ; relieving outpost reserves sentinels sentry squad subdivisions supports problems, advance guards - rear guard, general principles - setting-up exercises ; shelter tent: care of pitching: new model old model - striking shock, first aid shoes: care on marches polishing ; ; repair selection "short point" (d) shot group shots grazing enemy have approximate value of hits sick report side step siege operations siege works sight rear, description sight setting: command importance sighting and aiming sighting drills ; sights, kinds of signal corps, establishment of lines of communication signal flags: carried by musician (now bugler) ; carried by orderlies description use signaling: "chop chop" signal general service code heliograph, flash lantern, searchlight morse code semaphore code sound signals wigwag signals: arm attention fixed at first motion bugle used on and off the battlefield captain of supporting company to look out for major's signals cease firing change elevation commence firing communication between firing line and reserve flag ; for "platoon" and "squad," use of instruction in use of limitation of long blast of whistle: signifies suspension of firing to be avoided as signal for cease firing in rushes movement commences when signal is understood range, to announce repetition of special prearranged training in use of, to control firing line (d) use during firing use on firing line use of saber, rifle, or headdress in making when used whistle simple maneuvers best simple movements essential to correct battle training simulate load, how executed simultaneous movements by companies or platoons in battalion drill single loader, use of rifle as single rank (a); sitting position used instead of kneeling one size of clothing, record skirmishers: deployment: company general rules - squad to rear face to front and take advantage of cover on halting interval between ; ; ; ; not assembled, marching to rear to form from platoon or squad column skulking of troops carrying back wounded sky lines to be avoided sleeping bag ; sling, gun: adjustment and use included in grip of piece at balance (first) use when deployed sling packs, old equipment slopes, gentle reverse slopes on maps slower, fire small arms firing. see "rifle training and instruction" smartness taught by drills at attention, etc. (a) snake's bites sniperscope snow blindness sore throat sortie steps sound signals special units; posts of ; spider bites spirit of order to be complied with by officers spirit to govern in interpreting drill regulations splicing - splints spoon, care sprains, first aid squad: base ; composition dressing front when deployed integrity in battle movements executed as prescribed in school of the soldier right right (left) about to dismiss to form squad column: deployment how executed to assemble from use in advancing ; squad drill, object squad leader: action at preparatory command for forming skirmish line corporal is duties in fire fight post squads: deployment when company is deployed designation division of company into grouping soldiers into preservation of integrity in battle right (left) about right (left) column right (left) right (left) front into line stable guards stack arms ; staff: does not change position when commander faces about to give command draws and returns saber with chief habitually mounted post of saluting by, in review turning out of column in review ; stains, how removed standards and colors standing trench "star spangled banner" "star spangled banner" played at: funeral review statement of clothing charged to enlisted men stationary targets, firing at step, change, how executed stepping off with left foot steps and marchings - stings, first aid straggling in marches strange country, finding way in striking tents ; subordinates: coöperation latitude allowed and initiative ; ; success in battle: depends upon leadership, etc. factors entering into ; object of military training principles for increasing probability of, provided for in drill regulations succession of thin lines: command for advancing use in advancing use and purpose successive formations, guide toward point of rest successive movements in double time, base unit marches in quick time suffocation, first aid summary court records summary of combat principles sunburn, first aid ; sunstroke superiority of fire - support: artillery - battalion: battalion acting alone in defense distance from firing line division of battalion into support and firing line furnished by battalion none at beginning position size company: captain to look out for major's signals control by major duties of officers and sergeants upon joining firing line formations for original platoon divisions to be maintained promptness in reënforcing firing line reënforcements joining firing line occupying trenches vacated by firing line, to improve same of firing line, strength ; post and strength, in holding attack to cover withdrawal supporting artillery - supreme will, but one in battle surprise: each commander to guard his command against human element protection against, when company is acting alone suspend firing ; syphilis t tactical exercises, methods of conducting tactical orders tactical principles, application of take arms take interval: actions of guides and file closers how executed taking distance: actions of guides and file closers how executed "tanks" target: action in defense when it disappears aiming points, use announced before or after range allotment to platoon leaders apportioned by major assignment by major change to be avoided choice of, etc. designation ; ; (a) determination of distance to distribution of fire ; ; hostile firing line usual target ; observation of ; once designated, not changed unless ordered target practice. see "rifle training and instruction" target records, company targets, number hit teamwork: developed by thorough and uniform training general principles - technical principles of firing telegraph code telephones in trenches tent folding tent pitching: all types except shelter and conical wall conical wall shelter ; tent striking ; terrain exercises ; the color: cased, defined meaning of "color" national, renders no salute receiving of salute by regimental where kept theoretical instruction, purpose "the star spangled banner," see "star spangled banner" thin lines succession of: commands for advancing use and purpose use in advancing thoroughness in training "to the color" sounded at review to the rear, how executed tourniquet "tracking" trail, at, (command) (sixth) trail from order training and instruction: art of instruction on varied ground captain's responsibility for cheerfulness clearness commanding officers accountable for comradeship contentment courage cover, training in use of delivery of messages determination and individual intelligence fear for battle, simple movements and elastic formations human element individual initiative interest in use of signals to control fire line (d) map problems method and progression object ; of battalions, major responsible for operating against other troops practice in commanding mixed squads principles provided for in drill regulations program reality respect responsibility see, "general common sense principles of applied minor tactics" simultaneous instruction and training surprise thoroughness ; vanity trajectory traveling in strange country traverses treatment of soldiers trench and mine warfare: aerial mines aids to firing asphyxiating gases bombs from air-craft countermining grenades and bombs ; ; helmets liquid fire masks mining periscopes protection against gases protection against hand grenades sniperscope "tanks" winged torpedoes trenches: located by major occupied by supports and reserves, to be improved see "field fortifications" trial shots, determination of range trials by court-martial triangle of sighting trigger-squeeze exercise troops stable guards trous de loup true meridian turning about, mounted officer turning movements when allowable turning on fixed pivot: how executed when used two's right (left) front into line u umpire ; unfix bayonet: krag rifle springfield rifle uniform, dignity of unit: attack fire units not to be broken up unload ; unload, krag rifle unnecessary hardship to be avoided unsling equipment unsling packs, old equipment urinal tubs use of cover - use of ground ; v valleys determination of range variety in instruction vegetables, distribution of disease venereal disease verbal orders vertical clock face system of target designation visibility problem vision at night volley firing: how executed use w wall tents war game ; warning calls watchmen water: distribution of disease in camp in trenches whistle, long blast whistle signals whistles, by whom carried, different tones, etc. wigwag will supreme, but one in battle windage winged torpedoes wire entanglements ; ; wire fence, trenches withdrawal from action: action by commander covered by support generally effected at heavy cost part of line to be withdrawn first rear guard and distance to be placed between enemy and defeated troops reserve used to check pursuit retreating troops to be gotten under control as soon as possible selection of rendezvous point under fire use of artillery, machine guns and cavalry use of machine guns with dummy (blank or ball) cartridges, load "without the numbers" (fifth) witness, appearance as wood, camping work, devolution of wounded not to be carried back by fighting troops wounds, first aid y yellow fever z zero of rifle zone of effective fire the moss publications officers' manual $ . noncommissioned officers' manual . privates' manual . manual of military training . questions on manual of military training . applied minor tactics . field service . infantry drill regulations simplified . spanish for soldiers . self-helps for the citizen-soldier . riot duty . army changes single copies, c; annual subscription . army paperwork . military training for boys . peace and war duties of the enlisted man . trench warfare . questions on infantry drill regulations . company training . extracts from army regulations . combined army publications . questions on combined army publications . our flag and its message . what sammy's doing . origin and significance of military customs . army manual for military surgeons . a b c's of personal preparedness $ . intended to be used with the "dandy dummy gun" . ----- . (plus transportation charges on gun.) [illustration] publishers george banta publishing company menasha, wisconsin --> banta's complete catalogue of military books will be mailed on application. [illustration] corona _the pen of the army_ note the ease with which this portable writing machine may be used under service conditions. its parts never work loose or drop off. it has no attachments and does not take down. you can carry corona anywhere for, case and all, it weighs but lbs. and measures only × - / × - / ins. being built almost entirely of aluminum and steel, corona is practically indestructible. the corona folding stand adds greatly to the convenience of using corona in the field. this stand has three telescopic brass legs, stands ins. high and collapses to - / ins. it weighs lbs. _price of corona and case, $ _ _price of folding stand, $ _ corona typewriter co., inc. groton, new york to make your shoes waterproof to make your shoes soft and comfortable to make your shoes wear times longer to keep the harness and saddle in good order use viscol [illustration] viscol makes the leather soft and pliable and also waterproof. viscolized leather remains soft and pliable under continuous hard service, even when it is worn in salt water or in snow. viscol is a solution of a rubber-like material which amalgamates with the leather substance and is not driven out of the leather by heat or by water, the way oils are. its beneficial effect is lasting. leather that is treated with viscol wears several times as long as leather that has not been thus treated. viscol is sold by many of the post exchanges and by most shoe dealers. if you can not procure it at the nearest post exchange or from your shoe dealer, write to viscol company east cambridge boston, mass. trophies and prizes for military, athletic and sporting events of quality as designed and made for the u. s. army and navy, west point academy and u. s. naval academy _catalogues and information upon request_ bailey, banks & biddle co. _diamond merchants, jewelers, silversmiths, goldsmiths, heraldists_ philadelphia [illustration] eisner uniforms for u. s. army and national guard officers and enlisted men uniforms independent military organizations uniforms military training camps uniforms boys military and society clubs uniforms official national outfitter boy scouts of america sigmund eisner co. red bank, n. j. new york office, fifth avenue comfort your feet keep shoes, puttees and all leather accouterments soft, water proof and pliable with -in-one. not sticky or greasy. contains no acid. after a march or tiresome drill, rub -in-one oil on your feet--wonderful how it helps take the smart out! [illustration] use -in-one on gun and revolver--prevents rust and keeps them in order for inspection. use on bayonet and side arms, too. -in-one will make your gun work with out sticking or jamming. best shots use and recommend it. put -in-one on your razor strop; also draw razor blade between thumb and finger moistened with -in-one after shaving. you'll shave easier. [illustration] sold at post exchanges and ship's stores: -oz. bottle, c; -oz., c; -oz. ( / pt.) c. also in handy oil cans, -oz. c. _avoid substitutes._ free a generous sample and dictionary of uses three-in-one oil co., dal, broadway, new york _outdoor equipage_ meyer's military shops [illustration] _riding breeches and habits_ tailors f street, between th and th sts. n. w. washington, d. c. _complete outdoor equipage_ _ready to wear_ _for men, women, and children_ riding breeches, puttee leggins, norfolk jackets, hunting clothes, boots and shoes, middy blouse and skirts, tents and sleeping bags, riding skirts and norfolk jackets, moccasins write for catalogue _visit our camp rooms when in washington_ ridabock & company - west th st., new york _u. s. army, national guard officers' uniforms and equipments_ _military school uniforms and equipments_ _military training camp outfits_ _military supplies, military textbooks_ individual departments and workshops for the respective grades of uniforms. used by uncle sam's expert riflemen [illustration] hoppe's nitro powder solvent no. trade mark registered for cleaning high power (springfield) rifles, revolvers and firearms of all kinds a compound that will remove the residue of any high-power powder, including black powder. it will neutralize and residue and loosen metal fouling and leading that may be left in the barrel after cleaning, and prevent pitting. no. is the only rifle cleaning solvent that will remove rust, metal fouling and leading. for cleaning the . cal. rifles, revolvers and automatic pistols it has no equal. nitro powder solvent no. is endorsed by the most prominent riflemen in america. used by u. s. rifle teams, and at buenos ayres, argentine matches. no rifleman or quartermaster's department should be without it. sold by sporting goods dealers and at post exchanges frank a. hoppe, sole manufacturer, station o, philadelphia, u. s. a. established b. pasquale company - post st. san francisco, cal. _the only manufacturers of_ army and navy equipments and uniforms on the pacific coast "quality and fit guaranteed" (write for catalogue) the military historian and economist quarterly harvard university press, cambridge, mass. _subscription, $ . per annum._ edited by major a. l. conger, u. s. a., and professor r. m. johnston, harvard university. advisory board: general j. f. morrison, u. s. a., colonel j. w. mcandrew, u. s. a., professors c. j. bullock, a. bushnell hart, o. m. w. sprague, and justin h. smith, esq. original articles and notes on military history, the conduct of war, strategy, tactics. military economics by the best american and foreign authorities. clausewitz to date edited by r. m. johnston synopsis of the views of clausewitz with selected quotations from the best military theorists, systematically modernized. the volume measures only - / × - / inches. field service binding. _price, postpaid $ . ._ the military historian and economist widener hall cambridge, massachusetts +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | transcriber's note. | | =================== | | | | irregularities within the original book have been preserved, | | notably: | | | | part i has appendicies a, b and d. there is no appendix c. | | | | part i chapter i contains plates ii, iii and vi. plates i, iv | | and v are not present nor referenced. | | | | references to other paragraphs within the text mostly use the | | book paragraph number. however, there are some cases where the | | paragraph number relates to the source document paragraph number | | (in brackets at the end of the paragraph)--these have been left | | as shown in the book. the link in the html version does, however,| | point to the intended paragraph. | | | | spelling variants (e. g. reinforce vs reënforce) have been | | preserved. | | | | the 'pointing finger' picture has been transcribed as --> in the | | text version. | | | | brackets have been added as necessary to equations to aid clarity. | | | | for consistency, subheadings which originally appeared next to a | | paragraph number have been extracted out to the line above (i. e. | | they do not appear on the same line as the paragraph number in | | this transcription.) affected paragraphs are: | | | | , , , - , - , , , - , - , - , | | , , , - , - , , - , - , , | | , - , . | | | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ sly. html version by al haines. little wars (a game for boys from twelve years of age to one hundred and fifty and for that more intelligent sort of girl who likes boys' games and books) with an appendix on kriegspiel by h. g. wells contents i. of the legendary past ii. the beginnings of modern little warfare iii. the rules-- the country the move mobility of the various arms hand-to-hand fighting and capturing varieties of the battle-game composition of forces size of the soldiers iv. the battle of hook's farm v. extensions and amplifications of little war vi. ending with a sort of challenge appendix-- little wars and kriegspiel i of the legendary past "little wars" is the game of kings--for players in an inferior social position. it can be played by boys of every age from twelve to one hundred and fifty--and even later if the limbs remain sufficiently supple--by girls of the better sort, and by a few rare and gifted women. this is to be a full history of little wars from its recorded and authenticated beginning until the present time, an account of how to make little warfare, and hints of the most priceless sort for the recumbent strategist.... but first let it be noted in passing that there were prehistoric "little wars." this is no new thing, no crude novelty; but a thing tested by time, ancient and ripe in its essentials for all its perennial freshness--like spring. there was a someone who fought little wars in the days of queen anne; a garden napoleon. his game was inaccurately observed and insufficiently recorded by laurence sterne. it is clear that uncle toby and corporal trim were playing little wars on a scale and with an elaboration exceeding even the richness and beauty of the contemporary game. but the curtain is drawn back only to tantalise us. it is scarcely conceivable that anywhere now on earth the shandean rules remain on record. perhaps they were never committed to paper.... and in all ages a certain barbaric warfare has been waged with soldiers of tin and lead and wood, with the weapons of the wild, with the catapult, the elastic circular garter, the peashooter, the rubber ball, and such-like appliances--a mere setting up and knocking down of men. tin murder. the advance of civilisation has swept such rude contests altogether from the playroom. we know them no more.... ii the beginnings of modern little warfare the beginning of the game of little war, as we know it, became possible with the invention of the spring breechloader gun. this priceless gift to boyhood appeared somewhen towards the end of the last century, a gun capable of hitting a toy soldier nine times out of ten at a distance of nine yards. it has completely superseded all the spiral-spring and other makes of gun hitherto used in playroom warfare. these spring breechloaders are made in various sizes and patterns, but the one used in our game is that known in england as the four-point-seven gun. it fires a wooden cylinder about an inch long, and has a screw adjustment for elevation and depression. it is an altogether elegant weapon. it was with one of these guns that the beginning of our war game was made. it was at sandgate--in england. [illustration: showing a country prepared for the war game] [illustration: showing countries prepared for the war game] the present writer had been lunching with a friend--let me veil his identity under the initials j. k. j.--in a room littered with the irrepressible debris of a small boy's pleasures. on a table near our own stood four or five soldiers and one of these guns. mr j. k. j., his more urgent needs satisfied and the coffee imminent, drew a chair to this little table, sat down, examined the gun discreetly, loaded it warily, aimed, and hit his man. thereupon he boasted of the deed, and issued challenges that were accepted with avidity.... he fired that day a shot that still echoes round the world. an affair--let us parallel the cannonade of valmy and call it the cannonade of sandgate--occurred, a shooting between opposed ranks of soldiers, a shooting not very different in spirit--but how different in results!--from the prehistoric warfare of catapult and garter. "but suppose," said his antagonists; "suppose somehow one could move the men!" and therewith opened a new world of belligerence. the matter went no further with mr j. k. j. the seed lay for a time gathering strength, and then began to germinate with another friend, mr w. to mr w. was broached the idea: "i believe that if one set up a few obstacles on the floor, volumes of the british encyclopedia and so forth, to make a country, and moved these soldiers and guns about, one could have rather a good game, a kind of kriegspiel."... primitive attempts to realise the dream were interrupted by a great rustle and chattering of lady visitors. they regarded the objects upon the floor with the empty disdain of their sex for all imaginative things. but the writer had in those days a very dear friend, a man too ill for long excursions or vigorous sports (he has been dead now these six years), of a very sweet companionable disposition, a hearty jester and full of the spirit of play. to him the idea was broached more fruitfully. we got two forces of toy soldiers, set out a lumpish encyclopaedic land upon the carpet, and began to play. we arranged to move in alternate moves: first one moved all his force and then the other; an infantry-man could move one foot at each move, a cavalry-man two, a gun two, and it might fire six shots; and if a man was moved up to touch another man, then we tossed up and decided which man was dead. so we made a game, which was not a good game, but which was very amusing once or twice. the men were packed under the lee of fat volumes, while the guns, animated by a spirit of their own, banged away at any exposed head, or prowled about in search of a shot. occasionally men came into contact, with remarkable results. rash is the man who trusts his life to the spin of a coin. one impossible paladin slew in succession nine men and turned defeat to victory, to the extreme exasperation of the strategist who had led those victims to their doom. this inordinate factor of chance eliminated play; the individual freedom of guns turned battles into scandals of crouching concealment; there was too much cover afforded by the books and vast intervals of waiting while the players took aim. and yet there was something about it.... it was a game crying aloud for improvement. improvement came almost simultaneously in several directions. first there was the development of the country. the soldiers did not stand well on an ordinary carpet, the encyclopedia made clumsy cliff-like "cover", and more particularly the room in which the game had its beginnings was subject to the invasion of callers, alien souls, trampling skirt-swishers, chatterers, creatures unfavourably impressed by the spectacle of two middle-aged men playing with "toy soldiers" on the floor, and very heated and excited about it. overhead was the day nursery, with a wide extent of smooth cork carpet (the natural terrain of toy soldiers), a large box of bricks--such as i have described in floor games--and certain large inch-thick boards. it was an easy task for the head of the household to evict his offspring, annex these advantages, and set about planning a more realistic country. (i forget what became of the children.) the thick boards were piled up one upon another to form hills; holes were bored in them, into which twigs of various shrubs were stuck to represent trees; houses and sheds (solid and compact piles of from three to six or seven inches high, and broad in proportion) and walls were made with the bricks; ponds and swamps and rivers, with fords and so forth indicated, were chalked out on the floor, garden stones were brought in to represent great rocks, and the "country" at least of our perfected war game was in existence. we discovered it was easy to cut out and bend and gum together paper and cardboard walls, into which our toy bricks could be packed, and on which we could paint doors and windows, creepers and rain-water pipes, and so forth, to represent houses, castles, and churches in a more realistic manner, and, growing skilful, we made various bridges and so forth of card. every boy who has ever put together model villages knows how to do these things, and the attentive reader will find them edifyingly represented in our photographic illustrations. there has been little development since that time in the country. our illustrations show the methods of arrangement, and the reader will see how easily and readily the utmost variety of battlefields can be made. (it is merely to be remarked that a too crowded country makes the guns ineffective and leads to a mere tree to tree and house to house scramble, and that large open spaces along the middle, or rivers without frequent fords and bridges, lead to ineffective cannonades, because of the danger of any advance. on the whole, too much cover is better than too little.) we decided that one player should plan and lay out the country, and the other player choose from which side he would come. and to-day we play over such landscapes in a cork-carpeted schoolroom, from which the proper occupants are no longer evicted but remain to take an increasingly responsible and less and less audible and distressing share in the operations. [illustration: showing the war game in the open air] [illustration: the war game in the open air] we found it necessary to make certain general rules. houses and sheds must be made of solid lumps of bricks, and not hollow so that soldiers can be put inside them, because otherwise muddled situations arise. and it was clearly necessary to provide for the replacement of disturbed objects by chalking out the outlines of boards and houses upon the floor or boards upon which they stood. and while we thus perfected the country, we were also eliminating all sorts of tediums, disputable possibilities, and deadlocks from the game. we decided that every man should be as brave and skilful as every other man, and that when two men of opposite sides came into contact they would inevitably kill each other. this restored strategy to its predominance over chance. we then began to humanise that wild and fearful fowl, the gun. we decided that a gun could not be fired if there were not six--afterwards we reduced the number to four--men within six inches of it. and we ruled that a gun could not both fire and move in the same general move: it could either be fired or moved (or left alone). if there were less than six men within six inches of a gun, then we tried letting it fire as many shots as there were men, and we permitted a single man to move a gun, and move with it as far as he could go by the rules--a foot, that is, if he was an infantry-man, and two feet if he was a cavalry-man. we abolished altogether that magical freedom of an unassisted gun to move two feet. and on such rules as these we fought a number of battles. they were interesting, but not entirely satisfactory. we took no prisoners--a feature at once barbaric and unconvincing. the battles lingered on a long time, because we shot with extreme care and deliberation, and they were hard to bring to a decisive finish. the guns were altogether too predominant. they prevented attacks getting home, and they made it possible for a timid player to put all his soldiers out of sight behind hills and houses, and bang away if his opponent showed as much as the tip of a bayonet. monsieur bloch seemed vindicated, and little war had become impossible. and there was something a little absurd, too, in the spectacle of a solitary drummer-boy, for example, marching off with a gun. but as there was nevertheless much that seemed to us extremely pretty and picturesque about the game, we set to work--and here a certain mr m. with his brother, captain m., hot from the great war in south africa, came in most helpfully--to quicken it. manifestly the guns had to be reduced to manageable terms. we cut down the number of shots per move to four, and we required that four men should be within six inches of a gun for it to be in action at all. without four men it could neither fire nor move--it was out of action; and if it moved, the four men had to go with it. moreover, to put an end to that little resistant body of men behind a house, we required that after a gun had been fired it should remain, without alteration of the elevation, pointing in the direction of its last shot, and have two men placed one on either side of the end of its trail. this secured a certain exposure on the part of concealed and sheltered gunners. it was no longer possible to go on shooting out of a perfect security for ever. all this favoured the attack and led to a livelier game. our next step was to abolish the tedium due to the elaborate aiming of the guns, by fixing a time limit for every move. we made this an outside limit at first, ten minutes, but afterwards we discovered that it made the game much more warlike to cut the time down to a length that would barely permit a slow-moving player to fire all his guns and move all his men. this led to small bodies of men lagging and "getting left," to careless exposures, to rapid, less accurate shooting, and just that eventfulness one would expect in the hurry and passion of real fighting. it also made the game brisker. we have since also made a limit, sometimes of four minutes, sometimes of five minutes, to the interval for adjustment and deliberation after one move is finished and before the next move begins. this further removes the game from the chess category, and approximates it to the likeness of active service. most of a general's decisions, once a fight has begun, must be made in such brief intervals of time. (but we leave unlimited time at the outset for the planning.) as to our time-keeping, we catch a visitor with a stop-watch if we can, and if we cannot, we use a fair-sized clock with a second-hand: the player not moving says "go," and warns at the last two minutes, last minute, and last thirty seconds. but i think it would not be difficult to procure a cheap clock--because, of course, no one wants a very accurate agreement with greenwich as to the length of a second--that would have minutes instead of hours and seconds instead of minutes, and that would ping at the end of every minute and discharge an alarm note at the end of the move. that would abolish the rather boring strain of time-keeping. one could just watch the fighting. moreover, in our desire to bring the game to a climax, we decided that instead of a fight to a finish we would fight to some determined point, and we found very good sport in supposing that the arrival of three men of one force upon the back line of the opponent's side of the country was of such strategic importance as to determine the battle. but this form of battle we have since largely abandoned in favour of the old fight to a finish again. we found it led to one type of battle only, a massed rush at the antagonist's line, and that our arrangements of time-limits and capture and so forth had eliminated most of the concluding drag upon the game. our game was now very much in its present form. we considered at various times the possibility of introducing some complication due to the bringing up of ammunition or supplies generally, and we decided that it would add little to the interest or reality of the game. our battles are little brisk fights in which one may suppose that all the ammunition and food needed are carried by the men themselves. but our latest development has been in the direction of killing hand to hand or taking prisoners. we found it necessary to distinguish between an isolated force and a force that was merely a projecting part of a larger force. we made a definition of isolation. after a considerable amount of trials we decided that a man or a detachment shall be considered to be isolated when there is less than half its number of its own side within a move of it. now, in actual civilised warfare small detached bodies do not sell their lives dearly; a considerably larger force is able to make them prisoners without difficulty. accordingly we decided that if a blue force, for example, has one or more men isolated, and a red force of at least double the strength of this isolated detachment moves up to contact with it, the blue men will be considered to be prisoners. that seemed fair; but so desperate is the courage and devotion of lead soldiers, that it came to this, that any small force that got or seemed likely to get isolated and caught by a superior force instead of waiting to be taken prisoners, dashed at its possible captors and slew them man for man. it was manifestly unreasonable to permit this. and in considering how best to prevent such inhuman heroisms, we were reminded of another frequent incident in our battles that also erred towards the incredible and vitiated our strategy. that was the charging of one or two isolated horse-men at a gun in order to disable it. let me illustrate this by an incident. a force consisting of ten infantry and five cavalry with a gun are retreating across an exposed space, and a gun with thirty men, cavalry and infantry, in support comes out upon a crest into a position to fire within two feet of the retreating cavalry. the attacking player puts eight men within six inches of his gun and pushes the rest of his men a little forward to the right or left in pursuit of his enemy. in the real thing, the retreating horsemen would go off to cover with the gun, "hell for leather," while the infantry would open out and retreat, firing. but see what happened in our imperfect form of little war! the move of the retreating player began. instead of retreating his whole force, he charged home with his mounted desperadoes, killed five of the eight men about the gun, and so by the rule silenced it, enabling the rest of his little body to get clean away to cover at the leisurely pace of one foot a move. this was not like any sort of warfare. in real life cavalry cannot pick out and kill its equivalent in cavalry while that equivalent is closely supported by other cavalry or infantry; a handful of troopers cannot gallop past well and abundantly manned guns in action, cut down the gunners and interrupt the fire. and yet for a time we found it a little difficult to frame simple rules to meet these two bad cases and prevent such scandalous possibilities. we did at last contrive to do so; we invented what we call the melee, and our revised rules in the event of a melee will be found set out upon a later page. they do really permit something like an actual result to hand-to-hand encounters. they abolish horatius cocles. [illustration: the war game in the open air] [illustration: fig. --battle of hook's farm. general view of the battlefield and red army] we also found difficulties about the capturing of guns. at first we had merely provided that a gun was captured when it was out of action and four men of the opposite force were within six inches of it, but we found a number of cases for which this rule was too vague. a gun, for example, would be disabled and left with only three men within six inches; the enemy would then come up eight or ten strong within six inches on the other side, but not really reaching the gun. at the next move the original possessor of the gun would bring up half a dozen men within six inches. to whom did the gun belong? by the original wording of our rule, it might be supposed to belong to the attack which had never really touched the gun yet, and they could claim to turn it upon its original side. we had to meet a number of such cases. we met them by requiring the capturing force--or, to be precise, four men of it--actually to pass the axle of the gun before it could be taken. all sorts of odd little difficulties arose too, connected with the use of the guns as a shelter from fire, and very exact rules had to be made to avoid tilting the nose and raising the breech of a gun in order to use it as cover.... we still found it difficult to introduce any imitation into our game of either retreat or the surrender of men not actually taken prisoners in a melee. both things were possible by the rules, but nobody did them because there was no inducement to do them. games were apt to end obstinately with the death or capture of the last man. an inducement was needed. this we contrived by playing not for the game but for points, scoring the result of each game and counting the points towards the decision of a campaign. our campaign was to our single game what a rubber is to a game of whist. we made the end of a war , , or or more points up, according to the number of games we wanted to play, and we scored a hundred for each battle won, and in addition for each infantry-man, - / for each cavalry-man, for each gun, / for each man held prisoner by the enemy, and / for each prisoner held at the end of the game, subtracting what the antagonist scored by the same scale. thus, when he felt the battle was hopelessly lost, he had a direct inducement to retreat any guns he could still save and surrender any men who were under the fire of the victors' guns and likely to be slaughtered, in order to minimise the score against him. and an interest was given to a skilful retreat, in which the loser not only saved points for himself but inflicted losses upon the pursuing enemy. at first we played the game from the outset, with each player's force within sight of his antagonist; then we found it possible to hang a double curtain of casement cloth from a string stretched across the middle of the field, and we drew this back only after both sides had set out their men. without these curtains we found the first player was at a heavy disadvantage, because he displayed all his dispositions before his opponent set down his men. and at last our rules have reached stability, and we regard them now with the virtuous pride of men who have persisted in a great undertaking and arrived at precision after much tribulation. there is not a piece of constructive legislation in the world, not a solitary attempt to meet a complicated problem, that we do not now regard the more charitably for our efforts to get a right result from this apparently easy and puerile business of fighting with tin soldiers on the floor. and so our laws all made, battles have been fought, the mere beginnings, we feel, of vast campaigns. the game has become in a dozen aspects extraordinarily like a small real battle. the plans are made, the country hastily surveyed, and then the curtains are closed, and the antagonists make their opening dispositions. then the curtains are drawn back and the hostile forces come within sight of each other; the little companies and squadrons and batteries appear hurrying to their positions, the infantry deploying into long open lines, the cavalry sheltering in reserve, or galloping with the guns to favourable advance positions. in two or three moves the guns are flickering into action, a cavalry melee may be in progress, the plans of the attack are more or less apparent, here are men pouring out from the shelter of a wood to secure some point of vantage, and here are troops massing among farm buildings for a vigorous attack. the combat grows hot round some vital point. move follows move in swift succession. one realises with a sickening sense of error that one is outnumbered and hard pressed here and uselessly cut off there, that one's guns are ill-placed, that one's wings are spread too widely, and that help can come only over some deadly zone of fire. so the fight wears on. guns are lost or won, hills or villages stormed or held; suddenly it grows clear that the scales are tilting beyond recovery, and the loser has nothing left but to contrive how he may get to the back line and safety with the vestiges of his command.... but let me, before i go on to tell of actual battles and campaigns, give here a summary of our essential rules. iii the rules here, then, are the rules of the perfect battle-game as we play it in an ordinary room. the country ( ) the country must be arranged by one player, who, failing any other agreement, shall be selected by the toss of a coin. ( ) the other player shall then choose which side of the field he will fight from. ( ) the country must be disturbed as little as possible in each move. nothing in the country shall be moved or set aside deliberately to facilitate the firing of guns. a player must not lie across the country so as to crush or disturb the country if his opponent objects. whatever is moved by accident shall be replaced after the end of the move. the move ( ) after the country is made and the sides chosen, then (and not until then) the players shall toss for the first move. ( ) if there is no curtain, the player winning the toss, hereafter called the first player, shall next arrange his men along his back line, as he chooses. any men he may place behind or in front of his back line shall count in the subsequent move as if they touched the back line at its nearest point. the second player shall then do the same. but if a curtain is available both first and second player may put down their men at the same time. both players may take unlimited time for the putting down of their men; if there is a curtain it is drawn back when they are ready, and the game then begins. [illustration: fig. --battle of hook's farm. a near view of the blue army] [illustration: fig. --battle of hook's farm. position of both armies after first move.] ( ) the subsequent moves after the putting down are timed. the length of time given for each move is determined by the size of the forces engaged. about a minute should be allowed for moving men and a minute for each gun. thus for a force of men and guns, moved by one player, seven minutes is an ample allowance. as the battle progresses and the men are killed off, the allowance is reduced as the players may agree. the player about to move stands at attention a yard behind his back line until the timekeeper says "go." he then proceeds to make his move until time is up. he must instantly stop at the cry of "time." warning should be given by the timekeeper two minutes, one minute, and thirty seconds before time is up. there will be an interval before the next move, during which any disturbance of the country can be rearranged and men accidentally overturned replaced in a proper attitude. this interval must not exceed five or four minutes, as may be agreed upon. ( ) guns must not be fired before the second move of the first player--not counting the "putting down" as a move. thus the first player puts down, then the second player, the first player moves, then the second player, and the two forces are then supposed to come into effective range of each other and the first player may open fire if he wishes to do so. ( ) in making his move a player must move or fire his guns if he wants to do so, before moving his men. to this rule of "guns first" there is to be no exception. ( ) every soldier may be moved and every gun moved or fired at each move, subject to the following rules: mobility of the various arms (each player must be provided with two pieces of string, one two feet in length and the other six inches.) (i) an infantry-man may be moved a foot or any less distance at each move. (ii) a cavalry-man may be moved two feet or any less distance at each move. (iii) a gun is in action if there are at least four men of its own side within six inches of it. if there are not at least four men within that distance, it can neither be moved nor fired. (iv) if a gun is in action it can either be moved or fired at each move, but not both. if it is fired, it may fire as many as four shots in each move. it may be swung round on its axis (the middle point of its wheel axle) to take aim, provided the country about it permits; it may be elevated or depressed, and the soldiers about it may, at the discretion of the firer, be made to lie down in their places to facilitate its handling. moreover, soldiers who have got in front of the fire of their own guns may lie down while the guns fire over them. at the end of the move the gun must be left without altering its elevation and pointing in the direction of the last shot. and after firing, two men must be placed exactly at the end of the trail of the gun, one on either side in a line directly behind the wheels. so much for firing. if the gun is moved and not fired, then at least four men who are with the gun must move up with it to its new position, and be placed within six inches of it in its new position. the gun itself must be placed trail forward and the muzzle pointing back in the direction from which it came, and so it must remain until it is swung round on its axis to fire. obviously the distance which a gun can move will be determined by the men it is with; if there are at least four cavalry-men with it, they can take the gun two feet, but if there are fewer cavalry-men than four and the rest infantry, or no cavalry and all infantry, the gun will be movable only one foot. (v) every man must be placed fairly clear of hills, buildings, trees, guns, etc. he must not be jammed into interstices, and either player may insist upon a clear distance between any man and any gun or other object of at least one-sixteenth of an inch. nor must men be packed in contact with men. a space of one-sixteenth of an inch should be kept between them. (vi) when men are knocked over by a shot they are dead, and as many men are dead as a shot knocks over or causes to fall or to lean so that they would fall if unsupported. but if a shot strikes a man but does not knock him over, he is dead, provided the shot has not already killed a man. but a shot cannot kill more than one man without knocking him over, and if it touches several without oversetting them, only the first touched is dead and the others are not incapacitated. a shot that rebounds from or glances off any object and touches a man, kills him; it kills him even if it simply rolls to his feet, subject to what has been said in the previous sentence. hand-to-hand fighting and capturing ( ) a man or a body of men which has less than half its own number of men on its own side within a move of it, is said to be isolated. but if there is at least half its number of men of its own side within a move of it, it is not isolated; it is supported. ( ) men may be moved up into virtual contact (one-eighth of an inch or closer) with men of the opposite side. they must then be left until the end of the move. ( ) at the end of the move, if there are men of the side that has just moved in contact with any men of the other side, they constitute a melee. all the men in contact, and any other men within six inches of the men in contact, measuring from any point of their persons, weapons, or horses, are supposed to take part in the melee. at the end of the move the two players examine the melee and dispose of the men concerned according to the following rules:-- either the numbers taking part in the melee on each side are equal or unequal. (a) if they are equal, all the men on both sides are killed. (b) if they are unequal, then the inferior force is either isolated or (measuring from the points of contact) not isolated. (i) if it is isolated (see ( ) above), then as many men become prisoners as the inferior force is less in numbers than the superior force, and the rest kill each a man and are killed. thus nine against eleven have two taken prisoners, and each side seven men dead. four of the eleven remain with two prisoners. one may put this in another way by saying that the two forces kill each other off, man for man, until one force is double the other, which is then taken prisoner. seven men kill seven men, and then four are left with two. (ii) but if the inferior force is not isolated (see ( ) above), then each man of the inferior force kills a man of the superior force and is himself killed. and the player who has just completed the move, the one who has charged, decides, when there is any choice, which men in the melee, both of his own and of his antagonist, shall die and which shall be prisoners or captors. all these arrangements are made after the move is over, in the interval between the moves, and the time taken for the adjustment does not count as part of the usual interval for consideration. it is extra time. the player next moving may, if he has taken prisoners, move these prisoners. prisoners may be sent under escort to the rear or wherever the capturer directs, and one man within six inches of any number of prisoners up to seven can escort these prisoners and go with them. prisoners are liberated by the death of any escort there may be within six inches of them, but they may not be moved by the player of their own side until the move following that in which the escort is killed. directly prisoners are taken they are supposed to be disarmed, and if they are liberated they cannot fight until they are rearmed. in order to be rearmed they must return to the back line of their own side. an escort having conducted prisoners to the back line, and so beyond the reach of liberation, may then return into the fighting line. prisoners once made cannot fight until they have returned to their back line. it follows, therefore, that if after the adjudication of a melee a player moves up more men into touch with the survivors of this first melee, and so constitutes a second melee, any prisoners made in the first melee will not count as combatants in the second melee. thus if a moves up nineteen men into a melee with thirteen of b's--b having only five in support--a makes six prisoners, kills seven men, and has seven of his own killed. if, now, b can move up fourteen men into melee with a's victorious survivors, which he may be able to do by bringing the five into contact, and getting nine others within six inches of them, no count is made of the six of b's men who are prisoners in the hands of a. they are disarmed. b, therefore, has fourteen men in the second melee and a twelve, b makes two prisoners, kills ten of a's men, and has ten of his own killed. but now the six prisoners originally made by a are left without an escort, and are therefore recaptured by b. but they must go to b's back line and return before they can fight again. so, as the outcome of these two melees, there are six of b's men going as released prisoners to his back line whence they may return into the battle, two of a's men prisoners in the hands of b, one of b's staying with them as escort, and three of b's men still actively free for action. a, at a cost of nineteen men, has disposed of seventeen of b's men for good, and of six or seven, according to whether b keeps his prisoners in his fighting line or not, temporarily. [illustration: fig. --battle of hook's farm. the battle developing rapidly.] [illustration: fig. a--battle of hook's farm. red cavalry charging the blue guns.] ( ) any isolated body may hoist the white flag and surrender at any time. ( ) a gun is captured when there is no man whatever of its original side within six inches of it, and when at least four men of the antagonist side have moved up to it and have passed its wheel axis going in the direction of their attack. this latter point is important. an antagonist's gun may be out of action, and you may have a score of men coming up to it and within six inches of it, but it is not yet captured; and you may have brought up a dozen men all round the hostile gun, but if there is still one enemy just out of their reach and within six inches of the end of the trail of the gun, that gun is not captured: it is still in dispute and out of action, and you may not fire it or move it at the next move. but once a gun is fully captured, it follows all the rules of your own guns. varieties of the battle-game you may play various types of game. ( ) one is the fight to the finish. you move in from any points you like on the back line and try to kill, capture, or drive over his back line the whole of the enemy's force. you play the game for points; you score for the victory, and for every gun you hold or are in a position to take, - / for every cavalry-man, for every infantry-man still alive and uncaptured, / for every man of yours prisoner in the hands of the enemy, and / for every prisoner you have taken. if the battle is still undecided when both forces are reduced below fifteen men, the battle is drawn and the points for victory are divided. note--this game can be fought with any sized force, but if it is fought with less than a side, the minimum must be a side. ( ) the blow at the rear game is decided when at least three men of one force reach any point in the back line of their antagonist. he is then supposed to have suffered a strategic defeat, and he must retreat his entire force over the back line in six moves, i.e. six of his moves. anything left on the field after six moves capitulates to the victor. points count as in the preceding game, but this lasts a shorter time and is better adapted to a cramped country with a short back line. with a long rear line the game is simply a rush at some weak point in the first player's line by the entire cavalry brigade of the second player. instead of making the whole back line available for the blow at the rear, the middle or either half may be taken. ( ) in the defensive game, a force, the defenders, two-thirds as strong as its antagonist, tries to prevent the latter arriving, while still a quarter of its original strength, upon the defender's back line. the country must be made by one or both of the players before it is determined which shall be defender. the players then toss for choice of sides, and the winner of the toss becomes the defender. he puts out his force over the field on his own side, anywhere up to the distance of one move off the middle line--that is to say, he must not put any man within one move of the middle line, but he may do so anywhere on his own side of that limit--and then the loser of the toss becomes first player, and sets out his men a move from his back line. the defender may open fire forthwith; he need not wait until after the second move of the first player, as the second player has to do. composition of forces except in the above cases, or when otherwise agreed upon, the forces engaged shall be equal in number and similar in composition. the methods of handicapping are obvious. a slight inequality (chances of war) may be arranged between equal players by leaving out men on each side and tossing with a pair of dice to see how many each player shall take of these. the best arrangement and proportion of the forces is in small bodies of about to infantry-men and to cavalry to a gun. such a force can maneuver comfortably on a front of or feet. most of our games have been played with about infantry, cavalry, or naval guns, and a field gun on either side, or with smaller proportional forces. we have played excellent games on an eighteen-foot battlefield with over two hundred men and six guns a side. a player may, of course, rearrange his forces to suit his own convenience; brigade all or most of his cavalry into a powerful striking force, or what not. but more guns proportionally lead to their being put out of action too early for want of men; a larger proportion of infantry makes the game sluggish, and more cavalry--because of the difficulty of keeping large bodies of this force under cover--leads simply to early heavy losses by gunfire and violent and disastrous charging. the composition of a force may, of course, be varied considerably. one good fight to a finish game we tried as follows: we made the country, tossed for choice, and then drew curtains across the middle of the field. each player then selected his force from the available soldiers in this way: he counted infantry as each, cavalry as - / , and a gun as , and, taking whatever he liked in whatever position he liked, he made up a total of . he could, for instance, choose infantry and guns, or cavalry and no guns, or infantry, cavalry, and guns. in the result, a boer-like cavalry force of with guns suffered defeat at the hands of infantry with . size of the soldiers the soldiers used should be all of one size. the best british makers have standardised sizes, and sell infantry and cavalry in exactly proportioned dimensions; the infantry being nearly two inches tall. there is a lighter, cheaper make of perhaps an inch and a half high that is also available. foreign-made soldiers are of variable sizes. iv the battle of hook's farm and now, having given all the exact science of our war game, having told something of the development of this warfare, let me here set out the particulars of an exemplary game. and suddenly your author changes. he changes into what perhaps he might have been--under different circumstances. his inky fingers become large, manly hands, his drooping scholastic back stiffens, his elbows go out, his etiolated complexion corrugates and darkens, his moustaches increase and grow and spread, and curl up horribly; a large, red scar, a sabre cut, grows lurid over one eye. he expands--all over he expands. he clears his throat startlingly, lugs at the still growing ends of his moustache, and says, with just a faint and fading doubt in his voice as to whether he can do it, "yas, sir!" [illustration: fig. b--battle of hook's farm. after the cavalry mêlée] [illustration: fig. a--battle of hook's farm. prisoners being led to the rear.] now for a while you listen to general h. g. w., of the blue army. you hear tales of victory. the photographs of the battlefields are by a woman war-correspondent, a. c. w., a daring ornament of her sex. i vanish. i vanish, but i will return. here, then, is the story of the battle of hook's farm. "the affair of hook's farm was one of those brisk little things that did so much to build up my early reputation. i did remarkably well, though perhaps it is not my function to say so. the enemy was slightly stronger, both in cavalry and infantry, than myself [footnote: a slight but pardonable error on the part of the gallant gentleman. the forces were exactly equal.]; he had the choice of position, and opened the ball. nevertheless i routed him. i had with me a compact little force of guns, infantry, and horse. my instructions were to clear up the country to the east of firely church. "we came very speedily into touch. i discovered the enemy advancing upon hook's farm and firely church, evidently with the intention of holding those two positions and giving me a warm welcome. i have by me a photograph or so of the battlefield and also a little sketch i used upon the field. they will give the intelligent reader a far better idea of the encounter than any so-called 'fine writing' can do. "the original advance of the enemy was through the open country behind firely church and hook's farm; i sighted him between the points marked a a and b b, and his force was divided into two columns, with very little cover or possibility of communication between them if once the intervening ground was under fire. i reckoned about to his left and or to his right. [footnote: here again the gallant gentleman errs; this time he magnifies.] evidently he meant to seize both firely church and hook's farm, get his guns into action, and pound my little force to pieces while it was still practically in the open. he could reach both these admirable positions before i could hope to get a man there. there was no effective cover whatever upon my right that would have permitted an advance up to the church, and so i decided to concentrate my whole force in a rush upon hook's farm, while i staved off his left with gun fire. i do not believe any strategist whatever could have bettered that scheme. my guns were at the points marked d c e, each with five horsemen, and i deployed my infantry in a line between d and e. the rest of my cavalry i ordered to advance on hook's farm from c. i have shown by arrows on the sketch the course i proposed for my guns. the gun e was to go straight for its assigned position, and get into action at once. c was not to risk capture or being put out of action; its exact position was to be determined by red's rapidity in getting up to the farm, and it was to halt and get to work directly it saw any chance of effective fire. "red had now sighted us. throughout the affair he showed a remarkably poor stomach for gun-fire, and this was his undoing. moreover, he was tempted by the poorness of our cover on our right to attempt to outflank and enfilade us there. accordingly, partly to get cover from our two central guns and partly to outflank us, he sent the whole of his left wing to the left of firely church, where, except for the gun, it became almost a negligible quantity. the gun came out between the church and the wood into a position from which it did a considerable amount of mischief to the infantry on our right, and nearly drove our rightmost gun in upon its supports. meanwhile, red's two guns on his right came forward to hook's farm, rather badly supported by his infantry. "once they got into position there i perceived that we should be done for, and accordingly i rushed every available man forward in a vigorous counter attack, and my own two guns came lumbering up to the farmhouse corners, and got into the wedge of shelter close behind the house before his could open fire. his fire met my advance, littering the gentle grass slope with dead, and then, hot behind the storm of shell, and even as my cavalry gathered to charge his guns, he charged mine. i was amazed beyond measure at that rush, knowing his sabres to be slightly outnumbered by mine. in another moment all the level space round the farmhouse was a whirling storm of slashing cavalry, and then we found ourselves still holding on, with half a dozen prisoners, and the farmyard a perfect shambles of horses and men. the melee was over. his charge had failed, and, after a brief breathing--space for my shot--torn infantry to come up, i led on the counter attack. it was brilliantly successful; a hard five minutes with bayonet and sabre, and his right gun was in our hands and his central one in jeopardy. "and now red was seized with that most fatal disease of generals, indecision. he would neither abandon his lost gun nor adequately attack it. he sent forward a feeble little infantry attack, that we cut up with the utmost ease, taking several prisoners, made a disastrous demonstration from the church, and then fell back altogether from the gentle hill on which hook farm is situated to a position beside and behind an exposed cottage on the level. i at once opened out into a long crescent, with a gun at either horn, whose crossfire completely destroyed his chances of retreat from this ill-chosen last stand, and there presently we disabled his second gun. i now turned my attention to his still largely unbroken right, from which a gun had maintained a galling fire on us throughout the fight. i might still have had some stiff work getting an attack home to the church, but red had had enough of it, and now decided to relieve me of any further exertion by a precipitate retreat. my gun to the right of hook's farm killed three of his flying men, but my cavalry were too badly cut up for an effective pursuit, and he got away to the extreme left of his original positions with about infantry-men, cavalry, and gun. he went none too soon. had he stayed, it would have been only a question of time before we shot him to pieces and finished him altogether." so far, and a little vaingloriously, the general. let me now shrug my shoulders and shake him off, and go over this battle he describes a little more exactly with the help of the photographs. the battle is a small, compact game of the fight-to-a-finish type, and it was arranged as simply as possible in order to permit of a full and exact explanation. [illustration: fig. b--battle of hook's farm. position of armies at end of blue's third move.] [illustration: fig. --battle of hook's farm. red's left wing attempting to join the main body.] figure shows the country of the battlefield put out; on the right is the church, on the left (near the centre of the plate) is the farm. in the hollow between the two is a small outbuilding. directly behind the farm in the line of vision is another outbuilding. this is more distinctly seen in other photographs. behind, the chalk back line is clear. red has won the toss, both for the choice of a side and, after making that choice, for first move, and his force is already put out upon the back line. for the sake of picturesqueness, the men are not put exactly on the line, but each will have his next move measured from that line. red has broken his force into two, a fatal error, as we shall see, in view of the wide space of open ground between the farm and the church. he has gun, cavalry, and infantry on his left, who are evidently to take up a strong position by the church and enfilade blue's position; red's right, of guns, cavalry, and infantry aim at the seizure of the farm. figure is a near view of blue's side, with his force put down. he has grasped the strategic mistake of red, and is going to fling every man at the farm. his right, of cavalry and infantry, will get up as soon as possible to the woods near the centre of the field (whence the fire of their gun will be able to cut off the two portions of red's force from each other), and then, leaving the gun there with sufficient men to serve it, the rest of this party will push on to co-operate with the main force of their comrades in the inevitable scrimmage for the farm. figure shows the fight after red and blue have both made their first move. it is taken from red's side. red has not as yet realised the danger of his position. his left gun struggles into position to the left of the church, his centre and right push for the farm. blue's five cavalry on his left have already galloped forward into a favourable position to open fire at the next move--they are a little hidden in the picture by the church; the sixteen infantry follow hard, and his main force makes straight for the farm. figure shows the affair developing rapidly. red's cavalry on his right have taken his two guns well forward into a position to sweep either side of the farm, and his left gun is now well placed to pound blue's infantry centre. his infantry continue to press forward, but blue, for his second move, has already opened fire from the woods with his right gun, and killed three of red's men. his infantry have now come up to serve this gun, and the cavalry who brought it into position at the first move have now left it to them in order to gallop over to join the force attacking the farm. undismayed by red's guns, blue has brought his other two guns and his men as close to the farm as they can go. his leftmost gun stares red's in the face, and prevents any effective fire, his middle gun faces red's middle gun. some of his cavalry are exposed to the right of the farm, but most are completely covered now by the farm from red's fire. red has now to move. the nature of his position is becoming apparent to him. his right gun is ineffective, his left and his centre guns cannot kill more than seven or eight men between them; and at the next move, unless he can silence them, blue's guns will be mowing his exposed cavalry down from the security of the farm. he is in a fix. how is he to get out of it? his cavalry are slightly outnumbered, but he decides to do as much execution as he can with his own guns, charge the blue guns before him, and then bring up his infantry to save the situation. figure a shows the result of red's move. his two effective guns have between them bowled over two cavalry and six infantry in the gap between the farm and blue's right gun; and then, following up the effect of his gunfire, his cavalry charges home over the blue guns. one oversight he makes, to which blue at once calls his attention at the end of his move. red has reckoned on twenty cavalry for his charge, forgetting that by the rules he must put two men at the tail of his middle gun. his infantry are just not able to come up for this duty, and consequently two cavalry-men have to be set there. the game then pauses while the players work out the cavalry melee. red has brought up eighteen men to this; in touch or within six inches of touch there are twenty-one blue cavalry. red's force is isolated, for only two of his men are within a move, and to support eighteen he would have to have nine. by the rules this gives fifteen men dead on either side and three red prisoners to blue. by the rules also it rests with red to indicate the survivors within the limits of the melee as he chooses. he takes very good care there are not four men within six inches of either blue gun, and both these are out of action therefore for blue's next move. of course red would have done far better to have charged home with thirteen men only, leaving seven in support, but he was flurried by his comparatively unsuccessful shooting--he had wanted to hit more cavalry--and by the gun-trail mistake. moreover, he had counted his antagonist wrongly, and thought he could arrange a melee of twenty against twenty. figure b shows the game at the same stage as a, immediately after the adjudication of the melee. the dead have been picked up, the three prisoners, by a slight deflection of the rules in the direction of the picturesque, turn their faces towards captivity, and the rest of the picture is exactly in the position of a. it is now blue's turn to move, and figure a shows the result of his move. he fires his rightmost gun (the nose of it is just visible to the right) and kills one infantry-man and one cavalry-man (at the tail of red's central gun), brings up his surviving eight cavalry into convenient positions for the service of his temporarily silenced guns, and hurries his infantry forward to the farm, recklessly exposing them in the thin wood between the farm and his right gun. the attentive reader will be able to trace all this in figure a, and he will also note the three red cavalry prisoners going to the rear under the escort of one khaki infantry man. figure b shows exactly the same stage as figure a, that is to say, the end of blue's third move. a cavalry-man lies dead at the tail of red's middle gun, an infantry-man a little behind it. his rightmost gun is abandoned and partly masked, but not hidden, from the observer, by a tree to the side of the farmhouse. and now, what is red to do? the reader will probably have his own ideas, as i have mine. what red did do in the actual game was to lose his head, and then at the end of four minutes' deliberation he had to move, he blundered desperately. he opened fire on blue's exposed centre and killed eight men. (their bodies litter the ground in figure , which gives a complete bird's-eye view of the battle.) he then sent forward and isolated six or seven men in a wild attempt to recapture his lost gun, massed his other men behind the inadequate cover of his central gun, and sent the detachment of infantry that had hitherto lurked uselessly behind the church, in a frantic and hopeless rush across the open to join them. (the one surviving cavalry-man on his right wing will be seen taking refuge behind the cottage.) there can be little question of the entire unsoundness of all these movements. red was at a disadvantage, he had failed to capture the farm, and his business now was manifestly to save his men as much as possible, make a defensive fight of it, inflict as much damage as possible with his leftmost gun on blue's advance, get the remnants of his right across to the church--the cottage in the centre and their own gun would have given them a certain amount of cover--and build up a new position about that building as a pivot. with two guns right and left of the church he might conceivably have saved the rest of the fight. that, however, is theory; let us return to fact. figure gives the disastrous consequences of red's last move. blue has moved, his guns have slaughtered ten of red's wretched foot, and a rush of nine blue cavalry and infantry mingles with red's six surviving infantry about the disputed gun. these infantry by the definition are isolated; there are not three other reds within a move of them. the view in this photograph also is an extensive one, and the reader will note, as a painful accessory, the sad spectacle of three red prisoners receding to the right. the melee about red's lost gun works out, of course, at three dead on each side, and three more red prisoners. henceforth the battle moves swiftly to complete the disaster of red. shaken and demoralised, that unfortunate general is now only for retreat. his next move, of which i have no picture, is to retreat the infantry he has so wantonly exposed back to the shelter of the church, to withdraw the wreckage of his right into the cover of the cottage, and--one last gleam of enterprise--to throw forward his left gun into a position commanding blue's right. [illustration: fig. --battle of hook's farm. the red army suffers heavy loss.] [illustration: fig. --battle of hook's farm. complete victory of the blue army.] blue then pounds red's right with his gun to the right of the farm and kills three men. he extends his other gun to the left of the farm, right out among the trees, so as to get an effective fire next time upon the tail of red's gun. he also moves up sufficient men to take possession of red's lost gun. on the right blue's gun engages red's and kills one man. all this the reader will see clearly in figure , and he will also note a second batch of red prisoners--this time they are infantry, going rearward. figure is the last picture that is needed to tell the story of the battle. red's position is altogether hopeless. he has four men left alive by his rightmost gun, and their only chance is to attempt to save that by retreating with it. if they fire it, one or other will certainly be killed at its tail in blue's subsequent move, and then the gun will be neither movable nor fireable. red's left gun, with four men only, is also in extreme peril, and will be immovable and helpless if it loses another man. very properly red decided upon retreat. his second gun had to be abandoned after one move, but two of the men with it escaped over his back line. five of the infantry behind the church escaped, and his third gun and its four cavalry got away on the extreme left-hand corner of red's position. blue remained on the field, completely victorious, with two captured guns and six prisoners. there you have a scientific record of the worthy general's little affair. v extensions and amplifications of little war now that battle of hook's farm is, as i have explained, a simplification of the game, set out entirely to illustrate the method of playing; there is scarcely a battle that will not prove more elaborate (and eventful) than this little encounter. if a number of players and a sufficiently large room can be got, there is no reason why armies of many hundreds of soldiers should not fight over many square yards of model country. so long as each player has about a hundred men and three guns there is no need to lengthen the duration of a game on that account. but it is too laborious and confusing for a single player to handle more than that number of men. moreover, on a big floor with an extensive country it is possible to begin moving with moves double or treble the length here specified, and to come down to moves of the ordinary lengths when the troops are within fifteen or twelve or ten feet of each other. to players with the time and space available i would suggest using a quite large country, beginning with treble moves, and, with the exception of a select number of cavalry scouts, keeping the soldiers in their boxes with the lids on, and moving the boxes as units. (this boxing idea is a new one, and affords a very good substitute for the curtain; i have tried it twice for games in the open air where the curtain was not available.) neither side would, of course, know what the other had in its boxes; they might be packed regiments or a mere skeleton force. each side would advance on the other by double or treble moves behind a screen of cavalry scouts, until a scout was within ten feet of a box on the opposite side. then the contents of that particular box would have to be disclosed and the men stood out. troops without any enemy within twenty feet could be returned to their boxes for facility in moving. playing on such a scale would admit also of the introduction of the problem of provisions and supplies. little toy army service waggons can be bought, and it could be ruled that troops must have one such waggon for every fifty men within at least six moves. moreover, ammunition carts may be got, and it may be ruled that one must be within two moves of a gun before the latter can be fired. all these are complications of the war game, and so far i have not been able to get together sufficient experienced players to play on this larger, more elaborate scale. it is only after the smaller simpler war game here described has been played a number of times, and its little dodges mastered completely, that such more warlike devices become practicable. but obviously with a team of players and an extensive country, one could have a general controlling the whole campaign, divisional commanders, batteries of guns, specialised brigades, and a quite military movement of the whole affair. i have (as several illustrations show) tried little wars in the open air. the toy soldiers stand quite well on closely mown grass, but the long-range gun-fire becomes a little uncertain if there is any breeze. it gives a greater freedom of movement and allows the players to lie down more comfortably when firing, to increase, and even double, the moves of the indoor game. one can mark out high roads and streams with an ordinary lawn-tennis marker, mountains and rocks of stones, and woods and forests of twigs are easily arranged. but if the game is to be left out all night and continued next day (a thing i have as yet had no time to try), the houses must be of some more solid material than paper. i would suggest painted blocks of wood. on a large lawn, a wide country-side may be easily represented. the players may begin with a game exactly like the ordinary kriegspiel, with scouts and boxed soldiers, which will develop into such battles as are here described, as the troops come into contact. it would be easy to give the roads a real significance by permitting a move half as long again as in the open country for waggons or boxed troops along a road. there is a possibility of having a toy railway, with stations or rolling stock into which troops might be put, on such a giant war map. one would allow a move for entraining and another for detraining, requiring the troops to be massed alongside the train at the beginning and end of each journey, and the train might move at four or five times the cavalry rate. one would use open trucks and put in a specified number of men--say twelve infantry or five cavalry or half a gun per truck--and permit an engine to draw seven or eight trucks, or move at a reduced speed with more. one could also rule that four men--the same four men--remaining on a line during two moves, could tear up a rail, and eight men in three moves replace it. i will confess i have never yet tried over these more elaborate developments of little wars, partly because of the limited time at my disposal, and partly because they all demand a number of players who are well acquainted with the same on each side if they are not to last interminably. the battle of hook's farm (one player a side) took a whole afternoon, and most of my battles have lasted the better part of a day. vi ending with a sort of challenge i could go on now and tell of battles, copiously. in the memory of the one skirmish i have given i do but taste blood. i would like to go on, to a large, thick book. it would be an agreeable task. since i am the chief inventor and practiser (so far) of little wars, there has fallen to me a disproportionate share of victories. but let me not boast. for the present, i have done all that i meant to do in this matter. it is for you, dear reader, now to get a floor, a friend, some soldiers and some guns, and show by a grovelling devotion your appreciation of this noble and beautiful gift of a limitless game that i have given you. and if i might for a moment trumpet! how much better is this amiable miniature than the real thing! here is a homeopathic remedy for the imaginative strategist. here is the premeditation, the thrill, the strain of accumulating victory or disaster--and no smashed nor sanguinary bodies, no shattered fine buildings nor devastated country sides, no petty cruelties, none of that awful universal boredom and embitterment, that tiresome delay or stoppage or embarrassment of every gracious, bold, sweet, and charming thing, that we who are old enough to remember a real modern war know to be the reality of belligerence. this world is for ample living; we want security and freedom; all of us in every country, except a few dull-witted, energetic bores, want to see the manhood of the world at something better than apeing the little lead toys our children buy in boxes. we want fine things made for mankind--splendid cities, open ways, more knowledge and power, and more and more and more--and so i offer my game, for a particular as well as a general end; and let us put this prancing monarch and that silly scare-monger, and these excitable "patriots," and those adventurers, and all the practitioners of welt politik, into one vast temple of war, with cork carpets everywhere, and plenty of little trees and little houses to knock down, and cities and fortresses, and unlimited soldiers--tons, cellars-full--and let them lead their own lives there away from us. my game is just as good as their game, and saner by reason of its size. here is war, done down to rational proportions, and yet out of the way of mankind, even as our fathers turned human sacrifices into the eating of little images and symbolic mouthfuls. for my own part, i am _prepared_. i have nearly five hundred men, more than a score of guns, and i twirl my moustache and hurl defiance eastward from my home in essex across the narrow seas. not only eastward. i would conclude this little discourse with one other disconcerting and exasperating sentence for the admirers and practitioners of big war. i have never yet met in little battle any military gentleman, any captain, major, colonel, general, or eminent commander, who did not presently get into difficulties and confusions among even the elementary rules of the battle. you have only to play at little wars three or four times to realise just what a blundering thing great war must be. great war is at present, i am convinced, not only the most expensive game in the universe, but it is a game out of all proportion. not only are the masses of men and material and suffering and inconvenience too monstrously big for reason, but--the available heads we have for it, are too small. that, i think, is the most pacific realisation conceivable, and little war brings you to it as nothing else but great war can do. appendix little wars and kriegspiel this little book has, i hope, been perfectly frank about its intentions. it is not a book upon kriegspiel. it gives merely a game that may be played by two or four or six amateurish persons in an afternoon and evening with toy soldiers. but it has a very distinct relation to kriegspiel; and since the main portion of it was written and published in a magazine, i have had quite a considerable correspondence with military people who have been interested by it, and who have shown a very friendly spirit towards it--in spite of the pacific outbreak in its concluding section. they tell me--what i already a little suspected--that kriegspiel, as it is played by the british army, is a very dull and unsatisfactory exercise, lacking in realism, in stir and the unexpected, obsessed by the umpire at every turn, and of very doubtful value in waking up the imagination, which should be its chief function. i am particularly indebted to colonel mark sykes for advice and information in this matter. he has pointed out to me the possibility of developing little wars into a vivid and inspiring kriegspiel, in which the element of the umpire would be reduced to a minimum; and it would be ungrateful to him, and a waste of an interesting opportunity, if i did not add this appendix, pointing out how a kriegspiel of real educational value for junior officers may be developed out of the amusing methods of little war. if great war is to be played at all, the better it is played the more humanely it will be done. i see no inconsistency in deploring the practice while perfecting the method. but i am a civilian, and kriegspiel is not my proper business. i am deeply preoccupied with a novel i am writing, and so i think the best thing i can do is just to set down here all the ideas that have cropped up in my mind, in the footsteps, so to speak, of colonel sykes, and leave it to the military expert, if he cares to take the matter up, to reduce my scattered suggestions to a system. now, first, it is manifest that in little wars there is no equivalent for rifle-fire, and that the effect of the gun-fire has no resemblance to the effect of shell. that may be altered very simply. let the rules as to gun-fire be as they are now, but let a different projectile be used--a projectile that will drop down and stay where it falls. i find that one can buy in ironmongers' shops small brass screws of various sizes and weights, but all capable of being put in the muzzle of the ' guns without slipping down the barrel. if, with such a screw in the muzzle, the gun is loaded and fired, the wooden bolt remains in the gun and the screw flies and drops and stays near where it falls--its range being determined by the size and weight of screw selected by the gunner. let us assume this is a shell, and it is quite easy to make a rule that will give the effect of its explosion. half, or, in the case of an odd number, one more than half, of the men within three inches of this shell are dead, and if there is a gun completely within the circle of three inches radius from the shell, it is destroyed. if it is not completely within the circle, it is disabled for two moves. a supply waggon is completely destroyed if it falls wholly or partially within the radius. but if there is a wall, house, or entrenchment between any men and the shell, they are uninjured--they do not count in the reckoning of the effect of the shell. i think one can get a practical imitation of the effect of rifle-fire by deciding that for every five infantry-men who are roughly in a line, and who do not move in any particular move, there may be one (ordinary) shot taken with a ' gun. it may be fired from any convenient position behind the row of five men, so long as the shot passes roughly over the head of the middle man of the five. of course, while in little wars there are only three or four players, in any proper kriegspiel the game will go on over a larger area--in a drill-hall or some such place--and each arm and service will be entrusted to a particular player. this permits all sorts of complicated imitations of reality that are impossible to our parlour and playroom little wars. we can consider transport, supply, ammunition, and the moral effect of cavalry impact, and of uphill and downhill movements. we can also bring in the spade and entrenchment, and give scope to the royal engineers. but before i write anything of colonel sykes' suggestions about these, let me say a word or two about kriegspiel "country." the country for kriegspiel should be made up, i think, of heavy blocks or boxes of wood about x x / feet, and curved pieces (with a rounded outline and a chord of three feet, or shaped like right-angled triangles with an incurved hypotenuse and two straight sides of feet) can easily be contrived to round off corners and salient angles. these blocks can be bored to take trees, etc., exactly as the boards in little wars are bored, and with them a very passable model of any particular country can be built up from a contoured ordnance map. houses may be made very cheaply by shaping a long piece of wood into a house-like section and sawing it up. there will always be someone who will touch up and paint and stick windows on to and generally adorn and individualise such houses, which are, of course, the stabler the heavier the wood used. the rest of the country as in little wars. upon such a country a kriegspiel could be played with rules upon the lines of the following sketch rules, which are the result of a discussion between colonel sykes and myself, and in which most of the new ideas are to be ascribed to colonel sykes. we proffer them, not as a finished set of rules, but as material for anyone who chooses to work over them, in the elaboration of what we believe will be a far more exciting and edifying kriegspiel than any that exists at the present time. the game may be played by any number of players, according to the forces engaged and the size of the country available. each side will be under the supreme command of a general, who will be represented by a cavalry soldier. the player who is general must stand at or behind his representative image and within six feet of it. his signalling will be supposed to be perfect, and he will communicate with his subordinates by shout, whisper, or note, as he thinks fit. i suggest he should be considered invulnerable, but colonel sykes has proposed arrangements for his disablement. he would have it that if the general falls within the zone of destruction of a shell he must go out of the room for three moves (injured); and that if he is hit by rifle-fire or captured he shall quit the game, and be succeeded by his next subordinate. now as to the moves. it is suggested that: infantry shall move one foot. cavalry shall move three feet. the above moves are increased by one half for troops in twos or fours on a road. royal engineers shall move two feet. royal artillery shall move two feet. transport and supply shall move one foot on roads, half foot across country. the general shall move six feet (per motor), three feet across country. boats shall move one foot. in moving uphill, one contour counts as one foot; downhill, two contours count as one foot. where there are four contours to one foot vertical the hill is impassable for wheels unless there is a road. infantry. to pass a fordable river = one move. to change from fours to two ranks = half a move. to change from two ranks to extension = half a move. to embark into boats = two moves for every twenty men embarked at any point. to disembark = one move for every twenty men. cavalry. to pass a fordable river = one move. to change formation = half a move. to mount = one move. to dismount = one move. artillery. to unlimber guns = half a move. to limber up guns = half a move. rivers are impassable to guns. neither infantry, cavalry, nor artillery can fire and move in one move. royal engineers. no repairs can be commenced, no destructions can be begun, during a move in which r.e. have changed position. rivers impassable. transport and supply. no supplies or stores can be delivered during a move if t. and s. have moved. rivers impassable. next as to supply in the field: all troops must be kept supplied with food, ammunition, and forage. the players must give up, every six moves, one packet of food per thirty men; one packet of forage per six horses; one packet of ammunition per thirty infantry which fire for six consecutive moves. these supplies, at the time when they are given up, must be within six feet of the infantry they belong to and eighteen feet of the cavalry. isolated bodies of less than thirty infantry require no supplies--a body is isolated if it is more than twelve feet off another body. in calculating supplies for infantry the fractions either count as thirty if fifteen or over, or as nothing if less than fifteen. thus forty-six infantry require two packets of food or ammunition; forty-four infantry require one packet of food. n.b.--supplies are not effective if enemy is between supplies and troops they belong to. men surrounded and besieged must be victualled at the following rate:-- one packet food for every thirty men for every six moves. one packet forage every six horses for every six moves. in the event of supplies failing, horses may take the place of food, but not of course of forage; one horse to equal one packet. in the event of supplies failing, the following consequences ensue:-- infantry without ammunition cannot fire (guns are supposed to have unlimited ammunition with them). infantry, cavalry, r.a., and r.e. cannot move without supply--if supplies are not provided within six consecutive moves, they are out of action. a force surrounded must surrender four moves after eating its last horse. now as to destructions: to destroy a railway bridge r.e. take two moves; to repair, r.e. take ten moves. to destroy a railway culvert r.e. take one move; to repair r.e. take five moves. to destroy a river road bridge r.e. take one move; to repair, r.e. take five moves. a supply depot can be destroyed by one man in two moves, no matter how large (by fire). four men can destroy the contents of six waggons in one move. a contact mine can be placed on a road or in any place by two men in six moves; it will be exploded by the first pieces passing over it, and will destroy everything within six inches radius.* next as to constructions: entrenchments can be made by infantry in four moves.* they are to be strips of wood two inches high tacked to the country, or wooden bricks two inches high. two men may make an inch of entrenchment. epaulements for guns may be constructed at the rate of six men to one epaulement in four moves.* [* notice to be given to umpire of commencement of any work or the placing of a mine. in event of no umpire being available, a folded note must be put on the mantelpiece when entrenchment is commenced, and opponent asked to open it when the trench is completed or the mine exploded.] rules as to cavalry charging: no body of less than eight cavalry may charge, and they must charge in proper formation. if cavalry charges infantry in extended order-- if the charge starts at a distance of more than two feet, the cavalry loses one man for every five infantry-men charged, and the infantry loses one man for each sabre charging. at less than two feet and more than one foot, the cavalry loses one man for every ten charged, and the infantry two men for each sabre charging. at less than one foot, the cavalry loses one man for every fifteen charged, and the infantry three men for each sabre charging. if cavalry charges infantry in close order, the result is reversed. thus at more than two feet one infantry-man kills three cavalry-men, and fifteen cavalry-men one infantry-man. at more than one foot one infantry-man kills two cavalry, and ten cavalry one infantry. at less than one foot one infantry-man kills one cavalry, and five cavalry one infantry. however, infantry that have been charged in close order are immobile for the subsequent move. infantry charged in extended order must on the next move retire one foot; they can be charged again. if cavalry charges cavalry:-- if cavalry is within charging distance of the enemy's cavalry at the end of the enemy's move, it must do one of three things--dismount, charge, or retire. if it remains stationary and mounted and the enemy charges, one charging sabre will kill five stationary sabres and put fifteen others three feet to the rear. dismounted cavalry charged is equivalent to infantry in extended order. if cavalry charges cavalry and the numbers are equal and the ground level, the result must be decided by the toss of a coin; the loser losing three-quarters of his men and obliged to retire, the winner losing one-quarter of his men. if the numbers are unequal, the melee rules for little wars obtain if the ground is level. if the ground slopes, the cavalry charging downhill will be multiplied according to the number of contours crossed. if it is one contour, it must be multiplied by two; two contours, multiplied by three; three contours, multiplied by four. if cavalry retires before cavalry instead of accepting a charge, it must continue to retire so long as it is pursued--the pursuers can only be arrested by fresh cavalry or by infantry or artillery fire. if driven off the field or into an unfordable river, the retreating body is destroyed. if infantry find hostile cavalry within charging distance at the end of the enemy's move, and this infantry retires and yet is still within charging distance, it will receive double losses if in extended order if charged; and if in two ranks or in fours, will lose at three feet two men for each charging sabre; at two feet, three men for each charging sabre. the cavalry in these circumstances will lose nothing. the infantry will have to continue to retire until their tormentors have exterminated them or been driven off by someone else. if cavalry charges artillery and is not dealt with by other forces, one gun is captured with a loss to the cavalry of four men per gun for a charge at three feet, three men at two feet, and one man at one foot. if artillery retires before cavalry when cavalry is within charging distance, it must continue to retire so long as the cavalry pursues. the introduction of toy railway trains, moving, let us say, eight feet per move, upon toy rails, needs rules as to entraining and detraining and so forth, that will be quite easily worked out upon the model of boat embarkation here given. an engine or truck within the circle of destruction of a shell will be of course destroyed. the toy soldiers used in this kriegspiel should not be the large soldiers used in little wars. the british manufacturers who turn out these also make a smaller, cheaper type of man--the infantry about an inch high--which is better adapted to kriegspiel purposes. we hope, if these suggestions "catch on," to induce them to manufacture a type of soldier more exactly suited to the needs of the game, including tray carriers for troops in formation and (what is at present not attainable) dismountable cavalry that will stand. we place this rough sketch of a kriegspiel entirely at the disposal of any military men whose needs and opportunities enable them to work it out and make it into an exacter and more realistic game. in doing so, we think they will find it advisable to do their utmost to make the game work itself, and to keep the need for umpire's decisions at a minimum. whenever possible, death should be by actual gun- and rifle-fire and not by computation. things should happen, and not be decided. we would also like to insist upon the absolute need of an official upon either side, simply to watch and measure the moves taken, and to collect and check the amounts of supply and ammunition given up. this is a game like real war, played against time, and played under circumstances of considerable excitement, and it is remarkable how elastic the measurements of quite honest and honourable men can become. we believe that the nearer that kriegspiel approaches to an actual small model of war, not only in its appearance but in its emotional and intellectual tests, the better it will serve its purpose of trial and education. from page images provided by the digital & multimedia center, michigan state university libraries the art of fencing, or, the use of the _small sword_. translated from the french of the late celebrated monsieur l'abbat; master of that art at the academy of toulouse. * * * * * by andrew mahon, professor of the small sword in dublin. _dublin_: printed by james hort, at the sign of _mercury_ in _skinner-row_, . dedication. [transcribers note: first page of dedication missing.] sue for. i shall omit saying any thing, my lord, of the shining qualities, which seem hereditary in your lordship's family, as well as of the dignity and importance of the charge with which his majesty has been pleased to entrust your lordship's most noble father. neither will i presume to trouble your lordship with those encomiums, which are most deservedly due to the vertues, whereby your lordship has gained the admiration and esteem of the polite and ingenious persons of this nation. be pleased then, my lord, to permit me to have the honour of subscribing myself, my lord, your lordship's most devoted, and most humble servant, _andrew mahon_. preface. i thought it very suitable to my business, when i met with so good an author as monsieur _l'abbat_, on the art of fencing, to publish his rules, which in general, will i believe be very useful, not only as they may contribute to the satisfaction of such gentlemen as are already proficients in the art, and to the better discipline of those who intend to become so, but also in regard that the nicety and exactness of his rules, for the most part, and their great consistency with reason, may, and will in all probability, lay a regular and good foundation for future masters, who tho' accustom'd to any particular method formerly practised, may rather chuse to proceed upon the authority of an excellent master, than upon a vain and mistaken confidence of their own perfection, or upon an obstinate refusal to submit to rules founded on, and demonstrated by reason. for my part, though i had my instructions from the late mr. _hillary tully_ of _london_, who was (and i think with great reason) esteemed a most eminent master in his time, i thought i could not make too nice a scrutiny into my profession, by comparing notes with monsieur _l'abbat_, which improved me in some points, and confirmed me and others, to my no small satisfaction, being well persuaded, that, as a professor of this science, it would have been an unpardonable fault in me to deprive our nations of such an improvement, either through prejudice to his, or partiality to my own opinion. though i have already said that mr. _l'abbat's_ rules are nice, reasonable, and demonstrative, yet i would not have it inferred from thence, that he approves of them all, as really essential to the art of fencing; there being some which he does not approve of, and which he would not have mentioned, had they not interfered with his profession, by the practice and recommendation of some masters, who being more capricious than knowing, were fonder of the shewy or superficial, than of the solid part of the science. volting, passing, and lowering the body, are three things which mr. _l'abbat_ disapproves of, in which opinion i join; because the sword being the instrument of defence, there can be no safety when the proper opposition of the blade is wanting, as it is in volting and lowering the body, and in passing, by reason of the weakness of the situation, which cannot produce a vigorous action. notwithstanding which, there is a modern master, who as soon as he had seen this book, and the attitudes representing volting, passing and lowering the body, began and still continues teaching them to his scholars, without considering how unsafe and dangerous they are, for want of the proper opposition of the sword when within measure. of all professions, that of arms has in all ages, since their invention, been esteemed the noblest and most necessary; it being by them that the laws preserve their force, that our dominions are defended from the encroachments of our enemies, and ill designing people kept in the subjection due to their sovereigns; and of all arms, the sword is probably the most ancient: it is honourable and useful, and upon occasion, causes a greater acquisition of glory than any other: it is likewise worn by kings and princes, as an ornament to majesty and grandeur, and a mark of their courage, and distinguishes the nobility from the lower rank of men. it is the most useful, having the advantage of fire arms, in that it is as well defensive as offensive, whereas they carry no defence with them; and it is far preferable to pikes and other long weapons, not only because it is more weildy and easy of carriage, but also by reason of the perfection to which art has brought the use of the small sword; there being no exercise that conduces so much as fencing, to strengthen and supple the parts, and to give the body an easy and graceful appearance. the sword, since it's first invention, has been used in different manners: first, with a shield or buckler; secondly, with a helmet, and thirdly, with a dagger, which is still used in _spain_ and _italy_. mr. _patinotris_, who taught at _rome_, introduced, and laid down rules for the use of the small sword alone, which has since been much improved by the _french_ and our nations. as the art of fencing consists in attacking and defending with the sword, it is necessary that every motion and situation tend to these two principal points, _viz._ in offending to be defended, and in defending to be in an immediate condition to offend. there is no guard but has it's thrust, and no thrust without it's parade, no parade without it's feint, no feint without it's opposite time or motion, no opposite time or motion but has it's counter, and there is even a counter to that counter. some injudicious persons have objected to mr. _l'abbat's_ manner of fencing, that it is too beautiful and nice, without observing that if it be beautiful, it cannot be dangerous, beauty consisting in rule, and rule in the safety of attacking and defending. in fencing, there are five figures of the wrist, _viz._ _prime_, _seconde_, _tierce_, _quart_, and _quinte_. the first is of very little use, and the last of none at all. prime is the figure that the wrist is in, in drawing the sword. _seconde_ and _tierce_ require one and the same figure of the wrist, with this difference only, that in _seconde_, the wrist must be raised higher, in order to oppose the adversary's sword; but in both these thrusts the thumb nail must be turned directly down, and the edges of the blade of the foil of an equal height. quart is the handsomest figure in fencing, the thumb nail and the flat of the foil being directly up, and the wrist supported so as to cover the body below as well as above. in _quinte_, the wrist is more turned and raised that in _quart_, which uncovers the body, and weakens the point, and therefore is not used by the skilful. some masters divide the blade into three parts, _viz._ the fort, the feeble, and the middle. others divide it into four, _viz._ the fort, the half fort, the feeble, and the half feeble; but to avoid perplexity, i divide it only into fort and feeble; tho' it may be divided into as many parts as there are degrees of fort and feeble to be found on the blade. the attitudes which are in the book, are copied exactly from the originals; tho' i might perhaps have made some alterations, in my opinion, for the better, yet i chose rather to leave them as they are, than to run the hazard of spoiling any of them: i have therefore left the same bend in the foils as mr. _l'abbat_ recommends, _and for which he makes an apology in his preface_. nor have i, in any of the attitudes, represented a left-handed figure, because by looking thro' the paper on the blank side, they will appear reversed, and consequently left-handed. monsieur _l'abbat_ recommends the turning on the edge of the left-foot in a lunge, as may be seen by the attitudes. this method indeed was formerly practised by all masters, and would be very good, if their scholars had not naturally run into an error, by turning the foot so much as to bring the ancle to the ground, whereby the foot became so weak as to make the recovery difficult, for want of a sufficient support from the left-foot, which, in recovering, bears the whole weight of the body: therefore i would not advise the turning on the edge of the foot to any but such as, by long practice on the flat, are able to judge of the strength of their situation, and consequently, will not turn the foot more than is consistent therewith. it may sometimes be necessary to turn on the edge, on such ground whereon the flat would slip, and the edge would not, if it were properly turned; but even in this case, by turning it too much it would have no hold of the terrace, and therefore would be as dangerous as keeping it on the flat. the chief reason for turning on the edge, is that the length of the lunge is greater by about three inches, which a man who is a judge of measure need never have recourse to, because he will not push but when he knows he is within reach. some of the subscribing gentlemen will, perhaps, be surprized, when they find this book published in my name, after having taken receipts, for the first moiety of their subscription money, in the name of mr. _campbell_, to whom i am obliged for his assistance in the translation, he being a better master of the _french_ tongue than i am. indeed to the chief reasons why they were not signed in my name, are, first, because i was, at the time of their being signed, a stranger in this city, being then lately come from _england_. and secondly, lest i should meet with such opposition as might perhaps have frustrated my design of publishing this book, i thought proper to conceal my being concerned in it, 'till mr. _campbell_ had shown the translation to all the principal masters in town, and gained their approbation much in favour of it. the art of fencing; or the use of the small-sword. chap. i. _of chusing and mounting a_ blade. courage and skill being often of little use without a good weapon, i think it necessary, before i lay down rules for using it, to shew how to chuse a good blade, and how it ought to be mounted. the length of the blade ought to be proportionable to the stature of the person who is to use it: the longest sword, from point to pommel, should reach perpendicularly from the ground to the navel, and the shortest, to the waste; being large in proportion to its length, and not extremely large, nor very small, as some people wear them; the over large blades being unweildy, unless very hollow, which makes them weak, and the narrow ones being not sufficient to cover the body enough. in order to chuse a good blade, three things are to be observed: first, that the blade have no flaw in it, especially across, it being more dangerous so than length-way. secondly, that it be well tempered, which you'll know by bending it against a wall or other place; if it bend only towards the point, 'tis faulty, but if it bend in a semicircular manner, and the blade spring back to its straitness, 'tis a good sign; if it remains bent it is a fault, tho' not so great as if it did not bend at all; for a blade that bends being of a soft temper, seldom breaks; but a stiff one being hard tempered is easily broke. the third observation is to be made by breaking the point, and if the part broken be of a grey colour, the steel is good; if it be white 'tis not: or you may strike the blade with a key or other piece of iron, and if he gives a clear sound, there is no hidden fault in it. in bending a blade you must not force it, what i have said being sufficient to know it by, and besides by forcing it, it may be so weakened in some part as to break when it comes to be used. it would not be amiss for a man to see his sword mounted, because the cutlers, to save themselves the trouble of filing the inside of the hilts and pommel, to make the holes wider, often file the tongue[ ] of the blade too much, and fill up the vacancies with bits of wood, by which means the sword is not firm in the hand, and the tongue being thin and weak, is apt to break in parrying or on a dry beat, as has been unhappily experienced. care should also be taken that the end of the tongue be well riveted to the extremity of the pommel, lest the grip should fly off, which would be of very dangerous consequence. some men chuse strait blades, others will have them bending a little upwards or downwards; some like them to bend a little in the fort, and others in the feeble, which is commonly called _le tour de breteur_, or the bullie's blade. the shell should be proportionable in bigness to the blade, and of a metal that will resist a point, and the handle fitted to the hand. some like square handles, and others chuse round ones; the square are better and firmer in the hand, but as this difference depends on fancy, as does also the bow, which in some cases may preserve the hand, but may be a hindrance in inclosing, i shall leave it to the decision of the fashions. chap. ii. _of guard._ by guard, is meant such a situation of all the parts of the body as enables them to give their mutual assistance to defend or attack. a guard cannot be perfect without a good and graceful disposition, proceeding from a natural proportion of the parts of the body, and an easy and vigorous motion, which is to be acquired by practice, and the instruction of a good master. [illustration: plate . the middling guard.] [illustration: the straight guard or flat sword.] as in all bodily excercises, a good air, freedom, vigour, and a just disposition of the body and limbs are necessary, so are they more especially in fencing, the least disorder in this case being of the worst consequence; and the guard being the center whence all the vigour should proceed, and which should communicate strength and agility to every part of the body, if there be the least irregularity in any one part, there cannot be that agreeableness, power of defence, justness, or swiftness that is requisite. in order to be well in guard, it is absolutely necessary that the feet, as the foundation that conduces chiefly to communicate freedom and strength to the other parts, be placed at such a distance from each other, and in such a lineal manner as may be advantageous: the distance must be about two foot from one heel to the other; for if it were greater, the adversary, tho' of the same stature, and with a sword of equal length, would be within measure when you would not, which would be a very considerable fault, measure being one of the principal parts of fencing, and if the feet were nearer together, you would want strength, which is also a great fault, because a feeble situation cannot produce a vigorous action. the line must be taken from the hindmost part of the right heel to the left heel near the ancle. the point of the right foot must be opposite to the adversary's, turning out the point of the left foot, and bending the left knee over the point of the same foot, keeping the right knee a little bent, that it may have a freedom of motion. the body must be upright, which gives it a better air, greater strength, and more liberty to advance and retire, being supported almost equally by the two feet. some masters teach to keep the body back in favour of measure, which cannot be broke by the body when 'tis already drawn back, tho' it is often necessary, not only to avoid a surprize, but also to deceive a man of superior swiftness who pushes a just length: therefore 'tis much better to have the liberty of retiring to avoid the thrusts of the adversary, or of extricating yourself by advancing towards him and pushing (as i shall observe in its proper place) than to keep the body in one situation at a distance, which being fixed, cannot deceive a person who knows any thing of measure; moreover, such a retention of the body does not only hinder the breaking measure with the body, but also the left leg is so oppressed with its whole weight, that it would find it difficult to retire upon occasion. the elbows must be almost on a line, and of an equal height, that one shoulder may not be higher than the other, and that they may be both turn'd alike; the left hand must be over against the top of the ear, the hilt of the sword a little above the hip, turning towards half _quart_, the thumb extended, pressing the middle of the eye of the hilt, keeping the fingers pretty close to the handle, especially the little one, in order to feel the sword firmer and freer in the hand. by feeling the sword, is meant commanding the fort and feeble equally with the hand, in order to communicate to the more distant part of the blade, as well as to that which is nearer, the motion and action that is requisite. the hilt should be situated in the center, that is to say, between the upper and lower parts, and the inside and outside of the body, in order to be in a better condition to defend whatever part may be attacked. the arm must not be strait nor too much bent, to preserve its liberty and be cover'd. the parts being thus placed, the wrist and the point of the right foot will be on a perpendicular line. the point of the sword ought to be about the height of, and on a line with the adversary's shoulder, that is, it must be more or less raised, according as he is taller or shorter: some masters raise it to one fixed height, which would be very well if all men were of the same stature; but if we consider the difference in height of persons, we shall find it evidently bad. 'tis to be observed, that according to the length or shortness of the blade, the line from the shell to the point is higher or lower, when the height of the point is fix'd. the shoulder, the bend of the arm, the hilt, the point of the sword, the hip, the right knee and the point of the right foot must be on a line. the head should be upright and free without stiffness or affectation, the face turned between full and profile, and not altogether full, as many masters will have it, that being a constrained and disagreeable figure. [illustration: d plate. a lunge in quart.] [illustration: a thrust in quart.] the sight should be fixed on the adversary's, not only to observe his motions, but also to discover his design, it being possible to guess at the interior design, by the exterior action. it is necessary to appear animated with a brave boldness, for nothing requires a man to exert himself more than sword in hand; and it is as difficult to attain such an air of intrepidity without much excercise, as it is to become perfectly expert. chap. iii. _of pushing quart._ to push _quart_ within, besides the precautions of placing yourself to advantage, and of pushing properly and swiftly, which is to be acquired by practice and nice speculation, it is necessary that the parts, in order to assist each other in making the thrust, should be so disposed and situated, as that the wrist should draw with it the bend of the arm, the shoulder, and the upper part of the fore-part of the body, at the same time that the left hand and arm should display or stretch themselves out smartly, bending one of the knees and extending the other, which gives more vigour and swiftness to the thrust; and the body finding itself drawn forward by the swift motion of the wrist and other parts, obliges the right foot to go forward in order to support it, and to give the thrust a greater length; the left foot should, at the same instant, turn on the edge, without stirring from its place; whilst the right foot coming smartly to the ground, finishes the figure, extension and action of the lunge. this is the order and disposition of the parts in making the thrust, which see in the second plate. at the instant when the wrist moves forward, it must do three things, turn, support and oppose. to turn the wrist in _quart_, the thumb nail must be up, and the inside edge equal in height with the other, for if it were not so high, the thrust would not be so swift, for want of motion enough, neither would the body be so well covered, because the edge, instead of being directly opposite to the adversary's sword, would fall off with a slant; and if it were higher, it would make a quint figure, which, by the excessive turn of the wrist, would weaken the thrust, and by the unequal turn of the edges would uncover the body. the wrist ought to be of a height sufficient to cover the body without contracting the arm, which cannot be fixed to a particular height; for a short man against a tall one, should raise it as high as the head, which people of equal; stature, or a tall man against a short one, ought not to do. when the opposition is accompanied with such a turn and support of the wrist as will cover the body, it is good, but if the wrist be carried too far in, you not only lose part of the length of the thrust, but also uncover the outside of the body, which are two very great faults. the thrust must be made on the inside of the right shoulder, in order to take the feeble with your fort, and that you may be covered, bearing on the adversary's sword, by which means, the thrust will be well planted, and you less liable to receive one, which advantages you lose by pushing otherwise. in order to make the thrust perfect, it must have its proper strength and support when planted: the strength, is the vigour with which the thrust is made, and the support is the consequence of the motion of the wrist, turning and bearing upwards, which makes the foil to bend accordingly, fixing itself 'till you retire. the foil may bend upwards in two manners; the best way for it to bend, is from the middle towards the button; the other way is, when almost all the blade makes a semi-circle. the first has a better effect, the feeble being stronger, the other makes a greater show; but the point being feeble, there is not the same advantage in the thrust. in all thrusts, the button should hit before the right foot comes to the ground, and the left hand and arm be stretched out smartly, to help the body forward, and give more swiftness to the thrust: the left hand should always be conformable to the right, turning to _quart_ or _tierce_, according to the thrust. the left hand and arm should be on a line with the thigh, and their height a little lower than the shoulder. the body must lean a little forward before, to give the thrust a greater length; the hips must not be so much bent as other times; which weakens and shortens the thrust, by the distance which the lowering the body causes from the height of the line which must come from the shoulder; besides 'tis harder to recover, and you, by that means, give the adversary an opportunity of taking your feeble with his fort, your situation being very low. the front of the body should be hid by turning the two shoulders equally on a line. the foot should go out strait; in order to preserve the strength and swiftness of the thrust, it must have its proper line and distance. the line must be taken from the inside of the left heel to the point of the adversary's right foot; if it turn inward or outward, the button will not go so far, the strait line being the shortest; besides the body would be uncovered, for by carrying the foot inwards, the flank is exposed, and by carrying it outwards the front of the body, and the body is thereby weakened; the prop and the body being obliged to form an angle instead of a strait line, from the heel of the left foot to the point or button of the foil. in order to know the distance of the lunge, the right knee being bent, must form a perpendicular line with the point of the foot; if the foot were not so forward, the heel would be off the ground, and the body would have less strength, and if it were carried farther the body could not easily bend it self, and consequently could not extend so far; moreover, it would want strength, being at too great a distance from the perpendicular line of the foot and leg, which are its support, and its recovery would be more difficult. the foot should fall firm without lifting it too high, that the soal of the sandal, or pump, may give a smart sound, which not only looks better and animates more, but also makes the foot firm, and in a condition to answer the swiftness of the wrist. care must be taken not to carry the point of the foot inward or outward, because the knee bending accordingly, as part of the thigh, goes out of the line of the sword, and consequently, of the line of defence, besides 'tis very disagreeable to the sight. the feet sometimes slip in the lunge, the right foot sliding forward, or the left backward; the first is occasioned by carrying out the foot before the knee is bent, whereas when the knee brings it forward, it must fall flat and firm; the other proceeds from the want of a sufficient support on the left foot. the head should follow the figure of the body; when this is upright, that should be so to; when the body leans, the head must lean; when you push within, you must look at your adversary on the outside of your arm, which is done without turning the head, by the opposition of the hand only. that every thrust may carry with it it's due extent and strength, the opposition of the sword, the true placing of the body, and a facility of recovering; you are to observe that the two first are for offence, and the others for defence. every thrust must have it's just length, and carry with it a good air, a regular situation, vigour, and a due extension; _see the d. plate_. _of recovering in_ guard. as soon as the thrust is made, you must recover in _guard_, which is done either by retiring out of measure, or only to the place from whence you, pushed; if out of measure, 'tis done by springing back, or by bringing the right foot back behind the left, and the left behind the right; and if to the place from whence you pushed, you must parry if there's a thrust made; and if not, you must command the feeble of the adversary's sword, in order to cover the side on which it is, without giving an open on the other side, which is done as you recover, by drawing back the body on the left foot; which should bring with it the right knee, drawing the foot, with the heel a little raised from the ground, to prevent any accident that may happen by the badness of the terrace. by this recovery, commanding the adversary's sword, you either get light if he not stir, or time if he does, which instead of being dangerous, as has formerly been thought, it is, by the help of art, become advantageous. chap. iv. _of the parade of quart._ to parry, signifies, in our art, to cover when the adversary pushes, that part which he endeavors to offend; which is done it either by the opposition of the sword or of the left hand; but as i am now speaking of the sword only, i must observe; that in order to parry well with it, you are to take notice of the manner and swiftness of your adversary: by the manner, is meant whether in _quart_ or _tierce_; with his fort to your feeble, or with his feeble to your fort; and you are to observe the swiftness of his thrust, that you may regulate your parade accordingly. [illustration: rd. plate. parade of quart.] [illustration: parade of quart opposing with the hand.] when a thrust is made with the fort to your feeble, which is the best way; you must, by raising and turning the hand a little in _quart_, raise the point, which brings it nearer to you, and hinders the adversary from gaining your feeble, which being raised up is too far from him, and makes it easy for you to seize his feeble. (refer to the d. plate.) if the thrust be made on the fort or middle of your sword, you need only turn the hand a little in _quart_. if after the adversary has pushed _quart_, he pushes _seconde_; you must parry with the fort, bringing it nearer to you, and for the greater safety, or to avoid other thrusts, or the taking time on your return, you must oppose with the left hand, which hinders him from hitting you as he meets your thrust, and from parrying it, for want of having his sword at liberty. (refer to the th plate.) the same opposition may be made on a lunge in _quart_, and to be more safe in returning thrust or thrusts, you must close the measure in parrying, which confounds the enemy, who finds himself too near to have the use of his sword: your sword, in parrying, must carry it's point lower and more inward than in the other parades. if the adversary makes a thrust, with shortning or drawing back his arm, or leaving his body open; you must defend with the left hand, and lunge strait on him, unless you had rather parry with the sword, making use of the opposition of the hand, and closing the measure, as i just now observed. you may also parry in disengaging,[ ] drawing back the body to the left, in order to give the hand time and facility to make the parade. there are several other parades, of which i shall treat in their proper places, confining myself now to the most essential. [illustration: th. plate. a lunge in tierce.] [illustration: tierce parryed.] chap. v. _of pushing_ tierce _without_, or _on the outside of the sword_. in order to push _tierce_ well, the hand being gone first, taking the feeble with the fort, turning down the nails, and the wrist a little outwards, not too high or low; in order not to give light above or below, the body must bend more forward and inward than in _quart_; the left hand should extend itself in _tierce_, because it ought, in all cases, to be conformable with the right, except that it is lower. when you push _tierce_, you should look within your sword: as to the feet, they must be, in every lunge, on the same line, and at the same distance. the rules i have laid down for recovering in _quart_, will serve also in _tierce_, but of the contrary side. _parade_ of tierce. to parry a thrust made with the fort to the feeble, you must turn the whole hand, carrying it a little outwards, raising the point, in order to avoid the adversary's taking your feeble, and at the same time take his. _see the th_ plate. if a thrust be made on the middle, or fort of your sword, you need only turn the hand, carrying all the blade equally outwards. some masters teach to parry this thrust with the hand in _quart_, which is very dangerous if the enemy pushes _quart_ over the arm in the fort, or _quart_ within, in the feeble, there being an opening in one, as well as the other case; besides the point is too far from the line, to make a quick return. to avoid the return of a thrust when you have pushed _tierce_, and that the adversary, in parrying, has gained to your feeble; you must, by raising and opposing with the fort, bring the pommel of your sword on high; so that the point be downwards; whereby his point will be near your left shoulder, and you, not only avoid being hit, but you may make a thrust at the same time, by opposing with the left hand, and for the greater safety, you must return on the blade, and push strait, without quitting it. _see the th_ plate. [illustration: th plate. parade of tierce yeilding the feeble.] [illustration: the same parade & opposition of the hand.] when a thrust is made in _tierce_ upon the blade on the feeble, or by disengaging; tho' the first is more easily parryed, you must yeild the feeble, opposing with the fort, in order to guide the adversary's sword to the place the most convenient for the opposition of the left hand, and closing the measure at the same time, you have an opportunity, before he can recover, to hit him several times; which must be done by advancing on him, as fast as he retires. _see the th_ plate. you may also parry by disengaging, drawing the body back. the return is easy, by pushing _quart_; and to avoid a second thrust from the enemy at the time of your return, you must oppose with the left hand. _see the th_ plate. chap. vi. _of pushing_ seconde. in pushing under, the hand must be turned in _seconde_, as high as in _quart_, and more within than in _tierce_; the body should be more bent, lower, and more forward than in thrusting _tierce_, and the left hand lower. _see the th_ plate. seconde ought not be pushed, but on the following occasions: first, when an engagement, _feint_ or _half-thrust_, is made without, that the adversary at one of these times parrys high. secondly, when your adversary engages your sword on the outside, with his hand raised high; or on the inside, with his feeble only; and thirdly, upon a thrust or pass, within or without. the recovery in guard, should be in _quart_ within the arm, though most masters teach to recover on the outside, which takes much more time, and though the _seconde_ is independent on the side, it is nearer to the inside than to the outside; because the adversary carries his wrist to the outside, when he gives an opportunity of making this thrust; therefore you ought to return to his sword in the shortest time, in order to be sooner on your guard. if you examine this parade, you will find it is the only means of recovering with safety. what introduced the manner of returning to the sword on the outside, was the false method formerly used in parrying the _seconde_ by beating on the blade; in _tierce_, with the point downwards; so that the adversary not being able to return but above, there was a necessity for returning to the sword on the outside in order to defend; but the parade and return being no longer the same, the manner of returning to the sword must also be different. chap. vii. _the parades of_ seconde. _seconde_ may be parried three ways. first, according to the ancient manner i just described, which is done by a semi-circle on the inside, with the hand in _tierce_, the point low, almost on a line with the wrist; but the greatness of the motion does not only render it difficult to parry the thrust but still harder to parry the feint of the thrust and come up again; besides the _rispost_ is dangerous; because it requires a long time to raise the point, which is almost as low as the ground, to the body; in which time, the adversary has not only an opportunity of parrying the thrust, but also of hitting you whilst you are bringing up your point. secondly, _seconde_ may be parryed by making a half-circle on the outside, the wrist in _quart_, as high as the shoulder, the arm extended, and the point very low. _see the th_ plate. it is less dangerous, and more easy for the _rispost_ than the former, which must be made as soon as you have parryed, by pushing strait in _quart_ which the adversary having pushed under, can hardly avoid, but by yeilding, and battering the sword. _see the th_ plate. to this manner of parrying _seconde_, there is but one opposite, which is done by _feinting_ below, and as the adversary is going to cross your sword, in order to parry, you must disengage by a little circle, with the hand in _seconde_, which preventing the enemy's sword, gives an opportunity of hitting him above, if the wrist is lower than i have observed, or in _flanconnade_, if the wrist is high. a man that parrys below, in order to avoid this _feint_, must redouble his circle to meet the blade. this parade is best in recovering, after having pushed, not only to avoid the strait or low _rispost_, but also any feint or thrust. the third and best parade, is made with your fort to the middle of the adversary's sword, the wrist turned in _quart_, but a little lower: the _rispost_ of this parade is very good, when you know how to bind the sword upon the _rispost_; and it cannot be parryed without returning to the parade that i have here, before, described and which, i believe, is peculiar to myself. this parade is by so much the more adventageous, as the _rispost_ is easy the sword being near the adversary's body, which makes it, more difficult for him to avoid you; besides, by this parade, you are in better condition to parry, not only a thrust below, but also any other thrusts and feints, the sword being near the situation of guard. chap. viii. _of_ quart _under the wrist_. this thrust should not be made but instead of _seconde_, that is to say, on an engagement, parade, or lunge of the adversary in _quart_. the wrist must not be so much turned up, nor so high as in _quart_ within; the body should be more inward, and bending more forward. (refer to the th plate.) in case the adversary pushes _quart_, in order to take the time, you must lunge the foot strong inward, to throw the body farther from the line of the adversary's sword. in recovering from this thrust, the wrist must be in _tierce_, and the sword without the enemy's whilst the other parts take their situation. the parade of this thrust is made by a half-circle of the sword within, the wrist raised in _quart_, and the point low. _see the th plate_. [illustration: _ th plate. thrust under the wrist_.] [illustration: _it's parade_.] [illustration: _ th. plate. flannconade.] [illustration: the opposition of the hand to the lowering the body_.] chap. ix. _of_ flanconnade. this thrust is to be made only in engaging or _risposting_ when the adversary carries his wrist too far inward, or drops the feeble of his sword, then you must press a little within, and with your feeble on his, in order to lower it, and by that means get an opening in his flank. the body, in this thrust, is not so strait as in _quart_ within, tho' the arms are. _see the th_ plate. it is necessary to oppose with the left hand, in order to avoid a low thrust on your engaging, pushing or _risposting_. this is the last thrust of the five which are to be made in our art. the first us _quart_ within the sword, the second _tierce_ without the sword, the third _seconde_ under the sword, the fourth _quart_ under the sword, and the fifth, _flanconnade_; and there is not any attack, thrust, feint, time or rispost in this extensive art, but what depends on one of these. the recovery from _flanconnade_, should be the same as from _quart_ within the sword. flanconnade is generally avoided by taking the time in _seconde_ with the body low; the hand must oppose to shun the thrust, and hit the adversary at the same time. instead of pushing at the flank, you should push within the body. _see the th_ plate. besides the taking time in _seconde_, there is another very good parade, very little practised in schools; either because few masters know it, or because it is more difficult to execute it justly. this parade is made by lowering the adversary's sword, bringing it under your's to the inside, and parrying a little lower on the feeble of his sword, you make your _rispost_ where he intended his thrust, that is to say in the flank. chap. x. _of parades_. there are two sorts of parades, the one by binding the blade, the other by a dry beat. the binding parade is to be used when you are to _rispost_ in _quart_ within, in _tierce_ without, in _seconde_ under, in _flanconnade_, and in all _feints_: and the beat, giving a favourable opportunity of _risposting_, is to be used when you _rispost_ to a thrust in _seconde_; or when after having parryed a thrust in _quart_ within, you see an opening under the wrist. to these two thrusts, you must _rispost_ almost as soon as the adversary pushes, quitting his blade for that purpose, which is to be done only by a smart motion, joining again immediately, in order to be in defence if the adversary should thrust. there are three things more to be observed in parrying. first, that you are to parry all thrusts with the inmost edge, except in yeilding parades, which are made with the flat. secondly, that your fort be to the middle, and your middle to the feeble of the adversary's sword. and thirdly, that your situation be as rear to the guard as possible, as to favour your riposte. the ripostes. in order to riposte well, you must observe the adversary's time and recovery in guard. the time is to be taken in the thrusts of opposition when he is recovering, and the other as soon as you have parryed. there are three ways of riposting on the adversary's recovery in guard: when he does not come enough to the sword, or not at all: the second, when he comes too much, and the third, when his recovery and parade are just. to the first, you must riposte strait; to the second by disengaging, or cutting over or under, according as you see light; and to the last, by making a strait feint or half-thrust, to oblige the adversary to come to the parade, and then pushing where there is an opening, which is called baulking the parade. chap. xi. _of the demarches, or manner of advancing and retiring._ most of the faults committed in making thrusts when the measure is to be closed, proceed from the disorder of the body, occasioned by that of the feet, so that for want of moving well, you are not only in danger of being taken on your time, but likewise you cannot execute your thrusts neatly, justly, nor swiftly; the body being disordered and weak. there are ten demarches in fencing; four in advancing, five in retiring, and one to turn your adversary, or hinder him from turning you. the first demarche in advancing, is made by lifting and carrying your left-foot the length of your shoe before the right, keeping it turned as in guard, with the knee bent, lifting up the heel of the right-foot, leaning the body forward, which, on this occasion, gives it more strength and a better air; then carrying the right-foot about two foot before the left, in order to be in guard, which is done by a smart beat of the right-foot. the same _demarche_ in retiring, is made by lifting and carrying the right foot the length of the shoe behind the left, with the knee a little bent, then carrying the left-foot on the line, and to the distance of guard. the second _demarche_ is called closing the measure; which is done by lifting and advancing the right-foot a bout a foot with a beat, drawing the left the same length; because by drawing it more or less you would lose your strength or your measure, which few people have observed. there is such a _demarche_ backward, which is called breaking measure; which is done by lifting and carrying the left-foot a foot back, drawing or bringing back the right in proportion according as the ground will permit. if the ground be uneven, or that you have a mind to surprize an unskilful man by gaining measure unperceived, or to oblige one, a little expert, to push at the time you advance your body; you must, i say, if your adversary is unskilful, bring the left-foot more or less near the right, as you are more or less out of measure, which gains more ground, and less visibly than the foregoing _demarche_, and is more favourable to your thrust: if your adversary is a little expert, and pushes on this your advancing you must bring back the left-foot to it's place, and he will be out of measure, tho' by means of his lunge you will be well in measure, which is a great advantage. the same _demarche_ may be made in retiring, where the ground is uneven, lifting the right-foot, bringing it near the left, and putting back the left in guard. to make a thrust in three motions, being out of measure, you must make a double beat, which is done by a small beat of the right-foot in the same place, beginning immediately with the same foot to close the measure. the three ways of retiring which i have shewn, are done from the situation in guard. the two which are done after a lunge are, first by lifting and bringing the right-foot back from the place of the lunge behind the left, and then carrying the left behind the right, in order to be in guard. the late monsieur de latouche, and monsieur de liancour, found this demarche better than the following one, tho' it is not so generally used. the second retreat after having pushed, is made by drawing back the right-foot about the length of the shoe, bending the knees, in order to be in a condition to chace or drive back the left-foot with the right, keeping the hams very supple, the body free, and the sword before you; not only that you may spring the farther, but also to be in a better posture of defence. the point of the right-foot should come down first, leaning immediately after on the heel; the left-foot must fall on the line at the distance, and in the situation in guard, as i before observed, in order to be ready to take the time, or to make a riposte. the two masters that i have quoted, condemned this retreat very much, especially monsieur de latouche, who says in springing back, three motions are necessary; first to draw back the right-foot in guard, secondly to bend the knee, and thirdly to chace or fly back. any master, will find that there should be but two motions, it being easy to bend the knees and draw back the right-foot at the same time. besides, his rule for springing back is false; for by drawing the right-foot back so far as in guard; you lose time, the first motion being too long, and the feet being so close together, the body has not sufficient strength, and consequently cannot go far. from this it is plain that three motions are not necessary for springing back, there being but two in all. he likewise says that the leaping back, requires such an effort, that you have not power to parry; but experience sufficiently shows that you may easily parry and spring back. indeed on a moving sand, or slippery ground, it is very difficult to leap back; and if we consider things rightly, we cannot find our purpose answered at all times and places; and tho' the first retreat that i recommended, and which these gentlemen esteemed, is very good, yet if you are followed closely in retreating thus, as the two steps do not place you at so great a distance, by much, as the springing back, you may be put to a nonplus by a redouble. when you know the just length of your adversary's thrust, you may break or steal out of measure, by leaning back the body, without stirring the foot. if in the field, you have the disadvantage of the ground, the wind, or the sun, or that in a school, you are exposed to too much light, or, pushing with an awkard man; in order to obviate these inconveniencies, you must go round him, which may be done within or without according as you have room. the turning must be done out of measure, and with great caution: when 'tis within your sword, you must begin with your left-foot, carrying it to that side, and then bring the right-foot to it's proper line and distance; and if your adversary turns on the outside, you must carry the right-foot to that side, and the left in guard, as well to avoid his thrusts, as to lay hold on every favourable opportunity, in case he should persist in his _demarche_. you should never give measure but to your inferior: giving measure, is when the body and feet advance too much, or in disorder; or advancing before you are well situated, although corrected in the _demarche_, or advancing when you are near enough, except you be much superior to the enemy. the measure should be given to oblige the adversary to push; in order to get an opportunity of taking the time, or of _risposting_. chap. xii. _of_ disengagements. there is nothing more nice, or more necessary in fencing, than disengagements; the nicest motion, being the smoothest and finest, and the most necessary, there being but few thrusts where you ought not to disengage, and to several more than once; and there is no better means of avoiding the advantage that a strong man has when he presses on your sword. if we confine ourselves, strictly, to the meaning of disengagements, we shall find it to be of three sorts; which are, upon the blade, over the point, and under the wrist: but as this might be too intricate in lessons, and a learner mistake one for another; none should be called a disengagement, but that which is made on the blade; and though the others are, in effect, disengagements, especially that over the point, which is done closer than those under the wrist, yet they are distinguished from disengagements, by calling them cuts over the point, and under the wrist, according as they are used. in order to disengage and push from the outside to the inside, being in guard towards half _quart_; the wrist must be raised a little at the time that you lower the point and raise it again, which should be done as close as possible, by a smooth and quick motion, that you may be covered and lose no time, and be able to push with your fort to the adversary's feeble. some people, in pushing _quart_ and _tierce_, keep the wrist in _tierce_, in order to push _quart_ the swifter, which is a fault; because they accustom themselves to a situation, which, when they come to assault, is unsafe and dangerous, for want of being in the guard of defence. in disengaging from the inside to the outside, the wrist should turn a little more towards _quart_, than in the guard which i have recommended: the point should fall and rise and the same instant, and the hand should turn insensibly in _tierce_, as the thrust goes forward. some masters teach to hold the sword in guard between _quart_ and _tierce_, and to disengage in that situation; whereby the three advantages which the disengagement in _half-quart_ gives you, are lost; that is to say, first, a good air, secondly, the being covered with the fort of the sword, and thirdly, the swiftness of the thrust; because the hand has not a sufficient freedom of motion. the knowing how to disengage barely is not sufficient; it is necessary that you be acquainted with the time, and with your adversary's play, in order to disengage to advantage. the time is when the adversary comes to your sword; and when your adversary, depending on his strength, comes to your blade, in order to guide his thrust to your body, is what is meant by his play or manner. you may indeed disengage without taking the time, but with less success. when the adversary engages swift, 'tis good to keep your point a little low, or distant from his; by which means he requires more time to engage you, and gives you more to prevent him, unless you suffer him to touch your sword; which would not only make you lose the time of hitting him, but would also expose you to receive a thrust, it being certain that when you go to the blade on one side, you cannot defend the other; for you cannot do two opposite actions at one and the same time; and by the same rule, if you miss the time of disengaging, and disengage too late, you expose yourself to his thrust; for you cannot, at the same time, quit his blade and parry. though it is necessary that every fencer should understand the disengagements, it is more especially so to tall and weak men. to the first, that they may keep their adversary at a distance; which by reason of their height, is an advantage to them; and to the others in order to prevent closing; in which case, their weakness would be a disadvantage to them. chap. xiii. _of_ feints. feints are much used in _fencing_, whether it be by reason of their number, their ease, or the success that attends them, gaining more time and light than is to be got in plain thrusts, there being no thrust to be given so well as after a feint. the number of feints is so great, by reason of the many guards and parades, that i should find it as difficult to describe them, as the reader would to comprehend them without experience; so that i shall confine myself to those from which the rest derive, which are, strait feint, feint, and double feint. by strait feint, is meant a motion or feint to thrust on the side on which your sword is, which is to be done on the inside, the wrist in _quart_, a little higher than the point which must be near the adversary's sword, that you may be covered, whilst you endeavour to get an opening. this motion should be attended with a little beat of the right-foot, keeping back the body. if, at the time you feint, your adversary does not stir, you must push _quart_: if he parrys with his feeble, you must immediately disengage to _tierce_; and if he parrys high you must cut in _quart_ under the wrist. the feint, to which i give no other name, it being the most used, and to distinguish it from the others, is done by feinting from _quart_ to _tierce_, with a little beat of the foot, keeping the body back: the wrist must be raised in _quart_, and the button a little lower than the pommel, near the adversary's blade; by which means you are covered, and can make your thrust swifter. if the adversary does not stir at the feint, you must go on strait with the _tierce_: if he parrys with his feeble, you must disengage and thrust _quart_, and if he parrys with his fort, you must push _seconde_. several masters teach to make this feint from the inside to the outside, with the wrist turned in _tierce_; and indeed they are seemingly in the right; a feint being a likeness of the beginning of a thrust; and that likeness cannot be better shown than in the figure of the thrust: but the smart motion of the point, causes the adversary to stir, the figure of the hand no way contributing thereto. you are to consider which is the most proper, not only to make the adversary answer you, but also to make the motion quicker. monsieur de latouche says, that from _quart_ to _quart_ there is no motion; but we have two instances to the contrary. first, that a man of experience has his wrist and the bend of his arm free, so as to thrust strait in _quart_, tho' in the same figure; and secondly, if there be a motion preceding the thrust, as in a disengagement, or a cut under; this motion is sufficient to help the swiftness of the feint, and of the thrust: in short, the motion from _quart_ to _quart_, being quicker than feinting from _quart_ to _tierce_, and returning in _quart_; it ought to have the preference, swiftness being the line of fencing. the only feints that should be made in _tierce_, are those that are marked from below above to return below, and from above below to return above. the double feint is in two motions, so that in order to push within the sword, you must be without; and making a little motion in _quart_ within, with a little beat of the foot, you feint again without closing the measure, keeping back the body in order to be out of the adversary's reach: if he parrys with his fort, you must cut under in _seconde_, and if he parrys with his feeble, disengage to _quart_ within. as there are in this thrust three motions of the sword, _viz._ the two feints and the thrust; the foot must make as many, in order to answer the motions of the hand. some masters teach to make the double feint without stirring the foot; and others teach to advance on the first motion. in the first case, being in the adversary's measure, you lose too much time, which is very dangerous: and advancing on the first motion, is almost as dangerous as keeping the foot firm, by putting yourself within the adversary's reach; besides the manner is not so graceful as that which i recommend, in which you are not within his reach 'till the second motion; and this is attended with another advantage; for by bearing with the right-foot, the body must of necessity be kept back, and consequently, farther from the sword of the adversary, and in a better condition to act. there are two other ways of making these thrusts: the one by an interval between the first and second motions, joining or uniting the other two; and the latter between the second and third motions, joining the two first. though both these methods are good, i prefer the latter, which puts you in a better condition, not only to avoid your adversary's thrust, but also to chuse your own; the interval giving you a favourable opportunity of doing both. there has been so much said of the feints which i have described, with their opposites, that i shall say no more of them, nor will i speak of an infinite number of other feints, strait, single, and double, within, without, and under, in disengaging, or cutting over the point, or under the wrist, in risposting, or redoubling thrusts; all which, depend on the three which i have described; in which, as in all thrusts, the body must be kept back, and the fort of the sword before you; by which means, you are more out of danger, and the wrist is better prepared. some men mark feints with the head and body, which is a very disagreeable sight, and dangerous with regard to time. a feint is the likeness of the beginning of a thrust: it is made to put the adversary off his guard, and to gain an opening. in order to take advantage of the time and light which you get by your feint, you must take care to avoid an inconveniency into which many people fall, by uncovering themselves in endeavouring to uncover the adversary. chap. xiv. _of cutting over the point of the_ sword. in order to cut over the point, within from without, the wrist must be turned towards _tierce_, which gives it a swifter motion. when your point is over your adversary's, you must turn the wrist in _quart_, pushing with your fort to his feeble: though this is a regular way of cutting, what is most essential to perfect the thrust is wanting, that is to say, the motion that should precede it, which is commonly a half-thrust or feint, by which, two advantages are gained: first you discompose your adversary, and secondly, your thrust is swifter, being by so much the more vigorous, as the motion previous thereto is so. at the time you make a half-thrust or feint, you must make a little beat with the foot, bearing back the body to break your adversary's measure. the cut from the inside to the outside, has commonly more success than that from the outside to the inside, the adversary going more readily to his parade on this side than on the other. the manner of cutting on the outside, is by placing your sword within, making a little motion or strait feint, the wrist in _quart_, the fort of the sword before you, in order to be covered, and your point very near the adversary's sword; you must beat a little with the foot, bending the body back a little, and as the adversary is going to parry with the feeble, you must pass your point quickly over his, pushing in _tierce_, with your fort to his feeble. though all thrusts have the same following ones; the cut has them more easy; it's motion from above to below, disposing it better than the disengagements, if the thrust be from the outside to the inside, and that the adversary parrys with his fort to your feeble: besides the recovery in guard, which is common after all thrusts, you must, upon a parade with the fort, if it be without stirring the foot, or in advancing, join: and if the adversary makes this parade in retiring, he gives you an opportunity of cutting in _quart_ under the wrist, and on his parrying with the feeble, you must return in _seconde_, bringing forward the left-foot a little, in order to procure a reprise or second lunge. these two reprises are to be made before you are acquainted with your adversary's manner of parrying; but when you have discovered it, if it be with his fort, you must cut over and under the wrist in _quart_, and if with his feeble, return in _tierce_, that is to say, make an entire circle. these cuts are to be made in one or two motions; in the first you are not to stop, but in the other, you make a short interval by a little beat with the foot. the thrusts following the cut from the inside to the outside, before you know your adversary's parade, are made thus: if 'tis with the fort, you must return with a cut in _seconde_, under the sword, advancing the left-foot a little; if he parrys with the feeble, you must return by disengaging to _quart_ within, advancing the left-foot, as before: some people return a cut in _tierce_, in _quart_, by another cut over the point, of _quart_ in _tierce_, and so on the contrary side. when you foresee the parade, you may at once cut from the inside to the outside, and under in _seconde_; or return within, according as the parade is made with the fort or feeble. you may also make these redoubles by a little interval over the sword, beating with the foot. there are other redoubles which are made by drawing back the body without stirring the feet. see the chapter of reprises. the cut may be made not only after a half-thrust, or strait feint, as i have said, but also after an engagement, lunge, or pass, and in risposting, which is the best and most used; because that is to be done only in recovering to guard, or by bringing one foot behind the other, or springing back; to the first you must rispost with the foot firm, and to the other by closing the measure. chap. xv. _of the_ reprise, _or redoubled thrust_. the term _reprise_ signifies a succession of thrusts without interval, or with very little. it may be done in three manners; first after having pushed without recovering, secondly, in recovering or being recovered; and thirdly, when the enemy steals measure. the first and last of these three reprises may be called redoubles. the first reprise is made after having pushed _quart_, the enemy having parryed with his feeble, you must return in _seconde_, advancing the left foot a little to make the action easier to the right foot, and tho' it be not necessary to advance it unless the enemy retires, it serves for an ornament, and to give more vigour to the thrust: but if as soon as the enemy has parryed he risposts, you must only redouble with the hand, the body low without stirring the feet, and join. if he risposts under the wrist in the flank, you must either parry crossing his sword as you recover, opposing with the left hand, or return, as i said, with the hand in _seconde_. upon the rispost of the enemy, you may also redouble, volting strait, or cutting in the flank according as he raises his hand more or less in his rispost, in order to facilitate your volt; you must immediately after your lunge follow a little with the left foot. the second reprise is made, after having pushed _quarte_, when in recovering to guard the enemy advances, without being covered, or that suffering the superiority of your sword, he gives you room to thrust in _quarte_, if he disengages, you must go off in _tierce_, if he forces your sword with his feeble, you must disengage to _tierce_, and if with his fort cut _quarte_ under the wrist. in order to get time for this redouble, you must make a half thrust, immediately getting out of measure, either with the body simply, or by the first demarche backwards, or by leaping a little back; if the enemy advances it will be either strait or making a feint, or on your sword; to the two first you must push strait _quarte_, or _seconde_, lowering the body or volting, and if he comes on your sword you must disengage and push over in _tierce_. the third reprise is made when the enemy upon your pushing _quarte_ breaks measure without or with parrying; to the one you must redouble in _quarte_, with your fort to his feeble, which is done after a strait thrust, feint, engagement, or rispost; and if the enemy parrys, you must likewise redouble forwards by a disengagement, or a cut under or over according to his parade, or as opportunity offers. to redouble forward, or make several reprises following with ease, you must as often as you thrust follow with the left foot. _the_ reprises _on the_ outside. if you push in _tierce_ and your adversary parrys with the fort, you must redouble in _seconde_, and if he parrys with the feeble disengage to _quarte_, advancing a little the left foot that the right may have the liberty of a second motion. if the enemy after parrying _tierce_ shou'd rispost strait or under, to the first you may disengage and volt, and to the other volt strait, advancing the left foot a little in lunging, in order to have the liberty of volting, because you cannot easily do it when you are extended: it is more easy to take the time opposing with the left hand; and 'tis best of all to parry and thrust strait in _quarte_; if after having pushed _tierce_, on your recovery to guard, you find you have the command of the enemy's sword, or that he advances uncovered, you, must in these cases push strait in _tierce_ if he disengage you must take the time and push _quarte_, if he comes to your sword with his fort, you must cut under in _seconde_, if with his feeble, disengage in _quarte_, it is also good after having pushed _tierce_ to recover with your sword high, giving light under, and if the enemy pushes there, you must take the time opposing with the left hand, or parry and rispost. it is good likewise for a decoy to make a half thrust and recover with the sword quite distant from you body, and if the enemy comes to your sword, you must disengage and thrust at his open, and if he makes at your body, you must volt or oppose with the hand and thrust where you have light. the reprises or redoubles in advancing are made in _tierce_ by the same rules as those within are. that is to say, either strait, or by disengaging or cutting over or under, according as the enemy either lets you make your thrust, or goes to his parade. all these redoubles may be made on a rispost as well as on other lunges. chap. xvi. _of passing_ quarte _within the sword._ a pass is contrary to a volt as well in figure as in it's occasion, the left leg in the figure passing foremost, and in a volt behind, to help the body to turn, and in it's occasion, the pass being to be made as in a lunge, taking the time, or his time, whereas the volt cannot be made without a great deal of time; yet the pass is different from a lunge, the one being made with the foremost foot, and the pass with the hindmost, which gives the thrust a greater length, more strength and swiftness, and a greater facility of taking the feeble with your fort, the body goes further, because the center from which it departs in a lunge is in the left foot, and in a pass in the right foot which is more advanced, and also because in passing you advance the left foot more than you do the right in lunging, and the parts being higher on a pass than in a lunge there is a greater facility of taking the feeble with your fort. [illustration: th plate. a pass in quart.] [illustration: the lowering the body on the pass.] in a pass in _quarte_, the hands and arms must be displayed as in a lunge, not only in their figure, but in the same order, that is to say, the hand must move first to bring on the shoulder and the body; which should lean more forward than in lunging, at the time that carrying the left foot about two foot and an half, you find your pass at it's full extention. as your body is too much abandoned forward to recover itself easily, you must rush on your enemy, seize the guard of his sword, and present him your point, which is done by advancing the right foot to such a distance as to be out of the reach of his leg whilst you advance, which otherwise might give him an opportunity, by tripping to throw you down. as you advance the right foot you must seize the guard of his sword, at the same time drawing back your sword, keeping it high. then you must carry your right foot behind the left to almost the distance of a lunge, in order to be strong, as well to avoid his pulling you forward, as to draw him to you. if the enemy parrys the pass with his fort, you must only join, commanding his sword with your fort, 'till you have seized his guard with the left hand, which must be done at the time that you advance the right foot, carrying your sword from the inside to the out, then you must bring the left foot to the side of the right, and bring back the right presenting the sword to the enemy. if he parrys with his feeble, you must, without stopping, either cut over his point from within to without, or turn the wrist in _seconde_, lowering your body, and bringing up the right foot seize his guard, then carrying your sword from within to without, you advance the left foot to the side of the right, and drawing back the right present your sword. the easiest means to avoid and hit a man who passes in _quart_ within are to parry dry and rispost swiftly in the flank, and if the pass is made straight along the blade with the fort to your feeble, you must by lowering your feeble, turn your wrist in _quarte_ carrying the point perpendicularly down, supporting the wrist, without, and bringing your sword round by the outside of the adversary's shoulder, you find your sword above his, with your point to his body. you may also upon the same pass lower the body and push _seconde_. [illustration: th plate. the turning the body on a pass in tierce.] [illustration: pass in seconde volting the body.] _to pass in_ tierce. in passing _tierce_, as in a lunge, the wrist must draw the shoulder and body forward, bringing, as in a pass in _quarte_, the left-foot about two feet and an half before the right, then advancing the right foremost and out of the reach of the enemy's; you must seize the guard of his sword, and again advancing the left-foot near the right, you draw back the right and present the point. the counters or opposites to this pass, are the strait rispost, or the rispost under, the taking time, cutting _seconde_ under, disengaging, or counter disengaging and volting, but the surest is to loosen the right-foot turning the body half round to the right, opposing with the sword and presenting the point to the enemy, which hindering him from hurting you, throws him on your point if he abandons himself, and at the same time you seize the guard of his sword. _see the th_ plate. _to pass in_ seconde. in passing _seconde_, there must, as in a lunge, be a preparatory motion, which is made by a feint, or by an engagement on the blade to oblige the enemy to parry high, in order to take that time to pass under, which is done by advancing the left-foot very much, with the body lower and more forward than in other passes, and advancing the right-foot, you seize the enemy's sword, bringing yours from under over, and advancing the left-foot to the side of the right, you draw back the right presenting the point. you must take notice, that in a pass in _quarte_ with it's joining, there are but three steps, and that in the passes in _tierce_ and _seconde_ there are four. the first, passing the left-foot before the right; the second, advancing the right to seize the sword; the third, bringing up the left-foot a little, and the fourth, bringing back the right, presenting the point. in order to avoid, and to hit the enemy on his pass, besides parrying and pushing strait, as in the thrust lunged in _seconde_, in the th plate, you may also make a strait thrust, opposing with the left-hand, or by volting, as is shewn in the cut of the th plate. tho' a pass carries along with it, as i have observed, a greater extension and swiftness than a lunge, yet as you cannot recover from it, it should be seldom practised, especially if you are not the strongest, or able in three attacks to hit twice, there being nothing more disagreeable to the sight than to see several passes made without hitting. but it is otherwise in lunges, by reason of the liberty of recovering and parrying. passes were more used formerly than they are now, whether it was to endeavour to bring them to perfection, or because it has been found that this sort of play was not so sure. chap. xvii. _of volting the body._ the volting of the body, which many people call _quarting_, shou'd never be done but at times when you are abandoned, as in case of lunges or on an engagement of feint in disorder, of when finding yourself so disordered as not being able to parry, you must of necessity have recourse to volting in order to avoid the thrust; but to do it at an improper time, as some do, is very dangerous, by reason of the facility of parrying it, it being a figure in fencing which gives the least strength, extention, of swiftness to a thrust; besides that presenting the flank and small of the back, the adversary, in order to hit these parts, has nothing to do but parry with his point a little within and low. in volting you must begin with the arms and left-foot, by whose assistance you turn the body; the hands shou'd turn in _quarte_, the right as in a lunge or pass, and the left more without; you must at the same time turn upon the point of the right-foot, bringing the heel outwards, and the left-foot behind the right, a little farther outwards, which gives the body almost the figure of a left-handed man; having turned about a quarter round, the body in this posture must necessarily be in disorder. _see the th plate_. having finished these motions, if you find, for want of the enemy's having suficiently abandoned himself, that you have not an opportunity of joining, you must without stirring the body or left-foot, return with your sword on the enemy's, and from his sword to his body, and from the body to the sword, as often as you shall see proper, which may be easily done, your thrusts being but of small extension, as well by reason of the action of the enemy coming to you, as by the advancement of the volt; you should, at the same time, oppose with the left-hand, to avoid the thrusts that the enemy might make upon the time of yours; by this means you may easily come to guard again, or if he retires you may push at him, the left-foot by it's advancement having given a great advantage to your thrust, and if instead of retiring, he has a mind to join, you must prevent him by seizing the guard of his sword, presenting your point to him. if in an assault the foil be entangled in the shirt or elsewhere, or that in battle the sword be too far entered, or that the enemy lay hold on the blade; in these cases you must shift your sword to the other hand, which is done after the volt, advancing your right-foot, taking hold of your blade with the left-hand about four inches from the guard, whilst with the right you seize his guard, and drawing back your sword you present him the point. tho' volting is not best in combat, yet it may on some occasions be necessary, besides it is my business to speak of them, at the same time advising that 'tis much better to make use of parades and risposts, than of time of what sort soever. the joining on a volt is the same as on passing in _quarte_. chap. xviii. _of joining or seizing the_ sword. you may join after having parryed any thrust or pass whatever, as also after having pushed, passed, or volted in whatever figure, or on whatever side it may be, especially when the enemy abandons himself, or you abandon yourself: if the enemy abandons himself by a lunge or pass; in case of the first, you must close the measure in parrying, seizing at the same time the guard of his sword with your left-hand and carrying the right-foot back present him the point; and in case of a pass, you must parry with your feet firm, and seize his guard, drawing back the right-foot and presenting your point in like manner. [illustration: th plate the seizing and presenting the sword.] [illustration: parrying and disarming.] if you have pushed being too near, that your right-foot slipped, or that the enemy in parrying closed measure; if he parryed with his feeble you must redouble in _seconde_ and join, and if with his fort, you must oppose his sword with your's 'till with your left-hand you have seized the guard, advancing the left-foot; this motion being done, you pass your sword over the enemy's from within to without; and loosing the right-foot present him your point. upon the parade of _tierce_ with the fort, being near you must join, seizing the guard, advancing the left leg, and drawing back the right, and present the point; or you may, before you join, cut under in _seconde_; the first is surer at the sword, and the other more beautiful in an assault where a thrust is more esteemed, than joining. if on a pass or lunge the enemy shou'd attempt to join or seize your sword, you must, in order to prevent him, change it from the right-hand to the left, four inches from the guard, as i have already observed, seizing his with the right-hand, and presenting him the point, holding it at such a length as to hit him whilst he is unable to come near you. in joining, if you cannot seize the guard, you must the blade, helping with your elbow, turning the hand to break the blade, or take away the sword, which may be done if you are cunning and nervous, especially if the enemy's wrist is in _quarte_, in which there is no danger of hurting yourself, because the sword cannot slip thro', and consequently, can't cut your fingers, as has happened to some by their imprudence; by this means, you have time not only to secure yourself, but also to hit your enemy. some people seize the arm, but that is of no use, because the enemy may change hands and hit you. you may throw a man down after having pushed, either upon the pass of _quarte_ or _tierce_; if in _quarte_, it is done after advancing the left-foot, crossing the enemy's sword with your fort, and carrying your right-leg without his, at the same time pushing the sword up from the inside to the out, and carrying the right arm to his neck, and the left to the small of his back: these three actions must be done at the same time. there has been so much said on this head, with the joining without, that i shall say no more of it. the joining in passes within, without, and under, is the same as in their lunges. in whatever manner you join you must present the sword at a distance, in order to hinder the enemy from seizing it, or putting it off with his left hand to throw himself in upon you: if the enemy shou'd make a difficulty of yeilding up his sword, you must, in order to frustrate his hopes of closing you, and to make him follow you, draw back the left-foot behind the right, and the right behind the left, at such a distance as to be strong, at the same time moving the point of your sword circularly; by this means, you are in a condition either of giving or taking his life, which you would not be if he could close you, by which you would be oblig'd to kill him, or render the advantage doubtful by struggling. chap. xix. _of engaging in_ quarte _in a midling guard._ i have hitherto treated of the means whereby to make thrusts, and in this and the following chapters, i will shew on what occasion they are to be made use of. tho' there is an infinite number of figures or postures, and that every posture may be in guard, whether within, or without, _prime_, _seconde_, _tierce_, or _quarte_, they proceed from the midling guard, the strait, the high, or the low guard, each of which may be attacked and defended within or without. though there are many means to disorder the enemy by putting him out of guard in order to hit him on that occasion, they all depend either upon a feint by the side of his sword to draw him on, or on a motion of your sword on his, to uncover him, taking his sword from the line of your body, and placing yours on a line with his, which is called engaging. and there are several other ways of coming to the sword, which are the beats, crossings, bindings, and lashings; the occasions of which, and the manners of using them, i shall shew in their proper places. i begin with engaging in the midling guard, as the neatest, the most used, and the best. to engage this guard within, it must be done with the edge on the same side, without going wide, in order to keep your fort before you, and your point before the enemy, carrying both parts alike; the engagement must be made feeble to feeble, a little more to your enemy's than your own, because if it were with the feeble to the fort, the enemy's sword would not be displaced, besides if he should push, you could not parry, being unable with your feeble to resist his fort; and if it were with the fort to the feeble, you wou'd be in danger of being hit under, where there would be an opening; besides you would be oblig'd to advance much, which would be dangerous. on your engagement, the enemy may do three things, either of which, produces several others. first, either he will let you engage, or secondly, he will disengage, or thirdly, he will come to your blade. if he lets you engage, you must push _quarte_, or, by way of precaution, make a half-thrust, in order to see if he stirs, to retire, or to have recourse to his parade, or to time. if he does not stir, you must, as i said, push _quarte_; if he retires, redouble your thrust; if he parrys with his fort cut _quarte_ under the wrist; if with the feeble, disengage, or cut over the point in _tierce_; and if upon the half-thrust he takes the time pushing strait, you must parry and risposte, or take the time in _seconde_, with your body low; if he takes the time lowering his body, you must parry and oppose with the left-hand, risposting in _quarte_; if he takes the time cutting under the wrist, you must parry crossing the sword in _quarte_, opposing with the hand, in order to make your rispost more safely; and if he volts upon the half-thrust, you must parry and risposte in _flanconnade_, or take the time, with, your body low. if when you engage he disengages, it will be either, st, without design, or dly, to disengage and push _tierce_ over, or dly, disengage breaking measure, or thly, disengage, and come to your blade without, or thly disengage making a feint, and pushing _quarte_ or thly, disengage to take a counter to your time. st. if he disengages with a design only to disengage, you must on the time push _tierce_. dly. if he disengages breaking measure, you must redouble in _tierce_, advancing. dly. if he disengages and pushes without, you must parry and risposte quick where you have light, or take time against him, disengaging and volting, or lowering the body. thly. if he disengages and comes to your blade without; if 'tis with his fort, you must cut under in _seconde_; and if with the feeble, you must counter-disengage from without to within. thly. if on the engagement, he feint _tierce_ in order to push _quarte_, you must push or take the time strait upon the feint, or by lowering the body on the thrust. thly. if he disengages giving light, to take a counter to your thrust, whether by a rispost or time, you must make a false-time or half-thrust, and if he parrys, or takes the time, in case of the first, you must baulk his parade; and if he takes the time, you must take another upon him. if, upon the engagement, he goes to your blade with his fort, you must cut under his wrist, and if with his feeble, disengage and push without in _tierce_. though an engagement may be made blade to blade, without disengaging, that is inside to inside; better and more common to make it by disengaging from the outside to the inside. chap. xx. _of engaging in_ tierce _in the midling guard_. the engagement without shou'd be made from your being placed within, feeble to feeble, for the same reason as in _quarte_, the wrist shou'd be turned in _tierce_; in this engagement as in _quarte_, the antagonist may do three things. st, let you engage him, d. or disengage, d. or come to your blade. if he lets you engage him, you must carry on your thrust in _tierce_, or make a half-thrust, to see if he does not stir, if he retires, if he parrys, or if he takes the time. if upon your half-thrust he does not stir, you must thrust strait, if he retires, advance and redouble. if he parrys with his fort, cut _seconde_ under, if with his feeble, you must disengage or cut over the point from _tierce_ to _quarte_, and if upon the half-thrust he takes the time pushing strait, you must either parry and risposte, or make him time, volting or lowering the body. if he takes the time in _seconde_, lowering his body, you must either parry him and thrust _quarte_, or pushing _quarte_, oppose with the left hand, or volt. if on your engagement he disengages, 'tis as in _quarte_, st either without design, d. or to retire, d. or to take the time pushing _quarte_ or volting, th. or to come to your blade, th. or to make a feint; th. or to take a counter to your thrust. st. if he disengage without design, you must push strait in _quarte_, or make a half-thrust, and go on with the same. d. if he disengages breaking measure, you must come forward redoubling in _quarte_. d. if he disengages and pushes _quarte_, which, on this occasion, is called counter-disengaging, you must either parry and risposte, or take the time lowering the body, or volting. th. if he disengages and comes to your sword within, with his fort, you must cut _quarte_ under the wrist, and if with his feeble, you must counter-disengage from the inside to the outside. th. if he makes a feint in order to return in _tierce_, you must either parry or take the time as i have said. th. if he disengages giving light, to take a counter on your thrust, whether by rispost or time, you must make a feint, and if he parrys with his fort you must cut under in _seconde_, if with his feeble, you must disengage and push _quarte_, if he takes the time strait, you must lower the body, if he takes time lowering his body, you must parry and push strait in _quarte_, if he cuts in _flank_, you must parry crossing the sword in _quarte_, and if he volts, you must parry and risposte in _flanconnade_. if on the engagement without, he comes to your sword with his fort, you must cut under in _seconde_, if with his feeble, disengage or cut over the point in _quarte_. _when you are engaged within the_ sword. if the enemy engage you within with his fort, you must cut under the wrist, and if with his feeble, disengage from within to without, of if you don't care to do that, make a feint without; if on this feint he goes to the parade with his fort, you must push _seconde_ under, and if with his feeble, disengage in _quarte_. when the enemy engages to make you push, in order to parry and rispost, you must, as i have said, make a half-thrust and retire giving light, in order to take him by a counter to his thrust, by a parade, or by time. you may on the same engagement, remain engaged on purpose, in order to make the adversary path strait; and in this case, you must parry and risposte where he is uncovered, or take time lowering the body. if after having engaged you he shou'd make a feint, you must, by going to the parade, give light on purpose, and if he pushes, take him by a contrary. if he engages to make you disengage, in order to take the time on your disengagement, you must disengage and give him a little light, and if he pushes at it, take him by a rispost, or a time opposite to his. if you are engaged in _tierce_ with the fort, you must cut under the wrist in _seconde_, and if with the feeble, and the hand in _quarte_, disengage to _quarte_ within, or, by way of caution, make a half-thrust; if the adversary goes to the parade, you must push where you have light, and if he takes the time, parry and risposte, or take a time to his. you may also upon an engagement in _tierce_, make a feint below, and if he takes the time, parry above and risposte below. this thrust is very good against a man that's disorder'd, who coming to the parade above, gives room to hit him below. chap. xxi. _of several guards, and the manner of attacking them_. tho' all the guards are good when well defended, yet they are not equally good; because we ought not to look upon any thing as good, that does not procure us some advantage, and an ill placed guard, instead of being favourable, requires a great deal of skill to be of any use at all, being farther from a posture of defence, the midling guard only carrying with it such a disposition of the point and wrist as is sufficient to defend the inside, the outside, the upper and lower parts of the body with the sword: for as to the other guards, whether flat, high, or low, or holding the sword with both hands, they leave some part uncovered, either by reason of their height, or their line. _to attack a strait guard._ no man of skill or reason will give a considerable open without a design, and as the people who hold such a guard as i am going to describe, have their several designs, you must be cautious of them, in order not only to make them useless to them, but advantageous to yourself. some men hold their swords strait or flat,[ ] whether 'tis because they are more used to disengagements than parades, or to take advantage of the superiority of their stature, or of the length of their sword, to avoid the attacks and engagements to which the other guards are more exposed; for you can hardly engage or feint on this guard, the point being too low; so that to attack him, you must bind the sword, which you must do after placing yourself within his sword, binding his blade under yours, when he is out of measure, to take, with more ease, the feeble of his sword, crossing it with yours, raising your hand in _seconde_, and carrying the point low, whilst gaining measure, you form a little circle with the two points, and raising them up again, you push _seconde_ within, with the body low. tho' it be almost impossible for the enemy to disengage, when you have bound his sword as i have described, it may happen that if some of the circumstances were wanting, he might disengage and push, which ought not to hinder you from making your thrust; because your sword may very well hit him, passing under his, which cannot hurt you, because of the lowness of your body. the binding is easy to be parryed, by reason of the natural tendency to follow the sword, which is done by raising and bringing your fort nearer. these following have commonly more success. the first is made after having bound the sword, instead of pushing _seconde_ within, you must, upon the parade, disengage and push _tierce_ over: if the adversary is quick enough in his parade to shun this double motion, you must have recourse to the third, binding the sword in the like manner, and feinting above, return below. tho' the sword is seldom bound on the outside, upon some occasions and to some people it would not be amiss; it must be done with your feeble to the enemy's, with the precautions necessary in binding within, by a little circle without, the hand in _quarte_, and if he does not stir, or if he disengages, you must push without, the hand in _quarte_. these following are according to the parade with the fort or with the feeble, pushing _seconde_ under, or _quarte_ within. as in all thrusts the hand must be easy and uniform, it must be more so in this than in the others, because the binding cannot be made without a very close and smooth motion. though several masters teach to disengage in order to bind the sword, i would not have it done so for two reasons: first, because the disengaging gives time to the opponent, not only to thrust strait, but also to disengage; and secondly, because you cannot so easily bind the sword as when you are on the same side. in binding the blade, you must close the measure; because a man who is superior to you, in height, by the length of his sword, or by his situation, won't let his inferior into measure; in one or the other case, being at a proper distance, you bind more easily on the feeble. [illustration: th plate. attack in the high guard.] [illustration: attack in the low guard.] _to attack the high guard._ in this guard, you must place yourself under, with the hand in _seconde_, covering the upper part, in order to oblige the enemy to go under; which being the most distant place from his sword, procures you more time to avoid him. he may, on this occasion, do three things: let you engage him, go under, or force your sword. if he lets you engage him, 'tis either with a design to parry, or to take the time; wherefore, before you push, you must make a half-thrust under: if he parrys, it will be in one of the three ways that i have shewn in the parade of _seconde_, chap. , where you may see all their counters. if upon the half-thrust he takes the time, you must parry and risposte below, or push strait, opposing with the hand; you may also volt on this occasion, but it is better to parry. if he opposes with his hand upon your half-thrust, you must parry with your left-hand, and, pushing near his left shoulder, baulk his hand. and if he volts on your half-thrust, you must parry and risposte in the flank. if on the engagement he thrust under, you must parry and thrust strait, or take the time, opposing with your hand, and if instead of going under, he only feints there in order to return above; you must either parry the feint and risposte under, or push on the time, as i have said before. if he makes use of the same thrust, pushing at the time of your going under, you must make believe to push there, returning quickly to the parade above, and risposte under. and if he would draw you on in order to make this rispost on you, you must make a half-thrust, keeping on your parade below, to risposte strait in _quarte_. if upon your engagement he forces your sword, you must yeild the feeble, opposing with the fort and the left-hand. _see the th_ plate. to keep the enemy from forcing your sword, you must cross his blade with your fort to his feeble. _to attack the low guard._ those who hold a low guard have a design either to parry with the sword or with the hand, to lower the body or to volt; therefore as in the other guards you must make a false time, or half thrust, and if he parrys with the sword, thrust where you see light, if he parry with the hand, you must feign a strait thrust in order to bring his left-hand to the parade, at the same time raising your point with a little circle, pushing at the left side with the hand in _seconde_, the body low, whereby you baulk his left-hand, and for the greater safety, you must oppose his thrust with your hand, endeavouring in your risposts, to deceive his sword and his hand. if he waits for your thrust in order to lower the body or to volt, you must make a half-thrust to draw him on, and take one of the counters which i have spoken of before. if the low guard is within your sword, you must attack it making a semi-circle with the point of the sword down, lashing and crossing his, the hand in _quarte_, and to push without danger, you must oppose with the left-hand: this thrust is good against a man that pushes at the same time. if the low guard is without your sword, you must lash in _tierce_, crossing the sword and push without. if the low guard is neither within nor without, you must lash smartly in _tierce_ and in _quarte_, that is to say on his outside and inside, pushing _quarte_ afterwards, opposing with the left-hand: this thrust puzzles a man who disengages quick, which in this case is of no use. you may also engage this guard placing yourself within, the wrist in _tierce_, and the point low[ ] closing the enemy pretty near to oblige him to push above, and if he pushes there, you must parry and risposte above, or under, according as you have light. if instead of making a thrust above, he makes a feint there and pushes within, or under, you must push _quarte_, opposing with the left-hand, or else going to the parade with the sword to all thrusts and feints without, leave to the left-hand the defense of the inside, and of the under part. and if instead of pushing, he waits for your thrust to take the time upon it, you must press close upon him and push strait in _quarte_, with the point low, opposing with the left hand, in order to throw off his sword, or push at his arm, of which you are in reach, though he is not in measure of your body. these sorts of guards are not so much practised, with sword in hand, as the middling guard, people being more careful of parrying with the sword, and a man is in much better condition to parry from the middling guard than from any other. _to attack the guard where the sword is held in both hands._ those who hold the sword in both hands, that is to say, the handle in the right-hand, and the blade about four fingers breadth in the left, will either engage, or beat on your sword, with great force, or stick to a strong parade, in order to uncover you the more, in favour of their thrust. but as they cannot keep this situation without exposing their body very much, which is often dangerous, as also a very unseemly posture, this guard is therefore, with good reason, condemned by most, if not all, experience'd masters. if you have to do with one that holds this guard, you must keep your point a little low, and be always ready to change, in order to render the strength which the left-hand gives to the right, useless, in his engaging or beating. if he will not attack you, but waits for your thrust in order to parry and risposte, you must make a half-thrust, and recover quickly to your parade, to avoid his rispost; wherein, throwing back his left-hand, and abandoning himself extremely, he is not in a condition to avoid your thrust after you have parryed his. you may also make a home-thrust on him, by a single or double feint, because these require two or three parades; so that your adversary being unable to parry without throwing his point a great way off, he cannot bring it back in time if you disorder him by a feint. you may likewise catch him, by placing your sword along his, with your point a little raised, and sliding on a defence along his sword, push at his left-hand or arm, for he cannot, tho' he goes to his parade, hinder your blade from sliding so as to hit him there, without running any risque, you being in measure of his hand and arm, when he is out of reach of your body. you are to observe, that in all guards with sword in hand, you must push at the nearest and most uncovered part; which in the guards that i have described is the arm; therefore you must not abandon yourself to hit the body, but in risposting, or after having disordered, or engaged the enemy as aforesaid. chap. xxii. _of left-handed men._ most people imagine that a left-handed man has, by nature, the advantage of a right-handed man in fencing, whereas he has it only by habit, exercising oftener with right-handed men than a right-handed man with him, as well in lessons as in assaults, most masters being right-handed, as well as most of the scholars, taking lessons from the right-hand, and practising seldom with left-handed men, find themselves puzzled, nothing surprizing more than what one is not used to, which is so true, that to embarrass a left-handed man, who has not fenced much, you must put another against him; i say one that has not fenced much, because right or left-handed men who go to the school of a perfect master, will be taught to use both hands, by which means, they will not be so much surprized when they meet with a left-handed man, as they would otherwise be. when a right and a left-handed man fence together, the right handed man should push but seldom within, that being the antagonist's strongest part; and his weakest and outward, which should be kept covered, or in a defensive condition, as the most liable to be attacked; the best way is to push _quarte_ without, engagements, feints under, and thrusts above, and double feints, finished above or under the wrist in _quarte_, cuts over the point without, and upon the parade, with the fort, or with the feeble, redoubling _quarte_ under the wrist, or _seconde_ over: these are chiefly the thrusts which a right-handed and a left-handed man may make against each other, whether on an attack, or in defence, by time or risposts. several masters puzzle their scholars by telling them that with a left-handed man they must act quite contrary to what they do with a right-handed, which appears to be false; because to a right or left-handed man you must push, opposing with the sword, which is to be done by pushing _quarte_, when the enemy is within your sword, and _tierce_, when he is without. all the difference between a right and a left-handed man is, that two right, or two left-handed men, are both within or without, whereas a right with a left-handed man, the one is within when the other is without, the one in _quarte_, the other in _tierce_. chap. xxiii. _of the parade of the hand._ there are, in fencing, three parades with the left-hand: the first, like the opposition that is from the top to the bottom; the second, with the palm of the hand without, towards the right shoulder, and the third, from the bottom to the top, with the outside of the hand: of these three parades, the first is the easiest, the most used, and the least dangerous: they are condemned by able men, as weakening those of the sword; wherefore it is wrong in a master to shew them to a scholar, before he has practised those of the blade a good while, which being longer, can return to all feints, which the left-hand cannot, it being impossible to parry with it except you be near, which is very dangerous, as well by reason of the difficulty of meeting properly with the sword, as of the facility of deceiving the hand, which in this case has not time to come to the parade, because of it's small distance; and besides the facility of deceiving it, you need only push at the arm, sword in hand, in order to make it useless. _of the opposition of the hand._ many people make no distinction between the parade and opposition of the hand, tho' there is a very great difference, the parade being made only against the adversary's thrust, and the opposition to prevent a following thrust after having parryed with the sword, which is very necessary in most thrusts, especially in the risposts which may be made to your thrust in _seconde_. besides the opposition of the hand, after having parryed with the sword, you may oppose with it, taking the time, that is to say, when the enemy pushes from above to below, as the motion of his sword is greater than your's, having only a strait line to push _quarte_ on, whereas his from above to below, is crooked, so that pushing upon his time, he cannot avoid the thrust, and you may easily oppose his with the left-hand, which is very different from the parade with the hand, to which you do not push 'till after you have parryed. chap. xxiv. _of the beat of the foot, in closing the measure, or in the same place._ though it may seem to many people, that the beat of the foot, in gaining measure, making appels, or alurements, engagements, or other thrusts, is rather ornamental than necessary; nevertheless, there is nothing puts the foot in a better condition to follow the swiftness of the wrist, in most of the actions of the sword; nor can any thing contribute more to the equal situation, and to the retention of the body, qualities, which keeping you covered from the time of your combatant, procures you the means, not only of taking advantage of his, but also of possessing firmness, freedom, justness and swiftness. you are to observe two sorts of beating, the one with the foot firm in the same place, the other gaining measure; the beat with the foot firm, is done in two ways, the one in appels, or alurements on the blade, and the other in engagements or feints. that upon the allurement on the blade, may be made by a single beat of the foot, but those who are pretty well advanced, make two without lifting the foot but once, the first with the point, and the other with the whole foot: that on engagements or single feints, shou'd have but one beat, the thrust being to be made on the second motion. the beat of the foot in marching or advancing, is also divided into two sorts, the one in engagements or single feints, and the other in engagements and feints following, or in double feints; the manner of engaging must be with a single beat gaining measure, and that of engaging with a double feint, must be done with a double beat, in order to agree with the motion of the wrist; and as in all, including the lunge, there must be three beats; you must, on the first time or feint, beat with the whole foot in the same place, at the second motion of the wrist beat again with the foot getting measure, and at the third motion push. you must observe, that between the first and second motion, there is no interval, but between the second and third there is, in order to see where the enemy gives light: this interval must be shorter or longer according as your disposition or practice is more or less. chap. xxv. _of the good effects of a nice discernment of the eye._ in fencing, there is the foreseen, and the unforeseen; the foreseen is the effect of the understanding and of the will, and the unforeseen is the effect of the discernment of the eye, and of custom; which being upheld by this quality, has no sooner discerned an action or opening of the enemy, than all the parts which are to act, display themselves to oppose or attack him, as if they depended on the eye. to be convinced of this truth, you may reflect on reading, wherein, as soon as the eye has discerned the words, the pronouncing them follows as quick as in a studied discourse; the eye and tongue being so disposed by custom, as to do it without immediately reflecting. indeed before they cou'd arrive to this, the understanding and the will were necessary, which having been united for a certain time, have communicated such a habit to these parts, as to make them act as it were of themselves. in order to acquire this quality in fencing, it is necessary that the master, in his lessons, shou'd shew what opportunities are to be favourably laid hold of, two opposite actions at one and the same time, that whilst he is uncovering some part of his body, he cannot, at the same instant, parry, because by the parade, it must be covered; so that by making them make their thrusts, and other motions, by the discernment of the eye, they find themselves by practice ready to oppose all the motions of the antagonist without the assistance of the will. this method is indeed a little more tedious in the beginning, but it afterwards becomes shorter and more certain. if you have not had practice enough to make the discernment of the eye thus habitual, you must observe what motions your action causes in the adversary, by making a half, or home-thrust, in order to discover whether the enemy has recourse to the parade, or to the time: if he goes to parry, you must observe his manner, in order to make a feint resembling the same thrust, and to push at the part where you observed him to give the light; and if he goes to the time, you also make a feint, preparing yourself for the parade and rispost, or to take a time contrary to his. chap. xxvi. _of time_. if we were to follow the exact term of time, every thing that is done in fencing might be called so; for you shou'd never thrust but when you have a favourable opportunity of hitting, nor parry, but at the time that favours you to oppose the enemy's sword, not make an engagement, nor a feint, but to take the time upon the motion that your action occasions in the adversary. time is the duration of any motion: it is called time because it is the most favourable opportunity of pushing, the enemy being unable during one action to do a contrary one. it is divided into several manners and terms: the first is called the time, the second, taking his time, the third, time to time, the fourth, the same time, and the fifth, false time. . taking the time, is making your thrust by a judicious discernment on the motion of the enemy, taking him by a contrary one: you are to know that every motion, of whatever part it be, is called time; for which reason, i shall say nothing of feints, engagements, and disengagements, upon which it may be taken; and that in three manners, _viz._ strait, lowering the body, or volting it, which you must know how to apply. in a strait thrust the time shou'd be taken by lowering and volting the body, because the thrust coming strait, if you were to push the same way, you would, by supporting the wrist, make a _contrast_; and by pushing crooked, you would make a _coup fourres_, or an interchanged thrust; but if the thrust be in two times, or motions, you may push on the first; if it be in three motions, on the second. as to the volting and lowering the body, they may be used on all motions, provided they be abandoned, and that the enemy does not keep back his body to draw you on. . taking his time, is the most subtle thing in fencing, depending principally on the mind: the manner of taking it proceeds from your place or situation, which gives you an opportunity of knowing the fort and the feeble of the enemy, so that feeling his blade with your's, you may by a judicious custom, push at a proper instant, according as you find the weakness of his sword; and though it may seem that the enemy, in the same guard, and at the same distance, can as easily parry; that does not happen because of his different design to push, disengage, or make a feint, by reason of the several operations of the mind which follow the will. . the time to time, or the counter to time, is by several people, called counter-time: this cannot in effect alter this necessary part of the art; it being but an impropriety in terms; when they say that making a motion to bring the enemy on, and when he is going to make a thrust, the making a counter; this is by consequence a counter time, like a counter-disengagement, without observing that a counter-time is nothing but an ill timed motion, which should upon all occasions be avoided: and if that argument were to take place, it might be said that there is no such thing in fencing as taking the time, because it is to be done only by taking a time contrary to that which is intended to be taken of you, which according to their argument would be a counter-time; whereas the term time to time, or counter to time, sufficiently shews, that it requires three motions; since the taking the time requires two, and the taking it at the time that he takes it, must require a third. of these three motions you are to make two: the first, in order to get one from the enemy, that you may have an advantage by your second, which is the third time; so that when he thinks to take the time upon you, you take it upon him, which, far from being a counter-time, is a time to his, or counter to his time. . the same time, depends on three things: first, that both having a design to push, you both push by chance at once, without expecting it from each other: secondly: that full of the design to take the time, and not knowing it, you push upon the enemy's thrust, without foreseeing how to avoid it; and thirdly, when an inferior or desperate man, unable to defend himself, had rather run on your thrust in endeavouring to hit you, than strive in vain to avoid it. these are not only the occasions of the same time, but also of the _coups fourres_. it is to be observed, that time, and the same time, differ only in their figure, and not in their occasion, as monsieur _de la touche_ says, for to take the time upon a thrust, you must go off upon the lunge, as if it were on the same time, except that the figure of the body shuns the thrust, which in that of the same time it does not do. . false time, is a motion made by the enemy to draw you on, in order to take a time upon your's; therefore he that would take the time, shou'd distinguish whether the motion made, is to disorder him, and take the advantage of his parade, or to make him thrust, and take the advantage of his lunge; in case of the first, it would be a fault not to push; and in case of the other, it would be amiss to push. some masters call the false time, half time, which is wrong, every motion being a time, and as it is impossible to make a half motion, so 'tis impossible to make a half time. the difference of time between the dexterous and awkard is, that the dexterous present and take the time, and the others, give and lose it. chap. xxvii. _of swiftness_. swiftness is the shortness of time between the beginning and end of a motion: it proceeds from a regular and frequent exercise, joined with a good disposition; that is to say, vigour and suppleness, which form agility. a great swiftness cannot be acquired without long practice and a good disposition, the one not being sufficient, without the other, to give it: for the best natural parts, without practice, will be of very little service to those who have the best disposition; and the most regular practice without the assistance of nature, will never make a man perfectly swift. swiftness in fencing, is so necessary, that without this quality, it is very difficult to defend, and impossible to offend: this truth is so well known, that every one is earnestly desirous of it, tho' most people are ignorant of the means necessary to acquire it. what contributes most to the becoming swift, besides, frequent exercise and a fine disposition, is a perfect situation of the parts, the retention of the body, and the regular motion of the wrist: the situation requires this advantageous point of all the parts, to communicate freedom and vigour to the action, that they may act with quickness. in order to retain the body, it is necessary that it be always in it's perfect situation, during the motions previous to the thrust; and if the thrust consist of one time only, the wrist must begin. as to the motion of the hand, it must not only be animated, but also the action must not be wide, whether in disengagements, engagements, feints, or risposts; because if you would be soon at your mark, it is not sufficient to go quick, but it is also necessary that the action be close. many people have confounded the swiftness of pushing with precipitate or consecutive thrusts, without considering that precipitation is either when the body moves before the hand, or when an improper motion is made; and the consecutive thrusts, the pushing several times without interval, or when there is no occasion; which may be done by one who is not swift; for swiftness is only the shortness of time between the beginning and end of an action, as i have already said. swiftness and time are very justly called the soul of fencing, and all thrusts owe their success to these qualities; for you cannot hit but by surprize, nor surprize but by swiftness. there are three ways of surprizing in fencing: the first is the situation of the guard, taking his time: the second, is doing an action to disorder the enemy, in order to hit him, at that time, where he is open; and the third is when the opponent attacks you, either by feints, engagements, or lunges, you take him upon the time. tho' these three sorts of surprize require a certain point of swiftness, the first needs the most, having no other support; but the two others have the advantage of having disorder'd the enemy. although time, swiftness, and the other qualities are absolutely necessary in fencing, without their just concurrence they are useless. in order to acquire which, the wrist must be easy by practice, that you may hit where you see light. chap. xxviii. _of measure_. time, swiftness, and justness, without the knowledge of measure, would be in vain, thrusts from afar being of no use, and from near, dangerous; and the other motions shou'd also be at a certain distance, in order not only to be ready for the time, but also to take advantage of the disorder of the enemy. the measure is taken from you to the enemy, and from the enemy to you: the first is easier known, as well because it is naturally so, as by the custom of your lunge, which being, in regard of yourself, always the same, makes it easier by practice: the measure from the enemy to you is difficult, from the difference in persons whose stature, activity, or swords, are not always alike; and tho' the height shou'd be the same, the arms, thighs and legs are not proportionable; besides there are big men that have short arms, and little men that have long arms. it is likewise so in regard to the clift; some being longer in the fork than others; and though two men shou'd in that particular be alike, if one of them has shorter legs than the other, he will reach farther, because his thighs are longer, and in the lunge, only one of the legs contributes to it's length, the other making a line almost perpendicular, whereas the two thighs making a strait line, contribute equally to the extention. the difference in suppleness, also makes a difference in the extention; a man who has the freedom of his shoulders and hips, going farther than one that has them constrain'd. it may also happen that two men of like proportion and freedom of parts, may not have an equal extention, by their being taught differently; some masters teaching to keep the body upright, the wrist raised, or too much on one side, and the left-foot first; whereas the body shou'd lean a little forward, without raising or carrying the hand to one side, farther than to keep the body covered, and the left-foot shou'd lye down on the edge; this situation gives a greater length than the other. the different lengths of swords sometimes make it difficult to know the measure, and makes it impossible to fix it by rule, as several masters have pretended: some of them say that the measure is just, when the points cross each other a foot; others, with as little reason, wou'd have the middle of your blade touch the point of the adversary's; but what gives a true knowledge of the measure is frequent exercise, accompanied with a good judgment, pushing often _quart_ and _tierce_ with different foils, and being pushed at by different persons. the extention is taken from the left-foot, which is the centre, to the button of the foil. i did design, in this place, to treat of time, and of a regular way of pushing in lessons, from the beginning to the end of one year, according to the disposition of scholars; but after i had finished it, i thought that my fellow-brethren would perhaps take it ill that i should prescribe lessons to their scholars, by which, instead of gaining their good opinion, i might incur the accusation of being more busy than knowing. chap. xxix. _of the necessity of some qualities in a master_. in order to teach well, it's necessary to have a perfect idea of the means which conduce from the beginning to the end of the matter proposed, i mean to it's perfection, or to what comes nearest it, if our age has not as yet arrived to it. in fencing, as well as in other exercises, there should be judgment and knowledge how to act and how to teach: the first is the effect of a long and good theory; the second, of a good theory, long practice, and a good disposition; and the third, besides the theory and practice, is the effect of a good genius, or of a particular talent. qualities which shou'd be always united; so that the genius may be capable of teaching properly to different persons, the application of the rules which are acquired by experience. it is as necessary in this art that a master's motions shou'd be regular, and that he shou'd hold the foil properly in his hand, as it is for a writing master to draw the example well that he would have copied; so that the scholar of the one, or of the other, may learn a better motion, or a finer character. it is also proper that when a scholar commits a fault, the master shou'd shame him by imitating it, the seeing the fault making a greater impression than the hearing of it. a master in his lesson shou'd give a time to the scholar to make him push, in order to teach him to take the enemy's time. he shou'd likewise sometimes beat back his body, and parry him from time to time, that he may accustom him to be firm on his legs, to oppose his sword well, and to recover well: it is good sometimes to let him make several thrusts following, and then remaining firm all of a sudden, to shew him, that he shou'd always be ready to thrust when an opportunity offers, and to retain himself when it does not offer. in order to make him take the time well, and to form his parade and rispost properly, the time that the master gives must have a regard to rule, and sometimes to the disorder of an unskilful enemy, that he may be equally fortifyed for both; and to form his parade and rispost the master must push in the manner the most like to an assault. though most masters give lessons with shorter and stiffer foils than are used in assaulting or playing loose, i esteem it better always to use the same foils that they may not be deceived in an assault. a master's play shou'd be neat, subtle agreeable, and useful, as fit for combat as for the school. the art of fencing being to make the most of a good or bad disposition, when 'tis good 'tis capable of being made perfectly dexterous, and when bad, the defect of nature is to be repaired by art. by saying that 'tis no hard matter to perfect such men as are naturally of a very good disposition, is meant the bringing them to a certain point which they could almost arrive to of themselves, by practice and speculation; but it is well known that it is the business of a good master to make his scholar perfectly dexterous, and tho' he may have a good disposition and long exercise, if he is not well instructed, he cannot become dexterous, even tho' he shou'd execute with agility, being incapable of acquiring a good without knowing and practising it. a good disposition is seldom to be met with, for there is generally a mixture of bad parts with the good. some have a supple, light and vigorous body, and with these qualities a heavy or ill adjusted hand; and others that have as good a disposition as is desirable, have a narrow genius, fearing to undertake any thing, or are hot and inconsiderate, which shews that it is only be a perfect accord of the parts and understanding that a man can be perfectly dexterous. in short an able master does not only shew the fault, and whence it proceeds, but also the danger to which it exposes, and the means to leave it. a master whose play is regular, or who has the best foundation, may properly be said to be a good master. chap. xxx. _rules for pushing and parrying at the wall, and for making an assault._ though 'tis absolutely necessary to begin by way of lesson, and to continue in it a long time, in order that practice growing to a habit, may give liberty to the parts to form themselves: nevertheless however well you may take your lessons, some other means are necessary to make an assault well, than those which the master gives at his _plastron_: this rule must be supported by pushing and parrying at the wall, and in the manner i am going to lay down. when you have laboured a certain time at lessons, you must push at a cushion which is fixed against the wall for that purpose, observing the guard, and the measure or extention of the thrust; and that the hand display itself in _quart_, not only according to the rule, but first, adjusting and supporting the thrust, and that all the parts be placed in the most advantageous situation for the thrust and recovery, which shou'd be very regularly observed. after having lunged for some days on the cushion, to fix the wrist and body a little, you must push at a scholar, who being placed at the wall will parry your thrusts; you shou'd be in measure, and to see if it be just, you must lunge in _quart_, placing the button softly on the body, at the same time taking off your hat, having taken the measure you must recover in guard, and place yourself on the outside of his sword in order to disengage and push _quart_, being more careful of pushing justly than hitting; he that parrys shou'd from time to time drop his foil, which will shew whether he that pushes follows the blade or the line of the body; having remain'd some time upon the lunge to form the support of the wrist and the posture of the body you recover to guard. when you lunge pretty well in _quart_, you may disengage and push _tierce_, and when the thrust is pushed and parryed, you may recover and push _seconde_ under. when you have pushed for some time in this manner, you may practise to parry, putting yourself for that purpose to the wall, which furnishes a better parade than at large, where you are used to draw back the body which weakens it, whereas here you cannot, which makes the parade stronger, having no dependence but on the foil; you shou'd chuse a scholar that pushes the most regularly, it being difficult without that, that a beginner shou'd learn to parry justly. most young beginners endeavour to hit at any rate, instead of practising what would be beneficial to them, but instead of deceiving others they deceive themselves, by practising less how to form themselves and push according to rule, than how to spoil their bodies, and destroy the solidity of the principles: some use themselves to push with the wrist only, without the foot, which is dangerous, by reason of the too great measure; others with as little reason, and as much danger, place themselves without binding the blade, and thrust under the wrist; in the one the situation of the guard is good for nothing, and in the other there is no defence if the adversary thrusts at that time: others deceive by making a time or motion when they are placed, but the pushing at the wall requires only the justness and swiftness of the thrust; others put themselves very near baulking the measure, which may be done four ways, tho' the left-foot may be in it's proper place, and kept firm in the thrust; the first is done by marking or bringing forward the point of the left-foot, keeping it a little in, then advancing the heel, which gives more measure; secondly, by keeping back the body on a lunge, you deceive the measure and hit by abandoning it forward, which gives it a greater extention, thirdly, by raising or carrying the wrist too high, or too much to one side, which shortning the thrust, makes it believed that you are out of reach, but according to the rule and line you are too much in reach; fourthly, some take measure by holding the thumb on the body of the guard, and when they have a mind to hit they hold it on the middle of the handle, with the pommel in the hand, which also gives a greater length. when you have for some time used yourself to push and parry at the wall, according to the rules that i have laid down, you must, (tho' 'tis not the rule of schools, especially when you push with strangers,) you must i say, when you push with a scholar of your own master, push and parry a thrust alternately, disengaging, and then do the same feinting, and sometime after you shou'd make the other thrusts, telling one another your design, which makes you execute and parry them by rule, especially if you reflect on the motions and postures of the lunges and parades. being a little formed to this method, you may, being warned of the thrust, parry it, telling the adversary where you intend your riposte, which puts him in a condition to avoid it, and gives him room to redouble after his parade, either strait or by a feint, at which you are not surprised, expecting by being forewarned the thrust he is to make, which puts you easily on your defence and offence: by this manner of exercise, you may not only improve faster, but with more art, the eye and parts being insensibly disposed to follow the rule, whereas without this method, the difference that there is between a lesson of assaulting a man who forewarns you, helps you, and lets you hit him, and another who endeavours to defend himself and hit you, is, that except the practice of lessons be very well taught by long exercise, you fall into a disorder which is often owing to the want of art more than to any defect in nature. the taking a lesson well, and the manner of pushing and parrying which i have just described, may be attained to by practice only, but some other things are necessary to make an assault well; for besides the turn of the body, the lightness, suppleness and vigour which compose the exteriour part, you must be stout and prudent, qualities so essential, that without them you cannot act with a good grace, nor to the purpose. if you are apprehensive, besides, that you don't push home, or justly, fear making you keep back your thrust, or follow the blade, the least motion of the enemy disorders you, and puts you out of a condition to hit him, and to avoid his thrusts. without prudence, you cannot take the advantage of the situation, motions designs of the enemy, which changing very often, according to his capacity and to the measure, demonstrates that an ill concerted enterprise exposes more to danger than it procures advantage: in order to turn this quality to an advantage, you are to observe the enemy's _fort_ and _feeble_, whether he attack or defend; if he attack it will be either by plain thrusts strait, or disengaged, or by feints or engagements, which may be opposed by time, or ripostes: if he keeps on his defence, it is either to take the time or to riposte. in case of the first; you shou'd, by half thrusts, oblige him to push in order to take a counter to his time, and if he sticks to his parade you must serve in what manner, in order to disorder him by feints, and push where he gives light. it would fill a whole volume to describe the thrusts that may be made, according to the difference of persons, as well to surprise as to avoid being surprised; besides the many repetitions wou'd be extremely puzzling, for which reason, i have, instead of them, laid down the following advices, which contain chiefly, what i cou'd not otherwise have communicated without a long treatise. don't put yourself in guard within the reach of the enemy. make no wry faces, or motions that are disagreeable to the sight. be not affected, negligent, nor stiff. don't flatter yourself in your lessons, and still less in assaults. be not angry at receiving a thrust, but take care to avoid it. be not vain at the thrusts you give, nor shew contempt when you receive them. do not endeavour to give many thrusts, running the risque of receiving one. don't think yourself expert, but that you may become so. when you present the foils, give the choice without pressing. if you are much inferiour, make no long assaults. do nothing that's useless, every action shou'd tend to your advantage. lessons and assaults are only valuable when the application and genius make them so. too good an opinion spoils many people, and too bad a one still more. a natural disposition and practice are necessary in lessons, but in assaults there must be a genius besides. the goodness of lessons and of assaults does not consist so much in the length as in the manner of them. when you have to do with one that's bold and forward, it is necessary to seem apprehensive in order to get a favourable opportunity. if you act against one that's fearful, attack him briskly to put him in disorder. before you applaud a thrust given, examine if chance had no hand in it. thrusts of experience, and those of chance are different, the first come often, the others seldom or never happen, you may depend on one, but not on the other. in battle let valour and prudence go together, the lyon's courage with the fox's craft. to be in possession of what you know, you must be in possession of yourself. undertake nothing but what your strength and the capacity of the enemy will admit of in the execution. the beauty of an assault appears in the execution of the design. make no thrust without considering the advantage and the danger of it. if the eye and wrist precede the body, the execution will be good. be always cautious, time lost cannot be regained. if you can hit without a feint, make none, two motions are more dangerous than one. to know what you risque, you must know what you are worth. if you would do well, acquire the agreeable and useful. twenty good qualities will not make you perfect, and one bad one will hinder your being so. judge of a thrust, rather by reason than by it's success; the one may fail, but the other cannot. to parry well is much, but it is nothing when you can do more. let your guard, and your play be always directly opposite to the enemy. practice is either a good or an evil; all consists in the choice of it. when you think yourself skilful and dexterous, 'tis then you are not so. 'tis not enough that your parts agree, they must also answer the enemy's motions. the knowing a good without practising it, turns to an evil. two skilful men acting together, fight more with their heads than with their hands. if you are superiour to your enemy, press him close, and if you are inferiour, break measure to keep him moving. endeavour both to discover the enemy's design, and to conceal your own. when the eye and the hand agree in the same instant, you are perfectly right. draw not your sword, but to serve the king, preserve your honour, or defend your life. chap. xxxi. _against several erroneous opinions._ though there are people of a bad taste in every art or science, there are more in that of fencing than in others, as well by reason of the little understanding of some teachers, as of the little practice of some learners, who are not acting upon a good foundation, or long enough, to have a good idea of it, argue so weakly on this exercise, that i thought it as much my business to observe their errors, as it is my duty to instruct those that i have the honour to teach in the theory of it: by this means, i may furnish the one with juster sentiments, and the others with the means of preserving their honour and lives. i begin with those, who defer letting their children learn 'till they have attained a certain age, growth and strength. if these three qualities would enable them to put this art in execution immediately, i acknowledge that they ought not to begin 'till they possessed them; but it is by long experience and practice only, that they can become perfect; so that except they begin young, the employments for which they are designed, may not give them time to arrive to it; besides, by beginning in a tender age, the body is more easily brought to a good air, and an easy disengagement; being more at liberty, and less used to faults, which it would naturally fall into for want of being cultivated. others say that it is needless to learn when the disposition is wanting, which is an error; for a body that is well disposed by nature, can better dispense with the want of improvement, than those that she has taken less care of; these requiring a constant labour, to acquire what the others have almost of themselves; and tho' they cannot arrive to a perfect agility, yet their bodies will be better disposed to act, and their lives not so much in danger. some assure you that the knowing how to fence, makes a man quarrelsome, and thereby exposes him to dangerous consequences, without considering it is a natural brutality, honour, or danger, which obliges him to attack another, or defend himself, which he would do without having learned, with this difference; that though he have the same brutality or courage, the issue of the battle is not the same; and if he have occasion to defend himself, would it not be better for him to be able to do it, than to leave his life to an uncertain and dangerous hazard. others say that it is enough to learn one exercise at a time; that a plurality of different lessons fatigues the mind and the body: but as one science disposes the mind for the others, they having a sort of a correspondence one with another, so exercises favour one another as well in regard to the posture of the body, as to the freedom of motion; besides, that learning them one after another, as each particular would take up as much time as all in general, this length of time would be too great for any one almost to succed in them. many people say that with sword in hand the rules of the school are not observed, and that 'tis sufficient to have a good heart: it is certain that people who are subject to this error, are not capable of following the rules which are to be acquired only by putting a good theory in practice; which by frequent use, disposes the eye and the part of executing so well, that it is almost impossible to act otherwise: and as to the practice of schools and of the sword, 'tis the same; for no one ought to do any thing with the foil, but what he knows by experience to be without risque, according to his rules. in some cases, it is true, what is esteemed good in one, is not in the other. for example: thrusts with the foil are good only on the body, and with the sword they are good every where; and that in an assault with the foil, the joining is reckoned as nothing, whereas in battle 'tis the seal of the victory; but except in that, it should be alike in every thing. others say that if they had to do with experienced men, they would not give them time to put themselves in guard; as if a man who is expert were not always on his guard, being more knowing, and better disposed, not only to place himself at once, by the habit that all his parts have contrasted, but also to surprise, and to avoid being surprised, by the knowledge he has of time and measure: on the contrary, an unskilful person being ignorant of both, is easily catch'd; besides, that his parts being unaccustomed to place themselves regularly, or at once, must always be in a continual motion, vainly seeking their place, by which they give the time, and would lose it if it were given to them. some, in opposition to these, say that if they know how to keep themselves in guard 'tis sufficient. they are in the right if the guard be perfect, which is not to be acquired but by a practice as long as is necessary to make them perfectly dexterous, which is not their meaning; they thinking that it is only the placing of the parts, which is useless, without freedom and vigour to manage them. these are qualities which when accompanied with a certain regular air, and a good grace, shew, as soon as a man takes a sword or foil in his hand, to what pitch of dexterity he is arrived. some men will tell you that they know enough to serve their turn: those who use this expression, as well as those i have spoken of before, sufficiently shew that they have learnt but little or nothing. in effect it is no hard matter to judge of the different degrees of ability; so that when a man finds himself inferiour, he cannot properly say that he knows enough to serve his turn; and a man who is superiour, knows very well that he is not perfect, and that if his good disposition together with his long practice, has brought him very forward in the art, others may know as much as he, and that therefore he is not so perfect as an unskilful person may imagine. i have heard several people say that they did not care to be dexterous, nor to know the five rules, provided they knew how to defend themselves, and to push and parry well; and really they are in the right, supposing they could do that without practising what the most able men have invented upon this occasion. there are people that say, that with sword in hand, against an able man, there is nothing to be done but push vigorously, to disorder him: i am apt to believe that this may succeed against a man who is not well form'd, or has not the courage and resolution that is necessary; but if he has enough to keep up his spirit, this attack will be advantageous to him; because it cannot be done without giving him an opportunity of getting the better; and besides, i have reason to believe that the greatest part of those who talk in this manner, would hardly attempt an able man. it may be said that people have then fought in this manner with success; but as there is difference in persons, what succeeded with them against unskilful people or cowards, would have been dangerous against other men. i have met with people who were weak enough to believe that knowledge in fencing takes away the heart, saying, that seeing the counters to every thrust they form, by means of that knowledge, an idea of evident danger, which dissipating the courage, and causing an apprehension, hinders them from their enterprise; when an unskilful person blindly undertakes every thing. it is true that there is great blindness in this way of pushing, as they say, and still more in their understanding, to think that an able man dares not undertake or venture when the appearance of success leads him to it; and that an ignorant man shall venture when his loss is almost certain. is it reasonable to suppose, that a man of natural courage shou'd lose it, because he is assured that he is more expert than his enemy, over whom, or perhaps his equals, he always had the better in assaults, by the help of his knowledge and dexterity? this, far from intimidating him, seems to assure him of success, which is due to his habitual practice. on the contrary, an awkard man having seen, by his disadvantage in school assaults, that he has no room to hope in combat, the dexterous man possessing the qualities which procure success, and one who had never handled a foil, will be as much puzzled, as if he had experience'd the disadvantage of it. others, with as little reason, leave all to chance, but the very name is sufficient to shew that it is not to be relye'd on. some again say to what purpose shall we learn to fence, the king had forbid duels: it is true that this great prince, as august for his piety as for his victories, was willing thereby to preserve the blood of his bravest subjects, who expose'd it every day to be shed through a false notion of honour. but tho' he forbid duels, he was so far from hindering the practice of the sword, that he has established several academies for the perfect use of it, not only for defence, but also to qualify his subjects to put the justice of his measures in execution: and it must at last be agreed to, that a man who wears a sword, without knowing how to use it, runs as great a hazard, and is full as ridiculous, as a man who carries books about him without knowing how to read. many men are of opinion that a man may naturally know enough to attack or defend himself, without the assistance of art: man, tho' the only reasonable creature, finds himself deprived of what irrational creatures naturally possess; and he requires for his improvement the assistance and practice of others; the grand art of war, and that of using the sword, which has been practised thro' so many ages, still find new inventions; and it may be said, that as there is no place, in whatever situation by nature, but requires art to secure it's defence; so likewise, whatever disposition a man possesses, he cannot be perfect without the assistance of rules and practice. some men acknowledge that skill is necessary in single combat, but that in a crowd or battle it is altogether useless: i own that on these occasions, it is less useful than in single battle, by reason of the different accidents, as of cannon, musquets, and of other arms; besides, a man may be attacked by several at once: but if a man cannot avoid being hit with a ball, and sometimes with a sword, he may, nevertheless, by the disposition and agility of the parts, more easily defend and return a thrust: besides, being more able to hit with the edge or point, he may put more enemies to flight, or keep them at a greater distance. if the french troops have always been victorious, sword in hand, a part of the glory is owing to the skill of several officers; and i'll venture to say, that if they had all been as expert as they should have been, you might see, as well on foot as on horseback, in battle as on a breach, actions that would be not only uncommon but prodigious. it may perhaps be said, that our enemies have some expert officers among them; besides, that their number is commonly less than in _france_, there is as great a difference between their dexterity and that of the _french_, as between their masters and our's, from whom very few would have learned if the war had no suspended our academies.[ ] i think it proper to finish this chapter by confuting an error as common, and more ridiculous, than the others; which is, of an infallible thrust, which a great many people think that masters reserve for dangerous occasions, or to sell it at a dear rate. this wonderful thing, is called the secret thrust. i don't know whether this error proceeded from those who have not learned, or from the chimera of some self-conceited masters, who have sold to ignorant scholars, some thrusts as infallible, of their own contrivance, as ridiculous and dangerous as the simplicity of the scholar and the knavery of the master are great. to discover the error of this opinion you must observe two things: first, that in fencing there are no more than five thrusts or places, which i have described in page , shewing the parade of each of them; and secondly, that there is no motion without it's opposite; so that as you cannot push without a motion, there is no thrust without it's counter, and even several; for besides the different positions of the body, there is not only the time to take, but also several parades to favour the risposts, which plainly shews, that doing one of these things properly, this imaginary infallible thrust, far from succeeding will expose him that would make it. all the secrets in the thrusts that are given by an able man, far from being an effect of the thrust, is only an effect of the occasion, and the swiftness; or rather of the judgment and practice: by means of these qualities all thrusts are secret ones, or they wou'd be worth nothing. all the thrusts in fencing are equally good, when they are made according to rule, with swiftness, and on the occasions proper to them; wherefore they ought not to be neglected whilst the time of learning them offers; not but you may stick closer to some thrusts than to others, either because you may be better disposed for them, or because you are more used to them. i thought that after i had exposed the errors of several persons, i might tell them, that it is contrary to the rules of good breeding, to talk of things they do not understand; that oftentimes people, by their first appearance, have been thought to possess the qualities of knowing men, but have afterwards forfeited the good opinion which they had at first imposed on others. finis. _thrusts of emulation for prizes, wagers &c._ all thrusts from the neckband to the wastband are counted good. _coup fourres_ or interchanged thrusts are not counted on either side, except one of the competitors has recourse to it in order to make the thrusts equal, then the thrust of the other is good, and not his. if one hits the body and the other the face or below the wast at the same time; the thrust on the body is counted, but not the other. if a man parrys with his hand, and afterwards hit, his thrust is not good, because by parrying with the hand, his antagonist's foil is less at liberty than if he had parryed with the blade, and might be a reason why he could not parry and risposte. if a man takes the time, opposing with the left-hand, and hits without receiving, his thrust is not good, because if he had not opposed with the hand, both would have hit, the opposition of the hand serving only to avoid, but no way contributing to the success of the thrust. if in parrying, binding, or lashing the foil, it falls, and that the thrust is made without interval, it is good. thrusts made with the sword in both hands, or shifting from one hand to the other are not good. a master is not to give judgment for his own scholar. footnotes: [footnote : the iron at the end of the blade that runs into the handle.] [footnote : i am not of opinion that the body should be drawn back, except it be impossible to avoid the thrust without doing it; all parades being best when the body is not disorder'd.] [footnote : see the th. plate.] [footnote : see the th plate.] [footnote : as in this paragraph, monsieur l'abbat rather introduces an encomium on his country-men, than any thing essential to the art of fencing. i leave the reader to his own opinion thereon.] battle studies ancient and modern battle by colonel ardant du picq french army translated from the eighth edition in the french by colonel john n. greely field artillery, u.s. army and major robert c. cotton general staff (infantry), u.s. army joint author of "military field notebook" [transcriber's note: footnotes have been moved to the end of the book.] [illustration: colonel ardant du picq] [illustration: letter from marshal foch to major general a. w. greely dated malsherbe, october , ] translation of a letter from marshal foch to major general a. w. greely, dated malsherbe, october , my dear general: colonel ardant du picq was the exponent of _moral force_, the most powerful element in the strength of armies. he has shown it to be the preponderating influence in the outcome of battles. your son has accomplished a very valuable work in translating his writings. one finds his conclusions amply verified in the experience of the american army during the last war, notably in the campaign of . accept, my dear general, my best regards. f. foch. preface by frank h. simonds author of "history of the world war," "'they shall not pass'--verdun," etc. in presenting to the american reading public a translation of a volume written by an obscure french colonel, belonging to a defeated army, who fell on the eve of a battle which not alone gave france over to the enemy but disclosed a leadership so inapt as to awaken the suspicion of treason, one is faced by the inevitable interrogation--"why?" yet the answer is simple. the value of the book of ardant du picq lies precisely in the fact that it contains not alone the unmistakable forecast of the defeat, itself, but a luminous statement of those fundamental principles, the neglect of which led to gravelotte and sedan. napoleon has said that in war the moral element is to all others as three is to one. moreover, as du picq impressively demonstrates, while all other circumstances change with time, the human element remains the same, capable of just so much endurance, sacrifice, effort, and no more. thus, from caesar to foch, the essential factor in war endures unmodified. and it is not the value of du picq's book, as an explanation of the disasters of , but of the triumphs of - , which gives it present and permanent interest. it is not as the forecast of why bazaine, a type of all french commanders of the franco-prussian war, will fail, but why foch, joffre, pétain will succeed, that the volume invites reading to-day. beyond all else, the arresting circumstances in the fragmentary pages, perfect in themselves but incomplete in the conception of their author, is the intellectual and the moral kinship they reveal between the soldier who fell just before the crowning humiliation of gravelotte and the victor of fère champenoise, the yser and the colossal conflict of to which historians have already applied the name of the battle of france, rightly to suggest its magnitude. read the hastily compiled lectures of foch, the teacher of the École de guerre, recall the fugitive but impressive words of foch, the soldier, uttered on the spur of the moment, filled with homely phrase, and piquant figure and underlying all, one encounters the same integral conception of war and of the relation of the moral to the physical, which fills the all too scanty pages of du picq. "for me as a soldier," writes du picq, "the smallest detail caught on the spot and in the heat of action is more instructive than all the thiers and the jominis in the world." compare this with foch explaining to his friend andré de mariecourt, his own emotions at the critical hour at fère champenoise, when he had to invent something new to beguile soldiers who had retreated for weeks and been beaten for days. his tactical problem remained unchanged, but he must give his soldiers, tired with being beaten to the "old tune" a new air, which would appeal to them as new, something to which they had not been beaten, and the same philosophy appears. du picq's contemporaries neglected his warning, they saw only the outward circumstances of the napoleonic and frederican successes. in vain du picq warned them that the victories of frederick were not the logical outgrowth of the minutiae of the potsdam parades. but du picq dead, the third empire fallen, france prostrated but not annihilated by the defeats of , a new generation emerged, of which foch was but the last and most shining example. and this generation went back, powerfully aided by the words of du picq, to that older tradition, to the immutable principles of war. with surprising exactness du picq, speaking in the abstract, foretold an engagement in which the mistakes of the enemy would be counterbalanced by their energy in the face of french passivity, lack of any control conception. forty years later in the École de guerre, foch explained the reasons why the strategy of moltke, mistaken in all respects, failed to meet the ruin it deserved, only because at gravelotte bazaine could not make up his mind, solely because of the absence in french high command of precisely that "creed of combat" the lack of which du picq deplored. of the value of du picq's work to the professional soldier, i naturally cannot speak, but even for the civilian, the student of military events, of war and of the larger as well as the smaller circumstances of battle, its usefulness can hardly be exaggerated. reading it one understands something, at least of the soul as well as the science of combat, the great defeats and the great victories of history seem more intelligible in simple terms of human beings. beyond this lies the contemporaneous value due to the fact that nowhere can one better understand foch than through the reading of du picq. by translating this volume of du picq and thus making it available for an american audience whose interest has been inevitably stirred by recent events, the translators have done a public as well as a professional service. both officers enjoyed exceptional opportunities and experiences on the western front. col. greely from cantigny to the close of the battle of the meuse-argonne was not only frequently associated with the french army, but as chief of staff of our own first division, gained a direct knowledge of the facts of battle, equal to that of du picq, himself. on the professional side the service is obvious, since before the last war the weakness of the american like the british army, a weakness inevitable, given our isolation, lay in the absence of adequate study of the higher branches of military science and thus the absence of such a body of highly skilled professional soldiers, as constituted the french or german general staff. the present volume is a clear evidence that american officers themselves have voluntarily undertaken to make good this lack. on the non-professional side and for the general reader, the service is hardly less considerable, since it supplies the least technically informed with a simply comprehensible explanation of things which almost every one has struggled to grasp and visualize during the last six years extending from the battle of marne in to that of the vistula in . of the truth of this latter assertion, a single example will perhaps suffice. every forthcoming military study of the campaign of emphasizes with renewed energy the fact that underlying all the german conceptions of the opening operations was the purpose to repeat the achievement of hannibal at cannae, by bringing the french to battle under conditions which should, on a colossal scale, reproduce those of hannibal's greatest victory. but nowhere better than in du picq's volume, are set forth the essential circumstances of the combat which, after two thousand years gave to field marshal von schlieffen the root ideas for the strategy expressed in the first six weeks of . and, as a final observation, nowhere better than in du picq's account, can one find the explanation of why the younger moltke failed in executing those plans which gave hannibal one of the most shining triumphs in all antiquity. thus, although he died in , du picq lives, through his book, as one of the most useful guides to a proper understanding of a war fought nearly half a century later. frank h. simonds. snowville, new hampshire, october , . translators' note colonel ardant du picq's "battle studies" is a french military classic. it is known to every french army officer; it is referred to as an established authority in such works as marshal foch's "the principles of war." it has been eagerly read in the original by such american army officers as have chanced upon it; probably only the scarcity of thinking men with military training has precluded the earlier appearance of an american edition. the translators feel that the war with germany which brought with it some military training for all the best brains of the country has prepared the field for an american edition of this book. they are sure that every american reader who has had actual battle experience in any capacity will at some point say to himself, "that is absolutely true...." or, "that reminds me of the day...." appendices ii, iii, iv, and v, appearing in the edition from which this translation is made, deal with issues and military questions entirely french and not of general application. they are therefore not considered as being of sufficient interest to be reproduced herein. appendix vi of the original appears herein as appendix ii. the translation is unpretentious. the translators are content to exhibit such a work to the american military public without changing its poignancy and originality. they hope that readers will enjoy it as much as they have themselves. j. n. g. r. c. c. introduction we present to the public the complete works of colonel ardant du picq, arranged according to the plan of the author, enlarged by unpublished fragments and documents. these unpublished documents are partially known by those who have read "studies on combat" (hachette & dumaine, ). a second edition was called for after a considerable time. it has left ineffaceable traces in the minds of thinking men with experience. by its beauty and the vigor of its teachings, it has created in a faithful school of disciples a tradition of correct ideas. for those familiar with the work, there is no need for emphasizing the importance and usefulness of this rejuvenated publication. in it they will find new sources of interest, which will confirm their admiration for the author. they will also rejoice in the popularity of their teacher, already highly regarded in the eyes of his profession on account of his presentation of conclusions, the truth of which grows with years. his work merits widespread attention. it would be an error to leave it in the exclusive possession of special writers and military technicians. in language which is equal in power and pathetic beauty, it should carry its light much further and address itself to all readers who enjoy solid thought. their ideas broadened, they will, without fail, join those already initiated. no one can glance over these pages with indifference. no one can fail to be moved by the strong and substantial intellect they reveal. no one can fail to feel their profound depths. to facilitate treatment of a subject which presents certain difficulties, we shall confine ourselves to a succinct explanation of its essential elements, the general conception that unites them, and the purpose of the author. but we must not forget the dramatic mutilation of the work unfortunately never completed because of the glorious death of ardant du picq. when colonel ardant du picq was killed near metz in by a prussian shell, he left works that divide themselves into two well-defined categories: ( ) completed works: pamphlet (printed in but not intended for sale), which forms the first part of the present edition: ancient battle. a series of memoirs and studies written in . these are partly reproduced in appendices i and ii herein. ( ) notes jotted down on paper, sometimes developed into complete chapters not requiring additions or revision, but sometimes abridged and drawn up in haste. they reveal a brain completely filled with its subject, perpetually working, noting a trait in a rapid phrase, in a vibrating paragraph, in observations and recollections that a future revision was to compile, unite and complete. the collection of these notes forms the second part: modern battle. these notes were inspired by certain studies or memoirs which are presented in appendices i-v, and a study on combat, with which the colonel was occupied, and of which we gave a sketch at the end of the pamphlet of . he himself started research among the officers of his acquaintance, superiors, equals or subordinates, who had served in war. this occupied a great part of his life. in order to collect from these officers, without change or misrepresentation, statements of their experiences while leading their men in battle or in their divers contacts with the enemy, he sent to each one a questionnaire, in the form of a circular. the reproduction herein is from the copy which was intended for general lafont de villiers, commanding the st division at limoges. it is impossible to over-emphasize the great value of this document which gives the key to the constant meditations of ardant du picq, the key to the reforms which his methodical and logical mind foresaw. it expounds a principle founded upon exact facts faithfully stated. his entire work, in embryo, can be seen between the lines of the questionnaire. this was his first attempt at reaction against the universal routine surrounding him. from among the replies which he received and which his family carefully preserved, we have extracted the most conclusive. they will be found in appendix ii--historical documents. brought to light, at the urgent request of the author, they complete the book, corroborating statements by examples. they illuminate his doctrines by authentic historical depositions. in arranging this edition we are guided solely by the absolute respect which we have for the genius of ardant du picq. we have endeavored to reproduce his papers in their entirety, without removing or adding anything. certain disconnected portions have an inspired and fiery touch which would be lessened by the superfluous finish of an attempt at editing. some repetitions are to be found; they show that the appendices were the basis for the second part of the volume, modern battle. it may be stated that the work, suddenly halted in , contains criticisms, on the staff for instance, which aim at radical reforms. ernest judet. contents frontispiece--portrait of colonel ardant du picq foreword preface translator's note introduction a military thinker record of military service of colonel ardant du picq extract from the history of the th infantry regiment part one: ancient battle introduction chapter i man in primitive and ancient combat ii knowledge of man made roman tactics; the successes of hannibal; those of caesar iii analysis of the battle of cannae iv analysis of the battle of pharsalus and some characteristic examples v morale in ancient battle vi how real combatants are obtained and how the fighting of to-day requires them to be more dependable than in ancient battle vii purpose of this study and what is necessary to complete it part two: modern battle i general discussion . ancient and modern battle . moral elements in battle . material and moral effect . the theory of strong battalions . combat methods ii infantry . masses--deep columns . skirmishers--supports--reserves--squares . firing . marches--camps--night attacks iii cavalry . cavalry and modern appliances . cavalry against cavalry . cavalry against infantry . armor and armament iv artillery v command, general staff and administration vi social and military institutions; national characteristics appendices i memorandum on infantry fire . introduction . succinct history of the development of small arms, from the arquebus to our rifle . progressive introduction of fire-arms into the armament of the infantryman . the classes of fire employed with each weapon . methods of fire used in the presence of the enemy; methods recommended or ordered but impractical . fire at will--its efficacy . fire by rank is a fire to occupy the men in ranks . the deadly fire is the fire of skirmishers . the absolute impossibility of fire at command ii historical documents . cavalry (an extract from xenophon) . marius against the cimbrians (extract from plutarch's "life of marius") . the battle of the alma (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) . the battle of the alma (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) . the battle of inkermann (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) . the battle of magenta (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) . the battle of solferino (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) . mentana (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) battle studies a military thinker near longeville-les-metz on the morning of august , , a stray projectile from a prussian gun mortally wounded the colonel of the th regiment of the line. the obscure gunner never knew that he had done away with one of the most intelligent officers of our army, one of the most forceful writers, one of the most clear-sighted philosophers whom sovereign genius had ever created. ardant du picq, according to the annual register, commanded but a regiment. he was fitted for the first rank of the most exalted. he fell at the hour when france was thrown into frightful chaos, when all that he had foreseen, predicted and dreaded, was being terribly fulfilled. new ideas, of which he was the unknown trustee and unacknowledged prophet, triumphed then at our expense. the disaster that carried with it his sincere and revivifying spirit, left in the tomb of our decimated divisions an evidence of the necessity for reform. when our warlike institutions were perishing from the lack of thought, he represented in all its greatness the true type of military thinker. the virile thought of a military thinker alone brings forth successes and maintains victorious nations. fatal indolence brought about the invasion, the loss of two provinces, the bog of moral miseries and social evils which beset vanquished states. the heart and brain of ardant du picq guarded faithfully a worthy but discredited cult. too frequently in the course of our history virtues are forsaken during long periods, when it seems that the entire race is hopelessly abased. the mass perceives too late in rare individuals certain wasted talents--treasures of sagacity, spiritual vigor, heroic and almost supernatural comprehension. such men are prodigious exceptions in times of material decadence and mental laxness. they inherit all the qualities that have long since ceased to be current. they serve as examples and rallying points for other generations, more clear-sighted and less degenerate. on reading over the extraordinary work of ardant du picq, that brilliant star in the eclipse of our military faculties, i think of the fatal shot that carried him off before full use had been found for him, and i am struck by melancholy. our fall appears more poignant. his premature end seems a punishment for his contemporaries, a bitter but just reproach. fortunately, more honored and believed in by his successors, his once unappreciated teaching contributes largely to the uplift and to the education of our officers. they will be inspired by his original views and the permanent virtue contained therein. they will learn therefrom the art of leading and training our young soldiers and can hope to retrieve the cruel losses of their predecessors. ardant du picq amazes one by his tenacity and will power which, without the least support from the outside, animate him under the trying conditions of his period of isolated effort. in an army in which most of the seniors disdained the future and neglected their responsibilities, rested satisfied on the laurels of former campaigns and relied on superannuated theories and the exercises of a poor parade, scorned foreign organizations and believed in an acquired and constant superiority that dispenses with all work, and did not suspect even the radical transformations which the development of rifles and rapid-fire artillery entail; ardant du picq worked for the common good. in his modest retreat, far from the pinnacles of glory, he tended a solitary shrine of unceasing activity and noble effort. he burned with the passions which ought to have moved the staff and higher commanders. he watched while his contemporaries slept. toward the existing system of instruction and preparation which the first blow shattered, his incorruptible honesty prevented him from being indulgent. while terrified leaders passed from arrogance or thoughtlessness to dejection and confusion, the blow was being struck. served by his marvelous historical gifts, he studied the laws of ancient combat in the poorly interpreted but innumerable documents of the past. then, guided by the immortal light which never failed, the feverish curiosity of this soldier's mind turned towards the research of the laws of modern combat, the subject of his preference. in this study he developed to perfection his psychological attainments. by the use of these attainments he simplified the theory of the conduct of war. by dissecting the motor nerves of the human heart, he released basic data on the essential principles of combat. he discovered the secret of combat, the way to victory. never for a second did ardant du picq forget that combat is the object, the cause of being, the supreme manifestation of armies. every measure which departs therefrom, which relegates it to the middle ground is deceitful, chimerical, fatal. all the resources accumulated in time of peace, all the tactical evolutions, all the strategical calculations are but conveniences, drills, reference marks to lead up to it. his obsession was so overpowering that his presentation of it will last as long as history. this obsession is the rôle of man in combat. man is the incomparable instrument whose elements, character, energies, sentiments, fears, desires, and instincts are stronger than all abstract rules, than all bookish theories. war is still more of an art than a science. the inspirations which reveal and mark the great strategists, the leaders of men, form the unforeseen element, the divine part. generals of genius draw from the human heart ability to execute a surprising variety of movements which vary the routine; the mediocre ones, who have no eyes to read readily therein, are doomed to the worst errors. ardant du picq, haunted by the need of a doctrine which would correct existing evils and disorders, was continually returning to the fountain-head. anxious to instruct promising officers, to temper them by irrefutable lessons, to mature them more rapidly, to inspire them with his zeal for historical incidents, he resolved to carry on and add to his personal studies while aiding them. daring to take a courageous offensive against the general inertia of the period, he translated the problem of his whole life into a series of basic questions. he presented in their most diverse aspects, the basic questions which perplex all military men, those of which knowledge in a varying degree of perfection distinguish and classify military men. the nervous grasp of an incomparable style models each of them, carves them with a certain harshness, communicates to them a fascinating yet unknown authority which crystallizes them in the mind, at the same time giving to them a positive form that remains true for all armies, for all past, present and future centuries. herewith is the text of the concise and pressing questions which have not ceased to be as important to-day ( ) as they were in : "_general_, "in the last century, after the improvements of the rifle and field artillery by frederick, and the prussian successes in war--to-day, after the improvement of the new rifle and cannon to which in part the recent victories are due--we find all thinking men in the army asking themselves the question: 'how shall we fight to-morrow?' we have no creed on the subject of combat. and the most opposing methods confuse the intelligence of military men. "why? a common error at the starting point. one might say that no one is willing to acknowledge that it is necessary to understand yesterday in order to know to-morrow, for the things of yesterday are nowhere plainly written. the lessons of yesterday exist solely in the memory of those who know how to remember because they have known how to see, and those individuals have never spoken. i make an appeal to one of those. "the smallest detail, taken from an actual incident in war, is more instructive for me, a soldier, than all the thiers and jominis in the world. they speak, no doubt, for the heads of states and armies but they never show me what i wish to know--a battalion, a company, a squad, in action. "concerning a regiment, a battalion, a company, a squad, it is interesting to know: the disposition taken to meet the enemy or the order for the march toward them. what becomes of this disposition or this march order under the isolated or combined influences of accidents of the terrain and the approach of danger? "is this order changed or is it continued in force when approaching the enemy? "what becomes of it upon arriving within the range of the guns, within the range of bullets? "at what distance is a voluntary or an ordered disposition taken before starting operations for commencing fire, for charging, or both? "how did the fight start? how about the firing? how did the men adapt themselves? (this may be learned from the results: so many bullets fired, so many men shot down--when such data are available.) how was the charge made? at what distance did the enemy flee before it? at what distance did the charge fall back before the fire or the good order and good dispositions of the enemy, or before such and such a movement of the enemy? what did it cost? what can be said about all these with reference to the enemy? "the behavior, i.e., the order, the disorder, the shouts, the silence, the confusion, the calmness of the officers and men whether with us or with the enemy, before, during, and after the combat? "how has the soldier been controlled and directed during the action? at what instant has he had a tendency to quit the line in order to remain behind or to rush ahead? "at what moment, if the control were escaping from the leader's hands, has it no longer been possible to exercise it? "at what instant has this control escaped from the battalion commander? when from the captain, the section leader, the squad leader? at what time, in short, if such a thing did take place, was there but a disordered impulse, whether to the front or to the rear carrying along pell-mell with it both the leaders and men? "where and when did the halt take place? "where and when were the leaders able to resume control of the men? "at what moments before, during, or after the day, was the battalion roll-call, the company roll-call made? the results of these roll-calls? "how many dead, how many wounded on the one side and on the other; the kind of wounds of the officers, non-commissioned officers, corporals, privates, etc., etc.? "all these details, in a word, enlighten either the material or the moral side of the action, or enable it to be visualized. possibly, a closer examination might show that they are matters infinitely more instructive to us as soldiers than all the discussions imaginable on the plans and general conduct of the campaigns of the greatest captain in the great movements of the battle field. from colonel to private we are soldiers, not generals, and it is therefore our trade that we desire to know. "certainly one cannot obtain all the details of the same incident. but from a series of true accounts there should emanate an ensemble of characteristic details which in themselves are very apt to show in a striking, irrefutable way what was necessarily and forcibly taking place at such and such a moment of an action in war. take the estimate of the soldier obtained in this manner to serve as a base for what might possibly be a rational method of fighting. it will put us on guard against _a priori_ and pedantic school methods. "whoever has seen, turns to a method based on his knowledge, his personal experience as a soldier. but experience is long and life is short. the experiences of each cannot therefore be completed except by those of others. "and that is why, general, i venture to address myself to you for your experiences. "proofs have weight. "as for the rest, whether it please you to aid or not, general, kindly accept the assurance of most respectful devotion from your obedient servant." * * * * * the reading of this unique document is sufficient to explain the glory that ardant du picq deserved. in no other career has a professional ever reflected more clearly the means of pushing his profession to perfection; in no profession has a deeper penetration of the resources been made. it pleases me particularly to associate the two words 'penseur' and 'militaire,' which, at the present time, the ignorance of preconceived opinion too frequently separates. because such opinion is on the verge of believing them to be incompatible and contradictory. yet no calling other than the true military profession is so fitted to excite brain activity. it is preëminently the calling of action, at the same time diverse in its combinations and changing according to the time and locality wherein it is put to practice. no other profession is more complex nor more difficult, since it has for its aim and reason the instruction of men to overcome by training and endurance the fatigue and perils against which the voice of self-preservation is raised in fear; in other words, to draw from nature what is most opposed and most antipathic to this nature. there is, however, much of routine in the customs of military life, and, abuse of it may bring about gross satires which in turn bring it into derision. to be sure, the career has two phases because it must fulfill simultaneously two exigencies. from this persons of moderate capacity draw back and are horrified. they solve the question by the sacrifice of the one or the other. if one considers only the lower and somewhat vulgar aspect of military life it is found to be composed of monotonous obligations clothed in a mechanical procedure of indispensable repetition. if one learns to grasp it in its ensemble and large perspective, it will be found that the days of extreme trial demand prodigies of vigor, spirit, intelligence, and decision! regarded from this angle and supported in this light, the commonplace things of wearisome garrison life have as counterweights certain sublime compensations. these compensations preclude the false and contemptible results which come from intellectual idleness and the habit of absolute submission. if it yields to their narcotic charms, the best brain grows rusty and atrophies in the long run. incapable of virile labor, it rebels at a renewal of its processes in sane initiative. an army in which vigilance is not perpetual is sick until the enemy demonstrates it to be dead. far, then, from attaching routine as an indispensable companion to military discipline it must be shown continually that in it lies destruction and loss. military discipline does not degenerate except when it has not known the cult of its vitality and the secret of its grandeur. the teachers of war have all placed this truth as a preface to their triumphs and we find the most illustrious teachers to be the most severe. listen to this critique of frederick the great on the maneuvers which he conducted in silesia: "the great mistake in inspections is that you officers amuse yourselves with god knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service. this is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of a serious conflict. take shoe-makers and tailors and make generals of them and they will not commit worse follies! these blunders are made on a small as well as on a large scale. consequently, in the greatest number of regiments, the private is not well trained; in zaramba's regiment he is the worst; in thadden's he amounts to nothing; and to no more in keller's, erlach's, and haager's. why? because the officers are lazy and try to get out of a difficulty by giving themselves the least trouble possible." * * * * * in default of exceptional generals who remold in some campaigns, with a superb stroke, the damaged or untempered military metal, it is of importance to supply it with the ideals of ardant du picq. those who are formed by his image, by his book, will never fall into error. his book has not been written to please aesthetic preciseness, but with a sincerity which knows no limit. it therefore contains irrefutable facts and theories. the solidity of these fragmentary pages defies time; the work interrupted by the german shell is none the less erected for eternity. the work has muscles, nerves and a soul. it has the transparent concentration of reality. a thought may be expressed by a single word. the terseness of the calcined phrase explains the interior fire of it all, the magnificent conviction of the author. the distinctness of outline, the most astounding brevity of touch, is such that the vision of the future bursts forth from the resurrection of the past. the work contains, indeed, substance and marrow of a prophetic experience. amidst the praise rendered to the scintillating beauties of this book, there is perhaps, none more impressive than that of barbey d'aurevilly, an illustrious literary man of a long and generous patrician lineage. his comment, kindled with lyric enthusiasm, is illuminating. it far surpasses the usual narrow conception of technical subjects. confessing his professional ignorance in matters of war, his sincere eulogy of the eloquent amateur is therefore only the more irresistible. "never," writes barbey d'aurevilly, "has a man of action--of brutal action in the eyes of universal prejudice--more magnificently glorified the spirituality of war. mechanics--abominable mechanics--takes possession of the world, crushing it under its stupid and irresistible wheels. by the action of newly discovered and improved appliances the science of war assumes vast proportions as a means of destruction. yet here, amid the din of this upset modern world we find a brain sufficiently master of its own thoughts as not to permit itself to be dominated by these horrible discoveries which, we are told, would make impossible fredericks of prussia and napoleons and lower them to the level of the private soldier! colonel ardant du picq tells us somewhere that he has never had entire faith in the huge battalions which these two great men, themselves alone worth more than the largest battalions, believed in. well, to-day, this vigorous brain believes no more in the mechanical or mathematical force which is going to abolish these great battalions. a calculator without the least emotion, who considers the mind of man the essential in war--because it is this mind that makes war--he surely sees better than anybody else a profound change in the exterior conditions of war which he must consider. but the spiritual conditions which are produced in war have not changed. such, is the eternal mind of man raised to its highest power by discipline. such, is the roman cement of this discipline that makes of men indestructible walls. such, is the cohesion, the solidarity between men and their leaders. such, is the moral influence of the impulse which gives the certainty of victory. "'to conquer is to advance,' de maistre said one day, puzzled at this phenomenon of victory. the author of "etudes sur le combat" says more simply: 'to conquer is to be sure to overcome.' in fine, it is the mind that wins battles, that will always win them, that always has won them throughout the world's history. the spirituality, the moral quality of war, has not changed since those times. mechanics, modern arms, all the artillery invented by man and his science, will not make an end to this thing, so lightly considered at the moment and called the human soul. books like that of ardant du picq prevent it from being disdained. if no other effect should be produced by this sublime book, this one thing would justify it. but there will be others--do not doubt it--i wish merely to point out the sublimity of this didactic book which, for me, has wings like celestial poetry and which has carried me above and far away from the materialistic abjectness of my time. the technique of tactics and the science of war are beyond my province. i am not, like the author, erudite on maneuvers and the battle field. but despite my ignorance of things exclusively military, i have felt the truth of the imperious demonstrations with which it is replete, as one feels the presence of the sun behind a cloud. his book has over the reader that moral ascendancy which is everything in war and which determines success, according to the author. this ascendancy, like truth itself, is the sort which cannot be questioned. coming from the superior mind of a leader who inspires faith it imposes obedience by its very strength. colonel ardant du picq was a military writer only, with a style of his own. he has the latin brevity and concentration. he retains his thought, assembles it and always puts it out in a compact phrase like a cartridge. his style has the rapidity and precision of the long-range arms which have dethroned the bayonet. he would have been a writer anywhere. he was a writer by nature. he was of that sacred phalanx of those who have a style all to themselves." barbey d'aurevilly rebels against tedious technicalities. carried away by the author's historical and philosophical faculties, he soars without difficulty to the plane of ardant du picq. in like manner, du picq ranges easily from the most mediocre military operations to the analysis of the great functions of policy of government and the evolution of nations. who could have unraveled with greater finesse the causes of the insatiable desires of conquest by the new power which was so desirous of occupying the leading rôle on the world's stage? if our diplomats, our ministers and our generals had seized the warning of , the date of the defeat of austria, it is possible that we might have been spared our own defeats. "has an aristocracy any excuse for existing if it is not military? no. the prussian aristocracy is essentially military. in its ranks it does accept officers of plebeian extraction, but only under condition that they permit themselves to be absorbed therein. "is not an aristocracy essentially proud? if it were not proud it would lack confidence. the prussian aristocracy is, therefore, haughty; it desires domination by force and its desire to rule, to dominate more and more, is the essence of its existence. it rules by war; it wishes war; it must have war at the proper time. its leaders have the good judgment to choose the right moment. this love of war is in the very fiber, the very makeup of its life as an aristocracy. "every nation that has an aristocracy, a military nobility, is organized in a military way. the prussian officer is an accomplished gentleman and nobleman; by instruction or examination he is most capable; by education, most worthy. he is an officer and commands from two motives, the french officer from one alone. "prussia, in spite of all the veils concealing reality, is a military organization conducted by a military corporation. a nation, democratically constituted, is not organized from a military point of view. it is, therefore, as against the other, in a state of unpreparedness for war. "a military nation and a warlike nation are not necessarily the same. the french are warlike from organization and instinct. they are every day becoming less and less military. "in being the neighbor of a military nation, there is no security for a democratic nation; the two are born enemies; the one continually menaces the good influences, if not the very existence of the other. as long as prussia is not democratic she is a menace to us. "the future seems to belong to democracy, but, before this future is attained by europe, who will say that victory and domination will not belong for a time to military organization? it will presently perish for the lack of sustenance of life, when having no more foreign enemies to vanquish, to watch, to fight for control, it will have no reason for existence." in tracing a portrait so much resembling bellicose and conquering prussia, the sharp eye of ardant du picq had recognized clearly the danger which immediately threatened us and which his deluded and trifling fellow citizens did not even suspect. the morning after sadowa, not a single statesman or publicist had yet divined what the colonel of the th regiment of the line had, at first sight, understood. written before the catastrophes of froeschwiller, metz and sedan, the fragment seems, in a retrospective way, an implacable accusation against those who deceived themselves about the hohenzollern country by false liberalism or a softening of the brain. unswerved by popular ideas, by the artificial, by the trifles of treaties, by the chimera of theories, by the charlatanism of bulletins, by the nonsense of romantic fiction, by the sentimentalities of vain chivalry, ardant du picq, triumphant in history, is even more the incomparable master in the field of his laborious days and nights, the field of war itself. never has a clearer vision fathomed the bloody mysteries of the formidable test of war. here man appears as his naked self. he is a poor thing when he succumbs to unworthy deeds and panics. he is great under the impulse of voluntary sacrifice which transforms him under fire and for honor or the salvation of others makes him face death. the sound and complete discussions of ardant du picq take up, in a poignant way, the setting of every military drama. they envelop in a circle of invariable phenomena the apparent irregularity of combat, determining the critical point in the outcome of the battle. whatever be the conditions, time or people, he gives a code of rules which will not perish. with the enthusiasm of pascal, who should have been a soldier, ardant du picq has the preëminent gift of expressing the infinite in magic words. he unceasingly opens an abyss under the feet of the reader. the whole metaphysics of war is contained therein and is grasped at a single glance. he shows, weighed in the scales of an amazing exactitude, the normal efficiency of an army; a multitude of beings shaken by the most contradictory passions, first desiring to save their own skins and yet resigned to any risk for the sake of a principle. he shows the quantity and quality of possible efforts, the aggregate of losses, the effects of training and impulse, the intrinsic value of the troops engaged. this value is the sum of all that the leader can extract from any and every combination of physical preparation, confidence, fear of punishment, emulation, enthusiasm, inclination, the promise of success, administration of camps, fire discipline, the influence of ability and superiority, etc. he shows the tragic depths, so somber below, so luminous above, which appear in the heart of the combatant torn between fear and duty. in the private soldier the sense of duty may spring from blind obedience; in the non-commissioned officer, responsible for his detachment, from devotion to his trade; in the commanding officer, from supreme responsibility! it is in battle that a military organization justifies its existence. money spent by the billions, men trained by the millions, are gambled on one irrevocable moment. organization decides the terrible contest which means the triumph or the downfall of the nation! the harsh rays of glory beam above the field of carnage, destroying the vanquished without scorching the victor. such are the basic elements of strategy and tactics! there is danger in theoretical speculation of battle, in prejudice, in false reasoning, in pride, in braggadocio. there is one safe resource, the return to nature. the strategy that moves in elevated spheres is in danger of being lost in the clouds. it becomes ridiculous as soon as it ceases to conform to actual working tactics. in his classical work on the decisive battle of august , , captain fritz hoenig has reached a sound conclusion. after his biting criticism of the many gross errors of steinmetz and zastrow, after his description of the triple panic of the german troops opposite the french left in the valley and the ravine of the mance, he ends by a reflection which serves as a striking ending to the book. he says, "the grandest illustration of moltke's strategy was the battle of gravelotte-saint privat; but the battle of gravelotte has taught us one thing, and that is, the best strategy cannot produce good results if tactics is at fault." the right kind of tactics is not improvised. it asserts itself in the presence of the enemy but it is learned before meeting the enemy. "there are men," says ardant du picq, "such as marshal bugeaud, who are born military in character, mind, intelligence and temperament. not all leaders are of this stamp. there is, then, need for standard or regulation tactics appropriate to the national character which should be the guide for the ordinary commander and which do not exact of him the exceptional qualities of a bugeaud." "tactics is an art based on the knowledge of how to make men fight with their maximum energy against fear, a maximum which organization alone can give." "and here confidence appears. it is not the enthusiastic and thoughtless confidence of tumultuous or improvised armies that gives way on the approach of danger to a contrary sentiment which sees treason everywhere; but the intimate, firm, conscious confidence which alone makes true soldiers and does not disappear at the moment of action." "we now have an army. it is not difficult for us to see that people animated by passions, even people who know how to die without flinching, strong in the face of death, but without discipline and solid organization, are conquered by others who are individually less valiant but firmly organized, all together and one for all." "solidarity and confidence cannot be improvised. they can be born only of mutual acquaintanceship which establishes pride and makes unity. and, from unity comes in turn the feeling of force, that force which gives to the attack the courage and confidence of victory. courage, that is to say, the domination of the will over instinct even in the greatest danger, leads finally to victory or defeat." in asking for a doctrine in combat and in seeking to base it on the moral element, ardant du picq was ahead of his generation. he has had a very great influence. but, the doctrine is not yet established. how to approach the adversary? how to pass from the defensive to the offensive? how to regulate the shock? how to give orders that can be executed? how to transmit them surely? how to execute them by economizing precious lives? such are the distressing problems that beset generals and others in authority. the result is that presidents, kings and emperors hesitate, tremble, interrogate, pile reports upon reports, maneuvers upon maneuvers, retard the improvement of their military material, their organization, their equipment. the only leaders who are equal to the difficulties of future war, come to conclusions expressed in almost the same terms. recently general de negrier, after having insisted that physical exhaustion determined by the nervous tension of the soldier, increased in surprising proportions according to the invisibility of the adversary, expressed himself as follows: "the tide of battle is in the hands of each fighter, and never, at any time, has the individual bravery of the soldier had more importance. "whatever the science of the superior commander, the genius of his strategic combinations, the precision of his concentrations, whatever numerical superiority he may have, victory will escape him if the soldier does not conduct himself without being watched, and if he is not personally animated by the resolution to conquer or to perish. he needs much greater energy than formerly. "he no longer has the intoxication of ancient attacks in mass to sustain him. formerly, the terrible anxiety of waiting made him wish for the violent blow, dangerous, but soon passed. now, all his normal and physical powers are tried for long hours and, in such a test, he will have but the resoluteness of his own heart to sustain him. "armies of to-day gain decisions by action in open order, where each soldier must act individually with will and initiative to attack the enemy and destroy him. "the frenchman has always been an excellent rifleman, intelligent, adroit and bold. he is naturally brave. the metal is good; the problem is to temper it. it must be recognized that to-day this task is not easy. the desire for physical comfort, the international theories which come therefrom, preferring economic slavery and work for the profit of the stranger to the struggle, do not incite the frenchman to give his life in order to save that of his brother. "the new arms are almost valueless in the hands of weakhearted soldiers, no matter what their number may be. on the contrary, the demoralizing power of rapid and smokeless firing, which certain armies still persist in not acknowledging, manifests itself with so much the more force as each soldier possesses greater valor and cool energy. "it is then essential to work for the development of the moral forces of the nation. they alone will sustain the soldier in the distressing test of battle where death comes unseen. "that is the most important of the lessons of the south african war. small nations will find therein the proof that, in preparing their youth for their duties as soldiers and creating in the hearts of all the wish for sacrifice, they are certain to live free; but only at this price." this profession of faith contradicts the imbecile sophisms foolishly put into circulation by high authority and a thoughtless press, on the efficiency of the mass, which is nothing but numbers, on the fantastic value of new arms, which are declared sufficient for gaining a victory by simple mechanical perfection, on the suppression of individual courage. it is almost as though courage had become a superfluous and embarrassing factor. nothing is more likely to poison the army. ardant du picq is the best specific against the heresies and the follies of ignorance or of pedantry. here are some phrases of unerring truth. they ought to be impressed upon all memories, inscribed upon the walls of our military schools. they ought to be learned as lessons by our officers and they ought to rule them as regulations and pass into their blood: "man is capable of but a given quantity of fear. to-day one must swallow in five minutes the dose that one took in an hour in turenne's day." "to-day there is greater need than ever for rigid formation." "who can say that he never felt fear in battle? and with modern appliances, with their terrible effect on the nervous system, discipline is all the more necessary because one fights only in open formation." "combat exacts a moral cohesion, a solidarity more compact that ever before." "since the invention of fire arms, the musket, rifle, cannon, the distances of mutual aid and support are increased between the various arms. the more men think themselves isolated, the more need they have of high morale." "we are brought by dispersion to the need of a cohesion greater than ever before." "it is a truth, so clear as to be almost naïve, that if one does not wish bonds broken, he should make them elastic and thereby strengthen them." "it is not wise to lead eighty thousand men upon the battle field, of whom but fifty thousand will fight. it would be better to have fifty thousand all of whom would fight. these fifty thousand would have their hearts in the work more than the others, who should have confidence in their comrades but cannot when one-third of them shirk their work." "the rôle of the skirmisher becomes more and more predominant. it is more necessary to watch over and direct him as he is used against deadlier weapons and as he is consequently more prone to try to escape from them at all costs in any direction." "the thing is then to find a method that partially regulates the action of our soldiers who advance by fleeing or escape by advancing, as you like, and if something unexpected surprises them, escape as quickly by falling back." "esprit de corps improves with experience in wars. war becomes shorter and shorter, and more and more violent; therefore, create in advance an esprit de corps." these truths are eternal. this whole volume is but their masterful development. they prove that together with audacious sincerity in the coördination of facts and an infallible judgment, ardant du picq possessed prescience in the highest degree. his prophetic eye distinguished sixty years ago the constituent principles of a good army. these are the principles which lead to victory. they are radically opposed to those which enchant our parliamentarians or military politicians, which are based on a fatal favoritism and which precipitate wars. ardant du picq is not alone a superior doctrinaire. he will be consulted with profit in practical warlike organization. no one has better depicted the character of modern armies. no one knew better the value of what clausewitz called, "the product of armed force and the country's force ... the heart and soul of a nation." no more let us forget that he launched, before the famous prediction of von der goltz, this optimistic view well calculated to rekindle the zeal of generals who struggle under the weight of enormous tasks incident to obligatory service. "extremes meet in many things. in the ancient times of conflict with pike and sword, armies were seen to conquer other solid armies even though one against two. who knows if the perfection of long-range arms might not bring back these heroic victories? who knows whether a smaller number by some combination of good sense or genius, or morale, and of appliances will not overcome a greater number equally well armed?" after the abandonment of the law of , and the repeal of the law of , and before the introduction of numerous and disquieting reforms in recruitment and consequently, in the education of our regiments, would it not be opportune to study ardant du picq and look for the secret of force in his ideas rather than in the deceptive illusions of military automatism and materialism? the martial mission of france is no more ended than war itself. the severities of war may be deplored, but the precarious justice of arbitration tribunals, still weak and divested of sanction, has not done away with its intervention in earthly quarrels. i do not suppose that my country is willing to submit to the mean estate, scourged with superb contempt by donoso cortes, who says:-- "when a nation shows a civilized horror of war, it receives directly the punishment of its mistake. god changes its sex, despoils it of its common mark of virility, changes it into a feminine nation and sends conquerors to ravish it of its honor." france submits sometimes to the yoke of subtle dialecticians who preach total disarmament, who spread insanely disastrous doctrine of capitulation, glorify disgrace and humiliation, and stupidly drive us on to suicide. the manly counsels of ardant du picq are admirable lessons for a nation awakening. since she must, sooner or later, take up her idle sword again, may france learn from him to fight well, for herself and for humanity! ernest judet. paris, october , . * * * * * ardant du picq has said little about himself in his writings. he veils with care his personality. his life and career, little known, are the more worthy of the reader's interest, because the man is as original as the writer. to satisfy a natural curiosity, i asked the colonel's family for the details of his life, enshrined in their memory. his brother has kindly furnished them in a letter to me. it contains many unpublished details and shows traits of character which confirm our estimate of the man, ardant du picq. it completes very happily the impression made by his book. "paris, october , . "_sir,_ "herewith are some random biographical notes on the author of 'etudes sur le combat' which you requested of me. "my brother entered saint-cyr quite late, at twenty-one years, which was i believe the age limit at that time. this was not his initial preference. he had a marked preference for a naval career, in which adventure seemed to offer an opportunity for his activity, and which he would have entered if the circumstances had so permitted. his childhood was turbulent and somewhat intractable; but, attaining adolescence, he retained from his former violence a very pronounced taste for physical exercise, especially for gymnastics, little practiced then, to which he was naturally inclined by his agility and muscular strength. "he was successful in his classes, very much so in studies which were to his taste, principally french composition. in this he rose above the usual level of schoolboy exercises when the subject interested him. certain other branches that were uninteresting or distasteful to him, as for instance latin grammar, he neglected. i do not remember ever having seen him attend a distribution of prizes, although he was highly interested, perhaps because he was too interested. on these occasions, he would disappear generally after breakfast and not be seen until evening. his bent was toward mechanical notions and handiwork. he was not uninterested in mathematics but his interest in this was ordinary. he was nearly refused entrance to saint-cyr. he became confused before the examiners and the results of the first part of the tests were almost negligible. he consoled himself with his favorite maxim as a young man: 'onward philosophy.' considering the first test as over and done with, he faced the second test with perfect indifference. this attitude gave him another opportunity and he came out with honors. as he had done well with the written test on 'hannibal's campaigns,' he was given a passing grade. "at school he was liked by all his comrades for his good humor and frank and sympathetic character. later, in the regiment, he gained naturally and without effort the affection of his equals and the respect of his subordinates. the latter were grateful to him for the real, cordial and inspiring interest he showed in their welfare, for he was familiar with the details of the service and with the soldier's equipment. he would not compromise on such matters and prevaricators who had to do with him did not emerge creditably. "it can be said that after reaching manhood he never lied. the absolute frankness from which he never departed under any circumstances gave him prestige superior to his rank. a mere lieutenant, he voted 'no' to the coup d'etat of december , and was admonished by his colonel who was sorry to see him compromise thus his future. he replied with his usual rectitude: 'colonel, since my opinion was asked for, i must suppose that it was wanted.' "on the eve of the crimean war, his regiment, ( th) not seeming destined to take the field, he asked for and obtained a transfer to the light infantry ( th battalion). it was with this battalion that he served in the campaign. when it commenced, he made his first appearance in the fatal dobrutscha expedition. this was undertaken in a most unhealthy region, on the chance of finding there cossacks who would have furnished matter for a communiqué. no cossacks were found, but the cholera was. it cut down in a few hours, so as to speak, a large portion of the total strength. my brother, left with the rear guard to bury the dead, burn their effects and bring up the sick, was in his turn infected. the attack was very violent and he recovered only because he would not give in to the illness. evacuated to the varna hospital, he was driven out the first night by the burning of the town and was obliged to take refuge in the surrounding fields where the healthfulness of the air gave him unexpected relief. returned to france as a convalescent, he remained there until the month of december ( ). he then rejoined his regiment and withstood to the end the rigors of the winter and the slowness of the siege. "salle's division to which the trochu brigade belonged, and in which my brother served, was charged with the attack on the central bastion. this operation was considered a simple diversion without a chance of success. my brother, commanding the storming column of his battalion, had the good fortune to come out safe and sound from the deadly fire to which he was exposed and which deprived the battalion of several good officers. he entered the bastion with a dozen men. all were naturally made prisoners after a resistance which would have cost my brother his life if the bugler at his side had not warded off a saber blow at his head. upon his return from captivity, in the first months of , he was immediately made major in the th regiment of the line, at the instance of general trochu who regarded him highly. he was called the following year to the command of the th battalion of foot chasseurs. he served with this battalion during the syrian campaign where there was but little serious action. "back again in france, his promotion to the grade of lieutenant-colonel, notwithstanding his excellent ratings and his place on the promotion list, was long retarded by the ill-will of marshal randon, the minister of war. marshal randon complained of his independent character and bore him malice from an incident relative to the furnishing of shoes intended for his battalion. my brother, questioned by marshal niel about the quality of the lot of shoes, had frankly declared it bad. "promoted finally to lieutenant-colonel in the th in algeria, he took the field there in two campaigns, i believe. appointed colonel of the th of the line in february, , he was stationed at lorient and at limoges during the eighteen months before the war with germany. he busied himself during this period with the preparation of his work, soliciting from all sides first-hand information. it was slow in coming in, due certainly to indifference rather than ill-will. he made several trips to paris for the purpose of opening the eyes of those in authority to the defective state of the army and the perils of the situation. vain attempts! 'they take all that philosophically,' he used to say. "please accept, sir, with renewed acknowledgements of gratitude, the expression of my most distinguished sentiments. "c. ardant du picq. "p. s. as to the question of atavism in which you showed some interest in our first conversation, i may say that our paternal line does not in my knowledge include any military man. the oldest ancestor i know of, according to an album of engravings by albert dürer, recovered in a garret, was a gold and silversmith at limoges towards the end of the sixteenth century. his descendants have always been traders down to my grandfather who, from what i have heard said, did not in the least attend to his trade. the case is different with my mother's family which came from lorraine. our great-grandfather was a soldier, our grandfather also, and two, at least, of my mother's brothers gave their lives on the battlefields of the first empire. at present, the family has two representatives in the army, the one a son of my brother's, the other a first cousin, once removed, both bearing our name. "c. a. du p." record of military service of colonel ardant du picq ardant du picq (charles-jean-jacques-joseph), was born october , at périgueux (dordogne). entered the service as a student of the special military school, november , . sub-lieutenant in the th regiment of the line, october , . lieutenant, may , . captain, august , . transferred to the th battalion of foot chasseurs, december , . major of the th regiment of the line, february , . transferred to the th battalion of chasseurs, march , . transferred to the th regiment of the line, january , . lieutenant colonel of the th regiment of the line, january , . colonel of the th regiment of infantry of the line, february , . died from wounds at the military hospital in metz, august , . campaigns and wounds orient, march , to may , . was taken prisoner of war at the storming of the central bastion (sebastopol) september , ; returned from enemy's prisons december , . served in the syrian campaign from august , to june , ; in africa from february , to april , ; in franco-german war, from july , to august , . wounded--a comminute fracture of the right thigh, a torn gash in the left thigh, contusion of the abdomen--by the bursting of a projectile, august , , longeville-les-metz (moselle). decorations chevalier of the imperial order of the legion of honor, dec. , . officer of the imperial order of the legion of honor, september , . received the medal of h. m. the queen of england. received the medal for bravery in sardinia. authorized to wear the decoration of the fourth class of the ottoman medjidie order. extract from the history of the th infantry regiment campaign of on the nd of july, the three active battalions of the th regiment of infantry of the line left limoges and angoulême by rail arriving on the rd at the camp at châlons, where the th corps of the rhine army was concentrating and organizing, under the command of marshal canrobert. the regiment, within this army corps, belonged to the st brigade (pechot) of the st division (tixier). the organization on a war footing of the th regiment of infantry of the line, begun at limoges, was completed at the châlons camp. the battalions were brought up to seven hundred and twenty men, and the regiment counted twenty-two hundred and ten present, not including the band, the sappers and the headquarters section, which raised the effectives to twenty-three hundred men. the troops of the th corps were soon organized and marshal canrobert reviewed them on the st of july. on august th, the division received orders to move to nancy. it was placed on nine trains, of which the first left at a. m. arriving in the evening at its destination, the st brigade camped on the leopold racetrack, and the th regiment established itself on the place de la grève. the defeats of forbach and reichshofen soon caused these first plans to be modified. the th corps was ordered to return to the châlons camp. the last troops of the d brigade, held up at toul and commercy, were returned on the same trains. the st brigade entrained at nancy, on the night of august th, arriving at the châlons camp on the afternoon of august th. the th corps, however, was to remain but a few days in camp. on the th it received orders to go to metz. on the morning of the th the regiment was again placed on three successive trains. the first train carrying the staff and the st battalion, arrived at metz without incident. the second train, transporting the d battalion and four companies of the d was stopped at about p.m. near the frouard branch. the telegraph line was cut by a prussian party near dieulouard, for a length of two kilometers, and it was feared the road was damaged. in order not to delay his arrival at metz, nor the progress of the trains following, major morin at the head of the column, directed his commands to detrain and continue to metz. he caused the company at the head of the train to alight ( th company, d battalion, commanded by captain valpajola) and sent it reconnoitering on the road, about three hundred meters in advance of the train. all precautions were taken to assure the security of the train, which regulated its progress on that of the scouts. after a run of about eight kilometers in this way, at marbache station, all danger having disappeared and communication with metz having been established, the train resumed its regulation speed. in consequence of the slowing up of the second column, the third followed at a short distance until it also arrived. on the afternoon of the th, the regiment was entirely united. the division of which it was a part was sent beyond montigny and it camped there as follows: the th chasseurs and th regiment of the line, ahead of the thionville railroad, the right on the moselle, the left on the pont-à-mousson highway; the th regiment of the line, the right supported at the branch of the thionville and nancy lines, the left in the direction of saint-privat, in front of the montigny repair shops of the eastern railroad lines. the regiment was thus placed in the rear of a redoubt under construction. the company of engineers was placed at the left of the th near the earth-works on which it was to work. along the ridge of the plateau, toward the seille, was the d brigade, which rested its left on the river and its right perpendicular to the saint-privat road, in rear of the field-work of this name. the divisional batteries were behind it. the division kept this position august th and during the morning of the th. in the afternoon, an alarm made the division take arms, during the engagement that took place on the side of vallières and saint-julien (battle of borny). the regiment immediately occupied positions on the left of the village of montigny. at nightfall, the division retired to the rear of the railroad cut, and received orders to hold itself in readiness to leave during the night. the regiment remained thus under arms, the d battalion (major deschesnes), passing the night on grand guard in front of the montigny redoubt. before daybreak, the division marched over the bank of the thionville railroad, crossed the moselle, and, marching towards gravelotte, descended into the plain south of longeville-les-metz, where the principal halt was made and coffee prepared. scarcely had stacks been made, and the men set to making fires, about a.m. when shells exploded in the midst of the troops. the shots came from the bradin farm, situated on the heights of montigny, which the division had just left the same morning, and which a german cavalry reconnaissance patrol supported by two pieces had suddenly occupied. the colonel had arms taken at once and disposed the regiment north of the road which, being elevated, provided sufficient cover for defilading the men. he himself, stood in the road to put heart into his troops by his attitude, they having been a little startled by this surprise and the baptism of fire which they received under such disadvantageous circumstances. suddenly, a shell burst over the road, a few feet from the colonel, and mutilated his legs in a frightful manner. the same shell caused other ravages in the ranks of the th. the commander of the d battalion, major deschesnes, was mortally wounded, captain reboulet was killed, lieutenant pone ( d battalion, st company), and eight men of the regiment were wounded. the colonel was immediately taken to the other side of the highway into the midst of his soldiers and a surgeon called, those of the regiment being already engaged in caring for the other victims of the terrible shot. in the meantime, colonel ardant du picq asked for lieut.-colonel doleac, delivered to him his saddlebags containing important papers concerning the regiment and gave him his field glasses. then, without uttering the least sound of pain, notwithstanding the frightful injury from which he must have suffered horribly, he said with calmness: "my regret is to be struck in this way, without having been able to lead my regiment on the enemy." they wanted him to take a little brandy, he refused and accepted some water which a soldier offered him. a surgeon arrived finally. the colonel, showing him his right leg open in two places, made with his hand the sign of amputating at the thigh, saying: "doctor, it is necessary to amputate my leg here." at this moment, a soldier wounded in the shoulder, and placed near the colonel, groaned aloud. forgetting his own condition, the colonel said immediately to the surgeon: "see first, doctor, what is the matter with this brave man; i can wait." because of the lack of instruments it was not possible to perform the amputation on the ground, as the colonel desired, so this much deplored commander was transported to the metz hospital. four days later ( th of august), colonel ardant du picq died like a hero of old, without uttering the least complaint. far from his regiment, far from his family, he uttered several times the words which summed up his affections: "my wife, my children, my regiment, adieu!" part one ancient battle introduction battle is the final objective of armies and man is the fundamental instrument in battle. nothing can wisely be prescribed in an army--its personnel, organization, discipline and tactics, things which are connected like the fingers of a hand--without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat. it often happens that those who discuss war, taking the weapon for the starting point, assume unhesitatingly that the man called to serve it will always use it as contemplated and ordered by the regulations. but such a being, throwing off his variable nature to become an impassive pawn, an abstract unit in the combinations of battle, is a creature born of the musings of the library, and not a real man. man is flesh and blood; he is body and soul. and, strong as the soul often is, it can not dominate the body to the point where there will not be a revolt of the flesh and mental perturbation in the face of destruction. the human heart, to quote marshal de saxe, is then the starting point in all matters pertaining to war. let us study the heart, not in modern battle, complicated and not readily grasped, but in ancient battle. for, although nowhere explained in detail, ancient battle was simple and clear. centuries have not changed human nature. passions, instincts, among them the most powerful one of self-preservation, may be manifested in various ways according to the time, the place, the character and temperament of the race. thus in our times we can admire, under the same conditions of danger, emotion and anguish, the calmness of the english, the dash of the french, and that inertia of the russians which is called tenacity. but at bottom there is always found the same man. it is this man that we see disposed of by the experts, by the masters, when they organize and discipline, when they order detailed combat methods and take general dispositions for action. the best masters are those who know man best, the man of today and the man of history. this knowledge naturally comes from a study of formations and achievements in ancient war. the development of this work leads us to make such an analysis, and from a study of combat we may learn to know man. let us go even back of ancient battle, to primeval struggle. in progressing from the savage to our times we shall get a better grasp of life. and shall we then know as much as the masters? no more than one is a painter by having seen the methods of painting. but we shall better understand these able men and the great examples they have left behind them. we shall learn from them to distrust mathematics and material dynamics as applied to battle principles. we shall learn to beware of the illusions drawn from the range and the maneuver field. there, experience is with the calm, settled, unfatigued, attentive, obedient soldier, with an intelligent and tractable man-instrument in short, and not with the nervous, easily swayed, moved, troubled, distrait, excited, restless being, not even under self-control, who is the fighting man from general to private. there are strong men, exceptions, but they are rare. these illusions, nevertheless, stubborn and persistent, always repair the very next day the most damaging injuries inflicted on them by experience. their least dangerous effect is to lead to prescribing the impractical, as if ordering the impractical were not really an attack on discipline, and did not result in disconcerting officers and men by the unexpected and by surprise at the contrast between battle and the theories of peacetime training. battle, of course, always furnishes surprises. but it furnishes less in proportion as good sense and the recognition of truth have had their effect on the training of the fighting man, and are disseminated in the ranks. let us then study man in battle, for it is he who really fights. chapter i man in primitive and ancient combat man does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. he does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second. war between savage tribes, between arabs, even today, [ ] is a war of ambush by small groups of men of which each one, at the moment of surprise, chooses, not his adversary, but his victim, and is an assassin. because the arms are similar on both sides, the only way of giving the advantage to one side is by surprise. a man surprised, needs an instant to collect his thoughts and defend himself; during this instant he is killed if he does not run away. the surprised adversary does not defend himself, he tries to flee. face to face or body to body combat with primitive arms, ax or dagger, so terrible among enemies without defensive arms, is very rare. it can take place only between enemies mutually surprised and without a chance of safety for any one except in victory. and still ... in case of mutual surprise, there is another chance of safety; that of falling back, of flight on the part of one or the other; and that chance is often seized. here is an example, and if it does not concern savages at all, but soldiers of our days, the fact is none the less significant. it was observed by a man of warlike temperament who has related what he saw with his own eyes, although he was a forced spectator, held to the spot by a wound. during the crimean war, on a day of heavy fighting, two detachments of soldiers, a and b, coming around one of the mounds of earth that covered the country and meeting unexpectedly face to face, at ten paces, stopped thunderstruck. then, forgetting their rifles, they threw stones and withdrew. neither of the two groups had a decided leader to lead it to the front, and neither of the two dared to shoot first for fear that the other would at the same time bring his own arm to his shoulder. they were too near to hope to escape, or so they thought at least, although in reality, reciprocal firing, at such short ranges, is almost always too high. the man who would fire sees himself already killed by the return fire. he throws stones, and not with great force, to avoid using his rifle, to distract the enemy, to occupy the time, until flight offers him some chance of escaping at point-blank range. this agreeable state of affairs did not last long, a minute perhaps. the appearance of a troop b on one flank determined the flight of a, and then the opposing group fired. surely, the affair is ridiculous and laughable. let us see, however. in a thick forest, a lion and a tiger meet face to face at a turn in the trail. they stop at once, rearing and ready to spring. they measure each other with their eyes, there is a rumbling in their throats. the claws move convulsively, the hair stands up. with tails lashing the ground, and necks stretched, ears flattened, lips turned up, they show their formidable fangs in that terrible threatening grimace of fear characteristic of felines. unseen, i shudder. the situation is disagreeable for both: movement ahead means the death of a beast. of which? of both perhaps. slowly, quite slowly, one leg, bent for the leap, bending still, moves a few inches to the rear. gently, quite gently, a fore paw follows the movement. after a stop, slowly, quite slowly, the other legs do the same, and both beasts, insensibly, little by little, and always facing, withdraw, up to the moment where their mutual withdrawal has created between them an interval greater than can be traversed in a bound. lion and tiger turn their backs slowly and, without ceasing to observe, walk freely. they resume without haste their natural gaits, with that sovereign dignity characteristic of great seigneurs. i have ceased to shudder, but i do not laugh. there is no more to laugh at in man in battle, because he has in his hands a weapon more terrible than the fangs and claws of lion or tiger, the rifle, which instantly, without possible defense, sends one from life into death. it is evident that no one close to his enemy is in a hurry to arm himself, to put into action a force which may kill him. he is not anxious to light the fuse that is to blow up the enemy, and himself at the same time. who has not observed like instances between dogs, between dog and cat, cat and cat? in the polish war of , two russian and two polish regiments of cavalry charged each other. they went with the same dash to meet one another. when close enough to recognize faces, these cavalrymen slackened their gait and both turned their backs. the russians and poles, at this terrible moment, recognized each other as brothers, and rather than spill fraternal blood, they extricated themselves from a combat as if it were a crime. that is the version of an eyewitness and narrator, a polish officer. what do you think of cavalry troops so moved by brotherly love? but let us resume: when people become more numerous, and when the surprise of an entire population occupying a vast space is no longer possible, when a sort of public conscience has been cultivated within society, one is warned beforehand. war is formally declared. surprise is no longer the whole of war, but it remains one of the means in war, the best means, even to-day. man can no longer kill his enemy without defense. he has forewarned him. he must expect to find him standing and in numbers. he must fight; but he wishes to conquer with as little risk as possible. he employs the iron shod mace against the staff, arrows against the mace, the shield against arrows, the shield and cuirass against the shield alone, the long lance against the short lance, the tempered sword against the iron sword, the armed chariot against man on foot, and so on. man taxes his ingenuity to be able to kill without running the risk of being killed. his bravery is born of his strength and it is not absolute. before a stronger he flees without shame. the instinct of self-preservation is so powerful that he does not feel disgraced in obeying it, although, thanks to the defensive power of arms and armor he can fight at close quarters. can you expect him to act in any other way? man must test himself before acknowledging a stronger. but once the stronger is recognized, no one will face him. individual strength and valor were supreme in primitive combats, so much so that when its heroes were killed, the nation was conquered. as a result of a mutual and tacit understanding, combatants often stopped fighting to watch with awe and anxiety two champions struggling. whole peoples often placed their fate in the hands of the champions who took up the task and who alone fought. this was perfectly natural. they counted their champion a superman, and no man can stand against the superman. but intelligence rebels against the dominance of force. no one can stand against an achilles, but no achilles can withstand ten enemies who, uniting their efforts, act in concert. this is the reason for tactics, which prescribe beforehand proper means of organization and action to give unanimity to effort, and for discipline which insures united efforts in spite of the innate weakness of combatants. in the beginning man battled against man, each one for himself, like a beast that hunts to kill, yet flees from that which would kill him. but now prescriptions of discipline and tactics insure unity between leader and soldier, between the men themselves. besides the intellectual progress, is there a moral progress? to secure unity in combat, to make tactical dispositions in order to render it practically possible, we must be able to count on the devotion of all. this elevates all combatants to the level of the champions of primitive combat. esprit appears, flight is a disgrace, for one is no longer alone in combat. there is a legion, and he who gives way quits his commanders and his companions. in all respects the combatant is worth more. so reason shows us the strength of wisely united effort; discipline makes it possible. will the result be terrible fights, conflicts of extermination? no! collective man, a disciplined body of troops formed in tactical battle order, is invincible against an undisciplined body of troops. but against a similarly disciplined body, he becomes again primitive man. he flees before a greater force of destruction when he recognizes it or when he foresees it. nothing is changed in the heart of man. discipline keeps enemies face to face a little longer, but cannot supplant the instinct of self-preservation and the sense of fear that goes with it. fear!... there are officers and soldiers who do not know it, but they are people of rare grit. the mass shudders; because you cannot suppress the flesh. this trembling must be taken into account in all organization, discipline, arrangements, movements, maneuvers, mode of action. all these are affected by the human weakness of the soldier which causes him to magnify the strength of the enemy. this faltering is studied in ancient combat. it is seen that of nations apt in war, the strongest have been those who, not only best have understood the general conduct of war, but who have taken human weakness into greatest account and taken the best guarantees against it. it is notable that the most warlike peoples are not always those in which military institutions and combat methods are the best or the most rational. and indeed, in warlike nations there is a good dose of vanity. they only take into account courage in their tactics. one might say that they do not desire to acknowledge weakness. the gaul, a fool in war, used barbarian tactics. after the first surprise, he was always beaten by the greeks and romans. the greek, a warrior, but also a politician, had tactics far superior to those of the gauls and the asiatics. the roman, a politician above all, with whom war was only a means, wanted perfect means. he had no illusions. he took into account human weakness and he discovered the legion. but this is merely affirming what should be demonstrated. chapter ii knowledge of man made roman tactics. the successes of hannibal, those of caesar greek tactics developed the phalanx; roman tactics, the legion; the tactics of the barbarians employed the square phalanx, wedge or lozenge. the mechanism of these various formations is explained in all elementary books. polybius enters into a mechanical discussion when he contrasts the phalanx and the legion. (book .) the greeks were, in intellectual civilization, superior to the romans, consequently their tactics ought to have been far more rational. but such was not the case. greek tactics proceeded from mathematical reasoning; roman tactics from a profound knowledge of man's heart. naturally the greeks did not neglect morale nor the romans mechanics, [ ] but their primary, considerations were diverse. what formation obtained the maximum effort from the greek army? what methods caused the soldiers of a roman army to fight most effectively? the first question admits of discussion. the roman solved the second. the roman was not essentially brave. he did not produce any warrior of the type of alexander. it is acknowledged that the valorous impetuosity of the barbarians, gauls, cimbri, teutons, made him tremble. but to the glorious courage of the greeks, to the natural bravery of the gauls he opposed a strict sense of duty, secured by a terrible discipline in the masses. it was inspired in the officers by a sentiment of the strongest patriotism. the discipline of the greeks was secured by exercises and rewards; the discipline of the romans was secured also by the fear of death. they put to death with the club; they decimated their cowardly or traitorous units. in order to conquer enemies that terrified his men, a roman general heightened their morale, not by enthusiasm but by anger. he made the life of his soldiers miserable by excessive work and privations. he stretched the force of discipline to the point where, at a critical instant, it must break or expend itself on the enemy. under similar circumstances, a greek general caused tyrtaeus to sing. [ ] it would have been curious to see two such forces opposed. but discipline alone does not constitute superior tactics. man in battle, i repeat, is a being in whom the instinct of self-preservation dominates, at certain moments, all other sentiments. discipline has for its aim the domination of that instinct by a greater terror. but it cannot dominate it completely. i do not deny the glorious examples where discipline and devotion have elevated man above himself. but if these examples are glorious, it is because they are rare; if they are admired, it is because they are considered exceptions, and the exception proves the rule. the determination of that instant where man loses his reasoning power and becomes instinctive is the crowning achievement in the science of combat. in general, here was the strength of the roman tactics. in particular cases such successful determination makes hannibals and caesars. combat took place between masses in more or less deep formation commanded and supervised by leaders with a definite mission. the combat between masses was a series of individual conflicts, juxtaposed, with the front rank man alone fighting. if he fell, if he was wounded or worn out, he was replaced by the man of the second rank who had watched and guarded his flanks. this procedure continued up to the last rank. man is always physically and morally fatigued in a hand-to-hand tournament where he employs all his energy. these contests generally lasted but a short time. with like morale, the least fatigued always won. during this engagement of the first two ranks, the one fighting, the other watching close at hand, the men of the rear ranks waited inactive at two paces distance for their turn in the combat, which would come only when their predecessors were killed, wounded or exhausted. they were impressed by the violent fluctuations of the struggle of the first rank. they heard the clashes of the blows and distinguished, perhaps, those that sank into the flesh. they saw the wounded, the exhausted crawl through the intervals to go to the rear. passive spectators of danger, they were forced to await its terrible approach. these men were subjected to the poignant emotions of combat without being supported by the animation of the struggle. they were thus placed under the moral pressure of the greatest of anxieties. often they could not stand it until their turn came; they gave way. the best tactics, the best dispositions were those that made easiest a succession of efforts by assuring the relief by ranks of units in action, actually engaging only the necessary units and keeping the rest as a support or reserve outside of the immediate sphere of moral tension. the superiority of the romans lay in such tactics and in the terrible discipline which prepared and assured the execution. by their resistance against fatigue which rude and continual tasks gave them and by the renewal of combatants in combat, they secured greater continuity of effort than any others. [ ] the gauls did not reason. seeing only the inflexible line, they bound themselves together, thus rendering relief impracticable. they believed, as did the greeks, in the power of the mass and impulse of deep files, and did not understand that deep files were powerless to push the first ranks forward as they recoiled in the face of death. it is a strange error to believe that the last ranks will go to meet that which made the first ones fall back. on the contrary, the contagion of recoil is so strong that the stopping of the head means the falling back of the rear! the greeks, also, certainly had reserves and supports in the second half of their dense ranks. but the idea of mass dominated. they placed these supports and reserves too near, forgetting the essential, man. the romans believed in the power of mass, but from the moral point of view only. they did not multiply the files in order to add to the mass, but to give to the combatants the confidence of being aided and relieved. the number of ranks was calculated according to the moral pressure that the last ranks could sustain. there is a point beyond which man cannot bear the anxiety of combat in the front lines without being engaged. the romans did not so increase the number of ranks as to bring about this condition. the greeks did not observe and calculate so well. they sometimes brought the number of files up to thirty-two and their last files, which in their minds, were doubtless their reserves, found themselves forcibly dragged into the material disorder of the first ones. in the order by maniples in the roman legion, the best soldiers, those whose courage had been proved by experience in battle, waited stoically, kept in the second and third lines. they were far enough away not to suffer wounds and not to be drawn in by the front line retiring into their intervals. yet they were near enough to give support when necessary or to finish the job by advancing. when the three separate and successive maniples of the first cohort were united in order to form the united battle cohort of marius and of caesar, the same brain placed the most reliable men in the last lines, i.e., the oldest. the youngest, the most impetuous, were in the first lines. the legion was not increased simply to make numbers or mass. each had his turn in action, each man in his maniple, each maniple in its cohort, and, when the unit became a cohort, each cohort in the order of battle. we have seen that the roman theory dictated a depth of ranks to furnish successive lines of combatants. the genius of the general modified these established formations. if the men were inured to war, well-trained, reliable, tenacious, quick to relieve their file leaders, full of confidence in their general and their own comrades, the general diminished the depth of the files, did away with the lines even, in order to increase the number of immediate combatants by increasing the front. his men having a moral, and sometimes also a physical endurance superior to that of the adversary, the general knew that the last ranks of the latter would not, under pressure, hold sufficiently to relieve the first lines nor to forbid the relief of his own. hannibal had a part of his infantry, the africans, armed and drilled in the roman way; his spanish infantrymen had the long wind of the spaniards of to-day; his gallic soldiers, tried out by hardship, were in the same way fit for long efforts. hannibal, strong with the confidence with which he inspired his people, drew up a line less deep by half than the roman army and at cannae hemmed in an army which had twice his number and exterminated it. caesar at pharsalus, for similar reasons, did not hesitate to decrease his depth. he faced double his strength in the army of pompey, a roman army like his own, and crushed it. we have mentioned cannae and pharsalus, we shall study in them the mechanism and the morale of ancient combat, two things which cannot be separated. we cannot find better examples of battle more clearly and more impartially exhibited. this is due in one case to the clear presentation of polybius, who obtained his information from the fugitives from cannae, possibly even from some of the conquerors; in the other it is due to the impassive clearness of caesar in describing the art of war. chapter iii analysis of the battle of cannae recital of polybius: "varro placed the cavalry on the right wing, and rested it on the river; the infantry was deployed near it and on the same line, the maniples drawn close to each other, with smaller intervals than usual, and the maniples presenting more depth than front. "the cavalry of the allies, on the left wing, completed the line, in front of which were posted the light troops. there were in that army, including the allies, eighty thousand foot and a little more than six thousand horse. "meanwhile hannibal had his slingers and light troops cross the aufidus and posted them in front of his army. the rest crossed the river at two places. he placed the iberian and gallic cavalry on the left wing, next the river and facing the roman cavalry. he placed on the same line, one half of the african infantry heavily armed, the iberian and gallic infantry, the other half of the african infantry, and finally the numidian cavalry which formed the right wing. "after he had thus arrayed all his troops upon a single line, he marched to meet the enemy with the iberian and gallic infantry moving independently of the main body. as it was joined in a straight line with the rest, on separating, it was formed like the convex face of a crescent. this formation reduced its depth in the center. the intention of the general was to commence the battle with the iberians and gauls, and have them supported by the africans. "the latter infantry was armed like the roman infantry, having been equipped by hannibal with arms that had been taken from the romans in preceding battle. both iberians and gauls had shields; but their swords were quite different. the sword of the former was as fit for thrusting as for cutting while that of the gauls only cut with the edge, and at a limited distance. these troops were drawn up as follows: the iberians were in two bodies of troops on the wings, near the africans; the gauls in the center. the gauls were nude; the iberians in linen shirts of purple color, which to the romans was an extraordinary and frightening spectacle. the carthaginian army consisted of ten thousand horse and little more than forty thousand foot. "aemilius commanded the right of the romans, varro the left; the two consuls of the past year, servilius and attilius, were in the center. on the carthaginian side, hasdrubal had the left under his orders, hanno the right, and hannibal, who had his brother mago with him, reserved for himself the command of the center. the two armies did not suffer from the glare of the sun when it rose, the one being faced to the south, as i remarked, and the other to the north. "action commenced with the light troops, which were in front of both armies. the first engagement gave advantage to neither the one nor the other. just as soon as the iberian and gallic cavalry on the left approached, the conflict became hot. the romans fought with fury and rather more like barbarians than romans. this falling back and then returning to the charge was not according to their tactics. scarcely did they become engaged when they leaped from their horses and each seized his adversary. in the meanwhile the carthaginians gained the upper hand. the greater number of the romans remained on the ground after having fought with the greatest valor. the others were pursued along the river and cut to pieces without being able to obtain quarter. "the heavily armed infantry immediately took the place of the light troops and became engaged. the iberians and gauls held firm at first and sustained the shock with vigor; but they soon gave way to the weight of the legions, and, opening the crescent, turned their backs and retreated. the romans followed them with impetuosity, and broke the gallic line much more easily because the wings crowded toward the center where the thick of the fighting was. the whole line did not fight at the same time. the action commenced in the center because the gauls, being drawn up in the form of a crescent, left the wings far behind them, and presented the convex face of the crescent to the romans. the latter then followed the gauls and iberians closely, and crowded towards the center, to the place where the enemy gave way, pushing ahead so forcibly that on both flanks they engaged the heavily armed africans. the africans on the right, in swinging about from right to left, found themselves all along the enemy's flank, as well as those on the left which made the swing from left to right. the very circumstances of the action showed them what they had to do. this was what hannibal had foreseen; that the romans pursuing the gauls must be enveloped by the africans. the romans then, no longer able to keep their formation [ ] were forced to defend themselves man to man and in small groups against those who attacked them on front and flank.[ ] "aemilius had escaped the carnage on the right wing at the commencement of the battle. wishing, according to the orders he had given, to be everywhere, and seeing that it was the legionary infantry that would decide the fate of the battle, he pushed his horse through the fray, warded off or killed every one who opposed him, and sought at the same time to reanimate the ardor of the roman soldiers. hannibal, who during the entire battle remained in the conflict, did the same in his army. "the numidian cavalry on the right wing, without doing or suffering much, was useful on that occasion by its manner of fighting; for, pouncing upon the enemy on all sides, they gave him enough to do so that he might not have time to think of helping his own people. indeed, when the left wing, where hasdrubal commanded, had routed almost all the cavalry of the roman right wing, and a junction had been effected with the numidians, the auxiliary cavalry did not wait to be attacked but gave way. "hasdrubal is said to have done something which proved his prudence and his ability, and which contributed to the success of the battle. as the numidians were in great number, and as these troops were never more useful than when one was in flight before them, he gave them the fugitives to pursue, and led the iberian and gallic cavalry in a charge to aid the african infantry. he pounced on the romans from the rear, and having bodies of cavalry charge into the mêlée at several places, he gave new strength to the africans and made the arms drop from the hands of the adversaries. it was then that l. aemilius, a citizen who during his whole life, as in this last conflict, had nobly fulfilled his duties to his country, finally succumbed, covered with mortal wounds. "the romans continued fighting, giving battle to those who were surrounding them. they resisted to the last. but as their numbers diminished more and more, they were finally forced into a smaller circle, and all put to the sword. attilius and servilius, two persons of great probity, who had distinguished themselves in the combat as true romans, were also killed on that occasion. "while this carnage was taking place in the center, the numidians pursued the fugitives of the left wing. most of them were cut down, others were thrown under their horses; some of them escaped to venusia. among these was varro, the roman general, that abominable man whose administration cost his country so dearly. thus ended the battle of cannae, a battle where prodigies of valor were seen on both sides. "of the six thousand horse of which the roman cavalry was composed, only seventy romans reached venusia with varro, and, of the auxiliary cavalry, only three hundred men found shelter in various towns. ten thousand foot were taken prisoners, but they were not in the battle. [ ] of troops in battle only about three thousand saved themselves in the nearby town; the balance, numbering about twenty thousand, died on the field of honor." [ ] hannibal lost in that action in the neighborhood of four thousand gauls, fifteen hundred iberians and africans and two hundred horses. let us analyze: the light infantry troops were scattered in front of the armies and skirmished without result. the real combat commenced with the attack on the legitimate cavalry of the roman left wing by the cavalry of hannibal. there, says polybius, the fight grew thickest, the romans fought with fury and much more like barbarians than like romans; because this falling back, then returning to the charge was not according to their tactics; scarcely did they become engaged when they leaped from their horses and each seized his adversary, etc., etc. this means that the roman cavalry did not habitually fight hand to hand like the infantry. it threw itself in a gallop on the enemy cavalry. when within javelin range, if the enemy's cavalry had not turned in the opposite direction on seeing the roman cavalry coming, the latter prudently slackened its gait, threw some javelins, and, making an about by platoons, took to the rear for the purpose of repeating the charge. the hostile cavalry did the same, and such an operation might be renewed several times, until one of the two, persuaded that his enemy was going to attack him with a dash, turned in flight and was pursued to the limit. that day, the fight becoming hot, they became really engaged; the two cavalry bodies closed and man fought man. the fight was forced, however; as there was no giving way on one side or the other, it was necessary actually to attack. there was no space for skirmishing. closed in by the aufidus and the legions, the roman cavalry could not operate (livy). the iberian and gallic cavalry, likewise shut in and double the roman cavalry, was forced into two lines; it could still less maneuver. this limited front served the romans, inferior in number, who could thus be attacked only in front, that is by an equal number. it rendered, as we have said, contact inevitable. these two cavalry bodies placed chest to chest had to fight close, had to grapple man to man, and for riders mounted on simple saddle cloths and without stirrup, embarrassed with a shield, a lance, a saber or a sword, to grapple man to man is to grapple together, fall together and fight on foot. that is what happened, as the account of titus livius explains it in completing that of polybius. the same thing happened every time that two ancient cavalry organizations really had to fight, as the battle of the tecinus showed. this mode of action was all to the advantage of the romans, who were well-armed and well-trained therein. note the battle of tecinus. the roman light infantry was cut to pieces, but the elite of the roman cavalry, although surprised and surrounded, fought a-foot and on horse back, inflicted more casualties on the cavalry of hannibal than they suffered, and brought back from the field their wounded general. the romans besides were well led by consul aemilius, a man of head and heart, who, instead of fleeing when his cavalry was defeated, went himself to die in the ranks of the infantry. meanwhile we see thirty to thirty-four hundred roman cavalrymen nearly exterminated by six to seven thousand gauls and iberians who did not lose even two hundred men. hannibal's entire cavalry lost but two hundred men on that day. how can that be explained? because most of them died without dreaming of selling their lives and because they took to flight during the fight of the first line and were struck with impunity from behind. the words of polybius: "most of them remained on the spot after having defended themselves with the utmost valor," were consecrated words before polybius. the conquered always console themselves with their bravery and conquerors never contradict. unfortunately, the figures are there. the facts of the battle are found in the account, which sounds no note of desperation. the gallic and roman cavalry had each already made a brave effort by attacking each other from the front. this effort was followed by the terrible anxiety of close combat. the roman cavalrymen, who from behind the combatants on foot were able to see the second gallic line on horse back, gave ground. fear very quickly made the disengaged ranks take to their horses, wheel about like a flock of sheep in a stampede, and abandon their comrades and themselves to the mercy of the conquerors. yet, these horsemen were brave men, the elite of the army, noble knights, guards of the consuls, volunteers of noble families. the roman cavalry defeated, hasdrubal passed his gallic and iberian troopers behind hannibal's army, to attack the allied cavalry till then engaged by the numidians. [ ] the cavalry of the allies did not await the enemy. it turned its back immediately; pursued to the utmost by the numidians who were numerous (three thousand), and excellent in pursuit, it was reduced to some three hundred men, without a struggle. after the skirmishing of the light infantry troops, the foot-soldiers of the line met. polybius has explained to us how the roman infantry let itself be enclosed by the two wings of the carthaginian army and taken in rear by hasdrubal's cavalry. it is also probable that the gauls and iberians, repulsed in the first part of the action and forced to turn their backs, returned, aided by a portion of the light infantry, to the charge upon the apex of the wedge formed by the romans and completed their encirclement. but we know, as will be seen further on in examples taken from caesar, that the ancient cavalryman was powerless against formed infantry, even against the isolated infantryman possessing coolness. the iberian and gallic cavalry ought to have found behind the roman army the reliable triarians penned in, armed, with pikes. [ ] it might have held them in check, forced them to give battle, but done them little or no harm as long as the ranks were preserved. we know that of hannibal's infantry only twelve thousand at the most were equipped with roman weapons. we know that his gallic and iberian infantry, protected by plain shields, had to fall back, turn, and probably lost in this part of the action very nearly the four thousand men, which the battle cost them. let us deduct the ten thousand men that had gone to the attack of hannibal's camp and the five thousand which the latter must have left there. there remain: a mass of seventy thousand men surrounded and slaughtered by twenty-eight thousand foot soldiers, or, counting hasdrubal's cavalry, by thirty-six thousand men, by half their number. it may be asked how seventy thousand men could have let themselves be slaughtered, without defense, by thirty-six thousand men less well-armed, when each combatant had but one man before him. for in close combat, and especially in so large an envelopment, the number of combatants immediately engaged was the same on each side. then there were neither guns nor rifles able to pierce the mass by a converging fire and destroy it by the superiority of this fire over diverging fire. arrows were exhausted in the first period of the action. it seems that, by their mass, the romans must have presented an insurmountable resistance, and that while permitting the enemy to wear himself out against it, that mass had only to defend itself in order to repel assailants. but it was wiped out. in pursuit of the gauls and iberians, who certainly were not able, even with like morale, to stand against the superior arms of the legionaries, the center drove all vigorously before it. the wings, in order to support it and not to lose the intervals, followed its movement by a forward oblique march and formed the sides of the salient. the entire roman army, in wedge order, marched to victory. suddenly the wings were attacked by the african battalions; the gauls, the iberians, [ ] who had been in retreat, returned to the fight. the horsemen of hasdrubal, in the rear, attacked the reserves. [ ] everywhere there was combat, unexpected, unforeseen. at the moment when they believed themselves conquerors, everywhere, in front, to the right, to the left, in the rear, the roman soldiers heard the furious clamor of combat. [ ] the physical pressure was unimportant. the ranks that they were fighting had not half their own depth. the moral pressure was enormous. uneasiness, then terror, took hold of them; the first ranks, fatigued or wounded, wanted to retreat; but the last ranks, frightened, withdrew, gave way and whirled into the interior of the wedge. demoralized and not feeling themselves supported, the ranks engaged followed them, and the routed mass let itself be slaughtered. the weapons fell from their hands, says polybius. the analysis of cannae is ended. before passing to the recital of pharsalus, we cannot resist the temptation, though the matter be a little foreign to the subject, to say a few words about the battles of hannibal. these battles have a particular character of stubbornness explained by the necessity for overcoming the roman tenacity. it may be said that to hannibal victory was not sufficient. he must destroy. consequently he always tried to cut off all retreat for the enemy. he knew that with rome, destruction was the only way of finishing the struggle. he did not believe in the courage of despair in the masses; he believed in terror and he knew the value of surprise in inspiring it. but it was not the losses of the romans that was the most surprising thing in these engagements. it was the losses of hannibal. who, before hannibal or after him, has lost as many as the romans and yet been conqueror? to keep troops in action, until victory comes, with such losses, requires a most powerful hand. he inspired his people with absolute confidence. almost always his center, where he put his gauls, his food for powder, was broken. but that did not seem to disquiet or trouble either him or his men. it is true that his center was pierced by the romans who were escaping the pressure of the two carthaginian wings, that they were in disorder because they had fought and pushed back the gauls, whom hannibal knew how to make fight with singular tenacity. they probably felt as though they had escaped from a press, and, happy to be out of it, they thought only of getting further away from the battle and by no means of returning to the flanks or the rear of the enemy. in addition, although nothing is said about it, hannibal had doubtless taken precautions against their ever returning to the conflict. all that is probably true. the confidence of the gallic troops, so broken through, is none the less surprising. hannibal, in order to inspire his people with such confidence, had to explain to them before the combat his plan of action, in such a way that treachery could not injure him. he must have warned his troops that the center would be pierced, but that he was not worried about it, because it was a foreseen and prepared affair. his troops, indeed, did not seem to be worried about it. let us leave aside his conception of campaigns, his greatest glory in the eyes of all. hannibal was the greatest general of antiquity by reason of his admirable comprehension of the morale of combat, of the morale of the soldier whether his own or the enemy's. he shows his greatness in this respect in all the different incidents of war, of campaign, of action. his men were not better than the roman soldiers. they were not as well armed, one-half less in number. yet he was always the conqueror. he understood the value of morale. he had the absolute confidence of his people. in addition he had the art, in commanding an army, of always securing the advantage of morale. in italy he had, it is true, cavalry superior to that of the romans. but the romans had a much superior infantry. had conditions been reversed, he would have changed his methods. the instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them, and pompey, we shall see, was beaten at pharsalus precisely because he had a cavalry superior to that of caesar. if hannibal was vanquished at zuma, it was because genius cannot accomplish the impossible. zuma proved again the perfect knowledge of men that hannibal possessed and his influence over the troops. his third line, the only one where he really had reliable soldiers, was the only one that fought. beset on all sides, it slew two thousand romans before it was conquered. we shall see later what a high state of morale, what desperate fighting, this meant. chapter iv analysis of the battle of pharsalus, and some characteristic examples here is caesar's account of the battle of pharsalus. "as caesar approached pompey's camp, he noted that pompey's army was placed in the following order: "on the left wing were the nd and rd legions which caesar had sent to pompey at the commencement of the operation, pursuant to a decree of the senate, and which pompey had kept. scipio occupied the center with the legions from syria. the legion from cilicia was placed on the right wing together with the spanish cohorts of afranius. pompey regarded the troops already mentioned as the most reliable of his army. between them, that is, between the center and the wings, he had distributed the remainder, consisting of one hundred and ten complete cohorts in line. these were made up of forty-five thousand men, two thousand of whom were veterans, previously rewarded for their services, who had come to join him. he had scattered them throughout the whole line of battle. seven cohorts had been left to guard his camp and the neighboring forts. his right wing rested on a stream with inaccessible banks; and, for that reason, he had placed all his seven thousand cavalry, [ ] his archers and his slingers (forty-two hundred men) on the left wing. "caesar, keeping his battle order, [ ] had placed the th legion on the right wing, and on the left, the th, which was much weakened by the combats of dyrrachium. to the latter he added the th in order to form something like a full legion from the two, and ordered them to support one another. he had eighty very completely organized cohorts in line, approximately twenty-two thousand men. two cohorts had been left to guard the camp. caesar had entrusted the command of the left wing to anthony, that of the right to p. sylla, and of the center to c. domitius. he placed himself in front of pompey. but when he saw the disposition of the opposing army, he feared that his right wing was going to be enveloped by pompey's numerous cavalry. he therefore withdrew immediately from his third line a cohort from each legion (six cohorts), in order to form a fourth line, placed it to receive pompey's cavalry and showed it what it had to do. then he explained fully to these cohorts that the success of the day depended on their valor. at the same time he ordered the entire army, and in particular the third line, not to move without his command, reserving to himself authority to give the signal by means of the standard when he thought it opportune. "caesar then went through his lines to exhort his men to do well, and seeing them full of ardor, had the signal given. "between the two armies there was only enough space to give each the necessary distance for the charge. but pompey had given his men orders to await the charge without stirring, and to let caesar's army break its ranks upon them. he did this, they say, on the advice of c. triarius, as a method of meeting the force of the first dash of caesar's men. he hoped that their battle order would be broken up and his own soldiers, well disposed in ranks, would have to fight with sword in hand only men in disorder. he thought that this formation would best protect his troops from the force of the fall of heavy javelins. at the same time he hoped that caesar's soldiers charging at the run would be out of breath and overcome with fatigue at the moment of contact. pompey's immobility was an error because there is in every one an animation, a natural ardor that is instilled by the onset to the combat. generals ought not to check but to encourage this ardor. it was for this reason that, in olden times, troops charged with loud shouts, all trumpets sounding, in order to frighten the enemy and encourage themselves. "in the meanwhile, our soldiers, at the given signal advanced with javelins in hand; but having noticed that pompey's soldiers were not running towards them, and taught by experience and trained by previous battles, they slowed down and stopped in the midst of their run, in order not to arrive out of breath and worn out. some moments after, having taken up their run again, they launched their javelins, and immediately afterwards, according to caesar's order drew their swords. the pompeians conducted themselves perfectly. they received the darts courageously; they did not stir before the dash of the legions; they preserved their lines, and, having dispatched their javelins, drew their swords. "at the same time pompey's entire cavalry dashed from the left wing, as had been ordered, and the mass of his archers ran from all parts of the line. our cavalry did not await the charge, but fell back a little. pompey's cavalry became more pressing, and commenced to reform its squadrons and turn our exposed flank. as soon as caesar saw this intention, he gave the signal to the fourth line of six cohorts. this line started directly and, standards low, they charged the pompeian cavalry with such vigor and resolution that not a single man stood his ground. all wheeled about and not only withdrew in full flight, but gained the highest mountains as fast as they could. they left the archers and slingers without their defense and protection. these were all killed. at the same time the cohorts moved to the rear of pompey's left wing, which was still fighting and resisting, and attacked it in rear. "meanwhile, caesar had advanced his third line, which up to this moment had been kept quietly at its post. these fresh troops relieved those that were fatigued. pompey's men, taken in rear, could no longer hold out and all took to flight. "caesar was not in error when he put these cohorts in a fourth line, particularly charged with meeting the cavalry, and urged them to do well, since their effort would bring victory. they repulsed the cavalry. they cut to pieces the slingers and archers. they turned pompey's left wing, and this decided the day. "when pompey saw his cavalry repulsed and that portion of the army upon which he had counted the most seized with terror, he had little confidence in the rest. he quit the battle and galloped to his camp, where, addressing his centurions who were guarding the praetorian gate, he told them in a loud voice heard by the soldiers: 'guard well the camp and defend it vigorously in case of attack; as for myself, i am going to make the tour of the other gates and assure their defense.' "that said, he retired to the praetorium, despairing of success and awaiting events. "after having forced the enemy to flee to his entrenchments caesar, persuaded that he ought not to give the slightest respite to a terrorized enemy, incited his soldiers to profit by their advantage and attack the camp. although overcome by the heat, for the struggle was prolonged into the middle of the day, they did not object to greater fatigue and obeyed. the camp was at first well defended by the cohorts on watch and especially by the thracians and barbarians. the men who had fled from the battle, full of fright and overcome with fatigue, had nearly all thrown their arms and colors away and thought rather more of saving themselves than of defending the camp. even those who defended the entrenchments were unable long to resist the shower of arrows. covered with wounds, they abandoned the place, and led by their centurions and tribunes, they took refuge as quickly as they could in the high mountains near the camp. "caesar lost in this battle but two hundred soldiers, but nearly thirty of the bravest centurions were killed therein. of pompey's army fifteen thousand perished, and more than twenty-four thousand took refuge in the mountains. as caesar had invested the mountains with entrenchments, they surrendered the following day." such is caesar's account. his action is so clearly shown that there is scarcely any need of comment. initially caesar's formation was in three lines. this was the usual battle order in the roman armies, without being absolute, however, since marius fought with two only. but, as we have said, according to the occasion, the genius of the chief decided the battle formation. there is no reason to suppose that pompey's army was in a different order of battle. to face that army, twice as large as his, caesar, if he had had to preserve the disposition of cohorts in ten ranks, would have been able to form but one complete line, the first, and a second, half as numerous, as a reserve. but he knew the bravery of his troops, and he knew the apparent force of deep ranks to be a delusion. he did not hesitate to diminish his depth in order to keep the formation and morale of three-fifths of his troops intact, until the moment of their engagement. in order to be even more sure of the third line of his reserve, and in order to make sure that it would not be carried away by its enthusiasm for action, he paid it most particular attention. perhaps, the text is doubtful, he kept it at double the usual distance in rear of the fighting lines. then, to guard against a turning movement by pompey's seven thousand cavalry and forty-two hundred slingers and archers, a movement in which pompey placed the hopes of victory, caesar posted six cohorts that represented scarcely two thousand men. he had perfect confidence that these two thousand men would make pompey's cavalry wheel about, and that his one thousand horsemen would then press the action so energetically that pompey's cavalry would not even think of rallying. it happened so; and the forty-two hundred archers and slingers were slaughtered like sheep by these cohorts, aided, without doubt, by four-hundred foot [ ] young and agile, whom caesar mixed with his thousand horsemen and who remained at this task, leaving the horsemen, whom they had relieved, to pursue the terror-stricken fugitives. thus were seven thousand horsemen swept away and forty-two hundred infantrymen slaughtered without a struggle, all demoralized simply by a vigorous demonstration. the order to await the charge, given by pompey to his infantry, was judged too severely by caesar. caesar certainly was right as a general rule; the enthusiasm of the troops must not be dampened, and the initiative of the attack indeed gives to the assailant a certain moral influence. but with trusted soldiers, duly trained, one can try a stratagem, and the men of pompey had proven their dependability by awaiting on the spot, without stirring, a vigorous enemy in good order, when they counted on meeting him in disorder and out of breath. though it may not have led to success, the advice of triarius was not bad. even the conduct of caesar's men proves this. this battle shows the confidence of the soldier in the material rank in ancient combat, as assuring support and mutual assistance. notwithstanding the fact that caesar's soldiers had the initiative in the attack, the first encounter decided nothing. it was a combat on the spot, a struggle of several hours. forty-five thousand good troops lost scarcely two hundred men in this struggle for, with like arms, courage and ability, pompey's infantry ought not to have lost in hand-to-hand fighting more than that of caesar's. these same forty-five thousand men gave way, and, merely between the battle field and their camp, twelve thousand were slaughtered. pompey's men had twice the depth of caesar's ranks, whose attack did not make them fall back a step. on the other hand their mass was unable to repel him, and he was fought on the spot. pompey had announced to them, says caesar, that the enemy's army would be turned by his cavalry, and suddenly, when they were fighting bravely, step by step, they heard behind them the shouts of attack by the six cohorts of caesar, two thousand men. does it seem an easy matter for such a force to ward off this menace? no. the wing taken in rear in this way loses ground; more and more the contagion of fear spreads to the rest. terror is so great that they do not think of re-forming in their camp, which is defended for a moment only by the cohorts on guard. just as at cannae, their arms drop from their hands. but for the good conduct of the camp guards which permitted the fugitives to gain the mountains, the twenty-four thousand prisoners of the next day might have been corpses that very day. cannae and pharsalus, are sufficient to illustrate ancient combat. let us, however, add some other characteristic examples, which we shall select briefly and in chronological order. they will complete our data. [ ] livy relates that in an action against some of the peoples in the neighborhood of rome, i do not recall now which, the romans did not dare to pursue for fear of breaking their ranks. in a fight against the hernici, he cites the roman horsemen, who had not been able to do anything on horseback to break up the enemy, asking the consul for permission to dismount and fight on foot. this is true not only of roman cavalrymen, for later on we shall see the best riders, the gauls, the germans, the parthanians even, dismounting in order really to fight. the volsci, the latini, the hernici, etc., combined to fight the romans; and as the action nears its end, livy relates: "finally, the first ranks having fallen, and carnage being all about them, they threw away their arms and started to scatter. the cavalry then dashed forward, with orders not to kill the isolated ones, but to harass the mass with their arrows, annoy it, to delay it, to prevent dispersion in order to permit the infantry to come up and kill." in hamilcar's engagement against the mercenaries in revolt, who up to then had always beaten the carthaginians, the mercenaries endeavored to envelop him. hamilcar surprised them by a new maneuver and defeated them. he marched in three lines: elephants, cavalry and light infantry, then heavily armed phalanxes. at the approach of the mercenaries who were marching vigorously towards him the two lines formed by the elephants, the cavalry and light infantry, turned about and moved quickly to place themselves on the flanks of the third line. the third line thus exposed met a foe which had thought only of pursuit, and which the surprise put to flight. it thus abandoned itself to the action of the elephants, horses and the light infantry who massacred the fugitives. hamilcar killed six thousand men, captured two thousand and lost practically nobody. it was a question as to whether he had lost a single man, since there had been no combat. in the battle of lake trasimenus, the carthaginians lost fifteen hundred men, nearly all gauls; the romans fifteen thousand and fifteen thousand prisoners. the battle raged for three hours. at zama, hannibal had twenty thousand killed, twenty thousand prisoners; the romans two thousand killed. this was a serious struggle in which hannibal's third line alone fought. it gave way only under the attack on its rear and flank by the cavalry. in the battle of cynoscephalae, between philip and flaminius, philip pressed flaminius with his phalanx thirty-two deep. twenty maniples took the phalanx from behind. the battle was lost by philip. the romans had seven hundred killed; the macedonians eighty thousand, and five thousand prisoners. at pydna, aemilius paulus against perseus, the phalanx marched without being stopped. but gaps occurred from the resistance that it encountered. hundreds penetrated into the gaps in the phalanx and killed the men embarrassed with their long pikes. they were effective only when united, abreast, and at shaft's length. there was frightful disorder and butchery; twenty thousand killed, five thousand captured out of forty-four thousand engaged! the historian does not deem it worth while to speak of the roman losses. after the battle of aix against the teutons, marius surprised the teutons from behind. there was frightful carnage; one hundred thousand teutons and three hundred romans killed. [ ] in sulla's battle of chaeronea against archelaus, a general of mithridates, sulla had about thirty thousand men, archelaus, one hundred and ten thousand. archelaus was beaten by being surprised from the rear. the romans lost fourteen men, and killed their enemies until worn out in pursuit. the battle of orchomenus, against archelaus, was a repetition of chaeronea. caesar states that his cavalry could not fight the britons without greatly exposing itself, because they pretended flight in order to get the cavalry away from the infantry and then, dashing from their chariots, they fought on foot with advantage. a little less than two hundred veterans embarked on a boat which they ran aground at night so as not to be taken by superior naval forces. they reached an advantageous position and passed the night. at the break of day, otacilius dispatched some four hundred horsemen and some infantry from the alesio garrison against them. they defended themselves bravely; and having killed some, they rejoined caesar's troops without having lost a single man. in macedonia caesar's rear-guard was caught by pompey's cavalry at the passage of the genusus river, the banks of which were quite steep. caesar opposed pompey's cavalry five to seven thousand strong, with his cavalry of six hundred to one thousand men, among which he had taken care to intermingle four hundred picked infantrymen. they did their duty so well that, in the combat that followed, they repulsed the enemy, killed many, and fell back upon their own army without the loss of a single man. in the battle of thapsus in africa, against scipio, caesar killed ten thousand, lost fifty, and had some wounded. * * * * * in the battle under the walls of munda in spain, against one of pompey's sons, caesar had eighty cohorts and eight thousand horsemen, about forty-eight thousand men. pompey with thirteen legions had sixty thousand troops of the line, six thousand cavalry, six thousand light infantry, six thousand auxiliaries; in all, about eighty thousand men. the struggle, says the narrator, was valiantly kept up, step by step, sword to sword. [ ] in that battle of exceptional fury, which hung for a long time in the balance, caesar had one thousand dead, five hundred wounded; pompey thirty-three thousand dead, and if munda had not been so near, scarcely two miles away, his losses would have been doubled. the defensive works of munda were constructed from dead bodies and abandoned arms. in studying ancient combats, it can be seen that it was almost always an attack from the flank or rear, a surprise action, that won battles, especially against the romans. it was in this way that their excellent tactics might be confused. roman tactics were so excellent that a roman general who was only half as good as his adversary was sure to be victorious. by surprise alone they could be conquered. note xanthippe,--hannibal--the unexpected fighting methods of the gauls, etc. indeed xenophon says somewhere, "be it agreeable or terrible, the less anything is foreseen, the more does it cause pleasure or dismay. this is nowhere better illustrated than in war where every surprise strikes terror even to those who are much the stronger." but very few fighters armed with cuirass and shield were killed in the front lines. hannibal in his victories lost almost nobody but gauls, his cannon-fodder, who fought with poor shields and without armor. nearly always driven in, they fought, nevertheless, with a tenacity that they never showed under any other command. thucydides characterizes the combat of the lightly armed, by saying: "as a rule, the lightly armed of both sides took to flight." [ ] in combat with closed ranks there was mutual pressure but little loss, the men not being at liberty to strike in their own way and with all their force. caesar against the nervii, saw his men, who in the midst of the action had instinctively closed in mass in order to resist the mass of barbarians, giving way under pressure. he therefore ordered his ranks and files to open, so that his legionaries, closed in mass, paralyzed and forced to give way to a very strong pressure, might be able to kill and consequently demoralize the enemy. and indeed, as soon as a man in the front rank of the nervii fell under the blows of the legionaries, there was a halt, a falling back. following an attack from the rear, and a mêlée, the defeat of the nervii ensued. [ ] chapter v morale in ancient battle we now know the morale and mechanism of ancient fighting; the word mêlée employed by the ancients was many times stronger than the idea to be expressed; it meant a crossing of arms, not a confusion of men. the results of battles, such as losses, suffice to demonstrate this, and an instant of reflection makes us see the error of the word mêlée. in pursuit it was possible to plunge into the midst of the fugitives, but in combat every one had too much need for the next man, for his neighbor, who was guarding his flanks and his back, to let himself be killed out of sheer wantonness by a sure blow from within the ranks of the enemy. [ ] in the confusion of a real mêlée, caesar at pharsalus, and hannibal at cannae, would have been conquered. their shallow ranks, penetrated by the enemy, would have had to fight two against one, they would even have been taken in rear in consequence of the breaking of their ranks. also has there not been seen, in troops equally reliable and desperate, that mutual weariness which brings about, with tacit accord, falling back for a breathing spell on both sides in order again to take up the battle? how can this be possible with a mêlée? with the confusion and medley of combatants, there might be a mutual extermination, but there would not be any victors. how would they recognize each other? can you conceive two mixed masses of men or groups, where every one occupied in front can be struck with impunity from the side or from behind? that is mutual extermination, where victory belongs only to survivors; for in the mix-up and confusion, no one can flee, no one knows where to flee. after all, are not the losses we have seen on both sides demonstration that there was no real mêlée? the word is, therefore, too strong; the imagination of painters' and poets' has created the mêlée. this is what happened: at a charging distance troops marched towards the enemy with all the speed compatible with the necessity for fencing and mutual aid. quite often, the moral impulse, that resolution to go to the end, manifested itself at once in the order and freedom of gait. that impulse alone put to flight a less resolute adversary. it was customary among good troops to have a clash, but not the blind and headlong onset of the mass; the preoccupation [ ] of the rank was very great, as the behavior of caesar's troops at pharsalus shows in their slow march, timed by the flutes of lacedaemonian battalions. at the moment of getting close to the enemy, the dash slackened of its own accord, because the men of the first rank, of necessity and instinctively, assured themselves of the position of their supports, their neighbors in the same line, their comrades in the second, and collected themselves together in order to be more the masters of their movements to strike and parry. there was a contact of man with man; each took the adversary in front of him and attacked him, because by penetrating into the ranks before having struck him down, he risked being wounded in the side by losing his flank supports. each one then hit his man with his shield, expecting to make him lose his equilibrium, and at the instant he tried to recover himself landed the blow. the men in the second line, back of the intervals necessary for fencing in the first, were ready to protect their sides against any one that advanced between them and were prepared to relieve tired warriors. it was the same in the third line, and so on. every one being supported on either side, the first encounter was rarely decisive, and the fencing, the real combat at close quarters, began. if men of the first line were wounded quickly, if the other ranks were not in a hurry to relieve or replace them, or if there was hesitation, defeat followed. this happened to the romans in their first encounters with the gauls. the gaul, with his shield, parried the first thrust, brought his big iron sword swooping down with fury upon the top of the roman shield, split it and went after the man. the romans, already hesitating before the moral impulse of the gauls, their ferocious yells, their nudeness, an indication of a contempt for wounds, fell then in a greater number than their adversaries and demoralization followed. soon they accustomed themselves to this valorous but not tenacious spirit of their enemies, and when they had protected the top of their shields with an iron band, they no longer fell, and the rôles were changed. the gauls, in fact, were unable either to hold their ground against the better arms and the thrusts of the romans, or against their individual superior tenacity, increased nearly tenfold by the possible relay of eight ranks of the maniple. the maniples were self-renewing. whereas with the gauls the duration of the combat was limited to the strength of a single man, on account of the difficulties of close or tumultuous ranks, and the impossibility of replacing losses when they were fighting at close quarters. if the weapons were nearly alike, preserving ranks and thereby breaking down, driving back and confusing the ranks of the enemy, was to conquer. the man in disordered, broken lines, no longer felt himself supported, but vulnerable everywhere, and he fled. it is true that it is hardly possible to break hostile lines without doing the same with one's own. but the one who breaks through first, has been able to do so only by making the foe fall back before his blows, by killing or wounding. he has thereby raised his courage and that of his neighbor. he knows, he sees where he is marching; whilst the adversary overtaken as a consequence of the retreat or the fall of the troops that were flanking him, is surprised. he sees himself exposed on the flank. he falls back on a line with the rank in rear in order to regain support. but the lines in the rear give way to the retreat of the first. if the withdrawal has a certain duration, terror comes as a result of the blows which drive back and mow down the first line. if, to make room for those pushed back, the last lines turn their backs, there is small chance that they will face the front again. space has tempted them. they will not return to the fight. then by that natural instinct of the soldier to worry, to assure himself of his supports, the contagion of flight spreads from the last ranks to the first. the first, closely engaged, has been held to the fight in the meantime, under pain of immediate death. there is no need to explain what follows; it is butchery. (caedes). but to return to combat. it is evident that the formation of troops in a straight line, drawn close together, existed scarcely an instant. moreover each group of files formed in action was connected with the next group; the groups, like the individuals, were always concerned about their support. the fight took place along the line of contact of the first ranks of the army, a straight line, broken, curved, and bent in different directions according to the various chances of the action at such or such a point, but always restricting and separating the combatants of the two sides. once engaged on that line, it was necessary to face the front under pain of immediate death. naturally and necessarily every one in these first ranks exerted all his energy to defend his life. at no point did the line become entangled as long as there was fighting, for, general or soldier, the effort of each one was to keep up the continuity of support all along the line, and to break or cut that of the enemy, because victory then followed. we see then that between men armed with swords, it was possible to have, and there was, if the combat was serious, penetration of one mass into the other, but never confusion, or a jumble of ranks, by the men forming these masses. [ ] sword to sword combat was the most deadly. it presented the most sudden changes, because it was the one in which the individual valor and dexterity of the combatant had the greatest and most immediate influence. other methods of combat were simpler. let us compare pikes and broadswords. the close formation of men armed with pikes was irresistible so long as it was maintained. a forest of pikes fifteen to eighteen feet long kept you at a distance. [ ] on the other hand it was easy to kill off the cavalry and light infantry about the phalanx, which was an unwieldy mass marching with a measured step, and which a mobile body of troops could always avoid. openings in the phalanx might be occasioned by marching, by the terrain, by the thousand accidents of struggle, by the individual assault of brave men, by the wounded on the ground creeping under the high held pikes and cutting at the legs of the front rank. men in the phalanx could scarcely see and even the first two lines hardly had a free position for striking. the men were armed with long lances, useless at close quarters, good only for combat at shaft's length (polybius). they were struck with impunity by the groups [ ] which threw themselves into the intervals. and then, once the enemy was in the body of the phalanx, morale disappeared and it became a mass without order, a flock of panic-stricken sheep falling over each other. in a mob hard-pressed men prick with their knives those who press them. the contagion of fear changes the direction of the human wave; it bends back upon itself and breaks to escape danger. if, then, the enemy fled before the phalanx there was no mêlée. if he gave way tactically before it and availing himself of gaps penetrated it by groups, still there was no mêlée or mixture of ranks. the wedge entering into a mass does not become intermingled with it. with a phalanx armed with long pikes against a similar phalanx there was still less confusion. they were able to stand for a long time, if the one did not take the other in flank or in rear by a detached body of troops. in all ancient combat, even in victory achieved by methods which affected the morale, such methods are always effective, for man does not change. it is unnecessary to repeat that in ancient conflicts, demoralization and flight began in the rear ranks. we have tried to analyze the fight of infantry of the line because its action alone was decisive in ancient combat. the light infantry of both sides took to flight, as thucydides states. they returned later to pursue and massacre the vanquished. [ ] in cavalry against cavalry, the moral effect of a mass charging in good order was of the greatest influence. we rarely see two cavalry organizations, neither of which breaks before such reciprocal action. such action was seen on the tecinus and at cannae, engagements cited merely because they are very rare exceptions. and even in these cases there was no shock at full speed, but a halt face to face and then an engagement. the hurricanes of cavalry of those days were poetic figures. they had no reality. in an encounter at full speed, men and horses would be crushed, and neither men nor horses wished such an encounter. the hands of the cavalrymen reined back, the instinct of men and horses was to slacken, to stop, if the enemy himself did not stop, and to make an about if he continued to advance. and if ever they met, the encounter was so weakened by the hands of the men, the rearing of the horses, the swinging of heads, that it was a face to face stop. some blows were exchanged with the sword or the lance, but the equilibrium was too unstable, mutual support too uncertain for real sword play. man felt himself too isolated. the moral pressure was too strong. although not deadly, the combat lasted but a second, precisely because man felt himself, saw himself, alone and surrounded. the first men, who believed themselves no longer supported, could no longer endure uneasiness: they wheeled about and the rest followed. unless the enemy had also turned, he then pursued at his pleasure until checked by other cavalry, which pursued him in turn. there never was an encounter between cavalry and infantry. the cavalry harassed with its arrows, with the lance perhaps, while passing rapidly, but it never attacked. close conflict on horseback did not exist. and to be sure, if the horse by adding so much to the mobility of man gave him the means of menacing and charging with swiftness, it permitted him to escape with like rapidity when his menace did not shake the enemy. man by using the horse, pursuant to his natural inclination and sane reasoning, could do as much damage as possible while risking the least possible. to riders without stirrups or saddle, for whom the throwing of the javelin was a difficult matter (xenophon), combat was but a succession of reciprocal harassings, demonstrations, menaces, skirmishes with arrows. each cavalry sought an opportunity to surprise, to intimidate, to avail itself of disorder, and to pursue either the cavalry or the infantry. then "vae victis;" the sword worked. man always has had the greatest fear of being trampled upon by horses. that fear has certainly routed a hundred thousand times more men than the real encounter. this was always more or less avoided by the horse, and no one was knocked down. when two ancient cavalry forces wanted really to fight, were forced to it, they fought on foot (note the tecinus, cannae, examples of livy). i find but little real fighting on horseback in all antiquity like that of alexander the great at the passage of the granicus. was even that fighting? his cavalry which traversed a river with steep banks defended by the enemy, lost eighty-five men; the persian cavalry one thousand; and both were equally well armed! the fighting of the middle ages revived the ancient battles except in science. cavalrymen attacked each other perhaps more than the ancient cavalry did, for the reason that they were invulnerable: it was not sufficient to throw them down; it was necessary to kill when once they were on the ground. they knew, however, that their fighting on horseback was not important so far as results were concerned, for when they wished really to battle, they fought on foot. (note the combat of the thirty, bayard, etc.) the victors, arrayed in iron from head to foot, lost no one, the peasants did not count. if the vanquished was taken, he was not massacred, because chivalry had established a fraternity of arms between noblemen, the mounted warriors of different nations, and ransom replaced death. if we have spoken especially of the infantry fight, it is because it was the most serious. on foot, on horseback, on the bridge of a vessel, at the moment of danger, the same man is always found. any one who knows him well, deduces from his action in the past what his action will be in the future. chapter vi under what conditions real combatants are obtained and how the fighting of our days, in order to be well done, requires them to be more dependable than in ancient combat let us repeat now, what we said at the beginning of this study. man does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. he does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second. the continued improvement of all appliances of war has no other goal than the annihilation of the enemy. absolute bravery, which does not refuse battle even on unequal terms, trusting only to god or to destiny, is not natural in man; it is the result of moral culture. it is infinitely rare, because in the face of danger the animal sense of self-preservation always gains the upper hand. man calculates his chances, with what errors we are about to see. now, man has a horror of death. in the bravest, a great sense of duty, which they alone are capable of understanding and living up to, is paramount. but the mass always cowers at sight of the phantom, death. discipline is for the purpose of dominating that horror by a still greater horror, that of punishment or disgrace. but there always comes an instant when natural horror gets an upper hand over discipline, and the fighter flees. "stop, stop, hold out a few minutes, an instant more, and you are victor! you are not even wounded yet,--if you turn your back you are dead!" he does not hear, he cannot hear any more. he is full of fear. how many armies have sworn to conquer or perish? how many have kept their oaths? an oath of sheep to stand up against wolves. history shows, not armies, but firm souls who have fought unto death, and the devotion of thermopylae is therefore justly immortal. here we are again brought to the consideration of essential truths, enunciated by many men, now forgotten or unknown. to insure success in the rude test of conflict, it is not sufficient to have a mass composed of valiant men like the gauls or the germans. the mass needs, and we give it, leaders who have the firmness and decision of command proceeding from habit and an entire faith in their unquestionable right to command as established by tradition, law and society. we add good arms. we add methods of fighting suitable to these arms and those of the enemy and which do not overtax the physical and moral forces of man. we add also a rational decentralization that permits the direction and employment of the efforts of all even to the last man. we animate with passion, a violent desire for independence, a religious fanaticism, national pride, a love of glory, a madness for possession. an iron discipline, which permits no one to escape action, secures the greatest unity from top to bottom, between all the elements, between the commanding officers, between the commanding officers and men, between the soldiers. have we then a solid army? not yet. unity, that first and supreme force of armies, is sought by enacting severe laws of discipline supported by powerful passions. but to order discipline is not enough. a vigilance from which no one may escape in combat should assure the maintenance of discipline. discipline itself depends on moral pressure which actuates men to advance from sentiments of fear or pride. but it depends also on surveillance, the mutual supervision of groups of men who know each other well. a wise organization insures that the personnel of combat groups changes as little as possible, so that comrades in peace time maneuvers shall be comrades in war. from living together, and obeying the same chiefs, from commanding the same men, from sharing fatigue and rest, from coöperation among men who quickly understand each other in the execution of warlike movements, may be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment, above all unity. the duty of obedience, the right of imposing discipline and the impossibility of escaping from it, would naturally follow. and now confidence appears. it is not that enthusiastic and thoughtless confidence of tumultous or unprepared armies which goes up to the danger point and vanishes rapidly, giving way to a contrary sentiment, which sees treason everywhere. it is that intimate confidence, firm and conscious, which does not forget itself in the heat of action and which alone makes true combatants. then we have an army; and it is no longer difficult to explain how men carried away by passions, even men who know how to die without flinching, without turning pale, really strong in the presence of death, but without discipline, without solid organization, are vanquished by others individually less valiant, but firmly, jointly and severally combined. one loves to picture an armed mob upsetting all obstacles and carried away by a blast of passion. there is more imagination than truth in that picture. if the struggle depended on individuals, the courageous, impassioned men, composing the mob would have more chance of victory. but in any body of troops, in front of the enemy, every one understands that the task is not the work of one alone, that to complete it requires team work. with his comrades in danger brought together under unknown leaders, he feels the lack of union, and asks himself if he can count on them. a thought of mistrust leads to hesitation. a moment of it will kill the offensive spirit. unity and confidence cannot be improvised. they alone can create that mutual trust, that feeling of force which gives courage and daring. courage, that is the temporary domination of will over instinct, brings about victory. unity alone then produces fighters. but, as in everything, there are degrees of unity. let us see whether modern is in this respect less exacting than ancient combat. in ancient combat there was danger only at close quarters. if the troops had enough morale (which asiatic hordes seldom had) to meet the enemy at broadsword's length, there was an engagement. whoever was that close knew that he would be killed if he turned his back; because, as we have seen, the victors lost but few and the vanquished were exterminated. this simple reasoning held the men and made them fight, if it was but for an instant. neglecting the exceptional and very rare circumstances, which may bring two forces together, action to-day is brought on and fought out from afar. danger begins at great distances, and it is necessary to advance for a long time under fire which at each step becomes heavier. the vanquished loses prisoners, but often, in dead and in wounded, he does not lose more than the victor. ancient combat was fought in groups close together, within a small space, in open ground, in full view of one another, without the deafening noise of present day arms. men in formation marched into an action that took place on the spot and did not carry them thousands of feet away from the starting point. the surveillance of the leaders was easy, individual weakness was immediately checked. general consternation alone caused flight. to-day fighting is done over immense spaces, along thinly drawn out lines broken every instant by the accidents and the obstacles of the terrain. from the time the action begins, as soon as there are rifle shots, the men spread out as skirmishers or, lost in the inevitable disorder of a rapid march, [ ] escape the supervision of their commanding officers. a considerable number conceal themselves; [ ] they get away from the engagement and diminish by just so much the material and moral effect and confidence of the brave ones who remain. this can bring about defeat. but let us look at man himself in ancient combat and in modern. in ancient combat:--i am strong, apt, vigorous, trained, full of calmness, presence of mind; i have good offensive and defensive weapons and trustworthy companions of long standing. they do not let me be overwhelmed without aiding me. i with them, they with me, we are invincible, even invulnerable. we have fought twenty battles and not one of us remained on the field. it is necessary to support each other in time; we see it clearly; we are quick to replace ourselves, to put a fresh combatant in front of a fatigued adversary. we are the legions of marius, fifty thousand who have held out against the furious avalanches of the cimbri. we have killed one hundred and forty thousand, taken prisoner sixty thousand, while losing but two or three hundred of our inexperienced soldiers. to-day, as strong, firm, trained, and courageous as i am, i can never say; i shall return. i have no longer to do with men, whom i do not fear, i have to do with fate in the form of iron and lead. death is in the air, invisible and blind, whispering, whistling. as brave, good, trustworthy, and devoted as my companions may be, they do not shield me. only,--and this is abstract and less immediately intelligible to all than the material support of ancient combat,--only i imagine that the more numerous we are who run a dangerous risk, the greater is the chance for each to escape therefrom. i also know that, if we have that confidence which none of us should lack in action, we feel, and we are, stronger. we begin more resolutely, are ready to keep up the struggle longer, and therefore finish it more quickly. we finish it! but in order to finish it, it is necessary to advance, to attack the enemy, [ ] and infantryman or troopers, we are naked against iron, naked against lead, which cannot miss at close range. let us advance in any case, resolutely. our adversary will not stand at the point-blank range of our rifle, for the attack is never mutual, we are sure of that. we have been told so a thousand times. we have seen it. but what if matters should change now! suppose the enemy stands at point-blank range! what of that? how far this is from roman confidence! in another place we have shown that in ancient times to retire from action was both a difficult and perilous matter for the soldier. to-day the temptation is much stronger, the facility greater and the peril less. now, therefore, combat exacts more moral cohesion, greater unity than previously. a last remark on the difficulty of obtaining it will complete the demonstration. since the invention of fire arms, the musket, the rifle, the cannon, the distances of mutual aid and support have increased among the different arms. [ ] besides, the facility of communications of all kinds permits the assembling on a given territory of enormous forces. for these reasons, as we have stated, battle fields have become immense. supervision becomes more and more difficult. direction being more distant tends more often to escape from the supreme commanders and the subordinate leaders. the certain and inevitable disorder, which a body of troops always presents in action, is with the moral effect of modern appliances, becoming greater every day. in the midst of the confusion and the vacillation of firing lines, men and commanding officers often lose each other. troops immediately and hotly engaged, such as companies and squads, can maintain themselves only if they are well-organized and serve as supports or rallying points to those out of place. battles tend to become now, more than they have ever been, the battles of men. this ought not to be true! perhaps. but the fact is that it is true. not all troops are immediately or hotly engaged in battle. commanding officers always try to keep in hand, as long as possible, some troops capable of marching, acting at any moment, in any direction. to-day, like yesterday, like to-morrow, the decisive action is that of formed troops. victory belongs to the commander who has known how to keep them in good order, to hold them, and to direct them. that is incontrovertible. but commanders can hold out decisive reserves only if the enemy has been forced to commit his. in troops which do the fighting, the men and the officers closest to them, from corporal to battalion commander, have a more independent action than ever. as it is alone the vigor of that action, more independent than ever of the direction of higher commanders, which leaves in the hands of higher commanders available forces which can be directed at a decisive moment, that action becomes more preponderant than ever. battles, now more than ever, are battles of men, of captains. they always have been in fact, since in the last analysis the execution belongs to the man in ranks. but the influence of the latter on the final result is greater than formerly. from that comes the maxim of to-day: the battles of men. outside of the regulations on tactics and discipline, there is an evident necessity for combating the hazardous predominance of the action of the soldier over that of the commander. it is necessary to delay as long as possible, that instant which modern conditions tend to hasten--the instant when the soldier gets from under the control of the commander. this completes the demonstration of the truth stated before: combat requires to-day, in order to give the best results, a moral cohesion, a unity more binding than at any other time. [ ] it is as true as it is clear, that, if one does not wish bonds to break, one must make them elastic in order to strengthen them. chapter vii purpose of this study what would be necessary to complete it any other deductions on this subject must come from the meditations of the reader. to be of value in actual application such deductions should be based upon study of modern combat, and that study cannot be made from the accounts of historians alone. the latter show the action of troop units only in a general way. action in detail and the individual action of the soldier remain enveloped in a cloud of dust, in narratives as in reality. yet these questions must be studied, for the conditions they reveal should be the basis of all fighting methods, past, present and future. where can data on these questions be found? we have very few records portraying action as clearly as the report on the engagement at the pont de l'hôpital by colonel bugeaud. such stories in even greater detail, for the smallest detail has its importance, secured from participants and witnesses who knew how to see and knew how to remember, are what is necessary in a study of the battle of to-day. the number of killed, the kind and the character of wounds, often tell more than the longest accounts. sometimes they contradict them. we want to know how man in general and the frenchman in particular fought yesterday. under the pressure of danger, impelled by the instinct for self-preservation, did he follow, make light of, or forget the methods prescribed or recommended? did he fight in the manner imposed upon him, or in that indicated to him by his instinct or by his knowledge of warfare? when we have the answers to these questions we shall be very near to knowing how he will conduct himself to-morrow, with and against appliances far more destructive to-day than those of yesterday. even now, knowing that man is capable only of a given quantity of terror, knowing that the moral effect of destruction is in proportion to the force applied, we are able to predict that, to-morrow less than ever will studied methods be practicable. such methods are born of the illusions of the field of fire and are opposed to the teachings of our own experience. to-morrow, more than ever, will the individual valor of the soldier and of small groups, be predominant. this valor is secured by discipline. the study of the past alone can give us a true perception of practical methods, and enable us to see how the soldier will inevitably fight to-morrow. so instructed, so informed, we shall not be confused; because we shall be able to prescribe beforehand such methods of fighting, such organization, such dispositions as are seen to be inevitable. such prescriptions may even serve to regulate the inevitable. at any rate they will serve to reduce the element of chance by enabling the commanding officer to retain control as long as possible, and by releasing the individual only at the moment when instinct dominates him. this is the only way to preserve discipline, which has a tendency to go to pieces by tactical disobedience at the moment of greatest necessity. it should be understood that the prescriptions in question have to do with dispositions before action; with methods of fighting, and not with maneuvers. maneuvers are the movements of troops in the theater of action, and they are the swift and ordered movement on the scene of action of tactical units of all sizes. they do not constitute action. action follows them. confusion in many minds between maneuvers and action brings about doubt and mistrust of our regulation drills. these are good, very good as far as they go, inasmuch as they give methods of executing all movements, of taking all possible formations with rapidity and good order. to change them, to discuss them, does not advance the question one bit. they do not affect the problem of positive action. its solution lies in the study of what took place yesterday, from which, alone, it is possible to deduce what will happen to-morrow. this study must be made, and its result set forth. each leader, whose worth and authority has been tested in war and recognized by armies, has done something of the sort. of each of these even might be said, "he knew the soldier; he knew how to make use of him." the romans, too, had this knowledge. they obtained it from continuous experience and profound reflexion thereon. experience is not continuous to-day. it must be carefully gathered. study of it should be careful and the results should stimulate reflexion, especially in men of experience. extremes meet in many things. in ancient times at the point of the pike and sword, armies have conquered similar armies twice their size. who knows if, in these days of perfected long-range arms of destruction, a small force might not secure, by a happy combination of good sense or genius with morale and appliances, these same heroic victories over a greater force similarly armed?[ ] in spite of the statements of napoleon i, his assumption that victory is always on the side of the strongest battalions was costly. part ii. modern battle chapter i general discussion . ancient and modern battle i have heard philosophers reproached for studying too exclusively man in general and neglecting the race, the country, the era, so that their studies of him offer little of real social or political value. the opposite criticism can be made of military men of all countries. they are always eager to expound traditional tactics and organization suitable to the particular character of their race, always the bravest of all races. they fail to consider as a factor in the problem, man confronted by danger. facts are incredibly different from all theories. perhaps in this time of military reorganization it would not be out of place to make a study of man in battle and of battle itself. the art of war is subjected to many modifications by industrial and scientific progress. but one thing does not change, the heart of man. in the last analysis, success in battle is a matter of morale. in all matters which pertain to an army, organization, discipline and tactics, the human heart in the supreme moment of battle is the basic factor. it is rarely taken into account; and often strange errors are the result. witness the carbine, an accurate and long range weapon, which has never given the service expected of it, because it was used mechanically without considering the human heart. we must consider it! with improvement in weapons, the power of destruction increases, the moral effect of such weapons increases, and courage to face them becomes rarer. man does not, cannot change. what should increase with the power of material is the strength of organization, the unity of the fighting machine. yet these are most neglected. a million men at maneuvers are useless, if a sane and reasoned organization does not assure their discipline, and thereby their reliability, that is, their courage in action. four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. there is the science of the organization of armies in a nutshell. at any time a new invention may assure victory. granted. but practicable weapons are not invented every day, and nations quickly put themselves on the same footing as regards armament. the determining factor, leaving aside generals of genius, and luck, is the quality of troops, that is, the organization that best assures their esprit, their reliability, their confidence, their unity. troops, in this sense, means soldiers. soldiers, no matter how well drilled, who are assembled haphazard into companies and battalions will never have, have never had, that entire unity which is born of mutual acquaintanceship. in studying ancient battle, we have seen what a terrible thing battle is. we have seen that man will not really fight except under disciplinary pressure. even before having studied modern battle, we know that the only real armies are those to which a well thought out and rational organization gives unity throughout battle. the destructive power of improved firearms becomes greater. battle becomes more open, hindering supervision, passing beyond the vision of the commander and even of subordinate officers. in the same degree, unity should be strengthened. the organization which assures unity of the combatants should be better thought out and more rational. the power of arms increases, man and his weaknesses remain the same. what good is an army of two hundred thousand men of whom only one-half really fight, while the other one hundred thousand disappear in a hundred ways? better to have one hundred thousand who can be counted upon. the purpose of discipline is to make men fight in spite of themselves. no army is worthy of the name without discipline. there is no army at all without organization, and all organization is defective which neglects any means to strengthen the unity of combatants. methods cannot be identical. draconian discipline does not fit our customs. discipline must be a state of mind, a social institution based on the salient virtues and defects of the nation. discipline cannot be secured or created in a day. it is an institution, a tradition. the commander must have confidence in his right to command. he must be accustomed to command and proud to command. this is what strengthens discipline in armies commanded by an aristocracy in certain countries. the prussians do not neglect the homogeneity and consequent unity of organization. they recognize its value. hessian regiments are composed, the first year, of one-third hessians, two-thirds prussians, to control the racial tendencies of troops of a recently annexed country; the second year, of two-thirds hessians, one-third prussians; the third year, all hessians with their own officers. the americans have shown us what happens in modern battle to large armies without cohesion. with them the lack of discipline and organization has had the inevitable result. battle has been between hidden skirmishers, at long distance, and has lasted for days, until some faulty movement, perhaps a moral exhaustion, has caused one or the other of the opposing forces to give way. in this american war, the mêlées of agincourt are said to have reappeared, which merely means a mêlée of fugitives. but less than ever has there been close combat. to fight from a distance is instinctive in man. from the first day he has worked to this end, and he continues to do so. it was thought that with long range weapons close combat might return. on the contrary troops keep further off before its effects. the primitive man, the arab, is instability incarnate. a breath, a nothing, governs him at each instant in war. the civilized man, in war, which is opposed to civilization, returns naturally to his first instincts. with the arab war remains a matter of agility and cunning. hunting is his principal pastime and the pursuit of wild beasts teaches the pursuit of man. general daumas depicts arabs as cavaliers. what more chivalrous warfare than the night surprise and sack of a camp! empty words!! it is commonly said that modern war is the most recondite of things, requiring experts. war, so long as man risks his skin in it, will always be a matter of instinct. ancient battle resembled drill. there is no such resemblance in modern battle. this greatly disconcerts both officers and soldiers. ancient battles were picnics, for the victors, who lost nobody. not so to-day. artillery played no part in ancient battle. the invention of firearms has diminished losses in battle. the improvement of firearms continues to diminish losses. this looks like a paradox. but statistics prove it. nor is it unreasonable. does war become deadlier with the improvement of weapons? not at all. man is capable of standing before a certain amount of terror; beyond that he flees from battle. the battle of pharsalus lasted some four hours. caesar broke his camp, which is done in the morning; then the formation for battle; then the battle, etc. and he says that his troops were tired, the battle having lasted up to noon. this indicates that he considered it long. for the middle ages, consult froissart. the knights in the battle of the thirty were armed for battle on foot which they preferred in a serious affair, that is to say in a restricted space. there was a halt, a rest in the combat, when the two parties became exhausted. the bretons, at this rest, were twenty-five against thirty. the battle had lasted up to exhaustion without loss by the english! without montauban the battle would have been terminated by complete and mutual exhaustion and without further losses. for the greater the fatigue, the less strength remained for piercing the armor. montauban was at the same time felon and hero; felon because he did a thing not permitted by the code of combat; hero, because, if the bretons had not ably profited by the disorder, he would have been killed when he entered the english formation alone. at the end of the contest the bretons had four killed, the english eight. four of the killed were overcome by their armor. explain how, under turenne, men held much longer under fire than to-day. it is perfectly simple. man is capable of standing before only a certain amount of terror. to-day there must be swallowed in five minutes what took an hour under turenne. an example will be given. with the present arms, whose usage is generally known, the instruction of the soldier is of little importance. it does not make the soldier. take as an example the case of the peasants of the vendée. their unity and not individual instruction made them soldiers, whose value could not be denied. such unity was natural in people of the same village of the same commune, led in battle by their own lords, their own priests, etc. the greater the perfection of weapons, the more dreadful becomes modern battle, and discipline becomes more difficult to maintain. the less mobile the troops, the deadlier are battles. bayonet attacks are not so easily made to-day, and morale consequently is less affected, man fearing man more than death. astonishing losses seem to have been suffered without breaking by turenne's armies. were the casualty reports submitted by the captains of those days correct? frederick liked to say that three men behind the enemy were worth more than fifty in front of him, for moral effect. the field of action to-day is more extensive than in frederick's time. battle is delivered on more accidented terrain, as armies with great mobility do not need any particular terrain to fight on. the nature of ancient arms required close order. modern arms require open order, and they are at the same time of such terrible power that against them too often discipline is broken. what is the solution? have your combatants opened out? have them well acquainted with each other so as to have unity. have reserves to threaten with, held with an iron hand. modern weapons have a terrible effect and are almost unbearable by the nervous system. who can say that he has not been frightened in battle? discipline in battle becomes the more necessary as the ranks become more open, and the material cohesion of the ranks not giving confidence, it must spring from a knowledge of comrades, and a trust in officers, who must always be present and seen. what man to-day advances with the confidence that rigid discipline and pride in himself gave the roman soldier, even though the contest is no longer with man but with fate? to-day the artillery is effective at great distances. there is much liberty of movement for the different arms. the apparent liaison between arms is lessened. this has its influence on morale. there is another advantage in reliable troops, in that they can be extended more widely, and will consequently suffer smaller losses and be in better morale for close conflict. the further off one is, the more difficult it is to judge of the terrain. consequently the greater is the necessity for scouting, for reconnoitering the terrain by skirmishers. this is something that the duke of gramont forgot at nordlingen, and which is often forgotten; but it constitutes another important reason for the use of skirmishers. the formation in rank is a disciplinary measure against the weakness of man in the face of danger. this weakness is greater to-day in that the moral action of weapons is more powerful, and that the material rank has the inherent lack of cohesion of open order. however, open order is necessary to economize losses and permit the use of weapons. thus to-day there is greater necessity than ever for the rank, that is for discipline, not for the geometrical rank. it is at the same time more necessary and doubly difficult to attain. in ancient battle unity existed, at least with the greeks and the romans. the soldier was known to his officer and comrades; they saw that he fought. in modern armies where losses are as great for the victor as for the vanquished, the soldier must more often be replaced. in ancient battle the victor had no losses. to-day the soldier is often unknown to his comrades. he is lost in the smoke, the dispersion, the confusion of battle. he seems to fight alone. unity is no longer insured by mutual surveillance. a man falls, and disappears. who knows whether it was a bullet or the fear of advancing further that struck him! the ancient combatant was never struck by an invisible weapon and could not fall in this way. the more difficult surveillance, the more necessary becomes the individuality of companies, sections, squads. not the least of their boasts should be their ability to stand a roll call at all times. the ancients often avoided hand to hand conflict, so terrible were its consequences. in modern combat, there never is hand to hand conflict if one stands fast. from day to day close combat tends to disappear. it is replaced by fire action; above all by the moral action of maneuvers. dispersion brings us back to the necessity for the unity which was an absolute necessity in ancient battle. strategy is a game. the first strategist, long before napoleon, was horace with his three enemies. the size of the battle field permits, less than ever, holding units together; the rôle of the general is much more difficult: many more chances are left to fate. thus the greater the necessity for the best troops who know best their trade, who are most dependable and of greatest fortitude. to diminish the effect of luck, it is necessary to hold longer, to wait for help from a distance. battles resolve themselves into battles of soldiers. the final decision is more difficult to obtain. there is a strange similarity in battle at one league to battle at two paces. the value of the soldier is the essential element of success. let us strengthen the soldier by unity. battle has more importance than ever. communication facilities such as the telegraph, concentration facilities such as the railroad, render more difficult such strategic surprises as ulm and jena. the whole forces of a country can thus be united. so united, defeat becomes irreparable, disorganization greater and more rapid. in modern combat the mêlée really exists more than in ancient battle. this appears paradoxical. it is true nevertheless of the mêlée taken in the sense of a mixed up affair where it is infinitely difficult to see clearly. man, in the combat of our days, is a man who, hardly knowing how to swim, is suddenly thrown into the sea. the good quality of troops will more than ever secure victory. as to the comparative value of troops with cohesion and of new troops, look at the zouaves of the guard or the grenadiers at magenta, and the th at solferino. [ ] nothing should be neglected to make the battle order stronger, man stronger. . moral elements in battle when, in complete security, after dinner, in full physical and moral contentment, men consider war and battle they are animated by a noble ardor that has nothing in common with reality. how many of them, however, even at that moment, would be ready to risk their lives? but oblige them to march for days and weeks to arrive at the battle ground, and on the day of battle oblige them to wait minutes, hours, to deliver it. if they were honest they would testify how much the physical fatigue and the mental anguish that precede action have lowered their morale, how much less eager to fight they are than a month before, when they arose from the table in a generous mood. man's heart is as changeable as fortune. man shrinks back, apprehends danger in any effort in which he does not foresee success. there are some isolated characters of an iron temper, who resist the tendency; but they are carried away by the great majority (bismarck). examples show that if a withdrawal is forced, the army is discouraged and takes flight (frederick). the brave heart does not change. real bravery, inspired by devotion to duty, does not know panic and is always the same. the bravery sprung from hot blood pleases the frenchman more. he understands it, it appeals to his vanity; it is a characteristic of his nature. but it is passing; it fails him at times, especially when there is nothing for him to gain in doing his duty. the turks are full of ardor in the advance. they carry their officers with them. but they retreat with the same facility, abandoning their officers. mediocre troops like to be led by their shepherds. reliable troops like to be directed, with their directors alongside of them or behind. with the former the general must be the leader on horseback; with the latter, the manager. warnery did not like officers to head a charge. he thought it useless to have them killed before the others. he did not place them in front and his cavalry was good. general leboeuf did not favor the proposed advance into battle with platoon leaders in front of the center of their platoons. the fear exists that the fall of the captain will demoralize the rest. what is the solution? leboeuf must have known that if the officer is not in front of his command, it will advance less confidently, that, with us, all officers are almost always in advance. practice is stronger than any theory. therefore fit theories to it. in column, put the chiefs of platoon on the flank where they can see clearly. frightfulness! witness the turks in the polish wars. what gave power to the turks in their wars with poland was not so much their real strength as their ferocity. they massacred all who resisted; they massacred without the excuse of resistance. terror preceded them, breaking down the courage of their enemies. the necessity to win or to submit to extreme peril brought about cowardice and submission, for fear of being conquered. turenne said, "you tremble, body...." the instinct of self-preservation can then make the strongest tremble. but they are strong enough to overcome their emotion, the fear of advancing, without even losing their heads or their coolness. fear with them never becomes terror; it is forgotten in the activities of command. he who does not feel strong enough to keep his heart from ever being gripped by terror, should never think of becoming an officer. the soldiers themselves have emotion. the sense of duty, discipline, pride, the example of their officers and above all their coolness, sustain them and prevent their fear from becoming terror. their emotion never allows them to sight, or to more than approximately adjust their fire. often they fire into the air. cromwell knew this very well, dependable as his troops were, when he said, "put your trust in god and aim at their shoe laces." what is too true is that bravery often does not at all exclude cowardice, horrible devices to secure personal safety, infamous conduct. the romans were not mighty men, but men of discipline and obstinacy. we have no idea of the roman military mind, so entirely different from ours. a roman general who had as little coolness as we have would have been lost. we have incentives in decorations and medals that would have made a roman soldier run the gauntlet. how many men before a lion, have the courage to look him in the face, to think of and put into practice measures of self-defense? in war when terror has seized you, as experience has shown it often does, you are as before a lion. you fly trembling and let yourself be eaten up. are there so few really brave men among so many soldiers? alas, yes! gideon was lucky to find three hundred in thirty thousand. napoleon said, "two mamelukes held three frenchmen; but one hundred french cavalry did not fear the same number of mamelukes; three hundred vanquished the same number; one thousand french beat fifteen hundred mamelukes. such was the influence of tactics, order and maneuver." in ordinary language, such was the great moral influence of unity, established by discipline and made possible and effective in battle by organization and mutual support. with unity and sensible formation men of an individual value one-third less beat those who were individually their betters. that is the essential, must be the essential, point in the organization of an army. on reflection, this simple statement of napoleon's seems to contain the whole of battle morale. make the enemy believe that support is lacking; isolate; cut off, flank, turn, in a thousand ways make his men believe themselves isolated. isolate in like manner his squadrons, battalions, brigades and divisions; and victory is yours. if, on account of bad organization, he does not anticipate mutual support, there is no need of such maneuver; the attack is enough. some men, such as orientals, chinese, tartars, mongols do not fear death. they are resigned to it at all times. why is it that they can not stand before the armies of the western people? it is lack of organization. the instinct of self-preservation which at the last moment dominates them utterly, is not opposed by discipline. we have often seen fanatic eastern peoples, implicitly believing that death in battle means a happy and glorious resurrection, superior in numbers, give way before discipline. if attacked confidently, they are crushed by their own weight. in close combat the dagger is better than the bayonet, but instinct is too strong for such people. what makes the soldier capable of obedience and direction in action, is the sense of discipline. this includes: respect for and confidence in his chiefs; confidence in his comrades and fear of their reproaches and retaliation if he abandons them in danger; his desire to go where others do without trembling more than they; in a word, the whole of esprit de corps. organization only can produce these characteristics. four men equal a lion. note the army organizations and tactical formations on paper are always determined from the mechanical point of view, neglecting the essential coefficient, that of morale. they are almost always wrong. esprit de corps is secured in war. but war becomes shorter and shorter and more and more violent. consequently, secure esprit de corps in advance. mental acquaintanceship is not enough to make a good organization. a good general esprit is needed. all must work for battle and not merely live, quietly going through with drills without understanding their application. once a man knows how to use his weapon and obey all commands there is needed only occasional drill to brush up those who have forgotten. marches and battle maneuvers are what is needed. the technical training of the soldier is not the most difficult. it is necessary for him to know how to use and take care of his weapon; to know how to move to the right and to the left, forward, to the rear, at command, to charge and to march with full pack. but this does not make the soldier. the vendeans, who knew little of this, were tough soldiers. it is absolutely necessary to change the instruction, to reduce it to the necessary minimum and to cut out all the superfluities with which peacetime laborers overload it each year. to know the essential well is better than having some knowledge of a lot of things, many of them useless. teach this the first year, that the second, but the essential from the beginning! also instruction should be simple to avoid the mental fatigue of long drills that disgust everybody. here is a significant sentence in colonel borbstaed's enumeration of the reasons for prussian victory over the austrians in , "it was ... because each man, being trained, knew how to act promptly and confidently in all phases of battle." this is a fact. to be held in a building, at every minute of the day to have every movement, every attitude under a not too intelligent surveillance is indeed to be harried. this incessant surveillance weakens the morale of both the watched and the watcher. what is the reason for this incessant surveillance which has long since exceeded shipboard surveillance? was not that strict enough? . material and moral effect the effect of an army, of one organization on another, is at the same time material and moral. the material effect of an organization is in its power to destroy, the moral effect in the fear that it inspires. in battle, two moral forces, even more than two material forces, are in conflict. the stronger conquers. the victor has often lost by fire more than the vanquished. moral effect does not come entirely from destructive power, real and effective as it may be. it comes, above all, from its presumed, threatening power, present in the form of reserves threatening to renew the battle, of troops that appear on the flank, even of a determined frontal attack. material effect is greater as instruments are better (weapons, mounts, etc.), as the men know better how to use them, and as the men are more numerous and stronger, so that in case of success they can carry on longer. with equal or even inferior power of destruction he will win who has the resolution to advance, who by his formations and maneuvers can continually threaten his adversary with a new phase of material action, who, in a word has the moral ascendancy. moral effect inspires fear. fear must be changed to terror in order to vanquish. when confidence is placed in superiority of material means, valuable as they are against an enemy at a distance, it may be betrayed by the actions of the enemy. if he closes with you in spite of your superiority in means of destruction, the morale of the enemy mounts with the loss of your confidence. his morale dominates yours. you flee. entrenched troops give way in this manner. at pharsalus, pompey and his army counted on a cavalry corps turning and taking caesar in the rear. in addition pompey's army was twice as numerous. caesar parried the blow, and his enemy, who saw the failure of the means of action he counted on, was demoralized, beaten, lost fifteen thousand men put to the sword (while caesar lost only two hundred) and as many prisoners. even by advancing you affect the morale of the enemy. but your object is to dominate him and make him retreat before your ascendancy, and it is certain that everything that diminishes the enemy's morale adds to your resolution in advancing. adopt then a formation which permits your destructive agency, your skirmishers, to help you throughout by their material action and to this degree diminish that of the enemy. armor, in diminishing the material effect that can be suffered, diminishes the dominating moral effect of fear. it is easy to understand how much armor adds to the moral effect of cavalry action, at the critical moment. you feel that thanks to his armor the enemy will succeed in getting to you. it is to be noted that when a body actually awaits the attack of another up to bayonet distance (something extraordinarily rare), and the attacking troop does not falter, the first does not defend itself. this is the massacre of ancient battle. against unimaginative men, who retain some coolness and consequently the faculty of reasoning in danger, moral effect will be as material effect. the mere act of attack does not completely succeed against such troops. (witness battles in spain and waterloo). it is necessary to destroy them, and we are better at this than they by our aptitude in the use of skirmishers and above all in the mad dash of our cavalry. but the cavalry must not be treated, until it comes to so consider itself, as a precious jewel which must be guarded against injury. there should be little of it, but it must be good. "seek and ye shall find" not the ideal but the best method that exists. in maneuvers skirmishers, who have some effect, are returned to ranks to execute fire in two ranks which never killed anybody. why not put your skirmishers in advance? why sound trumpet calls which they neither hear nor understand? that they do not is fortunate, for each captain has a different call sounded. example: at alma, the retreat, etc. [ ] the great superiority of roman tactics lay in their constant endeavor to coördinate physical and moral effect. moral effect passes; finally one sees that the enemy is not so terrible as he appeared to be. physical effect does not. the greeks tried to dominate. the romans preferred to kill, and kill they did. they followed thereby the better method. their moral effect was aided by their reliable and deadly swords. what moral force is worth to a nation at war is shown by examples. pichegru played the traitor; this had great influence at home and we were beaten. napoleon came back; victory returned with him. but at that we can do nothing without good troops, not even with a napoleon. witness turenne's army after his death. it remained excellent in spite of conflict between and the inefficiency of its two leaders. note the defensive retreat across the rhine; the regiment in champagne attacked in front by infantry and taken in the rear by cavalry. one of the prettiest feats of the art of war. in modern battle, which is delivered with combatants so far apart, man has come to have a horror of man. he comes to hand to hand fighting only to defend his body or if forced to it by some fortuitous encounter. more than that! it may be said that he seeks to catch the fugitive only for fear that he will turn and fight. guilbert says that shock actions are infinitely rare. here, infinity is taken in its exact mathematical sense. guilbert reduces to nothing, by deductions from practical examples, the mathematical theory of the shock of one massed body on another. indeed the physical impulse is nothing. the moral impulse which estimates the attacker is everything. the moral impulse lies in the perception by the enemy of the resolution that animates you. they say that the battle of amstetten was the only one in which a line actually waited for the shock of another line charging with the bayonets. even then the russians gave way before the moral and not before the physical impulse. they were already disconcerted, wavering, worried, hesitant, vacillating, when the blow fell. they waited long enough to receive bayonet thrusts, even blows with the rifle (in the back, as at inkermann). [ ] this done, they fled. he who calm and strong of heart awaits his enemy, has all the advantage of fire. but the moral impulse of the assailant demoralizes the assailed. he is frightened; he sets his sight no longer; he does not even aim his piece. his lines are broken without defense, unless indeed his cavalry, waiting halted, horsemen a meter apart and in two ranks, does not break first and destroy all formation. with good troops on both sides, if an attack is not prepared, there is every reason to believe that it will fail. the attacking troops suffer more, materially, than the defenders. the latter are in better order, fresh, while the assailants are in disorder and already have suffered a loss of morale under a certain amount of punishment. the moral superiority given by the offensive movement may be more than compensated by the good order and integrity of the defenders, when the assailants have suffered losses. the slightest reaction by the defense may demoralize the attack. this is the secret of the success of the british infantry in spain, and not their fire by rank, which was as ineffective with them as with us. the more confidence one has in his methods of attack or defense, the more disconcerted he is to see them at some time incapable of stopping the enemy. the effect of the present improved fire arm is still limited, with the present organization and use of riflemen, to point blank ranges. it follows that bayonet charges (where bayonet thrusts never occur), otherwise attacks under fire, will have an increasing value, and that victory will be his who secures most order and determined dash. with these two qualities, too much neglected with us, with willingness, with intelligence enough to keep a firm hold on troops in immediate support, we may hope to take and to hold what we take. do not then neglect destructive effort before using moral effect. use skirmishers up to the last moment. otherwise no attack can succeed. it is true it is haphazard fire, nevertheless it is effective because of its volume. this moral effect must be a terrible thing. a body advances to meet another. the defender has only to remain calm, ready to aim, each man pitted against a man before him. the attacking body comes within deadly range. whether or not it halts to fire, it will be a target for the other body which awaits it, calm, ready, sure of its effect. the whole first rank of the assailant falls, smashed. the remainder, little encouraged by their reception, disperse automatically or before the least indication of an advance on them. is this what happens? not at all! the moral effect of the assault worries the defenders. they fire in the air if at all. they disperse immediately before the assailants who are even encouraged by this fire now that it is over. it quickens them in order to avoid a second salvo. it is said by those who fought them in spain and at waterloo that the british are capable of the necessary coolness. i doubt it nevertheless. after firing, they made swift attacks. if they had not, they might have fled. anyhow the english are stolid folks, with little imagination, who try to be logical in all things. the french with their nervous irritability, their lively imagination, are incapable of such a defense. anybody who thinks that he could stand under a second fire is a man without any idea of battle. (prince de ligne). modern history furnishes us with no examples of stonewall troops who can neither be shaken nor driven back, who stand patiently the heaviest fire, yet who retire precipitately when the general orders the retreat. (bismarck). cavalry maneuvers, like those of infantry, are threats. the most threatening win. the formation in ranks is a threat, and more than a threat. a force engaged is out of the hand of its commander. i know, i see what it does, what it is capable of. it acts; i can estimate the effect of its action. but a force in formation is in hand; i know it is there, i see it, feel it. it may be used in any direction. i feel instinctively that it alone can surely reach me, take me on the right, on the left, throw itself into a gap, turn me. it troubles me, threatens me. where is the threatened blow going to fall? the formation in ranks is a serious threat, which may at any moment be put into effect. it awes one in a terrible fashion. in the heat of battle, formed troops do more to secure victory than do those actively engaged. this is true, whether such a body actually exists or whether it exists only in the imagination of the enemy. in an indecisive battle, he wins who can show, and merely show, battalions and squadrons in hand. they inspire the fear of the unknown. from the taking of the entrenchments at fribourg up to the engagement at the bridge of arcola, up to solferino, there occur a multitude of deeds of valor, of positions taken by frontal attack, which deceive every one, generals as well as civilians, and which always cause the same mistakes to be made. it is time to teach these folks that the entrenchments at fribourg were not won by frontal attack, nor was the bridge of arcola (see the correspondence of napoleon i), nor was solferino. lieutenant hercule took fifty cavalry through alpon, ten kilometers on the flank of the austrians at arcola, and the position that held us up for three days, was evacuated. the evacuation was the result of strategic, if not of tactical, moral effect. general or soldier, man is the same. demonstrations should be made at greater or less distance, according to the morale of the enemy. that is to say, battle methods vary with the enemy, and an appropriate method should be employed in each individual case. we have treated and shall treat only of the infantryman. in ancient as in modern battle, he is the one who suffers most. in ancient battle, if he is defeated, he remains because of his slowness at the mercy of the victor. in modern battle the mounted man moves swiftly through danger, the infantryman has to walk. he even has to halt in danger, often and for long periods of time. he who knows the morale of the infantryman, which is put to the hardest proof, knows the morale of all the combatants. . the theory of strong battalions to-day, numbers are considered the essential. napoleon had this tendency (note his strength reports). the romans did not pay so much attention to it. what they paid most attention to was to seeing that everybody fought. we assume that all the personnel present with an army, with a division, with a regiment on the day of battle, fights. right there is the error. the theory of strong battalions is a shameful theory. it does not reckon on courage but on the amount of human flesh. it is a reflection on the soul. great and small orators, all who speak of military matters to-day, talk only of masses. war is waged by enormous masses, etc. in the masses, man as an individual disappears, the number only is seen. quality is forgotten, and yet to-day as always, quality alone produces real effect. the prussians conquered at sadowa with made soldiers, united, accustomed to discipline. such soldiers can be made in three or four years now, for the material training of the soldier is not indeed so difficult. caesar had legions that he found unseasoned, not yet dependable, which had been formed for nine years. austria was beaten because her troops were of poor quality, because they were conscripts. our projected organization will give us four hundred thousand good soldiers. but all our reserves will be without cohesion, if they are thrown into this or that organization on the eve of battle. at a distance, numbers of troops without cohesion may be impressive, but close up they are reduced to fifty or twenty-five per cent. who really fight. wagram was not too well executed. it illustrated desperate efforts that had for once a moral effect on an impressionable enemy. but for once only. would they succeed again? the cimbrians gave an example [ ] and man has not changed. who to-day is braver than they were? and they did not have to face artillery, nor rifles. originally napoleon found as an instrument, an army with good battle methods, and in his best battles, combat followed these methods. he himself prescribed, at least so they say, for he misrepresented at saint helena, the methods used at wagram, at eylau, at waterloo, and engaged enormous masses of infantry which did not give material effect. but it involved a frightful loss of men and a disorder that, after they had once been unleashed, did not permit of the rallying and reemployment that day of the troops engaged. this was a barbaric method, according to the romans, amateurish, if we may say such a thing of such a man; a method which could not be used against experienced and well trained troops such as d'erlon's corps at waterloo. it proved disastrous. napoleon looked only at the result to be attained. when his impatience, or perhaps the lack of experience and knowledge in his officers and soldiers, forbade his continued use of real attack tactics, he completely sacrificed the material effect of infantry and even that of cavalry to the moral effect of masses. the personnel of his armies was too changing. in ancient battle victory cost much less than with modern armies, and the same soldiers remained longer in ranks. at the end of his campaigns, when he had soldiers sixty years old, alexander had lost only seven hundred men by the sword. napoleon's system is more practicable with the russians, who naturally group together, mass up, but it is not the most effective. note the mass formation at inkermann. [ ] what did napoleon i do? he reduced the rôle of man in battle, and depended instead on formed masses. we have not such magnificent material. infantry and cavalry masses showed, toward the end of the empire, a tactical degeneracy resulting from the wearing down of their elements and the consequent lowering of standards of morale and training. but since the allies had recognized and adopted our methods, napoleon really had a reason for trying something so old that it was new to secure that surprise which will give victory once. it can give victory only once however, tried again surprise will be lacking. this was sort of a desperate method which napoleon's supremacy allowed him to adopt when he saw his prestige waning. when misfortune and lack of cannon fodder oppressed him, napoleon became again the practical man not blinded by his supremacy. his entire good sense, his genius, overcame the madness to conquer at all price, and we have his campaign of . general ambert says: "without military traditions, almost without a command, these confused masses (the american armies of the civil war) struck as men struck at agincourt and crecy." at agincourt and crecy, we struck very little, but were struck a lot. these battles were great slaughters of frenchmen, by english and other frenchmen, who did not greatly suffer themselves. in what, except in disorder, did the american battles resemble these butcheries with the knife? the americans were engaged as skirmishers at a distance of leagues. in seeking a resemblance the general has been carried away by the mania for phrase-making. victory is always for the strong battalions. this is true. if sixty determined men can rout a battalion, these sixty must be found. perhaps only as many will be found as the enemy has battalions (note gideon's proportion of three hundred to thirty thousand of one to one hundred.) perhaps it would be far and away better, under these circumstances, to fight at night. . combat methods ancient battle was fought in a confined space. the commander could see his whole force. seeing clearly, his account should have been clear, although we note that many of these ancient accounts are obscure and incomplete, and that we have to supplement them. in modern battle nobody knows what goes on or what has gone on, except from results. narrations cannot enter into details of execution. it is interesting to compare tales of feats of arms, narrated by the victor (so-called) or the vanquished. it is hard to tell which account is truthful, if either. mere assurance may carry weight. military politics may dictate a perversion of the facts for disciplinary, moral or political reasons. (note sommo-sierra.) it is difficult even to determine losses, the leaders are such consummate liars. why is this? it is bewildering to read a french account and then a foreign account of the same event, the facts stated are so entirely different. what is the truth? only results can reveal it, such results as the losses on both sides. they are really instructive if they can be gotten at. i believe that under turenne there was not existent to the same degree a national pride which tended to hide unpleasant truths. the troops in contending armies were often of the same nation. if national vanity and pride were not so touchy about recent occurrences, still passionately debated, numerous lessons might be drawn from our last wars. who can speak impartially of waterloo, or waterloo so much discussed and with such heat, without being ashamed? had waterloo been won, it would not have profited us. napoleon attempted the impossible, which is beyond even genius. after a terrible fight against english firmness and tenacity, a fight in which we were not able to subdue them, the prussians appear. we would have done no better had they not appeared, but they did, very conveniently to sustain our pride. they were confronted. then the rout began. it did not begin in the troops facing the prussians but in those facing the english, who were exhausted perhaps, but not more so than their enemies. this was the moral effect of an attack on their right, when they had rather expected reinforcements to appear. the right conformed to the retrograde movement. and what a movement it was! why do not authorities acknowledge facts and try to formulate combat methods that conform to reality? it would reduce a little the disorder that bothers men not warned of it. they jump perhaps from the frying pan into the fire. i have known two colonels, one of them a very brave man, who said, "let soldiers alone before the enemy. they know what to do better than you do." this is a fine statement of french confidence! that they know better than you what should be done. especially in a panic, i suppose! a long time ago the prince de ligne justified battle formations, above all the famous oblique formation. napoleon decided the question. all discussion of formations is pedantry. but there are moral reasons for the power of the depth formation. the difference between practice and theory is incredible. a general, who has given directions a thousand times on the battle field, when asked for directions, gives this order, "go there, colonel." the colonel, a man of good sense, says, "will you explain, sir? what point do you want me to guide on? how far should i extend? is there anybody on my right? on my left?" the general says, "advance on the enemy, sir. it seems to me that that ought to be enough. what does this hesitation mean?" but my dear general, what are your orders? an officer should know where his command is, and the command itself should know. space is large. if you do not know where to send your troops, and how to direct them, to make them understand where they are to go, to give them guides if necessary, what sort of general are you? what is our method for occupying a fortified work, or a line? we have none! why not adopt that of marshal saxe? ask several generals how they would do it. they will not know. there is always mad impatience for results, without considering the means. a general's ability lies in judging the best moment for attack and in knowing how to prepare for it. we took melegnano without artillery, without maneuver, but at what a price! at waterloo the hougoumont farm held us up all day, cost us dear and disorganized us into a mad mob, until napoleon finally sent eight mortars to smash and burn the château. this is what should have been done at the commencement of the general attack. a rational and ordered method of combat, or if not ordered, known to all, is enough to make good troops, if there is discipline be it understood. the portuguese infantry in the spanish war, to whom the english had taught their method of combat, almost rivalled the english infantry. to-day who has formulated method? who has a traditional method? ask the generals. no two will agree. we have a method, a manner rather, that accords with the national tendency, that of skirmishers in large numbers. but this formation is nowhere formulated. before a campaign it is decried. properly so, for it degenerates rapidly into a flock of lost sheep. consequently troops come to the battle field entirely unused to reality. all the leaders, all the officers, are confused and unoriented. this goes so far that often generals are found who have lost their divisions or brigades; staff officers who have lost their generals and their divisions both; and, although this is more easily understood, many company officers who have lost their commands. this is a serious matter, which might cost us dear in a prolonged war in which the enemy gains experience. let us hope that experience will lead us, not to change the principle, but to modify and form in a practical way our characteristic battle method of escaping by advancing. the brochure of the prince of prussia shows that, without having fought us, the prussians understand our methods. there are men such as marshal bugeaud who are born warriors in character, mental attitude, intelligence and temperament. they recommend and show by example, such as colonel bugeaud's battles in at the hospital bridge, tactics entirely appropriate to their national and personal characters. note wellington and the duke of york among the english. but the execution of tactics such as bugeaud's requires officers who resemble their commanders, at least in courage and decisions. all officers are not of such temper. there is need then of prescribed tactics conforming to the national character, which may serve to guide an ordinary officer without requiring him to have the exceptional ability of a bugeaud. such prescribed tactics would serve an officer as the perfectly clear and well defined tactics of the roman legion served the legion commander. the officer could not neglect them without failing in his duty. of course they will not make him an exceptional leader. but, except in case of utter incapacity they will keep him from entirely failing in his task, from making absurd mistakes. nor will they prevent officers of bugeaud's temper from using their ability. they will on the contrary help them by putting under their command men prepared for the details of battle, which will not then come to them as a surprise. this method need not be as completely dogmatic as the roman. our battle is too varying an affair. but some clearly defined rules, established by experience, would prevent the gross errors of inefficients. (such as causing skirmishers to fall back when the formed rank fires, and consequently allowing them to carry with them in their retreat, the rank itself.) they would be useful aids to men of coolness and decision. the laying down of such tactics would answer the many who hold that everything is improvised on the battle field and who find no better improvisation than to leave the soldier to himself. (see above.) we should try to exercise some control over our soldiers, who advance by flight (note the vendeans) or escape by advancing, as you like. but if something unexpected surprises them, they flee as precipitately. invention is less needed than verification, demonstration and organization of proper methods. to verify; observe better. to demonstrate; try out and describe better. to organize, distribute better, bearing in mind that cohesion means discipline. i do not know who put things that way; but it is truer than ever in this day of invention. with us very few reason or understand reason, very few are cool. their effect is negligible in the disorder of the mass; it is lost in numbers. it follows that we above all need a method of combat, sanely thought out in advance. it must be based on the fact that we are not passively obedient instruments, but very nervous and restless people, who wish to finish things quickly and to know in advance where we are going. it must be based on the fact that we are very proud people, but people who would all skulk if we were not seen, and who consequently must always be seen, and act in the presence of our comrades and of the officers who supervise us. from this comes the necessity for organizing the infantry company solidly. it is the infantryman on whom the battle has the most violent effect, for he is always most exposed; it is he therefore who must be the most solidly supported. unity must be secured by a mutual acquaintanceship of long standing between all elements. if you only use combat methods that require leaders without fear, of high intelligence, full of good sense, of esprit, you will always make mistakes. bugeaud's method was the best for him. but it is evident, in his fight at the hospital bridge that his battalion commanders were useless. if he had not been there, all would have been lost. he alone, omnipresent, was capable of resolute blows that the others could not execute. his system can be summed up in two phrases; always attack even when on the defensive; fire and take cover only when not attacked. his method was rational, considering his mentality and the existing conditions, but in carrying it into execution he judged his officers and soldiers by himself and was deceived. no dogmatic principles can be drawn from his method, nor from any other. man is always man. he does not always possess ability and resolution. the commander must make his choice of methods, depending on his troops and on himself. the essential of tactics is: the science of making men fight with their maximum energy. this alone can give an organization with which to fight fear. this has always been true. we must start here and figure mathematically. mathematics is the dominant science in war, just as battle is its only purpose. pride generally causes refusal to acknowledge the truth that fear of being vanquished is basic in war. in the mass, pride, vanity, is responsible for this dissimulation. with the tiny number of absolutely fearless men, what is responsible is their ignorance of a thing they do not feel. there is however, no real basis but this, and all real tactics are based on it. discipline is a part of tactics, is absolutely at the base of tactics, as the romans showed. they excelled the gauls in intelligence, but not in bravery. to start with: take battalions of four companies, four platoons each, in line or in column. the order of battle may be: two platoons deployed as skirmishers, two companies in reserve, under command of the battalion commander. in obtaining a decision destructive action will come from skirmishers. this action should be directed by battalion commanders, but such direction is not customary. no effect will be secured from skirmishers at six hundred paces. they will never, never, never, be nicely aligned in front of their battalions, calm and collected, after an advance. they will not, even at maneuvers. the battalion commander ought to be advanced enough to direct his skirmishers. the whole battalion, one-half engaged, one-half ready for any effort, ought to remain under his command, under his personal direction as far as possible. in the advance the officers, the soldiers, are content if they are merely directed; but, when the battle becomes hot, they must see their commander, know him to be near. it does not matter even if he is without initiative, incapable of giving an order. his presence creates a belief that direction exists, that orders exist, and that is enough. when the skirmishers meet with resistance, they fall back to the ranks. it is the rôle of reserves to support and reinforce the line, and above all, by a swift charge to cut the enemy's line. this then falls back and the skirmishers go forward again, if the advance is resumed. the second line should be in the formation, battalions in line or in column, that hides it best. cover the infantry troops before their entry into action; cover them as much as possible and by any means; take advantage of the terrain; make them lie down. this is the english method in defense of heights, instanced in spain and at waterloo. only one bugle to each battalion should sound calls. what else is there to be provided for? many haughty generals would scream protests like eagles if it were suggested that they take such precautions for second line battalions or first line troops not committed to action. yet this is merely a sane measure to insure good order without the slightest implication of cowardice. [ ] with breech-loading weapons, the skirmishers on the defensive fire almost always from a prone position. they are made to rise with difficulty, either for retreat or for advance. this renders the defense more tenacious.... chapter ii infantry . masses--deep columns. study of the effect of columns brings us to the consideration of mass operations in general. read this singular argument in favor of attacks by battalions in close columns: "a column cannot stop instantly without a command. suppose your first rank stops at the instant of shock: the twelve ranks of the battalion, coming up successively, would come in contact with it, pushing it forward.... experiments made have shown that beyond the sixteenth the impulsion of the ranks in rear has no effect on the front, it is completely taken up by the fifteen ranks already massed behind the first.... to make the experiment, march at charging pace and command halt to the front rank without warning the rest. the ranks will precipitate themselves upon each other unless they be very attentive, or unless, anticipating the command, they check themselves unconsciously while marching." but in a real charge, all your ranks are attentive, restless, anxious about what is taking place at the front and, if the latter halts, if the first line stops, there will be a movement to the rear and not to the front. take a good battalion, possessed of extraordinary calmness and coolness, thrown full speed on the enemy, at one hundred and twenty steps to the minute. to-day it would have to advance under a fire of five shots a minute! at this last desperate moment if the front rank stops, it will not be pushed, according to the theory of successive impulses, it will be upset. the second line will arrive only to fall over the first and so on. there should be a drill ground test to see up to what rank this falling of the pasteboard figures would extend. physical impulse is merely a word. if the front rank stops it will let itself fall and be trampled under foot rather than cede to the pressure that pushes it forward. any one experienced in infantry engagements of to-day knows that is just what happens. this shows the error of the theory of physical impulse--a theory that continues to dictate as under the empire (so strong is routine and prejudice) attacks in close column. such attacks are marked by absolute disorder and lack of leadership. take a battalion fresh from barracks, in light marching order; intent only on the maneuver to be executed. it marches in close column in good order; its subdivisions are full four paces apart. the non-commissioned officers control the men. but it is true that if the terrain is slightly accidented, if the guide does not march with mathematical precision, the battalion in close column becomes in the twinkling of an eye a flock of sheep. what would happen to a battalion in such a formation, at one hundred paces from the enemy? nobody will ever see such an instance in these days of the rifle. if the battalion has marched resolutely, if it is in good order, it is ten to one that the enemy has already withdrawn without waiting any longer. but suppose the enemy does not flinch? then the man of our days, naked against iron and lead, no longer controls himself. the instinct of preservation controls him absolutely. there are two ways of avoiding or diminishing the danger; they are to flee or to throw one-self upon it. let us rush upon it. now, however small the intervals of space and time that separate us from the enemy, instinct shows itself. we rush forward, but ... generally, we rush with prudence, with a tendency to let the most urgent ones, the most intrepid ones, pass on. it is strange, but true, that the nearer we approach the enemy, the less we are closed up. adieu to the theory of pressure. if the front rank is stopped, those behind fall down rather than push it. even if this front rank is pushed, it will itself fall down rather than advance. there is nothing to wonder at, it is sheer fact. any pushing is to the rear. (battle of diernstein.) to-day more than ever flight begins in the rear, which is affected quite as much as the front. mass attacks are incomprehensible. not one out of ten was ever carried to completion and none of them could be maintained against counter-attacks. they can be explained only by the lack of confidence of the generals in their troops. napoleon expressly condemns in his memoirs such attacks. he, therefore, never ordered them. but when good troops were used up, and his generals believed they could not obtain from young troops determined attacks in tactical formation, they came back to the mass formation, which belongs to the infancy of the art, as a desperate resort. if you use this method of pressing, of pushing, your force will disappear as before a magician's wand. but the enemy does not stand; the moral pressure of danger that precedes you is too strong for him. otherwise, those who stood and aimed even with empty rifles, would never see a charge come up to them. the first line of the assailant would be sensible of death and no one would wish to be in the first rank. therefore, the enemy never merely stands; because if he does, it is you that flee. this always does away with the shock. the enemy entertains no smaller anxiety than yours. when he sees you near, for him also the question is whether to flee or to advance. two moral impulses are in conflict. this is the instinctive reasoning of the officer and soldier, "if these men wait for me to close with them, it means death. i will kill, but i will undoubtedly be killed. at the muzzle of the gun-barrel the bullet can not fail to find its mark. but if i can frighten them, they will run away. i can shoot them and bayonet in the back. let us make a try at it." the trial is made, and one of the two forces, at some stage of the advance, perhaps only at two paces, makes an about and gets the bayonet in the back. imagination always sees loaded arms and this fancy is catching. the shock is a mere term. the de saxe, the bugeaud theory: "close with the bayonet and with fire action at close quarters. that is what kills people and the victor is the one who kills most," is not founded on fact. no enemy awaits you if you are determined, and never, never, never, are two equal determinations opposed to each other. it is well known to everybody, to all nations, that the french have never met any one who resisted a bayonet charge. the english in spain, marching resolutely in face of the charges of the french in column, have always defeated them.... the english were not dismayed at the mass. if napoleon had recalled the defeat of the giants of the armada by the english vessels, he might not have ordered the use of the d'erlon column. blücher in his instructions to his troops, recalled that the french have never held out before the resolute march of the prussians in attack column.... suvaroff used no better tactics. yet his battalions in italy drove us at the point of their bayonets. each nation in europe says: "no one stands his ground before a bayonet charge made by us." all are right. the french, no more than others, resist a resolute attack. all are persuaded that their attacks are irresistable; that an advance will frighten the enemy into flight. whether the bayonet be fixed or in the scabbard makes no difference.... there is an old saying that young troops become uneasy if any one comes upon them in a tumult and in disorder; the old troops, on the contrary, see victory therein. at the commencement of a war, all troops are young. our impetuosity pushes us to the front like fools ... the enemy flees. if the war lasts, everybody becomes inured. the enemy no longer troubles himself when in front of troops charging in a disordered way, because he knows and feels that they are moved as much by fear as by determination. good order alone impresses the enemy in an attack, for it indicates real determination. that is why it is necessary to secure good order and retain it to the very last. it is unwise to take the running step prematurely, because you become a flock of sheep and leave so many men behind that you will not reach your objective. the close column is absurd; it turns you in advance into a flock of sheep, where officers and men are jumbled together without mutual support. it is then necessary to march as far as possible in such order as best permits the action of the non-commissioned officers, the action of unity, every one marching in front of eye-witnesses, in the open. on the other hand, in closed columns man marches unobserved and on the slightest pretext he lies down or remains behind. therefore, it is best always to keep the skirmishers in advance or on the flanks, and never to recall them when in proximity to the enemy. to do so establishes a counter current that carries away your men. let your skirmishers alone. they are your lost children; they will know best how to take care of themselves. to sum up: there is no shock of infantry on infantry. there is no physical impulse, no force of mass. there is but a moral impulse. no one denies that this moral impulse is stronger as one feels better supported, that it has greater effect on the enemy as it menaces him with more men. from this it follows that the column is more valuable for the attack than the deployed order. it might be concluded from this long statement that a moral pressure, which always causes flight when a bold attack is made, would not permit any infantry to hold out against a cavalry charge; never, indeed, against a determined charge. but infantry must resist when it is not possible to flee, and until there is complete demoralization, absolute terror, the infantry appreciates this. every infantryman knows it is folly to flee before cavalry when the rifle is infallible at point-blank, at least from the rider's point of view. it is true that every really bold charge ought to succeed. but whether man is on foot or on horseback, he is always man. while on foot he has but himself to force; on horseback he must force man and beast to march against the enemy. and mounted, to flee is so easy. (remark by varney). we have seen then in an infantry mass those in rear are powerless to push those in front unless the danger is greater in rear. the cavalry has long understood this. it attacks in a column at double distance rather than at half-distance, in order to avoid the frightful confusion of the mass. and yet, the allurement of mathematical reasoning is such that cavalry officers, especially the germans, have seriously proposed attacking infantry by deep masses, so that the units in rear might give impulse to those in front. they cite the proverb, "one nail drives the other." what can you say to people who talk such nonsense? nothing, except, "attack us always in this way." real bayonet attacks occurred in the crimean war. (inkermann). [ ] they were carried out by a small force against a larger one. the power of mass had no influence in such cases. it was the mass which fell back, turned tail even before the shock. the troops who made the bold charge did nothing but strike and fire at backs. these instances show men unexpectedly finding themselves face to face with the enemy, at a distance at which a man can close fearlessly without falling out on the way breathless. they are chance encounters. man is not yet demoralized by fire; he must strike or fall back.... combat at close quarters does not exist. at close quarters occurs the ancient carnage when one force strikes the other in the back. columns have absolutely but a moral effect. they are threatening dispositions.... the mass impulse of cavalry has long been discredited. you have given up forming it in deep ranks although cavalry possesses a speed that would bring on more of a push upon the front at a halt than the last ranks of the infantry would bring upon the first. yet you believe in the mass action of infantry! as long as the ancient masses marched forward, they did not lose a man and no one lay down to avoid the combat. dash lasted up to the time of stopping; the run was short in every case. in modern masses, in french masses especially, the march can be continued, but the mass loses while marching under fire. moral pressure, continually exerted during a long advance, stops one-half of the combatants on the way. to-day, above all in france, man protests against such use of his life. the frenchman wants to fight, to return blow for blow. if he is not allowed to, this is what happens. it happened to napoleon's masses. let us take wagram, where his mass was not repulsed. out of twenty-two thousand men, three thousand to fifteen hundred reached the position. certainly the position was not carried by them, but by the material and moral effect of a battery of one hundred pieces, cavalry, etc., etc. were the nineteen thousand missing men disabled? no. seven out of twenty-two, a third, an enormous proportion may have been hit. what became of the twelve thousand unaccounted for? they had lain down on the road, had played dummy in order not to go on to the end. in the confused mass of a column of deployed battalions, surveillance, difficult enough in a column at normal distances, is impossible. nothing is easier than dropping out through inertia; nothing more common. this thing happens to every body of troops marching forward, under fire, in whatever formation it may be. the number of men falling out in this way, giving up at the least opportunity, is greater as formation is less fixed and the surveillance of officers and comrades more difficult. in a battalion in closed column, this kind of temporary desertion is enormous; one-half of the men drop out on the way. the first platoon is mingled with the fourth. they are really a flock of sheep. no one has control, all being mixed. even if, in virtue of the first impulse, the position is carried, the disorder is so great that if it is counter-attacked by four men, it is lost. the condition of morale of such masses is fully described in the battle of caesar against the nervii, marius against the cimbri. [ ] what better arguments against deep columns could there be than the denials of napoleon at st. helena? . skirmishers--supports--reserves--squares this is singular. the cavalry has definite tactics. essentially it knows how it fights. the infantry does not. our infantry no longer has any battle tactics; the initiative of the soldier rules. the soldiers of the first empire trusted to the moral and passive action of masses. to-day, the soldiers object to the passive action of masses. they fight as skirmishers, or they march to the front as a flock of sheep of which three-fourths seek cover enroute, if the fire is heavy. the first method, although better than the second, is bad unless iron discipline and studied and practical methods of fighting insure maintaining strong reserves. these should be in the hands of the leaders and officers for support purposes, to guard against panics, and to finish by the moral effect of a march on the enemy, of flank menaces, etc., the destructive action of the skirmishers. to-day when the ballistic arm is so deadly, so effective, a unit which closes up in order to fight is a unit in which morale is weakened. maneuver is possible only with good organization; otherwise it is no more effective than the passive mass or a rabble in an attack. in ancient combat, the soldier was controlled by the leader in engagements; now that fighting is open, the soldier cannot be controlled. often he cannot even be directed. consequently it is necessary to begin an action at the latest possible moment, and to have the immediate commanders understand what is wanted, what their objectives are, etc. in the modern engagement, the infantryman gets from under our control by scattering, and we say: a soldier's war. wrong, wrong. to solve this problem, instead of scattering to the winds, let us increase the number of rallying points by solidifying the companies. from them come battalions; from battalions come regiments. action in open order was not possible nor evident under turenne. the majority of the soldiers that composed the army, were not held near at hand, in formation. they fought badly. there was a general seeking for cover. note the conduct of the americans in their late war. the organization of the legion of marshal saxe shows the strength of the tendency toward shock action as opposed to fire action. the drills, parades and firing at potsdam were not the tactics of old fritz. frederick's secret was promptitude and rapidity of movement. but they were popularly believed to be his means. people were fond of them, and are yet. the prussians for all their leaning toward parade, mathematics, etc., ended by adopting the best methods. the prussians of jena were taken in themselves by frederick's methods. but since then they have been the first to strike out in a practical way, while we, in france, are still laboring at the potsdam drills. the greater number of generals who fought in the last wars, under real battle conditions, ask for skirmishers in large units, well supported. our men have such a strong tendency to place themselves in such units even against the will of their leaders, that they do not fight otherwise. a number of respectable authors and military men advocate the use of skirmishers in large bodies, as being dictated by certain necessities of war. ask them to elucidate this mode of action, and you will see that this talk of skirmishers in large bodies is nothing else but an euphemism for absolute disorder. an attempt has been made to fit the theory to the fact. yet the use of skirmishers in large bodies is absurd with frenchmen under fire, when the terrain and the sharpness of the action cause the initiative and direction to escape from the commanders, and leave it to the men, to small groups of soldiers. arms are for use. the best disposition for material effect in attack or defense is that which permits the easiest and most deadly use of arms. this disposition is the scattered thin line. the whole of the science of combat lies then in the happy, proper combination, of the open order, scattered to secure destructive effect, and a good disposition of troops in formation as supports and reserves, so as to finish by moral effect the action of the advanced troops. the proper combination varies with the enemy, his morale and the terrain. on the other hand, the thin line can have good order only with a severe discipline, a unity which our men attain from pride. pride exists only among people who know each other well, who have esprit de corps, and company spirit. there is a necessity for an organization that renders unity possible by creating the real individuality of the company. self-esteem is unquestionably one of the most powerful motives which moves our men. they do not wish to pass for cowards in the eyes of their comrades. if they march forward they want to distinguish themselves. after every attack, formation (not the formation of the drill ground but that adopted by those rallying to the chief, those marching with him,) no longer exists. this is because of the inherent disorder of every forward march under fire. the bewildered men, even the officers, have no longer the eyes of their comrades or of their commander upon them, sustaining them. self-esteem no longer impels them, they do not hold out; the least counter-offensive puts them to rout. the experience of the evening ought always to serve the day following; but as the next day is never identical with the evening before, the counsel of experience can not be applied to the latter. when confused battalions shot at each other some two hundred paces for some time with arms inferior to those of our days, flight commenced at the wings. therefore, said experience, let us reënforce the wings, and the battalion was placed between two picked companies. but it was found that the combat methods had been transformed. the elite companies were then reassembled into picked corps and the battalion, weaker than ever, no longer had reënforced wings. perhaps combat in open order predominates, and the companies of light infantrymen being, above all, skirmishers, the battalion again is no longer supported. in our day the use of deployed battalions as skirmishers is no longer possible; and one of the essential reasons for picked companies is the strengthening of the battalion. the question has been asked; who saved the french army on the beresina and at hanau? the guard, it is true. but, outside of the picked corps, what was the french army then? droves, not troops. abnormal times, abnormal deeds. the beresina, hanau, prove nothing to-day. with the rapid-firing arms of infantry to-day, the advantage belongs to the defense which is completed by offensive movements carried out at opportune times. fire to-day is four or five times more rapid even if quite as haphazard as in the days of muzzle loaders. everybody says that this renders impossible the charges of cavalry against infantry which has not been completely thrown into disorder, demoralized. what then must happen to charges of infantry, which marches while the cavalry charges? attacks in deep masses are no longer seen. they are not wise, and never were wise. to advance to the attack with a line of battalions in column, with large intervals and covered by a thick line of skirmishers, when the artillery has prepared the terrain, is very well. people with common sense have never done otherwise. but the thick line of skirmishers is essential. i believe that is the crux of the matter. but enough of this. it is simple prudence for the artillery to prepare the infantry action by a moment's conversation with the artillery of the enemy infantry. if that infantry is not commanded by an imbecile, as it sometimes is, it will avoid that particular conversation the arguments of which would break it up, although they may not be directed precisely in its direction. all other things being equal, both infantries suffer the same losses in the artillery duel. the proportion does not vary, however complete the artillery preparation. one infantry must always close with another under rapid fire from troops in position, and such a fire is, to-day more than ever, to the advantage of the defense. ten men come towards me; they are at four hundred meters; with the ancient arm, i have time to kill but two before they reach me; with rapid fire, i have time to kill four or five. morale does not increase with losses. the eight remaining might reach me in the first case; the five or six remaining will certainly not in the second. if distance be taken, the leader can be seen, the file-closers see, the platoon that follows watches the preceding. dropping out always exists, but it is less extensive with an open order, the men running more risks of being recognized. stragglers will be fewer as the companies know each other better, and as the officers and men are more dependable. it is difficult, if not impossible, to get the french infantry to make use of its fire before charging. if it fires, it will not charge, because it will continue to fire. (bugeaud's method of firing during the advance is good.) what is needed, then, is skirmishers, who deliver the only effective fire, and troops in formation who push the skirmishers on, in themselves advancing to the attack. the soldier wants to be occupied, to return shot for shot. place him in a position to act immediately, individually. then, whatever he does, you have not wholly lost your authority over him. again and again and again, at drill, the officers and non-commissioned officer ought to tell the private: "this is taught you to serve you under such circumstances." generals, field officers, ought to tell officers the same thing. this alone can make an instructed army like the roman army. but to-day, who of us can explain page for page, the use of anything ordered by our tactical regulations except the school of the skirmisher? "forward," "retreat," and "by the flank," are the only practical movements under fire. but the others should be explained. explain the position of "carry arms" with the left hand. explain the ordinary step. explain firing at command in the school of the battalion. it is well enough for the school of the platoon, because a company can make use thereof, but a battalion never can. everything leads to the belief that battle with present arms will be, in the same space of time, more deadly than with ancient ones. the trajectory of the projectile reaching further, the rapidity of firing being four times as great, more men will be put out of commission in less time. while the arm becomes more deadly, man does not change, his morale remains capable of certain efforts and the demands upon it become stronger. morale is overtaxed; it reaches more rapidly the maximum of tension which throws the soldier to the front or rear. the rôle of commanders is to maintain morale, to direct those movements which men instinctively execute when heavily engaged and under the pressure of danger. napoleon i said that in battle, the rôle of skirmishers is the most fatiguing and most deadly. this means that under the empire, as at present, the strongly engaged infantry troops rapidly dissolved into skirmishers. the action was decided by the moral agency of the troops not engaged, held in hand, capable of movement in any direction and acting as a great menace of new danger to the adversary, already shaken by the destructive action of the skirmishers. the same is true to-day. but the greater force of fire arms requires, more than ever, that they be utilized. the rôle of the skirmisher becomes preëminently the destructive role; it is forced on every organization seriously engaged by the greater moral pressure of to-day which causes men to scatter sooner. commanders-in-chief imagine formed battalions firing on the enemy and do not include the use of skirmishers in drill. this is an error, for they are necessary in drill and everywhere, etc. the formed rank is more difficult to utilize than ever. general leboeuf used a very practical movement of going into battle, by platoons, which advance to the battle line in echelon, and can fire, even if they are taken in the very act of the movement. there is always the same dangerous tendency toward mass action even for a battalion in maneuver. this is an error. the principles of maneuver for small units should not be confused with those for great units. emperor napoleon did not prescribe skirmishers in flat country. but every officer should be reduced who does not utilize them to some degree. the rôle of the skirmisher becomes more and more predominant. he should be so much the more watched and directed as he is used against more deadly arms, and, consequently, is more disposed to escape from all control, from all direction. yet under such battle conditions formations are proposed which send skirmishers six hundred paces in advance of battalions and which give the battalion commander the mission of watching and directing (with six companies of one hundred and twenty men) troops spread over a space of three hundred paces by five hundred, at a minimum. to advance skirmishers six hundred paces from their battalion and to expect they will remain there is the work of people who have never observed. inasmuch as combat by skirmishers tends to predominate and since it becomes more difficult with the increase of danger, there has been a constant effort to bring into the firing line the man who must direct it. leaders have been seen to spread an entire battalion in front of an infantry brigade or division so that the skirmishers, placed under a single command, might obey a general direction better. this method, scarcely practicable on the drill-ground, and indicating an absolute lack of practical sense, marks the tendency. the authors of new drills go too far in the opposite direction. they give the immediate command of the skirmishers in each battalion to the battalion commander who must at the same time lead his skirmishers and his battalion. this expedient is more practical than the other. it abandons all thought of an impossible general control and places the special direction in the right hands. but the leadership is too distant, the battalion commander has to attend to the participation of his battalion in the line, or in the ensemble of other battalions of the brigade or division, and the particular performance of his skirmishers. the more difficult, confused, the engagement becomes, the more simple and clear ought to be the roles of each one. skirmishers are in need of a firmer hand than ever to direct and maintain them, so that they may do their part. the battalion commander must be entirely occupied with the rôle of skirmishers, or with the rôle of the line. there should be smaller battalions, one-half the number in reserve, one-half as skirmisher battalions. in the latter the men should be employed one-half as skirmishers and one-half held in reserve. the line of skirmishers will then gain steadiness. let the battalion commander of the troops of the second line entirely occupy himself with his battalion. the full battalion of six companies is to-day too unwieldy for one man. have battalions of four companies of one hundred men each, which is certainly quite sufficient considering the power of destruction which these four companies place in the hands of one man. he will have difficulty in maintaining and directing these four companies under the operation of increasingly powerful modern appliances. he will have difficulty in watching them, in modern combat, with the greater interval between the men in line that the use of the present arms necessitates. with a unified battalion of six hundred men, i would do better against a battalion of one thousand prussians, than with a battalion of eight hundred men, two hundred of whom are immediately taken out of my control. skirmishers have a destructive effect; formed troops a moral effect. drill ground maneuvers should prepare for actual battle. in such maneuvers, why, at the decisive moment of an attack, should you lighten the moral anxiety of the foe by ceasing his destruction, by calling back your skirmishers? if the enemy keeps his own skirmishers and marches resolutely behind them, you are lost, for his moral action upon you is augmented by his destructive action against which you have kindly disarmed yourself. why do you call back your skirmishers? is it because your skirmishers hinder the operation of your columns, block bayonet charges? one must never have been in action to advance such a reason. at the last moment, at the supreme moment when one or two hundred meters separate you from the adversary, there is no longer a line. there is a fearless advance, and your skirmishers are your forlorn hope. let them charge on their own account. let them be passed or pushed forward by the mass. do not recall them. do not order them to execute any maneuver for they are not capable of any, except perhaps, that of falling back and establishing a counter-current which might drag you along. in these moments, everything hangs by a thread. is it because your skirmishers would prevent you from delivering fire? do you, then, believe in firing, especially in firing under the pressure of approaching danger, before the enemy? if he is wise, certainly he marches preceded by skirmishers, who kill men in your ranks and who have the confidence of a first success, of having seen your skirmishers disappear before them. these skirmishers will certainly lie down before your unmasked front. in that formation they easily cause you losses, and you are subjected to their destructive effect and to the moral effect of the advance of troops in formation against you. your ranks become confused; you do not hold the position. there is but one way of holding it, that is to advance, and for that, it is necessary at all costs to avoid firing before moving ahead. fire opened, no one advances further. do you believe in opening and ceasing fire at the will of the commander as on the drill ground? the commencement of fire by a battalion, with the present arms especially, is the beginning of disorder, the moment where the battalion begins to escape from its leader. while drilling even, the battalion commanders, after a little lively drill, after a march, can no longer control the fire. do you object that no one ever gets within two hundred meters of the enemy? that a unit attacking from the front never succeeds? so be it! let us attack from the flank. but a flank is always more or less covered. men are stationed there, ready for the blow. it will be necessary to pick off these men. to-day, more than ever, no rapid, calm firing is possible except skirmish firing. the rapidity of firing has reduced six ranks to two ranks. with reliable troops who have no need of the moral support of a second rank behind them, one rank suffices to-day. at any rate, it is possible to await attack in two ranks. in prescribing fire at command, in seeking to minimize the rôle of skirmishers instead of making it predominate, you take sides with the germans. we are not fitted for that sort of game. if they adopt fire at command, it is just one more reason for our finding another method. we have invented, discovered the skirmisher; he is forced upon us by our men, our arms, etc. he must be organized. in fire by rank, in battle, men gather into small groups and become confused. the more space they have, the less will be the disorder. formed in two ranks, each rank should be still thinner. all the shots of the second line are lost. the men should not touch; they should be far apart. the second rank in firing from position at a supreme moment, ought not to be directly behind the first. the men ought to be echeloned behind the first. there will always be firing from position on any front. it is necessary to make this firing as effective and as easy as possible. i do not wish to challenge the experiences of the target range but i wish to put them to practical use. it is evident that the present arms are more deadly than the ancient ones; the morale of the troops will therefore be more severely shaken. the influence of the leader should be greater over the combatants, those immediately engaged. if it seems rational, let colonels engage in action, with the battalions of their regiment in two lines. one battalion acts as skirmishers; the other battalion waits, formed ready to aid the first. if you do not wish so to utilize the colonels, put all the battalions of the regiment in the first line, and eventually use them as skirmishers. the thing is inevitable; it will be done in spite of you. do it yourself at the very first opportunity. the necessity of replenishing the ammunition supply so quickly used up by the infantry, requires engaging the infantry by units only, which can be relieved by other units after the exhaustion of the ammunition supply. as skirmishers are exhausted quickly, engage entire battalions as skirmishers, assisted by entire battalions as supports or reserves. this is a necessary measure to insure good order. do not throw into the fight immediately the four companies of the battalion. up to the crucial moment, the battalion commander ought to guard against throwing every one into the fight. there is a mania, seen in our maneuver camps, for completely covering a battle front, a defended position, by skirmishers, without the least interval between the skirmishers of different battalions. what will be the result? initially a waste of men and ammunition. then, difficulty in replacing them. why cover the front everywhere? if you do, then what advantage is there in being able to see from a great distance? leave large intervals between your deployed companies. we are no longer only one hundred meters from the enemy at the time of firing. since we are able to see at a great distance we do not risk having the enemy dash into these intervals unexpectedly. your skirmisher companies at large intervals begin the fight, the killing. while your advance companies move ahead, the battalion commander follows with his formed companies, defilading them as much as possible. he lets them march. if the skirmishers fight at the halt, he supervises them. if the commanding officer wishes to reënforce his line, if he wants to face an enemy who attempts to advance into an interval, if he has any motive for doing it, in a word, he rushes new skirmishers into the interval. certainly, these companies have more of the forward impulse, more dash, if dash is needed, than the skirmishers already in action. if they pass the first skirmishers, no harm is done. there you have echelons already formed. the skirmishers engaged, seeing aid in front of them, can be launched ahead more easily. besides, the companies thrown into this interval are a surprise for the enemy. that is something to be considered, as is the fact that so long as there is fighting at a halt, intervals in the skirmish lines are fit places for enemy bullets. furthermore, these companies remain in the hands of their leaders. with the present method of reënforcing skirmishers--i am speaking of the practical method of the battlefield, not of theory--a company, starting from behind the skirmishers engaged, without a place in which to deploy, does not find anything better to do than to mingle with the skirmishers. here it doubles the number of men, but in doing so brings disorder, prevents the control of the commanders and breaks up the regularly constituted groups. while the closing up of intervals to make places for new arrivals is good on the drill ground, or good before or after the combat, it never works during battle. no prescribed interval will be kept exactly. it will open, it will close, following the fluctuations of the combat. but the onset, during which it can be kept, is not the moment of brisk combat; it is the moment of the engagement, of contact, consequently, of feeling out. it is essential that there remain space in which to advance. suppose you are on a plain, for in a maneuver one starts from the flat terrain. in extending the new company it will reënforce the wings of the others, the men naturally supporting the flanks of their comrades. the individual intervals will lessen in order to make room for the new company. the company will always have a well determined central group, a rallying point for the others. if the interval has disappeared there is always time to employ the emergency method of doubling the ranks in front; but one must not forget, whatever the course taken, to preserve good order. we cannot resist closing intervals between battalions; as if we were still in the times of the pikemen when, indeed, it was possible to pass through an interval! to-day, the fighting is done ten times farther away, and the intervals between battalions are not weak joints. they are covered by the fire of the skirmishers, as well covered by fire as the rest of the front, and invisible to the enemy. skirmishers and masses are the formations for action of poorly instructed french troops. with instruction and unity there would be skirmishers supported and formation in battalion columns at most. troops in close order can have only a moral effect, for the attack, or for a demonstration. if you want to produce a real effect, use musketry. for this it is necessary to form a single line. formations have purely moral effect. whoever counts on their material, effective action against reliable, cool troops, is mistaken and is defeated. skirmishers alone do damage. picked shots would do more if properly employed. in attacking a position, start the charge at the latest possible moment, when the leader thinks he can reach the objective not all out of breath. until then, it has been possible to march in rank, that is under the officers, the rank not being the mathematical line, but the grouping in the hands of the leader, under his eye. with the run comes confusion. many stop, the fewer as the run is shorter. they lie down on the way and will rejoin only if the attack succeeds, if they join at all. if by running too long the men are obliged to stop in order to breathe and rest, the dash is broken, shattered. at the advance, very few will start. there are ten chances to one of seeing the attack fail, of turning it into a joke, with cries of "forward with fixed bayonet," but none advancing, except some brave men who will be killed uselessly. the attack vanishes finally before the least demonstration of the foe. an unfortunate shout, a mere nothing, can destroy it. absolute rules are foolish, the conduct of every charge being an affair requiring tact. but so regulate by general rules the conduct of an infantry charge that those who commence it too far away can properly be accused of panic. and there is a way. regulate it as the cavalry charge is regulated, and have a rearguard in each battalion of non-commissioned officers, of most reliable officers, in order to gather together, to follow close upon the charge, at a walk, and to collect all those who have lain down so as not to march or because they were out of breath. this rearguard might consist of a small platoon of picked shots, such as we need in each battalion. the charge ought to be made at a given distance, else it vanishes, evaporates. the leader who commences it too soon either has no head, or does not want to gain his objective. the infantry of the line, as opposed to elite commands, should not be kept in support. the least firm, the most impressionable, are thus sent into the road stained with the blood of the strongest. we place them, after a moral anxiety of waiting, face to face with the terrible destruction and mutilation of modern weapons. if antiquity had need of solid troops as supports, we have a greater need of them. death in ancient combat was not as horrible as in the modern battle where the flesh is mangled, slashed by artillery fire. in ancient combat, except in defeat, the wounded were few in number. this is the reply to those who wish to begin an action by chasseurs, zouaves, etc. he, general or mere captain, who employs every one in the storming of a position can be sure of seeing it retaken by an organized counter-attack of four men and a corporal. in order that we may have real supervision and responsibility in units from companies to brigades, the supporting troops ought to be of the same company, the same battalion, the same brigade, as the case may be. each brigade ought to have its two lines, each battalion its skirmishers, etc. the system of holding out a reserve as long as possible for independent action when the enemy has used his own, ought to be applied downwards. each battalion should have its own, each regiment its own, firmly maintained. there is more need than ever to-day, for protecting the supporting forces, the reserves. the power of destruction increases, the morale remains the same. the tests of morale, being more violent than previously, ought to be shorter, because the power of morale has not increased. the masses, reserves, the second, the first lines, should be protected and sheltered even more than the skirmishers. squares sometimes are broken by cavalry which pursues the skirmishers into the square. instead of lying down, they rush blindly to their refuge which they render untenable and destroy. no square can hold out against determined troops.... but! the infantry square is not a thing of mechanics, of mathematical reasoning; it is a thing of morale. a platoon in four ranks, two facing the front, two the rear, its flanks guarded by the extreme files that face to the flank, and conducted, supported by the non-commissioned officers placed in a fifth rank, in the interior of the rectangle, powerful in its compactness and its fire, cannot be dislodged by cavalry. however, this platoon will prefer to form a part of a large square, it will consider itself stronger, because of numbers, and indeed it will be, since the feeling of force pervades this whole force. this feeling is power in war. people who calculate only according to the fire delivered, according to the destructive power of infantry, would have it fight deployed against cavalry. they do not consider that although supported and maintained, although such a formation seem to prevent flight, the very impetus of the charge, if led resolutely, will break the deployment before the shock arrives. it is clear that if the charge is badly conducted, whether the infantry be solid or not, it will never reach its objective. why? moral reasons and no others make the soldier in a square feel himself stronger than when in line. he feels himself watched from behind and has nowhere to flee. . firing it is easy to misuse breech-loading weapons, such as the rifle. the fashion to-day is to use small intrenchments, covering battalions. as old as powder. such shelter is an excellent device on the condition, however, that behind it, a useful fire can be delivered. look at these two ranks crouched under the cover of a small trench. follow the direction of the shots. even note the trajectory shown by the burst of flame. you will be convinced that, under such conditions, even simple horizontal firing is a fiction. in a second, there will be wild firing on account of the noise, the crowding, the interference of the two ranks. next everybody tries to get under the best possible cover. good-by firing. it is essential to save ammunition, to get all possible efficiency from the arm. yet the official adoption of fire by rank insures relapsing into useless firing at random. good shots are wasted, placed where it is impossible for them to fire well. since we have a weapon that fires six times more rapidly than the ancient weapon, why not profit by it to cover a given space with six times fewer riflemen than formerly? riflemen placed at greater intervals, will be less bewildered, will see more clearly, will be better watched (which may seem strange to you), and will consequently deliver a better fire than formerly. besides, they will expend six times less ammunition. that is the vital point. you must always have ammunition available, that is to say, troops which have not been engaged. reserves must be held out. this is hard to manage perhaps. it is not so hard to manage, however, as fire by command. what is the use of fire by rank? by command? it is impracticable against the enemy, except in extraordinary cases. any attempt at supervision of it is a joke! file firing? the first rank can shoot horizontally, the only thing required; the second rank can fire only into the air. it is useless to fire with our bulky knapsacks interfering so that our men raise the elbow higher than the shoulder. learn what the field pack can be from the english, prussians, austrians, etc.... could the pack not be thicker and less wide? have the first rank open; let the second be checkerwise; and let firing against cavalry be the only firing to be executed in line. one line will be better than two, because it will not be hindered by the one behind it. one kind of fire is practicable and efficient, that of one rank. this is the fire of skirmishers in close formation. the king's order of june st, , reads (p. ): "experience in war having proved that three ranks fire standing, and the intention of his majesty being to prescribe only what can be executed in front of the enemy, he orders that in firing, the first man is never to put his knee on the ground, and that the three ranks fire standing at the same time." this same order includes instructions on target practice, etc. marshal de gouvion-saint cyr says that conservatively one-fourth of the men who are wounded in an affair are put out of commission by the third rank. this estimate is not high enough if it concerns a unit composed of recruits like those who fought at lützen and bautzen. the marshal mentions the astonishment of napoleon when he saw the great number of men wounded in the hand and forearm. this astonishment of napoleon's is singular. what ignorance in his marshals not to have explained such wounds! chief surgeon larrey, by observation of the wounds, alone exonerated our soldiers of the accusation of self-inflicted wounds. the observation would have been made sooner, had the wounds heretofore been numerous. that they had not been can be explained only by the fact that while the young soldiers of kept instinctively close in ranks, up to that time the men must have spaced themselves instinctively, in order to be able to shoot. or perhaps in , these young men might have been allowed to fire a longer time in order to distract them and keep them in ranks, and not often allowed to act as skirmishers for fear of losing them. whilst formerly, the fire by rank must have been much rarer and fire action must have given way almost entirely to the use of skirmishers. fire by command presupposes an impossible coolness. had any troops ever possessed it they would have mowed down battalions as one mows down corn stalks. yet it has been known for a long time, since frederick, since before frederick, since the first rifle. let troops get the range calmly, let them take aim together so that no one disturbs or hinders the other. have each one see clearly, then, at a signal, let them all fire at once. who is going to stand against such people? but did they aim in those days? not so accurately, possibly, but they knew how to shoot waist-high, to shoot at the feet. they knew how to do it. i do not say they did it. if they had done so, there would not have been any need of reminding them of it so often. note cromwell's favorite saying, "aim at their shoe-laces;" that of the officers of the empire, "aim at the height of the waist." study of battles, of the expenditure of bullets, show us no such immediate terrible results. if such a means of destruction was so easy to obtain, why did not our illustrious forbears use it and recommend it to us? (words of de gouvion-saint-cyr.) security alone creates calmness under fire. in minor operations of war, how many captains are capable of tranquilly commanding their fire and maneuvering with calmness? here is a singular thing. you hear fire by rank against cavalry seriously recommended in military lectures. yet not a colonel, not a battalion commander, not a captain, requires this fire to be executed in maneuvers. it is always the soldier who forces the firing. he is ordered to shoot almost before he aims for fear he will shoot without command. yet he ought to feel that when he is aiming, his finger on the trigger, his shot does not belong to him, but rather to the officer who ought to be able to let him aim for five minutes, if advisable, examining, correcting the positions, etc. he ought, when aiming, always be ready to fire upon the object designated, without ever knowing when it will please his commander to order him to fire. fire at command is not practicable in the face of the enemy. if it were, the perfection of its execution would depend on the coolness of the commander and the obedience of the soldier. the soldier is the more easily trained. the austrians had fire by command in italy against cavalry. did they use it? they fired before the command, an irregular fire, a fire by file, with defective results. fire by command is impossible. but why is firing by rank at will impossible, illusory, under the fire of the enemy? because of the reasons already given and, for this reason: that closed ranks are incompatible with fire-arms, on account of the wounding caused by the latter in ranks. in closed ranks, the two lines touching elbows, a man who falls throws ten men into complete confusion. there is no room for those who drop and, however few fall, the resulting disorder immediately makes of the two ranks a series of small milling groups. if the troops are young, they become a disordered flock before any demonstration. (caldiero, duhesme.) if the troops have some steadiness, they of themselves will make space: they will try to make way for the bullets: they will scatter as skirmishers with small intervals. (note the grenadier guards at magenta.)[ ] with very open ranks, men a pace apart, whoever falls has room, he is noticed by a lesser number, he drags down no one in his fall. the moral impression on his comrades is less. their courage is less impaired. besides, with rapid fire everywhere, spaced ranks with no man in front of another, at least permit horizontal fire. closed ranks permit it hardly in the first rank, whose ears are troubled by the shots from the men behind. when a man has to fire four or five shots a minute, one line is certainly more solid than two, because, while the firing is less by half, it is more than twice as likely to be horizontal fire as in the two-rank formation. well-sustained fire, even with blank cartridges, would be sufficient to prevent a successful charge. with slow fire, two ranks alone were able to keep up a sufficiently continuous fusillade. with rapid fire, a single line delivers more shots than two with ancient weapons. such fire, therefore, suffices as a fusillade. close ranks, while suitable for marching, do not lend themselves to firing at the halt. marching, a man likes a comrade at his side. firing, as if he felt the flesh attracting the lead, he prefers being relatively isolated, with space around him. breech-loading rifles breed queer ideas. generals are found who say that rapid firing will bring back fire at command, as if there ever were such a thing. they say it will bring back salvo firing, thus permitting clear vision. as if such a thing were possible! these men have not an atom of common sense. it is singular to see a man like guibert, with practical ideas on most things, give a long dissertation to demonstrate that the officers of his time were wrong in aiming at the middle of the body, that is, in firing low. he claims this is ridiculous to one who understands the trajectory of the rifle. these officers were right. they revived the recommendations of cromwell, because they knew that in combat the soldier naturally fires too high because he does not aim, and because the shape of the rifle, when it is brought to the shoulder, tends to keep the muzzle higher than the breech. whether that is the reason or something else, the fact is indisputable. it is said that in prussian drills all the bullets hit the ground at fifty paces. with the arms of that time and the manner of fighting, results would have been magnificent in battle if the bullets had struck fifty paces before the enemy instead of passing over his head. yet at mollwitz, where the austrians had five thousand men disabled, the prussians had over four thousand. firing with a horizontal sector, if the muzzle be heavy, is more deadly than firing with a vertical sector. . marches. camps. night attacks. from the fact that infantry ought always to fight in thin formation, scattered, it does not follow that it ought to be kept in that order. only in column is it possible to maintain the battle order. it is necessary to keep one's men in hand as long as possible, because once engaged, they no longer belong to you. the disposition in closed mass is not a suitable marching formation, even in a battalion for a short distance. on account of heat, the closed column is intolerable, like an unventilated room. formation with half-distances is better. (why? air, view, etc.) such a formation prevents ready entry of the column into battle in case of necessity or surprise. the half-divisions not in the first line are brought up, the arms at the order, and they can furnish either skirmishers or a reserve for the first line which has been deployed as skirmishers. at leuctra, epaminondas diminished, by one-half, the depth of his men; he formed square phalanxes of fifty men to a side. he could have very well dispensed with it, for the lacedaemonian right was at once thrown into disorder by its own cavalry which was placed in front of that wing. the superior cavalry of epaminondas overran not only the cavalry but the infantry that was behind it. the infantry of epaminondas, coming in the wake of his cavalry finished the work. turning to the right, the left of epaminondas then took in the flank the lacedaemonian line. menaced also in front by the approaching echelons of epaminondas, this line became demoralized and took to flight. perhaps this fifty by fifty formation was adopted in order to give, without maneuver, a front of fifty capable of acting in any direction. at leuctra, it simply acted to the right and took the enemy in the flank and in reverse. thick woods are generally passed through in close column. there is never any opening up, with subsequent closing on the far side. the resulting formation is as confused as a flock of sheep. in a march through mountains, difficult country, a bugler should be on the left, at the orders of an intelligent officer who indicates when the halt seems necessary for discipline in the line. the right responds and if the place has been judged correctly an orderly formation is maintained. keep in ranks. if one man steps out, others follow. do not permit men to leave ranks without requiring them to rejoin. in the rear-guard it is always necessary to have pack mules in an emergency; without this precaution, considerable time may be lost. in certain difficult places time is thus lost every day. in camp, organize your fatigue parties in advance; send them out in formation and escorted. definite and detailed orders ought to be given to the convoy, and the chief baggage-master ought to supervise it, which is rarely the case. it is a mistake to furnish mules to officers and replace them in case of loss or sickness. the officer overloads the mule and the government loses more thereby than is generally understood. convoys are endless owing to overloaded mules and stragglers. if furnished money to buy a mule the officer uses it economically because it is his. if mules are individually furnished to officers instead of money, the officer will care for his beast for the same reason. but it is better to give money only, and the officer, if he is not well cared for on the march has no claim against the government. always, always, take draconian measures to prevent pillage from commencing. if it begins, it is difficult ever to stop it. a body of infantry is never left alone. there is no reason for calling officers of that arm inapt, when battalions although established in position are not absolutely on the same line, with absolutely equal intervals. ten moves are made to achieve the exact alignment which the instructions on camp movements prescribe. yet designating a guiding battalion might answer well enough and still be according to the regulations. why are not night attacks more employed to-day, at least on a grand scale? the great front which armies occupy renders their employment more difficult, and exacts of the troops an extreme aptitude in this kind of surprise tactics (found in the arabs, turcos, spahis), or absolute reliability. there are some men whose knowledge of terrain is wonderful, with an unerring eye for distance, who can find their way through places at night which they have visited only in the day time. utilizing such material for a system of guides it would be possible to move with certainty. these are simple means, rarely employed, for conducting a body of troops into position on the darkest night. there is, even, a means of assuring at night the fire of a gun upon a given point with as much precision as in plain day. chapter iii cavalry . cavalry and modern appliances they say that cavalry is obsolete; that it can be of no use in battles waged with the weapons of today. is not infantry affected in the same way? examples drawn from the last two wars are not conclusive. in a siege, in a country which is cut off, one does not dare to commit the cavalry, and therefore takes from it its boldness, which is almost its only weapon. the utility of cavalry has always been doubted. that is because its cost is high. it is little used, just because it does cost. the question of economy is vital in peace times. when we set a high value upon certain men, they are not slow to follow suit, and to guard themselves against being broken. look at staff officers who are almost never broken (reduced), even when their general himself is. with new weapons the rôle of cavalry has certainly changed less than any other, although it is the one which is most worried about. however, cavalry always has the same doctrine: charge! to start with, cavalry action against cavalry is always the same. also against infantry. cavalry knows well enough today, as it has always known, that it can act only against infantry which has been broken. we must leave aside epic legends that are always false, whether they relate to cavalry or infantry. infantry cannot say as much of its own action against infantry. in this respect there is a complete anarchy of ideas. there is no infantry doctrine. with the power of modern weapons, which forces you to slow down if it does not stop you, the advance under fire becomes almost impossible. the advantage is with the defensive. this is so evident that only a madman could dispute it. what then is to be done? halt, to shoot at random and cannonade at long range until ammunition is exhausted? perhaps. but what is sure, is that such a state of affairs makes maneuver necessary. there is more need than ever for maneuver at a long distance in an attempt to force the enemy to shift, to quit his position. what maneuver is swifter than that of cavalry? therein is its role. the extreme perfection of weapons permits only individual action in combat, that is action by scattered forces. at the same time it permits the effective employment of mass action out of range, of maneuvers on the flank or in the rear of the enemy in force imposing enough to frighten him. can the cavalry maneuver on the battle field? why not? it can maneuver rapidly, and above all beyond the range of infantry fire, if not of artillery fire. maneuver being a threat, of great moral effect, the cavalry general who knows how to use it, can contribute largely to success. he arrests the enemy in movement, doubtful as to what the cavalry is going to attempt. he makes the enemy take some formation that keeps him under artillery fire for a while, above all that of light artillery if the general knows how to use it. he increases the enemy's demoralization and thus is able to rejoin his command. rifled cannon and accurate rifles do not change cavalry tactics at all. these weapons of precision, as the word precision indicates, are effective only when all battle conditions, all conditions of aiming, are ideal. if the necessary condition of suitable range is lacking, effect is lacking. accuracy of fire at a distance is impossible against a troop in movement, and movement is the essence of cavalry action. rifled weapons fire on them of course, but they fire on everybody. in short, cavalry is in the same situation as anybody else. what response is there to this argument? since weapons have been improved, does not the infantryman have to march under fire to attack a position? is the cavalryman not of the same flesh? has he less heart than the infantryman? if one can march under fire, cannot the other gallop under it? when the cavalryman cannot gallop under fire, the infantryman cannot march under it. battles will consist of exchanges of rifle shots by concealed men, at long range. the battle will end only when the ammunition is exhausted. the cavalryman gallops through danger, the infantryman walks. that is why, if he learns, as it is probable he will, to keep at the proper distance, the cavalryman will never see his battle rôle diminished by the perfection of long range fire. an infantryman will never succeed by himself. the cavalryman will threaten, create diversions, worry, scatter the enemy's fire, often even get to close quarters if he is properly supported. the infantryman will act as usual. but more than ever will he need the aid of cavalry in the attack. he who knows how to use his cavalry with audacity will inevitably be the victor. even though the cavalryman offers a larger target, long range weapons will paralyze him no more than another. the most probable effect of artillery of today, will be to increase the scattering in the infantry, and even in the cavalry. the latter can start in skirmisher formation at a distance and close in while advancing, near its objective. it will be more difficult to lead; but this is to the advantage of the frenchman. the result of improving the ballistics of the weapon, for the cavalry as for the infantry (there is no reason why it should be otherwise for the cavalry), will be that a man will flee at a greater distance from it, and nothing more. since the empire, the opinion of european armies is that the cavalry has not given the results expected of it. it has not given great results, for the reason that we and others lacked real cavalry generals. he is, it seems, a phenomenon that is produced only every thousand years, more rarely than a real general of infantry. to be a good general, whether of infantry or cavalry, is an infinitely rare thing, like the good in everything. the profession of a good infantry general is as difficult as, perhaps more difficult than, that of a good cavalry general. both require calmness. it comes more easily to the cavalryman than to the foot soldier who is much more engaged. both require a like precision, a judgment of the moral and physical forces of the soldier; and the morale of the infantryman, his constitution, is more tried than is the case with the horseman. the cavalry general, of necessity, sees less clearly; his vision has its limits. great cavalry generals are rare. doubtless seidlitz could not, in the face of the development of cannon and rifle, repeat his wonders. but there is always room for improvement. i believe there is much room for improvement. we did not have under the empire a great cavalry general who knew how to handle masses. the cavalry was used like a blind hammer that strikes heavily and not always accurately. it had immense losses. like the gauls, we have a little too much confidence in the "forward, forward, not so many methods." methods do not hinder the forward movement. they prepare the effect and render it surer and at the same time less costly to the assailant. we have all the gallic brutality. (note marignano, where the force of artillery and the possibility of a turning movement around a village was neglected). what rare things infantry and cavalry generals are! a leader must combine resolute bravery and impetuosity with prudence and calmness; a difficult matter! the broken terrain of european fields no longer permits, we are told, the operation of long lines, of great masses of cavalry. i do not regret it. i am struck more with the picturesque effect of these hurricanes of cavalry in the accounts of the empire than with the results obtained. it does not seem to me that these results were in proportion to the apparent force of the effort and to the real grandeur of the sacrifices. and indeed, these enormous hammers (a usual figure), are hard to handle. they have not the sure direction of a weapon well in hand. if the blow is not true, recovery is impossible, etc. however, the terrain does not to-day permit the assembling of cavalry in great masses. this compelling reason for new methods renders any other reason superfluous. nevertheless, the other reasons given in the ministerial observations of , on the cavalry service, seems to me excellent. the improvement of appliances, the extension of battle fields, the confidence to the infantry and the audacity to the artillery that the immediate support of the cavalry gives, demand that this arm be in every division in sufficient force for efficient action. i, therefore, think it desirable for a cavalry regiment to be at the disposal of a general commanding a division. whatever the experiences of instruction centers, they can not change in the least my conviction of the merit of this measure in the field. . cavalry against cavalry cavalry action, more than that of infantry, is an affair of morale. let us study first the morale of the cavalry engagement in single combat. two riders rush at each other. are they going to direct their horses front against front? their horses would collide, both would be forced to their feet, while running the chance of being crushed in the clash or in the fall of their mounts. each one in the combat counts on his strength, on his skill, on the suppleness of his mount, on his personal courage; he does not want a blind encounter, and he is right. they halt face to face, abreast, to fight man to man; or each passes the other, thrusting with the sabre or lance; or each tries to wound the knee of the adversary and dismount him in this way. but as each is trying to strike the other, he thinks of keeping out of the way himself, he does not want a blind encounter that does away with the combat. the ancient battles, the cavalry engagements, the rare cavalry combats of our days, show us nothing else. discipline, while keeping the cavalrymen in the ranks, has not been able to change the instinct of the rider. no more than the isolated man is the rider in the line willing to meet the shock of a clash with the enemy. there is a terrible moral effect in a mass moving forward. if there is no way to escape to the right or to the left, men and horses will avoid the clash by stopping face to face. but only preëminently brave troops, equally seasoned in morale, alike well led and swept along, animated alike, will meet face to face. all these conditions are never found united on either side, so the thing is never seen. forty-nine times out of fifty, one of the cavalry forces will hesitate, bolt, get into disorder, flee before the fixed purpose of the other. three quarters of the time this will happen at a distance, before they can see each other's eyes. often they will get closer. but always, always, the stop, the backward movement, the swerving of horses, the confusion, bring about fear or hesitation. they lessen the shock and turn it into instant flight. the resolute assailant does not have to slacken. he has not been able to overcome or turn the obstacles of horses not yet in flight, in this uproar of an impossible about face executed by routed troops, without being in disorder himself. but this disorder is that of victory, of the advance, and a good cavalry does not trouble itself about it. it rallies in advancing, while the vanquished one has fear at its heels. on the whole, there are few losses. the engagement, if there is one, is an affair of a second. the proof is that in this action of cavalry against cavalry, the conquered alone loses men, and he loses generally few. the battle against infantry is alone the really deadly struggle. like numbers of little chasseurs have routed heavy cuirassiers. how could they have done so if the others had not given way before their determination? the essential factor was, and always is, determination. the cavalry's casualties are always much less than those of the infantry both from fire and from disease. is it because the cavalry is the aristocratic arm? this explains why in long wars it improves much more than the infantry. as there are few losses between cavalry and cavalry, so there is little fighting. hannibal's numidians, like the russian cossacks, inspired a veritable terror by the incessant alarms they caused. they tired out without fighting and killed by surprise. why is the cavalry handled so badly?--it is true that infantry is not used better.--because its rôle is one of movement, of morale, of morale and movement so united, that movement alone, often without a charge or shock action of any sort can drive the enemy into retreat, and, if followed closely, into rout. that is a result of the quickness of cavalry. one who knows how to make use of this quickness alone can obtain such results. all writers on cavalry will tell you that the charge pushed home of two cavalry bodies and the shock at top speed do not exist. always before the encounter, the weaker runs away, if there is not a face to face check. what becomes then of the mv squared? if this famous mv squared is an empty word, why then crush your horses under giants, forgetting that in the formula besides m there is v squared. in a charge, there is m, there is v squared, there is this and that. there is resolution, and i believe, nothing else that counts! cohesion and unity give force to the charge. alignment is impossible at a fast gait where the most rapid pass the others. only when the moral effect has been produced should the gait be increased to take advantage of it by falling upon an enemy already in disorder, in the act of fleeing. the cuirassiers charge at a trot. this calm steadiness frightens the enemy into an about face. then they charge at his back, at a gallop. they say that at eckmühl, for every french cuirassier down, fourteen austrians were struck in the back. was it because they had no back-plate? it is evident that it was because they offered their backs to the blows. jomini speaks of charges at a trot against cavalry at a gallop. he cites lasalle who used the trot and who, seeing cavalry approach at a gallop, would say: "there are lost men." jomini insists on the effect of shock. the trot permits that compactness which the gallop breaks up. that may be true. but the effect is moral above all. a troop at the gallop sees a massed squadron coming towards it at a trot. it is surprised at first at such coolness. the material impulse of the gallop is superior; but there are no intervals, no gaps through which to penetrate the line in order to avoid the shock, the shock that overcomes men and horses. these men must be very resolute, as their close ranks do not permit them to escape by about facing. if they move at such a steady gait, it is because their resolution is also firm and they do not feel the need of running away, of diverting themselves by the unchecked speed of the unrestrained gallop, etc. [ ] galloping men do not reason these things out, but they know them instinctively. they understand that they have before them a moral impulse superior to theirs. they become uneasy, hesitate. their hands instinctively turn their horses aside. there is no longer freedom in the attack at a gallop. some go on to the end, but three-fourths have already tried to avoid the shock. there is complete disorder, demoralization, flight. then begins the pursuit at a gallop by the men who attacked at the trot. the charge at a trot exacts of leaders and men complete confidence and steadfastness. it is the experience of battle only that can give this temper to all. but this charge, depending on a moral effect, will not always succeed. it is a question of surprise. xenophon [ ] recommended, in his work on cavalry operations, the use of surprise, the use of the gallop when the trot is customary, and vice-versa. "because," he says, "agreeable or terrible, the less a thing is foreseen, the more pleasure or fright does it cause. this is nowhere seen better than in war, where every surprise strikes terror even to the strongest." as a general rule, the gallop is and should be necessary in the charge; it is the winning, intoxicating gait, for men and horses. it is taken up at such a distance as may be necessary to insure its success, whatever it may cost in men and horses. the regulations are correct in prescribing that the charge be started close up. if the troopers waited until the charge was ordered, they would always succeed. i say that strong men, moved by pride or fear, by taking up too soon the charge against a firm enemy, have caused more charges to fail than to succeed. keeping men in hand until the command "charge," seizing the precise instant for this command, are both difficult. they exact of the energetic leader domination over his men and a keen eye, at a moment when three out of four men no longer see anything, so that good cavalry leaders, squadron leaders in general are very rare. real charges are just as rare. actual shock no longer exists. the moral impulse of one of the adversaries nearly always upsets the other, perhaps far off, perhaps a little nearer. were this "a little nearer," face to face, one of the two troops would be already defeated before the first saber cut and would disentangle itself for flight. with actual shock, all would be thrown into confusion. a real charge on the one part or the other would cause mutual extermination. in practice the victor scarcely loses any one. observation demonstrates that cavalry does not close with cavalry; its deadly combats are those against infantry alone. even if a cavalryman waits without flinching, his horse will wish to escape, to shrink before the collision. if man anticipates, so does the horse. why did frederick like to see his center closed in for the assault? as the best guarantee against the instincts of man and horse. the cavalry of frederick had ordinarily only insignificant losses: a result of determination. the men want to be distracted from the advancing danger by movement. the cavalrymen who go at the enemy, if left to themselves, would start at a gallop, for fear of not arriving, or of arriving exhausted and material for carnage. the same is true of the arabs. note what happened in to the cavalry of general martineau. the rapid move relieves anxiety. it is natural to wish to lessen it. but the leaders are there, whom experience, whom regulations order to go slowly, then to accelerate progressively, so as to arrive with the maximum of speed. the procedure should be the walk, then the trot, after that the gallop, then the charge. but it takes a trained eye to estimate distance and the character of the terrain, and, if the enemy approaches, to pick the point where one should meet him. the nearer one approaches, the greater among the troops is the question of morale. the necessity of arriving at the greatest speed is not alone a mechanical question, since indeed one never clashes, it is a moral necessity. it is necessary to seize the moment at which the uneasiness of one's men requires the intoxication of the headlong charging gallop. an instant too late, and a too great anxiety has taken the upper hand and caused the hands of the riders to act on the horses; the start is not free; a number hide by remaining behind. an instant too soon: before arrival the speed has slowed down; the animation, the intoxication of the run, fleeting things, are exhausted. anxiety takes the upper hand again, the hands act instinctively, and even if the start were unhampered, the arrival is not. frederick and seidlitz were content when they saw the center of the charging squadron three and four ranks deep. it was as if they understood that with this compact center, as the first lines could not escape to the right or left, they were forced to continue straight ahead. in order to rush like battering-rams, even against infantry, men and horses ought to be watered and fresh (ponsomby's cavalry at waterloo). if there is ever contact between cavalry, the shock is so weakened by the hands of the men, the rearing of the horses, the swinging of heads, that both sides come to a halt. only the necessity for carrying along the man and the horse at the supreme moment, for distracting them, necessitates the full gallop before attacking the enemy, before having put him to flight. charges at the gallop of three or four kilometers, suppose horses of bronze. because morale is not studied and because historical accounts are taken too literally, each epoch complains that cavalry forces are no longer seen charging and fighting with the sword, that too much prudence dictates running away instead of clashing with the enemy. these plaints have been made ever since the empire, both by the allies, and by us. but this has always been true. man was never invulnerable. the charging gait has almost always been the trot. man does not change. even the combats of cavalry against cavalry today are deadlier than they were in the lamented days of chivalry. the retreat of the infantry is always more difficult than that of the cavalry; the latter is simple. a cavalry repulsed and coming back in disorder is a foreseen, an ordinary happening; it is going to rally at a distance. it often reappears with advantage. one can almost say, in view of experience, that such is its rôle. an infantry that is repelled, especially if the action has been a hot one and the cavalry rushes in, is often disorganized for the rest of the day. even authors who tell you that two squadrons never collide, tell you continually: "the force of cavalry is in the shock." in the terror of the shock, yes. in the shock, no! it lies only in determination. it is a mental and not a mechanical condition. never give officers and men of the cavalry mathematical demonstrations of the charge. they are good only to shake confidence. mathematical reasoning shows a mutual collapse that never takes place. show them the truth. lasalle with his always victorious charge at a trot guarded against similar reasonings, which might have demonstrated to him mathematically that a charge of cuirassiers at a trot ought to be routed by a charge of hussars at a gallop. he simply told them: "go resolutely and be sure that you will never find a daredevil determined enough to come to grips with you." it is necessary to be a daredevil in order to go to the end. the frenchman is one above all. because he is a good trooper in battle, when his commanders themselves are daredevils he is the best in europe. (note the days of the empire, the remarks of wellington, a good judge). if moreover, his leaders use a little head work, that never harms anything. the formula of the cavalry is r (resolution) and r, and always r, and r is greater than all the mv squared in the world. there is this important element in the pursuit of cavalry by cavalry. the pursued cannot halt without delivering himself up to the pursuer. the pursuer can always see the pursued. if the latter halts and starts to face about the pursuer can fall upon him before he is faced, and take him by surprise. but the pursued does not know how many are pursuing him. if he alone halts two pursuers may rush on him, for they see ahead of them and they naturally attack whoever tries to face about. for with the about face danger again confronts them. the pursuit is often instigated by the fear that the enemy will turn. the material fact that once in flight all together cannot turn again without risking being surprised and overthrown, makes the flight continuous. even the bravest flee, until sufficient distance between them and the enemy, or some other circumstances such as cover or supporting troops, permits of a rally and a return to the offensive. in this case the pursuit may turn into flight in its turn. cavalry is insistent on attacking on an equal front. because, if with a broader front, the enemy gives way before it, his wings may attack it and make it the pursued instead of the pursuer. the moral effect of resolution is so great that cavalry, breaking and pursuing a more numerous cavalry, is never pursued by the enemy wings. however the idea that one may be taken in rear by forces whom one has left on the flanks in a position to do so, has such an effect that the resolution necessary for an attack under these circumstances is rare. why is it that colonel a---- does not want a depth formation for cavalry, he who believes in pressure of the rear ranks on the first? it is because at heart he is convinced that only the first rank can act in a cavalry charge, and that this rank can receive no impression, no speeding up, from those behind it. there is debate as to the advantage of one or two ranks for the cavalry. this again is a matter of morale. leave liberty of choice, and under varying conditions of confidence and morale one or the other will be adopted. there are enough officers for either formation. it is characteristic of cavalry to advance further than infantry and consequently it exposes its flanks more. it then needs more reserves to cover its flanks and rear than does infantry. it needs reserves to protect and to support the pursuers who are almost always pursued when they return. with cavalry even more than infantry victory belongs to the last reserves held intact. the one with the reserves is always the one who can take the offensive. tie to that, and no one can stand before you. with room to maneuver cavalry rallies quickly. in deep columns it cannot. the engagement of cavalry lasts only a moment. it must be reformed immediately. with a roll call at each reforming, it gets out of hand less than the infantry, which, once engaged, has little respite. there should be a roll call for cavalry, and for infantry after an advance, at each lull. there should be roll calls at drill and in field maneuvers, not that they are necessary but in order to become habituated to them. then the roll call will not be forgotten on the day of action, when very few think of what ought to be done. in the confusion and speed of cavalry action, man escapes more easily from surveillance. in our battles his action is increasingly individual and rapid. the cavalryman should not be left too free; that would be dangerous. frequently in action troops should be reformed and the roll called. it would be an error not to do so. there might be ten to twenty roll calls in a day. the officers, the soldiers, would then have a chance to demand an accounting from each man, and might demand it the next day. once in action, and that action lasts, the infantryman of today escapes from the control of his officers. this is due to the disorder inherent in battle, to deployment, to the absence of roll calls, which cannot be held in action. control, then, can only be in the hands of his comrades. of modern arms infantry is the one in which there is the greatest need for cohesion. cavalry always fights very poorly and very little. this has been true from antiquity, when the cavalryman was of a superior caste to the infantryman, and ought to have been braver. anybody advancing, cavalry or infantry, ought to scout and reconnoiter as soon as possible the terrain on which it acts. condé forgot this at neerwinden. the th forgot it at solferino. [ ] everybody forgets it. and from the failure to use skirmishers and scouts, come mistakes and disasters. the cavalry has a rifle for exceptional use. look out that this exception does not become the rule. such a tendency has been seen. at the battle of sicka, the first clash was marred by the lack of dash on the part of a regiment of chasseurs d'afrique, which after being sent off at the gallop, halted to shoot. at the second clash general bugeaud charged at their head to show them how to charge. a young colonel of light cavalry, asked carbines for his cavalry. "why? so that if i want to reconnoiter a village i can sound it from a distance of seven or eight hundred meters without losing anybody." what can you say to a man advancing such ideas? certainly the carbine makes everybody lose common sense. the work of light cavalry makes it inevitable that they be captured sometimes. it is impossible to get news of the enemy without approaching him. if one man escapes in a patrol, that is enough. if no one comes back, even that fact is instructive. the cavalry is a priceless object that no leader wants to break. however it is only by breaking it that results can be obtained. some authors think of using cavalry as skirmishers, mounted or dismounted. i suppose they advance holding the horse by the bridle? this appears to be an absurdity. if the cavalryman fires he will not charge. the african incident cited proves that. it would be better to give the cavalryman two pistols than a carbine. the americans in their vast country where there is unlimited room, used cavalry wisely in sending it off on distant forays to cut communications, make levies, etc. what their cavalry did as an arm in battle is unknown. the cavalry raids in the american war were part of a war directed against wealth, against public works, against resources. it was war of destruction of riches, not of men. the raiding cavalry had few losses, and inflicted few losses. the cavalry is always the aristocratic arm which loses very lightly, even if it risks all. at least it has the air of risking all, which is something at any rate. it has to have daring and daring is not so common. but the merest infantry engagements in equal numbers costs more than the most brilliant cavalry raid. . cavalry against infantry cavalry knows how to fight cavalry. but how it fights infantry not one cavalry officer in a thousand knows. perhaps not one of them knows. go to it then gaily, with general uncertainty! a military man, a participant in our great wars, recommends as infallible against infantry in line the charge from the flank, horse following horse. he would have cavalry coming up on the enemy's left, pass along his front and change direction so as to use its arms to the right. this cavalryman is right. such charges should give excellent results, the only deadly results. the cavalryman can only strike to his right, and in this way each one strikes. against ancient infantry such charges would have been as valuable as against modern infantry. this officer saw with his own eyes excellent examples of this attack in the wars of the empire. i do not doubt either the facts he cites or the deductions he makes. but for such charges there must be officers who inspire absolute confidence in their men and dependable and experienced soldiers. there is necessary, in short, an excellent cavalry, seasoned by long wars, and officers and men of very firm resolution. so it is not astonishing that examples of this mode of action are rare. they always will be. they always require a head for the charge, an isolated head, and when he is actually about to strike, he will fall back into the formation. it seems to him that lost in the mass he risks less than when alone. everybody is willing to charge, but only if all charge together. it is a case of belling the cat. the attack in column on infantry has a greater moral action than the charge in line. if the first and second squadrons are repulsed, but the infantry sees a third charging through the dust, it will say "when is this going to stop?" and it will be shaken. an extract from folard: "only a capable officer is needed to get the best results from a cavalry which has confidence in its movement, which is known to be good and vigorous, and also is equipped with excellent weapons. such cavalry will break the strongest battalions, if its leader has sense enough to know its power and courage enough to use this power." breaking is not enough, and is a feat that costs more than it is worth if the whole battalion is not killed or taken prisoner, or at least if the cavalry is not immediately followed by other troops, charged with this task. at waterloo our cavalry was exhausted fruitlessly, because it acted without artillery or infantry support. at krasno, august , , murat, at the head of his cavalry could not break an isolated body of ten thousand russian infantry which continually held him off by its fire, and retired tranquilly across the plain. the nd was upset by cavalry at solferino. from ancient days the lone infantryman has always had the advantage over the lone cavalryman. there is no shadow of a doubt about this in ancient narrations. the cavalryman only fought the cavalryman. he threatened, harassed, troubled the infantryman in the rear, but he did not fight him. he slaughtered him when put to flight by other infantry, or at least he scattered him and the light infantry slaughtered him. cavalry is a terrible weapon in the hands of one who knows how to use it. who can say that epaminondas could have defeated the spartans twice without his thessalonian cavalry. eventually rifle and artillery fire deafen the soldier; fatigue overpowers him; he becomes inert; he hears commands no longer. if cavalry unexpectedly appears, he is lost. cavalry conquers merely by its appearance. (bismarck or decker). modern cavalry, like ancient cavalry, has a real effect only on troops already broken, on infantry engaged with infantry, on cavalry disorganized by artillery fire or by a frontal demonstration. but against such troops its action is decisive. in such cases its action is certain and gives enormous results. you might fight all day and lose ten thousand men, the enemy might lose as many, but if your cavalry pursues him, it will take thirty thousand prisoners. its role is less knightly than its reputation and appearance, less so than the rôle of infantry. it always loses much less than infantry. its greatest effect is the effect of surprise, and it is thereby that it gets such astonishing results. what formation should infantry, armed with modern weapons, take to guard against flank attacks by cavalry? if one fires four times as fast, if the fire is better sustained, one needs only a quarter as many men to guard a point against cavalry. protection might be secured by using small groups, placed the range of a rifle shot apart and flanking each other, left on the flank of the advance. but they must be dependable troops, who will not be worried by what goes on behind them. . armor and armament an armored cavalry is clearly required for moral reasons. note this with reference to the influence of cuirassiers (armored cavalrymen) on morale. at the battle of renty, in , tavannes, a marshal, had with him his company armored in steel. it was the first time that such armor had been seen. supported by some hundreds of fugitives who had rallied, he threw himself at the head of his company, on a column of two thousand german cavalry who had just thrown both infantry and cavalry into disorder. he chose his time so well that he broke and carried away these two thousand germans, who fell back and broke the twelve hundred light horsemen who were supporting them. there followed a general flight, and the battle was won. general renard says "the decadence of cavalry caused the disappearance of their square formations in battle, which were characteristic in the seventeenth century." it was not the decadence of the cavalry but the abandonment of the cuirass and the perfecting of the infantry weapon to give more rapid fire. when cuirassiers break through they serve as examples, and emulation extends to others, who another time try to break through as they did. why cuirassiers? because they alone, in all history, have charged and do charge to the end. to charge to the end the cuirassiers need only half the courage of the dragoons, as their armor raises their morale one half. but since the cuirassiers have as much natural courage as the dragoons, for they are all the same men, it is proper to count the more on their action. shall we have only one kind of cavalry? which? if all our cavalry could wear the cuirass and at the same time do the fatiguing work of light cavalry, if all our horses could in addition carry the cuirass through such work, i say that there should be only cuirassiers. but i do not understand why the morale given by the cuirass should be lightly done away with, merely to have one cavalry without the cuirass. a cavalryman armored completely and his horse partially, can charge only at a trot. on the appearance of fire arms, cavalry, according to general ambert, an author of the past, covered itself with masses of armor resembling anvils rather than with cuirasses. it was at that time the essential arm. later as infantry progressed the tactics changed, it needed more mobility. permanent armies began to be organized by the state. the state thought less of the skin of the individual than of economy and mobility and almost did away with cuirassiers. the cuirass has always given, and today more than ever it will give, confidence to the cavalryman. courage, dash, and speed have a value beyond that of mere mass. i leave aside mathematical discussions which seem to me to have nothing in common with battle conditions. i would pick to wear the cuirass the best men in the army, big chested, red-blooded, strong limbed, the foot chasseurs. i would organize a regiment of light cuirassiers for each of our divisions. men and horses, such a cavalry would be much more robust and active than our present cuirassiers. if our armored cavalry is worth more than any other arm by its dash in battle, this cavalry would be worth twice as much. but how would these men of small stature get into the saddle? to this serious objection i answer, "they will arrange it." and this objection, which i do not admit, is the only one that can be made against the organization of a light armored cavalry, an organization that is made imperative by the improvement in weapons. the remainder of those chasseur battalions which furnish cuirassiers, should return to the infantry, which has long demanded them, and hussars and dragoons, dismounted in the necessary number will also be welcomed by the infantry. as for the thrust, the thrust is deadlier than the cut. you do not have to worry about lifting your arm; you thrust. but it is necessary that the cavalryman be convinced that to parry a vertical cut is folly. this can be done by his officers, by those who have had experience, if there are any such in peace times. this is not easy. but in this respect, as in all others, the advantage lies with the brave. a cavalry charge is a matter of morale above all. it is identical in its methods, its effects, with the infantry charge. all the conditions to be fulfilled in the charge (walk, trot, gallop, charge, etc.) have a reason bearing on morale. these reasons have already been touched on. roman discipline and character demand tenacity. the hardening of the men to fatigue, and a good organization, giving mutual support, produced that tenacity, against which the bravest could not stand. the exhausting method of powerful strokes used by the gauls could not last long against the skillful, terrible and less fatiguing method of fighting by the thrust. the sikh cavalrymen of m. nolan armed with dragoon sabers sharpened by themselves, liked the cut. they knew nothing about methods of swordsmanship; they did not practice. they said "a good saber and a willingness to use it are enough." true, true! there is always discussion as to the lance or the saber. the lance requires skillful vigorous cavalrymen, good horsemen, very well drilled, very adroit, for the use of the lance is more difficult than that of the straight sword, especially if the sword is not too heavy. is not this an answer to the question? no matter what is done, no matter what methods are adopted, it must always be remembered that our recruits in war time are sent into squadrons as into battalions, with a hasty and incomplete training. if you give them lances, most of them will just have sticks in their hands, while a straight sword at the end of a strong arm is at the same time simple and terrible. a short trident spear, with three short points just long enough to kill but not only enough to go through the body, would remain in the body of the man and carry him along. it would recoil on the cavalryman who delivered the blow, he would be upset by the blow himself. but the dragoon must be supported by the saddle, and as he had kept hold of the shaft he would be able to disengage the fork which had pierced the body some six inches. no cavalry of equal morale could stand against a cavalry armed with such forked spears. as between forks and lances, the fork would replace the lance. that is, of course, for beginners in mounted fencing. but the fork! it would be ridiculous, not military! with the lance one always figures without the horse, whose slightest movement diverts the lance so much. the lance is a weapon frightful even to the mounted man who uses it properly. if he sticks an enemy at the gallop, he is dismounted, torn off by the arm attached to the lance which remains in the body of his enemy. cavalry officers and others who seek examples in "victories and conquests," in official reports, in "bazancourt" are too naïve. it is hard to get at the truth. in war, in all things, we take the last example which we have witnessed. and now we want lances, which we do not know how to use, which frighten the cavalryman himself and pluck him from the saddle if he sticks anybody. we want no more cuirasses; we want this and that. we forget that the last example gives only a restricted number of instances relating to the matter in question. it appears, according to xenophon, that it was not easy to throw the dart from horseback. he constantly recommends obtaining as many men as possible who know how to throw the dart. he recommends leaning well back to avoid falling from the horse in the charge. in reading xenophon it is evident that there was much falling from the horse. it appears that in battle there is as great difficulty in handling the saber as in handling the bayonet. another difficulty for the cavalryman lies in the handling of the musket. this is seen in the handling of the regulation weapon of the spahis. there is only one important thing for the cavalryman, to be well seated. men should be on horseback for hours at a time, every day, from their arrival in the organization. if the selection of those who know something about horses was not neglected in the draft, and if such men were, made cavalrymen, the practical training of the greater number would be much more rapidly concluded. i do not speak of the routine of the stable. between mounted drills, foot drills might be gone through with in a snappy, free fashion, without rigidity, with daily increasing speed. such drills would instruct cavalrymen more rapidly than the restricted method employed. a dragoon horse carries in campaign with one day's food three hundred and eight pounds, without food or forage two hundred and seventy seven pounds. how can such horses carry this and have speed? seek the end always, not the means! make a quarter of your cavalrymen into muleteers, a quarter of your horses into pack animals. you will thus secure, for the remaining three quarters unquestioned vigor. but how will you make up these pack trains? you will have plenty of wounded horses after a week of campaign. chapter iv artillery if artillery did not have a greater range than the rifle, we could not risk separating it far from its support, as it would have to wait until the enemy was but four or five hundred paces away to fire on him. but the more its range is increased, the further away it can be placed from its support. the greater the range of artillery, the greater freedom of action from the different arms, which no longer have to be side by side to give mutual support. the greater the range of artillery, the easier it is to concentrate its fire. two batteries fifteen hundred meters apart can concentrate on a point twelve hundred meters in front of and between them. before the range was so long they had to be close together, and the terrain did not always lend itself to this. furthermore, do not support a piece by placing infantry just behind or alongside of it, as is done three-quarters of the time at maneuvers. on the contrary hide the infantry to the right or left and far behind, cover it without worrying too much about distance and let the artillery call for help if they think that the piece is in danger of being lost. why should infantry be placed too close, and consequently have its advance demoralized? this will throw away the greatest advantage that we frenchmen have in defense, that of defending ourselves by advancing, with morale unimpaired, because we have not suffered heavy losses at a halt. there is always time to run to the defense of artillery. to increase the moral effect advance your supports in formation. skirmishers can also be swiftly scattered among the batteries. these skirmishers, in the midst of the guns will not have to fear cavalry. even if they are assailed by infantry it will not be such a terrible thing. the engagement will merely be one between skirmishers, and they will be able to take cover behind the pieces, firing against the enemy who is coming up in the open. guibert, i believe, held that artillery should not worry whether it was supported or not; that it should fire up to the last minute, and finally abandon the pieces, which supporting troops might or might not recapture. these supporting troops should not be too close. it is easier to defend pieces, to take them back even, by advancing on an enemy dispersed among them, than to defend them by standing fast after having participated in the losses suffered by the artillery under fire. (note the english in spain. the system of having artillery followed by infantry platoons is absurd.) artillery in battle has its men grouped around the pieces, stationary assembly points, broadly distributed, each one having its commander and its cannoneers, who are always the same. thus there is in effect a roll call each time artillery is put into battery. artillery carries its men with it; they cannot be lost nor can they hide. if the officer is brave, his men rarely desert him. certainly, in all armies, it is in the artillery that the soldier can best perform his duty. as general leboeuf tells us, four batteries of artillery can be maneuvered, not more. that is all right. here is the thing in a nut-shell. four battalions is a big enough command for a colonel. a general has eight battalions. he gets orders, "general, do so and so." he orders, "colonel, do so and so." so that without any maneuvers being laid down for more than four battalions, as many battalions as you like can be maneuvered and drilled. chapter v command, general staff, and administration there are plenty of carefree generals, who are never worried nor harassed. they do not bother about anything. they say, "i advance. follow me." the result is an incredible disorder in the advance of columns. if ten raiders should fall on the column with a shout, this disorder would become a rout, a disaster. but these gentlemen never bother with such an eventuality. they are the great men of the day, until the moment that some disaster overwhelms them. cavalry is no more difficult to work with than infantry. according to some military authors, a cavalry general ought to have the wisdom of the phoenix. the perfect one should have. so should the perfect infantry general. man on horseback and man afoot is always the same man. only, the infantry general rarely has to account for the losses in his command, which may have been due to faulty or improper handling. the cavalry general does have to do this. (we shall lay aside the reasons why.) the infantry general has six chances for real battle to one for the cavalry general. these are the two reasons why, from the beginning of a war, more initiative is found in infantry than in cavalry generals. general bugeaud might have made a better cavalry general than an infantry general. why? because he had immediate decision and firm resolution. there is more need for resolution in the infantryman than in the cavalryman. why? there are many reasons, which are matters of opinion. in short, the infantryman is always more tired than the cavalryman. his morale is therefore harder to keep up. i believe therefore that a good infantry general is rarer than one of cavalry. also, the resolution of an infantry general does not have to last for a moment only; it has to endure for a long, long time. good artillery generals are common. they are less concerned with morale than with other things, such as material results. they have less need to bother about the morale of their troops, as combat discipline is always better with them than with the other arms. this is shown elsewhere. brigadier generals ought to be in their prescribed places. very well, but the most of them are not and never have been. they were required to be in place at the battle of moscow, but, as they were so ordered there, it is evident that they were not habitually in place. they are men; and their rank, it seems to them, ought to diminish rather than increase the risks they have to run. and, then, in actual engagement, where is their prescribed place? when one occupies a high command there are many things which he does not see. the general-in-chief, even a division commander, can only escape this failing by great activity, moved by strict conscientiousness and aided by clairvoyance. this failing extends to those about him, to his heads of services. these men live well, sleep well; the same must be true of all! they have picked, well-conditioned horses; the roads are excellent! they are never sick; the doctors must be exaggerating sickness! they have attendants and doctors; everybody must be well looked after! something happens which shows abominable negligence, common enough in war. with a good heart and a full belly they say, "but this is infamous, unheard of! it could not have happened! it is impossible! etc." to-day there is a tendency, whose cause should be sought, on the part of superiors to infringe on the authority of inferiors. this is general. it goes very high and is furthered by the mania for command, inherent in the french character. it results in lessening the authority of subordinate officers in the minds of their soldiers. this is a grave matter, as only the firm authority and prestige of subordinate officers can maintain discipline. the tendency is to oppress subordinates; to want to impose on them, in all things, the views of the superior; not to admit of honest mistakes, and to reprove them as faults; to make everybody, even down to the private, feel that there is only one infallible authority. a colonel, for instance, sets himself up as the sole authority with judgment and intelligence. he thus takes all initiative from subordinate officers, and reduces them to a state of inertia, coming from their lack of confidence in themselves and from fear of being severely reproved. how many generals, before a regiment, think only of showing how much they know! they lessen the authority of the colonel. that is nothing to them. they have asserted their superiority, true or false; that is the essential. with cheeks puffed out, they leave, proud of having attacked discipline. this firm hand which directs so many things is absent for a moment. all subordinate officers up to this moment have been held with too strong a hand, which has kept them in a position not natural to them. immediately they are like a horse, always kept on a tight rein, whose rein is loosened or missing. they cannot in an instant recover that confidence in themselves, that has been painstakingly taken away from them without their wishing it. thus, in such a moment conditions become unsatisfactory, the soldier very quickly feels that the hand that holds him vacillates. "ask much, in order to obtain a little," is a false saying, a source of errors, an attack on discipline. one ought to obtain what one asks. it is only necessary to be moderately reasonable and practical. in following out this matter, one is astonished at the lack of foresight found in three out of four officers. why? is there anything so difficult about looking forward a little? are three-quarters of the officers so stupid? no! it is because their egoism, generally frankly acknowledged, allow them to think only of who is looking at them. they think of their troops by chance perhaps, or because they have to. their troops are never their preoccupation, consequently they do not think about them at all. a major in command of an organization in mexico, on his first march in a hot country, started without full canteens, perhaps without canteens at all, without any provision for water, as he might march in france. no officer in his battalion called his attention to the omission, nor was more foresighted than he. in this first march, by an entire lack of foresight in everything, he lost, in dead, half of his command. was he reduced? no! he was made a lieutenant-colonel. officers of the general staff learn to order, not to command. "sir, i order," a popular phrase, applies to them. the misfortune is not that there is a general staff, but that it has achieved command. for it always has commanded, in the name of its commanders it is true, and never obeyed, which is its duty. it commands in fact. so be it! but just the same it is not supposed to. is it the good quality of staffs or that of combatants that makes the strength of armies? if you want good fighting men, do everything to excite their ambition, to spare them, so that people of intelligence and with a future will not despise the line but will elect to serve in it. it is the line that gives you your high command, the line only, and very rarely the staff. the staff, however, dies infrequently, which is something. do they say that military science can only be learned in the general staff schools? if you really want to learn to do your work, go to the line. to-day, nobody knows anything unless he knows how to argue and chatter. a peasant knows nothing, he is a being unskilled even in cultivating the soil. but the agriculturist of the office is a farmer emeritus, etc. is it then believed that there is ability only in the general staff? there is the assurance of the scholar there, of the pedagogue who has never practiced what he preaches. there is book learning, false learning when it treats of military matters. but knowledge of the real trade of a soldier, knowledge of what is possible, knowledge of blows given and received, all these are conspicuously absent. slowness of promotion in the general staff as compared to its rapidity in the line might make many men of intelligence, of head and heart, pass the general staff by and enter the line to make their own way. to be in the line would not then be a brevet of imbecility. but to-day when general staff officers rank the best of the line, the latter are discouraged and rather than submit to this situation, all who feel themselves fitted for advancement want to be on the general staff. so much the better? so much the worse. selection is only warranted by battle. how administrative deceits, in politics or elsewhere, falsify the conclusions drawn from a fact! in the crimea one hundred per cent. of the french operated upon succumbed, while only twenty-seven per cent. of the english operated upon died. that was attributed to the difference in temperament! the great cause of this discrepancy was the difference in care. our newspapers followed the self-satisfied and rosy statements given out by our own supply department. they pictured our sick in the crimea lying in beds and cared for by sisters of charity. the fact is that our soldiers never had sheets, nor mattresses, nor the necessary changes of clothes in the hospitals; that half, three-quarters, lay on mouldy straw, on the ground, under canvass. the fact is, that such were the conditions under which typhus claimed twenty-five to thirty thousand of our sick after the siege; that thousands of pieces of hospital equipment were offered by the english to our quartermaster general, and that he refused them! everybody ought to have known that he would! to accept such equipment was to acknowledge that he did not have it. and he ought to have had it. indeed he did according to the newspapers and the quartermaster reports. there were twenty-five beds per hospital so that it could be said, "we have beds!" each hospital had at this time five hundred or more sick. these people are annoyed if they are called hypocrites. while our soldiers were in hospitals, without anything, so to speak, the english had big, well-ventilated tents, cots, sheets, even night stands with urinals. and our men had not even a cup to drink from! sick men were cared for in the english hospitals. they might have been in ours, before they died, which they almost always did. it is true that we had the typhus and the english had not. that was because our men in tents had the same care as in our hospitals, and the english the same care as in their hospitals. read the war reports of supply departments and then go unexpectedly to verify them in the hospitals and storehouses. have them verified by calling up and questioning the heads of departments, but question them conscientiously, without dictating the answers. in the crimea, in may of the first year, we were no better off than the english who complained so much, who has dared to say, however, that from the time they entered the hospital to the time that they left it, dead, evacuated, or cured, through fifteen or twenty days of cholera or typhus, our men lay on the same plank, in the same shoes, drawers, shirts and clothing that they brought in with them? they were in a state of living putrefaction that would by itself have killed well men! the newspapers chanted the praises of the admirable french administration. the second winter the english had no sick, a smaller percentage than in london. but to the eternal shame of the french command and administration we lost in peace time, twenty-five to thirty thousand of typhus and more than one thousand frozen to death. nevertheless, it appeared that we had the most perfect administration in the world, and that our generals, no less than our administration, were full of devoted solicitude to provide all the needs of the soldier. that is an infamous lie, and is known as such, let us hope. the americans have given us a good example. the good citizens have gone themselves to see how their soldiers were treated and have provided for them themselves. when, in france, will good citizens lose faith in this best of administrations which is theirs? when will they, confident in themselves, do spontaneously, freely, what their administration cannot and never will be able to do? the first thing disorganized in an army is the administration. the simplest foresight, the least signs even of order disappear in a retreat. (note russia-vilna). in the crimea, and everywhere more or less, the doctor's visit was without benefit to the patient. it was made to keep up his spirits, but could not be followed by care, due to lack of personnel and material. after two or three hours of work, the doctor was exhausted. in a sane country the field and permanent hospitals ought to be able to handle one-fifth of the strength at least. the hospital personnel of to-day should be doubled. it is quickly cut down, and it ought to have time, not only to visit the sick, but to care for them, feed them, dose and dress them, etc. chapter vi social and military institutions. national characteristics. man's admiration for the great spectacles of nature is the admiration for force. in the mountains it is mass, a force, that impresses him, strikes him, makes him admire. in the calm sea it is the mysterious and terrible force that he divines, that he feels in that enormous liquid mass; in the angry sea, force again. in the wind, in the storm, in the vast depth of the sky, it is still force that he admires. all these things astounded man when he was young. he has become old, and he knows them. astonishment has turned to admiration, but always it is the feeling of a formidable force which compels his admiration. this explains his admiration for the warrior. the warrior is the ideal of the primitive man, of the savage, of the barbarian. the more people rise in moral civilization, the lower this ideal falls. but with the masses everywhere the warrior still is and for a long time will be the height of their ideals. this is because man loves to admire the force and bravery that are his own attributes. when that force and bravery find other means to assert themselves, or at least when the crowd is shown that war does not furnish the best examples of them, that there are truer and more exalted examples, this ideal will give way to a higher one. nations have an equal sovereignty based on their existence as states. they recognize no superior jurisdiction and call on force to decide their differences. force decides. whether or not might was right, the weaker bows to necessity until a more successful effort can be made. (prud'homme). it is easy to understand gregory vii's ideas on the subject. in peace, armies are playthings in the hands of princes. if the princes do not know anything about them, which is usually the case, they disorganize them. if they understand them, like the prince of prussia, they make their armies strong for war. the king of prussia and the prussian nobility, threatened by democracy, have had to change the passion for equality in their people into a passion for domination over foreign nations. this is easily done, when domination is crowned with success, for man, who is merely the friend of equality is the lover of domination. so that he is easily made to take the shadow for the substance. they have succeeded. they are forced to continue with their system. otherwise their status as useful members of society would be questioned and they would perish as leaders in war. peace spells death to a nobility. consequently nobles do not desire it, and stir up rivalries among peoples, rivalries which alone can justify their existence as leaders in war, and consequently as leaders in peace. this is why the military spirit is dead in france. the past does not live again. in the spiritual as in the physical world, what is dead is dead. death comes only with the exhaustion of the elements, the conditions which are necessary for life. for these reasons revolutionary wars continued into the war with prussia. for these reasons if we had been victorious we would have found against us the countries dominated by nobilities, austria, russia, england. but with us vanquished, democracy takes up her work in all european countries, protected in the security which victory always gives to victors. this work is slower but surer than the rapid work of war, which, exalting rivalries, halts for a moment the work of democracy within the nations themselves. democracy then takes up her work with less chance of being deterred by rivalry against us. thus we are closer to the triumph of democracy than if we had been victors. french democracy rightfully desires to live, and she does not desire to do so at the expense of a sacrifice of national pride. then, since she will still be surrounded for a long time by societies dominated by the military element, by the nobility, she must have a dependable army. and, as the military spirit is on the wane in france, it must be replaced by having noncommissioned officers and officers well paid. good pay establishes position in a democracy, and to-day none turn to the army, because it is too poorly paid. let us have well paid mercenaries. by giving good pay, good material can be secured, thanks to the old warrior strain in the race. this is the price that must be paid for security. the soldier of our day is a merchant. so much of my flesh, of my blood, is worth so much. so much of my time, of my affections, etc. it is a noble trade, however, perhaps because man's blood is noble merchandise, the finest that can be dealt in. m. guizot says "get rich!" that may seem cynical to prudes, but it is truly said. those who deny the sentiment, and talk to-day so loftily, what do they advise? if not by words, then by example they counsel the same thing; and example is more contagious. is not private wealth, wealth in general, the avowed ambition sought by all, democrats and others? let us be rich, that is to say, let us be slaves of the needs that wealth creates. the invalides in france, the institutions for pensioners, are superb exhibits of pomp and ostentation. i wish that their founding had been based on ideas of justice and christianity and not purely on military-political considerations. but the results are disastrous to morality. this collection of weaklings is a school of depravity, where the invalided soldier loses in vice his right to respect. some officers want to transform regiments into permanent schools for officers of all ranks, with a two-hour course each day in law, military art, etc. there is little taste for military life in france; such a procedure would lessen it. the leisure of army life attracts three out of four officers, laziness, if you like. but such is the fact. if you make an officer a school-boy all his life he will send his profession to the devil, if he can. and those who are able to do so, will in general be those who have received the best education. an army is an extraordinary thing, but since it is necessary, there should be no astonishment that extraordinary means must be taken to keep it up; such as offering in peace time little work and a great deal of leisure. an officer is a sort of aristocrat, and in france we have no finer ideal of aristocratic life than one of leisure. this is not a proof of the highest ideals, nor of firmness of character. but what is to be done about it? from the fact that military spirit is lacking in our nation (and officers are with greater difficulty than ever recruited in france) it does not follow that we shall not have to engage in war. perhaps the contrary is true. it is not patriotic to say that the military spirit is dead in france? the truth is always patriotic. the military spirit died with the french nobility, perished because it had to perish, because it was exhausted, at the end of its life. that only dies which has no longer the sap of life, and can no longer live. if a thing is merely sick it can return to health. but who can say that of the french nobility? an aristocracy, a nobility that dies, dies always by its own fault; because it no longer performs its duties; because it fails in its task; because its functions are of no more value to the state; because there is no longer any reason for its existence in a society, whose final tendency is to suppress its functions. after had threatened our patriotism, the natural desire for self-protection revived the military spirit in the nation and in the army. the empire developed this movement, changed the defensive military spirit to the offensive, and used it with increasing effect up to or . the military spirit of the july restoration was a reminiscence, a relic of the empire, a form of opposition to government by liberalism instead of democracy. it was really the spirit of opposition and not the military spirit, which is essentially conservative. there is no military spirit in a democratic society, where there is no aristocracy, no military nobility. a democratic society is antagonistic to the military spirit. the military spirit was unknown to the romans. they made no distinction between military and civil duties. i think that the military air dates from the time that the profession of arms became a private profession, from the time of the bravos, the italian condottieri, who were more terrifying to civilians than to the enemy. when the romans said "cedant arma togae," they did not refer to civil officials and soldiers; the civil officials were then soldiers in their turn; professional soldiers did not exist. they meant "might gives way to right." machiavelli quotes a proverb, "war makes thieves and peace has them hanged" the spaniards in mexico, which has been in rebellion for forty years, are more or less thieves. they want to continue to ply the trade. civil authority exists no longer with them, and they would look on obedience to such an authority as shameful. it is easy to understand the difficulty of organizing a peaceful government in such a country. half the population would have to hang the other half. the other half does not want to be hanged. we are a democratic society; we become less and less military. the prussian, russian, austrian aristocracies which alone make the military spirit of those states, feel in our democratic society an example which threatens their existence, as nobility, as aristocracy. they are our enemies and will be until they are wiped, out, until the russian, austrian and prussian states become democratic societies, like ours. it is a matter of time. the prussian aristocracy is young. it has not been degenerated by wealth, luxury and servility of the court. the prussian court is not a court in the luxurious sense of the word. there is the danger. meanwhile machiavellian doctrines not being forbidden to aristocracies, these people appeal to german jingoism, to german patriotism, to all the passions which move one people who are jealous of another. all this is meant to hide under a patriotic exterior their concern for their own existence as an aristocracy, as a nobility. the real menace of the day is czarism, stronger than the czars themselves, which calls for a crusade to drive back russia and the uncultured slav race. it is time that we understood the lack of power in mob armies; that we recall to mind the first armies of the revolution that were saved from instant destruction only by the lack of vigor and decision in european cabinets and armies. look at the examples of revolutionaries of all times, who have all to gain and cannot hope for mercy. since spartacus, have they not always been defeated? an army is not really strong unless it is developed from a social institution. spartacus and his men were certainly terrible individual fighters. they were gladiators used to struggle and death. they were prisoners, barbarian slaves enraged by their loss of liberty, or escaped serfs, all men who could not hope for mercy. what more terrible fighters could be imagined? but discipline, leadership, all was improvised and could not have the firm discipline coming down from the centuries and drawn from the social institutions of the romans. they were conquered. time, a long time, is needed to give to leaders the habit of command and confidence in their authority--to the soldiers confidence in their leaders and in their fellows. it is not enough to order discipline. the officers must have the will to enforce it, and its vigorous enforcement must instill subordination in the soldiers. it must make them fear it more than they fear the enemy's blows. how did montluc fight, in an aristocratic society? montluc shows us, tells us. he advanced in the van of the assault, but in bad places he pushed in front of him a soldier whose skin was not worth as much as was his. he had not the slightest doubt or shame about doing this. the soldier did not protest, the propriety of the act was so well established. but you, officers, try that in a democratic army, such as we have commenced to have, such as we shall later have! in danger the officer is no better than the soldier. the soldier is willing enough to advance, but behind his officer. also, his comrades' skin is no more precious than is his, they must advance too. this very real concern about equality in danger, which seeks equality only, brings on hesitation and not resolution. some fools may break their heads in closing in, but the remainder will fire from a distance. not that this will cause fewer losses, far from it. italy will never have a really firm army. the italians are too civilized, too fine, too democratic in a certain sense of the word. the spaniards are the same. this may cause laughter, but it is true. the french are indeed worthy sons of their fathers, the gauls. war, the most solemn act in the life of a nation, the gravest of acts, is a light thing to them. the good frenchman lets himself be carried away, inflamed by the most ridiculous feats of arms into the wildest enthusiasm. moreover he interprets the word "honor" in a fashion all his own. an expedition is commenced without sufficient reason, and good frenchmen, who do not know why the thing is done, disapprove. but presently blood is spilled. good sense and justice dictate that this spilled blood should taint those responsible for an unjust enterprise. but jingoism says "french blood has been spilled: honor is at stake!" and millions of gold, which is the unit of labor, millions of men, are sacrificed to a ridiculous high-sounding phrase. whence comes this tendency toward war which characterizes above all the good citizen, the populace, who are not called upon personally to participate? the military man is not so easily swayed. some hope for promotion or pension, but even they are sobered by their sense of duty. it comes from the romance that clothes war and battle, and that has with us ten times more than elsewhere, the power of exciting enthusiasm in the people. it would be a service to humanity and to one's people to dispell this illusion, and to show what battles are. they are buffooneries, and none the less buffooneries because they are made terrible by the spilling of blood. the actors, heroes in the eyes of the crowd, are only poor folk torn between fear, discipline and pride. they play some hours at a game of advance and retreat, without ever meeting, closing with, even seeing closely, the other poor folks, the enemy, who are as fearful as they but who are caught in the same web of circumstance. what should be considered is how to organize an army in a country in which there is at the same time national and provincial feeling. such a country is france, where there is no longer any necessity for uniting national and provincial feeling by mixing up the soldiers. in france, will the powerful motif of pride, which comes from the organization of units from particular provinces, be useful? from the fusion of varying elements comes the character of our troops, which is something to be considered. the make-up of the heavy cavalry should be noted. it has perhaps too many germans and men from the northern provinces. french sociability creates cohesion in french troops more quickly than could be secured in troops in other nations. organization and discipline have the same purpose. with a proud people like the french, a rational organization aided by french sociability can often secure desired results without it being necessary to use the coercion of discipline. marshal de gouvion-saint cyr said, "experienced soldiers know and others ought to know that french soldiers once committed to the pursuit of the enemy will not return to their organization that day until forced back into it by the enemy. during this time they must be considered as lost to the rest of the army." at the beginning of the empire, officers, trained in the wars of the revolution by incessant fighting, possessed great firmness. no one would wish to purchase such firmness again at the same price. but in our modern wars the victor often loses more than the vanquished, apart from the temporary loss in prisoners. the losses exceed the resources in good men, and discourage the exhausted, who appear to be very numerous, and those who are skilled in removing themselves from danger. thus we fall into disorder. the duke of fezensac, testifying of other times, shows us the same thing that happens to-day. also to-day we depend only on mass action, and at that game, despite the cleverest strategic handling, we must lose all, and do. french officers lack firmness but have pride. in the face of danger they lack composure, they are disconcerted, breathless, hesitant, forgetful, unable to think of a way out. they call, "forward, forward." this is one of the reasons why handling a formation in line is difficult, especially since the african campaigns where much is left to the soldier. the formation in rank is then an ideal, unobtainable in modern war, but toward which we should strive. but we are getting further away from it. and then, when habit loses its hold, natural instinct resumes its empire. the remedy lies in an organization which will establish cohesion by the mutual acquaintanceship of all. this will make possible mutual surveillance, which has such power over french pride. it might be said that there are two kinds of war, that in open country, and in the plain, and that of posts garrisoning positions in broken country. in a great war, with no one occupying positions, we should be lost immediately. marshal saxe knew us well when he said that the french were best for a war of position. he recognized the lack of stability in the ranks. on getting within rifle range the rank formation tends to disappear. you hear officers who have been under fire say "when you get near the enemy, the men deploy as skirmishers despite you. the russians group under fire. their holding together is the huddling of sheep moved by fear of discipline and of danger." there are then two modes of conduct under fire, the french and the russian. the gauls, seeing the firmness of the roman formation, chained themselves together, making the first rank unbreakable and tying living to dead. this forbade the virtue they had not divined in the roman formation, the replacement of wounded and exhausted by fresh men. from this replacement came the firmness which seemed so striking to the gauls. the rank continually renewed itself. why does the frenchman of to-day, in singular contrast to the gaul, scatter under fire? his natural intelligence, his instinct under the pressure of danger causes him to deploy. his method must be adopted. in view of the impossibility to-day of the roman draconian discipline which put the fear of death behind the soldier, we must adopt the soldier's method and try to put some order into it. how? by french discipline and an organization that permits of it. broken, covered country is adapted to our methods. the zouaves at magenta could not have done so well on another kind of ground. [ ] above all, with modern weapons, the terrain to be advanced over must be limited in depth. how much better modern tactics fit the impatient french character! but also how necessary it is to guard against this impatience and to keep supports and reserves under control. it should be noted that german or gallic cavalry was always better than roman cavalry, which could not hold against it, even though certainly better armed. why was this? because decision, impetuosity, even blind courage, have more chance with cavalry than with infantry. the defeated cavalry is the least brave cavalry. (a note for our cavalry here!) it was easier for the gauls to have good cavalry than it is for us, as fire did not bother them in the charge. the frenchman has more qualities of the cavalryman than of the infantryman. yet french infantry appears to be of greater value. why? because the use of cavalry on the battlefield requires rare decision and the seizing of the crucial opportunity. if the cavalryman has not been able to show his worth, it is the fault of his leaders. french infantry has always been defeated by english infantry. in cavalry combat the english cavalry has always fled before the french in those terrible cavalry battles that are always flights. is this because in war man lasts longer in the cavalry and because our cavalrymen were older and more seasoned soldiers than our infantry? this does not apply to us only. if it is true for our cavalrymen, it is also true for the english cavalrymen. the reason is that on the field of battle the rôle of the infantryman against a firm adversary requires more coolness and nerve than does the rôle of the cavalryman. it requires the use of tactics based on an understanding of the national characteristics of ourselves and of our enemies. against the english the confidence in the charge that is implanted in our brains, was completely betrayed. the rôle of cavalry against cavalry is simpler. the french confidence in the charge makes good fighting cavalry, and the frenchman is better fitted than any other for this role. our cavalry charge better than any other. that is the whole thing, on the battle field it is understood. as they move faster than infantry, their dash, which has its limits, is better preserved when they get up to the enemy. the english have always fled before our cavalry. this proves that, strong enough to hold before the moral impulse of our infantry, they were not strong enough to hold before the stronger impulse of cavalry. we ought to be much better cavalrymen than infantrymen, because the essential in a cavalryman is a fearless impetuosity. that is for the soldier. the cavalry leader ought to use this trait without hesitation, at the same time taking measures to support it and to guard against its failings. the attack is always, even on the defensive, an evidence of resolution, and gives a moral ascendancy. its effect is more immediate with cavalry, because the movements of cavalry are more rapid and the moral effect has less time to be modified by reflection. to insure that the french cavalry be the best in europe, and a really good cavalry, it needs but one thing, to conform to the national temperament, to dare, to dare, and to advance. one of the singular features of french discipline is that on the road, especially in campaign the methods of punishment for derelictions become illusory, impractical. in there were twenty-five thousand skulkers in the army in italy. the soldier sees this immediately and lack of discipline ensues. if our customs do not permit of draconian discipline, let us replace that moral coercion by another. let us insure cohesion by the mutual acquaintanceship of men and officers; let us call french sociability to our aid. with the romans discipline was severest and most rigidly enforced in the presence of the enemy. it was enforced by the soldiers themselves. to-day, why should not the men in our companies watch discipline and punish themselves. they alone know each other, and the maintenance of discipline is so much to their interest as to encourage them to stop skulking. the twenty-five thousand men who skulked in italy, all wear the italian medal. they were discharged with certificates of good conduct. this certificate, in campaign should be awarded by the squad only. in place of that, discipline must be obtained somehow, and it is placed as an additional burden on the officer. he above all has to uphold it. he is treated without regard for his dignity. he is made to do the work of the non-commissioned officer. he is used as fancy dictates. this cohesion which we hope for in units from squad to company, need not be feared in other armies. it cannot develop to the same point and by the same methods with them as with us. their make-up is not ours, their character is different. this individuality of squads and companies comes from the make-up of our army and from french sociability. is it true that the rations of men and horses are actually insufficient in campaign? this is strange economy! to neglect to increase the soldier's pay five centimes! it would better his fare and prevent making of an officer a trader in vegetables in order to properly feed his men. yet millions are squandered each year for uniforms, geegaws, shakos, etc! if a big army is needed, it ought to cost as little as possible. simplicity in all things! down with all sorts of plumes! less amateurs! if superfluous trimmings are not cut down it will be unfortunate! what is the matter with the sailor's uniform? insignificant and annoying details abound while vital details of proper footgear and instruction, are neglected. the question of clothing for campaign is solved by adopting smocks and greatcoats and by doing away with headquarters companies! this is the height of folly. i suppose it is because our present uniforms need specialists to keep them in condition, and smocks and greatcoats do not! appendix i memorandum on infantry fire [written in (editor's note)] . introduction it may be said that the history of the development of infantry fire is none too plain, even though fire action to-day, in europe, is almost the sole means of destruction used by that arm. napoleon said, "the only method of fire to be used in war is fire at will." yet after such a plain statement by one who knew, there is a tendency to-day to make fire at command the basis of infantry battle tactics. is this correct? experience only can determine. experience is gained; but nothing, especially in the trade of war, is sooner forgotten than experience. so many fine things can be done, beautiful maneuvers executed, ingenious combat methods invented in the confines of an office or on the maneuver ground. nevertheless let us try to hold to facts. let us consider, in the study of any kind of fire, a succinct history of small arms; let us see what kind of fire is used with each weapon, attempting at the same time to separate that which has actually happened from the written account. . succinct history of the development of small arms, from the arquebus to our rifle the arquebus in use before the invention of powder gave the general design to fire arms. the arquebus marks then the transition from the mechanically thrown missile to the bullet. the tube was kept to direct the projectile, and the bow and string were replaced by a powder chamber and ignition apparatus. this made a weapon, very simple, light and easy to charge; but the small caliber ball thrown from a very short barrel, gave penetration only at short distances. the barrel was lengthened, the caliber increased, and a more efficient, but a less convenient arm resulted. it was indeed impossible to hold the weapon in aiming position and withstand the recoil at the moment of firing. to lessen recoil there was attached to the bottom of the barrel a hook to catch on a fixed object at the moment of discharge. this was called a hook arquebus. but the hook could only be used under certain circumstances. to give the arm a point of support on the body, the stock was lengthened and inclined to permit sighting. this was the petrinal or poitrinal. the soldier had in addition a forked support for the barrel. in the musket, which followed, the stock was again modified and held against the shoulder. further the firing mechanism was improved. the arm had been fired by a lighted match; but with the musket, the arm becoming lighter and more portable, there came the serpentine lock, the match-lock, then the wheel-lock, finally the spanish lock and the flint-lock. the adoption of the flint-lock and the bayonet produced the rifle, which napoleon regarded as the most powerful weapon that man possesses. but the rifle in its primitive state had defects. loading was slow; it was inaccurate, and under some circumstances it could not be fired. how were these defects remedied? as to the loading weakness, gustavus adolphus, understanding the influence on morale of rapid loading and the greater destruction caused by the more rapid fire, invented the cartridge for muskets. frederick, or some one of his time, the name marks the period, replaced wooden by cylindrical iron ramrods. to prime more quickly a conical funnel allowed the powder to pass from the barrel into the firing-pan. these two last improvements saved time in two ways, in priming and in loading. but it was the adoption of the breech-loader that brought the greatest increase in rapidity of fire. these successive improvements of the weapon, all tending to increase the rapidity of fire, mark the most remarkable military periods of modern times: cartridges--gustavus adolphus iron ramrod--frederick improved vent (adopted by the soldiers if not prescribed by competent orders)--wars of the republic and of the empire breech-loading--sadowa. accuracy was sacrificed to rapidity of fire. this will be explained later. only in our day has the general use of rifling and of elongated projectiles brought accuracy to the highest point. in our times, also, the use of fulminate has assured fire under all conditions. we have noted briefly the successive improvements in fire arms, from the arquebus to the rifle. have the methods of employment made the same progress? . progressive introduction of fire-arms into the armament of the infantryman the revolution brought about by powder, not in the art of war but in that of combat, came gradually. it developed along with the improvement of fire arms. those arms gradually became those of the infantryman. thus, under francis i, the proportion of infantrymen carrying fire arms to those armed with pikes was one to three or four. at the time of the wars of religion arquebusiers and pikemen were about equal in number. under louis xiii, in , there were two fire-arms to one pike; in the war of , four to one; finally pikes disappeared. at first men with fire-arms were independent of other combatants, and functioned like light troops in earlier days. later the pikes and the muskets were united in constituent elements of army corps. the most usual formation was pikes in the center, muskets on the wings. sometimes the pikemen were in the center of their respective companies, which were abreast. or, half the musketeers might be in front of the pikemen, half behind. or again, all the musketeers might be behind the kneeling pikemen. in these last two cases fire covered the whole front. finally pike and musket might alternate. these combinations are found in treatises on tactics. but we do not know, by actual examples, how they worked in battle, nor even whether all were actually employed. . the classes of fire employed with each weapon when originally some of the infantry were armed with the long and heavy arquebus in its primitive state, the feebleness of their fire caused montaigne to say, certainly on military authority, "the arms have so little effect, except on the ears, that their use will be discontinued." research is necessary to find any mention of their use in the battles of that period. [ ] however we find a valuable piece of information in brantôme, writing of the battle of pavia. "the marquis de pescani won the battle of pavia with spanish arquebusiers, in an irregular defiance of all regulation and tradition by employing a new formation. fifteen hundred arquebusiers, the ablest, the most experienced, the cleverest, above all the most agile and devoted, were selected by the marquis de pescani, instructed by him on new lines, and practiced for a long time. they scattered by squads over the battlefield, turning, leaping from one place to another with great speed, and thus escaped the cavalry charge. by this new method of fighting, unusual, astonishing, cruel and unworthy, these arquebusiers greatly hampered the operations of the french cavalry, who were completely lost. for they, joined together and in mass, were brought to earth by these few brave and able arquebusiers. this irregular and new method of fighting is more easily imagined than described. any one who can try it out will find it is good and useful; but it is necessary that the arquebusiers be good troops, very much on the jump (as the saying is) and above all reliable." it should be borne in mind, in noting the preceding, that there is always a great difference between what actually occurred, and the description thereof (made often by men who were not there, and god knows on what authority). nevertheless, there appears in these lines of brantôme a first example of the most destructive use of the rifle, in the hands of skirmishers. during the religious wars, which consisted of skirmishes and taking and retaking garrisoned posts, the fire of arquebusiers was executed without order and individually, as above. the soldier carried the powder charges in little metal boxes hung from a bandoleer. a finer, priming, powder was contained in a powder horn; the balls were carried in a pouch. at the onset the soldier had to load his piece. it was thus that he had to fight with the match arquebus. this was still far from fire at command. however this presently appeared. gustavus adolphus was the first who tried to introduce method and coördination into infantry fire. others, eager for innovations, followed in his path. there appeared successively, fire by rank, in two ranks, by subdivision, section, platoon, company, battalion, file fire, parapet fire, a formal fire at will, and so many others that we can be sure that all combinations were tried at this time. fire by ranks was undoubtedly the first of these; it will give us a line on the others. infantry was formed six deep. to execute fire by rank all ranks except the last knelt. the last rank fired and reloaded. the rank in front of it then rose and did the same thing, as did all other ranks successively. the whole operation was then recommenced. thus the first group firing was executed successively by ranks. montecuculli said, "the musketeers are ranged six deep, so that the last rank has reloaded by the time the first has fired, and takes up the fire again, so that the enemy has to face continuous fire." however, under condé and turenne, we see the french army use only fire at will. it is true that at this time fire was regarded only as an accessory. the infantry of the line which, since the exploit of the flemish, the swiss and the spaniards, had seen their influence grow daily, was required for the charge and the advance and consequently was armed with pikes. in the most celebrated battles of these times, rocroi, nordlingen, lens, rethel and the dunes, we see the infantry work in this way. the two armies, in straight lines, commenced by bombarding each other, charged with their cavalry wings, and advanced with their infantry in the center. the bravest or best disciplined infantry drove back the other, and often, if one of its wings was victorious, finished by routing it. no marked influence of fire is found at this time. the tradition of pescani was lost. nevertheless fire-arms improved; they became more effective and tended to replace the pike. the use of the pike obliged the soldier to remain in ranks, to fight only in certain cases, and exposed him to injury without being able to return blow for blow. and, this is exceedingly instructive, the soldier had by this time an instinctive dislike of this arm, which often condemned him to a passive role. this dislike necessitated giving high pay and privilege to obtain pikemen. and in spite of all at the first chance the soldier threw away his pike for a musket. the pikes themselves gradually disappeared before firearms; the ranks thinned to permit the use of the latter. four rank formation was used, and fire tried in that order, by rank, by two ranks, upright, kneeling, etc. in spite of these attempts, we see the french army in combat, notably at fontenoy, still using fire at will, the soldier leaving ranks to fire and returning to load. it can be stated, in spite of numerous attempts at adoption, that no fire at command was used in battle up to the days of frederick. already, under william, the prussian infantry was noted for the rapidity and continuity of its fire. frederick further increased the ability of his battalions to fire by decreasing their depth. this fire, tripled by speed in loading, became so heavy that it gave prussian battalions a superiority over others of three to one. the prussians recognized three kinds of fire, at a halt, in advancing, and in retreat. we know the mechanics of fire at a halt, the first rank kneeling. of fire in advancing guibert says: "what i call marching fire, and which anybody who thinks about it must find as ill advised as i do, is a fire i have seen used by some troops. the soldiers, in two ranks, fire in marching, but they march of course at a snail's pace. this is what prussian troops call fire in advancing. it consists in combined and alternating volleys from platoons, companies, half battalions or battalions. the parts of the line which have fired advance at the double, the others at the half step." in other methods of fire, as we have said, the prussian battalion was in three ranks; the first kneeling. the line delivered salvos, only at command. however, the theory of executing fire by salvo in three ranks did not bother frederick's old soldiers. we will see presently how they executed it on the field of battle. be that as it may, europe was impressed with these methods and tended to adopt them. d'argenson provided for them in the french army and introduced fire at command. two regulations prescribing this appeared, in and . but in the war which followed, marshal de broglie, who undoubtedly had experience and as much common sense as m. d'argenson, prescribed fire at will. all infantry in his army was practiced in it during the winter of - . two new regulations succeeded the preceding, in and . the last prescribed fire in three ranks at command, all ranks upright. [ ] thus we come to the wars of the revolution, with regulations calling for fire at command, which was not executed in battle. since these wars, our armies have always fought as skirmishers. in speaking of our campaigns, fire at command is never mentioned. it was the same under the empire, in spite of numerous essays from the boulogne school and elsewhere. at the boulogne school, fire at command by ranks was first tried by order of napoleon. this fire, to be particularly employed against cavalry--in theory it is superb--does not seem to have been employed napoleon says so himself, and the regulations of , in which some influence of soldiers of the empire should be found, orders fire in two ranks or at will, by bodies of men, to the exclusion of all others. according to our military authority, on the authority of our old officers, fire at command did not suit our infantry; yet it lived in the regulations. general fririon ( ) and de gouvion-saint-cyr ( ) attacked this method. nothing was done. it remained in the regulations of , but without being ordered in any particular circumstances. it appeared there for show purposes, perhaps. on the creation of the chasseurs d'orléans, fire by rank was revived. but neither in our african campaigns nor in our last two wars in the crimea and italy can a single example of fire at command be found. in practice it was believed to be impracticable. it was known to be entirely ineffective and fell into disrepute. but to-day, with the breech-loading rifle, there is a tendency to believe it practicable and to take it up with new interest. is this more reasonable than in the past? let us see. . methods of fire used in the presence of the enemy; methods recommended or ordered but impractical. use and efficacy of fire at command undoubtedly at the potsdam maneuvers the prussian infantry used only salvos executed admirably. an unbelievable discipline kept the soldier in place and in line. barbaric punishments were incorporated in the military code. blows, the whip, executions, punished the slightest derelictions. even n.c.o.'s were subjected to blows with the flat of the sword. yet all this was not enough on the field of battle; a complete rank of non-commissioned officer file closers was also needed to hold the men to their duty. m. carion-nisas said, "these file-closers hook their halberds together and form a line that cannot be broken." in spite of all this, after two or three volleys, so says general renard, whom we believe more than charitable, there is no power of discipline which can prevent regular fire from breaking into fire at will. but let us look further, into frederick's battles. let us take the battle of mollwitz, in which success was specifically laid to fire at command, half lost, then won by the prussian salvos. "the austrian infantry had opened fire on the lines of the prussians, whose cavalry had been routed. it was necessary to shake them to insure victory. the austrians still used wooden ramrods. their fire came slowly, while the prussian fire was thunderous, five or six shots to the rifle per minute. the imperial troops, surprised and disconcerted by this massed fire, tried to hurry. in their hurry many broke their fragile ramrods. confusion spread through the ranks, and the battle was lost." but, if we study actual conditions of the period, we see that things did not happen in such an orderly sequence. firing started, and it is said that it was long and deadly. the prussians iron ramrods gave them the advantage 'over an enemy whose ramrods were wooden, harder to manipulate and easily broken. however, when the order to advance was given to the prussians, whole battalions stood fast; it was impossible to budge them. the soldiers tried to escape the fire and got behind each other, so that they were thirty to forty deep. here are men who exhibit under fire an admirable, calm, an immovable steadiness. each instant they hear the dead heavy sound of a bullet striking. they see, they feel, around them, above them, between their legs, their comrades fall and writhe, for the fire is deadly. they have the power in their hands to return blow for blow, to send back to the enemy the death that hisses and strikes about them. they do not take a false step; their hands do not close instinctively on the trigger. they wait, imperturbably, the order of their chiefs--and what chiefs! these are the men who at the command "forward," lack bowels, who huddle like sheep one behind the other. are we to believe this? let us get to the truth of the matter. frederick's veterans, in spite of their discipline and drill, are unable to follow the methods taught and ordered. they are no more able to execute fire at command than they are to execute the ordered advance of the potsdam maneuver field. they use fire at will. they fire fast from instinct--stronger than their discipline--which bids them send two shots for one. their fire becomes indeed, a thunderous roll, not of salvos, but of rapid fire at will. who fires most, hits most, so the soldier figures. so indeed did frederick, for he encouraged fire in this same battle of mollwitz; he thereafter doubled the number of cartridges given the soldier, giving him sixty instead of thirty. furthermore, if fire at command had been possible, who knows what frederick's soldiers would have been capable of? they would have cut down battalions like standing grain. allowed to aim quietly, no man interfering with another, each seeing clearly--then at the signal all firing together. could anything hold against them? at the first volley the enemy would have broken and fled, under the penalty of annihilation in case they stayed. however, if we look at the final result at mollwitz, we see that the number of killed is about the same on the side that used fire at command as on the side that did not. the prussians lost dead, the austrians . but they say that if fire was not more deadly, it was because sight-setting was then unknown. what if it was? there was no adjustment of fire perhaps, but there were firing regulations; aiming was known. aiming is old. we do not say it was practiced; but it was known, and often mentioned. cromwell often said, "put your confidence in god, my children, and fire at their shoe-laces." do we set our sights better to-day? it is doubtful. if the able soldiers of cromwell, of frederick, of the republic and of napoleon could not set their sights--can we? thus this fire at command, which was only possible rarely and to commence action, was entirely ineffective. hardy spirits, seeing the slight effect of long range firing in battle, counselled waiting till the enemy was at twenty paces and driving him back with a volley. you do not have to sight carefully at twenty paces. what would be the result? "at the battle of castiglione," says marshal saxe, "the imperial troops let the french approach to twenty paces, hoping to destroy them by a volley. at that distance they fired coolly and with all precautions, but they were broken before the smoke cleared. at the battle of belgrade ( ) i saw two battalions who at thirty paces, aimed and fired at a mass of turks. the turks cut them up, only two or three escaping. the turkish loss in dead was only thirty-two." no matter what the marshal says, we doubt that these men were cool. for men who could hold their fire up to such a near approach of the enemy, and fire into masses, would have killed the front rank, thrown the others into confusion, and would never have been cut up as they were. to make these men await, without firing, an enemy at twenty or thirty paces, needed great moral pressure. controlled by discipline they waited, but as one waits for the roof to fall, for a bomb to explode, full of anxiety and suppressed emotion. when the order is given to raise the arms and fire the crisis is reached. the roof falls, the bomb explodes, one flinches and the bullets are fired into the air. if anybody is killed it is an accident. this is what happened before the use of skirmishers. salvos were tried. in action they became fire at will. directed against troops advancing without firing they were ineffective. they did not halt the dash of the assault, and the troops who had so counted on them fled demoralized. but when skirmishers were used, salvos became impossible. armies who held to old methods learned this to their cost. in the first days of the revolution our troops, undrilled and not strictly disciplined, could not fight in line. to advance on the enemy, a part of the battalion was detached as skirmishers. the remainder marched into battle and was engaged without keeping ranks. the combat was sustained by groups fighting without formal order. the art was to support by reserves the troops advanced as skirmishers. the skirmishers always began the action, when indeed they did not complete it. to oppose fire by rank to skirmishers was fools' play. skirmishers necessarily opposed each other. once this method was adopted, they were supported, reinforced by troops in formation. in the midst of general firing fire at command became impossible and was replaced by fire at will. dumouriez, at the battle of jemmapes, threw out whole battalions as skirmishers, and supporting them by light cavalry, did wonders with them. they surrounded the austrian redoubts and rained on the cannoneers a hail of bullets so violent that they abandoned their pieces. the austrians, astounded by this novel combat method, vainly reinforced their light troops by detachments of heavy infantry. their skirmishers could not resist our numbers and impetuosity, and presently their line, beaten by a storm of bullets, was forced back. the noise of battle, the firing, increased; the defeated troops, hearing commands no longer, threw down their arms and fled in disorder. so fire in line, heavy as it may be, cannot prevail against the power of numerous detachments of skirmishers. a rain of bullets directed aimlessly is impotent against isolated men profiting by the slightest cover to escape the fire of their adversaries, while the deployed battalions offer to their rifles a huge and relatively harmless target. the dense line, apparently so strong, withers under the deadly effect of the fire of isolated groups, so feeble in appearance. (general renard.) the prussians suffered in the same way at jena. their lines tried fire at command against our skirmishers. you might as well fire on a handful of fleas. they tell us of the english salvos at sainte-euphémie, in calabria, and later in spain. in these particular cases they could be used, because our troops charged without first sending out skirmishers. the battle of sainte-euphémie only lasted half an hour; it was badly conceived and executed, "and if," says general duhesme, "the advancing battalions had been preceded by detachments of skirmishers who had already made holes in enemy ranks, and, on close approach, the heads of columns had been launched in a charge, the english line would not have conserved that coolness which made their fire so effective and accurate. certainly it would not have waited so long to loose its fire, if it had been vigorously harassed by skirmishers." an english author, treating of the history of weapons, speaks of the rolling fire, well directed, of the english troops. he makes no mention of salvos. perhaps we were mistaken, and in our accounts have taken the fire of a battalion for the formal battalion fire at command of our regulations. the same tendency appears more clearly in the work on infantry of the marquis de chambray, who knew the english army well. he says that the english in spain used almost entirely fire in two ranks. they employed battalion fire only when attacked by our troops without skirmishers, firing on the flanks of our columns. and he says "the fire by battalion, by half battalion and by platoon is limited to the target range. the fire actually most used in war is that in two ranks, the only one used by the french." later he adds "experience proves fire in two ranks the only one to be used against the enemy." before him marshal saxe wrote "avoid dangerous maneuvers, such as fire by platoon, which have often caused shameful defeats." these statements are as true now as then. fire at command, by platoon, by battalion, etc., is used in case the enemy having repulsed skirmishers and arrived at a reasonable range either charges or opens fire for effect himself. if the latter, fire is reciprocal and lasts until one or the other gives way or charges. if the enemy charges, what happens? he advances preceded by skirmishers who deliver a hail of bullets. you wish to open fire, but the voices of your officers are lost. the noise of artillery, of small arms, the confusion of battle, the shrieks of the wounded, distract the soldiers' attention. before you have delivered your command the line is ablaze. then try to stop your soldiers. while there is a cartridge left, they will fire. the enemy may find a fold of ground that protects him; he may adopt in place of his deployed order columns with wide intervals between, or otherwise change his dispositions. the changing incidents of battle are hidden by smoke and the troops in front, from the view of the officers behind. the soldiers will continue to fire and the officers can do nothing about it. all this has been said already, has been gone into, and fire at command has been abandoned. why take it up again? it comes to us probably from the prussians. indeed the reports of their general staff on their last campaign, of , say that it was very effectively employed, and cite many examples. but a prussian officer who went through the campaign in the ranks and saw things close up, says, "in examining the battles of for characteristics, one is struck by a feature common to all, the extraordinary extension of front at the expense of depth. either the front is spun out into a single long thin line, or it is broken into various parts that fight by themselves. above all the tendency is evident to envelop the enemy by extending the wings. there is no longer any question of keeping the original order of battle. different units are confused, by battle, or even before battle. detachments and large units of any corps are composed of diverse and heterogeneous elements. the battle is fought almost exclusively by columns of companies, rarely of half-battalions. the tactics of these columns consists in throwing out strong detachments of skirmishers. gradually the supports are engaged and deployed. the line is broken, scattered, like a horde of irregular cavalry. the second line which has held close order tries to get up to the first promptly, first to engage in the fight, also because they suffer losses from the high shots directed at the first line. it suffers losses that are heavy as it is compact and supports them with impatience as it does not yet feel the fever of battle. the most of the second line then forces entry into the first, and, as there is more room on the wings, it gravitates to the wings. very often even the reserve is drawn in, entirely, or so largely that it cannot fulfill its mission. in fact, the fighting of the first two lines is a series of combats between company commands and the enemy each command faces. superior officers cannot follow on horseback all the units, which push ahead over all sorts of ground. they have to dismount and attach themselves to the first unit of their command met. unable to manipulate their whole command, in order to do something, they command the smaller unit. it is not always better commanded at that. even generals find themselves in this situation." here is something we understand better. it is certainly what occurs. as for the instances cited in the general staff reports, they deal with companies or half-battalions at most. not withstanding the complacency with which they are cited, they must have been rare, and the exception should not be taken as establishing a rule. . fire at will--its efficacy thus fire at command, to-day as in the past, is impractical and consequently not actually used in battle. the only means employed are fire at will and the fire of skirmishers. let us look into their efficacy. competent authorities have compiled statistics on this point. guibert thinks that not over two thousand men are killed or wounded by each million cartridges used in battle. gassendi assures us that of three thousand shots only one is a hit. piobert says that the estimate, based on the result of long wars, is that three to ten thousand cartridges are expended for each man hit. to-day, with accurate and long range weapons, have things changed much? we do not think so. the number of bullets fired must be compared with the number of men dropped, with a deduction made for the action of artillery, which must be considered. a german author has advanced the opinion that with the prussian needle rifle the hits are % of the shots fired. but then how explain the disappointment of m. dreyse, the happy inventor of the needle rifle, when he compared prussian and austrian losses. this good old gentleman was disagreeably astonished at seeing that his rifle had not come up to his expectations. fire at will, as we shall presently show, is a fire to occupy the men in the ranks but its effect is not great. we could give many examples; we only cite one, but it is conclusive. "has it not been remarked," says general duhesme, "that, before a firing line there is raised a veil of smoke which on one side or the other hides the troops from view, and makes the fire of the best placed troops uncertain and practically without effect? i proved it conclusively at the battle of caldiero, in one of the successive advances that occurred on my left wing. i saw some battalions, which i had rallied, halted and using an individual fire which they could not keep up for long. i went there. i saw through the smoke cloud nothing but flashes, the glint of bayonets and the tops of grenadier's caps. we were not far from the enemy however, perhaps sixty paces. a ravine separated us, but it could not be seen. i went into the ranks, which were neither closed nor aligned, throwing up with my hand the soldiers' rifles to get them to cease firing and to advance. i was mounted, followed by a dozen orderlies. none of us were wounded, nor did i see an infantryman fall. well then! hardly had our line started when the austrians, heedless of the obstacle that separated us, retreated." it is probable that had the austrians started to move first, the french would have given way. it was veterans of the empire, who certainly were as reliable as our men, who gave this example of lack of coolness. in ranks, fire at will is the only possible one for our officers and men. but with the excitement, the smoke, the annoying incidents, one is lucky to get even horizontal fire, to say nothing of aimed fire. in fire at will, without taking count of any trembling, men interfere with each other. whoever advances or who gives way to the recoil of his weapon deranges the shot of his neighbor. with full pack, the second rank has no loophole; it fires in the air. on the range, spacing men to the extremity of the limits of formation, firing very slowly, men are found who are cool and not too much bothered by the crack of discharge in their ears, who let the smoke pass and seize a loophole of pretty good visibility, who try, in a word, not to lose their shots. and the percentage results show much more regularity than with fire at command. but in front of the enemy fire at will becomes in an instant haphazard fire. each man fires as much as possible, that is to say, as badly as possible. there are physical and mental reasons why this is so. even at close range, in battle, the cannon can fire well. the gunner, protected in part by his piece, has an instant of coolness in which to lay accurately. that his pulse is racing does not derange his line of sight, if he has will power. the eye trembles little, and the piece once laid, remains so until fired. the rifleman, like the gunner, only by will-power keeps his ability to aim. but the excitement in the blood, of the nervous system, opposes the immobility of the weapon in his hands. no matter how supported, a part of the weapon always shares the agitation of the man. he is instinctively in haste to fire his shot, which may stop the departure of the bullet destined for him. however lively the fire is, this vague reasoning, unformed as it is in his mind, controls with all the force of the instinct of self preservation. even the bravest and most reliable soldiers then fire madly. the greater number fire from the hip. the theory of the range is that with continual pressure on the trigger the shot surprises the firer. but who practices it under fire? however, the tendency in france to-day is to seek only accuracy. what good will it do when smoke, fog, darkness, long range, excitement, the lack of coolness, forbid clear sight? it is hard to say, after the feats of fire at sebastopol, in italy, that accurate weapons have given us no more valuable service than a simple rifle. just the same, to one who has seen, facts are facts. but--see how history is written. it has been set down that the russians were beaten at inkermann by the range and accuracy of weapons of the french troops. but the battle was fought in thickets and wooded country, in a dense fog. and when the weather cleared, our soldiers, our chasseurs were out of ammunition and borrowed from the russian cartridge boxes, amply provided with cartridges for round, small calibered bullets. in either case there could have been no accurate fire. the facts are that the russians were beaten by superior morale; that unaimed fire, at random, there perhaps more than elsewhere, had the only material effect. when one fires and can only fire at random, who fires most hits most. or perhaps it is better said that who fires least expects to be hit most. frederick was impressed with this, for he did not believe in the potsdam maneuvers. the wily fritz looked on fire as a means to quiet and occupy the undependable soldiers and it proved his ability that he could put into practice that which might have been a mistake on the part of any other general officer. he knew very well how to count on the effect of his fire, how many thousand cartridges it took to kill or wound an enemy. at first his soldiers had only thirty cartridges. he found the number insufficient, and after mollwitz gave them sixty. to-day as in frederick's day, it is rapid random fire, the only one practicable, which has given prestige to the prussians. this idea of rapid fire was lost after frederick, but the prussians have recovered it to-day by exercising common sense. however our veterans of the empire had preserved this idea, which comes from instinct. they enlarged their vents, scornful of flare backs, to avoid having to open the chamber and prime. the bullet having a good deal of clearance when the cartridge was torn and put in the gun, with a blow of the butt on the ground they had their arms charged and primed. but to-day as then, in spite of skill acquired in individual fire, men stop aiming and fire badly as soon as they are grouped into platoons to fire. prussian officers, who are practical men, know that adjustment of sights is impracticable in the heat of action, and that in fire by volleys troops tend to use the full sight. so in the war of they ordered their men to fire very low, almost without sighting, in order to profit by ricochets. . fire by rank is a fire to occupy the men in ranks but if fire at will is not effective, what is its use? as we have already said its use is to occupy the men in the ranks. in ordinary fire the act of breathing alone, by the movement it communicates to the body greatly annoys men in firing. how then can it be claimed that on the field of battle, in rank, men can fire even moderately well when they fire only to soothe themselves and forget danger? napoleon said "the instinct of man is not to let himself be killed without defending himself." and indeed man in combat is a being in whom the instinct of self preservation dominates at times all other sentiments. the object of discipline is to dominate this instinct by a greater terror of shame or of punishment. but it is never able entirely to attain this object; there is a point beyond which it is not effectual. this point reached, the soldier must fire or he will go either forward or back. fire is then, let us say, a safety vent for excitement. in serious affairs it is then difficult, if not impossible, to control fire. here is an example given by marshal saxe: "charles xii, king of sweden, wished to introduce into his infantry the method of charging with the bayonet. he spoke of it often, and it was known in the army that this was his idea. finally at the battle of ---- against the russians, when the fighting started he went to his regiment of infantry, made it a fine speech, dismounted before the colors, and himself led the regiment to the charge. when he was thirty paces from the enemy the whole regiment fired, in spite of his orders and his presence. otherwise, it did very well and broke the enemy. the king was so annoyed that all he did was pass through the ranks, remount his horse, and go away without saying a word." so that, if the soldier is not made to fire, he will fire anyway to distract himself and forget danger. the fire of frederick's prussians had no other purpose. marshal saxe saw this. "the speed with which the prussians load their rifles," he tells us, "is advantageous in that it occupies the soldier and forbids reflection while he is in the presence of the enemy. it is an error to believe that the five last victories gained by the nation in its last war were due to fire. it has been noted that in most of these actions there were more prussians killed by rifle fire than there were of their enemies." it would be sad to think the soldier in line a firing machine. firing has been and always will be his principal object, to fire as many shots in as short a time as possible. but the victor is not always the one who kills the most; he is fortunate who best knows how to overcome the morale of his enemy. the coolness of men cannot be counted on. and as it is necessary above all to keep up their morale one ought to try above all to occupy and soothe them. this can best be done by frequent discharges. there will be little effect, and it would be absurd to expect them to be calm enough to fire slowly, adjust their ranges and above all sight carefully. . the deadly fire is the fire of skirmishers in group firing, when the men are grouped into platoons or battalions, all weapons have the same value, and if it is assumed to-day that fire must decide engagements, the method of fighting must be adopted which gives most effect to the weapon. this is the employment of skirmishers. it is this class of fire, indeed, which is deadliest in war. we could give many examples but we shall be content with the two following instances, taken from general duhesme. "a french officer who served with the austrians in one of the recent wars," says general duhesme, "told me that from the fire of a french battalion one hundred paces from them, his company lost only three or four men, while in the same time they had had more than thirty killed or wounded by the fire of a group of skirmishers in a little wood on their flank three hundred paces away." "at the passage of the minico, in , the nd battalion of the st received the fire of a battalion of bussi's regiment without losing a man; the skirmishers of that same organization killed more than thirty men in a few minutes while protecting the retreat of their organization." the fire of skirmishers is then the most deadly used in war, because the few men who remain cool enough to aim are not otherwise annoyed while employed as skirmishers. they will perform better as they are better hidden, and better trained in firing. the accuracy of fire giving advantages only in isolated fire, we may consider that accurate weapons will tend to make fighting by skirmishers more frequent and more decisive. for the rest, experience authorizes the statement that the use of skirmishers is compulsory in war. to-day all troops seriously engaged become in an instant groups of skirmishers and the only possible precise fire is from hidden snipers. however, the military education which we have received, the spirit of the times, clouds with doubt our mind regarding this method of fighting by skirmishers. we accept it regretfully. our personal experience being incomplete, insufficient, we content ourselves with the supposition that gives us satisfaction. the war of skirmishers, no matter how thoroughly it has been proven out, is accepted by constraint, because we are forced by circumstance to engage our troops by degrees, in spite of ourselves, often unconsciously. but, be it understood, to-day a successive engagement is necessary in war. however, let us not have illusions as to the efficacy of the fire of skirmishers. in spite of the use of accurate and long range weapons, in spite of all training that can be given the soldier, this fire never has more than a relative effect, which should not be exaggerated. the fire of skirmishers is generally against skirmishers. a body of troops indeed does not let itself be fired on by skirmishers without returning a similar fire. and it is absurd to expect skirmishers to direct their fire on a body protected by skirmishers. to demand of troops firing individually, almost abandoned to themselves, that they do not answer the shots directed at them, by near skirmishers, but aim at a distant body, which is not harming them, is to ask an impossible unselfishness. as skirmishers men are very scattered. to watch the adjustment of ranges is difficult. men are practically left alone. those who remain cool may try to adjust their range, but it is first necessary to see where your shots fall, then, if the terrain permits this and it will rarely do so, to distinguish them from shots fired at the same time by your neighbors. also these men will be more disturbed, will fire faster and less accurately, as the fight is more bitter, the enemy stauncher; and perturbation is more contagious than coolness. the target is a line of skirmishers, a target offering so little breadth and above all depth, that outside of point blank fire, an exact knowledge of the range is necessary to secure effect. this is impossible, for the range varies at each instant with the movements of the skirmishers. [ ] thus, with skirmishers against skirmishers, there are scattered shots at scattered targets. our fire of skirmishers, marching, on the target range, proves this, although each man knows exactly the range and has time and the coolness to set his sights. it is impossible for skirmishers in movement to set sights beyond four hundred meters, and this is pretty extreme, even though the weapon is actually accurate beyond this. also, a shot is born. there are men, above all in officer instructors at firing schools, who from poor shots become excellent shots after years of practice. but it is impossible to give all the soldiers such an education without an enormous consumption of ammunition and without abandoning all other work. and then there would be no results with half of them. to sum up, we find that fire is effective only at point blank. even in our last wars there have been very few circumstances in which men who were favored with coolness and under able leadership have furnished exceptions. with these exceptions noted, we can say that accurate and long range weapons have not given any real effect at a range greater than point blank. there has been put forward, as proof of the efficacy of accurate weapons the terrible and decisive results obtained by the british in india, with the enfield rifle. but these results have been obtained because the british faced comparatively poorly armed enemies. they had then the security, the confidence, the ensuing coolness necessary for the use of accurate weapons. these conditions are completely changed when one faces an enemy equally well armed, who consequently, gives as good as he gets. . absolute impossibility of fire at command let us return to fire at command, which there is a tendency to-day to have troops execute in line. can regular and efficient fire be hoped for from troops in line? ought it to be hoped for? no, for man cannot be made over, and neither can the line. even on the range or on the maneuver field what does this fire amount to? in fire at command, on the range, all the men in the two ranks come to the firing position simultaneously, everybody is perfectly quiet. men in the front rank consequently are not deranged by their neighbors. men in the second rank are in the same situation. the first rank being set and motionless they can aim through the openings without more annoyance than those in the first rank. fire being executed at command, simultaneously, no weapon is deranged at the moment of firing by the movements of the men. all conditions are entirely favorable to this kind of fire. also as the fire is ordered with skill and coolness by an officer who has perfectly aligned his men (a thing rare even on the drill ground) it gives percentage results greater than that of fire at will executed with the minutest precautions, results that are sometimes astonishing. but fire at command, from the extreme coolness that it demands of all, of the officer certainly more than of the soldier, is impracticable before the enemy except under exceptional circumstances of picked officers, picked men, ground, distance, safety, etc. even in maneuvers its execution is farcical. there is not an organization in which the soldiers do not hurry the command to fire in that the officers are so afraid that their men will anticipate the command that they give it as rapidly as possible, while the pieces are hardly in firing position, often while they are still in motion. the prescription that the command to fire be not given until about three seconds after coming to the firing position may give good results in the face of range targets. but it is not wise to believe that men will wait thus for long in the face of the enemy. it is useless to speak of the use of the sight-leaf before the enemy, in fire attempted by the same officers and men who are so utterly lacking, even on the maneuver ground. we have seen a firing instructor, an officer of coolness and assurance, who on the range had fired trial shots every day for a month, after this month of daily practice fire four trial shots at a six hundred meter range with the sight leaf at point blank. let us not pay too much attention to those who in military matters base everything on the weapon and unhesitating assume that the man serving it will adopt the usage provided and ordered in their regulations. the fighting man is flesh and blood. he is both body and soul; and strong as the soul may often be it cannot so dominate the body that there is no revolt of the flesh, no mental disturbance, in the face of destruction. let us learn to distrust mathematics and material dynamics as applied to battle principles. we shall learn to beware of the illusions drawn from the range and the maneuver field. there experience is with the calm, settled, unfatigued, attentive, obedient soldier, with an intelligent and tractable man instrument in short. and not with the nervous, easily swayed, moved, troubled, distrait, excited, restless being, not even under self-control, who is the fighting man from general to private. there are strong men, exceptions, but they are rare. these illusions nevertheless, stubborn and persistent, always repair the next day the most damaging injuries inflicted on them by reality. their least dangerous effect is to lead to prescribing the impracticable, as if ordering the impracticable were not really an attack on discipline, and did not result in disconcerting officers and men by the unexpected and by surprise at the contrast between battle and the theories of peace-time training. battle of course always furnishes surprises. but it furnishes less in proportion as good sense and the recognition of the truth have had their effect on the training of the fighting man. man in the mass, in a disciplined body organized for combat, is invincible before an undisciplined body. but against a similarly disciplined body he reverts to the primitive man who flees before a force that is proved stronger, or that he feels stronger. the heart of the soldier is always the human heart. discipline holds enemies face to face a little longer, but the instinct of self-preservation maintains its empire and with it the sense of fear. fear! there are chiefs, there are soldiers who know no fear, but they are of rare temper. the mass trembles, for the flesh cannot be suppressed. and this trembling must be taken into account in all organization, discipline, formation, maneuver, movement, methods of action. for in all of these the soldier tends to be upset, to be deceived, to under-rate himself and to exaggerate the offensive spirit of the enemy. on the field of battle death is in the air, blind and invisible, making his presence known by fearful whistlings that make heads duck. during this strain the recruit hunches up, closes in, seeking aid by an instinctive unformulated reasoning. he figures that the more there are to face a danger the greater each one's chances of escaping. but he soon sees that flesh attracts lead. then, possessed by terror, inevitably he retreats before the fire, or "he escapes by advancing," in the picturesque and profound words of general burbaki. the soldier escapes from his officer, we say. yes, he escapes! but is it not evident that he escapes because up to this moment nobody has bothered about his character, his temperament, the impressionable and exciteable nature of man? in prescribed methods of fighting he has always been held to impossibilities. the same thing is done to-day. to-morrow, as yesterday, he will escape. there is of course a time when all the soldiers escape, either forward, or to the rear. but the organization, the combat methods should have no other object than to delay as long as possible this crisis. yet they hasten it. all our officers fear, quite justifiably from their experience, that the soldier will too rapidly use his cartridges in the face of the enemy. this serious matter is certainly worthy of attention. how to stop this useless and dangerous waste of ammunition is the question. our soldiers show little coolness. once in danger they fire, fire to calm themselves, to pass the time; they cannot be stopped. there are some people you cannot embarrass. with the best faith in the world they say, "what is this? you are troubled about stopping the fire of your soldiers? that is not difficult. you find that they show little coolness, and shoot despite their officers, in spite even of themselves? all right, require of them and their officers methods of fire that demand extremes of coolness, calm and assurance, even in maneuver. they cannot give a little? ask a lot and you will get it. there you have a combat method nobody has ever heard of, simple, beautiful, and terrible." this is indeed a fine theory. it would make the wily frederick who surely did not believe in these maneuvers, laugh until he cried. [ ] this is to escape from a difficulty by a means always recognized as impossible, and more impossible than ever to-day. fearing that the soldier will escape from command, can not better means be found to hold him than to require of him and his officer, impracticable fire? this, ordered and not executed by the soldiers, and even by the officers, is an attack on the discipline of the unit. "never order the impossible," says discipline, "for the impossible becomes then a disobedience." how many requisites there are to make fire at command possible, conditions among the soldiers, among their officers. perfect these conditions, they say. all right, perfect their training, their discipline, etc.; but to obtain fire at command it is necessary to perfect their nerves, their physical force, their moral force, to make bronze images of them, to do away with excitement, with the trembling of the flesh. can any one do this? frederick's soldiers were brought, by blows of the baton, to a terrible state of discipline. yet their fire was fire at will. discipline had reached its limits. man in battle, let us repeat again, is a being to whom the instinct of self-preservation at times dominates everything else. discipline, whose purpose is to dominate this instinct by a feeling of greater terror, can not wholly achieve it. discipline goes so far and no farther. we cannot deny the existence of extraordinary instances when discipline and devotion have raised man above himself. but these examples are extraordinary, rare. they are admired as exceptions, and the exception proves the rule. as to perfection, consider the spartans. if man was ever perfected for war it was he; and yet he has been beaten, and fled. in spite of training, moral and physical force has limits. the spartans, who should have stayed to the last man on the battle field, fled. the british with their phlegmatic coolness and their terrible rolling fire, the russians, with that inertia that is called their tenacity, have given way before attack. the german has given way, he who on account of his subordination and stability has been called excellent war material. again an objection is raised. perhaps with recruits the method may be impracticable. but with veterans--but with whom is war commenced? methods are devised precisely for young and inexperienced troops. they ask, also, if the prussians used this method of fire successfully in the last war, why should not we do as well? supposing that the prussians actually did use it, and this is far from being proved, it does not follow that it is practicable for us. this mania for borrowing german tactics is not new, although it has always been properly protested against. marshal luchner said, "no matter how much they torment their men, fortunately they will never make them prussians." later de gouvion-saint-cyr said, "the men are drilled in various exercises believed necessary to fit them for war, but there is no question of adopting exercises to suit the french military genius, the french character and temperament. it has not been thought necessary to take this into account; it has been easier to borrow german methods." to follow preconceived tactics is more the part of the phlegmatic german than it is ours. the germans obey well enough, but the point is that they try to follow tactics which are contrary to nature. the frenchman cannot. more spontaneous, more exciteable and impressionable, less calm and obedient, he has in our last wars promptly and completely violated both the letter and the spirit of the regulations. "the german," said a prussian officer, "has sentiments of duty and obedience. he submits to severe discipline. he is full of devotion, although not animated by a lively mind. easy by nature, rather heavy than active, intellectually calm, reflective, without dash or divine fire, wishing but not mad to conquer, obeying calmly and conscientiously, but mechanically and without enthusiasm, fighting with a resigned valor, with heroism, he may let himself be sacrificed uselessly, but he sells his life dearly. without warlike tendencies, not bellicose, unambitious, he is yet excellent war material on account of his subordination and stability. what must be inculcated in him is a will of his own, a personal impulse to send him forward." according to this unflattering portrait, which we believe a little extreme, even if by a compatriot, it is possible that the germans can be handled in tactics impossible with french. however, did they actually use these tactics? remember the urgent warning of blücher to his brigade commanders, not to let bayonet attacks break down into fusillades. note the article in the present prussian firing regulations, which prescribes trial shots before each fire delivered, "so as to dissipate the kind of excitement that possesses the soldier when his drill has been interrupted for some time." in conclusion, if fire at command was impossible with the ancient rifle, it is more so to-day, for the simple reason that trembling increases as the destructive power increases. under turenne, lines held longer than to-day, because the musket was in use and the battle developed more slowly. to-day when every one has the rapid fire rifle, are things easier? alas no! relations between weapons and the man are the same. you give me a musket, i fire at sixty paces, a rifle, at two hundred; a chessepot, at four hundred. but i have perhaps less coolness and steadiness than at the old sixty paces, for with the rapidity of fire the new weapon is more terrible at four hundred paces, for me as well as for the enemy, than was the musket at sixty paces. and is there even more fire accuracy? no. rifles were used before the french revolution, and yet this perfectly well known weapon was very rarely seen in war, and its efficacy, as shown in those rare cases, was unsatisfactory. accurate fire with it at combat distances of from two hundred to four hundred meters was illusory, and it was abandoned in favor of the old rifle. did the foot chasseurs know fire at command? picked troops, dependable, did they use it? yet it would have been a fine method of employing their weapons. to-day we have weapons that are accurate at six hundred to seven hundred meters. does that mean that accurate fire at seven hundred meters is possible? no. if your enemy is armed as we are, fire at seven hundred meters will show the same results that have been shown for four hundred meters. the same losses will be suffered, and the coolness shown will be the same--that is, it will be absent. if one fire three times as fast, three times as many men will fall, and it will be three times as difficult to preserve coolness. just as formerly it was impossible to execute fire at command, so it is to-day. formerly no sight-setting was possible; it is no better to-day. but if this fire is impossible, why attempt it? let us remain always in the realm of the possible or we shall make sad mistakes. "in our art," said general daine, "theorists abound; practical men are very rare. also when the moment of action arrives, principles are often found to be confused, application impossible, and the most erudite officers remain inactive, unable to use the scientific treasures that they have amassed." let us then, practical men, seek for possible methods. let us gather carefully the lessons of their experience, remembering bacon's saying, "experience excels science." appendix ii historical documents . cavalry an extract from xenophon. "the unexpectedness of an event accentuates it, be it pleasant or terrible. this is nowhere seen better than in war, where surprise terrorizes even the strongest. "when two armies are in touch or merely separated by the field of battle, there are first, on the part of the cavalry, skirmishes, thrusts, wheels to stop or pursue the enemy, after which usually each goes cautiously and does not put forth its greatest effort until the critical part of the conflict. or, having commenced as usual, the opposite is done and one moves swiftly, after the wheel, either to flee or to pursue. this is the method by which one can, with the least possible risk, most harm the enemy, charging at top speed when supported, or fleeing at the same speed to escape the enemy. if it is possible in these skirmishes to leave behind, formed in column and unobserved four or five of the bravest and best mounted men in each troop they may be very well employed to fall on the enemy at the moment of the wheel." . marius against the cimbrians extract from plutarch's "life of marius." "boiorix, king of the cimbrians, at the head of a small troop of cavalry, approached marius' camp and challenged him to fix a day and place to decide who would rule the country. marius answered that romans did not ask their enemies when to fight, but that he was willing to satisfy the cimbrians. they agreed then to give battle in three days on the plain of verceil, a convenient place for the romans to deploy their cavalry and for the barbarians to extend their large army. the two opponents on the day set were in battle formation. catulus had twenty thousand three hundred men. marius had thirty-two thousand, placed on the wings and consequently on either side of those of catulus, in the center. so writes sylla, who was there. they say that marius gave this disposition to the two parts of his army because he hoped to fall with his two wings on the barbarian phalanxes and wished the victory to come only to his command, without catulus taking any part or even meeting with the enemy. indeed, as the front of battle was very broad, the wings were separated from the center, which was broken through. they add that catulus reported this disposition in the explanation that he had to make and complained bitterly of marius' bad faith. the cimbrian infantry came out of its positions in good order and in battle array formed a solid phalanx as broad as it was wide, thirty stades or about eighteen thousand feet. their fifteen thousand horsemen were magnificently equipped. their helmets were crowned by the gaping mouths of savage beasts, above which were high plumes which looked like wings. this accentuated their height. they were protected by iron cuirasses and had shields of an astonishing whiteness. each had two javelins to throw from a distance, and in close fighting they used a long heavy sword. "in this battle the cavalry did not attack the romans in front, but, turning to the right they gradually extended with the idea of enclosing the romans before their infantry and themselves. the roman generals instantly perceived the ruse. but they were not able to restrain their men, one of whom, shouting that the enemy was flying, led all the others to pursue. meanwhile the barbarian infantry advanced like the waves of a great sea. "marius washed his hands, raised them to heaven, and vowed to offer a hecatomb to the gods. catulus for his part, also raised his hands to heaven and promised to consecrate the fortune of the day. marius also made a sacrifice, and, when the priest showed him the victim's entrails, cried, 'victory is mine.' but, as the two armies were set in motion, something happened, which, according to sylla, seemed divine vengeance on marius. the movements of such a prodigious multitude raised such a cloud of dust that the two armies could not see each other. marius, who had advanced first with his troops to fall on the enemy's formation, missed it in the dust, and having passed beyond it, wandered for a long time in the plain. meanwhile fortune turned the barbarians toward catulus who had to meet their whole attack with his soldiers, among whom was sylla. the heat of the day and the burning rays of the sun, which was in the eyes of the cimbrians, helped the romans. the barbarians, reared in cold wooded places, hardened to extreme cold, could not stand the heat. sweating, panting, they shaded their faces from the sun with their shields. the battle occurred after the summer solstice, three days before the new moon of the month of august, then called sextilis. the cloud of dust sustained the romans' courage by concealing the number of the enemy. each battalion advancing against the enemy in front of them were engaged, before the sight of such a great horde of barbarians could shake them. furthermore, hardship and hard work had so toughened them that in spite of the heat and impetuousness with which they attacked, no roman was seen to sweat or pant. this, it is said, is testified to by catulus himself in eulogizing the conduct of his troops. "most of the enemy, above all the bravest, were cut to pieces, for, to keep the front ranks from breaking, they were tied together by long chains attached to their belts. the victors pursued the fugitives to their entrenched camp. "the romans took more than sixty thousand cimbrians prisoners, and killed twice as many." . the battle of the alma extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq. a letter sent from huy, february , , by captain de v----, a company officer in the attack division. "my company, with the rd, commanded by captain d---- was designated to cover the battalion. "at eight or nine hundred meters from the alma, we saw a sort of wall, crowned with white, whose use we could not understand. then, at not more than three hundred meters, this wall delivered against us a lively battalion fire and deployed at the run. it was a russian battalion whose uniform, partridge-gray or chestnut-gray color, with white helmet, had, with the help of a bright sun, produced the illusion. this, parenthetically, showed me that this color is certainly the most sensible, as it can cause such errors. [ ] we replied actively, but there was effect on neither side because the men fired too fast and too high.... the advance was then taken up, and i don't know from whom the order can have come.... we went on the run, crossing the river easily enough, and while we were assembling to scramble up the hill we saw the rest of the battalion attacking, without order, companies mixed up, crying, 'forward,' singing, etc. we did the same, again took up the attack, and were lucky enough to reach the summit of the plateau first. the russians, astounded, massed in a square. why? i suppose that, turned on the left, attacked in the center, they thought themselves surrounded, and took this strange formation. at this moment a most inopportune bugle call was sounded by order of major de m---- commanding temporarily a battalion of foot chasseurs. this officer had perceived the russian cavalry in motion and believed that its object was to charge us, while, on the contrary it was maneuvering to escape the shells fired into it while in squadron formation by the megere, a vessel of the fleet. this order given by bugle signal was executed as rapidly as had been the attack, such is the instinct of self-preservation which urges man to flee danger, above all when ordered to flee. happily a level-headed officer, captain daguerre, seeing the gross mistake, commanded 'forward' in a stentorian tone. this halted the retreat and caused us again to take up the attack. the attack made us masters of the telegraph-line, and the battle was won. at this second charge the russians gave, turned, and hardly any of them were wounded with the bayonet. so then a major commanding a battalion, without orders, sounds a bugle call and endangers success. a simple captain commands 'forward,' and decides the victory. this is the history of yesterday, which may be useful tomorrow." it appears from this that, apart from the able conception of the commander-in-chief, the detail of execution was abominable, and that to base on successes new rules of battle would lead to lamentable errors. let us sum up: first: a private chasseur d'afrique gave the order to attack; second: the troops went to the attack mixed up with each other. we needed nearly an hour merely to reform the brigade. this one called, that one congratulated himself, the superior officers cried out, etc., etc.; there was confusion that would have meant disaster if the cavalry charge which was believed to threaten us, had been executed. disorder broke out in the companies at the first shot. once engaged, commanders of organizations no longer had them in hand, and they intermingled, so that it was not easy to locate oneself; third: there was no silence in ranks. officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers commanded, shouted, etc.; the bugles sounded the commands they heard coming from nobody knew where; fourth: there was no maneuvering from the first shot to the last. i do not remember being among my own men; it was only at the end that we found each other. zouaves, chasseurs, soldiers of the th line formed an attack group--that was all. about four o'clock there was a first roll call. about a third of the battalion was missing at nine at night there was a second roll call. only about fifty men were missing, thirty of whom were wounded. where the rest were i do not know. fifth: to lighten the men, packs had been left on the plain at the moment fire opened, and as the operation had not been worked out in advance, no measures were taken to guard them. in the evening most of the men found their packs incomplete, lacking all the little indispensables that one cannot get in the position in which we were. it is evidently a vital necessity to restrain the individual initiative of subordinates and leave command to the chiefs, and above all to watch the training of the soldiers who are always ready, as they approach, to run on the enemy with the bayonet. i have always noted that if a body which is charged does not hold firm, it breaks and takes flight, but that if it holds well, the charging body halts some paces away before it strikes. i shall tell you something notable that i saw at castel-fidardo. they talk a lot of the bayonet. for my part i only saw it used once, in the night, in a trench. also it is noted that in the hospital, practically all the wounds treated were from fire, rarely from the bayonet. . the battle of the alma extract from the correspondence of colonel a. du picq. letters dated in november, , and february, , sent from rennes by captain p---- of the th battalion of foot chasseurs, with remarks by the colonel and responses of captain p----. first letter from captain p---- "... it is there that i had time to admire the coolness of my brave captain daguerre, advancing on a mare under the enemy's eyes, and observing imperturbable, like a tourist, all the movements of our opponents. "i will always pay homage to his calm and collected bravery...." remarks by the colonel. "did not captain daguerre change the bugle call 'retreat,' ordered by ---- to the bugle call 'forward?'" answer of captain p---- "in fact, when protected in the wood by pieces of wall we were firing on the russians, we heard behind us the bugle sounding 'retreat' at the order of ----. at this moment my captain, indignant, ordered 'forward' sounded to reestablish confidence which had been shaken by the distraction or by the inadvertance of ----." . the battle of inkermann extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq. first: letter sent from lyon, march , , by major de g----, th line regiment. "... the st battalion of the th light regiment had hardly arrived close to the telegraph when it received a new order to rush to the help of the english army, which, too weak to hold such a large army, had been broken in the center of its line and driven back on its camps. "the st battalion of the th light regiment, major vaissier, had the honor to arrive first in the presence of the russians, after moving three kilometers on the run. received by the enthusiastic cheers of the english, it formed for battle, then carried away by burning cries of 'forward, with the bayonet' from its brave major it threw itself headlong, on the russian columns, which broke. "for two hours the st battalion of the th light regiment, a battalion of the th line regiment, four companies of the rd battalion of foot chasseurs, five companies of algerian chasseurs held the head of the russian army which continued to debouch in massed columns from the ravine and plateau of inkermann. "three times the battalion of the th light regiment was obliged to fall back some paces to rally. three times it charged with the bayonet, with the same ardor and success. "at four in the afternoon the russians were in rout, and were pursued into the valley of inkermann. "on this memorable day all the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the th light regiment performed their duty nobly, rivalling each other in bravery and self-sacrifice." second: notes on inkermann, which colonel a. du picq indicates come from the letters of captain b---- (these letters are missing). "in what formation were the russians? in column, of which the head fired, and whose platoons tried to get from behind the mead to enter into action? "when major vaissier advanced was he followed by every one? at what distance? in what formation were the attackers? in disordered masses? in one rank? in two? in mass? did the russians immediately turn tail, receiving shots and the bayonet in the back? did they fall back on the mass which itself was coming up? what was the duration of this attack against a mass, whose depth prevented its falling back? "did we receive bayonet wounds? "did we fall back before the active reaction of the mass or merely because, after the first shock, the isolated soldiers fell back to find companions and with them a new confidence? "was the second charge made like the first one? was the th line regiment engaged as the first support of the th light regiment? how were the zouaves engaged?" . the battle of magenta extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq. letters from captain c----, dated august , . "at magenta i was in espinasse's division, of marshal macmahon's corps. this division was on the extreme left of the troops that had passed the ticino at turbigo and was moving on magenta by the left bank. close to the village a fusillade at close range apprised us that the enemy was before us. the country, covered with trees, hedges, and vines, had hidden them. "our st battalion and the nd foreign regiment drove the austrians into magenta. "meanwhile the nd and rd battalions of zouaves, with which i was, remained in reserve, arms stacked, under control of the division commander. apparently quite an interval had been left between espinasse's division and la motterouge's, the st of the corps, and, at the moment of engagement, at least an austrian brigade had entered the gap, and had taken in flank and rear the elements of our division engaged before magenta. happily the wooded country concealed the situation or i doubt whether our troops engaged would have held on as they did. at any rate the two reserve battalions had not moved. the fusillade extended to our right and left as if to surround us; bullets already came from our right flank. the general had put five guns in front of us, to fire on the village, and at the same time i received the order to move my section to the right, to drive off the invisible enemy who was firing on us. i remember that i had quit the column with my section when i saw a frightened artillery captain run toward us, crying 'general, general, we are losing a piece!' the general answered, 'come! zouaves, packs off.' at these words, the two battalions leaped forward like a flock of sheep, dropping packs everywhere. the austrians were not seen at first. it was only after advancing for an instant that they were seen. they were already dragging off the piece that they had taken. at the sight of them our men gave a yell and fell on them. surprise and terror so possessed the austrians, who did not know that we were so near, that they ran without using their arms. the piece was retaken; the regimental standard was captured by a man in my company. about two hundred prisoners were taken, and the austrian regiment--hartmann's th infantry--was dispersed like sheep in flight, five battalions of them. i believe that had the country not been thick the result might have been different. the incident lasted perhaps ten minutes. "the two battalions took up their first position. they had had no losses, and their morale was in the clouds. after about an hour general espinasse put himself at the head of the two battalions and marched us on the village. we were in column of platoons with section intervals. the advance was made by echelon, the nd battalion in front, the rd a little in rear, and a company in front deployed as skirmishers. "at one hundred and fifty paces from the austrians, wavering was evident in their lines; the first ranks threw themselves back on those in rear. at that instant the general ordered again, 'come! packs off. at the double!' everybody ran forward, shedding his pack where he was. "the austrians did not wait for us. we entered the village mixed up with them. the fighting in houses lasted quite a while. most of the austrians retired. those who remained in the houses had to surrender. i found myself, with some fifty officers and men, in a big house from which we took four hundred men and five officers, colonel hauser for one. "my opinion is that we were very lucky at magenta. the thick country in which we fought, favored us in hiding our inferior number from the austrians. i do not believe we would have succeeded so well in open country. in the gun episode the austrians were surprised, stunned. those whom we took kept their arms in their hands, without either abandoning them or using them. it was a typical zouave attack, which, when it succeeds, has astonishing results; but if one is not lucky it sometimes costs dearly. note the rd zouaves at palestro, the st zouaves at marignano. general espinasse's advance on the village, at the head of two battalions, was the finest and most imposing sight i have ever seen. apart from that advance, the fighting was always by skirmishers and in large groups." . the battle of solferino extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq. letters from captain c----. "the th infantry was part of the rd division of the th corps. "coming out of medole, the regiment was halted on the right of the road and formed, as each company arrived, in close column. fascines were made. "an aide-de-camp came up and gave an order to the colonel. "the regiment was then put on the road, marched some yards and formed in battalion masses on the right of the line of battle. this movement was executed very regularly although bullets commenced to find us. arms were rested, and we stayed there, exposed to fire, without doing anything, not even sending out a skirmisher. for that matter, during the whole campaign, it seemed to me that the skirmisher school might never have existed. "then up came a major of engineers, from general niel, to get a battalion from the regiment. the rd battalion being on the left received the order to march. the major commanding ordered 'by the left flank,' and we marched by the flank, in close column, in the face of the enemy, up to casa-nova farm, i believe, where general niel was. "the battalion halted a moment, faced to the front, and closed a little. "'stay here,' said general niel; 'you are my only reserve!' "then the general, glancing in front of the farm, said to the major, after one or two minutes, 'major, fix bayonets, sound the charge, and forward!' "this last movement was still properly executed at the start, and for about one hundred yards of advance. "shrapnel annoyed the battalion, and the men shouldered arms to march better. "at about one hundred yards from the farm, the cry 'packs down,' came from i do not know where. the cry was instantly repeated in the battalion. packs were thrown down, anywhere, and with wild yells the advance was renewed, in the wildest disorder. "from that moment, and for the rest of the day, the rd battalion as a unit disappeared. "toward the end of the day, after an attempt had been made to get the regiment together, and at the end of half an hour of backing and filling, there was a roll-call. "the third company of grenadiers had on starting off in the morning one hundred and thirty-two to one hundred and thirty-five present. at this first roll-call, forty-seven answered, a number i can swear to, but many of the men were still hunting packs and rations. the next day at reveille roll-call, ninety-three or four answered. many came back in the night. "this was the strength for many days i still remember, for i was charged with company supply from june th. "as additional bit of information--it was generally known a few days later that at least twenty men of the th company of grenadiers were never on the field of battle. wounded of the company, returned for transport to medole, said later that they had seen some twenty of the company together close to medole, lying in the grass while their comrades fought. they even gave some names, but could not name them all. the company had only been formed for the war on april th, and had received that same day forty-nine new grenadiers and twenty-nine at milan, which made seventy-eight recruits in two months. none of these men were tried or punished. their comrades rode them hard, that was all." . mentana extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq. letters from captain c----, dated august , . "november , at two in the morning, we took up arms to go to monte-rotondo. we did not yet know that we would meet the garibaldians at mentana. "the papal army had about three thousand men, we about two thousand five hundred. at one o'clock the papal forces met their enemies. the zouaves attacked vigorously, but the first engagements were without great losses on either side. there is nothing particular in this first episode. the usual thing happened, a force advances and is not halted by the fire of its adversary who ends by showing his heels. the papal zouaves are marked by no ordinary spirit. in comparing them with the soldiers of the antibes legion, one is forced to the conclusion that the man who fights for an idea fights better than one who fights for money. at each advance of the papal forces, we advanced also. we were not greatly concerned about the fight, we hardly thought that we would have to participate, not dreaming that we could be held by the volunteers. however, that did not happen. "it was about three o'clock. at that time three companies of the battalion were employed in protecting the artillery--three or four pieces placed about the battle-field. the head of the french column was then formed by the last three companies of the battalion, one of the st line regiment; the other regiments were immediately behind. colonel fremont of the st line regiment, after having studied the battle-field, took two chasseur companies, followed by a battalion of his regiment and bore to the right to turn the village. "meanwhile the st line regiment moved further to the right in the direction of monte-rotondo, against which at two different times it opened a fire at will which seemed a veritable hurricane. due to the distance or to the terrain the material result of the fire seemed to be negligible. the moral result must have been considerable, it precipitated a flood of fugitives on the road from mentana to monte-rotondo, dominated by our sharpshooters, who opened on the fugitives a fire more deadly than that of the chassepots. we stayed in the same position until night, when we retired to a position near mentana, where we bivouacked. "my company was one of the two chasseur companies which attacked on the right with the st line regiment. my company had ninety-eight rifles (we had not yet received the chassepots). it forced the volunteers from solidly held positions where they left a gun and a considerable number of rifles. in addition, it put nearly seventy men out of action, judging by those who remained on the field. it had one man slightly wounded, a belt and a carbine broken by bullets. "there remained with the general, after our movement to the right, three companies of chasseurs, a battalion of the th, and three of the th. i do not include many elements of the papal army which had not been engaged. some of my comrades told me of having been engaged with a chasseur company of the th in a sunken road, whose sides had not been occupied; the general was with this column. having arrived close to the village, some shots either from the houses or from enemy sharpshooters, who might easily have gotten on the undefended flanks, provoked a terrible fusillade in the column. in spite of the orders and efforts of the officers, everybody fired, at the risk of killing each other, and this probably happened. it was only when some men, led by officers, were able to climb the sides of the road that this firing ceased. i do not think that this was a well understood use of new arms. "the fusillade of the st line regiment against monte-rotondo was not very effective, i believe negligible. i do not refer to the moral result, which was great. "the garibaldians were numerous about monte-rotondo. but the terrain like all that around italian villages was covered with trees, hedges, etc. under these conditions, i believe that the fire of sharpshooters would have been more effective than volleys, where the men estimate distances badly and do not aim." notes [footnote : general daumas (manners and customs of algeria). nocturnal surprise and extermination of a camp.] [footnote : among the romans, mechanics and morale are so admirably united, that the one always comes to the aid of the other and never injures it.] [footnote : the romans did not make light of the influence of a poet like tyrtaeus. they did not despise any effective means. but they knew the value of each.] [footnote : also their common sense led them to recognize immediately and appropriate arms better than their own.] [footnote : this is an excuse. the maniple was of perfect nobility and, without the least difficulty, could face in any direction.] [footnote : this was an enveloping attack of an army and not of men or groups. the roman army formed a wedge and was attacked at the point and sides of the wedge; there was not a separate flank attack. that very day the maniple presented more depth than front.] [footnote : they had been sent to attack hannibal's camp; they were repulsed and taken prisoner in their own camp after the battle.] [footnote : this extract is taken from the translation of dom thuillier. livy does not state the precise number of roman combatants. he says nothing had been neglected in order to render the roman army the strongest possible, and from what he was told by some it numbered eighty-seven thousand two hundred men. that is the figure of polybius. his account has killed, forty-five thousand; taken or escaped after the action, nineteen thousand. total sixty-four thousand. what can have become of the twenty-three thousand remaining?] [footnote : the numidian horsemen were a light irregular cavalry, excellent for skirmishing, harassing, terrifying, by their extraordinary shouts and their unbridled gallop. they were not able to hold out against a regular disciplined cavalry provided with bits and substantial arms. they were but a swarm of flies that always harasses and kills at the least mistake; elusive and perfect for a long pursuit and the massacre of the vanquished to whom the numidians gave neither rest nor truce. they were like arab cavalry, badly armed for the combat, but sufficiently armed for butchering, as results show. the arabian knife, the kabyle knife, the indian knife of our days, which is the favorite of the barbarian or savage, must play its part.] [footnote : they formed the third roman line according to the order of battle of the legion. the contraction of the first line into a point would naturally hem them in.] [footnote : brought back by hannibal who had reserved to himself the command of the center.] [footnote : the triarians, the third roman line.] [footnote : what effect this might have, was shown in the battle of alisia, where caesar's men, forewarned by him, were nevertheless troubled by war-whoops behind them. the din of battle in rear has always demoralized troops.] [footnote : his cavalry consisted of seven thousand horse, of which five hundred were gauls or germans, the best horsemen of that time, nine hundred galicians, five hundred thracians, and thessalians, macedonians and italians in various numbers.] [footnote : caesar's legions in battle order were in three lines: four cohorts in the first line, two in the second, and three in the third. in this way the cohorts of a legion were, in battle, always supported by cohorts of the same legion.] [footnote : caesar stated that in order to make up the numerical inferiority of his cavalry, he had chosen four hundred of the most alert young men, from among those marching ahead of the standards, and by daily exercise had them accustomed to fighting between his horsemen. he had in this way obtained such results that his thousand riders dared, in open field, to cope with pompey's seven thousand cavalry without becoming frightened at their number.] [footnote : any one who wishes to read in extenso is referred to the fight of the ten thousand against pharnabazus in bithynia, xenophon, par. , page , lisken & sauvan edition.--in polybius, the battle of the tecinus, chapt. xiii, of book iii.--in caesar or those who followed him the battles against scipio, labienus, and afranius, the getae and the numidians, par. , page , and par. , , and , pp. , , and , in the african war, lisken & sauvan edition.] [footnote : in ancient combat, there was almost only, dead or lightly wounded. in action, a severe wound or one that incapacitated a man was immediately followed by the finishing stroke.] [footnote : hand-to-hand, sword-to-sword, serious fighting at short distances, was rare then. likewise in the duels of our day blades are rarely crossed in actual practice.] [footnote : to-day, it is the riflemen who do nearly all the work of destruction.] [footnote : considering caesar's narrative what becomes of the mathematical theory of masses, which is still discussed? if that theory had the least use, how could marius ever have held out against the tide of the armies of the cimbri and teutons? in the battle of pharsalus, the advice given by triarius to pompey's army, a counsel which was followed and which was from a man of experience, who had seen things close at hand, shows that the shock, the physical impulse of the mass was a by-word. they knew what to think of it.] [footnote : the individual advance, in modern battle, in the midst of blind projectiles that do not choose, is much less dangerous than in ancient times, because it seldom goes up to the enemy. at pharsalus, the volunteer crastinius, an old centurion, moved ahead with about a hundred men, saying to caesar: "i am going to act, general, in such a way that, living or dead, to-day you may have cause to be proud of me." caesar, to whom these examples of blind devotion to his person were not displeasing, and whose troops had shown him that they were too mature, too experienced, to fear the contagion of this example, let crastinius and his companions go out to be killed. such blind courage influences the action of the mass that follows. probably for that reason, caesar permitted it. but against reliable troops, as the example of crastinius proves, to move ahead in this way, against the enemy, is to go to certain death.] [footnote : the men of the maniple, of the roman company, mutually gave their word never to leave ranks, except to pick up an arrow, to save a comrade (a roman citizen), or to kill an enemy. (livy).] [footnote : a small body of troops falling into a trap might present a sort of mêlée, for a second, the time necessary for its slaughter. in a rout it might be possible at some moment of the butchery to have conflict, a struggle of some men with courage, who want to sell their lives dearly. but this is not a real mêlée. men are hemmed in, overwhelmed, but not thrown into confusion.] [footnote : the greek phalanx.] [footnote : the romans lost no one as their companies entered the openings in the phalanx.] [footnote : the roman velites, light-armed soldiers, of the primitive legion before marius, were required to stand for an instant in the intervals of the maniples, while awaiting the onset. they maintained, but only for an instant, the continuity of support.] [footnote : a result forced by the improvement of war appliances.] [footnote : in troops without cohesion, this movement begins at fifty leagues from the enemy. numbers enter the hospitals without any other complaint than the lack of morale, which very quickly becomes a real disease. a draconian discipline no longer exists; cohesion alone can replace it.] [footnote : it is a troublesome matter to attack men who shoot six to eight shots a minute, no matter how badly aimed. will he have the last word then, who has the last cartridge, who knows best how to make the enemy use his cartridges without using his own? the reasoning is always the same. with arrows: let us use up their arrows. with the club: let us break their clubs. but how? that is always the question. in matters of war, above all, precept is easy; accomplishment is difficult.] [footnote : the more one imagines he is isolated, the more has he need of morale.] [footnote : are not naval battles above all the battles of captains? all captains endeavor to promote a feeling of solidarity which will cause them all to fight unitedly on the day of action. trafalgar--lissa. in , the duke of medina sidonia, preparing for a naval engagement, sent three commanders on light vessels to the advance-guard and three to the rearguard, with executioners, and ordered them to have every captain hanged who abandoned the post that had been assigned to him for the battle. in , the english admiral benbow, a courageous man, was left almost alone by his captains during three days of fighting. with an amputated leg and arm, before dying, he had four brought to trial. one was acquitted, three were hanged; and from that instant dates the inflexible english severity towards commanders of fleets and vessels, a severity necessary in order to force them to fight effectively. our commanders of battalions, our captains, our men, once under fire, are more at sea than these commanders of vessels.] [footnote : the effect of surprise would certainly not last long to-day. however, to-day wars are quickly decided.] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents). (editor's note).] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents). (editor's note).] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents). (editor's note).] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents). (editor's note).] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents). (editor's note).] [footnote : it is true that such measures are recommended in camps of instruction and in publications. but in maneuvers they are neglected in the mania for alignment, and in that other mad desire of generals to mix in details which do not concern them.] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : see appendix ii. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : a propos of gaps: at the battle of sempach thirteen hundred badly armed swiss opposed three thousand lorraine knights in phalanxes. the attack of the swiss in a formation was ineffective, and they were threatened with envelopment. but arnold von winkelried created a gap; the swiss penetrated and the massacre followed.] [footnote : see appendix ii. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : see appendix ii. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : see appendix ii. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : it is hard to determine what method of fire, at command or at will, was used. but what we find in the works of the best military authorities, from montecuculli to marshal saxe, is general opposition to the replacement of the pike by the rifle. all predicted the abandonment of the rifle for the pike, and the future always proved them wrong. they ignored experience. they could not understand that stronger than all logic is the instinct of man, who prefers long range to close fighting, and who, having the rifle would not let it go, but continually improved it.] [footnote : the danger arising from this kind of fire, led to proposals to put the smallest men in the front rank, the tallest in the rear rank.] [footnote : nothing is more difficult than to estimate range; in nothing is the eye more easily deceived. practice and the use of instruments cannot make a man infallible. at sebastopol, for two months, a distance of one thousand to twelve hundred meters could not be determined by the rifle, due to inability to see the shots. for three months it was impossible to measure by ranging shots, although all ranges were followed through, the distance to a certain battery which was only five hundred meters away, but higher and separated from us by a ravine. one day, after three months, two shots at five hundred meters were observed in the target. this distance was estimated by everybody as over one thousand meters; it was only five hundred. the village taken and the point of observation changed, the truth became evident.] [footnote : his war instructions prove this. his best generals, zieten, warnery, knew of such methods, saw nothing practicable in them and guarded against them in war as indeed he did himself. but europe believed him, tried to imitate his maneuvers on the field of battle, and aligned her troops to be beaten by him. this is what he was after. he even deceived the prussians. but they came back to sound methods after , in and afterwards.] [footnote : it is noted here that french uniforms are of an absurd color, serving only to take the eye at a review. so the chasseurs, in black, are seen much further than a rifleman of the line in his gray coat. the red trousers are seen further than the gray--thus gray ought to be the basic color of the infantry uniform, above all that of skirmishers. at night fall the russians came up to our trenches without being seen by any one, thanks to their partridge-gray coats.] a catalogue _of_ early pennsylvania _and other_ firearms _and_ edged weapons _at_ "restless oaks" mcelhattan, pa. [illustration] _collected by_ henry w. shoemaker lieut. col., res., u. s. a. _compiled by_ h. beam piper, _of altoona, pa._ * * * * * [illustration: the last of the pennsylvania wayside gunsmiths busler brothers, clinton county, pa. (frontispiece)] _"aerataeque micant peltae, micat aereus ensis."_ --virgil, aen. viii, dedicated to the pennsylvania folk-lore society, by the compiler contents page the shoemaker collection of early pennsylvania and other firearms and edged weapons. rifles, muskets and other shoulder weapons. pistols and revolvers. the seth nelson group of early pennsylvania hunting equipment. edged weapons, polearms, clubs, etc. accessories, etc. a partial catalogue of the piper collection. (altoona, pa.) [illustration] introduction for years this writer's aim was to visualize the armed pennsylvanian of earlier days; how he went forth to fight his indian foe, to slay the bison, moose, elk and smaller game, and on his expeditions to the fields of love: where his firearms and edged weapons originated. to create the living man his arms must be secured, and gradually the present collection was assembled. and he lived again, dark, grim, bearded, the spirit of lofty pines and hemlocks among which he spent his days, always plotting to kill something. many of the arms, if they could speak, what tales of war, the chase, and love adventure they could tell! the pennsylvania woodsman was filled with the romance of slaughter, a heritage of mingled continental origins, huguenot, spanish, portuguese, swiss, waldensian, levantine, with the strains of ulster scot, alsatian, palatine, hollander and moravian, cooling cross currents in his veins. no wonder that the women of this blended race were the most darkly beautiful in the world, and a group of the curious edged weapons they carried to destroy men who annoyed them might well be the subject of another separate collection. but the arms stacked in silent panoply, or the daggers, dirks and powder flasks, would not suffice to give the collection the answer to the questions it involved. along with a group of daring alpinists to "restless oaks" came h. beam piper, of altoona, pa., a modern master-of-arms, who patiently set to work to describe the collection from its oldest to its newest examples. as the results of his intelligent energy and research the following catalogue has been prepared which gives us the skeleton figure of the armed pennsylvania mountain man, from the frontier days until later and more prosaic times ensued. while many of the arms listed are in imperfect condition and some of the more important ones are lacking, they give the idea of his times. other pieces of later periods, and a few of foreign use, are included for purposes of comparison. to these are added mr. piper's catalogue of his own collection, all in perfect order, to show similar types of weapons at their best. while, as stated, there are many specimens missing, these vacancies emphasize the wide range of weapons used by the old-time pennsylvanians. the frequent wars kept bringing new types of arms into the wilderness and new ideas for weapons among the woodsmen themselves, and this was most noteworthy after the civil war, which was also the end of the grand romantic period of the pennsylvania wilderness. the mountaineer of pennsylvania was of martial blood, his ancestors had fought in every state of continental europe--and the science of armorer was his birthright. david lewis, the "galloping jack" or highwayman of central pennsylvania, used new pistols every year, and weapons which he is said to have carried are as plentiful as ole bull's violins. the frontiersmen of british origins always named their favorite rifles "my friend," "my brother," "sure shot," "confidence," "never fail," "carry my wish," "kill deer," and "kill buck," and cherished them almost as living things. many of them camped out at the wayside gunshops until a specially ordered weapon was begun and finished, so as to supervise every detail of its fabrication. quaint and full of historic lore were these mystic wayside shrines of arms, which are alas with a few exceptions no more. billy de shera's on larry's creek near jersey shore instilled the love of arms in several generations of mountain boys, and the last gunshops in existence, those of seth nelson, jr., near round island, clinton county, and david c. busler, near collomsville, lycoming county, have had arms loving pilgrims of note from all over the state to learn the last dying secrets of the kentucky rifles, which, despite their name, were mostly made in pennsylvania. often the backwoods arms enthusiast would insist that the shutters be closed and the smith's work carried on by candle-light, lest a passing hechs cast a glance upon the barrel, which would ever afterward be deprived of the power to kill. the proud owner of a cherished gun would never leave it near a hechs, lest she run her cold trembling hand along the barrel and forever destroy its accuracy. there were also spells or pow-wowing to make a gun shoot perfectly, and these were put on before a foe was to be removed, and more especially with the heavy rifles used at shooting matches. needles and papers written full of incantations were slipped under the barrels where they joined the stocks to keep away the witches. the writer has seen robert covenhoven's rifle with thirteen notches on the under side of the stock. his scalping-knife has seven notches, where this merciless scalp-hunter enumerated his red victims prior to collecting the scalp bounty at harris' ferry. the covenhoven rifle was latterly owned by the old deer-hunter miller day, of english centre, lycoming county, but is now in philadelphia, while the knife is at the james v. brown library, williamsport, together with his ketland pistol. as symbols of a bolder and broader day the firearms of backwoods pennsylvania will always exercise a peculiar charm, typifying as they do the period of trackless forests, indians, panthers, wolves, unbridled romance. also, that strangely picturesque period of the civil war, when the sharp-shooting pennsylvania mountain boys (and older ones) went forth to snip; for did not jake karstetter, of sugar valley, clinton county, enlist as when he was and compass the death of seven confederate general officers? notched on the walnut stock of his favorite weapon, the work of henry barner, a wayside sugar valley gunsmith, were seven sets of minute carvings in the form of collar insignias in all the grades from a lieutenant general to a lieutenant colonel. and when they led him haltered through the streets of richmond they labelled him "a wild yankee from the north," because of his unshorn hair and beard, which he swore he would not cut until he had "set jeff davis cold." it is a pity that the science of ancient arms is not more popular in inland pennsylvania, and that more of the curious specimens of arms have not been retained, but were allowed to be shipped away to collectors elsewhere before their local value was recognized. it is with a hope that it may stimulate other collectors at home to assemble ancient weapons before it is too late that this catalogue has been published. it is as a fragment, and not as a complete collection, but it puts before the reader the picture of an arms loving race, in the glorious ante-mollycoddle age, which was the golden age of pennsylvania manhood. but in truth there has been very little, if any, decline, when one thinks of the valor of the boys of the th, the th and other outfits where pennsylvanians were most in evidence in the world war. many of these had old civil war grandfathers, who could tell of fredericksburg or petersburg, of how earlier they barked squirrels on tall hardwood trees, or shot into the flocks of wild pigeons "which darkened the sun" in their great flights. and to welcome in the "apostolic succession" of arms new lovers among our boys, even the least of them, this collection stands catalogued, thanks to mr. piper's perseverance. it is an invitation and appeal to carry on all that is boldest, bravest and best of that fearless company that bore their spears along the dark warpaths of obscurity, and stacked them on the campgrounds of eternal night. henry w. shoemaker. "restless oaks," mcelhattan, pa., july , . [illustration] the shoemaker collection of early pennsylvania and other firearms and edged weapons. rifles, muskets and other shoulder weapons. . extremely heavy sharpshooter's or target rifle. l. - / " full length stock with small cheek-piece and flattened at muzzle for shooting from a rest. weight, about lbs. . cal. double set triggers. rare. flintlock. made by pennebacker, berks county. . percussion target rifle. l. - / " octagon barrel, half stock, small brass patch-box, brass and german silver mountings. peep-and-globe sights, rear sight missing. fitted with false muzzle for loading. lock marked "warranted". about . cal. complete with tin box containing all original accessories, mould, bullet-starter, patch cutter, combination screwdriver and nipple wrench, patches, tow for cleaning, etc. rare with original accessories. this is the type of gun used at the old-time "turkey shoots." made in berks county, for john lebo, of clinton county. . double breech-loading shotgun. l. " side-lever action. fitted with rifle sights for shooting round balls. mark on lock, "wm. moore & co." on barrel, "fine laminated steel". -bore. . very short percussion gun. l. - / " full length black walnut stock. iron ramrod. about cal. no marks. probably used for hunting buffalo. . kentucky rifle. l. " percussion. stock originally full length, but has been shortened - / inches. brass mounts and long brass patch-box. ramrod missing. about . cal. . old and badly battered fowling piece. l. " lock gone. a cheap gun when new. . heavy kentucky rifle. l. " curley maple stock and brass mountings, including long brass patch-box. fairly good order. . small-bore percussion fowling piece. l. " this gun is of the cheapest sort, with painted stock of some soft wood. guns of this kind were sold by indian traders and by country merchants to farmers' boys and others unable to afford better arms. due to the almost uniform abuse which these weapons received, this specimen, which is in good condition, is somewhat of a rarity. mark on lock, "henry parker, warranted". . u. s. army musket, model. l. - / " altered to percussion by government system of screwing on new breech. mexican and civil war service possible. good order. . double over-and-under percussion rifle. l. - / " rigid barrels and two locks. no marks. ramrod and trigger-guard missing. small round patch-box, and german silver figure of spread eagle inset in cheek piece. . short percussion rifle. l. " this rifle is of the type used on the plains, period of -' and in pennsylvania period of - . no marks. long brass patch-box. about . cal. fairly good condition. . short kentucky rifle. l. - / " stock has been broken and repaired several times and the whole gun is crudely made and was evidently the work of an unskilled local gunsmith. without doubt, this is an authentic pennsylvania mountain relic. now a smooth-bore. . cut-down kentucky rifle. l. " barrel has been smooth-bored and stock shortened to half-length. rear sight of peculiar and artistic design. this was at one time a very fine gun, and has several interesting features. . u. s. army musket, model of . l. - / " has been varnished all over and is in good condition, but hammer is missing. . percussion kentucky rifle. l. " brass mounted, with considerable brass and silver inlay. good condition. maker's name illegible, but "philadelphia", on lock can be easily made out. probably a tryon. . springfield musket. l. " model of , caliber . , percussion. marks on lock, "u. s. springfield. ." good condition, with original bayonet. gift of general f. d. beary, the adjutant general, n. g. p., harrisburg, pa. . two u. s. springfield army rifles. l. " model of . fitted with ramrod bayonets. in the best of condition, like new. gift of gen'l f. d. beary. a. another, which has seen considerable service. formerly the property of jacob bierly, a famous early pennsylvania hunter. . kentucky rifle. l. " stock shortened to half-length and smooth-bored. the maker of this gun imported his lock from england, as it is stamped "london, warranted". percussion. . u. s. musket, model. l. " altered to percussion by a rare and rather crude civilian method, and barrel shortened to the end of the forestock. evidently used by some mountaineer soldier and retained at the end of his military service as a sporting arm. a kentucky type rear sight has been added and other changes have been made. _this gun is not reliable as a source of information on u. s. military arms_, owing to its numerous alterations. . german-american target rifle. l. " beautifully checkered stock, octagon barrel. no ramrod, nor is the gun provided with fittings for one. in the best of condition. almost new. this gun was made for use by a member of some early german "scheutzen" rifle club, period of -' . mark on lock, "rein, new york". . double over-and-under rifle. l. " patch-box gone, and rear sight not original and badly used. no marks. . french chassepot army rifle. l. " marks, "manufacture chatellerault. _mle_ ". almost perfect. may be a franco-prussian war weapon. . german boar rifle. l. " heavy octagon barrel, sliding wooden cover box in stock containing worm, sling-swivels, bayonet-stud. this gun has a most excellent adjustable rear sight, and is in splendid order. caliber, about . . . remington army rifle. l. rider system action. . - . good. . u. s. krag rifle. l. " model. five shots, . - cal. new condition. . remington carbine, cal., . - . l - / " . sharp's civil war carbine. l. " model of . good. with lawrence primer magazine and patch-box in stock. . double over-and-under rifle. l. " good order. round patch-box. german silver figure of deer inlaid on cheek-piece. no marks. good. . percussion buffalo rifle. l. " some illegible lettering on barrel, which is octagon and extremely heavy. ramrod under barrel. stock extends only to breech and is inlaid with german silver. extremely rare. this type was used on the western plains, -' . . u. s. flintlock musket. l. " model of . cheek-piece hollowed into stock. complete with flint and ramrod and in fine shooting condition. mark, "j. henry, phila." . flintlock kentucky rifle. l. - / " curley maple stock. brass mounts, including long patch-box. original striped ramrod, which has been re-tipped with an exploded pistol cartridge. this gun has been restored, though so skillfully as to pass for original condition. fine shooting order. mark on lockplate, "tryon, philada." . u. s. model army musket. l. - / " altered to percussion, apparently by civilian gunsmith. good condition. . double percussion shotgun. l. - / " about -bore. back action locks. no marks. has been abused. . double percussion shotgun. l. " stock cracked and both locks and one nipple gone. . percussion kentucky rifle. l. " inoperative and both sights gone, otherwise good. no marks. . "mule-ear" double shotgun. l. " superposed barrels. side action lock. two ramrods, both original. working order. -bore. very rare. no marks. . over-and-under rifle. l. - / " one lock, barrels revolving by hand. mark on lock, "jos. golgher, phila." on plate opposite lock, "i. l. beck." this rifle was once the property of imanuel beck, a noted sugar valley hunter, and has probably killed much big game. a rare and historic piece, in the best of condition. (these double rifles with revolving barrels are much rarer than the rigid type.) this gun was not made by golcher, as he made and furnished to other makers more locks than he made rifles. it was his custom to stamp his name on the barrels of his own guns. . winchester repeating rifle. -in. barrel. model of . . - cal. good order. . u. s. army musket. l. " model. this specimen has been fitted with a civil war type rear sight, evidently having been issued in , when arms were scarce. initials "l. h." cut in stock, while brass plate is marked "j. e. s." sling-strap not original and jaw-screw is obviously home-made, with square head. several inches have been cut off of barrel. this gun is not reliable as a source of data on u. s. military arms. a curious mountaineer gun, in fine order. . "zulu" shotgun. l. - / " made from old french army rifle. these guns were sold in great quantities to the poorer farmers in pennsylvania. in the stock is a small piece of wood which was blessed by the french priests and placed in the stock at the arsenal. it was supposed to insure accuracy. a curious outcropping of medieval superstition in modern times. . civil war austrian purchase carbine. l. - / " "during the first part of the civil war the united states purchased a great quantity of these arms, and before their worthlessness became apparent a considerable number was issued. the calibre of most of them was . ; the rifling was very deep; the recoil and trajectory were abnormal, and accuracy of shooting was conspicuous by absence."--sawyer, "our rifles." page . . moorish snaphaunce gun. l. - / " captured from riff tribesmen early in . a fine specimen of its type, inlaid with ivory and showing native repair-work. this is a genuine snaphaunce, not to be confused with the spanish or moorish miguelet or outside-lock flintlock. rare. . sharp & hankins civil war carbine. l. " this is the navy type, though the leather jacket is missing from the barrel. rare. . volcanic carbine. l. " the forerunner of the henry and the winchester. finely polished walnut stock and engraved brass receiver, the latter showing traces of silver plating. used hollow-bore bullets which contained powder and cap. good condition and excessively rare. . u. s. model army musket. l. " good condition, with sling-strap. . long flintlock fowling piece. good condition, but lacks ramrod. . oriental flintlock blunderbuss. l. " some traces of checkering on stock and damascening on barrel, otherwise plain. . oriental flintlock blunderbuss. l. " a much more ornate piece than the preceeding. the stock is carved and the metal parts engraved. dummy ramrod carved into stock. english lock. pistols and revolvers. . double barrel irish percussion pocket pistol. l. - / " superposed barrels, revolving by hand. disappearing trigger. mark:--"kavanaugh, dublin". . marston -barrel pistol. l. " breech-loading, . calibre. indicator on right side of frame. inoperative, but in good condition otherwise. . five-shot manhattan arms co. pepperbox. l. - / " a close replica of the allen. in excellent condition. . cal. . small philadelphia derringer. l. checkered grip, cap-box in butt. a facsimile of the pistol used by j. wilkes booth to assassinate abraham lincoln. . cooper five-shot revolver. l. " percussion. double action, . cal. this is the early pittsburg revolver, not to be confused with arms of the same type made at philadelphia. rare. resembles the colt model, except that trigger is in center of trigger-guard. . peculiar double action revolver. l. " percussion. similar in action to a pepperbox. marked "ell's patent." the cataloguer has never before seen a pistol of this type. good condition. . cal. purchased in a philadelphia pawn-shop, and said to be a favorite arm of the negroes in that city at one time. . reid's "my friend" knuckle-duster. seven shots, . cal. good order, except that cylinder does not revolve. . another. similar except for a slight difference of engraving and a catch under cylinder. . underhammer pistol. l. - / " has seen rough service. no marks. . double barrel percussion pistol. l. " broken, rusty and with all working parts except one spring missing. barrels side by side. . tiny . pistol. l. - / " one of the lightest pistols the cataloguer has ever seen. these ineffectual weapons are sold in large numbers on the waterfront of genoa, where the owner acquired this specimen. . heavy double barrel percussion pistol. l. - / " superposed barrels, two hammers and nipples. bronze frame and steel barrels. about -bore. excellent condition. evidently french, though it was bought in a philadelphia pawn-shop. . derringer pocket rifle. l. (over all) " shoulder-stock attached. quite similar in design to the ordinary pocket derringer, but has a long barrel (octagon), a ramrod and ramrod rib. peep rear sight. front sight missing. very rare. in good condition. . pair of english pocket pistols. l. " silver butt-plates, silver lion-masque butt-caps, much of original blueing remains. in the best of condition. mark, "doody". from krider's gunshop, philadelphia. . old pinfire revolver l. - / " . fine silver-mounted turkish pistol. l. " barrel and lock of english manufacture, the later having a sliding safety and being stamped "mortimer", but the rest is turkish. stock is of some dark, hard oriental wood, probably olive, and is covered with fine silver-wire inlay. all mountings are of silver, beautifully sculptured and engraved and bear curious turkish hallmarks. as the ramrods for these pistols were carried about the neck to facilitate loading on horseback, they were frequently made without ramrods attached. this pistol, like the following one, is furnished with a dummy or imitation rod. english proof-marks on barrel. gold breech-band. in the best of possible condition and a really beautiful specimen. from the austin collection. . silver-mounted arabian flintlock pistol. l. " mountings entirely of silver. stock covered with silver inlay in wire, dot and leaf-and-flower design. arabian armorer's marks in gold on barrel. fine. from the austin collection. . french army pistol, model of . l. - / " flintlock. calibre, / inch. mark on lock, "mauberge". this pistol may have come to this country with lafayette's expedition. it has been neatly though incorrectly restored and is hence unreliable as a source of information. . colt percussion revolver, cal. . . l. " model, five shot, bright finish, trigger-guard and back-strap silvered. mark, "address samuel colt, etc." note the absence of title "col." in mark. rare with this omission. good order. . u. s. percussion army pistol, model of . l. " marks on lockplate illegible, but enough can be deciphered to show that it was made by h. aston, of middleton, conn. ramrod not original, and swivel is missing, but otherwise the pistol is in good shooting order. . unusual set of devisme revolvers. contained in ebony case, " Ã� ", lined with purple velvet. fitted compartments, containing a large six-shot belt revolver of devisme's invention, about . calibre, a seven-shot . calibre smith & wesson pocket revolver and accessories and ammunition. on the inside of the lid, in gold letters, "devisme, , boulevard des italiens, paris." this is a most unusual combination of a belt and a pocket revolver in the same case. the little pistol is marked with the name, address and patent dates of the smith & wesson company and also with "claudin, brevete a paris, boulevard des italiens, ". extremely rare and in almost new condition. . pair of percussion holster pistols. l. " silver name-plates and key-plates, beautifully checkered grips, twist steel barrels and ramrod ribbs, swivel ramrods. barrels are extraordinarily heavy, of about . calibre. smooth bore. spur trigger-guards and horn tipped fore-ends. mark, on lockplates and barrels, "champion, chichester." these pistols were apparently at one time cased, for they are accompanied by cleaning rod with detachable head, nipple-wrench, bullet mould and combination powder and cap flask. all in new condition. . single-shot breech-loading pistol. l. " the only one of the sort that the cataloguer has ever seen. probably an inventor's model. no marks anywhere on it. stud on the left side of barrel opens the piece when pushed forward. about . cal. . u. s. army luger automatic. l. " calibre, . mm. a thousand of these arms were purchased by the government in for experimental purposes, with the view of making them standard army equipment. they were found to be deficient in stopping power, due to their small calibre, and were for the most part sold to bannerman & co., of new york. differences from the ordinary commercial luger are as follows:--one inch longer barrel, grip of black walnut, u. s. coat of arms stamped on receiver, and thumb-safety is reversed. curiously enough, this particular pistol was purchased from a gunsmith by w. fall gardner, of new york city, while at wiesbaden, germany, in , and while with the american army of occupation. it is interesting to speculate how the weapon found its way back to the country of its origin. rare. . bootjack "pistol". l. " a cast brass folding bootjack, resembling an old style percussion pocket pistol when closed. rare. the seth nelson group of early pennsylvania hunting equipment. seth iredell nelson and his son, seth nelson, jr., have long been regarded as two of the most renowned and resourceful big game hunters and armorers of central pennsylvania. at their home and hunting lodge on the sinnemahoning at the foot of altar rock, famed in indian lore, they maintained a gunshop and forge, making or repairing many of their own guns, knives, ammunition, etc., as well as their axes, saws, cant-hooks, farming implements and the like. many of their choicest specimens are now in dr. henry c. mercer's museum at doylestown, pa. seth iredell nelson was born in potter county, pa. in , the descendant of a scotch "kramer" who went to germany in the th century with the ancestor of col. john hay, author of "little breeches" and theodore roosevelt's great secretary of state. nelson migrated to clinton county in , the journey being made in pole-boats down kettle creek and up the west branch of the susquehanna to the mouth of the sinnemahoning, and settling in a community still inhabited by the seneca indians. he became known as the king hunter of the sinnemahoning, his game book showing hundreds of panthers, wolves and elk and thousands of deer, bears, and wildcats, and other animals which he captured during his long career in the pennsylvania big game fields. seth iredell nelson died in , and is buried on top of karthaus mountain, overlooking the one-time hunting paradise where for nearly a century he was the supreme ruler. seth nelson, jr. was born in potter county in and was brought to three runs, clinton county, by his parents two years later. he is today a handsome old man, with keen blue eyes, regular features, long hair and snow white beard, hale and hearty at four score and ten. he accompanied his father on most of his great hunts and was his devoted and able assistant in his gunshop and forge. even in late years he has turned out guns complete--"lock, stock and barrel" and hunting knives of unusual skill and workmanship. . hunting knife. l. " staghorn handle. this is of similar design, as, though of much later date, than the scalping knives used by such eighteenth century frontiersmen as covenhoven, the groves, van campen, van gundy and others. mounted in pewter. . seth nelson's seneca type axe. l. " this type of axe or tomahawk was designed by john smoke, one of the last seneca indians residing in pennsylvania. initials punched on blade, "s. n." double edge. this sort of tomahawk is now sold commercially under the name of "nessmuk axe". . hunting knife. l. - / " staghorn handle. pewter mounts. . small lead-ladle. l. " used for running bullets. made and used by seth nelson, jr. . lead ladle. l. " a trifle more artistic in design. also used by seth, jr. like the preceding number, this is of the period of -' . . large lead-ladle. l. " crudely made. former property of seth nelson, sr., the father of the maker of nos. and . period -' . . powder horn and bullet pouch. the -inch horn is still fitted with the original tip-plug and contains a quantity of rifle-powder, of about fff texture. these powder-and-bullet sets are now much rarer than the rifles with which they were used. a fine old pioneer piece. . small lead-handled dagger. l. - / " given to seth nelson, sr., by bill long, a famous clearfield county hunter. . little one-piece copper knife. l. " given to col. shoemaker by seth nelson, jr., to illustrate the earliest type of pocket-knife used by the frontiersmen. of indian manufacture and of the size carried by young girls for general use and, at a pinch, for protection. made by john smoke for his daughter. the pennsylvania german gipsies called this sort of knife a "schlor". a similar knife but larger, made by smoke was sent by col. shoemaker, to dr. h. c. mercer, doylestown, pa., . . double-edged folding dagger. l. (open) - / " given to col. shoemaker by seth nelson to illustrate the next type of frontier pocket-knife. edged weapons, polearms, clubs, etc. . spanish or italian left-hand dagger. l. " used to parry sword-thrusts in rapier fencing. xvi or xvii century. . improvised dagger made from table-knife. l. " blade has been ground down to dagger shape and guard has been added by twisting wire about hilt. used by an italian in williamsport to murder his step-daughter. . bowie knife. l. " old and rather crudely made. wooden grip. has seen civil war service and is believed to have been taken from the body of a confederate soldier. . dagger. l. - / " apparently home-made. hilt made from the handle of an old barlow pocket knife. found in pocket of lute shaffer, murderer of colby family, clinton county, . . two butcher-knives. crudely made, with wide blades and rough wooden handles. used to dismember the body of a girl who was killed in a family quarrel. this was the "pear tree murder", told of in col. shoemaker's "more allegheny episodes", ch. ii. . pennsylvania mountain hunting knife. l. " made and used by john e. smith, a famous clearfield county hunter of the middle nineteenth century. staghorn handle and pewter mountings. . spanish bull-fighter's puntilla. l. " this is the matador's weapon of last resort, to be used when his espada fails. spear-pointed. gift of count san juan de violada, of madrid, . . two spanish picador's lance-points. l. " one bears label marked "union de picadores de toros. mayo, . . union de criadores de toros de lidia. delegacion del norte." . italian alpine poacher's knife. l. (open) " folds into horn handle. has the peculiarly italian design of ornamentation, criss-cross lines on the ricasso. given to col. shoemaker by a former swiss soldier at visp, , who took it from poacher on swiss-italian frontier about . . roman javelin head. l. " found in excavation for subway in london. . two basque folding knives. l. (open) " broad, razor-like blades, folding into horn handles. both are stamped "e. pradel, acier fins." . two spanish ladies' knives. l. (open) - / and - / " horn handles, broad, thin blades which lock in place when open. of the type carried by raquel meller, when singing her songs of disappointed spanish love. (secured at segovia, .) . basque maquilla. l. ". length of maquilla proper, - / " the basque national weapon. in appearance, it resembles an ordinary walking stick with a plaited leather wrist-thong and grip. brass-mounted and tipped with a heavy steel ferrule. when the handle is unscrewed, there remains a stout wood shaft, tipped with a sharp steel point. a really dangerous weapon, in spite of its innocent appearance, and extremely rare in this country. . dagger cane. l. - / " ebony. - / -inch blade, slightly engraved. about . . pair of cuban machetes. l. " in embossed leather sheaths. horn handles. . model of indian sling. l. " made of sassafras wood by jesse logan, a grand-nephew of the great chief james logan for col. shoemaker, in , as a specimen of an early indian weapon. sling-stone in place. . pocket knife carried by jesse logan. ( - .) l. - / " originally a very cheap knife, of the sort sold by itinerant peddlers. . german hunting knife, middle xix cent. l. " beautiful bronze hilt, ornamented in relief with guns, horns and other implements of the chase. shell guard. boar-head pommel. quillions shaped like deer feet. double-edged blade, in original sheath. . collins heavy hunting knife. l. - / " vulcanite grips, quillions and elephant-head pommel of some white composition metal. in ornately stamped leather sheath. cheaply made, but of good steel and a serviceable weapon. . mandan tomahawk. l. " w. - / " brought from south dakota by a returning u. s. soldier, about , who obtained it from a fallen burial platform, along with the skeleton of the indian with whom it was placed. the remains of the indian are now interred on the restless oaks estate. . french hunting sword. xviii cent. l. " staghorn handle, ornamented bronze quillions and shell guard. blade engraved with hunting scenes and bears motto "recte faciendo neminem timeas." . german hunting sword. xviii cent. l. - / " gilt bronze hilt and quillions, engraved blade bearing inscription in german. original black leather sheath. in the best of condition and a high quality weapon. . turkish scimitar. l. - / " original scabbard with belt-sling and red-and-gilt silk tassles. hilt of silver, with gilt ornamentation, scabbard tipped with silver. fine. from the austin collection. . straight yatagahn. l. " tapering blade, slightly engraved, horn handle, silver and brass mounts. red velvet scabbard. probably circassian or cossack. . pair of foils. l. - / " cord-wrapped grips, ring quillions. point of one broken. belgian, about . . rhinoceros horn knob kerrie. south african. probably kafir or zulu. . two old socket bayonets. . all-metal bayonet for german mauser. l. " in metal sheath. no marks. rare. . german world war bayonet. l. - / " in leather sheath. . german sawtooth bayonet. l. - / " marks indecipherable except "solingen". these bayonets were exhibited in this country during the war as an evidence of german atrocity, but they were in reality intended for wire-cutting. only one was issued to each squad of infantry. for this reason they are comparatively rare. . british naval dirk. xviii cent. l. " fine condition, leather sheath, ivory handle, engraved blade, lion-masque pommel. claimed to have seen service in voyages against john paul "jones." called by the british "the great pirate." . morning star or battle flail. xv cent. l. " large spiked ball, linked by a ten-inch chain to a wooden shaft. a fine piece and rare. from austin collection. . napoleonic sabre (waterloo) in worn leather sheath. broken about half way down the blade. carried at waterloo by a colonel kaetz, of napoleon's belgian allies. . two assagais. rhodesian. from the austin collection. . rhinoceros hide shield, dahomey. circular and having a conical point in the center. . tyrolese bear-spear. xvii cent. l. " head original but shaft a replacement. from the austin collection. . spanish bear spear. xvii cent. l. " head original, but shaft a replacement. from the austin collection. . confederate officer's sword. l. - / " straight, single-edged blade, deeply grooved. half-basket guard, incorporating the letters "c. s." brass mountings. confederate arms are exceedingly rare. illustrated, plate v. . civil war sabre of st lt. henry f. shoemaker. l. " carried during the civil war by the father of the present owner, while an officer in the th pennsylvania volunteers. blade slightly engraved, leather-covered grip, gold and black sabre-knot. . u. s. late regulation officer's sabre. l. " carried by col. shoemaker while in the pennsylvania national guard. complete with scabbard, leather sabre-knot and leather carrying case. blade engraved "henry w. shoemaker." . another similar sabre. carried by col. shoemaker in the new york national guard. . equipment used by col. shoemaker during the world war. this includes a sabre on an old regulation belt, a sam browne belt, a colt . army automatic in an officers' type holster, a malacca swagger-stick, a black and gilt officer's hat cord, a steel helmet and spurs. . diplomatic sword. l. - / " carried by col. shoemaker while attached to the american legation at lisbon. straight, double-edged, with a cord-effect gilded hilt and double shell guard, one side of which is hinged. the ricasso of the blade is gilded and the blade is covered with arabesque work in gold and blue for about nine inches near the hilt and bright polished from there to the point. in general shape, resembles the small-swords of the xviii cent. . diplomatic sword. carried by col. shoemaker while attached to the american embassy at berlin. much similar to the preceeding, except that the guard is ornamented with an american eagle and the blade is elegantly chased. designed by charlemagne tower ( - ), while ambassador to germany. accessories, etc. . civil war bayonet. with sheath and belt-hanger. arsenal-new condition. gift of general f. d. beary. . two rounds of anti-aircraft m. g. ammunition. cal. . gift of general f. d. beary. . powder-horn. l. - / " rounded plug in base, with small mushroom-shaped filling-plug. knife-whittled plug. octagonal tip. color; old ivory, shading to black at tip. . powder horn. l. - / " rounded lathe-turned plug at base, ornamented with brass tacks. round tip. colors; dark brown at tip, shading off in light brown and gray to old ivory. . zinc powder flask. l. " corroded with age. . zinc powder flask. l. " pistol size. . very old powder horn. l. " acorn tip, flat plug with ball-head threaded filling-plug, old strap attached. colors; dark brown at tip, shading off to bright orange. this is age-coloring, and proves the horn to be quite old, possibly pre-revolutionary. a fine piece. . dated powder horn. l. " knife-whittled tip, flat bottom-plug painted red, tip-plug apparently whittled from a bit of ramrod wood. dated, . dated horns are rather rare. . powder horn with brass charger. l. " self-measuring charger, evidently from an old flask. two steeples driven in sides for carrying cord. rare. . copper flask. l. " embossed with hunting scenes. good. . old pennsylvania rifleman's powder horn and bullet pouch. horn and pouch are fastened to one strap. the horn is - / inches in length, of a beautiful pale green color and highly polished. ringed tip and rounded wooden plug. cut into it are the initials "e. w." in the pouch is a tin box marked "eley, london," containing a few caps. in fine order throughout and very rare. it was once the property of major enoch wolford, a noted sugar valley hunter. . most peculiar old bullet mould. casts one conical bullet, about . cal., and has a number of unique features. the cataloguer has never seen one just like it. evidently the work of local gunsmith. . two bullet moulds. musket size, for about an ounce ball. illustrated, plate iv. . bullet mould. crude and evidently homemade. casts one conical bullet. . cal. . canadian "tin hat". picked up by col. shoemaker between baupaume and arras in may . rusty, covered in spots with the peculiar chalk-like earth of northern france, all leather rotted away. big dent in top. . german helmet. picked up at chemin-des-dames, france, may, , by col. shoemaker. only a small part of the chin-strap remains. . civil war hand-grenade. painted red and black. in appearance, somewhat like a modern grenade. . civil war hand-grenade, mounted on stand h. - / " is equipped with a wooden shaft and four cartridge-paper "feathers" to aid in throwing. label reads "no. . grenade from ft. wagner. . gift of w. w. richie, to henry w. shoemaker." on paper wing, "patented, aug. , ." . web cartridge belt. for krag rifle. period of spanish war. . old re-loading tool. rusty. calibre unknown. possibly . - . . gas shell for mm gun. l. - / " no rotating band, as this has never been put on, and with tin shipping head. painted yellow. part of a shipment wrecked on the new york central railroad near mcelhattan, _en route_ for the loading plant. . exploded -inch shell. high explosive and probably german. picked up between arras and baupaume by col. shoemaker in . . small brass cannon-model. l. (over all) - / " wheels, axle, gun and trail are all made of brass. bore, / -inch, height, ten inches. can be fired. these little cannon-models are rare. period of . . ancient oriental helmet. probably persian. chain-and-plate mail neck guard. . waterloo relic helmet. prussian cavalry. bears the number . from austin collection. . pair of leather saddle holsters. carried by trooper samuel barker, th cavalry, of sugar valley, in the civil war. will take the colt or any other army type percussion revolver, or the or model single-shot pistol. . german soldier's belt. l. " has the familiar "gott mit uns" buckle. picked up in france, , by major p. m. la bach, c. e., a. e. f. . caltrop. xvii cent. used during the english civil wars. hand forged with four needle-like points. has at one time been painted black for preservation. . barbed american caltrop. four points. made for the defense of fort muncy. these caltrops were scattered in the grass and on the trails to hamper the approach of indians, and were frequently poisoned to cause infection. a rare pennsylvania indian war relic, in good state of preservation. secured through dr. nevin j. gray, former assistant state librarian, of pennsylvania. . blackjack. l. (including strap) - / " issued during the world war to the pennsylvania home defense police. a good, substantial "billy", covered with black leather and weighted with lead. . small flobert rifle. . cal. . german two handed sword. (from austin collection.) . complete suit of engraved german armor, th cent. (from austin collection.) . spanish matador's espada. (gift of count san juan de violada, .) . pair of flintlock pistols said to have been owned by david lewis, "the robber." a partial catalogue of the piper collection. (altoona, pa.) . african traders' flintlock gun. l. - / " roughly and cheaply made. black-painted poplar stock, brass mountings. belgian proof-marks. guns of this sort were made at a cost of about a dollar and often brought as much as five hundred dollars worth of ivory. . percussion kentucky rifle. l. " curley maple stock, highly polished and finished in a dark, mahogany-like red. big and extremely ornate brass patch-box, brass plate on under side of stock, running from trigger-guard to lower ramrod-thimble, original striped ramrod. all brasswork engraved. about . calibre. double set triggers. sights not original. this rifle was apparently made to order for some wealthy gentleman farmer or city sportsman, and it is extremely accurate. mark, "tryon, philadelphia". in almost original condition, inside and out. . percussion sporting rifle. l. " purchased in the neighborhood of altoona, pa., and probably of pennsylvania origin, though there are no marks. similar to the kentucky style of rifle, except for back-action lock and small oval patch-box. brass mountings and curley maple stock. about . cal. . over-and-under percussion rifle. l. " barrels revolve, being released by catch in front of trigger-guard. full length curley maple stock, ramrod on one side and three german silver inlays on the other. large brass patch-box. mark; "conestoga rifle works". these double-barrel rifles with revolving barrels are rare. . heavy percussion target rifle. l. - / " full-length kentucky type stock. lock marked "jos. golcher." weight, pounds. in comparatively poor order, though it can be fired. . u. s. artillery musket. (percussion) l. " civil war issue. used by field artillery for defending gun-positions against enemy cavalry. mark; "savage r. f. a. co." a rare type and by a scarce maker. . enfield style confederate musket. l. " light english walnut stock. claimed to have been used in the famous "louisiana tigers." confederate arms of any sort are rare. with bayonet. mark on lock; "barnet, london". on stock; "edward middleton, gunmaker, birmingham." with bayonet. . colt model u. s. army musket. l. " in almost new condition, with bayonet. . german world war mauser rifle. l. " . mm cal. model of . this rifle saw actual service during the war and was surrendered to the allies. mark, "danzig, ." . winchester rifle, model of . l. - / " cal., . - . weight, loaded, - / lbs. twelve shots. octagon barrel. stock and forearm crudely checkered by some former owner. for some inscrutable reason, the manufacture of this excellent weapon was discontinued long ago, but for the sort of hunting to be found in this state, it is much superior to the later small-bore, high-velocity arms now sold. roosevelt carried a rifle of this model and calibre on his first african expedition and used it on lions with good effect. . ballard sporting rifle. l. " octagon barrel. rocky mountain sights. weight, lbs., calibre, . . this rifle was used by a resident of eldorado, pa., for the purpose of ending his earthly woes. after the suicide, it was left uncleaned for about three years, with the result that the barrel is somewhat pitted. otherwise in good order. . sharp's percussion carbine. l. " . smith percussion carbine. l. " . dated english military pistol. l. " bears the stamp of the british east india company, and the date " ". no maker's name. brass mounted and similar to the pistols used by the british cavalry in the revolution, the war of and the napoleonic wars. three notches cut in the stock. . english flintlock pistol. l. - / " brass mountings, round barrel and bag grip. this pistol bears a curious assortment of marks. on the lockplate: "w. ketland & co." on the barrel: "london", a belgian proof-mark, and a half-obliterated engraved mark; "cur---- & bav----, market st., philadelphia." this pistol was made in england, shipped to belgium and then imported to america, possibly during the war of , when direct commerce with england was cut off. . french brass-barrel flintlock pistol l. - / " cannon-mouth barrel, brass mountings and lockplate, fishtail butt. ramrod not original and slight restorations. trophy design on barrel and stock slightly carved. mark, on lock: "cassaignard a nantes". . pair of french duelling pistols. l. - / " -inch damascus barrels, flaring at muzzles. nicely checkered walnut grips, steel mountings, back-action locks, rings in butts, which unscrew, the butts containing spare nipples and cleaning-head for ramrod. polygrooved rifling, / -inch bore. mark: "mre impale de chatelerault." and " ." . u. s. army pistol, model of . l. " altered from flint to percussion by rare civilian alteration. swivel ramrod. mark; "a. waters, millburg, mass." not reliable as a source of data on u. s. military weapons. . u. s. army pistol, model of . l. " percussion. swivel ramrod, brass mountings, almost new condition. mark; "h. aston, middleton, conn. ." from the meeks collection. . english holster or belt pistol. l. " large octagon barrel, german silver ramrod rib, swivel ramrod, belt-hook, cap-box in butt, back-action lock, silver mountings. mark; "chance & sons". british proof-mark on under side of barrel. . starr single action percussion revolver. l. " rusty and lacks cylinder-stop. mother-of-pearl lozenge set in butt, with initials, "j. r. l.". this is the first piece that i bought when i started collecting. . cal. . remington percussion revolver. l. " "new model" of . . cal. from the crouse collection. . smith & wesson single action revolver. l. " the rare holster size. six inch barrel, six shots, . rim fire. presented by harry a. mcgraw, of the pennsylvania alpine club, altoona, pa. rosewood grips. this model was a favorite among northern officers during the civil war. . colt army revolver, model of . l. " bright finish, steel back-strap and brass trigger-guard, has a most beautiful burl-maple grip. notched for shoulder stock. . cal. in almost new condition, and is still quite accurate. from the vaughn collection. . colt navy revolver, model of . l. " octagon barrel. steel back-strap and trigger-guard. london proof-marks. . cal. from the meeks collection. . colt pocket revolver, model of . l. - / " . calibre, five shots. fluted cylinder. silver plated back-strap and trigger-guard (wearing). a trifle rusty. . colt single action army revolver. l. " sliding rod ejector. . calibre. in almost new condition. - / " barrel. . colt new army model revolver. l. " . calibre. ring in butt. type used by u. s. troops in the philippines. during the world war, this revolver was carried by an employe of the dupont powder company. . colt new army model revolver. . - cal. l. " a civilian gun, made for sale. differs from no. in several minor respects. . english webly "bull dog" revolver. l. " "p. webly and son, london and birmingham" on barrel, also, "the pug." probably a scotland yard gun, as it bears a painted number ( ) on the frame. . "defender" revolver. l. " a cheap and altogether worthless revolver of the type selling for . or $ . to gullibles during the period of - . from the crouse collection. . hopkins & allen "ranger no. " revolver. l. - / " nickel-plated, rubber grips, . rim fire. peculiar cylinder-pin-catch on side of frame. . single shot cartridge pistol. l. - / " "morgan & clapp, new haven, ct.," on top of octagon barrel. brass frame, barrel swings out to load on pressure on a stud under frame, rosewood grips, rear sight notched in hammer. presented by dr. l. m. nugent, of altoona. . small . calibre cartridge pistol. l. " said to be the smallest cartridge pistol ever made. barrel swings to side to load. rare. . allen & thurber pepperbox. l. - / " . cal. from the vaughn collection. . flintlock pocket pistol. l. - / " checkered and carved grip, round screw-off barrel, center hammer, sliding safety. frame nicely engraved. french. . belgian percussion pocket pistol. l. - / " octagon barrel. . belgian percussion pocket pistol. l. " round barrel. folding trigger. german silver tulip shaped name-plate. . american percussion pocket pistol. l. - / " round barrel. cheap, being made of cast-iron throughout. no marks except a serial number, . peculiarly simple mechanism. barrel stopped at breech, otherwise good. . philadelphia type derringer. l. - / " engraved german silver mountings. no marks. almost in new condition. . small american percussion pocket pistol. l. " full stock of curley maple. hickory ramrod. barrel is octagon, rifled deeply and about . calibre. brass and german silver mountings. barrel marked "fleeger, allegheny". lock marked "howells, philadelphia." possibly made for some riverboat captain or river gambler, and may have a bloody history. rare. . u. s. army luger automatic. . m/m cal. l. " same as no. , shoemaker collection. . u. s. civil war non-commissioned officer's sword. l. - / " straight blade, bronze hilt, with sheath. mark; "emerson & silver, trenton, n. j." . cavalry sabre. l. - / " with scabbard. bloodstains on guard. mark; "u. s. ". . pair of fencing foils. l. " cup guards, engraved blades, cord-wrapped hilts. marked "solingen". from sibley collection. . dagger. l. " brass cross-guard. ivory handle, carved in the shape of two clasped hands. very old, possibly sixteenth century. spanish or italian. . small dagger. l. " ebony handle, brass guard and pommel, sharp five-inch blade. made by taylor, of sheffield, and so marked. from the crouse collection. . full set of equipment for the penna. home defense police. blackjack, black-and-white striped armband, badge and whistle. these sets were issued during the world war to a rather ineffectual organization of citizens, supposed to aid in keeping order. at the close of the war, this organization was disbanded and the equipment turned in and disposed of. in time, they will become quite rare. . blackjack. l. " an old type. worn and broken in the middle. this blackjack was used by the father of the present owner to beat an improvised bass-drum during a celebration of the election of governor pattison in , at tyrone, pa., and it was broken at that time. . five bullet moulds. one casting a rifle-ball, sixty-five to the pound. one casting a round ball, about . calibre. one casting a ball for the tryon rifle, no. . two two-bullet moulds, casting round and conical bullets, one for a . and the other for a . colt. . brass twelve-bullet mould. l. " crude and evidently old. . powder horn. l. " fine age-coloring, shading from black and dark brown at tip to gray and orange. wooden screw-plug in base for filling. an extremely old horn, and rare in this unusual size. . zinc powder flask. l. " embossed design. originally a shotgun flask, but the charger has been re-lined, making it small enough for a revolver or light rifle. . old pistol horn. l. " finely polished and colored. plug in tip is not original, being made of red fibre. plug in base is of black walnut, neatly turned. . powder horn. l. - / " this horn was made by myself in , for use with my various muzzle-loading arms. it probably enjoys the distinction of being the last powder horn made in this state for practical use. finis [illustration] * * * * * transcriber's notes: the table of contents has been added. the typo concial was changed to conical in: . bullet mould. crude and evidently homemade. casts one conical bullet. . cal. none proofreaders team the art of war by baron de jomini, general and aid-de-camp of the emperor of russia. a new edition, with appendices and maps. translated from the french by capt. g.h. mendell, corps of topographical engineers, u.s. army, and lieut. w.p. craighill, corps of engineers, u.s. army. originally published in preface. in the execution of any undertaking there are extremes on either hand which are alike to be avoided. the rule holds in a special manner in making a translation. there is, on the one side, the extreme of too rigid adherence, word for word and line for line, to the original, and on the other is the danger of using too free a pen. in either case the sense of the author may not be truly given. it is not always easy to preserve a proper mean between these extremes. the translators of jomini's summary of the principles of the art of war have endeavored to render their author into plain english, without mutilating or adding to his ideas, attempting no display and making no criticisms. to persons accustomed to read for instruction in military matters, it is not necessary to say a word with reference to the merits of jomini. to those not thus accustomed heretofore, but who are becoming more interested in such subjects, (and this class must include the great mass of the american public,) it is sufficient to say, and it may be said with entire truth, that general jomini is admitted by all competent judges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of this or any other day. the translation now presented to the people has been made with the earnest hope and the sincere expectation of its proving useful. as the existence of a large, well-instructed standing army is deemed incompatible with our institutions, it becomes the more important that military information be as extensively diffused as possible among the people. if by the present work the translators shall find they have contributed, even in an inconsiderable degree, to this important object, they will be amply repaid for the care and labor expended upon it. to those persons to whom the study of the art of war is a new one, it is recommended to begin at the article "strategy," chapter iii., from that point to read to the end of the second appendix, and then to return to chapters i. and ii. it should be borne in mind that this subject, to be appreciated, must be studied, map in hand: this remark is especially true of strategy. an acquaintance with the campaigns of napoleon i. is quite important, as they are constantly referred to by jomini and by all other recent writers on the military art. u.s. military academy, west point, n.y. january, . contents. translators' preface. definitions of the branches of the art of war. chapter i. the relation of diplomacy to war. art. i.--offensive wars to recover rights. art. ii.--wars which are politically defensive, and offensive in a military view. art. iii.--wars of expediency. art. iv.--wars with or without allies. art. v.--wars of intervention. art. vi.--wars of invasion, through a desire of conquest or for other causes. art. vii.--wars of opinion. art. viii.--national wars. art. ix.--civil and religious wars. art. x.--double wars, and the danger of undertaking two at the same time. chapter ii. military policy. art. xi.--military statistics and geography. art. xii.--different causes which have an influence over the success of a war. art. xiii.--the military institutions of states. art. xiv.--the command of armies and the supreme control of operations. art. xv.--the military spirit of nations and the morale of armies. chapter iii. strategy. definition of strategy and tactics. the fundamental principle of war. art. xvi.--the system of offensive or defensive operations. art. xvii.--the theater of operations. art. xviii.--bases of operations. art. xix.--strategic lines and points, decisive points of the theater of war, and objective points of operation. art. xx.--fronts of operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions. art. xxi.--zones and lines of operations. art. xxii.--strategic lines of maneuver. art. xxiii.--means of protecting lines of operations by temporary bases or strategic reserves. art. xxiv.--the old and new systems of war. art. xxv.--depots of supply, and their relations to operations. art. xxvi.--frontiers, and their defense by forts and intrenched lines.--wars of sieges. art. xxvii.--intrenched camps and têtes de ponts in their relation to strategy. art. xxviii.--strategic operations in mountainous countries. art. xxix.--grand invasions and distant expeditions. epitome of strategy. chapter iv. grand tactics and battles. art. xxx.--positions and defensive battles. art. xxxi.--offensive battles and orders of battle. art. xxxii.--turning maneuvers, and too extended movements in battle. art. xxxiii.--unexpected meeting of two armies on the march. art. xxxiv.--surprises of armies. art. xxxv.--attack of cities, intrenched camps or lines, and coups de main generally. chapter v. several operations of a mixed character, which are partly in the domain of strategy and partly of tactics. art. xxxvi.--diversions and great detachments. art. xxxvii.--passage of rivers and other streams. art. xxxviii.--retreats and pursuits. art. xxxix.--cantonments and winter quarters. art. xl.--descents, or maritime expeditions. chapter vi. logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. art. xli.--a few remarks on logistics in general. art. xlii.--reconnoissances, and other means of gaining accurate information of the enemy's movements. chapter vii. formation and employment of troops for battle. art. art. xliii--posting troops in line of battle. art. xliv.--formation and employment of infantry. art. xlv.---formation and employment of cavalry. art. xlvi.---formation and employment of artillery. art. xlvii.--employment of the three arms together. conclusion. supplement. appendix. second appendix. sketch of the principal maritime expeditions. summary of the art of war. definition of the art of war. the art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely military branches,--viz.: strategy, grand tactics, logistics, engineering, and tactics. a sixth and essential branch, hitherto unrecognized, might be termed _diplomacy in its relation to war_. although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it should have a place in a work like this. to recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:-- . statesmanship in its relation to war. . strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion. . grand tactics. . logistics, or the art of moving armies. . engineering,--the attack and defense of fortifications. . minor tactics. it is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of engineering. familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable. chapter i. statesmanship in its relation to war. under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war. a government goes to war,-- to reclaim certain rights or to defend them; to protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce, manufactures, or agriculture; to uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the safety of the government or the balance of power; to fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances; to propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to defend them; to increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of territory; to defend the threatened independence of the state; to avenge insulted honor; or, from a mania for conquest. it may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for the proposed end. the party who has provoked the war may be reduced to the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and conduct of a war, as,-- . a state may simply make war against another state. . a state may make war against several states in alliance with each other. . a state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy. . a state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary. . in the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning or after it has commenced. . the theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an ally, or upon its own. . if the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and adventurous. . it may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the enemy. . the war may be a civil or a religious war. war is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case. for example: two hundred thousand french wishing to subjugate the spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the same number of french in a march upon vienna, or any other capital, to compel a peace; nor would a french army fight the guerrillas of mina as they fought the russians at borodino; nor would a french army venture to march upon vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper of the governments and communities between the rhine and the inn, or between the danube and the elbe. a regiment should always fight in nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by circumstances and events. to these different combinations, which belong more or less to statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management of armies. the name military policy is given to them; for they belong exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general. article i. offensive wars to reclaim rights. when a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to enforce them by arms. the public interest must be consulted before action. the most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. unfortunately, in our times there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars, though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in reality but wars of expediency. the question of the succession to the spanish crown under louis xiv. was very clear, since it was plainly settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the general consent of the spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by all europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate legatee. frederick ii., while austria and france were at war, brought forward an old claim, entered silesia in force and seized this province, thus doubling the power of prussia. this was a stroke of genius; and, even if he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as such attempts can be justified. in wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. to watch and to profit by every circumstance covers all that can be said. offensive movements should be suitable to the end to be attained. the most natural step would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory by the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of his own country. every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. in an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the enemy. it is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance, and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper guarantees to other states. article ii. of wars defensive politically, and offensive in a military point of view. a state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more honorable. but it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of awaiting the attack on the frontiers. there are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. a power with no internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third party, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile soil. this course will spare its territory from devastation, carry on the war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers, and depress the spirits of the adversary. nevertheless, in a purely military sense, it is certain that an army operating in its own territory, upon a theater of which all the natural and artificial features are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge of the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the constituted authorities, possesses great advantages. these plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war; but, if the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different with the political part of war, which is modified by the tone of communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of states and armies. the fact of these modifications has been used to prove that war knows no rules. military science rests upon principles which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these variations. plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed. for instance, the plan of a war against france, austria, or russia would differ widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands of turks, which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, and possess no steadiness under misfortunes. article iii. wars of expediency. the invasion of silesia by frederick ii., and the war of the spanish succession, were wars of expediency. there are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful state undertakes to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political reasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or to prevent his aggrandizement. these last are wars of intervention; for a state will rarely singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor to form a coalition for that purpose. these views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war. article iv. of wars with or without allies. of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things being equal. although a great state will more probably succeed than two weaker states in alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger than either separately. the ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops, but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a great degree by threatening portions of his frontier which otherwise would have been secure. all history teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and neglected by any power, however formidable. article v. wars of intervention. to interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a state than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain. the power which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its whole weight and influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, when it can make decisive use of its resources. there are two kinds of intervention: . intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states; . intervention in external relations. whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of the first class, instances are frequent. the romans acquired power by these interferences, and the empire of the english india company was assured in a similar manner. these interventions are not always successful. while russia has added to her power by interference with poland, austria, on the contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of france during the revolution. intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, and perhaps more advantageous. it may be doubtful whether a nation has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but it certainly has a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which may reach the adjoining states. there are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign wars,--viz.: , by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; , to maintain the political equilibrium; , to avoid certain evil consequences of the war already commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war not to be obtained otherwise. history is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglect of these principles. "a state begins to decline when it permits the immoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may become the arbiter of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at the proper time." in a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appearance of a new and large army as a third party in a well-contested war must be decisive. much will depend upon its geographical position in reference to the armies already in the field. for example, in the winter of napoleon crossed the vistula and ventured to the walls of königsberg, leaving austria on his rear and having russia in front. if austria had launched an army of one hundred thousand men from bohemia upon the oder, it is probable that the power of napoleon would have been ended; there is every reason to think that his army could not have regained the rhine. austria preferred to wait till she could raise four hundred thousand men. two years afterward, with this force she took the field, and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well employed at the proper time would have decided the fate of europe. there are several kinds of war resulting from these two different interventions:-- . where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a force specified by former treaties. . where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defending his territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil. . a state interferes as a principal party when near the theater of war,--which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers against one. . a state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, or interferes before the declaration of war. when a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and with an imposing force, the case is quite different. the military chances in these wars are varied. the russian army in the seven years' war was in fact auxiliary to that of austria and france: still, it was a principal party in the north until its occupation of prussia. but when generals fermor and soltikoff conducted the army as far as brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of austria: the fate of these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad maneuvering of their allies. such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate operations. the campaigns of and furnish sad illustrations of this, to which we shall again refer in article xxix., in discussing the military character of these expeditions. it follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these distant interventions. the counterbalancing advantage is that its own territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be, in a measure, an advantage to the state. in wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations; finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with the common interests. by the neglect of these precautions, the greater number of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficult struggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies. the third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising than the others. austria had an opportunity of this character in , but failed to profit by it: she again had the opportunity in . napoleon had just collected his forces in saxony, when austria, taking his front of operations in reverse, threw herself into the struggle with two hundred thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. she regained in two months the italian empire and her influence in germany, which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. in this intervention austria had not only the political but also the military chances in her favor,--a double result, combining the highest advantages. her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theater was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possible display of force, she at the same time interfered in a contest already in progress, upon which she entered with the whole of her resources and at the time most opportune for her. this double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerful monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influence when they know how to profit by it. two examples may establish this. in , the elector maurice of saxony boldly declared war against charles v., who was master of spain, italy, and the german empire, and had been victorious over francis i. and held france in his grasp. this movement carried the war into the tyrol, and arrested the great conqueror in his career. in , the duke of savoy, victor amadeus, by declaring himself hostile to louis xiv., changed the state of affairs in italy, and caused the recall of the french army from the banks of the adige to the walls of turin, where it encountered the great catastrophe which immortalized prince eugene. enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of these opportune interventions: more illustrations might be given, but they could not add to the conviction of the reader. article vi. aggressive wars for conquest and other reasons. there are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoining state; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory of great extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile. wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,--as alexander, cæsar, and napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. however, there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed without incurring great disaster. cambyses in nubia, darius in scythia, crassus and the emperor julian among the parthians, and napoleon in russia, furnish bloody proofs of these truths.--the love of conquest, however, was not the only motive with napoleon: his personal position, and his contest with england, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was to make him supreme. it is true that he loved war and its chances; but he was also a victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of yielding to england. it might be said that he was sent into this world to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. his victories teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his disasters, what might have been avoided by prudence. a war of invasion without good reason--like that of genghis khan--is a crime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, when induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives. the invasions of spain of and of differed equally in object and in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, which threatened the existence of the spanish nation, and was fatal to its author; the second, while combating dangerous principles, fostered the general interests of the country, and was the more readily brought to a successful termination because its object met with the approval of the majority of the people whose territory was invaded. these illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of the same character. the first contributed largely to the fall of napoleon; the second restored the relation between france and spain, which ought never to have been changed. let us hope that invasions may be rare. still, it is better to attack than to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check the spirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by intervention at the proper time. an invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in magnitude to the end to be attained and to the obstacles to be overcome. an invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices and likely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous enterprise, as was well proved by the war in spain, ( ,) and by the wars of the revolution in , , and . in these latter wars, if france was better prepared than spain, she had no powerful ally, and she was attacked by all europe upon both land and sea. although the circumstances were different, the russian invasion of turkey developed, in some respects, the same symptoms of national resistance. the religious hatred of the ottoman powerfully incited him to arms; but the same motive was powerless among the greeks, who were twice as numerous as the turks. had the interests of the greeks and turks been harmonized, as were those of alsace with france, the united people would have been stronger, but they would have lacked the element of religious fanaticism. the war of proved that turkey was formidable only upon the frontiers, where her bravest troops were found, while in the interior all was weakness. when an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to fear from the inhabitants, the principles of strategy shape its course. the popular feeling rendered the invasions of italy, austria, and prussia so prompt. (these military points are treated of in article xxix.) but when the invasion is distant and extensive territories intervene, its success will depend more upon diplomacy than upon strategy. the first step to insure success will be to secure the sincere and devoted alliance of a state adjoining the enemy, which will afford reinforcements of troops, and, what is still more important, give a secure base of operations, depots of supplies, and a safe refuge in case of disaster. the ally must have the same interest in success as the invaders, to render all this possible. diplomacy, while almost decisive in distant expeditions, is not powerless in adjacent invasions; for here a hostile intervention may arrest the most brilliant successes. the invasions of austria in and might have ended differently if prussia had interfered. the invasion of the north of germany in was, so to speak, permitted by austria. that of rumelia in might have ended in disaster, had not a wise statesmanship by negotiation obviated all chance of intervention. article vii. wars of opinion. although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice. wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign, and, lastly, (which, however, is rare,) they may be foreign or exterior without being intestine or civil. wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of wars of intervention; for they result either from doctrines which one party desires to propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which it desires to crush,--in both cases leading to intervention. although originating in religious or political dogmas, these wars are most deplorable; for, like national wars, they enlist the worst passions, and become vindictive, cruel, and terrible. the wars of islamism, the crusades, the thirty years' war, the wars of the league, present nearly the same characteristics. often religion is the pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of dogmas. the successors of mohammed cared more to extend their empire than to preach the koran, and philip ii., bigot as he was, did not sustain the league in france for the purpose of advancing the roman church. we agree with m. ancelot that louis ix., when he went on a crusade in egypt, thought more of the commerce of the indies than of gaining possession of the holy sepulcher. the dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. for instance, the swedes in the thirty years' war, and philip ii. in france, had allies in the country more powerful than their armies. it may, however, happen, as in the crusades and the wars of islamism, that the dogma for which the war is waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter enemies in the country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful. the chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions are about equal. it may be recollected how in associations of fanatics thought it possible to propagate throughout europe the famous declaration of the rights of man, and how governments became justly alarmed, and rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcing the lava of this volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing it. the means were not fortunate; for war and aggression are inappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in the human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as it is the more violent. time is the true remedy for all bad passions and for all anarchical doctrines. a civilized nation may bear the yoke of a factious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval; but these storms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. to attempt to restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain the explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to try to prevent it and to perish in the attempt. after a profound study of the revolution, i am convinced that, if the girondists and national assembly had not been threatened by foreign armaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands upon the feeble but venerable head of louis xvi. the girondists would never have been crushed by the mountain but for the reverses of dumouriez and the threats of invasion. and if they had been permitted to clash and quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it is probable that, instead of giving place to the terrible convention, the assembly would slowly have returned to the restoration of good, temperate, monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and the immemorial traditions of the french. in a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force not only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of an exasperated people. it may be said that the violence of one party will necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation of another and opposite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all the public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is supported by a large majority of the people, of what avail will be the support of the faction which possesses no such means? what service did one hundred thousand vendeans and one hundred thousand federalists do for the coalition in ? history contains but a single example of a struggle like that of the revolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the danger of attacking an intensely-excited nation. however the bad management of the military operations was one cause of the unexpected result, and before deducing any certain maxims from this war, we should ascertain what would have been the result if after the flight of dumouriez, instead of destroying and capturing fortresses, the allies had informed the commanders of those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to france, to her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on paris with two hundred thousand men. they might have restored the monarchy; and, again, they might never have returned, at least without the protection of an equal force on their retreat to the rhine. it is difficult to decide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all would have depended upon the course of the french nation and the army. the problem thus presents two equally grave solutions. the campaign of gave one; whether the other might have been obtained, it is difficult to say. experiment alone could have determined it. the military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national wars, differing, however, in a vital point. in national wars the country should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of less importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be made to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its independence or the integrity of its territory. the war in spain in is an example which may be cited in favor of this course in opposition to that of the revolution. it is true that the conditions were slightly different; for the french army of was made up of more solid elements than that of the radicals of the isla de leon. the war of the revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national war, and a civil war,--while, if the first war in spain in was thoroughly a national war, that of was a partial struggle of opinions without the element of nationality; and hence the enormous difference in the results. moreover, the expedition of the duke of angoulême was well carried out. instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to the above-mentioned precepts. pushing on rapidly to the ebro, he there divided his forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements of strength of their enemies,--which they could safely do, since they were sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. if he had followed the instructions of the ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest of the country and the reduction of the fortresses between the pyrenees and the ebro, in order to provide a base of operations, he would perhaps have failed in his mission, or at least made the war a long and bloody one, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the country similar to that of . emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that it was a political operation rather than a military one, and that it behooved him to consummate it rapidly. his conduct, so different from that of the allies in , deserves careful attention from all charged with similar missions. in three months the army was under the walls of cadiz. if the events now transpiring in the peninsula prove that statesmanship was not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solid order of things, the fault was neither in the army nor in its commanders, but in the spanish government, which, yielding to the counsel of violent reactionaries, was unable to rise to the height of its mission. the arbiter between two great hostile interests, ferdinand blindly threw himself into the arms of the party which professed a deep veneration for the throne, but which intended to use the royal authority for the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. the nation remained divided in two hostile camps, which it would not have been impossible to calm and reconcile in time. these camps came anew into collision, as i predicted in verona in ,--a striking lesson, by which no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy land, although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violent reactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which to construct and consolidate. may god grant that from this frightful conflict may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated from all factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon the general interests of the country,--a monarchy capable of rallying to its support this incomprehensible spanish nation, which, with merits not less extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those who were in the best position to know it. article viii. national wars. national wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those of invasion, are the most formidable of all. this name can only be applied to such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority of them, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their independence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only its camp-ground, its supplies can only be obtained at the point of the sword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured. the spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of humanity, we ought to hope never to see it. this uprising must not be confounded with a national defense in accordance with the institutions of the state and directed by the government. this uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. the serfs may rise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters, affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country, may set them the example and take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical people may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic in its political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds most dear. the control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a national invasion. if the people possess a long stretch of coast, and are masters of the sea or in alliance with a power which controls it, their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of the facility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on all the points he may occupy, but still more by the difficulties which will be thrown in the way of his procuring supplies by the sea. the nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility of a national defense. in mountainous countries the people are always most formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive forests. the resistance of the swiss to austria and to the duke of burgundy, that of the catalans in and in , the difficulties encountered by the russians in the subjugation of the tribes of the caucasus, and, finally, the reiterated efforts of the tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the inhabitants of mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer time than those of the plains,--which is due as much to the difference in character and customs as to the difference in the natural features of the countries. defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of defense; and the bocage of la vendée, so justly celebrated, proves that any country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches or canals, admits of a formidable defense. the difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions, as well as in national wars, are very great, and render the mission of the general conducting them very difficult. the events just mentioned, the contest of the netherlands with philip ii. and that of the americans with the english, furnish evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary struggle of la vendée with the victorious republic, those of spain, portugal, and the tyrol against napoleon, and, finally, those of the morea against the turks, and of navarre against the armies of queen christina, are still more striking illustrations. the difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. the invader has only an army: his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost wholly in arms, and making means of resistance out of every thing, each individual of whom conspires against the common enemy; even the non-combatants have an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every means in their power. he holds scarcely any ground but that upon which he encamps; outside the limits of his camp every thing is hostile and multiplies a thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every step. these obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is difficult. each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the commanders also know the country, and, learning immediately the slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best measures to defeat his projects; while the latter, without information of their movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain safety only in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man: his combinations are failures; and when, after the most carefully-concerted movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he is about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like don quixote, he is attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications, destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, his depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must inevitably yield after a time. in spain i was a witness of two terrible examples of this kind. when ney's corps replaced soult's at corunna, i had camped the companies of the artillery-train between betanzos and corunna, in the midst of four brigades distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no spanish forces had been seen within fifty miles; soult still occupied santiago de compostela, the division maurice-mathieu was at ferrol and lugo, marchand's at corunna and betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night the companies of the train--men and horses--disappeared, and we were never able to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had thus made away with them. four months afterward, ney with a single division marched to conquer the asturias, descending the valley of the navia, while kellermann debouched from leon by the oviedo road. a part of the corps of la romana which was guarding the asturias marched behind the very heights which inclose the valley of the navia, at most but a league from our columns, without the marshal knowing a word of it: when he was entering gijon, the army of la romana attacked the center of the regiments of the division marchand, which, being scattered to guard galicia, barely escaped, and that only by the prompt return of the marshal to lugo. this war presented a thousand incidents as striking as this. all the gold of mexico could not have procured reliable information for the french; what was given was but a lure to make them fall more readily into snares. no army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself. if this enemy has a regular army of respectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, what force will be sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to assure the safety of the long lines of communication against numerous bodies? the peninsular war should be carefully studied, to learn all the obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. what efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops of napoleon, massena, soult, ney, and suchet to sustain themselves for six years against three or four hundred thousand armed spaniards and portuguese supported by the regular armies of wellington, beresford, blake, la romana, cuesta, castaños, reding, and ballasteros! if success be possible in such a war, the following general course will be most likely to insure it,--viz.: make a display of a mass of troops proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered, calm the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time and patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and, particularly, deal justly. the examples of henry iv. in the wars of the league, of marshal berwick in catalonia, of suchet in aragon and valencia, of hoche in la vendée, are models of their kind, which may be employed according to circumstances with equal success. the admirable order and discipline of the armies of diebitsch and paskevitch in the late war were also models, and were not a little conducive to the success of their enterprises. the immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these wars have led some speculative persons to hope that there should never be any other kind, since then wars would become more rare, and, conquest being also more difficult, would be less a temptation to ambitious leaders. this reasoning is rather plausible than solid; for, to admit all its consequences, it would be necessary always to be able to induce the people to take up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to be convinced that there would be in the future no wars but those of conquest, and that all legitimate though secondary wars, which are only to maintain the political equilibrium or defend the public interests, should never occur again: otherwise, how could it be known when and how to excite the people to a national war? for example, if one hundred thousand germans crossed the rhine and entered france, originally with the intention of preventing the conquest of belgium by france, and without any other ambitious project, would it be a case where the whole population--men, women, and children--of alsace, lorraine, champagne, and burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a saragossa of every walled town, to bring about, by way of reprisals, murder, pillage, and incendiarism throughout the country? if all this be not done, and the germans, in consequence of some success, should occupy these provinces, who can say that they might not afterward seek to appropriate a part of them, even though at first they had never contemplated it? the difficulty of answering these two questions would seem to argue in favor of national wars. but is there no means of repelling such an invasion without bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war of extermination? is there no mean between these contests between the people and the old regular method of war between permanent armies? will it not be sufficient, for the efficient defense of the country, to organize a militia, or landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their governments into service, would regulate the part the people should take in the war, and place just limits to its barbarities? i answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system to the cases stated above, i will guarantee that fifty thousand regular french troops, supported by the national guards of the east, would get the better of this german army which had crossed the vosges; for, reduced to fifty thousand men by many detachments, upon nearing the meuse or arriving in argonne it would have one hundred thousand men on its hands. to attain this mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that good national reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensive in peace and will insure the defense of the country in war. this system was used by france in , imitated by austria in , and by the whole of germany in . i sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a utopian philanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire that wars of extermination may be banished from the code of nations, and that the defenses of nations by disciplined militia, with the aid of good political alliances, may be sufficient to insure their independence. as a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, i acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the french and english guards courteously invited each other to fire first,--as at fontenoy,--preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, and children throughout spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers. article ix. civil wars, and wars of religion. intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally the result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religious sectarianism. in the middle ages they were more frequently the collisions of feudal parties. religious wars are above all the most deplorable. we can understand how a government may find it necessary to use force against its own subjects in order to crush out factions which would weaken the authority of the throne and the national strength; but that it should murder its citizens to compel them to say their prayers in french or latin, or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is difficult of conception. never was a king more to be pitied than louis xiv., who persecuted a million of industrious protestants, who had put upon the throne his own protestant ancestor. wars of fanaticism are horrible when mingled with exterior wars, and they are also frightful when they are family quarrels. the history of france in the times of the league should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. it is difficult to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the time of francis i. should in twenty years have fallen into so deplorable a state of brutality. to give maxims in such wars would be absurd. there is one rule upon which all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite the two parties or sects to drive the foreigners from the soil, and afterward to reconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or rights. indeed, the intervention of a third power in a religious dispute can only be with ambitious views. governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of a political disease whose principles threaten social order; and, although these fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is possible that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. but in religious disputes this is never the case; and philip ii. could have had no other object in interfering in the affairs of the league than to subject france to his influence, or to dismember it. article x. double wars, and the danger of undertaking two wars at once. the celebrated maxim of the romans, not to undertake two great wars at the same time, is so well known and so well appreciated as to spare the necessity of demonstrating its wisdom. a government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two neighboring states; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it does not find an ally to come to its aid, with a view to its own safety and the maintenance of the political equilibrium. it will seldom be the case that the nations allied against it will have the same interest in the war and will enter into it with all their resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, it will be an ordinary war. louis xiv., frederick the great, the emperor alexander, and napoleon, sustained gigantic struggles against united europe. when such contests arise from voluntary aggressions, they are proof of a capital error on the part of the state which invites them; but if they arise from imperious and inevitable circumstances they must be met by seeking alliances, or by opposing such means of resistance as shall establish something like equality between the strength of the parties. the great coalition against louis xiv., nominally arising from his designs on spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions which had alarmed his neighbors. to the combined forces of europe he could only oppose the faithful alliance of the elector of bavaria, and the more equivocal one of the duke of savoy, who, indeed, was not slow in adding to the number of his enemies. frederick, with only the aid of the subsidies of england, and fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different states, sustained a war against the three most powerful monarchies of europe: the division and folly of his opponents were his best friends. both these wars, as well as that sustained by alexander in , it was almost impossible to avoid. france had the whole of europe on its hands in , in consequence of the extravagant provocations of the jacobins, and the utopian ideas of the girondists, who boasted that with the support of the english fleets they would defy all the kings in the world. the result of these absurd calculations was a frightful upheaval of europe, from which france miraculously escaped. napoleon is, to a certain degree, the only modern sovereign who has voluntarily at the same time undertaken two, and even three, formidable wars,--with spain, with england, and with russia; but in the last case he expected the aid of austria and prussia, to say nothing of that of turkey and sweden, upon which he counted with too much certainty; so that the enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has been generally supposed. it will be observed that there is a great distinction between a war made against a single state which is aided by a third acting as an auxiliary, and two wars conducted at the same time against two powerful nations in opposite quarters, who employ all their forces and resources. for instance, the double contest of napoleon in against austria and spain aided by england was a very different affair from a contest with austria assisted by an auxiliary force of a given strength. these latter contests belong to ordinary wars. it follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided if possible, and, if cause of war be given by two states, it is more prudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them, until a proper opportunity for redressing them shall arrive. the rule, however, is not without exception: the respective forces, the localities, the possibility of finding allies to restore, in a measure, equality of strength between the parties, are circumstances which will influence a government so threatened. we now have fulfilled our task, in noting both the danger and the means of remedying it. chapter ii. military policy. we have already explained what we understand by this title. it embraces the moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. if the political considerations which we have just discussed be also moral, there are others which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of a war, which belong neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. we include these under the head of _military policy_. military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy; and, as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot be assigned to each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, and without deviating from my intention,--which is, not to give a treatise on theses subjects, but to point out their relations to military operations. indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to be fought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves, their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government or their institutions, the character of the executive, the characters and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence of cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon their operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the established force of the state and its armament, the military geography and statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all of which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy. there are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the government should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, and that it is indispensable to take them into consideration in the arrangement of all plans. we propose to sketch the principal points which ought to guide in this sort of combinations. article xi. military statistics and geography. by the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough knowledge possible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemy with whom we are called upon to contend; the second consists in the topographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with all the obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the examination of the permanent decisive points which may be presented in the whole extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of the country. besides the minister of war, the commanding general and his chief of staff should be afforded this information, under the penalty of cruel miscalculations in their plans, as happens frequently in our day, despite the great strides civilized nations have taken in statistical, diplomatic, geographical, and topographical sciences. i will cite two examples of which i was cognizant. in , moreau's army, entering the black forest, expected to find terrible mountains, frightful defiles and forests, and was greatly surprised to discover, after climbing the declivities of the plateau that slope to the rhine, that these, with their spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country, from the sources of the danube to donauwerth, was a rich and level plain. the second example was in . napoleon and his whole army supposed the interior of bohemia to be very mountainous,--whereas there is no district in europe more level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding it has been crossed, which may be done in a single march. all european officers held the same erroneous opinions in reference to the balkan and the turkish force in the interior. it seemed that it was given out at constantinople that this province was an almost impregnable barrier and the palladium of the empire,--an error which i, having lived in the alps, did not entertain. other prejudices, not less deeply rooted, have led to the belief that a people all the individuals of which are constantly armed would constitute a formidable militia and would defend themselves to the last extremity. experience has proved that the old regulations which placed the elite of the janissaries in the frontier-cities of the danube made the population of those cities more warlike than the inhabitants of the interior. in fact, the projects of reform of the sultan mahmoud required the overthrow of the old system, and there was no time to replace it by the new: so that the empire was defenseless. experience has constantly proved that a mere multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army nor a national defense. let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military geography and statistics of an empire. these sciences are not set forth in treatises, and are yet to be developed. lloyd, who wrote an essay upon them, in describing the frontiers of the great states of europe, was not fortunate in his maxims and predictions. he saw obstacles everywhere; he represents as impregnable the austrian frontier on the inn, between the tyrol and passau, where napoleon and moreau maneuvered and triumphed with armies of one hundred and fifty thousand men in , , and . but, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the european staff must necessarily possess many documents valuable for instruction in them,--at least for the special staff school. awaiting the time when some studious officer, profiting by those published and unpublished documents, shall present europe with a good military and strategic geography, we may, thanks to the immense progress of topography of late years, partially supply the want of it by the excellent charts published in all european countries within the last twenty years. at the beginning of the french revolution topography was in its infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of cassini, the works of bakenberg alone merited the name. the austrian and prussian staff schools, however, were good, and have since borne fruit. the charts published recently at vienna, at berlin, munich, stuttgart, and paris, as well as those of the institute of herder at fribourg, promise to future generals immense resources unknown to their predecessors. military statistics is not much better known than geography. we have but vague and superficial statements, from which the strength of armies and navies is conjectured, and also the revenue supposed to be possessed by a state,--which is far from being the knowledge necessary to plan operations. our object here is not to discuss thoroughly these important subjects, but to indicate them, as facilitating success in military enterprises. article xii. other causes which exercise an influence upon the success of a war. as the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a powerful enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts to allay them. we have nothing to add to what has been said on this point under the head of national wars. on the other hand, the general should do every thing to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress in his adversaries. all armies are alike susceptible of this spirit: the springs of action and means, only, vary with the national character. military eloquence is one means, and has been the subject of many a treatise. the proclamations of napoleon and of paskevitch, the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, and those of suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are models of their different kinds. the eloquence of the spanish juntas, and the miracles of the madonna del pilar, led to the same results by very different means. in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory. some dispute the advantages of this enthusiasm, and prefer imperturbable coolness in battle. both have unmistakable advantages and disadvantages. enthusiasm impels to the performance of great actions: the difficulty is in maintaining it constantly; and, when discouragement succeeds it, disorder easily results. the greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of the armies are elements of success or failure, which cannot be submitted to rules. a cabinet and a commander ought to consider the intrinsic value of their troops, and that resulting from their organization as compared with that of the enemy. a russian general, commanding the most solidly organized troops in europe, need not fear to undertake any thing against undisciplined and unorganized troops in an open country, however brave may be its individuals.[ ] concert in action makes strength; order produces this concert, and discipline insures order; and without discipline and order no success is possible. the russian general would not be so bold before european troops having the same instruction and nearly the same discipline as his own. finally, a general may attempt with a mack as his antagonist what it would be madness to do with a napoleon. the action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies influences the boldness of their operations. a general whose genius and hands are tied by an aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match for one who has liberty of action, other things being equal. as to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain pledges of victory, all other things being equal. it is true that great generals have often been beaten by inferior ones; but an exception does not make a rule. an order misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into the hands of the enemy all the chances of success which a skillful general had prepared for himself by his maneuvers. but these are risks which cannot be foreseen nor avoided. would it be fair on that account to deny the influence of science and principles in ordinary affairs? this risk even proves the triumph of the principles, for it happens that they are applied accidentally by the army against which it was intended to apply them, and are the cause of its success. but, in admitting this truth, it may be said that it is an argument against science; this objection is not well founded, for a general's science consists in providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. even if the number of battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due to accident, it would not invalidate my assertion. if the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it will readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one of the most delicate points in the science of government and one of the most essential parts of the military policy of a state. unfortunately, this choice is influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, rank, age, favor, party spirit, jealousy, will have as much to do with it as the public interest and justice. this subject is so important that we will devote to it a separate article. footnotes: [footnote : irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be of the greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting communication, &c., and may--as in the case of the french in --make a retreat very disastrous.] article xiii. military institutions. one of the most important points of the military policy of a state is the nature of its military institutions. a good army commanded by a general of ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army with a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a great deal more if its own superiority and that of the general be combined. twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:-- . to have a good recruiting-system; . a good organization; . a well-organized system of national reserves; . good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as well as those of a campaign; . a strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the formalities of the service; . a well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation; . the special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed; . an armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to defensive and offensive arms; . a general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical education of its officers; . a good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general administration; . a good system of assignment to command, and of directing the principal operations of war; . exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people. to these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field of battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the troops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives and health of veterans. none of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without grave inconvenience. a fine army, well drilled and disciplined, but without national reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered prussia to fall in fifteen days under the attacks of napoleon. on the other hand, it has often been seen of how much advantage it is for a state to have a good army. it was the care and skill of philip and alexander in forming and instructing their phalanxes and rendering them easy to move, and capable of the most rapid maneuvers, which enabled the macedonians to subjugate india and persia with a handful of choice troops. it was the excessive love of his father for soldiers which procured for frederick the great an army capable of executing his great enterprises. a government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thus culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for its standards and its country, instead of by a different course preparing for it success. we are far from saying that a government should sacrifice every thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but it ought to make the army the object of its constant care; and if the prince has not a military education it will be very difficult for him to fulfill his duty in this respect. in this case--which is, unfortunately, of too frequent occurrence--the defect must be supplied by wise institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good system of the general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system of national reserves. there are, indeed, forms of government which do not always allow the executive the power of adopting the best systems. if the armies of the roman and french republics, and those of louis xiv. and frederick of prussia, prove that a good military system and a skillful direction of operations may be found in governments the most opposite in principle, it cannot be doubted that, in the present state of the world, the form of government exercises a great influence in the development of the military strength of a nation and the value of its troops. when the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affected by local interest or party spirit, they may be so over-scrupulous and penurious as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive, whom very many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as a chief devoted to all the national interests. the abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also contribute to this deplorable result. then it will be impossible for the most far-sighted administration to prepare in advance for a great war, whether it be demanded by the most important interests of the country at some future time, or whether it be immediate and necessary to resist sudden aggressions. in the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not the members of an elective legislature, the majority of whom cannot be richelieus, pitts, or louvois, in a misconceived spirit of economy, allow the institutions necessary for a large, well-appointed, and disciplined army to fall into decay? deceived by the seductive fallacies of an exaggerated philanthropy, may they not end in convincing themselves and their constituents that the pleasures of peace are always preferable to the more statesmanlike preparations for war? i am far from advising that states should always have the hand upon the sword and always be established on a war-footing: such a condition of things would be a scourge for the human race, and would not be possible, except under conditions not existing in all countries. i simply mean that civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in a short time,--that they should never be found unprepared. and the wisdom of their institutions may do as much in this work of preparation as foresight in their administration and the perfection of their system of military policy. if, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms, governments subjected to all the changes of an elective legislature are less suitable than others for the creation or preparation of a formidable military power, nevertheless, in great crises these deliberative bodies have sometimes attained very different results, and have concurred in developing to the full extent the national strength. still, the small number of such instances in history makes rather a list of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by the extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country and themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measures and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, which overthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them. here it is the dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation of power, rather than the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the true cause of the display of energy. what happened in the convention after the fall of robespierre and the terrible committee of public safety proves this, as well as the chambers of . now, if the dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plank of safety in great crises, it seems natural to draw the conclusion that countries controlled by elective assemblies must be politically and militarily weaker than pure monarchies, although in other respects they present decided advantages. it is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in the interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely to degenerate. it is important to foster the military spirit in the armies, and to exercise them in great maneuvers, which, though but faintly resembling those of actual war, still are of decided advantage in preparing them for war. it is not less important to prevent them from becoming effeminate, which may be done by employing them in labors useful for the defense of the country. the isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worst possible systems, and the russian and prussian system of divisions and permanent corps d'armée seems to be much preferable. in general terms, the russian army now may be presented as a model in many respects; and if in many points its customs would be useless and impracticable elsewhere, it must be admitted that many good institutions might well be copied from it. as to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service, and at the same time to open a way for merit. three-fourths of the promotions in each grade should be made according to the roster, and the remaining fourth reserved for those distinguished for merit and zeal. on the contrary, in time of war the regular order of promotion should be suspended, or at least reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving the other two-thirds for brilliant conduct and marked services. the superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war: it does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of success. every one can recall how nearly fatal to the french at bylau and marengo was their great inferiority in artillery. we may also refer to the great gain of the heavy french cavalry in the resumption of the cuirass, which they had for so long thrown aside. every one knows the great advantage of the lance. doubtless, as skirmishers lancers would not be more effectual than hussars, but when charging in line it is a very different affair. how many brave cavalry soldiers have been the victims of the prejudice they bore against the lance because it was a little more trouble to carry than a saber! the armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; the state which shall take the lead in making them will secure great advantages. there is little left to be desired in artillery; but the offensive and defensive arms of infantry and cavalry deserve the attention of a provident government. the new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a great revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. strategy alone will remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the scipios and cæsars, frederick and napoleon, since they are independent of the nature of the arms and the organization of the troops. the means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity.[ ] the congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it is said the austrians can now regulate,--the shrapnel howitzers, which throw a stream of canister as far as the range of a bullet,--the perkins steam-guns, which vomit forth as many balls as a battalion,--will multiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of eylau, borodino, leipsic, and waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the european races. if governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these inventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to make the half of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capture with great rapidity these machines; and the infantry, even, will be obliged to resume its armor of the middle ages, without which a battalion will be destroyed before engaging the enemy. we may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armor, and horses also will require the same protection. while there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it is, however, certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made advances which should lead us to think of modifying the deep formation so much abused by napoleon. we will recur to this in the chapter on tactics. we will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of the military policy which ought to be adopted by a wise government. . the prince should receive an education both political and military. he will more probably find men of administrative ability in his councils than good statesmen or soldiers; and hence he should be both of the latter himself. . if the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will be his first duty and his nearest interest to have his place well supplied. he must confide the glory of his reign and the safety of his states to the general most capable of directing his armies. . the permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by reserves, which should always be prepared. its instruction and discipline should be of a high character, as well as its organization; its armament should at least be as good as that of its neighbors, and superior if possible. . the matériel of war should also be upon the best footing, and abundant. the reserves should be stored in the depots and arsenals. national jealousy should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of all improvements in this matériel made in other countries. . it is necessary that the study of the military sciences should be encouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal. the scientific military corps should be esteemed and honored: this is the only way of securing for the army men of merit and genius. . the general staff in times of peace should be employed in labors preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. its archives should be furnished with numerous historical details of the past, and with all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future. hence it is essential that the chief of this corps, with a number of its officers, should be permanently stationed at the capital in time of peace, and the war-office should be simply that of the general staff, except that there should be a secret department for those documents to be concealed from the subalterns of the corps. . nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography and the military statistics of other states, so as to know their material and moral capacity for attack and defense, as well as the strategic advantages of the two parties. distinguished officers should be employed in these scientific labors, and should be rewarded when they acquit themselves with marked ability. . when a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to prepare, not an entire plan of operations,--which is always impossible,--but a system of operations in reference to a prescribed aim; to provide a base, as well as all the material means necessary to guarantee the success of the enterprise. . the system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the war, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of the country, the characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether of the army or of the state. in fine, it should be based upon the moral and material means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring into action; and it ought to take into consideration the probable alliances that may obtain in favor of or against either of the parties during the war. . the financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among the chances of a war. still, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute to this condition the importance attached to it by frederick the great in the history of his times. he was probably right at his epoch, when armies were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the last crown brought the last soldier; but when national levies are well organised money will no longer exercise the same influence,--at least for one or two campaigns. if england has proved that money will procure soldiers and auxiliaries, france has proved that love of country and honor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war may be made to support war. france, indeed, in the fertility of her soil and the enthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of temporary power which cannot be adopted as a general base of a system; but the results of its efforts were none the less striking. every year the numerous reports of the cabinet of london, and particularly of m. d'yvernois, announced that france was about to break down for want of money, while napoleon had , , francs[ ] in the vaults of the tuileries, all the while meeting the expenses of the government, including the pay of his armies. a power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself very badly. history, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither the strongest nor the happiest. iron weighs at least as much as gold in the scales of military strength. still, we must admit that a happy combination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, of well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and public credit, imparts to a nation the greatest strength and makes it best capable of sustaining a long war. a volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under which a nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron, and to determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. this result can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory of the enemy; and all countries are not equally capable of furnishing resources to an assailant. we need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which are not directly connected with the art of war. it is sufficient for our purpose to indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will be for the statesman to develop the modifications which circumstances and localities may make in these relations. footnotes: [footnote : it will be recollected that the author wrote this many years ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has been attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. artillery, which he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone important improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no less marked, while we hear nothing now of perkins's steam-guns; and as yet no civilized army has been organized upon the plan the author suggests for depriving these destructive machines of their efficiency.--translators.] [footnote : there was a deficit in the finances of france at the fall of napoleon. it was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendous efforts he was obliged to make. there was no deficit in .] article xiv. the command of armies, and the chief control over operations. is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person by the monarch? whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certain that if the prince possess the genius of frederick, peter the great, or napoleon, he will be far from leaving to his generals the honor of performing great actions which he might do himself; for in this he would be untrue to his own glory and to the well-being of the country. as it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince, (which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will only state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in other respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who is himself not the head of a state. leaving out of the question that he is responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much by the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all the public resources for the attainment of his end. he also possesses the powerful accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will be devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with the execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and in secondary operations. here are, certainly, sufficient motives to induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and the contest be of a magnitude worthy of him. but if he possess no military ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easily influenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing good results, will open the way for all manner of intrigues. each one will present his projects to him; and, as he will not have the experience necessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will submit his judgment to that of his intimates. his general, interfered with and opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even if he have the requisite ability. it may be said that a sovereign might accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on the contrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence. in this case his presence might be productive of good results, but it also might lead to great embarrassment. if the army were turned and cut off from its communications, and obliged to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad results might not follow from the presence of the sovereign at head-quarters! when a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of his armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supreme direction of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by the prussian government with blücher,--viz.; he should be accompanied by two generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability, the other a well-instructed staff officer. if this trinity be harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the army of silesia in . the same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has frequently happened since the time of louis xiv. it has often occurred that the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser, who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. this was the case with the duke of orleans and marsin at the famous battle of turin, afterward with the duke of burgundy and vendôme at the battle of audenarde, and, i think, also at ulm with the archduke ferdinand and mack. this system is deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. it is known that at the battle of turin the duke of orleans exhibited more sagacity than marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secret authority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment and allow the battle to be lost. so at ulm the archduke displayed more skill and courage than mack, who was to be his mentor. if the prince possess the genius and experience of the archduke charles, he should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed full selection of his instruments. if he have not yet acquired the same titles to command, he may then be provided with an educated general of the staff, and another general distinguished for his talent in execution; but in no case will it be wise to invest either of these counselors with more authority than a voice in consultation. we have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies in person, his most important duty will be to have the position of commander well filled,--which, unfortunately, is not always done. without going back to ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall the more modern examples under louis xiv. and louis xv. the merit of prince eugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this drove him (the ablest commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. after louvois' death, tallard, marsin, and villeroi filled the places of turenne, condé, and luxembourg, and subsequently soubise and clermont succeeded marshal saxe. between the fashionable selections made in the saloons of the pompadours and dubarrys, and napoleon's preference for mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide enough to afford the least intelligent government means of making rational nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exercise an influence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off the prize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services. but, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will be profitable to inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will be difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to make it a judicious one. in the first place, to make choice of a skillful general requires either that the person who makes the selection shall be a military man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he should be guided by the opinions of others, which opens the way to the improper influence of cliques. the embarrassment is certainly less when there is at hand a general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside of the fact that every general is not a great leader because he has gained a battle, (for instance, jourdan, scherer, and many others,) it is not always the case that a victorious general is at the disposition of the government. it may well happen that after a long period of peace, there may not be a single general in europe who has commanded in chief. in this case, it will be difficult to decide whether one general is better than another. those who have served long in peace will be at the head of their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it? moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with their subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is not astonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to their appropriate positions. the judgment of the prince, misled by appearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may well be deceived in his selections. one of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be in realizing the beautiful fiction of fénélon in telemachus, by finding a faithful, sincere, and generous philocles, who, standing between the prince and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of his more direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch in reference to selections of individuals best recommended by their character and abilities. but will this faithful friend never yield to personal affections? will he be always free from prejudice? suwaroff was rejected by potemkin on account of his appearance, and it required all the art of catherine to secure a regiment for the man who afterward shed so much luster upon the russian arms. it has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothing could be more dangerous. it voted dumouriez to be a cæsar, when he was ignorant of the great operations of war. would it have placed bonaparte at the head of the army of italy, when he was known only by two directors? still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, public sentiment is not to be despised, particularly if it survive great crises and the experience of events. the most essential qualities for a general will always be as follow:--first, _a high moral courage, capable of great resolutions_; secondly, _a physical courage which takes no account of danger_. his scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. it is not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. his knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. next in importance come the qualities of his personal character. a man who is gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this merit conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even pass for a great man. unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are always jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizing that the nominal commander of an army always receives almost all the glory of its success, even when least entitled to it. the question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to assign to the command a general of long experience in service with troops, or an officer of the staff, having generally but little experience in the management of troops. it is beyond question that war is a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to be able to combine operations skillfully without ever having led a regiment against an enemy. peter the great, condé, frederick, and napoleon are instances of it. it cannot, then, be denied that an officer from the staff may as well as any other prove to be a great general, but it will not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a quartermaster that he will be capable of the supreme command, but because he has a natural genius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics. so, also, a general from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as capable of conducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. so this question does not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities of the individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading to a rational conclusion:-- . a general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery, who has commanded a division or a corps d'armée, will, with equal chances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one arm or special corps. . a general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war, will be equally fitted for the command. . that the character of the man is above all other requisites in a commander-in-chief. finally, he will be a good general in whom are found united the requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the principles of the art of war. the difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the formation of a good general staff, which being near the general may advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over the operations. a well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of organizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introduction into it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal. frederick, when he established the military school of potsdam, never thought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of general ruchel,[ ] and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible rule for gaining all battles. how true it is that there is but a step from the sublime to the ridiculous! moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man of recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice of the men who are to be his advisers. to impose a chief of staff upon a general would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit him to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous; for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. the best means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option of several designated officers, all of undoubted ability. it has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more weight and effect to the direction of military operations. doubtless, if the commander were a soubise, a clermont, or a mack, he might well find in a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be expected from operations conducted by others than those who have originated and arranged them? what must be the result of an operation which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his own conception? i have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is absurd. the greater the number and the higher the rank of the military officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount of dissent. what would have been the action of a council of war to which napoleon proposed the movement of arcola, the crossing of the saint-bernard, the maneuver at ulm, or that at gera and jena? the timid would have regarded them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been executed by any one but napoleon, would they not certainly have proved failures? in my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case they may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition, may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use every means to insure the success of the movement. this is the only advantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simply consultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of this harmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produce unfortunate results. accordingly, i think it safe to conclude that the best means of organizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved by experience, is-- st. to give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight, and of unshaken firmness in danger. d. to assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect harmony. the victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to the friend who has contributed to his success. in this way blücher, aided by gneisenau and muffling, gained glory which probably he would not have been able to do of himself. it is true that this double command is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a napoleon, a frederick, or a suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system. before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of influencing military operations--viz.: that of a council of war at the seat of government--deserves notice. louvois for a long time directed from paris the armies of louis xiv., and with success. carnot, also, from paris directed the armies of the republic: in he did well, and saved france; in his action was at first very unfortunate, but he repaired his faults afterward by chance; in he was completely at fault. it is to be observed, however, that both louvois and carnot individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of war. the aulic council, sitting in vienna, was often intrusted with the duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been but one opinion in europe as to its fatal influence. whether this opinion is right or wrong, the austrian generals alone are able to decide. my own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of operations. by this i do not mean a plan which should trace out the campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations, whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. these points, it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march to vienna or to paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of directing the army,--a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the scene of operations. footnotes: [footnote : general ruchel thought at the battle of jena that he could save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in order to form an oblique line.] article xv. the military spirit of nations, and the morale of armies. the adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army would be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a military spirit in its citizens. it may well be the case in london, situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets, that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a military decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and habits of the tradesmen of london or the bankers of paris would sooner or later fall a prey to its neighbors. it was to the union of the civic virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that the romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary goths and gauls, the fall of the empire became inevitable. it is doubtless true that whatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neither neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches of industry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but they should always be secondary to the great institutions which make up the strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly and heroic virtues. policy and justice both agree on this point; for, whatever boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront death in the footsteps of the cæsars than to fatten upon the public miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit. misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public estimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life, health, or fortune to the defense of his country. the first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army with all possible social and public consideration. the second means is to give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state, in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of the government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a qualification for certain offices. a comparison of the ancient military institutions of rome with those of russia and prussia, is a subject worthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting to contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare against the employment of officers of the army in other public functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the important offices of administration.[ ] it is true that many public employments demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession of arms? if these administrative offices were conferred upon officers retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not lead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than in the theaters and public clubs? it may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to the civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high military spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient to place the profession of the soldier above all others. this was the early practice of the mamelukes and janissaries. their soldiers were bought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the idea that they were to die by their standards. even the english--so jealous of their rights--contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for the whole length of their lives, and the russian, in enlisting for twenty-five years, does what is almost equivalent. in such armies, and in those recruited by voluntary enlistments, perhaps it would not be advisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil offices; but where the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people, the case is different, and the old roman laws which required a previous military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military spirit,--particularly in this age, when the attainment of material comfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people. however this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of government, it will be a wise part to honor the military profession, in order to encourage the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under the penalty of receiving the reproaches of posterity and suffering insult and dependency. it is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people, but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. of what avail would it be if the uniform be honored in the land and it be regarded as a duty to serve in the army, while the military virtues are wanting? the forces would be numerous but without valor. the enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quite different things, and should not be confounded, although they produce the same effects. the first is the effect of passions more or less of a temporary character,--of a political or religious nature, for instance, or of a great love of country; while the latter, depending upon the skill of the commander and resulting from military institutions, is more permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should be the object of the attention of every far-seeing government.[ ] courage should be recompensed and honored, the different grades in rank respected, and discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions rather than in external forms only. the officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, and faithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is possible, no army is respectable, and that firmness amid reverses is more honorable than enthusiasm in success,--since courage alone is necessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make a difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always opposing to him a firm and unbroken front. a fine retreat should meet with a reward equal to that given for a great victory. by inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnation in garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority over their enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring a love for great exploits,--in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm by every means in harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage, punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice,--we may expect to maintain a high military spirit. effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the roman legions: those formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass in the times of the scipios under the burning sun of africa, found them too heavy in the cool climates of germany and gaul; and then the empire was lost. i have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt for the enemy, lest the _morale_ of the soldier should be shaken if he encounter an obstinate resistance. napoleon at jena, addressing lannes' troops, praised the prussian cavalry, but promised that they would contend in vain against the bayonets of his egyptians. the officers and troops must be warned against those sudden panics which often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlled by discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is the surest hope of safety. it was not from want of courage that one hundred thousand turks were beaten at peterwardein by prince eugene, and at kagoul by romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because they fought individually, but not in masses and in order. an army seized with panic is similarly in a state of demoralization; because when disorder is once introduced all concerted action on the part of individuals becomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, no maneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and there is no resource but in ignominious flight. nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics; and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy it. even the french, whose military virtues when well led have never been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind which were highly ridiculous. we may refer to the unbecoming panic which pervaded the infantry of marshal villars after having gained the battle of friedlingen, in . the same occurred to napoleon's infantry after the victory of wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. a still more extraordinary case was the flight of the th semi-brigade, fifteen hundred strong, at the siege of genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. two days afterward these same men took fort diamond by one of the most vigorous assaults mentioned in modern history. still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken. in this respect the russian army may be taken as a model by all others. the firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. indeed, vivacity of imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder: the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this order contributes to it. i have often been astonished at the indifference of most generals on this point. not only did they not deign to take the slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the rallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in a momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were offended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. still, the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often be powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degree obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions. there are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficient for the maintenance of order, as when the physical sufferings of the soldiers have been so great as to render them deaf to all appeals, and when their officers find it impossible to do any thing to organize them,--which was the case in the retreat of . leaving out these exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for rallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not in preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it. it is now time to leave this branch, of which i have only desired to trace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects which are purely military. footnotes: [footnote : for instance, in france, instead of excluding all officers from the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to all colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature. the most venal deputies will not be those from military life.] [footnote : it is particularly important that this spirit should pervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable, and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.] chapter iii. strategy. definition of strategy and the fundamental principle of war. the art of war, independently of its political and moral relations, consists of five principal parts, viz.: strategy, grand tactics, logistics, tactics of the different arms, and the art of the engineer. we will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them. in order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the necessary details. tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation and handling of a great army. we will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war, and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies. the selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone of operations. the general will take a first objective point: he will select the line of operations leading to this point, either as a temporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction; namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorable opportunities with the least danger. an army marching on this line of operations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. the temporary positions which the corps d'armée will occupy upon this front of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions. when near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not be confounded. to connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made, lines of supply, depots, &c. will be established. if the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may be carried on without reference to them. if the second of these courses be pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be the result. the army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective point or will advance to attain a second. should the first objective point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be commenced. if the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a strategic position to cover it, as did the army of italy in , which, less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass mantua to enter austria, leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty thousand more in front on the double line of the tyrol and frioul. if the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more important objective point. if this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an intermediate point of support. one or more secure cities already occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and also the depots by temporary fortifications. when the army crosses large streams, it will construct _têtes de pont_; and, if the bridges are within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the strategic reserve which may occupy these posts. should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces. when winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. these winter campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased activity and energy to attain prompt success. such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it, while discussing combinations which result from these operations. strategy embraces the following points, viz.:-- . the selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the different combinations of which it admits. . the determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the most favorable direction for operations. . the selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of operations. . the selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive. . the strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations. . the choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front. . for a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases. . the eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves. . the marches of armies, considered as maneuvers. . the relation between the position of depots and the marches of the army. . fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army, as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered. . points for intrenched camps, _tétes de pont,_ &c. . the diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary. these points are principally of importance in the determination of the first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy. the maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different formations of troops for attack, constitute grand tactics. logistics is the art of moving armies. it comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises. to repeat. strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. grand tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops. it is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements, and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of pitched battles the above definition holds good. grand tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the following objects:-- . the choice of positions and defensive lines of battle. . the offensive in a defensive battle. . the different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the attack of the enemy's line. . the collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles. . surprises of armies in the open field. . the arrangements for leading troops into battle. . the attack of positions and intrenched camps. . _coups de main_. all other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties, skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and any thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be regarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations. the fundamental principle of war. it is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all the operations of war,--a principle which must be followed in all good combinations. it is embraced in the following maxims:-- . to throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own. . to maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's forces. . on the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow. . to so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy. this principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in recognizing those points. this truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all necessary explanations for its application upon the field. in article xix. these decisive points will be described, and in articles from xviii. to xxii. will be discussed their relations to the different combinations. those students who, having attentively considered what is there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a problem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehending strategy. the general theater of operations seldom contains more than three zones,--the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of operations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each line of battle, has the same subdivisions,--two extremities and the center. a direction upon one of these three will always be suitable for the attainment of the desired end. a direction upon one of the two remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will be wholly inapplicable. in considering the object proposed in connection with the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, it will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right, to the left, or directly in front. the selection of one of these three simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. the art of giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. executive talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessary to carry out any combinations previously arranged. we will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other. of strategic combinations. article xvi. of the system of operations. war once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant by these terms. there are several phases of the offensive: if against a great state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory is attacked, it is an _invasion_; if a province only, or a line of defense of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally, if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and is confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the _initiative_. in a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly always advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the _morale_ of his army, and generally depresses the adversary. it sometimes happens that invasion excites the ardor and energy of the adversary,--particularly when he feels that the independence of his country is threatened. in a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad side. strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations, which are always dangerous in a hostile country. all the obstacles in the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are favorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of the country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are generally hostile. however, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck in a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek a speedy termination of the contest. for a single operation, which we have called the taking the _initiative_, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly in strategy. indeed, if the art of war consists in throwing the masses upon the decisive points, to do this it will be necessary to take the initiative. the attacking party knows what he is doing and what he desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to strike. he who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel him. tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party taking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect his designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail. the attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on which account the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are about equally balanced. whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become defensive before it ends. a defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. it may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. the passive defense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes. the object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the country threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own army. he who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to his progress. an army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive inferiority. it then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or artificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying obstacles in the way of the enemy. this plan, when not carried to an extreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general has the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary; he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon the alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of the enemy. this plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, and may have strategical as well as tactical advantages.. it combines the advantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a prepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all the advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success take the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike. during the first three campaigns of the seven years' war frederick was the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of the defensive-offensive. he was, however, wonderfully aided in this by his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many opportunities of taking the offensive with success. wellington's course was mainly the same in portugal, spain, and belgium, and it was the most suitable in his circumstances. it seems plain that one of the greatest talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these two systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during the progress of a defensive war. article xvii. of the theater of operations. the theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest. when the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both hemispheres,--as has happened in contests between france and england since the time of louis xiv. the theater of a war may thus be undefined, and must, not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the other army. the theater of a continental war between france and austria may be confined to italy, or may, in addition, comprise germany if the german states take part therein. armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole theater of operations may be considered as a single field upon which strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. in the second case each army will have its own independent theater of operations. the _theater of operations_ of an army embraces all the territory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to defend. if the army operates independently, it should not attempt any maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be in danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that no concert of action has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields. if, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater of operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of the general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common object. independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one or more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:-- . of a fixed base of operations. . of a principal objective point. . of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense. . of zones and lines of operations. . of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications. . of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the enemy. . of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important, either for the offensive or defensive. . of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective point and the primary base. . of points of refuge in case of reverse. for illustration, let us suppose the case of france invading austria with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and starting from mayence, from the upper rhine, from savoy or the maritime alps, respectively. the section of country which each of these armies traverses may be considered as a zone of the general field of operations. but if the army of italy goes but to the adige without concerted action with the army of the rhine, then what was before but a zone becomes for that army a theater of operations. in every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point with the base, either in the offensive or the defensive. it has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations _par excellence._ now, as such a line must possess two or three roads to move the army within the range of its operations, and at least one line of retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of maneuver. it would be much more accurate to say that rivers are excellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment of a good line of operations, but never the line itself. it has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because they facilitate invasion. every country has its capital, its rich cities for manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these points must be the centers of converging routes. could germany be made a desert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an individual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and the roads would again necessarily converge to these points. moreover, was not the archduke charles enabled to beat jourdan in by the use of converging routes? besides, these routes are more favorable for defense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radial lines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which are pursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses separately. some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in strategic positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary, these points are more rare among the alps than in the plains, but also that if more rare they are more important and more decisive. some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war, inaccessible barriers. napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the rhetian alps, said that "an army could pass wherever a man could put his foot." generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of carrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of partisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the heights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at the decisive points,--the junctions of the large valleys. these differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many points that admit of discussion. the most important topographical or artificial features which make up the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be examined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to remark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the general. the great leader who crossed the saint-bernard and ordered the passage of the splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of these chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and a walled inclosure could change his destiny at waterloo. article xviii. bases of operations. a base of operations is the portion of country from which the army obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively. the base of operations is most generally that of supply,--though not necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance, a french army upon the elbe might be subsisted from westphalia or franconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the rhine. when a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line of defense when the state is invaded. in the latter case it will always be prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its own country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a vast difference between those parts of the country without military positions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those other portions where these military resources are found; and these latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. an army may have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a french army in germany will have the rhine for its first base; it may have others beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but if it is driven back across the rhine it will have for a base either the meuse or the moselle: it might have a third upon the seine, and a fourth upon the loire. these successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the first. on the contrary, a total change of direction may become necessary. a french army repulsed beyond the rhine might find a good base on béfort or besançon, on mézières or sedan, as the russian army after the evacuation of moscow left the base on the north and east and established itself upon the line of the oka and the southern provinces. these lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are often decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the country, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintain himself there. a base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks being held by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired. the more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from it. a state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have so favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more retired. a base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. there should be a _tête de pont_ upon each of its unfordable streams. all are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions have varied. some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to that of the enemy. my opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate. the quotations which follow are from my treatise on great military operations:-- "the general configuration of the theater of war may also have a great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and, consequently, upon the direction of the bases. [illustration: fig. .] "if every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign, may hold one of these faces,--perhaps two,--while the enemy occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable obstacles. the different ways of occupying this theater will lead to widely different combinations. to illustrate, we will cite the theater of the french armies in westphalia from to , and that of napoleon in , both of which are represented in fig. , p. . in the first case, the side a b was the north sea, b d the line of the weser and the base of duke ferdinand, c d the line of the main and the base of the french army, a c the line of the rhine, also guarded by french troops. the french held two faces, the north sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for them, by maneuvers, to gain the side b d to be masters of the four faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. the french army, starting from its base c d and gaining the front of operations f g h, could cut off the allied army i from its base b d; the latter would be thrown upon the angle a, formed by the lines of the rhine, the ems, and the sea, while the army e could communicate with its bases on the main and rhine. "the movement of napoleon in on the saale was similar. he occupied at jena and naumburg the line f g h, then marched by halle and dessau to force the prussian army i upon the sea, represented by the side a b. the result is well known. "the art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without losing one's own. the line f g h, by its extended position, and the bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications with the base c d; and this is exactly the maneuvers of marengo, ulm, and jena. "when the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and closes one side of the square. this may not be an obstacle insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the enemy upon it. the soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none the less cut off from its base. if the boundary of the theater of war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. the outline of the frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in figure . in either case, the advantage of the army which has control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided, since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the shortened side,--as was the case with the prussian army in , with the side b d j of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the rhine, the oder, the north sea, and the mountainous frontier of franconia." [illustration: fig. .] the selection of bohemia as a base in goes to prove the truth of my opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the french army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immense advantages which the line of the elbe would otherwise have afforded napoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor. likewise, in , by establishing their base perpendicularly upon the oka and kalouga, the russians were able to execute their flank march upon wiazma and krasnoi. if any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only be necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of the enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line of operations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communications and line of retreat. it has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable in the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. critics may object to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in favor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and against double lines of operations with equality of force. (art. xxi.) the objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient, which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. on the other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both should be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies, while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,--as was done in the campaigns of and . the angle of nearly ninety degrees formed by the portion of the rhine from constance to basel, and thence to kehl, gave general moreau one base parallel and another perpendicular to that of his antagonist. he threw two divisions by his left toward kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of the enemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon the extremity of the perpendicular face toward schaffhausen, which carried him in a few days to the gates of augsburg, the two detached divisions having already rejoined him. in , napoleon had also the double base of the rhine and main, forming almost a right re-entrant angle. he left mortier upon the first and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the extremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the prussians at gera and naumburg by reaching their line of retreat. if so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in article xx. another very important point in reference to the proper direction of bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. these bases may be favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others, as may be readily seen from what precedes. the danger which must always exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day praises of such a base. wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of spain and portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of torres-vedras, which covers all the avenues to that capital on the land side. the sea and the tagus not only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible line of retreat, which was upon the fleet. blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of torres-vedras secured for the english, and not tracing effects to their real causes, many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of supply and refuge with both flanks secured. fascinated by similar notions, colonel carion-nizas asserted that in napoleon ought to have posted half of his army in bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty thousand men on the mouths of the elbe toward hamburg; forgetting that the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon the front farthest _from_ the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the base were established upon the coast. an insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle, viz.: _to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe retreat._ a state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness. however, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior. we rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the turkish war of and . the whole attention of the russians was given to varna and bourghas, while shumla was merely observed; a plan which they could not have pursued in the presence of a european army (even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin. despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. the army covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of brailoff, varna, and silistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at sizeboli. as soon as its base was well established it moved upon adrianople, which previously would have been madness. had the season been a couple of months longer, or had the army not come so great a distance in , the war would have terminated with the first campaign. besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or temporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy's country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, they will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in article xxiii. article xix. strategic lines and points, decisive points of the theater of war, and objective points of operations. strategic lines and points are of different kinds. some receive this title simply from their position, which gives them all their importance: these are permanent geographical strategic points. others have a value from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against them: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. finally, there are points which have only a secondary importance, and others whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called decisive strategic points. every point of the theater of war which is of military importance, whether from its position as a center of communication, or from the presence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical strategic point. a distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated operation. i think differently; for a strategic point is such essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be from the scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field by some unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. it would, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are not necessarily decisive points. lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from their relation to temporary maneuvers. the first class may be subdivided as follows,--viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance belong to the decisive points[ ] of the theater of war, and those which have value merely because they connect two strategic points. to prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines in their relations to maneuvers,--confining ourselves here to what relates to the _decisive and objective points_ of the zone of operations upon which enterprises occur. although these are most intimately connected, since every objective point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all decisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations. we will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided in our selection of the second. i think the name of _decisive strategic point_ should be given to all those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. all points whose geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor the attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy in importance the first rank among them. the decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. the first are the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a consequence of the configuration of the country. for example, take the case of the french in belgium: whoever is master of the line of the meuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the country; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the meuse and the north sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if he give battle parallel to that sea.[ ] similarly, the valley of the danube presents a series of important points which have caused it to be looked upon as the key of southern germany. those points the possession of which would give the control of the junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of communication in a country are also _decisive geographic points_. for instance, lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls the valleys of the rhone and saône, and is at the center of communications between france and italy and between the south and east; but it would not be a _decisive_ point unless well fortified or possessing an extended camp with _têtes de pont_. leipsic is most certainly a strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the communications of northern germany. were it fortified and did it occupy both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country,--if a country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive point. all capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and government. in mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to any enterprise in this country. it is well known how great was the importance of the defile of bard, protected by a single small fort, in . the second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver, which result from the positions of the troops on both sides. when mack was at ulm, in , awaiting the approach of the russian army through moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was donauwerth or the lower lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to support him. on the contrary, kray, who, in , was in the same position, expected no aid from bohemia, but rather from the tyrol and from the army of mélas in italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon him was not donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by schaffhausen, since this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base, and force him upon the main. in the same campaign the first objective point of napoleon was to fall upon the right of mélas by the saint-bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence saint-bernard, ivrea, and piacenza were decisive points only by reason of the march of mélas upon nice. it may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting forces without being exposed to the same danger. the flank opposite to the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of forcing the enemy upon the sea. the only exception to this is in the case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet. if the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed separately. the decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,-- . the features of the ground. . the relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim. . the positions occupied by the respective forces. these considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles. objective points. there are two classes of objective points,--objective _points of maneuver_, and _geographical objective points_. a geographical objective point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support for ulterior enterprises. _objective points of maneuver_, in contradistinction to _geographical objectives_, derive their importance from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile masses. in strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point. if this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy to make peace. in a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the objective point. however, the geographical position of the capital, the political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and their respective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the art of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not to occupy the hostile capital. if it be concluded not to seize the capital, the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. for instance, if france were to invade italy in a war against austria, the first objective point would be the line of the ticino and po; the second, mantua and the line of the adige. in the defensive, the objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gain possession of, is that which is to be defended. the capital, being considered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point of the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a first line and of the first base of operations. thus, for a french army reduced to the defensive behind the rhine, the first objective would be to prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the forts in alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the first base of operations upon the meuse or moselle,--which might be attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front. as to the objective points of _maneuvers_,--that is, those which relate particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile forces,--their importance may be seen by what has already been said. the greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in some degree in the good choice of these points. this was the most conspicuous merit of napoleon. rejecting old systems, which were satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile army,--since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no organized force to protect them. to detect at a glance the relative advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his forces,--such was the system followed by napoleon in his first campaigns. these campaigns proved this system to be one of the very best. when these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances and the inhospitable regions of russia, they were not so successful as in germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle. napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of the adjoining states. the maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and in what will be stated in article xxi. in discussing the choice of lines of operations. as to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of the two parties. in cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,--such as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory. in other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the hostile army, as did napoleon. the maneuvers of ulm and jena cannot be recommended to an army whose only object is the siege of antwerp. for very different reasons, they could not be recommended to the french army beyond the niemen, five hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to be lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by success. there is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and plans of cabinets. they may be called _political objective points_. indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but often very irrational. they frequently lead to the commission of great errors in strategy. we cite two examples. first, the expedition of the duke of york to dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused their failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. the expedition of the same prince to holland in --likewise due to the views of the english cabinet, sustained by the intentions of austria on belgium--was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the archduke charles from zurich upon manheim,--a step quite contrary to the interests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. these illustrations prove that political objective points should be subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been attained. this subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. the only one which can be given has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events of the campaign. applying this rule to the examples just given, it will be seen that it was at cambray or in the heart of france that dunkirk should have been conquered in and holland delivered in ; in other words, by uniting all the strength of the allies for great attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. expeditions of this kind are generally included in grand diversions,--to be treated of in a separate article. footnotes: [footnote : i may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,--since a line cannot be a _point_, and yet i apply to lines the name of decisive or objective points. it seems almost useless to remark that _objective_ points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of expression used to designate the object which an army desires to attain.] [footnote : this only applies to continental armies, and not to the english, who, having their base on antwerp or ostend, would have nothing to fear from an occupation of the line of the meuse.] article xx. fronts of operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions. there are some parts of the military science that so closely resemble each other, and are so intimately allied, that they are frequently confounded, although they are decidedly distinct. such are _fronts of operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense_, and _strategic positions_. it is proposed in this article to show the distinction between them and to expose their relations to each other. fronts of operations and strategic fronts. when the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations, they generally occupy strategic positions. the extent of the front occupied toward the enemy is called the _strategic front_. the portion of the theater of war from which an enemy can probably reach this front in two or three marches is called the _front of operations_. the resemblance between these two fronts has caused many military men to confound them, sometimes under one name and sometimes under the other. rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates that formed by the actual positions occupied by the masses of the army, while the other embraces the space separating the two armies, and extends one or two marches beyond each extremity of the strategic front, and includes the ground upon which the armies will probably come in collision. when the operations of a campaign are on the eve of commencing, one of the armies will decide to await the attack of the other, and will undertake to prepare a line of defense, which may be either that of the strategic front or more to the rear. hence the strategic front and line of defense may coincide, as was the case in and upon the rhine, which was then a line of defense for both austrians and french, and at the same time their strategic front and front of operations. this occasional coincidence of these lines doubtless leads persons to confound them, while they are really very different. an army has not necessarily a line of defense, as, for example, when it invades: when its masses are concentrated in a single position, it has no strategic front, but it is never without a front of operations. the two following examples will illustrate the difference between the different terms. at the resumption of hostilities in , napoleon's front of operations extended at first from hamburg to wittenberg; thence it ran along the line of the allies toward glogau and breslau, (his right being at löwenberg,) and followed along the frontier of bohemia to dresden. his forces were stationed on this grand front in four masses, whose strategic positions were interior and central and presented three different faces. subsequently, he retired behind the elbe. his real line of defense then extended only from wittenberg to dresden, with a bend to the rear toward marienberg, for hamburg and magdeburg were beyond the strategic field, and it would have been fatal for him to have extended his operations to these points. the other example is his position about mantua in . his front of operations here really extended from the mountains of bergamo to the adriatic sea, while his real line of defense was upon the adige, between lake garda and legnago: afterward it was upon the mincio, between peschiera and mantua, while his strategic front varied according to his positions. the front of operations being the space which separates the two armies, and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of operations. the strategic front will have the same direction, and ought to be perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extend far enough on either flank to cover this line well. however, this direction may vary, either on account of projects that are formed, or on account of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite frequently happens that it is necessary to have a front perpendicular to the base and parallel to the original line of operations. such a change of strategic front is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by this means the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained, thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a base with two faces. (see art. xviii.) the strategic front of napoleon in his march on eylau illustrates these points. his pivots of operations were at warsaw and thorn, which made the vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the narew, from whence he set out, supported by sierock, pultusk, and ostrolenka, to maneuver by his right and throw the russians on elbing and the baltic. in such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be obtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. it ought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words, that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, and should be covered by it. napoleon, marching from the narew by allenstein upon eylau, had behind his left thorn, and farther from the front of the army the _tête de pont_ of praga and warsaw; so that his communications were safe, while benningsen, forced to face him and to make his line parallel to the baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrown back upon the mouths of the vistula. napoleon executed another very remarkable change of strategic front in his march from gera upon jena and naumburg in . moreau made another in moving by his right upon augsburg and dillingen, fronting the danube and france, and thereby forcing kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at ulm. the change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days' duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by important advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive blows, or to procure for the army a good line of defense and good pivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base. it often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic front, either by the features of the theater of war, or because every line of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. as an example of the first, the frontiers of turkey and spain may be cited. in order to cross the balkan or the ebro, an army would be obliged to present a double front,--in the first case, to face the valley of the danube; in the second, to confront forces coming from saragossa or leon. all extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the same precaution. a french army in the valley of the danube will require a double front as soon as the austrians have thrown sufficient troops into the tyrol or bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. those countries which present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception, since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy could themselves be cut off and captured. this necessity of double strategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of an offensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are always dangerous. (see article xxxvi.) of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. in a national or intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities. nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would have its own strategic front determined by the features of the country and the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. thus, suchet in catalonia and massena in portugal each had a strategic front, while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined. lines of defense. lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. strategical lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: . permanent lines of defense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as the line of a fortified frontier; . eventual lines of defense, which relate only to the temporary position of an army. the frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. thus, the range of the alps between france and piedmont is a line of defense, since the practicable passes are guarded by forts which would prove great obstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges in the valleys of piedmont are protected by large fortresses. the rhine, the oder, and the elbe may also be considered as permanent lines of defense, on account of the important forts found upon them. every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and every defile, having their weak points covered by temporary fortifications, may be regarded as _eventual lines of defense_, both strategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progress of the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left in search of a weaker point,--in which case the advantage is evidently strategic. if the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an army from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. on the other hand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should fall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so many armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense, it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.[ ] in addition to this, since a position naturally very strong[ ] is difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the outlets. this happened to the saxons in the camp of pirna, and to wurmser in mantua. strategic positions. there is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for battle. strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be covered in an actual battle. all positions behind a river or upon a line of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable distances, are of this class, such as those of napoleon at rivoli, verona, and legnago to overlook the adige. his positions in in saxony and silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. the positions of the anglo-prussian armies on the frontier of belgium before the battle of ligny, ( ,) and that of massena on the limmat and aar in , were also strategic. even winter quarters, when compact and in face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic positions,--for instance, napoleon on the passarge in . the daily positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements, are of this class. this class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of observation. the different positions taken up on a line of defense, the positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position of a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile operating on another point, are all strategic. indeed, all large detachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupying strategic positions. the maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety. in every case, the first general rule is that the communications with the different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured. in the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. the points of support on the strategic front are called _pivots of operations_, and are practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots of maneuver. for example, in verona was an excellent pivot of operations for all napoleon's enterprises about mantua for eight months. in dresden was his pivot. pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. thus, ney's corps was the pivot of napoleon's maneuver by donauwerth and augsburg to cut mack from his line of retreat. a pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material point of both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of support and endures throughout a campaign. the most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as short as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if it is compelled to take the defensive. it is also important that the extent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the prompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous point. the same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a short front could be easily covered by the defensive army. neither should the front of operations be too extended. such a front is unsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if not a good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the results of a strategic maneuver even if well planned. thus, the beautiful operations of marengo, ulm, and jena could not have produced the same results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the russian war in , since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could have found another by adopting a new zone of operations. the essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should be more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army should have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the intervention of the enemy. thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or interior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the front in the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead to a dangerous division of force. great mobility and activity on the part of the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possible rapid concentration at different and successive points of the front. an army should never long occupy any strategic point without making selection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of there concentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemy when he shall have unveiled his designs. in this manner napoleon prepared the fields of rivoli and austerlitz, wellington that of waterloo, and the archduke charles that of wagram. when an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should be careful that the front be not too extended. a disposition which might be called the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equal faces, so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal for all the divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive an attack. every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic front. for instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being able to occupy in force the whole line, ought always to have a position in rear of the center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so as to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting a passage. for an army entering a country with the purpose either of subjugation or of temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, however brilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of defense as a refuge in case of reverse. this remark is made to complete the subject: the lines themselves are intimately connected with temporary bases, and will be discussed in a future article, (xxiii.) footnotes: [footnote : this does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great difference. they are treated of in article xxvii.] [footnote : it is a question here of positions of camps, and not of positions for battle. the latter will be treated of in the chapter devoted to grand tactics, (article xxx.)] article xxi. zones and lines of operations. a zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war, which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object, whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. for example, in the plan of campaign of , italy was the zone of the right, bavaria that of the center, franconia that of the left army. a zone of operations may sometimes present but a single _line of operations_, either on account of the configuration of the country, or of the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein. generally, however, a zone presents several _lines of operations_, depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the number of great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations. it is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a _line of operations_,--though doubtless it may happen that any good road in a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line; but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the sphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real line of operations. moreover, the existence of several routes leading to the same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, would not constitute so many lines of operations, but, being the communications of the different divisions of the same army, the whole space bounded by them would constitute but a single line. the term _zone of operations_ is applied to a large fraction of the general theater of war; the term _lines of operations_ will designate the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army. whether it follow a single or several routes, the term _strategic lines_ will apply to those important lines which connect the decisive points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name to those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisive points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. _lines of communications_ designate the practicable routes between the different portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone of operations. for example, in , after the accession of austria to the grand coalition, three allied armies were to invade saxony, one bavaria, and another italy: so that saxony, or rather the country between dresden, magdeburg, and breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the forces. this zone had three _lines of operations_ leading to leipsic as an objective: the first was the line of the army of bohemia, leading from the mountains of erzgebirge by dresden and chemnitz upon leipsic; the second was the line of the army of silesia, going from breslau by dresden or by wittenberg upon leipsic; the third was that of bernadotte from berlin by dessau to the same objective point. each of these armies marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not be said that there were as many lines of operations as roads. the principal line of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned, and over which, if compelled, it would retreat. if the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive combinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones on each theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities, it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are divided into different classes, according to their relations to the different positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field, and to the enterprises projected by the commander. _simple lines of operations_ are those of an army acting from a frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies. _double lines of operations_ are those of two independent armies proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in distance and for long intervals of time.[ ] _interior lines of operations_ are those adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose to them a greater force.[ ] _exterior lines_ lead to the opposite result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses. _concentric lines of operations_ are those which depart from widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance of or behind the base. _divergent lines_ are those by which an army would leave a given point to move upon several distinct points. these lines, of course, necessitate a subdivision of the army. there are also _deep lines_, which are simply _long lines_. the term _maneuver-lines_ i apply to momentary strategic lines, often adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be confounded with the real _lines of operations_. _secondary lines_ are those of two armies acting so as to afford each other mutual support,--as, in , the army of the sambre and meuse was secondary to the army of the rhine, and, in , the army of bagration was secondary to that of barclay. _accidental lines_ are those brought about by events which change the original plan and give a new direction to operations. these are of the highest importance. the proper occasions for their use are fully recognized only by a great and active mind. there may be, in addition, _provisional_ and _definitive lines of operations_. the first designate the line adopted by an army in a preliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select a more advantageous or direct line. they seem to belong as much to the class of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines of operations. these definitions show how i differ from those authors who have preceded me. lloyd and bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than that arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter has even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has no lines of operations. the following example will disprove this paradox. let us suppose two armies, the first on the upper rhine, the second in advance of dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their large depots are immediately behind the river,--certainly the safest, nearest, and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted. these armies will have an offensive or defensive object: hence they will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the different proposed enterprises. . their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will extend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both be cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself in the interval which separates them from it. even if mélas[ ] had possessed a year's supplies in alessandria, he would none the less have been cut off from his base of the mincio as soon as the victorious enemy occupied the line of the po. . their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentrated his forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double exterior line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter divided his forces into two masses, giving them such directions as to enable him to concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred to could unite. bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than when on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of support and some of the advantages which are sought for in the establishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line of operations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why it has no line of operations. observations upon the lines of operations in the wars of the french revolution. at the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, prussia and austria were the only avowed enemies of france, and italy was included in the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, it being too remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed. the real theater extended from huningue to dunkirk, and comprised three zones of operations,--the first reaching along the rhine from huningue to landau, and thence to the moselle; the center consisting of the interval between the meuse and moselle; the third and left was the frontier from givet to dunkirk. when france declared war, in april, , her intention was to prevent a union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in the zones just described, while austria had but thirty-five thousand in belgium. it is quite impossible to understand why the french did not conquer this country, when no effectual resistance could have been made. four months intervened between the declaration of war and the concentration of the allied troops. was it not probable that an invasion of belgium would have prevented that of champagne, and have given the king of prussia a conception of the strength of france, and induced him not to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of imposing upon france another form of government? when the prussians arrived at coblentz, toward the end of july, the french were no longer able to invade. this _rôle_ was reserved for the allies; and it is well known how they acquitted themselves. the whole force of the french was now about one hundred and fifteen thousand men. it was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and forty leagues and divided into five corps d'armée, and could not make a good defense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was only necessary to attack the center. political reasons were also in favor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could only be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. the line between the moselle and meuse, which was the center, was less fortified than the rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the allies the advantage of the excellent fortress of luxembourg as a base. they wisely adopted this plan of attack; but the execution was not equal to the conception. the court of vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for family reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse might subject her provinces. for some reason, difficult to understand, austria co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five thousand men remained as an army of observation in brisgau, on the rhine, and in flanders. where were the imposing armies she afterward displayed? and what more useful disposition could have been made of them than to protect the flanks of the invading army? this remarkable conduct on the part of austria, which cost her so much, may account for the resolution of prussia to retire at a later period, and quit the field, as she did, at the very moment when she should have entered it. during the campaign the prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary for success. they spent eight days uselessly in camp at kons. if they had anticipated dumouriez at the little islands, or had even made a more serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have had all the advantage of a concentrated force against several scattered divisions, and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them separately. frederick the great would have justified the remark of dumouriez at grandpré,--that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he (dumouriez) would already have been driven behind châlons. the austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued with the false system of daun and lascy, of covering every point in order to guard every point. the fact of having twenty thousand men in brisgau while the moselle and sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, and how their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruin of armies. forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting the strongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length of a frontier to prevent invasion,--which was exactly the means of rendering invasion upon every point feasible. i will further observe that, in thin campaign, dumouriez foolishly abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theater from the center to the extreme left of the general field. moreover, he was unable to perceive the great results rendered possible by this movement, but attacked the army of the duke of saxe-teschen in front, while by descending the meuse to namur he might have thrown it back upon the north sea toward meuport or ostend, and have destroyed it entirely in a more successful battle than that of jemmapes. the campaign of affords a new instance of the effect of a faulty direction of operations. the austrians were victorious, and recovered belgium, because dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations to the gates of rotterdam. thus far the conduct of the allies deserves praise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this enterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the extreme right of the long front of dumouriez. but after the french had been driven back under the guns of valenciennes, and were disorganized and unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a few towns and permit the committee of public safety to organize new armies? when the deplorable condition of france and the destitution of the wreck of the army of dampierre are considered, can the parades of the allies in front of the fortresses in flanders be understood? invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are particularly advantageous. under the government of a powerful prince, and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of the army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars of opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power.[ ] if this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. paris was france, and this to such an extent that two-thirds of the nation had risen against the government which oppressed them. if, after having beaten the french army at famars, the allies had left the dutch and hanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the english and the austrians directed their operations upon the meuse, the sarre, and the moselle, in concert with the prussians and a part of the useless army of the upper rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with its flanks protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. it is even probable that, without changing the direction of the war or running great risks, the dutch and hanoverians could have performed the duty of observing maubeuge and valenciennes, while the bulk of the army pursued the remains of dampierre's forces. after gaining several victories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in carrying on a few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. while they threatened france with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies of troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! when valenciennes and mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon the camp at cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to dunkirk on one side and landau on the other. it is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts in the beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, they should have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that while the allies were operating in flanders they were in no manner seconded or aided by the imposing army upon the rhine; and when, in its turn, this army took up the offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the sambre. do not these false combinations resemble those of soubise and broglie in , and all the operations of the seven years' war? in the phase of affairs is wholly changed. the french from a painful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. the combinations of this campaign were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong to represent them as forming a new system of war. to be convinced of this, it is only necessary to observe that the respective positions of the armies in this campaign and in that of were almost identical, and the direction of the operations is quite the same. the french had four corps, which constituted two armies, as the king of prussia had four divisions, which composed two armies. these two large bodies took a concentric direction leading on brussels, as frederick and schwerin had adopted in on prague. the only difference between the two plans is that the austrian troops in flanders were not so much scattered as those of brown in bohemia; but this difference is certainly not favorable to the plan of . the position of the north sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. to outflank the austrian right, pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass of the enemy,--a direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given to great operations. this movement was the same as that of benningsen on the lower vistula which almost lost the russian army in . the fate of the prussian army, cut off from its communications and forced upon the baltic, is another proof of this truth. if the prince of coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have made pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a month before jourdan was prepared to follow it up. the center of the grand austrian army intended to act upon the offensive was before landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank flanders was covered by the corps d'armée of clairfayt, and upon the left charleroi was covered by that of the prince de kaunitz. the gain of a battle before landrecies opened its gates; and upon general chapuis was found a plan of the diversion in flanders: only _twelve battalions_ were sent to clairfayt. a long time afterward, and after the french were known to have been successful, the corps of the duke of york marched to clairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army before landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay invasion? the prince of coburg threw away all the advantages of his central position, by allowing the french to concentrate in belgium and to beat all his large detachments in detail. finally, the army moved, leaving a division at cateau, and a part having been sent to the prince de kaunitz at charleroi. if, instead of dividing this grand army, it had been directed upon turcoing, there would have been concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous diversion of pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up between the sea and two fortresses? the plan of invasion adopted by the french had not only the radical error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. the diversion on courtray took place on april , and jourdan did not arrive at charleroi till the d of june,--more than a month afterward. here was a splendid opportunity for the austrians to profit by their central position. if the prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the austrian army by its left,--that is, both upon the meuse,--the state of affairs would have been different. by establishing themselves in the center of a line of scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of the different fractions. it may be dangerous in a battle to attack the center of a close line of troops when it can be simultaneously sustained by the wings and the reserves; but it is quite different on a line of three hundred miles in extent. in prussia and spain retired from the coalition, and the principal theater of war was shifted from the rhine to italy,--which opened a new field of glory for the french arms. their lines of operations in this campaign were double; they desired to operate by dusseldorf and manheim. clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces alternately upon these points, and gained victories at manheim and in the lines of mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the sambre and meuse to recross the rhine to cover the moselle, and brought pichegru back to landau. in the lines of operations on the rhine were copied from those of and those in flanders in , but with different results. the armies of the rhine, and of the sambre and meuse, set out from the extremities of the base, on routes converging to the danube. as in , they were exterior lines. the archduke charles, more skillful than the prince of coburg, profited by his interior lines by concentrating his forces at a point nearer than that expected by the french. he then seized the instant when the danube covered the corps of latour, to steal several marches upon moreau and attack and overwhelm jourdan: the battle of wurzburg decided the fate of germany and compelled the army of moreau to retreat. bonaparte now commences in italy his extraordinary career. his plan is to separate the piedmontese and austrian armies. he succeeds by the battle of millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic lines, and beats them successively at mondovi and lodi. a formidable army is collected in the tyrol to raise the siege of mantua: it commits the error of marching there in two bodies separated by a lake. the lightning is not quicker than napoleon. he raises the siege, abandons every thing before mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon the first column, which debouches by brescia, beats it and forces it back upon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same ground, and is there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire into the tyrol to keep up its communications with the right. wurmser, upon whom these lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of roveredo and vicenza; napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown the first back upon the lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by the gorges of the brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to take refuge in mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender. in hostilities recommence: the french, punished for having formed two exterior lines in , nevertheless, have three upon the rhine and the danube. the army on the left observes the lower rhine, that of the center marches upon the danube, switzerland, flanking italy and swabia, being occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. _the three armies could be concentrated only in the valley of the inn_, eighty leagues from their base of operations. the archduke has equal forces: he unites them against the center, which he defeats at stockach, and the army of switzerland is compelled to evacuate the grisons and eastern switzerland. the allies in turn commit the same fault: instead of following up their success on this central line, which cost them so dearly afterward, they formed a double line in switzerland and on the lower rhine. the army of switzerland is beaten at zurich, while the other trifles at manheim. in italy the french undertake a double enterprise, which leaves thirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at naples, while upon the adige, where the vital blows were to be given or received, their force is too weak and meets with terrible reverses. when the army of naples returns to the north, it commits the error of adopting a strategic direction opposed to moreau's, and suwaroff, by means of his central position, from which he derives full profit, marches against this army and beats it, while some leagues from the other. in , napoleon has returned from egypt, and every thing is again changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanks of switzerland, and debouch, one upon the danube and the other upon the po. this insures the conquest of vast regions. modern history affords no similar combination. the french armies are upon interior lines, affording reciprocal support, while the austrians are compelled to adopt an exterior line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate. by a skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cuts off the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time preserving its own relations with its base and with the army of the rhine, which forms its secondary line. fig. demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations of the two parties. a and a a indicate the front of operations of the armies of the rhine and of the reserve; b and b b, that of kray and mélas; c c c c, the passes of the saint-bernard, of the simplon, of the saint-gothard, and of the splugen; d indicates the two lines of operations of the army of the reserve; e, the two lines of retreat of mélas; h j k, the french divisions preserving their line of retreat. it may thus be seen that mélas is cut off from his base, and that, on the contrary, the french general runs no risk, since he preserves all his communications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines. [illustration: fig. . the stratigic field of .] the analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military operations. indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render his invasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province. by a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led to success have been established in conformity to the fundamental principle already alluded to,--viz.: that _simple and interior lines enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the important point, a stronger force than the enemy_. the student may also satisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to this principle. an undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy. maxims on lines of operations. from the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from that of many others, the following maxims result:-- . if the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a campaign. napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in on donauwerth and in on gera,--maneuvers that cannot be too much studied by military men. of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. the objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for this end: what is to follow will depend upon the result of this first operation and the new phases it may develop. . the direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographical situation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the position of the hostile masses upon this strategic field. _in every case, however, it must be directed upon the center or upon one of the extremities. only when the assailing forces are vastly preponderating would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the two extremities at the same time_.[ ] it may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-line will be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible, the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon the rear of his line of defense or front of operations. the advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity it affords of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact that by using it the assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy's force. thus, the army of the rhine in , gaining the extreme left of the line of defense of the black forest, caused it to yield almost without an effort. this army fought two battles on the right bank of the danube, which, although not decisive, yet, from the judicious direction of the line of operations, brought about the invasion of swabia and bavaria. the results of the march of the army of the reserve by the saint-bernard and milan upon the extreme right of mélas were still more brilliant. . even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations is gained, it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing the assailant in many cases will lose his own communications. to avoid this danger, the line of operations should have a geographic and strategic direction, such that the army will always find either to its rear or to the right or left a safe line of retreat. in this case, to take advantage of either of these flank lines of retreat would require a change of direction of the line of operations, (maxim .) the ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most important qualities of a general. the importance of a direction is illustrated by these examples. if napoleon in , after passing the saint-bernard, had marched upon asti or alessandria, and had fought at marengo without having previously protected himself on the side of lombardy and of the left bank of the po, he would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat than mélas from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points of casale and pavia on the side of the saint-bernard, and savona and tenda toward the apennines, in case of reverse he had every means of regaining the var or the valais. in , if he had marched from gera directly upon leipsic, and had there awaited the prussian army returning from weimar, he would have been cut off from the rhine as much as the duke of brunswick from the elbe, while by falling back to the west in the direction of weimar he placed his front before the three roads of saalfeld, schleiz, and hof, which thus became well-covered lines of communication. if the prussians had endeavored to cut him off from these lines by moving between gera and baireuth, they would have opened to him his most natural line,--the excellent road from leipsic to frankfort,--as well as the two roads which lead from saxony by cassel to coblentz, cologne, and even wesel. . two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier: such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of large coalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act upon the same zone of operations; and even in this case it would be better to have all the forces under the same commander, who accompanies the principal army. . as a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forces on the same frontier, a single line of operations will be more advantageous than a double one. . it may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, either from the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line has been adopted by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part of the army to each of his masses. . in this case, interior or central lines will be preferable to exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can be concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate of the campaign.[ ] such an army may, by a well-combined strategic plan, unite upon and overwhelm successively the fractions of the adversary's forces. to be assured of success in these maneuvers, a body of observation is left in front of the army to be held in check, with instructions to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy as much as possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually falling back upon the principal army. . a double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority of force, when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bring against it. in this case this course will be advantageous,--since a single line would crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all from acting to advantage. however, it will always be prudent to support well the army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the respective positions of the parties, has the most important duty to perform. the principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two other maxims. the first is, that two armies operating on interior lines and sustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior in numbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contracted space, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. this happened to napoleon at leipsic.[ ] the second is, that interior lines should not be abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy the opportunity of overcoming the corps of observation. this risk, however, may be incurred if the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive as to conclude the war,--when the fate of these secondary bodies would be viewed with comparative indifference. . for the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous than two divergent. the first conform better to the principles of strategy, and possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication and supply; but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that the armies which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the combined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect their junction. . divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of the enemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or by a strategic movement,--in which case divergent operations would add to the dispersion of the enemy. such divergent lines would be interior, since the pursuers could concentrate with more facility than the pursued. . it sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line of operations in the middle of a campaign. this is a very delicate and important step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally great disasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate an army from an embarrassing position. napoleon projected several of these changes; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans to meet unforeseen events. at the battle of austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt a line of operations through bohemia on passau or ratisbon, which would have opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning by vienna, which route lay through an exhausted country and from which the archduke charles was endeavoring to cut him off. frederick executed one of these changes of the line of operations after the raising of the siege of olmutz. in napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but one which was favored by the localities. it was to base himself upon the fortresses of alsace and lorraine, leaving the route to paris open to the allies. if mortier and marmont could have joined him, and had he possessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced the most decisive results and have put the seal on his military career. . as before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographical character of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence on the direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantages to be obtained. central positions, salient toward the enemy, like bohemia and switzerland, are the most advantageous, because they naturally lead to the adoption of interior lines and facilitate the project of taking the enemy in reverse. the sides of this salient angle become so important that every means should be taken to render them impregnable. in default of such central positions, their advantages may be gained by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the following figure will explain. c d maneuvering upon the right of the front of the army a b, and h i upon the left flank of g f, will form two interior lines i k and c k upon an extremity of the exterior lines a b, f g, which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon them. such was the result of the operations of , , and . [illustration: fig. . k /\ / \ / \ / \ f lllllllllllll g / \ a llllllllllllll b / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ h ttttttttttttt i c tttttttttttttt d ] . the general configuration of the bases ought also to influence the direction to be given to the lines of operations, these latter being naturally dependent upon the former. it has already been shown that the greatest advantage that can result from a choice of bases is when the frontiers allow it to be assumed parallel to the line of operations of the enemy, thus affording the opportunity of seizing this line and cutting him from his base. but if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive point, the line of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages of the perpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen by referring to the figure on page . the army e, having the double base a c and c d, if it marched toward f, instead of to the right toward g h, would lose all the strategic advantages of its base c d. the great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to establish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the army as to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one's own, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy. . there is another point which exercises a manifest influence over the direction to be given to the line of operations; it is when the principal enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in the presence of a numerous and well-appointed enemy. in this case, the choice of this line depends neither upon the will of the general nor the advantages to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for the first consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be most certainly effected, and where are to be found the means for this purpose. the passage of the rhine in , by jourdan, was near dusseldorf, for the same reason that the vistula in was crossed by marshal paskevitch near ossiek,--viz., that in neither case was there the bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged to procure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the french in holland, and by the russians at thorn and dantzic. the neutrality of prussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy was not able to prevent it. this apparently incalculable advantage led the french into the double invasions of and , which failed because the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies separately. paskevitch was wiser, and passed the upper vistula with only a small detachment and after the principal army had already arrived at lowicz. when an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chances of failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary to select the point which may, either on account of its topography or the position of the enemy, be most advantageous. the discussion between napoleon and moreau on the passage of the rhine in is one of the most curious examples of the different combinations presented by this question, which is both strategic and tactical. since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victory is gained, the point of passage will exercise an influence upon the directions of a few marches immediately subsequent to the passage. the point selected in every case for the principal passage will be upon the center or one of the flanks of the enemy. a united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extended line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete the dispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would not think of disturbing the bridges. if the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after the passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be better to pass it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from the bridges. this will be referred to in the article upon the passage of rivers. . there is yet another combination of lines of operations to be noticed. it is the marked difference of advantage between a line at home and one in a hostile country. the nature of the enemy's country will also influence these chances. let us suppose an army crosses the alps or the rhine to carry on war in italy or germany. it encounters states of the second rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are always rivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of that unity and strength possessed by a single powerful state. on the other hand, a german army invading france would operate upon a line much more dangerous than that of the french in italy, because upon the first could be thrown the consolidated strength of franco, united in feeling and interest. an army on the defensive, with its line of operations on its own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants, authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and even private stores, are all in its favor. it is not ordinarily so abroad. lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to the assailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desert regions, particularly when the people are not united against the invader. in provinces like those first named the army would find a thousand necessary supplies, while in the other huts and straw are about the only resources. horses probably may obtain pasturage; but every thing else must be carried by the army,--thus infinitely increasing the embarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare and dangerous. the french armies, so long accustomed to the comforts of swabia and lombardy, almost perished in in the bogs of pultusk, and actually did perish in in the marshy forests of lithuania. . there is another point in reference to these lines which is much insisted upon by some, but which is more specious than important. it is that on each side of the line of operations the country should be cleared of all enemies for a distance equal to the depth of this line: otherwise the enemy might threaten the line of retreat. this rule is everywhere belied by the events of war. the nature of the country, the rivers and mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of the people, the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated by diagrams on paper. it is true that no considerable bodies of the enemy could be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but a compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means of taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign in recent wars, or in those of marlborough and eugene, which does not contradict this assertion. was not general moreau at the gates of vienna when fussen, scharnitz, and all the tyrol were in possession of the austrians? was not napoleon at piacenza when turin, genoa, and the col-di-tenda were occupied by the army of mélas? did not eugene march by way of stradella and asti to the aid of turin, leaving the french upon the mincio but a few leagues from his base? observations upon interior lines--what has been said against them. some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upon definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood; and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot disprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural principles. in opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the famous and successful march of the allies upon leipsic. this remarkable event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe in principles. at best, however, it is but one of those exceptional cases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of opposed instances. moreover, it is easy to show that, far from overthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to establish their soundness. indeed, the critics had forgotten that in case of a considerable numerical superiority i recommended double lines of operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric and arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment. now, in the allied armies of schwarzenberg, blücher, bernadotte, and benningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. the inferior army, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directed its efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are doubly in my favor. moreover, if the central position of napoleon between dresden and the oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of culm, katzbach, and dennewitz,--in a word, to faults of execution, entirely foreign to the principles in question. what i propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain on the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the decisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of an essential part of the army. then the combined efforts of the whole army may be directed upon other points. whenever the secondary armies are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of the army, the system is not understood; and this was what happened in . if napoleon, after his victory at dresden, had vigorously pursued the allies into bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at culm, have threatened prague, and perhaps have dissolved the coalition. to this error may be added a fault quite as great,--that of fighting decisive battles when he was not present with the mass of his forces. at katzbach his instructions were not obeyed. he ordered macdonald to wait for blücher, and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by hold movements. macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments over torrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and advanced to meet blücher. if he had fulfilled his instructions and napoleon had followed up his victory, there is no doubt that his plan of operations, based upon interior strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric line of operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. the study of his campaigns in italy in and in france in shows that he knew how to apply this system. there is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows the injustice of judging central lines by the fate of napoleon in saxony,--viz.: _that his front of operations was outflanked on the right, and even taken in reverse, by the geographical position of the frontiers of bohemia_. such a case is of rare occurrence. a central position with such faults is not to be compared to one without them. when napoleon made the application of these principles in italy, poland, prussia, and france, he was not exposed to the attack of a hostile enemy on his flanks and rear. austria could have threatened him in ; but she was then at peace with him and unarmed. to judge of a system of operations, it must be supposed that accidents and chances are to be as much in favor of as against it,--which was by no means the case in , either in the geographic positions or in the state of the respective forces. independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses at katzbach and dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof capable of destroying a principle the simplest application of which required these officers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement. instead of avoiding they sought collisions. indeed, what advantage can be expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of the army which have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere, shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contented with being bodies of observation?[ ] in this case it is the enemy who applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. moreover, in the succeeding campaign, the defense of napoleon in champagne, from the battle of brienne to that of paris, demonstrates fully the truth of these maxims. the analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategic question which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertions founded upon theories. it is, whether the system of central lines loses its advantages when the masses are very large. agreeing with montesquieu, that the greatest enterprises fail from the magnitude of the arrangements necessary to consummate them, i am disposed to answer in the affirmative. it is very clear to me that an army of one hundred thousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated armies of thirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating them successively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand strong against three armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; and for several good reasons:-- . considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to bring a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army of one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easily resist a much larger force. . if driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousand men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with one of the other armies. . the central army of four hundred thousand men requires such a quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and _matériel_ of every kind, that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to support such numbers. . the bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must be very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of such magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they will probably suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh the advantages gained by the principal army. i have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentric system. all my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, and to demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of principles. divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad: all depends on the situation of the respective forces. the eccentric lines, for instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from a given point, and acting in divergent directions to divide and separately destroy two hostile forces acting upon exterior lines. such was the maneuver of frederick which brought about, at the end of the campaign of , the fine battles of rossbach and leuthen. such were nearly all the operations of napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by closely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and, having pierced the enemy's center or turned his front, to give them eccentric directions to disperse the defeated army.[ ] on the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: . when they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will be sure to arrive before the enemy; . when they direct to the same end the efforts of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separately by a stronger enemy. concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may be most pernicious,--which should teach us the necessity of detecting the principles upon which systems are based, and not to confound principles and systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant base to march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines and more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a union before the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the case with moreau and jourdan in , opposed to the archduke charles. in starting from the same points, or from two points much less separated than dusseldorf and strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger. what was the fate of the concentric columns of wurmser and quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the mincio by the two banks of lake garda? can the result of the march of napoleon and grouchy on brussels be forgotten? leaving sombref, they were to march concentrically on this city,--one by quatre-bras, the other by wavre. blücher and wellington, taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, and the terrible disaster of waterloo proved to the world that the immutable principles of war cannot be violated with impunity. such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is not in accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. i lay no claim to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and were applied by cæsar, scipio, and the consul nero, as well as by marlborough and eugene; but i claim to have been the first to point them out, and to lay down the principal chances in their various applications. footnotes: [footnote : this definition has been criticized; and, as it has given rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it. in the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of _maneuver-lines_, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great routes. it must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three lines of operations. when moreau and jourdan entered germany with two armies of , men each, being independent of each other, there was a double line of operations; but a french army of which only a detachment starts from the lower rhine to march on the main, while the five or six other corps set out from the upper rhine to march on ulm, would not have a double line of operations in the sense in which i use the term to designate a maneuver. napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set them in motion by bamberg to march on gera, while mortier with a single corps marched on cassel to occupy hesse and flank the principal enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an accessory detachment. the territorial line was composed of two arms or radii, but the operation was not double.] [footnote : some german writers have said that i confound central positions with the line of operations,--in which assertion they are mistaken. an army may occupy a central position in the presence of two masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these are two very different things. others have thought that i would have done better to use the term _radii of operations_ to express the idea of double lines. the reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.] [footnote : this assertion has been disputed. i think it is correct; for mélas, confined between the bormida, the tanaro, and the po, was unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communication by couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged to cut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.] [footnote : the capture of paris by the allies decided the fate of napoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all europe, and the french people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. if he had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have shown that the capital was at his head-quarters.] [footnote : the inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively upon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their _morale_, and the ability of their commander are also very important elements.] [footnote : when the fractions of an army are separated from the main body by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not intended to act separately throughout the campaign, these are central strategic positions, and not lines of operations.] [footnote : in the movements immediately preceding the battle of leipsic, napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of operations, and his armies were simply in central strategic positions; but the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative of lines of operations.] [footnote : i am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a combat without running greater risks than would result from a check; but macdonald might have fought blücher to advantage if he had better understood napoleon's instructions.] [footnote : it will not be thought strange that i sometimes approve of concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we reflect that among the finest operations of napoleon there are some in which he employed these two systems alternately within twenty-four hours; for example, in the movements about ratisbon in .] article xxii. strategic lines. mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, which differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well to define them, for many confound them. we will not consider those strategic lines which have a great and permanent importance by reason of their position and their relation to the features of the country, like the lines of the danube and the meuse, the chains of the alps and the balkan. such lines can best be studied by a detailed and minute examination of the topography of europe; and an excellent model for this kind of study is found in the archduke charles's description of southern germany. the term _strategic_ is also applied to all communications which lead by the most direct or advantageous route from one important point to another, as well as from the strategic front of the army to all of its objective points. it will be seen, then, that a theater of war is crossed by a multitude of such lines, but that at any given time those only which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any real importance. this renders plain the distinction between the general line of operations of a whole campaign, and these _strategic_ lines, which are temporary and change with the operations of the army. besides territorial strategic lines, there are _strategic lines of maneuvers_. an army having germany as its general field might adopt as its zone of operations the space between the alps and the danube, or that between the danube and the main, or that between the mountains of franconia and the sea. it would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, at most, a double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior, directions,--while it would have successively perhaps twenty strategic lines as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one for each wing which would join the general line of operations. if it operated in the zone between the danube and the alps, it might adopt, according to events, the strategic line leading from ulm on donauwerth and ratisbon, or that from ulm to the tyrol, or that which connects ulm with nuremberg or mayence. it may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines of operations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarily applicable to strategic lines. these may be _concentric_, to inflict a decisive blow, or _eccentric_, after victory. they are rarely _simple_, since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but when they are double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be _interior_ if the forces be equal, or _exterior_ in the case of great numerical superiority. the rigorous application of this rule may perhaps sometimes be remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line, even when the forces are equal, to attain an important result without running much risk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to the important masses. strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed against one of the extremities of the enemy's front of operations. the maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding good for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to apply them to particular examples; but there is one, however, which deserves mention,--viz.: that it is important generally, in the selection of these temporary strategic lines, not to leave the line of operations exposed to the assaults of the enemy. even this may, however, be done, to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great success; but the operation must be of short duration, and care must have been taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of the line of operations, if necessary, as has already been referred to. we will illustrate this by the campaign of waterloo. the prussian army was based upon the rhine, its line of operations extended from cologne and coblentz on luxembourg and namur; wellington's base was antwerp, and his line of operations the short road to brussels. the sudden attack by napoleon on flanders decided blücher to receive battle parallel to the english base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have no uneasiness. this was pardonable, because he could always have a good chance of regaining wesel or nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge in antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerful maritime allies it would have been destroyed. beaten at ligny, and seeking refuge at gembloux and then at wavre, blücher had but three strategic lines to choose from: that which led directly to maestricht, that farther north on venloo, or the one leading to the english army near mont st. jean. he audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the application of interior strategic lines,--which napoleon here, perhaps for the first time in his life, neglected. it will readily be seen that the line followed from gembloux by wavre to mont st. jean was neither a line of operations of the prussian army nor a line of battle, but a _strategic line of maneuver_, and was interior. it was bold, because he exposed fully his own natural line of operations. the fact that he sought a junction with the english made his movement accord with the principles of war. a less successful example was that of ney at dennewitz. leaving wittenberg, and going in the direction of berlin, he moved to the right to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left his primitive line of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior in force. his object was to gain communication with napoleon, whose intention was to join him by herzberg or luckau; but ney should from the beginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of accomplishing this change of strategic line and of informing his army of it. he did nothing of this kind,--either from forgetfulness, or on account of the feeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat,--and the severe losses at dennewitz were the result. napoleon in gave one of the best illustrations of these different combinations of strategic lines. his general line of operations extended from the apennines to verona. when he had driven wurmser upon roveredo and determined to pursue him into the tyrol, he pushed on in the valley of the adige to trent and the lavis, where he learned that wurmser had moved by the brenta on the frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse. there were but three courses open to him,--to remain in the narrow valley of the adige at great risk, to retreat by verona to meet wurmser, or the last,--which was sublime, but rash,--to follow him into the valley of the brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two passages might be held by the austrians. napoleon was not the man to hesitate between three such alternatives. he left vaubois on the lavis to cover trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on bassano. the brilliant results of this bold step are well known. the route from trent to bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a _strategic line of maneuver_ still bolder than that of blücher on wavre. however, it was an operation of only three or four days' duration, at the end of which time napoleon would either beat or be beaten at bassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication with verona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in great haste trent, where, reinforced by vaubois, he could fall back either upon verona or peschiera. the difficulties of the country, which made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; for even if wurmser had been victorious at bassano he could not have interfered with the return to trent, as there was no road to enable him to anticipate napoleon. if davidovitch on the lavis had driven vaubois from trent, he might have embarrassed napoleon; but this austrian general, previously beaten at roveredo, and ignorant of what the french army was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before napoleon beaten at bassano would have been on his retreat. indeed, if davidovitch had advanced as far as roveredo, driving vaubois before him, he would there have been surrounded by two french armies, who would have inflicted upon him the fate of vandamme at culm. i have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of time and distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many adventures which may seem very imprudent. i conclude from this that it may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what is taking place. still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be adopted under an urgent necessity. article xxiii. means of protecting a line of operations by temporary bases or strategic reserves. when a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or temporary bases,--which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as his own frontiers. a river with _têtes de ponts_, and one or two large towns secure from a _coup de main_ to cover the depots of the army and to serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an excellent base of this kind. of course, such a line could not be a temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operations leading to the real base on the frontiers. napoleon would have had a good real base on the elbe in if austria had remained neutral; but, she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, and became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution of a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation, particularly in case of a serious reverse. as every army which is beaten in an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases, and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. in general, we cannot expect to find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for a temporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic reserve,--which is purely a modern invention. its merits and demerits deserve notice. strategic reserves. reserves play an important part in modern warfare. from the executive, who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. a wise government always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them when they come under his command. the state has its reserves, the army has its own, and every corps d'armée or division should not fail to provide one. the reserves of an army are of two kinds,--those on the battle-field, and those which are intended to recruit and support the army: the latter, while organizing, may occupy important points of the theater of war, and serve even as strategic reserves; their positions will depend not only on their magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and the distance from the base to the front of operations. whenever an army takes the offensive, it should always contemplate the possibility of being compelled to act on the defensive, and by the posting of a reserve between the base and front of operations the advantage of an active reserve on the field of battle is gained: it can fly to the support of menaced points without weakening the active army. it is true that to form a reserve a number of regiments must be withdrawn from active service; but there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to be instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing central depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and by making them the rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming from the army, and adding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a reserve may be formed capable of important service. napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. even in , in his bold march on the noric alps, he had first joubert on the adige, afterward victor (returning from the roman states) in the neighborhood of verona. in ney and augereau played the part alternately in the tyrol and bavaria, and mortier and marmont near vienna. in napoleon formed like reserves on the rhine, and mortier used them to reduce hesse. at the same time, other reserves were forming at mayence under kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, between the rhine and elbe, while mortier was sent into pomerania. when napoleon decided to push on to the vistula in the same year, he directed, with much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the elbe sixty thousand strong, its object being to protect hamburg against the english and to influence austria, whose disposition was as manifest as her interests. the prussians established a similar reserve in at halle, but it was badly posted: if it had been established upon the elbe at wittenberg or dessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by giving prince hohenlohe and blücher time to reach berlin, or at least stettin. these reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of the country leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill the double object of observing the second front, and, in case of necessity, of aiding the operations of the main army when the enemy threatens its flanks or a reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve. of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, and whenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or the troops in the depots only be employed as reserves. it is only in distant invasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if the scene of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from the frontier, they are quite superfluous. at home they may generally be dispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion, when new levies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under the protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will be indispensable. the general's talents will be exercised in judging of the use of these reserves according to the state of the country, the length of the line of operations, the nature of the fortified points, and the proximity of a hostile state. he also decides upon their position, and endeavors to use for this purpose troops which will not weaken his main army so much as the withdrawal of his good troops. these reserves ought to hold the most important points between the base and front of operations, occupy the fortified places if any have been reduced, observe or invest those which are held by the enemy; and if there be no fortress as a point of support, they should throw up intrenched camps or _têtes de ponts_ to protect the depots and to increase the strength of their positions. all that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable to temporary bases and to strategic reserves, which will be doubly valuable if they possess such well-located pivots. article xxiv. the old system of wars of position and the modern system of marches. _by the system of positions_ is understood the old manner of conducting a methodical war, with armies in tents, with their supplies at hand, engaged in watching each other; one besieging a city, the other covering it; one, perhaps, endeavoring to acquire a small province, the other counteracting its efforts by occupying strong points. such was war from the middle ages to the era of the french revolution. during this revolution great changes transpired, and many systems of more or less value sprang up. war was commenced in as it had been in : the french encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged them. it was not till , when assailed from without and within, that this system was changed. thoroughly aroused, france threw one million men in fourteen armies upon her enemies. these armies had neither tents, provisions, nor money. on their marches they bivouacked or were quartered in towns; their mobility was increased and became a means of success. their tactics changed also: the troops were put in columns, which were more easily handled than deployed lines, and, on account of the broken character of the country of flanders and the vosges, they threw out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and cover the columns. this system, which was thus the result of circumstances, at first met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted the methodical austrian and prussian troops as well as their generals. mack, to whom was attributed the success of the prince of coburg, increased his reputation by directing the troops to extend their lines to oppose an open order to the fire of skirmishers. it had never occurred to the poor man that while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carried the positions. the first generals of the republic were fighting-men, and nothing more. the principal direction of affairs was in the hands of carnot and of the committee of public safety: it was sometimes judicious, but often bad. carnot was the author of one of the finest strategic movements of the war. in he sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid of dunkirk, maubeuge, and landau, so that this small force, moving rapidly from point to point, and aided by the troops already collected at these different points, compelled the enemy to evacuate france. the campaign of opened badly. it was the force of circumstances, and not a premeditated plan, which brought about the strategic movement of the army of the moselle on the sambre; and it was this which led to the success of fleurus and the conquest of belgium. in the mistakes of the french were so great that they were imputed to treachery. the austrians, on the contrary, were better commanded by clairfayt, chateler, and schmidt than they had been by mack and the prince of coburg. the archduke charles, applying the principle of interior lines, triumphed over moreau and jourdan in by a single march. up to this time the fronts of the french armies had been large,--either to procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought it better to put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commanders to arrange them for battle. the reserves were small detachments, incapable of redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded in overwhelming but a single division. such was the state of affairs when napoleon made his _début_ in italy. his activity from the beginning worsted the austrians and piedmontese: free from useless incumbrances, his troops surpassed in mobility all modern armies. he conquered the italian peninsula by a series of marches and strategic combats. his march on vienna in was rash, but justified by the necessity of overcoming the archduke charles before he could receive reinforcements from the rhine. the campaign of , still more characteristic of the man, marked a new era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. he adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the capture or destruction of whole armies. the orders of battle were less extended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodies of two or three divisions was adopted. the system of modern strategy was here fully developed, and the campaigns of and were merely corollaries to the great problem solved in . tactically, the system of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of italy not to meet with his approval. it may now be a question whether the system of napoleon is adapted to all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there can be any return, in the light of the events of and , to the old system of wars of position. after a comparison of the marches and camps of the seven years' war with those of the _seven weeks'_ war,--as napoleon called the campaign of ,--or with those of the three months which elapsed from the departure of the army from boulogne in till its arrival in the plains of moravia, the reader may easily decide as to the relative merits of the two systems. the system of napoleon was _to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight, and then to camp in quiet_. he told me that he knew no other method of conducting a war than this. it may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his personal situation, and the tone of the french mind, all concurred in urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a throne, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare to adopt. this is probably true; but between the extremes of very distant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and, without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has marked out. it is probable that the old system of wars of positions will for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much modified and improved. if the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches, humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions and bivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun, are not materially different from the devastations of the barbarian hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. still, it is not likely that the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has been demonstrated by napoleon's wars,--viz.: that remoteness is not a certain safeguard against invasion,--that a state to be secure must have a good system of fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves and military institutions, and, finally, a good system of government. then the people may everywhere be organized as militia, and may serve as reserves to the active armies, which will render the latter more formidable; and the greater the strength of the armies the more necessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt results. if, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,--if nations, instead of fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, to acquire a natural frontier or to maintain the political equilibrium,--then a new right of nations may be agreed upon, and perhaps it will be possible to have armies on a less extensive scale. then also we may see armies of from eighty to one hundred thousand men return to a mixed system of war,--a mean between the rapid incursions of napoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century. until then we must expect to retain this system of marches, which has produced so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of an active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion. the science of marches now includes more than details, like the following, viz.: the order of the different arms in column, the time of departure and arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, and the means of communication between the columns, all of which is a part of the duties of the staff of an army. outside and beyond these very important details, there is a science of marches in the great operations of strategy. for instance, the march of napoleon by the saint-bernard to fall upon the communications of mélas, those made in by donauwerth to cut off mack, and in by gera to turn the prussians, the march of suwaroff from turin to the trebbia to meet macdonald, that of the russian army on taroutin, then upon krasnoi, were decisive operations, not because of their relation to logistics, but on account of their strategic relations. indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the great principle of throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point; and this point is to be determined from the considerations given in article xix. what was the passage of the saint-bernard but a line of operations directed against an extremity of the strategic front of the enemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? the marches of ulm and jena were the same maneuvers; and what was blücher's march at waterloo but an application of interior strategic lines? from this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend to throw the mass of the army successively upon the different points of the front of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply the principle of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. the operations of the french in from dunkirk to landau, and those of napoleon in , , and , are models of this kind. one of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is to so combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greatest strategic front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the triple object of deceiving him as to the objective in view, of moving with ease and rapidity, and of procuring supplies with more facility. however, it is necessary in this case to have previously arranged the means of concentration of the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow. this alternate application of extended and concentric movements is the true test of a great general. there is another kind of marches, designated as _flank marches_, which deserves notice. they have always been held up as very dangerous; but nothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. if by the term _flank marches_ are understood tactical maneuvers made upon the field of battle in view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very delicate operations, though sometimes successful; but if reference is made to ordinary strategic marches, i see nothing particularly dangerous in them, unless the most common precautions of logistics be neglected. in a strategic movement, the two hostile armies ought to be separated by about two marches, (counting the distance which separates the advanced guards from the enemy and from their own columns.) in such a case there could be no danger in a strategic march from one point to another. there are, however, two cases where such a march would be altogether inadmissible: the first is where the system of the line of operations, of the strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen as to present the flank to the enemy during a whole operation. this was the famous project of marching upon leipsic, leaving napoleon and dresden on the flank, which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies. it was modified by the emperor alexander upon the solicitations of the author. the second case is where the line of operations is very long, (as was the case with napoleon at borodino,) and particularly if this line affords but a single suitable route for retreat: then every flank movement exposing this line would be a great fault. in countries abounding in secondary communications, flank movements are still less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety may be found in a change of the line of operations. the physical and moral condition of the troops and the more or less energetic characters of the commanders will, of course, be elements in the determination of such movements. the often-quoted marches of jena and ulm were actual flank maneuvers; so was that upon milan after the passage of the chiusella, and that of marshal paskevitch to cross the vistula at ossiek; and their successful issue is well known. a tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy is quite a different affair. ney suffered for a movement of this kind at dennewitz, and so did marmont at salamanca and frederick at kolin. nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of frederick at leuthen was a true flank movement, but it was covered by a mass of cavalry concealed by the heights, and applied against an army which lay motionless in its camp; and it was so successful because at the time of the decisive shock daun was taken in flank, and not frederick. in the old system of marching in column at platoon distance, where line of battle could be formed to the right or left without deployment, (by a right or left into line,) movements parallel to the enemy's line were not _flank marches_, because the flank of the column was the real front of the line of battle. the famous march of eugene within view of the french army, to turn the lines of turin, was still more extraordinary than that of leuthen, and no less successful. in these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and not strategic. the march of eugene from mantua to turin was one of the greatest strategic operations of the age; but the case above referred to was a movement made to turn the french camp the evening before the battle. article xxv. depots of supplies, and their relation to marches. the subject most nearly connected with the system of marches is the commissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance food must be supplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous army in an enemy's country is a very difficult one. it is proposed to discuss the relation between the commissariat and strategy. it will always be difficult to imagine how darius and xerxes subsisted their immense armies in thrace, where now it would be a hard task to supply thirty thousand men. during the middle ages, the greeks, barbarians, and more lately the crusaders, maintained considerable bodies of men in that country. cæsar said that war should support war, and he is generally believed to have lived at the expense of the countries he overran. the middle ages were remarkable for the great migrations of all kinds, and it would be interesting to know the numbers of the huns, vandals, goths, and mongols who successively traversed europe, and how they lived during their marches. the commissariat arrangements of the crusaders would also be an interesting subject of research. in the early periods of modern history, it is probable that the armies of francis i., in crossing the alps into italy, did not carry with them large stores of provisions; for armies of their magnitude, of forty or fifty thousand men, could easily find provisions in the rich valleys of the ticino and po. under louis xiv. and frederick ii. the armies were larger; they fought on their own frontiers, and lived from their storehouses, which were established as they moved. this interfered greatly with operations, restricting the troops within a distance from the depots dependent upon the means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and the number of days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to camp. during the revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity. the large armies which invaded belgium and germany lived sometimes in the houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon the country, and often by plunder and pillage. to subsist an army on the granaries of belgium, italy, swabia, and the rich banks of the rhine and danube, is easy,--particularly if it marches in a number of columns and does not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; but this would be very difficult in some other countries, and quite impossible in russia, sweden, poland, and turkey. it may readily be conceived how great may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army where every thing depends only on the strength of the soldiers' legs. this system gave napoleon great advantages; but he abused it by applying it on too large a scale and to countries where it was impracticable. a general should be capable of making all the resources of the invaded country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use the local authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as to make them uniform and legal, while he himself should see to their fulfillment. if the authorities do not remain, he should create provisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with extraordinary powers. the provisions thus acquired should be collected at the points most convenient for the operations of the army. in order to husband them, the troops may be quartered in the towns and villages, taking care to reimburse the inhabitants for the extra charge thus laid upon them. the inhabitants should also be required to furnish wagons to convey the supplies to the points occupied by the troops. it is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent to undertake without having previously established these depots, as much depends upon the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit of the people; but the following may be considered as general maxims:-- . that in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of one hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant from the enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent of country, may draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by any single operation. as the first operation never requires more than a month, during which time the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will be sufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wants of the army, and particularly for those of the troops obliged to remain at a particular point. thus, the army of napoleon, while half of it was besieging ulm, would need bread until the surrender of the city; and if there had been a scarcity the operation might have failed. . during this time every effort should be made to collect the supplies obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve the wants of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take a position to recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise. . the depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should be echeloned as much as possible upon three different lines of communication, in order to supply with more facility the wings of the army, and to extend as much as possible the area from which successive supplies are to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots should be as well covered as possible. to this end, it would be well to have the depots on lines converging toward the principal line of operations, which will be generally found in the center. this arrangement has two real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to the attempts of the enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased; secondly, it facilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a single point of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the initiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the offensive and gained some advantage. . in thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack its most necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not to advance too far from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon its lines of depots. . in national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in their path, as was the case in spain, portugal, russia, and turkey, it is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. under these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not impossible. . it is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid expeditions. to facilitate their transportation, the rations should consist of the most portable articles,--as biscuit, rice, &c.: the wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of roads. it will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country, and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the successive resources. lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour. . the vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply himself at will. this advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of a large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communications with its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thus exposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the mass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. if the army advance too far from the coast, there will be danger of its communications being intercepted; and this danger increases with the progress of the army. . a continental army using the sea for transportation should base itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic front opposed to the sea. . navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations of the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise necessary. for this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the most favorable. the water-communications themselves are not in this case the lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is essential that the troops should be able to move at some distance from the river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back the exterior flank upon the river,--which might be as dangerous as if it were the sea. in the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used for transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since a small body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. to render it sure, it is necessary to occupy both banks,--which is hazardous, as mortier experienced at dirnstein. in a friendly country the advantages of rivers are more substantial. . in default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an army may be fed by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be found, in populous countries, in numbers to last for some little time. this source of supply will, however, be soon exhausted; and, in addition, this plan leads to plunder. the requisitions for cattle should be well regulated; and the best plan of all is to supply the army with cattle purchased elsewhere. i will end this article by recording a remark of napoleon which may appear whimsical, but which is still not without reason. he said that in his first campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troops were in want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemy to procure every thing in abundance. this is a remark upon which it would be absurd to found a system, but which perhaps explains the success of many a rash enterprise, and proves how much actual war differs from narrow theory. article xxvi. the defense of frontiers by forts and intrenched lines.--wars of sieges. forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the frontiers; secondly, to aid the operations of the campaign. the defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat indeterminate. it is not so for those countries whose borders are covered with great natural obstacles, and which present but few accessible points, and these admitting of defense by the art of the engineer. the problem here is simple; but in open countries it is more difficult. the alps and the pyrenees, and the lesser ranges of the crapacks, of riesengebirge, of erzgebirge, of the böhmerwald, of the black forest, of the vosges, and of the jura, are not so formidable that they cannot be made more so by a good system of fortresses. of all these frontiers, that separating france and piedmont was best covered. the valleys of the stura and suza, the passes of argentine, of mont-genèvre, and of mont-cenis,--the only ones considered practicable,--were covered by masonry forts; and, in addition, works of considerable magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plains of piedmont. it was certainly no easy matter to surmount these difficulties. these excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent the passage of an army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may be carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may find a passage over some other route hitherto deemed impracticable. the passage of the alps by francis i.,--which is so well described by gaillard,--napoleon's passage of the saint-bernard, and the splugen expedition, prove that there is truth in the remark of napoleon, _that an army can pass wherever a titan can set his foot_,--a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of the man, and applied by him with great success. other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line or as a second. it is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently so well calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade and communication, are generally not part of the real frontier. it cannot be said that the danube divides bessarabia from the ottoman empire as long as the turks have a foothold in moldavia. the rhine was never the real frontier of france and germany; for the french for long periods held points upon the right bank, while the germans were in possession of mayence, luxembourg, and the _têtes de ponts_ of manheim and wesel on the left bank. if, however, the danube, the rhine, rhone, elbe, oder, vistula, po, and adige be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why they should not be fortified as lines of permanent defense, wherever they permit the use of a system suitable for covering a front of operations. an example of this kind is the inn, which separates bavaria from austria: flanked on the south by the tyrolese alps, on the north by bohemia and the danube, its narrow front is covered by the three fortified places of passau, braunau, and salzburg. lloyd, with some poetic license, compares this frontier to two impregnable bastions whose curtain is formed of three fine forts and whose ditch is one of the most rapid of rivers. he has exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of "impregnable" was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of , , and . the majority of the european states have frontiers by no means so formidable as that of the alps and the inn, being generally open, or consisting of mountains with practicable passes at a considerable number of points. we propose to give a set of general maxims equally applicable to all cases. when the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no attempt to make a complete line of defense by building too many fortresses, requiring armies to garrison them, and which, after all, might not prevent an enemy from penetrating the country. it is much wiser to build fewer works, and to have them properly located, not with the expectation of absolutely preventing the ingress of the enemy, but to multiply the impediments to his progress, and, at the same time, to support the movements of the army which is to repel him. if it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely prevents the progress of an army, it is, nevertheless, an embarrassment, and compels the army to detach a part of its force or to make _détours_ in its march; while, on the other hand, it imparts corresponding advantages to the army which holds it, covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and, finally, is a place of refuge in case of need. fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military operations; and we now propose to examine their relations to strategy. the first point to be considered is their location; the second lies in the distinction between the cases where an army can afford to pass the forts without a siege, and those where it will be necessary to besiege; the third point is in reference to the relations of an army to a siege which it proposes to cover. as fortresses properly located favor military operations, in the same degree those which are unfortunately placed are disadvantageous. they are an incubus upon the army which is compelled to garrison them and the state whose men and money are wasted upon them. there are many in europe in this category. it is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses very close together. this system has been wrongly imputed to vauban, who, on the contrary, had a controversy with louvois about the great number of points the latter desired to fortify. the maxims on this point are as follow:-- . the fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines, and should extend from the frontiers toward the capital.[ ] there should be three in the first line, as many in the second, and a large place in the third, near the center of the state. if there be four fronts, this would require, for a complete system, from twenty-four to thirty places. it will be objected that this number is large, and that even austria has not so many. it must be recollected that france has more than forty upon only a third of its frontiers, (from besançon to dunkirk,) and still has not enough on the third line in the center of the country. a board convened for the purpose of considering the system of fortresses has decided quite recently that more were required. this does not prove that there were not already too many, but that certain points in addition should be fortified, while those on the first line, although too much crowded, may be maintained since they are already in existence. admitting that france has two fronts from dunkirk to basel, one from basel to savoy, one from savoy to nice, in addition to the totally distinct line of the pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts, requiring forty to fifty places. every military man will admit that this is enough, since the swiss and coast fronts require fewer than the northeast. the system of arrangement of these fortresses is an important element of their usefulness. austria has a less number, because she is bordered by the small german states, which, instead of being hostile, place their own forts at her disposal. moreover, the number above given is what was considered necessary for a state having four fronts of nearly equal development. prussia, being long and narrow, and extending from königsberg almost to the gates of metz, should not be fortified upon the same system as france, spain, or austria. thus the geographical position and extent of states may either diminish or increase the number of fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be included. . fortresses should always occupy the important strategic points already designated in article xix. as to their tactical qualities, their sites should not be commanded, and egress from them should be easy, in order to increase the difficulty of blockading them. . those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to their own defense or for seconding the operations of an army, are certainly those situated on great rivers and commanding both banks. mayence, coblentz, and strasbourg, including kehl, are true illustrations and models of this kind. places situated at the confluence of two great rivers command three different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. take, for instance, modlin. mayence, when it had on the left bank of the main the fort of gustavusburg, and cassel on the right, was the most formidable place in europe, but it required a garrison of twenty-five thousand men: so that works of this extent must be few in number. . large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial cities, are preferable to small ones,--particularly when the assistance of the citizens can be relied on for their defense. metz arrested the whole power of charles v, and lille for a whole year delayed eugene and marlborough. strasbourg has many times proved the security of french armies. during the last wars these places were passed without being besieged by the invading forces, because all europe was in arms against france; but one hundred and fifty thousand germans having in their front one hundred thousand french could not penetrate to the seine with impunity, leaving behind them these well-fortified points. . formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps, and positions; recently they have been directed only against organized armies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial obstacles. the exclusive use of either of these systems is faulty: the true course is a mean between these extremes. doubtless, it will always be of the first importance to destroy and disorganize all the armies of the enemy in the field, and to attain this end it may be allowable to pass the fortresses; but if the success be only partial it will be unwise to push the invasion too far. here, also, very much depends upon the situation and respective strength of the armies and the spirit of the nations. if austria were the sole antagonist of france, she could not follow in the footsteps of the allies in ; neither is it probable that fifty thousand french will very soon risk themselves beyond the noric alps, in the very heart of austria, as napoleon did in .[ ] such events only occur under exceptional circumstances. . it may be concluded from what precedes,-- st, that, while fortified places are essential supports, abuse in their application may, by dividing an army, weaken it instead of adding to its efficiency; d, that an army may, with the view of destroying the enemy, pass the line of these forts,--always, however, leaving a force to observe them; d, that an army cannot pass a large river, like the danube or the rhine, without reducing at least one of the fortresses on the river, in order to secure a good line of retreat. once master of this place, the army may advance on the offensive, leaving detachments to besiege other places; and the chances of the reduction of those places increase as the army advances, since the enemy's opportunities of hindering the siege are correspondingly diminished. . while large places are much the most advantageous among a friendly people, smaller works are not without importance, not to arrest an enemy, who might mask them, but as they may materially aid the operations of an army in the field. the fort of königstein in was as useful to the french as the fortress of dresden, because it procured a _tête de pont_ on the elbe. in a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in value to fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, and not to afford refuge to armies: the little fort of bard, in the valley of aosta, almost arrested napoleon's army in . . it follows that each frontier should have one or two large fortresses as places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small posts to facilitate military operations. walled cities with a shallow ditch may be very useful in the interior of a country, to contain depots, hospitals, &c, when they are strong enough to resist the attacks of any small bodies that may traverse the vicinity. they will be particularly serviceable if they can be defended by the militia, so as not to weaken the active army. . large fortified places which are not in proper strategic positions are a positive misfortune for both the army and state. . those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a maritime war, except for depots: they may even prove disastrous for a continental army, by holding out to it a delusive promise of support. benningsen almost lost the russian armies by basing them in on königsberg,--which he did because it was convenient for supply. if the russian army in , instead of concentrating on smolensk, had supported itself on dunaburg and riga, it would have been in danger of being forced into the sea and of being cut off from all its bases. the relations between sieges and the operations of active armies are of two kinds. an invading army may pass by fortified places without attacking them, but it must leave a force to invest them, or at least to watch them; and when there are a number of them adjacent to each other it will be necessary to leave an entire corps d'armée, under a single commander, to invest or watch them as circumstances may require. when the invading army decides to attack a place, a sufficient force to carry on the siege will be assigned to this duty; the remainder may either continue its march or take a position to cover the siege. formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a whole army, which buried itself in lines of circumvallation and contravallation. these lines cost as much in labor and expense as the siege itself. the famous case of the lines of turin, which were fifteen miles in length, and, though guarded by seventy-eight thousand french, were forced by prince eugene with forty thousand men in , is enough to condemn this ridiculous system. much as the recital of the immense labors of cæsar in the investment of alise may excite our admiration, it is not probable that any general in our times will imitate his example. nevertheless, it is very necessary for the investing force to strengthen its position by detached works commanding the routes by which the garrison might issue or by which the siege might be disturbed from without. this was done by napoleon at mantua, and by the russians at varna. experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to beat and pursue as far as possible the enemy's forces which could interfere. if the besieging force is numerically inferior, it should take up a strategic position covering all the avenues by which succor might arrive; and when it approaches, as much of the besieging force as can be spared should unite with the covering force to fall upon the approaching army and decide whether the siege shall continue or not. bonaparte in , at mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill for the operations of an army of observation. intrenched lines. besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to above, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and is in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is intended to protect a part of the frontiers. as a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for an army, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system of intrenched lines absurd. i do not now refer to lines of small extent closing a narrow gorge, like fussen and scharnitz, for they may be regarded as forts; but i speak of extended lines many leagues in length and intended to wholly close a part of the frontiers. for instance, those of wissembourg, which, covered by the lauter flowing in front, supported by the rhine on the right and the vosges on the left, seemed to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced on every occasion when they were assailed. the lines of stollhofen, which on the right of the rhine played the same part as those of wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; and those of the queich and the kinzig had the same fate. the lines of turin, ( ,) and those of mayence, ( ,) although intended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines in question in their extent and in the fate which befell them. however well they may be supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzes their defenders, and they are almost always susceptible of being turned. to bury an army in intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is manifest folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see another instance of it. nevertheless, in our chapter on tactics we will treat of their attack and defense. it may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extended lines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to be derived from detached works in increasing the strength of a besieging force, the safety of a position, or the defense of a defile. footnotes: [footnote : the memorable campaign of is evidence of the value of such a system. if the porte had possessed masonry forts in the defiles of the balkan and a good fortress toward faki, the russians would not have reached adrianople, and the affair would not have been so simple.] [footnote : still, napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the frioul, since the austrians were expecting a reinforcement from the rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly important to beat the archduke charles before this force joined him. in view of the circumstances of the case, napoleon's conduct was in accordance with the principles of war.] article xxvii. the connection of intrenched camps and têtes de ponts with strategy. it would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites of ordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards, or upon the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts. only fortified camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and even of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they afford an army. it may be seen by the example of the camp of buntzelwitz, which saved frederick in , and by those of kehl and dusseldorf in , that such a refuge may prove of the greatest importance. the camp of ulm, in , enabled kray to arrest for a whole month the army of moreau on the danube; and wellington derived great advantages from his camp of torres-vedras. the turks were greatly assisted in defending the country between the danube and the balkan mountains by the camp of shumla. the principal rule in this connection is that camps should be established on strategic points which should also possess tactical advantages. if the camp of drissa was useless to the russians in , it was because it was not in a proper position in reference to their defensive system, which should have rested upon smolensk and moscow. hence the russians were compelled to abandon it after a few days. the maxims which have been given for the determination of the great decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, because they ought only to be placed on such points. the influence of these camps is variable: they may answer equally well as points of departure for an offensive operation, as _têtes de ponts_ to assure the crossing of a large river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for a defeated army. however good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficult to locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp of torres-vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. whenever it can be passed either by the right or the left, the army will be compelled to abandon it or run the risk of being invested in it. the camp of dresden was an important support to napoleon for two months; but as soon as it was outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even of an ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corps within a few days for want of provisions. despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporary support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, even when the enemy passes by them, provided they cannot be taken in reverse,--that is, provided all their faces are equally safe from a _coup de main_. it is also important that they be established close to a fortress, where the depots may be safe, or which may cover the front of the camp nearest to the line of retreat. in general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large _tête de pont_ on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city like mayence or strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never be more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of collecting reinforcements. when the object is to drive away the enemy, it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the open country. the second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. if a french army occupied an intrenched camp on the elbe, it would be lost when the space between the rhine and elbe was held by the enemy; but if it were invested in an intrenched camp near strasbourg, it might with a little assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the enemy in the interior of france and between the relieving force and the intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the rhine. we have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; but several german generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover places or to prevent sieges,--which appears to me to be a little sophistical. doubtless, it will be more difficult to besiege a place when an army is encamped on its glacis; and it maybe said that the forts and camps are a mutual support; but, according to my view, the real and principal use of intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, a temporary refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensively upon a decisive point or beyond a large river. to bury an army in such a camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off, simply to retard a siege, would be folly. the example of wurmser, who prolonged the defense of mantua, will be cited in opposition to this; but did not his army perish? and was this sacrifice really useful? i do not think so; for, the place having been once relieved and revictualed, and the siege-train having fallen into the hands of the austrians, the siege was necessarily changed into a blockade, and the town could only be taken by reason of famine; and, this being the case, wurmser's presence ought rather to have hastened than retarded its surrender. the intrenched camp of the austrians before mayence in would, indeed, have prevented the siege of the place, if the french had possessed the means of carrying on a siege, as long as the rhine had not been crossed; but as soon as jourdan appeared on the lahn, and moreau in the black forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave the place to its own means of defense. it would only be in the event of a fortress occupying a point such that it would be impossible for an army to pass it without taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the object of preventing an attack upon it, would be established; and what place in europe is upon such a site? so far from agreeing with these german authors, on the contrary, it seems to me that a very important question in the establishment of these camps near fortified places on a river, is whether they should be on the same bank as the place, or upon the other. when it is necessary to make a choice, by reason of the fact that the place cannot be located to cover both banks, i should decidedly prefer the latter. to serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be on the bank of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the principal danger to be feared is that the enemy might take the camp in reverse by passing the river at some other point; and if the fortress were upon the same bank us the camp, it would be of little service; while if upon the other bank, opposite to the camp, it would be almost impossible to take the latter in reverse. for instance, the russians, who could not hold for twenty-four hours their camp of drissa, would have defied the enemy for a long time if there had been a fortification on the right bank of the dwina, covering the rear of the camp. so moreau for three months, at kehl, withstood all the efforts of the archduke charles; while if strasbourg had not been there upon the opposite bank his camp would easily have been turned by a passage of the rhine. indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the fortified place upon the other bank too; and a place holding both banks would fulfill this condition. the fortification of coblentz, recently constructed, seems to introduce a new epoch. this system of the prussians, combining the advantages of intrenched camps and permanent works, deserves attentive consideration; but, whatever may be its defects, it is nevertheless certain that it would afford immense advantages to an army intended to operate on the rhine. indeed, the inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is that they are only very useful when beyond the river; and in this case they are exposed to the dangers arising from destruction of bridges (as happened to napoleon at essling,)--to say nothing of the danger of losing their provisions and munitions, or even of a front attack against which the works might not avail. the system of detached permanent works of coblentz has the advantage of avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on the same bank as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from attack at least until the bridges be re-established. if the city were upon the right bank of the rhine, and there were only an intrenched camp of field-works on the left bank, there would be no certainty of security either for the depots or the army. so, if coblentz were a good ordinary fortress without detached forts, a large army could not so readily make it a place of refuge, nor would there be such facilities for debouching from it in the presence of an enemy. the fortress of ehrenbreitstein, which is intended to protect coblentz on the right bank, is so difficult of access that it would be quite easy to blockade it, and the egress of a force of any magnitude might be vigorously disputed. much has been recently said of a new system used by the archduke maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of linz,--by masonry towers. as i only know of it by hearsay and the description by captain allard in the _spectateur militaire_, i cannot discuss it thoroughly. i only know that the system of towers used at genoa by the skillful colonel andreis appeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible of improvements,--which the archduke seems to have added. we are told that the towers of linz, situated in ditches and covered by the glacis, have the advantage of giving a concentrated horizontal fire and of being sheltered from the direct shot of the enemy. such towers, if well flanked and connected by a parapet, may make a very advantageous camp,--always, however, with some of the inconveniences of closed lines. if the towers are isolated, and the intervals carefully covered by field-works, (to be thrown up when required,) they will make a camp preferable to one covered by ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous as afforded by the large detached forts of coblentz. these towers number thirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fort commanding the perlingsberg. of these twenty-four on the right bank, some seven or eight are only half-towers. the circumference of this line is about twelve miles. the towers are between five hundred and six hundred yards apart, and will be connected, in case of war, by a palisaded covered way. they are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, with a barbette battery which is the principal defense, mounting eleven twenty-four pounders. two howitzers are placed in the upper tier. those towers are placed in a wide and deep ditch, the _déblais_ of which forms a high glacis which protects the tower from direct shot; but i should think it would be difficult to protect the artillery from direct fire. some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a complete bastioned enceinte, necessary to make linz a fortress of the first rank, would have cost; others maintain that it has not cost more than a quarter as much as a bastioned work, and that it subserves, besides, an entirely different object. if these works are to resist a regular siege, they are certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched camp to give refuge and an outlet upon both banks of the danube for a large army, they are appropriate, and would be of great importance in a war like that of , and, if existing then, would probably have saved the capital. to complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better to encircle linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have built seven or eight towers between the eastern salient and the mouth of the traun, within a direct distance of about two and a half miles, so as to have included for the camp only the curved space between linz, the traun, and the danube. then the double advantage of a fortress of the first rank and a camp under its guns would have been united, and, even if not quite so large, would have answered for a large army, particularly if the eight towers on the left bank and the fort of perlingsberg had been preserved. tÊtes de ponts. _têtes de ponts_ are the most important of all field-works. the difficulties of crossing a river, particularly a large one, in the face of the enemy, demonstrate abundantly the immense utility of such works, which can be less easily dispensed with than intrenched camps, since if the bridges are safe an army is insured from the disastrous events which may attend a rapid retreat across a large river. _têtes de ponts_ are doubly advantageous when they are as it were _keeps_ for a large intrenched camp, and will be triply so if they also cover the bank opposite to the location of the camp, since then they will mutually support each other. it is needless to state that these works are particularly important in an enemy's country and upon all fronts where there are no permanent works. it may be observed that the principal difference between the system of intrenched camps and that of _têtes de ponts_ is that the best intrenched camps are composed of detached and closed works, while _têtes de ponts_ usually consist of contiguous works not closed. an intrenched line to admit of defense must be occupied in force throughout its whole extent, which would generally require a large army; if, on the contrary, the intrenchments are detached closed works, a comparatively small force can defend them. the attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a subsequent part of this volume. article xxviii. strategic operations in mountains. a mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of war, under four different aspects. it may be the whole theater of the war, or it may be but a zone; it may be mountainous throughout its whole extent, or there may be a line of mountains, upon emerging from which the army may debouch into large and rich plains. if switzerland, the tyrol, the noric provinces, some parts of turkey and hungary, catalonia and portugal, be excepted, in the european countries the mountains are in single ranges. in these cases there is but a difficult defile to cross,--a temporary obstacle, which, once overcome, is an advantage rather than an objection. in fact, the range once crossed and the war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains may be regarded as an eventual base, upon which the army may fall back and find a temporary refuge. the only essential precaution to be observed is, not to allow the enemy to anticipate the army on this line of retreat. the part of the alps between france and italy, and the pyrenees, (which are not so high, though equally broad,) are of this nature. the mountains of bohemia and of the black forest, and the vosges, belong to this class. in catalonia the mountains cover the whole country as far as the ebro: if the war were limited to this province, the combinations would not be the same as if there were but a line of mountains. hungary in this respect differs little from lombardy and castile; for if the crapacks in the eastern and northern part are as marked a feature as the pyrenees, they are still but a temporary obstacle, and an army overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of the waag, of the neytra, or of the theiss, or in the fields of mongatsch, would have the vast plains between the danube and the theiss for a field of operations. the only difference would be in the roads, which in the alps, though few in number, are excellent, while in hungary there are none of much value. in its northern part, this chain, though not so high, becomes broader, and would seem to belong to that class of fields of operations which are wholly mountainous; but, as its evacuation may be compelled by decisive operations in the valleys of the waag or the theiss, it must be regarded as a temporary barrier. the attack and defense of this country, however, would be a strategic study of the most interesting character. when an extremely mountainous country, such as the tyrol or switzerland, is but a zone of operations, the importance of these mountains is secondary, and they must be observed like a fortress, the armies deciding the great contests in the valleys. it will, of course, be otherwise if this be the whole field. it has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gave control of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gave control of the mountains. the archduke charles, a very intelligent and competent judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated that the valley of the danube is the key of southern germany. however, in this kind of questions much depends upon the relative forces and their arrangement in the country. if sixty thousand french were advancing on bavaria in presence of an equal force of austrians, and the latter should throw thirty thousand men into the tyrol, intending to replace them by reinforcements on its arrival on the inn, it would be difficult for the french to push on as far as this line, leaving so large a force on its flanks masters of the outlets of scharnitz, fussen, kufstein, and lofers. but if the french force were one hundred and twenty thousand men, and had gained such successes as to establish its superiority over the army in its front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment to mask the passes of the tyrol and extend its progress as far as linz,--as moreau did in . thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as only accessory zones. if we regard them as the principal fields of operations, the strategic problem seems to be more complicated. the campaigns of and are equally rich in instruction on this branch of the art. in my account of them i have endeavored to bring out their teachings by a historical exposition of the events; and i cannot do better than refer my readers to it. when we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of switzerland by the french directory, and its fatal influence in doubling the extent of the theater of operations and making it reach from the texel to naples, we cannot too much applaud the wisdom of france and austria in the transactions which had for three centuries guaranteed the neutrality of switzerland. every one will be convinced of this by carefully studying the interesting campaigns of the archduke charles, suwaroff, and massena in , and those of napoleon and moreau in . the first is a model for operations upon an entirely mountainous field; the second is a model for wars in which the fate of mountainous countries is decided on the plains. i will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow from this study. when a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the principal theater of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirely based upon maxims applicable in an open country. transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of operations of the enemy here become always very difficult, and often impossible. in such a country a considerable army can be maneuvered only in a small number of valleys, where the enemy will take care to post advanced guards of sufficient strength to delay the army long enough to provide means for defeating the enterprise; and, as the ridges which separate these valleys will be generally crossed only by paths impracticable for the passage of an army, transversal marches can only be made by small bodies of light troops. the important natural strategic points will be at the junction of the larger valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few in number; and, if the defensive army occupy them with the mass of its forces, the invader will generally be compelled to resort to direct attacks to dislodge it. however, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more rare and difficult, it by no means follows that they are less important. on the contrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining possession of one of these centers of communication between the large valleys upon the line of retreat of the enemy, it will be more serious for the latter than it would be in an open country; since the occupation of one or two difficult defiles will often be sufficient to cause the ruin of the whole army. if the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must be admitted that the defense has quite as many, on account of the necessity of covering all the outlets by which an attack in force may be made upon the decisive points, and of the difficulties of the transversal marches which it would be compelled to make to cover the menaced points. in order to complete what i have said upon this kind of marches and the difficulties of directing them, i will refer to what napoleon did in to cut off mack from ulm. if this operation was facilitated by the hundred roads which cross swabia in all directions, and if it would have been impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversal routes, to make the long circuit from donauwerth by augsburg to memmingen, it is also true that mack could by these same hundred roads have effected his retreat with much greater facility than if he had been entrapped in one of the valleys of switzerland or of the tyrol, from which there was but a single outlet. on the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level country concentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy scatter to occupy all the roads by which the defensive army may retire, it will be easy for the latter to crush these isolated bodies; but in a very mountainous country, where there are ordinarily but one or two principal routes into which other valleys open, even from the direction of the enemy, the concentration of forces becomes more difficult, since serious inconveniences may result if even one of these important valleys be not observed. nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic defense in mountainous regions than the perplexity in which we are involved when we attempt simply to give advice in such cases,--to say nothing of laying down maxims for them. if it were but a question of the defense of a single definite front of small extent, consisting of four or five converging valleys, the common junction of which is at a distance of two or three short marches from the summits of the ranges, it would be easier of solution. it would then be sufficient to recommend the construction of a good fort at the narrowest and least-easily turned point of each of these valleys. protected by these forts, a few brigades of infantry should be stationed to dispute the passage, while half the army should be held in reserve at the junction, where it would be in position either to sustain the advanced guards most seriously threatened, or to fall upon the assailant with the whole force when he debouches. if to this be added good instructions to the commanders of the advanced guards, whether in assigning them the best point for rendezvous when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them to continue to act in the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the general on the defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks to the many difficulties which the country offers to the assailant. but, if there be other fronts like this upon the right and left, all of which are to be defended, the problem is changed: the difficulties of the defense increase with the extent of the fronts, and this system of a cordon of forts becomes dangerous,--while it is not easy to adopt a better one. we cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the consideration of the position of massena in switzerland in . after jourdan's defeat at stockach, he occupied the line from basel by schaffhausen and rheineck to saint-gothard, and thence by la furca to mont-blanc. he had enemies in front of basel, at waldshut, at schaffhausen, at feldkirch, and at chur; bellegarde threatened the saint-gothard, and the italian army menaced the simplon and the saint-bernard. how was he to defend such a circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great valleys, thus risking every thing? from rheinfelden to the jura, toward soleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of the trap in which the french army was placed. this was, then, the pivot of the defense. but how could he leave schaffhausen unprotected? how abandon rheineck and the saint-gothard? how open the valais and the approach by berne, without surrendering the whole of switzerland to the coalition? and if he covered each point even by a brigade, where would be his army when he would need it to give battle to an approaching force? it is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate the masses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would surrender the keys of the country, and, besides, it is not easy to say where an inferior army could be concentrated without compromising it. after the forced evacuation of the line of the rhine and zurich, it seemed that the only strategic point for massena to defend was the line of the jura. he was rash enough to stand upon the albis,--a line shorter than that of the rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distance to the attacks of the austrians. if bellegarde, instead of going into lombardy by the valtellina, had marched to berne or made a junction with the archduke, massena would have been ruined. these events seem to prove that if a country covered with high mountains be favorable for defense in a tactical point of view, it is different in a strategic sense, because it necessitates a division of the troops. this can only be remedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to the offensive. general clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, on the contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kind of war, the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course he might lose the advantages of the local defenses. he, however, ends by demonstrating that a passive defense must yield under an active attack,--which goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable in mountains than in plains. if there could be any doubt on this point, it ought to be dispelled by massena's campaign in switzerland, where he sustained himself only by attacking the enemy at every opportunity, even when he was obliged to seek him on the grimsel and the saint-gothard. napoleon's course was similar in in the tyrol, when he was opposed to wurmser and alvinzi. as for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by reading the events of suwaroff's expedition by the saint-gothard upon the muttenthal. while we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to capture lecourbe in the valley of the reuss, we must also admire the presence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that general and his division. afterward, in the schachenthal and the muttenthal, suwaroff was placed in the same position as lecourbe had been, and extricated himself with equal ability. not less extraordinary was the ten days' campaign of general molitor, who with four thousand men was surrounded in the canton of glaris by more than thirty thousand allies, and yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the linth after four admirable fights. these events teach us the vanity of all theory _in details_, and also that in such a country a strong and heroic will is worth more than all the precepts in the world. after such lessons, need i say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, not to risk one's self in the valleys without securing the heights? shall i say also that in this kind of war, more than in any other, operations should be directed upon the communications of the enemy? and, finally, that good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of the great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined with great mobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best means of defending the country? i cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainous countries are particularly favorable for defense when the war is a national one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homes with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: every advance is then dearly bought. but to be successful it is always necessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more or less numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes of stanz and of the tyrol. the offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case: it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are extensive plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous. in the first case there is little more to be done than this,--viz.: make demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which promises the greatest results. the problem in such a case is to break through a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole line is forced. the history of bard in , and the capture of leutasch and scharnitz in by ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men on innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand austrians, and by seizing this central point compelled them to retreat in all directions,) show that with brave infantry and bold commanders these famous mountain-ranges can generally be forced. the history of the passage of the alps, where francis i. turned the army which was awaiting him at suza by passing the steep mountains between mont-cenis and the valley of queyras, is an example of those _insurmountable_ obstacles which can always be surmounted. to oppose him it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have already seen what is to be expected of it. the position of the swiss and italians at suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral issues. their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army toward turin or carignano. when we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, and the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. in my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to confirm what i say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the columns of championnet at the battle of fossano. if there be five or six roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened; but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the enemy might be able to defeat them separately. napoleon's passage of the saint-bernard was wisely planned. he formed the bulk of his army on the center, with a division on each flank by mont-cenis and the simplon, to divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march. the invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a much greater and more difficult task than where a dénouement may be accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of battle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous region, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. here it would be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated, the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at the junction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. the enemy should be driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys. of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of switzerland would be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with their assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple number. to give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies, would be absurd. history, well studied and understood, is the best school for this kind of warfare. the account of the campaign of by the archduke charles, that of the campaigns which i have given in my history of the wars of the revolution, the narrative of the campaign of the grisons by ségur and mathieu dumas, that of catalonia by saint-cyr and suchet, the campaign of the duke de rohan in valtellina, and the passage of the alps by gaillard, (francis i.,) are good guides in this study. article xxix. grand invasions and distant expeditions. there are several kinds of distant expeditions. the first are those which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. the second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile. the third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea by means of numerous fleets. the fourth class comprises those beyond the seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. the fifth includes the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great, but where a powerful state is attacked. as to the first, in a strategic point of view, a russian army on the rhine or in italy, in alliance with the german states, would certainly be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their arsenals;--while in the other case its resources would be upon the vistula or the niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad fate of many of these great invasions. in spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of all the armies,--particularly if he belong to the state which is not a principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of . general koutousoff advanced on the inn to the boundaries of bavaria with thirty thousand russians, to effect a junction with mack, whose army in the mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand men brought back from donauwerth by kienmayer. the russian general thus found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity of napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of about seven hundred and fifty miles. his position would have been hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. the battle of austerlitz--due to a fault of weyrother--endangered the russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. it almost became the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the opportunity of regaining its own country. the fate of suwaroff after the victory of novi, especially in the expedition to switzerland, and that of hermann's corps at bergen in holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander under such circumstances. general benningsen's position in was less disadvantageous, because, being between the vistula and the niemen, his communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in no respect dependent upon his allies. we may also refer to the fate of the french in bohemia and bavaria in , when frederick the great abandoned them and made a separate peace. in this case the parties were allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension which may compromise military operations. examples of this kind have been cited in article xix., on political objective points. history alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions across extensive territories. when half of europe was covered with forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to the other, the goths, huns, vandals, normans, arabs, and tartars overran empires in succession. but since the invention of powder and artillery and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining each other, no such events have taken place. besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the middle ages, which were of a more military character, as those of charlemagne and others. since the invention of powder there have been scarcely any, except the advance of charles viii. to naples, and of charles xii. into the ukraine, which can be called distant invasions; for the campaigns of the spaniards in flanders and of the swedes in germany were of a particular kind. the first was a civil war, and the swedes were only auxiliaries to the protestants of germany; and, besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. in modern times no one but napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of europe from the rhine to the volga; and there is little danger that he will be imitated. apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the same operations as all other wars. as the chief difficulty arises from these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable, although even that will not avert all danger. the campaign of , although so ruinous to napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. his care in leaving prince schwarzenberg and reynier on the bug, while macdonald, oudinot, and wrede guarded the dwina, victor covered smolensk, and augereau was between the oder and vistula, proves that he had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success. if napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of troops on the dwina and dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was unequal to it; and in confiding to prince schwarzenberg a duty which that general could not perform with the devotedness of a frenchman. i do not speak now of his error in remaining in moscow after the conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune; although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place immediately. he has also been accused of having too much despised distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the kremlin. before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to know the real motives which induced him to pass smolensk, instead of wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been possible for him to remain between that city and vitebsk without having previously defeated the russian army. it is doubtless true that napoleon neglected too much the resentment of austria, prussia, and sweden, and counted too surely upon a _dénouement_ between wilna and the dwina. although he fully appreciated the bravery of the russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the people. finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of russia, he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm. the fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "never to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of resuming the offensive." as to the precautions to be observed in these operations, the reader is referred to articles xxi. and xxii., on the safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles, seasons, and countries,--in short, accuracy in calculation and moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried too far. we are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly ruined nations and armies. expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been rare since the invention of artillery, the crusades being the last in date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers, has passed into the hands of england, an insular power, rich in ships, but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions. it is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now is very different from that existing when xerxes marched to the conquest of greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when alexander marched from macedonia over asia minor to tyre, while his fleet coasted the shore. nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert. still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress depends upon the winds,--which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare occurrence. the more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations of war. invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones, are still not without great danger of failure. a french army attacking cadiz might find a tomb on the guadalquivir, although well based upon the pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the ebro and the tagus. likewise, the army which in besieged komorn in the heart of hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of wagram without going as far as the beresina. the antecedents, the number of disposable troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general. although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in article vi., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not be useful to convert into an ally. the influence which the change of policy of the duke of savoy in exercised over the events of that day, and the effects of the stand taken by maurice of saxony in , and of bavaria in , prove clearly the importance of securing the strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their co-operation cannot be obtained. epitome of strategy * * * * * the task which i undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. we have seen, from the definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important operations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and that we depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. therefore, before treating of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made. by this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, i will give a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter. from the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters of operations is found in what follows:-- . in knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in accordance with article xviii. . in choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy with the least risk to one's self. . in establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the archduke charles in and of napoleon in ; or that of soult in , for retreats parallel to the frontiers. on the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success of napoleon in , , and , when he directed his line upon the extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was successful in , , and , of directing the line of operations upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims presented in article xxi. . in selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from affording each other mutual support. . in combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important strategic points of the theater of war. . in imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of the hostile army. the system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the enemy's, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will be quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive strategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows to the enemy can be given. however, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and successive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy, thus insuring their defeat. a general who moves his masses rapidly and continually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both of gaining victories and of securing great results therefrom. the oft-cited operations of and prove these truths most satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by carnot in , already mentioned in article xxiv., and the details of which may be found in volume iv. of my history of the wars of the revolution. forty battalions, carried successively from dunkirk to menin, maubeuge, and landau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four victories and saved france. the whole science of marches would have been found in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive strategic point. the austrian was then the principal army of the coalition, and its line of retreat was upon cologne: hence it was upon the meuse that a general effort of the french would have inflicted the most severe blow. the committee of public safety provided for the most pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the most decisive direction, as napoleon did at ulm, at jena, and at ratisbon. the whole of strategy is contained in these four examples. it is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be able to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of war most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own country, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and of _têtes de ponts_, and by the opening of communications in the great decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part of the science. we have already seen how we are to recognize these lines and these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. napoleon has afforded instruction on this point by the roads of the simplon and mont-cenis; and austria since has profited by it in the roads from the tyrol to lombardy, the saint-gothard, and the splugen, as well as by different fortified places projected or completed. chapter iv. grand tactics and battles. battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great questions of national policy and of strategy. strategy directs armies to the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance, the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and fortune, gains victories. grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress. the guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results. battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding features of war. this assertion is not strictly true, as armies have been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. it is also true that a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations. the results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which are not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the order of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details, the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officers subordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the proportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm, superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and the manner of handling these arms; but it is the _morale_ of armies, as well as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories and their results decisive. clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot result in a complete victory. at the battle of zama, hannibal, in a few brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish before his eyes, although scipio never had a thought of turning his position. at rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the maneuver more successful at stockach in , or at austerlitz in . as is evident from article xxxii., i by no means intend to discourage the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of it; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully and opportunely, and i am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's design to make himself master of his enemy's communications while at the same time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than tactical combinations to accomplish it. there are three kinds of battles: st, defensive battles, or those fought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy's attack; d, offensive battles, where one army attacks another in position; d, battles fought unexpectedly, and resulting from the collision of two armies meeting on the march. we will examine in succession the different combinations they present. article xxx. positions and defensive battles. when an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its line of battle. from the general definitions given at the beginning of this work, it will appear that i make a distinction between _lines of battle_ and _orders of battle_,--things which have been constantly confounded. i will designate as a _line of battle_ the position occupied by battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army will take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it will await attack, having no particular project in view for the future: it is the right name to give to a body of troops formed with proper tactical intervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will be more fully explained in article xliii. on the contrary, i will designate as an _order of battle_ an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the oblique order, the perpendicular order. this nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a proper distinction between two things which should by no means be confounded.[ ] from the nature of the two things, it is evident that the _line of battle_ belongs especially to defensive arrangements; because an army awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it will be must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line of battle. _order of battle_, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some maneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to offensive dispositions. however, it is by no means pretended that the line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a body of troops may in this formation very well proceed to the attack of a position, while an army on the defensive may use the oblique order or any other. i refer above only to ordinary cases. without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war of positions, an army may often find it proper to await the enemy at a favorable point, strong by nature and selected beforehand for the purpose of there fighting a defensive battle. such a position may be taken up when the object is to cover an important objective point, such as a capital, large depots, or a decisive strategic point which controls the surrounding country, or, finally, to cover a siege. there are two kinds of positions,--the _strategic_, which has been discussed in article xx., and the _tactical_. the latter, again, are subdivided. in the first place, there are intrenched positions occupied to await the enemy under cover of works more or less connected,--in a word, intrenched camps. their relations to strategic operations have been treated in article xxvii., and their attack and defense are discussed in article xxxv. secondly, we have positions naturally strong, where armies encamp for the purpose of gaining a few days' time. third and last are open positions, chosen in advance to fight on the defensive. the characteristics to be sought in these positions vary according to the object in view: it is, however, a matter of importance not to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steep and difficult of access,--quite suitable places, probably, for temporary camps, but not always the best for battle-grounds. a position of this kind, to be really strong, must be not only steep and difficult of access, but should be adapted to the end had in view in occupying it, should offer as many advantages as possible for the kind of troops forming the principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles presented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the enemy than for the assailed. for example, it is certain that massena, in taking the strong position of the albis, would have made a great error if his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery; whilst it was exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. for the same reason, wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his troops, made a good choice of position at waterloo, where all the avenues of approach were well swept by his guns. the position of the albis was, moreover, rather a strategic position, that of waterloo being simply a battle-ground. the rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions are the following:-- . to have the communications to the front such as to make it easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him to approach the line of battle. . to give the artillery all its effect in the defense. . to have the ground suitable for concealing the movements of troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any point deemed the proper one. . to be able to have a good view of the enemy's movements. . to have an unobstructed line of retreat. . to have the flanks well protected, either by natural or artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center, or at least some point of the front. this is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which seemed to afford perfect protection. this danger--about which there can be no doubt--gives rise to the thought that points admitting an easy defense are better on a battle-field than insurmountable obstacles.[ ] . sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied by throwing a crotchet to the rear. this is dangerous; because a crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of the two lines prolonged. a strong reserve in close column behind the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground must always decide in the choice between the two methods. full details on this point are given in the description of the battle of prague, (chapter ii. of the seven years' war.) . we must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack upon the center. such a position will always be one of the most advantageous for defense,--as was shown at malplaquet and waterloo. great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the insignificant rivulet of papelotte forced ney to attack wellington's center, instead of the left as he had been ordered. when a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining idle spectators of it. the fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is to _know_ how to take the offensive at a proper time, and _to take it_. among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us to an examination of a question presented by the battle of waterloo. would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road behind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? my own opinion is that such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirely open field; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure to very great danger. undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, a portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would, in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain. there is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a forest,--this statement being made upon the supposition that there are at least two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for retreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to press too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank movement to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest, as was the case at hohenlinden. the retreat would be the more secure if, as at waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the center; for this re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads. when discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the varying chances which the two systems, the _defensive_ and the _offensive_, give rise to; and it was seen that especially in strategy the army taking the initiative has the great advantage of bringing up its troops and striking a blow where it may deem best, whilst the army which acts upon the defensive and awaits an attack is anticipated in every direction, is often taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its movements by those of the enemy. we have also seen that in tactics these advantages are not so marked, because in this case the operations occupy a smaller extent of ground, and the party taking the initiative cannot conceal his movements from the enemy, who, instantly observing, may at once counteract them by the aid of a good reserve. moreover, the party advancing upon the enemy has against him all the disadvantages arising from accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile line; and, however flat a country it may be, there are always inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges, farm-houses, villages, &c., which must either be taken possession of or be passed by. to these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy's batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails to a greater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fire either of musketry or artillery. viewing the matter in the light of these facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantages resulting from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages. however undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still more manifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events of history. every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if attacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by all the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to take the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest success. a general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping strictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give way when properly attacked. it is not so, however, with a general who indeed waits to receive his enemy, but with the determination to fall upon him offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him and transfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onward movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strength into the action at the most important point,--a thing altogether impossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. in fact, a general who occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, has the advantage of observing the enemy's approach; his forces, previously arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; and when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops. a general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal success either the offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable,-- st, that, so far from limiting himself to a passive defense, he should know how to take the offensive at favorable moments; d, that his _coup-d'oeil_ be certain and his coolness undoubted; d, that he be able to rely surely upon his troops; th, that, in retaking the offensive, he should by no means neglect to apply the general principle which would have regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning; th, that he strike his blows upon decisive points. these truths are demonstrated by napoleon's course at rivoli and austerlitz, as well as by wellington's at talavera, at salamanca, and at waterloo. footnotes: [footnote : it is from no desire to make innovations that i have modified old terms or made new. in the development of a science, it is wrong for the same word to designate two very different things; and, if we continue to apply the term _order of battle_ to the disposition of troops in line, it must be improper to designate certain important maneuvers by the terms _oblique order of battle_, _concave order of battle_, and it becomes necessary to use instead the terms _oblique system of battle_, &c. i prefer the method of designation i have adopted. the _order of battle_ on paper may take the name _plan of organization_, and the ordinary formation of troops upon the ground will then be called _line of battle_.] [footnote : the park of hougoumont, the hamlet of la haye sainte, and the rivulet of papelotte were for ney more serious obstacles than the famous position of elchingen, where he forced a passage of the danube, in , upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. it may perhaps be said that the courage of the defenders in the two cases was not the same; but, throwing out of consideration this chance, it must be granted that the difficulties of a position, when properly taken advantage of, need not be insurmountable in order to render the attack abortive. at elchingen the great height and steepness of the banks, rendering the fire almost ineffectual, were more disadvantageous than useful in the defense.] article xxxi. offensive battles, and different orders of battle. we understand by offensive battles those which an army fights when assaulting another in position.[ ] an army reduced to the strategic defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an army receiving an attack may, during the progress of the battle, take the offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it. history furnishes numerous examples of battles of each of these kinds. as defensive battles have been discussed in the preceding article, and the advantages of the defensive been pointed out, we will now proceed to the consideration of offensive movements. it must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantage over the assailed, and almost always acts more understandingly than the latter, who must be more or less in a state of uncertainty. as soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attack must be adopted; and that is what i have thought ought to be called _order of battle_. it happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced without a detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirely known. in either case it should be well understood that there is in every battle-field a decisive point, the possession of which, more than of any other, helps to secure the victory, by enabling its holder to make a proper application of the principles of war: arrangements should therefore be made for striking the decisive blow upon this point. the decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been already stated, by the character of the position, the bearing of different localities upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by the arrangement of the contending forces. for example, suppose an enemy's flank to rest upon high ground from which his whole line might be attained, the occupation of this height seems most important, tactically considered; but it may happen that the height in question is very difficult of access, and situated exactly so as to be of the least importance, strategically considered. at the battle of bautzen the left of the allies rested upon the steep mountains of bohemia, which province was at that time rather neutral than hostile: it seemed that, tactically considered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to be held, when it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line of retreat upon reichenbach and gorlitz, and the french, by forcing the right, which was in the plain, would occupy this line of retreat and throw the allies into the mountains, where they might have lost all their _matériel_ and a great part of the personnel of their army. this course was also easier for them on account of the difference in the features of the ground, led to more important results, and would have diminished the obstacles in the future. the following truths may, i think, be deduced from what has been stated: . the topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tactical key; . the decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that which combines strategic with topographical advantages; . when the difficulties of the ground are not too formidable upon the strategic point of the battle-field, this is generally the most important point; . it is nevertheless true that the determination of this point depends very much upon the arrangement of the contending forces. thus, in lines of battle too much extended and divided the center will always be the proper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the center is the strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there, it is easy to support it from the flanks: the decisive point in this case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. when the numerical superiority is considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously upon both extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior numerically to the enemy's. it appears, therefore, that all the combinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three points mentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of success,--a point very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned. the object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic maneuvers to ruin his army completely. an enemy is dislodged either by overthrowing him at some point of his line, or by outflanking him so as to take him in flank and rear, or by using both these methods at once; that is, attacking him in front while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line turned. to accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to make choice of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used. at least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz.: . the simple parallel order; . the parallel order with a defensive or offensive crotchet; . the order reinforced upon one or both wings; . the order reinforced in the center; . the simple oblique order, or the oblique reinforced on the attacking wing; and . the perpendicular order on one or both wings; . the concave order; . the convex order; . the order by echelon on one or both wings; . the order by echelon on the center; . the order resulting from a strong combined attack upon the center and one extremity simultaneously. (see figs. to .) [illustration: fig. .[ ] a ttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt ____________________________|____________________________ b ] each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has been stated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column intended to turn the enemy's line. in order to a proper appreciation of the merits of each, it becomes necessary to test each by the application of the general principles which have been laid down. for example, it is manifest that the parallel order (fig. ) is worst of all, for it requires no skill to fight one line against another, battalion against battalion, with equal chances of success on either side: no tactical skill is needed in such a battle. there is, however, one important case where this is a suitable order, which occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in great strategic operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon the enemy's communications and cutting off his line of retreat while covering its own; when the battle takes place between them, that army which has reached the rear of the other may use the parallel order, for, having effected the decisive maneuver previous to the battle, all its efforts should now be directed toward the frustration of the enemy's endeavor to open a way through for himself. except for this single case, the parallel order is the worst of all. i do not mean to say that a battle cannot be gained while using this order, for one side or the other must gain the victory if the contest is continued; and the advantage will then be upon his side who has the best troops, who best knows when to engage them, who best manages his reserve and is most favored by fortune. [illustration: fig. . | | | | a | |b tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt | | ______________________|________________________| b ] the parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (fig. ) is most usually adopted in a defensive position. it may be also the result of an offensive combination; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in the case of defense it is to the rear. the battle of prague is a very remarkable example of the danger to which such a crotchet is exposed if properly attacked. [illustration: fig. . a ttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt ____|___ ___________________|____________________ b ____|___ ] the parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (fig. ,) or upon the center, (fig. , page ,) to pierce that of the enemy, is much more favorable than the two preceding ones, and is also much more in accordance with the general principles which have been laid down; although, when the contending forces are about equal, the part of the line which has been weakened to reinforce the other may have its own safety compromised if placed in line parallel to the enemy. [illustration: fig. . a tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt ________|________ _________________ b _________________ ] [illustration: fig. .] the oblique order (fig. ) is the best for an inferior force attacking a superior; for, in addition to the advantage of bringing the main strength of the forces against a single point of the enemy's line, it has two others equally important, since the weakened wing is not only kept back from the attack of the enemy, but performs also the double duty of holding in position the part of his line not attacked, and of being at hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engaged wing. this order was used by the celebrated epaminondas at the battles of leuctra and mantinea. the most brilliant example of its use in modern times was given by frederick the great at the battle of leuthen. (see chapter vii. of treatise on grand operations.) [illustration: fig. . c | \ | \ | \| tttttttttttttttttttttttttt/| / | / | / | c | b-| | | | | | | | ] [illustration: fig. . | | | | | ___________a______________ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |-b b-| | | | | | | | | | | ] the perpendicular order on one or both wings, as seen in figs. and , can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the direction along which the primary tactical movements might be made in a battle. two armies will never long occupy the relative perpendicular positions indicated in these figures; for if the army b were to take its first position on a line perpendicular to one or both extremities of the army a, the latter would at once change the front of a portion of its line; and even the army b, as soon as it extended itself to or beyond the extremity of a, must of necessity turn its columns either to the right or the left, in order to bring them near the enemy's line, and so take him in reverse, as at c, the result being two oblique lines, as shown in fig. . the inference is that one division of the assailing army would take a position perpendicular to the enemy's wing, whilst the remainder of the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying him; and this would always bring us back to one of the oblique orders shown in figures and . the attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack adopted, may be very advantageous, but it is only admissible when the assailant is very decidedly superior in numbers; for, if the fundamental principle is to bring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weaker army would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superior force. this truth will be clearly demonstrated farther on. [illustration: fig. .] the order concave in the center (fig. ) has found advocates since the day when hannibal by its use gained the battle of cannæ. this order may indeed be very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise to it; that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires before him, and he suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings. but, if this order is adopted before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling on the center, has only to attack the wings, which present their extremities and are in precisely the same relative situation as if they had been assailed in flank. this order would, therefore, be scarcely ever used except against an enemy who had taken the convex order to fight a battle, as will be seen farther on. [illustration: fig. , _bis_.] an army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a broken line with the center retired, (fig. , _bis_.) if several writers may be believed, such an arrangement gave the victory to the english on the famous days of crécy and agincourt. this order is certainly better than a semicircle, since it does not so much present the flank to attack, whilst allowing forward movement by echelon and preserving all the advantages of concentration of fire. these advantages vanish if the enemy, instead of foolishly throwing himself upon the retired center, is content to watch it from a distance and makes his greatest effort upon one wing. essling, in , is an example of the advantageous use of a concave line; but it must not be inferred that napoleon committed an error in attacking the center; for an army fighting with the danube behind it and with no way of moving without uncovering its bridges of communication, must not be judged as if it had been free to maneuver at pleasure. [illustration: fig. .] the convex order with the center salient (fig. ) answers for an engagement immediately upon the passage of a river when the wings must be retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges; also when a defensive battle is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to be passed and the defile covered, as at leipsic; and, finally, it may become a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. if an enemy directs his efforts against the center or against a single wing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole army.[ ] the french tried it at fleurus in , and were successful, because the prince of coburg, in place of making a strong attack upon the center or upon a single extremity, divided his attack upon five or six diverging lines, and particularly upon both wings at once. nearly the same convex order was adopted at essling, and during the second and third days of the famous battle of leipsic. on the last occasion it had just the result that might have been expected. [illustration: fig. a tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ b _____ _______ ] the order by echelon upon the two wings fig. is of the same nature as the perpendicular order, (fig. ,) being, however, better than that, because, the echelons being nearest each other in the direction where the reserve would be placed, the enemy would be less able, both as regards room and time, to throw himself into the interval of the center and make at that point a threatening counter-attack. [illustration: fig. a tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt ___|___ ___|__ __|___ _____ _____ _____b b_____ _____ _____ ] the order by echelon on the center (fig. ) may be used with special success against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too extended, because, its center being then somewhat isolated from the wings and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be probably destroyed. but, applying the test of the same fundamental principle, this order of attack would appear to be less certain of success against an army having a connected and closed line; for the reserve being generally near the center, and the wings being able to act either by concentrating their fire or by moving against the foremost echelons, might readily repulse them. if this formation to some extent resembles the famous triangular wedge or _boar's head_ of the ancients, and the column of winkelried, it also differs from them essentially; for, instead of forming one solid mass,--an impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use of artillery,--it would have a large open space in the middle, which would render movements more easy. this formation is suitable, as has been said, for penetrating the center of a line too much extended, and might be equally successful against a line unavoidably immovable; but if the wings of the attacked line are brought at a proper time against the flanks of the foremost echelons, disagreeable consequences might result. a parallel order considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps be a much better arrangement, (figs. and ;) for the parallel line in this case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as to the point of attack, and would hinder the wings from taking the echelons of the center by the flank. this order by echelons was adopted by laudon for the attack of the intrenched camp of buntzelwitz. (treatise on grand operations, chapter xxviii.) in such a case it is quite suitable; for it is then certain that the defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments, there is no danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. but, this formation having the inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point of his line which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be made upon the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack. [illustration fig .] the order of attack in columns on the center and on one extremity at the same time (fig. ) is better than the preceding, especially in an attack upon an enemy's line strongly arranged and well connected. it may even be called the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. the attack upon the center, aided by a wing outflanking the enemy, prevents the assailed party falling upon the assailant and taking him in flank, as was done by hannibal and marshal saxe. the enemy's wing which is hemmed in between the attacks on the center and at the extremity, having to contend with nearly the entire opposing force, will be defeated and probably destroyed. it was this maneuver which gave napoleon his victories of wagram and ligny. this was what he wished to attempt at borodino,--where he obtained only a partial success, on account of the heroic conduct of the russian left and the division of paskevitch in the famous central redoubt, and on account of the arrival of baggavout's corps on the wing he hoped to outflank. he used it also at bautzen,--where an unprecedented success would have been the result, but for an accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left wing intended to cut off the allies from the road to wurschen, every arrangement having been made with that view. it should be observed that these different orders are not to be understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. a general who would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be likely to suffer defeat. this is particularly true as battles are now fought. in the time of louis xiv. or of frederick, it was possible to form lines of battle almost as regular as the geometrical figures, because armies camped under tents, almost always closely collected together, and were in presence of each other several days, thus giving ample time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the columns to be at regular distances from each other. but in our day,--when armies bivouac, when their division into several corps gives greater mobility, when they take position near each other in obedience to orders given them while out of reach of the general's eye, and often when there has been no time for thorough examination of the enemy's position,--finally, when the different arms of the service are intermingled in the line of battle,--under these circumstances, all orders of battle which must be laid out with great accuracy of detail are impracticable. these figures have never been of any other use than to indicate approximate arrangements. if every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art of winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of battle, and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of maneuvers arranged beforehand. but the facts are altogether different; for the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to render certain the simultaneous entering into action of the numerous fractions whose efforts must combine to make such an attack as will give good ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty is to cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the decisive maneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of the battle, is to result in victory. inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief, excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective _coup-d'oeil militaire_,--every thing of this kind may interfere with the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, without speaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the arrival of a corps at the appointed place. hence result two undoubted truths: . the more simple a decisive maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; . sudden maneuvers seasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than those determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to previous strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are to decide the day upon those points where their presence will secure the expected result. waterloo and bautzen are proofs of the last. from the moment when blücher and bulow had reached the heights of frichermont, nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the french, and they could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. in like manner, at bautzen, as soon as ney had reached klix, the retreat of the allies during the night of the th of may could alone have saved them, for on the st it was too late; and, if ney had executed better what he was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one. as to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the co-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army, with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank, it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends upon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely seen. this subject will be considered in art. xxxii. besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin without even the assailant having a well-defined object, although the collision may have been expected. this uncertainty results either from circumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy's position and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may be still expected to arrive on the field. from these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that the adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an engagement,--an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases cited above. indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan it is probable that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy lines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; the party acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm will burst upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to be used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar efforts to have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the point of attack shall have been determined, the mass of his troops will be directed against the center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once. whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear a resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. even in unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,--which will, it is hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of the different systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless. there is nothing even in napoleon's battles which disproves my assertion, although they are less susceptible than any others of being represented by lines accurately laid down. we see him, however, at rivoli, at austerlitz, and at ratisbon, concentrating his forces toward the center to be ready at the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy. at the pyramids he formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. at leipsic, essling, and brienne he used a kind of convex order very like fig. . at wagram his order was altogether like fig. , bringing up two masses upon the center and right, while keeping back the left wing; and this he wished to repeat at borodino and at waterloo before the prussians came up. at eylau, although the collision was almost entirely unforeseen on account of the very unexpected return and offensive movement of the russians, he outflanked their left almost perpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was endeavoring to break through the center; but these attacks were not simultaneous, that on the center being repulsed at eleven o'clock, whilst davoust did not attack vigorously upon the left until toward one. at dresden he attacked by the two wings, for the first time probably in his life, because his center was covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in addition, the attack of his left was combined with that of vandamme upon the enemy's line of retreat. at marengo, if we may credit napoleon himself, the oblique order he assumed, resting his right at castel ceriole, saved him from almost inevitable defeat. ulm and jena were battles won by strategy before they were fought, tactics having but little to do with them. at ulm there was not even a regular battle. i think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to desire to mark out upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would be used in tracing them on a sketch, a skillful general may nevertheless bear in mind the orders which have been indicated above, and may so combine his troops on the battle-field that the arrangement shall be similar to one of them. he should endeavor in all his combinations, whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to form a sound conclusion as to the important point of the battle-field; and this he can only do by observing well the direction of the enemy's line of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategy requires him to operate. he will then give his attention and efforts to this point, using a third of his force to keep the enemy in check or watch his movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point the possession of which will insure him the victory. acting thus, he will have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics can impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art in the most perfect manner. the manner of determining the decisive point of a battle-field has been described in the preceding chapter, (art. xix.) having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has occurred to me that this would be a proper place to reply to several statements made in the memoirs of napoleon published by general montholon. the great captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern invention, a theorist's fancy,--an opinion i can by no means share; for the oblique order is as old as thebes and sparta, and i have seen it used with my own eyes. this assertion of napoleon's seems the more remarkable because napoleon himself boasted of having used, at marengo, the very order of which he thus denies the existence. if we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in the rigid and precise manner inculcated by general ruchel at the berlin school. napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an absurdity; but i repeat that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and when such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it can only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by the use of a known symbol. it is nevertheless true that every line of battle which is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy's must be oblique of necessity. if one army attacks the extremity of another army, the attacking wing being reinforced by massing troops upon it while the weakened wing is kept retired from attack, the direction of the line must of necessity be a little oblique, since one end of it will be nearer the enemy than the other. the oblique order is so far from being a mere fancy that we see it used when the order is that by echelons on one wing, (fig. .) as to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be denied that at essling and fleurus the general arrangement of the austrians was a concave line, and that of the french a convex. in these orders parallel lines may be used as in the case of straight lines, and they would be classified as belonging to the parallel system when no part of the line was more strongly occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than another. laying aside for the present further consideration of these geometrical figures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose of fighting battles in a truly scientific manner, the following points must be attended to:-- . an offensive order of battle should have for its object to force the enemy from his position by all reasonable means. . the maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to overwhelm one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same time. an enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking and turning his position. . these attempts have a much greater probability of success if concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault. . to attack the center and both wings at the same time, without having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points. . the oblique order has no other object than to unite at least half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing, while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique line. the different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point. . the object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position, and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least expect to meet it. . it is difficult to state with precision what is the best method to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. an order of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset. a skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good combination. in the practical use of this system many variations must arise from differences in the _coup-d'oeil_ of commanders, the _morale_ of officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers and firings of all sorts, from varying localities, &c. . as it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can be accumulated against him. it sometimes happens, however, that the direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. he may when thus threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if attacked by main force. history is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers, especially when used against generals of weak character; and, although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these turning movements with attacks by main force. . the combination of these two methods--that is to say, the attack in front by main force and the turning maneuver--will render the victory more certain than the use of either separately; but, in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in presence of a contemptible enemy. . the manner of driving an enemy from his position by main force is the following:--throw his troops into confusion by a heavy and well-directed fire of artillery, increase this confusion by vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well covered in front by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry. but, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon the first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that, the reserve; and at this period of the engagement the attacking party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat of the second and cause the general in command to lose his presence of mind. in fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat disordered, even in victory, and it will often be very difficult to replace them by those of the second line, because they generally follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within musket-range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in repelling the attack. these considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the troops of the defensive army are equally active in the performance of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if their flanks and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage will usually be on their side at the second collision of the battle; but to insure that result their second line and the cavalry must be launched against the victorious battalions of the adversary at the proper instant; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable, and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first. . from the preceding facts may be deduced the following truth: "that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of masses of cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the decisive blow at the second line of the enemy; for here is presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of battles." in this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient substitute for that intuitive _coup-d'oeil_ imparted by experience in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness. the simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of all arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should be always held in hand,[ ] will, therefore, at the critical moment of the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole attention. this critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put forth,--on the one side to complete the victory, on the other to wrest it from the enemy. it is scarcely necessary to say that, to make this decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous attack upon the enemy's flank would be very advantageous. . in the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is to be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops as skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses. the object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion the troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and musketry will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and when the enemy presses too closely the columns of the second line and part of the cavalry must be launched against him. there will then be a strong probability of his repulse. footnotes: [footnote : in every battle one party must be the assailant and the other assailed. every battle is hence offensive for one party and defensive for the other.] [footnote : the letter a in this and other figures of the twelve orders indicates the defensive army, and b the offensive. the armies are represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of battle ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in columns of attack, in squares, or checkerwise.] [footnote : an attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in some cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. as a rule, a false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack against one extremity, would be the best method to use against such a line.] [footnote : the great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when it is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. moreau decided the battle of engen with four companies of infantry; and what kellermann's cavalry accomplished at marengo is known to every reader of history.] article xxxii. turning maneuvers, and too extended movement in battles. we have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may be expected from them. a few words remain to be said as to the wide détours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of so many plans seemingly well arranged. it may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. nevertheless, as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain _coup-d'oeil_ of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous in presence of frederick, napoleon, or wellington might have entire success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself have been in the habit of moving in this manner. it seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject. the following directions are all that can be given. keep the mass of the force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful, however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies. a commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any thing that may happen. if the opposing general shows little skill and seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be more daring. a few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the armies concerned in them. in the seven years' war, frederick gained the battle of prague because the austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards between their right and the remainder of their army,--the latter part remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. this inaction was the more extraordinary as the left of the austrians had a much shorter distance to pass over in order to support their right than frederick had to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and frederick was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it. on the other hand, frederick came near losing the battle of torgau, because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of marshal daun.[ ] mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric movement to the heights of siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose line was thus reformed. the battle of rivoli is a noted instance in point. all who are familiar with that battle know that alvinzi and his chief of staff weyrother wished to surround napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the plateau of rivoli. their center was beaten,--while their left was piled up in the ravine of the adige, and lusignan with their right was making a wide _détour_ to get upon the rear of the french army, where he was speedily surrounded and captured. no one can forget the day of stockach, where jourdan conceived the unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst saint-cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to pass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of sixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over these divided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their rear. saint-cyr's escape was indeed little less than a miracle. we may call to mind how this same general weyrother, who had desired to surround napoleon at rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at austerlitz, in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. the left wing of the allied army, wishing to outflank napoleon's right, to cut him off from vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their line. napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between lakes tellnitz and melnitz. wellington gained the battle of salamanca by a maneuver very similar to napoleon's, because marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,--seeing which, the english general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no support. if weyrother had been opposed to jourdan at rivoli or at austerlitz, he might have destroyed the french army, instead of suffering in each case a total defeat; for the general who at stockach attacked a mass of sixty thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. in the same way, marmont was unfortunate in having at salamanca an adversary whose chief merit was a rapid and practiced tactical _coup-d'oeil_. with the duke of york or moore for an antagonist, marmont would probably have been successful. among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, waterloo and hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. of these the first was almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare concurrence of fortunate circumstances. as to hohenlinden, we will search in vain in military history for another example of a single brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies, and there performing such astonishing feats as richepanse effected in the defile of matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all probability, to lay down his arms. at wagram the turning wing under davoust contributed greatly to the successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center under macdonald, oudinot, and bernadotte had not rendered opportune assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have been the result. so many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance; but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his enemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to regulate his own actions accordingly. in case of superiority in numbers or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. a maneuver to outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center. finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected maneuver during the battle. footnotes: [footnote : for an account of these two battles, see chapters ii. and xxv. of the treatise on grand military operations.] article xxxiii. unexpected meeting of two armies on the march. the accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war. in the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in a position chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance as close and accurate as possible. it often happens, however,--especially as war is now carried on,--that two armies approach each other, each intending to make an unexpected attack upon the other. a collision ensues unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where it does not anticipate a meeting. one army may also be attacked by another which has prepared a surprise for it,--as happened to the french at rossbach. a great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of a skillful general and of the warrior able to control events. it is always possible to gain a battle with brave troops, even where the commander may not have great capacity; but victories like those of lutzen, luzzara, eylau, abensberg, can only be gained by a brilliant genius endowed with great coolness and using the wisest combinations. there is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is by no means easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but these are the very cases in which it is necessary to keep clearly before the mind the fundamental principles of the art and the different methods of applying them, in order to a proper arrangement of maneuvers that must be decided upon at the instant and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms. two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp-equipage, and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than cause their advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads they are traversing. in each army the forces should at the same time be concentrated so that they may be thrown in a proper direction considering the object of the march. a grave error would be committed in deploying the whole army behind the advanced guard; because, even if the deployment were accomplished, the result would be nothing more than a badly-arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the advanced guard with considerable vigor the consequence might be the rout of the troops which were forming. (see the account of the battle of rossbach, treatise on grand operations.) in the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, marching upon several roads, and divided into masses which may act independently, these routs are not so much to be feared; but the principles are unchanged. the advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then the mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is best suited for carrying out the object of the march. whatever maneuvers the enemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him. article xxxiv. of surprises of armies. i shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments,--the chief features in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the light russian and turkish cavalry are so well adapted. i shall confine myself to an examination of the surprise of whole armies. before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected than at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are heard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to an impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten and the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is known because there are no outposts to give the alarm. the seven years' war presents a memorable example in the surprise of hochkirch. it shows that a surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from the combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity of the army. in fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take it so entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged from their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack. as armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march, prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's camp. at marengo, at lutzen, and at eylau there was something like a surprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected attack. the only great surprise to be cited is the case of taroutin, in , where murat was attacked and beaten by benningsen. to excuse his imprudence, murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through his own negligence. it is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing of the sort is expected. confusion in the camp will certainly take place; and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can give a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen events occur. this is an operation by no means to be despised in war, although it is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination which renders the victory certain even before the battle is fought. for the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities for surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to prevent such attacks. the regulations for the government of any well-organized army should point out the means for doing the last. article xxxv. of the attack by main force of fortified places, intrenched camps or lines.--of coups de main in general. there are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses, are regarded as secure against _coups de main_, but may nevertheless be carried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether practicable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some other means of getting to the parapet. the attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinations as that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of _coups de main_. this kind of attack will vary with circumstances: st, with the strength of the works; d, with the character of the ground on which they are built; d, with the fact of their being isolated or connected; th, with the morale of the respective parties. history gives us examples of all of these varieties. for examples, take the intrenched camps of kehl, dresden, and warsaw, the lines of turin and mayence, the intrenchments of feldkirch, scharnitz, and assiette. here i have mentioned several cases, each with varying circumstances and results. at kehl ( ) the intrenchments were better connected and better constructed than at warsaw. there was, in fact, a _tête de pont_ nearly equal to a permanent fortification; for the archduke thought himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it would have been extremely hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. at warsaw the works were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had as a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended by a number of desperate men. dresden, in , had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front of which, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than such as was suited to a field-work. the camp proper was protected by simple redoubts, at considerable distances apart, very poorly built, the keep giving it its sole strength.[ ] at mayence and at turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation; but if in the first case they were strong, they were certainly not so at turin, where upon one of the important points there was an insignificant parapet with a command of three feet, and a ditch proportionally deep. in the latter case, also, the lines were between two fires, as they were attacked in rear by a strong garrison at the moment when prince eugene assailed them from without. at mayence the lines were attacked in front, only a small detachment having succeeded in passing around the right flank. the tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works are few in number. if it seems probable that a work may be surprised if attacked a little before day, it is altogether proper to make the attempt; but if this operation may be recommended in case of an isolated work, it is by no means to be expected that a large army occupying an intrenched camp will permit itself to be surprised,--especially as the regulations of all services require armies to stand to their arms at dawn. as an attack by main force seems likely to be the method followed in this case, the following simple and reasonable directions are laid down:-- . silence the guns of the work by a powerful artillery-fire, which at the same time has the effect of discouraging the defenders. . provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and mount the parapet. . direct three small columns upon the work to be taken, skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their support. . take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible. . give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner of attacking the troops occupying the camp. designate the bodies of cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the ground permits. when all these arrangements are made, there is nothing more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the gorge. hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most daring rashness. those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets. among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which i have read, none are better than those for the assault of warsaw and the intrenched camp of mayence. thielke gives a description of laudon's dispositions for attacking the camp of buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is an excellent example for instruction. the attack of warsaw may be cited as one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to marshal paskevitch and the troops who executed it. as an example not to be followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made for attacking dresden in . among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or escalades of port mahon in , and of berg-op-zoom in ,--both preceded by sieges, but still brilliant _coups de main_, since in neither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault. continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried, because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point. the capture of the lines of mayence and wissembourg, which are described in the history of the wars of the revolution, (chapters xxi. and xxii.,) and that of the lines of turin by eugene of savoy in , are excellent lessons for study. this famous event at turin, which has been so often referred to, is so familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details of it; but i cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory was bought and how little it should have been expected. the strategic plan was certainly admirable; and the march from the adige through piacenza to asti by the right bank of the po, leaving the french on the mincio, was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. when we examine the operations near turin, we must confess that the victors owed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom. it required no great effort of genius upon the part of prince eugene to prepare the order he issued to his army; and he must have felt a profound contempt for his opponents to execute a march with thirty-five thousand allied troops of ten different nations between eighty thousand frenchmen on the one side and the alps on the other, and to pass around their camp for forty-eight hours by the most remarkable flank march that was ever attempted. the order for the attack was so brief and so devoid of instruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to write a better. directing the formation of eight columns of infantry by brigade in two lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to make openings through them for the passage of the cavalry into the camp, make up the sum total of all the science exhibited by eugene in order to carry out his rash undertaking it is true he selected the weak point of the intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half the bodies of its defenders. but i am wandering from my subject, and must return to the explanation of the measures most suitable for adoption in an attack on lines. if they have a sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them by assault, and if on the other hand they may be outflanked or turned by strategic maneuvers, it is far better to pursue the course last indicated than to attempt a hazardous assault. if, however, there is any reason for preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon one of the wings, because the center is the point most easily succored. there have been cases where an attack on the wing was expected by the defenders, and they have been deceived by a false attack made at that point, while the real attack took place at the center, and succeeded simply because unexpected. in these operations the locality and the character of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course to be pursued. the attack may be executed in the manner described for intrenched camps. it has sometimes happened, however, that these lines have had the relief and proportions of permanent works; and in this case escalade would be quite difficult, except of old earthen works whose slopes were worn away from the lapse of time and had become accessible for infantry of moderate activity. the ramparts of ismail and praga were of this character; so also was the citadel of smolensk, which paskevitch so gloriously defended against ney, because he preferred making his stand at the ravines in front, rather than take shelter behind a parapet with an inclination of scarcely thirty degrees. if one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd to think of penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy collecting his forces, the mass of which would be near the center, might defeat the columns advancing between the center and the river and completely destroy them. this absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because the enemy driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive return upon the assailant, no matter how advantageous it might seem. a general and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are already half conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not occur to them when their intrenchments are attacked. notwithstanding these facts, i cannot advise such a course; and the general who would run such a risk and meet the fate of tallard at blenheim could have no just cause of complaint. very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps and lines. the first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed between the center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right of the left wing and on the left of the right wing. with this arrangement succor can be easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, which could not be done were there but one central reserve. it has been suggested that three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchment is very extensive; but i decidedly incline to the opinion that two are quite enough. another recommendation may be given, and it is of great importance,--that the troops be made to understand they must by no means despair of finally defending a line which may be forced at one point; because, if a good reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attack the assailant, and succeed in driving him out of the work he may have supposed in his power. coups de main. these are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the capture of posts of different strength or importance.[ ] they partake of the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both these methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a successful issue. although _coups de main_ seem to be entirely tactical operations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of the captured posts to the strategic combinations in hand. it will become necessary, therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de main in article xxxvi., when speaking of detachments. however tiresome these repetitions may seem, i am obliged to state here the manner of executing such operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the attack of intrenchments. i do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to these operations; for their name, _coups de main_, implies that ordinary rules are not applicable to them. i desire only to call attention to them, and refer my readers to the different works, either historical or didactic, where they are mentioned. i have previously stated that important results may often follow from these enterprises. the capture of sizeboli in , the unsuccessful attack of general petrasch upon kehl in , the remarkable surprises of cremona in , of gibraltar in , and of berg-op-zoom in , as well as the escalades of port mahon and badajos, give an idea of the different kinds of _coup de main_. some are effected by surprise, others by open force. skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of the assailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the things which have an influence upon the successful issue of _coups de main_. as war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longer of the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence upon the results of a great strategic operation. the capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, that of a large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like the two attacks which were made in upon the fort of lucisteig in the grisons; the capture of leutasch and scharnitz by ney in ; finally, the capture of a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of provisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;--such are the enterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment engaging in them may be exposed. posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes with fascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for the same purpose. ladders are generally necessary, and should always be prepared. hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes of soldiers, to help them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the intrenchment. an entrance was effected through the sewers at cremona by prince eugene. in reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; for what has been done once may be done again. footnotes: [footnote : the number of defenders at dresden the first day (august ) was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and the third day, more than one hundred thousand.] [footnote : the distinction between the importance and the strength of a post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very little importance, and vice aversá.] chapter v. of several mixed operations, which are in character partly strategical and partly tactical. article xxxvi. of diversions and great detachments. the operations of the detachments an army may send out have so important a bearing on the success of a campaign, that the duty of determining their strength and the proper occasions for them is one of the greatest and most delicate responsibilities imposed upon a commander. if nothing is more useful in war than a strong detachment opportunely sent out and having a good _ensemble_ of operations with the main body, it is equally certain that no expedient is more dangerous when inconsiderately adopted. frederick the great regarded it as one of the essential qualities of a general to know how to make his adversary send out many detachments, either with the view of destroying them in detail or of attacking the main body during their absence. the division of armies into numerous detachments has sometimes been carried to so great an extent, and with such poor results, that many persons now believe it better to have none of them. it is undoubtedly much safer and more agreeable for an army to be kept in a single mass; but it is a thing at times impossible or incompatible with gaining a complete or even considerable success. the essential point in this matter is to send out as few detachments as possible. there are several kinds of detachments. . there are large corps dispatched to a distance from the zone of operations of the main army, in order to make diversions of greater or less importance. . there are large detachments made in the zone of operations to cover important points of this zone, to carry on a siege, to guard a secondary base, or to protect the line of operations if threatened. . there are large detachments made upon the front of operations, in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the main body in some combined operation. . there are small detachments sent to a distance to try the effect of surprise upon isolated points, whose capture may have an important bearing upon the general operations of the campaign. i understand by diversions those secondary operations carried out at a distance from the principal zone of operations, at the extremities of a theater of war, upon the success of which it is sometimes foolishly supposed the whole campaign depends. such diversions are useful in but two cases, the first of which arises when the troops thus employed cannot conveniently act elsewhere on account of their distance from the real theater of operations, and the second is that where such a detachment would receive strong support from the population among which it was sent,--the latter case belonging rather to political than military combinations. a few illustrative examples may not be out of place here. the unfortunate results for the allied powers of the anglo-russian expedition to holland, and of that of the archduke charles toward the end of the last century, (which have been referred to in article xix.,) are well known. in , napoleon was occupying naples and hanover. the allies intended an anglo-russian army to drive him out of italy, while the combined forces of england, russia, and sweden should drive him from hanover, nearly sixty thousand men being designed for these two widely-separated points. but, while their troops were collecting at the two extremities of europe, napoleon ordered the evacuation of naples and hanover, saint-cyr hastened to effect a junction with massena in the frioul, and bernadotte, leaving hanover, moved up to take part in the operations of ulm and austerlitz. after these astonishing successes, napoleon had no difficulty in retaking naples and hanover. this is an example of the failure of diversions. i will give an instance where such an operation would have been proper. in the civil wars of , if the allies had sent twenty thousand men to la vendée, they would have accomplished much more than by increasing the numbers of those who were fighting fruitlessly at toulon, upon the rhine, and in belgium. here is a case where a diversion would have been not only very useful, but decisive. it has already been stated that, besides diversions to a distance and of small bodies, large corps are often detached in the zone of operations of the main army. if the employment of these large corps thus detached for secondary objects is more dangerous than the diversions above referred to, it is no less true that they are often highly proper and, it may be, indispensable. these great detachments are chiefly of two kinds. the first are permanent corps which must be sometimes thrown out in a direction opposite to the main line of operations, and are to remain throughout a campaign. the second are corps temporarily detached for the purpose of assisting in carrying out some special enterprise. among the first should be especially enumerated those fractions of an army that are detached either to form the strategic reserve, of which mention has been made, or to cover lines of operation and retreat when the configuration of the theater of the war exposes them to attack. for example, a russian army that wishes to cross the balkan is obliged to leave a portion of its forces to observe shumla, routchouk, and the valley of the danube, whose direction is perpendicular to its line of operations. however successful it may be, a respectable force must always be left toward giurgevo or krajova, and even on the right bank of the river toward routchouk. this single example shows that it is sometimes necessary to have a double strategic front, and then the detachment of a considerable corps must be made to offer front to a part of the enemy's army in rear of the main army. other localities and other circumstances might be mentioned where this measure would be equally essential to safety. one case is the double strategic front of the tyrol and the frioul for a french army passing the adige. on whichever side it may wish to direct its main column, a detachment must be left on the other front sufficiently strong to hold in check the enemy threatening to cut the line of communications. the third example is the frontier of spain, which enables the spaniards to establish a double front,--one covering the road to madrid, the other having saragossa or galicia as a base. to whichever side the invading army turns, a detachment must be left on the other proportioned in magnitude to the enemy's force in that direction. all that can be said on this point is that it is advantageous to enlarge as much as possible the field of operations of such detachments, and to give them as much power of mobility as possible, in order to enable them by opportune movements to strike important blows. a most remarkable illustration of this truth was given by napoleon in the campaign of . obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in the valley of the adige to observe the tyrol while he was operating toward the noric alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the risk of losing temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave the parts of his army disconnected and exposed to defeat in detail. persuaded that he could be victorious with his army united, he apprehended no particular danger from the presence of a few hostile detachments upon his communications. great movable and temporary detachments are made for the following reasons:-- . to compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of operations, or else to cover your own. . to intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main body of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own reinforcements. . to observe and hold in position a large portion of the opposing army, while a blow is struck at the remainder. . to carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or munitions, on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege or the success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the march of a convoy of your own. . to make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction where you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of an enterprise in another direction. . to mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places for a certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the garrison shut up within the ramparts. . to take possession of an important point upon the communications of an enemy already retreating. however great may be the temptation to undertake such operations as those enumerated, it must be constantly borne in mind that they are always secondary in importance, and that the essential thing is to be successful at the decisive points. a multiplication of detachments must, therefore, be avoided. armies have been destroyed for no other reason than that they were not kept together. we will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show that their success depends sometimes upon good fortune and sometimes upon the skill of their designer, and that they often fail from faulty execution. peter the great took the first step toward the destruction of charles xii. by causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of the famous convoy lowenhaupt was bringing up. villars entirely defeated at denain the large detachment prince eugene sent out in under d'albermale. the destruction of the great convoy laudon took from frederick during the siege of olmutz compelled the king to evacuate moravia. the fate of the two detachments of fouquet at landshut in , and of fink at maxen in , demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid making detachments, and how dangerous they may be. to come nearer our own times, the disaster of vandamme at culm was a bloody lesson, teaching that a corps must not be thrust forward too boldly: however, we must admit that in this case the operation was well planned, and the fault was not so much in sending out the detachment as in not supporting it properly, as might easily have been done. that of fink was destroyed at maxen nearly on the same spot and for the same reason. diversions or demonstrations in the zone of operations of the army are decidedly advantageous when arranged for the purpose of engaging the enemy's attention in one direction, while the mass of the forces is collected upon another point where the important blow is to be struck. in such a case, care must be taken not only to avoid engaging the corps making the demonstration, but to recall it promptly toward the main body. we will mention two examples as illustrations of these facts. in , moreau, wishing to deceive kray as to the true direction of his march, carried his left wing toward rastadt from kehl, whilst he was really filing off his army toward stockach; his left, having simply shown itself, returned toward the center by fribourg in brisgau. in , napoleon, while master of vienna, detached the corps of bernadotte to iglau to overawe bohemia and paralyze the archduke ferdinand, who was assembling an army in that territory; in another direction he sent davoust to presburg to show himself in hungary; but he withdrew them to brunn, to take part in the event which was to decide the issue of the campaign, and a great and decisive victory was the result of his wise maneuvers. operations of this kind, so far from being in opposition to the principles of the art of war, are necessary to facilitate their application. it readily appears from what goes before that precise rules cannot be laid down for these operations, so varied in character, the success of which depends on so many minute details. generals should run the risk of making detachments only after careful consideration and observation of all the surrounding circumstances. the only reasonable rules on the subject are these: send out as few detachments as possible, and recall thorn immediately when their duty is performed. the inconveniences necessarily attending them may be made as few as practicable, by giving judicious and carefully-prepared instructions to their commanders: herein lies the great talent of a good chief of staff. one of the means of avoiding the disastrous results to which detachments sometimes lead is to neglect none of the precautions prescribed by tactics for increasing the strength of any force by posting it in good positions; but it is generally imprudent to engage in a serious conflict with too large a body of troops. in such cases ease and rapidity of motion will be most likely to insure safety. it seldom happens that it is right for a detachment to resolve to conquer or die in the position it has taken, whether voluntarily or by order. it is certain that in all possible cases the rules of tactics and of field-fortification must be applied by detachments as well as by the army itself. since we have included in the number of useful cases of detachments those intended for _coups de main_, it is proper to mention a few examples of this kind to enable the reader to judge for himself. we may call to mind that one which was executed by the russians toward the end of with the view of taking possession of sizeboli in the gulf of bourghas. the capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the russians rapidly strengthened, procured for them in case of success an essential _point d'appui_ beyond the balkan, where depots could be established in advance for the army intending to cross those mountains: in case of failure, no one was compromised,--not even the small corps which had been debarked, since it had a safe and certain retreat to the shipping. in like manner, in the campaign of , the _coup de main_ attempted by the austrians for the purpose of taking possession of kehl and destroying the bridge whilst moreau was returning from bavaria, would have had very important consequences if it had not failed. in attempts of this kind a little is risked to gain a great deal; and, as they can in no wise compromise the safety of the main army, they may be freely recommended. small bodies of troops thrown forward into the zone of the enemy's operations belong to the class of detachments that are judicious. a few hundred horsemen thus risked will be no great loss if captured; and they may be the means of causing the enemy great injury. the small detachments sent out by the russians in , , and were a great hinderance to napoleon's operations, and several times caused his plans to fail by intercepting his couriers. for such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold and full of stratagems. they ought to inflict upon the enemy all the injury they can without compromising themselves. when an opportunity of striking a telling blow presents itself, they should not think for a moment of any dangers or difficulties in their path. generally, however, address and presence of mind, which will lead them to avoid useless danger, are qualities more necessary for a partisan than cool, calculating boldness. for further information on this subject i refer my readers to chapter xxxv. of the treatise on grand operations, and to article xlv. of this work, on light cavalry. article xxxvii. passage of rivers and other streams. the passage of a small stream, over which a bridge is already in place or might be easily constructed, presents none of the combinations belonging to grand tactics or strategy; but the passage of a large river, such as the danube, the rhine, the po, the elbe, the oder, the vistula, the inn, the ticino, &c, is an operation worthy the closest study. the art of building military bridges is a special branch of military science, which is committed to pontoniers or sappers. it is not from this point of view that i propose to consider the passage of a stream, but as the attack of a military position and as a maneuver. the passage itself is a tactical operation; but the determination of the point of passage may have an important connection with all the operations taking place within the entire theater of the war. the passage of the rhine by general moreau in is an excellent illustration of the truth of this remark. napoleon, a more skillful strategist than moreau, desired him to cross at schaffhausen in order to take kray's whole army in reverse, to reach ulm before him, to cut him off from austria and hurl him back upon the main. moreau, who had already a bridge at basel, preferred passing, with greater convenience to his army, in front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left. the tactical advantages seemed to his mind much more sure than the strategical: he preferred the certainty of a partial success to the risk attending a victory which would have been a decisive one. in the same campaign napoleon's passage of the po is another example of the high strategic importance of the choice of the point of crossing. the army of the reserve, after the engagement of the chiusella, could either march by the left bank of the po to turin, or cross the river at crescentino and march directly to genoa. napoleon preferred to cross the ticino, enter milan, effect a junction with moncey who was approaching with twenty thousand men by the saint-gothard pass, then to cross the po at piacenza, expecting to get before mélas more certainly in that direction than if he came down too soon upon his line of retreat. the passage of the danube at donauwerth and ingolstadt in was a very similar operation. the direction chosen for the passage was the prime cause of the destruction of mack's army. the proper strategic point of passage is easily determined by recollecting the principles laid down in article xix.; and it is here only necessary to remind the reader that in crossing a river, as in every other operation, there are permanent or geographical decisive points, and others which are relative or eventual, depending on the distribution of the hostile forces. if the point selected combines strategic advantages with the tactical, no other point can be better; but if the locality presents obstacles exceedingly difficult to pass, another must be chosen, and in making the new selection care should be taken to have the direction of the movement as nearly as possible coincident with the true strategic direction. independently of the general combinations, which exercise a great influence in fixing the point of passage, there is still another consideration, connected with the locality itself. the best position is that where the army after crossing can take its front of operations and line of battle perpendicular to the river, at least for the first marches, without being forced to separate into several corps moving upon different lines. this advantage will also save it the danger of fighting a battle with a river in rear, as happened to napoleon at essling. enough has been said with reference to the strategical considerations influencing the selection of the point of crossing a river. we will now proceed to speak of the passage itself. history is the best school in which to study the measures likely to insure the success of such operations. the ancients deemed the passage of the granicus--which is a small stream--a wonderful exploit. so far as this point is concerned, the people of modern days can cite much greater. the passage of the rhine at tholhuys by louis xiv. has been greatly lauded; and it was really remarkable. in our own time, general dedon has made famous the two passages of the rhine at kehl and of the danube at hochstadt in . his work is a model as far as concerns the details; and in these operations minute attention to details is every thing. more recently, three other passages of the danube, and the ever-famous passage of the beresina, have exceeded every thing of the kind previously seen. the two first were executed by napoleon at essling and at wagram, in presence of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men provided with four hundred pieces of cannon, and at a point where the bed of the stream is broadest. general pelet's interesting account of them should be carefully read. the third was executed by the russian army at satounovo in , which, although not to be compared with the two just mentioned, was very remarkable on account of the great local difficulties and the vigorous exertions made to surmount them. the passage of the beresina was truly wonderful. my object not being to give historical details on this subject, i direct my readers to the special narratives of these events. i will give several general rules to be observed. . it is essential to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage, that he may not accumulate an opposing force there. in addition to the strategic demonstrations, false attacks must be made near the real one, to divide the attention and means of the enemy. for this purpose half of the artillery should be employed to make a great deal of noise at the points where the passage is not to be made, whilst perfect silence should be preserved where the real attempt is to be made. . the construction of the bridge should be covered as much as possible by troops sent over in boats for the purpose of dislodging the enemy who might interfere with the progress of the work; and these troops should take possession at once of any villages, woods, or other obstacles in the vicinity. . it is of importance also to arrange large batteries of heavy caliber, not only to sweep the opposite bank, but to silence any artillery the enemy might bring up to batter the bridge while building. for this purpose it is convenient to have the bank from which the passage is made somewhat higher than the other. . the proximity of a large island near the enemy's bank gives great facilities for passing over troops in boats and for constructing the bridge. in like manner, a smaller stream emptying into the larger near the point of passage is a favorable place for collecting and concealing boats and materials for the bridge. . it is well to choose a position where the river makes a re-entering bend, as the batteries on the assailant's side can cross their fire in front of the point where the troops are to land from the boats and where the end of the bridge is to rest, thus taking the enemy in front and flank when he attempts to oppose the passage. . the locality selected should be near good roads on both banks, that the army may have good communications to the front and rear on both banks of the river. for this reason, those points where the banks are high and steep should be usually avoided. the rules for preventing a passage follow as a matter of course from those for effecting it, as the duty of the defenders is to counteract the efforts of the assailants. the important thing is to have the course of the river watched by bodies of light troops, without attempting to make a defense at every point. concentrate rapidly at the threatened point, in order to overwhelm the enemy while a part only of his army shall have passed. imitate the duke of vendôme at cassano, and the archduke charles at essling in ,--the last example being particularly worthy of praise, although the operation was not so decidedly successful as might have been expected. in article xxi. attention was called to the influence that the passage of a river, in the opening of a campaign, may have in giving direction to the lines of operations. we will now see what connection it may have with subsequent strategic movements. one of the greatest difficulties to be encountered after a passage is to cover the bridge against the enemy's efforts to destroy it, without interfering too much with the free movement of the army. when the army is numerically very superior to the enemy, or when the river is passed just after a great victory gained, the difficulty mentioned is trifling; but when the campaign is just opening, and the two opposing armies are about equal, the case is very different. if one hundred thousand frenchmen pass the rhine at strasbourg or at manheim in presence of one hundred thousand austrians, the first thing to be done will be to drive the enemy in three directions,--first, before them as far as the black forest, secondly, by the right in order to cover the bridges on the upper rhine, and thirdly, by the left to cover the bridges of mayence and the lower rhine. this necessity is the cause of an unfortunate division of the forces; but, to make the inconveniences of this subdivision as few as possible, the idea must be insisted on that it is by no means essential for the army to be separated into three equal parts, nor need these detachments remain absent longer than the few days required for taking possession of the natural point of concentration of the enemy's forces. the fact cannot be concealed, however, that the case supposed is one in which the general finds his position a most trying one; for if he divides his army to protect his bridges he may be obliged to contend with one of his subdivisions against the whole of the enemy's force, and have it overwhelmed; and if he moves his army upon a single line, the enemy may divide his army and reassemble it at some unexpected point, the bridges may be captured or destroyed, and the general may find himself compromised before he has had time or opportunity to gain a victory. the best course to be pursued is to place the bridges near a city which will afford a strong defensive point for their protection, to infuse all possible vigor and activity into the first operations after the passage, to fall upon the subdivisions of the enemy's army in succession, and to beat them in such a way that they will have no further desire of touching the bridges. in some cases eccentric lines of operations may be used. if the enemy has divided his one hundred thousand men into several corps, occupying posts of observation, a passage may be effected with one hundred thousand men at a single point near the center of the line of posts, the isolated defensive corps at this position may be overwhelmed, and two masses of fifty thousand men each may then be formed, which, by taking diverging lines of operations, can certainly drive off the successive portions of the opposing army, prevent them from reuniting, and remove them farther and farther from the bridges. but if, on the contrary, the passage be effected at one extremity of the enemy's strategic front, by moving rapidly along this front the enemy may be beaten throughout its whole extent,--in the same manner that frederick tactically beat the austrian line at leuthen throughout its length,--the bridges will be secure in rear of the army, and remain protected during all the forward movements. it was in this manner that jourdan, having passed the rhine at dusseldorf in , on the extreme right of the austrians, could have advanced in perfect safety toward the main. he was driven away because the french, having a double and exterior line of operations, left one hundred and twenty thousand men inactive between mayence and basel, while clairfayt repulsed jourdan upon the lahn. but this cannot diminish the importance of the advantages gained by passing a river upon one extremity of the enemy's strategic front. a commander-in-chief should either adopt this method, or that previously explained, of a central mass at the moment of passage, and the use of eccentric lines afterward, according to the circumstances of the case, the situation of the frontiers and bases of operations, as well as the positions of the enemy. the mention of these combinations, of which something has already been said in the article on lines of operations, does not appear out of place here, since their connection with the location of bridges has been the chief point under discussion. it sometimes happens that, for cogent reasons, a double passage is attempted upon a single front of operations, as was the case with jourdan and moreau in . if the advantage is gained of having in case of need a double line of retreat, there is the inconvenience, in thus operating on the two extremities of the enemy's front, of forcing him, in a measure, to concentrate on his center, and he may be placed in a condition to overwhelm separately the two armies which have crossed at different points. such an operation will always lead to disastrous results when the opposing general has sufficient ability to know how to take advantage of this violation of principles. in such a case, the inconveniences of the double passage may be diminished by passing over the mass of the forces at one of the points, which then becomes the decisive one, and by concentrating the two portions by interior lines as rapidly as possible, to prevent the enemy from destroying them separately. if jourdan and moreau had observed this rule, and made a junction of their forces in the direction of donauwerth, instead of moving eccentrically, they would probably have achieved great successes in bavaria, instead of being driven back upon the rhine. article xxxviii. retreats and pursuits. retreats are certainly the most difficult operations in war. this remark is so true that the celebrated prince de ligne said, in his usual piquant style, that he could not conceive how an army ever succeeded in retreating. when we think of the physical and moral condition of an army in full retreat after a lost battle, of the difficulty of preserving order, and of the disasters to which disorder may lead, it is not hard to understand why the most experienced generals have hesitated to attempt such an operation. what method of retreat shall be recommended? shall the fight be continued at all hazards until nightfall and the retreat executed under cover of the darkness? or is it better not to wait for this last chance, but to abandon the field of battle while it can be done and a strong opposition still made to the pursuing army? should a forced march be made in the night, in order to get as much start of the enemy as possible? or is it better to halt after a half-march and make a show of fighting again? each of these methods, although entirely proper in certain cases, might in others prove ruinous to the whole army. if the theory of war leaves any points unprovided for, that of retreats is certainly one of them. if you determine to fight vigorously until night, you may expose yourself to a complete defeat before that time arrives; and if a forced retreat must begin when the shades of night are shrouding every thing in darkness and obscurity, how can you prevent the disintegration of your army, which does not know what to do, and cannot see to do any thing properly? if, on the other hand, the field of battle is abandoned in broad daylight and before all possible efforts have been made to hold it, you may give up the contest at the very moment when the enemy is about to do the same thing; and this fact coming to the knowledge of the troops, you may lose their confidence,--as they are always inclined to blame a prudent general who retreats before the necessity for so doing may be evident to themselves. moreover, who can say that a retreat commenced in the daylight in presence of an enterprising enemy may not become a rout? when the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to decide whether a forced march shall be made to get as much the start of the enemy as possible,--since this hurried movement might sometimes cause the destruction of the army, and might, in other circumstances, be its salvation. all that can be positively asserted on this subject is that, in general, with an army of considerable magnitude, it is best to retreat slowly, by short marches, with a well-arranged rear-guard of sufficient strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in check for several hours. retreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from which they result. a general may retire of his own accord before fighting, in order to draw his adversary to a position which he prefers to his present one. this is rather a prudent maneuver than a retreat. it was thus that napoleon retired in from wischau toward brunn to draw the allies to a point which suited him as a battle-field. it was thus that wellington retired from quatre-bras to waterloo. this is what i proposed to do before the attack at dresden, when the arrival of napoleon was known. i represented the necessity of moving toward dippoldiswalde to choose a favorable battle-field. it was supposed to be a retreat that i was proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a retrograde movement without fighting, which would have been the means of avoiding the catastrophe of the next day, (august , .) a general may retire in order to hasten to the defense of a point threatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the line of retreat. when an army is marching at a distance from its depots, in an exhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in order to get nearer its supplies. finally, an army retires involuntarily after a lost battle, or after an unsuccessful enterprise. these are not the only causes having an influence in retreats. their character will vary with that of the country, with the distances to be passed over and the obstacles to be surmounted. they are specially dangerous in an enemy's country; and when the points at which the retreats begin are distant from the friendly country and the base of operations, they become painful and difficult. from the time of the famous retreat of the ten thousand, so justly celebrated, until the terrible catastrophe which befell the french army in , history does not make mention of many remarkable retreats. that of antony, driven out of media, was more painful than glorious. that of the emperor julian, harassed by the same parthians, was a disaster. in more recent days, the retreat of charles viii. to naples, when he passed by a corps of the italian army at fornovo, was an admirable one. the retreat of m. de bellisle from prague does not deserve the praises it has received. those executed by the king of prussia after raising the siege of olmutz and after the surprise at hochkirch were very well arranged; but they were for short distances. that of moreau in , which was magnified in importance by party spirit, was creditable, but not at all extraordinary. the retreat of lecourbe from engadin to altorf, and that of macdonald by pontremoli after the defeat of the trebbia, as also that of suwaroff from the muttenthal to chur, were glorious feats of arms, but partial in character and of short duration. the retreat of the russian army from the niemen to moscow--a space of two hundred and forty leagues,--in presence of such an enemy as napoleon and such cavalry as the active and daring murat commanded, was certainly admirable. it was undoubtedly attended by many favorable circumstances, but was highly deserving of praise, not only for the talent displayed by the generals who directed its first stages, but also for the admirable fortitude and soldierly bearing of the troops who performed it. although the retreat from moscow was a bloody catastrophe for napoleon, it was also glorious for him and the troops who were at krasnoi and the beresina,--because the skeleton of the army was saved, when not a single man should have returned. in this ever-memorable event both parties covered themselves with glory. the magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country to be traversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be encountered, the attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in flank, superiority or inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the troops, are circumstances which have a great effect in deciding the fate of retreats, leaving out of consideration the skillful arrangements which the generals may make for their execution. a general falling back toward his native land along his line of magazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in good order, and may effect a retreat with more safety than one compelled to subsist his army in cantonments, finding it necessary to occupy an extended position. it would be absurd to pretend that a french army retiring from moscow to the niemen without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalry and draft horses, could effect the movement in the same good order and with the same steadiness as a russian army, well provided with every thing necessary, marching in its own country, and covered by an immense number of light cavalry. there are five methods of arranging a retreat:-- the first is to march in a single mass and upon one road. the second consists in dividing the army into two or three corps, marching at the distance of a day's march from each other, in order to avoid confusion, especially in the _matériel_. the third consists in marching upon a single front by several roads nearly parallel and having a common point of arrival. the fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads. the fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging roads. i have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but it is taken for granted that a good one should always be prepared and well sustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves. this arrangement is common to all kinds of retreats, but has nothing to do with the strategic relations of these operations. an army falling back in good order, with the intention of fighting as soon as it shall have received expected reinforcements or as soon as it shall have reached a certain strategic position, should prefer the first method, as this particularly insures the compactness of the army and enables it to be in readiness for battle almost at any moment, since it is simply necessary to halt the heads of columns and form the remainder of the troops under their protection as they successively arrive. an army employing this method must not, however, confine itself to the single main road, if there are side-roads sufficiently near to be occupied which may render its movements more rapid and secure. when napoleon retired from smolensk, he used the second method, having the portions of his army separated by an entire march. he made therein a great mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, but moving along a lateral road which brought him in a nearly perpendicular direction into the midst of the separated french corps. the three fatal days of krasnoi were the result. the employment of this method being chiefly to avoid incumbering the road, the interval between the departure of the several corps is sufficiently great when the artillery may readily file off. instead of separating the corps by a whole march, the army would be better divided into two masses and a rear-guard, a half-march from each other. these masses, moving off in succession with an interval of two hours between the departure of their several army-corps, may file off without incumbering the road, at least in ordinary countries. in crossing the saint-bernard or the balkan, other calculations would doubtless be necessary. i apply this idea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand or one hundred and fifty thousand men, having a rear-guard of twenty thousand or twenty-five thousand men distant about a half-march in rear. the army may be divided into two masses of about sixty thousand men each, encamped at a distance of three or four leagues from each other. each of these masses will be subdivided into two or three corps, which may either move successively along the road or form in two lines across the road. in either case, if one corps of thirty thousand men moves at five a.m. and the other at seven, there will be no danger of interference with each other, unless something unusual should happen; for the second mass being at the same hours of the day about four leagues behind the first, they can never be occupying the same part of the road at the same time. when there are practicable roads in the neighborhood, suitable at least for infantry and cavalry, the intervals may be diminished. it is scarcely necessary to add that such an order of march can only be used when provisions are plentiful; and the third method is usually the best, because the army is then marching in battle-order. in long days and in hot countries the best times for marching are the night and the early part of the day. it is one of the most difficult problems of logistics to make suitable arrangements of hours of departures and halts for armies; and this is particularly the case in retreats. many generals neglect to arrange the manner and times of halts, and great disorder on the march is the consequence, as each brigade or division takes the responsibility of halting whenever the soldiers are a little tired and find it agreeable to bivouac. the larger the army and the more compactly it marches, the more important does it become to arrange well the hours of departures and halts, especially if the army is to move at night. an ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause as much mischief as a rout. if the rear-guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in order to relieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass, which will halt with this object in view. the enemy seeing eighty thousand men in battle-order will think it necessary to halt and collect his columns; and then the retreat should recommence at nightfall, to regain the space which has been lost. the third method, of retreating along several parallel roads, is excellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other. but, if they are quite distant, one wing separated from the center and from the other wing may be compromised if the enemy attacks it in force and compels it to stand on the defensive. the prussian army moving from magdeburg toward the oder, in , gives an example of this kind. the fourth method, which consists in following concentric roads, is undoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from each other when the retreat is ordered. nothing can be better, in such a case, than to unite the forces; and the concentric retreat is the only method of effecting this. the fifth method indicated is nothing else than the famous system of eccentric lines, which i have attributed to bulow, and have opposed so warmly in the earlier editions of my works, because i thought i could not be mistaken either as to the sense of his remarks on the subject or as to the object of his system. i gathered from his definition that he recommended to a retreating army, moving from any given position, to separate into parts and pursue diverging roads, with the double object of withdrawing more readily from the enemy in pursuit and of arresting his march by threatening his flanks and his line of communications. i found great fault with the system, for the simple reason that a beaten army is already weak enough, without absurdly still further dividing its forces and strength in presence of a victorious enemy. bulow has found defenders who declare that i mistake his meaning, and that by the term _eccentric retreat_ he did not understand a retreat made on several diverging roads, but one which, instead of being directed toward the center of the base of operations or the center of the country, should be eccentric to that focus of operations, and along the line of the frontier of the country. i may possibly have taken an incorrect impression from his language, and in this case my criticism falls to the ground; for i have strongly recommended that kind of a retreat to which i have given the name of the parallel retreat. it is my opinion that an army, leaving the line which leads from the frontiers to the center of the state, with a view of moving to the right or the left, may very well pursue a course nearly parallel to the line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations and its base. it seems to me more rational to give the name of parallel retreat to such a movement as that described, designating as eccentric retreat that where diverging roads are followed, all leading from the strategic front. however this dispute about words may result, the sole cause of which was the obscurity of bulow's text, i find fault only with those retreats made along several diverging roads, under pretense of covering a greater extent of frontier and of threatening the enemy on both flanks. by using these high-sounding words _flanks_, an air of importance may be given to systems entirely at variance with the principles of the art. an army in retreat is always in a bad state, either physically or morally; because a retreat can only be the result of reverses or of numerical inferiority. shall such an army be still more weakened by dividing it? i find no fault with retreats executed in several columns, to increase the ease of moving, when these columns can support each other; but i am speaking of those made along diverging lines of operations. suppose an army of forty thousand men retreating before another of sixty thousand. if the first forms four isolated divisions of about ten thousand men, the enemy may maneuver with two masses of thirty thousand men each. can he not turn his adversary, surround, disperse, and ruin in succession all his divisions? how can they escape such a fate? _by concentration_. this being in direct opposition to a divergent system, the latter falls of itself. i invoke to my support the great lessons of experience. when the leading divisions of the army of italy were repulsed by wurmser, bonaparte collected them all together at roverbella; and, although he had only forty thousand men, he fought and beat sixty thousand, because he had only to contend against isolated columns. if he had made a divergent retreat, what would have become of his army and his victories? wurmser, after his first check, made an eccentric retreat, directing his two wings toward the extremities of the line of defense. what was the result? his right, although supported by the mountains of the tyrol, was beaten at trent. bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left, and destroyed that at bassano and mantua. when the archduke charles gave way before the first efforts of the french armies in , would he have saved germany by an eccentric movement? was not the salvation of germany due to his concentric retreat? at last moreau, who had moved with a very extended line of isolated divisions, perceived that this was an excellent system for his own destruction, if he stood his ground and fought or adopted the alternative of retreating. he concentrated his scattered troops, and all the efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass which it was necessary to watch throughout the whole length of a line of two hundred miles. such examples must put an end to further discussion.[ ] there are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and then only as a last resource. first, when an army has experienced a great defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protection within the walls of fortified places. secondly, in a war where the sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province; but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply absurd. there is still another strategical consideration as to the direction of a retreat,--to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to the frontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should be parallel to the frontier. for example, when marshal soult gave up the line of the pyrenees in , he had to choose one of two directions for his retreat,--either by way of bordeaux toward the interior of france, or by way of toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the pyrenees. in the same way, when frederick retired from moravia, he marched toward bohemia instead of returning to silesia. these parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason that they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and the center of its power. the propriety of giving such a direction to a retreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, the positions of the fortresses, the greater or less space the army may have for its marches, and the facilities for recovering its direct communications with the central portions of the state. spain is admirably suited to the use of this system. if a french army penetrates by way of bayonne, the spaniards may base themselves upon pampeluna and saragossa, or upon leon and the asturias; and in either case the french cannot move directly to madrid, because their line of operations would be at the mercy of their adversary. the frontier of the turkish empire on the danube presents the same advantages, if the turks knew how to profit by them. in france also the parallel retreat may be used, especially when the nation itself is not divided into two political parties each of which is striving for the possession of the capital. if the hostile army penetrates through the alps, the french can act on the rhone and the saône, passing around the frontier as far as the moselle on one side, or as far as provence on the other. if the enemy enters the country by way of strasbourg, mayence, or valenciennes, the same thing can be done. the occupation of paris by the enemy would be impossible, or at least very hazardous, so long as a french army remained in good condition and based upon its circle of fortified towns. the same is the case for all countries having double fronts of operations.[ ] austria is perhaps not so fortunately situated, on account of the directions of the rhetian and tyrolean alps and of the river danube. lloyd, however, considers bohemia and the tyrol as two bastions connected by the strong curtain of the river inn, and regards this frontier as exceedingly well suited for parallel movements. this assertion was not well sustained by the events of the campaigns of , , and ; but, as the parallel method has not yet had a fair trial on that ground, the question is still an open one. it seems to me that the propriety of applying the parallel method depends mainly upon the existing and the antecedent circumstances of each case. if a french army should approach from the rhine by way of bavaria, and should find allies in force upon the lech and the iser, it would be a very delicate operation to throw the whole austrian army into the tyrol and into bohemia, with the expectation of arresting in this way the forward movement to vienna. if half the austrian army is left upon the inn to cover the approaches to the capital, an unfortunate division of force is the consequence; and if it is decided to throw the whole army into the tyrol, leaving the way to vienna open, there would be great danger incurred if the enemy is at all enterprising. in italy, beyond the mincio, the parallel method would be of difficult application on the side of the tyrol, as well as in bohemia against an enemy approaching from saxony, for the reason that the theater of operations would be too contracted. in prussia the parallel retreat may be used with great advantage against an army debouching from bohemia upon the elbe or the oder, whilst its employment would be impossible against a french army moving from the rhine, or a russian army from the vistula, unless prussia and austria were allies. this is a result of the geographical configuration of the country, which allows and even favors lateral movements: in the direction of its greatest dimension, (from memel to mayence;) but such a movement would be disastrous if made from dresden to stettin. when an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the operation, a pursuit always follows. a retreat, even when executed in the most skillful manner and by an army in good condition, always gives an advantage to the pursuing army; and this is particularly the case after a defeat and when the source of supplies and reinforcements is at a great distance; for a retreat then becomes more difficult than any other operation in war, and its difficulties increase in proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemy in conducting the pursuit. the boldness and activity of the pursuit will depend, of course, upon the character of the commanders and upon the _physique_ and _morale_ of the two armies. it is difficult to prescribe fixed rules for all cases of pursuits, but the following points must be recollected:-- . it is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank of the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. care must, however, be taken not to make too large a circuit; for there might then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely. . a pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively executed as possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained; because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously followed up. . there are very few cases where it is wise to make a bridge of gold for the enemy, no matter what the old roman proverb may say; for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy to leave a country, unless in the case when an unexpected success shall have been gained over him by an army much inferior to his in numbers. nothing further of importance can be added to what has been said on the subject of retreats, as far as they are connected with grand combinations of strategy. we may profitably indicate several tactical measures which may render them more easy of execution. one of the surest means of making a retreat successfully is to familiarize the officers and soldiers with the idea that an enemy may be resisted quite as well when coming on the rear as on the front, and that the preservation of order is the only means of saving a body of troops harassed by the enemy during a retrograde movement. rigid discipline is at all times the best preservative of good order, but it is of special importance during a retreat. to enforce discipline, subsistence must be furnished, that the troops may not be obliged to straggle off for the purpose of getting supplies by marauding. it is a good plan to give the command of the rear-guard to an officer of great coolness, and to attach to it staff officers who may, in advance of its movements, examine and select points suitable for occupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check. cavalry can rally so rapidly on the main body that it is evidently desirable to have considerable bodies of such troops, as they greatly facilitate the execution of a slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means of thoroughly examining the road itself and the neighborhood, so as to prevent an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of the retreating columns. it is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at the distance of half a day's march from the main body. the rear-guard would run great risk of being itself cut off, if farther distant. when, however, there are defiles in its rear which are held by friends, it may increase the sphere of its operations and remain a full day's march to the rear; for a defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same degree that it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy. if the army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally large, it may remain a day's march in rear. this will depend, however, upon its strength, the nature of the country, and the character and strength of the pursuing force. if the enemy presses up closely, it is of importance not to permit him to do so with impunity, especially if the retreat is made in good order. in such a case it is a good plan to halt from time to time and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy's advanced guard, as the archduke charles did in at neresheim, moreau at biberach, and kleber at ukerath. such a maneuver almost always succeeds, on account of the surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body of troops which is thinking of little else than collecting trophies and spoils. passages of rivers in retreat are also operations by no means devoid of interest. if the stream is narrow and there are permanent bridges over it, the operation is nothing more than the passage of a defile; but when the river is wide and is to be crossed upon a temporary military bridge, it is a maneuver of extreme delicacy. among the precautions to be taken, a very important one is to get the parks well advanced, so that they may be out of the way of the army; for this purpose it is well for the army to halt a half-day's march from the river. the rear-guard should also keep at more than the usual distance from the main body,--as far, in fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed will permit. the army may thus file across the bridge without being too much hurried. the march of the rear-guard should be so arranged that it shall have reached a position in front of the bridge just as the last of the main body has passed. this will be a suitable moment for relieving the rear-guard by fresh troops strongly posted. the rear-guard will pass through the intervals of the fresh troops in position and will cross the river; the enemy, coming up and finding fresh troops drawn up to give him battle, will make no attempt to press them too closely. the new rear-guard will hold its position until night, and will then cross the river, breaking the bridges after it. it is, of course, understood that as fast as the troops pass they form on the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to protect the corps left to hold the enemy in check. the dangers of such a passage in retreat, and the nature of the precautions which facilitate it, indicate that measures should always be taken to throw up intrenchments at the point where the bridge is to be constructed and the passage made. where time is not allowed for the construction of a regular _tête de pont_, a few well-armed redoubts will be found of great value in covering the retreat of the last troops. if the passage of a large river is so difficult when the enemy is only pressing on the rear of the column, it is far more so when the army is threatened both in front and rear and the river is guarded by the enemy in force. the celebrated passage of the beresina by the french is one of the most remarkable examples of such an operation. never was an army in a more desperate condition, and never was one extricated more gloriously and skillfully. pressed by famine, benumbed with cold, distant twelve hundred miles from its base of operations, assailed by the enemy in front and in rear, having a river with marshy banks in front, surrounded by vast forests, how could it hope to escape? it paid dearly for the honor it gained. the mistake of admiral tschitchagoff doubtless helped its escape; but the army performed heroic deeds, for which due praise should be given. we do not know whether to admire most the plan of operations which brought up the russian armies from the extremities of moldavia, from moscow, and from polotzk to the beresina as to a rendezvous arranged in peace,--a plan which came near effecting the capture of their formidable adversary,--or the wonderful firmness of the lion thus pursued, who succeeded in opening a way through his enemies. the only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to be closely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage, and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the way before the one which is following the rear of your column can come up. never place yourself in a position to be exposed to such danger; for escape in such a case is rare. if a retreating army should strive to protect its bridges either by regular _têtes de font_, or at least by lines of redoubts to cover the rear-guard, it is natural, also, that the enemy pursuing should use every effort to destroy the bridges. when the retreat is made down the bank of a river, wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, also fire-ships and mills,--a means the austrians used in against jourdan's army, near neuwied on the rhine, where they nearly compromised the army of the sambre and the meuse. the archduke charles did the same thing at essling in . he broke the bridge over the danube, and brought napoleon to the brink of ruin. it is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this character unless there is time for placing a stockade above it. boats may be anchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to catch floating bodies and with means for extinguishing fire-boats. footnotes: [footnote : ten years after this first refutation of bulow's idea, the concentric retreat of barclay and bagration saved the russian army. although it did not prevent napoleon's first success, it was, in the end, the cause of his ruin.] [footnote : in all these calculations i suppose the contending forces nearly equal. if the invading army is twice as strong as the defensive, it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which may move directly upon the capital, while the other may follow the army retiring along the frontier. if the armies are equal, this is impossible.] article xxxix. of cantonments, either when on the march, or when established in winter quarters. so much has been written on this point, and its connection with my subject is so indirect, that i shall treat it very briefly. to maintain an army in cantonments, in a war actively carried on, is generally difficult, however connected the arrangement may be, and there is almost always some point exposed to the enemy's attacks. a country where large towns abound, as lombardy, saxony, the netherlands, swabia, or old prussia, presents more facilities for the establishment of quarters than one where towns are few; for in the former case the troops have not only convenient supplies of food, but shelters which permit the divisions of the army to be kept closely together. in poland, russia, portions of austria and france, in spain and in southern italy, it is more difficult to put an army into winter quarters. formerly, it was usual for each party to go into winter quarters at the end of october, and all the fighting after that time was of a partisan character and carried on by the advanced troops forming the outposts. the surprise of the austrian winter quarters in upper alsace in , by turenne, is a good example, from which may be learned the best method of conducting such an enterprise, and the precautions to be taken on the other side to prevent its success. the best rules to be laid down on this subject seem to me to be the following. establish the cantonments very compactly and connectedly and occupying a space as broad as long, in order to avoid having a too extended line of troops, which is always easily broken through and cannot be concentrated in time; cover them by a river, or by an outer line of troops in huts and with their position strengthened by field-works; fix upon points of assembly which may be reached by all the troops before the enemy can penetrate so far; keep all the avenues by which an enemy may approach constantly patrolled by bodies of cavalry; finally, establish signals to give warning if an attack is made at any point. in the winter of , napoleon established his army in cantonments behind the passarge in face of the enemy, the advanced guard alone being hutted near the cities of gutstadt, osterode, &c. the army numbered more than one hundred and twenty thousand men, and much skill was requisite in feeding it and keeping it otherwise comfortable in this position until june. the country was of a favorable character; but this cannot be expected to be the case everywhere. an army of one hundred thousand men may find it not very difficult to have a compact and well-connected system of winter quarters in countries where large towns are numerous. the difficulty increases with the size of the army. it must be observed, however, that if the extent of country occupied increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the means of opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same proportion. the important point is to be able to assemble fifty thousand or sixty thousand men in twenty-four hours. with such an army in hand, and with the certainty of having it rapidly increased, the enemy may be held in check, no matter how strong he may be, until the whole army is assembled. it must be admitted, however, that there will always be a risk in going into winter quarters if the enemy keeps his army in a body and seems inclined to make offensive movements; and the conclusion to be drawn from this fact is, that the only method of giving secure repose to an army in winter or in the midst of a campaign is to establish it in quarters protected by a river, or to arrange an armistice. in the strategic positions taken up by an army in the course of a campaign, whether marching, or acting as an army of observation, or waiting for a favorable opportunity of taking the offensive, it will probably occupy quite compact cantonments. the selection of such positions requires great experience upon the part of a general, in order that he may form correct conclusions as to what he may expect the enemy to do. an army should occupy space enough to enable it to subsist readily, and it should also keep as much concentrated as possible, to be ready for the enemy should he show himself; and these two conditions are by no means easily reconciled. there is no better arrangement than to place the divisions of the army in a space nearly a square, so that in case of need the whole may be assembled at any point where the enemy may present himself. nine divisions placed in this way, a half-day's march from each other, may in twelve hours assemble on the center. the same rules are to be observed in these cases as were laid down for winter quarters. article xl. descents. these are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among the most difficult in war when effected in presence of a well-prepared enemy. since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it in navies, transports are so helpless in presence of the monstrous three-deckers of the present day, armed as they are with a hundred cannon, that an army can make a descent only with the assistance of a numerous fleet of ships of war which can command the sea, at least until the debarkation of the army takes place. before the invention of gunpowder, the transports were also the ships of war; they were moved along at pleasure by using oars, were light, and could skirt along the coasts; their number was in proportion to the number of troops to be embarked; and, aside from the danger of tempests, the operations of a fleet could be arranged with almost as much certainty as those of an army on land. ancient history, for these reasons, gives us examples of more extensive debarkations than modern times. who does not recall to mind the immense forces transported by the persians upon the black sea, the bosporus, and the archipelago,--the innumerable hosts landed in greece by xerxes and darius,--the great expeditions of the carthaginians and romans to spain and sicily, that of alexander into asia minor, those of cæsar to england and africa, that of germanicus to the mouths of the elbe,--the crusades,--the expeditions of the northmen to england, to france, and even to italy? since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated armada of philip ii. was the only enterprise of this kind of any magnitude until that set on foot by napoleon against england in . all other marine expeditions were of no great extent: as, for example, those of charles v. and of sebastian of portugal to the coast of africa; also the several descents of the french into the united states of america, into egypt and st. domingo, of the english to egypt, holland, copenhagen, antwerp, philadelphia. i say nothing of hoche's projected landing in ireland; for that was a failure, and is, at the same time, an example of the difficulties to be apprehended in such attempts. the large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states of the world prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men, except against second-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult to find transportation for one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men with their immense trains of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &c. we were, however, on the point of seeing the solution of the vast problem of the practicability of descents in great force, if it is true that napoleon seriously contemplated the transportation of one hundred and sixty thousand veterans from boulogne to the british isles: unfortunately, his failure to execute this gigantic undertaking has left us entirely in the dark as to this grave question. it is not impossible to collect fifty french ships-of-the-line in the channel by misleading the english; this was, in fact, upon the point of being done; it is then no longer impossible, with a favorable wind, to pass over the flotilla in two days and effect a landing. but what would become of the army if a storm should disperse the fleet of ships of war and the english should return in force to the channel and defeat the fleet or oblige it to regain its ports? posterity will regret, as the loss of an example to all future generations, that this immense undertaking was not carried through, or at least attempted. doubtless, many brave men would have met their deaths; but were not those men mowed down more uselessly on the plains of swabia, of moravia, and of castile, in the mountains of portugal and the forests of lithuania? what man would not glory in assisting to bring to a conclusion the greatest trial of skill and strength ever seen between two great nations? at any rate, posterity will find in the preparations made for this descent one of the most valuable lessons the present century has furnished for the study of soldiers and of statesmen. the labors of every kind performed on the coasts of france from to will be among the most remarkable monuments of the activity, foresight, and skill of napoleon. it is recommended to the careful attention of young officers. but, while admitting the possibility of success for a great descent upon a coast so near as the english to boulogne, what results should be expected if this armada had had a long sea-voyage to make? how could so many small vessels be kept moving, even for two days and nights? to what chances of ruin would not so many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open seas! moreover, the artillery, munitions of war, equipments, provisions, and fresh water that must be carried with this multitude of men require immense labor in preparation and vast means of transportation. experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such an expedition, even for thirty thousand men. from known facts, it is evident that a descent can be made with this number of men in four cases:-- st, against colonies or isolated possessions; d, against second-rate powers which cannot be immediately supported from abroad; d, for the purpose of effecting a temporary diversion, or to capture a position which it is important to hold for a time; th, to make a diversion, at once political and military, against a state already engaged in a great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from the point of the descent. it is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character. about the only recommendations i can make are the following. deceive the enemy as to the point of landing; choose a spot where the vessels may anchor in safety and the troops be landed together; infuse as much activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on shore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and protection to the troops that have landed. a great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact that the transports can never get near the beach, and the troops must be landed in boats and rafts,--which takes time and gives the enemy great advantages. if the sea is rough, the men to be landed are exposed to great risks; for what can a body of infantry do, crowded in boats, tossed about by the waves, and ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sickness for the proper use of their arms? i can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forces too much by attempting to cover every point. it is an impossibility to line the entire coast with batteries and battalions for its defense; but the approaches to those places where large establishments are to be protected must be closed. signals should be arranged for giving prompt notice of the point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable force should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a firm foothold. the configuration of coasts has a great influence upon descents and their prosecution. there are countries where the coasts are steep and present few points of easy access for the ships and the troops to be landed: these few places may be more readily watched, and the descent becomes more difficult. finally, there is a strategical consideration connected with descents which may be usefully pointed out. the same principle which forbids a continental army from interposing the mass of its forces between the enemy and the sea requires, on the contrary, that an army landing upon a coast should always keep its principal mass in communication with the shore, which is at once its line of retreat and its base of supplies. for the same reason, its first care should be to make sure of the possession of one fortified harbor/ or at least of a tongue of land which is convenient to a good anchorage and may be easily strengthened by fortifications, in order that in case of reverse the troops may be re-embarked without hurry and loss. chapter vi. logistics; or, the practical art of moving armies. article xli. a few remarks on logistics in general. is logistics simply a science of detail? or, on the contrary, is it a general science, forming one of the most essential parts of the art of war? or is it but a term, consecrated by long use, intended to designate collectively the different branches of staff duty,--that is to say, the different means of carrying out in practice the theoretical combinations of the art? these questions will seem singular to those persons who are firmly convinced that nothing more remains to be said about the art of war, and believe it wrong to search out new definitions where every thing seems already accurately classified. for my own part, i am persuaded that good definitions lead to clear ideas; and i acknowledge some embarrassment in answering these questions which seem so simple. in the earlier editions of this work i followed the example of other military writers, and called by the name of _logistics_ the details of staff duties, which are the subject of regulations for field-service and of special instructions relating to the corps of quartermasters. this was the result of prejudices consecrated by time. the word _logistics_ is derived, as we know, from the title of the _major général des logìs_, (translated in german by _quartiermeister_,) an officer whose duty it formerly was to lodge and camp the troops, to give direction to the marches of columns, and to locate them upon the ground. logistics was then quite limited. but when war began to be waged without camps, movements became more complicated, and the staff officers had more extended functions. the chief of staff began to perform the duty of transmitting the conceptions of the general to the most distant points of the theater of war, and of procuring for him the necessary documents for arranging plans of operations. the chief of staff was called to the assistance of the general in arranging his plans, to give information of them to subordinates in orders and instructions, to explain them and to supervise their execution both in their _ensemble_ and in their minute details: his duties were, therefore, evidently connected with all the operations of a campaign. to be a good chief of staff, it became in this way necessary that a man should be acquainted with all the various branches of the art of war. if the term _logistics_ includes all this, the two works of the archduke charles, the voluminous treatises of guibert, laroche-aymon, bousmard, and ternay, all taken together, would hardly give even an incomplete sketch of what logistics is; for it would be nothing more nor less than the science of applying all possible military knowledge. it appears from what has been said that the old term _logistics_ is insufficient to designate the duties of staff officers, and that the real duties of a corps of such officers, if an attempt be made to instruct them in a proper manner for their performance, should be accurately prescribed by special regulations in accordance with the general principles of the art. governments should take the precaution to publish well-considered regulations, which should define all the duties of staff officers and should give clear and accurate instructions as to the best methods of performing these duties. the austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for their government; but it was somewhat behind the times, and was better adapted to the old methods of carrying on war than the present. this is the only work of the kind i have seen. there are, no doubt, others, both public and secret; but i have no knowledge of their existence. several generals--as, for instance, grimoard and thiebaut--have prepared manuals for staff officers, and the new royal corps of france has issued several partial sets of instructions; but there is nowhere to be found a complete manual on the subject. if it is agreed that the old _logistics_ had reference only to details of marches and camps, and, moreover, that the functions of staff officers at the present day are intimately connected with the most important strategical combinations, it must be admitted that logistics includes but a small part of the duties of staff officers; and if we retain the term we must understand it to be greatly extended and developed in signification, so as to embrace not only the duties of ordinary staff officers, but of generals-in-chief. to convince my readers of this fact, i will mention the principal points that must be included if we wish to embrace in one view every duty and detail relating to the movements of armies and the undertakings resulting from such movements:-- . the preparation of all the material necessary for setting the army in motion, or, in other words, for opening the campaign. drawing up orders, instructions, and itineraries for the assemblage of the army and its subsequent launching upon its theater of operations. . drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief for different enterprises, as well as plans of attack in expected battles. . arranging with the chiefs of engineers and artillery the measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to be used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to facilitate the operations of the army. . ordering and directing reconnoissances of every kind, and procuring in this way, and by using spies, as exact information as possible of the positions and movements of the enemy. . taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements ordered by the general. arranging the march of the different columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connected manner. ascertaining certainly that the means requisite for the ease and safety of marches are prepared. regulating the manner and time of halts. . giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear-guards, flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good instructions for their guidance. providing all the means necessary for the performance of their duties. . prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or their staff officers, relative to the different methods of drawing up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand, as well as their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to engage in battle, according to the nature of the ground and the character of the enemy.[ ] . indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen points of assembly in case of their attack by superior numbers, and informing them what support they may hope to receive in case of need. . arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage, munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the columns and in their rear, in such manner that they will not interfere with the movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. taking precautions for order and security, both on the march and when trains are halted and parked. . providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies. collecting all the means of transportation of the country and of the army, and regulating their use. . directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations for their safety, good order, and police. . establishing and organizing lines of operations and supplies, as well as lines of communications with these lines for detached bodies. designating officers capable of organizing and commanding in rear of the army; looking out for the safety of detachments and convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also for preserving suitable means of communication of the army with its base. . organizing depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men, movable hospitals, and workshops for repairs; providing for their safety. . keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and looking out for their return to the main column as soon as their service on detachment is no longer necessary; giving them, when required, some center of action, and forming strategic reserves. . organizing marching battalions or companies to gather up isolated men or small detachments moving in either direction between the army and its base of operations. . in case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the chiefs of artillery and engineers as to the labors to be performed by those troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults. . in retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the rear-guard; causing intelligent officers to examine and select positions where the rear-guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his pursuit, and thus gain time; making provision in advance for the movement of trains, that nothing shall be left behind, and that they shall proceed in the most perfect order, taking all proper precautions to insure safety. . in cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps; indicating to each principal division of the army a place of assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders, instructions, and regulations are implicitly observed. an examination of this long list--which might easily be made much longer by entering into greater detail--will lead every reader to remark that these are the duties rather of the general-in-chief than of staff officers. this truth i announced some time ago; and it is for the very purpose of permitting the general-in-chief to give his whole attention to the supreme direction of the operations that he ought to be provided with staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution. their functions are therefore necessarily very intimately connected; and woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert! this want of harmony is often seen,--first, because generals are men and have faults, and secondly, because in every army there are found individual interests and pretensions, producing rivalry of the chiefs of staff and hindering them in performing their duties.[ ] it is not to be expected that this treatise shall contain rules for the guidance of staff officers in all the details of their multifarious duties; for, in the first place, every different nation has staff officers with different names and rounds of duties,--so that i should be obliged to write new rules for each army; in the second place, these details are fully entered into in special books pertaining to these subjects. i will, therefore, content myself with enlarging a little upon some of the first articles enumerated above:-- . the measures to be taken by the staff officers for preparing the army to enter upon active operations in the field include all those which are likely to facilitate the success of the first plan of operations. they should, as a matter of course, make sure, by frequent inspections, that the _matériel_ of all the arms of the service is in good order: horses, carriages, caissons, teams, harness, shoes, &c. should be carefully examined and any deficiencies supplied. bridge-trains, engineer-tool trains, _matériel_ of artillery, siege-trains if they are to move, ambulances,--in a word, every thing which conies under the head of _matériel_,--should be carefully examined and placed in good order. if the campaign is to be opened in the neighborhood of great rivers, gun-boats and flying bridges should be prepared, and all the small craft should be collected at the points and at the bank where they will probably be used. intelligent officers should examine the most favorable points both for embarkations and for landings,--preferring those localities which present the greatest chances of success for a primary establishment on the opposite bank. the staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will be necessary for the movement of the several corps of the army to the proper points of assemblage, making every effort to give such direction to the marches that the enemy shall be unable to learn from them any thing relative to the projected enterprise. if the war is to be offensive, the staff officers arrange with the chief engineer officers what fortifications shall be erected near the base of operations, when _têtes de ponts_ or intrenched camps are to be constructed there. if the war is defensive, these works will be built between the first line of defense and the second base. . an essential branch of logistics is certainly that which relates to making arrangements of marches and attacks, which are fixed by the general and notice of them given to the proper persons by the chiefs of staff. the next most important qualification of a general, after that of knowing how to form good plans, is, unquestionably, that of facilitating the execution of his orders by their clearness of style. whatever may be the real business of a chief of staff, the greatness of a commander-in-chief will be always manifested in his plans; but if the general lacks ability the chief of staff should supply it as far as he can, having a proper understanding with the responsible chief. i have seen two very different methods employed in this branch of the service. the first, which may be styled the old school, consists in issuing daily, for the regulation of the movements of the army, general instructions filled with minute and somewhat pedantic details, so much the more out of place as they are usually addressed to chiefs of corps, who are supposed to be of sufficient experience not to require the same sort of instruction as would be given to junior subalterns just out of school. the other method is that of the detached orders given by napoleon to his marshals, prescribing for each one simply what concerned himself, and only informing him what corps were to operate with him, either on the right or the left, but never pointing out the connection of the operations of the whole army.[ ] i have good reasons for knowing that he did this designedly, either to surround his operations with an air of mystery, or for fear that more specific orders might fall into the hands of the enemy and assist him in thwarting his plans. it is certainly of great importance for a general to keep his plans secret; and frederick the great was right when he said that if his night-cap knew what was in his head he would throw it into the fire. that kind of secrecy was practicable in frederick's time, when his whole army was kept closely about him; but when maneuvers of the vastness of napoleon's are executed, and war is waged as in our day, what concert of action can be expected from generals who are utterly ignorant of what is going on around them? of the two systems, the last seems to me preferable. a judicious mean may be adopted between the eccentric conciseness of napoleon and the minute verbosity which laid down for experienced generals like barclay, kleist, and wittgenstein precise directions for breaking into companies and reforming again in line of battle,--a piece of nonsense all the more ridiculous because the execution of such an order in presence of the enemy is impracticable. it would be sufficient, i think, in such cases, to give the generals special orders relative to their own corps, and to add a few lines in cipher informing them briefly as to the whole plan of the operations and the part they are to take individually in executing it. when a proper cipher is wanting, the order may be transmitted verbally by an officer capable of understanding it and repeating it accurately. indiscreet revelations need then be no longer feared, and concert of action would be secured. . the army being assembled, and being in readiness to undertake some enterprise, the important thing will be to secure as much concert and precision of action as possible, whilst taking all the usual precaution's to gain accurate information of the route it is to pursue and to cover its movements thoroughly. there are two kinds of marches,--those which are made out of sight of the enemy, and those which are made in his presence, either advancing or retiring. these marches particularly have undergone great changes in late years. formerly, armies seldom came in collision until they had been several days in presence of each other, and the attacking party had roads opened by pioneers for the columns to move up parallel to each other. at present, the attack is made more promptly, and the existing roads usually answer all purposes. it is, however, of importance, when an army is moving, that pioneers and sappers accompany the advanced guard, to increase the number of practicable roads, to remove obstructions, throw small bridges over creeks, &c., if necessary, and secure the means of easy communication between the different corps of the army. in the present manner of marching, the calculation of times and distances becomes more complicated: the columns having each a different distance to pass over, in determining the hour of their departure and giving them instructions the following particulars must be considered:-- , the distances to be passed over; , the amount of _matériel_ in each train; , the nature of the country; , the obstacles placed in the way by the enemy; , the fact whether or not it is important for the march to be concealed or open. under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method of arranging the movements of the great corps forming the wings of an army, or of all those corps not marching with the column attached to the general head-quarters, will be to trust the details to the experience of the generals commanding those corps,--being careful, however, to let them understand that the most exact punctuality is expected of them. it will then be enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and the object to be attained, the route to be pursued and the hour at which they will be expected to be in position. they should be informed what corps are marching either on the same roads with them or on side-roads to the right or left in order that they may govern themselves accordingly; they should receive whatever news there may be of the enemy, and have a line of retreat indicated to them.[ ] all those details whose object it is to prescribe each day for the chiefs of corps the method of forming their columns and placing them in position are mere pedantry,--more hurtful than useful. to see that they march habitually according to regulation or custom is necessary; but they should be free to arrange their movements so as to arrive at the appointed place and time, at the risk of being removed from their command if they fail to do so without sufficient reason. in retreats, however, which are made along a single road by an army separated into divisions, the hours of departure and halts must be carefully regulated. each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers, that its march may be conducted with the usual precautions: it is convenient also, even when they form part of a second line, for the head of each column to be preceded by a few pioneers and sappers, provided with tools for removing obstacles or making repairs in case of accidents; a few of these workmen should also accompany each train: in like manner, a light trestle-bridge train will be found very useful. . the army on the march is often preceded by a general advanced guard, or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the center and each wing may have its special advanced guard. it is customary for the reserves and the center to accompany the head-quarters; and the general advanced guard, when there is one, will usually follow the same road: so that half the army is thus assembled on the central route. under these circumstances, the greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing the road. it happens sometimes, however, when the important stroke is to be made in the direction of one of the wings, that the reserves, the general head-quarters, and even the general advanced guard, may be moved in that direction: in this case, all the rules usually regulating the march of the center must be applied to that wing. advanced guards should be accompanied by good staff officers, capable of forming correct ideas as to the enemy's movements and of giving an accurate account of them to the general, thus enabling him to make his plans understandingly. the commander of the advanced guard should assist the general in the same way. a general advanced guard should be composed of light troops of all arms, containing some of the _élite_ troops of the army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot, some horse-artillery, pontoniers, sappers, &c., with light trestles and pontoons for passing small streams. a few good marksmen will not be out of place. a topographical officer should accompany it, to make a sketch of the country a mile or two on each side of the road. a body of irregular cavalry should always be attached, to spare the regular cavalry and to serve as scouts, because they are best suited to such service. . as the army advances and removes farther from its base, it becomes the more necessary to have a good line of operations and of depots which may keep up the connection of the army with its base. the staff officers will divide the depots into departments, the principal depot being established in the town which can lodge and supply the greatest number of men: if there is a fortress suitably situated, it should be selected as the site of the principal depot. the secondary depots may be separated by distances of from fifteen to thirty miles, usually in the towns of the country. the mean distance apart will be about twenty to twenty-five miles. this will give fifteen depots upon a line of three hundred miles, which should be divided into three or four brigades of depots. each of these will have a commander and a detachment of troops or of convalescent soldiers, who regulate the arrangements for accommodating troops and give protection to the authorities of the country, (if they remain;) they furnish facilities for transmitting the mails and the necessary escorts; the commander sees that the roads and bridges are kept in good order. if possible, there should be a park of several carriages at each depot, certainly at the principal one in each brigade. the command of all the depots embraced within certain geographical limits should be intrusted to prudent and able general officers; for the security of the communications of the army often depends on their operations.[ ] these commands may sometimes become strategic reserves, as was explained in art. xxiii.; a few good battalions, with the assistance of movable detachments passing continually between the army and the base, will generally be able to keep open the communications. . the study of the measures, partly logistical and partly tactical, to be taken by the staff officers in bringing the troops from the order of march to the different orders of battle, is very important, but requires going into such minute detail that i must pass it over nearly in silence, contenting myself with referring my readers to the numerous works specially devoted to this branch of the art of war. before leaving this interesting subject, i think a few examples should be given as illustrations of the great importance of a good system of logistics. one of these examples is the wonderful concentration of the french army in the plains of gera in ; another is the entrance of the army upon the campaign of . in each of these cases napoleon possessed the ability to make such arrangements that his columns, starting from points widely separated, were concentrated with wonderful precision upon the decisive point of the zone of operations; and in this way he insured the successful issue of the campaign. the choice of the decisive point was the result of a skillful application of the principles of strategy; and the arrangements for moving the troops give us an example of logistics which originated in his own closet. it has been long claimed that berthier framed those instructions which were conceived with so much precision and usually transmitted with so much clearness; but i have had frequent opportunities of knowing that such was not the truth. the emperor was his own chief staff officer. provided with a pair of dividers opened to a distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a straight line, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five miles, taking into account the windings of the roads,) bending over and sometimes stretched at full length upon his map, where the positions of his corps and the supposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors, he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty and precision which were astonishing. turning his dividers about from point to point on the map, he decided in a moment the number of marches necessary for each of his columns to arrive at the desired point by a certain day; then, placing pins in the new positions, and bearing in mind the rate of marching that he must assign to each column, and the hour of its setting out, he dictated those instructions which are alone enough to make any man famous. ney coming from the shores of lake constance, lannes from upper swabia, soult and davoust from bavaria and the palatinate, bernadotte and augereau from franconia, and the imperial guard from paris, were all thus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneously between saalfeld, gera, and plauen, few persons in the army or in germany having any conception of the object of these movements which seemed so very complicated. in the same manner, in , when blücher had his army quietly in cantonments between the sambre and the rhine, and wellington was attending _fêtes_ in brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion of france, napoleon, who was supposed to be at paris entirely engrossed with diplomatic ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had been but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt upon charleroi and blücher's quarters, his columns arriving from all points of the compass, with rare punctuality, on the th of june, in the plains of beaumont and upon the banks of the sambre. (napoleon did not leave paris until the th.) the combinations described above were the results of wise strategic calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece of logistics. in order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures, i will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logistics came very near leading to fatal consequences. napoleon having been recalled from spain in by the fact of austria's taking up arms, and being certain that this power intended war, he sent berthier into bavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was extended from braunau as far as strasbourg and erfurt. davoust was returning from the latter city, oudinot from frankfort; massena, who had been on his way to spain, was retiring toward ulm by the strasbourg route; the saxons, bavarians, and wurtembergers were moving from their respective countries. the corps were thus separated by great distances, and the austrians, who had been long concentrated, might easily break through this spider's web or brush away its threads. napoleon was justly uneasy, and ordered berthier to assemble the army at ratisbon if the war had not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate it in a more retired position toward ulm. the reason for this alternative order was obvious. if the war had begun, ratisbon was too near the austrian frontier for a point of assembly, as the corps might thus be thrown separately into the midst of two hundred thousand enemies; but by fixing upon ulm as the point of rendezvous the army would be concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy would have five or six marches more to make before reaching-it,--which was a highly-important consideration as the parties were then situated. no great talent was needed to understand this. hostilities having commenced, however, but a few days after berthier's arrival at munich, this too celebrated chief of staff was so foolish as to adhere to a literal obedience of the order he had received, without conceiving its obvious intention: he not only desired the army to assemble at ratisbon, but even obliged davoust to return toward that city, when that marshal had had the good sense to fall back from amberg toward ingolstadt. napoleon, having, by good fortune, been informed by telegraph of the passage of the inn twenty-four hours after its occurrence, came with the speed of lightning to abensberg, just as davoust was on the point of being surrounded and his army cut in two or scattered by a mass of one hundred and eighty thousand enemies. we know how wonderfully napoleon succeeded in rallying his army, and what victories he gained on the glorious days of abensberg, siegberg, landshut, eckmühl, and ratisbon, that repaired the faults committed by his chief of staff with his contemptible logistics. we shall finish these illustrations with a notice of the events which preceded and were simultaneous with the passage of the danube before the battle of wagram. the measures taken to bring to a specified point of the island of lobau the corps of the viceroy of italy from hungary, that of marmont from styria, that of bernadotte from linz, are less wonderful than the famous imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated the details of the passage and the formation of the troops in the plains of enzersdorf, in presence of one hundred and forty thousand austrians and five hundred cannon, as if the operation had been a military _fête_. these masses were all assembled upon the island on the evening of the th of july; three bridges were immediately thrown over an arm of the danube one hundred and fifty yards wide, on a very dark night and amidst torrents of rain; one hundred and fifty thousand men passed over the bridges, in presence of a formidable enemy, and were drawn up before mid-day in the plain, three miles in advance of the bridges which they covered by a change of front; the whole being accomplished in less time than might have been supposed necessary had it been a simple maneuver for instruction and after being several times repeated. the enemy had, it is true, determined to offer no serious opposition to the passage; but napoleon did not know that fact, and the merit of his dispositions is not at all diminished by it. singularly enough, however, the chief of staff, although he made ten copies of the famous decree, did not observe that by mistake the bridge of the center had been assigned to davoust, who had the right wing, whilst the bridge on the right was assigned to oudinot, who was in the center. these two corps passed each other in the night, and, had it not been for the good sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful scene of confusion might have been the result. thanks to the supineness of the enemy, the army escaped all disorder, except that arising from a few detachments following corps to which they did not belong. the most remarkable feature of the whole transaction is found in the fact that after such a blunder berthier should have received the title of prince of wagram. the error doubtless originated with napoleon while dictating his decree; but should it not have been detected by a chief of staff who made ten copies of the order and whose duty it was to supervise the formation of the troops? another no less extraordinary example of the importance of good logistics was afforded at the battle of leipsic. in fighting this battle, with a defile in rear of the army as at leipsic, and in the midst of low ground, wooded, and cut up by small streams and gardens, it was highly important to have a number of small bridges, to prepare the banks for approaching them with ease, and to stake out the roads. these precautions would not have prevented the loss of a decisive battle; but they would have saved the lives of a considerable number of men, as well as the guns and carriages that were abandoned on account of the disorder and of there being no roads of escape. the unaccountable blowing up of the bridge of lindenau was also the result of unpardonable carelessness upon the part of the staff corps, which indeed existed only in name, owing to the manner of berthier's management of it. we must also agree that napoleon, who was perfectly conversant with the logistical measures of an offensive campaign, had then never seriously thought what would be proper precautions in the event of defeat, and when the emperor was present himself no one thought of making any arrangement for the future unless by his direction. to complete what i proposed when i commenced this article, it becomes necessary for me to add some remarks with reference to reconnoissances. they are of two kinds: the first are entirely topographical and statistical, and their object is to gain a knowledge of a country, its accidents of ground, its roads, defiles, bridges, &c., and to learn its resources and means of every kind. at the present day, when the sciences of geography, topography, and statistics are in such an advanced state, these reconnoissances are less necessary than formerly; but they are still very useful, and it is not probable that the statistics of any country will ever be so accurate that they may be entirely dispensed with. there are many excellent books of instruction as to the art of making these reconnoissances, and i must direct the attention of my readers to them. reconnoissances of the other kind are ordered when it is necessary to gain information of the movements of the enemy. they are made by detachments of greater or less strength. if the enemy is drawn up in battle-order, the generals-in-chief or the chiefs of staff make the reconnoissance; if he is on the march, whole divisions of cavalry may be thrown out to break through his screen of posts. footnotes: [footnote : i refer here to general instructions and forms, which are not to be repeated every day: such repetition would be impracticable.] [footnote : the chiefs of artillery, of engineers, and of the administrative departments all claim to have direct connection with the general-in-chief, and not with the chief of staff. there should, of course, be no hinderance to the freest intercourse between these high officers and the commander; but he should work with them in presence of the chief of staff, and send him all their correspondence: otherwise, confusion is inevitable.] [footnote : i believe that at the passage of the danube before wagram, and at the opening of the second campaign of , napoleon deviated from his usual custom by issuing a general order.] [footnote : napoleon never did this, because he maintained that no general should ever think seriously of the possibility of being beaten. in many marches it is certainly a useless precaution; but it is often indispensable.] [footnote : it may be objected that in some wars, as where the population is hostile, it may be very difficult, or impracticable, to organize lines of depots. in such cases they will certainly be exposed to great dangers; but these are the very cases where they are most necessary and should be most numerous. the line from bayonne to madrid was such a line, which resisted for four years the attacks of the guerrillas,--although convoys were sometimes seized. at one time the line extended as far as cadiz.] article xlii. of reconnoissances and other means of gaining correct information of the movements of the enemy. one of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. in fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant what his adversary is about? as it is unquestionably of the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility; and this is one of the chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice of war. from this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are simply learned men without a natural talent for war, and who have not acquired that practical _coup-d'oeil_ which is imparted by long experience in the direction of military operations. it is a very easy matter for a school-man to make a plan for outflanking a wing or threatening a line of communications upon a map, where he can regulate the positions of both parties to suit himself; but when he has opposed to him a skillful, active, and enterprising adversary, whose movements are a perfect riddle, then his difficulties begin, and we see an exhibition of the incapacity of an ordinary general with none of the resources of genius. i have seen so many proofs of this truth in my long life, that, if i had to put a general to the test, i should have a much higher regard for the man who could form sound conclusions as to the movements of the enemy than for him who could make a grand display of theories,--things so difficult to put in practice, but so easily understood when once exemplified. there are four means of obtaining information of the enemy's operations. the first is a well-arranged system of espionage; the second consists in reconnoissances made by skillful officers and light troops; the third, in questioning prisoners of war; the fourth, in forming hypotheses of probabilities. this last idea i will enlarge upon farther on. there is also a fifth method,--that of signals. although this is used rather for indicating the presence of the enemy than for forming conclusions as to his designs, it may be classed with the others. spies will enable a general to learn more surely than by any other agency what is going on in the midst of the enemy's camps; for reconnoissances, however well made, can give no information of any thing beyond the line of the advanced guard. i do not mean to say that they should not be resorted to, for we must use every means of gaining information; but i do say that their results are small and not to be depended upon. reports of prisoners are often useful, but it is generally dangerous to credit them. a skillful chief of staff will always be able to select intelligent officers who can so frame their questions as to elicit important information from prisoners and deserters. the partisans who are sent to hang around the enemy's lines of operations may doubtless learn something of his movements; but it is almost impossible to communicate with them and receive the information they possess. an extensive system of espionage will generally be successful: it is, however, difficult for a spy to penetrate to the general's closet and learn the secret plans he may form: it is best for him, therefore, to limit himself to information of what he sees with his own eyes or hears from reliable persons. even when the general receives from his spies information of movements, he still knows nothing of those which may since have taken place, nor of what the enemy is going finally to attempt. suppose, for example, he learns that such a corps has passed through jena toward weimar, and that another has passed through gera toward naumburg: he must still ask himself the questions, where are they going, and what enterprise are they engaged in? these things the most skillful spy cannot learn. when armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information of the enemy's operations was certain, because reconnoitering-parties could be thrown forward in sight of the camps, and the spies could report accurately their movements; but with the existing organization into corps d'armée which either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult to learn any thing about them. spies may, however, be very useful when the hostile army is commanded by a great captain or a great sovereign who always moves with the mass of his troops or with the reserves. such, for example, were the emperors alexander and napoleon. if it was known when they moved and what route they followed, it was not difficult to conclude what project was in view, and the details of the movements of smaller bodies needed not to be attended to particularly. a skillful general may supply the defects of the other methods by making reasonable and well-founded hypotheses. i can with great satisfaction say that this means hardly ever failed me. though fortune never placed me at the head of an army, i have been chief of staff to nearly a hundred thousand men, and have been many times called into the councils of the greatest sovereigns of the day, when the question under consideration was the proper direction to give to the combined armies of europe; and i was never more than two or three times mistaken in my hypotheses and in my manner of solving the difficulties they offered. as i have said before, i have constantly noticed that, as an army can operate only upon the center or one extremity of its front of operations, there are seldom more than three or four suppositions that can possibly be made. a mind fully convinced of these truths and conversant with the principles of war will always be able to form a plan which will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of the future. i will cite a few examples which have come under my own observation. in , when people in france were still uncertain as to the war with prussia, i wrote a memoir upon the probabilities of the war and the operations which would take place. i made the three following hypotheses:-- st. the prussians will await napoleon's attack behind the elbe, and will fight on the defensive as far as the oder, in expectation of aid from russia and austria; d. or they will advance upon the saale, resting their left upon the frontier of bohemia and defending the passes of the mountains of franconia; d. or else, expecting the french by the great mayence road, they will advance imprudently to erfurt. i do not believe any other suppositions could be made, unless the prussians were thought to be so foolish as to divide their forces, already inferior to the french, upon the two directions of wesel and mayence,--a useless mistake, since there had not been a french soldier on the first of these roads since the seven years' war. these hypotheses having been made as above stated, if any one should ask what course napoleon ought to pursue, it was easy to reply "that the mass of the french army being already assembled in bavaria, it should be thrown upon the left of the prussians by way of grera and hof, for the gordian knot of the campaign was in that direction, no matter what plan they should adopt." if they advanced to erfurt, he could move to gera, cut their line of retreat, and press them back along the lower elbe to the north sea. if they rested upon the saale, he could attack their left by way of hof and gera, defeat them partially, and reach berlin before them by way of leipsic. if they stood fast behind the elbe, he must still attack them by way of gera and hof. since napoleon's direction of operations was so clearly fixed, what mattered it to him to know the details of their movements? being certain of the correctness of these principles, i did not hesitate to announce, _a month before the war_, that napoleon would attempt just what he did, and that if the prussians passed the saale battles would take place at jena and naumburg! i relate this circumstance not from a feeling of vanity, for if that were my motive i might mention many more of a similar character. i have only been anxious to show that in war a plan of operations may be often arranged, simply based upon the general principles of the art, without much attention being of necessity given to the details of the enemy's movements. returning to our subject, i must state that the use of spies has been neglected to a remarkable degree in many modern armies. in the staff of prince schwarzenberg had not a single sou for expenditure for such services, and the emperor alexander was obliged to furnish the staff officers with funds from his own private purse to enable them to send agents into lusatia for the purpose of finding out napoleon's whereabouts. general mack at ulm, and the duke of brunswick in , were no better informed; and the french generals in spain often suffered severely, because it was impossible to obtain spies and to get information as to what was going on around them. the russian army is better provided than any other for gathering information, by the use of roving bodies of cossacks; and history confirms my assertion. the expedition of prince koudacheff, who was sent after the battle of dresden to the prince of sweden, and who crossed the elbe by swimming and marched in the midst of the french columns as far, nearly, as wittenberg, is a remarkable instance of this class. the information furnished by the partisan troops of generals czernicheff, benkendorf, davidoff, and seslawin was exceedingly valuable. we may recollect it was through a dispatch from napoleon to the empress maria louisa, intercepted near châlons by the cossacks, that the allies were informed of the plan he had formed of falling upon their communications with his whole disposable force, basing his operations upon the fortified towns of lorraine and alsace. this highly-important piece of information decided blücher and schwarzenberg to effect a junction of their armies, which the plainest principles of strategy had never previously brought to act in concert except at leipsic and brienne. we know, also, that the warning given by seslawin to general doctoroff saved him from being crushed at borovsk by napoleon, who had just left moscow in retreat with his whole army. doctoroff did not at first credit this news,--which so irritated seslawin that he effected the capture of a french officer and several soldiers of the guard from the french bivouacs and sent them as proofs of its correctness. this warning, which decided the march of koutousoff to maloi-yaroslavitz, prevented napoleon from taking the way by kalouga, where he would have found greater facilities for refitting his army and would have escaped the disastrous days of krasnoi and the beresina. the catastrophe which befell him would thus have been lessened, though not entirely prevented. such examples, rare as they are, give us an excellent idea of what good partisan troops can accomplish when led by good officers. i will conclude this article with the following summary:-- . a general should neglect no means of gaining information of the enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of reconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners. . by multiplying the means of obtaining information; for, no matter how imperfect and contradictory they may be, the truth may often be sifted from them. . perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means. . as it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of the principles of the art. i can assure a general that, with such precautions, nothing very unexpected can befall him and cause his ruin,--as has so often happened to others; for, unless he is totally unfit to command an army, he should at least be able to form reasonable suppositions as to what the enemy is going to do, and fix for himself a certain line of conduct to suit each of these hypotheses.[ ] it cannot be too much insisted upon that the real secret of military genius consists in the ability to make these reasonable suppositions in any case; and, although their number is always small, it is wonderful how much this highly-useful means of regulating one's conduct is neglected. in order to make this article complete, i must state what is to be gained by using a system of signals. of these there are several kinds. telegraphic signals may be mentioned as the most important of all. napoleon owes his astonishing success at ratisbon, in , to the fact of his having established a telegraphic communication between the head-quarters of the army and france. he was still at paris when the austrian army crossed the inn at braunau with the intention of invading bavaria and breaking through his line of cantonments. informed, in twenty-four hours, of what was passing at a distance of seven hundred miles, he threw himself into his traveling-carriage, and a week later he had gained two victories under the walls of ratisbon. without the telegraph, the campaign would have been lost. this single fact is sufficient to impress us with an idea of its value. it has been proposed to use portable telegraphs. such a telegraphic arrangement, operated by men on horseback posted on high ground, could communicate the orders of the center to the extremities of a line of battle, as well as the reports of the wings to the head-quarters. repeated trials of it were made in russia; but the project was given up,--for what reason, however, i have not been able to learn. these communications could only be very brief, and in misty weather the method could not be depended upon. a vocabulary for such purposes could be reduced to a few short phrases, which might easily be represented by signs. i think it a method by no means useless, even if it should be necessary to send duplicates of the orders by officers capable of transmitting them with accuracy. there would certainly be a gain of rapidity.[ ] attempt of another kind was made in , at the battle of fleurus, where general jourdan made use of the services of a balloonist to observe and give notice of the movements of the austrians. i am not aware that he found the method a very useful one, as it was not again used; but it was claimed at the time that it assisted in gaining him the victory: of this, however, i have great doubts. it is probable that the difficulty of having a balloonist in readiness to make an ascension at the proper moment, and of his making careful observations upon what is going on below, whilst floating at the mercy of the winds above, has led to the abandonment of this method of gaining information. by giving the balloon no great elevation, sending up with it an officer capable of forming correct opinions as to the enemy's movements, and perfecting a system of signals to be used in connection with the balloon, considerable advantages might be expected from its use. sometimes the smoke of the battle, and the difficulty of distinguishing the columns, that look like liliputians, so as to know to which party they belong, will make the reports of the balloonists very unreliable. for example, a balloonist would have been greatly embarrassed in deciding, at the battle of waterloo, whether it was grouchy or blücher who was seen coming up by the saint-lambert road; but this uncertainty need not exist where the armies are not so much mixed. i had ocular proof of the advantage to be derived from such observations when i was stationed in the spire of gautsch, at the battle of leipsic; and prince schwarzenberg's aid-de-camp, whom i had conducted to the same point, could not deny that it was at my solicitation the prince was prevailed upon to emerge from the marsh between the pleisse and the elster. an observer is doubtless more at his ease in a clock-tower than in a frail basket floating in mid-air; but steeples are not always at hand in the vicinity of battle-fields, and they cannot be transported at pleasure. there is still another method of signaling, by the use of large fires kindled upon elevated points of the country. before the invention of the telegraph, they afforded the means of transmitting the news of an invasion from one end of the country to the other. the swiss have made use of them to call the militia to arms. they have been also used to give the alarm to winter quarters and to assemble the troops more rapidly. the signal-fires may be made still more useful if arranged so as to indicate to the corps of the army the direction of the enemy's threatening movements and the point where they should concentrate to meet him. these signals may also serve on sea-coasts to give notice of descents. finally, there is a kind of signals given to troops during an action, by means of military instruments. this method of signals has been brought to greater perfection in the russian army than in any other i know of. while i am aware of the great importance of discovering a sure method of setting in motion simultaneously a large mass of troops at the will of the commander, i am convinced that it must be a long time before the problem is solved. signals with instruments are of little use except for skirmishers. a movement of a long line of troops may be made nearly simultaneous by means of a shout begun at one point and passed rapidly from man to man; but these shouts seem generally to be a sort of inspiration, and are seldom the result of an order. i have seen but two cases of it in thirteen campaigns. footnotes: [footnote : i shall be accused, i suppose, of saying that no event in war can ever occur which may not be foreseen and provided for. to prove the falsity of this accusation, it is sufficient for me to cite the surprises of cremona, berg-op-zoom, and hochkirch. i am still of the opinion, however, that such events even as these might always have been anticipated, entirely or in part, as at least within the limits of probability or possibility.] [footnote : when the above was written, the magnetic telegraph was not known.--translators.] chapter vii. of the formation of troops for battle, and the separate or combined use of the three arms. article xliii. posting troops in line of battle. having explained in article xxx. what is to be understood by the term _line of battle_, it is proper to add in what manner it is to be formed, and how the different troops are to be distributed in it. before the french revolution, all the infantry, formed in regiments and brigades, was collected in a single battle-corps, drawn up in two lines, each of which had a right and a left wing. the cavalry was usually placed upon the wings, and the artillery--which at this period was very unwieldy--was distributed along the front of each line. the army camped together, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were two cavalry wings and two infantry wings, if the march was by wings four columns were thus formed. when they marched by lines, (which was specially applicable to flank movements,) two columns were formed, unless, on account of local circumstances, the cavalry or a part of the infantry had camped in a third line,--which was rare. this method simplified logistics very much, since it was only necessary to give such orders as the following:--"the army will move in such direction, by lines or by wings, by the right or by the left." this monotonous but simple formation was seldom deviated from; and no better could have been devised as war was carried on in those days. the french attempted something new at minden, by forming as many columns as brigades, and opening roads to bring them to the front in line,--a simple impossibility. if the labor of staff officers was diminished by this method of camping and marching by lines, it must be evident that if such a system were applied to an army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty thousand men, there would be no end to the columns, and the result would be the frequent occurrence of routs like that of rossbach. the french revolution introduced the system of divisions, which broke up the excessive compactness of the old formation, and brought upon the field fractions capable of independent movement on any kind of ground. this change was a real improvement,--although they went from one extreme to the other, by returning nearly to the legionary formation of the romans. these divisions, composed usually of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, maneuvered and fought separately. they were very much extended, either to enable them to subsist without the use of depots, or with an absurd expectation of prolonging the line in order to outflank that of the enemy. the seven or eight divisions of an army were sometimes seen marching on the same number of roads, ten or twelve miles distant from each other; the head-quarters was at the center, with no other support than five or six small regiments of cavalry of three hundred or four hundred men each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of his forces against one of these divisions and beat it, the line was pierced, and the general-in-chief, having no disposable infantry reserve, could do nothing but order a retreat to rally his scattered columns. bonaparte in his first italian campaign remedied this difficulty, partly by the mobility of his army and the rapidity of his maneuvers, and partly by concentrating the mass of his divisions upon the point where the decisive blow was to fall. when he became the head of the government, and saw the sphere of his means and his plans constantly increasing in magnitude, he readily perceived that a stronger organization was necessary: he avoided the extremes of the old system and the new, while still retaining the advantages of the divisional system. beginning with the campaign of , he organized corps of two or three divisions, which he placed under the command of lieutenant-generals, and formed of them the wings, the center, and the reserve of his army.[ ] this system was finally developed fully at the camp of boulogne, where he organized permanent army corps under the command of marshals, who had under their orders three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, from thirty-six to forty pieces of cannon, and a number of sappers. each corps was thus a small army, able at need to act independently as an army. the heavy cavalry was collected in a single strong reserve, composed of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of dragoons, and one of light cavalry. the grenadiers and the guard formed an admirable infantry reserve. at a later period-- --the cavalry was also organized into corps of three divisions, to give greater unity of action to the constantly-increasing masses of this arm. this organization was as near perfection as possible; and the grand army, that brought about such great results, was the model which all the armies of europe soon imitated. some military men, in their attempts to perfect the art, have recommended that the infantry division, which sometimes has to act independently, should contain three instead of two brigades, because this number will allow one for the center and each wing. this would certainly be an improvement; for if the division contains but two brigades there is an open space left in the center between the brigades on the wings: these brigades, having no common central support, cannot with safety act independently of each other. besides this, with three brigades in a division, two may be engaged while the third is held in reserve,--a manifest advantage. but, if thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades are better than when formed in fifteen divisions of two brigades, it becomes necessary, in order to obtain this perfect divisional organization, to increase the numbers of the infantry by one-third, or to reduce the divisions of the army-corps from three to two,--which last would be a serious disadvantage, because the army-corps is much more frequently called upon to act independently than a division, and the subdivision into three parts is specially best for that[ ]. what is the best organization to be given an army just setting out upon a campaign will for a long time to come be a problem in logistics; because it is extremely difficult to maintain the original organization in the midst of the operations of war, and detachments must be sent out continually. the history of the grand army of boulogne, whose organization seemed to leave nothing farther to be desired, proves the assertion just made. the center under soult, the right under davoust, the left under ney, and the reserve under lannes, formed together a regular and formidable battle-corps of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting those of the guard and the grenadiers. besides these, the corps of bernadotte and marmont detached to the right, and that of augereau to the left, were ready for action on the flanks. but after the passage of the danube at donauwerth every thing was changed. ney, at first reinforced to five divisions, was reduced to two; the battle-corps was divided partly to the right and partly to the left, so that this fine arrangement was destroyed. it will always be difficult to fix upon a stable organization. events are, however, seldom so complicated as those of ; and moreau's campaign of proves that the original organization may sometimes be maintained, at least for the mass of the army. with this view, it would seem prudent to organize an army in four parts,--two wings, a center, and a reserve. the composition of these parts may vary with the strength of the army; but in order to retain this organization it becomes necessary to have a certain number of divisions out of the general line in order to furnish the necessary detachments. while these divisions are with the army, they may be attached to that part which is to receive or give the heaviest blows; or they may be employed on the flanks of the main body, or to increase the strength of the reserve. bach of the four great parts of the army may be a single corps of three or four divisions, or two corps of two divisions each. in this last case there would be seven corps, allowing one for the reserve; but this last corps should contain three divisions, to give a reserve to each wing and to the center. with seven corps, unless several more are kept out of the general line in order to furnish detachments, it may happen that the extreme corps may be detached, so that each wing might contain but two divisions, and from these a brigade might be occasionally detached to flank the march of the army, leaving but three brigades to a wing. this would be a weak order of battle. these facts lead me to conclude that an organization of the line of battle in four corps of three divisions of infantry and one of light cavalry, with three or four divisions for detachments, would be more stable than one of seven corps, each of two divisions. but, as every thing depends upon the strength of the army and of the units of which it is composed, as well as upon the character of the operations in which it may be engaged, the arrangement may be greatly varied. i cannot go into these details, and shall simply exhibit the principal combinations that may result from forming the divisions in two or three brigades and the corps in two or three divisions. i have indicated the formation of two infantry corps in two lines, either one behind the other, or side by side. (see figures from to inclusive.) _different formations of lines of battle for two corps of infantry._ [illustration: fig. . two corps deployed, one behind the other.] first corps. ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- d division. | st division. second corps. ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- d division. | st division. [illustration: fig. . two corps formed side by side.] second corps. ^ first corps. | ----- ----- | ----- ----- st division. | st division. | ----- ----- | ----- ----- d division. | d division. [illustration: fig. . two corps of divisions of brigades each.] first corps. ----- ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- ----- d division. | st division. second corps. ----- ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- ----- d division. | st division. [illustration: fig. . two corps side by side.] second corps. ^ first corps. | ----- ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- st division. | st division. | ----- ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- d division. | d division. [illustration: fig. . corps of divisions of brigades each.] first corps. d division. st division. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- second corps. d division. st division. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- [illustration: fig. . corps of divisions of brigades each, placed side by side.] second corps. ^ first corps. | st division. | st division. ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- | ----- | d division. | d division. ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- | ----- _formation of two corps of three divisions of two brigades each._ [illustration: fig. .] first corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- d division. | d division. | st division. second corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- d division. | d division. | st division. [illustration: fig. .] second corps. ^ first corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- | ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- d division. | st division | d division. | st division | ---- ---- | ---- ---- d division. | d division. [illustration: fig. .] d corps. ^ st corps. | ---- ---- | ---- ---- st division.| st division. | ---- ---- | ---- ---- d division. | d division. | ---- ---- | ---- ---- d division. | d division. * * * * * _two corps of three divisions of three brigades each._ [illustration: fig. . two divisions in the st line, and one in the d line.] first corps. ^ ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- d division. | st division. ---- ---- ---- d division. second corps. ^ ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- d division. | st division. ---- ---- ---- d division. [illustration: fig. . same order with d brigade as reserve, and the corps side by side.] second corps. ^ first corps. | d division. ^ st division. | d division. ^ st division. ---- ---- | ---- ---- | ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- | | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- d division. | d division. [illustration: _shallower formation: twelve brigades in the first line, and six in the second line._ fig. .] second corps. ^ first corps. | d division. ^ st division. | d division. ^ st division. ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- d division. | d division. * * * * * note.--in all these formations the unit is the brigade in line; but these lines may be formed of deployed battalions, or of battalions in columns of attack by divisions of two companies. the cavalry attached to the corps will be placed on the flanks. the brigades might be so drawn up as to have one regiment in the first line and one in the second. the question here presents itself, whether it is ever proper to place two corps one behind the other, as napoleon often did, particularly at wagram. i think that, except for the reserves, this arrangement may be used only in a position of expectation, and never as an order of battle; for it is much better for each corps to have its own second line and its reserve than to pile up several corps, one behind the other, under different commanders. however much one general may be disposed to support a colleague, he will always object to dividing up his troops for that purpose; and when in the general of the first line he sees not a colleague, but a hated rival, as too frequently happens, it is probable he will be very slow in furnishing the assistance which may be greatly needed. moreover, a commander whose troops are spread out in a long line cannot execute his maneuvers with near so much facility as if his front was only half as great and was supported by the remainder of his own troops drawn up in rear. the table below[ ] will show that the number of men in an army will have great influence in determining the best formation for it, and that the subject is a complicated one. in making our calculations, it is scarcely necessary to provide for the case of such immense masses being in the field as were seen from to , when a single army contained fourteen corps varying in strength from two to five divisions. with such large numbers nothing better can be proposed than a subdivision into corps of three divisions each. of these corps, eight would form the main body, and there would remain six for detachments and for strengthening any point of the main line that might require support. if this system be applied to an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, it would be hardly practicable to employ divisions of two brigades each where napoleon and the allies used corps. if nine divisions form the main body,--that is, the wings and the center,--and six others form the reserve and detachments, fifteen divisions would be required, or thirty brigades,--which would make one hundred and eighty battalions, if each regiment contains three battalions. this supposition brings our army up to one hundred and forty-five thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred thousand in all. with regiments of two battalions there would be required one hundred and twenty battalions, or ninety-six thousand infantry; but if each regiment contains but two battalions, each battalion should be one thousand men strong, and this would increase the infantry to one hundred and twenty thousand men and the entire army to one hundred and sixty thousand men. these calculations show that the strength of the minor subdivisions must be carefully considered in arranging into corps and divisions. if an army does not contain more than one hundred thousand men, the formation by divisions is perhaps better than by corps. an example of this was napoleon's army of . having now endeavored to explain the best method of giving a somewhat permanent organization to the main body of an army, it will not be out of place for me to inquire whether this permanency is desirable, and if it is not advantageous to deceive the enemy by frequently changing the composition of corps and their positions. i admit the advantage of thus deceiving the enemy; but it may be gained while still retaining a quite constant organization of the main body. if the divisions intended for detachments are joined to the wings and the center,--that is, if those parts contain each four divisions instead of three,--and if one or two divisions be occasionally added to the wing which is likely to bear the brunt of an engagement, each wing will be a corps properly of four divisions; but detachments will generally reduce it to three, and sometimes two, while it might, again, be reinforced by a portion of the reserve until it reached five divisions. the enemy would thus never know exactly the strength of the different parts of the line. but i have dwelt sufficiently on these details. it is probable that, whatever be the strength and number of the subdivisions of an army, the organization into corps will long be retained by all the great powers of europe, and calculations for the arrangement of the line of battle must be made upon that basis. the distribution of the troops in the line of battle has changed in recent times, as well as the manner of arranging the line. formerly it was usually composed of two lines, but now of two lines and one or more reserves. in recent[ ] conflicts in europe, when the masses brought into collision were very large, the corps were not only formed in two lines, but one corps was placed behind another, thus making four lines; and, the reserve being drawn up in the same manner, six lines of infantry were often the result, and several of cavalry. such a formation may answer well enough as a preparatory one, but is by no means the best for battle, as it is entirely too deep. the classical formation--if i may employ that term--is still two lines for the infantry. the greater or less extent of the battle-field and the strength of an army may necessarily produce greater depth at times; but these cases are the exceptions, because the formation of two lines and the reserves gives sufficient solidity, and enables a greater number of men to be simultaneously engaged. when an army has a permanent advanced guard, it may be either formed in front of the line of battle or be carried to the rear to strengthen the reserve;[ ] but, as has been previously stated, this will not often happen with the present method of forming and moving armies. each wing has usually its own advanced guard, and the advanced guard of the main or central portion of the army is naturally furnished by the leading corps: upon coming into view of the enemy, these advanced bodies return to their proper positions in line of battle. often the cavalry reserve is almost entirely with the advanced guard; but this does not prevent its taking, when necessary, the place fixed for it in the line of battle by the character of the position or by the wishes of the commanding general. from what has been stated above, my readers will gather that very great changes of army organization took place from the time of the revival of the art of war and the invention of gunpowder to the french revolution, and that to have a proper appreciation of the wars of louis xiv., of peter the great, and of frederick ii., they should consider them from the stand-point of those days. one portion of the old method may still be employed; and if, by way of example, it may not be regarded as a fundamental rule to post the cavalry on the wings, it may still be a very good arrangement for an army of fifty or sixty thousand men, especially when the ground in the center is not so suitable for the evolutions of cavalry as that near the extremities. it is usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalry to each infantry corps, those of the center being placed in preference to the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the flanks. if the reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to permit the organization of three corps of this arm, giving one as reserve to the center and one to each wing, the arrangement is certainly a good one. if that is impossible, this reserve may be formed in two columns, one on the right of the left wing and the other on the left of the right wing. these columns may thus readily move to any point of the line that may be threatened.[ ] the artillery of the present day has greater mobility, and may, as formerly, be distributed along the front, that of each division remaining near it. it may be observed, moreover, that, the organization of the artillery having been greatly improved, an advantageous distribution of it may be more readily made; but it is a great mistake to scatter it too much. few precise rules can be laid down for the proper distribution of artillery. who, for example, would dare to advise as a rule the filling up of a large gap in a line of battle with one hundred pieces of cannon in a single battery without adequate support, as napoleon did successfully at wagram? i do not desire to go here into much detail with reference to the use of this arm, but i will give the following rules:-- . the horse-artillery should be placed on such ground that it can move freely in every direction. . foot-artillery, on the contrary, and especially that of heavy caliber, will be best posted where protected by ditches or hedges from sudden charges of cavalry. it is hardly necessary for me to add--what every young officer should know already--that too elevated positions are not those to give artillery its greatest effect. flat or gently-sloping ground is better. . the horse-artillery usually maneuvers with the cavalry; but it is well for each army-corps to have its own horse-artillery, to be readily thrown into any desired position. it is, moreover, proper to have horse-artillery in reserve, which may be carried as rapidly as possible to any threatened point. general benningsen had great cause for self-congratulation at eylau because he had fifty light guns in reserve; for they had a powerful influence in enabling him to recover himself when his line had been broken through between the center and the left. . on the defensive, it is well to place some of the heavy batteries in front, instead of holding them in reserve, since it is desirable to attack the enemy at the greatest possible distance, with a view of checking his forward movement and causing disorder in his columns. . on the defensive, it seems also advisable to have the artillery not in reserve distributed at equal intervals in batteries along the whole line, since it is important to repel the enemy at all points. this must not, however, be regarded as an invariable rule; for the character of the position and the designs of the enemy may oblige the mass of the artillery to move to a wing or to the center. . in the offensive, it is equally advantageous to concentrate a very powerful artillery-fire upon a single point where it is desired to make a decisive stroke, with a view of shattering the enemy's line to such a degree that he will be unable to withstand an attack upon which the fate of the battle is to turn. i shall at another place have more to say as to the employment of artillery in battles. footnotes: [footnote : thus, the army of the rhine was composed of a right wing of three divisions under lecourbe, of a center of three divisions under saint-cyr, and of a left of two divisions under saint-suzanne, the general-in-chief having three divisions more as a reserve under his own immediate orders.] [footnote : thirty brigades formed in fifteen divisions of two brigades each will have only fifteen brigades in the first line, while the same thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades each may have twenty brigades in the first line and ten in the second. but it then becomes necessary to diminish the number of divisions and to have but two in a corps,--which would be a faulty arrangement, because the corps is much more likely to be called upon for independent action than the division.] [footnote : every army has two wings, a center, and a reserve,--in all, four principal subdivisions,--besides accidental detachments. below are some of the different formations that may be given to infantry. st. in regiments of two battalions of eight hundred men each:-- div's. brig's. batt'ns. men. four corps of two divisions each, and three divisions for detachments.................. = = = , four corps of three divisions each, and three divisions for detachments................... = = = , seven corps of two divisions each, and one corps for detachments....................... = = = , d. in regiments of three battalions, brigades of six battalions:-- div's. brig's. batt'ns. men. four corps of two divisions each, besides detachments,............................... = = , four corps of three divisions each, besides detachments................................ = = = , eight corps of two divisions each............ = = = , if to these numbers we add one-fourth for cavalry, artillery, and engineers, the total force for the above formations may be known. it is to be observed that regiments of two battalions if eight hundred men each would become very weak at the end of two or three months' campaigning. if they do not consist of three battalions, then each battalion should contain one thousand men.] [footnote : the term _recent_ here refers to the later wars of napoleon i.--translators.] [footnote : as the advanced guard is in presence of the enemy every day, and forms the rear-guard in retreat, it seems but fair at the hour of battle to assign it a position more retired than that in front of the line of battle.] [footnote : this disposition of the cavalry, of course, is made upon the supposition that the ground is favorably situated for it. this is the essential condition of every well-arranged line of battle.] article xliv. formation and employment of infantry. infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since it forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defense of positions. if we must admit that, next to the genius of the general, the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory, it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry and artillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at times be very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial success. we shall not here introduce those old discussions about the shallow and the deep formations, although the question, which was supposed decided, is far from being settled absolutely. the war in spain and the battle of waterloo have again given rise to disputes as to the relative advantages of fire and the shallow order, and of columns of attack and the deep order. i will give my own opinion farther on. there must, however, be no misconception on this subject. the question now is not whether lloyd was right in wishing to add a fourth rank, armed with pikes, to the infantry formation, with the expectation of producing more effect by the shock when attacking, or opposing a greater resistance when attacked. every officer of experience knows the difficulty of moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions in three ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase the disorder without adding any advantage. it is astonishing that lloyd, who had seen service, should have insisted so much upon the material advantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass of a battalion; for it very rarely happens that such a collision between opposing troops takes place that mere weight decides the contest. if three ranks turn their backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. this increase in the number of ranks diminishes the front and the number of men firing upon the defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so much mobility as in the ordinary column of attack. it is much more difficult to move eight hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three: although in the former case the extent of front is less, the ranks cannot be kept properly closed. lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so absurd that it is wonderful how a man of talents could have imagined it. he wishes to deploy twenty battalions, and leave between them one hundred and fifty yards, or an interval equal to their front. we may well ask what would befall those battalions thus separated. the cavalry may penetrate the intervals and scatter them like dust before the whirlwind. but the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist of deployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of columns of attack, each battalion being formed in column on the central division and depending on its force and impetuosity? i will now proceed to sum up the particulars bearing upon a decision of the question in hand. there are, in fact, only five methods of forming troops to attack an enemy:--l, as skirmishers; , in deployed lines, either continuous or checkerwise; , in lines of battalions formed in column on the central divisions; , in deep masses; , in small squares. the skirmishing-order is an accessory; for the duties of skirmishers are, not to form the line of battle, but to cover it by taking advantage of the ground, to protect the movements of columns, to fill up intervals, and to defend the skirts of a position. these different manners of formation are, therefore, reducible to four: the shallow order, where the line is deployed in three ranks; the half-deep order, formed of a line of battalions in columns doubled on the center or in battalion squares; the mixed order, where regiments are partly in line and partly in column; finally, the deep order, composed of heavy columns of battalions deployed one behind the other. [illustration: fig. .[ ] deployed order in two lines. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ] the formation into two deployed lines with a reserve was formerly used to a great extent: it is particularly suitable on the defensive. these deployed lines may either be continuous, (fig. ,) or checkerwise, or in echelons. [illustration: fig. . twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with skirmishers in the intervals. -----...-----...-----...-----...-----...----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----...-----...-----...-----...-----...----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ] a more compact order is shown in fig. , where each battalion is formed into a column of attack, being by divisions upon the central division. it is really a line of small columns in the three-rank formation, a battalion with four divisions[ ] will have twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are in this way too many non-combatants, and the column presents too good a mark for the artillery. to remedy in part these inconveniences, it has been proposed, whenever infantry is employed in columns of attack, to form it in two ranks, to place only three divisions of a battalion one behind the other, and to spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals of the battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, these skirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. (see fig. .) each battalion would thus have two hundred more men to fire, besides those thrown into the two front ranks from the third. there would be, also, an increase of the whole front. by this arrangement, while having really a depth of but six men, there would be a front of one hundred men, and four hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for each battalion. force and mobility would both be obtained.[ ] a battalion of eight hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of four divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the first alone--and only two ranks of that--discharge their pieces. bach battalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred and twenty shots at a volley, whilst formed in the manner shown in fig. it would deliver four hundred. [illustration: fig. .] while searching after methods of obtaining more fire when necessary, we must not forget that a column of attack is not intended to fire, and that its fire should be reserved until the last; for if it begins to fire while marching, the whole impulsive effect of its forward movement is lost. moreover, this shallower order would only be advantageous against infantry, as the column of four divisions in three ranks--forming a kind of solid square--would be better against cavalry. the archduke charles found it advantageous at essling, and particularly at wagram, to adopt this last order, which was proposed by myself in my chapter on the general principles of war, published in . the brave cavalry of bessières could make no impression upon these small masses. to give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers might, it is true, be recalled, and the fourth division reformed; but this would be a two-rank formation, and would offer much less resistance to a charge than the three-rank formation,--particularly on the flanks. if to remedy this inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many military men believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist so well as columns. the english squares at waterloo were, however, only in two ranks, and, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the french cavalry, only one battalion was broken. i will observe, in conclusion, that, if the two-rank formation be used for the columns of attack, it will be difficult to preserve that in three ranks for deployed lines, as it is scarcely possible to have two methods of formation, or, at any rate, to employ them alternately in the same engagement. it is not probable that any european army, except the english, will undertake to use deployed lines in two ranks. if they do, they should never move except in columns of attack. i conclude that the system employed by the russians and prussians, of forming columns of four divisions in three ranks, of which one may be employed as skirmishers when necessary, is more generally applicable than any other; whilst the other, of which mention has been made, would be suitable only in certain cases and would require a double formation. [illustration: fig. .] there is a mixed order, which was used by napoleon at the tagliamento and by the russians at eylau, where, in regiments of three battalions, one was deployed to form the first line, and two others to the rear in columns. (see fig. .) this arrangement--which belongs also to the half-deep order--is suitable for the offensive-defensive, because the first line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy, which must throw him into more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns may debouch through the intervals and fall with advantage upon him while in disorder. this arrangement would probably be improved by placing the leading divisions of the two battalions of the wings upon the same line with the central deployed battalion. there would thus be a half-battalion more to each regiment in the first line,--a by no means unimportant thing for the delivery of fire. there may be reason to fear that, these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, their battalions which are formed in column to be readily launched against the enemy may not be easily disengaged for that purpose. the order may be useful in many cases. i have therefore indicated it. [illustration: fig .] [illustration: fig .] the order in very deep masses (see figs. and ) is certainly the most injudicious. in the later wars of napoleon, twelve battalions were sometimes deployed and closed one upon the other, forming thirty-six ranks closely packed together. such masses are greatly exposed to the destructive effects of artillery, their mobility and impulsion are diminished, while their strength is not increased. the use of such masses at waterloo was one cause of the french being defeated. macdonald's column was more fortunate at wagram, but at a great sacrifice of life; and it is not probable that this column would have been victorious had it not been for the successes of davoust and oudinot on the left of the archduke's line. when it is decided to risk such a mass, the precaution should certainly be taken of placing on each flank a battalion marching in file, so that if the enemy should charge the mass in flank it need not be arrested in its progress. (see fig. .) under the protection of these battalions, which may face toward the enemy, the column may continue its march to the point it is expected to reach: otherwise, this large mass, exposed to a powerful converging fire which it has no means of returning, will be thrown into confusion like the column at fontenoy, or broken as was the macedonian phalanx by paulus emilius. squares are good in plains and to oppose an enemy who has a superiority in cavalry. it is agreed that the regimental square is best for the defensive, and the battalion square for the offensive. (see figs. , , .) [illustration: fig. . division in battalion squares.] [illustration: fig. . the same division in long battalion squares.] [illustration: fig. . squared of regiments of three battalions.] the figures may be perfect squares, or elongated to give a large front and pour a heavier column of fire in the direction of the enemy. a regiment of three battalions will thus form a long square, by wheeling the center battalion half to the right and half to the left. in the turkish wars squares were almost exclusively used, because hostilities were carried on in the vast plains of bessarabia, moldavia, or wallachia, and the turks had an immense force of cavalry. but if the seat of war be the balkan mountains or beyond them, and their irregular cavalry be replaced by an army organized according to the proportions usual in europe, the importance of the square will disappear, and the russian infantry will show its superiority in rumelia. however this may be, the order in squares by regiments or battalions seems suitable for every kind of attack, when the assailant has not the superiority in cavalry and maneuvers on level ground advantageous for the enemy's charges. the elongated square, especially when applied to a battalion of eight companies, three of which would march in front and one on each side, would be much better to make an attack than a deployed battalion. it would not be so good as the column proposed above; but there would be less unsteadiness and more impulsion than if the battalion marched in a deployed line. it would have the advantage, also, of being prepared to resist cavalry. squares may also be drawn up in echelons, so as entirely to unmask each other. all the orders of battle may be formed of squares as well as with deployed lines. it cannot be stated with truth that any one of the formations described is always good or always bad; but there is one rule to the correctness of which every one will assent,--that a formation suitable for the offensive must possess the characteristics of _solidity, mobility_, and _momentum_, whilst for the defensive _solidity_ is requisite, and also the power of delivering _as much fire as possible_. this truth being admitted, it remains yet to be decided whether the bravest troops, formed in columns but unable to fire, can stand long in presence of a deployed line firing twenty thousand musket-balls in one round, and able to fire two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand in five minutes. in the later wars in europe, positions have often been carried by russian, french, and prussian columns with their arms at a shoulder and without firing a shot. this was a triumph of _momentum_ and the moral effect it produces; but under the cool and deadly fire of the english infantry the french columns did not succeed so well at talavera, busaco, fuentes-de-onore, albuera, and waterloo. we must not, however, necessarily conclude from these facts that the advantage is entirely in favor of the shallow formation and firing; for when the french formed their infantry in those dense masses, it is not at all wonderful that the deployed and marching battalions of which they were composed, assailed on all sides by a deadly fire, should have been repulsed. would the same result have been witnessed if they had used columns of attack formed each of a single battalion doubled on the center? i think not. before deciding finally as to the superiority of the shallow order, with its facility for firing, over the half-deep order and its momentum, there should be several trials to see how a deployed line would stand an assault from a formation like fig. , (page .) these small columns have always succeeded wherever i have seen them tried. is it indeed an easy matter to adopt any other order when marching to attack a position? can an immense deployed line be moved up into action while firing? i think no one will answer affirmatively. suppose the attempt made to bring up twenty or thirty battalions in line, while firing either by file or by company, to the assault of a well-defended position: it is not very probable they would ever reach the desired point, or, if they did, it would be in about as good order as a flock of sheep. what conclusions shall be drawn from all that has been said? . if the deep order is dangerous, the half-deep is excellent for the offensive. . the column of attack of single battalions is the best formation for carrying a position by assault; but its depth should be diminished as much as possible, that it may when necessary be able to deliver as heavy a column of fire as possible, and to diminish the effect of the enemy's fire: it ought also to be well covered by skirmishers and supported by cavalry. . the formation having the first line deployed and the second in columns is the best-suited to the defensive. . either of them may be successful in the hands of a general of talent, who knows how to use his troops properly in the manner indicated in articles xvi. and xxx. since this chapter was first written, numerous improvements have been made in the arms both of infantry and artillery, making them much more destructive. the effect of this is to incline men to prefer the shallower formations, even in the attack. we cannot, however, forget the lessons of experience; and, notwithstanding the use of rocket-batteries, shrapnel-shot, and the perkins musket, i cannot imagine a better method of forming infantry for the attack than in columns of battalions. some persons may perhaps desire to restore to infantry the helmets and breastplates of the fifteenth century, before leading them to the attack in deployed lines. but, if there is a general return to the deployed system, some better arrangement must be devised for marching to the attack than long, continuous lines, and either columns must be used with proper distances for deployment upon arriving near the enemy's position, or lines drawn up checkerwise, or the march must be by the flanks of companies,--all of which maneuvers are hazardous in presence of an enemy who is capable of profiting by the advantages on his side. a skillful commander will use either, or a combination of all, of these arrangements, according to circumstances. experience long ago taught me that one of the most difficult tactical problems is that of determining the best formation of troops for battle; but i have also learned that to solve this problem by the use of a single method is an impossibility. in the first place, the topography of different countries is very various. in some, as champagne, two hundred thousand men might be maneuvered in deployed lines. in others, as italy, switzerland, the valley of the rhine, half of hungary, it is barely possible to deploy a division of ten battalions. the degree of instruction of the troops, and their national characteristics, may also have an influence upon the system of formation. owing to the thorough discipline of the russian army and its instruction in maneuvers of every kind, it may maintain in movements in long lines so much order and steadiness as to enable it to adopt a system which would be entirely out of the question for the french or prussian armies of the present day. my long experience has taught me to believe that nothing is impossible; and i do not belong to the class of men who think that there can be but one type and one system for all armies and all countries. to approximate as nearly as we can to the solution of the problem, it seems to me, we ought to find out:-- . the best method of moving when in sight of the enemy, but beyond his reach; . the best method of coming to close quarters with him; . the best defensive order. in whatever manner we may settle these points, it seems desirable in all cases to exercise the troops-- . in marching in columns of battalions doubled on the center, with a view to deployment, if necessary, when coming into musket-range, or even to attack in column; . in marching in continuous deployed lines of eight or ten battalions; . in marching in deployed battalions arranged checkerwise,--as these broken lines are more easily moved than continuous lines; . in moving to the front by the flanks of companies; . in marching to the front in small squares, either in line or checkerwise; . in changing front while using these different methods of marching; . in changes of front executed by columns of companies at full distance, without deployment,--a more expeditious method than the others of changing front, and the one best suited to all kinds of ground. of all the methods of moving to the front, that by the flanks of companies would be the best if it was not somewhat dangerous. in a plain it succeeds admirably, and in broken ground is very convenient. it breaks up a line very much; but by accustoming the officers and privates to it, and by keeping the guides and color-bearers well aligned, all confusion can be avoided. the only objection to it is the danger to which the separated companies are exposed of being ridden down by cavalry. this danger may be avoided by having good cavalry scouts, and not using this formation too near the enemy, but only in getting over the first part of the large interval separating the two armies. at the least sign of the enemy's proximity the line could be reformed instantly, since the companies can come into line at a run. whatever precautions may be taken, this maneuver should only be practiced with well-disciplined troops, never with militia or raw troops. i have never seen it tried in presence of an enemy,--but frequently at drills, where it has been found to succeed well, especially in changing front. i have also seen attempts made to march deployed battalions in checkerwise order. they succeeded well; whilst marches of the same battalions in continuous lines did not. the french, particularly, have never been able to march steadily in deployed lines. this checkered order would be dangerous in case of an unexpected charge of cavalry. it may be employed in the first stages of the movement forward, to make it more easy, and the rear battalions would then come into line with the leading ones before reaching the enemy. moreover, it is easy to form line at the moment of the charge, by leaving a small distance only between the leading and following battalions; for we must not forget that in the checkered order there are not two lines, but a single one, which is broken, to avoid the wavering and disorder observed in the marches of continuous lines. it is very difficult to determine positively the best formation for making a serious and close attack upon an enemy. of all the methods i have seen tried, the following seemed to succeed best. form twenty-four battalions in two lines of battalions in columns doubled on the center ready for deployment: the first line will advance at charging-pace toward the enemy's line to within twice musket-range, and will then deploy at a run; the voltigeur-companies of each battalion will spread out in skirmishing-order, the remaining companies forming line and pouring in a continued fire by file; the second line of columns follows the first, and the battalions composing it pass at charging-step through the intervals of the first line. this maneuver was executed when no enemy was present; but it seems to me an irresistible combination of the advantages of firing and of the column. besides these lines of columns, there are three other methods of attacking in the half-deep order. the first is that of lines composed of deployed battalions with others in column on the wings of those deployed, (fig. , page .) the deployed battalions and the leading divisions of those in column would open fire at half musket-range, and the assault would then be made. the second is that of advancing a deployed line and firing until reaching half musket-range, then throwing forward the columns of the second line through the intervals of the first. the third is the order in echelons, mentioned on page , and shown in fig. on that page. finally, a last method is that of advancing altogether in deployed lines, depending on the superiority of fire alone, until one or the other party takes to its heels,--a case not likely to happen. i cannot affirm positively which of these methods is the best; for i have not seen them used in actual service. in fact, in real combats of infantry i have never seen any thing but battalions deployed commencing to fire by company, and finally by file, or else columns marching firmly against the enemy, who either retired without awaiting the columns, or repulsed them before an actual collision took place, or themselves moved out to meet the advance. i have seen _mêlées_ of infantry in defiles and in villages, where the heads of columns came in actual bodily collision and thrust each other with the bayonet; but i never saw such a thing on a regular field of battle. in whatever manner these discussions terminate, they are useful, and should be continued. it would be absurd to discard as useless the fire of infantry, as it would be to give up entirely the half-deep formation; and an army is ruined if forced to adhere to precisely the same style of tactical maneuvers in every country it may enter and against every different nation. it is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms which will insure victory. i must, however, except very deep masses, as they should be entirely abandoned. i will conclude this subject by stating that a most vital point to be attended to in leading infantry to the combat is to protect the troops as much as possible from the fire of the enemy's artillery, not by withdrawing them at inopportune moments, but by taking advantage of all inequalities and accidents of the ground to hide them from the view of the enemy. when the assaulting troops have arrived within musket-range, it is useless to calculate upon sheltering them longer: the assault is then to be made. in such cases covers are only suitable for skirmishers and troops on the defensive. it is generally quite important to defend villages on the front of a position, or to endeavor to take them when held by an enemy who is assailed; but their importance should not be overestimated; for we must never forget the noted battle of blenheim, where marlborough and eugene, seeing the mass of the french infantry shut up in the villages, broke through the center and captured twenty-four battalions which were sacrificed in defending these posts. for like reasons, it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or brushwood, which may afford cover to the party holding them. they shelter the troops, conceal their movements, cover those of cavalry, and prevent the enemy from maneuvering in their neighborhood. the case of the park of hougoumont at the battle of waterloo is a fine example of the influence the possession of such a position, well chosen and strongly defended, may have in deciding the fate of a battle. at hochkirch and kolin the possession of the woods was very important. footnotes: [footnote : in this and subsequent figures we suppose a division of twelve battalions.] [footnote : the word _division_ being used to designate four or five regiments, as well as two companies of a battalion, there is danger of confusion in its use.] [footnote : in the russian army the skirmishers are taken from the third rank of each division,--which makes the column eight men in depth, instead of twelve, and gives more mobility. to facilitate rallying the skirmishers on the columns, it would be, perhaps, better to take the whole fourth division for that purpose, thus giving nine ranks, or three divisions of three ranks, against infantry, while against cavalry there would be twelve ranks.] article xlv. cavalry. the use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of course, somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with that of the whole army, and upon its quality. even cavalry of an inferior character may be so handled as to produce very great results, if set in action at proper moments. the numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has varied greatly. it depends on the natural tastes of nations making their people more or less fit for good troopers. the number and quality of horses, also, have something to do with it. in the wars of the revolution, the french cavalry, although badly organized and greatly inferior to the austrian, performed wonders. in i saw what was pompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the rhine,--a weak brigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! ten years later i saw the same reserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty thousand horses,--so much had ideas and means changed. as a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open country should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength; in mountainous countries one-tenth will suffice. the principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease of motion. to these characteristics may be added its impetuosity; but we must be careful lest a false application be made of this last. whatever may be its importance in the _ensemble_ of the operations of war, cavalry can never defend a position without the support of infantry. its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the enemy, rapidly succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. an army deficient in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats extremely difficult. the proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action depend upon the ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the battle, the enemy's movements, and a thousand other circumstances which cannot be mentioned here. i can only touch upon the principal things to be considered in its use. all are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line in good order cannot be attempted with much hope of success, unless it be supported by infantry and artillery. at waterloo the french paid dearly for having violated this rule; and the cavalry of frederick the great fared no better at kunnersdorf. a commander may sometimes feel obliged to push his cavalry forward alone, but generally the best time for charging a line of infantry is when it is already engaged with opposing infantry. the battles of marengo, eylau, borodino, and several others prove this. there is one case in which cavalry has a very decided superiority over infantry,--when rain or snow dampens the arms of the latter and they cannot fire. augereau's corps found this out, to their sorrow, at eylau, and so did the austrian left at dresden. infantry that has been shaken by a fire of artillery or in any other way may be charged with success. a very remarkable charge of this kind was made by the prussian cavalry at hohenfriedberg in . a charge against squares of good infantry in good order cannot succeed. a general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery and enable the infantry to take the position more easily; but the infantry must then be at hand to sustain the cavalry, for a charge of this character has only a momentary effect, which must be taken advantage of before the enemy can return offensively upon the broken cavalry. the beautiful charge of the french upon gosa at the battle of leipsic, october , is a fine example of this kind. those executed at waterloo with the same object in view were admirable, but failed because unsupported. the daring charge of ney's weak cavalry upon prince hohenlohe's artillery at jena is an example of what may be done under such circumstances. general charges are also made against the enemy's cavalry, to drive it from the field of battle and return more free to act against his infantry. cavalry may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear of an enemy's line at the moment of its being attacked in front by the infantry. if repulsed, it may rally upon the army at a gallop, and, if successful, it may cause the loss of the enemy's army. this operation is rarely attempted, but i see no reason why it should not be very good; for a body of cavalry well handled cannot be cut off even if it gets in rear of the enemy. this is a duty for which light cavalry is particularly fitted. in the defensive, cavalry may also produce very valuable results by opportune dashes at a body of the enemy which has engaged the opposing line and either broken it through or been on the point of doing so. it may regain the advantages lost, change the face of affairs, and cause the destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by his own success. this was proved at eylau, where the russians made a fine charge, and at waterloo by the english cavalry. the special cavalry of a corps d'armée may charge at opportune moments, either to co-operate in a combined attack, or to take advantage of a false movement of the enemy, or to finish his defeat by pressing him while in retreat. it is not an easy matter to determine the best mode of attacking, as it depends upon the object in view and other circumstances. there are but four methods of charging,--in columns, in lines at a trot, in lines at a gallop, and in open order,--all of which may be successfully used. in charges in line, the lance is very useful; in _mêlées_, the saber is much better: hence comes the idea of giving the lance to the front rank, which makes the first onslaught, and the saber to the second rank, which finishes the encounter usually in individual combats. pistol-firing is of very little use except for outpost-duty, in a charge as foragers, or when light cavalry desires to annoy infantry and draw its fire previous to a charge. i do not know what the carbine is good for; since a body of cavalry armed with it must halt if they wish to fire with any accuracy, and they are then in a favorable condition for the enemy to attack. there are few marksmen who can with any accuracy fire a musket while on horseback and in rapid motion. i have just said that all the methods of charging may be equally good. it must not be understood, however, that impetuosity always gives the advantage in a shock of cavalry against cavalry: the fast trot, on the contrary, seems to me the best gait for charges in line, because every thing depends, in such a case, upon the _ensemble_ and good order of the movement,--things which cannot be obtained in charges at a fast gallop. galloping is proper against artillery when it is important to get over the ground as rapidly as possible. in like manner, if the cavalry is armed with sabers, it may take the gallop at two hundred yards from the enemy's line if it stands firmly to receive the attack. but if the cavalry is armed with the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, since the advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the preservation of good order: in a _mêlée_ the lance is almost useless. if the enemy advances at a fast trot, it does not seem prudent to gallop to meet him; for the galloping party will be much disordered, while the trotting party will not. the only advantage of the gallop is its apparent boldness and the moral effect it produces; but, if this is estimated at its true value by the enemy, it is reasonable to expect his firm and compact mass to be victorious over a body of horsemen galloping in confusion. in their charges against infantry the turks and mamelukes showed the small advantage of mere impetuosity. no cavalry will penetrate where lancers or cuirassiers at a trot cannot. it is only when infantry is much disordered, or their fire poorly maintained, that there is any advantage in the impetuous gallop over the steady trot. to break good squares, cannon and lancers are required, or, better still, cuirassiers armed with lances. for charges in open order there are no better models for imitation than the turks and the cossacks. whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best ways of using cavalry is to throw several squadrons opportunely upon the flanks of an enemy's line which is also attacked in front. that this maneuver may be completely successful, especially in charges of cavalry against cavalry, it should be performed at the very moment when the lines come in collision; for a minute too soon or too late its effect may be lost. it is highly important, therefore, that a cavalry commander should have a quick eye, sound judgment, and a cool head. much discussion has taken place about the proper manner of arming and organizing cavalry. the lance is the best arm for offensive purposes when a body of horsemen charge in line; for it enables them to strike an enemy who cannot reach them; but it is a very good plan to have a second rank or a reserve armed with sabers, which are more easily handled than the lance in hand-to-hand fighting when the ranks become broken. it would be, perhaps, better still to support a charge of lancers by a detachment of hussars, who can follow up the charge, penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the victory. the cuirass is the best defensive armor. the lance and the cuirass of strong leather doubled seem to me the best armament for light cavalry, the saber and iron cuirass the best for heavy cavalry. some military men of experience are inclined even to arm the cuirassiers with lances, believing that such cavalry, resembling very much the men-at-arms of former days, would bear down every thing before them. a lance would certainly suit them better than the musketoon; and i do not see why they should not have lances like those of the light cavalry. opinions will be always divided as to those amphibious animals called dragoons. it is certainly an advantage to have several battalions of mounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a defile, defend it in retreat, or scour a wood; but to make cavalry out of foot-soldiers, or a soldier who is equally good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. this might have been supposed settled by the fate of the french dragoons when fighting on foot, had it not been seen that the turkish cavalry fought quite as well dismounted as mounted. it has been said that the greatest inconvenience resulting from the use of dragoons consists in the fact of being obliged at one moment to make them believe infantry squares cannot resist their charges, and the next moment that a foot-soldier armed with his musket is superior to any horseman in the world. this argument has more plausibility than real force; for, instead of attempting to make men believe such contradictory statements, it would be much more reasonable to tell them that if brave cavalry may break a square, brave foot-soldiers may resist such a charge; that victory does not always depend upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a thousand other things; that the courage of the troops, the presence of mind of the commanders, the opportuneness of maneuvers, the effect of artillery and musketry fire, rain,--mud, even,--have been the causes of repulses or of victories; and, finally, that a brave man, whether on foot or mounted, will always be more than a match for a coward. by impressing these truths upon dragoons, they will believe themselves superior to their adversaries whether they fight on foot or on horseback. this is the case with the turks and the circassians, whose cavalry often dismount to fight on foot in a wood or behind a cover, musket in hand, like foot-soldiers. it requires, however, fine material and fine commanders to bring soldiers to such perfection in knowledge of their duties. the conviction of what brave men can accomplish, whether on foot or mounted, doubtless induced the emperor nicholas to collect the large number of fourteen or fifteen thousand dragoons in a single corps, while he did not consider napoleon's unfortunate experiment with french dragoons, and was not restrained by the fear of often wanting a regiment of these troops at some particular point. it is probable that this concentration was ordered for the purpose of giving uniformity to the instruction of the men in their duties as foot and mounted soldiers, and that in war they were to be distributed to the different grand divisions of the army. it cannot be denied, however, that great advantages might result to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men on horseback to a decisive point and bring them into action as infantry. it thus appears that the methods of concentration and of distribution have their respective advantages and disadvantages. a judicious mean between the extremes would be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of the army and to the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a retreat,) and then to unite the remaining troops of this arm in divisions or corps. every thing that was said with reference to the formation of infantry is applicable to cavalry, with the following modifications:-- . lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons are much better for cavalry than full lines; whilst for infantry lines drawn up checkerwise are too much disconnected, and would be in danger if the cavalry should succeed in penetrating and taking the battalions in flank. the checkerwise formation is only advantageous for infantry in preparatory movements before reaching the enemy, or else for lines of columns which can defend themselves in every direction against cavalry. whether checkered or full lines be used, the distance between them ought to be such that if one is checked and thrown into confusion the others may not share it. it is well to observe that in the checkered lines the distance may be less than for full lines. in every case the second line should not be full. it should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there should be left the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that may be in column upon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the passage through of the troops which have been brought up. . when the order of columns of attack doubled on the center is used, cavalry should be formed in regiments and infantry only in battalions. the regiments should contain six squadrons, in order that, by doubling on the center into divisions, three may be formed. if there are only four squadrons, there can be but two lines. . the cavalry column of attack should never be formed _en masse_ like that of infantry; but there should always be full or half squadron distance, that each may have room to disengage itself and charge separately. this distance will be so great only for those troops engaged. when they are at rest behind the line of battle, they may be closed up, in order to cover less ground and diminish the space to be passed over when brought into action. the masses should, of course, be kept beyond cannon-range. . a flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry than in a combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed in echelons by platoons on the flanks of a line of cavalry, which may form to the right or left, to meet an enemy coming in that direction. . for the same reason, it is important to throw several squadrons against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is attacked in front. irregular cavalry is quite as good as the regular for this purpose, and it may be better. . it is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that the commander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of the formation. for example, in a deployed division of two brigades it would not be a good plan for one brigade to form in a single line behind the other, but each brigade should have one regiment in the first line and one in the second. each unit of the line will thus have its own proper reserve behind it,--an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for in a charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible for a general to control the deployed regiments. by adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be able to dispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also, to have a general reserve for the whole division. this consideration leads me to think that five regiments would make a good division. the charge may then be made in line by brigades of two regiments, the fifth serving as a general reserve behind the center. or three regiments may form the line, and two may be in column, one behind each wing. or it may be preferable to use a mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping the others in column. this is a good arrangement, because the three regiments, formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanks of the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it is beaten back. (see fig. .) [illustration: fig. . cavalry division of five regiments. cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in full lines.] . two essential points are regarded as generally settled for all encounters of cavalry against cavalry. one is that the first line must sooner or later be checked; for, even upon the supposition of the first charge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemy will bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must at length be forced to rally behind the second. the other point is that, with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, the victory will remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readiness to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is also engaged. attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to the proper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for battle. whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid deploying large cavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus drawn up is very unmanageable, and if the first line is checked suddenly in its career the second is also, and that without having an opportunity to strike a blow. this has been demonstrated many times. take as an example the attack made by nansouty in columns of regiments upon the prussian cavalry deployed in front of chateau-thierry. in opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, i never intended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or in echelons, or of reserves formed in columns. i only meant to say that when cavalry, expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in lines one behind the other, the whole mass will be thrown into confusion as soon as the first line breaks and turns.[ ] with cavalry still more than with infantry the _morale_ is very important. the quickness of eye and the coolness of the commander, and the intelligence and bravery of the soldier, whether in the _mêlée_ or in the rally, will oftener be the means of assuring a victory than the adoption of this or that formation. when, however, a good formation is adopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, the victory is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a vicious formation. the history of the wars between and has renewed the old disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in the end get the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all serious encounters, will retreat with the speed of the parthians and return to the combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemy by continual skirmishing. lloyd has decided in the negative; and several exploits of the cossacks when engaged with the excellent french cavalry seem to confirm his opinion. (when i speak of excellent french cavalry, i refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it does not compare with the russian or german cavalry either in horsemanship, organization, or in care of the animals.) we must by no means conclude it possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers to accomplish as much as the cossacks or other irregular cavalry. they acquire a habit of moving in an apparently disorderly manner, whilst they are all the time directing their individual efforts toward a common object. the most practiced hussars can never perform such service as the cossacks, tscherkesses, and turks do instinctively. experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate of a war may depend. such charges are valuable accessories to an attack in line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results. from the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to give cavalry a regular organization, and furnish them long weapons, not omitting, however, to provide, for skirmishing, &c., an irregular cavalry armed with pistols, lances, and sabers. whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that a numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a great influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. it may excite a feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country, it can carry off his convoys, it can encircle his army, make his communications very perilous, and destroy the _ensemble_ of his operations. in a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising _en masse_ of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and rear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty in his calculations. any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one which provides for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of war by the incorporation of militia; for they may, with the aid of a few good regular squadrons, be made excellent partisan soldiers. these militia would certainly not possess all the qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on horseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measure supply the places of such. in this respect russia is much better off than any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and quality of her horsemen of the don, and the character of the irregular militia she can bring into the field at very short notice. twenty years ago i made the following statements in chapter xxxv. of the treatise on grand military operations, when writing on this subject:-- "the immense advantages of the cossacks to the russian army are not to be estimated. these light troops, which are insignificant in the shock of a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks,) are terrible in pursuits and in a war of posts. they are a most formidable obstacle to the execution of a general's designs,--because he can never be sure of the arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys are always in danger, and his operations uncertain. if an army has had only a few regiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real value has not been known; but when their number increases to fifteen thousand or twenty thousand, their usefulness is fully recognized,--especially in a country where the population is not hostile to them. "when they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided with a strong escort, and no movement can be expected to be undisturbed. much unusual labor is thus made necessary upon the part of the opponent's regular cavalry, which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue. "volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time of war breaking out, may be nearly as valuable as the cossacks, if they are well officered and move freely about from point to point." in the hungarians, transylvanians, and croats, austria has resources possessed by few other states. the services rendered by mounted militia have proved, however, that this kind of cavalry may be very useful, if for no other purpose than relieving the regular cavalry of those occasional and extra duties to be performed in all armies, such as forming escorts, acting as orderlies, protecting convoys, serving on outposts, &c. mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often be more really useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of the line,--because the fear of compromising a body of these last often restrains a general from pushing them forward in daring operations where he would not hesitate to risk his irregulars, and he may thus lose excellent opportunities of accomplishing great results. footnotes: [footnote : to disprove my statement, m. wagner cites the case of the battle of ramillies, where marlborough, by a general charge of cavalry in fall lines, succeeded in beating the french drawn up checkerwise. unless my memory deceives me, the allied cavalry was at first formed checkered in two lines; but the real cause of marlborough's success was his seeing that villeroi had paralyzed half his army behind anderkirch and gette, and his having the good sense to withdraw thirty-eight squadrons from this wing to reinforce his left, which in this way had twice as many cavalry as the french, and outflanked them. but i cheerfully admit that there may be many exceptions to a rule which i have not laid down more absolutely than all others relating to cavalry tactics,--a tactics, by the way, as changeable as the arm itself.] article xlvi. employment of artillery. artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive and defensive. as an offensive means, a great battery well managed may break an enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and prepare the way for the troops that are to make an assault. as a defensive means, it doubles the strength of a position, not only on account of the material injury it inflicts upon the enemy while at a distance, and the consequent moral effect upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of approaching near, and specially within the range of grape. it is no less important in the attack and defense of fortified places or intrenched camps; for it is one of the main reliances in modern systems of fortification. i have already in a former portion of this book given some directions as to the distribution of artillery in a line of battle; but it is difficult to explain definitely the proper method of using it in the battle itself. it will not be right to say that artillery can act independently of the other arms, for it is rather an accessory. at wagram, however, napoleon threw a battery of one hundred pieces into the gap left by the withdrawal of massena's corps, and thus held in check the austrian center, notwithstanding their vigorous efforts to advance. this was a special case, and should not be often imitated. i will content myself with laying down a few fundamental rules, observing that they refer to the present state of artillery service, ( .) the recent discoveries not yet being fully tested, i shall say little with reference to them. . in the offensive, a certain portion of the artillery should concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to be struck. its first use is to shatter the enemy's line, and then it assists with its fire the attack of the infantry and cavalry. . several batteries of horse-artillery should follow the offensive movements of the columns of attack, besides the foot-batteries intended for the same purpose. too much foot-artillery should not move with an offensive column. it may be posted so as to co-operate with the column without accompanying it. when the cannoneers can mount the boxes, it may have greater mobility and be advanced farther to the front. . it has already been stated that half of the horse-artillery should be held in reserve, that it may be rapidly moved to any required point.[ ] for this purpose it should be placed upon the most open ground, whence it can move readily in every direction. i have already indicated the best positions for the heavy calibers. . the batteries, whatever may be their general distribution along the defensive line, should give their attention particularly to those points where the enemy would be most likely to approach, either on account of the facility or the advantage of so doing. the general of artillery should therefore know the decisive strategic and tactical points of the battle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space occupied. the distribution of the reserves of artillery will be regulated by these. . artillery placed on level ground or ground sloping gently to the front is most favorably situated either for point-blank or ricochet firing: a converging fire is the best. . it should be borne in mind that the chief office of all artillery in battles is to overwhelm the enemy's troops, and not to reply to their batteries. it is, nevertheless, often useful to fire at the batteries, in order to attract their fire. a third of the disposable artillery may be assigned this duty, but two-thirds at least should be directed against the infantry and cavalry of the enemy. . if the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should endeavor to cross their fire in order to strike the lines obliquely. if guns can be so placed as to enfilade a line of troops, a most powerful effect is produced. . when the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. it is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flank and reverse. the moral effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops is inconceivable; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it. the fine movement of ney on preititz at bautzen was neutralized by a few pieces of kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he was pursuing. a few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards upon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, far overbalancing the risks run. . batteries should always have supports of infantry or cavalry, and especially on their flanks. cases may occur where the rule may be deviated from: wagram is a very remarkable example of this. . it is very important that artillerists, when threatened by cavalry, preserve their coolness. they should fire first solid shot, next shells, and then grape, as long as possible. the infantry supports should, in such a case, form squares in the vicinity, to shelter the horses, and, when necessary, the cannoneers. when the infantry is drawn up behind the pieces, large squares of sufficient size to contain whatever they should cover are best; but when the infantry is on the flanks, smaller squares are better. rocket-batteries may also be very efficient in frightening the horses. . when infantry threatens artillery, the latter should continue its fire to the last moment, being careful not to commence firing too soon. the cannoneers can always be sheltered from an infantry attack if the battery is properly supported. this is a case for the co-operation of the three arms; for, if the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion by the artillery, a combined attack upon it by cavalry and infantry will cause its destruction. . the proportions of artillery have varied in different wars. napoleon conquered italy in with forty or fifty pieces,--whilst in he invaded russia with one thousand pieces thoroughly equipped, and failed. these facts show that any fixed rule on the subject is inadmissible. usually three pieces to a thousand combatants are allowed; but this allowance will depend on circumstances. the relative proportions of heavy and light artillery vary also between wide limits. it is a great mistake to have too much heavy artillery, whose mobility must be much less than that of the lighter calibers. a remarkable proof of the great importance of having a strong artillery-armament was given by napoleon after the battle of eylau. the great havoc occasioned among his troops by the numerous guns of the russians opened his eyes to the necessity of increasing his own. with wonderful vigor, he set all the prussian arsenals to work, those along the rhine, and even at metz, to increase the number of his pieces, and to cast new ones in order to enable him to use the munitions previously captured. in three months he doubled the _matériel_ and _personnel_ of his artillery, at a distance of one thousand miles from his own frontiers,--a feat without a parallel in the annals of war. . one of the surest means of using the artillery to the best advantage is to place in command of it a general who is at once a good strategist and tactician. this chief should be authorized to dispose not only of the reserve artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to the different corps or divisions of the army. he should also consult with the commanding general as to the moment and place of concentration of the mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a successful issue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of thus massing his artillery without previous orders from the commanding general. footnotes: [footnote : greater mobility is now given to foot-artillery by mounting the men on the boxes.] article xlvii. of the combined use of the three arms. to conclude this summary in a proper manner, i ought to treat of the combined use of the three arms; but i am restrained from so doing by considering the great variety of points necessary to be touched upon if i should attempt to go into an examination of all the detailed operations that would arise in the application of the general rules laid down for each of the arms. several authors--chiefly german--have treated this subject very extensively, and their labors are valuable principally because they consist mainly of citations of numerous examples taken from the actual minor engagements of the later wars. these examples must indeed take the place of rules, since experience has shown that fixed rules on the subject cannot be laid down. it seems a waste of breath to say that the commander of a body of troops composed of the three arms should employ them so that they will give mutual support and assistance; but, after all, this is the only fundamental rule that can be established, for the attempt to prescribe for such a commander a special course of conduct in every case that may arise, when these cases may be infinitely varied, would involve him in an inextricable labyrinth of instructions. as the object and limits of this summary do not allow me to enter upon the consideration of such details, i can only refer my readers to the best works which do treat of them. i have said all i can properly say when i advise that the different arms be posted in conformity with the character of the ground, according to the object in view and the supposed designs of the enemy, and that they be used simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care being taken to enable them to afford mutual support. a careful study of the events of previous wars, and especially experience in the operations of war, will give an officer correct ideas on these points, and the ability to use, at the right time and place, his knowledge of the properties of the three arms, either single or combined. conclusion. i am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may be regarded as fundamental in war. war in its _ensemble_ is not a science, but an art. strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole. among other things, combats may be mentioned as often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. the passions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of their commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and epochs,[ ]--in a word, every thing that can be called the poetry and metaphysics of war,--will have a permanent influence on its results. shall i be understood as saying that there are no such things as tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? what military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? are we to imagine that eugene and marlborough triumphed simply by inspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of their battalions? or do we find in the events of turin, blenheim, and ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at talavera, waterloo, jena, or austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? when the application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procured victory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their favor the great probability of leading to success, shall their occasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely denying their value and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? shall a theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the whole number of chances of success in its favor? the _morale_ of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon the fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effect produced by the moral cause. for example, the impetuous attack upon a hostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughly enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same point. strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the theater of war or of the zone of operations. tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which they shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the art of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point of the field of battle. when troops are thinking more of flight than of fight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in which i use the term. a general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessed of military _coup-d'oeil_, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent strategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics in presence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out, and his defeat will be probable. if he be a man of character, he will be able to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his wits he will lose his army. the same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good tactician and strategist, and have made all the arrangements for gaining a victory that his means will permit: in this case, if he be only moderately seconded by his troops and subordinate officers, he will probably gain a decided victory. if, however, his troops have neither discipline nor courage, and his subordinate officers envy and deceive him,[ ] he will undoubtedly see his fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations can only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost unavoidable defeat. no system of tactics can lead to victory when the _morale_ of an army is bad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon some occurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the danube at essling. neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence to or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle. these truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will lead to success. it is true that theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding brave troops, means of almost certain success. the correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remains to be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. in this ability consists the whole of a man's genius for war. there are, however, leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. every maxim relating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of the greatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment and place. in chapter iii. i have specified all the strategic combinations which lead to such a result. as regards tactics, the principal thing to be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for the object in view. when we come to consider the action of masses on the field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear, or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the adversary. each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause of victory. to define the cases in which each should be preferred is simply impossible. if a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war, his first duty is to study carefully the theater of operations, that he may see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it presents for himself and his enemies. this being done, he can understandingly proceed to prepare his base of operations, then to choose the most suitable zone of operations for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keep constantly before his mind the principles of the art of war relative to lines and fronts of operations. the offensive army should particularly endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objective points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of its subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance, depending upon its first successes. the defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all means, to neutralize the first forward movement of its adversary, protracting operations as long as possible while not compromising the fate of the war, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion of the enemy's forces are either exhausted by labors, or scattered for the purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places, covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &c. up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of operations; but no plan can provide with certainty for that which is uncertain always,--the character and the issue of the first conflict. if your lines of operations have been skillfully chosen and your movements well concealed, and if on the other hand your enemy makes false movements which permit you to fall on fractions of his army, you maybe successful in your campaign, without fighting general battles, by the simple use of your strategic advantages. but if the two parties seem about equally matched at the time of conflict, there will result one of those stupendous tragedies like borodino, wagram, waterloo, bautzen, and dresden, where the precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in the chapter on that subject, must have a powerful influence. if a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefully studying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the great masters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principles nor rules, i can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words of frederick, that "a mule which had made twenty campaigns under prince eugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning." correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals. if these means do not produce great men, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take rank next after the natural masters of the art of war. footnotes: [footnote : the well-known spanish proverb, _he was brave on such a day_, may be applied to nations as to individuals. the french at rossbach were not the same people as at jena, nor the prussians at prentzlow as at dennewitz.] [footnote : the unskillful conduct of a subordinate who is incapable of understanding the merit of a maneuver which has been ordered, and who will commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the same result of causing the failure of the plans of an excellent commander.] supplement to the summary of the art of war. my summary of the art of war, published in , to assist in the military instruction of the hereditary grand duke of russia, contained a concluding article that was never printed. i deem it expedient to give it now in the form of a supplement, and add a special article upon the means of acquiring a certain and ready strategic _coup-d'oeil_. it is essential for the reader of my summary to understand clearly that in the military science, as in every other, the study of details is easy for the man who has learned how to seize the fundamental features to which all others are secondary. i am about to attempt a development of these elements of the art; and my readers should endeavor to apprehend them clearly and to apply them properly. i cannot too often repeat that the theory of the great combinations of war is in itself very simple, and requires nothing more than ordinary intelligence and careful consideration. notwithstanding its simplicity, many learned military men have difficulty in grasping it thoroughly. their minds wander off to accessory details, in place of fixing themselves on first causes, and they go a long way in search of what is just within their reach if they only would think so. two very different things must exist in a man to make him a general: _he must know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it to a successful termination_. the first of these talents may be a natural gift, but it may also be acquired and developed by study. the second depends more on individual character, is rather a personal attribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved. it is particularly necessary for a monarch or the head of a government to possess the first of these talents, because in such case, although he may not have the ability to execute, he can arrange plans of operations and decide correctly as to the excellence or defects of those submitted to him by others. he is thus enabled to estimate properly the capacity of his generals, and when he finds a general producing a good plan, and having firmness and coolness, such a man may be safely trusted with the command of an army. if, on the other hand, the head of a state is a man of executive ability, but not possessing the faculty of arranging wise military combinations, he will be likely to commit all the faults that have characterized the campaigns of many celebrated warriors who were only brave soldiers without being at all improved by study. from the principles which i have laid down, and their application to several famous campaigns, my readers will perceive that the theory of the great combinations of war may be summed up in the following truths. the science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how to choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of the enemy. to do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to the importance of decisive points,--which is not a difficult matter when he is aided by the hints i have given on the subject, particularly in articles from xviii. to xxii. the art consists, next, in a proper employment of the troops upon the theater of operations, whether offensive or defensive. (see article xvii.) this employment of the forces should be regulated by two fundamental principles: the first being, _to obtain by free and rapid movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against fractions of the enemy; the second, to strike in the most decisive direction_,--that is to say, in that direction where the consequences of his defeat may be most disastrous to the enemy, while at the same time his success would yield him no great advantages. the whole science of great military combination is comprised in these two fundamental truths. therefore, all movements that are disconnected or more extended than those of the enemy would be grave faults; so also would the occupation of a position that was too much cut up, or sending out a large detachment unnecessarily. on the contrary, every well-connected, compact system of operations would be wise; so also with central strategic lines, and every strategic position less extended than the enemy's. the application of these fundamental principles is also very simple. if you have one hundred battalions against an equal number of the enemy's, you may, by their mobility and by taking the initiative, bring eighty of them to the decisive point while employing the remaining twenty to observe and deceive half of the opposing army. you will thus have eighty battalions against fifty at the point where the important contest is to take place. you will reach this point by rapid marches, by interior lines, or by a general movement toward one extremity of the hostile line. i have indicated the cases in which one or the other of these means is to be preferred. (see pages and following.) in arranging a plan of operations, it is important to remember _"that a strategic theater, as well as every position occupied by an army, has a center and two extremities."_ a theater has usually three zones,--a right, a left, and a central. in choosing a zone of operations, select one,-- , that will furnish a safe and advantageous base; , in which the least risk will be run by yourself, while the enemy will be most exposed to injury; , bearing in mind the antecedent situations of the two parties, and, , the dispositions and inclinations of the powers whose territories are near the theater of war. one of the zones will always be decidedly bad or dangerous, while the other two will be more or less suitable according to circumstances. the zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first attempts must be selected. this is choosing an objective of operations. there are two very different kinds: some, that are called _territorial or geographical objectives_, refer simply to an enemy's line of defense which it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or intrenched camp to be captured; _the others, on the contrary, consist entirely in the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without giving attention to geographical points of any kind_. this was the favorite objective of napoleon.[ ] i can profitably add nothing to what i have already written on this point, (page ;) _and, as the choice of the objective is by far the most important thing in a plan of operations_, i recommend the whole of article xix., (pages and following.) the objective being determined upon, the army will move toward it by one or two lines of operations, care being taken to conform to the fundamental principle laid down, and to avoid double lines, unless the character of the theater of war makes it necessary to use them, or the enemy is very inferior either in the number or the quality of his troops. article xxi. treats this subject fully. if two geographical lines are used, it is essential to move the great mass of the forces along the most important of them, and to occupy the secondary line by detachments having a concentric direction, if possible, with the main body. the army, being on its way toward the objective, before arriving in presence of the enemy and giving battle, occupies daily or temporary strategic positions: the front it embraces, or that upon which the enemy may attack, is its front of operations. there is an important consideration with reference to the direction of the front of operations and to changes it may receive, which i have dwelt upon in article xx., (page .) the fundamental principle requires, even when the forces are equal, that the front be less extensive than the enemy's,--especially if the front remains unchanged for some time. if your strategic positions are more closely connected than the enemy's, you can concentrate more rapidly and more easily than he can, and in this way the fundamental principle will be applied. if your positions are interior and central, the enemy cannot concentrate except by passing by the mass of your divisions or by moving in a circle around them: he is then exactly in a condition not to be able to apply the fundamental principle, while it is your most obvious measure. but if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central position, that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior at every point, is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very far separated from each other, as was the case with the allied armies in the seven years' war; or unless the central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of its sides, like the rhine, the danube, or the alps, which would prevent the enemy from using his forces simultaneously. in case of great numerical inferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of the extremities than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if his masses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you. it was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the decisive points of a theater of war, requires two things:-- st, that the principal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's, to attack them in succession; d, that the best direction of movement be adopted,--that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive points already known, and afterward upon secondary points. to illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, i will give a sketch of the operations of the french at the close of . (see plate iii.) it will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps on the frontier of france from the rhine to the north sea. the duke of york was attacking dunkirk. (no. .) marshal freytag was covering the siege. (no. .) the prince of orange was occupying an intermediate position at menin. (no. .) the prince of coburg, with the main army, was attacking maubeuge, and was guarding the space between that place and the scheldt by strong detachments. (no. .) clairfayt was covering the siege. (no. .) benjouski was covering charleroi and the meuse, toward thuin and charleroi, the fortifications of which were being rebuilt. (no. .) another corps was covering the ardennes and luxembourg. (no. .) the prussians were besieging landau. (no. .) the duke of brunswick was covering the siege in the vosges. (no. .) general wurmser was observing strasbourg and the army of the rhine. (no. .) the french, besides the detachments in front of each of the hostile corps, had five principal masses in the camps of lille, douai, guise, sarre louis, and strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e.) a strong reserve, (g,) composed of the best troops drawn from the camps of the northern frontier, was intended to be thrown upon all the points of the enemy's line in succession, assisted by the troops already in the neighborhood, (i, k, l, m.) this reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of cassel near dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps and , under the duke of york; then that of the dutch, (no. ,) at menin; next that of clairfayt, ( ,) before maubeuge; finally, joining the army of the moselle toward sarre louis, it beat the duke of brunswick in the vosges, and, with the assistance of the army of the rhine, (f,) drove wurmser from the lines of wissembourg. the general principle was certainly well applied, and every similar operation will be praiseworthy. but, as the austrians composed half the allied forces, and they had their lines of retreat from the points , , and upon the rhine, it is evident that if the french had collected three of their large corps in order to move them against benjouski at thuin, (no. ,) and then fallen upon the prince of coburg's left by the charleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the north sea, and would have obtained immense results. the committee of public safety deemed it a matter of great importance that dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of the english. besides this, york's corps, encamped on the downs, might be cut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable french masses for this object were at douai, lille, and cassel: so that there were good reasons for commencing operations by attacking the english. the principal undertaking failed, because houchard did not appreciate the strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line of retreat of the anglo-hanoverian army. he was guillotined, by way of punishment, although he saved dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off the english as he might have done. it will be observed that this movement of the french reserve along the whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which had decisive results, _because the attacks were made in front_, and because, when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through, and the french reserve moving on to the different points in succession, none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. if the french had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the meuse, had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed benjouski, assailed the prince of coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued him vigorously as napoleon pursued at ratisbon, and as he wished to do at ligny in , the result would have been very different. i have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the two important points to be attended to in the strategic management of masses of troops; that is, their employment at different points in succession and at decisive points.[ ] every educated military man will be impressed by the truths educed, and will be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers will depend upon their conforming to the principle already insisted upon; that is to say, the great part of the force must be moved against one wing or the center, according to the position of the enemy's masses. it is of importance in battles to calculate distances with still greater accuracy; for the results of movements on the battle-field following them more rapidly than in the case of strategic maneuvers, every precaution must be taken to avoid exposing any part of the line to a dangerous attack from the enemy, especially if he is compactly drawn up. add to these things calmness during the action; the ability to choose positions for fighting battles in the manner styled the defensive with _offensive returns_, (art. xxx.;) the simultaneous employment of the forces in striking the decisive blow, (see pages from to ;) the faculty of arousing the soldiers and moving them forward at opportune moments; and we have mentioned every thing which can assist, as far as the general is concerned, in assuring victories, and every thing which will constitute him a skillful tactician. it is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field of battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely here that genius and experience are every thing, and mere theory of little value. it is important, also, to consider attentively article xlii., which explains how a general may make a small number of suppositions as to what the enemy may or can do, and as to what course of conduct he shall himself pursue upon those hypotheses. he may thus accustom himself to be prepared for any eventuality. i must also call attention to article xxviii., upon great detachments. these are necessary evils, and, if not managed with great care, may prove ruinous to the best armies. the essential rules on this point are, to make as few detachments as possible, _to have them readily movable_, to draw them back to the main body as soon as practicable, and to give them good instructions for avoiding disasters. i have nothing to say relative to the first two chapters on military policy; for they are themselves nothing more than a brief summary of this part of the art of war, which chiefly concerns statesmen, but should be thoroughly understood by military men. i will, however, invite special attention to article xiv., relating to the command of armies or to the choice of generals-in-chief,--a subject worthy the most anxious care upon the part of a wise government; for upon it often depends the safety of the nation. we may be confident that a good strategist will make a good chief of staff for an army; but for the command in chief is required a man of tried qualities, of high character and known energy. the united action of two such men as commander-in-chief and chief of staff, when a great captain of the first order cannot be had, may produce the most brilliant results. footnotes: [footnote : the objective may be in some degree _political_,--especially in cases of wars of intervention in the affairs of another country; but it then really becomes geographical.] [footnote : the operations mentioned show the advantage of employing masses at the decisive point, not because it was done in , but because it was not done. if napoleon had been in carnot's place, he would have fallen with all his force upon charleroi, whence be would have attacked the left of the prince of coburg and cut his line of retreat. let any one compare the results of carnot's half-skillful operations with the wise maneuvers of saint-bernard and jena, and be convinced.] note upon the means of acquiring a good strategic coup-d'oeil. the study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance, never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or to the brilliant operations of great captains. by such exercises may be procured a rapid and certain strategic _coup-d'oeil_,--the most valuable characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in practice the finest theories in the world. when a military man who is a student of his art has become fully impressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong mass against successive fractions of the enemy's force, and particularly when he recognizes the importance of constantly directing the main efforts upon decisive points of the theater of operations, he will naturally desire to be able to perceive at a glance what are these decisive points. i have already, in chapter iii., page , of the preceding summary, indicated the simple means by which this knowledge may be obtained. there is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains in all the combinations of a methodical war. it is this:--_in every position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate by the right, by the left, or by the front_. to be convinced of the correctness of this assertion, let us first take this general in his private office at the opening of the war. his first care will be to choose that zone of operations which will give him the greatest number of chances of success and be the least dangerous for him in case of reverse. as no theater of operations can have more than three zones, (that of the right, that of the center, and that of the left,) and as i have in articles from xvii. to xxii. pointed out the manner of perceiving the advantages and dangers of these zones, the choice of a zone of operations will be a matter of no difficulty. when the general has finally chosen a zone within which to operate with the principal portion of his forces, and when these forces shall be established in that zone, the army will have a front of operations toward the hostile army, which will also have one. now, these fronts of operations will each have its right, left, and center. it only remains, then, for the general to decide upon which of these directions he can injure the enemy most,--for this will always be the best, especially if he can move upon it without endangering his own communications. i have dwelt upon this point also in the preceding summary. finally, when the two armies are in presence of each other upon the field of battle where the decisive collision is to ensue, and are upon the point of coming to blows, they will each have a right, left, and center; and it remains for the general to decide still between these three directions of striking. let us take, as an illustration of the truths i have mentioned, the theater of operations, already referred to, between the rhine and the north sea. (see fig. .) although this theater presents, in one point of view, four geographical sections,--viz.: the space between the rhine and the moselle, that between the moselle and the meuse, that between the meuse and the scheldt, and that between the last river and the sea,--it is nevertheless true that an army of which a a is the base and b b the front of operations will have only three general directions to choose from; for the two spaces in the center will form a single central zone, as it will always have one on the right and another on the left. [illustration: fig. .] the army b b, wishing to take the offensive against the army cc, whose base was the rhine, would have three directions in which to operate. if it maneuvered by the extreme right, descending the moselle, (toward d,) it would evidently threaten the enemy's line of retreat toward the rhine; but he, concentrating the mass of his forces toward luxembourg, might fall upon the left of the army d and compel it to change front and fight a battle with its rear toward the rhine, causing its ruin if seriously defeated. if, on the contrary, the army b wished to make its greatest effort upon the left, (toward e,) in order to take advantage of the finely-fortified towns of lille and valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniences still more serious than before. for the army cc, concentrating in force toward audenarde, might fall on the right of b, and, outflanking this wing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable country toward antwerp between the scheldt and the sea,--where there would remain but two things for it to do: either to surrender at discretion, or cut its way through the enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers. it appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the most disadvantageous for army b, and the right zone would be inconvenient, although somewhat favorable in a certain point of view. the central zone remains to be examined. this is found to possess all desirable advantages, because the army b might move the mass of its force toward charleroi with a view of cutting through the immense front of operations of the enemy, might overwhelm his center, and drive the right back upon antwerp and the lower scheldt, without seriously exposing its own communications. when the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most favorable zone, they should, of course, have that direction of movement toward the enemy's front of operations which is in harmony with the chief object in view. for example, if you shall have operated by your right against the enemy's left, with the intention of cutting off the greater portion of his army from its base of the rhine, you should certainly continue to operate in the same direction; for if you should make your greatest effort against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was to gain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result as you anticipated, no matter how well they might be executed. if, on the contrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with the intention of crowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to maneuver by your right in order to accomplish your object; for if you maneuvered by the left, yourself and not the enemy would be the party thrown back upon the sea in case of a reverse. applying these ideas to the theaters of the campaigns of marengo, ulm, and jena, we find the same three zones, with this difference, that in those campaigns the central direction was not the best. in , the direction of the left led straight to the left bank of the po, on the line of retreat of mélas; in , the left zone was the one which led by the way of donauwerth to the extreme right, and the line of retreat of mack; in , however, napoleon could reach the prussian line of retreat by the right zone, filing off from bamberg toward gera. in , napoleon had to choose between a line of operations on the right, leading to the sea-shore toward nice and savona, that of the center, leading by mont-cenis toward turin, and that of the left, leading to the line of communications of mélas, by way of saint-bernard or the simplon. the first two directions had nothing in their favor, and the right might have been very dangerous,--as, in fact, it proved to massena, who was forced back to genoa and there besieged. the decisive direction was evidently that by the left. i have said enough to explain my ideas on this point. the subject of battles is somewhat more complicated; for in the arrangements for these there are both strategical and tactical considerations to be taken into account and harmonized. a position for battle, being necessarily connected with the line of retreat and the base of operations, must have a well-defined strategic direction; but this direction must also depend somewhat upon the character of the ground and the stations of the troops of both parties to the engagement: these are tactical considerations. although an army usually takes such a position for a battle as will keep its line of retreat behind it, sometimes it is obliged to assume a position parallel to this line. in such a case it is evident that if you fall with overwhelming force upon the wing nearest the line of retreat, the enemy may be cut off or destroyed, or, at least, have no other chance of escape than in forcing his way through your line. i will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of leuthen in , of which i have given an account in the history of frederick's wars, and the famous days of krasnoi, in the retreat from moscow in . [illustration: fig. .] the annexed figure ( ) explains the combination at krasnoi. the line a a is napoleon's line of retreat toward c. he took the position b b to cover his line. it is evident that the principal mass of koutousoff's army d d should have moved to e e in order to fall on the right of the french, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had been anticipated at c; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thus fifteen hundred miles from its true base. there was the same combination at jemmapes, where dumouriez, by outflanking the austrian left, instead of attacking their right, would have entirely cut them off from the rhine. at the battle of leuthen frederick overwhelmed the austrian left, which was in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason the right wing was obliged to take refuge in breslau, where it capitulated a few days later. in such cases there is no cause for hesitation. the decisive point is that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and this line you must seize while protecting your own. when an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to and behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack the center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be the least favorable for the defense; for in such a case the first consideration is to gain the battle, without having in view the total destruction of the enemy. that depends upon the relative numerical strength, the _morale_ of the two armies, and other circumstances, with reference to which no fixed rules can be laid down. finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing the enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as napoleon did at marengo, ulm, and jena. the decisive point having in such case been secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to prevent the enemy from forcing his way through your line. you can do nothing better than fight a parallel battle, as there is no reason for maneuvering against one wing more than the other. but for the enemy who is thus cut off the case is very different. he should certainly strike most heavily in the direction of that wing where he can hope most speedily to regain his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the mass of his forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. all that he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort shall be toward the right or the left. it is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great river in the presence of a hostile army is sometimes an exceptional case to which the general rules will not apply. in these operations, which are of an exceedingly delicate character, the essential thing is to keep the bridges safe. if, after effecting the passage, a general should throw the mass of his forces toward the right or the left with a view of taking possession of some decisive point, or of driving his enemy back upon the river, whilst the latter was collecting all his forces in another direction to seize the bridges, the former army might be in a very critical condition in case of a reverse befalling it. the battle of wagram is an excellent example in point,--as good, indeed, as could be desired. i have treated this subject in article xxxvii., (pages and following.) a military man who clearly perceives the importance of the truths that have been stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate _coup-d'oeil_. it will be admitted, moreover, that a general who estimates them at their true value, and accustoms himself to their use, either in reading military history, or in hypothetical cases on maps, will seldom be in doubt, in real campaigns, what he ought to do; and even when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, he will always be ready with suitable measures for counteracting them, by constantly bearing in mind the few simple fundamental principles which should regulate all the operations of war. heaven forbid that i should pretend to lessen the dignity of the sublime art of war by reducing it to such simple elements! i appreciate thoroughly the difference between the directing principles of combinations arranged in the quiet of the closet, and that special talent which is indispensable to the individual who has, amidst the noise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand men co-operating toward the attainment of one single object. i know well what should be the character and talents of the general who has to make such masses move as one man, to engage them at the proper point simultaneously and at the proper moment, to keep them supplied with arms, provisions, clothing, and munitions. still, although this special talent, to which i have referred, is indispensable, it must be granted that the ability to give wise direction to masses upon the best strategic points of a theater of operations is the most sublime characteristic of a great captain. how many brave armies, under the command of leaders who were also brave and possessed executive ability, have lost not only battles, but even empires, because they were moved imprudently in one direction when they should have gone in the other! numerous examples might be mentioned; but i will refer only to ligny, waterloo, bautzen, dennewitz, leuthen. i will say no more; for i could only repeat what has already been said. to relieve myself in advance of the blame which will be ascribed to me for attaching too much importance to the application of the few maxims laid down in my writings, i will repeat what i was the first to announce:--"_that war is not an exact science, but a drama full of passion_; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight and ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the impulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great influence upon it." i may be permitted also, after having written the detailed history of thirty campaigns and assisted in person in twelve of the most celebrated of them, to declare that i have not found a single case where these principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success. as to the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating mind which distinguish the practical man from the one who knows only what others teach him, i confess that no book can introduce those things into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. i have seen many generals--marshals, even--attain a certain degree of reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. i have seen these men intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the most extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgment and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. my works are not intended for such misguided persons as these, but my desire has been to facilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring minds, by pointing out directing principles. taking this view, i claim credit for having rendered valuable service to those officers who are really desirous of gaining distinction in the profession of arms. finally, i will conclude this short summary with one last truth:-- "the first of all the requisites for a man's success as a leader is, that he be perfectly brave. when a general is animated by a truly martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commit faults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels." [blank page] second appendix to the summary of the art of war. on the formation of troops for battle. happening to be in paris, near the end of , a distinguished person did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in fire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of making war. i replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of tactics, but that, in great strategic operations and the grand combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the application of the principles which had led to the success of great generals in all ages,--of alexander and cæsar as well as of frederick and napoleon. my illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of my opinion. the heroic events which have recently occurred near sebastopol have not produced the slightest change in my opinion. this gigantic contest between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies and mounting two thousand guns of the largest caliber, is an event without precedent, which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstances which produced it cannot occur again. moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no resemblance to regular pitched battles fought in the center of a continent, cannot influence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even the tactics of battles. the bloody battles of the alma and inkermann, by giving evidence of the murderous effect of the new fire-arms, naturally led me to investigate the changes which it might be necessary to make on this account in the tactics for infantry. i shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order to complete what was published on this point twenty years ago in the summary of the art of war. the important question of the influence of musketry-fire in battles is not new: it dates from the reign of frederick the great, and particularly from the battle of mollwitz, which he gained (it was said) because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of cylindrical rammers in loading their muskets, were able to fire three shots per minute more than their enemies.[ ] the discussion which arose at this epoch between the partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for troops is known to all military students. the system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for the infantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order of battle, was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in reserve. the celebrated regulation for maneuvers of fixed the deployed as the only order for battle: it seemed to admit the use of battalion-columns doubled on the center only in partial combats,--such as an attack upon an isolated post, a village, a forest, or small intrenchments.[ ] the insufficient instruction in maneuvers of the troops of the republic forced the generals, who were poor tacticians, to employ in battle the system of columns supported by numerous skirmishers. besides this, the nature of the countries which formed the theaters of operations--the vosges, alps, pyrenees, and the difficult country of la vendée--rendered this the only appropriate system. how would it have been possible to attack the camps of saorgio, figueras, and mont-cenis with deployed regiments? in napoleon's time, the french generally used the system of columns, as they were nearly always the assailants. in , i published, at glogau in silesia, a small pamphlet with the title of "summary of the general principles of the art of war," in which i proposed to admit for the attack the system of lines formed of columns of battalions by divisions of two companies; in other words, to march to the attack in lines of battalions closed in mass or at half-distance, preceded by numerous skirmishers, and the columns being separated by intervals that may vary between that necessary for the deployment of a battalion and the minimum of the front of one column. what i had recently seen in the campaigns of ulm, austerlitz, jena, and eylau had convinced me of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of marching an army in deployed lines in either two or three ranks, to attack an enemy in position. it was this conviction which led me to publish the pamphlet above referred to. this work attracted some attention, not only on account of the treatise on strategy, but also on account of what was said on tactics. the successes gained by wellington in spain and at waterloo with troops deployed in lines of two ranks were generally attributed to the murderous effect of the infantry-fire, and created doubt in some minds as to the propriety of the use of small columns; but it was not till after that the controversies on the best formation for battle wore renewed by the appearance of a pamphlet by the marquis of chambray. in these discussions, i remarked the fatal tendency of the clearest minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, and to cast in the same mold all the tactical combinations a general may arrange, without taking into consideration localities, moral circumstances, national characteristics, or the abilities of the commanders. i had proposed to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack: i never intended to make it an exclusive system, particularly for the defense. i had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation was approved of by the greatest generals of our times. the first was at the congress of vienna, in the latter part of : the archduke charles observed "that he was under great obligations for the summary i had published in , which general walmoden had brought to him in from silesia." at the beginning of the war of , the prince had not thought it possible to apply the formation which i had proposed; but at the battle of essling the contracted space of the field induced him to form a part of his army in columns by battalions, (the landwehr particularly,) and they resisted admirably the furious charges of the cuirassiers of general d'espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke, they could not have done if they had been deployed. at the battle of wagram, the greater part of the austrian line was formed in the same way as at essling, and after two days of terrible fighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not because his army was badly beaten, but because his left was outflanked and thrown back so as to endanger his line of retreat on hungary. the prince was satisfied that the firm bearing of his troops was in part due to this mixture of small columns with deployed battalions. the second witness is wellington; although his evidence is, apparently, not so conclusive. having been presented to him at the congress of verona in , i had occasion to speak to him on the subject of the controversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system to which a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise. he remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the french upon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well supported by artillery and cavalry. i observed to the duke that these deep columns were very different from the small columns which i proposed,--a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force, and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and force than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of artillery. i asked the illustrious general if at waterloo he had not formed the hanoverian, brunswick, and belgian troops in columns by battalions. he answered, "yes; because i could not depend upon them so well as upon the english." i replied that this admission proved that he thought a line formed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines. he replied, "they are certainly good, also; but their use always depends upon the localities and the spirit of the troops. a general cannot act in the same manner under all circumstances." to this illustrious evidence i might add that napoleon himself, in the campaign of , prescribed for the attack the formation of the infantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as the most suitable,--which was identically what i had proposed in . the duke of wellington also admitted that the french columns at waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columns of battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper. if we can believe the prussian accounts and plans of the battle, it would seem that ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, at least in their march to the attack of la haye sainte and the line extending from this farm to the papelotte. i was not present; but several officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formed in columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being deployed behind each other at six paces' interval. this circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms of the french. we give the same name of _division_ to masses of four regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,--which is absurd. let us suppose, for example, that napoleon had directed on the th of june, , the formation of the line in columns by divisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of should be followed. his lieutenants might naturally have understood it very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order, would have executed one of the following formations:-- . either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight battalions.[ ] . or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the system i have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:-- i do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led to the deep masses at waterloo; but it might have done so; and it is important that in every language there should be two different terms to express two such different things as a _division_ of twelve battalions and a _division_ of a quarter of a battalion. struck with what precedes, i thought it proper to modify my summary already referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it i devoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the different formations for battle. i also added some considerations relative to a mixed system used at eylau by general benningsen, which consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying the central one, the other two being in column on the wings. * * * * * after these discussions, i drew the conclusions:-- . that wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive. . that the system of benningsen might, according to circumstances, be as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was successfully used by napoleon at the passage of the tagliamento. . that the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry. i have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. i regard it as impossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to the attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for success. napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in these terms:--"take your troops up in good order, and make a vigorous assault upon the enemy." i ask, what means is there of carrying up to the assault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed battalions as a whole in good order? they will reach the enemy in detachments disconnected from each other, and the commander cannot exercise any control over the mass as a whole. i saw nothing of this kind either at ulm, jena, eylau, bautzen, dresden, culm, or leipsic; neither did it occur at austerlitz, friedland, katzbach, or dennewitz. i am not aware that wellington, in any of his battles, ever marched in deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. he generally awaited the attack. at vittoria and toulouse he gained the victory by maneuvers against the flanks; and at toulouse soult's right wing was beaten while descending the heights to attack. even at waterloo, what fate would have befallen the english army if, leaving the plateau of mont saint-jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack napoleon in position on the heights of la belle alliance? i will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to be necessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since my summary of the art of war was written. some german generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived in from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored to add to its value by dividing up the columns and increasing their number, so as to make them more shallow and to facilitate their deployment. with this view, they propose, instead of forming four divisions or companies one behind the other, to place them beside each other, not deployed, but in small columns. that is, if the battalion consists of four companies of two hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into four sections of sixty each: one of these sections will be dispersed as skirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will form a small column; so that the battalion, instead of forming one column, will form four, and the regiment of three battalions will form twelve small columns instead of three-- [illustration: d battalion. d battalion. st battalion. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---] it is certain that it would be easier to march such a line against the enemy than if deployed; but these diminutive columns of sixty skirmishers and one hundred and eighty men in the ranks would never present the same order and solidity as a single column of a battalion. still as the system has some advantages, it deserves a trial; and, indeed, it has already been practiced in prussia and austria. the same formation applies equally to battalions of six or eight companies. in this case the battalion would not be formed by companies, but by divisions of two companies,--that is, in three or four columns, according to the number of companies. two serious inconveniences appear to me to attach to each of these formations. if vigorously charged by cavalry, these small subdivisions would be in great danger; and even in attacking the enemy's line, if driven back and pursued, disorder would be more likely to occur than in the columns of battalions. still, either of them may be employed, according to circumstances, localities, and the _morale_ of the troops. experience alone can assign to each its proper value. i am not aware whether the austrians applied these columns of companies at custozza and novara, or whether these maneuvers have only been practiced in their camps of instruction. be that as it may, there is another not less important question to be considered:-- "will the adoption of the rifled small-arms and improved balls bring about any important changes in the formation for battle and the now recognized principles of tactics?" if these arms aided the allies at the alma and inkermann, it was because the russians were not provided with them; and it must not be forgotten that in a year or two all armies will alike be furnished with them, so that in future the advantage will not be confined to one side. what change will it make in tactics? will whole armies be deployed as skirmishers, or will it not still be necessary to preserve either the formation of lines deployed in two or three ranks, or lines of battalions in columns? will battles become mere duels with the rifle, where the parties will fire upon each other, without maneuvering, until one or the other shall retreat or be destroyed? what military man will reply in the affirmative? it follows, therefore, that, to decide battles, maneuvers are necessary, and victory will fall to the general who maneuvers most skillfully; and he cannot maneuver except with deployed lines or lines of columns of battalions, either whole or subdivided into columns of one or two companies. to attempt to prescribe by regulation under what circumstances either of these systems is to be applied would be absurd. if a general and an army can be found such that he can march upon the enemy in a deployed line of forty or fifty battalions, then let the shallow order be adopted, and the formation in columns be confined to the attack of isolated posts; but i freely confess that i would never accept the command of an army under this condition. the only point for a regulation for the formation for battle is to forbid the use of very deep columns, because they are heavy, and difficult to move and to keep in order. besides, they are so much exposed to artillery that their destruction seems inevitable, and their great depth does not increase in any respect their chances of success. if the organization of an army were left to me, i would adopt for infantry the formation in two ranks, and a regimental organization according with the formation for battle. i would then make each regiment of infantry to consist of three battalions and a depot. each battalion should consist of six companies, so that when in column by division the depth would be three divisions or six ranks. this formation seems most reasonable, whether it is desired to form the battalion in columns of attack by divisions on the center of each battalion, or on any other division. the columns of attack, since the depth is only six ranks, would not be so much exposed to the fire of artillery, but would still have the mobility necessary to take the troops up in good order and launch them upon the enemy with great force. the deployment of these small columns could be executed with great ease and promptitude; and for the forming of a square a column of three divisions in depth would be preferable in several respects to one of four or six divisions. in the russian service each battalion consists of four companies of two hundred and fifty men each; each company being as strong as a division in the french organization. the maneuver of double column on the center is not practicable, since the center is here merely an interval separating the second and third companies. hence the column must be simple, not on the center, but on one of the four companies. something analogous to the double column on the center would be attained by forming the first and fourth companies behind the second and third respectively; but then the formation would be in two lines rather than in column; and this is the reason why i would prefer the organization of the battalion in six companies or three divisions. by dividing each of the four companies into two platoons, making eight in all, the formation of _double column on the center_ might be made on the fourth and fifth platoons as the leading division; but then each division would be composed of two platoons belonging to different companies, so that each captain would have half of the men of his company under the command of another officer, and half of his own division would be made up of another company. such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient; for, as the captain is the real commander, father, and judge of the men of his own company, he can always obtain more from them in the way of duty than any stranger. in addition, if the double column should meet with a decided repulse, and it should be necessary to reform it in line, it would be difficult to prevent disorder, the platoons being obliged to run from one side to the other to find their companies. in the french system, where each battalion consists of eight companies, forming as many platoons at drill, this objection does not exist, since each company is conducted by its own captain. it is true that there will be two captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather an advantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and emulation between the two captains and their men, which will lead to greater display of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior captain is there, to command the division as a whole. it is time to leave these secondary details and return to the important question at issue. since i have alluded to the system adopted by wellington, it is proper to explain it so that it can be estimated at its true value in the light of historical events. in spain and portugal, particularly, wellington had under his command a mass of troops of the country, in which he placed but little confidence in regular formation in a pitched battle, on account of their want of instruction and discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatred of the french and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing the enemy. having learned by experience the effects of the fury and impetuosity of the french columns when led by such men as massena and ney, wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this impetuosity and afterward securing a triumph over it. he chose positions difficult to approach, and covered all their avenues by swarms of spanish and portuguese riflemen, who were skilled in taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground; he placed a part of his artillery on the tactical crest of his position, and a part more to the rear, and riddled the advancing columns with a murderous artillery and musketry fire, while his excellent english infantry, sheltered from the fire, were posted a hundred paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival of these columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, out of breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a general discharge of artillery and musketry and immediately charged by the infantry with the bayonet. this system, which was perfectly rational and particularly applicable to spain and portugal, since he had there great numbers of this kind of troops and there was a great deal of rough ground upon which they could be useful as marksmen, needed some modifications to make it applicable to belgium. at waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with a gentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent field of fire, and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of this plateau were well protected. wellington, from the crest of the plateau, could discover the slightest movement in the french army, while his own were hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have prevented his losing the battle if a number of other circumstances had not come to his aid. every one knows more or less correctly the events of this terrible battle, which i have elsewhere impartially described. i demonstrated that its result was due neither to the musketry-fire nor to the use of deployed lines by the english, but to the following accidental causes, viz.:-- . to the mud, which rendered the progress of the french in the attack painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective, and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery. . to the original formation of very deep columns on the part of the french, principally on the right wing. . to the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: the infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with each other, but they were in no case simultaneous. . finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole prussian army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not the rear, of the french. every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of the mud and the firmness of the english infantry, if the mass of the french infantry had been thrown on the english in columns of battalions immediately after the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have been broken and forced back on antwerp. independently of this, if the prussians had not arrived, the english would have been compelled to retreat; and i maintain that this battle cannot justly be cited as proof of the superiority of musketry-fire over well-directed attacks in columns. from all these discussions we may draw the following conclusions, viz.:-- . that the improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any important change in the manner of taking troops into battle, but that it would be useful to introduce into the tactics of infantry the formation of columns by companies, and to have a numerous body of good riflemen or skirmishers, and to exercise the troops considerably in firing. those armies which have whole regiments of light infantry may distribute them through the different brigades; but it would be preferable to detail sharp-shooters alternately in each company as they are needed, which would be practicable when the troops are accustomed to firing: by this plan the light-infantry regiments could be employed in the line with the others; and should the number of sharp-shooters taken from the companies be at any time insufficient, they could be reinforced by a battalion of light infantry to each division. . that if wellington's system of deployed lines and musketry-fire be excellent for the defense, it would be difficult ever to employ it in an attack upon an enemy in position. . that, in spite of the improvements of fire-arms, two armies in a battle will not pass the day in firing at each other from a distance: it will always be necessary for one of them to advance to the attack of the other. . that, as this advance is necessary, success will depend, as formerly, upon the most skillful maneuvering according to the principles of grand tactics, which consist in this, viz.: in knowing how to direct the great mass of the troops at the proper moment upon the decisive point of the battle-field, and in employing for this purpose the simultaneous action of the three arms. . that it would be difficult to add much to what has been said on this subject in chapters iv. and v.; and that it would be unreasonable to define by regulation an absolute system of formation for battle. . that victory may with much certainty be expected by the party taking the offensive when the general in command possesses the talent of taking his troops into action in good order and of boldly attacking the enemy, adopting the system of formation best adapted to the ground, to the spirit and quality of his troops, and to his own character. finally, i will terminate this article with the following remark: that war, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and impassioned drama, regulated, it is true, by three or four general principles, but also dependent for its results upon a number of moral and physical complications. footnotes: [footnote : it is probable that baron jomini here refers to iron, instead of cylindrical, ramrods. before , all european troops used wooden ramrods; and the credit of the invention of iron ones is attributed by some to the prince of anhalt, and by others to prince leopold of dessau. the prussians were the first to adopt the iron ramrod, and at the date of the battle of mollwitz ( ) it had not been introduced into the austrian service. frederick did not adopt the cylindrical ramrod till , thirty-six years after the battle of mollwitz. the advantage of the cylindrical ramrod consisted in this,--that the soldier in loading saved the time necessary to turn the ramrod; but obviously this small economy of time could never have enabled him to load three times while the enemy loaded once,--all other things being equal.--translators.] [footnote : columns by battalions closed in mass seemed only to be intended to use in long columns on the march, to keep them closed, in order to facilitate their deployment.] [footnote : we suppose each regiment to consist of two battalions: if there should be three in each regiment, the deep column would then consist of twelve lines of either twenty-four or thirty-six ranks, while in the next figure there would be twelve battalions on the line instead of eight, the depth not being increased.] sketch of the principal maritime expeditions. i have thought it proper to give here an account of the principal maritime expeditions, to be taken in connection with maxims on descents. the naval forces of egypt, phoenicia, and rhodes are the earliest mentioned in history, and of them the account is confused. the persians conquered these nations, as well as asia minor, and became the most formidable power on both land and sea. about the same time the carthaginians, who were masters of the coast of mauritania, being invited by the inhabitants of cadiz, passed the straits, colonized boetica and took possession of the balearic isles and sardinia, and finally made a descent on sicily. the greeks contended against the persians with a success that could not have been expected,--although no country was ever more favorably situated for a naval power than greece, with her fifty islands and her great extent of coast. the merchant marine of athens produced her prosperity, and gave her the naval power to which greece was indebted for her independence. her fleets, united with those of the islands, were, under themistocles, the terror of the persians and the rulers of the east. they never made grand descents, because their land-forces were not in proportion to their naval strength. had greece been a united government instead of a confederation of republics, and had the navies of athens, syracuse, corinth, and sparta been combined instead of fighting among each other, it is probable that the greeks would have conquered the world before the romans. if we can believe the exaggerated traditions of the old greek historians, the famous army of xerxes had not less than four thousand vessels; and this number is astonishing, even when we read the account of them by herodotus. it is more difficult to believe that at the same time, and by a concerted movement, five thousand other vessels landed three hundred thousand carthaginians in sicily, where they were totally defeated by gelon on the same day that themistocles destroyed the fleet of xerxes at salamis. three other expeditions, under hannibal, imilcon, and hamilcar, carried into sicily from one hundred to one hundred and fifty thousand men: agrigentum and palermo were taken, lilybæum was founded, and syracuse besieged twice. the third time androcles, with fifteen thousand men, landed in africa, and made carthage tremble. this contest lasted one year and a half. alexander the great crossed the hellespont with only fifty thousand men: his naval force was only one hundred and sixty sail, while the persians had four hundred; and to save his fleet alexander sent it back to greece. after alexander's death, his generals, who quarreled about the division of the empire, made no important naval expedition. pyrrhus, invited by the inhabitants of tarentum and aided by their fleet, landed in italy with twenty-six thousand infantry, three thousand horses, and the first elephants which had been seen in italy. this was two hundred and eighty years before the christian era. conqueror of the romans at heraclea and ascoli, it is difficult to understand why he should have gone to sicily at the solicitation of the syracusans to expel the carthaginians. recalled, after some success, by the tarentines, he recrossed the straits, harassed by the carthaginian fleet: then, reinforced by the samnites or calabrians, he, a little too late, concluded to march on rome. he in turn was beaten and repulsed on beneventum, when he returned to epirus with nine thousand men, which was all that remained of his force. carthage, which had been prospering for a long time, profited by the ruin of tyre and the persian empire. the punic wars between carthage and rome, now the preponderating power in italy, were the most celebrated in the maritime annals of antiquity. the romans were particularly remarkable for the rapidity with which they improved and increased their marine. in the year b.c. their boats or vessels were scarcely fit to cross to sicily; and eight years after found regulus conqueror at ecnomos, with three hundred and forty large vessels, each with three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty combatants, making in all one hundred and forty thousand men. the carthaginians, it is said, were stronger by twelve to fifteen thousand men and fifty vessels. the victory of ecnomos--perhaps more extraordinary than that of actium--was the first important step of the romans toward universal empire. the subsequent descent in africa consisted of forty thousand men; but the greater part of this force being recalled to sicily, the remainder was overthrown, and regulus, being made prisoner, became as celebrated by his death as by his famous victory. the great fleet which was to avenge him was successful at clypea, but was destroyed on its return by a storm; and its successor met the same fate at cape palinuro. in the year b.c. the romans were defeated at drepanum, and lost twenty-eight thousand men and more than one hundred vessels. another fleet, on its way to besiege lilybæum, in the same year, was lost off cape pactyrus. discouraged by this succession of disasters, the senate at first resolved to renounce the sea; but, observing that the power of sicily and spain resulted from their maritime superiority, it concluded to arm its fleets again, and in the year lutatius catullus set out with three hundred galleys and seven hundred transports for drepanum, and gained the battle in the Ægates islands, in which the carthaginians lost one hundred and twenty vessels. this victory brought to a close the first punic war. the second, distinguished by hannibal's expedition to italy, was less maritime in its character. scipio, however, bore the roman eagles to cartagena, and by its capture destroyed forever the empire of the carthaginians in spain. finally, he carried the war into africa with a force inferior to that of regulus; but still he succeeded in gaining the battle of zama, imposing a shameful peace on carthage and burning five hundred of her ships. subsequently scipio's brother crossed the hellespont with twenty-five thousand men, and at magnesia gained the celebrated victory which surrendered to the mercy of the romans the kingdom of antiochus and all asia. this expedition was aided by a victory gained at myonnesus in ionia, by the combined fleets of rome and rhodes, over the navy of antiochus. from this time rome had no rival, and she continued to add to her power by using every means to insure to her the empire of the sea. paulus emilius in the year b.c. landed at samothrace at the head of twenty-five thousand men, conquered perseus, and brought macedonia to submission. twenty years later, the third punic war decided the fate of carthage. the important port of utica having been given up to the romans, an immense fleet was employed in transporting to this point eighty thousand foot-soldiers and four thousand horses; carthage was besieged, and the son of paulus emilius and adopted son of the great scipio had the glory of completing the victory which emilius and scipio had begun, by destroying the bitter rival of his country. after this triumph, the power of rome in africa, as well as in europe, was supreme; but her empire in asia was for a moment shaken by mithridates. this powerful king, after seizing in succession the small adjacent states, was in command of not less than two hundred and fifty thousand men, and of a fleet of four hundred vessels, of which three hundred were decked. he defeated the three roman generals who commanded in cappadocia, invaded asia minor and massacred there at least eighty thousand roman subjects, and even sent a large army into greece. sylla landed in greece with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand romans, and retook athens; but mithridates sent in succession two large armies by the bosporus and the dardanelles: the first, one hundred thousand strong, was destroyed at chæronea, and the second, of eighty thousand men, met a similar fate at orchomenus. at the same time, lucullus, having collected all the maritime resources of the cities of asia minor, the islands, and particularly of rhodes, was prepared to transport sylla's army from sestos to asia; and mithridates, from fear, made peace. in the second and third wars, respectively conducted by murena and lucullus, there were no descents effected. mithridates, driven step by step into colchis, and no longer able to keep the sea, conceived the project of turning the black sea by the caucasus, in order to pass through thrace to assume the offensive,--a policy which it is difficult to understand, in view of the fact that he was unable to defend his kingdom against fifty thousand romans. cæsar, in his second descent on england, had six hundred vessels, transporting forty thousand men. during the civil wars he transported thirty-five thousand men to greece. antony came from brundusium to join him with twenty thousand men, and passed through the fleet of pompey,--in which act he was as much favored by the lucky star of cæsar as by the arrangements of his lieutenants. afterward cæsar carried an army of sixty thousand men to africa; they did not, however, go in a body, but in successive detachments. the greatest armament of the latter days of the roman republic was that of augustus, who transported eighty thousand men and twelve thousand horses into greece to oppose antony; for, besides the numerous transports required for such an army, there were two hundred and sixty vessels of war to protect them. antony was superior in force on land, but trusted the empire of the world to a naval battle: he had one hundred and seventy war-vessels, in addition to sixty of cleopatra's galleys, the whole manned by twenty-two thousand choice troops, besides the necessary rowers. later, germanicus conducted an expedition of one thousand vessels, carrying sixty thousand men, from the mouths of the rhine to the mouths of the ems. half of this fleet was destroyed on its return by a storm; and it is difficult to understand why germanicus, controlling both banks of the rhine, should have exposed his army to the chances of the sea, when he could have reached the same point by land in a few days. when the roman authority extended from the rhine to the euphrates, maritime expeditions were rare; and the great contest with the races of the north of europe, which began after the division of the empire, gave employment to the roman armies on the sides of germany and thrace. the eastern fraction of the empire still maintained a powerful navy, which the possession of the islands of the archipelago made a necessity, while at the same time it afforded the means. the first five centuries of the christian era afford but few events of interest in maritime warfare. the vandals, having acquired spain, landed in africa, eighty thousand strong, under genseric. they were defeated by belisarius; but, holding the balearic isles and sicily, they controlled the mediterranean for a time. at the very epoch when the nations of the east invaded europe, the scandinavians began to land on the coast of england. their operations are little better known than those of the barbarians: they are hidden in the mysteries of odin. the scandinavian bards attribute two thousand five hundred vessels to sweden. less poetical accounts assign nine hundred and seventy to the danes and three hundred to norway: these frequently acted in concert. the swedes naturally turned their attention to the head of the baltic, and drove the varangians into russia. the danes, more favorably situated with respect to the north sea, directed their course toward the coasts of france and england. if the account cited by depping is correct, the greater part of these vessels were nothing more than fishermen's boats manned by a score of rowers. there were also _snekars_, with twenty banks or forty rowers. the largest had thirty-four banks of rowers. the incursions of the danes, who had long before ascended the seine and loire, lead us to infer that the greater part of these vessels were very small. however, hengist, invited by the briton vortigern, transported five thousand saxons to england in eighteen vessels,--which would go to show that there were then also large vessels, or that the marine of the elbe was superior to that of the scandinavians. between the years and , three new expeditions, under ida and cridda, gained england for the saxons, who divided it into seven kingdoms; and it was not until three centuries had elapsed ( ) that they were again united under the authority of egbert. the african races, in their turn, visited the south of europe. in , the moors crossed the straits of gibraltar, under the lead of tarik. they came, five thousand strong, at the invitation of count julian; and, far from meeting great resistance, they were welcomed by the numerous enemies of the visigoths. this was the happy era of the caliphs, and the arabs might well pass for liberators in comparison with the tyrants of the north. tarik's army, soon swelled to twenty thousand men, defeated rodrigo at jerez and reduced the kingdom to submission. in time, several millions of the inhabitants of mauritania crossed the sea and settled in spain; and if their numerous migrations cannot be regarded as descents, still, they form one of the most curious and interesting scenes in history, occurring between the incursions of the vandals in africa and the crusades in the east. a revolution not less important, and one which has left more durable traces, marked in the north the establishment of the vast empire now known as russia. the varangian princes, invited by the novgorodians, of whom rurik was the chief, soon signalized themselves by great expeditions. in , oleg is said to have embarked eighty thousand men in two thousand boats on the dnieper: they passed the falls of the river and debouched in the black sea, while their cavalry followed the banks. they proceeded to constantinople, and forced leo the philosopher to pay tribute. forty years subsequently, igor took the same route with a fleet said to have consisted of ten thousand boats. near constantinople his fleet, terrified by the effects of the greek fire, was driven on the coast of asia, where the force was disembarked. it was defeated, and the expedition returned home. not discouraged, igor re-established his fleet and army and descended to the mouths of the danube, where the emperor romanus i. sent to renew the tribute and ask for peace, ( .) in , svatoslav, favored by the quarrel of nicephorus with the king of bulgaria, embarked sixty thousand men, debouched into the black sea, ascended the danube, and seized bulgaria. recalled by the petchenegs, who were menacing kiew, he entered into alliance with them and returned into bulgaria, broke his alliance with the greeks, and, being reinforced by the hungarians, crossed the balkan and marched to attack adrianople. the throne of constantine was held by zimisces, who was worthy of his position. instead of purchasing safety by paying tribute, as his predecessors had done, he raised one hundred thousand men, armed a respectable fleet, repulsed svatoslav at adrianople, obliged him to retreat to silistria, and took by assault the capital of the bulgarians. the russian prince marched to meet him, and gave battle not far from silistria, but was obliged to re-enter the place, where he sustained one of the most memorable sieges recorded in history. in a second and still more bloody battle, the russians performed prodigies of valor, but were again compelled to yield to numbers. zimisces, honoring courage, finally concluded an advantageous treaty. about this period the danes were attracted to england by the hope of pillage; and we are told that lothaire called their king, ogier, to france to be avenged of his brothers. the first success of these pirates increased their fondness for this sort of adventure, and for five or six years their bands swarmed on the coasts of france and britain and devastated the country. ogier, hastings, regner, and sigefroi conducted them sometimes to the mouths of the seine, sometimes to the mouths of the loire, and finally to those of the garonne. it is even asserted that hastings entered the mediterranean and ascended the rhone to avignon; but this is, to say the least, doubtful. the strength of their fleets is not known: the largest seems to have been of three hundred sail. in the beginning of the tenth century, rollo at first landed in england, but, finding little chance of success against alfred, he entered into alliance with him, landed in neustria in , and advanced from rouen on paris: other bodies marched from nantes on chartres. repulsed here, rollo overran and ravaged the neighboring provinces. charles the simple saw no better means of delivering his kingdom of this ever-increasing scourge than to offer rollo the fine province of neustria on condition that he would marry his daughter and turn christian,--an offer which was eagerly accepted. thirty years later, rollo's step-son, annoyed by the successors of charles, called to his aid the king of denmark. the latter landed in considerable force, defeated the french, took the king prisoner, and assured rollo's son in the possession of normandy. during the same interval ( to ) the danes exhibited even greater hostility toward england than to france, although they were much more assimilated to the saxons than to the french in language and customs. ivar, after pillaging the kingdom, established his family in northumberland. alfred the great, at first beaten by ivar's successors, succeeded in regaining his throne and in compelling the submission of the danes. the aspect of affairs changes anew: sweyn, still more fortunate than ivar, after conquering and devastating england, granted peace on condition that a sum of money should be paid, and returned to denmark, leaving a part of his army behind him. ethelred, who had weakly disputed with sweyn what remained of the saxon power, thought he could not do better to free himself from his importunate guests than to order a simultaneous massacre of all the danes in the kingdom, ( .) but sweyn reappeared in the following year at the head of an imposing force, and between and three successive fleets effected disembarkations on the coast, and unfortunate england was ravaged anew. in , sweyn landed at the mouth of the humber and again swept over the land like a torrent, and the english, tired of obedience to kings who could not defend them, recognized him as king of the north. his son, canute the great, had to contend with a rival more worthy of him, (edmund ironside.) returning from denmark at the head of a considerable force, and aided by the perfidious edric, canute ravaged the southern part of england and threatened london. a new division of the kingdom resulted; but, edmund having been assassinated by edric, canute was finally recognized as king of all england. afterward he sailed to conquer norway, from which country he returned to attack scotland. when he died, he divided the kingdom between his three children, according to the usage of the times. five years after canute's death, the english assigned the crown to their anglo-saxon princes; but edward, to whom it fell, was better fitted to be a monk than to save a kingdom a prey to such commotions. he died in , leaving to harold a crown which the chief of the normans settled in france contested with him, and to whom, it is said, edward had made a cession of the kingdom. unfortunately for harold, this chief was a great and ambitious man. the year was marked by two extraordinary expeditions. while william the conqueror was preparing in normandy a formidable armament against harold, the brother of the latter, having been driven from northumberland for his crimes, sought support in norway, and, with the king of norway, set out with thirty thousand men on five hundred vessels, and landed at the mouth of the humber. harold almost entirely destroyed this force in a bloody battle fought near york; but a more formidable storm was about to burst upon his head. william took advantage of the time when the anglo-saxon king was fighting the norwegians, to sail from st. valery with a very large armament. hume asserts that he had three thousand transports; while other authorities reduce the number to twelve hundred, carrying from sixty to seventy thousand men. harold hastened from york, and fought a decisive battle near hastings, in which he met an honorable death, and his fortunate rival soon reduced the country to submission. at the same time, another william, surnamed bras-de-fer, robert guiscard, and his brother roger, conquered calabria and sicily with a handful of troops,( to .) scarcely thirty years after these memorable events, an enthusiastic priest animated europe with a fanatical frenzy and precipitated large forces upon asia to conquer the holy land. at first followed by one hundred thousand men, afterward by two hundred thousand badly-armed vagabonds who perished in great part under the attacks of the hungarians, bulgarians, and greeks, peter the hermit succeeded in crossing the bosporus, and arrived before nice with from fifty to sixty thousand men, who were either killed or captured by the saracens. an expedition more military in its character succeeded this campaign of religious pilgrims. one hundred thousand men, composed of french, burgundians, germans, and inhabitants of lorraine, under godfrey of bouillon, marched through austria on constantinople; an equal number, under the count of toulouse, marched by lyons, italy, dalmatia, and macedonia; and bohemond, prince of tarentum, embarked with a force of normans, sicilians, and italians, and took the route by greece on gallipolis. this extensive migration reminds us of the fabulous expeditions of xerxes. the genoese, venetian, and greek fleets were chartered to transport these swarms of crusaders by the bosporus or dardanelles to asia. more than four hundred thousand men were concentrated on the plains of nice, where they avenged the defeat of their predecessors. godfrey afterward led them across asia and syria as far as jerusalem, where he founded a kingdom. all the maritime resources of greece and the flourishing republics of italy were required to transport these masses across the bosporus and in provisioning them during the siege of nice; and the great impulse thus given to the coast states of italy was perhaps the most advantageous result of the crusades. this temporary success of the crusaders became the source of great disasters. the mussulmans, heretofore divided among themselves, united to resist the infidel, and divisions began to appear in the christian camps. a new expedition was necessary to aid the kingdom which the brave noureddin was threatening. louis vii. and the emperor conrad, each at the head of one hundred thousand crusaders, marched, as their predecessors had done, by the route of constantinople, ( .) but the greeks, frightened by the recurring visits of these menacing guests, plotted their destruction. conrad, who was desirous of being first, fell into the traps laid for him by the turks, and was defeated in detachments in several battles by the sultan of iconium. louis, more fortunate, defeated the turks on the banks of the mender; but, being deprived of the support of conrad, and his army being annoyed and partially beaten by the enemy in the passage of defiles, and being in want of supplies, he was confined to attalia, on the coast of pamphylia, where he endeavored to embark his army. the means furnished by the greeks were insufficient, and not more than fifteen or twenty thousand men arrived at antioch with the king: the remainder either perished or fell into the hands of the saracens. this feeble reinforcement soon melted away under the attacks of the climate and the daily contests with the enemy, although they were continually aided by small bodies brought over from europe by the italian ships; and they were again about to yield under the attacks of saladin, when the court of rome succeeded in effecting an alliance between the emperor frederick barbarossa and the kings of france and england to save the holy land. the emperor was the first to set out. at the head of one hundred thousand germans, he opened a passage through thrace in spite of the formal resistance of the greeks, now governed by isaac angelus. he marched to gallipolis, crossed the dardanelles, and seized iconium. he died in consequence of an imprudent bath in a river, which, it has been pretended, was the cydnus. his son, the duke of swabia, annoyed by the mussulmans and attacked by diseases, brought to ptolemais scarcely six thousand men. at the same time, richard coeur-de-lion[ ] and philip augustus more judiciously took the route over the sea, and sailed from marseilles and genoa with two immense fleets,( .) the first seized cyprus, and both landed in syria,--where they would probably have triumphed but for the rivalry which sprang up between them, in consequence of which philip returned to france. twelve years later, a new crusade was determined upon, ( .) part of the crusaders embarked from provence or italy; others, led by the count of flanders and the marquis of montferrat, proceeded to venice, with the intention of embarking there. the party last mentioned were persuaded by the skillful dandolo to aid him in an attack upon constantinople, upon the pretext of upholding the rights of alexis angelus, the son of isaac angelus, who had fought the emperor frederick and was the successor of those comnenuses who had connived at the destruction of the armies of conrad and louis vii. twenty thousand men had the boldness to attack the ancient capital of the world, which had at least two hundred thousand defenders. they assailed it by sea and land, and captured it. the usurper fled, and alexis was replaced upon the throne, but was unable to retain his seat: the greeks made an insurrection in favor of murzupha, but the latins took possession of constantinople after a more bloody assault than the first, and placed upon the throne their chief, count baldwin of flanders. this empire lasted a half-century. the remnant of the greeks took refuge at nice and trebizond. a sixth expedition was directed against egypt by john of brienne, who, notwithstanding the successful issue of the horrible siege of damietta, was obliged to give way before the constantly-increasing efforts of the mussulman population. the remains of his splendid army, after a narrow escape from drowning in the nile, deemed themselves very fortunate in being able to purchase permission to re-embark for europe. the court of rome, whose interest it was to keep up the zeal of christendom in these expeditions, of which it gathered all the fruits, encouraged the german princes to uphold the tottering realm at jerusalem. the emperor frederick and the landgrave of hesse embarked at brundusium in , at the head of forty thousand chosen soldiers. the landgrave, and afterward frederick himself, fell sick, and the fleet put in at tarentum, from which port the emperor, irritated by the presumption of gregory ix., who excommunicated him because he was too slow in the gratification of his wishes, at a later date proceeded with ten thousand men, thus giving way to the fear inspired by the pontifical thunders. louis ix., animated by the same feeling of fear, or impelled, if we may credit ancelot, by motives of a higher character, set out from aigues-mortes, in , with one hundred and twenty large vessels, and fifteen hundred smaller boats, hired from the genoese, the venetians and the catalans; for france was at that time without a navy, although washed by two seas. this king proceeded to cyprus, and, having there collected a still larger force, set out, according to joinville's statement, with more than eighteen hundred vessels, to make a descent into egypt. his army must have numbered about eighty thousand men; for, although half of the fleet was scattered and cast away upon the coast of syria, he marched upon cairo a few months later with sixty thousand fighting-men, twenty thousand being mounted. it should be stated that the count of poictiers had arrived also with troops from france. the sad fortune experienced by this splendid army did not prevent the same king from engaging in a new crusade, twenty years later,( .) he disembarked upon that occasion at the ruins of carthage, and besieged tunis. the plague swept off half his army in a few months, and himself was one of its victims. the king of sicily, having arrived with powerful reinforcements at the time of louis's death, and desiring to carry back the remains of the army to his island of sicily, encountered a tempest which caused a loss of four thousand men and twenty large ships. this prince was not deterred by this misfortune from desiring the conquest of the greek empire and of constantinople, which seemed a prize of greater value and more readily obtained. philip, the son and successor of saint louis, being anxious to return to france, would have nothing to do with that project. this was the last effort. the christians who were abandoned in syria were destroyed in the noted attacks of tripoli and ptolemais: some of the remnants of the religious orders took refuge at cyprus and established themselves at rhodes. the mussulmans, in their turn, crossed the dardanelles at gallipolis in , and took possession, one after the other, of the european provinces of the eastern empire, to which the latins had themselves given the fatal blow. mohammed ii., while besieging constantinople in , is said to have had his fleet transported by land with a view to placing it in the canal and closing the port: it is stated to have been large enough to be manned by twenty thousand select foot-soldiers. after the capture of this capital, mohammed found his means increased by all those of the greek navy, and in a short time his empire attained the first rank of maritime powers. he ordered an attack to be made upon rhodes and upon otranto on the italian main, whilst he proceeded to hungary in search of a more worthy opponent (hunniades.) repulsed and wounded at belgrade, the sultan fell upon trebizond with a numerous fleet, brought that city to sue for terms, and then proceeded with a fleet of four hundred sail to make a landing upon the island of negropont, which he carried by assault. a second attempt upon rhodes, executed, it is stated, at the head of a hundred thousand men, by one of his ablest lieutenants, was a failure, with loss to the assailants. mohammed was preparing to go to that point himself with an immense army assembled on the shores of ionia, which vertot estimates at three hundred thousand men; but death closed his career, and the project was not carried into effect. about the same period england began to be formidable to her neighbors on land as well as on the sea; the dutch also, reclaiming their country from the inroads of the sea, were laying the foundations of a power more extraordinary even than that of venice. edward iii. landed in france and besieged calais with eight hundred ships and forty thousand men. henry v. made two descents in and : he had, it is stated, fifteen hundred vessels and only thirty thousand men, of whom six thousand were cavalry. all the events we have described as taking place, up to this period, and including the capture of constantinople, were before the invention of gunpowder; for if henry v. had cannon at agincourt, as is claimed by some writers, they were certainly not used in naval warfare. from that time all the combinations of naval armaments were entirely changed; and this revolution took place--if i may use that expression--at the time when the invention of the mariner's compass and the discovery of america and of the cape of good hope were about to turn the maritime commerce of the world into new channels and to establish an entirely new system of colonial dependencies. i shall not mention in detail the expeditions of the spaniards to america, or those of the portuguese, dutch, and english to india by doubling the cape of good hope. notwithstanding their great influence upon the commerce of the world,--notwithstanding the genius of gama, albuquerque, and cortez,--these expeditions, undertaken by small bodies of two or three thousand men against tribes who knew nothing of fire-arms, are of no interest in a military point of view. the spanish navy, whose fame had been greatly increased by this discovery of a new world, was at the height of its splendor in the reign of charles v. however, the glory of the expedition to tunis, which was conquered by this prince at the head of thirty thousand fine soldiers transported in five hundred genoese or spanish vessels, was balanced by the disaster which befell a similar expedition against algiers, ( ,) undertaken when the season was too far advanced and in opposition to the wise counsels of admiral doria. the expedition was scarcely under way when the emperor saw one hundred and sixty of his ships and eight thousand men swallowed up by the waves: the remainder was saved by the skill of doria, and assembled at cape metafuz, where charles v. himself arrived, after encountering great difficulties and peril. while these events were transpiring, the successors of mohammed were not neglecting the advantages given them by the possession of so many fine maritime provinces, which taught them at once the importance of the control of the sea and furnished means for obtaining it. at this period the turks were quite as well informed with reference to artillery and the military art in general as the europeans. they reached the apex of their greatness under solyman i., who besieged and captured rhodes ( ) with an army stated to have reached the number of one hundred and forty thousand men,--which was still formidable even upon the supposition of its strength being exaggerated by one-half. in , mustapha and the celebrated dragut made a descent upon malta, where the knights of rhodes had made a new establishment; they carried over thirty-two thousand janissaries, with one hundred and forty ships. john of valetta, as is well known, gained an enduring fame by repulsing them. a more formidable expedition, consisting of two hundred vessels and fifty-five thousand men, was sent in to the isle of cyprus, where nicosia was taken and famagosta besieged. the horrible cruelties practiced by mustapha increased the alarm occasioned by his progress. spain, venice, naples, and malta united their naval forces to succor cyprus; but famagosta had already surrendered, notwithstanding the heroic defense of bragadino, who was perfidiously flayed alive by mustapha's order, to avenge the death of forty thousand turks that had perished in the space of two years spent on the island. the allied fleet, under the orders of two heroes, don john of austria, brother of philip ii., and andrea doria, attacked the turkish fleet at the entrance of the gulf of lepanto, near the promontory of actium, where antony and augustus once fought for the empire of the world. the turkish fleet was almost entirely destroyed: more than two hundred vessels and thirty thousand turks were captured or perished, ( .) this victory did not put an end to the supremacy of the turks, but was a great check in their career of greatness. however, they made such vigorous efforts that as large a fleet as the former one was sent to sea during the next year. peace terminated this contest, in which such enormous losses were sustained. the bad fortune of charles v. in his expedition against algiers did not deter sebastian of portugal from wishing to attempt the conquest of morocco, where he was invited by a moorish prince who had been deprived of his estates. having disembarked upon the shores of morocco at the head of twenty thousand men, this young prince was killed and his army cut to pieces at the battle of alcazar by muley abdulmalek, in . philip ii., whose pride had increased since the naval battle of lepanto on account of the success he had gained in france by his diplomacy and by the folly of the adherents of the league, deemed his arms irresistible. he thought to bring england to his feet. the invincible armada intended to produce this effect, which has been so famous, was composed of an expeditionary force proceeding from cadiz, including, according to hume's narrative, one hundred and thirty-seven vessels, armed with two thousand six hundred and thirty bronze cannon, and carrying twenty thousand soldiers, in addition to eleven thousand sailors. to these forces was to be added an army of twenty-five thousand men which the duke of parma was to bring up from the netherlands by way of ostend. a tempest and the efforts of the english caused the failure of this expedition, which, although of considerable magnitude for the period when it appeared, was by no means entitled to the high-sounding name it received: it lost thirteen thousand men and half the vessels before it even came near the english coast. after this expedition comes in chronological order that of gustavus adolphus to germany,( .) the army contained only from fifteen to eighteen thousand men: the fleet was quite large, and was manned by nine thousand sailors; m. ancillon must, however, be mistaken in stating that it carried eight thousand cannon. the debarkation in pomerania received little opposition from the imperial troops, and the king of sweden had a strong party among the german people. his successor was the leader of a very extraordinary expedition, which is resembled by only one other example mentioned in history: i refer to the march of charles x. of sweden across the belt upon the ice, with a view of moving from sleswick upon copenhagen by way of the island of funen,( .) he had twenty-five thousand men, of whom nine thousand were cavalry, and artillery in proportion. this undertaking was so much the more rash because the ice was unsafe, several pieces of artillery and even the king's own carriage having broken through and been lost. after seventy-five years of peace, the war between venice and the turks recommenced in . the latter transported an army of fifty-five thousand men, in three hundred and fifty vessels, to candia, and gained possession of the important post of canea before the republic thought of sending succor. although the people of venice began to lose the spirit which made her great, she still numbered among her citizens some noble souls: morosini, grimani, and mocenigo struggled several years against the turks, who derived great advantages from their numerical superiority and the possession of canea. the venetian fleet had, nevertheless, gained a marked ascendency under the orders of grimani, when a third of it was destroyed by a frightful tempest, in which the admiral himself perished. in , the siege of candia began. jussuf attacked the city furiously at the head of thirty thousand men: after being repulsed in two assaults, he was encouraged to attempt a third by a large breach being made. the turks entered the place: mocenigo rushed to meet them, expecting to die in their midst. a brilliant victory was the reward of his heroic conduct: the enemy were repulsed and the ditches filled with their dead bodies. venice might have driven off the turks by sending twenty thousand men to candia; but europe rendered her but feeble support, and she had already called into active service all the men fit for war she could produce. the siege, resumed some time after, lasted longer than that of troy, and each campaign was marked by fresh attempts on the part of the turks to carry succor to their army and by naval victories gained by the venetians. the latter people had kept up with the advance of naval tactics in europe, and thus were plainly superior to the mussulmans, who adhered to the old customs, and were made to pay dearly for every attempt to issue from the dardanelles. three persons of the name of morosini, and several mocenigos, made themselves famous in this protracted struggle. finally, the celebrated coprougli, placed by his merits at the head of the ottoman ministry, resolved to take the personal direction of this war which had lasted so long: he accordingly proceeded to the island, where transports had landed fifty thousand men, at whose head he conducted the attack in a vigorous manner.( .) in this memorable siege the turks exhibited more skill than previously: their artillery, of very heavy caliber, was well served, and, for the first time, they made use of trenches, which were the invention of an italian engineer. the venetians, on their side, greatly improved the methods of defense by mines. never had there been seen such furious zeal exhibited in mutual destruction by combats, mines, and assaults. their heroic resistance enabled the garrison to hold out during winter: in the spring, venice sent reinforcements and the duke of feuillade brought a few hundreds of french volunteers. the turks had also received strong reinforcements, and redoubled their efforts. the siege was drawing to a close, when six thousand frenchmen came to the assistance of the garrison under the leadership of the duke of beaufort and navailles,( .) a badly-conducted sortie discouraged these presumptuous young men, and navailles, disgusted with the sufferings endured in the siege, assumed the responsibility, at the end of two months, of carrying the remnant of his troops back to france. morosini, having then but three thousand exhausted men to defend a place which was open on all sides, finally consented to evacuate it, and a truce was agreed upon, which led to a formal treaty of peace. candia had cost the turks twenty-five years of efforts and more than one hundred thousand men killed in eighteen assaults and several hundred sorties. it is estimated that thirty-five thousand christians of different nations perished in the glorious defense of the place. the struggle between louis xiv., holland, and england gives examples of great maritime operations, but no remarkable descents. that of james ii. in ireland ( ) was composed of only six thousand frenchmen, although de tourville's fleet contained seventy-three ships of the line, carrying five thousand eight hundred cannon and twenty-nine thousand sailors. a grave fault was committed in not throwing at least twenty thousand men into ireland with such means as were disposable. two years later, de tourville had been conquered in the famous day of la hogue, and the remains of the troops which had landed were enabled to return through the instrumentality of a treaty which required their evacuation of the island. at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the swedes and russians undertook two expeditions very different in character. charles xii., wishing to aid the duke of holstein, made a descent upon denmark at the head of twenty thousand men, transported by two hundred vessels and protected by a strong squadron. he was really assisted by the english and dutch navies, but the expedition was not for that reason the less remarkable in the details of the disembarkation. the same prince effected a descent into livonia to aid narva, but he landed his troops at a swedish port. peter the great, having some cause of complaint against the persians, and wishing to take advantage of their dissensions, embarked (in ) upon the volga: he entered the caspian sea with two hundred and seventy vessels, carrying twenty thousand foot-soldiers, and descended to agrakhan, at the mouths of the koisou, where he expected to meet his cavalry. this force, numbering nine thousand dragoons and five thousand cossacks, joined him after a land-march by way of the caucasus. the czar then seized derbent, besieged bakou, and finally made a treaty with one of the parties whose dissensions at that time filled with discord the empire of the soofees: he procured the cession of astrabad, the key of the caspian sea and, in some measure, of the whole persian empire. the time of louis xv. furnished examples of none but secondary expeditions, unless we except that of richelieu against minorca, which was very glorious as an escalade, but less extraordinary as a descent. [in , an english fleet sailed from portsmouth: this was joined by a portion of the squadron from martinico. the whole amounted to nineteen ships of the line, eighteen smaller vessels of war, and one hundred and fifty transports, carrying ten thousand men. the expedition besieged and captured havana.--trs.] the spaniards, however, in , made a descent with fifteen or sixteen thousand men upon algiers, with a view of punishing those rovers of the sea for their bold piracies; but the expedition, for want of harmonious action between the squadron and the land-forces, was unsuccessful, on account of the murderous fire which the troops received from the turkish and arab musketeers dispersed among the undergrowth surrounding the city. the troops returned to their vessels after having two thousand men placed _hors de combat_. the american war ( ) was the epoch of the greatest maritime efforts upon the part of the french. europe was astonished to see this power send count d'estaing to america with twenty-five ships of the line, while at the same time m. orvilliers, with a franco-spanish fleet of sixty-five ships of the line, was to cover a descent to be effected with three hundred transports and forty thousand men, assembled at havre and st. malo. this new armada moved back and forth for several months, but accomplished nothing: the winds finally drove it back to port. d'estaing was more fortunate, as he succeeded in getting the superiority in the antilles and in landing in the united states six thousand frenchmen under rochambeau, who were followed, at a later date, by another division, and assisted in investing the english army under cornwallis at yorktown, ( :) the independence of america was thus secured. france would perhaps have gained a triumph over her implacable rival more lasting in its effects, had she, in addition to the display made in the english channel, sent ten ships and seven or eight thousand men more to india with admiral suffren. during the french revolution, there were few examples of descents: the fire at toulon, emigration, and the battle of ushant had greatly injured the french navy. hoche's expedition against ireland with twenty-five thousand men was scattered by the winds, and no further attempts in that quarter were made. ( .) at a later date, bonaparte's expedition to egypt, consisting of twenty-three thousand men, thirteen ships, seventeen frigates, and four hundred transports, obtained great successes at first, which were followed by sad reverses. the turks, in hopes of expelling him, landed fifteen thousand men at aboukir, but were all captured or driven into the sea, notwithstanding the advantages this peninsula gave them of intrenching themselves and waiting for reinforcements. this is an excellent example for imitation by the party on the defensive under similar circumstances. the expedition of considerable magnitude which was sent out in to st. domingo was remarkable as a descent, but failed on account of the ravages of yellow fever. since their success against louis xiv., the english have given their attention more to the destruction of rival fleets and the subjugation of colonies than to great descents. the attempts made in the eighteenth century against brest and cherbourg with bodies of ten or twelve thousand men amounted to nothing in the heart of a powerful state like france. the remarkable conquests which procured them their indian empire occurred in succession. having obtained possession of calcutta, and then of bengal, they strengthened themselves gradually by the arrival of troops in small bodies and by using the sepoys, whom they disciplined to the number of one hundred and fifty thousand. the anglo-russian expedition to holland in was composed of forty thousand men, but they were not all landed at once: the study of the details of the operations is, however, quite interesting. in , abercrombie, after threatening ferrol and cadiz, effected a descent into egypt with twenty thousand englishmen. the results of this expedition are well known. general stuart's expedition to calabria, ( ,) after some successes at maida, was for the purpose of regaining possession of sicily. that against buenos ayres was more unfortunate in its results, and was terminated by a capitulation. in , lord cathcart attacked copenhagen with twenty-five thousand men, besieged and bombarded the city, and gained possession of the danish fleet, which was his object. in , wellington appeared in portugal with fifteen thousand men. after gaining the victory of vimeira, and assisted by the general rising of the portuguese, he forced junot to evacuate the kingdom. the same army, increased in numbers to twenty-five thousand and placed under moore's command, while making an effort to penetrate into spain with a view of relieving madrid, was forced to retreat to corunna and there re-embark, after suffering severe losses. wellington, having effected another landing in portugal with reinforcements, collected an army of thirty thousand englishmen and as many portuguese, with which he avenged moore's misfortunes by surprising soult at oporto, (may, ,) and then beating joseph at talavera, under the very gates of his capital. the expedition to antwerp in the same year was one of the largest england has undertaken since the time of henry v. it was composed of not less than seventy thousand men in all,--forty thousand land-forces and thirty thousand sailors. it did not succeed, on account of the incapacity of the leader. a descent entirely similar in character to that of charles x. of sweden was effected by thirty russian battalions passing the gulf of bothnia on the ice in five columns, with their artillery. their object was to take possession of the islands of aland and spread a feeling of apprehension to the very gates of stockholm. another division passed the gulf to umeå, (march, .) general murray succeeded in effecting a well-planned descent in the neighborhood of tarragona in , with the intention of cutting suchet off from valencia: however, after some successful operations, he thought best to re-embark. the expedition set on foot by england against napoleon after his return from elba in was remarkable on account of the great mass of _matériel_ landed at ostend and antwerp. the anglo-hanoverian army contained sixty thousand men, but some came by land and others were disembarked at a friendly port. the english engaged in an undertaking in the same year which may be regarded as very extraordinary: i refer to the attack on the capital of the united states. the world was astonished to see a handful of seven or eight thousand englishmen making their appearance in the midst of a state embracing ten millions of people, taking possession of its capital, and destroying all the public buildings,--results unparalleled in history. we would be tempted to despise the republican and unmilitary spirit of the inhabitants of those states if the same militia had not risen, like those of greece, rome, and switzerland, to defend their homes against still more powerful attacks, and if, in the same year, an english expedition more extensive than the other had not been entirely defeated by the militia of louisiana and other states under the orders of general jackson. if the somewhat fabulous numbers engaged in the irruption of xerxes and the crusades be excepted, no undertaking of this kind which has been actually carried out, especially since fleets have been armed with powerful artillery, can at all be compared with the gigantic project and proportionate preparations made by napoleon for throwing one hundred and fifty thousand veterans upon the shores of england by the use of three thousand launches or large gun-boats, protected by sixty ships of the line[ ]. from the preceding narrative the reader will perceive what a difference there is in point of difficulty and probability of success between descents attempted across a narrow arm of the sea, a few miles only in width, and those in which the troops and _matériel_ are to be transported long distances over the open sea. this fact gives the reason why so many operations of this kind have been executed by way of the bosporus. * * * * * [the following paragraphs have been compiled from authentic data:-- in , the french government sent an expedition to algiers, composed of an army of thirty-seven thousand five hundred men and one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery. more than five hundred vessels of war and transports were employed. the fleet sailed from toulon. in , france sent a fleet of twenty-two vessels to vera cruz. the castle of san juan d'ulloa fell into their hands after a short bombardment. a small force of about one thousand men, in three columns, took the city of vera cruz by assault: the resistance was slight. in , the united states caused a descent to be made upon the coast of mexico, at vera cruz, with an army of thirteen thousand men, under the command of general scott. one hundred and fifty vessels were employed, including men-of-war and transports. the city of vera cruz and the castle of san juan d'ulloa speedily fell into the possession of the forces of the united states. this important post became the secondary base of operations for the brilliant campaign which terminated with the capture of the city of mexico. in commenced the memorable and gigantic contest between russia on the one side and england, france, sardinia, and turkey on the other. several descents were made by the allied forces at different points of the russian coast: of these the first was in the baltic sea. an english fleet sailed from spithead, under the command of sir charles napier, on the th of march, and a french fleet from brest, under the command of vice-admiral parseval deschênes, on the th of april. they effected a junction in the bay of barosund on the th of june. the allied fleet numbered thirty ships and fifty frigates, corvettes, and other vessels. the naval commanders wished to attack the defenses of bomarsund, on one of the aland isles, but, after a reconnoissance, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to have land-forces. a french corps of ten thousand men was at once dispatched to bomarsund under general baraguay-d'hilliers, and the place was speedily reduced. later in the same year, the great expedition to the crimea was executed; and with reference to it the following facts are mentioned, in order to give an idea of its magnitude:-- september , , an army of fifty-eight thousand five hundred men and two hundred pieces of artillery was landed near eupatoria, composed of thirty thousand french, twenty-one thousand five hundred english, and seven thousand turks. they were transported from varna to the place of landing by three hundred and eighty-nine ships, steamers, and transports. this force fought and gained the battle of the alma, (september ,) and thence proceeded to sebastopol. the english took possession of the harbor of balaklava and the french of kamiesch: these were the points to which subsequent reinforcements and supplies for the army in the crimea were sent. november , at the battle of inkermann, the allied army numbered seventy-one thousand men. at the end of january, , the french force was seventy-five thousand men and ten thousand horses. up to the same time, the english had sent fifty-four thousand men to the crimea, but only fifteen thousand were alive, present, and fit for duty. february , the french numbered eighty-five thousand; the english, twenty-five thousand fit for duty; the turks, twenty-five thousand. may , , general la marmora arrived at balaklava with fifteen thousand sardinians. in the latter part of may, an expedition of sixteen thousand men was sent to kertch. in august, the french force at sebastopol had risen to one hundred and twenty thousand men. september , the final assault took place, which resulted in the evacuation of the place by the russians. the allies had then in battery more than eight hundred pieces of artillery. the fleet which co-operated with the land-forces in the artillery attack of october , , consisted of twenty-five ships. there were present and prepared to attack in september, , thirty-four ships. october, , an expeditionary force of nine thousand men was sent to kinburn, which place was captured. marshal vaillant, in his report, as minister of war, to the french emperor, says there were sent from france and algeria three hundred and ten thousand men and forty thousand horses, of which two hundred and twenty-seven thousand men returned to france and algeria. the marshal's report gives the following striking facts, (he refers only to french operations:-) the artillery _matériel_ at the disposal of the army of the east comprised one thousand seven hundred guns, two thousand gun-carriages, two thousand seven hundred wagons, two millions of projectiles, and nine million pounds of powder. there were sent to the army three thousand tons of powder, seventy millions of infantry-cartridges, two hundred and seventy thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, and eight thousand war-rockets. on the day of the final assault there were one hundred and eighteen batteries, which during the siege had consumed seven million pounds of powder. they required one million sand-bags and fifty thousand gabions. of engineer materials, fourteen thousand tons were sent. the engineers executed fifty miles of trenches, using eighty thousand gabions, sixty thousand fascines, and one million sand-bags. of subsistence, fuel, and forage, five hundred thousand tons were sent. of clothing, camp-equipage, and harness, twelve thousand tons. hospital stores, six thousand five hundred tons. provision-wagons, ambulances, carts, forges, &c, eight thousand tons. in all, about six hundred thousand tons. it is not thought necessary to add similar facts for the english, sardinian, and turkish armies. in , the spaniards made a descent upon morocco with a force of forty thousand infantry, eleven squadrons of cavalry, and eighty pieces of artillery, using twenty-one vessels of war with three hundred and twenty-seven guns, besides twenty-four gun-boats and numerous transports. in , a force of english and french was landed on the coast of china, whence they marched to pekin and dictated terms of peace. this expedition is remarkable for the smallness of the numbers which ventured, at such a great distance from their sources of supply and succor, to land upon a hostile shore and penetrate into the midst of the most populous empire in the world. the french expedition to syria in was small in numbers, and presented no remarkable features. toward the close of the year , the government of the united states sent an expedition of thirteen thousand men to port royal, on the coast of south carolina, one of the seceding states. the fleet of war-vessels and transports sailed from hampton roads, under command of captain dupont, and was dispersed by a violent gale: the losses of men and _matériel_ were small, however, and the fleet finally reached the rendezvous. the defenses of the harbor having been silenced by the naval forces, the disembarkation of the land-troops took place, general sherman being in command. england, france, and spain are now (january , ) engaged in an expedition directed against mexico. the first operations were the capture, by the spanish forces, of vera cruz and its defenses: the mexicans offered no resistance at that point. the future will develop the plans of the allies; but the ultimate result of a struggle (if, indeed, one be attempted by the mexicans) cannot be doubted, when three of the most powerful states of europe are arrayed against the feeble and tottering republic of mexico.] footnotes: [footnote : richard sailed from england with twenty thousand foot and five thousand horsemen, and landed in normandy, whence he proceeded by land to marseilles. we do not know what fleet he employed to transport his troops to asia. philip embarked at genoa on italian ships, and with a force at least as large as that of richard.] [footnote : see the account of the expedition to the crimea.--translators.] index a. abercrombie's descent on egypt, . accidental lines, . action, concert of, how secured, . active armies and sieges, relation between, . advanced guard, , . attack of the enemy's, in retreats, . in armies meeting unexpectedly, . in battle, , . advance, line of, how determined, . advantages of awaiting invasion, . of elevated points for observation, . aggressive wars for conquest, . agincourt, order of battle at, . albis, position of, . alcazar, battle of, . alexander the great, , . alfred the great, . algiers, french descent on, in , . spanish descent on, . alise, investment of, by cæsar, . allies, at bautzen, . defeat of, at zurich, . error of, in , , . failure of diversion of, in , . in war, . march of, upon leipsic, . alps, passage of, by francis i., . american revolution, french maritime efforts during, . anglo-russian expedition to holland, . angoulême, duke of, expedition of, . antony, retreat of, from media, . antwerp, english expedition to, . archduke charles, . concentric retreat of, in , . interior lines of, . opinion of, as to small-column formation, . opinion of, as to the valley of the danube, . success of, , . archduke ferdinand, . armada, spanish, , , . armament, french, at eylau and marengo, . superior, importance of, , . armies, auxiliary, . central, observations on, . command of, . french, in the revolution, . how to act, . in intrenchments, . in peace, how preserved, . large, fitness of central lines for, . large, organization of, . meeting unexpectedly, advanced guard in, . morale of, , , . movements of, points to be attended to in, - . of french revolution, how subsisted, . of louis xiv. and frederick ii., how subsisted, . of napoleon, operations of, . promotions in, . standing, effect of, on distant invasions, . surprises of, . two, on interior lines, . two, on the same frontier, . unexpected meeting of two, . armor, defensive, for cavalry, . arms and organization of cavalry, , . arms for irregular cavalry, . army, best means of organizing the command of, . army corps, system of, . army, defensive, proper course for, . defensive, when it has the advantage, . head-quarters of, when the most important point, . how perfected, . importance of a good, . number of men in, often determines battle-formation for, . army of boulogne, . of four corps, . of seven corps, . offensive, proper course for, . of invasion, line of defense important to, . of the rhine in , . permanent, necessary condition of, . proportion of cavalry in, . pursuing, has the advantage, . artillerists, directions for, in battle, . artillery, concentration of fire of, in offensive line of battle, . employment of, - . heavy, in defensive line of battle, . importance of, to infantry, . matériel of the french army in the crimea, . napoleon's, at wagrani, , . post of, in line of battle, . proportion of, . protection of infantry from the enemy's, . rules for use of, in battle, - . use of, in the offensive, . who should command, . art of war, definition of, . principal parts of, . assailant, advantages of, . assailant's best means of victory, . assault, beat formation of infantry for, . of field-works, instances of well-arranged, . athens, naval power of, . attack, cavalry column of, . close, formation for, . column of, in two lines, . columns of, , . columns of, of single battalions, . five methods of forming troops for, . formation for, at turin, . in columns, order of, . in front, . in rear, . of field-works, directions for, , . of fortified places, . of intrenched lines, . on flank, . on sank, cavalry, . when order in squares suitable for, . attacks and marches, arrangements of, . in half-deep order, . audenarde, battle of, . augustus, armament of, . aulic council, . austerlitz, , , . napoleon's order of battle at, . austria, course of, in the french revolution, . force of, in the french revolution, . fortresses of, . interest of, in the french revolution, . intervention of, in , . austrian army, situation of, in , . camp before mayence, . order at essling and fleurus, . austrians, surprise of, by turenne, . why victorious in , . austria's adaptation to parallel retreats, . authority of counselors, . b. balloons, difficulties in use of, , . how they might be useful, . used at fleurus, . barbarossa, . bard, fort of, , . importance of defile of, . base of operations, where to be established, . bases of operations, definition of, of operations, how to be chosen, , . of operations, plurality of, . on the sea, , . temporary or eventual, . temporary, when necessary, . with two faces, . bassano, napoleon's march on, . battalions, deployed, in checkerwise order, . battalion squares, . batteries, . battle, advanced guard in, , . calculation of distances in, . classification of orders of, useful, . combinations of, . concave order of, . convex order of, . critical moment of, . decisive moment of, . defensive arrangements for, . battle-field, decisive point of, how determined, . decisive point of, . strategic point of, when important, . battle-formation in small columns, . influence of topography upon, . battle, formation of troops for, - . influence of orders of, on result of engagements, . line of, arrangement of cavalry in, . line of, before the french revolution, . line of, definition of, . line of, distribution of troops in, . line of, post of artillery in, . lines of, for two infantry corps, different formations of, - . oblique order of, . of agincourt, . of alcazar, . of audenarde, . of austerlitz, , , , . of bautzen, , , . of blenheim, . of cannæ, . of crécy, . of ecnomos, . of essling, , , , . of fossano, . of jena, , , . of leipsic, , , , , , . of lepanto, . of leuthen, , , , . of millesimo, . of mollwitz, . of prague, , . of ramillies, . of rivoli, , , . of torgau, . of turin, . of ulm, , . of ulm, won by strategy, . of waterloo, , , , , , , , , , , , - , , , . offensive, object of, . offensive order of, . order of, . order of, at leipsic, . order of, definition of, . orders of, . parallel order of, . reinforced, . when suitable, . with crotchet, . perpendicular order of, . position for, . posting troops in line of, . results of, depend on what, . rules for use of artillery in, - . battle-order for cavalry, . battle-orders, various, . battles, . defensive, . elements of uncertainty regarding, . great difficulty of tactics of, . influence of musketry-fire in, . offensive, . of napoleon, orders of, . rules for scientific, . success in, depends on maneuvering, . three kinds of, . what may interfere with success of, . bautzen, battle of, , . french at, . bellegarde, . benningsen, movement of, in , . benningsen's artillery reserve at eylau, . base on königsberg in , . position in , . mixed system at eylau, . beresina, passage of, , . berg-op-zoom, assault of, . berthier at leipsic, . berthier's error at wagram, . error in campaign of , . blenheim, battle of, . blücher, , . "boar's head" of the ancients, . bonaparte's career in italy, . expedition to egypt, . borodino, napoleon's order of battle at, . boulogne, army of, . camp of, . bravery, first requisite for a leader, . bridges, how to secure, against fire-ships, &c., . in retreats, . means of destroying, . protection of, after passage, . bridge-trains, importance of, . brienne, napoleon's order of battle at, . buntzelwitz, camp of, . burgundy, duke of, . c. cæsar's investment of alise, . maritime expeditions, . campaign, napoleon's, of , . of , . of , . of , . of , napoleon's error in, . of the spaniards in flanders, . of the swedes in germany, . campaigns in mountains, instances of, . in winter, . of and , . camp at kehl, . intrenched, influence of, . intrenched, on which side of a river, . intrenched, on river, . of boulogne, . of drissa, . camps and lines, intrenched, defense of, . fortified, . intrenched, connection of, with strategy, . intrenched, instances of, , . intrenched, maxims on, , . intrenched, prussian system of, . intrenched, use of, . intrenched, where to be established, . strategic square for, . candia, siege of, , . turkish descent on, . cannæ, order of battle at, . cantonment of napoleon on the passarge, . cantonments, . duty of staff officers in, . rules for establishing, . selection of positions for, . canute, . capitals as strategic points, . capital, when the center of power, . capture of posts, means for, . when important, . carbine, in cavalry-charges, . carnot, . operations of, . carthage, destruction of, . carthaginians, expeditions of, , . cavalry, . advantages of large corps of, . arms and organization of, , . arrangement of, in line of battle, . at ramillies, . battle-order for, . best formation of infantry against, . charge at hohenfriedberg, . charge, general, . charges, four kinds of, . charges of the turks, . defensive armor for, . divisions of five regiments, . duties of, . encounters of, against cavalry, . flank charges of, . formations of, - . importance of, in retreats, . importance of, to infantry, . influence of, in a war, , . in the defensive, . irregular, . light, advantages of, . militia as, , . morale of, . must be supported by infantry, . proportion of, in an army, . reserves, , . when it should charge a line of infantry, . center, when proper point of attack, . central armies, . line of napoleon in saxony, . lines, application of, to large masses, . position, when untenable, . chæronea, . charges, irregular cavalry, . charles v. of spain, expedition of, . viii., retreat of, to naples, . x. of sweden, expedition of, . xii. of sweden, descent of, on denmark, . checkerwise formation of cavalry, . order, infantry, . chief of staff, , . china, english and french expedition to, . choice of objective points, . circumvallation, lines of, . civil wars, . clairfayt, victories of, . clausewitz, erroneous assertion of, . opinion of, as to movements in mountainous countries, . coalition against france in , . frederick the great, , . louis xiv., . coasts, influence of, on descents, . coblentz, fortification of, , . towers of, . coburg, prince of, , . column of attack, cavalry, . of attack in two lines, . columns of attack, , , . of attack of single battalions, . of four divisions in three ranks, . combinations of battle, . strategic, . combined use of the three arms, , , . commander, difficulty of selecting, . essential qualities for a, . importance of, . commander, first care of, on taking the field, . of artillery, duties of, . command of an army, best means of organizing, . of armies, . commissariat, connection of, with system of marches, . of louis xiv. and frederick ii., . the, and strategy, . committee of public safety, . concave order of battle, . concentration of artillery-fire, . in retreat, advantages of, . concentric lines, . retreats, instances of, , . system, . concert of action, how secured, . in action, importance of, . conquest, difficulties of, in national wars, - . wars for, instances of, . conrad iii., crusade of, . constantinople, expeditions against, by the russians, . siege of, by the crusaders, . siege of, by mohammed ii., . contempt for the enemy, . contravallation, lines of, . control of operations, . convergent operations, . converging lines more advantageous than divergent, . continuous intrenched lines, . control of the sea, importance of, in an invasion, . convex order of battle, . copenhagen, siege of, . cordon system, . corps, organization by, likely to be permanent, . organization of an army in four, . organization of an army in seven, . system of, . two, one behind the other, . cossacks, , , , . council of war at seat of government, . councils of war, value of, . counselors, authority of, . coup-d'oeil, strategic, - . coups de main, . instances of, , . crécy, order of battle at, . crimea, details of the allied expedition to, - . crimean war, . critical moment of battles, . crossing a river in presence of an enemy, . crotchet, parallel order of battle with, . crotchets, danger of, . crusade of , . crusades, , - . cuirass, , . cuirassiers, . culm, . cyprus, turkish expedition against, . d. danes, incursions of, , . danger of two wars at once, . dangers of auxiliary armies, . danube, napoleon's passage of, . valley of, key of southern germany, . decisive direction, . moment of battle, . point at bautzen, . point, how affected by arrangement of forces, . point of battle-field, . point of battle-field, how determined, , . points, . points, defiles as, . points of the theater of war, . deep columns, . at waterloo, . masses, , . order, disadvantages of, . defeat, . of the french at waterloo, causes of, . defense, in mountainous countries, . line of, important to an army of invasion, . line of, should be short, . of frontiers, . of intrenched camps and lines, . rivers, mountains, and defiles as eventual lines of, . second lines of, . should not be passive, . tactical, of switzerland, . maxims for frontier, , . defensive armor for cavalry, . army has the advantage, when, . army, proper course for, . arrangements for battle, . battles, . best formation of infantry for, . cavalry in, . characteristics of infantry formation for, . in descents, duty of, . line of battle, heavy artillery in, . defensive movements, when advised, . -offensive war, . or offensive system, either may be employed, . the, in a level country, . war, , . defiles as decisive points, . as eventual lines of defense, . in retreats, . definitive lines, . dennewitz, ney's error at, . deployed battalions in checkerwise order, . lines in two ranks, . lines, two, formation of infantry in, . depots, establishment of, on march, . command of, . lines of, . of supplies, . of supplies, general maxims, . secondary, , . descents, . cases where made, . difficulties of, . duty of defensive in, . effect of modern inventions on, . more extensive in ancient times, . precautions after landing, . rules for conducting, . d'estaing's fleet, . detached orders of napoleon, . works, importance of, . detachments, field of operations of, should be large, . four kinds of, . great, , , . great, instances of, , . great, why made, , . multiplication of, must be avoided, . necessary when there is a double strategic front, . of napoleon in , . precise rules for, cannot be laid down, . requisites in officers of, . small, how useful, . detachment to form strategic reserve, illustration of, . détours, , . difficulty of applying theories in war, . diplomacy in invasions, . direction, lines of, their importance illustrated, . of lines of operations, . discipline, importance of, . importance of, in retreats, . distances in battle, calculation of, . distant expeditions, . invasions across extensive territories, . invasions, maxim for, . invasions to aid an ally, . distribution of troops in line of battle, . divergent lines, . duke of york's expedition to dunkirk, . to holland in , . dumouriez, errors of, in , , . dunkirk, expedition to, . duties of cavalry, . of staff officers, - . duty of a general, . of statesmen in offensive wars, . diversions in zone of operations, when advantageous, . division, improper use of the term, . divisions, cavalry, of five regiments, . defects of system of, . remedied by napoleon, . formation by, when preferable, . organization of, , . system of, . doctoroff, warning given to, in , by seslawin, . double line of operations, when applicable, . when necessary, . lines of operations, , . when advantageous, . lines to be avoided, . passages of rivers, . strategic front, . wars, . wars of napoleon, . dragoons, . concentration of, by emperor nicholas, . drepanum, . dresden, . intrenched camp at, , . napoleon's order of battle at, . victory at, . drissa, camp of, , . divergent lines, when advantageous, . operations, . retreats, when admissible, . diversions, . instances of, . when useful, . e. eccentric lines, . retreat. bulow's use of the term, . eccentric system, . echelon, order of battle by, . echelons, order in, . squares in, . ecnomos, victory of, . edward iii. of england, . egypt, expedition of john of brienne against, . ehrenbreitstein, . elchingen, ney at, . elective governments, weakness of, . elevated points, advantage of, for observation, . elongated squares, , . employment of artillery, - . encounters of cavalry against cavalry, . enemy, bodies of, near line of operations, . contempt for, . how dislodged, . how to drive from his position, , . should not be paid to leave a country, . enemy's movements, importance of knowing, . england controls the sea, . invasion of, by sweyn, . projected invasion of, by napoleon, , , . england's attack on washington in , . english and french expedition to china, . english, descents of, on france, . expedition against napoleon in , . expedition in against havana, . maritime expeditions, - . squares at waterloo, . enthusiasm, importance of, . not military spirit, . epaminondas, . error of napoleon in campaign of , . error of the allies in , , . errors in strategy, . essential bases of military policy, . essling, , , , . napoleon at, . napoleon's order of battle at, . order of battle at, , . eugene at turin, . march of, . eventual bases, . lines of defense, . expediency, wars of, . expedition of prince koudacheff, . to the crimea, details of, - . expeditions, assistance of fleets in, . distant, . marine, in modern times, . maritime, - . of the ancients, . of the middle ages, . partly on land, partly by sea, . extended movements, when dangerous, . exterior lines of operations, . extermination, wars of, . eylau, , , , . french armament at, . napoleon's march on, . napoleon's order of battle at, . russian artillery reserve at, . russian order at, . f. famous retreats, instances of, . field, strategic, of , . field-works, directions for attack of, , . instances of well-arranged assaults on, . final reserves, . financial considerations, . fire-arms, influence of improvements in, on war, , , . fire-signals, how used, . flank attack, . attack, cavalry, . charges of cavalry, . marches, , . marches, where inadmissible, . tactical maneuver by, . flanks of companies, movement by, , . protection of, in tactical positions, . fleets, assistance of, in expeditions, . fleurus, , , . balloons used at, . order of battle at, . foot-artillery in line of battle, . in the offensive, . forests, advantages of, in retreats, . formation by divisions, when preferable, . for attack at turin, . for battle in small columns, . for battle, napoleon's system, , . for battle often determined by size of army, . for battle, prussian and austrian system, . for close attack, . of infantry for attack, five methods of, . in two ranks, . of troops for battle, - . formations of cavalry, - . of lines of battle for two infantry corps, - . various, for infantry, . fortification of coblentz, , . fortifications, remark upon, . fortified camps, . places, attack of, . places on the sea-coast, importance of, . places, when a misfortune, . fortresses at mayence, . greatest advantages of, . large, when preferable, . number and position of, . of france and austria, . on frontiers, . relation of, to strategy, , . forts in a mountainous country, . purposes of, . fossano, battle of, . four-rank formation of infantry, . france adapted to parallel retreats, . coalition against, in , . course and error of, in , . fortresses of, . intention of, when declaring war in , . invasions of, by the english, . francis i., passage of the alps by, . frederick the great, , . at leuthen, . at prague, . at torgau, . commissariat of, . defensive-offensive operations of, . maneuver of, at leuthen, . military genius of, . frederick ii., crusade of, . french and english expedition to china, . french armies in the revolution, . armies, situation of, in , . at bautzen, . at fleurus, why successful, . at waterloo, . capture of vera cruz by, in , . causes of defeat of, at waterloo, . cavalry, . columns at waterloo, . defeat of, at stockach, . descent on algiers in , . errors in , . expedition to syria, . in bohemia in , . invasions of and , . french, maritime efforts of, during american revolution, . operations in italy, . operations of, at close of , - . operations of, in , . order at essling and fleurus, . order at minden, . plan in , error of, . revolution, - . revolution, armies of, how subsisted, . revolution, course of austria in, . revolution, course of prussia in, , . revolution, interest of austria in, . revolution, lines of operations in the wars of, . revolution, relation of italy to, . revolution, relation of prussia and austria to, . revolution, theater of operations in, . revolution, zones of operations in, . frontier defenses, maxims for, , . when a permanent line of defense, . frontiers, defense of, . disadvantage of fortresses on, . how to be fortified, . mountains as, . rivers as, . front of operations, , . of operations, extent of, . of operations, how varied, . strategic, change of, . strategic, not to be too extended, . fronts of operations, . fronts, strategic, . fundamental principle of war, . maxims of, . principles for employment of troops, . g. gallop, when best for cavalry charge, , . general advanced guard, how composed, . cavalry charge, . general, essential qualities of a, . importance of a skillful, . one of the greatest talents of, . qualities of a skillful, . what constitutes a, . general principle of war, manner of applying, . staff, employment of, in time of peace, . staff, usefulness of, . genoa, panic at siege of, . geography, military, . geographical objective points, . germanicus, expedition of, . girondists, , . gosa, french charge on, . governments, elective, weakness of, . should not be unprepared for war, . grand tactics, , , . principles of, . great detachments, , , . instances of, , . why made, , . grouchy, . guard, advanced, , . in battle, , . in unexpected battles, . gunpowder, effect of invention of, on distant invasions, . gustavus adolphus, expedition of, . h. half-deep order, infantry-formation, . attacks in, . halts and departures in retreats, hours of, . halts in retreats to relieve rear-guards, . hannibal at cannæ, . at zama, . harold, , . head-quarters of the army, when the most important point, . heights to be secured in mountainous countries, . hengist, . henry v. of england, descents of, on france, . hoche's expedition to ireland, . hochkirch, . surprise of, . hohenfriedberg, . hohenlinden, , . holland, expedition to, . horse-artillery in line of battle, . in the offensive, . houchard, . hougoumont, . hungary, strategic character of the mountains of, . hypotheses as to the enemy's movements, . hypotheses of the author in , . how events justified them, . i. igor, expeditions of, . illustrations of importance of logistics, - . improvements in fire-arms, effect of, on infantry formations, . effects of, on war, , , . industrial pursuits secondary to heroic virtues, , . infantry, battle-formation of, in two lines, . best formation of, for assault, . best formation of, for the defensive, . cavalry must be supported by, . checkerwise formation, . formation of, in two deployed lines, . formations, effect of improvements in fire-arms on, . importance of, . in three-rank formation, . in what movements should be exercised, . lines of battle for, - . mixed order, . mounted, . needs support of cavalry and artillery, . protection of, from enemy's artillery, . squares, , . supports of artillery, , . three-rank formation of, . various formations for, . when a line of, should be charged by cavalry, . information from partisans, . of enemy's movements, rules for gaining, , . of the enemy's movements, four means of acquiring, . initiative, advantages of, . institutions, military, . interior and simple lines, advantage of, . interior lines, observations on, . of archduke charles, . of operations, . of operations, why preferable, . should not be too much extended, . two armies on, . intervention, instances of, - . kinds of, . reasons for, . wars of, . wars of, essentials in, . intestine wars, . intrenched camp, on which side of a river, . intrenched camps and lines, defense of, . connection of, with strategy, . how differ from têtes deponts, . influence of, . instances of, , . maxims on, , . on river, . prussian system of. . use of, . where to be established, . intrenched lines, , . attack of, . continuous, . intrenched positions, . intrenchments, armies in, invaded country, how made to contribute to success, . invasion, advantage and disadvantage of, . advantages of awaiting, . army of, line of defense important to, . control of the sea important in, . difficult in national wars, . how rendered feasible, . of a mountainous country, . of england contemplated by napoleon, , , . of turkey by russia, . two kinds of, . wars of, when advantageous, . invasions, diplomacy in, . distant, across extensive territories, . distant, effect of standing armies on, . distant, how affected by invention of gunpowder, . distant, maxim for, . distant, to aid an ally, . how to be carried on, . neutrality of states adjoining the theater of war important in, . of neighboring states, . of spain, . when excusable, . investing a city, false system of, . force, how strengthened, . irregular cavalry, . arms for, . islamism, wars of, . italy, operations of the french in, , . parallel retreats in, . relation of, in the french revolution, . ivar, expedition of, . j. james ii., expedition of, in ireland, . jemmapes, . jena, battle of, won by strategy, . maneuvers at, . napoleon's march on, . ney's charge at, . jourdan, . at stockach, . balloons used by, at fleurus, . jourdan's passage of the rhine in , . julian, retreat of, from parthia, . k. kagoul, panic at, . katzbach, . kehl, intrenchments at, , , . kolin, . koudacheff's expedition, . koutousoff, . krasnoi, combination at, . kray, . kunnersdorf, . l. lance, importance of, . when best for cavalry, . when useful, . lender, bravery the first requisite for, . league, wars of the, . leipsic as a decisive and strategic point, . battle of, , , , . march of the allies upon, . march on, modified, . / napoleon's order of battle at, . order of battle at, . lepanto, battle of, . leuthen, battle of, , , . maneuver of frederick at, . level country, defensive in, light cavalry, advantages of, . ligny, . line of advance, how determined, . of battle, arrangement of cavalry in, . of battle before the french revolution, . of battle, definition of, . of battle, defensive, heavy artillery in, . of battle, distribution of troops in, . of battle, offensive, concentration of artillery fire in, . of battle, posting troops in, . line of battle, post of artillery in, . of defense important to an army of invasion, . of defense should be short, . of operations, double, when necessary, . of operations, how protected, . of operations, single, when advantageous, . of retreat, , - . lines and camps, intrenched, defense of, . and points, strategic, . central, application of, to large masses, . deployed, in two ranks, . double, to be avoided, . eccentric, . interior, observations on, . interior, two armies on, . intrenched, , . intrenched, attack of, . of battle for two infantry corps, different formations of, - . of circumvallation, . of contravallation, . of defense, second, . of defense, eventual, . of defense, permanent, . of defense, strategical and tactical, . of depots, . of direction, importance of, illustrated, . of maneuver, importance of, . of operations, - . of operations at home and in hostile countries, contrasted, . of operations, best direction of, . of operations, change of, . of operations, converging and divergent, . of operations, double, . of operations, double, when advantageous, . of operations, great art of directing, . of operations, how established, . of operations, how influenced, . of operations, illustration of, by strategic field of , . of operations in fertile and barren countries, contrasted, . of operations in the wars of the french revolution, . of operations, maxims on, . of operations, rivers as, . of operations, selecting of, . lines of operations, to have a geographic and strategic direction, . of stollhofen, . of turin, . of turin, capture of, . parallel, . strategic, , . strategic, of napoleon in , . linz, towers of, . lloyd's proposed fourth rank in infantry formation, . logistics, , - . derivation of the term, . faulty, instances of, - . illustration of importance of, - . of battle of leipsic, . principal points of, - . louis vii., crusade of, . ix., crusade of, . ix., expedition of, to tunis, . xiv., coalition against, . xiv., commissariat of, . louvois, . lyons as a strategic and decisive point, . m. macdonald's column at wagram, , . error at katzbach, . mack, , . at ulm, . magnesia, victory of, . malplaquet, . malta, descent of mugtapha on, . maneuvering, success in battle depends on, . maneuver line, , . lines, . lines of, their importance, . objective points of, . pivots of, . tactical, by flank, . turning, , . maneuvers, , , . at ulm and jena, . for breaking through a line, . must conform to strategic principles, . objective points of, . of napoleon in , . simplest, most likely to be successful, . strategic lines of, . sudden, generally better than predetermined, . transversal, . maneuvers, turning, rules for, . mantua, siege of, . wurmser at, . march, establishment of depots on, . marches and attacks, arrangements of, . effects of systems of, . flank, . instructions to generals commanding corps in, , . particulars to be considered in, . system of, , . rapid, . rules for, - . transversal, in mountainous countries, . two kinds of, . marengo, french armament at, . napoleon's order of battle at, . maritime expeditions, - . marmont at salamanca, . marsin, . masonry towers, archduke maximilian's system of defense by, . massena, position of, in switzerland in , , . massena's position of the albis, . matériel of war, . should be inspected by staff officers, . maurice of saxony, . maxim for distant invasions, . maxims for frontier defenses, , . of fundamental principle of war, . on intrenched camps, , . on lines of operations, - . on operations in mountainous countries, . on strategic fronts, , . on strategic operations, . relative to supplies, - . mayence, austrian camp before, . fortresses at, . intrenched camp at, . mexico, expedition against, in , . middle ages, expeditions of the, . military education important to a ruler, . geography and statistics, importance of a knowledge of, . geography, lloyd's essay on, . institutions, . institutions of rome, . instruments, signals by, . operations influenced by a cabinet, . policy, . policy, essential bases of, . sciences, study of. . spirit, how encouraged, . spirit, how maintained, . spirit of nations, . statistics and geography, . militia as cavalry, , . millesimo, effect of the battle of, . minden, french order at, . mithridates, , . mixed order, infantry formation, . system of benningsen at eylau, . modern inventions, effect of, on character of naval armaments, . marine expeditions, . mohammed ii., . molitor, general, . mollwitz, battle of, . montesquieu, opinion of, as to great enterprises, . moors, invasion of europe by, . morale of armies, , , . of cavalry, . moreau at engen, . base of operations of, in , . retreat of, in , . moreau's diversion toward kastadt in , . passage of the rhine in , , . morocco, spanish descent on, in , . moscow, retreat of the french from, . mountain-campaigns, instances of, . mountainous countries as principal fields of operations, . countries, cavalry in, . countries, defense in, . countries, heights to be secured in, . countries, strategic defense in, . countries, strategic positions of, . countries, the offensive in, . countries, transversal marches in, . country, character of a war in, . country, forts in a, . country, invasion of a, . mountains as eventual lines of defense, . as frontiers, . campaigns in, . importance of, when secondary, , . of european countries, relation of, to warlike operations, . strategic operations in, . mounted infantry, . militia, . movement by flanks of companies, , . movements, extended, when dangerous, . in which infantry should be exercised, . of armies, points to be attended to, - . of the enemy, rules for gaining information of, , . murat, surprise of, at taroutin, . murray's descent in , . musketry-fire better for defensive, . influence of, in battles, . n. nansouty's charge at chateau-thierry, . naples, french army at, . napoleon, , , , , , , , , . and grouchy at waterloo, , . at austerlitz, . at essling, . at ligny, . at ratisbon, . at wagram, . double wars of, . english expedition against, in , . his own chief staff officer, . operations of the armies of, . napoleon's artillery, . artillery at wagram, . base of operations in , - . battles, orders of, . bold maneuvers in , . campaign of , . cantonment on the passarge, . central lines in saxony, . central position in , why disastrous, . changes of line of operations, . choice of objective points, . concentric retreat in , . defense in champagne in , . detachments in , . error after his victory at dresden, . error in the campaign of , . favorite objective, . front of operations in , . front of operations in , . infantry, panic of, at wagram, . line of defense in , . logistics in and , , . march on bassano, . napoleon's march on eylau, . march on jena in , . march on naumburg in , . march to königsberg, . mode of issuing orders, . motives and necessities, . operations, comments on, . order at the tagliamento, . passages of the danube, , . passage of the saint-bernard, . passage of the po in , . projected invasion of england, , , . reserves, . retreat from smolensk, . return from egypt in , . rule for the passage of an army, . strategic lines in , , . strategic positions, . system of formation for battle, , . system of marches, . victories and disasters, lesson taught by them, . national wars, character of, in mountainous countries, . wars, definition of, . wars, difficulties of conquest in, - . wars, effect of the nature of the country in, . wars, how prevented, , . wars, how success attained in, . wars, invasion difficult in, . wars, military precepts for, . nations, military spirit of, . nature and extent of war, how influenced, . naumburg, napoleon's march on, . naval armaments, effect of modern inventions on, . neutrality of states adjoining theater of war, important in invasions, . ney, , , . at bautzen, . at dennewitz, . at elchingen, . at jena, . nicholas i., concentration of dragoons by, . o. objective point, how held, . point, manner of approach to, . point of napoleon in , . point, selection of, . points, geographical, . points, how chosen, . objective points in strategy, how determined, . points of maneuver, , . points of operations, . points, political, . objectives of operations, , . objects of war, . oblique order, , . order, antiquity of, . order assumed by napoleon at marengo, . order of battle, . offensive, advantage of the, in strategy, . army, proper course for, . battle, object of, . battles, . characteristics of infantry formation for, . line of battle, concentration of artillery-fire in, . movements, when advised, . or defensive system, either may be employed, . order of battle, . system to be followed in, . the, disadvantages of, in tactical operations, . the, in mountainous countries, . use of artillery in, . war, , . war, duty of staff officers in, . war, reserves, how posted in, , . wars, duty of statesmen in, . wars, how conducted, . wars to reclaim rights, . oleg, expedition of, . open positions, . operations, base of, where to be established, . bases of, definition of, . how to be chosen, , . plurality of, . change of lines of, . control of, . divergent and convergent, , . double lines of, , , . exterior lines of, . fronts of, , , . in mountainous countries, maxims on, . interior lines of, . line of, how protected, . lines of, , . lines of, converging and divergent, . lines of, how established, . lines of, how influenced, . lines of, maxims on, . military, influenced by a cabinet, . objective points of, . objectives of, , . of and , , . of the french at the close of , - . pivots of, . simple lines of, . system of, . system of, how to be judged, . system of, necessary in war, . theater of, , . theater of, between the rhine and the north sea, - . theater of, how divided, . zone of, . zone of, how to select, . zones of, , . opinion, public, danger of, . wars of, . orchomenus, . order, checkerwise, battalions deployed in, . half-deep, attacks in, . half-deep, infantry formation, . importance of, . in deep masses, infantry formation, , . in echelons, . in squares, when suitable for attack, . mixed, infantry formation, , oblique, , . of attack in columns, . of battle, . of battle at agincourt, . at cannæ, . at crécy, . at essling, , . at fleurus, . at leipsic, . at mollwitz, . at passage of a river, . by echelon, . convex, . definition of, . oblique, . offensive, . of the generals of the republic, . of infantry as skirmishers, . shallow, infantry, . orders, best mode of issuing, . how issued by napoleon, . inaccurate transmission of, . of battle, . of battle, classification of, useful, . orders of battle, influence of, on result of engagements, . of napoleon's battles, . should be clear, . two methods of issuing, , . organization and arms of cavalry, , . by corps, likely to be permanent, . of an army in four corps, . in seven corps, . of divisions, , . of very large armies, . p. panics, cause and remedy of, . instances of, . officers and troops to be warned against, . parallel lines, . order of battle, . order of battle reinforced, . order of battle, when suitable, . order of battle with crotchet, . retreat, . retreats, countries adapted to, , . retreats, when preferable, . partisans, information from, . partisan troops, services of, illustrated, . paskevitch's passage of the vistula in , . passage of an army, napoleon's rule for, . of a river, best position for, . of the beresina, , . of the danube by napoleon, . of the rhine in , . of the saint-bernard by napoleon, . of rivers, , . of rivers, double, . of rivers, famous modern, . of rivers in retreats, , . of rivers in retreats, rules for, . of rivers, rules for, . of rivers, rules for preventing, . peninsular war, . perfect army, essential conditions of, . permanent lines of defense, . perpendicular order of battle, . peter the great, expedition of, against persia, . peter the hermit, . peterwardein, panic at, . philip ii. of spain, . pichegru, movements of, in , . pistol-firing, in cavalry charges, . pivots of maneuver, . pivots of operations, . points, decisive, . decisive and objective, . decisive geographic, . decisive, how affected by arrangement of forces, . decisive, of battle-field, now determined, . decisive strategic, . of operations, objective, . political objective points, . objective points subordinate to strategy, . wars, . po, napoleon's passage of, in , . portable telegraphs, . port mahon, assault of, . port royal, expedition of u.s. government to, . position, defensive, means of retreat to be considered in, . for battle, . how to drive an enemy from, , . strong, essentials for, . system of wars of, . tactical, protection of flanks in, . positions, . for cantonments, selection of, . intrenched, . open, . strategic, , , , . tactical, . tactical, rules for selecting, . two kinds of, , . post, capture of, when important, . posting troops in line of battle, . posts, means for capture of, . prague, battle of, , . preservation of armies in time of peace, . prince, duty of, when not conducting his armies, . prince eugene, , , , . of coburg, error of, in , . principle of decisive points of maneuver, . principles of strategy, . of strategy always the same, . promotions in armies, . protection by trees and brushwood, . provisional lines, . prussia, course of, in the french revolution, , . parallel retreat in, . relation of, in the french revolution, . prussian army at waterloo, . reserves in , . system of forming columns, . system of intrenched camps, . public opinion, danger of, . punic wars, , . pursuit, rules for, . pursuits, . pyramids, napoleon's order of battle at, . pyrrhus, descent of, on italy, . q. qualities of a skillful general, . r. ramillies, . ramrods, . rapid marches, . ratisbon, napoleon at, . napoleon's order of battle at, . rear, attack in, . rear-guard in retreat, . rear-guards in retreat, . rear-guard in retreat, duty of, in passage of rivers, . reconnoissances, . give but limited information, . to gain information of the enemy's movements, . religion, wars of, . reports of prisoners, . reserve, cavalry, . final, . horse-artillery, advantages of, . reserves, cavalry, . importance of, , . in offensive war, how posted, , . nature of, . of napoleon, . prussian, in , . strategic, , . retreat along converging roads, along diverging roads, . along parallel roads, . by several corps, . difficulty of deciding method of, . five methods of arranging, . in single mass, when preferable, . line of, , - . means of, to be considered in a defensive position, . parallel, . well effected, should be rewarded, . retreats, . at night, . attack of the enemy's advanced guard in, . bridges in, . by diverging roads, danger of, . cavalry in, . circumstances influencing, , . concentration in, . concentric, instances of, , . defiles in, . divergent, when admissible, . duty of staff officers in, . firmness of russians in, . halts in, to relieve rear-guard, . hours of departures and halts in, . in daylight, . instances of famous, . measures to insure success of, , . parallel, countries adapted to, , . parallel, when preferable, . passage of rivers in, , . prince de ligne's remark on, . rear-guard in, , . should be slow, . various kinds of, . reverse fire, . rhine, passages of, , , . rhodes, capture of, by the turks, . richard coeur-de-lion, . richelieu, expedition of, against minorca, . river, best position for passage of, . crossing of, in presence of an enemy, . order of battle at passage of, . rivers as eventual lines of defense, . as frontiers, . as lines of operations, . double passage of, . famous modern passages of, . passage of, , . passage of, in retreats, , . rules for, . points of passage of, in presence of an enemy, . rules for passage of, . rules for preventing passage of, . rivoli , . napoleon's order of battle at, . rocket-batteries, use of, . rollo, . roman legions, cause of the ruin of, . nation, cause of the decline of, . romans, naval expeditions of, . rome, military institutions of, . rossbach, . ruler, a, should be able to arrange plans of operations, . rules for conducting descents, . for fighting battles scientifically, . for gaining information of enemy's movements, , . for offensive or defensive operations, . for passage of rivers, . for passage of a river in retreat, . for pursuit, . for preventing passage of rivers, . for use of artillery in battle, - . to be observed in selecting tactical positions, . russian army, firmness of, in retreats, . army, skirmishers in, . base in and , . cavalry, . expeditions in , . order at eylau, . retreat in , . system of forming columns, . russians, early maritime expeditions of, , . s. saber, when best for cavalry, . when useful, . saint-bernard, napoleon's passage of, . saint-cyr at stockach, . saxons, expedition of, . saxony, napoleon's central lines in, in , . savoy, duke of, . scandinavians, . science of marches, essential point in, . of marches, includes what, . sciences, military, study of, . scipio, . sea-coast as a base of operations, , . sea, control of, held by england, . control of, important in an invasion, . secondary lines, . sebastian of portugal, descent of, on morocco, . sebastopol, . secondary depots, , . shallow order, . order, infantry, . shumla, camp of, . siege, how covered, . of candia, , . of copenhagen, . of mantua, . sieges and active armies, relations between, . duty of staff officers in, . wars of, . signaling by fires, . signals by military instruments, . simultaneous shouts as, . system of, . simple and interior lines, advantage of, . lines of operations, . simultaneous shouts as signals, . single line of operations, when preferable, . sizeboli, capture of, . skill, superiority in, . skirmishers, , . skirmishing-order, . small detachments, how useful, . smolensk, napoleon's retreat from, . southern germany, valley of the danube the strategic key of, . sovereign as commander, . spain adapted to parallel retreats, . and portugal, wellington's tactics in, . invasions of, . war in, in , . spanish armada, , , . capture of vera cruz by, . descent on algiers, . descent on morocco in , . spies, . best course for, . difficulties in their way, . use of, neglected in many modern armies, . when especially useful, . squares in echelons, . infantry, , , . in two ranks, . staff, chief of, , chief of, how selected, . general, usefulness of, . officers and general must act in concert, . officers, duties of, should be defined, . officers, duty of, in offensive war, . officers should inspect matériel, . officers, summary of duties of, - . standing armies, effect of, on distant invasions, . state, how rendered secure, . statesmanship, relation of, to war, . statesmen, duty of, in offensive war, . statistics, military, . st. domingo, expedition to, in , . stockach, , . defeat of the french at, . strategic defense in mountainous countries, . stollhofen, lines of, . strategical and tactical lines of defense, . strategic combinations, . combinations, when better than tactical, . coup-d'oeil, - . field of , . front and line of defense may coincide, . front, change of, . front, double, . front not to be too extended, . front of napoleon in his march on eylau, . fronts, . fronts, maxims on, . lines, , . lines and points, . lines at waterloo, . lines of maneuvers, . lines of napoleon in , , . operations in mountains, . operations, maxims on, . point, leipsic as a, . lyons as a, . point of a battle-field, when important, . points, capitals as, . position, essential conditions for, . positions, , , , . positions of mountainous countries, . positions of napoleon, . reserves, , . square for camps, . strategy, , . advantage of the offensive in, . and the commissariat, . battles of ulm and jena won by, . connection of intrenched camps with, . connection of têtes de ponts with, . definition of, . directs movements, tactics executes them, . errors in, . how it should be studied, . illustration of, by operations of , - . illustrations of, - . in what it consists, . objective points in, how determined, . one great end of, . points embraced by, . political objective points subordinate to, . principles of, . principles of, always the same, . province of, . relation of fortresses to, , . science of marches in, . system of, developed in , . the art of, . strong position, essentials for a, . study of strategy, how made profitable, . successful retreat, how to insure, , . surprises of armies, . difficulty of, . suwaroff, , . suwaroff's expedition in switzerland, . supplies, depots of, , . suza, position of swiss and italians at, . svatoslav, expedition of, . sweyn, , . switzerland, invasion of, by french directory, . massena in, in , . suwaroff in, . tactical defense of, . syria, french expedition to, . system, concentric or eccentric, . of corps, . of divisions, . of marches, . of marches, effects of, . of marches, includes what, . of marches, relation of, to commissariat, . of marches the result of circumstances, . of operations, . of operations, how to be judged, . of signals, . of strategy developed in , . of wars, change of, . of wars of position, . systems modified by forms of government, . t. tactical combinations, guiding principle in, . defense of switzerland, . operations, disadvantages of the offensive in, . position, protection of flanks in, . tactical positions, . positions, rules for selecting, . tactics, . executes movements, strategy directs them, . grand, , . of battles, great difficulty of, . of wellington in spain and portugal, . tagliamento, napoleon's order at, . taroutin, surprise of murat at, . telegraphs, portable, . temporary bases, . bases, when necessary, . têtes de ponts, . connection of, with strategy, . how differ from intrenched camps, . theater of operations, , . of operations between the rhine and north sea, - . of operations, how composed, . of operations, how divided, . of operations in the french revolution, . of war, border of the, , . of war, decisive points of the, . of war, definition of, . theories, difficulty of applying, in war, . use of, in war, . thirty years' war, . three-rank formation of infantry, , . topographical and statistical reconnoissances, . torgau, battle of, . torres-vedras, camp of, . intrenched camp at, . towers, masonry, . of coblentz, . of linz, . transversal maneuvers, . marches in mountainous countries, . trees, clumps of, should be occupied, . troops, distribution of, in line of battle, . employment of, . trot, when best for cavalry charge, , . turenne's surprise of the austrian cantonments, . turin, battle of, . intrenched camp at, . lines of, , . turkey, invasion of, . turkish war of and , . wars, squares in, , . turks, cavalry charge of, . naval expeditions of, , , . turning maneuvers, , , . maneuver, rules for, . two corps, one behind the other, . two-rank formation, . two wars at once, danger of, . u. ulm, battle of, . battle of, won by strategy, . camp of, . maneuvers at, . uncertainty regarding battles, elements of, . unexpected battles, advanced guard in, . meeting of two armies, . united states, capture of vera cruz by, . english expeditions against, in and , , . expedition to port royal, . use of spies neglected in many modern armies, . of the three arms combined, . v. vandals, . vandamme's disaster at culm, lesson of, . venice, , . vera cruz captured by the spaniards, . taken by the french, . taken by the united states, . vessels, roman, . scandinavian, . victories, french, of , why indecisive, . victory, assailant's best means of, . on what it depends, , . when it may be expected, . villages, importance of, on front of a position, . villars's infantry, panic among, . vistula, passage of, by paskevitch, . w. wagram, , , , , , . macdonald's column at, , . napoleon's artillery at, , . napoleon's order of battle at, . panic at, . war an art, . border of the theater of, , . character of, from middle ages to french revolution, . circumstances which influence result of, . council of, at seat of government, . councils of, . decisive points of the theater of, . defensive-offensive, . definition of the art of, . fundamental principle of, , . governments should not be unprepared for, . how to be conducted, . influence of cavalry in a, , . influence of improvements in fire-arms on, , , . manner of applying general principle of, . matériel of, . maxims of fundamental principles of, . nature and extent of, how influenced, . not an exact science, , . objects of, . of the crimea, . offensive and defensive, definition of, . offensive, duty of staff officers in, . operations of, how directed, . principal parts of the art of, . relation of statesmanship to, . theater of, definition, . use of theories in, . warsaw, intrenchments at, . wars, aggressive, for conquest, . change of system of, . civil, . defensive politically, offensive militarily, . double, . for conquest, instances of, . intestine, . natural character of, in mountainous countries, . national, definition of, . national, difficulties of conquest in, - . national, effect of nature of the country on, . national, how prevented, , . national, invasion difficult in, . offensive, how conducted, . offensive, to reclaim rights, . of expediency, . kinds of, . of extermination, . of intervention, . of intervention, essentials in wars of, . of intervention, military chances in, . of invasion, when advantageous, . of opinion, . of opinion, character of, . of opinion, instances of, . of opinion, military precepts for, . of position, system of, . of religion, . of sieges, . political, . political part of, how modified, . punic, , . turkish, squares in, , . when most just, . with or without allies, . waterloo, , , , , - , . blücher at, . campaign of, , . english squares at, formations at, . french at, . napoleon's order of battle at, . ney at, , . strategic lines at, . wellington's position at, , . wellington, , , , , , , , , . and blücher at waterloo, , . at salamanca, . at torres-vedras, . defensive-offensive operations of, . wellington's position at waterloo, . weyrother, , . william the conqueror, , . winkelried, column of, . winter campaigns, . quarters, countries adapted to, . quarters, when dangerous, . quarters, when strategic, . woods, importance of possession of, . wurmser at mantua, . eccentric retreat of, in , . error of, . x. xerxes, . army of, . z. zama, battle of, . zimisces, . zone of operations, , , . of operations, how to select, . of operations in , . zones of operations in the french revolution, . zurich, defeat of the allies at, . [note: this book was taken from the website of the command and control research program (ccrp) within the within the office of the assistant secretary of defense. according to the privacy and security notice: . information presented on dodccrp.org is considered public information and may be distributed or copied unless otherwise specified. use of appropriate byline/photo/image credits is requested. the original electronic text was published at http://www.dodccrp.org/shockindex.html] shock and awe: achieving rapid dominance written by harlan k. ullman and james p. wade with: l.a. "bud" edney, fred m. franks, charles a. horner, jonathan t. howe, and keith brendley ndu press book december contents foreword prologue introduction to rapid dominance chapter . background and basis chapter . shock and awe chapter . strategic, policy, and operational application chapter . an outline for system innovation and technological integration chapter . future directions appendices -- reflections of three former commanders appendix a. "thoughts on rapid dominance" by admiral bud edney appendix b. "defense alternatives: forces required" by general chuck horner appendix c. "enduring realities and rapid dominance" by general fred franks biographies of the study group members foreword we are in the early stages of what promises to be an extended debate about the future of conflict and the future of our defense establishment. few will deny that the winds of change are blowing as never before, driven by a radically altered geopolitical situation, an evolving information-oriented society, advancing technology, and budgetary constraints. how our nation responds to the challenge of change will determine our ability to shape the future and defend ourselves against st century threats. the major issue, however it may be manifested, involves the degree of change that is required. advocates, all along the spectrum from a military technical revolution to a revolution in military affairs to a revolution in security affairs, are making their cases. military institutions are by their very nature somewhat conservative. history has shown that success has often sown the seeds of future failure. we as a nation can ill afford to follow in the footsteps of those who have rested on their laurels and failed to stretch their imaginations. often, those who are the most knowledgeable and experienced about a subject are not in the most advantageous position to understand a new world order. yet these same individuals are often among the most credible voices and therefore are essential to progress. the authors of shock and awe are a highly accomplished and distinguished group with the credibility that comes from years of front line experience. thus, this work is important not only because of the ideas contained within, but because of the caliber and credibility of the authors. actis seeks to articulate and explore advanced concepts. in sponsoring this work and in disseminating its initial results, we hope to contribute to the ongoing dialogue about alternatives, their promises, and their risks. as the authors note, this is a work in progress meant not to provide definitive solutions but a proposed perspective for considering future security needs and strategies. to the extent that vigorous debate ensues we will be successful. david s. alberts washington, d.c. october prologue the purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for structuring mission capability packages (mcps) around which future u. s. military forces might be configured. from the very outset of this study group's deliberations, we agreed that the most useful contribution we could make would be to attempt to reach beyond what we saw as the current and commendable efforts, largely but not entirely within the department of defense, to define concepts for strategy, doctrine, operations, and force structure to deal with a highly uncertain future. in approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what may prove to be the full extent of our grasp. it is, of course, clear that u.s. military forces are currently the most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a long time to come. why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose major excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of military superiority? for reasons noted in this study, we believe that excursions are important if only to confirm the validity of current defense approaches. there are several overrarching realities that have led us to this conclusion. first, while everyone recognizes that the cold war has ended, there is not a consensus about what this means for more precisely defining the nature of our future security needs. despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing external danger, the united states is actively examining new strategic options and choices. the variety of conceptual efforts underway in the pentagon to deal with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality. at the same time, the current dominance and superiority of american military power, unencumbered by the danger of an external peer competitor, have created a period of strategic advantage during which we have the luxury of time, perhaps measured in many years, to re-examine with a margin of safety our defense posture. on the other hand, potential adversaries cannot be expected to ignore this predominant military capability of the united states and fail to try to exploit, bypass, or counter it. in other words, faced with american military superiority in ships, tanks, aircraft, weapons and, most importantly, in competent fighting personnel, potential adversaries may try to change the terms of future conflict and make as irrelevant as possible these current u.s. advantages. we proceed at our own risk if we dismiss this possibility. second, it is relatively clear that current u.s. military capability will shrink. despite the pledges of the two major american political parties to maintain or expand the current level of defense capability, both the force structure and defense infrastructure are too large to be maintained at even the present levels and within the defense budgets that are likely to be approved. unless a new menace materializes, defense is headed for "less of the same." such reductions may have no strategic consequences. however, that is an outcome that we believe should not be left to chance. this shrinkage also means that the pentagon's good faith strategic reviews aimed at dealing with our future security needs may be caught up in the defense budget debate over downsizing and could too easily drift into becoming advocacy or marketing documents. as the services are forced into more jealously guarding a declining force structure, the tendency to "stove-pipe" and compartmentalize technology and special programs is likely to increase, thereby complicating the problem of making full use of our extraordinary technological resources. this means that some external thinking, removed from the bureaucratic pressures and demands, may be essential to stimulating and sustaining innovation. third, the american commercial-industrial base is undergoing profound change propelled largely by the entrepreneurial nature of the free enterprise system and the american personality. whether in information or materials-related technology or for that matter in other areas too numerous to count, the nature of competition is driving both product breadth and improvement at rates perhaps unthinkable a decade ago. one sign of these trends is the reality that virtually all new jobs in this country are being created by small business. in the areas of commercial information and related management information systems, these changes are extraordinary and were probably unpredictable even a few years ago. on the so-called information highway, performance is increasing dramatically and quickly while price, cost, and the time to bring to market new generation technology are diminishing. these positive trends are not matched yet in the defense-industrial base. one consequence of this broad commercial transformation is that any future set of defense choices may be inexorably linked to and dependent on this profound, ongoing change in the commercial sector and in learning to harness private sector advances in technology-related products. it must also be understood that only the united states among all states and nations has the vastness and breadth of resources and commercial capability to undertake the full exploitation of this revolutionary potential. finally, it is clear that u.s. forces are engaged and deployed worldwide, often at operating tempos as high as or higher than during the cold war. these demands will continue and the diversity of assigned tasks is unlikely to contract. these forces must be properly manned, equipped, and trained and must carry out their missions to standards that are both high and expected by the nation's leaders and its public. the matter of maintaining this capability while attempting to reshape the force for a changing future is a major and daunting challenge not to be underestimated. these structural realities are exciting and offer a major opportunity for real revolution and change if we are able and daring enough to exploit them. this, in turn, has led us to develop the concept of rapid dominance and its attendant focus on shock and awe. rapid dominance seeks to integrate these multifaceted realities and facts and apply them to the common defense at a time when uncertainty about the future is perhaps one of the few givens. we believe the principles and ideas underlying this concept are sufficiently compelling and different enough from current american defense doctrine encapsulated by "overwhelming or decisive force," "dominant battlefield awareness," and "dominant maneuver" to warrant closer examination. since before sun tzu and the earliest chroniclers of war recorded their observations, strategists and generals have been tantalized and confounded by the elusive goal of destroying the adversary's will to resist before, during, and after battle. today, we believe that an unusual opportunity exists to determine whether or not this long-sought strategic goal of affecting the will, understanding, and perception of an adversary can be brought closer to fruition. even if this task cannot be accomplished, we believe that, at the very minimum, such an effort will enhance and improve the ability of our military forces to carry out their missions more successfully through identifying and reinforcing particular points of leverage in the conflict and by identifying and creating additional options and choices for employing our forces more effectively. perhaps for the first time in years, the confluence of strategy, technology, and the genuine quest for innovation has the potential for revolutionary change. we envisage rapid dominance as the possible military expression, vanguard, and extension of this potential for revolutionary change. the strategic centers of gravity on which rapid dominance concentrates, modified by the uniquely american ability to integrate all this, are these junctures of strategy, technology, and innovation which are focused on the goal of affecting and shaping the will of the adversary. the goal of rapid dominance will be to destroy or so confound the will to resist that an adversary will have no alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military objectives. to achieve this outcome, rapid dominance must control the operational environment and through that dominance, control what the adversary perceives, understands, and knows, as well as control or regulate what is not perceived, understood, or known. in rapid dominance, it is an absolutely necessary and vital condition to be able to defeat, disarm, or neutralize an adversary's military power. we still must maintain the capacity for the physical and forceful occupation of territory should there prove to be no alternative to deploying sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment on the ground to accomplish that objective. should this goal of applying our resources to controlling, affecting, and breaking the will of an adversary to resist remain elusive, we believe that rapid dominance can still provide a variety of options and choices for dealing with the operational demands of war and conflict. to affect the will of the adversary, rapid dominance will apply a variety of approaches and techniques to achieve the necessary level of shock and awe at the appropriate strategic and military leverage points. this means that psychological and intangible, as well as physical and concrete effects beyond the destruction of enemy forces and supporting military infrastructure, will have to be achieved. it is in this broader and deeper strategic application that rapid dominance perhaps most fundamentally differentiates itself from current doctrine and offers revolutionary application. flowing from the primary concentration on affecting the adversary's will to resist through imposing a regime of shock and awe to achieve strategic aims and military objectives, four characteristics emerge that will define the rapid dominance military force. these are noted and discussed in later chapters. the four characteristics are near total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and environment; rapidity and timeliness in application; operational brilliance in execution; and (near) total control and signature management of the entire operational environment. whereas decisive force is inherently capabilities driven-that is, it focuses on defeating the military capability of an adversary and therefore tends to be scenario sensitive-rapid dominance would seek to be more universal in application through the overriding objective of affecting the adversary's will beyond the boundaries traditionally defined by military capability alone. in other words, where decisive force is likely to be most relevant is against conventional military capabilities that can be overwhelmed by american (and allied) military superiority. in conflict or crisis conditions that depart from this idealized scenario, the superior nature of our forces is assumed to be sufficiently broad to prevail. rapid dominance would not make this distinction in either theory or in practice. we note for the record that should a rapid dominance force actually be fielded with the requisite operational capabilities, this force would be neither a silver bullet nor a panacea and certainly not an antidote or preventative for a major policy blunder, miscalculation, or mistake. it should also be fully appreciated that situations will exist in which rapid dominance (or any other doctrine) may not work or apply because of political, strategic, or other limiting factors. we realize some will criticize our focus on affecting an adversary's will, perception, and understanding through shock and awe on the grounds that this idea is not new and that such an outcome may not be physically achievable or politically desirable. on the first point, we believe the use of basic principles of strategy can stand us in good stead even and perhaps especially in the modern era when adversaries may not elect to fight the united states along traditional or expected lines. on whether this ability can and should be achieved, we believe that question should be part of a broader examination. finally, we argue that what is also new in this approach is the way in which we attempt to integrate far more broadly strategy, technology, and innovation to achieve shock and awe. it is this interaction and focus which we think will provide the most interesting results. for these and other reasons, we have embarked on an ambitious intellectual excursion in making a preliminary definition of rapid dominance. for the moment, we view rapid dominance in the formation stage and not as a final product. over the next months, we believe further steps should be taken to refine rapid dominance and to develop "paper" systems and force designs that will add crucial specificity to this concept. then, this rapid dominance force can be assessed against five sets of questions: - first, assuming that a rapid dominance force can be fielded with the appropriate capabilities of shock and awe to affect and shape the adversary's will, how would this force compare with and improve on our ability to fight, win, and deal with a major regional contingency (mrc)? - second, what utility, if any, does rapid dominance and its application of shock and awe imply for operations other than war (ootw)? where might rapid dominance apply in ootw, where would it not, and where might it offer mixed benefits? - third, what are the political implications of rapid dominance in both broad and specific applications and could this lead to a form of political deterrence to underwrite future u.s. policy? would this political deterrence prove acceptable to allies and to our own public? - fourth, what might rapid dominance mean for alliances, coalitions, and the conduct of allied and combined operations? - finally, what are the consequences of rapid dominance on defense resource investment priorities and future budgets? from this examination and experimentation, we believe useful results will flow. we also would like to acknowledge the support and role of the national defense university in sponsoring this first effort. in particular, we owe a huge debt of gratitude to dr. david alberts of ndu whose intelligence, enthusiasm, and wisdom, as well as his full support, have been invaluable and without which this project would have been far less productive. washington, d.c. september l.a. edney j.t. howe f.m. franks h.k. ullman c. a. horner j.p. wade introduction to rapid dominance the military posture and capability of the united states of america are, today, dominant. simply put, there is no external adversary in the world that can successfully challenge the extraordinary power of the american military in either regional conflict or in "conventional" war as we know it once the united states makes the commitment to take whatever action may be needed. to be sure, the first phase of a crisis may be the most difficult-if an aggressor has attacked and u.s. forces are not in place. however, it will still be years, if not decades, before potential adversaries will be able to deploy systems with a full panoply of capabilities that are equivalent to or better than the aggregate strength of the ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, and weapons systems in our inventory. even if an adversary could deploy similar systems, then matching and overcoming the superb training and preparation of american service personnel would still be a daunting task. given this reality that our military dominance can and will extend for some considerable time to come, provided we are prepared to use it, why then is a re-examination of american defense posture and doctrine important? the answers to this question involve ( ) the changing nature of the domestic and international environments; ( ) the complex nature of resolving inter and intra-state conflict that falls outside conventional war, including peacekeeping, and countering terrorism, crime, and the use of weapons of mass destruction; ( ) resource constraints; ( ) defense infrastructure and technical industrial bases raised on a large, continuous infusion of funding now facing a future of austerity; and ( ) the vast uncertainties of the so-called social, economic, and information revolutions that could check or counter many of the nation's assumptions as well as public support currently underwriting defense. it is clear that these so-called grey areas involving non-traditional operations other than war (ootw) and law enforcement tasks are growing and pose difficult problems and challenges to american military forces, especially when and where the use of force may be inappropriate or simply may not work. the expansion of the role of un forces to nation-building in somalia and its subsequent failure comes to mind as an example of this danger. it is also arguable that the formidable nature and huge technological lead of american military capability could induce an adversary to move to a strategy that attempted to circumvent all this fighting power through other clever or agile means. the vietnam war is a grim reminder of the political nature of conflict and how our power was once outflanked. training, morale, and readiness to fight are perishable commodities requiring both a generous expenditure of resources and careful nurturing. thus, the greatest constraints today to retaining the most dominant military force in the world, paradoxically, may be in overcoming the inertia of this success. we may be our own worst enemy. during the cold war when the danger was clear, the defense debate was often fought over how to balance the so-called "strategy-force structure-budget" formula. today, that formula has expanded to include "threat, strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastructure." without a "clear and present danger" such as the axis powers in or, later, the soviet union to coalesce public agreement on the threat, it is difficult to construct a supporting strategy that can be effective either in setting priorities or objectives. hence, today's "two war" or two nearly simultaneous major regional contingency (mrc) strategy has been criticized as strategically and financially excessive. as noted by administration officials, the current force structure does not meet the demands of the "two war," mrc strategy and, in any event, the budget will not support the planned force structure. finally, it is widely recognized that the united states possesses far more infrastructure such as bases and facilities than it needs to support the current force, thereby draining scarce resources away from fighting power. as a result, there is a substantial defense imbalance that will erode fighting power. in designing its defense posture, the united states has adopted the doctrine of employing "decisive or overwhelming force." this doctrine reinforces american advantages in strategic mobility, prepositioning, technology, training, and in fielding integrated military systems to provide and retain superiority, and responds to the minimum casualty and collateral damage criteria set first in the reagan administration. the revolution in military affairs or rma is cited as the phenomenon or process by which the united states continues to exploit technology to maintain this decisive force advantage, particularly in terms of achieving "dominant battlefield awareness." through this awareness, the united states should be able to obtain perfect or near perfect information on virtually all technical aspects of the battlefield and therefore be able to defeat or destroy an adversary more effectively, with fewer losses to ourselves and with a range of capabilities from long-range precision strike to more effective close-in weapons. before proceeding further, an example is useful to focus some of the as yet unknowable consequences of these broader realities, changes, and trends. the deployment of american forces to bosnia is a reaction to and representation of major shifts occurring in the post-cold war world. with these shifts, this deployment is suggestive of what may lie ahead for the use, relevance, and design of military force. the legacy of hiroshima and nagasaki, and then, the start of the cold war, caused the west to adopt policies for containing and deterring the broad threat posed by the soviet union and its ideology. thermonuclear weapons, complemented over time by strong conventional forces, threatened societal damage to russia. conventional forces backed by tactical nuclear weapons were later required, in part, to halt a massive soviet ground attack in europe and, in part, to provide an alternative to (immediate) use of nuclear weapons. today, the first armored division, the principal american unit serving in bosnia is, in essence, the same force that fought so well in _desert storm_ and, for the bulk of the cold war along with our other units, had been designed to defend nato against and then defeat a numerically superior, armored and mechanized soviet adversary advancing across the plains of germany. now these troops, as well as others from both sides of the former iron curtain, are engaged in ootw for which special training, rules of engagement, command arrangements, and other support structures have been put in place at short notice, few of which were even envisaged a few years ago. these are also operations that, because of intense, instantaneous media coverage, can have huge domestic political impact especially if events go wrong. whether or not this armored division is the most optimally configured force for such an operation is not relevant for the moment even though this unit probably was the most appropriate for this task. however, it is prudent to examine the consequences of changing tasks presaged by bosnia, in which the enemy is instability rather than an ideological or regional adversary we are trying to contain or defeat and neutrality on our part may be vital to the success of the mission. do these changes mean that we should alter our traditional approach to the doctrine for and design of forces? if so, how? are there alternative or more effective ways and means to conduct these peacekeeping-related operations? and, in this evaluation, are there alternative doctrines we should consider to fight wars more effectively as we envisage scenarios under the construct of the mrc? with the end of the ussr and absent a hostile russian superpower, there is no external threat to the existence or survival of the united states as a nation and there will not be such an immediate threat for some time to come. this means that there is a finite window of opportunity when there is no external adversary threatening the total existence of american society; that our forces are far superior to any possible military adversary choosing to confront us directly; and that, with innovative thought, we may be able to create a more relevant, effective, and efficient means to ensure for the common defense at the likely levels of future spending. at the same time that the bosnia operation is underway, the fundamental changes occurring at home and abroad must be addressed. the industrial and technical base of the united states is changing profoundly. the entrepreneurial and technical advantages of the american economy were never greater and it is small business that is creating virtually all new jobs and employment opportunities. commercial technology and products are turning over on ever shortening cycles. performance, especially in high-technology products, is improving and costs are being driven downwards. sadly, the opposite trends are still found in the defense sector, where cost is high and will create even tougher choices among competing programs, especially as the budget shrinks. cycle time to field new generation capabilities is lengthening and performance, especially in computer and information systems, is often obsolete on delivery. the defense industrial base will continue to compress and it is not clear that the necessary level of efficiencies or increases in effectiveness in using this base can be identified and implemented, suggesting further pressures on a defense budget that is only likely to be cut. indeed, the question must be carefully examined of whether the military platforms that served us so well in both cold and hot wars such as tanks, fixed wing aircraft, and large surface ships and submarines represent the most effective mix of numbers, technology, strategic mobility, and fighting capability. our national preference for "attrition" and "force on forces" warfare continues to shape the way we design and rationalize our military capability. therefore, it is no surprise that in dealing with the mrc, american doctrine, in some ways, remains an extension of cold war force planning. while the magnitude and number of dangerous threats to the nation have been remarkably reduced by the demise of the ussr, we continue to use technology to fill traditional missions better rather than to identify or produce new and more effective solutions for achieving military and strategic/political objectives. while there is much talk about "military revolutions" and winning the "information war," what is generally meant in this lexicon and discussion is translated into defense programs that relate to accessing and "fusing" information across command, control, intelligence, surveillance, target identification, and precision strike technologies. what is most exciting among these revolutions is the potential to achieve "dominant battlefield awareness," that is, achieving the capability to have near-perfect knowledge and information of the battlefield while depriving the adversary of that capacity and producing "systems of systems" for this purpose. the near and mid-term aims of these "revolutions" largely remain directed at exploiting our advantages in firepower and on fielding more effective ways of defeating an adversary's weapons systems and infrastructure for using those systems. the doctrine of "decisive or overwhelming force" is the conceptual and operational underpinning for winning the next war based largely on this force-on-force and attrition model, and winning the information war is vital to this end. few have asked whether the pattern of employing more modern technology for traditional firepower solutions is the best one and if there are alternative ways to achieve military objectives more effectively and efficiently. in other words, can the idea of dominant battlefield awareness be expanded doctrinally, operationally, and in terms of fixing on alternative military, political, or strategic objectives? rapid dominance, if realized as defined in this paper, would advance the military revolution to new levels and possibly new dimensions. rapid dominance extends across the entire "threat, strategy, force structure, budget, infrastructure" formula with broad implications for how we provide for the future common defense. organization and management of defense and defense resources should not be excluded from this examination although, in this paper, they are not discussed in detail. the aim of rapid dominance is to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of shock and awe. clearly, the traditional military aim of destroying, defeating, or neutralizing the adversary's military capability is a fundamental and necessary component of rapid dominance. our intent, however, is to field a range of capabilities to induce sufficient shock and awe to render the adversary impotent. this means that physical and psychological effects must be obtained. rapid dominance would therefore provide the ability to control, on an immediate basis, the entire region of operational interest and the environment, broadly defined, in and around that area of interest. beyond achieving decisive force and dominant battlefield awareness, we envisage rapid dominance producing a capability that can more effectively and efficiently achieve the stated political or military objectives underwriting the use of force by rendering the adversary completely impotent. in rapid dominance, "rapid" means the ability to move quickly before an adversary can react. this notion of rapidity applies throughout the spectrum of combat from pre-conflict deployment to all stages of battle and conflict resolution. "dominance" means the ability to affect and dominate an adversary's will both physically and psychologically. physical dominance includes the ability to destroy, disarm, disrupt, neutralize, and to render impotent. psychological dominance means the ability to destroy, defeat, and neuter the will of an adversary to resist; or convince the adversary to accept our terms and aims short of using force. the target is the adversary's will, perception, and understanding. the principal mechanism for achieving this dominance is through imposing sufficient conditions of "shock and awe" on the adversary to convince or compel it to accept our strategic aims and military objectives. clearly, deception, confusion, misinformation, and disinformation, perhaps in massive amounts, must be employed. the key objective of rapid dominance is to impose this overwhelming level of shock and awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on. in crude terms, rapid dominance would seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at tactical and strategic levels. an adversary would be rendered totally impotent and vulnerable to our actions. to the degree that non-lethal weaponry is useful, it would be incorporated in the ability to shock and awe and achieve rapid dominance. theoretically, the magnitude of shock and awe rapid dominance seeks to impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact that the atomic weapons dropped on hiroshima and nagasaki had on the japanese. the japanese were prepared for suicidal resistance until both nuclear bombs were used. the impact of those weapons was sufficient to transform both the mindset of the average japanese citizen and the outlook of the leadership through this condition of shock and awe. the japanese simply could not comprehend the destructive power carried by a single airplane. this incomprehension produced a state of awe. we believe that, in a parallel manner, revolutionary potential in combining new doctrine and existing technology can produce systems capable of yielding this level of shock and awe. in most or many cases, this shock and awe may not necessitate imposing the full destruction of either nuclear weapons or advanced conventional technologies but must be underwritten by the ability to do so. achieving rapid dominance by virtue of applying shock and awe at the appropriate level or levels is the next step in the evolution of a doctrine for replacing or complementing overwhelming force. by way of comparison, we have summarized how we view the differences between the doctrines of rapid dominance and decisive force in terms of basic elements that apply to the objectives, uses of force, force size, scope, speed, casualties, and technique. we recognize that there will be debate over the relative utility and applicability of these doctrines and readers are encouraged to participate. in considering the differences between the concepts of rapid dominance and decisive force, it is important to define the terms as precisely as possible. the goals of achieving rapid dominance using shock and awe must be compared with overwhelming force. "rapid" implies the ability to "own" the dimension of time-moving more quickly than an opponent, operating within his decision cycle, and resolving conflict favorably in a short period of time. "dominance" means the ability to control a situation totally. rapid dominance must be all-encompassing. it will require the means to anticipate and to counter all opposing moves. it will involve the capability to deny an opponent things of critical value, and to convey the unmistakable message that unconditional compliance is the only available recourse. it will imply more than the direct application of force. it will mean the ability to control the environment and to master all levels of an opponent's activities to affect will, perception, and understanding. this could include means of communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and other aspects of infrastructure as well as the denial of military responses. deception, misinformation, and disinformation are key components in this assault on the will and understanding of the opponent. total mastery achieved at extraordinary speed and across tactical, strategic, and political levels will destroy the will to resist. with rapid dominance, the goal is to use our power with such compellance that even the strongest of wills will be awed. rapid dominance will strive to achieve a dominance that is so complete and victory is so swift, that an adversary's losses in both manpower and material could be relatively light, and yet the message is so unmistakable that resistance would be seen as futile. "decisive force," on the other hand, implies delivering massive enough force to prevail. decisive means using force with plenty of margin for error. force implies a traditional "force-on-force" and attrition approach. this concept does not exclude psychological and other complementary damage imposition techniques to enhance the application of force; they have been used throughout the history of warfare. but such non-destructive means would have an ancillary role. military force would be applied in a purer form and targeted primarily against the military capabilities of an opponent. time is not always an essential component. as in _desert shield/storm_, enough time would have to be allowed to assemble an overwhelming force. such a luxury is not always feasible. the differences become clearer if broken down into their essential elements: elements rapid dominance decisive force -------------------------------------------------------------------------- objective control the adversary's will, prevail militarily and perceptions, and understanding decisively against a set of opposing capabilities defined by the mrc use of control the adversary's will, unquestioned ability to force perceptions, and understanding prevail militarily over an and literally make an adversary opponent's forces and based impotent to act or react against the adversary's capabilities force size could be smaller than large, highly trained, and opposition, but with decisive well-equipped. materially edge in technology, training, overwhelming and technique scope all encompassing force against force (and supporting capability) speed essential desirable casualties could be relatively few in potentially higher on both number on both sides sides technique paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny, systematic destruction of destroy military capability. applicable in some situations four general categories of core characteristics and capabilities have been identified that rapid dominance-configured mission capability packages must embrace. these are identified briefly and discussed in later chapters. first, rapid dominance seeks to maximize */knowledge/* of the environment, of the adversary, and of our own forces on political, strategic, economic, and military/operational levels. on one hand, we want to get into the minds of the adversary far more deeply than we have in the past. beyond operational intelligence required for battlefield awareness, rapid dominance means cultural understanding of the adversary in ways that will affect both ours and their planning and the outcome of the operation at all appropriate tactical and strategic levels. second, rapid dominance must achieve */rapidity/* in the sense of timeliness. rapid dominance must have capabilities that can be applied swiftly and relatively faster than an adversary's. third, rapid dominance seeks to achieve total */control of the environment/* from complete "signature management" of both our and the adversary's information and intelligence to more discrete means to deceive, disguise, and misinform. fourth, rapid dominance aims to achieve new levels of operational competence that can virtually institutionalize */"brilliance."/* in some cases, this may mean changing the longstanding principle of military centralization and empowering individual soldiers, sailors, and airmen to be crucial components in applying and directing the application of force. as we move to turn this concept into specific doctrine and capabilities for future evaluation, there is another emerging reality to consider. if the commercial-economic sector is transforming at the current rate and breadth, it could be that, over the course of many years, the defense industrial base would follow suit, or face irrelevance and extinction. clearly, there are certain areas in defense which will never or may never be eliminated or replaced. nuclear systems are a current example. should this trend of commercial dominance play out, it may mean that military force design and procurement will become dependent on the private sector and commercial technology. rapid dominance is a first conceptual step to deal with this possibility. the purpose of this paper is to outline the beginnings of the concept of rapid dominance, its concentration on strategy, technology and innovation, and its focus on shock and awe. based on this, subsequent steps will involve expanding mission capability packages concepts consisting of operations harmonized with doctrine, organization, and systems and then move on to field prototype systems for further test and evaluation as advanced concept technology demonstrations. background and basis in both relative and absolute terms, since the end of world war ii, the military strength and capability of the united states have never been greater. yet this condition of virtual military superiority has created a paradox. absent a massive threat or massive security challenge, it is not clear that this military advantage can (always) be translated into concrete political terms that advance american interests. nor is it clear that the current structure and foundations for this extraordinary force can be sustained for the long term without either spending more money or imposing major changes to this structure that may exceed the capacity of our system to accommodate. as a consequence, the success of the current design and configuration of our forces may ironically become self-limiting and constraining. that is not to claim automatically that there are better military solutions or that the current defense program is not the best our political system can produce. it is to say, however, that we are well-advised to pursue alternate ideas and concepts to balance and measure against the current and planned program. to stimulate and intrigue the reader, we note at the outset that one thrust of rapid dominance is to expand on the doctrine of overwhelming or decisive force in both depth and breadth. to push the conceptual envelope, we ask two sets of broad questions: can a rapid dominance force lead, for example, to a force structure that can win an mrc such as _desert shield_ and _desert storm _far more quickly and cheaply with far fewer personnel than our planned force both in terms of stopping any invasion in its tracks and then ejecting the invader? can rapid dominance produce a force structure with more effective capacity to deal with grey areas such as ootw? second, if achievable, can rapid dominance lead to a form of political deterrence in which the capacity to make impotent or "shut down" an adversary can actually control behavior? what are the possible political implications of this capability and what would this power mean for conducting coalition war and for how our allies react and respond? because rapid dominance is aimed at influencing the will, perception, and understanding of an adversary rather than simply destroying military capability, this focus must cause us to consider the broadest spectrum of behavior, ours and theirs, and across all aspects of war including intelligence, training, education, doctrine, industrial capacity, and how we organize and manage defense. we observe at first that even with the successful ending of the cold war, the response of the united states in re-evaluating its national security and defense has been relatively and understandably modest and cautious. in essence, while the size of the force has been reduced from cold war levels of . million active duty troops to about . million, and the services have been vocal in revising doctrine and strategy to reflect the end of the soviet threat, with the exception of emphasis on jointness, there are few really fundamental differences in the design and structure of the forces from even or years ago. throughout the cold war, the defense of the united states rested on several central and widely accepted and publicly supported propositions. the "clear and apparent danger" of the soviet threat was real and seen as such. the ussr was to be contained and deterred from hostile action by a combination of political, strategic, and military actions ranging from the forging of a ring of alliances surrounding the ussr and its allies to the deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. following the truce ending the korean war, a large, standing military force was maintained and defined by the operational requirements of fighting the large formations of military forces of the ussr and its allies with similar types of military forces, albeit outnumbered. the role of allies, principally nato, was assumed and taken into account in planning, although the paradox of the issue of planning for a long versus short war in a nuclear world remained unresolved. mobilization, as in world war ii, was likewise assumed if the cold war went hot while, at the same time, it was hoped that any war might be ended quickly. the largely world war ii defense, industrial, and basing structure was retained along with the intent to rely on our technological superiority to offset numerical or geographical liabilities. it was not by accident that this cold war concept of defense through mobilization was similar to the strategy that won the second world war and the literal ability of ultimately overwhelming the enemy using the massive application of force, technology, and associated firepower. two decades later, vietnam exposed the frailty of this approach of dependence on massive application of firepower especially when political limits were placed on applying that firepower. currently, _desert storm_ and the liberation of kuwait in have been taken as the examples that confirm the validity of the doctrine of overwhelming or decisive force and of ensuring that both strategic objectives and tactical methods were in congruence. we argue that now is the time to re-examine these premises of reliance on overwhelming or decisive force as currently employed and deployed in the force structure if only as a prudent check. beyond prudence, however, it is clear that without a major threat to generate consensus and to rally the country around defense and defense spending, the military posture of the united states will erode as the defense budget is cut. hence, relying in the future on what is currently seen to be as sufficient force to be "decisive" could easily prove unachievable and the results problematic or worse for u.s. policy. the absence of a direct and daunting external security threat is, of course, a most obvious aspect of the difficulty in defining the future defense posture of the nation. the united states has long resisted maintaining a large standing military and the cold war years could prove an aberration to that history. extending this historical observation of small standing forces, it is clear that there is no adversary on the horizon even remotely approaching the military power of the former ussr. while we might conjure up nominal regional contingencies against korea or iraq as sensible planning scenarios for establishing the building blocks for force structure, it will prove difficult to sustain the current defense program over the long term without a real threat materializing to rally and coalesce public support. allocating three percent or less of gdp for defense could easily prove to be a ceiling and not a floor. it should be noted that in europe, defense spending is closing in on to percent of gdp. ironically, as the department of defense seeks to come to grips with this new world, the structural limitations and constraints in how we develop systems and procure weapons based on current technological and industrial capacity for producing them will be exacerbated by downward fiscal pressure giving us little room for mistakes and flexibility. air, land, space, and sea forces are currently limited in the actual numbers and types of systems that are available for purchase and more limited in that there are virtually no new major systems on the horizon. that could change. the m- a- tank is in production only for foreign sales. despite the allure of the arsenal ship, the navy still has only four active classes of warships from which to replace its capability and, for the first time this century since aircraft entered the inventory, is without a new aircraft in development. the air force can be placed in similar straits if the f- program is deferred or canceled because of rising cost and fiscal constraints. time will tell what happens to the joint strike fighter. assumptions about reliance on technology and r&d providing insurance policies for future defense needs may prove ill-advised if and as dod is forced to cut back and reduce those programs even further. indeed, over time, commercial r&d could become the main source for procuring software and other systems needed to upgrade today's weapons systems and for so-called "leap-ahead" technologies that may prove elusive to create. there is also the crucial issue of revising or indeed developing new doctrine and military thought to deal with these changing circumstances. but, without a compelling rationale and with the clear bureaucratic and political pressures of preparing and defending an annual budget, more of the same (or more likely, less of the same) becomes an almost irresistible outcome. while the jcs or osd or cincs may have genuine need for jointly packaged forces that are rapidly deployable irrespective of army, navy, marine, or air force labels, the services cannot be expected to reverse the years of viewing the world through service- specific arguments and doctrine. although the absolute danger has been dramatically reduced with the end of the ussr, it would be the height of folly to assume that there are no risks to the nation nor an absence of evil-doers wishing this nation harm. it would also be shortsighted to expect that potential adversaries are unintelligent and would not rely on superior knowledge of their environment and simplicity to overcome our current military and technical superiority much as the north vietnamese did. in addition, as technology diffuses around, over, and under borders, our assumptions about guarantees of permanent technological superiority should welcome thoughtful examination. lenin asked the question, "what is to be done?" as a start, the united states should act to exploit the several major advantages it possesses. first, we have time. the clarity and danger of future threats is sufficiently removed for us to take a longer view. while we may have deferred adding to the inventory of future systems in development, current systems possess more than enough military capability to get us through this transition period, even if this period were to last for more than a decade. this does not mean we can rest on our oars; if we take advantage of this opportunity, time is on our side. if we squander this opportunity, then we could ultimately find ourselves in trouble. second, the combination of american technical know-how, the luxury of the best technically educated and trained society in the world, and the entrepreneurial spirit of our system offers vast potential if we are clever enough to exploit this extraordinary resource. third, because of significant changes in law and organization regarding the military, particularly the goldwater-nichols act, and through a willingness to examine alternatives, the department of defense has actively sought new ideas and concepts. the enhanced role of the cincs and the acceptance of jointness are positive illustrations. yet, for understandable structural and political realities noted above, assuring productive innovation continues will not be automatic. against these conducive signs, vision, true joint thinking, and tactical advances still are premium commodities to be nourished and encouraged. in building an alternative intellectual concept, it is useful to rely on successful lessons of the past. for five decades, we have been successful in applying containment and deterrence in the cold war. when deterrence or diplomacy failed as in kuwait, then the use of force was inevitable. a first-order issue is how can we augment or improve the use of existing military capability should it be required. should force be needed, our proposal calls for establishing a regime of rapid dominance throughout the area of strategic as well as operational concern. by rapid dominance, we are seeking the capability to dominate, control, and isolate the entire environment in, around, over, and under the objective area as quickly as possible, and with fewer forces than currently envisaged, although direct insertion of forces is an important component depending upon the tactical situation. in many cases, this capacity need not be the traditional firepower solution of only physically destroying an adversary's military capabilities. our focus is on the clausewitzian principle of affecting the adversary's will to resist as the first order of business, quickly if not nearly instantaneously. a second goal would be to stop an attack during the first stages. a third goal, should it be achievable, would be to promote a regime of political deterrence that might restrain aggression in the first place. to accomplish the rendering an adversary incapable of action means neutralizing the ability to command; to provide logistics; to organize society; and to function; as well as to control, regulate and deny the adversary of information, intelligence, and understanding of what is and what is not happening. this means we must control all necessary intelligence and information on our forces-the ultimate form of stealth-and on an adversary's forces as well and then exploit total situational awareness for rapid action. regarding the emergence of current military thought and doctrine, as implied earlier, warfare today may be in the early and far less mature stages of a major revolution than is generally assumed. it is understandable that despite major strategic reassessments, current doctrine is still highly influenced by cold war tactics and strategy and perhaps by the iron grip of the history of conflict since the early th century. since napoleon, the conduct of war between major states has been largely dominated by combining industrial might with vast amounts of manpower over time and space. the united states advanced napoleon's use of industry and mass armies in the civil war and our planning up to the cold war tended to follow this same pattern. world war ii, of course, exemplified the triumph of this industrial, mobilization, and massive use of force approach. in the evolution of u.s. military theory, it can be argued that this model combining massive industrial might and manpower finally ended in . although, by then, technological advances to conventional military capabilities seemed to be approaching the destructive power, or more precisely, the system lethality of nuclear weapons. in other words, modern non-nuclear precision weapons perhaps could produce effects against enemy targets roughly comparable to the military lethality of theater-level nuclear weapons. if this condition proves true, could this new lethality fundamentally change the construct for designing american doctrine and strategy? this question is at the heart of the "precision and battlefield awareness" school of decisive force thinking that believes that this fundamental change is in place. since the end of the cold war and, with it, the end of the need to prepare our forces to fight a more or less equally powerful adversary, the united states military has conducted two post-cold war crises against lesser adversaries quite differently than it fought the cold war. in the panama intervention in and in kuwait shortly thereafter, the suggestion of newer and different methods of warfare was present. perhaps both will turn out to be transition campaigns, where there is much of the old, but also signs of the new. but there are specific pieces of evidence that should command our attention. underlying the planning for _operation just cause_ in panama and _desert shield/storm_ in kuwait was the premeditated incorporation of a series of rapid, simultaneous attacks designed to apply decisive force. the aim was to stun, and then rapidly defeat the enemy through a series of carefully orchestrated land, sea, air, and special operating forces strikes that took place nearly simultaneously across a wide battle space and against many military targets. the purpose of these rapid, simultaneous attacks was to produce immediate paralysis of both the national state and its armed forces that would lead to prompt neutralization and capitulation. in both _just cause_ and _desert storm_, the united states (plus coalition forces in _desert storm_) had such overwhelming military capabilities that, in retrospect, the outcome was largely a matter of drafting a cogent and coordinated operation plan based on using the entire system of capabilities, and then executing that plan to produce a decisive victory. the haitian incursion in used similar principles of intimidation to eliminate any real fighting. however, in _desert storm_ unlike haiti, it took the u.s. and its allies nearly months to deploy over a half million troops before the fighting began. the recently published jcs pub . and the u.s. army's - pamphlet reflect and exploit operational rapidity and simultaneity. yet, progress in these operational directions may be in danger of faltering if only old cold war yardsticks are used to make future force investments and to direct studies about future force structure and associated infrastructure. as in any transition period, innovation must be joined by a willingness to experiment. this means the establishment and cultivation of an experimental apparatus to test and evaluate new concepts are matters of importance both to foster innovation and assess its application. we build on the trends of rapidity and simultaneity and seek to emphasize control and time. control is necessary to force behavioral change in adversaries to achieve strategic or political ends. control and then influence come from a range of threats and outcomes, including putting at risk the targets an adversary holds dear, to imposing a hierarchy of shock and awe, to affecting will, perception, and understanding. achieving control may now be theoretically possible in even more compressed or shortened time periods because of the potential superiority of enhanced u.s. military capability and further training and education. to obtain this level of military superiority that can affect the adversary's will and perception, or at least achieve the practical military consequences, a great deal of thought, debate, and experimentation over new concepts will be needed if only to test and validate contemporary doctrine. if the political objective is to achieve a level of shock and awe beyond only temporary paralysis, then further actions must follow. the end point will be to dominate the enemy in such a way as to achieve the desired objectives. from this concept follows the need to shut down either a state or an organized enemy through the rapid and simultaneous application (or threat of application) of land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces against the broadest spectrum of the adversary's power base and center or centers of gravity and against the adversary's will and perception at tactical and strategic levels. in _desert storm_, the objectives were first to evict iraqi forces from kuwait and then to restore the legitimate government. from these objectives, more limited strategic and political objectives followed, some for purposes of maintaining coalition solidarity and un-imposed sanctions. not occupying baghdad was one such political limitation. these strategic objectives led to identification of the enemy's centers of gravity as the basis for the application of force to destroy these centers. this planning led to the repeated, rapid, and simultaneous use of massive force with great effect. one obvious tactical objective was to eliminate saddam hussein's command and control. this was accomplished by simultaneous and massive attacks. once command and control was destroyed, iraqi forces in the kuwait theater of operations (kto) would be destroyed as quickly as possible with overwhelming force and with minimum casualties. as general colin powell simply stated, "my plan is to cut off saddam's army and then kill it." there was no sanctuary for iraqi forces in the kto. they were completely vulnerable to unrelenting and devastating attack. outside the kto, targeting was more selective, not because the means were unavailable for imposing sufficient damage but because our military objectives were purposely limited. given the effectiveness of the air campaign and the overwhelming superiority on the ground, coalition land forces required only of the days of the war to defeat and to eject iraq's forces from kuwait. suppose a _desert storm_-type campaign were fought years from now based on a plan that exploited the concept of rapid dominance. further assume that iraq has improved (and rebuilt) its military and that, in a series of simultaneous and nearly instantaneous actions, our primary objective was still to shut iraq down, threaten or destroy its leadership, and isolate and destroy its military forces as we did in . however, two decades hence, rapid dominance might conceivably achieve this objective in a matter of days (or perhaps hours) and not after the months or the , troops that were required in to . rapid dominance may even offer the prospect of stopping an invasion in its tracks. shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping nuclear weapons on hiroshima and nagasaki had on the japanese. simultaneously, iraq's armed forces would be paralyzed with the neutralization or destruction of its capabilities. deception, disinformation, and misinformation would be applied massively. this level of simultaneity and rapid dominance must also demonstrate to the adversary our endurance and staying power, that is, the capability to dominate over as much time as is necessary less an enemy mistakenly try to wait it out and use time between attacks to recover sufficiently. if the enemy still resisted, then conventional forms of attack would follow resulting in the physical occupation of territory. control is thus best gained by the demonstrated ability to sustain the stun effects of the initial rapid series of blows long enough to affect the enemy's will and his means to continue. there must be staying power effect on the enemy or they merely absorb the blows, gain in confidence and their ability to resist, and change tactics much as occurred during the wwii bombing campaigns and the air war over north vietnam. achieving these levels of shock and awe requires a wide versatility and competence in employing land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces and in investment in technology to produce rapid dominance. different methods for commanding the battle using both hierarchical and non-hierarchical command to control and direct our forces are likely to be required especially given the simultaneous application of capabilities throughout the given battle space by the full spectrum of our forces. to use these combinations of forces will require adjustment of current service doctrine and prescribed roles and functions. rapid dominance also means looking to invest in technologies perhaps not fully or currently captured by the cold war paradigm. to develop the proper combination of forces and future technology investment for rapid dominance, extensive experimentation with this core concept will be required. this exper-imentation must apply to all levels of military educational institutions; it must be joint; it can be accelerated by availability of recent advances in simulation technology; and it must have operational trials in the field. to advance this concept, technology and its infrastructure and application are vital. here, understanding several facts is important. the u.s. today is graduating through its college and universities system approximately , american and foreign scientists and engineers per year. this is a great national resource. this technology infrastructure is dimensions larger in number and scope than the aggregate of anywhere else in the world. through appreciation and exploitation of this potential, a u.s. position of pre-eminence in science and technology could be assured for the foreseeable future. one adjunct of this technology revolution is in the information and information management areas- which, in the u.s., are heavily commercially oriented. future military application may well be analogous to the impact of the internal combustion engine and wireless radio on land, sea, and air forces in the s and s. the size of this technological lead between ourselves and the rest of the world, especially in the base for new information products and services, should widen further in knowledge and in application. the "silicon valley" revolution is likely to continue increasing computer capacity on an almost annual basis. by the year , computing power should be many fold times today's capacity-perhaps ultimately beginning to close in on the ability of humans to handle data flow as well as the ability to condense and synthesize data. in parallel to advances in computing power will be the ability to transfer information into and out of the hands of individual users. the addition of virtual reality and other technical aids will enhance and potentially quicken individual decision-making ability. technologies associated with bioscience and bioengineering are likely to be of particular importance in enhancing these capabilities and are also an area of american predominance. material sciences, software, and communications are all american strengths, and should remain so well into the next century. a significant element supporting this explosion in applied information and other technologies is the american free enterprise system and its entrepreneurial character. this drive is needed to translate this technology into military hardware. the nature of the u.s. market and its competitive basis reinforce this element. the largest challenges may be to shape and exploit this commercial potential and then to ensure that its enduring advantages become fundamental in the makeup of our military forces. unlike the defense industrial base required during the cold war, this new commercial base is neither heavy nor is it a massive industry relying on producing large things. indeed, its edge has depended on getting "smaller, smarter, and cheaper." the fundamental technology thrust for channeling this new american industrial base to support rapid dominance must be toward the control and management of everything that is significant to the operations bearing on the particular area of interest (aoi). and we mean everything! control of the environment is far broader than only the objective of achieving dominant battlefield awareness. control means the ability to change, to a greater or lesser degree, the "signatures" of all of the combat forces engaged in the aoi. with this concept, the operational frameworks in applying force across the entire spectrum of platforms (satellites, aircraft, land vehicles, ships) can be measured (and controlled) from many minus decibels of cross section, to many plus decibels; communications can be entirely covert, i.e., many db less than the ambient environment, or that approaching "white noise." the location of both the individual and his unit can be measured in real time in meters, if not feet, anywhere in the world. through virtual reality, movement in three-dimensional grids over hundreds of square kilometers, offer precise location and movement control, both during day and night in conditions of unprecedented confidence. this occurs in real time. denying or deceiving the adversary, including real-time manipulation of senses and inputs, is part of this control. a rapid dominance-configured force would enter an aoi and immediately control the operational/environmental signatures both individually and in the aggregate. as needed, line and non-line-of-sight weapons of near pin-point accuracy would be delivered across the entire area of operation. stealthy uavs and mobile robotics systems, together with decoys, would be deployed in large numbers for surveillance, targeting, strike, and deception and would produce their own impact of electronic shock and awe on the enemy. this application of force can be done as rapidly as political and strategic conditions demand. the effects mean literally "turning on and off" the "lights" that enable any potential aggressor to see or appreciate the conditions and events concerning his forces and, ultimately, his society. what is radically different in rapid dominance is the comprehensive system assemblage and integration of many evolving and even revolutionary technical advances in dominant battlefield awareness squared-materials application, sensor and signature control, computer and bioengineering applied to massive amounts of data, enable weapon application with simultaneity, precision, and lethality that to date have not been applied as a total system. deception, disinformation, and misinformation will become major elements of this systemic approach. the r&d reality is that technology advances will likely come from the commercial world as the dod base continues to shrink. it is clear that in certain areas, dod must remain involved where there is no private r&d or to fill gaps in r&d. warships, fighter aircraft, tanks, and missile defense are examples. however, advances in commercial technology in the information age are unlikely to be matched by dod. of equal importance is how we train, organize, and educate our combat officers and key enlisted personnel. command must be geared to achieving the best of the best-not the best among the good. assimilating in real time the vast amount of information and putting information to use will no doubt lead to major changes in the composition, competence, and authority of (even and especially) individual military unit commanders perhaps to the squad or private soldier level. of course, even with the most perfect information, an unqualified, inexperienced, or unprepared military commander may not win except with extraordinary luck or an incompetent foe. and, we repeat that there are cases where no military force may be able to succeed if the objectives are unobtainable. the match of the entrepreneurial individual with the potential of the technology base is key. optimizing and integrating all elements into a total system is a certain way to exploit the opportunity that we can perceive becoming more visible in the coming years. shock and awe the basis for rapid dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient shock and awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. war, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." in the clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. earlier and similar observations had been made by the great chinese military writer sun tzu around b.c. sun tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. sun tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving shock and awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. he also observed that "war is deception," implying that shock and awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force. in rapid dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, understanding, and perception through achieving shock and awe is multifaceted. to identify and present these facets, we need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which shock and awe affect an adversary. one recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of world war i and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. these images and expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. indeed, tv coverage of _desert storm_ vividly portrayed iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield shock and awe. in our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how shock and awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. then, shock and awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define rapid dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control. the first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of different types, models, and examples of shock and awe in order to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differentiate each model as unique or important. at this stage, historical examples are offered. however, in subsequent stages, a task will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of shock and awe. from this identification, the next step in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how best each form or variant of shock and awe might be achieved. to repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative force package. then the mission capability package is examined in conditions of both mrcs and ootw. for discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing historical types, variants, and characteristics of shock and awe have been derived. these examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists between and among them. the first example is "overwhelming force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's american force structure. the aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as possible. the superiority of american forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to successful application. there are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this approach. the first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the m- tank, f- , , and aircraft and cvn/ddg- /ssn- ships designed principally to be used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capability. in other words, this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from this doctrine. the other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning congress and public will prove more difficult. while it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. it should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives. second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts of force. this requires significant logistical lift and the time to transport the necessary forces. rapidity may not always follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of decisive force to remote or distant regions. third, the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed. finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense sector. this will compound the tension between quality and quantity already cited. none of these shortcomings is necessarily fatal. however, none should be dismissed without fuller understanding. certainly, rapid dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives that are similar to those of current doctrine. a major distinction is that rapid dominance envisages a wider application of force across a broader spectrum of leverage points to impose shock and awe. this breadth should lead to a more comprehensive and integrated interaction among all the specific components and units that produce aggregate military capability and must include training and education, as well as new ways to exploit our technical and industrial capacity. it is possible that in these resource, technical, and commercial industrial areas that rapid dominance may provide particular utility that otherwise may constrain the effectiveness of decisive force. the second example is "hiroshima and nagasaki" noted earlier. the intent here is to impose a regime of shock and awe through delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems. the employment of this capability against society and its values, called "counter-value" in the nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively destructive strikes directly at the public will of the adversary to resist and, ideally or theoretically, would instantly or quickly incapacitate that will over the space of a few hours or days. the major flaws and shortcomings are severalfold and rest in determining whether this magnitude and speed of destruction can actually be achieved using non-nuclear systems to render an adversary impotent; to destroy quickly the will to resist within acceptable and probably unachievably low levels of societal destruction; and whether a political decision would be taken in any case to use this type of capability given the magnitude of the consequences and the risk of failure. it can be argued that in the bombing campaign of _desert storm_, similar objectives were envisioned. the differences between this example and _desert storm_ are through the totality of a society that would be affected by a massive and indiscriminate regime of destruction and the speed of imposing those strikes as occurred to those japanese cities. this example of shock, awe, and intimidation rests on the proposition that such effects must occur in very short periods of time. the next example is "massive bombardment." this category of shock and awe applies massive and, perhaps today, relatively precise destructive power largely against military targets and related sectors over time. it is unlikely to produce an immediate effect on the will of the adversary to resist. in a sense, this is an endurance contest in which the enemy is finally broken through exhaustion. however, it is the cumulative effect of this application of destruction power that will ultimately impose sufficient shock and awe, as well as perhaps destroy the physical means to resist, that an adversary will be forced to accept whatever terms may be imposed. as noted, trench warfare of the first world war, the strategic bombing campaign in europe of the second world war (which was not effective in this regard), and related b- raids in vietnam and especially over the new year period of - , illustrate the application of massive bombardment. massive bombardment, directed at largely military-strategic targets, is indeed an aspect of applying "overwhelming force," even though political constraints make this example most unlikely to be repeated in the future. there is also the option of applying massive destruction against purely civilian or "counter-value" targets such as the firebombing of tokyo in world war ii when unconditionality marks the terms of surrender. it is the cumulative impact of destruction on the endurance and capacity of the adversary that ultimately affects the will to resist that is the central foundation of this example. the shortcoming with this example is clear, and rests in the question of political feasibility and acceptability, and what circumstances would be necessary to dictate and permit use of massive bombardment. outright invasion and aggression such as iraq's attack against kuwait could clearly qualify as reasons to justify using this level of shock and awe. however, as with overwhelming force, this response is not time-sensitive and would require massive application of force for some duration as well as political support. fourth is the "blitzkreig" example. in real blitzkreig, shock and awe were not achieved through the massive application of firepower across a broad front nor through the delivery of massive levels of force. instead, the intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of scale. the german wehrmacht's blitzkreig was not a massive attack across a very broad front, although the opponent may have been deceived into believing that. instead, the enemy's line was probed in multiple locations and, wherever it could be most easily penetrated, attack was concentrated in a narrow salient. the image is that of the shaped charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in a tank's armor and then exploding outwardly to achieve a maximum cone of damage against the unarmored or less protected innards. to the degree that this example of achieving shock and awe is directed against military targets, it requires skill if not brilliance in execution, or nearly total incompetence in the adversary. the adversary, finding front lines broken and the rear vulnerable, panics, surrenders, or both. hitler's campaign in france and holland and the seizure of the dutch forts and the occupation of crete in are obvious illustrations. the use of special operations forces in significant numbers is an adjunct to imposing this level of shock and awe. _desert storm_ could have been a classic blitzkreig maneuver if the attack were mounted without the long preparatory bombardment and was concentrated in a single sector-either the "left hook" or the marine attack "up the middle," and with total surprise. the major differences between the operation in kuwait and germany's capture of france in were that the allies in saudi arabia had complete military and technical superiority unlike the germans and that, once under attack, iraq's front line collapsed virtually everywhere, giving the coalition license to pick and choose the points for penetration and then dominate the battle with fire and maneuver. the lesson for future adversaries about the blitzkreig example and the united states is that they will face in us an opponent able to employ technically superior forces with brilliance, speed, and vast leverage in achieving shock and awe through the precise application of force. it must also be noted that there are certainly situations such as guerilla war where this or most means of employing force to obtain shock and awe may simply prove inapplicable. for example, the german blitzkreig would have performed with the greatest difficulty in the vietnam war, where enemy forces had relatively few lines to be penetrated or selectively savaged by this type of warfare. the shortcomings of blitzkrieg ironically rest in its strengths. can brilliance and superiority be maintained? is there a flexible enough infrastructure to ensure training to that standard, and can the supporting industrial base continue to produce at acceptable costs the systems to maintain this operational and technical superiority? rapid dominance requires a positive answer to these questions, at least theoretically. the fifth example is named after the chinese philosopher-warrior, sun tzu. the "sun tzu" example is based on selective, instant decapitation of military or societal targets to achieve shock and awe. this discrete or precise nature of applying force differentiates this from hiroshima and massive destruction examples. sun tzu was brought before ho lu, the king of wu, who had read all of sun tzu's thirteen chapters on war and proposed a test of sun's military skills. ho asked if the rules applied to women. when the answer was yes, the king challenged sun tzu to turn the royal concubines into a marching troop. the concubines merely laughed at sun tzu until he had the head cut off the head concubine. the ladies still could not bring themselves to take the master's orders seriously. so, sun tzu had the head cut off a second concubine. from that point on, so the story goes, the ladies learned to march with the precision of a drill team. the objectives of this example are to achieve shock and awe and hence compliance or capitulation through very selective, utterly brutal and ruthless, and rapid application of force to intimidate. the fundamental values or lives are the principal targets and the aim is to convince the majority that resistance is futile by targeting and harming the few. both society and the military are the targets. in a sense, sun tzu attempts to achieve hiroshima levels of shock and awe but through far more selective and informed targeting. decapitation is merely one instrument. this model can easily fall outside the cultural heritage and values of the u.s. for it to be useful without major refinement. shutting down an adversary's ability to "see" or to communicate is another variant but without many historical examples to show useful wartime applications. a subset of the sun tzu example is the view that war is deception. in this subset, the attempt is to deceive the enemy into what we wish the enemy to perceive and thereby trick, cajole, induce, or force the adversary. the thrust or target is the perception, understanding, and knowledge of the adversary. in some ways, the ancient trojan horse is an early example of deception. however, as we will see, the deception model may have new foundations in the technological innovations that are occurring and in our ability to control the environment. the shortcomings with sun tzu are similar to those of the massive destruction and the blitzkreig examples. it is questionable that a decision to employ american force this ruthlessly in quasi- or real assassination will ever be made by the u.s. further, the standard to maintain the ability to perform these missions is high and dependent on both resources and on supporting intelligence, especially human intelligence-not an american strong point. britain's special air service provides the sas example and is distinct from the blitzkreig or sun tzu categories because it focuses on depriving an adversary of its senses in order to impose shock and awe. the image here is the hostage rescue team employing stun grenades to incapacitate an adversary, but on a far larger scale. the stun grenade produces blinding light and deafening noise. the result shocks and confuses the adversary and makes him senseless. the aim in this example of achieving shock and awe is to produce so much light and sound or the converse, to deprive the adversary of all senses, and therefore to disable and to disarm. without senses, the adversary becomes impotent and entirely vulnerable. a huge "battlefield" stun grenade that encompasses large areas is a dramatic if unachievable illustration. perhaps a high altitude nuclear detonation that blacks out virtually all electronic and electrical equipment better describes the intended effect regardless of likelihood of use. depriving the enemy, in specific areas, of the ability to communicate, observe, and to interact is a more reasonable and perhaps more achievable variant. this deprival of senses, including all electronics and substitution of false signals or data to create this feeling of impotence, is another variant. above all, shock and awe are imposed instantly and the mechanism or target is deprivation of the senses. the shortcomings of the sas approach mirror in part shortcomings of other approaches. technological solutions are crucial but may not be conceivable outside the emp effects of nuclear weapons. intelligence is clearly vital. without precise knowledge of who and what are to be stunned, this example will not work. the sixth example of applying shock and awe is the "haitian" example (or to the purist, the potemkin village example). it is based on imposing shock and awe through a show of force and indeed through deception, misinformation, and disinformation and is different from the u.s. intervention in haiti in . in the early s, native haitians were seeking to extricate their country from french control. the haitian leaders staged a martial parade for the visiting french military contingent and marched, reportedly, a hand full of battalions repeatedly in review. the french were deceived into believing that the native forces numbered in the tens of thousands and concluded that french military action was futile and that its forces would be overwhelmed. as a result, the haitians were able to achieve their freedom without firing a shot. to be sure, there are points of similarity between the haitian example and the others. deception, disinformation, and guile are more crucial in this regime. however, the target or focus is the will and perception of the intended target. perhaps the sun tzu category comes closest to this one except that while sun tzu is selective in applying force, it is clear that imposing actual pain and shock are essential ingredients and deception, disin-formation, and guile are secondary. demonstrative uses of force are also important. the issue is how to determine what demonstrations will affect the perceptions of the intended target in line with the overall political aims. the weakness of this form of shock and awe is its major dependency on intelligence. one must be certain that the will and perceptions of the adversary can be manipulated. the classic misfire is the adversary who is not impressed and, instead, is further provoked to action by the unintended actions of the aggressor. saddam hussein and the iraqis' invasion of kuwait demonstrate when this potemkin village model can backfire. saddam simply let his bluff be called. the next example is that of "the roman legions." achieving shock and awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own invincibility, even though applying ultimate retribution could take a considerable period of time. the target set encompasses both military and societal values. in occupying a vast empire stretching from the atlantic to the red sea, rome could deploy relatively small number of forces to secure each of these territories. in the first place, roman forces were far superior to native forces individually and collectively. in the second place, if an untoward act occurred, the perpetrator could rest assured that roman vengeance ultimately would take place. this was similar to british "gunboat diplomacy" of the nineteenth century when the british fleet would return to the scene of any crime against the crown and extract its retribution through the wholesale destruction of offending villages. there were several vital factors in rome's ability to achieve shock and awe. the invincibility of its legions, or the perception of that prowess, and the inevitability of retribution were among the most significant factors. in other words, reprisals and the use of force to exact a severe punishment, as well as the certainty that this sword of damocles would descend, were essential ingredients. the distinction between this category and the others is the ex post facto nature of achieving shock and awe. in the other categories, there is the need for seizing the initiative and applying con-temporaneous force to achieve shock and awe. with the roman example, the shock and awe have already been achieved. it is the breakdown of this regime or the rise of new and as yet unbowed adversaries that leads to the reactive use of force. the major shortcoming is the assumption of the inevitability of reprisals and the capacity to take punitive action. that is not and may not always be the case with the united states, although we can attempt to make others believe it will be. the takeover of the embassy in tehran by dissident "students" in and american impotence in the aftermath are suggestive of the shortcoming. that aside, the example or perception of the invincibility of american military power is not a bad one to embellish. the next category for achieving shock and awe is termed the decay and default model and is based on the imposition of societal breakdown over a lengthy period but without the application of massive destruction. this example is obviously not rapid but cumulative. in this example, both military and societal values are targets. selective and focused force is applied. it is the long-term corrosive effects of the continuing breakdown in the system and society that ultimately compels an adversary to surrender or to accept terms. shock and awe are therefore not immediate either in application or in producing the end result. economic embargoes, long-term policies that harass and aggravate the adversary, and other types of punitive actions that do not threaten the entire society but apply pressure as in the chinese water torture, a drop at a time, are the mechanisms. finally, the preoccupation with the decay and disruption of society produces a variant of shock and awe in the form of frustration collapsing the will to resist. the significant weakness of this approach is time duration. in many cases, the time required to impose such a regime of shock and awe is unacceptably long or simply cannot be achieved by conventional or politically acceptable means. the final example is that of "the royal canadian mounted police," whose unofficial motto was "never send a man where you can send a bullet." the distinction between this example and the others is that this example is even more selective than sun tzu and implies that standoff capabilities as opposed to forces in place can achieve the required objectives. there should not be too fine a point, however, in belaboring differences with the other examples in this regard over standoff. a stealthy aircraft bombing unimpededly is not distinct from a cruise missile fired at , miles regarding the effect of ordnance on target. a few observations about these examples offer insights on which to test and evaluate means of applying rapid dominance. it is clear that the targets in each category include military, civilian, industrial, infrastructure, and societal components of a country or group. in certain cases, time is the crucial consideration in imposing shock and awe and in most of the examples, emphasis is on a rapid or sudden imposition of shock and awe. however, in several examples, the effects of shock and awe must be and are cumulative. they are either achieved over time or achieved through earlier conditioning and experiences. not all of these categories are dependent on technology or on new technological breakthroughs. what is relatively new or different is the extent to which brilliance and competence in using force, in understanding where an adversary's weak points lie and in executing military operations with deftness, are vital. while this recognition is not new, emphasis is crucial on exploiting brilliance and therefore on the presumption that brilliance may be taught or institutionalized and is not a function only of gifted individuals. there is also a key distinction between selective or precise and massive application of force. technology, in the form of "zero cep" weapons, may provide the seemingly contradictory capability of systems that are both precise and have the net consequence of imposing massive disruption, destruction, or damage. this damage goes beyond the loss of power grids and other easily identifiable industrial targeting sets. loss of all communications can have a massively destructive impact even though physical destruction can be relatively limited. in some of the examples, the objective is to apply brutal levels of power and force to achieve shock and awe. in the attempt to keep war "immaculate," at least in limiting collateral damage, one point should not be forgotten. above all, war is a nasty business or, as sherman put it, "war is hell." while there are surely humanitarian considerations that cannot or should not be ignored, the ability to shock and awe ultimately rests in the ability to frighten, scare, intimidate, and disarm. the clausewitzian dictum concerning the violent nature of war is dismissed only at our peril. for a policy maker in the white house or pentagon and the concerned member of congress with responsibility for providing for the common defense, what lessons emerge from these examples and hierarchies? first, there are always broader sets of operational concepts and constructs available for achieving political objectives than may be realized. not all of these alternatives are necessarily better or feasible. however, the examples suggest that further intellectual and conceptual effort is a worthwhile investment in dealing with national security options in the future. second, time becomes an opportunity as well as a constraint in generating new thinking. in many past cases, time was generally viewed as an adversary. we had to race against several clocks to arrive "firstest with the mostest," to prevent an enemy from advancing, or to ensure we had ample forces on station should they be required. rapid dominance would alleviate many of these constraints as we would have the capacity to deploy effective forces far more quickly. therefore, in this case, we can view time as an ally. the political issue rests in longstanding arguments to limit the president from having the capacity to deploy or use force quickly, thereby involving the nation without conferring with full consultation with congress. while this is an obvious point, it should not eliminate alternative types of force packages derived from rapid dominance from full consideration and experimentation. indeed, our experience with nuclear weapons and emergency release procedures shows that delegating instant presidential authority can be handled responsibly. responding to the precise, rapid, and massive criteria of several models, it is clear that one capability not presently in the arsenal is a "zero-cep" weapon, meaning one that is precise and timely. it is also clear that, while deception, guile, and brilliance are important attributes in war, there are no guarantees that they can be institutionalized in any military force. another capability that rapid dominance would stress relates to the sun tzu example. suppose there are "emp-like" or high powered microwave (hpm) systems that can be fielded and provide broad ability to incapacitate even a relatively primitive society. in using these weapons, the nerve centers of that society would be attacked rather than using this illustrative system to achieve hard target kill because there were few hard targets. to be sure, hpm and emp-like systems have been and are being carefully researched. finally, to return to the idea that deception, disinformation, and misinformation are crucial aspects of waging war, rapid dominance would seek to achieve several further capabilities. by using complete signature management, larger formations could be made to look like smaller and smaller formations made to seem larger. at sea, carrier battle groups could be disguised and smaller warships could be made to appear as large formations. this signature management would apply across the entire spectrum of the senses and not just radar or electronic ranges. indeed, gaining the ability to regulate what information and intelligence are both available and not available to the adversary is a key aim. this is more than denial or deception. it is control in the fullest sense of the word. the next step is to match the four significant characteristics that define rapid dominance- knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control-with shock and awe against achievable military objectives in order to derive suitable strategies and doctrines, configure forces and force packages accordingly, and determine those integrated systems and innovative uses of technologies and capabilities that will provide the necessary means to achieve these objectives in conditions that include both the mrc and ootw. strategic, policy, and operational application in assessing the future utility and applicability of rapid dominance, it is crucial to consider the political context in which force is likely to be employed. as we enter the next century, the probability is low that an overriding, massive, direct threat posed by a peer-competitor to the u.s. will emerge in the near term. without compelling reasons, public tolerance toward american sacrifice abroad will remain low and may even decrease. this reluctance on the part of americans to tolerate pain is directly correlated to perceptions of threat to u.s. interests. without a clear and present danger, the definition of national interest may remain narrow. americans have always appreciated rapid and decisive military solutions. but, many challenges or crises in the future are likely to be marginal to u.s. interests and therefore may not be resolvable before american political staying power is exhausted. in this period, political micro-management and fine tuning are likely to be even more prevalent as administrations respond to public sentiments for minimizing casualties and, without a threat or compelling reason, u.s. involvement. future actions and measures may likely reflect "politically correct" alternatives. in , the gulf war came close to presenting the nearly optimal situation for prosecution to a decisive and irreversible conclusion. such a course, however, was not politically feasible because it would have shattered the allied coalition while exceeding the authority of the un mandate. military operations that impact across a whole population or cause "innocent civilians" to suffer (e.g., some economic sanctions, collateral damage from raids) also are likely to be only politically acceptable in aggravated situations. for example, if economic sanctions cause malnutrition or other health problems or collateral damage from bombing or shelling impacts hospitals, schools, orphanages, or refugee camps, the policy may be the ultimate victim. the u.s. military is more likely to find itself in a supporting foreign policy role with discrete missions that are only one facet of a larger political context. this context is almost certainly going to expand into militarily grey areas of ootw, including those impinging on law enforcement and ensuring political stability. forces may be called upon to deal with or control situations on the margin rather than to achieve total submission or defeat of an opponent. the prevailing political preference is likely to continue to be to try to bound these complex challenges through fine tuning, artificial constructs, and discretely limited tasks, often performed in the midst of internal conflict. economic sanctions (e.g., serbia, iraq), "no fly" zones (e.g., southern and northern iraq and bosnia), "safe havens" (e.g., bosnia), humanitarian relief delivered by "all means necessary" (e.g., somalia, bosnia), and embassy protection and evacuation (e.g., liberia in and again in ) are the kinds of ootw tasks more likely to be assigned by policy makers. such tasks tend to be inconclusive and of long duration. they also increase vulnerability to terrorist attack such as the bombing of the kolbah barracks in riyadh in june . americans prefer not to intervene, especially when the direct threat to the u.s. is ambiguous, tenuous, or difficult to define. therefore, when intervention is necessary there is likely to be both a political and practical imperative to have allied or international involvement or at least the political cover of the un, nato, or appropriate ngos. as more states (and sub-national groups) acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction (wmd) capabilities and longer range delivery means, the ability for rogues to inflict pain will increase as will the ability to ratchet up the political risks. wmd can easily complicate our ability to influence positive and constructive behavior of possessors. because of the threat of retaliation, wmd capabilities may become politically acceptable targets provided collateral damage to civilians is minimized. preemption may become a more realistic option along the lines of israel's strikes against syria's nuclear reactors in . it is, however, a responsible state's worst nightmare to have successfully struck a chemical, biological, or nuclear production facility with precision only to learn the next day that hundreds of civilians have been killed due to the inadvertent release of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials. there must also be an appropriate political context that justifies the use of preemptive force, as opposed to less destructive or non-lethal types of sanctions (e.g., responses to terrorism in the case of libya, invasion of kuwait by iraq, exports of wmd to a threatening country such as iran, the north korean threat to south korea and japan). the u.s. will, nevertheless, need to maintain the capability to deter and defeat both strategic and other direct threats to its vital interests, preferably on a decisive basis. in an unsettled, less structured, and volatile world, the ability to use force with precision, effectiveness, impunity, and, when needed, rapidity, will still be a powerful influence on cooperation, stability, and, where relevant, submission. imposing rapid dominance on a nation, group, or situation, if achievable, will be a highly desirable and relevant asset in this turbulent period. bosnia offers an example. at the outset of the breakup of yugoslavia, if we had had this type of capability, without potentially high costs, to counter effectively the widely predicted invasion of bosnia, the u.s. strategy for dealing with that tangled and messy situation might have been much different. thousands of lives might have been spared. in other grey or marginal situations rapid dominance could make the difference between a politically acceptable response or inadequate action with consequences similar to what happened in bosnia. in considering how rapid dominance might apply and might be used, it is first important to know what it is that we want to achieve with military force. we need to consider whether the application of force will allow us to influence and control an adversary's will or merely exacerbate a bad situation. therefore, it is essential to know what is of value to that adversary. an objective, realistic, and in-depth situational grasp will be essential to such an understanding. for example, disarming or destroying may produce unintended consequences. for a conventional foe that values its military and depends on technology, rapid dominance should be particularly effective and persuasive. in the case of less developed nations, however, the opportunity for exercising influence in this way and against military formations may be considerably less and must be carefully assessed. as noted, in cases of marginal direct threats to u.s. security, the cost in casualties needs to be low. to be effective, we must take away an opponent's ability to make it cost us in terms of casualty levels we consider intolerable. in applying rapid dominance we also must be defending something which is of value to us. the lower the value in terms of our national interests, the lower the price we are likely to be willing to pay. in mrc situations, we need to have the capability to defeat, destroy, or incapacitate an opponent. on the other hand, in ootw, other non-military factors are likely to be involved and goals made more limited. for example, it may be necessary to intimidate or capture the leadership in order to restore order or reverse an action, or it may simply be necessary to anticipate, prevent, and counter opposition to conduct of a more limited mission (e.g., feeding the starving or protecting innocent people from genocide). in u.s. planning for ootw, it is a virtual given that risk will be minimized and there will be a discrete and proportional use of force with minimal collateral damage. this means that there must be a belief that a mission can be accomplished and is worth the resources necessary to do so. before initiating action in these often confusing situations, objectives must be clearly established and, once engaged, there should be a willingness to persevere through the inevitable rough patches. whether in an mrc or in ootw, we first will need to know what we want to achieve with rapid dominance. this is a task for political leadership which is informed with military advice concerning what is feasible, what is not, and what is uncertain. the extent of the mission must be clearly defined. is it to defeat an enemy so it will no longer pose a threat? do we only need to stop an adversary from carrying out a particular act? must we control a situation entirely or only sufficiently to be able to carry out a specific mission? can we really affect the adversary's will? recent events give us examples of outcomes likely to be relevant in the future. mrcs call for the full spectrum of outcomes-from reversing military action (e.g., the invasion of kuwait); to establishing a government more acceptable to the u.s. and the world, probably using military coercion (haiti, panama); to eliminating a threat to the u.s. or its allies. we may want to persuade an adversary to cease an aggression or act of interference or otherwise change behavior we cannot accept or tolerate. political expectations in mrcs are for the effective use of force and for rapid success or at least steady progress. casualties should be moderate or at least acceptable, with the threshold of american pain dependent on the directness of the threat to u.s. interests and with the degree of compellance appropriate to the political rationale. ootw present a different set of challenges. these challenges are likely to require discrete dominance of specific circumstances rather than total dominance. the general tasks may include a wide variety of requirements. for example, it may be necessary to try to prevent or stop genocide (e.g., rwanda) and ethnic cleansing (e.g., bosnia). the task may be to cooperate with a humanitarian relief effort (e.g., prevention of starvation in somalia or bosnia). the goal of employing force may be free and fair elections (e.g., cambodia, bosnia). the requirement could be to destroy a limited objective (e.g., an above-ground or underground chemical weapons plant or documented nuclear weapons facilities developed by hostile or unfriendly states). other tasks could simply be to preserve international rights (e.g., protecting the neutral shipping of the western oil flow in the gulf during the iran-iraq war). a more testing challenge might be to accomplish a limited political goal (e.g., gesture to deal with israeli incursion in lebanon in ). we undoubtedly will face the future requirement to reverse a potential threat to americans or to a region of importance with a limited military action (e.g., in grenada in or the mayaguez rescue in cambodia in ). discrete moves to bolster preventive diplomacy and/or overt measures to demonstrate preparedness to assist (e.g., forces sent to sudan to support chad under threat of invasion from libya and recent navy operations in the taiwan strait) will still be relevant. countering terrorism also will be part of a continuing agenda (hostage rescue-e.g., iran, lebanon; hijacking-e.g., _achille lauro_; deterrent to further moves-e.g., the higgins operation, libyan raids, missile attack on iraq after the threat to former president bush). we may also need to interdict weapons, terrorists, or other discrete cargoes moving between nations (e.g., north korean missile shipments to iran, iranian and libyan arms exchanges). economic sanctions are likely to continue to be a preferable political alternative or a necessary political prelude to an offensive military step (e.g., implemented as the first step in actions to counter libyan-sponsored terrorism; tried first as an alternative to war with iraq; used ineffectively against the serbs to try to convince them not to continue to support bosnian serb aggression; and tried with haiti as an unsuccessful alternative to occupation). our past experience has been that we seldom have had decisive or immediate results from these economic measures, sanctions, and embargoes. considerable time is required to have impact and we have not been particularly efficient in controlling the leakage and spillover in these situations. sanctions almost always require full international cooperation which cannot be assumed or guaranteed. in bosnia, of course, some portions of the arms embargo were deliberately allowed to be permeable and the u.s. turned a blind eye to iran's support of the bosnians. past experience also has taught us some relevant lessons about the potential of shock and awe. improvements in the capabilities enhancing these outcomes could make a decisive difference in dealing with future challenges. history also cautions us as well that there will be restraints in employing rapid dominance and that there are fundamental differences in mrc and ootw applications. shock and awe, when properly applied, have been very effective in the past. they will be effective in the future, even when applied in limited ways that do not reflect the more encompassing impact envisioned by rapid dominance. there are many examples of how a very limited application of force made a significant difference through the mechanisms of shock and awe. experiences, including successes and failures, illustrate some of the potential of rapid dominance if implemented effectively. the vietnam war provides certain lessons. when b- strikes, which made the ground rumble, were added to the equation during the christmas bombing of hanoi, dragging negotiations with the north vietnamese on a peace agreement moved swiftly to an acceptable conclusion. daily reports following the controversial b- "carpet" bombing raids in cambodia talked of north vietnamese/vietcong soldiers wandering around in a daze due to shock and concussion. both b- s and naval gunfire, especially from inch guns of a battleship, had a similar impact on invading north vietnamese troop concentrations. the mining of haiphong harbor, although initiated late in the war, was equally effective in immediately stopping shipping in and out of north vietnam. when president nixon wanted to deal with the perplexing problems of our pows and failing domestic morale, as well as take away substantial political leverage from the north vietnamese, he directed the raid to rescue prisoners jailed just outside hanoi. the raid itself was well executed. american forces reached and searched the prison and returned safely. but no americans were freed because a last minute transfer of the pows from the prison had not been detected. if there had been prisoners still there to be rescued, the operation would have been a highly dramatic and influential event. the point is that accurate and timely intelligence remains crucial. there seems to be little doubt that the combined f- and naval air strike against libya in in response to the discotheque terrorist attack in germany gave gadhafi pause. the perception that he personally might be targeted appeared to get gadhafi's attention. when our troops were having difficulty dislodging grenadian soldiers from their main fortress, marine tanks were sailed around the island to confront them. at the sight of tank guns, the seemingly stubborn occupants surrendered almost immediately without a fight. the cease fire in the bloody iran-iraq war was quick to follow after the commencement of daily iraqi long-range rocket bombardments of tehran that amounted to a reign of terror. given that both sides were exhausted at that point, a show of force could have been convincing. strong u.s. action in response to iran's mining of neutral waters may also have had a sobering effect on the mullahs. not only were iran's vulnerable oil-producing platforms in the gulf boarded and destroyed with impunity by the u.s., but iranian naval forces that had come out to challenge the u.s. navy were destroyed. iraq's reign of terror, and the strong american message to iran, possibly helped end the war. in our troublesome stay in somalia, ac- gunships earned immediate respect from potential troublemakers with their ability to see wide areas night or day, remain on station for hours as night patrols, and strike with precision and relative impunity. the methodical drone of ac- s circling in the air was enough to restore some order, although a few civilians found the noise unsettling. in another situation, the aftermath of systematic un efforts to destroy faction leader mohamed aideed's illegal arms facilities generated an unexpected reaction from other warlords, including those colluding with him, which was to volunteer to hand over their own weapons storage areas. for a fleeting moment, shock and awe created an important opportunity. during the many vagaries of the bosnia tragedy, it would appear that when nato accurately delivered potent doses of air power, rather than occasional pin pricks, the serbs seemed finally to understand that an appearance of cooperation rather than defiance was in their interest. this nato message in the form of air power, of course, was strengthened by the effectiveness of the accompanying croatian/muslim counter-offensive and the fatigue of bosnian serb fighters. sustaining the shock effect with forces on the ground was a necessary combination to gain the staying power effect to change the will of the serbs. it was not accomplished by air alone. timing remains important. past failures also offer examples of how rapid dominance might have made a difference in reacting to those difficult situations. rapid dominance might have provided a better response to those setbacks or might have offered a more effective alternative that would have avoided the vulnerabilities in those situations in the first place (e.g., bay of pigs, iran embassy rescue in , lebanon marine barracks bombing in , response to the pueblo seizure by north korea in , and the reaction to the downed helicopters during the ranger raid in somalia). we should also learn from other states who have demonstrated effective application of the characteristics of rapid dominance. israel's rout of syria's air force and missile defenses in lebanon's baaka valley shows how dramatic success can have political spillover. on the other hand, japan's surprise attack on pearl harbor produced the reverse effects of shock and awe and had the unintended consequence of galvanizing the u.s. into action. even without a rapid dominance capability or when facing a more technologically dependent opponent, it is clear from these examples and many others in recent u.s. experiences that certain improvements in capabilities would provide us with greater flexibility in the future. this is especially true in ootw situations, which require a multiplicity of effective instruments at our disposal. it is also true that certain operations such as peacekeeping tend to be manpower intensive. if we are to stay ahead of an adversary and deny things of value to that adversary, dynamic, accurate, and integrated intelligence is essential. intelligence needs to move to levels unprecedented in scope, timeliness, accuracy, and availability in real time. the gulf war, despite its success, showed classic limitations in intelligence. even though we had nearly every intelligence asset designed to deal with the ussr available for use, we were unable to detect the full extent of iraq's wmd capability; unable to find mobile missile launchers even with a major expenditure of on-scene assets; in some cases, we could only "see" kilometers in front of our advancing forces; and we mistakenly attacked targets we thought were legitimate but had civilians inside. in some instances, only reliable human intelligence may provide the necessary information (for example, in order to understand what is happening in deep underground facilities). another important capability we should try to achieve in the future is the ability to intimidate, capture, convince, or significantly influence the perceptions and understanding of individual troublemakers. this need has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent years (e.g., gadhafi in libya, aideed in somalia, saddam hussein in iraq, noreiga in panama). such a perception is particularly relevant when the problem appears not to be caused by a unified population but by the ambitions of individual leaders who have intimidated or killed off any likely internal opposition. such a capability requires effective real-time intelligence and a variety of methods for accomplishing the task (from exceptionally precise weapons to effective "snatch" operations). in a world in which non-lethal sanctions are a political imperative, we will continue to need the ability to shut down all commerce into and out of any country from shipping, air, rail, and roads. we ought to be able to do this in a much more thorough, decisive, and shocking way than we have in the past. the ability to apply pressure or cause acquiescence employing non-lethal means also will be important in some circumstances. weapons that shock and awe, stun and paralyze, but do not kill in significant numbers may be the only ones that are politically acceptable in the future. this also means that crowd control with minimum violence may be needed. in certain circumstances, the costs of having to resort to lethal force may be too politically expensive in terms of local support as well as support in the u.s. and internationally. as is already well recognized, we need to be able to shut down key electronic communications to, from, and within a country (or within a specific sub-group or faction). we also need the ability to control radio and television within a country. it is important, however, in all cases, to be able to deny an adversary's ability to communicate and to have our own means of reaching the population with appropriate messages. in addition to being able to eliminate military capabilities selectively, including weapons systems, overt and covert stockpiles, fuel, wmd, and related logistics, we will need to have the capability selectively to incapacitate, neutralize, or destroy other things considered of great value to opponents. increased targeting precision will compound effectiveness as well as help to avoid the political pitfalls of using force such as the inevitable, unintended collateral damage that has been the pattern of the past. more surgical and carefully crafted applications of force, however, will only partially reduce the restraints and limits on utilizing rapid dominance in mrcs and ootw. there are substantial differences in the political constraints likely to be imposed in dealing with mrcs and with ootw. for example, there is much greater latitude to use dominant force and shock and awe in mrcs than in ootw. in mrc situations, we are often likely to face conventional powers which are well organized, well equipped, and broadly dependent on technology. although more powerful, these developed states are also likely to be especially vulnerable to a technologically sophisticated approach such as rapid dominance as long as we maintain this military edge and the ability to neutralize their military systems. even in the most compelling circumstance where a rapid dominance force is used, however, support from other nations will be politically desirable. in most circumstances there will be limits to the targets of value to an adversary which can be destroyed as well as to the numbers and types of weapons that can be employed. for example, the political circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be employed are quite limited. in both mrcs and ootw, certain actions are politically as well as morally unacceptable except in extreme cases. such restrictions are likely to apply to targets affecting control of access to food, water, and clean air, and to destruction of religious and cultural centers, even if there is low collateral damage. in ootw situations, we are much more vulnerable to criticism of using excessive force, especially if there is civilian or collateral damage. the concept of proportionality is likely to remain an operative principle in u.s. policy and may be taken to extremes, especially if the marginal nature of a situation leads to a marginal and ineffective response. some people, both military and civilian, even argue that superior technology should not be employed in such situations and that an adversary should be fought on his own terms. while such arguments should be rejected, they nonetheless sometimes have a political influence that must be considered. we should always use technology to minimize our casualties, give us every advantage, reduce collateral damage, and make us look more formidable. at the same time, there needs to be sufficient provocation to warrant destruction or denial. our actions must always be consistent with our own system of values. the "rapid" component of rapid dominance is one of the most appealing aspects of the concept, both politically and militarily. the ability to take action that is timely and decisive multiplies substantially the chances of ultimate success. action needs to be taken precisely when it will have greatest impact. often initial public outrage and political support for action in response to a provocation subsides if a prolonged buildup is necessary in order to prepare to take action. the ability to react faster than an adversary, to assimilate information and act on it effectively, is also an important advantage. in a nato region-wide dynamic computer war game a few years ago, it was clear that the simulated enemy was advancing faster than the defensive chain of command could make counter moves. the tradition of sending decisions up the line was simply too slow to cope with the dynamic challenge posed by the adversary. commanders on scene lacked the authority to respond and adjust to rapidly changing situations. the exercise graphically demonstrated to the country involved the need to institute fundamental command and control streamlining. it also demonstrated the advantages of being able to make local decisions in real time while still effectively coordinating and optimizing the overall effort. the navy's "command by negation" concept evolved in the s in order to deal with the rapidity of the air/missile threat and the need to integrate dynamically the offensive and defensive missile, air, sea, and undersea capabilities of a battle group and its joint components (e.g., awacs). this concept was one way of solving the time problem while keeping the overall commander in the picture. the commander could then intervene and modify actions as necessary to conform to the broader strategy. this type of control was helped by the evolution of electronic links and secure communications and the availability of satellites. commanders employing rapid dominance will need to orchestrate it using similar principles, while applying greater selective ability to turn on and off a variety of systems, sensors, and devices influencing the whole operational picture. technology should also give commanders a much better grasp of what is evolving during a battle. just as the american military of today has made "owning the night" part of its tactical advantage, "owning" the dimension of time will be critical to the success of rapid dominance. in conceptual terms, the following is suggestive of a future force configuration and the design of a mission capability package (mcp) based on rapid dominance. operational construct rapid dominance is based on affecting the adversary's will, perception, and knowledge through imposing sufficient shock and awe to overcome resistance, allowing us to achieve our aims. four characteristics are vital: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control of the environment. application of all or of selective capabilities within the rapid dominance systems of systems will then decisively direct the application of military/defense resources and produce the requisite outcome. rapid dominance envisages the execution of specific actions in real or near real time to counter actions or intentions deemed detrimental to u.s. interests. on the high end of conflict, rapid dominance would introduce a reaction of shock and awe in areas of highest value to the threatening individual, group, or state. in many cases, prior understanding of the power of rapid dominance would act as a deterrent to the objectionable action. when used, rapid dominance would ensure favorable early resolution of issues with minimal loss of lives and collateral damage. the concept theoretically should be able to impact adversarial situations that apply across the board to high, mid, low, no, or minimal technology threats. rapid dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war fighting capabilities to a new level. rapid dominance requires a sophisticated, interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications systems, data analysis, and real-time deliverable actionable information to the shooter. this network must provide total situational awareness and supporting nodal analysis that enables u.s. forces to act inside the adversary's decision loop in a manner that on the high end produces shock and awe among the threat parties. properly detailed nodal analysis of this knowledge grid will enable the shutting down of specific functions or all essential functions near simultaneously. this will often times be netted pieces of data where the sum of the parts gives the answer and the battlefield advantage to the force possessing this rapidly netted information. the "rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real-time actionable targeting information to the appropriate shooter, whether the shooter is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery battery, an individual rifle man, a naval battle group, an individual ship, an air wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. this means the need to have the right shooter in the right place; locating and identifying the target correctly and quickly; allocating and assigning targets rapidly; getting the "shoot" order or general authority to the shooter; and then assessing the battle damage accurately. at whatever the unit level, shock and awe are provided by the speed and effectiveness of this cycle. then, the ability to do this simultaneously throughout the battlefield creates a strategic shock and awe on the opposing forces, their leadership, and populous. this simultaneity and concurrency are central tenets of imposing shock and awe. when the video results of these attacks are broadcast in real time worldwide on cnn, the positive impact on coalition support and negative impact on potential threat support can be decisive. the first priority of a doctrine of rapid dominance should be to deter, alter, or affect the will and therefore those actions that are either unacceptable to u.s. national security interests or endanger the democratic community of states and access to free markets. these political objectives are generally those envisioned in the major and lower regional conflict scenarios (mrc & lrc). should deterrence fail, the application of rapid dominance in these circumstances should create sufficient shock and awe to the immediate threat forces and leadership as well as provide a clear message for other potential threat partners. the doctrine of rapid dominance would not be limited to mrc and lrc scenarios. it has applications in a variety of areas such as countering wmd, terrorism, and perhaps other tasks. the challenge is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response based on rapid dominance must be proportional to the threat, yet decisive enough to convey the right degree of shock and awe. rapid dominance cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. we repeat our disclaimer that this is not a silver bullet. however, rapid dominance and its capacity for achieving shock and awe could be applied for egregious threats or violations of international law, such as: - direct military threats to the territory of the u.s., its friends, and allies; - blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small state; - rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of wmd; - egregious violations of human rights on a large scale; and - threat to essential world markets. clearly, the information highway is crossing all sovereign borders and penetrating even the most closed societies. the inequities and benefits in all societies are becoming known to the masses as well as the power brokers. the requirement for rapid dominance to develop sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the information highway and create road blocks as well as control inputs/outputs to the highway both overtly and covertly is fundamental to the concept. these same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies targeting international crime and drug cartels using the highway. closer interagency cooperations and coordination between military and law enforcement activities and capabilities must be established. experience with the military involvement in the drug war revealed considerable cultural differences between these organizations. overcoming these cultural differences among organizations is not easy. the required trust and confidence for sharing sensitive information and support between these agencies and the military needs to be developed further. interagency coordination and cooperation must be raised to a new level of sophistication. some laws may need to be changed. war in cyberspace does not recognize domestic or foreign boundaries. in this environment the subjects of information warfare and information in warfare take on new meaning and require focused development. we must become proficient within this environment. operational assumptions - the enemy picks the time and place to initiate the conflict (i.e., we are surprised). - we then attain control of the initiative through superior speed, knowledge, and capacity to act and react. - our forces are perceived to be invincible; engagements must convince the enemy there is no hope. - combat must be unrelenting and omnipresent at times, places, and tempo of choosing. - allied operations must be thoroughly integrated, from political objectives through combat to include psychological warfare. - the enemy must be hit in those areas of greatest importance to him and devastated by the ferocity and swiftness of our attack. from these assumptions, certain operational criteria follow that help to define a rapid dominance force with more specificity in improving: - intelligence, indications, and warning on an aggressor's actions - the length of time required for a decision to react - decisive responses at various levels and times after the crises or conflict begins to develop: - respond in to days with air and missile strikes and special forces - respond in to days with more massive power up to and including a joint task force of corps size - respond in to days with a second corps the rapid dominance mcp as a next step, we need to sketch out what a rapid dominance force might look like for a corps-sized air, ground, sea, and space joint task force supported by necessary intelligence assets that can impose sufficient shock and awe to break the will of the adversary. first, this force will emphasize capabilities to maximize the core characteristics of knowledge of self, adversary, and environment; rapidity; brilliance in execution; and control of the environment. knowledge means more than dominant battlefield awareness. it means understanding the adversary's mind and anticipating his reactions. it means targeting those things that will produce the intended shock and awe. and, it means having feedback and good, timely battle assessment to enable knowledge to be used dynamically as well as to know how our forces will react. rapidity means moving and acting as quickly as necessary and always on a timely basis. rapidity can be instant or as required. brilliance in operations means achieving the highest standards of operational competence and, through a superiority of knowledge, maintaining the ability to impose shock and awe through continuously surprising and psychologically and physically breaking the adversary's will to resist. this will require training and exercising of joint land, sea, air, space, and special forces to new standards of excellence and competence. it is mainly in training where the difference lies in achieving operational brilliance. this desired standard of performance can be achieved by making innovations to permit new levels of battlefield fidelity for training units and developing leaders. control of the environment would include complete signature control on the entire battle area out to hundreds of miles. we would control our signatures as well as what we wanted the adversary to see or hear and what we do not want the enemy to know. destruction of the adversary's systems would begin with long-range stealthy, or "stand-off" zero cep weapons, extend to fog-m type battlefield weapons to close-in systems. small units would be able to call in "fires" for degrees on a nearly instant basis. attacks from all aspects would be complemented by deception, disinformation, surveillance, targeting, and killing. "pulse" weapons would be used to disarm and actively deceive the enemy through disrupting and attacking all aspects of the adversary's electronics, information, and c i infrastructure. it is this "lay down" of total power across all areas in rapid and simultaneous actions that would impose the shock and awe. the remainder, roughly a third of this joint task force, would consist of traditional platforms including conventional ground, air, and amphibious forces, naval battle group forces, and the necessary supporting logistical, c i, medical and other capabilities and ground forces to conduct and sustain conventional or traditional operations if needed and to support or defend traditionally vulnerable targets such as ports, roads, and other infrastructure. tactical employment is, of course, dependent on the conditions of the mrc. in general, the most rapidly deployable units of this corps, the future equivalent of the eighteenth airborne corps, would be sent to secure or reinforce a limited area into which the remainder of the force would flow. this aor would be self-protected. our goal is that perhaps a rapid dominance force of as few as , troops could successfully defend against an enemy of - , in an mrc and that a full corps can be deployed within to days. these units would arrive quickly and, as directed, begin disarming, destroying, and disabling the enemy's military wherewithal using "stand-off" capabilities. forward-based or long-range reconnaissance units could be employed/supported by uavs and overhead surveillance. units would be forward deployed in accordance with their time phased plan. these units would be used either to complete the attack or to carry it to the adversary, occupy selective territory physically, or carry out the requirements of the post-war occupation campaign. should traditional forces be needed, they would of course be available. protection and self-defense would partly be provided by controlling the environment. in effect, we would cast a cloak around the adversary and permit the adversary to see and know what we alone provided. this would leave an adversary blind, deaf, and dumb. with superior and rapid firepower, the blinded, deafened enemy would be destroyed and defeated as we saw fit. this would maximize shock and awe and help break the adversary's will. in ootw, the rapid dominance jtf might function as follows. first, the ability to deploy dominant force rapidly to attack or threaten to attack appropriate targets could be brought to bear without involving manpower-intense or manned sensors and weapons. second, once deployed, since self-defense is likely to be required against small arms, mines, and shoulder carried or mortar weapons, certainly some form of "armor" or protective vehicles and shelters would be necessary. however, through the uavs, c i, and virtual reality systems, as well as through signature management and other shock and awe weapons including high powered microwave (hpm) and "stun-like" systems, this force would have more than dominant battlefield awareness. there are, of course, caveats. unless strategic or policy objectives are in line with operational capabilities, military force is unlikely to be a useful instrument. it is also unlikely that any operational construct, no matter how brilliantly conceived, could overcome such a disconnect. vietnam and somalia remind us of these limitations. the assimilation of intelligence-strategically, culturally, and operationally-is a central thrust and component of the knowledge aspect of rapid dominance. our forces must not only fight smarter; these forces, at all or most levels, must be educated and trained differently with far more emphasis on intelligence, broadly defined. this knowledge, when applied rapidly under conditions of brilliance and in a controlled environment, is a centerpiece of rapid dominance. there must be full comprehension of the adversary across strategic, political, military, cultural, intellectual, and perceptual lines. this understanding must go beyond how an adversary might use military force. those crucial values that motivate and underlie a nation or a group must be understood if the appropriate level of shock and awe is to be achieved. there are also obvious questions that must be answered. does rapid dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the conflict spectrum involving more traditional applications of force to achieve political objectives, as envisioned in the mrc and lrc scenarios? yet to be explored is the degree to which a concept of rapid dominance with shock and awe applies to ootw, countering terrorism against u.s. interests, controlling rogue states/leaders, etc. what are the political and military prerequisites to apply rapid dominance? are they applicable and realistically achievable in the increasingly complex interaction of national non-government organizations (pvos/ngos) present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care to refugees and other disenfranchised people? would the concept of rapid dominance with a degree of shock and awe offend and generate counterproductive public relations backlash from those who believe force should only be used as a last resort and then with a measurable degree of proportionality? at this point, we can only raise questions and expect to have them answered at a later date. this line of questions, concerns, and issues as well as a host of others, needs to be examined up front and answered in the rapid dominance concept development process. we must be careful that we do not overvisualize rapid dominance versus the reality of credible/affordable capabilities to execute the concept. rapid dominance must still confront the fog of war. decisions will still be made based on judgment and confidence in the intelligence provided, the estimate of threat intentions, knowledge of true center of gravity targets, and confidence in our own force capabilities to inflict shock and awe. in fact, the key will be the ability to penetrate this fog with increased clarity and to control events now unmanageable through more rapid gathering, analyzing, and distributing actionable information. complicating the issue is the fact that the u.s. has not clearly defined its role in the post-cold war era. as the world's only credible superpower, the u.s. cannot avoid a leadership role but neither can it avoid the focused criticism applied to all leaders. this is the classical "damned if you do and damned if you don't" syndrome. at this stage, the concept of rapid dominance is a work in progress. it needs to be "operationalized." by designing a nominal mcp and fitting with it paper systems and capabilities, we can explore the answers to many of the questions we raised above. three steps are needed to proceed down the road on the way to a real capability. first, feasibility of the requisite technical capabilities needs to be established. second, wargaming of the mcp must be done. third, and perhaps most difficult, deriving the means for implementing the most promising aspects of rapid dominance must occur. an outline for system innovation and technological integration achieving shock and awe is central to rapid dominance, and therefore must serve as the key organizing principle for any rigorous examination and exploitation of system concepts and technologies for rapid dominance. understanding the interplay between technology and doctrine is not only or simply a straightforward matter of establishing operational requirements and then seeking to attain them through invention and design. it is a complex and interactive process of experimentation and discovery wherein intellect, hard work, endurance, and innovation must drive the use of technology. rather than make changes, however significant, to modifying current capabilities or building newer, similar ones, rapid dominance seeks to identify and field systems specifically designed to achieve shock and awe-systems that may break the mold much as the model t ford once did years ago. the genetic decoders in bioengineering laboratories, computer-aided design tools used by engineers, vast database management systems in place in corporate offices, computer-controlled machines enabling composite materials, and the countless academic, business, and personal computers are all evidence of the prominent and ever increasing role information technologies have assumed in modern economies. many of the technologies underlying the information age are being spearheaded by u.s. small business and its entrepreneurial culture. certainly, from the huge consumer electronics firms in japan to software development businesses in india, the rest of the world participates and competes. but few can deny that u.s. industry provides the leadership in and is the preeminent developer of information technologies as they are most broadly defined. this leadership position, properly leveraged, provides the united states with an ever increasing military advantage over competing nations. leveraging technology requires more than merely incorporating it into u.s. forces; it is likely to include a significant redesign of both forces and leadership to embrace these rapidly evolving technologies. many of the technologies that will support rapid dominance are already discernible. unlike the impact of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that a single technology or system will emerge to produce rapid dominance. it will only be attainable through the broadest integration of strategic concepts, doctrine, operational needs, technological advances, system design, and appropriate organization of command, control, training and education. and only a large, immensely capable country such as the u.s. may be able to achieve this. rapid dominance seeks to integrate this confluence of strategy, technology, and innovation. four core characteristics were defined earlier as crucial: - complete knowledge of self, adversary, and the environment; - rapidity; - brilliance of execution; and - control of the environment. what follows is illustrative rather than exhaustive of how technology can be used in a broad system approach. many of these technologies currently are being addressed within the defense community. analysts, military strategists, acquisition planners, and even "futurists" are wrestling with the meaning and consequences of the information age. our focus on systems and technologies begins with these four characteristics. knowledge of self, adversary, and environment in the modern threat environment, it is difficult to estimate where the next crisis may occur, let alone the next war. even years ago, who would have foreseen the significant involvement of the u.s. military in places like somalia, haiti, rwanda, bosnia, and the south china sea? to which hot spots can we expect to see u.s. troops deployed over the next years? over the next ? in this section we argue that, in addition to improving our force capabilities, the u.s. must develop an intelligence repository far more extensive than during the cold war, covering virtually all the important regions and organizational structures throughout the world. during the cold war, intelligence agencies focused more on a bipolar world and built sizable organizations to collect information on "the other side." this same intelligence structure, in the main, is in place today facing a multipolar world, where any number of power structures-whether they be states, international organizations, or even small groups of individuals-must be monitored with an understanding that extends to their leadership, culture, economic direction, and military capability. as the technologies relevant to knowing the adversary and his environment are examined, an emerging theme is the clear shift from technology developments that once resided within our government to those driven by commercial demands. for example, the information technologies used by u.s. intelligence agencies are of such complexity, importance, and expense that they are referred to as "national assets" and are developed and managed by large, dedicated organizations. even here, commercial companies are rapidly encroaching on what once seemed to be an unassailable market position in earth observation systems. one may already purchase synthetic aperture radar interferometry images from any number of sources, and panchromatic visual images with one meter resolution will soon be available over the counter for remarkably little cost. indeed, the only real barrier to this burgeoning market is the understandable concerns that governments have with allowing such technology to be widely available. in areas such as encryption and data security, commercial developers are more likely to reach limits of government acceptance before those of technological capability. with untold billions invested in communications systems, even the most modern u.s. military communication systems often compare poorly with commercial systems. while this has long been the case for fielded systems, it is becoming true for even the most sophisticated research and development programs being undertaken by defense organizations. as a case in point, one may consider a program recently initiated by the defense advanced research projects agency (darpa) called battlefield awareness and data dissemination (badd). at the heart of this program, large amounts of data are collected within a vast database residing on commercial computers and enterprise management systems. this information is then disseminated to the troops through the commercial global broadcast system (gbs) onto "set-top" boxes, an enabling technology that was developed commercially. even with this leveraging of private industry, there is a real question as to whether darpa will be able to field a system that would compete well with surprisingly similar commercial systems. internet channels planned by media industry giants such as bskyb will offer multi-megabit, interactive, digital data connections to the net merely as an enticement for subscribers to enroll for their full digital broadcasting service ( to channels of digital video and sound). understanding that there is much more to badd than the little discussed here, one still almost wonders whether darpa could simply buy a subscription and connect it to an appropriate, commercial, network management system. more to the point, if even well funded and aggressive technology development organizations such as darpa find it difficult to remain ahead of commercial advancements, there may be a fundamental lesson to be learned regarding the management of defense-related technologies. knowledge and intelligence "intelligence" is comprised of five categories of knowledge and understanding: a society's leadership; culture and values; the strategic, political, economic, and physical environment; military capabilities and orders of battle; and comprehensive battlefield information. examples of technologies and system approaches of potential relevance in these areas are discussed below. understanding potential adversaries, coalition partners, and involved neutral countries implies an infrastructure for acquiring an in-depth knowledge about cultures, leadership values, and other driving factors that allow us, when needed and on a timely basis, to get "into their minds." applicable technologies include automated language translators, interactive and autonomous computer simulations, advanced database systems for organizing and understanding data and transactions of individuals and institutions, and computerized educational systems for training and learning these skills. collecting sufficient and timely environmental information is crucial to rapid dominance. logistics, demographics, and infrastructure are broad areas of collection along with geography, road/rail/ship lanes, utility sites and corridors, manufacturing, government sites, military and paramilitary facilities, population demographics, economic and financial pressure points (such as oil wells or gold mines), and major dams and bridges. technologies used to provide environmental awareness include traditional means such as satellites that can be augmented with dynamic sensor management tools for optimizing observation routines. the vast quantities of data that reside on the world's computer networks, if properly exploited, provide another rich source of information. data mining tools, such as web crawlers, gatherers, brokers, and repositories that pull and organize data from public networks, will be essential to building a more complete picture of potential adversaries. since not all databases and host computers are cooperative with these methods, offensive information warfare tools will be required to obtain specific pieces of information that are vital for national security purposes. once data are collected, they must be processed and disseminated and then stored for future access. enterprise data storage and retrieval systems that are capable of working with many terrabytes ( , gigabytes) of information are already commonplace. since it is impossible for humans to comprehend such vast quantities of information without some assistance, data exploitation tools (filters, fusion, automatic target recognition, image understanding, etc.) will be crucial technologies. finally, the information, once processed, will be of little use if not disseminated to the right people in a timely fashion. "intelligent data" dissemination and wide bandwidth communications are examples of essential technologies emerging in this area. in addition to knowledge about regions and locations where u.s. force may be applied, it is important to maintain vigilance and up-to-date knowledge on specific "hot spots" and to have sufficient flexibility within the system to shift attention rapidly to new areas. systems addressing this more time-sensitive set of tasks would include light, quickly deployable satellites, high altitude and endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, manned platforms, and unattended ground sensors. as a crisis unfolds and the insertion of u.s. troops or other military action becomes more probable, information needs and the number of information consumers both increase dramatically. information that must be collected and correlated include targeting, battle damage assessment (bda), weather, terrain, infrastructure, tracking of special targets, logistics, position and status of our own troops, identification friend or foe (iff), and status of material. it is vitally important that sufficient sensor systems work in all weather conditions and at night to maintain the "operations tempo" required by rapid dominance. battlefield awareness requires three information technologies: collection, fusion, and dissemination of real-time actionable information to a shooter. rapid dominance requires an unprecedented level of real-time information collection that will be provided by sensor systems such as space platforms, uavs, unattended ground sensors, and advanced manned reconnaissance platforms. in addition, the entire infosphere of the adversary will be monitored not only for classic information such as operational commands but also to determine the shock effect being created by rapid dominance operations. collecting data from cooperative sources such as one's own troops, allies, and friendly non-combatants is also critical. while _operation desert storm_ showed the value of self-location sensors such as gps, the friendly fire casualties demonstrated that there is still work to be done in terms of giving each commander and soldier sufficient information to operate effectively. much of this information, such as the physiological status of individual combatants, is not currently collected, and much of what is sensed is not properly disseminated. it would be hard to overstate the importance of information dissemination within rapid dominance. administering shock and awe requires a spectrum of attacks that the adversary is unable to fathom, but our own forces must operate effectively, even aggressively, within an environment that could easily lead to serious information bottlenecks and overload. commercial technologies will be key to the u.s. developing a structure to effectively disseminate information. already, commercial communications technologies such as global broadcast satellites and protocols like those underlying the internet have been used as stop gaps by the u.s. military in major deployments. merely transmitting the right information at the right time will not be sufficient for operations enabling rapid dominance. information will need to be fused to create knowledge-based displays. the technologies that will be important in this area go beyond the data fusion algorithms currently in place and should leverage heavily off of technologies in fields such as computer image generation, virtual reality, and advanced simulation. rapidity in a technology sense, rapidity includes the speed of operational planning, determining appropriate action, deployment, and employment all focused toward minimizing response time. three factors combine to make military planning far more difficult today than in the cold war era. first, there is great uncertainty early on in the location of a conflict, who the adversary may be, and with whom one may be allied. second, there is normally very little time available for planning, with the military sometimes having only weeks or days before committing troops to an unanticipated mission. third, vastly more information is available to the planner, which is both a blessing and a curse. several technologies that partially define intelligent dynamic planning will make it easier for the commander to plan rapid dominance: - model based planning - machine intelligence - dynamic planning based upon feedback and new information - selectively automated decision aides (commanders associate) - imbedded rehearsal and training - brilliance in execution it is impossible to institutionalize brilliance. however, the standard can be set. the dynamic planning noted above is part of the capability for this characteristic as are the systems and technologies discussed below. technologies critical to achieving brilliance in rapid dominance for shock to be administered with minimum collateral damage, key targets of value must be neutralized or destroyed, and the enemy must be made to feel completely helpless and unable to consider a meaningful response. furthermore, the enemy's confusion must be complete, adding to a general impression of impotence. most importantly, strategic targets, military forces, leadership and key societal resources must be located, tracked, and targeted. this will require substantial sensor, computational, and communication technologies. designated targets must be destroyed rapidly and with assurance. finally, the status and position of friendly forces must be known at all times, and the logistics supporting them must be sufficiently flexible to allow for rapid movement, reconfiguration, and decentralization of location. several technologies that can help in this are discussed below, as divided into the following subsections: sensors, computational systems, communications and system integration. sensor technologies sensor technologies are grouped into four areas: active, passive, imbedded, and processing. _active sensors:_ by far, the most important of the energy-emitting sensors is radar. among the best all-weather capabilities of any type of sensor, the role for and capabilities of radar have steadily increased since the second world war. radar systems are used for early warning, air defense, air asset management, air traffic control, naval fleet defense, detection and tracking of moving ground targets, missile targeting, missile terminal guidance, terrain data development, and weather prediction. for rapid dominance, radars and other active sensors must operate with low probability of intercept. particularly with stealthy systems, this will present a unique challenge to military systems where one may not expect a great amount of "spin-on" from the commercial sector. it is vitally important to be able to sense the enemy under all conditions and environments. sensors must penetrate foliage and walls and detect threats such as underground and underwater mines. there are many other important active sensor classes, three of which are active acoustics, lidar and magnetic anomaly detectors. broadband underwater active acoustics could address pressing needs such as shallow-water anti-submarine warfare and mine detection (both buried and silt covered). the practical application of lidar is a relatively recent development enabled by advances in laser, power management, and data processing technologies. lidar can be used for fire control, weapon guidance, foliage penetration (vegetation is translucent in the near infrared (nir) regime), and target imaging/recognition. lidar detects shape directly and shape fluctuations such as vibration and motion and has proven very hard to spoof. magnetic anomaly detectors will continue to find application in areas of anti-mine and anti-submarine warfare and in screening for weapons at security checkpoints and elsewhere. electronic emissions are of themselves a liability only where they create a signature of use to an enemy. the ability to emit energy, yet in ways that are less discernible, should be an attractive avenue to explore for the future. the coordinated application of many sensor platforms, some of which may be completely passive, in conjunction with emitting sensors is a potentially major area of exploration. _passive sensors:_ among the passive sensor types, the most important for u.s. forces is forward-looking infrared (flir). flir technology has allowed the u.s. to "own the night," as was handily displayed in _operation desert storm_. some of the significant technology advancements underway in this area include multiple wavelength sensors, very large focal planes, and the increasing performance of uncooled sensors. particularly in the area of uncooled sensors, commercial developments are underway that promise to drastically reduce the cost of competent ir sensors. other passive sensor technologies of note include hyperspectral visible/nir collection and processing and inexpensive, scatterable, unattended ground sensors (acoustic, seismic, "hot spot," etc.). hyperspectral imaging allows target searches to be conducted in the frequency domain, as opposed to the spatial domain as is the norm today. this provides a powerful new input for automatic target recognition (atr) systems, is useful for addressing low observables (lo), and is especially important for remote imaging assets. unattended ground sensors allow critical areas to be monitored continually. for example, the actual area of operations for scuds in ods was relatively small, but it was very difficult for then-current sensing systems to oversee. technologies being developed in the area of microelectromechanical systems, in particular, hold promise for enabling capable and inexpensive sensor fields. _imbedded sensors:_ monitoring the position and status of blue and friendly forces and assets is of equal importance in tracking the enemy. gps presented a tremendous advantage to troops in ods. this capability needs to be extended down to the individual soldier, and the status of all critical material and personnel needs to be tracked. _sensor signal processing:_ finally, the signals from modern sensors are of limited use without proper processing and presentation to the user. this area will be developed further in the computational technologies section. technologies that are historically grouped with sensor systems include automatic target recognition, imbedded multisensor fusion and correlation, and displays. computational technologies the capabilities of the integrated circuit (ic), and in particular the microprocessor, continue to increase unabated. certainly, physical limits must be approached at some point, but each looming barrier has so far been met by technological innovation. nevertheless, should the march of ic improvements slow somewhat, the software and networking technologies that are being developed at an accelerating pace will permit the vision of rapid dominance to become of ever increasing utility. rapid dominance requires the collection, management, and fast access of enormous quantities of information. technologies that will enable this include computational hardware advances such as increasingly powerful workstations, reduced-cost image generators, massively parallel machines, compact displays, reduced-cost memory devices (i.e., dram, raid, and optical jukeboxes) client/server-specific database engines, reconfigurable simulation cells, "wearable" pcs, advanced human-computer interface (hci) techniques (i.e., voice interfaces and those coming to define "virtual reality"), and pcmcia technology for peripherals (i.e., digital comms boards, miniaturized hard drives, and modems). software advances will be even more critical for rapid dominance. areas of importance include: - network data engines - object-oriented architectures - advanced modeling and simulation - machine intelligence - automatic target recognition - computer-aided software engineering (case) tools network technologies are just now emerging but are being driven at a frenzied pace in the commercial marketplace. a variety of advanced tools beyond "hot link" browsing are being introduced daily. data browsers, brokers, gatherers, and network repositories are being released, as demonstrated by products like _harvester_ and _netscape's catalog server_. platform independent languages such as java and their associated virtual computational engines promise the same network flexibility for programs that is now enjoyed by data. perhaps the most important area of technology development for rapid dominance is the development of practical object-oriented architectures and protocols. protocols such as corba, ole, alsp, hla and dis[ ] are changing the face of computing, making it much easier to link programs and databases, and access and correlate information that was previously "entombed" within its legacy application. [footnote : corba (common object request broker architecture), ole (object linking and embedding), alsp (aggregate level simulation protocol), hla (high-level architecture), dis (distributed interactive simulation). these are all protocols or the architectures defining protocols that, in part, enable disparate software and/or hardware components to be linked or otherwise share information and logical elements.] one interesting application area migrating toward an object-oriented approach is geospatial databases. in the past, geospatial data were stored as either raster-based or vector information, and significant processing was required for users to make queries regarding roads, areas, or objects such as building sites. a new approach, called a spatial database engine, creates intuitive objects from standard geospatial databases and uses commercial databases to add attributes to the objects. this is a very powerful technique that allows geospatial data, a key element of warfighting, to be managed quickly and efficiently using commercial-off-the-shelf (cots) software. it is particularly useful for distributed databases such as one would find on a network. modeling and simulation is also benefiting from object-oriented technologies. simulations were once stand-alone codes. if one wanted to simulate a joint battle, one began with an existing model (i.e., land combat) and then modified it to include other components (i.e., aircraft and ships). similarly, if a new technology were to be modeled, new code normally had to be written, even in cases where good, validated, stand-alone technology models existed. the obvious drawbacks to this approach are that it is costly, often produces inferior simulations for the new additions, and quickly results in extremely large codes with commensurate large code management problems. object-oriented approaches allow models and simulations to be linked to form a richer environment for examining new technologies and joint force structures. linking force-on-force simulations with design tools such as computer-aided design (cad) programs and physics-based simulations presents a new type of tool referred to as simulation-based design. once fully realized, this capability will allow new technologies to be much more easily evaluated, introducing a source for greater efficiency into today's somewhat haphazard acquisition system. simulations based on object-oriented architectures also promise more flexibility that will enable scenarios and unexpected situations to be made as inputs and simulated rapidly, forming the core for a battlefield visualization system capable of modeling "what if" situations. outputs from these simulations could be used for mission rehearsal. even today, pilots and special operations forces often "fly through" crude, three-dimensional renderings of a mission area to familiarize themselves with information such as surface-to-air missile (sam) sites and landmarks. the promise of computational technologies brings with it potential vulnerabilities that must be protected against threats. in a world where information plays a vital role in warfare, information collection and processing tools will become targets. defenses against information warfare must be developed. the threat is real and is growing especially in the commercial and private sectors. even today, malicious hackers devise data-destroying viruses and distribute them through a plethora of electronic media; numerous sites on the net are dedicated to the discussion and development of offensive computer viruses, with ample tools for even the novice to download and employ. moreover, computer crimes cost the world economy billions of dollars annually. although information warfare poses serious threats, the realm of information is where operations underlying rapid dominance most reside, and the enemy will find himself fully engaged should he choose to fight on our terms. rapid dominance is essentially information warfare on a grand scale in all dimensions of offensive, defensive and leveraging effective use of available information. communication technologies one of the modern communication devices being fielded within u.s. forces today is the singcars radio. with a data rate of somewhat less than kbps, singcars is woefully inadequate for supporting rapid dominance. however, more appropriate technologies are emerging: - gbs and other satellite broadcast services - wider bandwidth, digital communication protocols - asynchronous transfer mode (atm) switches - advanced comm relay platforms (uav, lightsat, iridium, etc.) gbs, for example, figures prominently in the badd (battlefield awareness and data dissemination) program that aims at providing close to mbps of data broadcast bandwidth. this will be supported by multi-terrabyte databases, advanced data browsers, and query managers, and will be linked to the joint tactical internet. networking must also be supported by communications technologies. the basic problem of a battlefield network is that while some nodes may support very large data pipes, a number of nodes will be operating at singcars data rates. this led to the badd notion of one-way data broadcasting via gbs of large data files (such as uav video and overhead imagery) and very low bandwidth data querying back to the data sources. modern communications will tend to be more multimedia-based, which is particularly important for rapid dominance, where decisions must be made quickly based upon very large quantities of data, some of which will be collected and transmitted in real time. technologies such as digital video teleconferencing, virtual whiteboards, and even d virtual environments where commanders may participate in collaborative planning sessions will become important. finally, battlefield communications must be secure and, where feasible, non-observable to the enemy. control of the environment the actual attack of targets in order to induce shock and awe may, in some sense, be considered a subset of controlling the enemy's perception. it will not always be necessary to destroy numerous targets in order to induce shock. however, it would be vitally important to give the appearance that there are no safe havens from attack, and that any target may be attacked at any time with impunity and force. furthermore, as discussed earlier, confusion must be imposed on the adversary by supplying only information which will shape the adversary's perceptions and help break his will. finally, the enemy must be displaced from selected key positions, for if he is allowed to occupy those areas that he considers strategically important, it is difficult to imagine how his shock could be complete. controlling an enemy's perception of the battlespace includes manipulating his view of the threat, his own troops and status, and the environment in which he operates. this will be accomplished by selectively denying knowledge to the enemy while presenting him with information that is either misleading or serves our purposes. sensing and feedback of an enemy leadership's perception of the situation will be critical. technologies of interest here include those that allow systems and entire force units to modify their signature from being very stealthy to being completely obvious. an ability to attack enemy information systems will also be critical, encompassing system technologies from laser-based counter sensor weapons to embedded computer viruses, commonly referred to as trojan horses. in all cases, the goal will be to deny the enemy any information that would be useful to him and to impose a construct of deception and misinformation at all levels of operations. clearly, technologies necessary to achieve battlefield awareness already mentioned will be crucial in allowing a "perception attack" (a form of information warfare) to be successfully carried out. the need and requirements for battlefield damage assessment (bda) will increase dramatically. it will be necessary to understand not only whether a target was killed but also how enemy leadership, troops, and society viewed this destruction. so far, primarily information technologies have been discussed. obviously, there will continue to be requirements for numerous other types of systems. among the more important system technologies critical to achieving control of the environment include: - weapons platforms with stealth technology - weapons systems - robotic systems weapons platforms one of the fundamental rationales for weapons platforms is to move people and ordinance to within an effective range of the target. centuries before smart weapons and robotic systems, this reasoning was understood intuitively. since ordinance must still be placed on the target, weapons platforms such as described below still demand consideration. - stealthy bombers and strike aircraft either land or sea platform based - arsenal ships - submarines with conventional cruise missiles - stealthy land vehicles - stealthy observation/attack helicopters stealth, combined with stand off, will contribute strongly to the protection of manned systems on the modern battlefield and will also be used extensively for other, high-value unmanned systems. however, protection of the force is inherent within the concept of rapid dominance, and it will rely upon the control of information and the enemy's perception of events, stealth being one of the elements enabling this control. weapons systems smart munitions will be required on the future battlefield. linked with information technologies, the combination will allow killing any target that can be identified. the main element rapid dominance requires of weapons systems is the ability to be rapidly focused on objectives as identified and targeted by commanders using the information management systems already discussed. commanders will require the flexibility to call massive, precision strikes or to attack individual, high-priority targets with near zero cep. this implies a mixture of weapons comprised of systems such as those mentioned below. - cruise missiles - zero cep, long-range cruise missile ("president's weapon") - stand-off submunition platforms - smart submunitions - brilliant submunitions - wide area smart mines - long-range and short-range surface attack missiles robotic systems robotic systems are an important area of consideration within rapid dominance. first, selected robotic systems will enable the force by making it more responsive in concentrating sensors and weapons. second, they will make fighting a -hour battle feasible even with reduced manpower within the force structure. third, robotic systems can provide force presence even in areas considered too dangerous for a large manned element. finally, since the ultimate operational goal of rapid dominance is to create shock, one may consider the effect that fighting robotic systems may have on the enemy. in examining the utility of robotic systems within rapid dominance, one must first consider that, by any measure, robotic systems have not lived up to the optimistic expectations placed on them in the past. from the overburdening of the aquilla uav to the massive and poorly planned investment in robotics made by general motors in the early s, robotics has been an area of unfulfilled promises. however, the reasons for a string of spectacular failures lie more with planners' faulty attempts to understand and incorporate the technology than by egregious shortcomings of the technology itself. robots have been seen as replacements for manned systems rather than extremely complicated and capable machines suitable for a set of tightly defined tasks. robotic systems, or taskable machines as some are beginning to refer to them, hold promise for the future simply because they represent the intersection of a myriad of fast-moving technology areas such as information technologies, communications, microelectronics, micro-electromechanical systems, simulation, and computer-aided design and manufacturing. in some sense, taskable machines are the physical embodiment of information technologies. it may well be that in the future the joke will be, "never send a robot to do a man's job." but even so, there will be ample jobs for taskable machines and the society that learns to properly design, build, control, and integrate these systems into their force structure will gain significant advantage over any potential opponent. conclusion the technologies and systems presented in this section are not extraordinary nor do they comprise a complete list. indeed, entire fields such as materials, bioengineering, and microelectronics are left for future consideration, although they are of obvious and vital importance. also not addressed here are the training, education, and organizational implications required under a regime of rapid dominance. given the overriding importance of information collection and management, these will need to be addressed across the defense community as it is most broadly defined. rapid dominance combines a doctrine and operational concept that challenges the current process of how new technologies invented in the commercial sector are incorporated into defense, and provides an affirmative methodology for research, development, and system integration. we must learn to exploit the potential of these technologies even though, in many cases, this development process in the private sector is profoundly independent from how we conduct the business of defense. it is this environment of innovative upheaval that any useful foundation for strategic and operational thought must address. rapid dominance capitalizes on, and may even require, this rapid and chaotic development of technology. we believe that what will distinguish rapid dominance from other doctrines is first that it uses an intellectual construct to drive innovation and innovation to drive exploiting and integrating technology into new and perhaps somewhat differently constructed systems. second, it is the comprehensive quality of rapid dominance in which strategies, doctrine, technology, systems, operations, training, organization, and education are dealt with together that may make the most significant difference. but, as the reader will discern, specific identification and design of rapid dominance systems is part of the next step. future directions at this stage, rapid dominance is an intellectual construct based on these key points. first, rapid dominance has evolved from the collective professional, policy, and operational experience of the study group covering the last four decades. this experience ran from vietnam to_ desert storm_ and from serving with operational units in the field to being part of the decision-making process in the oval office in washington. it also included immersion in technology and systems from thermonuclear weapons to advanced weapons software. second, rapid dominance seeks to exploit the unique juncture of strategy, technology, and innovation created by the end of the cold war and to establish an alternative foundation for military doctrine and force structure. third, rapid dominance draws on the strategic uses of force as envisaged by sun tzu and clausewitz to overpower or affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary for strategic aims and military objectives. but, in rapid dominance, the principal mechanism for affecting the adversary's will is through the imposition of a regime of shock and awe sufficient to achieve the aims of policy. it is this relationship with and reliance on shock and awe that differentiates rapid dominance from attrition, maneuver, and other military doctrines including overwhelming force. shock and awe impact on psychological, perceptual, and physical levels. at one level, destroying an adversary's military force leaving the enemy impotent and vulnerable may provide the necessary shock and awe. at another level, the certainty of this outcome may cause an adversary to accept our terms well short of conflict. in the great middle ground, the appropriate balance of shock and awe must cause the perception and anticipation of certain defeat and the threat and fear of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical destruction. finally, in order to impose enough shock and awe to affect an adversary's will, four core characteristics of a rapid dominance- configured force were defined. first, complete knowledge and understanding of self, of the adversary, and of the environment are essential. this knowledge and understanding exceed the expectations of dominant battlefield awareness and dba becomes a subset of rapid dominance. rather like the wise investor and not the speculator who is only familiar with a particular company and not the stock market in general, the rapid dominance force must have complete knowledge and understanding of many likely adversaries and regions. this requirement for knowledge and understanding will place a huge, new burden on the military forces and necessitate fundamental changes in policy, organization, training, education, structure, and equipage. second is rapidity. rapidity combines speed, timeliness, and agility and the ability to sustain control after the initial shock. rapidity enables us to act as quickly as needed and always more quickly than the adversary can react or take counter-actions. rapidity is also an antidote to surprise. if we cannot anticipate surprise, or are surprised, rapidity provides a correcting capacity to neutralize the effects of that surprise. third, and most provocatively, is setting the standard of operations and execution in terms of brilliance. the consequences and implications of setting brilliance as the standard and achieving it are profound. reconfiguration of command authority and organization possibly to decentrali-zation down to individual troops must follow. allowing and encouraging an operational doctrine of the "first to respond" will set the tempo provided that effective de-confliction of friendly on friendly engagements has been assured. this, of course, means that complete revision of doctrine, training, and organization will be required. the matter is not just "fighting smarter." it is learning to fight at even higher standards of skill and competence. fourth is control of the environment. control is defined in the broadest sense: physical control of the land, air, sea, and space and control of the "ether" in which information is passed and received. this requires signature management throughout the full conflict spectrum-deception, disinformation, verification, information control, and target management-all with rapidity in both physical and psychological impact. by depriving an adversary of the physical use of time, space, and the ether, we play on the adversary's will and offer the prospect of certain destruction should resistance follow. the next step in this process must be specifically defining this rapid dominance force in terms of force structure, capabilities, doctrine, organization, and order of battle. we have begun this effort and are focusing on a joint task force sized somewhere between a reinforced division and a full corps (i.e., a strength of , - , ). we also have the aim of being able to deploy this force within to days of the order to move and, of course, will be able to send smaller force packages on a nearly instantaneous basis. we appreciate the mobility and logistical implications of this requirement. once we design this "paper" force and equip it with "paper" systems, we must evaluate it against the five basic questions and tests we noted in the prologue. the first test of this rapid dominance force will be against the mrc. the comparison, in the broadest sense, must be with the programmed force and whatever emerges from the quadrennial defense review of . we will need to examine closely how and where and why rapid dominance and shock and awe work and where they do not. at the very least, we expect that this will help strengthen the current force and improve current capabilities. of course, it is our hope that this test will validate rapid dominance as a legitimate doctrine. second, the rapid dominance force must be tested across the entire spectrum of ootw. these are the most difficult tests because, in some of them, no force may be suitable and no force may work. third, the test of determining the political consequences of rapid dominance must be conducted. on one hand, if this force capability can be achieved and shock and awe administered to affect an adversary's will, can a form of political deterrence be created? in the most approximate sense, and we emphasize approximate, the analogy with nuclear deterrence might be drawn. an adversary may be persuaded or deterred from taking action in the first instance. on the other hand, this capacity may be seen as politically unusable and allies and others within the united states may not be fully trusting of the possessor always to employ this force responsibly. fourth is the test of the implications of rapid dominance for alliances and for waging coalition warfare. our allies are already concerned that the united states is leaving them far behind in military technology and capability. if we possess this force and our allies or partners do not, how do we fight together? our view is that this can be worked out through technology sharing and perhaps new divisions of labor and mission specialization. however, these are important points to be considered. finally, what does all this mean for resource investments in defense? it is also likely that because rapid dominance will cause profound consequences, the iron grip of the political bureaucracy will make a fair examination difficult. it is no accident that other attempts at change, especially those that ask for or are tainted with reform, have had a short life span. it is interesting to note in this regard that the president's commission on intelligence and its fine report that recommended changes and refinements to the u.s. intelligence community, despite a very positive initial reception, led to only a few meaningful actions. this discussion leads to two final points. we are all too well aware that any strategy and force structure have vulnerabilities and potential weaknesses. the experiences that this study group collectively had in vietnam makes this concern very strongly held. we observe that in the private sector, the vulnerability of information systems is real and is being exploited. a former director of the fbi has told us that in new york, for example, the number one recruiting target for organized crime is the teenage computer whiz. we think that this "hacking," writ large in the private sector, must be assumed as part of the defense problem. hence, sensitivity to vulnerabilities must be even greater, perhaps ironically, than it was during the cold war, because exploitation can come from many more sources in the future. second, wags may criticize rapid dominance as attempting to create a "mission impossible force." to be sure, we emphasize and demand brilliance as the operational goal. however, we also know that the military today is seen as a leading example of the best american society has to offer. we wish to build on this reality. we note the experience and the performance, albeit under highly unusual circumstances, of_ desert storm_. we see no reason why that level of performance cannot be made a permanent part of the fabric of the american military. because we have entered a period of transition in which we enjoy a dominant military position and a greatly reduced window of vulnerability, this is the right time for experimentation and demonstration. rapid dominance is still a concept and a work in progress, not a final road map or blueprint. but the concept does warrant, in our view, a commitment to explore and an opportunity that could lead to dramatically better capabilities. we believe that through rapid dominance and the commitment to examine the entire range of defense across all components and aspects, a revolution is possible. if rapid dominance can be harnessed in an affordable and efficient way and an operational capability fielded to impose sufficient shock and awe to affect an adversary's will, then this will be the real revolution in military affairs. we ask those who are intrigued by this prospect to join us. appendix a thoughts on rapid dominance by admiral bud edney, usn (ret.) why the need for a concept of rapid dominance? the answer lies in the combined realities of modern technology, economics, and politics. technology the evolution or revolution of information technology is impacting everything we do and how we do it on a worldwide basis. the far-reaching effects of the resulting information highway that crosses all boundaries are already impacting the strategic decisions, economics, and politics of the world of nation states. borders are no defense for the penetration of information even in highly controlled or authoritarian societies. similarly, the exploration and use of high technology in space, together with the advent of sophisticated highly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, means borders between states are not as important for strategic and impenetrable defenses in depth as they used to be. the rapid advancements in telecommunications technology, combined with the exploration and use of space vehicles to saturate a world hungry for information, means that leaders can no longer shield their people from the outside world. thus information will penetrate whatever curtain or wall that is erected in a futile attempt to block it out. new centers of gravity are being created as are new vulnerability choke points. the country or power structure that harnesses the capabilities and dimensions of the information revolution as it applies to issues of national security will remain in control of its own destiny. the united states possesses a qualitative and quantitative lead that, when combined with a properly focused and coordinated (harmonized) industry, defense, and national security policy, should ensure success for the foreseeable future. harnessing information technology and applying it to new strategic and doctrinal thought in application of military force is the essence of rapid dominance. economics with the end of the cold war and the dismantling of the soviet union, there is no major power capable of destroying the u.s. mainland. given this absence of devastating threat, defense expenditures will continue to be squeezed to address more pressing domestic priorities. voter demands for a balanced budget, national health care, social security reform, educational reform, family values, crime and drug use reduction, lower taxes, etc., will combine to put increasing pressure on the defense bottom line in the out years. the result will be a steady decline in war fighting readiness and force structure that will place our security interests at risk unless we leverage our technology leadership to achieve military advantage with lower force levels but increased war fighting effectiveness. this is also the essence of rapid dominance. politics the reality of current politics is that the trauma of vietnam, the results of the gulf war, and our status as the only remaining superpower after the cold war equate to some new constraints (real or perceived) on the application of military force to support our foreign policy. these political sensitivities need to be understood up front and include the following: - the u.s. is not the world's policeman - involvement of u.s. forces must be justified as essential to vital u.s. security interests - support of congress and people is a necessary prerequisite - avoid commitment of ground forces - offer instead u.s. intelligence, air lift, sea lift, logistics support, etc. - avoid risk of loss of u.s. lives at almost all costs - ensure decisive force applied for mission assigned - rules of engagement allow u.s. forces to defend themselves aggressively - minimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage - specify achievable mission objectives up front with an end in the not-too-distant future sight before committing - u.s. led coalition force preferred-u.s. forces remain under u.s. command. these political restraints may limit the application of rapid dominance to major and minor regional conflicts. this is an issue that needs further exploration and analysis. what is rapid dominance? rapid dominance is the full use of capabilities within a system of systems that can decisively impact events requiring the application of military/defense resources through affecting the adversary's will. rapid dominance envisions execution in real or near real time to counter actions or intentions deemed detrimental to u.s. interests. on one end of the spectrum, rapid dominance would introduce a regime of shock and awe in areas of high value to the threatening individual, group, or state. in many cases the prior knowledge of credible u.s. rapid dominance capabilities would act as a deterrent. rapid dominance would ensure favorable early resolution of issues at minimal loss of lives and collateral damage. the concept ideally should be able to impact adversarial situations that apply across the board, addressing high-, mid-, low-, and no-technology threats. some of these aims may not be achievable given the political and technology constraints, but need to be explored. rapid dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war fighting capabilities to a new level. rapid dominance requires a sophisticated, interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications systems, and data analysis to deliver in real time, actionable information to the shooter. this network must provide total situational awareness and nodal analysis that enables u.s. forces to act inside the adversary's decision loop in a manner that on the high end produces shock and awe among the threat parties. properly detailed nodal analysis of this grid of knowledge and vulnerability will enable the shutting down of specific or all essential functions nearly simultaneously. we expect that through these netted pieces of data, often, the sum of the parts will yield profound battlefield advantages to the possessor. the "rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real time actionable targeting information to the shooter, whether the shooter is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery battery, an individual rifleman, a naval battle group, an individual ship, an air wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. at whatever unit level, shock and awe are magnified by the speed and effectiveness of targeting. the ability to achieve rapid dominance simultaneously throughout the battlefield will create strategic shock and awe on the opposing forces, their leadership, and society. when the video results of these attacks are broadcast real time worldwide on cnn, the positive impact on coalition support and negative impact on potential threat support can be decisive. the top priority of rapid dominance should be to deter, alter, or affect those actions that are either unacceptable to u.s. national security interests or endanger the democratic community of states and access to free markets. these political objectives are generally those envisioned in the major and lesser regional conflict scenarios (mrc & lrc). should deterrence fail, the application of rapid dominance should create sufficient shock and awe to intimidate the enemy forces and leadership as well as provide a clear message for other potential aggressors. rapid dominance would not be limited to mrc and lrc scenarios. it has application in a variety of areas, including countering wmd, terrorism, and other political problems. the challenge is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response based on rapid dominance must be proportional to the threat yet decisive enough to convey the appropriate degree of shock and awe. rapid dominance cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. it initially appears that rapid dominance should be applied sparingly for egregious threats or violations of international law, such as: - blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small state - rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of wmd - egregious violations of human rights on a large scale - threat to essential world markets clearly the information highway is crossing all sovereign borders and penetrating even the most closed societies. the inequities and benefits in closed societies are becoming known to both the public as well as the bosses. the requirement for rapid dominance to develop sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the information highway and create road blocks as well as control input/outputs to the highway both overtly and covertly is fundamental to the concept. these same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies targeting international crime and drug cartels using the highway. closer interagency cooperation and coordination between military and law enforcement activities and capabilities must be established. experience with the military involvement in the drug war revealed considerable cultural differences between these organizations. overcoming these cultural differences is not easy. the required trust and confidence for sharing sensitive information and support between these agencies and the military needs to be developed further. interagency coordination and cooperation must be raised to a new level of sophistication. some laws may need to be changed. war in cyberspace does not recognize domestic versus foreign boundaries. in this environment the subjects of information warfare and information in warfare take on new meaning and require focused development. we must become proficient within this environment. this breakdown of traditional boundaries requires a great deal more thought with regard to the issues of security, vulnerabilities (their's and our's), and the concept of rapid dominance. does rapid dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the spectrum, involving more traditional applications of force to achieve political objectives as envisioned in the mrc and lrc scenarios? yet to be explored is the degree to which a concept of rapid dominance applies to ootw, countering terrorism against u.s. interests, controlling rogue states/leaders, etc. what are the political and military prerequisites to apply rapid dominance? are they applicable and realistically achievable in the increasingly complex interaction of national governments/law enforcement organizations and international as well as local private venture or non-government organizations (pvos/ngos) present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care to refugees and other disenfranchised people? would the concept of rapid dominance offend and generate a counterproductive public relations backlash from those who believe force should only be used as a last resort and then with a measurable degree of proportionality? at this point, one can only raise these types of issues to be addressed at a later date. this line of questions, concerns, and issues, as well as a host of others, needs to be raised up front during the concept development phase of the development of specific mission capability package concepts. we must be careful that we do not overvisualize rapid dominance versus the reality of credible/affordable capabilities to execute the concept. rapid dominance does not eliminate the fog of war. decisions will still be made on the leader's judgment and confidence in the intelligence provided, the estimate of threat intentions, knowledge of true center of gravity targets, and confidence in our own force capabilities to inflict shock and awe. in fact, the ability to penetrate this fog is the key to rapid dominance. complicating the issue is the fact that the u.s. has not clearly defined its role in the post-cold war era. as the world's only credible superpower, the u.s. can not avoid a leadership role, but neither can it avoid the focused criticism applied to all leaders. we are in the classical "damned if we do and damned if we don't" syndrome. one of the serious side effects of rapid dominance could be that if you adapt a strategy of rapid dominance and succeed, you may now own the problem and be responsible for the solution. do we know the funding tail to such a policy and are we as a nation ready to accept this cost when/if rapid dominance is applied in situations that are less than of vital interest? this subject needs further development beyond the limitations of this book. rapid dominance and the future battlefield what will the battlefield of the future really look like? the _desert storm_ conflict indicated to many who analyzed it that the real focus of battle will no longer be force on force as we have traditionally considered it. by the time the allied forces engaged the opposing iraq forces, the enemy force for all practical purposes had already been demoralized and smashed. this was accomplished by establishing air superiority followed by a carefully orchestrated campaign of precision air strikes (including tomahawk missiles). the iraqi ground forces were isolated by cutting off logistic support, severing communications with its leadership, and stinging them with the shock and awe achieved by b- strikes on the entrenched iraqi forces in the open desert. shock and awe were introduced in the manner that stealth aircraft penetrated enemy air defenses and surgically attacked center of gravity targets with impunity. shock and awe were also present in the degree that coalition forces owned the night and could rapidly maneuver large units in terrain thought to be foreign, imposing, and unforgiving for the predominantly u.s. forces. instead, as colin powell noted, the coalition forces cut off the head and life lines to the iraqi army in the field and then set about killing it. the fact that a democratically led coalition could choose not to massacre the remnants of iraq's army during its panic-induced retreat underscores that we knew how much power we had and could employ restraint. the impact of real-time video media coverage of these events, beamed simultaneously into government headquarters and civilian living rooms worldwide, is a phenomenon that impacted events on the battlefield and further highlighted the compassion of that decision. in dealing with a "butcher" we could not fall to that level. the battlefield of the future will not be a neat x mile box where you will know everything that is going on inside the box (although that would be an extremely helpful first step). the battlefield of the future will encompass every pressure point that controls or influences the elements of the battle. in examining this battlefield and the application of force and shock and awe, we seek to mass devastatingly accurate and simultaneous firepower on critical nodes/targets that count for the mission at hand, rather than necessarily having to mass large armies in the field to engage one another. clearly, the gulf war raised warfare to a new level with the demonstrated effectiveness and application of air to ground/water and surface to ground/water launched precision guided weapons. no longer will commanders count sorties and tonnage of ordnance dropped, but rather targets destroyed per sortie! note: there may well be an issue of affordability here. we may not be able to get ) high tech, ) mrc/ootw, and ) large armies. this does not eliminate the requirement for sufficient force in the field to defend against an all-out assault or eject another force and occupy the contested land to ensure the objectives of conflict are carried out. air power can punish, simultaneously destroy center of gravity targets, and so demoralize the opposing forces that land campaign objectives can be achieved with smaller forces. in some cases, the shock and awe achieved by the air campaign may result in an early cessation of conflict before the land campaign is necessary. this is more likely against a modernized, developed state than an underdeveloped government. the confluence of several technologies, including all aspects of stealth aircraft, satellite global positioning, improved weapon targeting and terminal guidance, cruise missile technology, space relayed command & control, real-time surveillance from space, the introduction of jstars, and massive application of night vision techniques, are the first phase of these changes. with elements of this technology now more and more on the open market to whomever has the cash or friends, the advantage of obtaining greater situational awareness and real-time processing of available data cannot be taken for granted. in future environments, and short of all-out war, it is clear that political and military decision making will have to establish close control of the actionable information distributed to shooters in the field. it is legitimate to ask why israeli forces that had air superiority, uav surveillance, and extremely accurate firepower capabilities in the most recent incursion into southern lebanon against hezbolla terrorist attacks had to respond with an artillery barrage to one kaytusha rocket fired from close to a known un encampment. when this artillery response resulted in killing more than refugees fleeing the israeli operation, the result was a public relations disaster and mission failure for the stated limited israeli objectives. this represents a case of ill-conceived application of rapid dominance that resulted in counter-productive shock and awe generating adverse public opinion focused against israel. this was also a case of applying high technology and state controlled rapid dominance against a low-technology guerrilla warfare force. clearly the hezbolla appeared to win more than they lost in this exchange. the lessons learned from this tragic incident as well as the applicability of rapid dominance techniques in this environment need further study. the massing and movement of refugees in large numbers is a reality and a planning factor that must be dealt with up front. the fact that the value of life itself is viewed differently by warring factions must also be considered. if one side willingly uses refugees as a shield and the other is trying to protect their lives, then operations to achieve rapid dominance require clear (and perhaps restrictive) rules of engagement in the field. the rapidity of response may not always be the right tactic and an escalation of targeting different centers of gravity rather than responding directly to events in the field promises to be more effective. the theory of rapid dominance clearly needs further development, gaming, and simulation. each decision to apply rapid dominance will be unique, complex, risky, and different than the previous one. knowledge and information on the battlefield as well as that concerning center of gravity targets will be incomplete even with a goal of total situational awareness. instruments to achieve shock and awe shock and awe are actions that create fears, dangers, and destruction that are incompre-hensible to the people at large, specific elements/sectors of the threat society, or the leadership. nature in the form of tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, uncontrolled fires, famine, and disease can engender shock and awe. the ultimate military application of shock and awe was the use of two atomic weapons against japan in wwii. the shock and awe that resulted from the use of these weapons not only brought an abrupt end to the war with japan (through unconditional surrender), but have deterred the further use of these weapons for over years. not unexpectedly, these events did not stop the proliferation or increase in the destructive power of these weapons by a factor of ten. the holocaust was a state policy of shock and awe that stunned the world in its brutality and inhumanity. yet it has not deterred the world from executing or tolerating atrocities of equal brutality and inhumanity (cambodia, syria, rwanda, etc.). similar applications of shock and awe have differing toleration levels and impacts depending on the environment and political system against which it is applied. as an example, the massive bombing raids of wwii by germany and the u.s. did not result in a sufficient level of shock and awe to end the fighting. the fear of the unknown created by the atomic attacks rather than their actual destruction was the deciding factor in that theater. the b- raids in vietnam provided localized elements of shock and awe, but until applied to the capital city of hanoi, had no impact toward war termination. when applied in concentrated repetitive strikes in november/december of under _operation rolling thunder iii_, the cease fire followed in short order. in fact, throughout history there have been weapons and tactics designed to create varying degrees of shock and awe. while there has always been shock, awe, and fear associated with warfare, unless the fear or losses are focused and great enough, a quick cessation of hostilities under favorable terms is not certain. how to apply elements of shock and awe against rogue states, terrorist elements, international drug and crime cartels, as well as in the more traditional mrcs and lrcs needs much further study and analysis. shock and awe, to reach the level required to achieve rapid dominance, must also bring fear to those who are in charge. it must be applied quickly, decisively, and preferably with impunity (such as stealth bombing with air superiority). the element of impunity, that is the other side is powerless to stop the damage, is a key element of this strategy. if on the other hand attacks are directed at the general public a backlash could be unleased because of the excessive and brutal losses of innocent civilians. much more study and analysis is needed to identify and examine the pros and cons of a policy that initiates a doctrine of shock and awe for limited objectives rather than responds in kind to a provocation. what are the limits of the doctrine of shock and awe? what circumstances merit the application? can shock and awe be used to achieve limited objectives with little or no risk of life to allied forces or innocent civilians? can true center of gravity targets be identified for ideological/terrorist groups? can levels of shock and awe be categorized by effectiveness and priority of weapons systems? if so, what are the key enabling technologies? what types of shock and awe would be both impressive and generate high returns? a few desirable capabilities from a former cinc's perspective are listed below: - blow up an entire mine field simultaneously in its entirety immediately after it had been laid. - destroy the mine laden mine-laying vehicles at their loading point. - destroy in real time terrorist training camps or publicity generating threats such as the recent display of bomb laden suicide terrorists pledging to wreak havoc worldwide. (this probably requires inside penetration of the targeted organization). - destroy simultaneously all/selective wmd launchers, storage/production facilities of a rogue state. - selectively target rogue terrorist leaders as was apparently done by the russians in chechnya recently when they killed the top rebel leader by detecting and homing in on his satellite phone conversation (helicopter rocket attack). - stop, divert, capture the cash flow to terrorist elements. thoughts on applications of shock and awe it is the use of shock and awe to achieve rapid dominance that is so fascinating and has the greatest potential for leverage if it can be harnessed in a variety of situations. this basis for rapid dominance requires a clearer under-standing of what our end objectives are than we usually have when we stumble into the use of military force, often it seems by default and at the last possible minute. at this point, i have more questions than answers. how does rapid dominance differ by the goals and missions assigned? what are the key elements to apply rapid dominance for each envisioned threat? what are the most likely threats for the next years? is rapid dominance applicable to all these threats? can we separate rapid dominance into categories with and without shock and awe? in addition to answering these and other questions, it seems to me it would be helpful to generate a list of desirable capabilities that would help me select a response option. this list of capabilities would be useful to focus ( ) scarce r&d dollars to fill in the holes with technology, ( ) intelligence and surveillance collection priorities, ( ) innovative thought to further develop the concept (war college papers and wargaming series), and ( ) development of cinc plans and requirements to meet these capabilities. examples of such capabilities are: - deploying highly effective tbmd and cruise missile defense. - severing all/selective communications between leadership and field as well as selective elements by call in the field. - intercepting and transmitting revised orders to selective threat field units. - projecting false radar pictures on selective key threat scopes. - inserting fouled fuel in threat storage facilities that generates engine failures. - inserting metal/material fatigue to failure attachments on key threat systems. - identifying specific location and determining strength and material of protected targets of value. - developing dial a setting ordnance capable of destroying all hardened targets. - detecting and tracting (destroying at will) all targets of value including mobile targets. - detecting and targeting key threat launch systems before launch. - detecting plot and simultaneously destroying an employed mine field (land & sea). - making threat submarine movements transparent to targeting at will. obviously, such a wish list should be prioritized and tailored to the limits of achievable near/mid-term technology and affordability. this may not even be the right type of capabilities one might want. that is, we may need a totally non-standard list. my judgment is that we should develop one or two black "silver bullet" capabilities, if we get too far afield, the system will not be able to digest the recommendations. however, the concept of rapid dominance requires stepping to a new level of getting inside the opposition's decision loop. rapid dominance at the ultimate level would enable stopping, diverting, or changing the decision process and decision executing machinery/systems either preemptively or reactively in time to ensure core u.s. security requirements are met. rapid dominance infrastructure the current direction and speed of downsizing and acquisition reform is adequate for the type of forces and capabilities necessary to implement a rapid dominance strategy. i would like to reserve comments in this area until the project is further developed. we do not need to raise reasons to discard the concept as too hard before it is sufficiently defined. i have the feeling that bringing these conceptual capabilities to realities within a system of systems is neither cheap nor easy. there is still too much waste and inefficiency in our defense acquisition process as well as in the overlap between service requirements and capabilities. rapid dominance will not be service-unique and requires a synergistic approach from planning to execution. final thoughts the implications of the ongoing revolution in telecommunications and information processing as it applies to our national security interests dictate that we need new imaginative concepts of operation to ensure the efficacy of our international leadership in a multipolar world. with technology upgrading capabilities by factors of or more every months, we can no longer afford to have concepts of operations wait for the technology to reach the field. the concept of rapid dominance requires innovative thought and different directions than that imbedded in our military hierarchy. we need to introduce the concept at all levels of military professional education and training. the best results of this effort will be generated from the younger minds brought up on the leading edge of the information revolution. the challenge is to engage those minds in the solution and to take the risks required to fund priorities enabling the development of this capability now. such a cultural change is not easy. one thing is certain-business as usual will not get us there. the window of opportunity will close faster than we think. appendix b defense alternatives: forces required by general chuck horner, usaf (ret.) the end of the cold war will require a review of united states national security policy and a concomitant change in our national defense strategy. this strategy will respond to the changes in the world's security environment, including the dissolution of the soviet union and warsaw pact, the evolution in u.s. security alliances such as nato and norad, the increased and unique threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the widening of the spectrum of conflict which will challenge the peace and security of our nation and its allies. the causes of conflict and the modes which threats to our security interests will take have multiplied with the end of the cold war. the nuclear weapons of the cold war remain and will remain for some considerable time, even though there is a growing appreciation as to the declining utility of these devices. for sure there will be continuing pressure throughout the world to eliminate the presence of nuclear weapons in conjunction with efforts to halt the production, stockpiling, and deployment of chemical and biological weapons. it is likely that start ii will be followed by start iii and iv, as nations who claim ownership of nuclear weapons realize ownership has a high cost and marginal payoff. however, progress will be slow due to the immense importance of achieving symmetry during nuclear disarmament and the cumbersome and exacting safeguards associated with the disarmament process. therefore, for the foreseeable future the threat of nuclear war must be addressed even though it will be less likely than before. the spectrum of national security challenges will expand as the threat of nuclear annihilation subsides. the decisive victory achieved by the coalition forces over iraq during _desert storm_ should give future aggressors of major regional conflict cause to pause. while this does not mean that the threat of conventional warfare has vanished, it does mean that the national leader intending to use major conflict to achieve political aims must carefully craft strategy that will avoid the opportunity for confrontation with a large coalition force lead by the united states. such a strategy might include surprise attack; short intense military action; the threat or use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons; advanced surveillance measures and precision munitions; and warfare carried out on a fragmented battlefield which includes attacks on the capitals of other nations by means of ballistic missiles or unconventional warfare forces. this will be warfare for which the united states is ill trained and ill equipped. other challenges to the world's security will take many forms to which the military forces of the united states can play a constructive role. these are commonly referred to as operations other than war, even though they may include the use of force to achieve desired political goals. they include the increasingly familiar peacemaking, peacekeeping, show of force, and humanitarian relief efforts. success in these operations may well require retraining, re-equipping, or reorganizing our military forces. each mission should be evaluated with respect to what is required to accomplish its unique challenges. however, the basic doctrine, training, or equipage of the military forces should be based on what is required to fight the residual cold war, as well as deal with the growing demands of a major regional conflict. the political goals upon which our national security strategy should be crafted are fairly straightforward. first, we should seek to preserve and invigorate the role of leadership the united states has maintained since the end of world war ii, or the end of the cold war (you take your pick). second, and not apart from the first goal, the united states must be sufficiently strong to prevent or deter use of effective military power against us. it is not inconceivable that our so-called superpower status could be defeated in battle by a crafty and well-prepared adversary. witness what happened to the powerful victors of wwii in vietnam. third, u.s. military forces must be of sufficient size, configuration, and readiness to bring a major conventional conflict to a successful termination. it goes without saying that during this process we need to reduce nuclear weapons to numbers that do not threaten the virtual destruction of the world. nuclear deterrence forces also must remain in place. fourth and lastly, our military forces must be capable of responding to all the other tasks and functions for which the national command authority calls upon the military. this first of challenges should be used to define the military forces we field, how we train them, and the methods we use to employ them. the strategic geographic depth the united states enjoys, bounded by two oceans on the east and west and non-threatening nations to the north and south, means that our nation is somewhat immune from attack, other than by means of infiltration such as a terrorist, or from the skies by means of long-range aircraft, and cruise or ballistic missiles. we will require some actions and defenses which address these threats, but the major portion of our national defense effort must be placed on building and sustaining offensive forces for combat in environments other than our own soil. this dictates that our projection forces must be capable of rapidly responding to an unforeseen crisis anywhere in the world, keeping in mind that quick, decisive surprise favors our potential enemies. given that we have proven unable to predict the outbreak of conflict in the past, these forces must also be ready at all times to carry out combat operations in most any place. there will not be time to modernize their equipment or train reserve force units. they must be capable of projecting and sustaining their military power over long distances and operating in the environment of the enemy's choosing. last but not least, when required, they must be capable of decisive combat, not by attrition of the enemy force in head-to-head combat as was our nature in past wars, but by shock and awe so that conflict resolution is achieved with a maximum of success at the minimum loss of life in the shortest time. these characteristics for our projection force cannot be achieved easily, as the processes that defined our cold war doctrines, force structures, equipment, and ways of doing business are loath to change. the services' and joint requirements oversight processes that define the equipment provided our military forces place emphasis on force structure and the traditional roles for those forces. this inertia can freeze our land, sea, air, and space capabilities at current or near current levels, but may prove inadequate to carry out new strategies. there are few incentives for a service or the joint staff to reward innovation or divestiture of roles or missions in order to change the character and mix of land, sea, air, and space forces and to prepare them to fight the battles we must envisage for the twenty-first century. for example, the services claim lessons learned from _desert storm_ which reinforce late twentieth century ways of fighting and ignore the troublesome aspects which loom in the future and threaten our traditional view of the battlefield. many acclaim the role of precision weapons for our forces, but ignore the threat they pose if they are in the hands of the enemy. what would be the lessons learned if several hundred canisters of live sensor fused weapons were released by a red force ballistic missile on the th division during a fort irwin engagement? certainly there would be profound changes in tactics, doctrine, and equipment indicated for the surviving u.s. army force. what if radar homing surface to air missiles were employed by the red force during a red flag exercise in the nevada desert, not using centralized soviet tactics/doctrine, but instead using decentralized yet cooperative engagement operations as would be used by our best and brightest if unleashed from their stagnant doctrines? i doubt that the air force would be spending millions of dollars trying to build electronic countermeasures to hide the large number of expensive and very non-stealthy aircraft they continue to build, such as the f- e. imagine the shock on our populace if a single cruise missile were actually allowed to score a direct hit on the carl vinson aircraft carrier during a solid shield joint exercise with the attendant loss of life numbering in the , to , range. you would think the maritime force would reexamine the method it provides air power from the sea, vital yet today too vulnerable. how many times do we hear that the space forces are configured to provide intelligence from overhead only to find in iraq or bosnia that the front line forces receive products that are old, inaccurate and altered to keep our soviet foes from gaining knowledge of our capabilities? perhaps we if we would dual hat the director of the central intelligence agency to the position of j- , or even commander-in-chief of a regional unified command, there would be vast improvements in the tasking, evaluation, and delivery of space-derived intelligence to regional combat forces. then we might see full understanding of the increasing role of space forces and implement change to make them more relevant to our national security strategies of the next century. innovation, not size, must be sought because we do not have the resources to do both. moreover, large forces drive our operational level strategy to force-on-force engagements in the attrition warfare model of the last century with its attendant causalities and destruction of equipment. george patton's dictum still stands that directed his troops not to die for their country, but to get the other sob to die for his. military operations will also place less emphasis on dying and destruction. the ever-present television camera ensures that the horrors of war are broadcast worldwide. war's immorality should some day lead to its banishment. unfortunately, that day is probably a long way away. nonetheless, weapons of war and their employment tactics must minimize death and destruction. this is not a call for non-lethal weapons; it is a call for military forces to get right to the heart of the enemy and conclude operations as rapidly and efficiently as they possibly can given their equipment, training, and doctrine. this means there must be wide flexibility in how they may function. military operations will be across a wide spectrum of warfare and will demand flexibility. modern war will require our military leadership to navigate through a changing spectrum of political constraints and ever changing political goals as each scenario unfolds. we must make our forces capable of dampening the capacity of the enemy to use force by controlling the conflict rapidly even when surprised. we failed to do that tactically in _desert storm_ in the case of the scud missile attacks, but were fortunate that the iraqis were equally inept at taking political advantage of this card they held and skillfully employed on the battlefield. we must also look for efficiency before we even join in battle. defense spending has declined as a percent of federal outlays since the end of the cold war. given the leadership role the united states plays in the world, one could think a reasonable sum to devote to defense might be three percent of our gross national product, certainly an amount much smaller than what an average family expends for its security by means of life, health, causality, car, medical insurance, and retirement benefits. given the prospect of long-term, constant funding, the department of defense could then give more thought to how to build the most modern, efficient military force within the dollars available. we would no longer define our forces against some mythical threat or scenario which generates impetus to protect force size rather than quality. the army, navy, air force, marine corps, and space forces would be required to build a team based on a salary cap. you might be willing to pay big bucks for a b- superstar quarterback, but you will also need lower cost and capable riflemen or destroyers to block and tackle. most of all, you would reward the service or agency who would innovate to provide efficiency. manpower has become the driving cost in the all-volunteer military force. investment cost of a ship, tank, aircraft or satellite might be high, but it is the operations and maintenance costs that will drive how much resources we are required to expend to gain and maintain a given military capability. again turning to _desert storm_, the huge advantages of overflight precision munitions dropped from stealth aircraft has not been understood or accepted by the operations analysts who argue what we should build or buy next. if it had been, would the navy have allowed the a- program to fail, would the air force be pouring hundreds of millions if not eventually billions of dollars into equipping forty year old b- s with conventional missiles, or would the army be maintaining heavy divisions at a personal cost of $ billion for years of ownership? why not build a division force equivalent using technology and doctrine to provide a "heavy division equivalent" force using far fewer troops featuring speed, shock, precision fire while avoiding the manpower costs of dollars that in peacetime include added costs for recruitment, training, and sustaining and in war have an even greater added cost computed in blood? why don't we do this? the answer is because it would require rare innovation, trust, and support from the equally intransigent federal funding authorities. most importantly, the services are not rewarded for innovation which recognizes the contributions of another service or ally. jointness has become an altar at which all military personnel must worship even if they don't understand or believe. defenders of the status quo argue that there is merit in duplication or redundancy and these arguments have some validity. the question becomes how much overlap or redundancy between land, sea, air, and space forces can the nation afford, and what is the opportunity cost to the core competency of the land, sea, air, or space force that builds and/or maintains the duplicative force structure. a second yet vastly different question arises when considering the unique capabilities a service provides to support itself and the other services. for example, how much the air force should spend on airlift forces is not cast in terms of what the envisaged requirement is for airlift, ton miles per day, to support the mythical scenarios. the alternative sea, land, and space lift requirements can be postulated; however, if the navy, army, or air force do not satisfy those sea, land, and space lift requirement, then there is a shortfall which will in turn generate a need for more airlift! during _desert storm_, nearly percent of the deployed equipment arrived by sea, but not in time if the iraqis had continued their first attack in august. a majority of overland movement was provided by saudi arabian civilian trucks and drivers, and the army had neither the resources nor the responsiveness to activate reserve forces needed to meet the truck and rail support requirements of our military forces. as a result, costly airlift was used to move forces that should have traveled by land and sea. if added space capabilities had been needed, there was almost no capability for the timely launch of a satellite. would it not be wise to index spending on land, sea, air, and space launch on one and other, postulate lift requirements on what the new force needs as it innovates and slims down. the need to respond on a moment's notice adds to the value of airlift and prepositioned ships. the outcome though would be not to allow any of the services to divert general support money into core competencies and thereby shift the jointness burden to another service. innovate. use the carrier to haul the army to war, and then fly the fighters aboard after the helicopters or tanks are unloaded. accept the benefits of federal express that can be federalized during times of national emergency as a costly, but ready augmentation to military supply lines that has no cost during the much longer periods of peacetime. our nation has other industrial capacities that also have duplicate military capabilities. they may be percent solutions, but the cost of ownership could prohibit creation and maintenance of a military owned and operated percent solution. iridium telephones may not be jam-resistant or secure, but percent of the time they will satisfy the need for percent of the cost. of course, this avoids the problem we have created for ourselves with our medieval acquisition system. finally, we must acquire hardware of a type and at a pace that will assure the future force capability will be enduring. we cannot keep up with technology using our current ways of acquiring military hardware and training our people in how to use and maintain it. in many areas we would be better off to throw it away when it breaks given the low cost, durability, and reliability of modern solid state electronics. why train technicians? give the troops a gold card and a telephone number and they know how to spend money more efficiently than do our government agencies. make sure the equipment we do buy not only integrates with that of other services and functions, but that it can integrate with both older and newer equipment designated to do the same function. the fighter aircraft secure radio must be capable of communicating with the ground and sea based forces command and control, as importantly it must be able to communicate with the next generation fighter aircraft radio. the added dimension is the realization that we are unlikely to fight alone in the future. we gain valuable legitimacy from forming coalitions, plus it makes up for the growing feeble force structure we maintain in declining budget years. an enduring force must also recognize the necessity to operate cooperatively with the forces of other nations. this means we must more freely release our technologies to foreign nations so that our military forces can fight side by side, so that our deployment forces can draw from stocks of others while our logistics system seeks to catch up with the rapidly deployed combat force. in the final analysis, all of this shaping and sharpening of our military forces will be for naught if there is not an equal change in the policy side of the equation. what good are highly trained, efficient, capable land, sea, air, and space forces if the implementing authorities are incapable of defining principles, goals, and integrating strategies for their employment? while this is not the province of the military to solve, the military must understand how disjointed policy, weak political leadership, or dysfunctional international cooperation will preclude success on the battlefield. again, one of the missed lessons of _desert storm_ was the difficult and successful integration of international leadership achieved by the president, secretary of defense, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, congressional leaders, and allied national command authorities as well as many others. it was this leadership, coupled with the ineptness of the enemy, that covered over the failures of our cold war-equipped and trained forces that fought _desert storm_. this does not take anything away from the military victory, but it does make it difficult to glean the right lessons for the future. perhaps that is why we are so loathe to change our forces at a time when change is demanded by a new strategic environment and new threats to our national security. defining alternative forces in light of the changed national security environment, goals and strategy raises two questions: what kind or mix of military force and how much best balances the requirements and funds available. deep strike: a key to shock and awe in the world of surprise attack and withdrawal from foreign bases, all initial responses to combat operations will be some form of deep strike. given strategic warning (don't bet on it) after deployment of our military forces, deep strike is a term that relates to the political boundaries or proximity to military forces. the geography of the area of conflict will further define deep strike. but a rule of thumb might be attacks on a target beyond range of surface-based fires except for ballistic or cruise missiles. more important than range is the characteristics of the deep strike targets. deep strike targets could be classified as ones the enemy does not wish to place at high levels of risk. they can be characterized by the functions they perform, such as: - leadership - command and control (a function of leadership) - control of military forces, especially air and space - logistics and sustainment - national economic base - internal security/political - national will, theirs and ours intelligence used to nominate the targets for these strikes must examine the functions and then define the physical objects or people who comprise the system which is responsible for the successful operation of the function. you define the system and then attack the critical elements in order to achieve economy of force. often these target sets are difficult to define, as these functions often represent the enemy's most valuable and therefore protected elements. the intelligence collection associated with each function will vary from target set to target set. large, fixed infrastructure, such as associated with an electrical grid, lends itself to traditional reconnaissance and evaluation of technical analysis. leadership targets are better defined by using human intelligence and subjective analysis. in all cases success starts with innovative intelligence products, which has not been a hallmark of united states operations. such intelligence products must be examined through the eyes of the enemy, their values and concerns. too often we apply judgments based on our viewpoint. one target system may serve the attainment of a number of different goals. for example, attacks on the electrical power system of the enemy may debilitate his capacity to command and control his military forces, operate vital elements of the economy and thus degrade the political support required to sustain the conflict. this same target system may be attacked a variety of ways. most common methods would be using stealth aircraft and cruise missiles to bomb power plants and switching centers. areas with isolated populations lend themselves to using special operations forces infiltrated to destroy an isolated power grid node for transmission of energy from one highly populated area to another. now it is obvious that computer signals used to command the power grid are targets as intrusion into the enemy's control system provides the means to simply turn off electricity to selected areas. attacks by all these means achieves even greater results than the sum of its parts because enemy responses to restore electrical power will be confused as elements such as computer intrusion are confused with bombing destruction. the characteristics of value in attacking these important targets systems are simultaneity, impunity, and timing. the greatest effect will be achieved when the strikes are coordinated in such a manner as to inflict maximum shock and awe on the enemy element. this means operations must be coordinated and orchestrated carefully and flexibly as enemy reaction to the attack is evaluated. moreover, presence is projected when a combination of functions or target sets supporting a variety of functions are struck at the same time with impunity. in order to achieve maximum results, the attacks will need to be evaluated quickly in order to define previously unknown elements of the system or how the enemy perceives the impact on his system. finally, the attacker must be alert as to the interaction of the functions as the effects of these deep strikes begin to take hold. in order to achieve desired levels of shock and awe, the attacker must know the current and projected effects of his strikes against elements of the enemy's residual system. if the trick is to define the system of targets needed to conduct successful deep strike, it is even more important to know how to alter the initial plan as the battle unfolds and timing becomes everything. the characteristics of forces needed to carry out deep strike are long range, flexibility, precision, survivability, and speed. cost of the operation is a factor; however, system cost must include peacetime operations and maintenance costs as well of the costs during actual combat. there is also a human element in the cost of combat operations which escalates rapidly as military force is misused. the total cost of these operations must also address the cost of intelligence used to support deep strikes. intelligence operations may be the most costly due to the importance of these targets to the enemy. alternatively, the human intelligence associated with these attacks may be the most inexpensive since their national importance makes them vulnerable to knowl-edgeable dissidents. stand-off deep strike is defined by distance, albeit relative distance. some of the target sets may lend themselves to circumstances beyond the nation's control; for example, seoul borders on north korea. our protective oceans mean that likely conflict is offshore. the likelihood our next adversary may have access to surveillance, precision munitions, and long-range delivery systems dictates that much of our operations will be at long range, lest our forces come under attack at their ports, camps, and bases. there will be a need for systems capable of projecting military force from distances of , km. a sizable portion of the force must be able to deliver ordnance of enemy targets from ranges in excess of , km. launching attacks from inside , km of the enemy forces will demand that friendly forces be protected from attack by means of active and passive defenses and dispersal. this latter constraint will preclude achieving levels of shock and awe through simultaneous attack. survivability great cost benefits are attained if the vehicle used to deliver the attack is reusable. keep in mind that the force built for the most demanding conflict must also be flexible for other operations. therefore, while ballistic missiles provide great range, speed, and survivability in reaching their target, their cost become prohibitive in large-scale operations which endure beyond a few hours, or in smaller-scale operations where the goals are modest and the demands on other military forces are low. simultaneous combat operations require a number of expensive, expendable platforms in the opening hours of the conflict if our response is to be timely and induce shock. awe is not achieved if the enemy is permitted to gain experience in being attacked; at best you may make them numb. alternatively, reusable long-range survivable systems provide needed flexibility to alter the deep strike plan as it unfolds. the food chain of weapons systems ranges from the most valuable systems such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and stealth bombers, to less valuable, but useful, stealth fighter and long-range surface-to-surface high trajectory fires. firepower discriminate fires are important due to the likelihood of people and structures being in close proximity to the desired target. it is not improbable that the national command center is located next door to a children's hospital. discriminate fires require precision in target cordinate identification and location. precision does not mean "small warhead," although there is a beneficial impact as the right amount of explosive is placed on the target due the penalties imposed on the delivery vehicle required to carry the warhead long distances. all operations involving the use of firepower must also understand and evaluate the beneficial aspects of using non-destructive elements in conjunction with the attack to include all aspects of the so-called information warfare. appendix c enduring realities and rapid dominance by general fred franks rapid dominance, as we see it, is a markedly different concept for the use of force to gain national security ob jectives. at its core, rapid dominance blends unique capabilities of land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces. it is important to note the vital role of jointness in using forces from all elements and resisting the lure of gimmicks and cost-free options that may appear within the reach of high technology but are not. examining current joint force capabilities reveals some enduring truths that should be used to evaluate future concepts. joint force commanders today benefit from the wide array of capabilities available to the joint warfighting team. the ability to combine and use forces from all dimensions in a variety of powerful combinations to fit mission circumstances presents a versatility of capabilities that makes defense by adversaries difficult. balance and versatility are key. balance in capabilities and the inherent versatility to combine them in unpredictable, yet highly effective ways has served u.s. national security interests well since the end of the cold war. one has only to look at the variety of methods employed in panama ( ), desert storm ( ), somalia ( ), rwanda ( ), haiti ( ), and bosnia ( ) in both war and operations other than war. joint force commanders employed, and in some cases invented, new combinations of balanced capabilities and were willing to go beyond the confines of service doctrines to fit mission circumstances. for example, a u.s. army brigade of the th mountain division with helicopters replaced much of the carrier air wing and flew off the carrier eisenhower during the haiti operation. this force packaging capability is an advantage unique to the u.s. as we look beyond the present to future and bolder defense concepts such as rapid dominance, the key will be to maintain that balance in land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces combinations available to the joint force commander. u.s. military forces are now multidimensional in capabilities, able to use force in ways unpredictable to an adversary. u.s. forces also have enormous versatility, able to be used in war and what have become termed operations other than war. balance permits that. moreover, joint force commanders, recognizing this capability, have found ways to introduce land forces even more rapidly given today's methods. recently, a brigade of the st cavalry division rapidly deployed by air from ft. hood, texas, to kuwait and was able to fall in on equipment forward positioned and be available for combat soon after arrival. a recent article in navy times pointed out, "in fact, as each wave of soldiers arrived in kuwait, they were heading north -- combat ready -- within six hours." this was a dramatic example of the rapid ability to combine land forces with air and sea forces using both distant forces with those already in the theater. that combination in that set of strategic circumstances provided a rapid deterrent in an area of vital national security interests to the u.s. another enduring truth is the need for staying power and ensuring that capacity is perceived by a potential adversary. staying power means the ability to press the initial advantage gained until the strategic objective is achieved. on-the-ground presence, in addition to forces in theater, as demonstrated in kuwait in and again in , provided commitment and staying power to convince iraq that it would be disastrous to consider any form of military action. the inherent staying power of land forces, wherever future tactical concepts may lead, makes them a powerful contributing partner in our rapid dominance concept. finally, there is the issue of physical control. control combines with staying power to defeat the enemy's will. one of the many lessons of desert storm is that it was not until after land forces attacked iraq and kuwait that iraqi forces were expelled from kuwait. despite the awesome shock and destructive effects of attacks f rom the air and sea, it was only after coalition ground attacks to extend control to both kuwait and southeastern iraq by defeat and destruction of defending iraqi forces that strategic objectives were secured. control on land was extended past the cease fire until such time in april as the un passed a permanent cease fire and sanctions resolution. land forces remaining in southeastern iraq provided the staying power and control. the size, shape, and composition of forces that will fight in all elements will assuredly change in the future. early work done in advanced warfighting experiments out of tradoc's battle labs beginning in and growing into the current force xxi and other promising capabilities as well as by the usmc at mccdc at quantico are the precursors of how change may be discovered and implemented. the challenge is to ensure that all components of our fighting power are properly balanced and combined into the most effective and lethal mixes of land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces. this is the heart of the rapid dominance force of the future. extension of real and perceived control over the will and ability of any adversary to oppose or threaten us will insure and guarantee success of initial operations, thereby maximizing shock and awe. indeed, getting forces on land rapidly and operationally will be a major factor in achieving the enduring effects of shock and awe. certainly, as forces on land evolve and change, they must meet the requirements of rapidity and sustainment and are vital components of any mix of forces that seek by shock and awe to stun and then rapidly dominate an adversary to achieve u.s. national security objectives. we strongly feel that we as a nation cannot stand still in exploring defense alternatives. we must seize this time to be bold in our thinking. more thought and hypotheses with operational methods that break through or expand current service doctrines are needed from a joint perspective even as services look to the future from their own service perspective. then there must be rigorous experiments using both high fidelity simulations and actual joint field trials to determine the worth of these hypotheses to blend the wide array of technology available to the total joint force and according to bold new concepts. the results will determine the worth of rapid dominance concepts by judging whether they will permit even more balanced, versatile, and lethal combinations to fit known and anticipated future strategic circumstances. study group members */l.a. "bud" edney/* is a retired navy admiral and naval aviator. a veteran of over combat missions in vietnam, admiral edney's senior billets included vice chief of naval operations and commander-in-chief, atlantic command/supreme allied commander, atlantic. admiral edney has an advanced degree from harvard and was a white house fellow. */fred m. franks/* is a retired army general and a highly experienced combat armor officer. during the gulf war, he commanded vii corps and last served as commanding general of the training and doctrine command. he has two master's degrees from columbia and is a graduate of the national war college. he is the author of _into the storm, a study in command,_ written with tom clancy to be published by g.p. putnam's sons in . */charles a. horner/* is a retired air force general and a highly experienced combat fighter and attack pilot. during the gulf war, general horner commanded all allied air forces. his last assignment was commander-in-chief, space command. a graduate of the national war college, he now serves as consultant to government and industry. */jonathan t. howe/* is a retired navy admiral and both a submarine and surface warfare qualified officer. he has served as deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, deputy chairman of nato's military committee, commander-in-chief allied forces southern europe/cinc u.s. naval forces europe, and was special representative of the secretary general of the un to somalia. he has a ph.d. from the fletcher school of law and diplomacy and currently heads a charitable foundation. */harlan k. ullman/* divides his time between the worlds of business and public policy. a former naval person, he is with the center for strategic and international studies and the center for naval analyses. his last book, _in irons: u.s. military might in the new century,_ was published by the national defense university press in . */james p. wade, jr./*, a scientist by training, is a west point graduate and infantry officer. he has held many senior positions in dod, including head of policy planning, assistant to secdef for atomic energy, assistant secretary for acquisition, and acting head of defense research and engineering. he is chairman and ceo of dgi which conducted this study. */keith brendley/* is a vice president with defense group inc. he was formerly with sarcos research corporation, rand, system planning corporation and nasa, ames research center. he holds mechanical engineering degrees from the university of illinois (b.s.) and the university of maryland (m.s.). [transcriber's notes: obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all other inconsistencies are as in the original. the author's spelling has been maintained. characters enclosed in { } are superscripts.] smithsonian institution united states national museum bulletin washington, d.c. _publications of the united states national museum_ the scholarly publications of the united states national museum include two series, _proceedings of the united states national museum_ and _united states national museum bulletin_. in these series are published original articles and monographs dealing with the collections and work of the museum and setting forth newly acquired facts in the fields of anthropology, biology, history, geology, and technology. copies of each publication are distributed to libraries and scientific organizations and to specialists and others interested in the different subjects. the _proceedings_, begun in , are intended for the publication, in separate form, of shorter papers. these are gathered in volumes, octavo in size, with the publication date of each paper recorded in the table of contents in the volume. in the _bulletin_ series, the first of which was issued in , appear longer, separate publications consisting of monographs (occasionally in several parts) and volumes in which are collected works on related subjects. _bulletins_ are either octavo or quarto in size, depending on the needs of the presentation. since papers relating to the botanical collections of the museum have been published in the _bulletin_ series under the heading _contributions from the united states national herbarium_. this work is number of the _bulletin_ series. frank a. taylor _director, united states national museum_ for sale by the superintendent of documents, u.s. government printing office washington , d.c.--price $ [illustration: shoulder-belt plate of vermont militia, attributed to ethan allen, about . in collection of dr. john lattimer.] museum of history and technology american military insignia - j. duncan campbell and edgar m. howell smithsonian institution, washington, d.c. contents _page_ preface ix bibliography xiv introduction organization of the regular army organization of the militia insignia of the regular army cap and helmet devices shoulder-belt and waist-belt plates insignia of the uniformed militia cap and helmet devices shoulder-belt and waist-belt plates preface this catalog is a descriptive and interpretive listing of the insignia of the army of the united states--other than buttons, epaulets, and horse furniture--in the national collections that were prescribed or worn during the period - . the subject of early american military buttons has been covered by l. f. emilio in _the emilio collection of military buttons_ (salem, massachusetts: essex institute, ), w. l. calver and r. p. bolton in _history written with pick and shovel_ (new york: new york historical society, ), and david f. johnson in _uniform buttons, american armed forces_, - . (watkins glen, new york: century house, , vols.). for epaulets, see mendel l. peterson, "american army epaulets, - ," _military collector and historian_ (march , vol. , no. , pp. - ). most of the specimens described here are from the huge w. stokes kirk collection acquired in , supplemented by the war department collection and the numerous biographical collections of the united states national museum; in addition, a few insignia in the collections of j. duncan campbell and others are included. the unique w. stokes kirk collection, unmatched in scope, volume, and rarity, is worthy of special note. it was begun in by w. stokes kirk, sr., of philadelphia, a dealer in u.s. government surplus. struck by the beautiful design and delicate art work in some of the early insignia, mr. kirk put aside all old and unusual devices for his personal collection. as his business expanded, so did his interest in military rarities and curios. after each bulk purchase from government sources, he would have all the odd and unusual items sorted out for his examination. the best of such items went into his personal collection, which included rare firearms, powder flasks, insignia, epaulets, military caps, and the like. w. stokes kirk, jr., who succeeded his father and expanded the business nationally until it became almost as well known as bannerman's military store in new york city, maintained and enlarged the collection. after his death, in , the collection was continued by his widow, mrs. linnie a. kirk mosler. items in this catalog from the w. stokes kirk collection are indicated by the letters "s-k" in parentheses following the united states national museum number. although this catalog is, in more than one sense, a developmental history of american military insignia, it is not, and is not intended to be, a definitive study. the picture is far too incomplete. whereas the record of regular army devices after is fairly clear--despite the fact that the uniform regulations continued sometimes to use the tantalizing phrase "according to pattern"--there remain serious gaps in the pre- period when regulations were exceedingly vague and fragmentary at best; for example, the badges of the regiment of light artillery ( - ). these gaps will be filled only by excavating at sites known to have been occupied by specific regular units during particular periods. indeed, since this study was begun, four unique and significant insignia were excavated at the site of a war of cantonment, and these greatly enrich our knowledge of the period. the record of insignia of the veritable multitude of independent uniformed militia companies in existence during the period under consideration may never be complete. the selection presented here, however, is an excellent representative chronological cross section of typical designs and variations of insignia worn by the uniformed or "volunteer" militia, as opposed to the "common" or "standing" militia. the best sources of documentation and dating for regular army devices are the uniform regulations and ordnance regulations; these are supplemented by pertinent records in the national archives, notably the letter files of the purveyor of public supplies and of the commissary general of purchases. the letter files are voluminous, but in some cases badly mixed and in many cases incomplete. we have conjectured a reason for this incompleteness. the two prime contractors for military insignia during the period - were george armitage and william crumpton, both of whom had their small factories in philadelphia within a mile of the office of callendar irvine, commissary general of purchases. the paucity of written transactions in the records in the national archives between these gentlemen and irvine tends to bear out our assumption that most of their dealings were conducted verbally in irvine's office. this would account for the lack of sketches and drawings of cap plates and belt plates in files of the national archives. in cases where no specific documentary evidence is available, dating has been based on a careful evaluation of design development and comparison with biographical specimens that can be more fairly dated through knowledge of the former owner's career. excavated insignia from datable sites have also reduced the problem considerably. for militia insignia worn about , the best documentation is to be found in _u.s. military magazine_, published between and by huddy and duval of philadelphia, and in _new york military magazine_, published by labree and stockton of new york during . in , frederick p. todd described the huddy and duval prints in detail (_journal of the american military institute_, , vol. , no. , pp. - ). however, evaluation and consideration of over-all design development and comparison with dated biographical specimens of the earlier period, before , are difficult and must be done cautiously, as there is no orderly pattern. one generalization does seem clear: during the decade after , when the regulars discarded large cap plates, the militia almost universally adopted them and continued to wear them well into the 's. very few insignia include the maker's name or initials, but when they do, bracketing within a definite period is relatively easy. similarly, when a cap plate appears to be original to a cap, the design of the cap and its maker's label, if included, are of great help. finally, when there is nothing else to rely on, the "feel" of the specimen, gained through the experience of studying several thousand, has been used, although with reluctance. the year was selected as the opening date of the study because it was in that year that the first metal ornament was prescribed to designate a particular branch of service. the closing date of was chosen because regular army devices for that year and thereafter are well documented in uniform regulations, manuals, and catalogs of manufacturers such as william horstmann and sons. militia dress after that general date becomes so increasingly complex that it should be attempted only as a separate study. most of the specimens described in this study were struck from steel dies; however--despite the relative wealth of knowledge on the striking of coins--little is known of the exact process, especially prior to the appearance of the punch press in the 's. several insignia dies dating as early as the war of period and a number dating in the 's do exist, however. all of these examined were found to be female dies, with the design in intaglio rather than in relief. the design was worked into the die--the art generally termed "die-sinking"--in the same basic manner as in coin dies. the die sinker first softened the steel to suit his particular taste and then incised the design, using a succession of small chisels. the steel was then retempered to withstand high impact pressures. although there is no documentation on the subject, manufacturing techniques of the period indicate that the following process was probably employed: the die was locked in place at the base of a drop press, similar to a guillotine, so that it could be struck accurately from above; a piece of pure lead was then affixed to the bottom of the weighted drop and allowed to strike the die a sufficient number of times to completely receive the impression of the die and become, in effect, a male counterpart; lastly, a thin sheet of brass, copper, or pewter was placed on the female die and struck with the weighted lead male, receiving the desired impression but without the excessive stretching and resultant cracking that a steel-on-steel strike might have produced. examination of finished products in the national collections bears out this theory of production; few if any of the specimens show evidence of having been struck with a steel male die. with only a few exceptions, all specimens have been photographed on a -inch grid. all references to right and left are made according to heraldic usage; the heraldic right is always on the left as viewed. during the months this work has been in progress, many people and institutions have generously assisted in many ways. it is a pleasure to thank them for their help. mr. detmar finke of the office of the chief of military history, department of the army, reviewed the regular army portions of the manuscript and made many valuable suggestions. mr. frederick p. todd, director of the west point museum, graciously answered many questions relative to both regular army and militia insignia. through the courtesy of mr. james koping and miss elizabeth ulrich of the pennsylvania state library, the _u.s. military magazine_ of huddy and duval was made available for unlimited use. thanks are also given to the following, who furnished photographs of specimens in their collections: mr. waverly p. lewis, devon, connecticut; mr. william e. codd, monkton, maryland; the filson club, louisville, kentucky; the west point museum; the fort sill museum; old fort erie museum, ontario, canada; the niagara historical society museum, niagara-on-the-lake, ontario, canada; the washington county historical society museum, fort calhoun, nebraska; the valley forge chapel museum, and dr. john lattimer, new york city. mr. michael arpad of washington, d.c., was especially helpful in matters pertaining to the techniques of chasing and die sinking. j. duncan campbell edgar m. howell _march , ._ bibliography the following works have been used in gathering the material for this book. they are frequently referred to in the text in shortened form. _american military history, - ._ (rotc manual - , department of the army.) washington, . _american state papers, class v, military affairs._ vol. . washington: gales and seaton, . ansell, s. t. legal and historical aspects of the militia. _yale law journal_ (april ), vol. , no. , pp. - . barnes, r. m. _military uniforms of britain and the empire._ london: seeley service and co., . belote, theodore t. _american and european swords in the historical collections of the united states national museum._ (u.s. national museum bulletin .) washington, . a bit of u.s. mint history. _american journal of numismatics_ ( ), vol. , no. , pp. - . calver, w. l., and bolton, r. p. _history written with pick and shovel._ new york: new york historical society, . chamberlain, georgia s. moritz furst, die-sinker and artist. _the numismatist._ (june ), vol. , no. , pp. - . davis, gherardi. _the colors of the united states army, - ._ new york: privately printed, . emilio, l. f. _the emilio collection of military buttons._ salem, massachusetts: essex institute, . finke, detmar h. insignia of rank in the continental army, - . _military collector and historian_ (fall ), vol. , no. , pp. - . _general regulations for the army._ philadelphia: m. carey and sons, . _general regulations for the army of the united states._ washington: department of the army, . _general regulations for the army of the united states, ._ washington: j. and g. s. gideon, . gronert, t. g. the first national pastime in the middle west. _indiana magazine of history_ (september ), vol. , no. , pp. - . history of the organization of the united states cavalry. ms, office of the chief of military history, department of the army, washington, d.c. hopkins, alfred f. volunteer corps hat of . _military affairs_ (winter ), vol. , no. , pp. - . johnson, david f. _uniform buttons, american armed forces, - ._ vols. watkins glen, new york: century house, . jones, willard l. history of the organization of the united states field artillery. ms, office of the chief of military history, department of the army, washington, d.c. _journals of the continental congress, - ._ edit. worthington chauncey ford and others. vols. washington: carnegie foundation, - . kivett, marvin f. excavations at fort atkinson, nebraska, a preliminary report. _nebraska history_ (march ), vol. , no. , pp. - . knox papers. mss division, library of congress, washington, d.c. kuhn, edward c. u.s. army colors and standards of . _military affairs_ (winter ), vol. , no. , pp. - . lefferts, charles w. _uniforms of the american, british, french, and german armies in the war of the american revolution._ new york: new york historical society, . lewis, waverly p. _u.s. military headgear, - ._ devon, connecticut: privately printed, . lundeberg, philip k. a history of the north carolina militia, - . master's dissertation, duke university, . mahon, john k. the citizen soldier in national defense, - . doctor's dissertation, university of california at los angeles, . ----. history of the organization of the united states infantry. (pp. - in vol. of _the army lineage book_, washington: department of the army, .) mcbarron, h. charles. regiment of riflemen, winter uniform, - . military collector and historian (december ), vol. , no. , p. . ----. the th u.s. infantry regiment, - . _military collector and historian_ (summer ), vol. , no. , pp. - . mcclellan, e. n. uniforms of the american marines, to . mimeographed in by marine corps historical section, department of the navy, washington, d.c. _the military laws of the united states._ edit. john f. callan. philadelphia: george w. childes, . _new york military magazine_ ( ). _official army register, corrected to october , ._ washington, . official drawings for the u.s. army uniform regulations of . _military collector and historian_, vol. , no. (spring ), pp. - ; vol. , no. (summer ), pp. - . _old print shop portfolio_ (may ), vol. , no. . parkyn, maj. h. g. _shoulder-belt plates and buttons._ aldershot, hants, england: gale and polden, ltd., . patterson, c. meade. the military rifle flasks of and . _military collector and historian_ (march ), vol. , no. , pp. - . peterson, harold l. _the american sword_, new hope, pennsylvania: the river house, . peterson, mendel l. american army epaulets, - . _military collector and historian_ (march ), vol. , no. , pp. - . preble, george henry. _history of the flag of the united states of america._ boston: a. williams and co., . records of the adjutant general's office. record group , national archives, washington, d.c. _regulations for the government of the ordnance department._ washington: francis p. blair, . _regulations for the uniform and dress of the army of the united states, june ._ philadelphia: william h. horstmann and sons, . riker, william h. _soldiers of the states._ washington: public affairs press, . standing order book, st infantry, detroit. mss division, library of congress, washington, d. c. swanson, neil h. _the perilous flight._ new york: farrar and rinehart, . todd, frederick p. the huddy and duval prints. _journal of the american military institute_ ( ), vol. , no. , pp. - . ----. notes on the dress of the regiment of light artillery, u.s.a. _military collector and historian_ (march ), vol. , no. , p. . ----. our national guard: an introduction to its history. _military affairs_, vol. , no. (summer ), pp. - ; vol. , no. (fall ), pp. - . ----. the curious case of the voltigeur uniform. _military collector and historian_ (june ), vol. , no. , pp. - . ----. notes on the organization and uniforms of south carolina military forces, - . _military collector and historian_ (september ), vol. , no. , pp. - . ----. three leather cockades. _military collector and historian_ (spring ), vol. , no. , pp. - . townsend, f. c., and todd, frederick p. branch insignia of the regular cavalry, - . _military collector and historian_ (spring ), vol. , no. , pp. - . upton, emory. the military policy of the united states. senate document no. , th congress, st session. washington: . _u.s. military magazine_ ( - ), vols. - . wall, alexander j. the flag with an eagle in the canton. _new york historical society quarterly bulletin_ (october ), vol. , no. , pp. - . wike, john w. untitled ms, office of the chief of military history, department of the army, washington, d.c. _writings of george washington._ edit. john g. fitzpatrick. washington: . zieber, eugene. _heraldry in america._ philadelphia: bailey, banks, and biddle, . american military insignia - introduction in almost all armies it long has been standard practice to use distinctive devices of cloth and metal to distinguish between arms and services, and between individual units of each arm, to enhance morale and develop esprit de corps. colors of units of the british army have had ancient badges emblazoned on them since before the establishment of the present standing army in . by the end of the first half of the th century some of these badges had been authorized for placement on horse furniture or for wear on grenadier caps. this was especially true of the regiments of horse and a few of the older regiments of foot. the infantry regiments received numerical designations in , and these numbers were worn on waist belts, shoulder belts, and cartridge-box plates. when the infantry units acquired county titles in , these names often were added to the plates. in regimental numbers were ordered placed on the buttons of officers and other ranks; in practice these numbers were often combined with other devices.[ ] [footnote : parkyn's _shoulder-belt plates and buttons_ contains a wealth of information on british regimental devices.] in the american army such devices have taken many forms, ranging from distinctive buttons, plumes, cockades, cap plates, shoulder-belt plates, and waist-belt and cartridge-box plates to the well-known shoulder sleeve insignia and distinctive unit insignia of the present day. the origin of much of this insignia and many of the changes in its design can be tied more or less directly to the organization of the regular army--its contractions and expansions and its changes in arm and service designations--and to the peculiar circumstances surrounding the origin and growth of the volunteer or uniformed militia. thus, a short discussion of the organization of each is in order.[ ] [footnote : for history of the organization of the army, see _american military history, - _; mahon, "history of the organization of the united states infantry"; and jones, "history of the organization of the united states field artillery." unfortunately, there is no single, completely satisfactory source on the militia system of the united states. the following works, however, contain sound information and, when taken together, provide an excellent background on the subject: todd, "our national guard"; mahon, "citizen soldier"; lundeberg, "history of the north carolina militia"; ansell, "legal and historical aspects of the militia"; gronert, "first national pastime in the middle west"; and riker, _soldiers of the states_.] organization of the regular army two months after the war of the revolution officially ended with the signing of a peace treaty on september , , general washington directed the army to turn in its arms and disband.[ ] since the continental congress had made no provision for a permanent establishment, washington retained in service one infantry regiment and a battalion of artillery to guard military stores and take over posts to be evacuated by the british.[ ] early in june congress ordered these units disbanded except for detachments to guard stores at fort pitt and west point; then, in order to secure the frontier against indian unrest, it immediately authorized a regiment to be raised from the militia of four of the states to comprise eight companies of infantry and two of artillery.[ ] this unit, called the first american regiment, gradually turned into a regular organization. [footnote : _writings of george washington_, vol. , p. .] [footnote : ibid., pp. - ; also letter dated january , , from henry knox, commander in chief of the army, to president of the continental congress (in knox papers).] [footnote : journals of the continental congress, vol. , p. ; also, upton, p. .] the failure of an expedition commanded by col. josiah harmar of the first american regiment against the indians in awakened the congress somewhat to the threat in the northwest and resulted in the organization of another infantry regiment, which was designated the d infantry regiment; the first american regiment was redesignated the " st".[ ] trouble with the indians continued, and after another severe reverse congress authorized the raising of three additional infantry regiments and, at the same time, empowered the president to organize the army as he might see fit.[ ] [footnote : act of march , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] [footnote : act of march , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] under this discretionary power, the army was reorganized into the legion of the united states. this was a field army in which the three combat branches--infantry, cavalry, and artillery--were combined. the legion was in turn broken down into four sublegions, with each containing infantry, cavalry, artillery, and riflemen; thus, the sublegions were the fore-runners of the modern combined arms team. the st and d infantries became the st and d sublegions. of the three additional infantry regiments authorized, only two were organized, these becoming the d and th sublegions.[ ] under the forceful leadership of gen. anthony wayne the legion reversed the record on the frontier and decisively defeated the indians at the battle of fallen timbers. the temporary peace which followed turned attention to the problem of protecting the atlantic seaboard, and in congress authorized a large increase in the artillery, assigned engineer officers, and designated the new organization the corps of artillerists and engineers.[ ] the legion was continued until it was replaced in by the st, d, d, and th infantry regiments, which were constituted from the four sublegions, two troops of light dragoons, and the above-mentioned corps.[ ] [footnote : _american state papers_, pp. - .] [footnote : act of may , (_military laws_, p. ).] [footnote : act of may , (_military laws_, p. ).] the threat of war with france in brought further expansions. in april of that year an "additional regiment" of artillerists and engineers was authorized, with the corps created in becoming the st and the new unit being designated the d regiment of artillerists and engineers.[ ] in the following july, more regiments of infantry and troops of light dragoons--to be combined with the two troops in existence to form a regiment--were authorized; an additional regiments of infantry, plus units of other arms, authorized the following winter made a total of regiments of infantry.[ ] actually, the greatest part of this force remained on paper. only the st and d infantries ever attained their required strength, and only , men were enlisted for the th through the th. there were no enlistments at all for the other regiments. officers were assigned to the six troops of light dragoons, but no enlisted personnel were raised and no horses were bought.[ ] [footnote : act of april , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] [footnote : acts of july , , and march , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] [footnote : _american state papers_, p. .] more quickly than it had arisen, the threat of a war with france abated. early in action was suspended under the two acts creating the paper regiments, and the army was reduced to the regular establishment of four regiments of infantry, two regiments of artillerists and engineers, and two troops of light dragoons.[ ] two years later the antipathy of the new jefferson administration to a standing army further reduced this establishment to two regiments of infantry and one of artillery. the corps of artillerists and engineers was abolished; a corps of engineers was organized to be stationed at west point and "constitute a military academy"; and the light dragoons were disbanded.[ ] [footnote : acts of february and may , (_military laws_, pp. , ); also, _american state papers_, p. .] [footnote : act of march , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] the jeffersonian theories regarding a strong militia and a small professional army were rudely shaken in by the _chesapeake-leopard_ affair. with war seeming imminent, congress added to the regular establishment, though cautiously "for a limited time," five regiments of infantry, one regiment of riflemen, one of light artillery, and one of light dragoons. the new regiments of infantry were numbered the d through the th.[ ] there was no further preparation for a fight with england until just before war was actually declared. in january , regiments of infantry, two of artillery, and one regiment of light dragoons were added; three months later a corps of artificers was organized; and in june provision was made for eight more infantry regiments, making a total of .[ ] in january , following the discouragements of the early campaigns in the northwest, congress constituted more infantry regiments, bringing the total to , the largest number in the regular establishment until the th century.[ ] a year later three more regiments of riflemen, designated the d through the th, were formed.[ ] [footnote : act of april , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] [footnote : acts of january , april , and june , (_military laws_, pp. - , - , ).] [footnote : act of january (_military laws_, pp. - ). there is some confusion as to just how many infantry regiments were organized and actually came into being. the act of january , , authorized the president to raise such regiments of infantry as he should see fit, "not exceeding twenty." it seems that were actually formed, made up partly of -year men and partly of -year men. there are regiments listed in the army register for january , , and it is known that several volunteer regiments were designated as units of the regular establishment and that a th and a th were redesignated as lower numbered units when several regiments were consolidated because of low recruitment rate. mahon (in "history of the organization of the united states infantry") is not clear on this point. there is an organizational chart of the army for this period in the files of the office of the chief of military history, department of the army.] [footnote : act of february , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] in march congress reorganized both the artillery and the dragoons. the three artillery regiments, which had never operated as such, but rather by company or detachment, were consolidated into the corps of artillery; and the two regiments of dragoons, which had never been adequately trained and generally had given a poor account of themselves, were merged into one.[ ] the regiment of light artillery remained untouched. [footnote : act of march , (_military laws_, pp. - ); jones, p. ; "history of the organization of the united states cavalry."] almost as soon as the war ended, congress moved to reduce the army[ ] by limiting the peacetime establishment to , men, to be divided among infantry, artillery, and riflemen, plus the corps of engineers. the number of wartime infantry units was reduced to eight, and the rifle units to one. the corps of artillery and the regiment of light artillery were retained, but dragoons were eliminated.[ ] [footnote : act of march , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] [footnote : the reorganization of is treated by mahon "history of the organization of the united states infantry" (pp. - ), jones "history of the organization of the united states field artillery" (pp. - ), and wike, unpublished study.] by the prospects of a prolonged peace appeared so good that congress felt safe in further reducing the army. consequently, in that year the number of infantry regiments was cut to seven; the rifle regiment was disbanded; the corps of artillery and the regiment of light artillery were disbanded, with four artillery regiments being organized in their stead; and the ordnance department was merged with the artillery,[ ] an arrangement that continued until . [footnote : act of march , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] the opening of the west in the decades following the war of brought an important change in the organization of the army. experience having shown that infantry were at a distinct disadvantage when pitted against the fleetly mounted indians, in a battalion of mounted rangers was organized to quell disturbances on the northwest frontier,[ ] but this loosely knit force was replaced by a regiment of dragoons the following year.[ ] the mounted arm had come to stay in the army. [footnote : acts of april and june , (_military laws_, pp. - , - ).] [footnote : act of march , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] when the second seminole war broke out in , a second regiment of dragoons was organized.[ ] and, as the war dragged through another inconclusive year, a reluctant congress was forced to increase the size of existing line units and to authorize an additional regiment of infantry, the th. meanwhile, increasing demands for surveying and mapping services resulted in the creation of the corps of topographical engineers as a separate entity.[ ] [footnote : act of may , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] [footnote : act of july , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] meanwhile, the responsibilities of the army in the opening of the west continued to increase, and in the regiment of mounted riflemen was organized to consolidate the northern route to the pacific by establishing and manning a series of posts along the oregon trail.[ ] however, the outbreak of the war with mexico postponed this mission. [footnote : act of may , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] at the start of the war with mexico congress leaned heavily on volunteer units, with the hard core of the regulars remaining unchanged. but early in it was found necessary to add nine regiments of infantry and one regiment of dragoons.[ ] of the infantry unit's, eight were of the conventional type; the ninth was formed as the regiment of voltigeurs and foot riflemen. theoretically, only half of this latter regiment was to be mounted. each horseman was to be paired with a foot soldier who was to get up behind and ride double when speed was needed. in practice, however, none of the voltigeurs were mounted; the entire unit fought as foot riflemen.[ ] [footnote : act of february , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] [footnote : mahon, "history of the organization of the united states infantry," p. .] all of these new units proved merely creatures of the war, and the coming of peace saw a reduction to the old establishment of eight regiments of infantry, four of artillery, two of dragoons, and one regiment of mounted riflemen.[ ] this organization remained substantially unchanged until .[ ] [footnote : official army register, .] [footnote : upton, p. .] organization of the militia the "common" militia was first established by the various colonies of all able-bodied men between roughly the ages of and for protection against indian attack. these militiamen were required by law to be enrolled in the unit of their township or county, furnish their own arms and equipment, and appear periodically for training. they were civilian soldiers who had little or no taste for things military, as their performance in both peace and war almost invariably demonstrated. they were not uniformed and contributed little or nothing to the field of military dress. the "volunteer" or "independent" militia companies, on the other hand, were something else again. these units, composed of men who enjoyed military life, or rather certain aspects of it, appeared rather early in the nation's history. the first of these, formed in , was the military company of the massachusetts, later and better known as the ancient and honorable artillery company of massachusetts. by there were a number of independent companies in existence--many of them chartered--and membership in them had become a recognized part of the social life of the larger urban centers. the concept of volunteer militia units was confirmed in the uniform militia act of , which prescribed flank companies of grenadiers, light infantry, or riflemen for the "common" militia battalions and a company of artillery and a troop of horse for each division, to be formed of volunteers from the militia at large and to be uniformed and equipped at the individual volunteer's expense. thus, from within the national militia structure emerged an elite corps of amateur--as opposed to civilian--soldiers who enjoyed military exercise, and the pomp and circumstance accompanying it, and who were willing to sacrifice both the time and the money necessary to enjoy it. since the members were volunteers, they were ready to submit to discipline up to a point; they trained rather frequently; many of the officers made an effort to educate themselves militarily; they chose their own officers; and their relative permanency gave rise to an excellent esprit de corps. in actuality, these organizations became private military clubs, and differed from other male social and fraternal groups only in externals. the great urban growth of the nation during the period - was the golden age of the volunteer companies, and by these units had all but supplanted the common militia. it would be difficult to even estimate the number of volunteer companies during this period. they sprang up almost everywhere, more in answer to a demand by the younger men of the nation for a recreation that would meet a social and physical need and by emigrant minorities for a group expression than for reasons military. it was a "gay and gaudy" militia, with each unit in its own distinctive and generally resplendent uniform. if the "raleigh cossacks," the "hibernia greens," the "velvet light infantry company," or the "teutonic rifles" were more "invincible in peace" than visible in war, they were a spectacular, colorful, and exciting integral of the social and military life of the first half of the th century. insignia of the regular army uniform regulations prior to were loosely and vaguely worded, and this was especially true in regard to officers' insignia. for example general orders of march , , stated: "... the swords of all officers, except the generals, to be attached by a white shoulder belt three inches wide, with an oval plate three inches by two and a half ornamented with an eagle."[ ] in the st infantry regiment directed that "the sword ... for platoon officers ... be worn with a white belt over the coat with a breast plate such as have been by the colonel established,"[ ] and in a regulation stated that "those gentlemen who have white sword belts and plates [are] to consider them as uniform, but those not so provided will be permitted to wear their waist belts."[ ] as a result, the officers generally wore what they wished, and there was a wide variation in design. most officer insignia were the product of local jewelers and silversmiths, although some known specimens are obviously the work of master craftsmen. quality varied as well as design, depending on the affluence of the officer concerned. some of the plainer plates appear to have been made by rolling silver dollars into an oval shape. [footnote : general orders, march , (records ago).] [footnote : standing order book, folio , october , .] [footnote : records ago.] in regard to enlisted men's insignia, only the descriptions of the dragoon helmet plate and the and riflemen's cap plates give us anything approaching a clear picture. "oblong silver plates ... bearing the name of the corps and the number of the regiment" for the infantry in , "plates in front" for the dragoons, and "gilt plate in front" for the light artillery are typical examples. as a result, the establishment of a proper chronology for these devices has depended on the careful consideration of specimens excavated at posts where specific units are known to have served at specific times, combined with research in pertinent records of the period in the national archives. cap and helmet devices dragoon helmet plate, _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the first known distinctive metal branch insignia authorized for the army was this helmet plate. general order, u.s. army, dated march , , prescribed for "cavalry ... a helmet of leather crowned with black horse hair and having a brass front, with a mounted dragoon in the act of charging."[ ] this oval plate, struck in thin brass with lead-filled back, has a raised rim, within which is a mounted, helmeted horseman in the act of charging; overhead is an eagle with a wreath in its beak. a double-wire fastener soldered to the back is not contemporary. [footnote : records ago.] dragoon helmet plate, , die sample _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] although from a different die, this plate, struck in thin brass, appears to be a die sample of the plate described above. it is also possible that it is a sample of the dragoon plate authorized in . ¶ the uniform regulations specified for enlisted men of the artillery a "black leather cockade, with points inches in diameter, a yellow button and eagle in the center, the button in uniform with the coat button."[ ] this specification gives some validity to the belief that a cockade with an approximation of the artillery button tooled on it may also have been worn. [footnote : general order, southern department, u.s. army, january , (photostatic copy in files of division of military history, smithsonian institution); also, _american state papers_, p. .] leather cockade, artillery, c. - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this cockade is of black leather of the size prescribed by the regulations. tooled into the upper fan is an eagle-on-cannon device with a stack of cannon balls under the trail; an arc of stars partially surrounds the eagle device. it is believed to have been worn on artillery _chapeaux de bras_ as early as . the specimen is unmarked as to maker, but from correspondence of callendar irvine, commissary general of purchases from to , it seems very possible that cockades similar to this one were made by robert dingee of new york city. dingee is first listed in new york directories as a "saddler" ( ); he is listed later as "city weigher" ( ) and "inspector of green hides" ( ). the eagle-on-cannon design is similar to that of several regular artillery buttons worn between and , but it most closely approximates a button johnson assigns to the period - .[ ] [footnote : specimen no. in johnson, vol. , p. , vol. , p. .] ¶ the question has been raised as to whether the regulars ever wore a cockade with such a device. the and uniform regulations merely specified black leather cockades of inches and - / inches in diameter respectively. however, since the militia generally did not start adopting regular army devices until the 's it seems probable that this cockade was an item of regular army issue, despite the lack of evidence of specific authorization. as early as january war office orders specified: "all persons belonging to the army, to wear a black cockade, with a small white eagle in the center. the cockade of noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates to be of leather with eagles of tin."[ ] this regulation was repeated in .[ ] by these cockade eagles had taken the colors used for the buttons and lace of the different arms. the purveyor of public supplies in that year purchased cockade eagles in tin (white) for infantry and in brass (yellow) for artillery enlisted men at a cost of one and two cents, respectively.[ ] the cockade eagles of infantry officers were to be of silver and those of artillery officers of gold. cockades for company officers and enlisted personnel were to be of leather. the loosely worded regulation of infers that field officers' cockades might be of silk similar to the "black ribbon" binding specified for their hats.[ ] [footnote : todd, "three leather cockades," pp. - .] [footnote : general order, march , (records ago).] [footnote : "statement of articles of clothing, ," in papers of purveyor of public supplies (records ago).] [footnote : general order, southern department, u.s. army, january , (photostatic copy in files of division of military history, smithsonian institution); also, _american state papers_, p. .] it is extremely difficult to determine whether cockade eagles are of regular army or militia origin, and to date them if the latter. they have been found in a wide variety of design and size, ranging from the rather plain example (fig. ) to the highly refined one on the general officer's _chapeau de bras_ (fig. ). examination of hats worn by both regulars and militia prior to reveals that there is little to choose between the eagles worn by the two components. after , however, when militia insignia tended to become more ornate and regular devices more uniform, some of the militia specimens emerge as distinct types because they have no regular counterparts. origin of the specimen, including excavations of military cantonment sites where the make-up of the garrison can be determined, has been the primary criterion used in assignment to either regular army or militia, and to a lesser extent in dating. over-all design and method of manufacture have also been considered in dating. cockade eagle, general officer, - _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] unusually refined in design, the eagle is of gold, with head to right, federal shield on breast, and olive branch in right talon. three arrows, with points outward, are held in left talon. this cockade eagle is on a _chapeau de bras_ formerly belonging to peter gansevoort, brigadier general of the new york state militia and brigadier general, u.s. army, - . although gansevoort wore this _chapeau_ while serving as a militia officer, as evidenced by a new york state button attached to it, this eagle is included with regular army devices because it is typical of those probably worn by high-ranking officers of both components. cockade eagle, c. - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] cast in pewter and gold-finished, this eagle looks to the right, stands on clouds, and holds three arrows (facing inward) in the right talon and an upright olive branch in the left. the eagle-on-clouds design is first seen on coins on the silver dollar.[ ] it was popular during the war of period, and was not used in new designs by the regular army after . eagles of identical design and size are also known in pewter without finish. such an eagle could have been worn by militia as well as regulars. similar specimens have been excavated at regular army cantonment sites of the period. [footnote : engraved by robert scott after a design by gilbert stuart.] cockade eagle, officers, - _usnm -m. figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this cockade eagle, which is struck in thin brass and silvered, was excavated on the site of a war of cantonment. comparison with similar specimens in other collections indicates that the missing head was turned to the right. this eagle is classed as an officer's device because of its silvered brass composition. the elements comprising the arc on which the eagle stands cannot be identified because of the lightness of the strike. ¶ when the dragoons were disbanded in the reduction following the dissipation of the french scare, distinctive hat devices other than cockades disappeared from the service. in , when the army was increased, the newly constituted regiments of light dragoons, light artillery, and riflemen were authorized to wear leather caps. the cap devices for these units were prescribed as roman letters, "u.s.l.d.," "u.s.l.a.," and "u.s.r.r.," rather than plates. the letters were to be of brass, - / inches "in length."[ ] [footnote : todd, "notes on the dress," p. . also, receipts from george green and son, and letter dated august , , from j. smith (commissary general at washington) to tench coxe requesting "brass letters u.s.r.r." (records ago). george green is listed in philadelphia directories of the period as a "brass founder and gilder."] [illustration: figure .--specimens in campbell collection.] illustrated in figure are the letters "u" and "l", of brass, slightly more than inch "in length" and a letter d, of pewter, inch "in length." the latter was excavated at sackets harbor, new york, where elements of the light artillery dragoons and riflemen are known to have served during and . it seems obvious that pewter letters were worn by the dragoons as consonant with their other trimmings, for in july col. james burn of the d light dragoons requested official permission to issue such.[ ] [footnote : letter dated july , , from j. burn to william eustis (secretary of war) and letter dated july , , from b. mifflin (deputy commissary general of purchases). both letters are in records ago.] with the large increase in the army in came a change in the headgear of some corps and also a change in insignia. the light artillery was to wear a yoeman-crowned (i.e., wider at the crown than at the base) black cap with "gilt plate in front," and the infantry platoon officers and enlisted men were finally to have the black cylindrical caps (first prescribed in ) with "an oblong silver plate in front of the cap bearing the name of the corps and number of the regiment."[ ] the rifle platoon officers and enlisted men were also to wear infantry caps, but with yellow trimmings.[ ] the dragoons were authorized "helmets" with "plates" in , and the foot artillery regiments in the fall of the same year were ordered to wear caps like the light artillery instead of the _chapeaux de bras_ previously worn, which would have necessitated the use of plates. [footnote : general orders, january , (records ago).] [footnote : letter dated march , , from coxe to eustis (records ago); mcbarron, "regiment of riflemen," p. .] the foot units received their new insignia almost immediately, the cap plates having been designed, contracted for, and delivered by late february for the th, th, th, and th infantry regiments[ ] (the latter two were new units). this rapid action in regard to the infantry plates appears to be strong witness to the emphasis placed on distinctive insignia as morale factors and aids to enlistment, for active recruiting for the new regiments did not begin until several months later. there were three different patterns of this infantry plate manufactured and issued, two of which are described below. [footnote : bill dated february , , from william crumpton (records ago).] all arms were wearing cap plates by the middle of , for there is record of such issue to the dragoons as well as record of rejection of ill-struck specimens for infantry, artillery, and rifles.[ ] these plates were made variously by william crumpton and george armitage of philadelphia, and aaron m. peasley of boston.[ ] philadelphia directories list crumpton as a button maker and silversmith between and . armitage is first listed in philadelphia directories, in , as a "silver plate worker"; in he is listed as "silverplater," and in as a "silverplater and military ornament maker." peasley was an ornament and insignia maker in boston during the same period.[ ] [footnote : letter dated august , , from eustis to irvine; general order of january , , southern department; letter dated march , , from irvine to amasa stetson (deputy commissary general of purchases, boston); and letter dated july , , from irvine to m. t. wickham. this material is in records ago.] [footnote : letter from irvine to wickham dated july , , and bill from william crumpton dated february , (both in records ago).] [footnote : statement of purchases for september , by stetson (records ago).] ¶ the three types of infantry cap plates issued between and are somewhat similar, and all carry the prescribed "name of the corps and number of the regiment." all three specimens of these types are ground finds, two having been excavated after this work was in draft. the first pictured specimen (fig. , left) is believed to be the earliest pattern issued. infantry plates as specified in the regulations were contracted for with william crumpton late in or early by tench coxe, purveyor of public supplies, and issued to troop units not later than the early summer.[ ] they had been in use but a few months when their generally poor quality of composition forced several regimental commanders to complain to the new commissary general of purchases, callendar irvine, who had just superseded coxe, and to request something better. irvine approved, and he let a contract for new plates with george armitage of philadelphia.[ ] irvine's reaction to the matter of the plates is an example of his opinion of his predecessor, coxe, and coxe's work in general, which he had observed while serving as superintendent of military stores in philadelphia. in replying to the complaint of colonel simonds, commanding officer of the th infantry, irvine wrote: "the plates are mere tin, in some respects like the man who designed and contracted for them, differing to him only as to durability ... i am contracting for a plate of decent composition to issue with your next year's clothing."[ ] [footnote : bill dated february , , from william crumpton (records ago).] [footnote : letter dated november , , from irvine to colonel simonds (commanding officer, th infantry); letter dated november , , from irvine to colonel pike (commanding officer, th infantry); and letter dated november , , from irvine to armitage. these letters are in records ago.] [footnote : letter from irvine to simonds cited in preceding note.] the first pattern carries the "name of the corps and the number of the regiment," the th infantry, commanded by col. zebulon pike who was one of the officers who complained to irvine about the poor quality of cap plates. the specimen is of tinned iron and the letters and numerals have been struck with individual hand dies. the two armitage plates, very similar in over-all design (figures , right, and ), have been designated the second and third patterns. at least one of these--perhaps both--apparently was designed by, and its die sunk by, moritz furst, well-known die sinker and designer of philadelphia. on march , , irvine wrote the secretary of war: "mr. furst executed a die for this office for striking infantry cap plates, designed by him, which has been admitted by judges to be equal, if not superior, to anything of the kind ever produced in this country."[ ] furst was hungarian by birth. he studied design and die sinking at the mint in vienna and came to the united states in with the expectation of becoming chief engraver at the philadelphia mint, an appointment which he did not receive. he sank the dies for many of the medals voted to war of leaders, did the obverse die work for a number of indian peace medals, and is believed to have designed the swords given by the state of new york to generals brown, scott, gaines, and macomb.[ ] [footnote : letter in records ago.] [footnote : "a bit of u.s. mint history," pp. - ; and chamberlain, pp. - .] cap plate, infantry, _usnm -m. figure , right._ [illustration: figure , left.] [illustration: figure , right.] this is the second pattern of the infantry cap plate described in the regulations as an "oblong silver plate ... bearing the name of the corps and the number of the regiment." the specimen was excavated on the site of smith's cantonment at sackets harbor, new york, known to have been occupied by regular infantry during the - period. the piece is struck in "white metal" and tinned [the term "silver" in the regulation referred only to color]. it is rectangular, with clipped corners, and is dominated by an eagle, with wings outspread, grasping lightning bolts in the right talon and an olive branch in the left talon. below is a panoply of stacked arms, flags with -pointed stars, two drums, and a cartridge box marked "u.s." the corps designation "u.s. infantry" is above; the unit designation is blank with the letters "regt." on the left. the plate is pierced with four pairs of holes on each side for attachment. another example of this second pattern is known; it is attached to an original cap and bears the unit designation " regt." cap plate, infantry, (reproduction) _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is the third pattern of the infantry cap plate prescribed in the regulations. like the preceding plate, of the second pattern, the original plate from which this reproduction was made was excavated on the site of smith's cantonment at sackets harbor, new york. made of tin-alloy, as is the original, and rectangular with clipped corners, the piece is dominated by an unusually fierce looking eagle that first appeared on one of the half-dollars struck at the philadelphia mint. the eagle has an out-sized, curved upper beak and is grasping lightning bolts in the right talon and an olive branch in the left. below is a panoply of flags and muskets with drum, saber, and cartridge box. the corps designation "us infan{y}." is above, and the unit designation " reg{t}" is below. the " " appears to have been added with separate die strikes. the specimen is pierced with two pairs of holes on each side for attachment. this third pattern was also struck in brass and silvered for wear by officers. several fragments of such a plate were excavated at sackets harbor; these, although of the third pattern, are the product of a die different from that used in striking the piece described above. dragoon cap plate, _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is an almost exact duplicate of the dragoon plate except that it is struck in pewter, "white metal," the color used by the infantry and dragoons. it is rectangular with clipped corners that are pierced for attachment. no detailed description of the plate has ever been found, but several identical specimens are known attached to dragoon helmets made by a contractor named henry cressman. the name "cressman" is stamped on the lower side of the visor alongside the initials of an inspector named george flomerfelt, who is known to have been employed by the army as an inspector in philadelphia during the period. henry cressman is listed in the philadelphia directories from through as a shoemaker. from to he is listed as a military cap maker. ¶ on january , , irvine wrote to the secretary of war as follows: "i send herewith an infantry cap plate which, with your permission, i will substitute for that now in use. the advantages of the former over the latter are that it is lighter, neater, and will not cost half [the] price. the present plate covers the greater part of the front of the cap, is heavy in its appearance, and adds much to the weight of the cap ...[ ]" this proposal was approved on january .[ ] [footnote : letter in records ago.] [footnote : letter from secretary of war to irvine (records ago).] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] but here we enter an area of some confusion and controversy. were these new plates to carry the name of the corps and/or the number of the regiment? irvine's correspondence gives us no clue, but on the following march he wrote at least two of his deputy commissary generals that he was forwarding , plates for distribution to specifically named infantry regiments plus "blank" plates.[ ] from the total of , forwarded for specific units, it would seem that these were probably plates of the new design, but then the variance in the number sent for individual regiments--from a low of for the th infantry to highs of , and , for the th and th, respectively--appears odd. specimens of the pattern are known both with and without the regimental number, while no examples of the pattern have been found with unit designation. two extant examples of the pattern, representing two very similar but distinct designs (figs. , ), were excavated at sackets harbor, new york, and fort atkinson, nebraska, where regular infantry served during - and - , respectively. both plates are "blank," and there is no appropriate place on either for the addition of the number of the unit, as in the case of the pattern. [footnote : letters in records ago.] another example of the pattern is known; it is attached to a bell-crowned cap of militia origin, which indicates that the plate was adopted by the militia after being discarded by the regular establishment. a plate of the same design, but struck in pewter and cut in the diamond shape popular in the 's and 's, is also known; it is obviously a militia item. infantry cap plate, - , die sample _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] like practically all die samples, this one is struck in brass. it is rectangular with unclipped corners, but is marked for clipping. within a raised oval an eagle, very similar to that on the plate, carries an olive branch in its beak, three arrows in its right talon, and thunder bolts and lightning in its left talon; below, there is a trophy of stacked muskets, drum, flag, and shield. although this specimen is struck in brass, the plate in used specimens is known only in silver on copper, despite the fact that there was considerable talk of issuing it in brass.[ ] [footnote : letters in records ago: irvine to james calhoun (deputy commissary general of purchases, baltimore), january , ; irvine to general scott, january , ; irvine to george armitage, july , .] cap plate, infantry officer, - _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate, which is original to the hat to which it is affixed, may well have been worn by a regular infantry officer during the period - . the cap is of the style first issued in october , with the front rising above the crown.[ ] [footnote : see mcbarron, "the th u.s. infantry," pp. - .] the plate, of silver on copper, is rectangular with four scallops top and bottom. a floral border, / of an inch wide, that surrounds the whole, strongly suggests that it was an officer's plate. within a central oval an eagle, with wings outspread, is superimposed upon a trophy of arms and flags; above, on a ribbon, are "e pluribus unum" and -pointed stars. it is possible that this plate is a militia item, but the fact that it appears to be original on a leather cap of the type worn by regulars makes it more likely that it is another example of officers' license in the matter of insignia during this period. its attachment to the cap is a variant method: two hasp-like metal loops, affixed to the plate, have been run through holes in the hat and a leather thong threaded through them. most cap plates of this period were pierced at the corners for attachment by threads. [illustration: figure .--specimen in fort erie museum, ontario, canada.] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] ¶ the cap plates issued to the artillery regiments (less the regiment of light artillery) and the riflemen during the period - are known, but only a fragment of one is represented in the national collections. illustrations of all extant are included to complete the picture. two of the plates issued the d regiment of artillery (fig. ) have been excavated at fort erie, ontario, and are in the collections of the museum there. a plate of the d regiment (fig. ) excavated at sackets harbor, new york, is of an entirely different design. the lower third of a plate of the st regiment (fig. ), again of a different design, was excavated by the authors in . in , when the three regiments were consolidated into the corps of artillery, these plates were superseded by one bearing the eagle-on-cannon device closely resembling the button of the artillery for the period - , which has the word "corps" inscribed.[ ] specimens of this latter plate representing two distinct though similar designs have been excavated at posts known to have been manned by regular artillery in and later (figs. , ). the same general design appears also on cross-belt plates and waist-belt plates (see below pp. - ). [footnote : see johnson, vol. , p. , and vol. , p. .] cap plate, st regiment artillery, _usnm -m. figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the over-all design of the plate of which this brass-struck fragment represents approximately one-third can be rather accurately surmised by comparing it with several of the ornamented buttons issued to the infantry in - . it is probably the work of the same designer.[ ] the plate is rectangular with clipped corners. within a raised border is an oval surrounded by cannon, cannon balls, and a drum, with the unit designation " r{t} art{y}". at the top of the oval can be seen grasping claws, obviously those of an eagle (as sketched in by the artist) and similar to those on the buttons referred to above. single holes at the clipped corners provided means of attachment. it seems probable that the design of the missing portion also include flags and additional arms and accoutrements. [footnote : see johnson, vol. , specimen nos. , , - .] ¶ the design of the "yellow front plate" authorized and issued to the regiment of light artillery[ ] in was unknown for many years. in may one of the authors fortunately located this plate (fig. ) in the collections of the niagara historical society museum at niagara-on-the-lake, ontario, included in a group of british badges of the war of period. there can be no doubt that the specimen is american: the eagle's head is of the same design as that on the third pattern infantry cap plate (fig. ); the wreath of laurel appears on both the and dragoon helmet plates; and the thunderbolts in the eagle's right talon are wholly american, as opposed to british, and are of the period. in the fort ticonderoga museum collections there is a gold signet ring (original owner unknown) that has an almost identical design. [footnote : letter dated february , , from irvine to secretary of war (records ago). in clothing returns for of light artillery companies stationed at williamsville, n. y., "caps and plates" are listed as being "on hand" (records ago).] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] this is one of the largest plates ever worn by the regular establishment. it measures - / by - / inches, and it is not surprising that it was replaced because of its size. on may , , the commissary general of purchases wrote lt. col. j. r. fenwick, second-in-command of the light artillery, asking his opinion of a new design and stating flatly: "the present light artillery plate is too large by one-half."[ ] the plate illustrated as figure is offered as a possible example of the design. a matching waist-belt plate is described below (p. ). [footnote : letter in records ago.] [illustration: figure .--specimen in u.s. army artillery and missile center museum, fort sill, oklahoma.] [illustration: figure .--specimen in niagara historical society museum, niagara-on-the-lake, ontario, canada.] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] there are four different patterns of riflemen's cap plates that can be fairly bracketed in three periods. the large ( - / by inches) diamond-shaped brass plate with the letters "r.r." (fig. ) was adopted for wear in the spring of as replacement for the letters "usrr" that had been worn on the cap since the organization of the regiment of riflemen in . it was excavated in the interior of one of the barracks comprising smith's cantonment at sackets harbor, new york, where riflemen were stationed as early as august . the style of the "r" is very similar to that on the artillery cap plate, and the "r.r." designation conforms to that on the button authorized for the riflemen in . the pattern of the second diamond-shaped plate (fig. ), also in brass and almost identical in size, although a ground find, is more difficult to account for, despite the fact that it most certainly falls in the same period. the most logical explanation seems that the riflemen, who considered themselves a cut above the common infantry, became disgruntled with the utter plainness of their plates when compared with those just issued the infantry, and asked for and received, possibly late in , the plate with the eagle and the designation "u.s. rifle men." the fact that the plate bears the designation " reg{t}"--although there were no other rifle regiments from to --can be explained by reference to the "national color" of the rifle regiment completed in , which bore the inscription " st rifle regt.--u.s." and the standard and national color of the light artillery which were inscribed "the first regiment of light artillery" when there was never more than one light artillery unit in the army.[ ] in any case, accurate dating of the third and fourth patterns definitely places the second pattern in the - period by process of elimination. it was superseded in [ ] very possibly for the same reason that the infantry plate was changed--heaviness in both appearance and weight--and replaced by a plate with a "design similar to that of the button ... flat yellow buttons which shall exhibit a bugle surrounded by stars with the number of the regiment within the curve of the bugle."[ ] at least three specimens of this third-pattern plate are known. they all are - / inches in diameter, and thus are large enough for a hat frontpiece and too large to be a cockade device. one of these plates is without a numeral (fig. ); one has the numeral " ," and one has the numeral " " (fig. ). the first and second of these were found at fort atkinson, but very probably were not worn as late as - . portions of specimens of this plate have also been recovered from an early pawnee village site in webster county, nebraska, indicating their possible use as trade goods after the rifle regiment changed its plates in .[ ] the fourth pattern, with an eagle over a horn (fig. ) was authorized[ ] in . apparently it was worn until , since several examples of it have been found at atkinson; other examples also are known. [footnote : see kuhn, pp. - , and davis, pp. - and pl. .] [footnote : act of february , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] [footnote : letter dated january , , from irvine to secretary of war (records ago).] [footnote : see kivett, p. .] [footnote : a letter dated july , , from irvine to secretary of war describes the device; a letter dated august , , from the adjutant and inspector general (daniel parker) to irvine authorizes the plate but gives no description. both letters are in records ago.] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] [illustration: figure ] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] [illustration: figure .--specimen in collection of waverly p. lewis, devon, connecticut.] the cap plate for the u.s. military academy, c. , is illustrated (fig. ) because it completes the cycle for insignia of the regular establishment for the period. apparently it is the work of the same designer as most of the insignia of the period - . scratched on its reverse side is the name george w. frost, a virginian who entered the military academy as a cadet in and resigned on march , . the two plates of the u.s. marine corps, despite the fact that they are naval rather than military, are included because they fit very precisely into the device design pattern of the strictly army items of the period and because they are unique in their rarity. cap plate, u.s. marine corps, c. , die sample _usnm -n-( ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this specimen was extremely puzzling for many years. the design is obviously that of the war of period, bearing strong similarity to both the and infantry plates and the artillery corps plate, possibly the work of the same die sinker. the marine corps uniform regulations specified merely a "brass eagle and plate," but the regulations called for "octagon plates."[ ] thus there was considerable reluctance to accept this die sample as the authentic design. in the summer of , however, the authors, excavating at fort tomkins, new york, which was known to have had a small barracks for the use of naval personnel ashore, recovered parts of two brass plates of this identical design, and in the octagon shape--that is, rectangular with clipped corners (fig. ). the design may thus be precisely dated. [footnote : see mcclellan, pp. , .] [illustration: figure ] the specimen is struck in rectangular brass with a raised edge. the whole is dominated by an eagle that is very similar to the eagles on the infantry and artillery corps plates described above. the talons grasp the shank of a large fouled anchor; a ribbon, held in the beak and streaming overhead, is embossed with the motto "fortitudine." the whole is on a trophy of arms and flags, and below the lower raised edge is embossed the word "marines." the excavated specimens vary slightly in size, but average - / by - / inches. reproductions of this die strike were made prior to its acquisition by the national museum, and specimens outside the national collections should be considered with caution. cap or shoulder-belt plate, u.s. marine corps, - (?) _usnm -n-( ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this specimen is known only in die samples. because of its similarity in design to the infantry plates, it cannot be dated later than . since no naval uniformed militia units are known for the period - , and since the plate is obviously not a device of the regular navy, it must be assigned to the marine corps. in studying this plate, however, we must recognize the possibility that the maker may have been designing and sinking dies in the hope of having a sample accepted and approved for issue rather than actually executing a contract. the plate is struck in rectangular brass, and the corners are marked for clipping. the design, within a wide oval with raised edge, consists of an eagle above a trophy of arms, flags, and a shield. the right talon grasps a fluke of a fouled anchor, and the left talon holds the pike of a stand of colors. reproductions of this die strike were made prior to its acquisition by the national museum, and specimens outside the national collections should be considered with caution. ¶ the uniform regulations were significant in several respects: cap plates were eliminated as distinctive insignia of the various arms; the color of certain items of dress and equipment remained the sole distinction; and the rules regarding nonregulation dress were more precisely stated than before. the cap plates were replaced by eagles, measuring inches between wing tips, and the number of the regiment was cut in the shield. regulations tersely stated that "all articles of uniform or equipment, more or less, than those prescribed, or in any manner differing from them, are prohibited."[ ] general and staff officers were to wear black sword belts with "yellow plates"; artillery officers were to wear white waist belts with a yellow oval plate - / inches wide and with an eagle in the center; infantry officers were to wear a similar plate that was white instead of yellow. cockade eagles for _chapeau de bras_ were to be gold and measure - / inches between wing tips. since enlisted men were no longer authorized to wear swords, they had no waist belts. [footnote : _general regulations_, pp. - .] cap and plate, third artillery, _usnm -m. figure ._ [illustration: figure ] although several "yellow" eagles that can be attributed to the - period are known, this brass specimen on the bell-crowned cap is the only one known to the authors that has the prescribed regimental number cut out of the shield. the button on the pompon rosette--which appears to be definitely original to the cap, as does the eagle--carries the artillery "a," thus the assignment to that branch of the service. the eagle bears a close similarity to the eagles on the and infantry cap plates and the marine corps cap plate, and is possibly the work of the same designer. cap insignia, infantry, _usnm -m (sk- ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] early in , the secretary of war, acting on a suggestion of callendar irvine, ordered that all metal equipment of the infantry be of "white metal" in keeping with its pompons, tassels, and lace.[ ] this specimen, struck in copper and silvered, is believed to have been issued as a result of that order. [footnote : letter dated january , , from secretary of war to irvine (records ago).] ¶ the regulations stated that cockade eagles should measure - / inches between wing tips. in this wingspread was increased to - / inches. thus, specimens of a relatively uniform pattern and measuring approximately - / inches in wingspread will be considered as of the regular army, - . similarly, those of a relatively uniform pattern and measuring approximately - / inches in wingspread are dated - . cockade eagle, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this eagle, struck in brass, has wings extended, head to the right, federal shield on breast with no stars, olive branch in right talon, and three arrows in left talon. cockade eagle, infantry, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). not illustrated._ this eagle is struck from the same die as the preceding specimen, but it is in white metal rather than brass. cockade eagle, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] of silver on copper, this eagle is similar to the two preceding specimens, but is struck from a variant die. it possibly was worn by the militia. cockade eagle, infantry, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this specimen is very similar to those above, but it has stars in the shield on the eagle's breast. ¶ despite the fact that it was found attached to a shako of distinct militia origin, the cap plate shown in figure is believed to be that prescribed for the cadets of the military academy in the uniform regulations and described as "yellow plate, diamond shape." the letters "u s m a" in the angles of the diamond, the word "cadet" at the top of the oval, what appears to be the designation "w point" at the left top of the map, and the tools of instruction (so similar to those embellishing the cadet diploma, although totally different in rendering), make it difficult to assign this plate to any source other than the academy. it is possible, of course, that this was a manufacturer's sample which was never actually adopted for wear at west point. the apparent maker's name, "casad," at the bottom of the oval, does not appear in the city directories of any of the larger manufacturing centers of the period. [illustration: figure .--specimen in west point museum, west point, new york.] cap insignia, (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] despite the facts that there was no change in cap insignia authorized in the uniform regulations and that this specimen is similar in most respects to the eagle, its refinement of design and manufacture indicates that it possibly belongs to the period of the 's and 's. it is struck in thin brass and has three plain wire fasteners soldered to the reverse. cap insignia, (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). not illustrated._ although similar to the preceding plate, this specimen measures - / by - / inches, is struck from a different die, and has a much wider breast shield. of somewhat heavier brass than most such similar eagles and exhibiting a well-developed patina, it may have been an officer's device. cap plate, dragoons, _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] when the dragoons returned to the army in , their cap device was described as "a gilt star, silver eagle ... the star to be worn in front."[ ] an -pointed, sunburst-type star, this plate is struck in brass and has a superimposed eagle that is struck in brass and silvered. the eagle is basically the napoleonic type adopted by the british after the battle of waterloo and altered by omitting the lightning in the talons and adding a wreath to the breast. plain wire fasteners are soldered to the back. [footnote : general order no. , headquarters of the army, may , . (photostatic copy in files of division of military history, smithsonian institution.)] ¶ in , possibly as a result of the newly organized dragoons receiving distinctive branch insignia, the infantry and artillery once again were authorized devices on the dress cap designating their particular arm. the gilt eagle was retained. below the eagle was an open horn with cords and tassels in silver for infantry, and cross cannons in "gilt" for artillery. the number of the regiment was added over the cannon or within the curve of the horn. these devices remained in use until the change in headgear in . cap insignia, infantry, - _usnm -m, -m (sk- , ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this eagle is similar to the pattern, although somewhat more compact in design. it is struck in brass, has wings upraised, head to the right, shield on breast, olive branch in right talon, and three arrows in left talon. the open horn, struck in brass and silvered, is suspended, with bell to the right, by four twisted cords tied in a -leaf-clover knot; the tassels on the four cord-ends hang below. cap insignia, artillery, - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is the "gilt ... cross cannons" device prescribed for artillery in the regulations. struck in sheet brass of medium thickness, the superimposed cannon has trunnions and dolphins. forage cap star, dragoon officer, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] although uniform regulations for the period of the 's and 's make no mention of a distinctive device for the dragoon forage cap, photographs in the national archives show that officers' caps, at least, carried a -pointed star, apparently gold-embroidered.[ ] this specimen is believed to be such a star. made of gold bullion and with rather large sequins sewed onto a heavy paper background, the star is mounted on dark blue wool. the points of the star are extended with gold embroidery on the cloth. [footnote : townsend and todd, pp. - .] cap insignia. cadet's, u.s. military academy, , and engineer soldiers, _usnm (s-k ) figure ._ [illustration: figure ] in the cadets at the military academy discarded the bell-crowned caps they had worn since and wore a cylindrical black shako similar to that worn by the regular artillery and infantry. the artillery gilt eagle and crossed cannon replaced the diamond-shaped plate on the front. in - the crossed cannon were replaced by the engineer castle as more in keeping with the original mission of the academy and the general orientation of its curriculum. shortly after the beginning of hostilities with mexico in , the congress authorized the enlistment of a company of "engineer soldiers" that was designated the company of sappers, miners, and pontoniers. these were the first enlisted men authorized the corps of engineers since the period of the war of . the headgear for these men was prescribed as "schako--same pattern as that of the artillery, bearing a yellow eagle over a castle like that worn by the cadets."[ ] [footnote : _general regulations for the army of the united states, _, pp. - .] struck in thin to medium brass, this plate is the familiar turreted castle of the corps of engineers so well known today. it was worn below the eagle. ¶ to complete the branches of the regular establishment during the mexican war period, the regiment of voltigeurs and foot riflemen must be mentioned, although they were apparently without any distinctive branch insignia. the regiment was constituted on february , , and its uniform[ ] was prescribed days later in the war department's general order no. . however, the regiment was issued infantry woolen jackets and trousers and never received what little gray issue clothing was sent to them in mexico almost a year later. uniform trimmings were to be as for the infantry, with the substitution of the letter "v" where appropriate. so far as presently known, this substitution affected only the button pattern--an appropriate letter "v" on the shield centered on the eagle's breast. [footnote : a detailed description is given in _military collector and historian_ (june ), vol. , no. , p. .] the uniform regulations radically changed almost every item of the army's dress. most of the distinctive devices were also altered, although more in size and composition than general design. some devices were completely eliminated. while officers retained insignia of their arm or branch on their hats, enlisted personnel, with the exception of those of engineers and ordnance, had only the letter of their company, their particular arm being designated by the color of collars, cuffs, bands on hats, pompons, epaulets, chevrons, and the like. a newly designed sword or waist-belt plate was prescribed for all personnel. all items of uniform and insignia authorized in were included in an illustrated edition of the regulations for the uniform and dress of the army of the united states, june , published by william h. horstmann and sons, well-known uniform and insignia dealers in philadelphia.[ ] [footnote : a partial republication of this work appears in _military collector and historian_, vol. , no. (spring ), pp. , ; no. (summer ), pp. - .] pompon eagle, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] worn attached to the base of the pompon by all enlisted personnel, this brass eagle, similar in general design to that worn on the shako in the 's, stands with wings upraised, olive branch in right talon, three arrows in left talon, and a scroll, with national motto, in beak. above are stars, clouds, and bursts of sun rays. officers wore an eagle of similar design of gold embroidery on cloth. cap insignia, general and staff officers, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this specimen, in accord with regulations, is on dark blue cloth and consists of a gold-embroidered wreath encircling old english letters "u.s." in silver bullion. embroidered insignia of this period were all made by hand, and they varied considerably in both detail and size. during the - period the same design was made about half this size for wear on officers' forage caps, and the device appeared in variant forms. one example is known where the numeral " " is embroidered over the letters "u.s.";[ ] and miller's _photographic history of the civil war_ includes several photos of general officers whose wreath insignia on the forage cap substitute small rank insignia stars for the letters. [footnote : lewis, p. .] cap insignia, officer, engineers, _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] on dark blue cloth, this device comprises a gold-embroidered wreath of laurel and palm encircling a turreted castle in silver metal as prescribed in regulations. other examples are known with the castle embroidered. hat insignia, officer, artillery, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this specimen adheres almost exactly to the regulations, but it lacks the number of the regiment as called for. the number was a separate insignia embroidered above the cannon. the cannon are of gold embroidery. the device was also made in gold metal imitation-embroidery in several variant designs. cap insignia, officer, infantry, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] on dark blue cloth, this device is the well-known looped horn in gold embroidery with three cords and tassels. the regimental number " ," in silver bullion, lies within the loop of the horn. this insignia is also common in metal imitation-embroidery. cap and collar insignia, enlisted ordnance, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] struck in brass, this device was worn on the caps and coat collars of ordnance enlisted personnel. although the shell and flame insignia appears in a number of variations of design, this specimen conforms exactly to the regulations of as published by horstmann. cap and collar insignia, engineer soldiers, _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the uniform regulations called for a "castle of yellow metal one and five-eighths inches by one and one-fourth inches high" on both the coat collar and the hat of "engineer soldiers." this specimen, struck in brass, conforms exactly to the descriptions and drawing in the horstmann publication of the regulations. cap insignia, dragoon officers, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] comprising crossed sabers of gold, with edges upward, this insignia is similar to the well-known device worn by the regular cavalry as late as . ¶ in the regiment of mounted riflemen was organized to consolidate the northern route to the pacific by establishing and manning a series of posts along the oregon trail.[ ] the outbreak of the war with mexico postponed this mission and the unit was diverted to the theater of operations. shortly after the regiment was constituted it was authorized to wear a forage cap device prescribed as "a gold embroidered spread eagle, with the letter r in silver, on the shield."[ ] no surviving specimen of this insignia is known, and there seems some doubt that it was ever actually manufactured.[ ] [footnote : act of may , (_military laws_, pp. - ).] [footnote : general order no. , june , , war department (photostatic copy in files of division of military history, smithsonian institution).] [footnote : insignia of the riflemen are discussed by townsend and todd, pp. - .] cap insignia, officer, regiment of mounted riflemen, _usnm (sk ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] in the regiment was given a "trumpet" hat device. officers were to wear "a trumpet, perpendicular, embroidered in gold, with the number of the regiment, in silver, within the bend."[ ] this trumpet is also known in metal imitation-embroidery. the prescribed regimental number, which is illustrated in the horstmann publication of the regulations (pl. ), is not included on the device, probably because there was but one such unit in the regular establishment. [footnote : general order no. , february , , war department (photostatic copy in files of division of military history, smithsonian institution).] cap insignia, enlisted, regiment of mounted riflemen, _usnm -m (sk- ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the same general order that gave rifle officers a gold-embroidered trumpet prescribed for enlisted men a similar device to be of "yellow metal." this insignia lasted but one year for the men in the ranks, being unmentioned in the regulations. shoulder-belt and waist-belt plates oval shoulder-belt plates were worn by american officers during the war of the revolution, but no extant specimens are known. highly ornamented or engraved officers' plates for the period after are in several collections (fig. ) and others are illustrated in contemporary portraits (fig. ). just what year shoulder-belt plates were issued to enlisted personnel is unknown, but their use appears to have been well established by . the uniform regulations for that year specified swords for sergeants of infantry to be "worn with a white cross belt - / inches wide," but nothing was said about a device on the belt.[ ] [footnote : general order, southern department u.s. army, january , (photostatic copy in files of division of military history, smithsonian institution).] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] normally, brass or "yellow metal" plates were authorized for the artillery and silvered or "white metal" for the infantry and dragoons, as consonant with the rest of their trimmings. in actuality, however, white-metal shoulder-belt plates do not seem to have been issued to the infantry prior to , and brass ones were still being issued in .[ ] most of these plates were plain oval, although a few are known that were struck with devices similar to those on cap plates; and at least one rectangular cap plate, fitted with the two studs and hook on the reverse normal to shoulder-belt plates, has been found. it seems probable that these were officers' plates. oval brass plates have been found that are identical in size and construction to the plain ones but with the letters "u.s." embossed on them; however, these are difficult to date. [footnote : letters from irvine in records ago: to colonel bogardus (commanding officer, st infantry), february , ; to james calhoun, january , ; and to general scott, january , .] [illustration: figure .--portrait in collection of the filson club, louisville, kentucky.] it is extremely doubtful that waist-belt plates were issued to enlisted personnel of foot units during this period. in enlisted dragoons were authorized a waist-belt plate of tinned brass and, as far as known, perfectly plain.[ ] [footnote : letter to the purveyor of public supplies in .] the regulations prescribed for the light dragoons a "buff leather waist belt, white plate in front with eagle in relief," and there is the possibility that the light artillery had such. in actuality, there was no call for a waist belt where a shoulder belt was authorized. neither civilian trousers nor the few surviving military "pantaloons" of the period are fitted with belt loops, trousers being held up either by suspenders or by being buttoned directly to the shirt or waistcoat. no example of the dragoon plate has been found. however, a rather tantalizing possibility exists--a fragment of a pewter belt plate (fig. ) was excavated at sackets harbor, new york, where the light dragoons are known to have served. the regulations specified for artillerymen "waist belts of white leather two inches wide, yellow oval plate of the same width." it is not made clear, however, whether this belt and plate was for officers only or for all ranks. the unusually striking oval specimen (fig. ) may be this plate, but its ornateness indicates that this particular design was for officers only. [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] shoulder-belt plate, (?)- _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate was worn by peter gansevoort sometime during his military career, probably after . gansevoort, between and his death in , was successively major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, and brigadier general of new york state militia and brigadier general u.s. army ( - ). although distinctly militia in design, the specimen is included here as an example of the wide variety of such devices worn by officers of the - period. this plate is octagonal, slightly convex, and has beveled edges. the design is hand engraved on copper, and the whole is gold plated. within an engraved border is the eagle-on-half-globe device of new york state. two studs and a hook soldered to the reverse are not believed to be original. shoulder-belt plate, infantry officer, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this rectangular, slightly convex plate of silver on copper has beveled edges and a small slot in the center for the attachment of an ornament. the ornament is missing, although it can be surmised that it was an eagle. the reverse is fitted with two studs and a hook and bears the hallmark of "w. pinchin, philad{a}." william pinchin is listed in the philadelphia directory for as a silversmith at sassafras street. the directory lists only "widow of," but another william pinchin (probably the son) appears in the 's. waist-belt plate, light artillery(?), - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the design of this rectangular plate, struck in rather heavy brass, is the same as that offered as the -pattern cap plate for the light artillery, although it is the product of a different and somewhat more crudely sunk die. the piece is dominated by an eagle with wings upraised, a shield on its breast, three arrows in its right talon, and an olive branch in its left talon. crossed cannon are in the foreground, and there is a pile of six cannon balls in the lower right corner. the whole is superimposed on a trophy of colors and bayoneted muskets. above is a -pointed "star of stars" made up of -pointed stars. waist-belt plate, officer, artillery corps, - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the rectangular plate is struck in brass on a die of the same design as that used in making the artillery corps cap plate, type i (p. ). before the strike was made, a piece of thin sheet iron, slightly narrower than the finished product, was applied to the reverse of the brass. after the strike, which shows through clearly on the iron, the ends of this applied metal were bent inward into tongues for attachments to the belt, and the remainder of the back was filled with pewter. the edges of the obverse were then beveled to finish the product. it seems very probable that plates such as this were produced for sale to officers. shoulder-belt plate, officer, artillery corps, - _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is a companion piece to the artillery corps waist-belt plate described above. it was struck in brass from the die of the artillery corps cap plate, type i, again with a thin sheet of iron applied to the reverse before the strike. there is no pewter filling; the beveled edges of the piece together with the adhesive effect of the strike--which shows through very clearly--holds on the back. the plate is fitted with two simple bent-wire fasteners for attachment, indicating that it was intended for ornamental use only. like its waist-belt plate counterpart, this specimen must be considered an officer's device. shoulder-belt plate, infantry, - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this specimen is of the same design as the infantry cap plate, type i (p. ). it is oval, with raised edge. within the oval is an eagle with an olive branch in its beak, three arrows in its right talon, and thunder bolts and lightning in its left talon. below is a trophy of stacked muskets, drum, flag, and shield. the plate is silver on copper, with sheet-iron backing and bent-wire fasteners. as in the case of the artillery corps plate, just preceding, this must be considered an officer's plate. a similar oval plate bearing the design of the dragoon cap plate, and of similar construction, is known. shoulder-belt plate, _usnm -m. figures , ._ [illustration: figure ] [illustration: figure ] excavated on the site of smith's cantonment at sackets harbor, new york, this plate is interesting in that it differs in both construction and method of attachment from similar plates of the same period in the national collections. rather than being struck in thin brass with a backing and fasteners applied to the reverse, this specimen is cast in brass and the edges rather unevenly beveled, with two studs and a narrow tongue for attachment cast integrally with the plate and with hexagonal heads forced over the ends of the studs. this means of attachment, which indicates that the plate was intended to be utilitarian as well as merely ornamental, is similar to that on british plates of the period between the revolution and the war of . the plate could have been worn by either infantry or artillery, for both were issued brass plates during this period,[ ] however, it is more probable that it was worn by the infantry, since the majority of the artillery in the sackets harbor area were stationed nearby at either fort pike or fort tomkins. [footnote : letters from irvine in records ago: to colonel bogardus, february , ; to james calhoun, january , .] shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the plain, oval, slightly convex plate of brass has a raised edge. the face is lapped over a piece of sheet-iron backing. on the reverse is soldered an early form of bent-wire fasteners. british shoulder-belt plates of the revolutionary period normally had fasteners cast as integral parts of the plate proper. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm (s-k ). not illustrated._ this plate is identical to the one described immediately above except that it is struck in copper and the surface is silvered. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm (s-k ). not illustrated._ this plate, struck from solid brass, has a slightly beveled edge and bent-wire fasteners. it is slightly convex. since it is smaller than the two preceding plates, it could have been designed for the militia. shoulder-belt plate, (?)- _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the two specimens of this plate in the national collections are undocumented. similar in size and construction to the plain oval brass and silvered plates, it has the raised letters "u.s.," three-fourths inch high in the center. definitely not later than , it may well have been issued soon after the end of the war of . it is considered a regular army item since the militia did not use the designation "u.s." at this early period. in this latter connection it is interesting to note that an example of the infantry cap plate, type ii, with the letters "us" crudely stamped out, is known attached to a cap of distinct militia origin. waist-belt plate, general officer, c. _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] after the war of , the state of new york presented swords to several prominent officers of the army and navy who had distinguished themselves in actions within new york or near its borders. one of these swords (usnm )[ ] and an unusually fine gold embroidered belt (usnm ) with this gold belt buckle were presented to maj. gen. jacob brown. [footnote : detailed descriptions of this sword are given by harold l. peterson, pp. - , and belote, pp. - .] chased in very fine gold, the buckle is considered by experts in the goldsmithing and silversmithing fields to be one of the outstanding pieces of american craftsmanship of its kind.[ ] the central motif is the new york state eagle-on-half-globe device on a wreath of the colors. the head of the eagle is very similar to that on the cap plates of the marine corps, infantry, and artillery corps. the border is of a rose pattern distinctly american in feeling, and in each corner within the border are acanthus leaves in unusually delicate viennese baroque design. [footnote : mr. michael arpad, well known and highly regarded silversmith, of washington, d.c., has called this specimen "an exquisite piece of work by a master craftsman."] the maker of this buckle is unknown, but since it is reasonably certain that the hilt of the sword was designed by moritz furst (see p. ), it is possible that the design of the buckle is his also, especially in view of the viennese touch in the acanthus leaves, his training at the mint in vienna, and the probability that he designed the infantry cap plate. ¶ although the regulations were very specific about the prohibition of nonregulation items of uniform and equipment, they were somewhat vague regarding specifications. general staff and engineer officers were to wear black belts with a "yellow plate," artillery "yellow oval plates ... with an eagle in the center," and infantry the same but "white" instead of yellow.[ ] no oval plates meeting these vague descriptions are known, but the specimens described below may well have been those actually approved by the ordnance department, and thus, worn. [footnote : _general regulations for the army_, pp. - .] waist-belt plate, infantry officer, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate, struck in copper and silvered, is round with an outer ring. it is attached to a white buff belt. the plate proper contains an eagle with wings outspread, shield on breast, olive branch in right talon, and three arrows in left talon. the whole is within a ring of -pointed stars. the outer ring is decorated as a wreath, and the narrow rectangular belt attachments are embossed with a floral pattern. the stars place this specimen between and . similar buckles are known in yellow metal for either staff or artillery and containing , , and stars, indicating that they probably were worn until the rectangular eagle-wreath plate was prescribed in . waist-belt plate, infantry officer, - _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this specimen is offered as another possibility for the regulation plate. it is identical in size and similar in design to the preceding plate. the plate proper contains an eagle with wings spread, a breast shield containing the letter "i," an olive branch in right talon, and three arrows in left talon. there is no outer ring of stars. the outer ring of the buckle is decorated with a wreath, but the rectangular belt attachments are plain. the regulations called for eagle buttons of "yellow" and "white" metal with the letters "a" and "i" (for artillery and infantry) on the eagle's shield, and the belt plate may have been designed to conform. there is also the possibility that this plate, as well as the one described below, was designed to conform to the regulations which prescribed a waist belt with a "round" clasp.[ ] [footnote : _general regulations for the army of the united states_, p. .] waist-belt plate, artillery officer, - _usnm -m (s-k ). not illustrated._ nearly identical to the infantry officer's plate above, this buckle, in brass, has the artillery "a" on the eagle's breast shield. ¶ although the regulations for this period do not mention shoulder-belt plates for enlisted men (officers had none as they wore their swords on their waist belts), it can be assumed that they were worn. the two specimens described below must be dated later than - because of the belt attachments. the earlier specimens had rudimentary bent-wire fasteners, but these, more refined, have two round studs and a hook soldered to the plate proper. shoulder-belt plate, infantry, c. _usnm (s-k ). figures , ._ [illustration: figure ] [illustration: figure ] this plate, of silver on copper, is plain oval and slightly convex. shoulder-belt plate, artillery, c. _usnm (s-k ). not illustrated._ this specimen is identical to the preceding one except that it is in plain brass. ¶ the uniform regulations brought some well-defined changes. general and staff officers were to wear gilt waist-belt plates "having the letters u s and a sprig of laurel on each side in silver," and the bottom of the skirts of officers' coats were to bear distinctive devices--a gold-embroidered star for general officers and officers of the general staff, a shell and flame in gold embroidery for artillery officers, and silver-embroidered bugles for infantry officers. waist-belt plate, general and staff officers, _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the plate and the belt to which it is attached formerly belonged to capt. charles o. collins, an graduate of the military academy. the belt is of patent leather, as specified for undress wear, and is - / inches wide. the plate is cast in brass and has raised edges. rather than having "a sprig of laurel on each side," it has a wreath of laurel enclosing the letters "u s," in old english, in silvered metal affixed to the front. it is attached on the right side by a rectangular belt attachment with a flat hook on the left rear. ¶ the regulations specified for engineer officers a waist-belt plate to be "gilt, elliptical, two inches in the shortest diameter, bearing the device of the button." such a plate (fig. ) is in the collections of the valley forge chapel museum. it is entirely possible that this plate is even earlier than , for the and regulations state that the engineer buttons were to contain "the device and motto heretofore established." [illustration: figure ] in the collections of the west point museum is a button, carrying the "essayons" device, that was excavated in the area behind the "long barracks," which burned in . another such button excavated at sackets harbor on the site of an - barracks bears a maker's name (wishart) of the - period. waist-belt plate, general and staff officers, (?)- _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure .--specimen in valley forge chapel museum, valley forge, pennsylvania.] this buckle is similar to the one (shown in fig. ) that belonged to capt. charles o. collins, but it is different in that the letters "u.s." are enclosed not by a laurel wreath but by a sprig of laurel on the right side and a sprig of palm on the left. the uniform regulations specified such a belt plate for officers of the corps of engineers, but with a "turreted castle, raised in silver" rather than the letters "u.s." this places the probable date of manufacture of this specimen in the 's. coat-skirt ornament, general staff, _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this skirt ornament, on buff cloth, is from a coat worn by capt. thomas swords when he was assistant quartermaster general in . the design consists of three -pointed stars of gold bullion cord: a line star of twisted cord superimposed upon a larger star of closely stitched cord that in turn is superimposed upon a still larger star of sunburst type. coat-skirt ornament, general staff, _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] like the preceding specimen, this ornament, on buff cloth, is comprised of three stars. a star made of lines of sequins secured by two strands of twisted bullion is superimposed upon a -pointed star of gold embroidery that in turn is superimposed upon a -pointed star made up of gold sequins secured by gold bullion cord. coat-skirt ornament, artillery officer, _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this specimen, on red cloth, is on a coat worn by william tecumseh sherman when he was a lieutenant in the d artillery. the bomb is made of whorls of gold bullion cord, while the flames are composed of curving lines of twisted bullion. the lowest flame on either side terminates in arrow heads. there are a number of gold-embroidered shell and flame devices in the national collections, all varying considerably in size and composition. some are skirt ornaments for artillery officers, both regular army and militia, while some are cap ornaments for ordnance officers. indeed, two coats formerly belonging to maj. levi twiggs, u.s. marine corps, carry the same device. coat-skirt ornament, infantry officer, _usnm -m. figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the silver coat-skirt horn ornaments of infantry officers varied almost as much as the shell and flame devices, generally in relation to the affluence of the individual concerned. unlike such ornaments of the other services, the horns were paired in rights and lefts on the coat. this specimen, of silver bullion cord, is on a coat that once belonged to lt. william williams mather, an graduate of the military academy who left the service in . the horn is looped, and it is suspended by twisted bullion from a simple -leaf-clover knot. the whole is backed on blue cloth. coat-skirt ornament, infantry officer, _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this rather elaborate specimen is on a coat worn by john porter hatch when he was a lieutenant of infantry in . the body of the horn--which is merely curved rather than looped--is made of silver lamé encircled by three ornamented bands of bullion. the mouthpiece and bell are of bullion. the whole is suspended by a rather ornate -leaf-clover knot of bands of edged bullion and is backed on blue cloth. coat-skirt ornament, corps of topographical engineers, (?) _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the uniform regulations for the period - carry no mention of coat-skirt ornaments for the corps of topographical engineers, rather only prescribing the "slashed skirt flaps to be embroidered in gold, with oak leaves and acorns" like the collar and cuffs. there is in the national collections, however, a uniform for the corps that corresponds with regulations in every way except that the coat skirts carry this ornament--a shield within a wreath of oak leaves--of gold embroidery. the device appears to be of the same vintage as the other embroidery on the coat. ¶ although the uniform regulations make no mention of swords for noncommissioned officers, in the ames manufacturing company of chicopee, massachusetts, began the manufacture of a new sword for the regular artillery. based on a european pattern, this weapon was the popular conception of the short roman stabbing sword, or _gladius_. in this weapon was also authorized for infantry noncommissioned officers.[ ] [footnote : _regulations for the government of the ordnance department_, p. ; and harold l. peterson, pp. - .] waist-belt plate, artillery noncommissioned officer, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is the belt-plate assembly designed for carrying the short "roman pattern" nco sword. the plate is of two round pieces joined by an s-hook that is open on one end for unbuckling. each round piece has a flat loop for attachment to the white buff belt. the right-hand round piece has an eagle with head to the left, wings drooping, three arrows in the right talon, and an olive branch in the left talon. the left-hand piece has crossed cannons and the letters "u.s." the whole is cast in rough bronze. assemblies of this type were popularly known as "dingee" belts, because one of the primary contractors for them was robert dingee of new york city. the eagle on this plate is very similar to the one on dingee's contract rifle flasks of .[ ] [footnote : see patterson, p. .] waist-belt plate, infantry noncommissioned officer, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate and belt are identical to the artillery specimen above except that the left-hand round portion exhibits three stacked muskets and a drum instead of crossed cannon. [illustration: figure .--specimen in collection of william e. codd, towson, maryland.] ¶ nco belt plates similar to the two above also appeared in what might be called a staff or branch immaterial pattern, with the crossed cannon and/or stacked muskets and drum replaced by the letters "us" alone (fig. ). this pattern apparently was intended for wear by nco's other than those assigned to the infantry, artillery, or dragoons. waist-belt plate, dragoon officer, _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate, which formerly belonged to gen. william s. harney when he commanded the d dragoons in , is identical to the general and staff officers' plate of the regulations except that the letters "u.s." have been replaced by the letter "d" in old english, as prescribed.[ ] [footnote : general order no. , headquarters of the army, may , (photostatic copy in files of the division of military history, smithsonian institution).] waist-belt plate, noncommissioned officer, _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the uniform regulations replaced the rather impractical s-hook nco belt plate with a "round clasp" on which the branch designation was replaced with the raised letters "u s." similar in over-all design to the officers' plate, round with outer ring, these plates were rough cast in brass and had a stippled surface. waist-belt plate, noncommissioned officer, _usnm (s-k ). not illustrated._ this specimen is very similar to the preceding plate, but it is of a definitely different casting and is generally heavier in over-all appearance, the inner ring is much more convex, and the letters "u s" are raised only slightly and spread farther apart. shoulder-belt plate, officers, _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the uniform regulations specified a shoulder belt (rather than a waist belt) for carrying the sword, with a "breast plate according to the pattern to be furnished by the ordnance department." this plate, which was worn by capt. erastus capron, st artillery, an graduate of the military academy, is believed to be that specified.[ ] the specimen is rectangular with beveled edges, cast in brass, and has the lines of a modified sunburst radiating outward. in the center, within a wreath of laurel, are the letters "u s" in old english. both the wreath and letters are of silvered copper and are applied. the plate is attached by three broad hooks rather than two studs and a hook. [footnote : _u.s. military magazine_ (april ), illustrations for "united states infantry, full dress" and "united states artillery (captain)."] shoulder-belt plate, officers, _usnm (s-k ). not illustrated._ this plate is almost identical to the capron specimen above except that the letters "u s," instead of being in old english, are formed of oak leaves. waist-belt plate, corps of topographical engineers, _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the uniform regulations prescribed this plate for the corps of topographical engineers. the oval inner plate, which contains the prescribed eagle, shield, and the letters "u s" in old english, is struck in medium weight copper and gilded. this inner plate is soldered to a cast-bronze and gilded tongue which in turn is brazed to a cast-bronze belt attachment. the oval outer ring, bearing the prescribed "corps of topographical engineers" in roman capitals, is cast in brass and gilded. to the inner edge of this outer ring are brazed two curved seats for the inner oval. the whole is brazed to the belt attachment, also cast in brass and gilded. ¶ in view of the large and somewhat elaborate cap plates as well as shoulder-belt plates adopted by both the regulars and militia early in the th century, it is somewhat surprising that apparently neither component had ornamentation on its cartridge boxes until the ordnance regulations of prescribed a very ornate design embossed on the leather flap.[ ] certainly there was precedent for such, for both the british and german mercenary troops of the revolution and the british and canadian troops of the war of wore metal ornaments on their cartridge boxes. at least partial explanation for this omission may lie in one of callender irvine's reasons for rejecting brass cartridge boxes in favor of leather ones: "the leather ... affords no mark for the enemy to sight at. the brass ... would afford a central object, as regards the body of the soldier, and one which would be seen at a great distance to fire at."[ ] why irvine did not object equally to the large white and yellow metal cap and shoulder-belt plates as targets is unknown. in any case--with a possible few militia exceptions such as a militia cartridge box with a plate bearing the likeness of washington in silver, both about --the model oval plates were the first to be worn. [footnote : _see military collector and historian_ (june ), vol. , no. , pp. - .] [footnote : letter dated june , , from irvine to secretary of war (records ago).] the ordnance regulations of and the ordnance manual of brought in two distinctly new types of plates, the familiar brass oval waist-belt and cartridge-box plates with the letters "u. s." and the round shoulder-belt plate with the eagle. the oval plates fall into two general sizes, . inches by . inches (for plates on the infantry's cartridge box and the cavalry's waist belts)[ ] and . inches by . inches (for plates on the infantry's waist belts and the cavalry's carbine cartridge boxes and pistol cartridge boxes). the use of each plate is determined by the type of fastener. these plates were struck in thin brass and the backs generally leaded, although some were used without such backing, probably to save both weight and material. cartridge boxes were also embossed with the outline of this oval plate in lieu of the plate itself. it is interesting to note that the larger plates with lead backs weighed about - / ounces and the smaller ones just over ounces. [footnote : the cavalry waist-belt plate is actually specified to be . inches by . inches.] waist-belt plate, cavalry, _usnm (s-k ). figures , ._ [illustration: figure ] [illustration: figure ] the specimen is oval, slightly convex, and struck in thin brass. the face has a raised edge and the letters "u s." the reverse is leaded, carries two studs and a hook (indicating its use), and is stamped with the maker's name, "w. h. smith, brooklyn." smith is listed in new york city directories of the civil war period as a contractor for metal and leather supplies. cartridge-box plate, infantry, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate is identical to the preceding one except that it is leaded and fitted with two looped-wire fasteners. the reverse is stamped with the name of the maker, "j. l. pittman," who, like smith, was a contractor in the new york city area in the civil war period. cartridge-box plate, cavalry, _usnm (s-k ). not illustrated._ this is the oval "us" plate of the smaller size ( - / by - / in.), otherwise identical to the larger plate. it is fitted with two looped-wire fasteners. waist-belt plate, infantry, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this specimen is identical to the preceding plate except that it is fitted with two brass hooks for attachment to the belt and the reverse is stamped with the maker's name, "boyd & sons." no trace of a manufacturer of such products by the name of boyd has been found. it is probable that he worked during the civil war period when there were many such contractors. waist-belt plate, infantry, _usnm (s-k ). not illustrated._ this plate is identical to those above except that the reverse is stamped with the maker's name. "h. a. dingee." waist-belt plate, infantry, _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the reverse side of this plate is fitted with the rather rudimentary wire fasteners similar to those on shoulder-belt plates of the - period. in other respects the specimen is identical to the preceding ones of . ¶ the regulations specified a bayonet-belt plate "round, brass, with eagle." the ordnance manual was more exact, specifying the plate to be "brass, circular, . in. diameter, with an eagle," and then stating: "the bayonet belt is about to be discontinued ..." although not so authorized at the time, this plate, so familiar during the civil war period, was switched over to the shoulder belt supporting the cartridge box. such plates were manufactured in great quantities and in many variations of the original design by a dozen or more contractors during the period - . cartridge-box-belt plate, _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this circular plate, with raised rim, is dominated by an eagle of refined design that is very similar to the eagles appearing on the war of plates. the eagle has its wings drooped, head to the left, three arrows in the right talon, and an olive branch in the left talon. this specimen can be dated with the earliest cartridge-box plates because of its backing and the type of fasteners. whereas the backs of the later models were lead-filled, this plate was struck in thin brass over tin and the edges of the obverse crimped to retain the backing. the fasteners are of the bent-wire type typical of the - period and are not the " eyes of iron wire" called for in the ordnance manual of . none of the later examples of this design evidence any of the refinement of the original. at least eight variations are represented in the national collections. cartridge-box-belt plate, , die sample _usnm -m (s-k ). not illustrated._ this is a die sample, struck in copper, of the plate described above. sword-belt plate, _usnm . figures , ._ [illustration: figure ] [illustration: figure ] the regulations prescribed this plate for all officers and enlisted men. it was specified to be "gilt, rectangular, two inches wide, with a raised bright rim; a silver wreath of laurel encircling the 'arms of the united states'; eagle, scroll, edge of cloud and rays bright. the motto, 'e pluribus unum,' in silver letters upon the scroll; stars also of silver; according to pattern."[ ] [footnote : _regulations for the uniform and dress_, pl. .] this plate has had a longer history than any other similar army device. it was authorized for all personnel until when it was dropped as an item of enlisted equipment. it was retained for officers, first for general wear, then for dress only. it was worn with officers' dress blue uniforms until , but was not revived when blues reappeared after world war ii. a plate of the same general size and pattern, although gilt in its entirety, was prescribed for senior nco's of the marine corps until about or . the buckle appears in many variations of design, at least being represented in the national collections. many of these variations are the result of the plate being produced in great numbers by many different contractors during the civil war. the original design itself is interesting. the description called for an "edge of cloud and rays" and the official, full size drawing in _regulations for the uniform and dress of the army_ includes the "edge of cloud" and pictures the eagle with its head to the heraldic left. at least of these plates were examined by the authors, but only this specimen had the "edge of cloud," silver letters and stars, and the eagle with its head to the left. in most specimens the plate proper is bronze, in one piece, and with the wreath silvered or left plain; in a few specimens the wreath is in white metal and has been applied after casting. this particular specimen is of an early issue. it is cast in heavy brass, with the wreath applied, and has the narrow brass tongue for attachment on the reverse (fig. ), typical of the early types. sword-belt plate, , die sample _usnm. -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is a sample struck from a die which apparently was not approved for the pattern plate. the eagle has wings upraised ( inches tip to tip), head to right, shield on breast, scroll with "e pluribus unum" in beak, three arrows in right talon, and an olive branch in left talon. stars are intermixed with "edge of cloud" and rays. the specimen leads to the interesting speculation as to the weight given to correct heraldic usage at this period. the significance of the clouds, or lack of them, is unknown, but it should be noted that in all but the earliest specimens the eagle's head is turned to the right, or the side of honor, and the olive branch is placed in the right talon, indicating peaceful national motives as opposed to the three arrows, signs of belligerency, in the left talon. in this respect, it is interesting to note that until the eagle on the president's seal and flag carried its head turned to the heraldic left. _insignia of the uniformed militia_ cap and helmet devices hat ornament, independent dragoons(?), c. _usnm . figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this silver ornament is one of the most unusual pieces of military insignia in the national collections. obviously military, it is just as obviously of militia origin. although hardly artistic in design, it has a rather attractive simplicity and has been made with considerable care. the eagle is of the "frogleg" design that first appeared on buttons of the post-revolutionary army and, later on, of the legion. in its right talon the eagle is grasping what appear to be rather stylized thunderbolts, and in its left, arrows. the arc above the eagle's head is comprised of sunrays, an edge of clouds, and -pointed stars. if the number of stars is of significance, the piece would date prior to november when the th state, ohio, was admitted to the union. the "frog-legged" aspect of the design would tend to confirm such dating, and the thunderbolts in the right talon, symbolic of a belligerent attitude, could be attributed to the national temper during the "quasi war" with france, - . the "id," in delicate floriated script on the eagle's breast, quite out of consonance with the design and execution of the piece proper and obviously the work of a talented engraver, is interpreted as "independent dragoons." too small for a hat frontpiece, it was probably worn as a side ornament on a dragoon helmet. leather fan cockade, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the leather fan cockade became a part of the uniform in the late th century, having evolved from the cloth cockade adopted early in the revolution.[ ] enlisted men's cockades of the early th century were of leather, as were those of line officers.[ ] this cockade, of black tooled leather with painted gold fan tips, was a common form of the period and was worn with an eagle in the center or possibly on the upper fan. it is assigned to the militia because of the gold ornamentation. [footnote : finke, pp. - .] [footnote : todd, "three leather cockades," pp. - .] cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this grenadier-type plate, which is untrimmed and thus may be a die sample, is a rare example of the use of coiled snakes as a military device after . a familiar motif of the revolution, coiled snakes were not revived as a popular military symbol during the war of . this specimen is struck in brass and is believed to have been made for a specific independent militia organization, designation unknown, for wear prior to . cockade eagle, - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the eagle-on-clouds design, which first appeared on coins on the silver dollar, was popular on insignia during the period - . the heraldic significance of the clouds, if any, is unknown. somewhat larger than most cockade devices, this eagle is struck in brass and silvered and has two simple wire fasteners soldered to the reverse. a very similar badge is shown by rembrandt peale in an oil portrait of col. joseph o. bogart of the d flying artillery.[ ] [footnote : reproduced in _antiques_ (july ), vol. , no. , p. .] cockade eagle, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this eagle, of the general design first seen on the half-dollar, is very similar to the one on buttons ascribed to staff officers, - .[ ] the eagle, struck in brass, has wings upraised and the familiar hooked beak; it stands on a wreath of the colors. the wire fasteners on the reverse are of a somewhat unusual type and may not be contemporary. [footnote : johnson, specimen nos. - .] ¶ die work for cap, shoulder-belt, and waist-belt plates was expensive, and many militia organizations found it expedient to purchase devices "ready made" from existing dies. by varying the trimming and adding borders of various designs, the same dies could be used to strike all three types of plates. such badges are called "common" plates. the common plates that follow were very popular during the period - and, although relatively rare today, were made in considerable quantity and in many die variations for the militia in every part of the country. they are known in brass, copper, and silver-on-copper. it is possible that specimens such as these may have been worn by some officers of the regular establishment between and . cap plate, - (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is a typical example of the common plates of the - period. the piece is struck in brass and has an edged and stippled border. the design is dominated by an eagle with wings outspread, head to left, arrows in right talon, olive branch in left talon, and with the national motto on a ribbon overhead. the whole is superimposed on a trophy of arms and colors with an arc of -pointed stars above. a plume socket, apparently original, is soldered to the reverse, as are two looped-wire fasteners. the fasteners are of a later period. cap plate, - (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] struck in copper and silvered, this piece is a die variant of the preceding plate. a floral border replaces the plain border, and the overhead arc has -pointed rather than -pointed stars. the floral border marks it as probably an officer's device. cap plate, - (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] a die variant of the preceding plate, this device has an unusually wide floral border. as in so many of the common pieces of this period, the center device was purposely designed small so that the die could be used to strike matching waist-belt plates. examples of waist-belt plates struck from dies of this particular design are known. struck in copper, there is a plume socket soldered to the reverse along with two looped-wire fasteners. the fasteners are not contemporary. cap plate, - (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is a die variant of the three plates immediately preceding. however, the center device lacks the fineness of detail of the others, a fact that suggests that several makers working with different die sinkers produced this basic pattern. the plate is struck in copper, and originally it had a plume socket attached to the reverse. the present looped-wire fasteners are not original. cap plate, - (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate, which is of brass, is of a less common design than its predecessors. however, since there is another such plate, but of silver-on-copper, in the national collections, it can be surmised that pieces of this same pattern were made for use by several different units. a floral-bordered shield is topped by an out-sized sunburst with stars, clouds, and the motto "unity is strength." in the center of the shield is the eagle, with wings widely outspread and with lightning bolts in the right talon and an olive branch in the left talon. the lightning bolt device, obvious sign of belligerency, first appeared about and is not seen in plates designed after . the motto and the date are far more typical of militia than regular army usage. ¶ in the regular army discarded all its large cap plates and adopted the bell-crown leather cap. militia organizations lost no time in adopting a similar cap and, conversely, placing on it--and on the tall beaver which followed in the 's--the largest plates it could accommodate, using variations of discarded regular army patterns as well as original designs. from until well into the 's large cap plates were mass-produced by manufacturers in boston, new york, philadelphia, and perhaps other cities of the new england metal manufacturing area. the few early platemakers, such as crumpton and armitage of philadelphia and peasley of boston, were joined by a number of others. prominent among these were charles john joullain, who made plates in new york during the 's, and william pinchin of philadelphia. joullain is first listed in new york directories, in , as a "gilder," and so continues through . sometimes his given name is listed as charles, sometimes as james, and finally as charles james. from to his address is the same, spring street. there is a william pinchin (pinchon) listed in the philadelphia directories as a silverplater or silversmith almost continuously from through , indicating the possibility of a family occupation. it is believed that some of the new england makers of uniform buttons also manufactured plates. among such buttonmakers of the 's and 's were r. and w. robinson, d. evans and co., leavenworth and co., benedict and coe, and others in connecticut and massachusetts. buttonmakers often stamped their names or easily recognizable hallmarks on the back of their products. in most cases it is virtually impossible to ascertain the precise units for which these different plates were first designed, and the problem is further complicated because the maker would sell a specific plate design to several different units. those designs that incorporate all or part of a state's seal were originally made for militia organizations of the particular state, but in several instances these plates were sold--altered or not--to units in other parts of the country. militia organizations that were widely separated geographically purchased cap plates from distant manufacturers who had perhaps a dozen or more stock patterns to offer at a cost much lower than that involved in making a new die from which to strike custom-made ornaments. it made no difference to the savannah greys, in georgia, that their new cap plates were the same as those worn by organizations in pennsylvania and massachusetts. toward the end of this period of large cap plates, manufacturers came out with two-piece ornaments. after , when the regiment of united states dragoons was authorized its large sunburst plate with separate eagle ornament in the center, insignia makers introduced a veritable rash of full sunburst, three-quarter sunburst, and half-sunburst cap plates with interchangeable centers. and for the first time small militia units could afford their own distinctive devices at little extra cost. shoulder-belt and waist-belt plates underwent the same evolution, and by the late 's such plates had become a mixture of either single die stampings or composite plates made of several parts soldered or otherwise held onto a rectangular or oval background. study of cap plates and other insignia in the huddy and duval prints in _u.s. military magazine_ points to the years between and perhaps or as the transition period from single to composite ornaments, years during which there was also tremendous growth in the popularity and number of independent militia units. in contrast to the 's when the militia often waited until the regulars discarded a device before adopting it, in there were no less than five organizations, mounted and dismounted, wearing the dragoon plate in full form while it was still in use by the regulars. _u.s. military magazine_ illustrates such plates for the richmond light infantry blues, the georgia hussars, the macon volunteers, the jackson rifle corps of lancaster, pa., the montgomery light guard, and the harrison guards of allentown, pa. the plate of the harrison guards is an example of the license sometimes practiced by huddy and duval in the preparation of their military prints. the color bearer in this print is depicted wearing a full sunburst plate, while the description of the uniform called for "a semi-circular plate or _gloria_."[ ] [footnote : _u.s. military magazine_ (march ), p. .] in the following descriptions of plates, the term "stock pattern" is used because the insignia are known to have been worn by more than one organization, because their basic designs are so elementary that it appears obvious that they were made for wide distribution, or because they are known to have been made both in silver and in gilt metals. cap plate, artillery, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] on the raised center of this shield-shaped plate is the eagle-on-cannon device within an oval floral border; the federal shield is below. the whole is superimposed on a trophy of arms and colors with portions of a modified sunburst appearing on the sides. the plate is struck in brass. the eagle-on-cannon first appeared on regular artillery buttons in . about it was used as an embossed device on the leather fan cockade, and in it became the principal design element of the cap plate for regulars. this plate is thought to be one of the earliest of the post- series of militia cap plates incorporating the discarded design of the regular artillery. unidentified ornament, probably cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this silver-on-copper plate is unique in size, shape, and over-all design. it is one of the most unusual militia insignia in the national collections. the standing eagle of the mint design with federal shield, the panoply of arms and colors, and the rayed background all suggest that this plate was made not later than the early 's. quite possibly it is a cap plate of the war of period, but positive dating is impossible. three simple wire fasteners are affixed to the reverse. cap plate, artillery, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] although the regular riflemen wore a diamond-shaped plate from to , this shape does not appear on militia caps until the mid- 's. it was a common form through the 's, but since it was always made as a one-piece die-struck plate it became out-dated in the late 's when the composite plates came into vogue. this plate, struck in brass and bearing the eagle-on-cannon device, must be considered a stock pattern available to many organizations. insignia struck from the same die could have been easily made into shoulder-belt plates as well. cap plate and plume holder, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass plate is similar in many respects to the regular infantry cap plate, type i, - . it is attached to a bell-crowned shako of distinctly militia origin and is cut in the diamond shape popular with the militia in the 's and 's. the design lies within a raised oval dominated by an eagle similar to ones used on war of insignia. below the eagle is a federal shield and a trophy of stacked muskets, a drum surmounted by a dragoon helmet, a gun on a truck carriage, and colors--one the national colors with stars in the canton. the plume holder attached to the cap above the plate is an unusually interesting and distinctive device. it is a hemisphere of thin brass with a round plume socket at the top. the hemisphere has an eagle on a shield and a superimposed wreath device in silver. the blazonry of the shield cannot be identified with any particular state or locality. cap plate, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the familiar hooked-beak eagle dominates the center of this brass, scalloped-edge plate. the arrows of belligerency, however, are held in the left talon. surrounding the eagle is a three-quarter wreath of olive with the national motto above and the date below. while there is a possibility that this plate may fall into the period - because of its outline shape, it lacks the panoply of arms associated with that era. it is much more probable that this is one of the earliest plates made for militia during the years - . since this plate is also known in silver-on-copper, it is considered a stock pattern. cap plate, militia, artillery(?), c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this oval, brass-struck plate framed within a large wreath of laurel is one of the finest in the national collections, comprising as it does a number of devices of excellent design and considerable detail standing in high relief. the curving line of stars above the motto, decreasing in size laterally, is an interesting detail, and the eagle and panoply of arms is reminiscent of those on the plate ascribed to the regiment of light artillery, - , and on several of the common militia plates of the same period. it is assigned to the artillery because of its "yellow metal" composition. it has simple wire fasteners, applied to the reverse, and carries no plume socket. cap plate, new york, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this unusually large, shield-shaped plate, struck in brass, is dominated by an eagle--within a smaller shield with raised edge--standing on a half globe and wreath of the colors, both of which are superimposed on a trophy of arms and flags; clouds and sun rays are above. the specimen represents one of the large cap plate patterns adopted by the militia for wear on the bell-crown cap soon after it came into general use in the early 's. while a stock pattern in a sense, its use was most likely confined to new york state militia because its principal device, the eagle-on-half-globe, is taken directly from that state's seal. these large plates were widely worn until the middle or late 's when newer styles began to replace them. the plume socket affixed to the reverse appears to be contemporary, but has been resoldered. cap plate, new york, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is a variant of the preceding plate and well illustrates how an insignia-maker could adapt a single die for several products. the eagle-on-half-globe, with a portion of the trophy of arms and colors, and the clouds and sunburst above have merely been cut out from the plate proper for use alone. the plate is struck in brass. another specimen, of silver-on-copper, is known, indicating that this insignia was made for wear by infantry as well as by other branches of the service; consequently, it may be termed a stock pattern. cap plate, new york, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] illustrating fine craftsmanship, this elaborate brass cap plate comprises perhaps the most ornate and intricately detailed design ever attempted by a military ornament die sinker. the strike itself has been so well executed that the most minute details are even today readily discernible, even after very apparent use. made for new york militia, its central theme is the eagle-on-half-globe superimposed on a trophy of arms and flags. many of the facets of detail are of particular interest. almost every ray of the aura of sunlight can still be clearly seen; the north pole is well marked with a vertical arrow; the arctic circle, tropic of capricorn, and the equator are included on the half-globe, as are the meridians of longitude and the parallels of latitude; both north america and south america are shown, and that portion of north america east of the mississippi basin is clearly denominated "united states." an unusual feature of the design is the way the arrows are held in the eagle's left talon--some of the arrow heads point inward, some outward. what appears to have been a contemporary plume socket has been resoldered to the reverse. although this plate is unmarked as to maker, another plate of a similar design but of silver-on-copper has the maker's mark "j. joullain, maker, n. york." since two distinct but similar designs are known, and the finished product is found in both brass and silver-on-copper, it seems probable that this plate was produced by more than one maker, and for all arms of the service. it is therefore deemed a stock pattern. cap plate, riflemen, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] almost immediately after the last regular rifle regiment was disbanded in , militia riflemen adopted the large open horn with loops and tassels that the regulars had worn from to . the basic device was altered slightly by showing an eagle in flight and the horn suspended much lower on its cords. the illustrated brass plate is one of four die variants, and more than a dozen similar to it have been examined. it is significant that all are of brass, for these were made and worn during the period when the trimmings for infantry were silver or "white metal." this plate differs from the others examined in that it has -pointed stars along the upper and lower parts of the shield inside the border. the number of stars cannot be significant in dating for the plate was obviously made long after when the th state, louisiana, was admitted to the union. a plume socket affixed to the reverse appears to be original. undoubtedly made as a stock pattern by several manufacturers, these plates continued in use for at least years after they first appeared about . although _u.s. military magazine_ illustrates many large cap plates for the period - , none has a shield outline. this may indicate a decline in the popularity of the design, but it must be remembered that huddy and duval presented the uniforms of only a small cross-section of the militia of the period. cap plate, riflemen, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is a second form of militia riflemen's plates. struck in brass, it differs from the preceding primarily in the placement of -pointed stars along the upper half of the shield, between the borders. other small differences show that the basic die was not that used for the preceding specimen. the most obvious difference is the legend "e pluribus unum" carried on the ribbon behind the knotted cord of the horn, an element not present in the other. a third form, not illustrated, substitutes a floral border for the plain border around the edge of the shield and contains no stars as part of the design. still a fourth form, also not illustrated, has the same center device of eagle and open horn placed in a longer and narrower shield, with -pointed stars between the borders. ¶ these various combinations of devices give a good clue as to the method of manufacture of stock patterns, and indicate the use of several different dies and hand punches. the blank metal was first struck by a die that formed the plain or floral border and cut the outline of the plate. next, a smaller die containing the center device of eagle and horn was used. then the stars, and sometimes elements of the floral border, were added by individual striking with a hand punch. this latter method is clearly revealed by the comparison of several "identical" plates in which the stars or elements of the border are irregularly and differently spaced. cap plate, rifleman pattern, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate is called "rifleman pattern" because it is silver-on-copper and is the only known example of this type of insignia made for wear by infantry, or possibly for militia riflemen whose trimmings were, incorrectly, silver. there are several conjectures about this cut-out device made from a die of the preceding series of shield plates. it may have been made after , when the open horn with cord and tassels was adopted by the regular infantry as a branch device. it is equally possible that it was submitted to a militia infantry organization by some maker as a sample during the 's and when selected was silvered to conform with other trimmings. in either case, it illustrates how a single die could serve to make many different variations from a basic design. cap plate, riflemen, c. _usnm -m (s-k b). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the very unusual construction of this brass plate for riflemen indicates that it is possibly one of the earliest of the composite plates. within a wreath of crossed laurel boughs is a small center circle with raised edge to which has been soldered the eagle and horn device struck in convex form. cap plate, riflemen, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the diamond-shaped plate was in vogue with militia units during the late 's and the 's. examples of such plates for the washington grays (philadelphia) and the philadelphia grays are recorded in _u.s. military magazine_.[ ] this brass plate, possibly made for a particular unit from stock dies, is a typical example of the endless variety possible with the use of a few dies. the blank was struck with a die for the center device of eagle and horn, but the irregularity of the spacing of the stars shows that they were added later by hand. similar plates may be found with essentially this same device, but placed on small shields or backgrounds of other shapes. [footnote : april , pl. ; june , pl. .] cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the eagle and horn devices were sometimes separated by the manufacturer to produce this type ornament open with cord and tassels. struck in brass, it differs in form and detail from the silver horn adopted by the regular infantry in as a cap plate. several militia units of the late 's and 's used a horn as an additional ornament on the rear of the cap, notably the state fencibles (philadelphia) and the national guard (philadelphia). on the rear of the leather cap of the state fencibles were "two broad rich stripes of silver lace, starting from the same point at the top and running down, forming an angle, in the center of which is a bugle ornament...."[ ] the cap of the national guard has been described as being "of blue cloth ... and in the rear a plated bugle ornament."[ ] [footnote : _u.s. military magazine_ (march ), p. and pl. .] [footnote : _u.s. military magazine_ (october ), p. .] ¶ in the following series of rather similar plates, four different dies are used for the center ornament, perhaps made by as many different die sinkers. the relatively large number of these plates still in existence suggests that they were worn very extensively. those with silver finish were used by infantry; the gilt or copper ones by artillery and perhaps by staff officers. all specimens are currently fitted with plain wire fasteners and plume sockets, both of which may or may not be original. cap plate, infantry, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the floral-bordered shield outline of this silver-on-copper infantry plate is known to have been used also with the rifleman's eagle-horn device in the center. the panoply of arms and flags used as a background for the center device, which is characterized by the long neck of the eagle swung far to the right, links it closely to the plate of similar type worn during the period - . because of its large size, it is assigned to the post- era of the bell-crown cap, contemporary with the riflemen's large plates. the -pointed stars were added with a hand punch. cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass plate is a duplicate of the preceding, lacking only the hand-applied stars. the crispness of detail indicates that it was one of the very early products of the die. cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the second variation of the series is a product of perhaps the best executed die of the group, with unusually fine detail in the eagle's wings and with neatly stacked cannon balls at the bottom of the center device. it includes other excellent detail not found in other dies: an eagle-head pommel on one sword, a star pattern made of smaller stars in the cantons of the flags, and crossed cannon, rammer, and worm behind the federal shield. it is struck in brass. cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] a tall, slender, rather graceless eagle with broad wings and erect head reminiscent of the napoleonic eagle is the outstanding difference in this third example of the series. the floral border lacks a finished look because the plate, which is of brass, was apparently hand trimmed. cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this fourth variation, of silver-on-copper, bears an eagle with very small legs (somewhat out of proportion), an erect head, a fierce mien, and a heavy round breast. the design is struck on a shield-plate with the exact measurements as on one of the riflemen series. cap plate, musician, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the oldest known plate made expressly for musicians, this silver-on-copper, floral-bordered shield bears an eagle similar to one for riflemen of the same period (see fig. ). among the early musical instruments easily identifiable in the design are the tambor, the serpent, the french horn, and the rack of bells. such a plate was undoubtedly a stock pattern, available in either gilt or silver finish, and was probably sold well into the 's. the reverse is fitted with what appears to be a contemporary plume socket, although resoldered, and two simple wire fasteners. cap plate, musician, c. _usnm -m (s-k a). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this gilded brass plate, while not as old as the preceding one, is of an unusual pattern. made for new york state militia, it carries the eagle-on-half-globe device at the top. the central design includes a french horn, a serpent, and a straight horn, all intertwined about an open roll of sheet music. it is probably a stock pattern. the reverse is fitted with three simple bent-wire fasteners. cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the design on this brass plate, reminiscent of that on the regular infantry cap plate, - , was adopted for wear by the militia after being discarded by the regular establishment. the ornate floral border and diamond shape place it in the late 's and the 's, although the lightning in the eagle's left talon and the arrows in its right talon are usually associated with plates designed prior to . it has been suggested that this is the plate worn by the west point cadets after , but such seems doubtful. ¶ no militia plates enjoyed wider use or longer life than those patterned after the plate that disappeared from the regular establishment with the disbanding of the dragoons in . more than a dozen die variants are known, several worn by more than one militia unit. although size and shape may vary, any plate exhibiting a mounted trooper with upraised saber can safely be assigned to mounted militia. however, the dating of such plates is a real problem because they are known to have been in use as late as . a huddy and duval print of the washington cavalry of philadelphia county shows that unit wearing a plate similar to the one used by the regulars, differing only in its brass composition, as opposed to the original pewter of the regulations.[ ] a cap in the collections of the valley forge museum that was worn by a member of this unit in the period - is very similar to the one shown in the huddy and duval print. the cap is a copy of the regular army pattern, with somewhat more ornate brass bindings in place of the iron strips. a similar cap, carrying the label "canfield and bro., baltimore," is owned by lexington, virginia, descendants of a member of the rockbridge [virginia] dragoons. that unit is said to have worn such a cap upon first entering confederate service in . [footnote : see _u.s. military magazine_ (february ), pl. .] in the national collections there is a dragoon cap (usnm , s-k ) carrying a plate of this design struck on a massive diamond-shaped piece with concave sides. there are additional variations in several private collections and at the fort ticonderoga museum. the mounted horseman device was also struck on heart-shaped martingale ornaments. cap plate, dragoons, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the horseman on this brass plate, designed with a rather crude, childlike simplicity, is garbed quite differently than the regular dragoon on the pewter specimen. the plate is assigned to the general period to fit the era of the diamond-shaped plates, but its use doubtless continued on into the 's. by nature of its design it would have been a manufacturer's stock pattern. cap plate, artillery(?), c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the eagle on this brass plate is similar to the ones on the preceding shield plates, but the federal shield on which he stands is ornamented with three star devices composed of smaller stars. an unusual feature of this plate is the addition of the flaming portion of a grenade rising from the eagle's head, a device not a part of any other known cap plate. this symbol suggests artillery, and the plate is of the proper color. although an unusual over-all design, the lack of any components of state arms or crests indicate that it may have been a stock pattern. the reverse is fitted with two simple bent-wire fasteners. cap plate, massachusetts infantry, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this silver-on-copper plate bears the familiar elements of the massachusetts seal: indian, in hunting shirt, with bow in right hand, arrow with point downward in left hand, and star above right shoulder. the crest--an arm grasping a broad sword on a wreath of the colors--is superimposed on a burst of sun rays above. the state's motto is written around the shield. the earlier plates containing elements of state arms were for the most part confined to the states of massachusetts, connecticut, and new york. no large plates bearing pennsylvania state symbols that can be dated prior to are known. this seal was not authorized by law until . however, the devices and the motto were elements of the seal of the commonwealth of massachusetts ordered prepared by the state legislature in and, although apparently never formally approved, used as such for many years. it differs considerably in detail from the seal in use from to .[ ] [footnote : see zieber, pp. - .] cap plate, massachusetts infantry, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this scalloped plate, which is struck in thin iron metal and silvered, bears elements of the massachusetts seal, minus the motto, and the legend "massachusetts militia." its silver color assigns it to the infantry. the form of the specimen indicates that it was probably designed prior to . in consideration of its over-all design and the use of the word "militia," it was probably made as a stock pattern and sold to several different organizations. a plume holder, which has been resoldered to the reverse, appears to be of the same metal as the plate proper. it is pierced at the sides for attachment. ¶ painted cap fronts were worn during the war of the revolution by several units of the continental army--including the light infantry company of the canadian regiment, haslet's delaware regiment, and the rhode island train of artillery[ ]--and it is probable that the practice continued among some volunteer corps up to the war of . their use in the uniformed militia units generally declined after the introduction of die-struck metal cap plates. two notable exceptions are a cap plate of the morris rangers that is attached to a civilian-type round hat of the - period[ ] and the cap front described below (fig. ). [footnote : illustrated in lefferts, pls. , , .] [footnote : in the collections of the morristown national historical park. the morris rangers was one of three uniformed militia units in morris county, new jersey, at the outbreak of the war of ; it saw service at paulus hook in (hopkins, pp. - ).] although discarded by the more elite volunteer corps, painted metal hat fronts in the "tombstone" shape similar to that of the morris rangers continued to be used, to some extent, by the common militia. easily attached to the ordinary civilian hat of the period, they provided the common militia a quick and inexpensive transformation from civilian to military dress at their infrequent musters perhaps as late as . there are several contemporary sketches of these musters and in one, dated (fig. ), these "tombstone" plates can be identified. [illustration: figure .--from library of congress print.] a total of perhaps a dozen of these hat fronts are known. most are of connecticut origin, although at least two containing new york state devices are extant. the most elaborate of these devices bears, oddly enough, elements of the connecticut state seal, the motto _qui trans. sust._, and the crest of the massachusetts coat of arms--an arm grasping a broad-sword (fig. ). the elaborate detail of this plate indicates that it was probably an officer's. the fact that unit designations on other such known hat fronts run as high as the " d regt." is definite proof that these were devices of the common militia as opposed to the volunteer corps. [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] painted cap front, connecticut, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this painted front, of leather rather than metal, forms an integral part of the cap itself. edged in gold, it has the unit designation "light infantry: d comp." in gold at the top; a shield in the center contains elements of the connecticut state seal, and below it is the state motto "qui trans sust" ("he who brought us over here will sustains us"). cap front, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] a majority of these hat fronts are very similar in design, size, and shape, and are painted over a black background on thin precut sheets of tinned iron. this specimen carries a gold eagle with the federal shield on its breast and a ribbon in its beak. the unit designation, " d comp{y}. d reg{t}.", also in gold, is below. the artwork, although somewhat unartistically executed, has an attractive simplicity. other such hat fronts in the national collections are of the d company, th regiment; d company, th regiment; and st company, th regiment. the plate shown here has metal loops soldered to the reverse close to the edge midway between top and bottom for attachment to a civilian type hat by means of a ribbon or strip of cloth. other such plates have hole for attachment with string. cap plate, south carolina, c. - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this crescent-shaped, silver-on-copper plate bears an eagle that is very similar in design to the one adopted by the regular army in . sometimes mistakenly identified as a gorget because of its shape, the crescent form of the specimen is an old south carolina state heraldic device. a cap worn by the charleston light dragoons after the civil war, and probably before, carries a similar crescent-shaped plate, with the familiar palmetto tree device substituted for the eagle.[ ] the design of the eagle, however, places this piece in the - period. a silvered ornament, it may have been made originally for either infantry or dragoons, and must be considered a manufacturer's stock pattern. [footnote : illustrated in _military collector and historian_ ( ), vol. , no. , p. .] cap plate, washington grays, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass, diamond-shaped plate was worn by the washington grays, a light artillery outfit of philadelphia. within a raised oval are a profile of washington--with his shoulders draped in a toga, a typically neoclassic touch--and, below, the unit designation "grays" in raised letters. a matching oval shoulder-belt plate struck from the same die is known.[ ] [footnote : see _u.s. military magazine_ (april ), pl. .] many militia units named themselves after prominent military personalities. there were washington guards, washington rifles, jackson artillerists, and so forth. cap plate, national greys, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] an illustration in _u.s. military magazine_[ ] shows this plate being worn by the national greys; however, with such a nondistinctive center ornament as the rosette of six petals, it must surely have been a stock pattern sold to many different organizations. the sunburst proper is struck in brass, as is the rosette, and each of the rays is pierced at the end for attachment. the rosette is affixed with a brass bolt, also for attachment, which must have extended through the front of the cap. [footnote : may , pl. .] cap plate, artillery, c. - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate is struck in very thin brass. the combination of devices in the design, especially of the cannon and cannon balls, indicates that it was probably made for militia artillery. its shape suggests that it may have been worn high on the cap front, with the sunburst serving an added function as a cockade of sorts. it was very probably a stock pattern. cap plate, mounted troops, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] from the size of this brass plate it can be assumed that it was worn without other ornament on the front of the round leather cap associated with mounted troops. the upper portion of the shield bears -pointed stars, an unusual feature. the arrows in the eagle's left talon point inward, a characteristic of eagle representation between and . the plate is known both in brass and with silver finish. it was probably a stock pattern issued to both cavalry and mounted artillery. cap eagle, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass eagle was worn in combination with backgrounds of full-, half-, and three-quarter sunbursts and as a single ornament on the cap front. the inward-pointed arrows in the left talon place it in the - period. known in both brass and silver-on-copper, it was a popular stock pattern sold to many units. cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] struck in copper, and silvered, this eagle, which is very similar in design to that prescribed for the regular establishment in both and , was made for militia infantry from about to perhaps as late as . specimens struck in brass are also known, and the same eagle is found on half-sunburst backgrounds. it is quite possible that this is the eagle illustrated in the huddy and duval prints as being worn by both the washington blues of philadelphia and the u.s. marine corps.[ ] [footnote : _u.s. military magazine_ (february ), pl. ; (november ), unnumbered plate.] chapeau ornament, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass ornament is a die sample or unfinished badge. after the circular device was trimmed from the brass square, it would have been worn as an officer's chapeau ornament or as a side ornament on the round leather dragoon cap of the period. the four arrows in the eagle's left talon are unusual. chapeau cockade, general officer, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this large, round chapeau cockade with its gold embroidery and sequins on black-ribbed silk and its ring of silver-metal stars appears to be identical to cockades that have been shown as being worn around by gen. edmund p. gaines and gen. winfield scott[ ] but without the added center eagle. close examination of this cockade shows it to be complete, with no traces of a center eagle ever having been added. the stars would have been appropriate at any time between and . [footnote : _u.s. military magazine_ (may ), unnumbered plate; (march ), unnumbered plate.] cap and cap plate, jackson artillerists, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the jackson artillerists of philadelphia, after the appearance of the regular dragoon cap plate in and the large crossed cannon of the regular artillery one year later, lost no time in combining these two devices to make their distinctive cap device.[ ] it seems probable, however, that the plate was adopted by other artillery units and eventually became more or less of a stock pattern. [footnote : illustrated in _u.s. military magazine_ (january ), pl. .] cap plate, washington grays(?), c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the washington grays of philadelphia wore a diamond-shaped plate with a likeness of george washington in the center (see fig. ), but this plate, for some other "washington" unit, bears his likeness in silver metal on a brass sunburst background. this silver outline of the head of washington is also known on cartridge-box flaps of the period. cap plate, artillery, die sample, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this uncut, brass cap plate may have been a manufacturer's die strike sent out as a sample, with others, so that a distant militia organization could select a pattern. the finished plate is known on a bell-crown cap of the pattern of the 's, but its design indicates that it probably should be dated after when the regular artillery first adopted the crossed-cannon device. the eagle is distinctly similar to the one adopted by the regulars in lieu of cap plates in , and the modified sunburst background probably was taken from the dragoon device. cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ) figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this cap plate is a somewhat wider variation of the dragoon device than most of the militia plates of that type popular in the late 's and the 's. while the brass sunburst has the usual -pointed form, the eagle, applied to the center, is unusually small ( - / by in.) and gives every indication of having been originally designed as a cockade eagle at a somewhat earlier period. cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this pattern of the dragoon eagle on a half-sunburst, struck in brass and silvered, was worn by the washington [d.c.] light infantry [ ] and possibly by other units of the period. both the eagle and the half-sunburst were obviously stock items. [footnote : illustrated in _u.s. military magazine_ (august ), pl. .] cap plate, republican blues, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this silver-metal plate can be accurately identified by reading its devices. the center device is from the seal of the state of georgia. during the period that the plate was worn, one of the best known of the state's militia organizations was the republican blues--the "rb" on the plate--of savannah.[ ] the silver color of the plate also agrees with the other trimmings of the uniform of that unit. [footnote : a volunteer militia company known as the republican blues was organized in savannah in . from notes filed under "georgia national guard" in organizational history and honors branch, office of the chief of military history, department of the army, washington, d.c.] cap plate, irish dragoons, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this three-quarter-sunburst plate with the monogram "i d" applied in silver is identical to one on a brass-bound dragoon cap in the national collections carrying in its crown the label "irish dragoons, brooklyn, n.y." (usnm , s-k ). it is typical of the two-piece sunburst-type plates and was probably worn until the 's. the plate was attached by means of two looped-wire fasteners that were run through holes in the helmet and secured by leather thongs. cap and plate, lancer type, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] with no regulations but their own to restrain them, militia organizations designed their uniforms to suit their fancies, although generally following the regulations for the regulars. this often led to odd and unusual cap shapes and trimmings and bindings on clothing, and to somewhat garish horse furniture in in some mounted units. the illustrated cap and plate is very similar to the ones worn by the boston light infantry[ ] about - except that the upper or "mortar board" portion is beige instead of red and the plate is a full instead of a three-quarter sunburst. the mortar board form is that introduced by the polish lancers in europe in the early years of the th century and worn by most european lancer regiments of the same period. lancer units in the british army adopted this type cap in when they were first converted from light dragoons.[ ] the large, brass, eagle-on-sunburst plate was obviously patterned after the one prescribed for the regular dragoons in . [footnote : depicted in _u.s. military magazine_ (november ), pl. .] [footnote : barnes, p. and pl. ( ).] cockade eagle, infantry, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] as an example of more than a dozen known variants of the eagle, this silver-on-copper specimen is illustrated to show the general form and size of militia cockade eagles that became distinct types in the 's and continued until about . all such eagles were obviously stock patterns. cockade eagle, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this gold-embroidered cockade eagle with a wreath of silver lamé about its breast appears to have been patterned directly after the eagle on the regular dragoon cap plate (see fig. ). it possibly is one of a type worn by general officers of militia. on this specimen, both the eye and mouth of the eagle are indicated with red thread. cockade eagle, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this gold-embroidered eagle, with wings and tail of gold embroidery and gold sequins, was worn by staff and field officers, and possibly general officers, of militia. a duplicate on an original chapeau is in the collections of the maryland historical society in baltimore, maryland. eagle ornaments such as this were generally centered on a round cloth cockade about inches in diameter. the eagle's mouth is indicated by embroidery with red thread. similar eagles of a smaller size are known on epaulets of the same period. cap plate, c. _usnm l-m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the flaming grenade, adopted by the regulars in after long usage by the british and other foreign armies, was quickly adopted by the militia. this specimen, of silver-on-copper, was worn as a cap plate either in conjunction with another device below it on the cap front or as a lone distinctive ornament. it cannot precisely be identified as an artillery plate, but since some militia artillery units are definitely known to have worn silver buttons of the artillery pattern, such is highly probable. also known in brass and in smaller sizes, it is a stock pattern. cap plate, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] although this plate appears to be of possible french or british origin, close examination indicates that it is probably an american militia device of the 's. its looped-wire fasteners indicate that it is a cap plate. the design of the modified napoleonic-type eagle is almost exactly that used in the regular dragoon cap plate and other militia plates; and the period of apparent manufacture coincides with the early use of the flaming grenade as an american device. incorporating two devices common to the period, it would have been a stock pattern. cap plate, artillery, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the button for the ordnance corps bears a flaming grenade over crossed cannon, devices that date from and respectively. consequently, it seems likely that this combination emerged as a stock pattern for militia artillery early in the 's. this specimen, struck from a single piece of brass, is a copy of the french artillery device of the same period, and, while it is believed to be american, it may be a foreign insignia. confusion arises in the case of foreign designs, for die sinkers often used as a model either an actual imported badge or a scale drawing of one. cap plate, artillery, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is a variation of the pattern of the preceding specimen in which silver-metal devices have been placed on a small, gilt, half-sunburst plate. this was probably a stock pattern available to any militia organization beginning about and worn for the next or years. cap plate, south carolina, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the palmetto of south carolina in outline form first appeared as a large cap ornament about , after having been worn in smaller size as a cockade ornament and on the side of dragoon caps. a huddy and duval print shows it on the caps of the dekalb rifle guards of camden, south carolina.[ ] the illustrated specimen was worn into the 's, and it is highly probable that some south carolina troops wore plates such as this in the early days of the civil war. [footnote : _u.s. military magazine_ (august ), unnumbered plate]. the palmetto was adopted as the principal heraldic device of south carolina in commemoration of the defeat of admiral sir peter parker's fleet by the garrison of sullivan's island under col. william moultrie in june . the defenses of the island were constructed primarily of palmetto logs. the devices comprising this brass plate are all taken from the state seal, including the mottos _animis opibusque parati_ and _dum spiro spero spes_. the date " " alludes to the year of moultrie's victory and not to the organization date of any particular unit. cap plate, south carolina, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] struck from a different die, with broader fronds and a wider base, this brass plate is of the same period as the preceding one. cap plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this grenadier-type plate, struck in brass, is one of the most beautiful examples of the die maker's art in the national collections. on a sunburst-over-clouds background is an eagle grasping the top of the federal shield superimposed on panoply of arms and colors. the national motto is on a ribbon below. certainly not from a stock pattern, this plate obviously was made for a specific militia unit of considerable affluence. three simple wire fasteners soldered to the reverse provide means of attachment. this specimen is one of the scarce examples of military plates bearing the maker's name "bale," which may be seen just above the raised lower edge and below the "unum." this was probably thomas bale of new york who is first listed in new york directories, in , as an engraver at nassau street. the directory lists him as a die sinker at the same address in partnership with a frederick b. smith. he is last listed in . cap and cap plate, st artillery, pennsylvania, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the plate on this cap uses only the shield of the pennsylvania seal without crest or supporters. it is surrounded at the sides and bottom with a wreath carrying a ribbon with the unit designation "first artily." equally interesting and unusual is the small separate insignia at the pompon socket. it is based on the flaming grenade ordnance device with crossed cannon superimposed. cockade eagle, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this eagle is of a rather odd design, and the five arrows in its left talon is an even more unusual variation. it is believed to be a cockade eagle because of its form and size, but it may well have been used elsewhere on the person as a piece of uniform insignia. chapeau cockade, state fencibles (pennsylvania), c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the state fencibles of philadelphia were originally organized as "sea fencibles" in for duty at the port of philadelphia. this cockade, with brass eagle, was first worn about and it continued in use for many years thereafter. dates incorporated as parts of devices are generally the original organizational dates of the units concerned--as is the case in this instance--and bear no necessary relation to the age of the badges. some militia cap plates bear the date " ," and there are waist-belt plates bearing organization dates of years earlier than the dates at which the plates were made. ¶ the transition to composite plates in the late 's was a tremendous step forward in the field of military ornament. handsome insignia could be manufactured less expensively and individual units were able to have plates distinctive to themselves at relatively low cost; however, only gold and silver colors could be used. in the mid- 's there was introduced a new manufacturing technique which opened this field even wider. in this innovation, various stock patterns were struck with a round center as a part of the design. in either the initial strike, or a second, this round center was punched out, leaving a hole. then pieces of colored leather or painted tin, carrying distinctive numerals, letters, monograms, or other devices were affixed to the reverse of the plate, in effect filling the hole. although this added a step in manufacture, it permitted the incorporation of bright colors, which added zest and sparkle to the finished product. such plates remained popular until the 's, and a few are still worn on the full-dress caps of some units. this type of insignia came into use at the time when many of the independent companies of the larger states, such as new york and pennsylvania, were starting to become elements of regiments and brigades within the over-all militia structure of the state, thus the use of distinctive numbers and/or letters on the badges. many of these units, however, retained their original designation[ ] and continued to wear insignia distinctive to themselves on full-dress uniforms. [footnote : _new york military magazine_ (june , ), vol. , no. , p. .] cap plate, - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the first of the stock patterns, with basic wreath and -pointed starlike sunburst, has the numeral " " on black leather as a center device. other specimens in the national collections have single numerals, single letters, branch of service devices, and state coats of arms. this plate, and those following, were worn through the 's on the dress cap copied after the pattern adopted for the regular establishment in . it is struck in brass. cap plate, - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this stock pattern, in brass, is very definitely military in composition, employing cannon and flag-staff spearheads radiating from a beaded center and superimposed on a sunburst background. the metal letter " " is backed with black leather. cap and cap plate, albany burgesses corps, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this unusually ornate and distinctive plate is that of the albany [new york] burgesses corps that was founded, as stated on the plate itself, october , . the arms and the motto "assiduity", appearing above the ribbon with the letters "a b c," are those of the city of albany. cap and cap plate, rifles, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the original buttons on the sides of this cap have the eagle with the letter "r" (used by both regulars and militia) on the shield. the brass plate proper, however, includes no device indicative of any particular branch of service; combining flags and a federal shield surmounted by an eagle, it may well have been a stock pattern. cap plate, c. (?) _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the type and form of this eagle plate give no clue to its age, or to the identity of the unit that wore it other than the numeral " " in the eagle's beak and the letter "e" in the shield. it is a type more apt to have been made about than later. the eagle is struck in brass, and the stippled inner portion of the shield, product of a separate strike, is soldered in place; thus, the plate proper must be considered a stock pattern. cap plate, c. (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] a companion piece to the preceding plate, this specimen differs in that the letters "r g" and their stippled background are struck integrally with the plate proper--indicating that two dies were combined for a single strike--and in that the shield, ribbon, and numeral " " have been silvered. cap plate, th regiment, massachusetts volunteer militia, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate is of a type form worn on militia dress caps prior to the civil war. there is little doubt that plates such as this continued in use for several decades after their initial appearance. this brass specimen, surmounted by elements of the massachusetts seal, is struck as a stock pattern for massachusetts troops with the center left blank. the numeral " " is applied to a black-painted metal disk affixed with simple wire fasteners. cap plate, georgia, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate and the one following are of militia types worn on caps in the 's and perhaps earlier. such plates are known to have been in use with little or no change almost to the present day on military school dress shakos and dress caps worn by some national guard units. the plate proper, which is of brass, is the well-known half-sunburst device so popular in the 's and 's. the georgia state seal, also in brass, is applied with wire fasteners. the plate is dated later than a similar one of the republican blues (fig. ) because of the "feel" of the piece and the fact that it cannot be ascribed to a particular unit whose existence can be dated. cap plate, virginia, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate differs from the preceding one only in that it substitutes the coat of arms of virginia for that of georgia. the backgrounds, although very similar, are products of different dies. shoulder-belt and waist-belt plates waist-belt plate, st marine artillery, _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] undoubtedly one of the most interesting of all the militia plates of the war of period is this rectangular one worn by john s. stiles of (as indicated by the engraving) the "first marine artillery of the union." engraved in brass, it bears an unusual combination of military and naval devices--the familiar eagle-on-cannon of the regular artillery and the eagle with oval shield that appears on naval officers' buttons of the period.[ ] actually, the devices befit the character of the organization. the following quotation from _niles weekly register_ of baltimore, june , , tells something of the unit: the first marine artillery of the union, an association of the masters and mates of vessels in baltimore, about strong all told, assembled on sunday last and proceeded to the rev. mr. glendy's church in full uniform, where they received an address suited to the occasion; which, as usual, done honor to the head and heart to the reverend orator. we cannot pass over this pleasant incident without observing that the members of this invaluable corps are they who, of all other classes of society, feel the burthens and privations of the war. [footnote : johnson, vol. , pp. , .] obviously, this organization was one of the state fencible units enlisted for defense only, but little else is known about it. in there was in baltimore, a corps of marine artillery commanded by a capt. george stiles. the roster of this unit, however, does not include the name john s. stiles. other records do indicate that a lt. john s. stiles commanded a section of the baltimore union artillery at the battle of north point in .[ ] it is probable that john stiles, originally a member of the st marine artillery of the union had transferred his commission to the baltimore union artillery. [footnote : swanson, pp. , .] ¶ an example of militia officers' shoulder-belt plates of the period - is a solid silver oval plate (fig. ) engraved with an eagle and elements of the arms of massachusetts within a shield suspended from the eagle's neck. being silver, the plate probably was worn by infantry or possibly dragoons. many such plates were locally made, as was this one, and examination of a number of specimens gives reason to believe that many were made by rolling out large silver coins into thin ovals, which were then engraved and fitted with fasteners on the reverse. the fasteners on all pieces studied indicate that the plates were intended to be ornamental rather than functional. [illustration: figure .--specimen in campbell collection.] in the pennsylvania state museum there is a similar oval plate that was worn by col. philip spengler of that state's militia in - . ornamented with an eagle, with the initials "ps" within an oval below, it generally follows the construction of the illustrated plate, differing only slightly in size. since plates of this general type were made locally by hand, each is unique in itself. identification must depend upon an interpretation of the devices engraved on the face. the initials of the officer for whom the plate was made are often included. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] a second example of a militia officer's plate is this engraved brass specimen with the design placed along the longer axis of the oval. since there probably were many "volunteer rifle companies," it is impossible to determine precisely which one wore this plate. the initials of the officer may be read either "i. b." or "j. b.," for many of the early- th-century engravers used the forms of the letters "i" and "j" interchangeably. the two small hooks on the reverse indicate that the plate was for a shoulder belt rather than for a waist belt, and that it was ornamental rather than functional. shoulder-belt buckle, c. (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass buckle, obviously made for a sword hanger, has an eagle in flight above, a -star flag below, and four -pointed stars on either side. the spearhead on the pike of the flag is definitely of military design, and, in the absence of nautical devices in the engraving, the buckle must be considered an army item. ornamented waist-belt plate, - (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] cast in silver and then carefully finished, this rectangular plate with beveled edge is one of the most ornate and beautiful known. in the center is an officer's marquee with an eagle, wings spread, perched on top. in front of the marquee are a field piece with bombs, cannon balls, and drum; the whole on grassy ground and superimposed on a trophy of colors and bayonetted muskets. the canton of one color has, instead of stars, an eagle with a shield on its breast and a ribbon in its beak. it has been suggested that the eagle-in-canton flag would tend to date the piece after when many militia units had the design in its colors;[ ] however, flags of such design are known to have been used as early as the last year of the revolution.[ ] in addition, the "feel" of the specimen is early, and it is included here as a possible militia dragoon officer's plate since the dragoons of the war of period generally wore their swords attached to a waist belt rather than to a shoulder belt. [footnote : the national collections contain several such militia colors.] [footnote : see wall.] waist-belt plate, infantry, - (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate is typical of the early waist-belt plates, which generally were more square than rectangular. it bears the over-all design of the - series of "common" cap plates. struck in copper and silvered, it would have been appropriate for either infantry or dragoons, as both wore "white metal" trimmings during this period. there are as many die variations known for this type belt plate as for the matching cap plates. the wide latitude allowed officers in selecting their own insignia makes it quite possible that this design was worn by some officers of the regular establishment, particularly those in the high-numbered regiments, which were organized during the course of the war of . a third use of this basic design is indicated by a museum specimen at fort ticonderoga, n.y.: cut into its outline form, it was worn on the side of militia dragoon caps. waist-belt plate, infantry, - (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass plate is one of several similar examples made of both brass and silvered copper that differ only in small die variations and the use of either -pointed or -pointed stars. the arc of stars in this specimen may or may not be significant, because there were states in the union from until when louisiana was admitted. not until did the th state, indiana, come into the union. after thinking in terms of and working with stars for a -year period, die sinkers may well have overlooked the inclusion of a star for louisiana. buttons for the regular rifles made after but before show an arc of stars.[ ] as in the case of the preceding plate, there is a good possibility that this one was worn by regular officers in - . it is also probable that the pattern was made and sold to militia for many years after . [footnote : johnson, vol. , pp. .] waist-belt plate, militia artillery, c. - (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] while this plate could have been worn by an officer of the regular artillery in the period - when uniform regulations were vague and seldom enforced, it is more probable that it was a militia item of about - . the reason for this is that the eagle-on-cannon device was adopted quickly by militia units when it was discarded by the regulars in , and the over-all design of the plate itself follows the pattern adopted by the regulars in (see fig. ). several artillery organizations of the massachusetts militia wore the discarded button pattern (eagle-on-cannon with the word "corps" below) until the 's,[ ] and this plate would have been an ideal match. [footnote : johnson, vol. , pp. , .] the whole is cast in brass, the inner ring rather crudely so. the outer ring is embossed with zig-zag fretwork enclosing a circle of -pointed stars; the rectangular belt attachments have a floral design. waist-belt plate, maine, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate, struck in copper, contains the basic devices of the state of maine seal enclosed by a curled ribbon border embellished with -pointed stars. the specimen is more square than rectangular, a characteristic of waist-belt plates of the early 's. it was probably worn by maine militia no later than the 's, possibly a few years earlier. the method of attachment also is indicative of this early period: the heavy vertical wire is brazed to one end of the reverse, and the l-shaped tongue to the other. this plate obviously was a stock pattern. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate, cast in brass, is typical of the small plates, both round and rectangular, that were worn with light-weight, full-dress staff swords. it is an example of the early, hand-made, bench-assembled types. the outer ring carries the wreath typical of the period, while the inner ring carries the eagle with its head to the right, shield on breast, arrows in left talon, and olive branch in right talon. the whole lies within a ring of -pointed stars; the uppermost five stars are mixed with a sunburst rising from the eagle's wings. waist-belt plate, c. (?)- _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass, bench-assembled plate is similar to the regular artillery belt plate of (fig. ) in that the design on the inner ring is struck with a series of separate hand-held dies on a piece of blank round stock. the floral design on the belt attachments is cast. in many of the early bench-made plates, the final assemblyman marked the matching pairs so that they could readily be re-paired after buffing and plating. in this specimen, each ring bears the numeral xxviii. waist-belt plate, new york, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate, with the center ring struck in medium brass and the belt attachment cast, was worn by militia of new york state, as indicated by the eagle-on-half-globe device taken from that state's seal. of brass, it is assigned to the artillery. the quality of the belt to which it is attached and the ornateness of the plate itself indicate that it was made for an officer. the left-hand belt attachment is missing. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this small, cast-brass plate is another example of the plates made for social or full-dress wear with the light-weight staff sword. the design on the inner ring is unusual in that the eagle, with upraised wings, is standing on the federal shield. the plate is a bench-made product, with the inner and outer rings bearing the numeral vii. it was very probably a stock pattern for officers. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] rather unusual in construction, this small silver-on-copper rectangular plate was struck in thin metal. two broad tongues, for attachment to a belt, are inserted in the rear; and the reverse is filled with lead to imbed the fasteners. the eagle design is very similar to the one prescribed for the caps of the regular establishment in , although somewhat reduced in size. the general lack of finish and polish in construction indicates that the specimen was probably the product of an inexperienced and small-scale manufacturer. officer's waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this unusually large plate, which is struck in medium brass and with the edges crimped over a heavier piece of brass backing, is believed to be an officer's plate because of its size, gilt finish, and over-all ornate design. within a floral and star pattern border, the specimen is dominated by an eagle, on a sunburst background, that holds in its left talon five arrows with points inward; above are stars and an edge of clouds above. arrows held with points inward are usually considered indicative of the general period - . if the number of stars is of any significance, such dating would be correct, as the canton of the national colors contained stars from to . the central design used without the border is also known in smaller, more standard sized plates. the design is a stock pattern. this type plate is also known in both brass and silver. shoulder-belt plate, washington grays, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this may well be a companion piece to the diamond-shaped cap plate ascribed to the washington greys[ ] of philadelphia (see fig. ). in any case, the two appear to have been struck from the same die. it may also have been worn by the washington greys of reading, pennsylvania, or by another company of the same designation. the specimen is struck in thin brass with a tin backing applied before the strike and the edges crimped over the reverse. three soldered copper-wire staples provide means of attachment. [footnote : the spelling of "grays" may or may not be significant. a huddy and duval print of the washington greys in _u.s. military magazine_ (april , pl. ) used "greys" in the title and "grays" on an ammunition box in the same print.] ¶ militia organizations generally modeled their uniforms rather closely on those of the regular establishment; of course, there were certain exceptions, notably the flamboyant zouave units. however, the militia often added additional trimmings that gave the "gay and gaudy" touch for which they were noted. following the example of the regulars, the militia adopted coat-skirt ornaments almost immediately after their appearance in . they used the regulation flaming grenades, open and looped horns, and -and -pointed stars, but in both gold and silver on varicolored backgrounds and in a wide variety of sizes. they also used a number of peculiarly militia forms, such as crossed-cannon, elements of state seals, and devices peculiar to specific units. coat-skirt ornament, artillery, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] typical of militia coat-skirt ornaments is this pair of crossed cannon devices for militia artillery. they are of gold embroidery on a background of black velvet. similar pairs in the national collections are embroidered in silver. the regular artillery never wore the crossed cannon device on the skirt of the coat; so used, it was exclusively a militia ornament. coat-skirt ornament, south carolina, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] another coat-skirt ornament with an even more distinctly militia touch is this small palmetto tree of gold embroidery, with sequins, on black wool cloth. as the palmetto tree is the basic device of the south carolina seal (see pp. and ), this specimen must be attributed to the militia of that state. ¶ most militia cartridge-box plates made in the decade after were oval, following the pattern of the regulars. while a few of these varied from the prescribed sizes, most were almost identical in both size and shape to those of the regular establishment, but with strictly militia ornamentation. the exact years in which these plates were produced cannot be determined, but it is reasonably sure that they were supplied to militia for some years prior to the opening of the civil war. not included here are similar types known to have been made for units born of the war as the pennsylvania fire zouaves, pennsylvania home guard, pennsylvania reserve brigade, and the ohio volunteer militia. cartridge-box and waist-belt plates often are identical except for the methods of attachment. the plates for cartridge boxes have two wire loops imbedded in the backing (see fig. ), while those for waist belts have one or two round, or sometimes arrowheaded, prongs on one side of the reverse, and with a narrow tongue on the opposite side bent parallel to the plane of the plate (see fig. ). cartridge-box plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass, oval cartridge-box plate, with its eagle on a panoply of arms and colors, closely matches in size the regular cavalry's plates for carbine cartridge boxes and the infantry's waist belts. although plates of this design were worn as waist-belt plates, the two looped-wire fasteners on the reverse of this specimen clearly indicate its use on a cartridge box. this was undoubtedly a stock pattern. an oil painting of capt. george bumm, pennsylvania state artillery, c. , shows the subject wearing a waist-belt plate of this same design.[ ] [footnote : _old print shop folio_, p. .] cartridge-box plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] slightly smaller than the preceding specimen, this brass plate bears the eagle design popular from to . fitted with looped-wire fasteners, it would have been a stock pattern for cartridge boxes. cartridge-box plate, maine, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] a frequently misidentified plate is this brass-struck, lead-filled oval with the raised letters "vmm" for volunteer maine militia. it is also known in a smaller size. the reverse is fitted with the two looped-wire fasteners normal to such plates. other prewar oval plates bearing raised letters are known for the alabama volunteer corps (avc), north carolina (nc), south carolina (sc), state of new york (sny), and new hampshire state militia (nhsm). many such plates recently have been reproduced for sale, and more probably will be made if a market is created. thus, all plates of this general type should be cautiously considered. waist-belt plate, die sample, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] one of the more unusual forms of the militant eagle used on ornaments is shown on this brass die sample for a waist-belt plate. the eagle, with fierce mien and wings outspread, stands high on a craggy ledge. an example of an untold number of odd and unusual pieces of insignia, this specimen is unidentified as to unit or area of intended use. it may well have been designed for use as a stock pattern. waist-belt plate, riflemen, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] a stock pattern, this plate is struck in brass with the open-horn device of riflemen, which has been previously discussed. wire fasteners are on the reverse. although the outer ring of the plate is missing, it was probably decorated with a wreath, a common form in the 's and 's. waist-belt plate, charlestown artillery, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this -piece, brass-cast plate was worn by members of a charlestown, massachusetts, unit. the date " ," as on nearly all dated pieces of insignia, refers to the date of original organization of the unit. the design of the plate is typical of early- to mid-victorian taste. waist-belt plate, massachusetts, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] bearing elements of the seal of the state of massachusetts, this plate likely was a stock pattern sold to many officers. in construction, it is a composite piece similar to the plate for officers of the corps of topographical engineers (see fig. and p. ) with the device applied to the inner oval. because of its unusually striking appearance, it would have been a most appropriate type for staff and field officers, and possibly general officers. waist-belt plate, new york, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate, struck in poor-quality, medium-weight brass, is of a stock pattern bearing the eagle-on-half-globe device and the motto "excelsior" from the new york state seal superimposed on a panoply of arms and colors. this type of belt plate, with the device on the inner panel and a wreath between the inner and outer borders, is most characteristic of the 's. more than ten different plates are known that vary only as to the design of the inner panel; some contain new york state heraldic devices, and others contain variants of the usual eagle design of the period. waist-belt plate, philadelphia, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the devices on this cast-brass plate comprise the arms of the city of philadelphia, and its form and pattern, especially the floral design of the outer ring, place it in the 's. the piece is bench-made and carries on the reverse many marks of the file used in its final assembly. it must be considered a stock pattern. waist-belt plate, south carolina, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] somewhat larger than many plates of the period, this brass specimen carries the south carolina palmetto device. such plates also were struck in copper and silver plated. it obviously was a stock pattern sold to several different units. the rectangular plate with the vine-patterned border was a stock pattern in itself, with many different devices being added in the center as ordered. this is one of the many pieces of insignia too often called confederate but which ante-date the civil war by almost two decades. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the eagle device on this silver-on-copper specimen closely resembles that on the cap plate of the first troop philadelphia city cavalry (usnm -m) and may possibly be the matching belt-plate worn by that organization. such an eagle, however, would have been a stock pattern of the manufacturer, and sold to many different units. a very unusual aspect of this particular eagle are the three arrows held in the left talon: two of them point inward, the third outward. waist-belt plate, artillery, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] although members of the artillery of the regular establishment wore the crossed-cannon device on their shakos, they never wore it on waist- or shoulder-belt plates. thus, this cast-brass plate must have been a stock pattern sold to many militia units. the outer ring is missing. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this specimen, roughly cast in brass and gilded, is unusual because the militia rarely used the letters "u s" on any of its equipment. the pattern does not conform to anything prescribed for regulars and the quality does not come up to standards required by the regular establishment; hence it must have been worn by militia. it would have been a stock pattern. there is the possibility that it might have been worn by diplomatic personnel, but its poor quality makes this unlikely. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the over-all design of this plate, which is cast roughly in brass and gilded, reflects the growing ornateness of the victorian era. obviously a stock pattern, it would have suited the fancy of several units and cannot be identified further than "for militia." the design of the eagle is unusual in that three arrows are carried in the right talon--although it is possible that this is intended to reflect the belligerency inherent in the period of the war with mexico--and there is a single large star in the canton of the federal shield. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the generalities that apply to all "stock pattern" insignia are equally valid in referring to this brass-struck plate with a -pointed star as its sole ornament. dating its period of design poses no difficulty, for it contains the panel with wreath inside an edging border characteristic of the 's. the star device would have been appropriate for militia units of maine ("north star"), texas ("lone star"), or for dragoon units that took the star as a distinctive insignia. although it may have been worn by texans, it is doubtful that it was made originally for them. the design enjoyed a long life, and plates of this general pattern were struck well into the 's. the major difference between earlier and later specimens is that the early ones were struck on rather heavy sheets of copper-colored brass, with fasteners consisting of a tongue and heavy wire loops brazed to the reverse. the later plates have a bright brassy color, are struck on thin brass, and have the loop and tongue soldered rather than brazed. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the lack of a mane on the beast on this plate marks it as a tiger. the best known and most affluent militia organization with the nickname "tigers" was the boston light infantry, although a number of others also were so-called. the craftsmanship and general elegance of this gold-plated brass specimen suggests that it was worn by an officer, though an occasional volunteer company was so richly endowed that all its members, officers and enlisted men alike, wore expensive devices. the bench-assembled manufacturing technique, gaudy embellishment, and lack of a distinct victorian touch date the piece about . the tiger's head is applied. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the full-flowing mane on the beast on this plate identifies it as a lion. the device would have been appropriate for wear by the albany burgesses corps, which, when founded in , almost immediately adopted the lion's head as its distinctive insignia. the unit continued to wear this plate for about half a century. while that unit's cap plate (fig. ) is much more formal and is without a lion's head, its buttons contain the lion--with head turned to half-right--as a principal ornament. while it is probable that the original die for this cast-brass plate was sunk for the albany organization, the manufacturer would not have hesitated to offer it for sale to any interested militia unit. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the raised letters "w g" on this cast-brass and gilded plate would have been suitable for many militia units of the period. we can only suggest that it may have been worn by members of a "washington greys" or "washington guard" from pennsylvania or new york. a round plate with an outer wreath would have been more appropriate for officers than for enlisted personnel. waist-belt plate, washington greys, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the waist-belt plates shown in the _u.s. military magazine_[ ] for the washington greys of philadelphia and reading, pennsylvania, while indistinct, are definitely not of this pattern. thus, this brass plate with its sunken letters filled with black enamel must have been worn by yet a third unit with such a name. additional specimens in the national collections have the company letters "g" and "k." [footnote : april , pl. ; june , pl. .] waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this oval, convex, brass plate, with two studs and a hook soldered to the reverse for attachment, very probably was originally a shoulder-belt plate. the letters "w l g" incised on the obverse are very patently the added work of an engraver of no great talent. the letters doubtless stand for washington light guard, and, since there were several militia units of that designation, it seems possible that one of the less affluent units bought the plates and had them engraved locally. waist-belt plate, city guards, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] there were city guards in charleston, south carolina, new york city, philadelphia, and possibly in other places. thus it is impossible to determine just which of these units wore this cast-brass plate. the ornamented outer oval is typical of the 's. waist-belt plate, national guard, c. _usnm -m. figure ._ [illustration: figure ] a number of militia units carried the designation "national guard." the unit that used this particular plate was from new jersey, for scratched on the reverse is "sergeant o. clinton, october th, , st reg hudson brigade, njsm"; however, the adjutant general, state of new jersey, was unable to give any information on such an organization. the specimen is cut from rolled brass with sunken letters filled with black enamel. ¶ shoulder-belt plates underwent the same transition as cap plates did beginning about - , with the single die strike plate yielding to the composite plate, and applied devices being attached to oval, rectangular, or rectangular "clipped corner" plates. while some single die plates were made and worn after , no composite types that predate are known. the following group of shoulder-belt plates are typical of those that first appeared about . of these, several continued unchanged through the civil war and into the 's and 's. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this unusually large, oval, brass plate with the letters "c g" in silver applied with wire fasteners is another of that sizable group of lettered insignia that cannot be attributed definitely to a particular organization. the "c g" may stand variously for city guard, cleveland greys, charleston guard, or some other organization. with a stock of oval and rectangular blanks and a set of lettering and number-cutting dies, an almost limitless combination of plates could be turned out by a single manufacturer. shoulder-belt plate, new york, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the basic form of this brass plate--with one of the many variations of the seal of the state of new york[ ] applied with wire fasteners--is a copy, with minor changes, of the bevelled plate prescribed for the regular establishment in . distinctly an officer's plate, it would have been appropriate for artillery or staff. [footnote : zieber, p. .] shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this composite plate, struck in brass, has a bevelled, rectangular base almost identical to the base of the regulation plate (see fig. ). the design consists of a silvered center ornament comprising a trophy of flags, a sword, and a liberty pole surmounted by a wreath of laurel inclosing fasces and a federal shield with stars in its canton. this silver ornament is applied with four simple wire fasteners rather than soldered. since the sun rays in the background radiate outward not from the center but from the edge of a circle about - / inches in diameter, almost any desired center ornament could have been added to the basic strike, or the plate could be struck a second time to add a device integral to it. thus the background portion of the specimen must be considered a stock pattern. a print of the national guards of philadelphia in _u.s. military magazine_ for october shows an officer wearing a similar plate. if the stars are significant, the plate can be dated between and . shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] in this plate, the center ornament used in the preceding specimen has been struck directly in a rectangular, bevelled background. however, the background of this plate has a stippled surface rather than a sunburst. an interesting feature is that there are four slots punched through the plate for the attachment of an additional device over the wreath and shield. this is another of the many examples of how a unit might have an insignia distinctive to itself at little extra cost. this plate is obviously of a stock pattern. the national collections also contain a die sample of this particular plate. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] another example of the rectangular, bevelled-edged, shoulder-belt plate for officers is this brass-cast copy of the regular army pattern with the wire-fastened letters "s v g" substituted for "u. s." the specimen bears a touchmark "w. pinchin philad" on the reverse (see p. ). the unit for which this plate was made is unidentified. shoulder-belt(?) plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the silver letters "s f" applied with wire fasteners to the small brass plate are most appropriate for the state fencibles of philadelphia, and it is believed to have possibly been worn by that unit in the 's. a print in the _u.s. military magazine_[ ] portraying this unit shows an officer wearing a plate of an entirely different design, but since a plate in this simple form would most probably have been worn by enlisted personnel, and the soldier in the print is to be seen only from the rear, such identification as to unit may be correct. [footnote : march , pl. .] shoulder-belt plate, boston light infantry, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this unusually large silver-on-copper plate with its brass letters "b l i", " ", and brass tiger's head is attributed to the boston light infantry. the applied devices are attached with simple wire fasteners. the date is believed to be the year of the original organization of the unit, but the adjutant general of the commonwealth of massachusetts was unable to verify this. shoulder-belt plate, new york light guard, c. _usnm. -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the _new york military magazine_ provides us with a strong clue in identifying this clipped-corner, bevelled-edged brass plate with a silver-on-copper tiger's head applied. in a sketch of the light guard of new york it is related that, following a visit in to the boston light infantry, members of the company "adopted, as part of their uniform, a silver tiger's head, to be placed on the breast plate, as a further memento of the spirited and elegant corps whose guests they had been."[ ] this specimen is in agreement with that description. [footnote : _new york military magazine_ ( ), vol. , p. .] shoulder-belt plate, dragoons, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] an unusual manufacturing technique was used in making this plate. it was struck in very heavy brass about / inch thick and the whole tinned; then, all the tin on the obverse, except that on the crested helmet device, was buffed away, giving the center ornament the appearance of having been silvered. the specimen obviously was made for a particular mounted unit, designation unknown. an interesting detail is the letter "a" on the half-sunburst plate of the dragoon helmet device. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate, which is of brass with a cast, white-metal likeness of washington applied with wire fasteners, may well have belonged to either the washington greys of philadelphia or the unit of the same designation of reading, pennsylvania. prints of these two organizations in _u.s. military magazine_[ ] show profiles on the shoulder-belts plates, although the plate of the reading unit is depicted as being oval. [footnote : april , pl. ; june , pl. .] shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass plate with its wire-applied devices obviously belonged to an irish-group militia unit. the huddy and duval print of the hibernia greens of philadelphia[ ] definitely depicts an irish harp on both the shoulder-belt plate and the cap plate, but the motto "erin go bragh" is not included. the specimen would have been suitable for several militia organizations, such as the irish jasper greens of savannah, georgia, and the montgomery hibernia greens. its devices are wire-applied, and it possibly was a stock pattern. [footnote : _u.s. military magazine_ (january ), pl. .] shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plain brass plate, having wire-applied pewter letters "s l i" is believed to have been worn by the salem light infantry of massachusetts. shoulder-belt plate, new england guards, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] letters signifying the new england guards are embossed on a shield of white metal that is attached to this brass plate, which has scalloped corners. although the officer depicted in the huddy and duval print of the new england guards[ ] wears a waist belt rather than a shoulder belt for his sword, the soldier standing in the background is shown with crossed shoulder belts. thus, this plate may have been an item of equipment for enlisted personnel rather than for officers. [footnote : _u.s. military magazine_ (november ), pl. .] shoulder-belt plate, massachusetts, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] although the white-metal arm and sword on wreath device wired to this large brass plate immediately identifies the origin of the specimen as massachusetts, the considerable heraldic license taken by this insignia-maker is only too evident. when the massachusetts state seal was first adopted in , the blazonry of the crest was given as follows: "on a wreath a dexter arm cloathed and ruffled proper, grasping a broad sword...."[ ] the designer has placed the arm in armor and replaced the "broad sword" with a scimiter-like, edged weapon. the use of the crest of a state seal or coat of arms to indicate the state was common usage, with the eagle-on-half-globe of new york providing an excellent example. this plate would have been appropriate for wear by any massachusetts unit, and is thus considered to have been a stock pattern. [footnote : zieber, pp. - .] shoulder-belt plate, south carolina, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the silver palmetto tree identifies this as a south carolina plate. the letters "l" and "a" are subject to several interpretations, the more probable being "light artillery." the devices are attached with simple wire fasteners, and the basic brass plate can be considered to have been a stock item adaptable to any number of units. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass, lead-backed badge bears no devices that would assist in identifying it as to unit, and its general composition would have made it appealing to more than one militia organization. it is considered a stock pattern. the stars-on-belt motif, forming the border of the oval, is very unusual, as are the arrows in the eagle's left talon and the star beneath its beak. the center eagle device is applied with simple wire fasteners. ¶ following the war with mexico, many state militia, especially those in the south, began using their state coats of arms as the principal devices on their waist-belt plates. the plates for officers followed the earlier pattern for regulars, a round device clasped within an outer ring. plates of enlisted personnel more often were rectangular, but there were many exceptions. the following series includes examples of both types. waist-belt plate, alabama c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the old alabama state seal with a representation of a map of the state hung from a tree trunk, as depicted on the inner ring of this cast-brass waist-belt plate, became obsolete after the civil war when the "reconstruction" government changed the device to that of an eagle resting on a federal shield. some years later, however, the original seal, in somewhat modified form, was readopted. although made in the early 's, plates of this type were worn by personnel of the confederate states army throughout the civil war. many plates of this same basic pattern were made in england and run through the blockade. waist-belt plate, california, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the six-pointed stars in the outer ring of this cast-brass plate bearing the central elements of the california state seal indicate that it was made after statehood was granted in but before when minnesota became the d state. actually, this design for the arms of the state was adopted in anticipation of admission to the union, on october , .[ ] the ornate design of this plate is more characteristic of the 's than later, indicating that it was made very early in the 's. [footnote : zieber, p. .] waist-belt plate, florida, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the palm tree, standing alone, although sometimes mistaken for the palmetto of south carolina, is representative of the state of florida. thus, this plate is ascribed to florida militia, about . the late richard d. steuart, of baltimore, maryland, an outstanding authority on confederate equipment and accoutrements, was firm in asserting that this pattern should be ascribed to florida. waist-belt plate, massachusetts, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] while cast-brass plates of this type were first made in the early 's, their use continued for years or more after that decade. the principal device on this specimen is taken from the arms of the commonwealth of massachusetts. the form of the plate is identical to the pattern of the eagle-wreath plate adopted by the regulars in . waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the star device was used by the militia of both texas and maine, as well as by volunteer units located in other states; thus, this plate cannot be ascribed to any particular geographical area. plates such as this, with the silver wreath of laurel and palm, are patterned directly after the basic plate prescribed for officers of the corps of engineers in . they would have been stock items for general sale. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this cast-brass officer's plate, a pre-civil war product of american manufacture, would have been appropriate for wear by texas militia. obviously a stock pattern, it would also have been sold to militia organizations in other parts of the country. as in the case of most round plates, the outer ring is of a standard design; variation in pattern would occur on the inner ring. waist-belt plate, new york, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass-struck rectangular plate carries the arms of the state of new york[ ] with its familiar eagle-on-half-globe device. the whole is superimposed on a sunburst background. the plate originally was made for militia, but it is conceivable that such a plate may have been worn by early uniformed police. [footnote : for the variations in the arms of new york see zieber, pp. - .] waist-belt plate, new york, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass-cast plate with its letters "s n y" for state of new york is copied directly from the plate for noncommissioned officers of the regular establishment. the example is the oldest known use of the letters "s n y" for new york militia. in later patterns, the letters "s n y" and "n y" were placed on rectangular plates and on oval plates worn on the waist belt and on cartridge boxes just prior to and during the civil war. small square plates with silver, old english letters "ny" are included in the catalog of the warnock uniform co. of new york as regulation pattern that year for national guard officers. waist-belt plate, new york city, c. _usnm. -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this cast-brass plate bears the arms of the city of new york superimposed on an almost full sunburst. the surrounding wreath of laurel is taken directly from the plate authorized for general and staff officers of the regular establishment in . while this is thought to be the plate for the new york city guards, for whom a matching shoulder-belt plate is known, there is the possibility that it was also worn by uniformed police of the 's. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] a stock pattern, this cast-brass and gilded plate would have been appropriate for any of the several organizations called "national guards" or "national greys" that existed in a number of states. the letters "n g" do not connote the national guard as we know it today. waist-belt plate, ohio, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the center piece applied to this cast-brass plate with wire fasteners bears an early form of the arms of the state of ohio.[ ] the plate proper has holes in it other than those needed to apply the present device, which indicates that it was a stock part, or possibly that the present center device is not original to the plate. [footnote : for an interesting discussion of the evolution of the arms of ohio see preble, pp. - .] waist-belt plate, ohio, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate bears another variation of the ohio state arms. here, the arms lie within a wreath as prescribed for regular general and staff officers in . the entire specimen is cast in brass; the wreath, sun, arrows, canal wall, and hull of keelboat are silvered. waist-belt plate, pennsylvania, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] officers of the pennsylvania volunteer militia wore plates of this type in the 's, although most were discarded in when pennsylvania troops went into active federal service. the outer ring, with floral wreath design, has been modified to give the appearance of a solid rectangle. another plate in the national collections bears the letters "p v m" with the conventional outer ring. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] just prior to there were two militia units in philadelphia using the letters "p g" to indicate organizational designation--the philadelphia guards and the philadelphia city greys. this brass-cast plate is believed to have been worn by the philadelphia guards, whose buttons were marked "p g." the buttons worn by the philadelphia city greys carried the three letters "p c g."[ ] [footnote : johnson, vol. , p. , vol. , pl. .] waist-belt plate, providence marine corps artillery c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the letters and device on this rather unusual brass plate make its identification easy. the letters stand for the providence [r.i.] marine corps artillery; the date is the unit's original organization date. the crossed cannon indicate militia artillery. the letters and numerals are of white metal and brazed to the plate. the brass crossed cannon are affixed with wire fasteners. the reverse is fitted with a broad tongue and two wire hooks for attachment. waist-belt plate, south carolina, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] although this specimen is not so old as the similar south carolina plate described previously (fig. ), it is believed to date about . the plate proper is of rolled brass, and the applied device, which comprises well-known elements of the arms of south carolina, is struck in brass and attached by means of two wire staples and leather thongs. waist-belt plate, virginia, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate, carrying the virginia seal, was made about for wear by officers. similar plates made by british manufacturers during the civil war to be run through the blockade are generally distinguishable by their unusually sharp, clean die work. the center device of this specimen is struck in brass and brazed in place; the remainder of the plate is brass-cast. waist-belt plate, gray guards, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the unit for which this plate was made cannot be precisely identified. it is reasonable to assume that there were several militia organizations called "gray guards." the central "g" probably indicates "company g." the whole is cast brass. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plain brass plate of unusually fine manufacture is very definitely a stock pattern which could have been sold without ornament or, as was more likely, with a center device added by soldering or brazing. the plate was cast in three pieces, with the round center brazed to the belt attachment. it was bench-fitted, as indicated by the numbers on the reverse of the inner and outer rings. waste-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is a typical stock pattern with the company designation "e." other specimens in the national collections have the letters "d," "f," "k," and "r." although rather crudely cast in brass, this piece has been bench-fitted and then gilded. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is another stock pattern with company designation. in this case, the numeral " " has been applied with wire fasteners rather than cast integrally with the two portions of the plate. the national collections also contain similar plates with the numerals " ," " ," and " ." waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is another typical stock pattern with the eagle-on-shield device surrounded by -pointed stars as the center ornament. it is cast in brass in two pieces. an example of this plate, on a belt, formed part of a cased sharps rifle outfit displayed at the national rifle association meeting in washington, d.c. waist-belt plate, musician, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the musician's lyre has never been strictly a military ornament, being widely worn by civilian bands; thus, this plate cannot precisely be identified as military or nonmilitary. unlike most plates of this type and period, the entire piece is struck in brass rather than cast. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the letters "t c b" on this brass-cast plate open wide the doors of conjecture as to interpretation. possible combinations range from trenton city blues (if such a militia organization ever existed) to troy cornet band, a nonmilitary unit. plates such as this can seldom be positively identified. waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] as in the case of the preceding plate, the letters "h r" on this specimen cannot be specifically identified. similar unidentified plates in the national collections have the letters "s o i" and "p b." waist-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this plate is known both in heavy metal stamping and in thin, cheap brass. examples of the latter type appear to have been struck in the period of the 's from a die then years old. a plate similar to this one has been excavated from a civil war battlefield site. a stock pattern, the design was obsolete for issue to militia before the civil war, but it is known to have been continued almost to the end of the century for use by groups such as secondary school cadet corps. ¶ the shoulder-belt plates worn in the 's were little changed from those of the preceding decade. in the regular establishment the shoulder belt and plate for officers had been discarded in favor of the waist belt for carrying the sword, but militia officers--bound by no regulations--continued to wear the shoulder belt. enlisted personnel wore at least one shoulder belt, and in many cases used two belts, which crossed, one belt carrying the cartridge box and the other the bayonet and scabbard. mounted militia sometimes wore the saber on a waist belt and the carbine cartridge box on a shoulder belt. it is interesting to note that the custom of using elements of state seals on waist-belt plates was not followed to any great extent in the embellishment of shoulder-belt plates except in the southern states. cartridge-box-belt plate, south carolina, c. (?) _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] in size and pattern this plate is exactly like that prescribed for the regular establishment in , substituting the arms of south carolina for the eagle. it possibly may date as early as . made for south carolina militia, plates similar to this were worn during the civil war and several have been recovered from battlefield sites. the specimen is struck in brass and the reverse filled with lead. it has three bent-wire fasteners imbedded in the reverse, which indicates that it was decorative rather than functional. a similar plate with elements of the virginia state seal is known. modern reproductions of both are being sold. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] a popular stock pattern of the 's, this design with the silver numeral " " on a rectangle of rolled brass was worn for at least half a century after it first appeared. similar plates are known with all numerals through and a few higher numbers. other plates of the same general type are known with company letters "a" through "m." the plate proper is fitted with two brass wire hooks and a medium width tongue, indicating a functional use. the numeral is attached by means of two staples with leather thongs reeved through on the reverse of the plate. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this rolled-brass plate with its silver "tc" monogram is presently unidentified. in the national collections there is a militia helmet with the same device used as part of the cap plate; also known is another insignia, comprising the monogram alone, that was used as a cartridge-box device. _new york military magazine_ for july , , refers to the elegant armory of the troy [n.y.] corps where the light guard of new york had been visitors. this plate may have been an insignia of that organization. the monogram is affixed with staples and leather thongs, and the plate proper carries a large safety pin soldered to the reverse for purely decorative attachment. it is unknown whether the safety pin fasteners are contemporary with the plates to which they are attached. rudimentary safety pins were known in egypt before christ, but they apparently did not appear in america until the 's and 's. walter hunt patented the first american safety pin in .[ ] [footnote : u.s. patent (april , ).] shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] several militia organizations of the 's and 's were called "republican guards," and this silver "rg" monogram on a rolled-brass rectangle would have been appropriate on shoulder belts of so-named units. the monogram is affixed with wire fasteners, but the means of attachment for the plate proper are missing. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the silver letters "gg" on this rolled-brass plate present several possibilities for identification. among the uniformed militia units of the 's and 's were garibaldi guards, german guards, and gray guards. this piece could have been the device of any of the three. the letters are affixed with wire fasteners, and a safety pin is soldered to the rear of the plate proper for decorative attachment. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this oval brass plate with the wire-affixed silver-on-copper letters "ag" is unidentified, but it might well have been worn by the american guards, or by a uniformed company from some city as atlanta or albany, with the letter "g" representing "grays," "guards," "grenadiers," or the like. it was attached to the belt with three simple wire fasteners. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the white-metal device on this brass plate comprises elements of the arms of "new amsterdam" topped by the crest of the arms of new york state with supporting figures representing the original indian owner of manhattan island and the mariner who became the first white settler. the specimen is believed to have been worn by the new york city guard. the device is affixed with three staples originally intended to be reeved through with leather thongs, although now bent over. the means of attachment of the plate proper are missing. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the letters "k l g" forming the white-metal monogram on this brass plate indicate that it could well have been worn by the kentish light guard of rhode island. the monogram is attached by means of two staples with thongs reeved through, and the plate proper is fitted with four similar staples. the reverse bears the hallmark of william h. horstmann and sons, well-known military outfitters of philadelphia. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the white-metal letters "sg" on this brass plate lend themselves to so many interpretations that no identification is attempted. the applied device has two staples for attachment, and the plate proper is fitted with a safety pin on the reverse. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] many volunteer companies used the designation "rifle guards," and this plate with the initials "c r g" probably falls into such a category. the "c," of course, cannot be identified. the monogram is of pewter and has three round lugs fitted through holes in the plate proper for attachment with pins. the plate itself has a safety pin soldered to the reverse for attachment. shoulder-belt plate, scott legion(?), c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] although this plate bearing the profile of gen. winfield scott is very similar in design and construction to several bearing the head of washington and dated much earlier, it is believed to postdate the war with mexico when scott's popularity was at its zenith. there were several volunteer units called "scott legion" during this period. the piece was struck, with a tin backing applied, and the edges of the obverse were then crimped over. it is fitted with three wire staples for attachment. shoulder-belt plate, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this is a stock pattern in cast brass. it is oval with raised edges and has a white-metal "f" applied with simple wire fasteners. although the piece has the appearance of a waist-belt plate or cartridge-box plate, the wire fasteners on the reverse indicate that it was intended for shoulder-belt wear. in the national collections is a similar plate with the letter "i," indicating that the letters designate companies of larger units rather than a unit itself. shoulder-belt plate, artillery, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this rolled-brass plate with a wire-applied silvered "a" and pile of cannon balls topped by the hand die-struck motto "always ready" is unidentified beyond the fact that it was worn by a member of company a of a militia unit using a popular motto. similar specimens in the national collections have center letters "b," "d," and "e." the plate was attached to the shoulder belt by means of two flat brass fasteners soldered to the reverse. the fasteners are almost as wide as the plate itself. baldric device, c. _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the baldric is a highly ornamented wide sash normally worn by drum majors and sometimes by band leaders. during at least part of the civil war, baldrics were worn by some aides-de-camp, and the uniform regulations specified them for signal corps officers. this specimen and the one that follows are the earlier of several examples in the national collections; they fall in the early 's. the shield, suspended from a lion's mouth by small chains, carries an eagle with a shield on its breast. the stars and edge of clouds, above, are somewhat similar to those on the regulation waist-belt plate. the whole is superimposed on a three-quarter sunburst. both the lion's head and the shield are fitted with simple wire fasteners for attachment. baldric device and baldric, c. _usnm -m. figure ._ [illustration: figure ] the device is attached to a red, gold-edged-embroidered baldric worn by the drum major of the d new york militia during the civil war but believed to ante-date . the brass shield, with ebony drum sticks, is suspended from an eagle of the regular army pattern for wear as a cap device. the shield, convex with beveled edges, is very similar to waist-belt and shoulder-belt plates of about . ¶ few militia gorgets are known, and this scarcity leads us to believe that few were made and worn, despite the militia's love for the "gay and gaudy." still, some units did adopt them, and officers of the portland [maine] rifle corps were still wearing them in the late 's.[ ] as a military symbol for officers, the gorget passed its zenith in the late th century. gorgets were worn during the war of the revolution by both american and british officers, and the british also gave them to indian chiefs as marks of authority. officers in at least one regiment of the regular establishment wore them as part of their regulation dress about the turn of the th century, but they were not a part of the prescribed uniform during or after the war of . [footnote : in the national collections are a uniform jacket, chapeau, and gorget once owned by frederick forsyth, a member of the portland rifle corps in .] gorget, c. (?) _usnm -m (s-k b). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this gorget, of gilded brass, is of -piece construction. the eagle-on-clouds, very similar to cockade eagles worn in - , is attached by four wire fasteners rather than brazed. the engraved edging on the gorget proper is rather crudely done. although composite insignia did not come into general use until the mid- 's, it seems reasonable to assume that this particular design of the eagle device applied to the chapeau might equally have been applied to a gorget. a similar specimen in the national collections has a silver-on-copper eagle instead of a brass one. gorget, c. - _usnm -m (s-k a). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this gorget is of -piece construction, the specimen proper being of brass and the wreath and eagle of gilded brass applied with wire fasteners. although the eagle is of the early "on-clouds" design, the feel of the piece is later, and this, together with the rather wide crescent indicate that it belongs to the period of the 's and 's. gorget, state fencibles, new york, c. - _usnm -m (s-k ). figure ._ [illustration: figure ] this brass gorget, with wreath and letters in applied silver, is an example of one of the later types worn by militia. the letters "s f" are interpreted as "state fencibles," and the "excelsior" buttons on the ends of the crescent identify the origin of the unit as new york state. fencibles were basically troop units organized for home defense only. there was a volunteer militia company called the "state fencibles" in new york city as early as . it apparently lost its identity as such in or when the organization split, half entering the th regiment and half entering the th regiment of new york state militia.[ ] [footnote : personal communication from frederick p. todd, july , . mr. todd is the foremost authority on new york militia units.] u.s. government printing office: crown vo, cloth extra price s. d. the queen's service being the experiences of a private soldier in the british infantry at home and abroad by horace wyndham late of the --th regt. london: william heinemann bedford street, w.c. [illustration: dragoon in full dress uniform of ] trooper a private soldier of the third republic by lionel decle author of "three years in savage africa" _with eight illustrations by h. chartier_ [illustration] london william heinemann first edition _august , _ reprinted _august , _ _this edition enjoys copyright in all countries signatory to the berne treaty, and is not to be imported into the united states of america._ _all rights including translation reserved._ _note_ _it is right to state that the following pages have not had the advantage of final revision by the author, as mr. decle was called upon to take charge of an important mission to africa on behalf of the "daily telegraph," and was therefore unable to complete the preparation of his ms. for the press._ preface the bitter and protracted discussions which have arisen out of the dreyfus case, and which have divided france into two hostile camps, have concentrated the attention of the civilised world on the french army, but nobody has done more to disgrace it, and to lower it in the eyes of friends and foes alike, than frenchmen themselves. those who, persuaded of dreyfus' innocence, made superhuman efforts to further the noble cause of justice and to obtain the redress of one of the greatest wrongs ever committed against a human being, spoiled their noble task by indiscriminate and wholesale abuse of the army in general, holding the thousands of french officers responsible for the conduct of a few of their number. those, on the other hand, who believed in the guilt of dreyfus, based their conviction upon their blind belief in the infallibility of half a dozen officers who had passed judgment upon the condemned man. trusting to unworthy subordinates, the highest officers of the general staff made of dreyfus' guilt a matter on which they staked their own honour and reputation, and when they discovered that they had been deceived, they found themselves in the position of having either to acknowledge that they had been befooled, or else of having to stand by those who had led them into their awkward predicament. they chose the latter alternative, and their friends and supporters played into the hands of those who so fiercely attacked the army, by refusing to admit that there could be a single black sheep in it, and by thus linking together the whole body of french officers and making their collective honour dependent on the honour of every individual member. a time came, however, when even the most determined partisans of this system had to turn against those they had extolled but the day before. first came esterhazy, the liar, the swindler, and the traitor; then henry the forger, and de paty du clam, his accomplice. it is a remarkable fact that amidst all these scenes of violent abuse there should be but one man who maintained implicit trust in the good faith of his worst enemies--dreyfus himself--the victim of this most abominable conspiracy. his case is, unfortunately, but a greatly magnified example of what daily happens throughout the french army, and the recollections i am now offering to the reader, of the time i served in its ranks, will show that dreyfus has been a victim not so much of the malice of individuals as of a faulty system. it will be seen how, in a regiment, the colonel forms his opinion of a private from the character given to him by his corporal or sergeant, and how the mere fact of appealing against a punishment is considered as an act of insubordination. it is always the same principle--_le respect de la chose jugée_ (the upholding of a judgment, without considering upon what grounds or evidence it has been delivered). i wish it to be clearly understood that this little book has not been written for the purpose of attacking the french army as represented by its officers. it is intended merely as a faithful account of the hardships i endured when i served my time in the ranks--hardships which every frenchman has still to bear. i cannot follow m. urbain gohier in his virulent and indiscriminate attacks upon all french officers--among whom individuals differ as in other classes of men; but each one of my readers will be able to draw his own conclusions with regard to the system which, in practice, is universally in force. illustrations _dragoon in full dress uniform of _ _frontispiece_ _dragoon sitting on his bed eating from mess-tin_ _to face page_ _the plank bed_ " _a fatigue party of dragoons_ " _exercises in riding school_ (_vaulting_) " _a duel in the riding school_ " introduction i every frenchman is liable to military service during twenty-five years of his life--viz., from the age of twenty until he is forty-five.[ ] in time of peace this period of service is thus divided: (i) three years of active service. (ii) ten years in the reserve of the standing army, during which two periods of a month each with the colours must be undergone. (iii) six years in the territorial army, with two periods of thirteen days each with the colours, and (iv) six years in the reserve of the territorial army. the conscription lists are thus made out: every year the mayor of each "commune" draws up a list of all the young men who have arrived at the age of twenty during the past twelve months. these lists must be posted up by january at the latest. the names of the sons of foreigners, if born in france, are included, and unless they claim foreign nationality they are liable to serve, and on failing to do so when called upon are regarded as deserters and punished accordingly. domicile is established by the parents' residence. every year the war minister fixes the number of conscripts required to serve three years with the colours; those in excess of that number are called upon to serve for one year only; but during the following two years they are liable to be called upon to complete their time of active service. in order to determine those who are to benefit by this arrangement _tirage au sort_ (drawing lots) is resorted to. in time of peace, conscripts falling under any of the following categories, among others, are also called upon to serve for one year only: (_a_) the eldest of orphans, or the eldest son of a widow, or of a family whose father is blind, or has reached his seventieth year. (_b_) the only son in a family of seven children or more--or the eldest son of a family of at least seven. (_c_) the elder of twins. (_d_) brothers of men engaged in active service. (_e_) brothers of a man who has been killed, or who has died in active service, or who has been invalided on account of disease contracted, or wounds received, while serving. (_f_) young men who have signed an engagement to serve during ten years as teachers in the national schools. (_g_) students in law, science, or medicine who have already obtained their admission to the government universities or other institutions mentioned in the act. (_h_) students of the religious institutions who are studying to become ministers of one of the religions recognised by the state. provided that, in classes (_f_), (_g_), (_h_), such young men have obtained their final degree before their twenty-sixth year, or that religious students have been ordained before the end of their twenty-sixth year, failing which, they are called upon to complete three years' active service. whoever has been convicted of theft, obtaining money by false pretences, rape, and other crimes against morals, and has been sentenced to more than three months' imprisonment for such crimes, or has been sentenced twice for similar offences, is sent to special battalions in algeria. if, at the time a conscript is called upon to serve, he is undergoing imprisonment, he begins his service at the expiration of his sentence. instead of joining their regiment like other conscripts, these men have to report themselves on a certain date at the headquarters of the military district to which they belong, and they are thence taken by gendarmes to the dépôt of their battalion. they are subjected to an iron discipline, being commanded by officers and non-commissioned officers picked out from other regiments where they have distinguished themselves for their harshness. many are the tales of dreadful revenge taken by these conscripts on their officers. it is no uncommon thing for a few of them to play away the life of an officer at cards, the loser being obliged to kill him within a certain time. to quote but a single instance: a few years ago one of these battalions was being marched from biskra to tuggurt in southern algeria. before leaving, four of the men had played away the life of their major at cards. the loser, who was to carry out the deed, pretended to be ill, and kept to the rear of the column. on the second day he kept still farther back, and sat down pretending to be exhausted. the major, who had fallen far behind, seeing the man, spoke to him kindly, telling him to make an effort. "oh, sir," said the soldier, "i can't; i am done for." the major kindly handed the man his flask to take a pull from, and as he was replacing it in his holster, the man fired his rifle point blank at his officer. fortunately the horse swerved, and the bullet missed. thereupon the major drew his revolver, and blew the ruffian's brains out. a few months later a stone was found on the spot bearing this inscription: here on the th of december -- private ---- was murdered by major x. the man who placed the stone there was never discovered, and, although it was removed by order of the military authorities, another one bearing a similar inscription soon afterwards stood in its place. six times these stones were removed, and six times they were replaced, yet the guilty parties were never detected. it is hardly to be wondered at if the officers of these battalions usually carry loaded revolvers. to return to our description of the mode of recruiting. the lists having been duly posted up, a day is appointed for drawing the lots. this public ceremony is presided over by the "sous-préfet" of the "arrondissement." having counted the number of names on the list, the sous-préfet places a corresponding number of tickets, each bearing a number, in an urn: he then calls out the names of the young men, and each in turn draws a ticket; in case of absence of one of them his lot is drawn by the mayor. as already explained only a certain number of men being required to serve three years, those who draw the highest numbers stand a chance of serving for but twelve months, besides those who have a right to claim the privilege, although the latter are also bound to draw lots. all the young men whose names appear in the lists have next to appear before a _conseil de revision_ (revising commission). this commission consists of: the prefect of the department, who is ex-officio president. a conseiller de préfecture. a member of the conseil général. a member of the conseil d'arrondissement. a general or field officer appointed by the military authority. an intendant militaire (commissariat officer). the chief recruiting officer of the district. a military surgeon, or a doctor, is appointed by the military authorities to make a medical examination of all the conscripts, and upon his report the commission decides by vote whether each individual conscript shall serve or not. it should be added that the minimum height is feet ½ inch. the commission also decides upon claims of exemption made by sons of foreigners, and upon the claims of those entitled to a service of one year only.[ ] each conscript subsequently receives his _feuille de route_, stating the regiment he must join, and the date on which he must join it, and making an allowance for his journey to the town where he is to be quartered.[ ] from the moment conscripts receive their _feuilles de route_ they are under military law, and can only be tried by court-martial for any crimes or offences they may commit. men while serving for a month in the reserve, or for a fortnight in the territorial army, are also exclusively under martial law for the time being. even in the case of a soldier who has finished his service the fact of his assaulting one of his former superiors (from a corporal upwards) renders him liable to be tried by court-martial "should such assault be considered the result of revenge for a punishment received during his service."--(art. and of the code of military justice.) so that a man who has been abominably treated during his time of service and who gives a good hiding to one of his former officers ten or twenty years later, is liable to be tried by the military authorities. i may add here that the act of striking a _supérieur_, meaning any man superior in rank to one's self, from a corporal upwards, is punished with death, _even in time of peace_. two instances occurred while i served. in the first instance a private had struck a corporal who had bullied him in a most shameful way; in the second instance a corporal had struck an officer who had called his mother by a vile name. both men were found guilty and publicly shot in the presence of their regiment on special parade. it very seldom occurs that a man who has struck even a corporal is reprieved. in each subdivision of every military district is kept a register in which are inscribed the names of all the men in that subdivision who are serving, or have served. in this register is stated the date at which each man has been incorporated, as well as the date of his leaving the service, the date of his passing into the reserve, then into the territorial army and into the reserve of the territorial army, until he has satisfied all his military obligations. every change of address is also noted. every soldier receives on joining his regiment a _livret matricule_, a book in which are stated his age, his name, the address of his parents, his full description, the list of all the punishments he has received, and many other particulars. it is of the utmost importance for every frenchman to keep this book carefully, as it has to be produced whenever required by the military, civil, or judicial authorities, and its loss entails several days' imprisonment. whenever a frenchman--until he has reached the age of forty-five and has thus satisfied all his military obligations--wishes to absent himself from his domicile, he is bound to present his _livret_ at the nearest _gendarmerie_ and to declare where he is going: this is written down in his _livret_, and on arrival at his new residence he must have this book "_visé_" anew. if he goes abroad he must present it to the french consul, and whenever he changes his residence for more than three months, he must repeat the operation exactly after the fashion of a ticket-of-leave man in england. to omit to do so renders the offender liable to imprisonment. it is therefore easy to realise the tremendous power of the military authorities in france. ii the military law i have just explained is that which has been in force since only. it differs from the previous law chiefly in regard to the length of service. in my time ( ) the period of service in the active army was five years instead of three. young men, however, who had obtained the degrees of b.a. or b.s., provided they paid £ to government, and provided also they contracted a voluntary engagement within the year preceding that in which they became liable to conscription, were allowed to serve only one year instead of five. during the next four years they still belonged, however, to the active army, and were liable to be called at any time by decree of the war minister. these young men were officially called _engagés conditionnels_, but commonly termed _volontaires d'un an_, or by abbreviation _volontaires_. it was as such that i served. i have roughed it a good deal since those days, but i have no hesitation in saying that the time of my active service with the colours was the bitterest experience i ever underwent. in the case of a nation which possesses no public schools like the great institutions of england, i believe that compulsory military service might be made an excellent moral and physical training for young men in every rank of life. but the french system is vicious. a system in which gentlemen of refinement and the vilest dregs of the city slums are subjected to identical treatment, and ruled by identical measures of discipline, is an impossible one. take punishments, for instance. "equality of punishment" may sound well in theory, but in practice it becomes the rankest inequality. a gentleman accustomed to comfort, or perhaps luxury, is for the slightest fault sent to the _salle de police_ to endure the degrading horrors presently to be described--his companions are perhaps roughs who have never slept in a bed since they were children, to whom dirt is a mere necessary condition, and vermin are "familiar beasts." where is the equality of punishment in such a case? it must not be thought either that some compensation lies in the comparative infrequency of the punishments meted out to gentlemen. the contrary is the truth. for an equal fault the rough usually gets a shorter punishment than the man of higher class. the german system is very different. in germany they also have the reduced service of one year for young men who have fulfilled certain conditions of superior education. but these _ein jahr preiviller_, as they are called, form a class absolutely distinct from the other privates, and are distinguished by a uniform of better cloth. during the first month of their service they live in barracks, where they learn the routine of a common soldier's duties, but afterwards they are allowed lodgings in the town where their regiment is quartered, and they are altogether treated differently from the rest. then, again, in the german army non-commissioned officers cannot punish a private, the captain alone having the right of punishment, while in the french army a corporal could give us two days' _salle de police_; a sergeant, four; a sergeant-major, a sub-lieutenant, or a lieutenant, eight; and a captain could send us to prison. each of those punishments was usually increased by the major, and also by the colonel, and it will scarcely be credited that _no man could appeal against a punishment until he had undergone the whole of it_. things have altered a little since general boulanger was minister of war, but very slightly. there is still no higher appeal than to the colonel, and such a thing as a private or even an officer having the right to ask for a court-martial in case he considers himself unjustly punished does not exist. but more of this in the sequel. iii in order to enable readers to understand clearly the account of my adventures, i think it will be necessary to describe somewhat fully the routine of a french cavalry regiment, as well as the rights and duties of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates. any one desiring further particulars can obtain them from a little book called "règlement du service intérieur des troupes de cavalerie." (paris: librairie militaire de l. baudoin, rue dauphine.) the following are the titles of the officers and non-commissioned officers of a french cavalry regiment, with the duties and responsibilities which theoretically devolve upon them. how far those duties are carried out will appear in the course of my narrative. colonel. (_five gold stripes._) the authority of the colonel extends over every part of the service. he is responsible for the discipline, military education, instruction, police, hygiene, and appearance of the regiment he commands. he directs its administration with the help of a "conseil d'administration." he appoints all non-commissioned officers and corporals. lieutenant-colonel. (_three gold and two silver stripes._) "the lieutenant-colonel is the intermediary of the colonel in every branch of the service. he acts on behalf of the colonel in the absence of the latter.... when thus acting he states that the orders are the colonel's, so that the authority of the latter should be sustained.... "among the books he has to keep are those containing the individual notes on each officer, in which are entered twice yearly the punishments inflicted on each officer, and information as to their military as well as private conduct, their instruction, and military aptitude. these notes are countersigned by the colonel, who adds whatever remarks he thinks fit...." chefs d'escadrons (majors). (_four gold stripes._) there are two of these in each regiment, each commanding two squadrons. "the 'chefs d'escadrons' see that the captains commanding their squadrons carry out their duties, as well as the colonel's orders, with zeal and intelligence.... "one of them presides over the _commission des ordinaires_ (food supply). the other presides over the _commission d'abatage_ (killing of horses)...." each of them has also to look carefully into the service of the kitchens of their squadrons, and they must frequently visit the canteens. they take in turns the weekly duty and are in charge of the general police of barracks. under their orders they have for this service a captain and an _adjudant_. major. (_two gold and two silver stripes._) the duties of this officer are chiefly connected with the general administration of the regiment--accounts, purchases, pay, equipment, barrack furniture, &c. he is in command of the th squadron,[ ] which forms the dépôt in case of war. capitaine instructeur. the capitaine instructeur is chiefly concerned with the instruction of the non-commissioned officers. he also gives the lieutenants and sub-lieutenants lectures on shooting, artillery, topography, hippology, &c., and has to teach the _adjudants_ (to be described later) their duties. capitaine trÉsorier (paymaster). he receives all moneys for the use of the regiment; he makes all payments authorised by the council of administration, of which he is a member. he keeps the "archives" of the regiment. every five days he hands over the pay to the captain commanding each squadron or to his sergeant-major, and issues the demand for forage supplied through the "intendant" (an official apart from the regiment). under him he has a deputy, a lieutenant, or sub-lieutenant. capitaine d'habillement. this captain is in charge of the armoury, clothing, and barrack furniture, keeping all accounts relating to the same. all the regimental workshops are under his orders: the chief armourer, the master saddler, the master tailor, and master bootmaker. under this officer is: the porte Étendard. a lieutenant who helps generally his immediate chief, and carries the colours on parade. doctors. two doctors are attached to each cavalry regiment--a _médecin major_ (captain-surgeon) and _médecin aide major_ (lieutenant-surgeon). their duties are similar to those of regimental doctors in an english regiment. veterinary surgeons. two veterinary surgeons are attached to each regiment, and their duties need not be described here. capitaines (captains). (_three stripes._) there are two captains in each squadron--the captain commanding (_capitaine commandant_) and a second captain (_capitaine en second_). captain commanding.--this officer is in full charge of the squadron (in time of peace a squadron consists of about men and horses); he is the real chief and almost the only one the non-commissioned officers and men of his squadron know, many of them leaving the service without having ever been spoken to by such an exalted and god-like being as a major, much less by their lieutenant-colonel or colonel. the captain in command is himself a very great man indeed, who has very little intercourse with such riff-raff as common privates. no leave nor promotion can be obtained except through him, and punishments are usually increased when they reach his mightiness. when i served my time i think i saw my captain nearly twenty times in as many months, but nevertheless i must show what his duties are--in theory. let us quote once more from the "service intérieur." "the chief duty of the captain commanding is to inspire the soldiers under his command with zeal and love [!] of the service; to develop among them feelings of duty, honour, and devotion to their fatherland. he must endeavour to make their duties easy by advice, the equitable use of his authority, and a constant solicitude for their welfare. he is the necessary intermediary of all their requests.... he must repress the familiarity and harshness of his subordinates towards the privates, who must never be illtreated or insulted." he has also to look after the officers under his direct orders. "he visits his squadron daily, visits the men in hospital, and signs a daily report to the colonel." "he is responsible for the military education of his squadron, for the discipline of the rank and file, the condition of the horses and stables...." he is also responsible for the moneys and supplies handed over to him. the captain receives from the treasurer the money for the use of the squadron on the st, th, th, th, st, and th of each month. this money is divided into two parts: the first being the money to be spent on the men's food, and the second being the men's pocket-money, "which," say the regulations, "must not be less than centimes (½_d._) per day." the money invariably handed over to the men is ½_d._ every five days in the infantry, and _d._ every five days in the cavalry! corporals get about twice as much, while sergeants get about _d._ a day, and sergeant-majors _d._ what would tommy atkins say to that? all the accounts and books are kept by the sergeant-major, the sergeant _fourrier_, and the corporal _fourrier_, non-commissioned officers whose duties will be described more fully later on. all clothes, saddlery, arms, &c., are supplied to the men in the presence of the captain: all repairs are done on his written requisition. when the men's food is supplied through the _commission des ordinaires_ the captain finds every day the amount of supplies required. when, however, he receives money for the purchase of provisions he must see that supplies are bought at the cheapest rate. the daily rations for each private are as follows: ten ounces of meat (bone included). one pound of bread for soup, which is reduced to ½ ounces if stew is served instead of soup. in the same way the ration of meat is reduced if fish, lard, or preserves are given to the men. the captain in command assigns a horse to each trooper, and has to see that the horses are kept in good condition. he reports on all matters to his major. second captain.--the duties of this officer are two-fold: first, in the squadron, and secondly, as captain on regimental duty for the week--"captain of the week." in the squadron he is under the orders of the captain commanding, but he is specially in charge of all matters connected with the food supply. in case of the absence of the captain commanding he takes the command of the squadron. the five second captains take "the week" by turn. the "captain of the week" is under the immediate orders of the "major of the week." he has to see to the roll-calls, the assemblies, and the changing of guards. he is in charge of the cells, and is responsible for the cleanliness of the barracks, and their police and security. the evening roll-call takes place in the rooms, and is made by each sergeant-major, who hands over his report to the _adjudant_, who makes out a general bulletin and hands it over to the "captain of the week." this captain may order extra roll-calls in the middle of the night should he think fit to do so. lieutenants and sub-lieutenants. there are four of these in each squadron, and they take in turn the "weekly service" (_service de semaine_). as such they must be, or ought to be, present at "stables," drill, &c. let us quote again from the "service intérieur": "they must maintain perfect order in their _peloton_ [company] excite emulation among their men, advise union" [the only union i ever saw was in the hatred all the men felt against them], "develop the love of service, and always show an impartial example of justice." [but wait until i tell my own story.] "the chief of a _peloton_ visits it daily. he inquires into everything relating to it.... "he sees to the cleanliness of his men" [mine must have had peculiar ideas on the subject].... "often and without warning he inspects the clothes of a man whom he suspects of bad conduct. "he passes constant reviews of the men's effects" [doesn't he], "and when a man returns after an absence of fifteen days or more he inspects his kit...." he does many other things--in theory--but chiefly acts on the principle that rules are made to be broken. petit etat major and peloton hors rang. under these titles are known all the skilled assistants (whether non-commissioned officers or troopers) who are employed as clerks in the offices of the treasurer, and other officers employed in the various administrative services of the regiment. the capitaine d'habillement acts as their captain commandant. adjudants. the _adjudants_, although non-commissioned officers, wear the uniform of a sub-lieutenant, the only difference being that their galloons are striped with a small red thread. they receive from the troopers and other non-commissioned officers the same marks of respect as officers. there are three _adjudants_ in each cavalry regiment. the first two are the _adjudants_ proper, while the third (_adjudant vaguemestre_) has different duties. the two _adjudants_ have under their immediate authority all the sergeants and corporals so far as the discipline and the general police of barracks are concerned. they have to keep watch over the private conduct and appearance of the sergeants. they take "the week" in turn under the immediate orders of the "captain of the week." all strangers wishing to enter the barracks are referred to him when he takes "the week." the _adjudant_ receives from the one he has relieved: ( ) the list of all sergeants and corporals, so as to arrange their rotation of duty; ( ) the list of the various sergeants and corporals who take "the week" at the same time as himself; ( ) the register of punishments of non-commissioned officers and troopers, on which he inscribes all punishments of two days or more of _salle de police_, or confinement to the room, or of four days or more c.b.; ( ) the list of men under punishment, which he hands over to the sergeant of the guard. he posts up in the orderly room the list of the officers, sergeants, and corporals "of the week." he is responsible for all trumpet calls. the colonel's orders and decisions are handed over to him for dictation to the various sergeant-majors, by whom they are read aloud to the troopers of each squadron, after afternoon "stables." he conveys the general's orders to the colonel. every morning after _réveille_ each sergeant-major hands over to him a report on the morning roll-call, but this call never actually takes place in the cavalry. at the same time the sergeant of the guard hands over to him the register bearing the names of all troopers who have returned to barracks after the last roll-call ( p.m.),[ ] and he reports on these to the "captain of the week." he sees that the canteens are closed at the proper time, and that lights are extinguished in the rooms at p.m. he has besides the general control of all men undergoing punishment. it will thus be seen what enormous power the _adjudant_ has. with his connivance a trooper may absent himself for three or four days without any one being the wiser. let a sergeant or a sergeant-major dare to report the matter to the captain and he will soon discover what it will cost him. how i made use of the _adjudant_ will be seen when i describe my personal adventures. "stand well with your sergeant-major and one of the _adjudants_ and you are all right," is a well-known saying in the french cavalry. the _adjudant-vaguemestre_ is really the regimental postmaster and postman; he collects letters, cashes money-orders for the troopers, and does all sorts of dirty work others don't care to undertake; he acts as sergeant-major to the _peloton hors rang_, and is usually chosen from among old sergeants who are unfit for anything else. of the skilled artisans, armourers, saddlers, tailors, &c., little or nothing need be said, as they are soldiers but in name. let us now return to the true inner life of a regiment, the squadron and its units. sergeant-major (marÉchal des logis chef). the sergeant-major is the right hand of the captain commanding a squadron. in theory he is, of course, far below a lieutenant or sub-lieutenant; in practice--at least in most squadrons--he is the real head of the squadron in barracks. he is in hourly contact with the sergeants, corporals, and troopers, and it is through the sergeant-major that the captain judges them. most sergeant-majors will send a man to prison in the captain's name, knowing well that the latter will approve of and endorse their decision. "the sergeant-major," says the "service intérieur," "must study the conduct, the character, and the capabilities of the sergeants, corporals, and troopers of his squadron, in order to give information to the officers, and chiefly to the captain commanding the squadron. he gives all orders with regard to duty, dress, and discipline.... he is the captain's agent in all matters of administration and accounts, he is responsible for the proper keeping of all books, registers, &c., and for the proper state of all the _matériel_ belonging to the squadron. "the sergeant _fourrier_ and corporal _fourrier_ do the clerical work under his immediate supervision. he is responsible for the proper keeping of the squadron stores and must supervise the reception, distribution or return of every article, whatever may be its nature...." the sergeant of the week hands over to him the list of all sick men and reports to him on every roll-call. "it is through him that all applications of the sergeants, corporals, or troopers must be addressed; after informing the lieutenant he submits these applications to the captain. troopers cannot, without his leave, change their rotation of duty." sergeant (marÉchal des logis). "the sergeants give the corporals and troopers all orders relating to duty, police, discipline, and military instruction." they take in turn the duty "of the week" in their squadron. sergeants drill the men of their _peloton_, and are responsible to their lieutenant for the horses of their _peloton_. they have to take particular care that the rooms are kept in proper order, that the men have their clothes properly cleaned and arranged above their beds, and no article of their kit is missing; they take care that the arms and saddlery are always kept in perfect order; they are responsible for the cleanliness of their men, seeing that their clothes are duly mended, and that they are frequently shaved and have their hair cropped short. whenever the _peloton_ is ordered to assemble, the sergeant passes through the rooms to see that the troopers are getting ready. if the _peloton_ has to be mounted, the sergeant sees that the horses are properly saddled. he always superintends "stables" and sees that the horses are properly groomed. when the _peloton_ is ordered to assemble singly, he calls the roll and reports to the lieutenant in command; in case, however, the whole squadron is ordered out, he reports to the sergeant-major. "sergeant of the week."--the sergeant of the week is under the direct orders of the officer "of the week" and seconds him in every way. he reports on the morning and evening roll-calls to the sergeant-major, and hands over to him the list of the sick troopers. at the daily parade of the squadron he notes all duties which are ordered and designates the troopers for the fatigues and distributions. after _réveille_ he goes to the stables and superintends their cleaning and airing; he must see that all head-stalls and stable utensils are in proper order; he transmits to the stable guards their orders, and sees that these are punctually executed. in case of the sickness of a horse he sends at once for the vet. the sergeant of the week also keeps the key of the oat-bin and is responsible for the proper distribution of its contents as well as of forage. before the time fixed for the assembly of the guard of the day he sees that the troopers who have been ordered for such duty are properly turned out. he then escorts them to the place which has been fixed for the parade. he takes to the cells the troopers who are to be punished, and those who are sick to the doctor's inspection. he has to see that all corridors, staircases, and rooms of his squadron are kept clean, and swept twice daily. sergent-fourrier the sergeant _fourrier_ is under the direct orders of the sergeant-major, keeping all books and accounts under his supervision; he receives besides, on his behalf, all supplies, and is responsible for them. he escorts every man sent to hospital. caporal-fourrier. this n.c.o. helps generally the sergeant _fourrier_. he enters in a book all the orders issued by the colonel, and takes it to each officer of the squadron; he reads these orders out to the assembled troopers after afternoon "stables." corporals. (in command of an _escouade_ of about ten men.) "a corporal sleeps in the same room with the troopers of his _escouade_; he sees that his troopers wash their heads, faces, hands and feet." he sees that the beds are properly made, and that the troopers ordered for special duty are in readiness. once a week, on the day fixed by the captain, he gets all the kits thoroughly cleaned. "he takes particular care that the troopers change their linen once a week." on pay-day he receives the pay from the sergeant-major and hands it over to the troopers. he superintends the drill of the recruits, teaches them how to do their packing, and how to clean their arms and kit. he also shows them how to groom their horses. he reports to the sergeant the punishments he has given, and reports to him on matters generally. at _réveille_ he compels the troopers to rise, and calls the roll; he sees that all beds are uncovered, and that the great-coats which may have been used at night are properly rolled up. he then sends to the stables a certain number of men to feed the horses and to clean the stalls. "when the other men are dressed he orders the windows to be opened in order to change the air." he takes the names of the sick men, and reports on the events of the night. he designates a trooper in turn to clean and tidy up the room. (when several _escouades_ sleep in the same room the senior corporal is in charge.) it is his duty to keep proper order. he stops all games likely to lead to quarrels, he sends men who are drunk to bed; should they disturb the peace he calls the sergeant of the week by whom they are sent to the _salle de police_. he forbids smoking in bed, and sees that troopers take their meals properly. in winter he takes care that the stoves are heated in moderation, and in the evening sees that the water jug is full. when the trumpeter has sounded "lights out," he sees that all lights are extinguished. when an officer enters the room the corporal commands "_fixe!_" (attention). the troopers rise, uncover themselves, and stand at attention until the officer has given the word "_repos!_" (stand at ease). should the officer be a field or general officer the corporal commands "_a vos rangs--fixe!_" at which command every trooper stands at the foot of his bed at "attention." the "corporal of the week" helps generally the "sergeant of the week," who, in practice, relies upon him for the performance of many of the duties he is supposed to carry out himself. caporal d'ordinaire. this corporal takes delivery of, or purchases, the supplies required for the meals of the troopers of his squadron; he has also the supervision of the kitchen, and collects the washing. iv punishments. "the following are regarded as offences against discipline, and punished as such according to their gravity: "on the part of the superior, every act of weakness, abuse of authority, insulting language, or the unjust infliction of any punishment. "on the part of the inferior, murmuring, unseemly answers, lack of obedience (whatever may be the circumstances or the provocation); evading a punishment; drunkenness (even without disturbance); general misconduct, debt, quarrels ... in fact, every dereliction of military duty, whether it is the result of negligence, laziness, or stubbornness." the fact of publishing, even under a _nom de plume_, a book, pamphlet, article, or letter, whatever may be its subject, without previous leave from the minister of war, is considered an offence against discipline. "_any man belonging to the army or navy can be punished by another man holding a rank superior to his own, whatever may be the place or the circumstances._" to be rightly understood this requires some explanation. for instance, a captain in the navy (who ranks as a colonel), on leave in paris, meets at a _café_ a major of a cavalry regiment; if the latter does not salute him, or misbehaves himself in any way, the naval officer can punish him on the spot. it constantly happens, for instance, that a trooper of a cavalry regiment passing a corporal of the line fails to salute him. the corporal has the right to punish the trooper forthwith. "the officer in command of a regiment can increase or reduce punishments; he can even cancel them. in that case, he points out to the officer or non-commissioned officer the mistake he has made, and orders him to cancel himself the punishment he has inflicted...." the captain in command of a squadron can increase a punishment inflicted by one of his direct subordinates. he cannot, however, reduce such punishment without the colonel's leave. punishment of officers. the following are the punishments which may be inflicted on regimental officers: (a) arrêts simples (confinement to rooms). (b) reprimand by colonel. (c) arrêts de rigueur (strict confinement to room). (d) arrêts de forteresse (confinement in a fortress). (e) reprimand by a general. a lieutenant can inflict a punishment of four days _arrêts simples_ on a sub-lieutenant; a captain a punishment of eight days on any officer of lower rank; a captain of a squadron fifteen days on officers of his own squadron; a major fifteen days, and the colonel thirty days, on any officer of a rank lower than their own. an officer thus placed under arrest must attend to his military duties as usual, but in the intervals he must keep to his room, and may receive no visits except official ones. _arrêts de rigueur_ (viz., confinement to the room, with a sentry posted at the door) and _arrêts de forteresse_ can be inflicted by the colonel alone. he can give any officer under his orders thirty days of the former and fifteen days of the latter. (in no case can an officer apply for a court-martial, as in england. in some regiments, especially in the line, officers get punished more frequently than privates get mere c.b. in a british regiment.) "the punishment begins from the moment it has been inflicted." let it be also noted that an officer can inflict a punishment on any other officer inferior in rank to himself, to whatever squadron he may belong, and can similarly punish officers of other regiments; and, as stated before, any officer in the navy can punish an officer in the army of inferior rank, and _vice versâ_! recent events in france give special interest to this subject, and i will therefore give some account of various other punishments which can be inflicted upon french officers without enabling them to appeal to a court-martial. the question is, indeed, one of such high interest at the present juncture that i will quote verbatim from the army regulations: "when an officer commits a fault, which--without being such as to entail the loss of his commission or his being sent before a court-martial--is still serious enough to require a heavier punishment than those above described, he can be suspended (placed in _non-activité_) or his commission can be cancelled (_ils peuvent être mis en réforme_)." the _non-activité_, which means the temporary exclusion from the service, is determined by decree of the president of the republic upon the report of the minister of war. the "superior authority" decides as to the causes which may necessitate the placing of an officer in _non-activité_, a disciplinary measure taken in cases of less serious a nature than those for which an officer may lose his commission (_peut-être mis en réforme--c'est-à-dire, l'exclusion définitive de l'armée_[ ]). the place of an officer who has been suspended (_non-activité par suspension d'emploi_) is not filled up during a year, and he can be sent back to his regiment before the expiration of that period. an officer placed in non-activity _par retrait d'emploi_ remains in that position for an unlimited period, but at the end of three years a court of inquiry (_un conseil d'enquête_) is called upon to give its opinion as to whether the officer ought to be cashiered or not (_si l'officier doit être mis en réforme_). when the officer commanding a regiment considers that an officer under his orders cannot remain _en activité_ either on account of misconduct or on account of neglect of duty, or else through incapacity, he details his complaint against the said officer in a report he sends to the major-general commanding his brigade. he specifies whether he considers that the officer ought to be suspended for a time or permanently (_si l'officier doit être mis en non-activité par suspension ou par retrait d'emploi_), and sends with his complaint a list of the various punishments inflicted on the officer, a copy of the officer's notes, and, if necessary, documents relating to the facts upon which the demand is based. the documents are examined by the general commanding the brigade, who forwards them to the general commanding the division, who sends them in his turn to the general commanding the army corps, by whom they are forwarded to the minister of war. each one of the above-mentioned generals writes his opinion on the case. an officer who has been suspended (_mis en non-activité_) remains subject to military discipline under the _surveillance_ of the general commanding the military district where he has been allowed to reside.[ ] the _mise en réforme_[ ] (cashiering) is determined by the president of the republic upon the proposal of the minister of war as a disciplinary measure. this punishment can be inflicted upon an officer as an immediate measure without it being necessary that he should have been previously suspended: it can be inflicted for habitual misconduct, serious neglect of duty, or breach of discipline, or dishonourable conduct. it can also become the consequence of three years of non-activity either as a disciplinary measure or through ill-health. when an officer is, as above stated, sent before a commission of inquiry (_conseil d'enquête_) the minutes of the proceedings are forwarded to the minister of war. the opinion of such a commission cannot be modified except in favour of the officer[ ] (_sic_). an officer who has been cashiered (_en réforme_) is liberated from all obligations imposed on officers in a position of activity or non-activity.[ ] i have wandered far away from the regiment, i have quoted dry law, and i feel afraid that readers will begin to ask, "but what about your own adventures?" i am as anxious as my readers to get to them, but i think it better to get rid of all the dreary details first, and this introduction will enable me to go on with my story without having constantly to stop to explain this or that. i shall not abuse the patience of my readers much longer, but there are still a few details i must explain, and i hope that i shall be forgiven for doing so. the punishments which may be inflicted on non-commissioned officers are as follows:-- (i) confinement to barracks after the evening roll-call. this is given to sergeants who show laziness in, or ignorance of, their work, or who return late to barracks. (n.c.o.s, unless thus punished, can remain out till p.m.) (ii) confinement to barracks. inflicted on a sergeant whose personal appearance is slovenly, or who allows his men to fail in their appearance. (iii) confinement to the room. inflicted for slight breaches of discipline. for more serious offences n.c.o.s are sent to prison. (except, in the latter case, n.c.o.s under punishment have to do their duty as usual.) (iv) reprimand by captain commanding the squadron. (v) reduction in rank (_retrogradation_). (vi) absolute loss of rank (_cassation_). the appended table explains itself:-- +-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------+ | | right of punishment by-- | | +---------+----------+---------+--------+----------+--------+ |punishments|sergeant-| sergeant-|adjudant,|captain.| majors, |colonel.| | of | major. | major | lieut. | |and capt.-| | | n.c.o.s. | | in |and sub- | | commt. | | | | | his | lieut. | | | | | | | squadron.| | | | | +-----------+---------+----------+---------+--------+----------+--------+ | | days. | days. | days. | days. | days. | days. | | (i) | | | | | | | | (ii) | | | | | | | | (iii) | -- | -- | | | | | | prison | -- | -- | -- | -- | | | +-----------+---------+----------+---------+--------+----------+--------+ corporals in the french army do not rank as n.c.o.s. the latter are far better treated now than they were in my time, the change being entirely due to general boulanger, and being one of the causes of his great popularity among the soldiers. until he became minister of war, non-commissioned officers could be sent to the _salle de police_ (lock-up). an _adjudant_ could give a sergeant eight days of _salle de police_, or fifteen days' c.b., and a sergeant-major could give the sergeants four days' _salle de police_ and eight days' c.b. sergeants could even be sent to prison by the _adjudants_. there existed a _salle de police_ separate from the one allotted to the men, to which sergeants and corporals were sent together, the only difference being that sergeants were allowed a straw mattress and blanket, while the corporals were only allowed one blanket and slept on boards. the punishments inflicted on corporals are: (a) confinement to barracks. (b) _salle de police_ (lock-up). (c) prison. (d) reduction to the ranks. +----------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ | | right of punishment by-- | |----------+------+-------+---------+----------+-----+----------+--------+ |nature of |serge-|serge- |sergeant-| adjudant,|capt-| field |colonel.| |punishment|ants. |ant- | major |sub-lieut.|ains.| officers | | | of | |majors.| in his | and | | and | | |corporals.| | |squadron.| lieuts. | | captains | | | | | | | | |commanding| | | | | | | | | a | | | | | | | | | squadron.| | +----------+------+-------+---------+----------+-----+----------+--------+ | | days.| days. | days. | days. |days.| days. | days. | | (a) | | | | | | | | | (b) | -- | -- | -- | | | | | | (c) | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | | +----------+------+-------+---------+----------+-----+----------+--------+ corporals are confined to barracks for slight breaches of discipline. for failing to answer the evening call, bad language,[ ] disobedience, quarrels, drunkenness, corporals are sent to the _salle de police_. for more serious faults, especially when on duty, corporals are sent to prison. troopers. the punishments inflicted on troopers are: (a) extra work. (b) inspection with the guard parade. (c) confinement to barracks. (d) _salle de police._ (e) prison. (f) cells (solitary confinement). punishments (_a_), (_b_), (_c_) were in my time very seldom inflicted in a cavalry regiment, being regarded as too mild for a trooper and only fit for men in the line. i am told that this is still the case. +-----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | | right of punishment by-- | +-----------+----------+---------------+--------------+----------+ |nature of | |sergeants |sergeant-major|adjudant, | |punishments| | and | in his |sub-lieut.| |given to |corporals.|sergeant-major.|squadron. | and | |troopers. | | | |lieuts. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----------+----------+---------------+--------------+----------+ | | days. | days. | days. | days. | | | | | | | | (_c_) | | | | | | (_d_) | -- | -- | -- | | | (_e_) | -- | -- | -- | -- | | (_f_) | -- | -- | -- | -- | +-----------+----------+---------------+--------------+----------+ +-----------+------------------------------+ | | right of punishment by-- | +-----------+----------+----------+--------+ |nature of | | field | | |punishments| |officers | | |given to | captains.| and | | |troopers. | |captains |colonel.| | | |commanding| | | | | a | | | | |squadron. | | +-----------+----------+----------+--------+ | | days. | days. | days. | | | | | | | (_c_) | | | | | (_d_) | | | | | (_e_) | -- | | | | (_f_) | -- | -- | | +-----------+----------+----------+--------+ (until general boulanger became minister of war corporals could give a trooper two days' _salle de police_; a sergeant could inflict four days, a sergeant-major eight days, and an _adjudant_ fifteen days, or four days' prison.) troopers confined to barracks are employed in doing the hardest and dirtiest manual work. they take part in every drill and duty besides. those sent to the _salle de police_ are kept at night in the lock-up. troopers sent to prison do no duty, but undergo special punishment drill for three hours in the morning and three hours at night. they are deprived of pay, of sugar, and of coffee. troopers in the cells are kept in confinement day and night. only a blanket without bedding is allowed to the troopers in prison or in the cells. any corporal or trooper who, during his three years' service, has been sent to prison or to the cells, must at the expiration of his three years' service, remain with the colours for a number of days equal to those he has spent in prison or in the cells. i have not yet exhausted the list of punishments which may be inflicted upon french privates. there is another one more terrible than all the others i have described. this consists in sending a soldier to the _compagnies de discipline_. this means transportation to algeria. there the soldier is drafted into one of the special companies encamped far away in the interior. the men are drilled for several hours daily, and during the remainder of the time they are employed at road-making and subjected to other hard labour. officers and sergeants in command are always armed with loaded revolvers, and at the least sign of disobedience they can blow a man's brains out. for the slightest fault these men are sent to the _silos_--deep holes dug in the ground, and funnel-shaped at the bottom, so that neither standing, sitting, nor lying down is possible. they are left there for one or two days with bread and water. an awful case occurred some years ago in connection with these _silos_, which will be described in the course of my narrative. "the minister of war," say the regulations, "has full power to send to the _compagnies de discipline_ any private who has committed one or several faults, the gravity of which makes any other mode of repression inadequate." usually, however, such men are tried before a _conseil de discipline_. when the captain in command of a squadron considers that one of his troopers has deserved to be sent to a _compagnie de discipline_ he sends a written report to the major stating the faults or misdemeanours of the trooper and the punishments which have been inflicted upon him, dwelling upon the recurrence of certain acts which show a perseverance in ill-doing, a danger to the good order of the service. this report is endorsed by the major, and the lieutenant-colonel, who hands it over to the colonel. the latter can either transmit this report to the minister of war, who decides upon the case, or (as is usually done) he can assemble a disciplinary commission (_conseil de discipline_) consisting of the following officers of the regiment: one major (who presides over the commission). the two senior captains and the two senior lieutenants, provided they do not belong to the squadron of the trooper to be tried. the captain who applies for the infliction of the punishment, as well as the major who commands the squadrons to which the trooper belongs, lay their case before the court. they then retire, and the trooper is brought in and makes his defence. the court then deliberates and sends its decision to the colonel. it must be remembered that the court merely gives its advice, and this is sent to the general commanding the division of which the regiment is a unit. should the court recommend the trooper to be sent to the _compagnies de discipline_, the general can decline to act upon their advice, but should the court decide that the trooper ought not to be sent there, the general is bound to abide by the decision. this seems, at first blush, an equitable procedure, but when we remember the almost unlimited power possessed by a colonel over the officers of his regiment, it is easy to realise that a _conseil de discipline_ usually sits for the mere purpose of carrying out the well-ascertained wishes of the supreme regimental authority. footnotes: [ ] for full particulars see "loi du juillet , sur la recrutement de l'armée." librairie militaire l. baudoin, rue dauphine, paris. [ ] all who for any cause are considered unfit for service have to pay a yearly tax of francs, and an additional tax proportionate to their means. [ ] soldiers pay one-third of ordinary fares on french railways. [ ] french cavalry regiments have five squadrons. [ ] it was p.m. in my time. [ ] the vagueness of this should be noted. [ ] which means that an officer so punished cannot travel out of his district without leave. [ ] colonel picquart's case. [ ] l'avis du conseil ne peut être modifié qu'en faveur de l'officier. ("service intérieur," p. .) [ ] it therefore stands to reason that a court-martial could not legally try colonel picquart. [ ] _e.g._, saying that dreyfus is innocent. reading a newspaper--whatever it may be--is also a serious offence. chapter i i have already explained that twenty years ago, when i served my time in the ranks of the french army, french military law differed from what it is now. it is true that--speaking generally--every able-bodied frenchman was then, as now, compelled to undergo five years' active service, but for young men who had graduated at a university there was the loop-hole of escape described in the introduction. having no ambition to serve for five years as a private, i naturally determined to avail myself of the benefit of the law, and accordingly in the month of august i went over to the headquarters of the military division of paris, and there, after producing all the papers required by french red-tapeism,[ ] i signed a voluntary engagement for a period of one year (_engagement conditionnel_). a month later i received orders to appear before the _conseil de revision_, held in the town-hall of my district. about two hundred fellows, belonging to every class of society, were waiting in the yard--most of them, indeed, being roughs from la villette (the whitechapel of paris). we were called up by batches of twenty-five, and shown by gendarmes into a room, around which stood long benches with pegs above them. a red-hot stove was burning in a corner of this room, and as there was no ventilation of any kind, and more than one hundred unwashed ruffians had already undressed and dressed there, the smell was abominable. a gendarme then ordered us to strip off all our clothing, barring our socks, and when we had done so--what a sight we were!--he called each one of us in turn and placed us under a measuring gauge. he first took our height with our socks on, and then without them--except in the case of those who possessed no such garment, and who formed the majority. the gendarme who measured us was a sergeant, and he dictated to a private the result of his measurements. when my turn came he placed me under the apparatus and then asked for my name. "decle," i said. "and your christian name?" "lionel." "lionel," he replied: "that's not a christian name." i assured him that it was my christian name, and, what was more, the only one i possessed. "well, it's a queer christian name, and i don't know where your people fished it out," he remarked. after a glance at the scale he dictated " · metre in his socks," to his subordinate. he then ordered me to remove my socks, and, measuring me once more, pronounced the verdict " · metre without socks." "but, sergeant," i asked, "how can i be taller without my socks than with them on?" "you will perhaps teach me my business!" he angrily replied, and seeing that the private was hesitating to write down the figures, "d---- you," he shouted, "are you going to take that down or not?" the private silently obeyed, doubtless accustomed for years to passive obedience. i was then told to stand aside, and another fellow was called up. we were then sent, each in turn, into another room, where sat the _conseil de revision_, presided over by a general in full uniform, assisted by officials also in uniform, and a few respectable-looking old gentlemen. i confess that i felt rather shy at having to appear without clothes before so ornamental a company, whose uniforms strangely contrasted with the state of nature i was in. a clerk, having inquired my name, fished out my papers from a huge bundle, and asked me a long list of questions about my family history. the president then inquired whether i could show any cause why i should not serve, and upon my negative reply, a military surgeon proceeded to examine me. a paper was handed over to him by the clerk. "what's this?" he said. "you're one metre seventy-eight in your socks, and a centimetre more without them?" "that's just what i said to the gendarme, sir," i replied, "but he told me to shut up." the gendarme was called and questioned about the matter. "all i can say, sir," he replied, "is that a machine can't lie, and i've had enough experience not to make a mistake." there was a burst of laughter from all the members of the council, which seemed to greatly astonish the old gendarme. the doctor took me back to measure me himself, and finding that my exact height was one metre seventy-nine without socks, he pointed this out to the gendarme. the latter, however, shook his head. "well, sir," he stoutly declared, "all i can say is that he was one seventy-eight just now." i was brought back to the council-room and the doctor then proceeded to take my chest and other measurements, dictating to the clerk a list of my various "points." he then asked me about my past illnesses, and inquired into the health of my father, mother, and grand-parents. he then tested my heart and lungs, felt my legs, and examined my teeth; concluding the whole performance by making me sit down, walk, and cough. i felt like a horse under examination by a "vet." the result of this inspection was that i was passed as fit for service. before retiring i was asked whether i preferred to serve in the infantry, artillery, heavy or light cavalry. i expressed a desire to serve in the dragoons, and my wish was duly noted. shortly afterwards i received notice to present myself at one of the paris cavalry barracks, in order to pass an examination in riding, for _volontaires_, having then to serve only one year, were admitted into the cavalry only if they could already ride. the examination was a most simple one: we had to mount a horse, which was saddled, but without stirrups, and then had to walk, trot, and canter once round the riding-school. about a score of others passed the examination at the same time as myself, and only one candidate, who managed to fall off his horse while trotting, was rejected as unfit to serve in the cavalry, though of the whole batch hardly three could pretend to a knowledge of horsemanship. at the beginning of october i received a notification that i was to serve in the th dragoons, at dinan in brittany. i was most anxious not to go so far from paris, and as my maternal uncle then held a most prominent position in the _senat_, being leader of the left centre, i obtained a letter from him to the minister of war, who allowed me to choose whatever regiment i liked. one year before, a great friend of mine, baron de lanoy, had enlisted for five years in the th dragoons stationed at noilly,[ ] and he had lately been promoted to the rank of sergeant. he had strongly advised me to join his regiment, the colonel of which, the marquis de vieilleville, was most favourably disposed towards the _volontaires_. at my request i was accordingly drafted into that regiment. unfortunately, shortly before i joined, the marquis died, and was replaced by colonel hermann, who hated _volontaires_, and proved, as will be seen, a martinet of the worst type. towards the end of october i received my _feuille de route_, ordering me to present myself at a.m. at the cavalry barracks at noilly. it was a dull, dreary, miserable, wet day when i took a train at the _gare du nord_ at half-past seven in the morning, to begin my military experiences--experiences which proved, as will be seen, little short of what i might have had to suffer had i been sentenced to hard labour. an hour later the train stopped at noilly, where, following the advice previously given to me by my friend de lanoy, i drove to the crown hotel, the best in the place, engaged a room, and hastily swallowed the last decent breakfast i was to enjoy for many days to come. half an hour before the appointed time i drove to the barracks. the sentry stood shivering in his box, and the thought then flashed across my mind that it would soon become my lot to stand there myself. i passed the gate, and seeing one of the troopers standing outside the guardroom, i was about to ask him where i could find my friend, sergeant de lanoy, when a sergeant, dragging his sword on the ground, stepped out of the guard-room and addressed me: "hullo! what do you want, you there?" "sir," i replied, "i am a _volontaire_, and i want to go and see a friend of mine, sergeant de lanoy." "oh, you're a _volontaire_, are you? well, you can wait where you are!" "but, sir," i asked again, "can't i be allowed to go and see sergeant de lanoy?" "what! answers, eh? you'll have to be put through your paces at once, my fine fellow, or else you will make the acquaintance of the _boite_ (cells) sooner than you care for. wait there and shut up," he concluded. there was nothing for it, therefore, but to walk up and down in the drizzling rain. i had already visited the barracks once, a few months before, when i came to pay a call on de lanoy, little thinking then that i should soon belong to his regiment. now they presented a much keener interest for me, and i looked anxiously at my surroundings. on each side of the gate stood a small lodge. one of these was used as a guard-room, the other was the residence of the barrack caretaker, a post usually bestowed on an old pensioned non-commissioned officer. the barrack yard itself was about yards long and broad; in the middle of it stood the riding-school, flanked on each side by two rows of huge two-storied buildings running at right angles to the entrance gate. on the ground floor of these buildings were the stables, and above them the men's quarters. the right-hand portion of the barracks was occupied by an infantry regiment, while the remainder was used by the dragoons. it may here be noted that different names are given to the barracks occupied by cavalry and by infantry, the latter being called _casernes_, while the former are termed _quartiers_. the yard was teeming with life: troopers in stable uniforms were running to and fro, some carrying buckets of water, others empty-handed; in front of me was a group of half a dozen men pumping water into a long tank running along the riding-school; other troopers were sweeping the yard while one of their number collected in a wheelbarrow the little heaps of refuse gathered by the others; then an officer came out of the riding-school and called to a trooper to take back his charger to the stables. in a few moments a man came running to the guard-room, and shouted to the trumpeter to call the sergeants of the week quickly, as the captain of the week wanted them. the trumpeter sounded the call, and had hardly finished when five sergeants came at a run and went to the captain, who stood near the riding-school, where i could hear him abusing them with frantic gesticulations. my attention was next called to six troopers in stable dress (but with swords and carbines), their faces turned towards a wall; they were being drilled by a sergeant, and i was struck by the length of time during which they remained in the same position. while i was looking at them the sergeant gave a word of command, and the troopers stood with their swords extended at arm's length: two, three, minutes elapsed, and i could see the poor fellows getting so tired that they had to bend their bodies to remain with their swords in the right position; the sergeant, walking up and down, did not seem to mind this, but one of the troopers, having slightly bent his arm, the sergeant, in a monotonous tone of voice, calling the fellow by name, said, "so-and-so, two days more for not holding your sword straight." this seemed to me little short of barbaric cruelty. i afterwards realised that this exercise was punishment drill for men punished with prison. soon the trumpeter sounded "soup," and every trooper employed in the barrack square hurried to put away his tools, while men rushed from every corner, shouting like school-boys let loose. while i was watching the scene i have described i noticed the arrival of a tall, handsome, and well-groomed young man in civilian attire, who asked me if i was a _volontaire_, adding that he was himself one, and that he wanted to know where he had to report himself. in order to save him from the sergeant's abuse, i warned him that he had better wait with me until the sergeant of the guard called us. while we were talking the sergeant appeared on the threshhold of the guard-room, and, at the top of his voice, shouted out, "what the deuce are you hatching there, you idiots? i suppose you're another of these (using a double-barrelled adjective) _volontaires_?" turning to my companion. "yes, sir," replied the young fellow. "well, why the devil don't you come and report yourself, you blockhead?" "oh, sir," replied walter--for such we will suppose his name to be--"this gentleman," pointing to me, "told me----" "this gentleman told you!" howled the sergeant, "this _gentleman_, indeed; you're really too damned polite. you're another colt who requires breaking in. now, you two young _pekins_[ ] advance to orders, and show me your papers." we produced our _feuilles de route_, and the sergeant having examined them told us to go to the paymaster's office in the town. "oh! you want to speak to sergeant de lanoy, do you?" he said to me. "i'll give you a trooper to take you to him." having asked my new comrade to wait a few minutes for me outside the barracks, so that we might go together to the paymaster's office, i was going with the trooper towards de lanoy's quarters when we met him coming to look out for me. i told him how i had been treated by the sergeant of the guard, and he replied that he was not in the least astonished, as the fellow was a brute, adding that he had no right to keep me waiting when i asked to go and see him. "i'll have it out with him," he remarked, adding: "you go straight to the paymaster's office and ask to be drafted into my squadron, the rd, and i'll see that you're placed under my orders, so that i can look after you." we then parted, and outside the barracks, i found jack walter waiting for me. curiously enough, though he was the first acquaintance i made in the regiment, our friendship, which began that day, has lasted ever since. my friend is of english origin (his grandfather having been an englishman who became naturalised in france), and were i to mention his real name it would be recognised by most of my readers as that of a rising painter of undoubted genius, whose works have graced many a _salon_. we went to the paymaster's office, and, although we were rather upset by the reception we had received from the sergeant of the guard, we were both very keen on serving. the paymaster made no difficulty about placing me in the rd squadron, while walter was drafted into the nd, having a letter of introduction to one of the officers of that squadron. we each received a paper from the paymaster's clerk with instructions to hand them over to our respective sergeant-majors; the clerk kindly added that we need not return to barracks before a.m., as the sergeants were eating their breakfast. when i returned to the barracks i went to the sergeant of the guard and told him that i was back from the paymaster's office, asking him to direct me to my sergeant-major's office. "do you take me for a sign-post?" he answered. "no, sir," i replied, "but i wanted your leave before asking a trooper to show me the way." "you long-nosed chap, you're a soldier now, remember that; so do me the honour of calling me 'sergeant,' and not 'sir.'" "yes, sergeant," i replied. he then ordered a trooper who stood in the guard-room to take me to the office of my sergeant-major. "by the way," he said, as i was going off, "what squadron do you belong to?" "to the rd squadron, sergeant." "it's a pity you don't belong to mine," he answered: "i should like to have had you under my orders; it would have been a real pleasure to lick you into shape. but god help you if you ever cross my path. i don't like your face. when i don't like a man's face it's a poor chance he stands with me. now go, clear out of this." i'm sorry to say that it was my misfortune to have this man later on as my chief, and he duly proved that his boast was no vain one. when i reached the sergeant-major's office i met outside the door my friend de lanoy, and informed him that i had managed to be placed in his squadron. "i'm glad of it," he said: "i will go with you to see the sergeant-major, and try to get you put in my _peloton_" (company). the sergeant-major's office was a small room about sixteen feet by twelve, and served as a bedroom as well as an office. three non-commissioned officers slept in it; the sergeant-major, the sergeant _fourrier_, and the corporal _fourrier_, who ranks as a non-commissioned officer.[ ] at a huge table in the centre of the room sat the sergeant-major, a cold, stern, and distant individual. he granted de lanoy's request, and put me in his _peloton_, ordering him at the same time to assign me a bed. de lanoy, now my sergeant, took me to the room where the men of our squadron lived, ate, and slept. two lateral partitions, ten or twelve feet high, ran the whole length of the room, with beds on each side of them. there were thus four rows of beds running along the room, each row being occupied by the troopers belonging to the same company. the beds themselves seemed so narrow that one could hardly realise how a man could manage to sleep in one of them. at the head of each bed hung the trooper's sword; on a nail near it was suspended the bag containing brushes and other stable implements, while laid on two shelves running along the whole length of the room, above the beds, each trooper had his clothes carefully folded, and covered with a canvas bag on which the number under which he was registered appeared in large figures. on the top of this stood the helmet, with a pair of boots on each side of it. in each corner of the room the carbines stood on racks. "although you are not allowed to have any one to help you," said de lanoy to me, "it is simply impossible for you to make your bed and to clean yourself, your clothes, your boots, saddlery, and weapons, for, the moment you begin the special work allotted to _volontaires_, you will only have two hours to spare for meals every day; you must therefore arrange with two men to do your work, and i will place you between two good fellows whom i can trust to look after you. only mind you," he added, "the new colonel hates _volontaires_, and as any man found helping them will be severely punished, you will have to allow ten francs a week to each of the troopers who look after your things." he then gave me an empty bed which was placed between those of the two men he had selected and who were only too glad to look after me. one of them was a parisian ruffian, nicknamed _titi de la villette_, and the other a country bumpkin whom every one called "the old un," on account of his prematurely aged appearance. by de lanoy's advice i gave titi five francs to buy a two-gallon jar of wine for the troopers belonging to my _peloton_. i then returned to the sergeant-major's room, in order to supply him with particulars about myself such as have to be registered in the _livret_ (regimental book) handed over to every french soldier. "what's your name?" he began. "decle." "what's your christian name?" "lionel." "your profession?" "i have none." "ah, yes," he replied, "a good-for-nothing, like all the _volontaires_." he then asked me for my father's name, christian name and profession. i had also to give him my mother's maiden name, and to tell him whether i had any brothers or sisters. after this followed some rather ludicrous questions: "can you read and write?" "well," i said, "i suppose so, considering that i am a _volontaire_, and have therefore taken a university degree." "i want none of your remarks," replied the sergeant-major, staring at me from head to foot; "answer my questions. can you swim?" i replied in the affirmative. "how many times have you been convicted?" i protested against the implication most energetically, but this only brought down on me a few cutting remarks about my cheek and impertinence. i had then to state whether i had had small-pox, whether i had been vaccinated or not, and whether i meant to re-enlist at the end of my year's service. my reply was in the negative as may well be imagined. the sergeant-major having taken down all my answers looked at me once more from top to toe, and then delivered the following little speech: "look here, my boy," he began, "don't you run away with the idea that military service is all beer and skittles, or you'll soon be disappointed. i know what you _volontaires_ are like; you come here and imagine that you are going to have a good time of it; but i warn you that you will have a devilish bad time of it if you don't keep straight. i'm a good sort of fellow enough, but all the troopers will tell you that i am pretty stiff. i won't punish you often, but when i do, you'll remember it. you're too much of a fine gentleman for my taste, so i fancy it won't be long before you get into trouble. now you can clear out--sergeant de lanoy will tell you what you have to do." i retired, a sadder but a wiser man. footnotes: [ ] birth certificate, father's consent, certificate of degree, certificate of respectability and good morals (signed by the local police commissary), father's undertaking to pay £ on my being accepted by the _conseil de revision_. [ ] all names of persons and places in the narrative are fictitious. [ ] an offensive term for "civilian" used by soldiers. [ ] corporals do not rank as such. chapter ii when i returned to my room the corporal told me to follow him, as i had to undergo another medical inspection. two other _volontaires_ who had been drafted into my squadron accompanied us; one of them evidently belonged to the middle classes, but the other looked a mere farm hand; he was, indeed, the son of a small farmer who had made great sacrifices to give his son a good education, and the boy, brought up in a government school, had managed to get his b.a. degree, and his people had with difficulty scraped together the £ necessary for obtaining the privilege of serving for one year only. the fact of the poor boy having been foolish enough to elect to serve in the cavalry can only be ascribed to his ignorance, as he lacked sufficient means for this branch of the service, and a bad time of it he had, poor fellow. "i say," the corporal said to me confidentially, "that chap is a nice sort of _volontaire_: fancy--he said that he'd be blowed if he was going to pay eight bob a week to get a trooper to fag for him, and he's only given two bob for us to drink his health with, and not a brass farthing to me, his corporal. ain't i going to set him to work he won't relish!" i took the hint and promptly handed the corporal a ten-franc piece. "oh, i didn't mean that as a hint, of course," he said, pocketing the money, "but i know you're quite the gentleman, and the right sort too, and besides, you're a friend of sergeant de lanoy, a real live count, and the best of fellows into the bargain. i say you, what's-your-name," the corporal went on, addressing the country bumpkin, "that's the canteen, what are you going to stand us?" "oh," replied the poor fellow blushing, "i thought we were going to the medical inspection?" "yes, of course we are," replied the corporal, "but i can see that the surgeon-major hasn't turned up yet, so we've got lots of time." taking pity on the poor fellow, i invited the corporal and my two comrades to accompany me to the canteen, where we each had a cup of coffee, or rather chicory, with a glass of brandy, a refreshment which cost six pence for the four of us. the third _volontaire_ insisted upon standing another drink, and then we hastened to the dispensary. there we were told to wait in a large, bare ante-room, and walter, whom i had not seen since the morning, joined us. "a queer lot," he said, looking at our companions (there were fourteen of us, all told). one of them especially attracted our attraction, for he had a huge moustache and was apparently a man of thirty. half a dozen at most looked gentlemen, while the others were, to say the least, commonplace. few of us felt inclined to be communicative, and when the surgeon-major turned up he found us gazing at each other in silence. the surgeon-major was a short, active, sharp-spoken man, and having entered his office he sent the corporal in charge of the dispensary to order us to strip. once more we were measured, felt, and thoroughly examined, all of us with one exception being passed as sound in wind and limb. the only one who failed to pass was rejected for short-sight, and ultimately invalided by the "_réforme_" commission. our respective corporals then took us back to our rooms, mine choosing a route through the canteen, where he insisted upon treating us--with the money i had given him--and he was half-seas-over before we left. on our return to the room we found the sergeant _fourrier_ awaiting us, and he at once took us to the store, where we were to receive our outfit. the store consisted of a long apartment, along the centre of which rows of shelves ran, reaching from floor to ceiling; on these were classified, according to size, every conceivable article of regimental outfit, each department being under the charge of a skilled regimental sergeant--a sergeant tailor, a sergeant bootmaker, a saddler, and a sergeant storekeeper. we were first sent to the tailor. when my turn came he cast a glance over me, took from a shelf two pairs of trousers, two tunics, and one morning jacket. a corporal showed us how to put them on according to regulations. the trousers are made of red felt, the seat and inside of the legs being of double thickness, that is to say, fully one inch thick; from the knee downwards they were covered with soft but thick leather, with straps to fix under the boots. when i first held them in front of me they nearly reached to my chin, but the corporal said that they would be all right. i therefore got into them, but when i pulled my braces as tight as they would go, the trousers reached my armpits, and were so broad and so stiff that i could only walk with legs apart, to say nothing of their weight, which amounted to a good many pounds. i next got into my tunic, but the sleeves were so long that they reached the middle of my hand, while the collar was several inches too large for me. under the collar of the tunic we had to fasten twice round our necks a blue cotton tie, two inches broad, fastened in a single knot in front. the tunic, a blue one, had a white collar with the regimental number in red figures embroidered on a blue background. a white strap was also affixed to the outside of the cuffs of the sleeves. the corporal having examined me, ordered me to go to the bootmaker's department, in another part of the stores. "when you have been fitted with boots," he said, as i was walking off, "you must return to the tailor, who will send you to be inspected by the captain." when i reached the bootmaker's special corner, i found him cursing furiously because he could not fit one of my comrades. "ah ces nom de dieu de ---- d'volontaires faudrait leur y faire des bottes expres. ah malheur de dieu vrai!" at last he seemed to have succeeded and called me forward in turn. having told me to take off one of my boots he looked at it: "encore un d'ces malheurs de dieu qu'a des pieds qu'ça fait suer," he exclaimed. "i shall never find boots for you," he went on, "why have you got a long narrow foot like that? damnation! damnation!" he kept repeating as he went to look through his stock. i must mention here that only four sizes of boots are kept in stock; they all are square-toed and immensely broad; the heels are nearly two inches high, with spurs nailed on to them. the top of the boot is made of a soft piece of leather on which two leather tags are sewn, the boot itself reaching half way up the calf of the leg. most french soldiers are, i suppose, flat-footed. at any rate every boot presented to me was so low in the instep that i could not find a single pair in which i could insert my feet, until, at last, the assistant bootmaker triumphantly produced a pair about two inches too long and an inch too broad for me, explaining that if i put sufficient straw inside them they would fit all right. finally, i had to pull down the leather portion of my trousers over the boots, not forgetting to fasten the under straps which alone prevented the boots from dropping off my feet. i hobbled as well as i could towards the tailor; he turned me round admiringly. "it's all right," he said, "go and show yourself to the captain." my boots, as i have just said, were only held on my feet by the straps under them, and at every step my spurs caught in the heavy leather coverings of my trousers, but at last i managed to reach the captain. he ordered me to unbutton my tunic, and looking at my elephantine trousers: "what's that?" he cried; "put your braces lower," and artistically creasing my trousers from top to bottom, he stepped back a few feet, and having had a good look at me: "they're too short," he said, "go and get another pair from the tailor." as i was hobbling away he called me back. "what are those boots you've got on? they are too big for you. are you such an idiot that you can't feel they are too big?" "yes, sir," i replied, "but----" "but!" he exclaimed, "now look here, my boy, please understand that we don't allow remarks of any kind in the army. go and get another pair of boots and trousers, and look sharp about it." i stumbled back towards the bootmaker. "the captain says," i began, "that these boots are too large for me and that you must find me another pair." "ah, these d----d _volontaires_, what a lot of trouble they give us!" sighed the bootmaker. after looking through all his stock he chucked three more pairs at me. in vain i tried to get into them, and called the bootmaker to show him that none of them would fit me. "why the deuce don't you take off your socks, socks aren't regulation," he angrily retorted. notwithstanding my protests, i had to take them off. at last i managed to get one foot inside a boot, but the other, notwithstanding the efforts of two strong men, resisted. "all right," said the bootmaker, "i'll stretch it a bit later on." so with only one boot on i hobbled to the tailor. "the captain says my trousers are too short," i told him. "oh, i'll soon put them to rights," he answered. having pulled my braces lower down he thereupon proceeded to crease the leather at the bottom of the trousers. "now go back to the captain," he said. when i once more appeared before that officer he looked at me in utter disgust. "why have you only got one boot on? bootmaker," he shouted, without leaving me time to reply, "can't you find a pair of boots for this man?" "no, sir," replied the bootmaker, who had hurried up at the officer's command, "he's got an instep like i've never seen." "what business has a cripple like you in my squadron?" angrily remarked the captain. "but, sir----" i began. "shut up," he howled; "if you answer me again i'll send you straight off to the cells!" and without looking at my trousers, he angrily told me to put on my tunic, which i had removed at his orders. i did so, and was then ordered to fold my arm over my chest. "what's that?" said the captain; "how dare you come and show me such a tunic? are you such a fool as not to see for yourself it's too small?" warned by previous experience i made no reply, and returned limping with my single boot to the tailor. i explained to him that the captain found my tunic too small. "all right," he said, "i'll soon make it larger." he pulled it about a little and sent me back to the captain, who once more ordered me to fold my right arm over my chest. "sleeves too long, go and change," he said brusquely. i returned to the tailor and explained matters to him. "never mind, my boy," he said; "i'll make you one that will fit you, it won't cost you much, and, of course, you have got money--you're a _volontaire_; now pull up your sleeve a bit and hold it tight under your arm before the captain looks at you." i did so. "fold your arms," once more said the captain, when i returned to him for inspection. i followed the tailor's instruction. "it's too small," yelled the captain, "go and change." without taking the trouble of doing this, i merely walked to where the tailor stood, and came back with the same tunic, letting the sleeve drop a little. this time, when the captain examined me, he found it was a perfect fit! one aspect of the grotesque muddle i have just described is a very serious one. in the event of war breaking out between france and germany, there is absolutely no doubt that success would depend on the rapidity with which troops could be mobilised in each country. while i was in the regiment, i witnessed more than once the arrival of the men belonging to the reserve. although they are supposed to arrive with one suit of uniform, which they must take home with them after performing their act of service, their equipment has to be handed over to them, and the process entails all the confusion and trouble which were incurred when our own outfit had to be given out to us. in germany things are very differently managed; every man belonging to the reserve knows at what barracks he will have to report himself, and every year the reserve men are called together for a few hours, and shown where each man can find his complete outfit. these are stored up in the following way: long rows of shelves are divided into a certain number of partitions, each one of which contains the complete outfit of a private, every article of clothing having been properly fitted to the wearer, so that in case of mobilisation each soldier would know exactly where to go for his outfit, and no time would be wasted in distribution, in trying on uniforms and boots, and running from one department to the other. the object of calling out the reserve men for a few hours yearly is to teach them exactly where their outfit stands, and also to try on all the garments with a view to making any alterations rendered desirable by advancing years. in france, on the contrary, everything would be in confusion, and the various services, instead of helping each other, would lose valuable time in complicated red-tapeism. but to proceed: i went through the same ceremony with all the other clothes which were handed over to me. my outfit consisted of two tunics, two pairs of trousers, one short jacket for drill, one _képi_, and a helmet. the latter is certainly the most comfortable head-gear in the french army. it rests on the head by means of a broad leather band, the ends of which are cut into strips tapering towards the centre, where they are tied together so as to form a kind of skull-cap, which bears the whole weight of the helmet. the latter affords a splendid protection against the sun and rain. although its weight is nearly double that of the _shako_ used by the light cavalry, it does not cause any pressure on the forehead or on the back of the head, as the latter invariably does. besides the above garments, we also received two pairs of boots, two pairs of stable suits consisting of canvas trousers and blouse, with a blue and white cap and a dark-blue great-coat with a huge cape. our regulation linen consisted of two shirts of the coarsest material, two pairs of drawers of the same stuff, two towels, and, besides these, two pairs of thick white leather gloves. (all soldiers being supposed to have hands of the same size, the regulation gloves are invariably "nines.") socks form no part of the regulation outfit; the men usually replace them by bits of rag, which are nicknamed "russian socks." to complete the list of our wearing apparel, i must mention an enormous pair of wooden clogs for use in the stables, and a canvas bag into which our outfit was shoved; having received this, we were told to carry it on our shoulders to our rooms. we did not receive our arms until the following day, when each of us was given a carbine and a straight sword about four feet long, besides a small box of tools with which to take the carbine to pieces. at the same time we received our various trappings--a sword-belt with brass buckles, a sword-strap, a carbine-strap, and a cartridge-box (which in my time was slung over the shoulder and across the breast and back of the trooper). the next day our saddlery and stable gear were served out to us. the saddles then in use were still the discarded ones which had been bought from the british government in . these saddles had a high and straight wooden back, behind which the portmanteau was attached. this portmanteau was round and made of blue cloth with a red grenade at each end. two holsters with miscellaneous straps, a leather bag containing a spare iron, and an open cord-girth completed our saddle fittings. the bridle was similar to that used in the english army, with bit and snaffle so contrived that, by removing the straps holding the bit, the head-stall remained on the horse, the snaffle being passed through the rings of the head-stall. our stable outfit consisted in a currycomb, a soft brush, a hard brush, a chamois leather, a sponge, and a comb for mane and tail, the whole being enclosed in a small canvas bag. to return to my first day in the regiment. having brought back all my gear to the room, i was informed by the corporal that all the things would have to be marked with the number which had been assigned to me. the clothes, linen, and all articles of wear i was supposed to mark, myself, with stencils which could be obtained from the sergeant _fourrier_. i entrusted, however, the two men who had arranged to clean my things with this tedious work, as i was, myself, most anxious to get into the town. of course i had to be in uniform. full dress had to be worn after noon. i therefore borrowed clothes, a helmet, a sword, and even a pair of boots, from my two orderlies; and i received instructions how to behave in the streets. i had to carry my sword in my left hand, the hilt turned downwards and a few inches behind my hip, the tip of the scabbard in front of me. in case i should meet any corporal, non-commissioned officer, or officer, whether they belonged to my regiment or not, i was to salute them with the right hand, the elbow lifted high in the air, two steps before reaching them, bringing my hand down only when i had passed two steps beyond them. it was not without difficulty that i managed to get down the stairs into the barrack yard, and i found it still more difficult to walk about. the enormous weight and width of my trousers, the looseness of the boots which had been lent to me, their high heels and the spurs which caught at every step in the leather coverings of my elephantine trousers, the tightness of the tunic under the arms, and the wobbling of the helmet, which was much too big for me, conspired to produce such a state of discomfort and insecurity that i only managed to walk with legs apart and arms held stiffly away from my body. i could hardly manage to hold my sword with my no. gloves, which were, moreover, as stiff as a board; and i felt as awkward as a man who, for the first time in his life, tries to walk across a tight-rope. i had just reached, with much difficulty, the gate of the barracks, and was going to walk out, when a stentorian voice proceeding from the guard-room suddenly stopped me. "hullo, you recruit, where are you going?" i looked over my shoulder and saw the sergeant of the guard. i turned round, saluted, and nearly lost my balance in doing so. "come here, you booby!" shouted the sergeant. he examined me from head to foot. "right about turn!" he then said to me. it was easier said than done; but i was already walking off when the sergeant called me anew. "where are you going?" he said. "well, sergeant, i am going into the town." "oh, really, are you? turn round first, i want to look at your back." i turned and stood there for a minute or two. "go back to your room," said the sergeant at last. "but, sergeant," i replied, "i thought that we were allowed to go out." "go back to your room," he said, laughing, "and ask your corporal why i won't let you go out." disconsolately i trudged back to the room. there i was greeted with a roar of laughter from all the troopers. "so," they exclaimed, "the sergeant has sent you back?" "yes, but why?" all the men shouted with laughter. i confess that i felt rather foolish. "come here, you recruit," good-naturedly said one of them at last, "let me brush you." and so saying he vigorously applied a brush to my back. it appears that before i went out one of the troopers had drawn a huge chalk cross on my tunic. i then learnt that before leaving barracks, every trooper must present himself before the sergeant of the guard, who has to examine him, and see that he is properly groomed; if anything is amiss in his uniform the sergeant sends him back to put himself straight. this, i may add, often leads to considerable abuse of their power by certain sergeants, for when one of them has a grudge against a man he will send him back five or six times to his room without telling him what he considers wrong in his attire--the regulations in no way compelling the sergeant to explain to the trooper where he considers that the fault lies. i have seen a trooper sent back in this way to his room no less than eight times running. it was a pouring wet day, and when for the ninth time the sergeant ordered him to return the trooper implored him to tell him what was wrong. "you dirty pig," replied the sergeant, "look at your boots, they are covered with mud." the trooper, it must be mentioned, had to walk over a hundred yards from his room across the courtyard before reaching the gate, and irritated beyond measure by the injustice of the sergeant, he asked, in a sarcastic tone, whether he was expected to carry an umbrella. "if you like," added the man, "i'll go and fetch my brushes and brush my boots here, and then perhaps you will be satisfied?" for that answer the sergeant gave the man four days' _salle de police_, stating in his report as a reason for that punishment that "the trooper, after presenting himself nine times before the sergeant of the guard in a disgraceful state of filth, had grossly insulted the sergeant who had remonstrated with him." the trooper had often been punished before, and held a bad record, so, upon reading the sergeant's report, the colonel altered the punishment into thirty days' prison. but to return to myself. when i appeared once more before the sergeant of the guard, that non-commissioned officer, who was not a bad fellow after all, laughed at the trick that had been played on me and allowed me to go out. i shall always remember that first outing. i never realised how grotesque a figure i was cutting, until i met another _volontaire_ in the same plight as myself. i had, besides, been so terrified by the warning i had received not to fail to salute corporals, especially of the infantry--as a feud always exists between infantry and cavalry--that whenever i saw a soldier with a red woollen stripe on his sleeve, i saluted at once. for this i was unmercifully chaffed by some troopers of my squadron who happened to pass while i was solemnly saluting an infantry man just adorned. they ultimately explained to me that only men with two stripes held the rank of corporal, while those who had but a single stripe were merely first-class privates--_i.e._, men drawing higher pay for good conduct. for my blunder i had to pay a fine to my comrades, taking them to the nearest café to have a drink. although we were not allowed to have rooms in the town, most of the _volontaires_ had engaged lodgings before joining the regiment. as i have already said, i had engaged a room at the crown hotel, and, as every year the best set among the _volontaires_ had been in the habit of putting up there, special accommodation was reserved for them: even a private dining-room was retained for us, and when i arrived there that evening, i found six of my comrades having an appetiser in our special room. they were all young men of good and well-known families: besides walter, of whom i have already spoken, there were cuffet, whose father had been a cabinet minister a few years before; pager de la tasherie, whose father had been an ambassador; meix, now the head of one of the largest engineering firms in france; de nevers, who succeeded, some years ago, to a dukedom, and a couple of others, also of gentle birth. the greatest comfort we found at the hotel was the possibility of getting a tub, for we soon discovered the absolute lack of sanitary arrangements in our barracks. we had a pleasant dinner that night, and having taken off our tight-fitting tunics, we almost felt like civilised beings. we were, however, soon recalled to the reality of our position by the rolling of drums and the sounding of bugles. it was the tattoo. in every french garrison town, a quarter of an hour before soldiers have to be in barracks, the trumpeters, and, if there is an infantry regiment in the place, the buglers and drummers, assemble in the principal square and thence march back to barracks playing the _retraite_. we hurried over our coffee and returned to barracks. for fear of being late we walked as fast as we could, but one or two of us got entangled in our spurs or fell head over heels over our swords. i cannot possibly give an adequate idea of the horrible stench which caught me by the throat when i opened the door of "my" room. imagine the odour of human beings, of which had not had a bath within the last three months, add to that the emanations from pairs of boots which had been in use for an average of three years, sheets that had not been changed for a month, and crown the mixture with a smell of stables rising through the floor (our room stood over a stable containing horses), and you will perhaps be able to gather a faint idea of what the place smelt like. five minutes after the trumpeters had returned to barracks the evening "call" took place. in the cavalry, troopers are not called by their individual names in the evening; but every trooper has either to stand at the foot of his bed in uniform if he has been out, or in stable dress if he has not left barracks, or else he can be in bed if he chooses. the sergeant of the week walks through the room, each corporal having to report with reference to absent men, whether they are on guard, or stable duty, on leave, or missing. when the sergeant has been the round of a room, the men can do what they like throughout the barracks until p.m., when they must all be in bed at the bugle call of "lights out." in my time the night call was at p.m., but since general boulanger was minister of war soldiers have been allowed to stop out until p.m. after the evening call we changed our clothes and the _volontaires_ collected in the canteen. this consisted of a large room, feet by ; a long table stood in the middle of it, with smaller tables on each side, forms running alongside of each. a kitchen opened on to this room, and the place was crowded. if the smell of our living-rooms was bad, the smell of the canteen was equally so: burnt fat, onions, garlic, wine, and bad tobacco furnished its chief components. a large number of men, and almost every corporal of the various squadrons in which the _volontaires_ were serving, were collected in the canteen in the hope--which was not deceived--of getting drinks from us. they chiefly appreciated red wine, which was sold at fivepence and sixpence a quart, superior wine fetching eightpence a quart. brandy could be had at a halfpenny a glass, or _s._ _d._ the quart. these prices left a very good margin of profit to the canteen-keeper, as all wines and spirits sold in french barracks are exempt from excise duty. a table had been reserved for us, and there the fourteen _volontaires_ who were serving that year met in the evening. that night our chief topic of discussion related to the _bienvenue_ (welcome), a canteen banquet offered by the _volontaires_ to the men and corporals of their respective _pelotons_. it was at length settled that this should take place on the following friday. at ten o'clock, when the trumpeters sounded "lights out," we returned to our respective rooms, and for the first time i was taught how to get into a military bed. to do this properly is a fine art. the bed, as i have already mentioned, was about two feet eight inches broad, and to guard against its occupant tumbling out blankets and sheets are tightly tucked under the straw mattress. in order to get in you have therefore to stand at the head of your bed, and to gently pull yourself inside as if you were getting into a bag. i got halfway down satisfactorily, but then, notwithstanding my efforts, i was unable to make further progress. suspecting that a practical joke had been played on me, i got out of bed, and soon found that it had been prepared apple-pie fashion. while i was examining my bed, i heard, not far from me, a tremendous noise, and saw the bed of one of my comrades rolling bodily on the floor. this is another favourite trick played on recruits, and easily accomplished. the bed consisting of three boards perched on two iron trestles, by pulling sharply the trestle which stands under the foot of the bed, the whole of it can be precipitated forward; while the sleeper, thus suddenly aroused, is further terrified by seeing the corporal (who usually is a party to the joke) near him, threatening to send him to the cells for kicking up a row. in the present case the sufferer was the impecunious _volontaire_ whom i have already mentioned. the poor fellow had to make his bed anew in the dark--no easy matter. [illustration: dragoon sitting on his bed eating from mess-tin] so far as i was concerned, i turned my attention to one of the troopers who had undertaken to look after me. he was a parisian, a former street arab, and i suspected him of having prepared an apple-pie bed in order to have a laugh at me. he pretended to be fast asleep, although i called him two or three times; but i struck a match and caught him grinning. in order therefore to make him heed me, i went to the foot of his bed and, seizing the iron trestle, determined to bring the whole affair to the floor if he did not get up. this soon aroused him. "look here, old chap," he exclaimed, "you don't try any of these 'ere jokes on your seniors, or else you'll smart for it." "well, titi," i replied, "you've got to make my bed over again, so, after all, the joke you wanted to play on me has been wasted, for it only gives you extra trouble." at first he declined to touch my things, but, as i warned him that if he didn't do it he'd never get another tip from me, he reluctantly set to work. it took me a pretty long time to go to sleep that night; my neighbour snored like a pug dog, and a goodly number of the eighty men who slept in the same room as myself, besides snoring, emitted such an atrocious effluvium that i did not feel able to go to sleep. it takes some time, too, to get accustomed to the noise of stables, and i could hear quite distinctly the chargers below constantly kicking their stalls; at last, however, i dropped to sleep from sheer exhaustion. chapter iii at o'clock in the morning i was aroused by a loud shouting; it was the corporal of the week who was passing through the room calling out, "any sick men here?" the names of the men who want medical attention have to be put down on the sergeant-major's morning report, on which also figures the morning call, which is merely nominal, as it never takes place in the cavalry. half an hour later the trumpeters sounded the _réveille_ and immediately the various corporals told off a certain number of men to go and clean the stables. i was one of those selected. hastily i donned my stable suit, of coarse canvas, and when i reached the stables, was told off to clean the straw under four horses--my comrade titi, who had accompanied me, being ordered to show me how to proceed. neither pitchforks nor shovels are used, the men having to separate with their hands the dry from the wet straw, and having also to pick out with their fingers whatever dung may be mixed with the litter. i scarcely relished this unsavory work, and as i did not consider it likely to improve in any way my military training, i tipped titi a franc to do it for me, while i went to the canteen to have a cup of coffee and a crust of bread. it may be noted here that before _réveille_ a jug of very thin coffee, with a pretence of sugar added to it, was brought into the rooms, but few of the men cared to touch it. those who were unable to afford the canteen preferred to break their fast with a glass of water and a slice of bread--not that the charges of the canteen were high, for a cup of coffee (so called) and a roll of bread costs but three halfpence--but there exists an unwritten but inviolable law that no man may take a drink of any kind by himself. _faire suisse_ is the term used to describe the fact of going to the canteen alone, and this is considered a real crime, to be severely punished by the rest, so that a poor fellow who gets a few francs monthly from his people must always share them with a comrade. it is also a curious fact that, although most men complain of the scarcity of the food supplied to them, few will ever spend in victuals the money they may receive from home--they invariably consume it in drink. at o'clock the trumpets sounded "stables," so fetching the bags containing our implements we returned to the stables to groom our chargers. every man has often two horses to groom--his own charger as well as the horse of any trooper who may be on guard, or otherwise employed.[ ] our chargers had not yet been allotted to us, so i was told to groom a lively little mare, which i afterwards found out enjoyed the reputation of being the most vicious charger of the whole squadron; however, whether it was that i was not afraid of her, or that she instinctively felt that i loved horses, we got on very well together. the grooming lasted for an hour, and towards o'clock the lieutenant of the week turned up and gave orders for the horses to be taken to the watering-tanks. as i was leading out the mare i had been grooming i was ordered by the lieutenant to also lead two other chargers; holding their reins in my right hand, i tried to jump on the bare back of the little mare--she was called "durance" after the name of a torrent in the south of france, and she well deserved her appellation. the moment i caught hold of her mane to jump on her back she plunged, and, jumping back a few steps, nearly brought her reins over her head. twice she played me the same trick, and at the same time the other horses, whose reins i held, pulled away from her, but the third time i landed on her back, and although she tried buck-jumping, i easily rode her with the other animals to the watering-tank. when i returned she was lively enough, but it was all play and not vice: and when i jumped off her back the lieutenant called me: "how do you like the mare?" he asked. "very much indeed, sir," i replied. "would you like her as your charger?" "certainly," i said. "very well," said the officer, "you shall have her, as you seem to be able to ride." i was quite delighted, and very soon made friends with the little beast (she was hardly hands high); she came to know me so well that at the end of a few months she used to follow me about like a dog. she was, it is true, very vicious at times, and would not let certain men come near her; she also had a hatred of officers, as years before she had been one of the surgeon-major's chargers, and the fellow used to thrash her unmercifully. she was one of the oldest chargers in the regiment--being eighteen years old--and originally came from hungary, where many horses were bought just after the franco-prussian war, but notwithstanding her age, she was full of "go" and of play. we became such good friends that many a time when i was on stable guard i used to lie alongside of her, my head resting on her neck, and she would remain quite still for hours until i moved. i always bought extra food for her, and kept her in tip-top condition. after "stables" we were taken to get our arms and saddlery, and shown how to take our carbines to pieces and put them together again. we then had the _gras carbine_, which has long since been discarded. at the call of "soup" ( a.m.) the troopers rushed off to the kitchen, and wishing to taste regimental food, i told titi to bring me my ration, and waited until it arrived. in those days food came from the kitchen in what was called a _gamelle_--a stout tin pot in the shape of a saucepan, without a handle, but with a tin cover. each man found his ration ready in the kitchen, with an allowance of salt on the lid of the _gamelle_; the fare consisted that morning of thin soup which tasted like sloppy water in which dishes might have been washed, with lumps of bread soaked in it and a little fat floating about in cold lumps. at the bottom of the pan was a bit of bone with very little meat on it, the ration of meat allowed to each man being four ounces including bone. the mere sight of that so-called soup and the filthiness of the pan which contained it, was too much for me. however ill-fed the men were, very few of them could ever finish the whole of their ration. when a man had finished eating he chucked his _gamelle_ into a corner, a trooper being told off every day to take the tins back to the kitchen. in my time men had to feed on their beds, but since the days of general boulanger things have, as i stated before, greatly altered. the men now eat at table, the food is served in dishes, and the man at the head of each table, who is generally a corporal, helps each man on his own enamelled plate. to return to my own experiences: i went to the canteen to get something to eat. most of the other _volontaires_ were already there, and, although the place was horribly dirty, i ate with great relish a couple of cutlets. we tried the various brands of wine; that at fivepence a bottle was more suitable for use as a dye than as a beverage, but the one at sixpence was quite drinkable, and the one at eightpence quite equal to the so-called claret sold at two shillings a bottle in second-rate london restaurants. we discovered that the canteen-keeper had a yet better brand at a shilling a bottle, and this was really very good. it was a genuine bottled wine, and not drawn from the cask like the others. during my stay in the regiment i was much struck with the fact that hardly any beer is drunk by frenchmen belonging to the lower classes. to see troopers drinking it was quite exceptional; wine was their staple drink, except when they wanted to get drunk, in which case they went in for brandy, which was served in flasks holding about two-thirds of a pint and costing fourpence. it took about a pint and a quarter of this stuff to have the desired effect. it was nearly a.m. before we had finished our breakfast, and i then returned to my quarters, most anxious to have a wash, which i had so far been obliged to do without. i asked titi where the lavatory was. "lavatory!" he laughed out; "his highness wants a lavatory. you'll get a lavatory in barracks, old chap. what else do you want?--a valet to dress your royal highness?" "but," i said, "isn't there any place where i can go and have a wash?" "oh yes, there's the pump!" this seemed rather unsatisfactory, and i could hardly believe it to be the case, so i went to the room of my friend sergeant de lanoy and asked him about it. "it's quite true, old man," he replied; "lavatories do exist in the barracks, but they have never been utilised since ' , and are now used for storing straw, so that the only place where you can go and have a wash is at the pump. if i were alone in my room," he added, "i would lend it to you, but the other sergeant who lives with me is a beast, and he would kick up a row if he found you performing your ablutions here." i had therefore to go to the pump, and fortunately found a bucket near at hand, so that i managed to wash at least the upper portion of my body. there is in each squadron a barber, who has to shave, free of cost, every trooper twice a week; but the mere sight of the fellow, to say nothing of his implements, was enough. it is impossible to realise how men can live in the state of filth which seems natural to french soldiers. hardly one of them ever thinks of washing his hands after cleaning the stables in the way i have previously described; occasionally some of them wash their faces, necks, and hands on sundays, or when they have to appear on parade, but many of them remain all the year round (except in the summer season, when they are sent in batches to the swimming baths) without taking a single bath or feeling the want of one. it will be seen how, later on, when we were permanently consigned to barracks, i had to get special leave from the doctor to be able to go out and have a bath in the town. at twelve o'clock we were all taken to the dispensary to be vaccinated, vaccination being compulsory throughout the french army. that operation concluded, we were taught to fold our clothes and shown how to arrange them on the shelves above our bed. at p.m. we returned to stables, after which the sergeant-major made us stand in circle round him while the regimental orders of the day were read out by the corporal _fourrier_, all the punishments inflicted upon officers, non-commissioned officers, and troopers being announced at the end of the orders. it has always struck me as a great mistake to let privates learn the punishments inflicted upon officers, as this, of course, tends to lower them in the eyes of their men. that day, for instance, i was much astonished to hear that one of the captains of the regiment had been punished by the colonel with fifteen days of _arrêts de rigueur_ (strict confinement to his room, with a sentry in front of his door) "for," said the orders, "having been seen walking about in a drunken state, with his uniform in disarray, at ten o'clock at night." this captain was greatly hated by the men, and it is needless to say that they all rejoiced at the punishment which had been inflicted upon him, expressing their feelings in the coarsest language. "stables" over, we hurried to the town, and our set met as usual at the crown hotel, where we exchanged impressions on military service. we were all unanimous in declaring it a filthy and disgusting ordeal. after the evening call, we entertained our respective corporals at the canteen, most of them having to be supported back to their beds. the following day was enlivened by the arrival of the ordinary recruits coming to serve their five years. most of them came from paris, and belonged to the worst set of ruffians imaginable. a few were countrymen, among whom were two or three stupid "bretons" coming from the remotest parts of brittany. one of the latter was assigned a bed next to the "old 'un," and therefore close to mine. as soon as he had eaten his evening meal, he sat on his bed, weeping bitterly, and as i asked him the cause of his grief he began with deep sobs: "our poor jeanne; it's the day she ought to calve, and to think that i shall not be near her! if you saw that cow, sir----" "oh! it's a cow!" "yes, sir, and when she calves she won't take any food except from my hand, and now i am here, and she calving! my poor jeanne, my poor jeanne!" i tried to console him, but it was in vain. of course, the other troopers made great fun of him, and one of them remarked that if his cow was as ugly as himself, and as ill-fed, she must be a hideous beast indeed. this drove the fellow into an absolute frenzy, and, seizing the sword hanging at the head of my bed, he would have made deadly use of it had i not forcibly prevented him. the recruits went, that day, through the routine we had undergone on the day of our arrival--the only difference being that they were marched in batches to the _capitain-tresorier's_ office under the command of a sergeant--and before evening every one of them had been drafted into a squadron, each recruit being put under the care of a trooper of at least a year's standing, who had to teach his _bleu_ (recruit) what to do. the recruits, upon receiving their outfit, have to hand over their civilian clothes, which are sold by auction. this rule did not, however, apply to the _volontaires_, but we had to remove our civilian clothes out of barracks, and were, under no circumstances, allowed to wear anything but uniform. that year the recruits numbered about , or twenty-five to each squadron. that night the most elaborate practical jokes were played on the new-comers. first of all an "artful dodger," a typical parisian blackguard, attired himself in a great coat and an old cocked hat; alongside of him marched two troopers with swords, helmets, and carbines, but devoid of all clothing. the "artful dodger" went to the bed of each one of the recruits. "get up," said another trooper, "here comes the surgeon-major." "you are a recruit, my boy?" queried the "artful dodger." "yes, sir," usually replied the recruit, rather awed. "don't call me 'sir,'" went on the tormentor, "call me 'monsieur le major.'" (the way in which military surgeons are addressed.) "get out of bed," he went on, "and be sharp about it." if the recruit declined to obey, he was dragged out of his bed by other troopers and stripped; many foul questions were then put to him, and the joke ended by his body being blackened all over with a blacking-brush if he took the proceedings ill. when the recruits had gone back to bed, the "dodger" and his companions proceeded to play other jokes on them. in order to enable my readers to understand what took place, it is necessary to recall the description of our rooms. these apartments were about feet long, with two partitions on each side of the centre, and rows of beds standing on each side of these partitions, which were from to feet high. the "dodger" and his companions, taking a forage-rope, with which every trooper is provided, tied a slip-knot around the bed of the recruit, so as to encircle the three boards forming the base of the bed as well as the mattress and the feet of the man inside it; the end of the rope was then thrown over the partition, being grasped on the other side by three or four men, while the "artful one" was peeping round the corner to see that the man had not moved. he then gave a whistle, the rope was smartly pulled, and the recruit's bed instantly stood straight up against the wall, the man inside it being tightly imprisoned with his feet held up in the air by the slip-knot and his head downwards. after leaving him for a few minutes in this uncomfortable position, the rope was suddenly slackened, and bed and man crashed with a great noise to the floor. this was called "sending a man to heaven," and the unfortunate victim could not possibly find out who was responsible for the "joke." another trick consisted in sticking a carbine-rod between the shelf and the clothes on it, over the recruit's head, so that the end of the rod projected above the fellow's face; a drinking-cup filled with water was then slung from the gun-rod by two strings fastened round its rim, while a third and independent string attached its handle to the rod. a piece of lighted paper was then placed on the top of the water, and before it had time to go out, it burnt the two first strings, tilting the water down as the cup remained suspended by its handle. the half-minute or so which elapsed between the lighting of the paper and the burning of the strings, enabled the men who had played the trick to get back to bed, so that the poor fellow whose face had been deluged with water was unable to find out who his persecutors were. in every case when the recruit made a noise, the corporal, who was invariably a consenting party to these rough "amusements," came forward and threatened to send him to the cells for disturbing his comrades. of course, to complain to the officers was considered by the troopers a heinous crime, and whoever did so was never tempted to adopt that course again. that same night one of the recruits whose bed had been sent "heavenwards" rushed to the sergeant's room and complained. the sergeant came to our quarters, and shouted in a loud voice, "look here, you fellows," "here's a recruit who has come to complain to me of having been bullied, as we have all been on joining the regiment; you had better leave him alone, and don't let him disturb me any more." thereupon, knowing well what the result would be, the sergeant retired to his room. immediately a blanket was produced round which from twelve to fifteen men stood holding it, while four other men collared the recruit and chucked him into it. before he knew where he was, he had been sent flying up to the ceiling, and as soon as he dropped into the blanket was again sent up, the operation being repeated a dozen times until all the breath had nearly left the poor fellow's body. the same misfortune, i am sorry to say, befell me that very night. a trooper from the second squadron, whose room was close to mine, sneaked in and pulled my bed down. i saw him go back to his room, and as soon as he had got under the blankets without noticing me, i pulled his bed down with a crash; but some other fellows had seen me, and, unfortunately for myself, i was ignorant at the time of the unwritten law that no practical jokes may be played on the men of a squadron different from one's own, so, before i realised where i was, i was chucked into a blanket and tossed more than once into the air. i must, however, add that the thing was purely done as a joke, and with no ill-feeling--the bed, indeed, that i had pulled down was that of my friend, walter. i found it by no means a disagreeable sensation to be tossed in a blanket, but i can quite understand that a repetition of the performance, a dozen times or more, may shake a man more than he may like. the following day we began to drill. after morning stables we were hurried to our rooms. we kept on our stable-dress, but had to exchange our clogs for boots, although we were allowed to wear ordinary shoes if we possessed any. we assembled in the barrack-square, _volontaires_ and recruits together, and three or four of us were told off under the orders of a corporal, who proceeded to explain to us the difference between our left and right leg. however absurd this may seem, it is absolutely necessary in the case of many recruits coming from remote districts in the provinces, and i have known some of them to take a fortnight before they realised the difference between left and right. we went through the various preliminaries of drill, we were taught to stand in line, to execute "by the left quick march," "right turn," "left turn," "right about turn," and so on--preliminary exercises, which are the same in all the armies of the world. at the end of two hours, at the call of "soup," we were to our great relief at last dismissed. at a.m. we were put through the first elements of _voltige_ (circus-riding). a specially-trained horse was brought into the riding-school, and while its foreleg was held up by a trooper, the others had to jump on its back from behind, leap-frog fashion. it was most amusing to see the efforts of some of the recruits to accomplish this feat, most of them at first rushing as hard as they could towards the horse, and ending by merely striking their noses against its tail; as, however, every man who failed to ultimately succeed in getting on the horse's back was sent to sleep in the cells, very few of us remained unsuccessful. we were afterwards placed on a bare-backed horse around which was buckled a surcingle with two handles--a non-commissioned officer holding the animal at the end of a long rope so as to make him canter in a circle. we had to jump on and off while the animal was cantering, and those who failed, or did not try their best, were usually rewarded with a smart cut from the huge circus-whip which the non-commissioned officer carried in his hand. we had also to repeat the same performance on a broad circus saddle, and many were those who, taking too powerful a spring, were sent flying outside the circle. these were merely preliminary exercises, however, and i will describe later on others we were called upon to do in the same way. among the recruits there was one so clumsy that he could never manage to alight on the horse's back, and no amount of assistance seemed to be of any use to him. the sergeant threatened to send the man to the lock-up, but he looked so helplessly stupid, and made such simple and amusing excuses, that his instructor could not find it in his heart to punish him. when placed on the bare-backed steed, he clung to the surcingle like a monkey, and upon being told to jump off, he rolled like an untidy bundle to the ground. the sergeant began to lose his temper, and warned the man that if he failed to get on again he would certainly be punished. thereupon the recruit caught hold of the handle and ran round the ring alongside of the cantering horse; at last, with a mighty effort, he got his knee upon the animal's back and finally sat there, looking half exhausted. "now," said the sergeant, "you see you can do it; jump off and try again." clumsily the recruit got down, and tripping, fell on his knees at the sergeant's feet. "now then, up you get!" cried the sergeant; "jump on once more." "jump on?" replied the recruit dreamily, as though just aroused from a reverie; "well, here goes!" and so saying, he took a mighty bound, and alighted on his feet on the back of the cantering horse! in another moment, turning a splendid somersault, he reached the ground, and stood composedly before the astonished sergeant, amidst universal laughter and applause. "you have been fooling me!" cried the latter, when he could find words. "forgive me, sergeant," said the fellow in reply; "you see, it isn't easy for a man to forget his business all at once; and the fact is, i have been a clown. houp-la!" and, taking a short run, he this time turned a somersault right over the still cantering horse. i may add that the ex-clown became a great favourite with all the officers, and was certainly one of the most wonderful trick-riders i have ever seen. after _voltige_ we were allowed some rest, and before "stables" we had an hour's physical drill. this consisted of bending the body downwards with extended arms, bending the knees with uplifted arms, and other exercises which are taught in every english and foreign gymnasium. a curious part of the performance consisted, however, in the principles of french boxing. the position in which we were placed would have been the joy of any english schoolboy; we were told to put our legs well apart, one foot twenty inches behind the other, the left arm level with our chin, and the right arm a little lower. the first movement consisted in striking forward with the right fist. we then had to bring forward the right leg, which had been extended the whole time behind the left; as we brought the right leg forward we had to strike it against the calf of our left leg, so as to give a powerful kick with the heel, which then described a circle, bringing our right foot twenty inches behind the left. such is what is called "french boxing." in the evening, after "soup," we were taken to the riding-school, having to dress for the purpose in undress uniform--namely, the red trousers with leather covering which i have previously described, a short jacket, a képi, and white gloves--pieces of rags being tied round the rowels of our spurs. we were first taught how to dress in line, and how to stand at our horse's head. at the command of "prepare to mount!" we had to take a long step backwards, slipping the reins through our left hand and catching hold of the mane with it while we seized the pommel of the saddle with the right, and at the command "mount!" we had to raise ourselves well up (our weight resting on the wrists), and then throw the right leg over the saddle. many of us were unable to get on our horses in this way without a good deal of shoving up by the corporals. once on our horses, the position we had to assume was explained, and we were also taught how to hold our reins and how to direct our animals (we had only a snaffle on our bridles). we were then marched in indian file after a corporal all round the riding-school. most of the recruits knew something about horses, as those drafted into the cavalry are usually picked out from amongst farm hands, carters, or men who have had something to do with stables. some of them, however, had never been on a horse in their lives, and when the command "trot!" was given, two or three very soon tumbled off. i had been warned beforehand by my friend, de lanoy, that the looseness and roughness of our military trousers would cause me serious abrasions unless i adopted a plan which had succeeded admirably with him. i had accordingly brought with me when i joined the regiment a few pairs of thin doeskin riding-breeches, which i put on before dressing to go to the riding-school, and over these i pulled my trousers, an easy matter if one considers the abnormal size of the latter. i congratulated myself many a time afterwards upon having adopted this plan, as i was the only man who never was galled. at the end of an hour we were dismissed, and having taken back our horses to the stables, we were shown how to rub them down with straw, and we then returned to our room, carrying our saddles on our heads. it was that night that the _bienvenue_ (welcome supper) was to take place. the evening "call" over, we therefore repaired to the canteen, where the fourteen _volontaires_ sat down with about one hundred and twenty of the corporals and troopers belonging to their respective _pelotons_. as one canteen would not have been able to accommodate this number, it was arranged that as there were _two_ canteens in our regiment, the _volontaires_ of the first and second squadrons should give their _bienvenue_ in one, while those of the third and fourth squadrons would use the other. we accordingly sat down with about sixty of our guests, the corporals and troopers of our companies. tables had been laid in a large room and we crowded around them. cold meats, sausages, coffee, with wine and brandy _ad libitum_, formed the bill of fare. as the meal proceeded, and the men helped themselves to a liberal quantity of wine, they became more and more noisy. at last one of the corporals, although very drunk, stood on a form and demanded "order," adding that the company would now be favoured with a few songs; and at the same time calling upon anybody who could sing to add to the pleasure of the entertainment. nobody responded, so, rising once more, the corporal, after swallowing a large glass of brandy to steady himself, began in a drunken and cracked voice to sing a sentimental ditty, an old and simple country song which, although interrupted by many hiccups, was greeted with much applause. next came a lanky country bumpkin whose regimental training had been unable to obliterate his countrified appearance; he sang, with the utmost monotony and an innumerable number of false notes, an atrociously indecent song, the coarseness of which had evidently never struck him. every one of the troopers took up the chorus, which they all sang in different keys, but with marvellous seriousness. then came the turn of a parisian ruffian, who sang in a voice of thunder an old and also very obscene regimental song, of course with a chorus; he could, however, not get further than the second verse, for in the middle of this he collapsed on the floor, and interrupted for a moment the gaiety of the proceedings by so noisy an attack of sickness that the whole distinguished company called for his removal. (we found him later on soundly asleep on a dung-heap in the barrack-yard.) after his removal, another trooper, also a countryman, sang a religious song, with a mournful tune, which ran into more than twenty verses, but was greatly appreciated. at this point the delightful proceedings were once more interrupted, this time by a fight between two corporals. they went for each other like madmen, kicking, scratching, and biting one another. they were, however, too drunk to hurt each other much, and everything would have concluded peacefully had not the quarrel degenerated into a free fight, which resulted in the smashing of a good many glasses and plates, for which we had, of course, to pay. the whole bill, however, only amounted to about _s._ for each one of the _volontaires_. before the call of "lights out" peace had been restored, and the whole company adjourned to their respective rooms, most of the troopers supporting (?) one another and collapsing a good many times on the way. i shall never forget the scene when we got near the dung-heap. we discovered the fellow of whom i spoke just now, fast asleep in the mire, and four or five of his comrades volunteered to get him out, but, being as drunk as himself, they all fell in a heap on the top of him, and it was only with great difficulty that they were extricated from the filth and, in a state that i dare not describe, carried to their room. some of the men who were boisterously drunk were sent to pass the night in the cells by a corporal who resented not having been invited, and having thus missed the chance of a good "booze." on the friday, at o'clock in the morning, the trumpeters sounded "forage," and we were all paraded in the yard, each one of us carrying his forage-rope. (sergeant de lanoy had previously told me that he couldn't excuse me from this work, but he promised that he would manage to let me slip off in the middle of it.) we were then marched to the forage-store, some two hundred yards away from the barracks; and there stood the officers of the week of each squadron, whose duty it was to get delivery of the forage required for the next seven days. each of the troopers was told to pick out of a heap eight huge bundles of straw, and to fasten them together with his forage-rope, the end of which is fitted with a kind of metal pulley so as to form a slip-knot. the rope being thus tied round the eight bundles of straw, we were supposed to take the load on our shoulders and to carry it to the squadron store. to peasants and men of the lower classes, such as were most of the troopers, men who had been accustomed from their boyhood to carry heavy and cumbrous loads, this entailed merely a little extra exertion, but to one who, like myself, had never been used to manual work, it was almost an impossible task. the other troopers enjoyed, of course, the sight of a gentleman carrying on his back a cumbersome weight of nearly one hundred and sixty pounds. i did my best to go on with it, but i had not covered fifty yards before one of the bundles began to drop out of the heap, and the whole load soon came to the ground. i did my best to tie it together again, but when it came to hoisting it on to my back i found that it was out of the question. in vain did i ask some of the troopers who had already carried one load, and were returning to the stores, to help me; they all laughed, but none of them would give me a hand. to my great relief, however, my friend titi soon appeared on the scene, and, telling me to wait a few minutes, he promised that when he returned with his own load he would relieve me of a few bundles. while i was waiting for him a captain chanced to pass; i saluted him, but he did not return my salute, and merely said: "what the devil are you doing here?" "i cannot manage to carry my load, sir," i replied. "now catch hold of it at once, you blasted lazy beggar!" he cried, standing in front of me, and waiting to see me execute his order. i renewed my efforts, but was unable to hoist the enormous bundle on to my shoulders. the captain then called out to two troopers who happened to pass by: "stick me that load on that lazy dog's shoulders!" he said to them. they lifted the bundle, and dropping it on the top of my head before i was prepared for it, they brought me to the ground under the heap. this put the captain in a fury; he swore at me and cursed me, and said that it was all obstinacy on my part, and that i would "d----d well have to carry it." at last i managed to get it on my shoulders, and went twenty-five yards farther with it; but it was too much for me, and i had to put it down once more. fortunately, the captain had disappeared, and titi soon came to my relief. although he was carrying seven bundles, he took three of mine, and i was then able to carry the five remaining ones as far as the squadron stores. these, i found to my astonishment, to have been originally built as a lavatory, with a number of large basins for the use of the men. i stopped there a little while, hoping to escape a repetition of my previous experience, when our sergeant-major looked into the place. "what are you doing there, you lazy dog?" (the actual expression which is constantly used in french regimental slang, by officers and non-commissioned officers alike, cannot be translated into english for more than one reason.) in reply to the sergeant-major's civil question i told him that i was putting the straw in order, but he told me to return at once to the stores. all the straw had already been carried away, so i was told off to carry four bundles of hay, each one of them tied up in the shape of a ball and weighing about fifty pounds. i told the corporal that i should be unable to bear such a weight, especially considering the enormous size of the load. he abused me, called me a lazy dog, and as he was raising his voice an officer came to see what was the matter. "the fellow refuses to carry his load," said the corporal. "refuses!" exclaimed the officer. "no, sir," i interrupted; "i merely said that i was unable to bear the weight of such a load." the officer, who was one of the exceptionally just and gentlemanly lieutenants in our regiment, told me to try and carry two bundles, and to show him that i appreciated his manner towards me, i did my best to go on with them. i only succeeded, however, in going half way to the barracks, and then i tipped another trooper to carry my load as far as the stores. i escaped having to carry any more, de lanoy having considerately ordered me to sweep the straw in front of the building. the following days were devoted to drill, stables, and the routine i have already described; on sundays we had no drill, but, unless we had obtained leave, we had to attend stables. the first sunday, i obtained midnight leave, so that i was able to have a quiet dinner and to enjoy the luxury of a thoroughly good wash. the second week passed off very much in the same way, but at the end of it i obtained twenty-four hours' leave, so that i was enabled to go to paris. i can hardly describe the delight i felt at wearing civilian clothes, in which i felt a gentleman once more. footnote: [ ] non-commissioned officers do not groom their own chargers; they are allowed an orderly, to whom they pay _s._ per month. corporals are supposed to groom their chargers, but usually order a trooper to do so. chapter iv at the end of about three weeks the colonel decided to form the _volontaires_ into a separate _peloton_, as, according to the usual custom, they had to follow a special course of instruction besides learning the ordinary regimental duties of a trooper. a sergeant, assisted by a corporal, was put in charge of us under a captain selected to supervise our instruction. sergeant legros, who was placed in command of the _volontaires_, was well known as one of the sulkiest brutes in the whole regiment. our captain, whose name was hermann, was the colonel's nephew. when this "_décision_" appeared in the regimental orders, read after "stables," all the troopers had a good laugh at us. "well, old chaps," they said, "now you're going to have a grand time of it. by jove, won't you!" i went to de lanoy's room and asked him what sort of a fellow legros was. de lanoy told me that he was the son of a small farmer, and was a stubborn, vindictive man, who positively enjoyed punishing his men and doing a bad turn to his fellow sergeants whenever he got a chance. this picture, indeed, was but too accurately drawn. our captain was in command of my own squadron, and i had already had a specimen of his manners when i went before him to try on my clothes. notwithstanding his rough and abrupt manners, i must concede that he was a gentleman; but, unfortunately, for the future he scarcely ever came to see us, and left to the sergeant the entire control of the _volontaires_, merely signing the daily reports drawn up by legros. the following day the colonel paid one of his rare visits to the barracks, and had the _volontaires_ mustered in the riding-school. we waited there for him more than an hour. when he appeared he walked past us, surveying each one of us with a disgusted look on his face. he was a harsh, stout, sulky looking officer. for a few minutes he walked up and down in front of us, talking with our captain and striking his boot with his riding-stick. then, suddenly turning towards us with one hand in his pocket and the other on the handle of his riding-whip, which was stuck under his arm, he addressed us. "so," he said, "you're the _volontaires_ who have been sent to demoralise my regiment. well, there are a few things i want you to remember; you are serving five times less than other troopers; you will therefore have five times more work, five times more punishments, and five times less leave than the rest." then turning towards the non-commissioned officer: "dismiss your men," he said, and at the same time he walked away with our captain. before dismissing us our sergeant also thought fit to address us: "you are now going to be under my orders," he began, "and you may have been told that the _volontaires_ who served last year had a good time of it, but if you think that you are going to be treated as they were, you are jolly well mistaken. i mean to make you work, and to make you work hard too. there are a few hard-mouthed ones among you. i will use the curb with them so as to soon break them in." with these words he dismissed us. as we were running off to the canteen he recalled us. "at eleven o'clock," he said, "you will have to be at the gymnasium without arms." so saying, he dismissed us once more. it was then a quarter to eleven, so that we hardly had any time for our food. at eleven o'clock sharp we were all standing where he had ordered us, and the corporal, having dressed us in a single file, stood grumbling at not having had time for his meal. it was raining hard, and as the sergeant had not appeared at the end of a quarter of an hour, the corporal took us inside one of the stables. nearly three-quarters of an hour elapsed before legros turned up. he marched us to a room specially reserved as a schoolroom for _volontaires_, and also used as a lecture-room for those troopers who aspired to pass the examination necessary for obtaining the rank of corporal. at the end of the room stood a raised platform with a desk for the sergeant, while we sat at tables, twelve to fourteen of which stood in pairs facing the sergeant's desk. having been ordered to take our seats, we placed ourselves as we liked, all those belonging to my set selecting a table far away from the sergeant's desk. he began by giving us a list of books we were to purchase--viz.: . "general instructions as to the service in barracks" (_service intérieur des troupes de cavalerie_). . "cavalry drill regulations" (_réglement sur les exercices de la cavalerie_). . "the duties of cavalry in the field" (_service de la cavalerie en campagne_). . "moral duties of the soldier." . "dismounted cavalry drill regulations" (_réglement sur les exercices de la cavalerie à pied_). besides these there was another book, the title of which i cannot remember, and which is now out of print. this book contained most interesting information as to the composition of the french army, the details of the rations allowed to troopers, as well as the principles of topography, and many other matters of use to soldiers. the sergeant then explained to us what our daily work would consist in. we should no longer have to groom our horses, except on saturdays[ ] and sundays. but this was to be our time-table: from . a.m. to a.m. school. from to a.m. drill on foot. from to a.m. breakfast. from to school. from to p.m. gymnastics. from to p.m. _voltige_ (circus-riding). from . to p.m. school. from to p.m. dinner. from to p.m. mounted drill. as will be seen by the above, we had only two hours to ourselves during the whole day, and we had absolutely no chance of being able to leave barracks. we were to begin this programme at once, but as it was necessary that we should purchase the books of which a list had been handed over to us, the sergeant told us that we should have no _voltige_ that day, but that we could, instead of it, go to the town to purchase our books. we hurried to dress, and at . every one of us was once more in the schoolroom. the sergeant, however, gave us leave to smoke during our lectures, a concession which we all greatly appreciated. we were first given to study "the moral duties of the soldier." this little book begins with an outline of the origin of the first permanent french army created by charles vii. in . it tells how this army was recruited at first on the principle that each parish had to supply one man, and how this small force continuously and rapidly grew in numbers under the following reigns: how in the time of louis xiv. the french army already numbered , men; how vauban, the greatest engineer of modern times, fortified the frontiers of france, drew up new rules for carrying on the siege of fortified places, and was alleged to be the inventor of bayonets; how louvois, when he became minister of war, compelled the officers to be punctual in their service, improved the armaments, erected the first barracks, established regular pay, and devised new uniforms. the book then went on to tell us that before the great revolution of last century the active army was recruited by recruiting sergeants; while the provincial militia consisted of men called under the flag by conscription, the poorer classes alone being compelled to serve. the highest commands were granted to incapable courtiers, commissions being exclusively granted to noblemen; corporal punishment was in force, and the condition of soldiers was a most miserable one. thus desertions were of constant occurrence. with the revolution came great changes; the provincial militia was abolished and corporal punishment was suppressed, bravery and military worth entitled any citizen to reach the highest ranks; and this enabled eminent soldiers to reveal themselves--men such as hoche, kléber, desaix, jourdan, masséna, lecourbe and many others, most of whom became field-marshals and generals under napoleon. as will be seen, the drift of all this was to try and impress our minds with the fact that we were entirely indebted for our present happy (?) condition to the republic. this sketch was read to us by the sergeant, who, taking no more interest in the matter than we did, soon stopped and told us to read the remainder carefully, while he himself proceeded to enjoy a novel. the rest of the booklet contained a summary description of the various wars of the republic, and of the first empire, special stress being laid on the persistent antagonism of "perfidious albion." a brief summary of the war of ' was also given, concluding with these words: "do not let us forget this terrible lesson; do not let us slumber in apparent security, lest on our awakening we find the soil of france invaded by the enemy. let us therefore adopt and put in practice this fine motto, the basis of a strong army, "'work and discipline.'" then came a pompous dissertation on the duties of citizens towards _la patrie_, and on the duties of soldiers towards their superiors, beginning thus: "what is subordination and discipline?" the answer consisted of three pages of high-sounding phrases, among which i may quote the following: "orders must be executed to the letter without hesitation or murmuring, the authority from which orders come being alone responsible for them; _the inferior has only the right to complain after he has obeyed and carried out his orders_ ... unquestioning and blind obedience is absolutely necessary to enable every individual effort to work towards a common aim." curiously enough, duelling is officially countenanced in these regulations, which are still in force: "if a soldier has been gravely insulted by one of his comrades, and the insult has taken place in public, he must not hesitate to claim reparation for it by a duel. he should address his demand to his captain, who should transmit it to the colonel; but it must not be forgotten that duels must be the exception, and that a good soldier ought to avoid quarrels." the passage relating to cleanliness is rather interesting: "troopers are sent to the swimming-baths in the summer, and are allowed to have tepid baths in winter, in order to scrape off the deposit formed on the surface of the body by perspiration and dirt (_sic_)." i must add that, as in many other cases, theory and practice differ vastly, for in my time there existed but one dilapidated bath in the whole of our barracks, where men were quartered. no appliance for admitting hot water into the bath existed, so that, when it had to be used for a sick man, hot water had to be carried from the nearest kitchen yards away! i need dwell no longer on this little book, evidently written with the best intentions, but entirely ignored by every french soldier. at the end of an hour or so the sergeant closed his novel, and told us to learn by heart two pages of the regulations dealing with drill on foot. in order to show how narrow-minded sergeant legros was, i must mention that he expected us to learn _verbatim_ every single sentence of those regulations. so far as i am concerned (and i am not the only one who suffers from this defect in memory), i am totally unable to learn anything _verbatim_, so that, when an hour later, the sergeant called upon me to recite what i had learnt, instead of reciting the following: "at the command of 'cavalerie en avant--marche,' the trooper _places_ the whole weight of his body on his right foot, _after which he_...." &c. &c. i recited, "at the command of 'cavalerie en avant--marche,' the trooper _puts_ the whole weight of his body on his right foot _and then_...." &c. &c. the sergeant stopped me: "you blockhead," he exclaimed, "what the deuce is that you are reciting?" "what you gave us to learn, sergeant." "what i gave you to learn! go and look at your regulations, and you'll see if it's right, and as you can't learn the thing in an hour, you will be confined to barracks next sunday, and that will give you plenty of time to ponder over it." in everything we were given to learn it was always thus. legros cared little or nothing whether we understood what we learnt or not, but he attached the greatest importance to our repeating it _verbatim_, notwithstanding the fact that he was himself unable to do so. even when we had to learn the principles of surveying, he expected us to know word for word every explanation given in the book. later on, before we were dismissed, the sergeant called me up once more, and finding that this time i could answer his question to his satisfaction, he cancelled my punishment, telling me, however, that he would deprive me of the right of applying for leave on the following sunday. as the routine of our daily work made it impossible for us to dine out in future, we made an arrangement with the canteen-keeper, who agreed to supply us with board at the rate of £ a month, and henceforth a table was permanently reserved in the canteen for us. we had been more than two hours in the schoolroom, and it was with real relief that we heard the trumpeter's call of "soup" (dinner). before dismissing us from school, however, the sergeant read us the regimental orders for the day, which contained a reference to ourselves. "the _volontaires_," said the colonel, "are warned that they are, under no circumstances, to ask for another troopers' help, either to clean their outfits, or their arms, or to get their horses saddled. any _volontaire_ receiving assistance from another trooper will have eight days' _salle de police_, and the trooper who has helped him will receive a similar punishment." "now you're warned," commented the sergeant, "and although i have no right to interfere with those who don't belong to my squadron, i'll see about those among you who are in it, and i'll take jolly good care that the colonel's orders are strictly carried out." here was a nice state of affairs! we had but two hours to ourselves every day, and we were expected, not only to take our meals during that time, but also to do work for which an ordinary well-trained trooper was supposed to require three to four hours of steady application! that we could carry out the colonel's orders was physically impossible, and the only result was that the two men who looked after our things insisted upon getting two francs more a week, as a compensation for the risk of punishment to which they were exposed. that evening we had our first mounted drill in the riding-school under our new sergeant, and we were able to realise what a bully the man was. he frequently kept us trotting without rest for a quarter of an hour at a time, though it may be remembered that we had no stirrups, and riding as we did on hard saddles with coarse trousers was a terrible strain on most fellows who had very little previous training on horseback. it was then that i appreciated the precaution i had taken of donning doeskin riding breeches under my trousers. one of my comrades fainted from sheer exhaustion, while three others dropped off their horses, but every one of them was immediately ordered to remount, and the trotting went on for fully five minutes longer. when our sergeant commanded a halt and let us dismount for a few minutes' rest, some of my comrades sat on the ground, completely exhausted; they were coarsely rebuked, and ordered to stand up at once, the sergeant commanding "attention!" "there's a fine lot of troopers," he said, "who can't even stick on a horse and trot round a riding-school without coming a cropper! now i warn you that, if one of you falls off again, i'll keep you on the trot until every blessed one of you drops from exhaustion--you blasted recruits!" and forthwith he gave the command to "mount," starting us immediately at a trot. on we went round and round the riding-school, and god knows how long we should have been kept on the move had not our captain appeared on the scene. the sergeant's manner altered immediately; he made us halt and spoke gently, carefully explaining to each one of us the right position on horseback, and while the captain was there, never kept us trotting or cantering for more than a couple of minutes at a time. during one of the rests the captain said that he could not congratulate us, as a body, on our riding; "out of fourteen of you," he said, "there are not five who understand a horse, and i see but three who can really ride." i am glad to say that i was among the three that he pointed out with his whip. how one of the _volontaires_ could ever have been foolish enough to join a cavalry regiment passes my comprehension; the poor fellow was absolutely ignorant of the first principles of riding; he was, besides, terribly afraid of horses, and never managed to get over his dread; in fact, it was through sheer luck that he stuck on his horse for five consecutive minutes. hardly a day passed during the first two months of his service without coming a cropper, although he was allotted the quietest horse in the regiment. i must mention here that our horses were changed every day, and that, besides, while we drilled in the riding-school, we were told to change horses in the middle of the lesson. the first day, i was mounted on a mare, who was the worst kicker i ever came across in my life; she could kick so high that at times she almost stood perpendicular with her hind legs in the air, but fortunately she had a very tender mouth, so that with judgment and good handling it was easy to check her antics. when we were told to exchange horses i handed over the mare to my neighbour, the son of a farmer, who had never ridden anything but plough-horses; the moment he got on the mare's back she gave a tremendous kick and he was sent flying in the air, and turning a complete somersault he landed on his back. he soon got up and was ordered to mount again, but he had no sooner done so than the mare, guessing his lack of confidence, gave another furious kick, with her hind legs so straight in the air that he slipped over her head to the ground, where he sat in front of his charger. it was fortunate for him that in these two instances the animal was immediately caught by a corporal, as that mare was such a vicious brute that she never failed, after having thrown her rider, to turn round and try to kick him. i was therefore ordered to take her back, and having asked leave to remove the rags covering my spur rowels, i was allowed to do so. as soon as i got on her back she tried her kicks once more, but i gave her such a dressing with the sharp points of my spurs, holding her head well up at the same time, that she became as quiet as a lamb for the remainder of the evening. i often rode this charger afterwards, having a particular liking for her, as she ambled easily, and one hardly moved on her back while trotting, a great boon when one has to ride without stirrups. when we were dismissed that evening several of my comrades were almost unable to walk, and one of them had his knees so terribly scraped that he was losing a large quantity of blood, and was literally leaving a red trail on the ground behind him! notwithstanding this, he was compelled to ride the following day, as he did not wake up in time to report himself sick, and was therefore not allowed to attend the surgeon-major's visit. footnote: [ ] saturday being inspection-day. chapter v so far none of the _volontaires_ had been punished, and it fell to my lot to be the first to become acquainted with the _salle de police_. i had been ordered to ride that evening the kicking mare i described just now, but the revengeful beast, remembering the lesson i had given her on the previous day, let out with her hind legs the moment she saw me coming near her stall with a saddle. i laid it on the ground and tried to get into the stall in order to tie her head up before saddling her. try as i would, i could not possibly manage to get alongside of her, the stalls being very narrow, and consisting of wooden partitions hung up by a chain fixed to the ceiling. these partitions, which are two feet broad, stand about four feet from the ground, so, getting into the next stall, i climbed over the partition and got alongside the charger and caught her by the head-stall. a more vicious beast i never came across; not only did she try to bite me, but she also tried to stamp on my foot, then she kicked me with her near hind leg, and while i was tying her head up she gave me a forward kick with her foreleg; and when i brought the saddle to put it on her back, she lashed out so furiously that she broke the rope by which i had tied her head high up and bit me viciously. she was titi's charger, and he alone was able to manage her, so i sent a trooper to call him to help me. titi came, and i was holding the mare's head while he was putting the saddle on her back when the sergeant-major suddenly appeared. "what are you doing there?" he asked titi. "sergeant-major," i replied, "i could not manage to saddle the beast, and as i have to ride her to-night, i asked titi to help me." "very well," answered the sergeant-major, "you will both have eight days' _salle de police_, and if i catch you another time," he went on, addressing titi, "it's eight days' prison _you_ will get." so saying he walked away pompously, evidently well pleased with himself. "well, old chap," said titi to me, "so you've got it at last." i felt very crestfallen, but i had no time to think much about the matter, as i was already late and had to rush to riding-school. the drill over, i hastened to de lanoy's room and asked him to intercede for me with the sergeant-major. he promised to do so at once, and i anxiously awaited the result of his interview. at the end of a few minutes i was called into the sergeant-major's room. "i am very sorry for you, decle," said the latter; "de lanoy has spoken to me on your behalf, and if he had done so sooner i might have overlooked the matter this time, on account of the special circumstances, but your punishment has already been put down on the report, so the best thing you can do is to go through it with good grace." when i returned to my room all the other troopers chaffed me unmercifully, but titi was practical and sympathetic. "now look here, old man," said he, "let me give you a few tips. first of all, as you've got warm drawers i advise you to put on two or three pairs one on the top of the other, and i also advise you to wear two or three thick vests, because you know you'll have to be searched before you go to the cells, and you are not allowed to wear any regimentals under your canvas trousers and blouse. you'll have to put on your clogs, and all the covering you are allowed is your bread-bag" (a canvas bag i have already described, and called a bread-bag because it is generally used for fetching the loaves of bread from the bakery. it afforded very little covering, being only about four feet by two). at a quarter to eight the trumpeters called "the men under punishment," and i went down with titi to the guard-room. there were a dozen troopers punished with _salle de police_ that evening, and we were drawn up in front of the guard-room. the sergeant came out with a lantern, and having called out our names he began to search us. he felt us all over to see that we had neither matches, tobacco, candles, nor spirits concealed under our clothes. but he was a good fellow, and did not make as thorough a search as i have seen made by some others. one trooper only, who had his riding trousers under his canvas ones, was ordered to pull them off, getting two days more for wearing them. we were then marched off to the cells. we first reached a huge door which the sergeant opened with an enormous key. this door led into a passage, on the left of which were five heavily bolted doors leading into the cells reserved to the men punished with solitary confinement. at the end of the corridor stood a solid door reminding one of the traditional prison portal of the old melodrama; it was locked with two gigantic iron bolts, each one closing with a key; when these had been drawn, a key half a foot long and more than an inch thick was inserted in the centre lock, in which it turned with a grating noise. the door itself was at least six inches thick and covered with heavy iron nails. we had to stoop to pass through the doorway, and were immediately greeted by a dreadful stench. the light of the lantern being turned on our faces we could hardly see where we were going, but when we had all marched in the sergeant gave a look round with his lantern and thus enabled me to get a glance at the place. the room, a kind of cellar, was about twenty feet square. on each side of it ran a sloping wooden platform about seven feet broad, its base standing a couple of feet above the cement floor; at the top of the platform was a raised board about two inches high and one foot broad, which was meant as a pillow; this platform was our bed. the room was about ten feet high, and at the extremity of it, near the ceiling, was a small window, perhaps three square feet in area, strongly and closely barred. the only furniture consisted of an earthenware jug containing water and an iron cup. in a corner of the room, in a small recess, stood a large barrel about four feet high, with two steps leading to the top of it, and with two iron handles on each side. this, in regimental slang, is called "jules," and is the only sanitary (?) convenience at the disposal of the prisoners. the whole place, having no means of ventilation, was musty and slimy. we all stretched ourselves on the platform, and the sergeant, having seen us thus comfortably settled for the night, retired. [illustration: the plank bed] as soon as the key had been removed from the outer door i heard the cracking of a match, and a candle was lit by my friend titi. having stuck the candle on the flat edge at the top of the bed he at once jumped to the floor and addressed us. "look here, boys," he began, "i am the chairman of this 'ere meeting, as i hold the record for attendance in this hall, where i have already presided over many a merry gathering. as chairman, and as your senior, i must warn you that my authority has to be recognised by every one of you, and in my capacity of commander of the place, i may as well remind you of the regulations. remember that 'refusal to obey is a most heinous crime, the offender being liable to be tried by court-martial.' as i notice that there are a few uninitiated members here to-night, i will let them know what are the rules and regulations of the place. i will first proceed to the inspection." so saying, he ordered us to stand in a single file in the middle of the room; and all the troopers, scenting fun, readily obeyed. he then commanded four of us, who were making our first appearance in the place, to step forward, allowing the others to sit down. "troopers," he said, addressing us and mimicking the colonel capitally, "you have the honour of being admitted for the first time to these ancient precincts, which have sheltered many a great man, and it now becomes necessary that you should pay due homage to our military patron, the great and noble jules. in order not to interrupt the sanctity of your devotions, we shall leave you in _tête-à-tête_ with our noble patron, whom you will have at the same time to guard. trooper decle," he concluded, "right turn by the left, quick march!" having been warned beforehand of this traditional farce, i executed the movement, and when i came within a step of "jules" was ordered to halt. "now," said titi, closing the door upon me, here are your orders: "in case any one knocks at the door you are to challenge the fellow and inquire what he wants, and you must also see that jules does not run away." the door was then closed upon me, and i was nearly stifled. at the end of a minute or two came a knock. "who goes there?" i said. "your commander," replied titi from outside; "have you followed my instructions, and has jules inspired you?" he went on. "yes," i replied, "he told me that the distinguished company would feel thirsty in the morning, and he advised me to allay their thirst." "that's right," answered titi, opening the door; i then handed over to him a five-franc piece to pay my footing. "boys," he exclaimed, "'tis a hind wheel" (_une roue de derrière_--the slang word for a silver dollar). "three cheers for decle." the cheers were duly given. the three other recruits were still standing in the middle of the room. "now what may your name be, you pug-nosed, carroty villain?" demanded titi, addressing one of the fellows standing up--a recruit. "dieudonné, _présent_," shouted the boy, adding to his name the answer given at a roll-call. promptly he was marched to jules as i had been, and locked in, but he was left there for ten minutes at least. when titi went to release him the lad only offered one franc. "it won't do, my boy," said titi. the fellow replied that this was all he possessed; but on his promising to give fifty centimes more in the morning, "to make up the price of a quart of brandy," he was released. then came the turn of the third recruit: he was a tall and magnificently built fellow, feet inch high. "now, you _colonne de la bastille_,[ ] what name has your father transmitted to his pillar of a son?" "look 'ere you," cried the recruit, "don't imagine that i am going to let myself be bullied like those two other idiots." "i say, tommy," remarked an old trooper of four years' standing, "don't be an ass; we're having a bit of fun, and even the _volontaire_ has played the game like a man: we've all been through it; if you don't go willing, you'll be made to go unwilling. go on, old chap." it was of no use; the man sulked and would not budge. thereupon titi began another speech, giving this time an imitation of one of our lieutenants. "ahem, i warned you, my friend, of the--as i might say--disastrous; yes, disastrous consequences of disobedience; you, er--understand well--disobedience--well, as i said, i shall have you removed where you won't--or, rather, where you decline to--go. now, boys," he added, turning towards the other men. four of them had already jumped up, and among them a certain piatte, a kind-hearted, clumsy-looking chap, but a most powerful man. the first who approached the recruit were knocked down, but piatte, catching him by the legs from behind, brought him to the floor. the three others at once seized him by the arms and head, while piatte held his legs, and so carried he was roughly bundled into jules' corner, and the door locked upon him. to make it the more secure the door was then tightly held by four men, while the recruit inside kicked and hammered at it in vain. "you cowards," he howled, with curses; "you took me unawares, four to one, and from behind too; wait until i get out! you don't know who i am. i am _jeannot the butcher, the terror of belleville_!" "shut up, jeannot, and listen one minute," cried piatte, in his deep bass voice. "if you like i'll stand up to you; fair fight, mind you; square fall, both shoulders touching. is that a go?" jeannot ceased hammering upon the door. "all right," he shouted. "now, you fellows, open the door!" "let go, boys," said piatte. slowly the tall recruit stepped out; his face was flushed, his eyes bloodshot. folding his arms on his chest he looked round. "where's the idiot who dares challenge me?" he said, surveying us with contempt. "i am that 'ere idiot," said piatte, good-naturedly. jeannot looked at him and laughed. "so," he said, "you want me to crush your bones? you fancy yourself pretty strong, but presently you'll be sorry you spoke, putty-face!" "very well, my boy, very well," quietly replied piatte, beginning to strip. jeannot followed his example, and as he had but a shirt under his blouse, he was soon naked to the waist. he was a magnificent specimen of humanity. his muscles looked as if made of cast-iron; his chest was broad, his body supple, and his wrists and hands were not coarse like those usually found among the labouring classes. piatte took longer to strip, having a couple of flannel shirts and three heavy vests to remove. when he was bare to the waist, he appeared immensely powerful indeed, but lacking the manly beauty of jeannot. he was thick set, with a short neck, breasts like a woman's, and a tendency to stoop. his hands were enormous (he could not get on no. gloves). he was fully two inches shorter than his opponent. both men were, however, equally matched in weight, each being about stone, but at first sight i felt sure that jeannot would easily win the day. "who is to be umpire?" said jeannot. "titi, of course," answered piatte. "titi? who is titi?" my chum came forward. "you don't know me, old fellow," he began, "but you've often heard my name. i was one year with old blanc the wrestler. 'titi de la villette,' don't you remember now?" "what," cried jeannot, "titi de la villette, the champion light-weight? shake hands," and so saying he extended his palm, which titi firmly grasped. "now, boys," said titi, addressing the adversaries, "here are the conditions of the match: no grasping below the waist or by the clothes; no foul tripping, and both shoulders to touch the ground." "right you are--agreed," answered piatte and jeannot simultaneously. the two adversaries shook hands, and immediately stood in an attitude of attack, with their knees bent, and both arms half extended forward with open hands. then titi gave the signal "go!" jeannot thereupon advanced towards piatte, who did not shift his position. the assailant then laid one hand on piatte's shoulder, while he tried to get his left arm round his adversary's waist, but every feint was baffled by piatte, who still remained on the defensive. not a whisper could be heard, but only the loud breathing of the two wrestlers, and the sound of flesh striking flesh. all of a sudden jeannot sprang back, and immediately rushing once more upon his adversary, caught hold of him round the waist with his left arm, putting his right arm over piatte's left shoulder. piatte stood the shock without flinching, and with a rapid movement he brought jeannot's right arm down, allowing him to pass it under his own arm so that jeannot was grasping piatte round the body, while piatte was encircling him over the arms. under ordinary circumstances piatte would have been at a disadvantage, but so powerful was his grasp that jeannot, though the taller man, could not bend to catch his opponent round the waist, while piatte fairly encircled his man--over the arms, it is true, but under the elbows. for a few seconds the two men held each other in a grip of iron, but i noticed that, while jeannot was panting, piatte did not seem out of breath. then piatte, with a tremendous effort, lifted jeannot slightly from the ground; but, as he did so, jeannot arched himself to regain his footing, and both men crashed heavily to the floor: they both fell on the side without loosening their grip, but piatte quickly disengaged his left hand from under his adversary's body, with the evident intention of using his two hands to force his shoulders down. taking advantage of the movement, jeannot, arching himself on his head and feet, so that his two shoulders should not touch the ground, succeeded in turning piatte a little round, and nearly managed to get on the top of him. before he could do so, however, piatte had slipped one hand on jeannot's shoulder, and placed his other hand against his waist, thus pushing him away. jeannot was still holding piatte round the body, but the moment piatte slipped his hand on to his shoulder he let go, and, with one hand on the ground, pushed himself away from piatte, and the next instant both men were kneeling alongside each other. with a hand planted firmly on the ground, each one tried in turn to grasp the other by the waist, but in vain. it was a fine sight to see these two powerful athletes rooted to the ground in grim silence, broken only by the impact of hands against muscular backs. at last jeannot managed to encircle piatte's waist, but, before he had succeeded in doing so, piatte had caught him round the neck; for a second they were entangled, but jeannot threw his legs up, and, turning a back somersault, slipped his hand from piatte's arm and fell on his feet, standing in front of his adversary. piatte had meanwhile remained on his knees, and, with tremendous efforts, jeannot tried to move him, first by seizing him by the waist, then by the shoulders. but piatte remained immovable as a rock. he told me afterwards that his chief object was to let jeannot exhaust himself while he was saving his own wind. this struggle lasted for a few minutes more, when jeannot suddenly slipped on the damp cement floor, and, to save himself from being seized by piatte, he flung himself away, and rolled behind his adversary. in an instant both men were on their legs once more, piatte as cool as when he had first begun, jeannot panting heavily. for a short time they both stood feinting, when piatte, changing his tactics, made a rush at the parisian giant, and, before the latter knew where he was, he had been lifted in the air and heavily thrown on his back with piatte on the top of him. in order to well assert his victory, piatte twice lifted jeannot bodily, and made his two shoulders touch the ground. then the victor stood up, greeted by our unanimous applause. titi handed over to him a flask of brandy he had managed to smuggle in, and, after taking a long pull, piatte wiped his mouth and, turning round, said, "now it's your turn, jeannot." it was only then that we noticed that jeannot was lying where he had been felled, and we all feared that he might be seriously injured. piatte hastened to his side, and was about to lift him when jeannot opened his eyes and jumped up unaided. turning towards piatte, he extended his hand to him. "shake hands," he said; "you are the first man who has ever felled jeannot the butcher; but you're a good 'un; you fight fair, and i like that; but you fairly took the wind out of me that last go. now, boys," he went on, "to show you that i don't bear any grudge, i'll pay my footing, and i'll be as generous as that blasted millionaire of a _volontaire_. here goes 'a hind wheel,' and good health to you all." so saying, he took a long pull at the flask which titi had handed over to him. the combatants then wiped off the blood that ran from a good many scratches on their bodies, and donned their garments once more. in the excitement of the contest the fourth recruit was forgotten, and, as he hailed from normandy (the scotland of france), he kept cannily in the background, and so avoided paying his footing. titi then suggested that we should have a song or two, and it was fully midnight when, the candle having died out, we all tried to go to sleep. the night was bitterly cold, and as we had no blankets to cover ourselves with, we all slept huddled together like sardines in a tin. having been awake since a.m., i was quite exhausted, and soon dropped off to sleep, but only to wake up almost immediately with a horrid sensation that something had run over my face. i awoke my faithful titi, who was sleeping beside me. "got any matches?" i asked hurriedly. "yes, why--want a smoke?" he replied, handing me a match. just as i was going to sit up to strike the match something else stirred my hair. when i had obtained a light i looked round, and to my disgust i saw half a dozen huge rats running about over my companions' bodies. "ah, it's the rats that worry you," said titi; "you'll soon get accustomed to them--the place swarms with those fellows." a nice prospect indeed! every time i tried to go to sleep i was aroused by a rat cantering over my face, so at last i determined to sit up, gladly accepting titi's offer of tobacco and cigarette-papers. "the sergeant of the guard to-night is a good sort," titi told me, "and he won't say anything if he smells a whiff of smoke." at . a.m. the sergeant turned up, and when he ordered us to get up and to clear out, i was already rejoicing at the idea that i should be able to spend a few hours in bed: but i was sorely disappointed when we were taken to the pump and ordered to fill the two huge tanks where the chargers had to be watered in the morning. the night--it was early in december--was a bitterly cold one, and the nipping wind pierced us to the bones in the intervals between our turns at the pump. it was nearly five o'clock before we had concluded our work: i rushed to my bed, and when, a few minutes later, the corporal called out for the names of the sick men who wanted to go to the medical visit, i put mine down, notwithstanding titi's warning that if the surgeon-major did not consider me ill, i should get an extra four days _salle de police_ for malingering. at a.m., after _réveille_, the sergeant-major came to the room and called me. "look here," he said, "you are not going to begin these tricks with me--to report yourself sick just because you have slept in the _salle de police_." i assured him that i was really ill. "so much the better for you, if you really are," he replied; "but mind you, i shall warn the surgeon-major, and if he finds that you are shamming there'll be another eight days for you. and, by-the-by," he added, "i want to warn you that troopers who are punished with _salle de police_ are not allowed to use the canteen, and if i find that you've set foot there--god help you! you will also, during the two hours of rest you get every day, have to do _corvées_ (hard work, such as cleaning the cells, carrying _jules_ about, and doing any unpleasant jobs that have to be performed in the barracks)." with this intimation he walked away. need i say that, now i knew all that _salle de police_ implied, it was not without dread that i looked forward to the seven days i had still to undergo. although the description of my adventures has been but just begun, enough has, perhaps, already been said to indicate that the military training which might be made of real educational value to french youngsters is but a sordid and degrading experience, to be remembered with loathing, or forgotten--if possible. footnote: [ ] a high monument in paris, somewhat like the nelson column. chapter vi at . a.m. all the troopers who had had their names put down on the sick list were taken to the infirmary by the corporal of the week. we awaited the surgeon-major's arrival in a corridor; that morning there were about fifty troopers on the sick list, and, to my great relief, i learned that the assistant surgeon-major was going to pay the medical visit. i had been specially recommended to this officer, and when i had previously called on him with my letter of introduction he had received me most kindly, and promised that if i ever wanted his services he would be glad to do anything he could for me. as soon as he arrived we were called into the consulting-room in batches, the troopers of each squadron going in together. the consulting-room was small, the only furniture consisting of a large table, on one side of which sat the doctor, with the infirmary corporal opposite to him. when the corporals of the week in each squadron brought the sick troopers to the infirmary, they handed over to the infirmary corporal a book drawn up as on p. . as the troopers came to be examined by the surgeon-major, this book was placed by the infirmary corporal before the doctor, who filled in the figures--these signifying the number of days during which each trooper was to be exempt from the work stated at the head of each column. "duty" means absolute exemption from all work, and if the trooper so exempted was under punishment in the _salle de police_, he was excused from sleeping in the cells. "boots" means that the trooper is excused from all exercises necessitating the use of boots--viz., mounted and dismounted drill, gymnastics, and _voltige_. +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | | exemptions | | names. +-----+------+-------+----------+------------------+ | |duty.|boots.|riding.|dismounted| remarks. | | | | | | drill. | | +-----------------+-----+------+-------+----------+------------------+ |dupont, sergeant | | | | | | |martin, corporal | | | | | | |duval, trooper | | | | | | |perrin, trooper | | | | | | |bouchaud, trooper| | | | |is able to do | | | | | | |his work. days' | | | | | | |_salle de police_ | | | | | | |for having come to| | | | | | |the medical visit | | | | | | |with unwashed | | | | | | |feet. | +-----------------+-----+------+-------+----------+------------------+ the two other columns need no explanation. whenever a trooper failed to be regarded as sick by the surgeon-major, he was invariably punished with four days' _salle de police_ by the captain commanding the squadron. the surgeon-major always refused to pass as "sick" troopers who were dirty, and i have seen poor fellows, with awful excoriations, sent back to their work _because_ they were _dirty_. a copy of the above-mentioned book was taken by the infirmary corporal, who wrote down the surgeon's diagnosis of each case. that day the troopers of our squadron were called in first, and, as i was the sixth or seventh on the list, i watched the proceedings with keen interest. the first trooper called up was suffering from a boil on the thigh. "what's the matter with you?" said the doctor. "well, sir," replied the trooper, a stupid recruit, "i have a sort of a red thing--you know, sir--just there," pointing to the place, "and it hurts me something awful when i ride." "well, show it," said the doctor. the fellow tried to pull up his canvas trousers, but couldn't manage to get them up high enough. "why don't you take them off?" said the doctor impatiently. the recruit hesitated, and the doctor, losing patience, ordered the corporal to undress him; the boy thereupon, violently blushing, exposed his trouble. "oh, a boil," said the doctor, handling him pretty roughly; and taking a lancet from his instrument case, he made a deep incision through the swelling. the recruit howled, but the doctor told him to shut up, adding that he would be "exempt from boots" for the next three days. "you will come back in three days' time," he added, and he then ordered the corporal to give him a dose of sulphate of soda. on the table stood four very dirty tin mugs; two of them contained a solution of sulphate of soda, and the others ipecacuanha and another emetic, mixed with water. the corporal handed one of the tumblers to the trooper, and as he was going out with it the doctor cried, "no, no, my boy, you must drink it here." with a wry face the poor recruit swallowed the ghastly mixture, and the corporal having ascertained that he had drained all the contents, gave the tumbler to a trooper who stood beside a cupboard containing medicines; without rinsing the tumbler, the latter trooper, who was attached to the infirmary, filled it up with another dose of sulphate of soda and replaced it on the table. in the meantime the man next on the list had been called. he was an _ancien_ trooper (_i.e._, one of more than one year's standing), and when asked what was the matter with him, he showed the doctor a huge sore on his heel, keeping the remainder of his foot inside his clog, which he held with one hand. "take off that clog," said the surgeon-major. the man hesitated to do so. "if you don't take it off at once," roared the doctor, "i'll send you back to your duty with four days' cells." the man obeyed, and the sight which he then displayed was too disgusting to be dwelt upon. suffice it to say that his toes were encased in a cake of filth. "just what i expected," remarked the surgeon, "and still you're not ashamed of yourself," he went on, addressing the man; "go and wash yourself. the next time a trooper dares to come to me in such a state of filth i'll give him eight days." when my turn came the doctor told me to wait until the consultation was over, when he would see me privately. after me came a trooper who complained of pains in his back. "oh, rheumatics," said the doctor; "ipecac." the man had to swallow the contents of one of the tumblers on the table, and rushed out very pale, in anticipation of what he knew would soon happen. he was exempted from drill on foot. others were suffering from sores of various kinds, chiefly due to riding without being accustomed to it, and they were alternately ordered a dose of sulphate of soda or of ipecac.; indeed, these two medicines seemed to be considered a panacea in the french army. one man, none other than piatte, the hero of the previous night's contest, complained that he was not well, but the doctor could not elicit from him any particulars of his ailment. "have you any pain?" asked the doctor. "yes, sir, plenty of them," blandly replied piatte. "where? in your stomach?" "oh, yes, sir, just so, in my stomach." "show me your tongue." after examining this the doctor told him that his stomach could not be out of order, as his tongue was perfectly clean. "well, sir," said piatte, "my stomach hurts me in just the same way that it does here," pointing to his back. the doctor felt the place he had pointed out, and piatte winced as though it caused him intense pain. "have you lifted any heavy load lately?" good-naturedly said the doctor. "oh, yes, sir," innocently replied piatte; "and you don't know, sir, what i've been suffering for these last four days. i didn't like to come to the medical visit, because i thought it would pass off; but really to-day, sir, it's more than i can bear." the doctor fully believed him, and exempted him from all duty for two days. when piatte walked out he winked at me. "well, old chap," he whispered, "ain't that grand? we'll have a jolly good drunk to-day and to-morrow with yesterday's oof." if only the doctor had seen him wrestling the previous night, piatte would not have fared so well. the medical visit over, the surgeon-major called me into his private office. "so," he said, "you've fallen out with your sergeant-major. he sent me a note to warn me that you have been punished with eight days' _salle de police_, and he says that you are only shamming." i told the doctor what had happened, and explained that i was really feeling ill after the terrible night i had gone through. "i can quite believe you," replied the doctor, "but i don't like to exempt you altogether from duty, as i do not want to show too openly the interest i take in you. i shall exempt you from 'boots' for a couple of days, however, so that you will be excused from mounted and dismounted drill, gymnastics, and _voltige_; in two days' time return here, and i will then exempt you from duty for two days, so that you will be able to have a good long rest in bed. if i don't come to pass a medical visit on that day i shall mention your case to my colleague, surgeon-major lesage, and he will do what i ask him." i returned to the room, and as i was free until o'clock, when i should have to go to the schoolroom, i hurried to my bed in order to get a refreshing sleep. de lanoy soon turned up and asked me how i was. i told him i was dead beat, but he remarked that i had made a blunder in going to the medical visit. "it has," he said, "absolutely put the sergeant-major's back up against you; he said to me just now that you are nothing but a lazy brute without twopennyworth of pluck." although this rather upset me, i felt so exhausted that i dropped asleep before i could think the matter over. at o'clock i turned up in the schoolroom, and sergeant legros ordered me to come and speak to him. "so, _monsieur_ decle," he sarcastically remarked, "you've made the acquaintance of the _boite_.[ ] how do you like it?" "not at all, sergeant," i answered. "and therefore," he went on, "you thought that you would like a little rest to-day, didn't you?" "no, sergeant," i said, "i assure you i'm really ill." "just so, just so," he went on. "but you'll soon get used to it, as i am afraid that i shall have to send you there _more often than your turn_." (another regimental expression in constant use in the french army.) i returned to my table, and as the lesson we were told to learn that day dealt with hippology (the care and management of horses), a subject with which i was already conversant, i had soon learnt the page we had been given to study, and then joined my comrades in a game of baccarat, which a sporting member of our set had suggested. at first, as usual, we played for small stakes, but these were soon increased, banks being sold by auction and fetching as much as £ . in less than half an hour's time one of my comrades had won over £ , while i was a loser by nearly £ . these games of baccarat soon became an institution, but i am glad to say that i never "plunged," and never played beyond my means. one of the _volontaires_, who did not belong to our set, asked as a favour to be permitted to join in our gambling, and having been allowed to do so plunged recklessly. payments were made in i.o.u.s, redeemable at the end of each month, but when the time came our plunger (whose losses were a good deal over £ ) explained that he could not pay up just then as his allowance "hadn't yet arrived." apparently that allowance never arrived; at all events, we never saw a penny of the money he owed us. as a matter of fact, we soon found out that his parents only allowed him £ a month, a sum barely sufficient to cover the cost of his board at the canteen and the pay of the two troopers who fagged for him; so after paying certain necessary tips, he was, of course, left with hardly any pocket-money. while i am dealing with the money question, i may say that £ was the minimum required to cover our necessary expenditure during our year's service in the cavalry, and a good many of us spent much more than that amount. being exempt from "boots," i was excused from attending gymnastics and _voltige_, and was therefore free from till half-past , but of course, being under punishment, i could not go out of barracks. i proceeded therefore to hunt up the orderly of the _capitaine d'habillement_, as i had heard from de lanoy that his orderly had a room to himself, above the stores, and that, until de lanoy was promoted to the rank of sergeant, he used to arrange to keep a tub and all his washing things in that room, paying the man for the privilege _s._ a month. i found the fellow, but to my utter disgust he informed me that he had already arranged with three other _volontaires_ for the loan of his room (walter being one of the lucky ones), and he absolutely declined to have another _volontaire_ using his apartment. "you see, old chap," he said to me, "if a lot of you fellows come to my room, i shall soon be found out, and not only shall i lose my billet as orderly to the captain, but i shall be sent back to ordinary duty in the squadron, losing the comfortable little income i am now making, and i am not going to run the risk." i insisted earnestly, but without avail. i then inquired whether any other orderly had a room to himself, but found that he was the only one, and i was therefore reduced to the pump for my ablutions. i explained just now that troopers who were punished with _salle de police_ were prohibited from using the canteen, but i discovered that there existed, besides the two cavalry canteens, an infantry canteen where dragoons could go; i therefore repaired there to have a meal, as i had been quite unable to swallow for _déjeuner_ the repulsive mixture of bread and red beans cooked in stale fat, with a few pieces of bone and sundry bits of tendons, served in a greasy tin pot, which formed the fare of the day. i found the canteen quite empty at this time of the day, and the cooking was decent; there was, besides, no chance of being discovered by any of the cavalry non-commissioned officers, for they all messed in a room set apart for them in each of the two cavalry canteens, while this one stood at the top of a portion of the building reserved for the line regiment. during the remainder of the time i served i never failed to use this canteen whenever i was punished, and the fact was never found out. when i returned to my room, towards one o'clock, intending to lie down, a corporal came to me and ordered me out for fatigue duty: i was to go and sweep the cells with the other troopers. i pointed out to the corporal that i was sick and that i was exempt from "boots," so that i meant to have a rest while the other _volontaires_ were at _voltige_. "yes, my boy," replied the corporal, "i'm quite aware of that. but you're not exempt from clogs, and troopers exempt from 'boots' are not excused from fatigue duty. so, up you get, and come along." reluctantly i followed. the corporal presented me with a very dirty broom and accompanied by three other troopers i marched wearily towards the cells. first of all, i was told off to sweep the corridor, then the sergeant of the guard opened the doors of three of the cells used for solitary confinement. it was the first sight i had had of these cells, and i hoped that it would never fall to my lot to be incarcerated in one of them. each was about twelve feet by six. on one side stood a wooden bed raised a couple of feet from the ground; and about seven feet long and two and a half broad. a small shelf, a foot square, suspended against the wall by two strings, was meant for the prisoner's bread, so that the rats should not get at it. in a corner was a small "_jules_," and alongside of it an earthenware water-jug with an iron beaker on the top of it; the only ventilation consisted of a small hole a foot square and strongly barred, opening above the door, so that when the latter was closed the prisoner found himself in almost complete darkness. while we were cleaning the cells the sergeant of the guard remained marching up and down the corridor, as there was a prisoner in one of them. his door was the last to be opened, and the sergeant of the guard ordered him to step out in the passage, while we were told off to clean his cell. the man looked the picture of misery. he had already been confined for five days, and during that time he had been able neither to wash nor to shave, and the short allowance of food had told heavily on him. prisoners in cells are only allowed the ordinary trooper's ration every other day; during the intervening days they get one ration of soup without meat, their other meal consisting of dry bread and water. the prisoner asked the non-commissioned officer to have his water-jug emptied and refilled, as there was a drowned rat in it. i was told to hand over my broom to another trooper, and ordered with another man to catch hold of "_jules_" and to go and empty it--a task, as you may imagine, i hardly relished. fortunately for me, as i was crossing the yard i met my friend de lanoy, who told me to put my odoriferous burden on the ground and to follow him. he then went to the cells and ordered the corporal to send another man to relieve me, as he wanted me for special work. he then ordered me to go and wait for him outside his room while he remained behind. he soon joined me and told me to go and have a good wash and to return to his room. i went to the pump, and after indulging in a good scrubbing returned to de lanoy's. [illustration: a fatigue party of dragoons] "what a filthy life this is!" i exclaimed, when i entered his quarters. "have you only just found that out?" he answered. "i have been serving two years and a half, and although i have been two years a non-commissioned officer, i am thoroughly disgusted with it. i heard the corporal ordering you to follow him, and i might have told him to select another trooper for fatigue duty, but, you see, i have to be careful; if i showed you too much favour i couldn't help you as i may be able to under more serious circumstances. now," he went on, "listen to my advice. whenever a corporal orders you for fatigue duty just call him aside and quietly tip him a couple of francs to drink your health with, asking him at the same time to allow you to find another man to do the work in your stead. you will never fail to find a trooper glad to take the job for a franc." i followed his advice in the future, and it was only when no other trooper was handy that i ever did fatigue duty again. that evening, at . i stood before the guard-room among the troopers punished with _salle de police_. the sergeant of the guard did not trouble to search us, but immediately marched us off to the lock-up. we were but six that evening; as usual, when the sergeant had retired titi lit his candle. after singing a few songs all the fellows dropped to sleep with the exception of titi and myself. "what a life!" said titi to me. "i much prefer to be in quod--some of them ain't bad at all." "what! have you been in gaol?" i asked in astonishment. "have i been to gaol! heaps of times, old chappy!" he was clearly not in the least ashamed to own it, but felt quite proud, and enjoyed my astonishment. "what did you do before you joined the regiment?" i queried, in order to change the subject. "_j'faisais la muche_," he replied. i did not understand what this meant, not being yet versed in low slang; and i imagined that it meant that--like many of the parisians in our regiment--he had been a _vidangeur_ (scavenger). i inquired what pay he used to draw. "oh," he said, "it depended; my last _marmite elle était rien épatante, mon vieux, elle faisait ses cinq roues de derrière tous les soirs_!" he went on telling me a lot of stories on the subject, which cannot, unfortunately, be reproduced here, but which gave me a striking insight into the life of a french _maquereau_ (a man who lives on unfortunates). seeing that he had absolutely no sense of shame, i ventured to ask him about his convictions. he became quite keen on the subject. "ah, my boy," he said, "don't think that it's only poor beggars like me who're sent to quod: i have seen there many a gentleman--yes, _gentleman_," he repeated, as i was smiling--"gentlemen, like you, who drove in their own cart; but that's neither here nor there. there's one thing certain: _y a pas d'justice en france, ma vieille!_" (there is no justice in france, old chap.) "one day, for instance," he went on, "i had been with some friends to the _théâtre de la villette_ (a small suburban theatre), and being a bit of an artist myself--i have been a super at the porte st. martin[ ]--i became disgusted at the way one of the fellows played taillhade's part. instead of walking like a nobleman of the old times, and taking off his hat with a great sweep of the arm and bowing like a prince, that actor chap just walks in like if he had stepped into the café at the corner, and he takes his hat off like if it had been a billycock; i got that disgusted that i couldn't help shouting: '_ah! malheur d'ons que tu sors?_' (good gracious, where do you hail from?) chambardeau, the grocer's assistant, then says to me: '_tais donc ta sale gueule, titi!_' (shut up your ugly mug, titi!) 'ugly mug,' i says; 'what d'ye call that filthy beak of yours?' (_ton sal museau._) 'all right,' howls chambardeau, 'i'll smash that phiz of yours[ ] when we get out.' that was too much for me, so i jumps at him; all the people shout, 'turn them out!' the police comes and chucks us out, and the other boys, guessing there'll be a row outside, follers us. well, we first kick up a row to get our money returned; but it was no good, and the _sergots_[ ] chucks us into the street: chambardeau and me we goes into a side street to have it out. on the way chambardeau pulls his knife out of his pocket. 'knives?' i ask. 'yes, knives,' he says. 'all right, _mon salop_,'[ ] i reply, 'i'll soon rip open your tripe-bag.' some of the boys had joined us, and told us that the police were not likely to come, so chambardeau he says: 'are you ready?' 'yes,' i says, and we close. just then mimi--she was the grocer's daughter, and she was sweet on me, you know--'twas that which made chambardeau mad with me. well, mimi turns up. they'd gone and told her, some of the other chaps, and when she sees us going at it with knives she hollers, 'murder! murder! police!' the _sergots_ come at a run, and just then chambardeau he drops down. the _sergots_ arrest me--the cowards! there was four of them. they knock me down and kick me all over, then they clasp the bracelets (handcuffs) on my wrists, while the others pick up chambardeau. 'what's the row?' one of the _sergots_ asks of him. 'row?' he says; 'there's no row.' 'but,' says a _sergot_, 'you are wounded.' 'am i?' says chambardeau. 'i suppose that i fell on my open knife while i was playing with titi.' he was a d---- sneak, chambardeau was, but he never split on a pal. well, they took us both to the police station and locked us up--me, chambardeau, and mimi. we had chucked our knives away, or else we should have had another round. 'it's a pity,' says chambardeau, 'that the police came and spoiled the fun!' 'you bet, old chap,' i says. but then mimi--she ought not to have been with us, but the cells for the women was full--she had been crying, and, as i was saying, she takes chambardeau's hand. 'it was real good of you,' she says to him, 'not to have split on titi.' 'i split on a pal!' he exclaims. _mimi, j'en ai soupé d'toi._[ ] 'ah,' he goes on, excited, 'i thought i'd make you love me; but it's no use, you must think me d---- low to imagine that i could split on a pal! shake hands, titi,' he then says, 'and keep her.' just then his wound begins to hurt him. it was nothing--i'd only stuck him through the arm--but he was bleeding a lot, only he would not call out for a doctor for fear it might tell against me. so mimi tears her apron and makes a bandage of it. the next morning we were all brought before the commissary of police; and although chambardeau swore that it was all lies about our having been fighting, and my having stabbed him, they sent us both to the _dépôt_[ ] in the _panier à salade_[ ] (black maria). two days later the _juge d'instruction_[ ] examined me. he knew me, that man; i had been twice before him already. "'so here you are again, martin!' he says. "'yes, sir,' i answers. "'attempted murder this time,' he goes on, reading a long report. "'_ah la bonne blague! c'est tout des menteries d'la police._' (well, that's a good one! all lies from the police.) "'but,' he answers, 'you were caught in the act of stabbing the man chambardeau.' "'now, _monsieur le juge_,' i said, 'ask chambardeau himself, ask mimi robinson, the grocer's daughter: they'll both tell you if i am not speaking god's own truth.' "'i have seen them both,' said the judge, 'and they both accuse you.'" "now you see, _mon vieux_," went on titi, waxing excited, and shaking me by the blouse, "you see i'd been there before, and i knew that the judge was telling a lie as big as himself. i had seen chambardeau in the passage at the _dépôt_, and he had winked at me and telegraphed--you know we had both been in quod before and had learned there how to telegraph with our hands--so he telegraphed: 'i have not been examined yet, and i'll swear we were playing, and i hurt myself; i won't split.' what's more, i had caught sight of mimi in the witness room, and she would not have been left there if she had already been examined, so i knew it was all lies that the judge was telling just to make me confess. i didn't lose my head, but quite polite i replied: "'i'm as innocent as an unborn baby, sir, and i only ask you to confront[ ] me with chambardeau and mimi.' "'that will come in due time,' said the judge; 'you are not going to teach me how to conduct my examination, are you?' "'may the lord almighty preserve me from such a thought,' i replied, quite lamb-like, and to please him i added, '--a kind, considerate, and just magistrate like you, sir.' "'that's enough, that's enough,' he says, but i could see that he was pleased. "he then sent me back to gaol, and said he'd send for me next day. i heard afterwards that chambardeau was examined after me: he swore on the head of his mother that he had hurt himself by falling with the knife, which he held open in his hand to peel an orange, and that while we were skylarking he slipped on a bit of orange-peel. but the judge told him that he could not possibly have inflicted that wound of his on himself--and to prove it he read the doctor's report. chambardeau replied that he had always been clumsy with knives, ever since he was two months old; but he overdid it, you know. i've always told him so--he overdid it when he showed the judge a scar on his right arm, and said he had cut himself there while slicing bread when he was two years of age. the judge, of course, tried to make him believe that i had confessed, but chambardeau, whose temper was rather quick, replied that he knew that was a d----d lie, and so the judge sent him back to gaol. mimi was fine; she said she had seen nothing of a fight, but that we were skylarking, and that chambardeau had slipped on some orange-peel and fell on his knife. "i was examined three times that week, and once the next, and on the third week was 'confronted' with chambardeau and mimi. we all stuck to our story, swore that the _sergots_ had told nothing but lies, and everything was going on beautifully until the judge picks up our knives that were lying on his table. one of them was still covered with dried-up blood: it was mine; so the judge says, 'whose knife is that?' 'hullo, they've found my knife,' chambardeau says natural like. 'you are quite sure it belongs to you?' says the judge. "'sure!' answers chambardeau; 'sure! a knife i've had for more than a year: i remember the day i bought it like if it was yesterday. it was a monday, and it was raining hard, and it was just to get out of the rain that i went into the shop and bought it." "'_greffier_,'[ ] says the judge to his clerk, 'you have carefully taken down this deposition?' "'yes, sir,' answers the _greffier_. "'and this knife?' asks the judge, taking another one from the table, 'is that yours?' i saw chambardeau wink at me, but did not understand, so thinking it was chambardeau's knife i said boldly, 'for sure it's my knife, sir.' "'look at it carefully,' the judge says, handing it over to me. i looked at it, and, without pretending to do so, looked at the maker's name. 'of course it is my knife,' i again said, handing it back to the judge. "'and where did you buy it?' he then asked. "i thought that i had been jolly clever to look at the maker's name and address, but i thought i'd keep that for the last, so i said that i had bought it from a chap who had bought it from another chap. 'but,' i added, 'to show you that it's my knife and no mistake, i can tell you, sir, that it comes from lebrun, rue de l'arbre sec.' "the judge smiled in a way i didn't like, and, calling his clerk, he showed him the knife. 'do you know that knife?' he said. 'of course, sir,' replied the clerk; 'it is the knife you always keep on your desk!' "the judge looked at me smiling, and did not say a word, but his silence went bang through me. "i had put my foot in it, right up to the knee, so i pretended to gaze out of the window. "'chambardeau,' then said the judge, after a few minutes of uncomfortable silence, 'and you, _fille_[ ] robinson, you have both tried to obstruct the course of justice and to defeat its aim, but truth cannot be hidden from it.' he went on like that for ten minutes, old chap, and then he said to chambardeau that, as there was nothing against him, he would be released, and then he went for me, calling me a sanguinary ruffian, one of those men who are a disgrace to society, and all sorts of tommy rot of the same kind. he concluded his little speech by saying that i would be sent for trial before the _tribunal correctionnel_,[ ] where he hoped i would be made an example of, and then he dismissed us. "chambardeau and myself were taken back to gaol with the _tourniquet_[ ] on, held by a _garde municipal_, and mimi had just time to tell me that she would see about getting a good barrister to defend me. i told her to try and get a fellow called lehautier, who had already got me off once: he could speak, that man, something grand. the last time he defended me, he told the judges that if i was before them it was because i was an orphan who had had no mother to look after my youth--the old lady was at the time doing five years under an _alias_!--and he talked them round so well that he actually drew tears from them, and i was acquitted. "chambardeau was released the following day, but it was not till a month later that i was tried. my counsel came to see me twice before the trial, and i did not like his ways. mimi could not manage to secure lehautier, who had become a great man, and wanted francs (£ ) to take my case up, so she got that little chap for francs (£ ). if you had seen the side he put on! 'don't tell me that you are guilty,' he began, 'because, if you tell me so, my conscience'--_en va donc!_ (get along) his conscience!--well, his conscience would not allow him to defend me. i told him, therefore, the story we had concocted, but he said that would never do, and advised me to say that it was true that i had stabbed chambardeau, but that he had begun the row, and that i only acted in self-defence. and a jolly mess he made of it: he never told chambardeau nor mimi anything about what they had to swear; so they swore all wrong, and then the judge presiding over the court put me all sorts of questions about my previous convictions; and he then called me a demoralised scoundrel and what not, and in the end i got two months! and," added titi, violently shaking me by the blouse, "you call that justice! it was a fair fight, all fair and square, and i got two months for it. _ah malheur!_ that's what they call a republic. if we had both been fine gentlemen, and fought a duel with swords, and, instead of bleeding chambardeau a bit, i had stuck my sword right through his guts, every one would have said what a fine fellow i was. instead of that, because i am only martin, _alias_ titi de la villette, i get two months, and they call me a scoundrel. _ah malheur! malheur! malheur!_ liberté, egalité, fraternité.[ ] that's all right for those who've got money, but the poor people, _on s'en fiche!_ (who cares about them?)" i am bound to admit that titi was right on some points; but, unfortunately, he did not realise to what depths of degradation he had fallen. there is not the slightest doubt that, taken as a whole, the lowest classes in large towns, like paris, marseilles, lyons, and others, are far more degraded than the people belonging to the same class of society in england, and the french military service, instead of raising these men to a higher plane, only brings down to their level those who belong to the better classes, such as peasants, small clerks, and so on. it is true that now men who have been convicted before serving their time are, as i have explained, sent to special battalions in algeria; but still, even to this day, the three years every able-bodied frenchman has to serve in the army are nothing but a period of ceaseless degradation for men possessing any self-respect. the system, one must acknowledge it, works better in germany; and the british army cannot, of course, be compared to either these armies in which every citizen has to serve; but i feel certain that had the troopers of my regiment been placed under the command of british officers, things would have been very different from what they were. most of the troopers who were constantly punished would, with gentler treatment--and if the sergeants and officers, instead of bullying them, had appealed to their sense of honour, and to their better feelings--have proved some of the smartest and most reliable troopers in the whole regiment. instead of that they soon became discouraged, and ceased to care whether they were punished or not. when my sergeant, after asking me how i liked the _salle de police_, added: "you will soon get accustomed to it," he condensed in those words all the reasons which make a blindly rigid system of discipline a complete failure. footnotes: [ ] _boite_ (box): slang word for _salle de police_. [ ] the theatre of the porte st. martin was then the stage where historical melodrama was represented; it was associated with frederick lemaître and melinge taillhade. [ ] _la fichu tête à claques._ [ ] _sergots_: slang for _sergeants de ville_ (policemen). [ ] _mon salop_=you piece of dirt; used as a term of comradeship. [ ] i have done with you. [ ] central lock-up, where all persons who have been arrested the previous evening are sent in the morning. (bailing out does not exist in france; but in case of arrest for slight reasons, such as making a disturbance, the commissary of police can release a prisoner after taking down his name and address. this is only done when the prisoner appears to be a gentleman.) [ ] "salad basket": so called because prisoners are locked up in tight compartments, and are rudely shaken like salad in the baskets used by french cooks to shake the water off after washing it. [ ] _juge d'instruction_: see appendix b. [ ] it is usual for accused and witnesses to be confronted before the _juge d'instruction_. [ ] clerk. [ ] _fille_: woman, term applied to all persons of the gentler sex in all criminal proceedings. [ ] a kind of police-court. only felonies are tried by jury in france. [ ] _tourniquet_: a piece of very flexible steel cord which is passed round the prisoner's wrist, or wrists, the two ends being held by the guard. the slightest twist causes such excruciating agony that no prisoner can escape. [ ] the motto of the french republic, which is painted on all french monuments. chapter vii the day following my second night in the _salle de police_ was a saturday, and inspection-day. our clothing was to be inspected on this occasion. each trooper had to lay on his bed his various garments in such a way that the regimental numbers should be clearly displayed. the inspection took place at p.m., but as early as . our respective corporals compared the list in our _livret_ with the clothes on our beds, counting our tunics, trousers, boots, underlinen, towels, and stable costume (canvas trousers and blouse), in order to ascertain whether any of our outfit was missing. all our underclothing had to be previously washed, as well as our stable uniform, so that troopers had to purchase secondhand canvas trousers and blouses to wear while the others were drying. in order to avoid punishment in case any of my kit should be missing, i had, shortly after my arrival in the regiment, a complete duplicate set of outfit made to order by the regimental tailor, bootmaker, and armourer. the clothes were made of exactly the same pattern and cloth as those issued to us, but they were cut so that i could wear them without discomfort. i had regulation boots made in which i could walk with ease, and besides these i had several pairs made in paris by my own bootmaker; in appearance these looked like regulation boots, but the toes were narrower and the heels lower, with box spurs, imitating the regulation spurs, screwed into the heels. these i used for drill on foot and on horseback. i had arranged to keep all my regulation outfit in a box which i left in the orderly's room which i have already mentioned. in this way i was always able to produce my regulation outfit in perfect order whenever a clothing inspection was held. that morning i sent titi to fetch my clothes and regimental underlinen from their box, in which was also stored all my duplicate kit, as we were forbidden to keep on our shelves anything besides our regulation outfit, or to have even a locker under our beds. under the previous colonel troopers had been allowed to have a box in which they could lock up their private belongings, such as spare underclothing and letters, as well as any money they might possess. to be deprived of this convenience was hard on most of the troopers, as they had to carry their money day and night on their persons. it was even impossible to keep a book, as this was invariably "bagged" while its owner was at drill or stables. petty thefts were of common occurrence, and it even happened several times to me to have loose cash stolen from under my bolster when i was asleep. to complain of a theft would only have made the complainant pass as a dirty sneak among his comrades, and would have exposed every man of his squadron to suspicion. to return to the inspection: the corporal having seen that each man's outfit was complete, the sergeant came to inspect the trooper's clothes to make sure that they were in proper order, that no button was missing, and that all spots of grease or dirt had been properly removed. in case a trooper was short of some article of clothing, this was duly reported by the corporal, the sergeant making a note of it and reporting it in his turn to the lieutenant. if there was time enough before the arrival of the officer, troopers who had sufficient money could go and purchase at the canteen any small articles which were needed to complete their kit (sponges and chamois leathers were especially apt to be stolen from _volontaires_, as it was impossible to identify such articles). at five minutes to two we all had to be ready at the foot of our beds; and the sergeant-major passed through the room to make sure that everything was in order, and every trooper properly attired. a quarter of an hour later the cry of "_fixe!_" (attention) was uttered by the trooper standing nearest to the door. this announced the arrival of an officer. the first to come was the lieutenant of our _peloton_, a stout, middle-aged man, who spoke through his nose. he carefully turned over the clothes on each man's bed, distributing here and there a few days of _salle de police_. when my turn came he looked at me. "so that's you?" he remarked. "yes, sir," i replied. "impertinent as usual," he went on. "how dare you answer me?" "i beg your pardon, sir," i replied. "i thought you had questioned me." "oh, you did, did you?" "yes, sir." "well, don't think another time. i don't like troopers who think. you've got no business to think. d'ye hear?" "yes, sir." "what? don't you understand me? i tell you not to answer. do you understand?" warned by what he had just told me, i shut up. whereupon the lieutenant, turning towards the sergeant, remarked, "sulky brute, that fellow." "are all your things there?" he then asked me. "yes, sir, i think so." "you think! you always think. i told you not to think. you have no business to think. that's always the result of too much education. these lazy dogs of _volontaires_, they are always thinking. troopers have no business to think." continuing to mutter peevishly, the lieutenant proceeded to overhaul my things while i stolidly stood at attention, at the foot of my bed. "look here, you--what's-your-name, what's the fellow's name?" he grumbled to himself, looking at the placard hanging at the head of my bed, on which my name and regimental number was written. "oh--decle," he read aloud, holding a pair of eyeglasses in his hand--he seldom wore them on his nose. "lionel," he went on, reading to himself, "too d----d aristocratic to have a christian name like anybody else. why is lionel your christian name?" he asked me; "will you tell me why you call yourself lionel?"[ ] "because my parents christened me so, sir," i replied. "a fine reason!" he said. "but it doesn't matter. don't you ever wear your clothes?" he added. "they are all new; they've never been worn!" "no, sir," i said. "i bought duplicates so as to save those that were served out to me." "plenty of money to waste, eh? regimentals not good enough for you? i suppose you would consider yourself degraded if you had to wear a regimental shirt? linen's too coarse for a tender skin like yours, eh?" i thought it as well to make no reply. lifting up my blouse, the lieutenant then looked at my shirt, and told me to unbutton it. i was wearing under my flannel shirt an under-vest made of wool and spun silk. "ah! just what i thought," again remarked the lieutenant. "the thing must wear flannel and silk like a _cocotte_ (a fast woman), and then calls itself a trooper. _i_ don't wear any undervests, and yet i'm an officer! well," he added, as he passed on to the next bed, "you've already found out that silk vests won't prevent you from going to the _salle de police_. you've got nothing missing to-day, but i'll soon catch you napping. you won't pass many inspections without having to send you to the _boite_. silk vests indeed!" he kept on muttering. he then began to examine titi's bed. after looking through his outfit he lifted up the mattress, and found underneath it a dirty pair of drawers and a newspaper. "just as i expected," he remarked. "what's that?" he asked, showing the newspaper to titi. "oh, it's an old newspaper, sir," blandly replied titi, "that i put aside. i bought some things in the town and they were wrapped up in it." the lieutenant looked at the date of the paper; it was the previous day's number of a radical journal. "so, we read the paper here; the vilest rag, too, that was ever printed. well, you will see what it will cost you, you dirty _communard_. to begin with, you'll have eight days' _salle de police_, and i shall specially report you." so saying, the lieutenant, holding the paper by the tips of his fingers, at arm's length, as if it had been something likely to contaminate him, handed it over to the sergeant, de lanoy, ordering him to go and throw that "vermin" on the dung-heap. "de lanoy," he added, "on your way stop at the sergeant-major's office and tell him to put you down for two days' _salle de police_ for the disgusting state in which your _peloton_ is kept." as the lieutenant was looking over the last trooper's outfit our captain came into the room. the lieutenant went and spoke to him, and they both returned towards titi's bed. "so, martin," said the captain in a great rage, "you dare to read papers in the barracks,[ ] and as you are now undergoing eight days' _salle de police_ you cannot possibly have brought it in yourself. i want to know from whom you got it?" "i didn't get it from anybody, sir," replied titi. "i found it in the courtyard of the infantry barracks." "don't tell me lies," said the captain sternly, "or you'll be sorry for it. tell me who gave you that paper." "nobody, sir." "if you tell me," said the captain, "i won't increase the punishment lieutenant pernod has given you. if you don't, i'll give you eight days' prison." "i found it, sir," insisted titi. "very well," said the captain, "get your things ready to go to prison." "yes, sir," politely replied titi. "and if you go on much longer like that," said the captain, in a voice shaking with rage, "you'll soon go to biribi."[ ] the captain walked out, accompanied by the lieutenant, and soon afterwards two men from the guard, accompanied by a corporal, came into the room with drawn swords, and titi was marched away between them to the prison. on inspection-days we did squadron duty after "stables," having neither drill nor school, and those _volontaires_ who were not undergoing punishment were at liberty to go out of barracks until p.m. the troopers who had twenty-four hours' leave were allowed to quit the barracks after evening stables and remain away until the next monday at a.m. after stables the regimental orders for the day were, as usual, read out to us, as well as the punishments. those were numerous, and included two days' confinement to the room, for a lieutenant, for being out in civilian clothes the previous afternoon; _salle de police_ for three sergeants as a result of the inspection, while about twenty men were punished similarly, getting from two to eight days, their outfit having been found short, or their clothes soiled. among the troopers punished with _salle de police_ were three _volontaires_, and, finally, came titi's name, with a sentence of eight days' prison by the captain "for having introduced a newspaper into barracks, and having obstinately refused to give the name of the trooper from whom he had obtained it." that evening, i was, as usual, taken to the _salle de police_, where i was much astonished to find titi lying on a straw mattress rolled up in a blanket. he called out to me as soon as the non-commissioned officer had locked us in, "come here, old chap," he said; "i'll make some room for you, old decle, and we'll share my mattress and blanket." although a scoundrel, titi was at the bottom of his heart a kind fellow, and i felt most grateful to him for sharing his rough bedding with me, especially when a little later on he produced his inevitable candle, and i saw that in order to let me lie down comfortably he was lying himself on the bare boards, his back only resting against the mattress. i inquired from him how it was that he was undergoing his prison in the same lock-up as the one used for men punished with _salle de police_, and i expressed astonishment at his being privileged to enjoy a mattress and a blanket. he explained to me that the only difference between prison and _salle de police_ was that the men punished with the former, instead of doing duty in the daytime remained in the _salle de police_ day and night. they had, however, to do two hours' punishment drill in the morning and again in the evening, and during the remainder of the day they were employed on fatigue duty, having to carry water about, to make ditches and earthworks, and to do all the dirtiest work. on the other hand, they were allowed a straw mattress and one blanket, and were not called upon to work at the pump in the middle of the night. on the whole, it struck me that prison was a far milder punishment than _salle de police_, and i found this undoubtedly to be the case when later on i became personally acquainted with the former punishment. footnotes: [ ] as may have been noticed, my christian name was a puzzle to every one. [ ] it is strictly forbidden to read newspapers in french barracks, and any infringement of this regulation is severely punished. [ ] _biribi, compagnies de discipline_, see p. . chapter viii according to the doctor's orders i went to the medical visit in the morning. being a sunday, there were but a few men who had reported themselves, but besides myself there were two _volontaires_, one of them being the poor fellow of whom i spoke when i described our first riding-lesson under sergeant legros; the inside of his knee had been so badly scraped that further riding had caused extensive inflammation, and he was ordered to the _infirmerie_ (a kind of hospital ward in the barracks, where sick soldiers who want special attention, but are not ill enough to go to hospital, are kept). as before, the doctor kept me waiting until he had disposed of the other cases, and then exempted me from duty for two days. i was thus excused from all work, and, what i still more appreciated, had not to sleep in the _salle de police_. the doctor also inquired very kindly how we were treated by our sergeant. i frankly told him the truth. "i am not astonished," he said; "i know the man and i pity you." he then went on to tell me how different had been the treatment of the _volontaires_ under the previous colonel; my friend, de lanoy, was then in charge of them, and none of the bullying we were subject to ever occurred, or would have been tolerated then. the doctor further allowed me to make use of the dispensary if i cared to read or write while off duty, and, as will be seen, i owe an immense debt of gratitude to him, as well as to the other surgeon-major of my regiment, dr. lesage, who was surgeon-captain, dr. chatelain holding only the rank of lieutenant. in the afternoon i availed myself of the permission which had been granted me of using the dispensary, and i was sitting there sketching when surgeon-major lesage stepped into the room. he was a brisk and restless little man, very stern in appearance, but with the kindest of hearts. "what the deuce are you doing there?" he asked, as i rose to salute him and stood at attention. i explained matters to him. "yes," he said, "i know; dr. chatelain has spoken to me about you, but you're a bit of a _pricotteur_,[ ] aren't you?" "no, sir," i replied. "never mind, never mind," he said in his brusque way. "when you are ill, i'll look after you, but don't come to me when you aren't--i don't like it." he hurried out of the room, and went to visit the troopers in the sick ward. when i resumed work on the tuesday it had been snowing hard during the night, and the cold was such that our fingers soon became benumbed through contact with our carbines. i have omitted to mention that in the cavalry white doeskin gloves are always worn at drill; and we were even allowed during the winter months to wear white woollen gloves. in the infantry the men drill without gloves, and only wear them on parade, or when they go out of barracks, their gloves being of white cotton.[ ] before drilling us sergeant legros carefully examined our carbines, and gave _salle de police_ "_à l'oeil_" to three of us. as i have already explained, _à l'oeil_ means that the punishment is not reported to the officers, and therefore is not recorded. in my time this led to monstrous abuse, as neither the captains nor the colonel were aware of the number of men who were daily punished. it was so cold that we felt quite delighted when we were commanded to start at _pas gymnastique_ (a quick run), the sergeant and the corporal running with us for a couple of hundred yards, when they fell out. we soon, however, began to feel exhausted, but legros noticing this called out to us: "you d---- lazy brutes, keep your distances, or i'll leave you on the run for half an hour longer." first one, then another, fell out, utterly unable to go on, each one of them being told that he would sleep in the _salle de police_ that night; then came my turn, with the same result, but little did i care for the punishment, as i had to sleep in the den in any case. altogether six of us were punished after we had been kept on the run for more than a quarter of an hour! we were kept drilling on foot for half an hour longer, and during that time our sergeant took a delight in making us "shoulder arms," "slope arms," "present arms," and leaving us in the same position for three or four minutes at a time, while if a single one of us wavered in the least he never failed to make us repeat the movement. day after day the same thing occurred, until the two hours of foot drill became a daily terror to us. sergeant legros took also special pleasure in the _voltige_. the few of us who, like myself, had soon learnt to run alongside the horse while cantering in a circle and to jump on his back facing the head or the tail, or to jump on the horse and then to alight by passing the leg over the neck jumping up once more astride the animal, were seldom called. the sergeant's delight was to get a _volontaire_ who could just manage to jump on the cantering horse, and then to order another clumsy chap to jump behind him: if the man succeeded in doing so without bringing the first rider to the ground, the sergeant whipped the horse until both riders fell off, and in that case he usually gave each of them one or two days' _salle de police_. another trick he was particularly fond of making us perform was "the scissors." this was usually done on the circus saddle, although some of us could do it on the bareback horse with only a surcingle. it may be thus described: [illustration: exercise in riding school (vaulting)] being on the horse you seize the iron handles fixed on each side in front of the saddle, then putting your weight on your wrists you throw your legs high up in the air, bending forward as much as you can; you then cross your legs, and letting the handles go you drop back into the saddle facing the horse's tail. to face once more the horse's head you repeat the movement, laying hold of two leather loops fixed at the back of the saddle, but you must be careful to bend your head downwards towards the outside of the circle described by the horse, or else instead of falling on the saddle you are violently jerked to the ground. a fairly good rider can soon learn to perform this trick bareback, throwing himself back with the aid of the handles fixed on to the surcingle, while to face once more the horse's head he pushes himself well forward towards the withers, and placing his hand on the animal's back he vaults with the weight of his body thrown well towards the inside of the circle. had we had a different sergeant who, instead of having but one object in view--to punish us--had put us on our mettle and developed a spirit of emulation, we would have soon proved the pick of the regiment. one or two of the _volontaires_ were splendid athletes, two of us at least being able to jump over the whole length of a horse leap-frog fashion, leaping from behind and landing in front of the animal's head. most of us could in the same way jump standing on to the horse's back, my friend delbruck being among the best athletes of our lot. it is true that his mother was english and that he had received an english education. that evening it was freezing so hard that we were allowed to take our great-coats to the _salle de police_, and the sergeant of the guard being a friend of de lanoy's i was excused from pumping water, and sent to my bed at a.m. the following day i was still more lucky, for de lanoy having taken the guard, allowed me to sleep in the stables instead of the _salle de police_. i made myself snug alongside my mare, and the dear little beast cannot have moved for hours, for i slept beside her from . p.m. till a.m. i was awakened by a great commotion: one of the chargers had kicked in such a way as to get astride the partition of his stall, where he got stuck. i arose to help the stable guard, and with the handle of a broom we managed after a good deal of trouble to unhook the partition, which fell to the ground, releasing the unfortunate horse. i then returned to my own charger's stall, and passed a most comfortable night. i had once more to sleep in the _salle de police_, but, fortunately, that was my last day of it for the time being. the frost was getting more intense every day, and it has, indeed, been recorded that the winter of was one of the severest within the memory of man. the cold at last was such that orders were given by various captains that we should drill in the stables instead of out of doors; this at least saved us from having to run round a yard until we were completely exhausted. as we began to know sergeant legros better we were able to realise into what hands we had fallen: some days he was in a good humour and none of us would be punished; at other times he would only put in an appearance when we were assembled for drill on foot; but when he failed to appear at morning school, which in his absence was presided over by a corporal, we were certain that it was a bad sign. the moment he appeared he looked sulky, with a heavy cloud over his face, and his first words to us usually were, "i am going to stick four of you in the _salle de police_ to-night, so you had better look out." this promise he never failed to keep, and four of us invariably slept in the lock-up. we were already in the middle of december, and christmas was fast approaching, so that we all looked forward to the few days' leave we hoped to get at that festive season; but, alas, i little suspected what was about to befall me. the colonel seemed to have taken an increased dislike to _volontaires_. first came a regimental order by which the _volontaires_ were strictly forbidden to mess at the canteen. as, however, he could not stretch regulations far enough to prevent us from using the canteen, he worded the order thus: "in future," he said, "the _volontaires_ will have to go and fetch their rations from the kitchen like other troopers; corporals are enjoined to report any _volontaire_ failing to obey this order." this was all very well, but he could not compel us to eat if we were not hungry. still, the result of this order was great inconvenience to us, as it meant our being detained in the room until our _gamelle_ had been brought by the orderly. on the sunday before christmas i was expecting a party of friends who had promised to come and look me up, and had asked me to dinner. at afternoon "stables" i therefore went to the officer of the week, and asked him for ten o'clock leave, as i said some members of my family were coming to see me. immediately after "stables," donning one of the uniforms i had had specially made of better cloth, i went to the station to await my friends' arrival. they were artists, and were accompanied by two music-hall stars of the day. i waited for them on the platform, and when they alighted from their compartment, one of the ladies complained that an old gentleman, whom she pointed out to me, had been rubbing his foot against hers in so persistent and insulting a manner that she was compelled to request him to desist. i had a good stare at the old man, and made some uncomplimentary remark to the lady about him. we then proceeded to take our seats in a four-in-hand brake i had hired for the occasion, and drove off merrily to the forest, a few miles from the town. i was driving, and on the way i observed that we passed in one of the streets the old gentleman of the train. we spent a most pleasant afternoon, and were enjoying our dinner when my friend de lanoy sent word that he wanted to speak to me. i asked him to join us, but he declined to do so, and insisted upon the waiter telling me that it was most important that i should come out to him at once. accordingly i went, and, at de lanoy's request, we adjourned to my room. "what the deuce have you been doing, old chap?" he began; "major vian has just been to the barracks, fuming with rage, and ordered me to mount my horse and look for you all over the town, and when i had found you, i was to bring you back with me, and stick you straight off in prison." i simply could not understand what it meant, and told him exactly how the case stood: that some friends, whose names i mentioned, as he knew them also, had come to spend the afternoon with me, and that before dinner we had driven in a brake to the forest. i asked de lanoy whether by so doing i had in any way infringed the regulations; but he told me that he did not see anything irregular in my proceedings. he then inquired whether i had met the major on the way and failed to salute him; but i was able to assure him that i was quite certain that i had duly saluted every officer i came across. "well," he said, "i cannot understand it; but i will tell you what i will do for you: i will tell the major that i couldn't find you; so go on with your dinner, and, as you have ten o'clock leave, enjoy yourself till then; but you must expect to be locked up the moment you return to barracks." de lanoy then expressed his regret at being unable to join us, explaining that being on duty he could not possibly do so. this occurrence naturally marred the gaiety of the following proceedings, but my friends tried to cheer me up, and affected to treat the adventure as a joke. at ten o'clock i returned to barracks and reported myself to the sergeant of the guard. the sergeant, a friend of mine, told me that "i had put my foot in it," and that he had strict orders to march me to the cells then and there. at the same time, with some curiosity, he asked me what i had been doing. i was as ignorant as he was of my supposed crime, and could supply him with no information. i handed my sword over to one of the troopers of the guard, and asked him to take it to my room with my helmet. i was then marched off to the cells. between ten o'clock and midnight five more troopers were brought into the prison, all of them in full uniform, and in a disgusting state of drunkenness; of course they kicked up an awful row, and there was no sleep for me, as may well be imagined. at half-past twelve we heard a tremendous disturbance outside the cell door, and the moment it was opened a trooper, mad with drink, struggling, kicking, and swearing, was chucked inside. as soon as the door had been closed upon him he rushed to it, and for fully a quarter of an hour went on hammering and kicking at it like a maniac; realising then that his efforts were all in vain, he tottered towards the camp bed and threw himself bodily on two or three men who were lying on it. he was received with curses, and violently thrown off, dropping with a tremendous thud on to the pavement of the cell. he arose, however, madder than ever, and, with oaths and curses, declared that he was going to rip open the whole b---- lot of us. unfortunately at that moment one of the troopers struck a match and lit a candle. this only added to the fellow's drunken fury, and to our horror we saw him pull a huge clasp-knife from one of his pockets. we all sprang to our feet, but the drunken man, selecting a trooper against whom he evidently had a grudge, made a rush for him; at the same time the candle was upset, and in the dark we could hear the two men struggling and rushing about the cell. "who has got a match?" i shouted. as ill luck would have it, nobody could find one for the moment, so, unwilling to be ripped open in the dark, i groped my way towards a recess where "_jules_" stood, and closed the door behind me. a few minutes, perhaps but a few seconds, later i heard piatte's deep bass voice saying, "no you don't, my children, no you don't!" i carefully peeped out, slightly opening the door. the candle had been re-lighted, and in the middle of the cells stood piatte, in uniform, holding two men, one by his coat-collar, and the other by the wrist. it appears that piatte had returned to barracks drunk that night, and had been taken to the lock-up, but, being in a very quiet mood when "boozed," he had merely gone to lie down in a corner. he had been aroused by the noise of the fight, and had immediately jumped up to separate the belligerents. it was dark when he first tackled them, and in the struggle he had been stabbed through the arm. in the meantime some one had found a match and re-lighted the candle just as i emerged from my place of safety. it was superb to see the hercules piatte holding these two men, absolutely frenzied as they were, as easily as if they had been mere babies. "put down your knives, you beggars," he said to them, and as the man who had begun the row, and whose wrist he held, swore that he would do no such thing, but that he would soon have his knife through piatte's digestive organs, the latter gave a wrench to his wrist which made the weapon drop to the ground. some of us had in the meantime disarmed the other fellow, and piatte then addressed them: "are you going to be quiet and go to sleep, you silly beggars?" a torrent of abuse was the only reply, and the two combatants continued to swear they would have one another's blood. "very well!" said piatte. "if you are so anxious to knock each other about here goes!" and so saying, he banged the two men one against the other half a dozen times as if they had been mere puppets. he then let them go. "got enough of it, my boys?" he asked grimly. they had apparently had quite enough of it, for they both went to lie down moaning heavily. curiously enough, neither of them had been stabbed, and they had only received some insignificant scratches. beckoning to piatte to come to me, i examined his wound; luckily for him he was wearing his uniform coat, and the thickness of the cloth had partly stopped the knife, and it had only penetrated slightly into the flesh of his arm. it was with difficulty that i induced him to let me bind it up with my pocket handkerchief, a trifling service which the kind-hearted fellow never forgot, and which he repaid in more ways than one. when the sergeant of the guard came at a.m. to take the men to the pump, i was ordered to stop in the cells, the sergeant having received special instructions to keep me there until the major turned up in the morning. there were two prisoners to keep me company, but dog-tired as i was, i soon dropped off to sleep, and did not awake till half-past six, when my friend de lanoy came to look me up. he had tried to find out what i was charged with, but had failed to do so; he promised, however, to come and let me know as soon as he obtained any information, so that i should be prepared to face the major, before whom i was to be brought at a.m. de lanoy also kindly suggested sending me my washing materials and a razor, in order that i should not look the disgraceful object i then did. shortly afterwards the corporal of the guard brought me my things, as well as a bucket and a looking-glass, and while i was making my toilet he chattered with me about my case. "you're in a nice hole, old boy," he said, "and i shouldn't like to stand in your shoes. what on earth have you been doing?" i assured him that this was the very thing i did not know myself. "now that is all rot," he replied. "it must have been something, jolly serious, too, for when the major came to the barracks yesterday he was in a greater rage than i have ever seen him in before. yes," he went on, "i really thought he would have had a fit." i once more renewed my assurance that i was absolutely unconscious of having done anything wrong. "get along with you," said the corporal; "you won't get me to believe that, but if you choose to keep it to yourself, do so, by all means, i don't care." he then took my things away, and i was soon left to my own thoughts, the two prisoners being taken out to do work. at o'clock de lanoy returned, and told me that so far all he knew was that i had been given four days' _salle de police_ by the lieutenant who had given me ten o'clock leave the previous day. at . a.m. the door of the cells once more opened, and the corporal of the guard ordered me to step out, whereupon i was marched off between two of the troopers of the guard, who, with drawn swords, escorted me as far as the _salle de rapport_. the _adjudant_ soon came to the door and ordered me to walk in, stepping out himself at the same time, and closing the door behind him. the room was a spacious one, with a large table in the middle of it, at which a small bald-headed man sat signing documents; his back was turned to me whilst i stood near the door at attention. after a few minutes' silence, only interrupted by the grating of his pen upon the paper, the little man, without turning round, called out: "trooper decle, come here." i advanced, turned round to face him, and, as i saluted, what was my horror at discovering that the enterprising old gentleman whose foot had annoyed one of my lady friends in the train on the previous day, and about whom i had passed some rather uncivil remarks, was ... my major!! the reason i had not recognised him as an officer was that since i had joined the regiment he had been away on leave, and he had only just returned. i stood at "attention," my heart beating fast, but the old gentleman (his age was perhaps fifty-six or fifty-seven) did not speak a word, but stared at me from head to foot with a look that seemed to pierce me. "so," he said, after a few minutes' time, "we are one of these _volontaires_, one of these dashing _volontaires_, who, although they wear a dragoon uniform, are nothing after all but dirty _petits crêvés_. we invite painted females, who are nothing but low _cocottes_, to come and visit us, and we parade them about the streets in a four-horse brake when our officers are content to walk on foot! trooper decle," he proceeded in a stern voice, "you are a disgrace to the th dragoons. you have disgraced your uniform by a contact with such creatures, you have disgraced yourself by passing uncalled-for remarks on your betters, and although you are a _volontaire_ you are a liar, and nothing but a b---- _maquereau_." i turned pale under the insult, but as i had determined to keep my temper, i made no reply. this seemed to excite the gradually rising fury of the major, who had now risen from his chair and was pacing up and down the room livid with rage. "why don't you answer?" he cried; "what have you got to say, dirty swine that you are! i suppose you belong to the class of youngsters who are proud to be seen in the company of _cocottes_, and afterwards leave those ladies to settle the bill for them." this i confess was too much for me, but still determined to outwardly restrain my temper, i took two steps towards the major, and crossing my arms on my chest, looked him straight in the eyes. "i have let you insult me, sir," i said slowly, "in order to see how far you would go. the ladies of whom you have just spoken are, i know, far above your contempt, and it strikes me that if they had cared to accept your senile advances, you would probably have thought them most divine creatures. i need not defend them, they are too well known to require such defence," i continued, mentioning their names. "as for myself," i went on, "you have accused me of playing the basest part a man can play in this world. it was not through respect for the gold stripes you wear on your sleeve that i kept silent, but through respect for your white hairs. in a few months' time i shall no longer be a dragoon, and i hope that in a few years i shall be somebody, while you will be--yourself: nothing else but one of the mass of retired majors whose intelligence and means will limit them to a glass of absinthe, and a game of dominoes before dinner, and the company of a local bailiff, or the constable of their native village. you called me a _maquereau_ just now, and you seem to be so well acquainted with the habits of that class, that i can only conclude that you gained that knowledge personally at a time when nature made you more attractive than you are now." the major, who had been too dumbfounded to answer a word so far, turned pale when i uttered those words, and, seizing his riding-whip, which lay on the table, lifted it as though about to strike me, shouting at the same time, in a voice choked with rage, "_misérable!_" i wrenched the whip from his hands, and replacing it on the table stood once more at "attention." "i will court-martial you," went on the major; "you shall have ten years for this!" "i may or may not, sir," i replied; "but supposing i am court-martialled, i shall bring witnesses to expose the way in which you behaved in the train yesterday, and you may regret the step you have taken. as to our present conversation there is only your word against mine, but i suppose that being only a trooper my word will stand for nothing; still, as i told you before, think well over the matter before you do anything rash." the major said nothing, but went on feverishly pacing up and down the room, he at last stopped, and sat down at the table. "decle," he said, "lieutenant riel has given your four days' _salle de police_ for having told him a lie in asking for ten o'clock leave on the pretence that you were going to meet your family, and your punishment will be increased to fifteen days' _salle de police_ for having been seen driving a four-in-hand through the town in fancy uniform. now, go!" i did not wait to ask for any further explanation, being only too glad to escape as i had. i must add that the major was evidently persuaded that he had put himself in the wrong, for i was never afterwards punished by him, and in no case did he increase any punishment given to me. the whole thing was pretty rough on me, however, as those fifteen days meant my spending christmas and new year in the cells while all my comrades were enjoying a well-deserved leave. after the eight days' cells i had previously had, those fifteen days given to me within the first two months of my service branded me as a bad character, and i fully realised that in future punishments would be showered upon me. footnotes: [ ] a fellow who shirks work. [ ] the regulation gloves for officers are brown driving-gloves, except on special occasions, such as reviews, official calls, &c., when white gloves have to be worn. chapter ix it will be readily understood that the end of that year was one of the most unpleasant times i ever went through. the cold was bitter, and we were pretty nearly frozen in the _salle de police_. just before christmas all my comrades went home with eight days' leave, and i was the only _volontaire_ left behind. there was one comfort, however, in the fact that, sergeant legros being also on leave, i escaped his daily bullying. by that time i had also learned how to avoid all fatigue duty, having found out that there was not a single one of our corporals who was not open to a bribe; in fact, some of them knowing that i was pretty free with my money, openly came to me, saying, "i say, decle, i am thirsty to-day; are you going to stand a bottle, or do you want to do fatigue duty?" of course i immediately forked out a franc, and was thereupon left alone. i had also made friends with a good many of the sergeants, and when any of those with whom i was friendly took the guard they invariably allowed me to sleep in the stables instead of the _salle de police_. the cold was so bitter just before christmas that the colonel issued an order allowing the troopers punished with _salle de police_ to wear their second-best regimental trousers under their canvas ones, and to use their great-coats when sleeping in the cells. on christmas day more than fifteen troopers were thrown into the _salle de police_ during the night, all of them having returned to barracks in a state which an english policeman would describe as "drunk and disorderly"; prominent among them were titi and piatte, both most gloriously drunk, but having just enough sense left to remember that their chum decle was in durance vile. the moment they got in they called out for me, and on my answering them, they threatened every one with blue murder if a candle was not produced at once, as they wanted to see their dear decle. i had smuggled in a candle as well as some matches, and thinking that it might keep them quiet, i lit it. the moment they saw me they rushed to me with demonstrations of affection with which i could well have dispensed, piatte especially insisting on repeatedly embracing me, and, unconscious of his great strength, hugging me as tightly as a bear, until i feared he would crack my ribs. the boon companions then produced a miscellaneous collection of articles from their pockets--greasy papers containing sausages and _boudin_ (a kind of sausage made of pig's blood with a lavish addition of garlic); mixed up with these were bits of cheese, cakes, and, last but not least, a pint of brandy. "we brought you that, old chap," said piatte, "because we didn't want an old chum to spend a miserable christmas." it must be remarked that piatte was a protestant from lorraine, where christmas is, i believe, religiously kept as the greatest festival of the year, while in other parts of france new year's day is considered far more important. to please the poor fellows, whose kind-heartedness i fully appreciated, i partook sparingly of their victuals, although they were far from appetising. i pretended, too, to drink some of the vile brandy, but a sip of it was quite enough. the two men then sat down near me. "oh!" said piatte, "we've had a grand time of it, a grand time, my boy!" "yes," interrupted titi, who was a little muddled; "if you had seen that little infantryman flying out of the window you would have simply roared." "don't interrupt, titi," screamed out piatte, trying at the same time to give titi a friendly buffet with his open palm; unfortunately, however, i sat between the two, and the badly aimed blow fell on my head and nearly knocked the senses out of me; seeing this, piatte, to comfort me, hugged me once more in his powerful arms. "well," he resumed, "we started at three o'clock this afternoon, just after stables, and as we got outside titi says to me, 'got any oof, piatte?' 'oof,' i says, 'open your eyes well and look at that.' i had received, two days ago, a remittance from the old woman, my old granny--ten francs, _mon salop_. so titi looks at it, and he says, 'ah, ten francs; oh my, i'll show you something better than that,' and he pulls out of his pocket a 'gold un'--a whole twenty-franc piece. 'that's from my _volontaire_; he's a rare un,' he says. "that's you, you know," added piatte, digging me in the ribs. "that's god's truth," hiccoughed titi. "shut your head, titi--you're drunk. isn't he drunk, that fellow? but, as i was telling you," piatte went on, "we took the road past the railway, and came to that little pub 'the three jolly comrades,' where there's a sign-board where they've painted a dragoon, a piou-piou,[ ] and a gunner walking arm-in-arm--you know the place, don't you?" i didn't, but assured piatte that i knew it well. "'let's go in,' says titi: but i says, 'no.' fancy going into a place where they put a dragoon arm-in-arm with a piou-piou! but titi, he says, 'oh, never mind their bally sign-board if their wine's good,' and i says, 'there's sense in that,' so in we goes. "there was a billiard-table in the place, so i says to titi, 'after we have had a drink we will have a game, titi.' we called for a drink, and a jolly nice girl comes to serve us. you should have seen her, old chap; she was a regular ripper--plenty of flesh and some to spare. i had taken her hand, and was telling her what a fine girl she was when half a dozen piou-pious walked in the place. the girl tries to take her hand away and blushes, and i see one of the piou-pious stare at me like mad. well, i didn't say nothing, but i let go the girl's hand, and she brings us our wine and a flask of brandy; we finish our bottle, and just as we were drinking our last glass i see one of the piou-pious take off his coat, and they all take billiard cues and calls out for balls; so i get up and i say, 'no, look here; 'tis our game and not yours.' one of them says, 'first come, first served.' i says, 'just so; we came first, and first we play.' but the piou-pious wouldn't give in, and the one that had stared at me, he calls the landlord. when the old man comes i say, civil like, 'now, look here, landlord: i have come into your house, although i didn't like that 'ere board on the outside. how dare you call that "the three jolly comrades," and put up a picture of a dragoon walking arm-in-arm with a dirty mean bug of piou-piou, like if any dragoon would lower himself in that way!' "'dirty mean bug!' shout all the piou-pious together. 'you filthy _citrouille_!' (a nickname given to dragoons, meaning "pumpkin.") "this was too much for me, so i turns to titi and i says, 'did you hear that?' "'didn't i!' he says. 'what shall we do--chuck all these dirty shrimps out of the window, eh?' "'that's it,' i say, and i goes to open the window. i must tell you titi and i had taken off our swords and put them in a corner when we came in. i had just opened the window when one of them takes his billiard cue by the tip and hits me with the thick part of it; but it just struck on my helmet, and you can see it hit hard. look," added piatte, picking up his helmet, which was quite bashed in. "oh, then," he went on, "my blood was up and i went for that chap, and without more ceremony i take him by his coat-tails and his collar, and i send him, cue and all, right over the billiard-table, where he falls all of a heap and stops there. at the same time the four others had set on titi, so i rushed to his help; he was down, and they were hammering at him like mad; so i hit one here, i hit another there, i gave the third a dig in the chest with my head, i sent the fourth against the billiard-table with a kick, and titi gets on his legs. the others, except the one i had chucked over the billiard-table, had also got up, and we were fighting like mad when three other devils who were passing along the road stepped in and joined in the row. 'oh,' i says, 'is that so? helmets, then!' titi understands me; we take our helmets off, and swinging them by the end of the horse-tail, we strike right in among them promiscuous like. my boy, if you had seen them: they drops one after the other; only three of them remained standing up, and while titi was having it out in the corner with one of the chaps i stood facing the two others. one of them, the coward, draws his sword-bayonet, but with a swing of my helmet i knocks it out of his hand, and as the window stood open i chucked him out of it. the other one, in the meantime, had caught hold of me from behind, but i soon shook him off, and lifting him from the ground--he was a miserable little cur--i shook him like a rat. i bang him against the wall, and at last he cries, 'oh don't, don't.' 'going to beg pardon?' i asked. 'oh yes,' he says, 'i beg pardon.' 'very well, then,' i says, sticking him on the ground standing with his back to me, 'if you move god help you!' at the same time i holler, 'prepare to receive cavalry!' and didn't he receive cavalry, just! with one kick in the back i sent him flying to join the others." at the recollection of this piatte burst into such a roar of laughter that it awoke titi, who had fallen asleep on my shoulder, and he, too, began to guffaw idiotically. "shut up, titi," yelled piatte once more. "where was i? oh, i know," he went on. "titi had by this time knocked his man down, and without asking for our bill, we pick up our swords and bolt like mad. as we get out, the chap i had chucked out of the window has just regained his feet, and he hollers 'murder! murder!' he was a corporal, and 'twas a bad case. the landlord had been hollering 'murder!' the whole time; but, d'ye see, the place stands all by itself, and only the three chaps i spoke of heard him. we hadn't gone a hundred yards before we see all the piou-pious rush out of the pub and make for us like mad. we hadn't been such fools as to cut towards the town, so when we saw them after us we made off across country, and, as luck would have it, they didn't chivy us far. but we'd given them too good a dressing to be up to much. all the same, we ran for another mile, and then we sat down and had a good laugh. then titi, he says, 'it's all very fine, but i don't like it; that ere d----d corporal'll be bad for our health: we must rig up an alleyby.' so to rig up his blooming alleyby, he says, 'let's go down to the river, and first of all let's have a swill!'--we were pretty bloody and dirty, you bet--'and then we'll go to a bloke i know who's got a boat, and then we'll get back to the town, and make out as how we've come from the north road, and we've been in the forest, and you got your helmet smashed bird's-nesting.' and so we did. by a roundabout way we got to the river and had a wash; we soon found titi's bloke, and he took us over in his boat. 'give us a hind-wheel,' says titi, and he hands it over to the boat chap. 'mind you,' says titi, 'you've seen no dragoons to-day.' 'mum's the word,' he says back, and he pulls off and throws a line into the water quite innocent like. we ran towards the forest until we hit the road, and then we walked quietly down towards the town. on the way we meets lieutenant granford riding; he stops and says, 'what's the matter with your helmet?' 'oh, sir,' i says, 'i tried to get a rook's nest, and nearly broke my neck.' 'well,' says the lieutenant--he's a good sort, you know--'you'll have to pay for it; but bird's-nesting is a better occupation than getting drunk.' 'yes, sir,' says titi, 'we don't mean to liquor any more!' 'i'm glad to hear it,' says the lieutenant, and he canters off. "'there's our alleyby,' says titi, 'all cut and dried, and now for a bally good booze!' ah! my boy, what a day we had of it! but unluckily we forgot the time. we'd only got ten o'clock leave, and as we were looking for another pub, to blow off our remaining four francs, we found one where the shutters were just being put up. 'by jove!' says titi, and asking the chap who was putting up the shutters what sort of time it was, we heard ''twas a quarter to twelve!' off we cut to barracks, but on the way, just as we were getting round the corner, titi didn't feel well, and he says, 'hold hard a minute, old chap!' that's just what done it. titi never can stand a drop of lush, and he began to be that sick, and made such a bally row, that the _adjudant_, who was sneaking about the shop, he pounces on us, and wants our names. so long as we were walking it was all right; but the moment we had to stand at 'attention' things began to swim a bit. i see titi isn't steady, so i catch hold of him to prop him up; but he clutches me, and we both sprawl on the ground. well, that finished it. the _adjudant_ calls out to the sentry to send two men from the guard-room, and he orders them to march us up to the _salle de police_--and here we are. but we had a jolly good drunk," concluded piatte, with a satisfied air; and extinguishing the candle we went to sleep. the next day the two revellers had fifteen days' prison by the colonel's orders. a complaint was lodged by the colonel of the infantry regiment that an assault had been committed by dragoons on one of his corporals, and it appeared that two of the privates had also been seriously injured in the fray, and were lying in hospital. fortunately for piatte and titi the injured corporal and his comrades had reported that they were set upon by at least half a dozen dragoons. the case was a serious one, however, and i feared that piatte and titi would be found out; this would mean a court-martial, and very likely they would be sentenced to death, a sentence invariably carried out in all cases when an inferior has been striking a superior. the following day the corporal and two of the soldiers who had taken part in the fight were taken through our barracks. we were all mustered by squadrons in stable-dress, the prisoners among the others; the corporal and the two infantry soldiers were marched along our ranks, and the corporal soon pointed out a trooper as one of the offenders, while the two privates also declared that they recognised him. it fortunately turned out that the man was on guard duty the previous day; and on discovering this our captain of the week, who was in charge of the parade, immediately ordered the infantry soldiers to be taken back to their barracks, and to be sent straight off to prison; he also drew up a strong report against them, which was at once handed over to our colonel, who demanded an exemplary punishment for the men from the colonel commanding the infantry regiment. doubtless these men merely made a mistake, for troopers look so different in stable-dress and in full uniform, that it is almost impossible to recognise them, unless you know them personally. nevertheless, it was a narrow escape for piatte and titi. our captain gladly availed himself of the men's mistake to prevent further investigation, as the rivalry which exists between troopers and infantry soldiers extends to the officers, and in cases such as the one i have just described officers will generally try and screen their men. it is, indeed, very seldom that infantry officers are seen with cavalry officers, who generally look down upon the former with utter contempt. between christmas and new year we had hardly any drill, a large number of the troopers being away on leave, so that with the exception of stables we had scarcely any work, and i was able to rest in the daytime. at night i had, of course, to sleep in the _salle de police_; it was daily more loathsome a trial, as since the frost had set in the rats which infested the place were constantly coming to lie against us for the sake of heat. i devised an arrangement which proved most useful. i got a bag made of very thin india-rubber sheeting; it was about six feet long with a drawing-string at the top of it, so that when i had pulled it on i could fasten it round my neck, and it kept me as warm as if i had several blankets over me. when it was folded up i could wind it round my waist, where it looked like an ordinary belt. i also had the benefit of the mattresses piatte and titi were allowed as prisoners, and i soon got accustomed to the _salle de police_ without suffering severely from it. there is no doubt, however, that it is a cruel and barbarous punishment, especially in the cavalry, as neither blankets nor straw mattresses are allowed to the troopers. in the infantry, soldiers punished with _salle de police_ are allowed a straw mattress and a blanket, and have, moreover, no pumping to do in the middle of the night. it is scandalous, too, that troopers once in the _salle de police_ should be isolated in such a way that in case of sickness or emergency they cannot possibly summon help. many fatal cases have been the result of this practice. some years ago a trooper was found in the morning frozen to death in the cells, and yet more serious tragedies have occurred. since i served there was the case of a zouave who was put in solitary confinement and forgotten there, his body being only found a week later; so great had been his pangs of hunger that it was found that he had been trying to eat the flesh of his arms and his hands, and when he was discovered the rats had themselves eaten a portion of his back and of his throat. i also remember another case of a man who was sent to the punishment battalions in algeria; he was punished with two days in the _silos_ and was forgotten there, and when he was discovered six days later he was still breathing, but the whole of his chest, on which he had been lying, was but a vast ulcer swarming with maggots. "how?" it will be asked, "can such a thing occur?" it may be explained in a few words. every morning before the guard is changed a list of all the men who are punished is drawn up by the _adjudant's_ clerk. in the columns standing opposite their names is written down the class of punishment which they are undergoing, with the number of days they have still to do, thus: +---------------------------------------------------------------------+ | hommes punis (men punished). | +-------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+ | | | nature des punitions. | |noms (names).| escadron | (nature of punishments.) | | |(squadron).+--------+--------+-------+-----------------+ | | |consigne|salle de|prison.|cellule (solitary| | | |(c.b). |police. | |confinement). | +-------------+-----------+--------+--------+-------+-----------------+ |martin | | | | | | |piatte | | | | | | |duval | | | | | | |decle | | | | | | | &c. &c.| | | | | | +-------------+-----------+--------+--------+-------+-----------------+ as will be seen, the numbers in the various columns reserved for each punishment indicate how many more days of that class of punishment the soldier has to undergo, and this list is stuck on a board which is hung up in the room of the sergeant of the guard, a fresh list being made up every day. supposing that by some mistake the _adjudant's_ clerk should, in making up his fresh list, put the figure belonging to trooper duval's name in the c.b. column instead of the cells, the sergeant of the guard would naturally conclude that there were no men in cells, and since in the case of certain barracks the cells are a few hundred yards away from the guard-room, the unfortunate fellow would be left in them without food, and might be unable to make himself heard. this was actually the case in the instance of the zouave i have just mentioned. this arrangement turned out, however, to my benefit. one day, as i was complaining to de lanoy of the hardship of having still ten days' _salle de police_ before me, he suggested my making friends with the _adjudant's_ clerk, who would gradually leave out a few days in the punishment list; for instance, when i had still eleven days to do, he would mark nine days on his list, and at the end of a couple of days more, instead of marking seven days against my name he would put down five, and the following day mark me as having only three days more, so that in this way i should contrive to sleep in the _salle de police_ for _seven_ nights instead of twelve. de lanoy added that this could never be found out, as the sergeants of the guard were daily replaced, and none of them saw anything but the fresh list. i immediately followed his advice, and found that a young fellow with whom i had become great friends had previously acted as _adjudant's_ clerk, and was on very good terms with the present occupant of the post. both were fond of drawing, and as i did a little in that way myself, my friend suggested that he should take me to the clerk's office to show me his drawings. we adjourned there at once, and in the course of conversation my friend suggested to the clerk that he might as well strike off a few days from the remainder of my punishment. the latter readily agreed, and explained that it was especially easy to do so the following morning, as on that day the week would be taken by the second _adjudant_. he then asked me how many days i had still to do, and i told him that twelve days remained. "oh, that will be all right," he said. "i'll put you down for seven, so that in case the _adjudant_, who is just quitting duty to-morrow morning, should, when he takes back 'the week,' look through the list, he would again see your name on it. but it is very unlikely that he will see the list. he never calls for it." this plan was duly carried out, with complete success, though unfortunately it did not prevent my sleeping in the _salle de police_ on new year's day. i had purposely avoided going to the medical visit, as we had but little work in the daytime, and i did not like to pester the doctor or to take advantage of his kindness. i had cause to regret, however, not having done so on new year's day, as i spent a terrible night on that occasion. more than twenty-five troopers were thrown into the _salle de police_, and the disgraceful scenes i have previously described were renewed. quarrels, fights, and fiendish uproar lasted throughout the night, so that i was unable to close my eyes. i was not, however, ejected from my resting-place, as i was lying between piatte and titi, who soon disposed of any man who tried to encroach on our domain. i fully expected that on the occasion of new year's day the colonel would, in accordance with precedent, cancel all punishments. there was one man in solitary confinement, three in prison (viz., piatte, titi, and another trooper who had been absent without leave for five days), and about ten other troopers punished with _salle de police_, ranging from three to five days. on new year's eve the colonel proclaimed in the regimental orders that all punishments would be cancelled, except in the case of troopers who were undergoing a punishment of more than eight days' _salle de police_. this, of course, was aimed at me, for the colonel was fully aware that i was the only trooper who had lately been punished with fifteen days' _boite_. as, however, i was free in the daytime, although i could not go out of barracks, i got a good dinner prepared at the infantry canteen, where i used to go and take my meals _sub rosâ_. i also managed to bribe the corporal of the guard, and sent through him half a bottle of brandy, a bottle of wine, and a large meat pie to my two chums titi and piatte in prison. i need not say that my attention was greatly appreciated, and the two fellows heartily thanked me when i joined them in the evening. on january we resumed our work, under sergeant legros, who returned from his leave sulkier and more malicious than ever. four of the _volontaires_ were sent to the _salle de police_ that night, and the sergeant threatened me with the same punishment because i was hoarse and was unable to command when ordered to do so. i had now been sleeping for many nights in the lock-up, and although i did not realise it at the time, the cold and dampness of the place had told heavily on me. i was so weak that i could hardly sit my horse, and i grew worse daily. on the saturday (inspection-day) we did our usual squadron duty, and after stables, as i was leading my charger to the watering-tanks, i felt hardly able to sit on her back. she was as usual prancing and plunging, and once or twice i had to cling to her mane so as not to drop off. as we were returning from the tanks towards the stables, the lieutenant of the week, who was also the lieutenant of my _peloton_, shouted to me: "jump off your charger, and give it to another man." i jumped off, and staggered towards the lieutenant. "you're drunk, you dirty pig!" he screamed. "you shall have eight days' _salle de police_ for drunkenness." then turning towards the sergeant, he went on, "sergeant, can't you see that man is drunk? get him taken to the cells at once. why couldn't you have seen before that he was drunk?" "i'll teach you, you blackguard!" he added, turning to me. i said: "sir, i am not drunk, i am ill." "and you dare reply!" he again howled; "you are always answering back! we will see what that will cost you. sergeant," he said to de lanoy, "you will put down eight days' _salle de police_ to this drunken swine for having come to stables helplessly intoxicated, and having made impertinent remarks to an officer." i at once realised that if such a report reached the colonel my punishment would be altered to at least fifteen days' prison, and seven days' cells, in solitary confinement, on bread-and-water, and that it would further mean a disgrace for me from which i should never recover. fortunately, at that very moment, i caught sight in the distance of our regimental doctor, and without asking leave i ran to him for all i was worth. "sir," i said, "lieutenant pernot has just accused me of being drunk, and i implore you to examine me, as i am not drunk, but seriously ill." the doctor told me to follow him to the dispensary, and as i was doing so sergeant de lanoy came hurrying along. "decle," he said, "lieutenant pernot has sent me to bring you back to him at once, and he threatens to have you court-martialled for having refused to obey his orders when you were told to go to the cells." the surgeon-major, who had caught the message, turned round to de lanoy, "go and tell lieutenant pernot," he said, "that decle is coming to the dispensary with me by my orders, and there is an end of it." de lanoy returned to the lieutenant, but before we had reached the staircase leading to the dispensary he returned once more, saying that the lieutenant insisted on my going back to him, whether the surgeon-major liked it or not. the latter, whose temper was shortish, asked in a voice shaking with rage whether de lanoy was quite sure that he had exactly repeated the lieutenant's words. "yes, sir," replied de lanoy. "very well," said the surgeon-major, "tell lieutenant pernot that i, surgeon-major lesage, holding the rank of captain, order lieutenant pernot to come to me at once." as de lanoy hesitated, the surgeon-major angrily added, "do you hear me or not? you had better tell your lieutenant to hurry up." we did not wait long, for lieutenant pernot soon arrived, and had evidently been hurrying, as he was nearly breathless. "what the deuce do you mean," said the surgeon, "by countermanding my orders?" "well," replied the lieutenant, pointing to me, "that man is drunk." "that remains to be seen," answered the surgeon, "and i am the best judge of that. i should strongly advise you not to interfere with my orders another time." thereupon he turned on his heel, and telling me to follow him, hurried up to the dispensary. there he laid me on a sofa, and asked me what was the matter. i told him that i had undergone fifteen days' _salle de police_, and felt perfectly worn out. he felt my pulse and took my temperature, which was very high. "you are pretty bad, my boy," he said, "and i am going to send you to hospital." i thanked him warmly, and told him how grateful i felt, pointing out that had it not been for him i might have been disgraced for ever in the regiment. "yes," he said, "i don't like the way they are treating you, and--i will tell you what--whenever you are bullied come to me, and i will excuse you from work. i respect you because you went through your last punishment without ever coming to the medical visit, and, in future, if you don't feel well, you have only got to come here and tell me what you don't feel fit for, and i will inform the colonel." he added, "troopers used to be punished only when they deserved it, but now the _salle de police_ seems to have become a regular institution, and i don't like it--that is all i can say." he concluded by telling me that the dispensary corporal would make out my _billet de l'hôpital_, and that he himself would come and see how i was that same evening. footnote: [ ] a common slang expression for an infantryman. chapter x it must not be imagined that a trooper can be sent to hospital without having to go through innumerable formalities, the french administrative system being so devised as to complicate the simplest matter. before going to hospital, a full inventory of all the trooper's belongings has to be drawn up by the sergeant _fourrier_, the trooper being allowed to retain only the undress uniform which he wears. the remainder of his kit, including his arms, are returned to the stores, where a fresh inventory is made, his saddle alone remaining in the squadron saddle-room. it would be tedious to describe the innumerable documents which have to be drawn up on the occasion. all these formalities having been at length completed, i was marched to the hospital by a corporal, and, on arriving there, fresh ceremonials had to be gone through, after which i was handed over to the tender mercies of a sister of charity. she took me to the ward reserved for soldiers, the hospital being a mixed one, where civilians also were received. our ward contained about twenty-four beds, and was spotlessly clean. the beds were excellent, and certainly far superior to those usually found in english hospitals. i then received my hospital kit, consisting of a huge night-shirt, a pair of dark blue flannel trousers, with a dressing-gown of the same material, a pair of woollen socks, slippers, and a _bonnet de coton_, a most extraordinary head-gear made of thick knitted cotton, finishing up in a point with a tassel sewn on to it. (most of the french peasants still sleep in a similar night-cap, and, until thirty years ago, every frenchman, even if belonging to the higher classes, used to wear this strange head-gear at night.) i was put to bed; my temperature was taken, and then i was left to my own thoughts. in the next bed to mine a poor fellow lay with typhoid fever, while in the bed on the other side lay an infantry soldier suffering from jaundice. the _personnel_ of the hospital, or at least of the military wards, consisted of three sisters of mercy, with an old male nurse belonging to the hospital service corps. the latter, however, was of little use, as he was usually drunk during three parts of the day. the sisters, however, did not look harshly on this little vice of his, for the fellow was a most fervent catholic, who never failed to go to confession, and to high mass every sunday. i had been about half an hour in my bed, when one of the sisters brought me a cup of _tisane_, a kind of tea made of harmless herbs, which is always given in case of sickness, whatever may be the disease one may be suffering from. that sister was a middle-aged woman, with hard, drawn features; the turned-down corners of her mouth expressed a violent temper, and a square chin showed indomitable energy. she sat down near me, and asked me if i was a catholic. i replied that i had been baptized a roman catholic, but that i did not approve of the teachings of that religion, all my tendencies being protestant. she expressed absolute horror at my being so plain-spoken, and told me that all the patients who were roman catholics were expected to go to confession and mass every sunday. "if they don't," she added, "we can't compel them, and that is their own look out, but they do not usually stay here very long. you had better think the matter over, my lad," she added, as she arose from her chair. "i will send, in any case, the chaplain to talk to you of your spiritual state." i thanked her, but had no wish to discuss matters with her. later in the afternoon the head doctor of the hospital, who was surgeon-major to the infantry regiment, and held the rank of major, came on a visit of inspection. when he came to my bedside, he did not even give me a word of greeting, but looked at the board which hung at the head of my bed, and reading the diagnosis made by our regimental doctor shrugged his shoulders. "again a dragoon," he said. "why can't dr. lesage keep his patients in his own dispensary? why did he send you here?" he went on, addressing me. "i don't know, sir," i answered; "i suppose he found that i needed to be sent here." "well, let me see your throat." he examined me, and remarked to the sister that there was nothing much the matter with me, and that, although i might have a slight rise of temperature, every man had fever sometimes, adding that, if every dragoon who had fever was to be sent to hospital, the place would soon be overflowing. he walked away with the sister, and i could see that they were having an animated conversation. the doctor then came back to my bed: "i hear," he said, "that you are a d----d heathen; is that so?" "no, sir," i replied; "i told the sister that i did not approve of the roman catholic religion, and that, although i had been baptized a roman catholic, i was a protestant at heart." "oh," he said, "that is all the same; you are a heathen, and you ought to be ashamed of yourself. that is why, i suppose, dr. lesage sent you here. he likes heathens, and i don't. well, he can look after you if he chooses." and, turning on his heel, he walked off. later in the afternoon dr. lesage came to see me, and i told him what had taken place. he said that he was not in the least surprised, and that he was thoroughly disgusted with the bigotry of all the people connected with the place. he then called the sister, and told her to show him the register where the head surgeon had written out his orders concerning my case. after looking through it, he told me that, just as he had expected, the head surgeon had put me on ordinary rations, but that he was not going to have it; and he immediately ordered that i should be put on a diet of chicken, eggs, and the like. he found my throat very bad, and said that i ought to have come to see him much sooner than i did. he also explained to me that he would give orders enabling me to get from outside whatever food i fancied, as well as books; he promised too to come and see me on the following day. i took advantage of his permission to send the hospital orderly to fetch me a stock of eatables, books, and some newspapers. our dinner was served at six o'clock, and i was much astonished when the sister brought me a piece of beef which had been boiled to a rag to make soup. i reminded her that dr. lesage had put me on "fowl and egg diet." "i know it," she said, "but, as there is none to be had to-night, you will have to put up with what there is." i pointed out to her that rations of fowl had been served to at least six of the other patients. "well," she said, "the fact is there is none left." upon this i declared that, unless i had a portion immediately brought to me, i would forthwith send a letter to dr. lesage to explain how matters stood. "oh," she said, "please don't trouble yourself, and i'll go to the kitchen, and see if there is some remaining." ten minutes later she returned with the wing of a fowl, and when i had finished it she brought me an omelet. i mention this incident to show the gross partiality which is usually displayed by sisters of mercy in french hospitals. most of the patients, who belong to the humbler classes, are afraid to complain, and i have constantly seen patients who make a display of deep religious zeal treated with the utmost attention, receiving the best of fare, while others who were lax in the practice of religion, or who had the misfortune to be protestants, were given the commonest food, even if the doctor had ordered special delicacies for them. the sisters of mercy have absolutely no training in nursing, and an english nurse, after a year's hospital work, is far more efficient than sisters of mercy who have spent years in the wards. i do not mean to say that there are not to be found among the sisters touching examples of disinterested devotion to their fellow creatures, but, taking them as a class, their employment in hospitals is not calculated to benefit the patients, and they are far inferior to english trained nurses in education, manners, and skill. they have no fear of dismissal, as, in case of their failing to do their duty, they are merely removed to the headquarters of their order. it is true that it would be most difficult to replace them in french hospitals, as there exists in france no body of trained nurses like those in this country. the french lay nurses are almost invariably middle-aged women of the charwoman type, who have had no practical training, and are usually addicted to drink. in the largest hospitals the administration of drugs and the dressing of wounds devolves entirely on the medical students, and nurses, whether sisters of mercy or lay, merely stand in the wards to watch the patients, and in case of need they have to go and summon a student. while i was in the hospital, i witnessed some shocking examples of the way in which sufferers were treated. i remember one night when a patient, who was suffering from a most serious attack of jaundice, cried out to the sister on duty for a basin. the sister, who was counting her beads and muttering prayers in a half-dozing state, merely lifted her eyes dreamily towards the patient, but took no notice. the poor fellow called her again and again, and, seeing how matters stood, i got out of bed, and, going to the sister, called her attention to the patient. "go to bed," she said to me: "it is no business of yours. the female attendant has gone out; it is her work, and not mine, to carry basins about." i thereupon went to fetch what was needed myself, and rendered what help i could to my sick comrade. facts such as these help to explain why the poor in france have a greater dread of the hospital than many people have of the workhouse in england. it took me a few minutes to find a basin that night, and while i looked about i must have caught a chill, for the following day i had a relapse. i had been rather upset, too, by the death of the typhoid patient in the bed next to mine. his old mother came with his father that afternoon, and their distress was heartrending to witness. "they have taken my boy, they have killed him," the poor mother kept repeating; complaining bitterly that she had not been informed of his illness till too late. two days later, early in the morning, as luck would have it, none other than piatte was brought into the hospital; he was carried on a stretcher, and carefully laid in the vacant bed next to mine. "you see, old chap," he said, "i would not leave my chum decle, so here i am." "what is the matter with you?" i asked. "oh, broken leg, that is all." the two cavalry and infantry doctors then arrived, and piatte was questioned as to the way in which the accident occurred. "it's a beast of a charger that's kicked me in the stables," he told the doctor. he was carefully examined, and the doctors found that he had broken his leg below the knee. the limb was set, and although the poor fellow must have suffered dreadfully, beads of perspiration running down his face during the process, he did not utter a single complaint. dr. lesage remained near him after the others had retired, and told him that he would soon be all right. "ah, that's nothing, sir," said piatte; "but look here, sir, i'll tell you what: if you would like to do me a great favour you would come and look after me yourself. _you_ can do anything you like to me, but i do not want that other infantry doctor to mess about with me." dr. lesage promised that he would attend him, and before retiring held out his hand to the injured man. this evidently went to the poor chap's heart, and his eyes moistened. "thank you, sir," he said; "thank you. it is good of you to shake hands with me--a bad character as they make me out. if the officers were all like you, why i would jump into the fire for them--and mind you, sir, i won't forget it." dr. lesage retired, more moved than he liked to show. when he had gone, i asked piatte how he felt. "a bit queer," he said; "but you don't know, old chap, how well i worked it. i thought i had killed myself, you know." "weren't you kicked?" i queried. "kicked," he said; "well, it wasn't a horse that kicked me. i'll tell you how it all happened. when i got out of prison yesterday, i said to myself, i must have a spree, so, after 'lights out,' i got over the wall. you see, my old granny had sent me another ten francs for the new year, but, of course, being in prison, i only got my money when i came out, so then i jumped over the wall, and, my boy, i can tell you i had a grand booze. at two o'clock this morning i said to myself, 'it is time to go back.' so i got into the little lane at the back of our stable, you know. the wall there on the top side of the lane is only six feet high, so i easily got on top of it, but on the other side there is a drop of at least thirty feet, you know, alongside our stable. i had often done it, and it was only thirty yards along the wall to get to the back door of the barracks, where you can get down quite easy. but last night it had been raining, and freezing afterwards, so that the wall was that slippery that i had to walk on all-fours to keep my balance. i was a bit on, i suppose, and i don't know how it happened, but just as i was getting near the end of the wall i slipped, and down i went. oh, my boy, what a drop it was! i came down flop, and when i tried to rise it was no go; one of my legs felt like cotton-wool. i knew that if i called for help i should be nabbed, so i crept on all-fours as far as the room. i then went to wake up titi; he took off my clothes and laid me on my bed. by jove! didn't it hurt me. titi says to me, 'let me go and call for help, you can say that you have fallen down stairs.' but i say, 'no, that's no go, and it won't wash.' so we arranged with titi, that just before _réveille_ he would take me down to the stables, which he did. by god, you don't know what it meant to go to the stables: i felt my heart in my mouth the whole way; to come down the stairs i sat down, and holding on to titi's neck, i let myself slide, and then to cross the yard i tried to stand on my other leg, but it was all numb; so i sent titi to fetch monard, and between them they carried me to the stables and lay me behind your kicking mare, as she's known as a kicker. as soon as the others come down to clean the stables, i shout, 'ah, murder, murder!' one of them goes and fetches the sergeant, and i tell him how, passing behind your mare's heels, i got kicked. titi, in the meantime, had gone to fetch me a stiff glass of brandy, as i felt pretty queer. the sergeant then sent for a stretcher, and they carried me to the dispensary. when the doctor came i told him i had been kicked, and when he looks at my leg, he says: 'it's jolly funny that it should have got swollen up so quickly.' of course i told him that i have got a queer constitution, and he says, 'yes, a queer constitution indeed,' and then he tells the corporal that i must be taken to the hospital at once, and he sends everybody out of the room, and he says to me: "'it was not a horse that kicked you, eh, piatte?' "'well, sir,' i says, 'if you ask me, not as an officer, but as the gentleman that you are, i will tell you the truth.' "'go on,' he says, ''tis not as an officer that i am asking you.' "'oh, then,' says i, 'that mare, sir, that kicked me, 'twas a paving-stone.' and i tell him the whole story, from beginning to end, and then he got very wild, and asked why i hadn't sent for him at once, and he also asked whether i supposed that he would give me away. "my boy," concluded piatte, "he is a ripper, that man." "i remember one day--it was two years ago--i went to the medical visit, and he says, 'what is the matter with you?' so i replied, 'i rather tell you privately, sir,' and he says, 'very well.' after the medical visit he calls me to his room. 'well?' he says. i then told him what was the matter with me, and as it is the rule, you know, that men suffering with that complaint are punished with thirty days' confinement to barracks, i asked him if he would mind keeping it dark. 'of course,' he said, and he sent me to the dispensary for a fortnight for rheumatism. now don't you think that he was a brick?" i quite agreed with him. this matter is one which has given rise to many discussions in parliament, and in the english press, especially with regard to the british troops in india. the french system appears to me one of the chief causes of depopulation in france, when one considers that nine-tenths of the male population have to pass through the ranks of the army. the fear of punishment prevents most soldiers from attending the medical visit when they suffer from complaints of this kind, and the consequence is that in most cases they wait until the disease has made such progress that the doctors are unable to cope successfully with it. the day piatte was brought to hospital the roman catholic chaplain came to see me. i told him exactly what my religious views were, but far from showing himself offended, he showed me the utmost kindness, and asked me to go and visit him when i was able to leave my bed. i did so, and found him a most enlightened man. i frankly explained to him my views, and although we could not, of course, agree, our discussion was carried on in the most courteous terms, and he told me that although he regretted that he was unable to convince me, he should always be glad to see me, placing at the same time his fine library at my disposal. he was a man well versed in science, and, although a fervent catholic, did not consider those whose opinions differed from his as black sheep, and he had the utmost respect for sincere religion of every kind. i stopped a week longer in hospital, and felt rather glad of piatte's companionship, as i had taken quite a liking for this poor fellow, who interested me. i asked him many a time why he did not give up drink, which meant his ruin. "give up drink, old fellow," he invariably replied, "why should i? it is the only thing which makes a man forget. don't imagine that i was a drunkard before i came to the regiment; but they've driven me to it. during my first year's service i was keen on doing my best, and i hoped to be promoted to the rank of corporal. i had got through the exams all right, and had been actually nominated for promotion after the manoeuvres we were in the thick of were over, when the crash came. one night, when three other troopers and myself had made ourselves comfortable in a barn full of straw, in comes a corporal with a pipe in his mouth. just then he hears a step outside, and suspecting that it is an officer, he shouts out: "'who's been smoking here? now look sharp--are you going to tell me or not?' "i wasn't asleep, and i saw through his dirty trick in an instant. the other fellows were soon aroused, and confusedly asked what was the matter. the corporal repeats his question, but of course there was no culprit to answer it. then in comes the officer--for the corporal's suspicion was right enough. "'go and fetch a lantern,' says he. "off goes the corporal and gets one. "then the officer says: "'some one has been smoking here, let the man come forward.' "of course nobody moves because nobody has done it, for 'twas the corporal all along. "'very well,' the officer says; 'let's have your numbers,' and he tells the corporal to put them down. "mine was the highest as it happened, and on finding this out the officer says: "'you put eight days' _salle de police_ to that trooper.' "when the officer has gone i go out to the corporal--he was a hussar chap, and so was the officer--and i tell him that it's not right what he's done, and that he knows well enough that it's him that had been smoking, so he turns savage on me, and he says: "'you'll have two days more for insulting me.' "the next day i tell what's happened to my lieutenant, and he says that he will speak to the hussar officer; but my lieutenant comes back, and he says that the officer doesn't mind cancelling my punishment, but that the corporal insists on letting his two days stand as they are, and that he won't cancel them. all that makes a shindy between the younger officers of our regiment and those of the hussars, and the general hears of it, because two of them officers actually applied for leave to fight a duel. the general sends for me--he was just mad because during the past fortnight two other barns had been set on fire--and he tells me i am a scoundrel to have smoked in the barn; but i tell him how things happened, and that 'twas the corporal himself who'd been smoking. the colonel of the hussars, who just happened to be coming for some report to the general, says: "'ah, that's the swine who nearly set a barn on fire last night, and now he tries to take away the character of one of my corporals!' "this makes the general quite mad, and he gives me fifteen days' prison. yes, old chap, fifteen days' prison, when i'd done nothing. it fairly turned my blood, and i went away hardly knowing what i was doing. i passed a pub and went in. i called for absinthe and brandy and the lord knows what else. the more i drunk the more i wanted, and i was that mad that when two hussars walked into the pub i sprang on them, and if others hadn't come to their rescue 'twould have been a case of murder, i think. they had to tie me up, and by gad it took eight of them to do it. to my first punishment, fifteen days' prison, and fifteen days' solitary confinement in cells, were added, and when, two days later, the manoeuvres ended, i was marched back to barracks--a prisoner. of course any question of promotion was at an end--to think of it after i had worked so hard to become a corporal! when i came out of prison i no longer cared a b---- d---- what happened to me. i drank whenever i had money, and if i hadn't, decle, my boy, i would have shot myself. how i have got through these last three years i don't know. they threatened more than once to send me to biribi. what did i care? if it hadn't been for our late colonel--he understood me, that man--i should have done something desperate; but since he is dead--ah, _malheur_! the new colonel calls me a disgrace to the regiment, and a disgrace to the french army: but what do i care? but then when a chap like our doctor doesn't feel ashamed to hold out his hand to me--well, my boy, it goes to my heart. you, too, old decle, although we are both mere troopers, you are a gentleman, while i am but a labourer and a low blackguardly drunkard; and yet you treat me as a friend. give me your hand, old boy." i gave it to him, and he pressed it between his two enormous palms, and then, in a husky voice, he added, "ah! it's long since i have felt so happy," and with the back of his hand he wiped off a tear. "forgive me, old chap," he said, "i know i'm making a fool of myself!" for answer i could only squeeze his hand, and i turned round to hide a tear of my own--a tear of pity for the poor fellow whose feelings i could now understand so well. during the long days we spent together piatte delighted to speak of his home; he belonged to the country, where he drove a diligence: he loved horses and animals, and he was still full of old and quaint superstitions. "i was seventeen," he once said to me, "when i drove a coach for the first time, and i shall never forget that night. i had never driven the coach except to bring it round from the stables to the inn, when one night the governor orders the diligence to be got ready for a foreign gentleman who wanted to catch a train twenty miles from our place. all the other carriages were out, and the diligence alone was available. when jean-paul, the usual driver, hears of it he says that he will not drive it for all the money in the world, it being a friday night in the month of january. 'why?' i asked him. he told me that at one place where the road meets the strasbourg road there was a ghost which always came out from behind a tree when the diligence passed along at night on a friday in january: 'his grandfather, his father, and him too had seen it, and he did not want to see it no more.' i didn't believe much in ghosts, so i offered to drive, and my governor, to whom the coach belonged, let me go. the horses were fresh, the carriage light, and we were rattling along at a good pace when all of a sudden i see a woman dressed in white jump from behind a tree and stand in the middle of the road. 'hi! hi! look out!' i shout, but she did not seem to heed me, and before i could pull up the leaders were on her. they shied and reared, but there she rises between the two of them and seems to jump over the wheelers, and for a second or two she flitters in front of me like a huge bat. as i looked round i saw that we were just at the spot which jean-paul had told me was haunted. i felt my heart in my mouth, and lashing the horses put them at a gallop--and they didn't want no urging either; but the ghost seemed to fly in the air alongside the coach for a distance of about a hundred yards, when she disappeared in a bush." i told piatte that it was the effect of his imagination, but he was positive about it; according to him the ghost had the face of a young girl with very dark hair, and was draped in white garments with a kind of hood over her head. soon after his first adventure he became the regular driver of the diligence, the former driver having been upset with the coach and killed on the spot. during the year previous to his military service he had worked in some large engineering works, and he always swore to me that until he was first punished he had never been drunk, adding at the same time that during the fourteen months he had still to serve he meant to drink whenever he could get a chance. i thoroughly believe that if he had become a corporal he would have been one of the best men in the regiment, and there is no doubt that it was the injustice with which he had been treated which led him to drink and degradation. at the end of ten days i left hospital, and, on my return to barracks, was kept for three days in the dispensary as a convalescent. during the whole time i had been in hospital i had been unable to get a bath, and when i suggested taking one the doctor laughed at me, and the sisters considered me a kind of lunatic to want a bath when i had a sore throat. it was therefore with great relief that, on my return to barracks, i was allowed by our doctor to go out to the town to have the wash of which i was naturally in great need. chapter xi at the end of january we passed our first examination. each one of us had to command in turn the various kinds of drill we had been taught so far--viz., drill on foot without arms, carbine and sword drill, as well as mounted drill in the riding-school. we were also examined on hippology and the first principles of topography, and were questioned on that portion of the regulations which referred to the duties of corporals, and we were further examined as to our individual proficiency in _voltige_ and gymnastics. there was not a single one of us who hadn't received by that time a more complete military education than any of the corporals in the regiment, but although troopers can, according to the regulations, be promoted to the rank of corporal at the end of three months' service, none of us received any promotion. i was the fifth by marks out of the fourteen of us. after this examination the order of our day's work was altered, and mounted drill, instead of taking place in the riding-school, was carried out on the manoeuvring ground, about three miles outside the town. this was a vast area of loose sand, a certain portion of which was prepared for different exercises. there were jumps too of various kinds, but none of them above three feet high. the most peculiar arrangement was what we call the "crater," a huge hole about thirty yards in diameter, and from ten to twelve feet in depth, shaped like a crater, and tapering at the bottom. there was also a narrow defile some hundred feet long, just broad enough to allow the passage of four riders abreast. for the present, however, no use was made of these obstacles, but we went on drilling as we had done in the riding-school. squares were marked out with huge poles, and we rode in indian file around them. half an hour before the time fixed for mounted drill four of us were sent out under the command of a corporal to mark the squares. we were all very keen to be selected for this work, for having to carry the poles we were allowed to ride with stirrups, and when we had marked the squares, we always had ten minutes or a quarter of an hour to spare, during which time we used to jump our horses and canter round the manoeuvring ground. we also began mounted drill with arms--viz., carbine and sword. in my time swords were not fixed to the saddle as they are now, and we invariably carried our carbines slung over our backs, the boot never being used. most cavalry officers considered the carrying of the carbine in the boot a most dangerous plan, likely to break the trooper's leg in case of a fall. the carrying of the carbine across the back, on the other hand, was a most cruel torture, especially as we were never allowed to use our stirrups. the french cavalry carbines are much heavier and longer than those in use in the english cavalry. (we had, of course, the gras pattern in my time.) on saturdays, besides undergoing the weekly inspection, we had to prepare a number of horses for the infantry officers. the captains in command of infantry companies being mounted, lieutenants and sub-lieutenants had to be taught riding, and few of them had any idea of what riding a horse meant, their only knowledge of such animals being derived from seeing them in the streets. of course the sergeants who had drawn up the lists of the horses to be used by the infantry officers took a secret pleasure in selecting the hardest trotters as well as the most vicious chargers in each squadron, so that my little mare was invariably chosen. the costumes donned by the infantry officers for this riding lesson were rather peculiar. most of them wore patent leather gaiters over their trousers, while a few appeared in tightly-fitting grey breeches. as we brought our chargers to them the timid learners always carefully inquired about the special vice of each. i well remember the appearance one day of a young infantry lieutenant putting any amount of "side" on, and adorned by a resplendent pair of patent leather top-boots. "i say, dragoon," he said quietly, slipping a two-franc piece into my hand, "that looks rather a nice little horse you're holding there." "it isn't a horse, sir," i replied. he looked much astonished, and said: "what! you don't call it a mule, i suppose?" "no, sir," i replied; "i call it a mare." "oh--ah--yes!" he said. "a mare, of course. fact is, i'd hardly looked at her. is she lively?" he added. "i don't like a beast with the paces of a donkey!" "yes, sir," i said; "you'll find her quite lively enough." "but she's not vicious--not vicious?" he asked anxiously. "vice!" i replied. "she doesn't know what vice means. she likes to show off a bit, that's all." "just what i like," said the lieutenant. he asked me to get on her back, and after i had made her prance about a bit, i dropped the reins on her neck, and pulling a bit of sugar from my pocket i made her turn her head to eat it from my hand--a trick i had taught her. "what a jolly little beast!" said the lieutenant, as i dismounted; "mind," he added, "that you do not let anybody else ride her." "no fear, sir," i answered, upon which he tipped me another franc. i was careful to bring the mare last of all into the riding-school, having purposely put the stirrup-straps three holes too long for my man. the lieutenant walked up to me. he looked at the girths as if he knew everything about a saddle, and then measured the stirrups, asking me if i thought they were right. "it's not for me, sir," i replied, "to presume to advise a gentleman like you, who probably has horses of his own." "of course--of course," he replied, highly flattered. "i should say you're a rare 'un with horses," i again said. "how do you know?" he asked proudly. "i can tell a gentleman when i see one," i answered. "just so," he went on patronisingly. "i suppose you've been in good houses before?" "that's just it, sir," i innocently replied. just then our _capitaine instructeur_, who gave the lesson to the infantry officers, rode into the riding-school and ordered the officers to mount. we had to hold our charger's head and the off-stirrup, and the lieutenant having got on to the mare remarked that the stirrups were rather long. "how many holes, sir?" "just shorten those two holes," he said. purposely i went on slowly shortening one of the stirrups, holding the mare's head at the same time, and, as i fully expected, before i had time to touch the second stirrup our captain commanded the lieutenants to fall in, and i let go at once the mare's head, and she began to prance about. her rider, who knew nothing of riding, foolishly pulled on the bit and pressed his legs to keep his equilibrium. my mare, greatly resenting such treatment, darted forward into the middle of the riding-school, plunging and rearing. in a second or two the officer was landed on the ground, while our captain coolly asked him what he was doing there? he replied that it had all happened because his stirrups were not right. in the meantime i had rushed to catch the mare, and as the lieutenant came to remount, our captain told me to put the stirrups to their proper length. while i was doing so the poor young lieutenant whispered to me: "mais c'est une bête terrible que cet animal."[ ] i advised him not to use the curb, and not to touch her with his heels, as she did not like it. "it is very difficult not to use the heels," he replied, with dismay, "i wish i had never seen that beast." the poor fellow knew even less about riding than i had thought, and i soon regretted having recommended him to take my mare, as twice more she landed him in the middle of the school, and ultimately the captain commanding the lesson made him change horses with one of his colleagues. to return to our own work. shortly after we had started drilling on the manoeuvring ground, we began to drill by _pelotons_ on foot. the cavalry drill on foot is essentially different from the infantry drill, as all the movements are performed in the same way as the mounted drill; for instance, the troopers being dressed on two ranks, to break off by fours they swing on a pivot as if they were mounted, and the drill on foot is, indeed, especially intended as a preparation for the mounted drill. our work in the field, however, consisted of two distinct _rôles_: we had to act as cavalry and at the same time as mounted infantry, although we were absolutely unfit for the latter work. i have often discussed with french officers the question why mounted infantry have never been tried in france, but all the french officers seem to believe them to be practically useless. they point out that all the french cavalry being drilled and armed in such a way as to be able to act as mounted infantry, there is no necessity for the latter. this is all very well in theory, but it is out of the question in practice. all the trooper is fit for when dismounted is to defend himself, but the moment he is sent forward on foot, his heavy, cumbersome trousers, his boots with spurs nailed on to them, and fitting as loosely as they always do, are a terrible burden to him. more than once when we were sent out as sharpshooters through heavy ground, we had not gone yards before our boots came off our feet; in this respect it may therefore be safely said that, whatever their other qualities may be, the french are very inferior to the english or german cavalry. too much time is wasted in educating the troopers to drill on foot, and nothing is done to develop individual initiative in the field. there were not ten of the troopers in my regiment who could have been trusted alone as scouts, and even among the _volontaires_, men who had all received a good education, not one half of them at the end of the year's training thoroughly understood the use of a map, and with the exception of delbruck and myself not one could have made a sketch-plan, however rough, of the ground we had been over. another of the great mistakes made throughout the whole of the french army is the tendency to overburden soldiers as well as horses. cavalry horses have to carry in the field a kit which, including the rider, amounts to an average of stone, in the light cavalry the kit is, it is true, a little lighter, but there is hardly a stone and a half difference. the light cavalry horses are small, few of them being over hands, while many are under. in the heavy cavalry there is hardly a horse standing hands high, and the average size ranges between · and · . in the infantry, soldiers have to carry in the field, cartridges included, an average of over lbs. during the madagascar war this enormous burden was not even reduced, and naturally per cent. of the men died within five months of the beginning of the campaign. another great fault of the french system is that too much is expected of the troopers, instead of their being regarded exclusively as mounted men. their uniform is not only grotesque, but is quite unsuitable for riding. i have often heard it said that the introduction of top-boots and breeches would entail too heavy an expenditure--but the germans have them, and their cavalry is not inferior in numbers to the french. but this is a digression. our sergeant legros was as great a bully as ever; _volontaires_ were constantly being punished, and never a week elapsed without my being sent to the _salle de police_; in fact, legros got so accustomed to punishing me that many a time he used to say to me in the morning, "i am in a bad temper to-day, and you'll get two days' _salle de police_--you'll find out why latter on." at other times he used to tell us that he meant to stick four of the _volontaires_ in the lock-up that day, and, true to his word, he always found some cause for punishing exactly four of us during the day. i had become so used to punishment by that time that it had grown quite indifferent to me, and i became a mere dare-devil. one day having been sent to the lock-up _à l'oeil_, i found that the sergeant of the guard was my friend de lanoy, and he told me that i could go and sleep in my own bed. as my punishment had not been reported, he ran no risk, but unfortunately for me that night i made a fool of myself. titi, whom i had told that de lanoy had excused me from sleeping in the _salle de police_, came to tell me a long story of how his brother had come to see him on most important business, and how he could not get leave to go out to him, adding that he was sure i would help him. i told him that i would willingly do so if i could, and he then unfolded his plan to me. "you see," he went on, "when the sergeant of the week comes for the roll-call at eight o'clock, the corporal will report you as being in the _salle de police_, but what you will really do will be to get into my bed and cover your head well up, so that your face can't be seen, and then they will think that it is me. in the meantime i shall have got out, letting myself down from the window into the street with my forage rope." foolishly enough, i agreed to the plan. at a quarter to eight piatte, who had long left the hospital, helped me to let titi down through the window, and as soon as he had landed safely in the street i went and wrapped myself up in titi's bed. piatte, i must say, tried to dissuade me, but having promised titi, i said i would certainly keep my word. i covered up my head, and soon after, the sergeant of the week walked round the room to make the evening call. when he passed in front of my bed he walked straight up to me and pulled the blankets off. "what are you doing here?" he cried. "sergeant," i replied, "sergeant de lanoy has allowed me to sleep here instead of in the lock-up." "and that is why," he said, "you sleep in another man's bed, after you have helped him to get out through the window. you will have four days' _salle de police_. and now," he added, "off you go to the cells." the sergeant was a new one who had exchanged into the regiment a few days previously, so he was a stranger to me, and though immediately after the call i rushed after him, he had already walked into the sergeant-major's office and reported the matter to him. when he came out i asked him to cancel my punishment, not so much for my sake, as for de lanoy's, who might be severely punished for having excused me from sleeping in the cells. the sergeant expressed his regret, but told me it was too late, as he had already reported the matter to the sergeant-major, adding that he was absolutely unconscious that by so doing he might bring one of his comrades into trouble. i advised him to go and see sergeant legros at once, in order to urge him not to lodge a complaint against de lanoy, adding that i wished to take the whole blame upon myself. i was very glad to find the following day that de lanoy had not been embroiled in the business. i did not fare so well. the four days the sergeant had given me were altered to eight by our captain, and the colonel added four more to the total, so that i had twelve days in all. i can honestly say that this was the only punishment i fully deserved among all those which were bestowed on me. titi also got fifteen days, so that we were once more companions in misfortune. it was during that time that our sergeant-major suddenly altered his behaviour towards me. i had been about three days in the lock-up when one afternoon he called me into his office and locked the door. he looked much embarrassed, but asked me to sit down, and offered me a cigarette and a glass of beer. this seemed a very extraordinary proceeding on his part, but i accepted the proffered hospitality and waited for him to open the conversation. "i am sorry, decle," he said, "that you should have been once more punished, but i'll try to make your punishment as light as possible, and i have already given instructions that you are not to sleep in the _salle_ to-night, as i am acting _adjudant_ to-day." i thanked him, and silence followed. "by the way," he said, "i have also sent for you to ask your advice. you are a gentleman and a man of the world, and i want some information, but before i consult you i want your word of honour that you will not mention to a living soul what i am going to tell you." i assured him that he could make his mind easy on this point and reckon on my silence. "well, it is just this," he began: "i am in a fix, and i want to borrow five hundred francs (£ ), and unless i get the money within a fortnight i shall be a disgraced man. you know how strict the colonel is, and how severely he punishes non-commissioned officers who are in debt. now don't you know a jew who would lend me the money?" i replied that i was not acquainted with money-lenders, but that in any case i was quite certain that none of the fraternity would advance him the money unless he could give some substantial security. "i could give my pay," he replied; "wouldn't that be sufficient security?" i fairly laughed in his face. "your pay," i said; "why, it does not amount to twenty pounds a year; that would be no security at all." the man must have been in a fix indeed, for he grew pale and trembled visibly. once more he told me that unless he had the money his creditor would apply to the colonel, and that would mean the ruin of his military career. "i tell you what," i then said; "why should you go to money-lenders? let me lend you the money, and you can repay me whenever you like." he protested that he could not possibly accept money from me, but i assured him that i could well afford it, and at last he said that he accepted my offer, but that he did not know how to express his gratitude. i knew perfectly well that from the outset he had meant to get the money out of me, but i was not going to let him off so easily as he imagined. i therefore told him that, although i would be very glad to let him have the money, i could not give it to him in a lump sum, as my allowance was only paid to me monthly, and i added that my money being in paris, i should have to go there to fetch it, and that, having eleven more days' _salle de police_ to undergo, i should have to wait until i had finished my punishment, and until i got leave. "oh," he replied, "i will arrange that for you. to-day is monday, and i'll see that your punishment is put down as finishing on saturday morning, and then i'll give you leave to go to paris from saturday night till monday night. you see," he went on, "i am acting as _adjudant_ during the whole of this week, and i need not report you missing, so nobody will be the wiser." i thanked him, but he replied most courteously that it was from himself that the thanks were due, and he added that he was very sorry he had hitherto misunderstood me, but that in future he would be delighted to do anything he could on my behalf. i retired, feeling much pleased with myself, as i knew that in future i should have a devoted friend in my sergeant-major, whose power was far greater than that of any of the officers of our squadron. for instance, no officer, with the exception of the captain commanding the squadron, would dare take upon himself to grant a trooper twenty-four hours' leave _sub rosâ_, while the sergeant-major could do this easily, merely by not reporting the trooper as missing from the calls, and even should an officer inquire where the trooper was, the sergeant-major could always reply that he had given the man leave not to attend the "stables," which he was entitled to do; moreover, as no officer was ever present at the night-call, the sergeant-major could deal with that roll exactly as he liked. on the saturday my sergeant-major kept his promise, and told me to get dressed immediately after "stables." he advised me, however, to go to my rooms in the town to change my uniform for civilian clothes, as that week the platoon at the station was supplied by the infantry. i should explain here that soldiers on leave who are allowed to leave their garrison town are supplied with a paper stating that they are permitted to go to a specified place outside the garrison. in order to prevent soldiers leaving the garrison without leave, a non-commissioned officer is sent every saturday and sunday to the railway-station, and makes the soldiers show him their written leave before they are allowed to take their ticket. when i was dressed to go out my sergeant-major accompanied me as far as the hotel, and we had a chat while i was changing my clothes. he told me incidentally that he had re-enlisted one year before, and that he hoped to be sent to the school of saumur within the next two years, which would enable him to become an officer in three years' time, and he again insisted on the fact that if the colonel found out that he was in debt he would lose all chance of going to saumur, and might even be reduced to the rank of ordinary sergeant. i promised faithfully that i would bring back at least francs from paris, and i then jumped into a brougham and ordered the blinds to be carefully drawn down, as the fact of being seen in civilian attire would have meant imprisonment at least. in order to avoid meeting any of my officers, i had timed myself to go by a slow train; but before i got out of the carriage i carefully peeped round, and did not get out until i had made certain there were no cavalry officers about. the traffic superintendent was a personal friend of my family, and he had given me a card specially recommending me to all the stationmasters of the line, and allowing me to use any train i chose, even goods trains. privates are not as a rule allowed to ride in first-class carriages, and non-commissioned officers are also debarred from this privilege, so that the traffic superintendent's card was doubly useful to me, enabling me as it did to travel by express trains which only contained first-class carriages. upon entering the station the stationmaster allowed me to stop in his office until the last minute, and sent for my ticket, thus reducing the chances of detection to a minimum. i reached paris safely, and when i returned the next evening my sergeant-major was waiting for me at the hotel, in order to take me back into barracks without my name being taken down by the sergeant of the guard, who has to report the names of all troopers who come in after evening call, the exact time at which they return being entered against their names. i told my sergeant-major that i had been able to get francs only, but that i would get a further sum if i went to paris the following sunday. he thanked me profusely, and told me that he would arrange that i should go to paris on the following saturday. it soon became an understood thing that when i wanted to go to paris without leave, i was to ask him to arrange it for me, while on my return i duly handed him from fifty to a hundred francs. before my first years' service was over the sergeant-major had been enabled to repay considerably more than twenty pounds he owed to his obdurate creditor, but he still maintained the fiction, and whenever i handed him over the price of my journey to paris, he thanked me warmly, invariably adding, "ah! i am so glad, i shall be able to take that to my creditors to-morrow!" in this way the sergeant-major certainly received between fifty and sixty pounds from me in all. footnote: [ ] it is a terrible beast, this animal. chapter xii although my sergeant-major had altered his behaviour towards me, he could only help me in the squadron, having no power over the _volontaires_, who were under the absolute command of sergeant legros. captain hermann, who was nominally our chief, and who was supposed to give us lectures twice a week, never took the trouble to do so, and we scarcely ever saw him for more than a few minutes at a time. he left, in fact, the whole of our instruction in legros' hands, and the latter's powers seemed to become greater every week. hitherto, whenever we had wanted to apply for leave we used to send our application through the usual channel, handing it over to our sergeant-major, who transmitted it to the captain; but the colonel issued a regimental order to the effect that in future any _volontaire_ wishing to get leave would have to apply for it through sergeant legros. our captain also strictly forbade us to apply for ten o'clock or midnight leave from the officer of the week (to whom all such demands were made by the other troopers), and told us that in future we should have to apply on the saturday to sergeant legros for any leave we might wish to obtain. he added that any _volontaire_ who applied for leave to the lieutenant of his company, or to the sergeant-major, would be punished with eight days' _salle de police_ for having done so. it is needless to say that i never obtained a single day's regular leave after that; but i cared little, as my sergeant-major had become so friendly to me that he used to give me whatever leave i wanted. it was at about this time that i met with rather a serious accident. i was leading my mare and two other chargers to the watering-tank, when one of the chargers was bitten by the other, and rearing straight up in the air, came down on my mare, who fell down on the top of me. i was much bruised and nearly stunned, but fortunately no bones were broken. i was led to the dispensary, and, after examining me, the doctor ordered that i should be detained there. i have already explained that there was a ward in the place where sick troopers who were not ill enough to be sent to hospital were placed under medical treatment. the ward contained twelve beds, and adjoining it were two rooms for non-commissioned officers. the beds were of the usual military type, and the sick troopers were only allowed the ordinary rations: those who could afford it, however, being at liberty to send for extra food from the canteen. there were no nurses attached to the dispensary, and it was superintended by a corporal assisted by one trooper. i confess that i far preferred being there to going to the hospital. during the ten days i passed in the dispensary i made great friends with the sergeant, who was himself sick. he had enlisted before his time for conscription was due, and his aim was to work his way up to a commission from the ranks; but although he had served already three years, he was thoroughly disgusted with military service, and had made up his mind to leave it at the end of his five years' engagement. he explained to me that he stood absolutely no chance of being sent to the saumur school, as only three sergeants were selected every year, and, although he had passed the examination some time previously, he was only fourth on the list. he ought by rights to have been the second, but the two candidates who were classed second and third had taken that rank through their fathers' influence, one of them being the son of an ex-minister of state and the other of an influential senator. the sergeant had but one more chance, and he felt sure that another job would be perpetrated, as among the next candidates stood the colonel's nephew and two sons of generals. he added that his only chance would be to re-enlist for another five years, but he was not inclined to do this. he was a thorough gentleman, and had had an excellent education, and he naturally hated the life he led among ignorant comrades--men who had no idea of common decency, and who were addicted to the grossest immorality.[ ] as _volontaires_ had only to serve for one year instead of for the five during which the other troopers had to be under the flag, military instruction had to be carried out a good deal more rapidly than in the case of the ordinary recruits. as soon, therefore, as we had become proficient in the use of our arms on horseback, and showed that we understood thoroughly drilling on foot by _peloton_, we were put through mounted drill by _peloton_. we were taught to walk, trot, and gallop in two ranks, to wheel to the right and to the left, to break off by fours and by twos, and then to form again into line, each one of us having to act in turn as commander of the company. at first we had to execute all these movements without stirrups, and a good deal of time was also devoted to the improvement of our riding capacities. in this respect our instruction was first-rate. we were first taken over jumps singly, being taught to trot our chargers until we got within twelve to fifteen feet of the jump, when we had to let go the reins and get over the jump with our hands behind our backs. we also had to do the same with drawn swords, and without holding the reins, the same movements being repeated with the carbine held on the leg. then we had to repeat the exercises by twos and by fours, and after some time we were taken over the jumps in two ranks. we were also taught to pass through the _défilé_, a most difficult manoeuvre. in order to complete the regulation number of thirty troopers which form a _peloton_, some old troopers were added to our ranks. we were then started at a gallop, wheeled round, and brought in front of the _défilé_. this, as i explained before, consisted of a narrow lane between two high hurdles, and was just broad enough to allow four troopers to ride abreast. when we got within twenty yards of the _défilé_, we had to form fours, and the moment we had gone through it we had to form once more in line. the passage through the crater at full gallop was also a most exciting exercise. the two troopers riding in the centre of the line had to pass down the bottom of the crater while the others rode on the slope; the centre of the front had to increase his pace so as to keep our lines perfectly straight, and as we came out of the crater our two lines had to be unbroken. i was much astonished at the manner in which we were taught to charge. instead of charging in serried ranks, the moment the command "charge!" was given, every trooper had to force his horse forward as hard as he could go, without troubling to keep in line; in fact, it resembled a race rather than the onset of a compact mass. the troopers of the front rank charged with the points of their swords held forward, while those of the second rank held their swords high up, ready to cut down their men, and as soon as the command had been given every trooper had to shout at the top of his voice three times, "charge! charge! charge!" this, with the clattering of the scabbards against our spurs, drove the chargers to the highest pitch of excitement, and every one of them went for all he was worth. we were also taught to charge in serried ranks, but it was explained to us that in case of war this mode of charging would hardly ever be used, as it would enable modern artillery to destroy whole regiments before they had been able to reach the enemy. the charge over, the bugle sounded "assembly" (_ralliement_), and at this command we had to re-form our line. at the beginning of april we underwent a second examination before a board consisting of the captain and the commander of the _volontaires_, the _capitaine instructeur_, and one of the majors. the three _volontaires_ who obtained the first places were nominated corporals after the examination. one of them certainly fully deserved his promotion, but the two others only obtained it through interest; one of them in particular, who is now duc de ----, ought by rights to have been classed among the two last, but his family was able to put great pressure on our colonel, and one of our lieutenants, who was his first cousin, helped him to obtain a place on the list to which he was in no way entitled. the same thing happens in the case of the promotion of officers in france, and in some cases undeserved favour is shown in an absolutely shameful way. i am well aware that in all countries of the world family interest goes a long way--in this country it is hard to get on without it--but at least it may be said that the recipients of special favours have always something to show to their credit, while this is far from being the case under the french republic. after we had passed our half-yearly examination we began our duty as trained soldiers in earnest, and besides company drill we were taken to the shooting-range once a week, one day being also devoted to service in the field. our shooting, i confess, was very poor, but this was chiefly due to the bad sighting of our carbines, none of which were true. they were theoretically sighted up to a thousand yards, but could not be relied on above three hundred. the range was in the middle of the forest, in an opening among stately trees, and the target stood at the foot of a small hill. while firing was going on two of us were sent to patrol the approaches on each side of the targets, as quite a number of poor people used, at the risk of their lives, to lurk behind the targets in order to pick up the bullets. the patrols had strict orders to prevent any one from approaching within two hundred yards of the butts, and we had to keep a very sharp look-out, for these bullet-collectors were up to many dodges to evade us. all of a sudden, for instance, a couple of them showed themselves on the road leading to the open space between the troopers and the target, and although we shouted hard to warn them off, they pretended to be deaf and not to hear us. we had, of course, therefore, to gallop towards them, and as we came up to them they pretended to be wood-gatherers on their way home. meanwhile, half a dozen others had crawled under the bushes a couple of hundred yards behind the targets, and we had thus to start off once more at full gallop to clear the place of the new intruders, as the shooting had to be interrupted the moment they came in view. it was for that reason that the best riders, mounted on the fastest chargers, were usually selected for this patrol work, and i usually managed to be sent out. i thoroughly enjoyed the work, as it gave me the chance of a good gallop over rough ground, and more than once we had quite exciting chases across country after the most obdurate of the law-breakers. i say "we," as after a short time it became necessary to post two troopers on each side of the targets, this decision having been come to on account of an accident which happened while the infantry were practising. an old woman had managed to creep, unseen by the sentry, right across the line of fire, and just then a volley was fired and she received two bullets in her body. i cannot speak at all highly of the way in which we were taught field service. we were supposed to learn how to direct ourselves, how to reach a specified point with the help of a map, and how to report on the country we had been across. the explanations given to us by our sergeant showed that he knew very little about the subject himself, and i am certain that none of us ever understood a word of his explanations. i was perhaps the only trooper who knew anything technically about topography, having begun at a very early age to go in for mountain-climbing; and as this became a regular hobby with me i had studied map-making, and had learnt not only to read the smallest details of the map, but also to find my way among the greatest difficulties, a detailed map representing to me not only the roads, but also the whole contour of the country, and the nature of its surface. during the few years preceding my service i had also explored the french alps, forming the frontier between france and italy, of which no map had then been published, and i had never failed to make rough surveys and triangulations with the help of the prismatic compass, an instrument of which i suppose our sergeant had never even heard. it was a great pity that we were never accompanied by an officer on these field-days; but i do not remember our captain turning up more than once during the three months this part of our education lasted. we were also taught, after a fashion, how to take to pieces and to lay down a railway line, and two or three times we were shown how to use dynamite. such was our work during april and may; it could certainly have been made most interesting but for the terror we always stood in of being punished. so far as i was concerned, i do not remember a fortnight elapsing without my being sent to the _salle de police_, usually for the most absurd reasons. another great mistake which was committed was that of never allowing us any personal initiative; and we did not even dare to ask for any explanations. one or two of the _volontaires_ having ventured to do so met with a rebuff, accompanied by a punishment. shortly after the half-yearly examination we were also told off to take the guard according to the roll in our different squadrons. as our regiment had only the barrack guard to supply, an individual trooper's turn only came about once a month. ordinary troopers were allowed to get a comrade to take their turn for them, but the colonel issued an order to the effect that no _volontaire_ would be allowed to be replaced when his turn for taking the guard came round. the troopers told off to take the barrack guard numbered six, besides a trumpeter and two stable guards, and were commanded by a sergeant and a corporal--all of them selected from the same squadron. besides these troopers, two stable guards from each one of the other squadrons had to be supplied at a few minutes before a.m. the troopers nominated for guard duty met in the yard at some distance from the guard-room, and the sergeant in command carefully examined each man to ascertain that his equipment was in good order. the officer of the week of the squadron who supplied the guard also inspects the troopers' equipment, and the _adjudant_ of the week stands by, and at eight o'clock sharp marches the incoming guard past the captain of the week, halting the men in front of the guard-room. he then gives the word, "front!" and a fresh inspection of each trooper is made by the captain of the week. at the same time the outgoing guard has been formed up by a sergeant, and is marched away under the orders of the outgoing sergeant, who soon dismisses his men, and returns with the corporal to hand the service over to the sergeant who replaces him. he has also to make his report to the captain of the week, or to the _adjudant_ in the absence of the former. the sentries are then relieved by the incoming corporal and sent back to their rooms. all the troopers who have been on guard the previous day are excused from duty for four and twenty hours. the first time i took the guard, the captain of the week was an old captain who was a perfect disgrace to the regiment. he was constantly drunk, and while at one time he would abuse the troopers in the vilest fashion, at another he would display a familiarity which was most embarrassing. that morning, being in one of his furious moods, he found something to say about the equipment of every one of us, called us a set of dirty pigs, and told our sergeant that he was a worse pig than any of us. "when i was a youngster," he added, "things were different. then we had soldiers--then we had an emperor; but now that is the lot of swine one has to command," pointing out to us. "look here," he went on, "they have given me the legion of honour, but i am ashamed of it; and you see," pointing to the decoration on his breast, "their d---- republic; i've put the head the other way, so that it should not be seen!" he then ordered the _adjudant_ to dismiss us. he walked into the guard-room, where a wooden camp-bed, similar to the one in the _salle de police_, occupied the whole length of the room, while a few forms, on which we could sit, were scattered about. in a tiny recess adjoining this room was a table. this was the portion of the guard-room reserved for the sergeant. we only had to supply two sentries, one in front of the barrack gate and the other near the entrance of the forage-store in a small side-street some two hundred yards from the barracks. our corporal made out the list of the sentries and stuck on the wall a bit of paper on which he had written our rotation. we had to be twenty-four hours on guard duty, so that each one of us had to be on sentry-go four times, doing two hours at a time, and with an interval of four hours before his turn came round again. i was put on the second turn, from a.m. to noon, to p.m., to p.m., and to a.m. the sergeant and corporal were both on friendly terms with me, so that i did not have too bad a time of it. i took a great deal of interest in the duties of the sergeant, and he explained to me what an awkward task his was. of course i was supposed to have learned before all the routine of a sergeant of the guard, but merely hearing a description read out gives one but a poor idea of what things are in practice. the sergeant of the guard is of course responsible for the relieving of sentries (though the actual duty is left to the corporal); he has besides to see that the trumpeter is punctual in the various calls, he is responsible for the cleanliness of the various barrack-yards, and of the cells, and the _salle de police_, and for all the sanitary arrangements of the barracks. whenever he requires troopers for fatigue duty he gets the trumpeter to call the various corporals of the week belonging to his squadron and tells them how many men he requires. he has the right to call the troopers who are punished with _salle de police_ or confinement to barracks, and order them for fatigue duty. he has to examine every sergeant, corporal, and trooper who goes out of barracks, and has power to prevent their going out in the event of their outfit not being in proper order. he has also to see that no strangers come into the barracks without proper leave. after the night-call he sees that the doors of the barracks are closed, visits the stables to ascertain that no horses are loose, and that the stable guards are at their posts. he has also during the night to make rounds outside the barracks, and in case a horse or a trooper is taken sick and requires urgent help, he has to send round to call either the vet. or the doctor as the case may be. the regulations on this subject are rather amusing, special stress being laid on the fact that the sergeant of the guard must only send on such an errand an _intelligent_ trooper. there is no doubt that a sergeant taking the guard gets very little opportunity for rest during the continuous twenty-four hours he is on duty, especially if he is under the orders of a strict _adjudant_, or of an erratic captain of the week, such as captain des tourelles, who was on duty the first time i took the guard. when i took my first turn as sentry i was put outside the barrack gates, my instructions being as follows: in case any officer up to the rank of captain passed me i was to shoulder arms, and if the officer was a major or lieutenant-colonel i had to present arms; in case of our colonel coming to the barracks i was to present arms, shouting at the same time, "aux armes!" all the troopers in the guard-room having to turn out and to render him military honours. i had to prevent strangers from going out of barracks with a parcel, and was not to let any corporal or trooper out of barracks if they carried a parcel or a carbine, unless the sergeant of the guard gave me orders to the contrary. when i took my third turn (from ten to twelve) i was placed as sentry before the forage-store, and my orders were of the strictest--i had to challenge anybody passing within ten yards of me, and in case no reply was given to my challenge, i was to arrest the offender and to call out for help. this last order was well-meant, but the guard-room being over three hundred yards away, i did not see how the others could possibly hear me. i was also ordered to prevent any one from approaching the wall of the store, and in case the offender did not move away after being challenged three times i had to fire on him. i had not, however, to salute any officers, such honours being dispensed with after evening call. for the first hour nobody passed through the street, but towards half-past eleven i noticed captain des tourelles coming along; he was rather unsteady in his gait, and had to help himself by holding on to the wall. when he came within the regulation distance i challenged him, whereupon he leant against the wall of the store and said: "that's all ri', my boy, it's all ri', it's me." i walked up to him and respectfully told him that my orders were to allow nobody to come near the wall of the forage-store. "it's all right," he said, "it's me." i expostulated with him, but i could not get him to budge, and i hardly knew what to do, when he pulled a cigarette out of his pocket and asked me for a match. i was well aware that if i allowed him to smoke near the forage-store i became liable to be court-martialled, but, on the other hand, if i laid hands on an officer i should also be court-martialled, so while he was fumbling in his pocket for a match i said to him, "look here, sir, this is the forage-store, and you know that i can't let you smoke here." "the forage-store," he replied, "the forage-store--shpose can't smoke--here, you smoke it for me, my boy," he added, handing the cigarette over to me. i stuck it in my pocket and again asked him to move on. "yes, move on," he said; "it's all very fine to say move on, but i sh'ld like to know first where my house is. now where is my house?" i knew that he lived opposite the stores, and pointed out his house to him. "oh," he said, "that's my house? funny my house getting so big all of a sudden. why, it's all over windows--why's that, now tell me why d' i see so many windows?" "it's rather foggy, sir," i replied, "that is what makes you think so. it is your house all right, and there are only four windows to it." "contr'dict me," he said, "and you contr'dict your superior officer. you will have four days' _salle de police_, you understan'-four days' _salle de police_ for contr'dicting your superior officer. now--just hold on to me." i noticed that he was ready to collapse, and putting my carbine against the wall i held him up. after a few minutes his attack was over, and it evidently did him good, for he seemed much steadier on his legs, and proceeded to walk with some accuracy in the direction of his house. he had just reached the middle of the road when he stopped and called out to me, "dragoon!" he said, "you are a nice old dragoon, and there's for you." thereupon he handed over to me a -centime piece, and then reached the door of his house with my help. i suggested his handing me over his key, and having opened the door for him i stuck the key in his pocket and closed the door upon him. soon after the corporal came to relieve me, and i returned to the barracks. when i reached the guard-room i went to the sergeant's room, and told him what had happened, but we both agreed that it would never do to report the matter, as it never paid to "give away" an officer. i had to be once more on sentry-go (from to a.m.), but i tipped one of the troopers, who agreed to take my turn, and to remain four hours instead of two at his post. at half-past twelve, as i was disposing myself to lie down for a good sleep, captain des tourelles turned up again. all the other troopers were lying down, and i had just left the sergeant's office, so the captain pounced on me. "trooper," he said, "catch hold of a lantern, i want to go for a round," and at the same time he shouted for the sergeant and corporal of the guard; noticing through the open door the sergeant, who had begun to doze with his head resting on his arms. as soon, however, as the captain called out to him he jumped up and stood at "attention." "_nom de dieu de fainéant!_" ("you d---- lazy beast!") he cried out in a drunken voice. "there, i catch you asleep." the sergeant tried to excuse himself, but the captain told him to shut up. "i am going with this dragoon," he said, pointing to me, "to see whether everything is in order, and if everything is not in order _je t'en ficherai de dormir_. come on," he added, turning to me, "walk in front of me." i prepared to do so, and asked the captain where he wished to go. "to the _adjudant's_ room, of course," he replied. "why do you stick the light of that lantern in my eyes? come on, walk alongside of me, and give me your arm: you know that i am a father to all my dragoons, and i don't know where i have seen your face, but i like you--yes, i like you," he went on repeating. as we got to the staircase leading to the _adjudant's_ room the captain stopped, and told me he was not going up all those stairs, and he ordered me to go and rouse the _adjudant_, and to tell him that if he did not come sharp he would be sorry for it. the _adjudant_, who had been a gendarme, and was an old soldier of many years' standing, having only a few months to wait to get his pension, cursed and swore when i explained matters to him. i abstained from telling him that the captain was drunk, but he evidently knew the old fellow's failing, for he muttered, as he got out of bed, "drunk again, the old beast!" i did not wait for him, but returned to the captain. i found him sitting at the bottom of the stairs dropping off into a doze; but as soon as he heard my steps, and saw the light of my lantern, he tried to get up, but was quite unable to do so until i helped him. he looked at me in a stupid way, and muttered, "what do you want?" i reminded him that he had sent me to call the _adjudant_. "the _adjudant_? oh yes, the _adjudant_. why isn't he here?" "he is dressing, sir, and coming at once," i answered. "dressing?" he said. "what business has he to be undressed? i'm not undressed." thereupon the _adjudant_, who had donned his uniform in a remarkably short time, came down the stairs. he saluted, and said: "you have sent for me, sir?" "sent for you," slowly replied the captain. "oh yes--i sent for you; why the devil didn't you come at once?" "i was in bed, sir, and had to dress." "well," replied the captain, "you had better go and undress and get back to bed; i don't want you. i've got a dragoon, and i have got a lantern, and do you imagine that i want any one to show me what is wrong? don't stare at me like that," he added. "go to bed, i tell you." the _adjudant_ saluted, and quietly returned to his room, evidently well accustomed to such scenes. "come on, my dragoon," said the captain, taking hold of my arm, and dragging me towards the kitchen. when we got to the door i told him where we were. "that is just it," he says; "it's the kitchen i want to see"; and as we stepped in, he slipped on the dirty floor, and before i could stop him he was sitting down besmeared with grease. he laughed, but the fall appeared to have done him good, and to have partly recalled him to his senses. i helped him to rise, and as he did so he turned to me, and ordered me to light up the stove with my lantern. "that's all right," he said, "i only wanted to see in what state the cooks had left the kitchen. i'll give them four days' cells to-morrow for having left their floor in such a disgraceful condition. and now i'll go home." according to his orders i walked ahead, and, pulling himself together, he followed me; he told me to lead him as far as the gate of the infantry barracks, thus saving himself a _détour_ of at least yards. when he got to the gate he had so far recovered that he was able to order the infantry sergeant to open it for him, and he walked straight out, the sergeant never suspecting for a moment the state he was in. i returned to the guard-room and reported matters to the sergeant, who asked me to keep the matter quite dark for the sake of the honour of the regiment. i do not mean to suggest that the picture i have just drawn is meant to represent the average french officer. captain des tourelles was, like lieutenant pernot, whom i have previously mentioned, one of those officers who had gained their commission during the franco-prussian war, and who but for an accident would never have held the rank of an officer in the french cavalry. they were therefore men of an exceptional class no longer to be found in the french army. most of the cavalry officers nowadays are gentlemen, and this remark even applies to the majority of those who have gained their commissions through the ranks, since the examinations for the admission of cavalry sergeants to the school of saumur can only be passed by men who have received a superior education, and, as i have already stated, the cadets of the st. cyr who are allowed to serve in the cavalry are selected from amongst the most able of the candidates. i should not like to give so high a character to the french infantry officers. from my personal experience, as well as from all i have heard, i should say that very few of them are gentlemen. there are, of course, exceptions, but, taken as a class, they are certainly below the average british sergeant in education, manners, and military training. i am speaking here of the subalterns, as those who reach a higher rank are either men belonging to the middle classes, whose contact with gentlemen has improved their manners, or men who belong to good families but have been unable to secure the highest places as cadets at st. cyr. such, then, was my experience of the first guard i took. twenty-four hours on duty seems a long time, but, after all, troopers enjoy a great deal of rest between the intervals of sentry-go, and "taking the guard" is really more of a hardship to sergeants and corporals than to the troopers themselves. where it becomes a real burden is in paris, or other great towns where the various regiments have to supply a considerable number of men for different guards, so that the sergeants may be called upon to take the guard as often as twice a week, and even the troopers cannot expect more than a week's immunity. footnote: [ ] the picture he drew of the average sergeant was not an inviting one, but all he told me was quite in accord with the description given in a book published later on--"sous-offs," by lucien descares. this book was written by a _volontaire_ who had served at evreux in the duc de chartres' regiment, both under the duke himself and under the colonel who had replaced the former when he was expelled from the french army. the latter officer was so furious with the work when it appeared that he ordered it to be burnt on a dung-hill, and promised thirty days in prison to any trooper found reading it. the book presents a vivid picture of the life of sergeants in a cavalry regiment; but to appreciate it the reader must have served in the french army himself, as it teems with military slang; i may add that the details given are so gross that its pages cannot be perused without disgust. chapter xiii in june we began "squadron school," and were drilled on the manoeuvring ground with our respective squadrons. it was only then that all the officers attended the drill, for the training of the _peloton_ had been left almost entirely to the sergeants. by this time we might be regarded as trained troopers, and, indeed, in time of war the _volontaires_ would have been quite fit to act as sergeants, although it did not seem to be the aim of the french military authorities to use the _volontaires_ as such, in the reserve, in case of war. all the reserve men had their own sergeants already, and it was therefore difficult to understand why so much of our time was wasted in giving us a military education far superior to that of the average non-commissioned officer. since we had begun to see less of sergeant legros i had not been incessantly punished as i had been when we were constantly under his orders, and i almost dared to hope that i should be able to finish my time without getting further acquainted with the _salle de police_. however, it was not so to be. one sunday morning at six o'clock a corporal, who was on weekly duty, came to me and asked me to let him have five francs, adding that if i gave him the money he would not send me down to clean the stables. i gave him the money, but half an hour later he came and asked me for more. he had no time to press me hard, as he was called away by the sergeant, but, as soon as the latter had done with him, he came back just as i was going down to stables. he was already drunk, and said he wanted another five francs. i absolutely declined to give him the money, pointing out that as he was on duty that day he would be severely punished for getting drunk, and i might also get punished for having supplied him with money. this put him in a frightful rage, and he asked me if i took him for a fool. i told him that it didn't matter whether i took him for a fool or not, but that he knew perfectly well that he made a fool of himself when he was drunk. "all right," he said; "you will have two days' _salle de police_ for having called me a fool. by the way," he added, "lemaire is sick, and you will have to take the guard for him." i remonstrated, explaining that i had taken the guard the previous week, and that it could not therefore be my turn to take the guard, even to replace a sick man. "you refuse to obey the orders of the corporals?" "of course i don't refuse," i said, knowing well that in his state of mind he might, upon the least provocation, report me as having refused to obey orders, and this would have meant a court-martial, and most likely a sentence of several years' hard labour. "well, get ready then," said the corporal. "i want to go and talk to the sergeant-major first," i replied. "no you don't," he said, standing in front of me. of course i could not lay hands on him, for, as i have already explained, the slightest assault on any man holding a rank superior to one's own was invariably punished with _death_. i therefore proceeded to get my things ready, well knowing, however, that it was physically impossible for me to get my kit into proper order for parade upon so short a notice. soon after, the corporal having reeled away, i went to the sergeant-major's room, but there i found only his orderly, who told me to my utter dismay that the sergeant-major had gone the previous evening on twenty-four hours' leave. i therefore walked down to the stables in order to find the sergeant of the week. on my way, however, i fell foul of the corporal, who asked me where i was going. "i am going to speak to the sergeant of the week," i said. "no you don't," he replied; "you just walk back with me." "i am going to the sergeant of the week," i repeated. "you refuse to obey orders then?" asked the corporal. "no, but i am going to the sergeant of the week." "by god," he said, "if you don't follow me to the room at once i will go straight to the captain of the week and report you for having refused to obey orders." of course i had no alternative but to follow the corporal, and i had to dress anyhow in order to be ready in time for the parade of the guard. the leather tops of my trousers were not properly polished, my sword and carbine were not spick and span as they ought to have been for parade, and the brass work of my helmet was a trifle tarnished, for it had not been cleaned since the previous afternoon. as it was, i had to run to join the other troopers on parade, and when i got there the command "attention" had already been given. captain des tourelles was captain of the week, and the moment he caught sight of me he ordered me to come to him. "you are late," he said. "captain," i replied, "the reason of it is----" "shut up!" he interrupted; "don't answer me--you are filthy, you dirty beast!" he then began to examine my buttons, my sword, my helmet, my carbine, muttering the whole time, "swine, swine. you are a _volontaire_, i think, and you come here late, and as filthy as a pig! you shall have four days' _salle de police_." "but--sir----" i ejaculated. "you dare answer me! you shall have four days more. step back into the ranks!" after we had been paraded and dismissed to the guardroom, i went to the sergeant of the guard to explain my case. this man was of low extraction, a peasant, in fact, who had been promoted to the rank of sergeant merely on account of his undoubted severity. (he had once sent a man before the court-martial for refusing to obey him, and the poor trooper was sentenced to two years' hard labour.) this would seem to constitute a poor qualification for promotion, but, in many french regiments, it is notorious that a corporal who sends a man before a court-martial is almost certain to be rewarded for his harshness. the sergeant took very little interest in what i told him, and said it was no business of his, and that i had better speak to the sergeant-major about it. the following day, when i left the guard, i went to see my sergeant-major, but, unfortunately for me, he had obtained a two days' extension of leave, and the sergeant _fourrier_, who was acting in his stead, told me that my punishment had already appeared on the report, and had been forwarded to the colonel. "very well then," i said, losing my temper, "i shall go and complain to the colonel," and i asked him to transmit my application to see that officer. he strongly urged me not to do so, assuring me that i should get no redress, but i was obstinate, and my demand was duly forwarded through the usual channels. at noon the sergeant _fourrier_ showed me a copy of the colonel's orders for the day. "you have got it pretty hot," he said, and he showed me the passage of the colonel's decision referring to my case. to my dismay i read the following: "the punishments inflicted on trooper decle by corporal armand and by captain des tourelles are altered to twenty days' _salle de police_." i had, therefore, to sleep in the cells that night, and the sergeant told me that the answer to my application to see the colonel would probably appear in the following day's regimental orders. i did not see sergeant legros until the following day, for, as i have explained before, troopers who have taken the guard are exempt from duty for four and twenty hours. the next morning, however, when we went to schoolroom, legros called me. "so you have been at your tricks once more, eh, decle?" he said. i told him exactly what had occurred, but he only shrugged his shoulders. "serves you right!" he said. "you _volontaires_ get into the habit of throwing your money right and left, and if you hadn't begun by tipping the corporal all this wouldn't have happened." in the regimental orders of the day the colonel stated that the application of trooper decle to see him was granted, and that the said trooper decle would have to be at his house at p.m. the next day. i therefore got titi and my other orderly to clean my clothes and my equipment with the utmost care, and at one o'clock sharp i proceeded to the colonel's house. i was received by one of his orderlies, who took me to the kitchen. he went to inform the colonel that i was there, and returned saying that the colonel had sent word that i must wait. the cook very graciously offered me a cup of coffee, and during the good three-quarters of an hour that i had to wait she related to me the details of her family history, telling me that she had already saved £ , which would make a nice little dowry when she got married, and also suggesting that i should take her out for a walk next sunday. (i could only politely express my regret at being unable to do this, as i was undergoing punishment.) she further told me that she did not care much for her place, as "_la colonelle_"[ ] was too close-fisted, and there was not enough _grattage_ (perquisites) in the place. at the end of three-quarters of an hour the colonel's orderly told me to walk upstairs, and showed me into a study where the colonel was writing at a desk, in regimental trousers, a pair of slippers, and a black alpaca coat. he did not turn round, and i stood, helmet in hand, near the door. i had quite forgotten the regulations, and, finding myself in polite society, i had instinctively uncovered. just as i remembered that i ought to keep my helmet on, and was replacing it, the colonel, hearing me move, turned his head round. "what are you fiddling about with your helmet for?" he asked. "stand still, will you?" and he went on writing. ten minutes later he ordered me to come forward. i saluted and stood at attention. "take off your helmet," said the colonel. i took it off. "your hair is too long, you will have to get it cut; and you will soon get a court-martial if you go on like that. put on your helmet. what do you want?" "sir," i began, "i have been punished----" "punished!" he exclaimed. "yes, you are always punished. you are the worst trooper in my regiment. we don't want men like you in the french army. what do you want?" "sir," i once more began, "i have been punished by corporal----" "i know it," he replied, waxing quite angry. "i told you so before, you are always punished--always punished. if it is to tell me that you have come here, you might have stopped at the barracks. why the deuce don't you tell me what you want? do you think i am standing here at your orders?" "if you will allow me to explain, sir," i replied, "i will tell you why and how i have been punished." "i don't want to know anything about it," said the colonel, in an angry voice. "let me see, how many days have you got?" "twenty days, sir," i said. "have you finished your punishment?" "no, sir, i have only done two days so far." "and you dare to come and complain to me! but i ought not to be astonished--for cool cheek and impudence you haven't your equal. go back to barracks and tell the _adjudant_ to put you down ten days more for having made an unjustified complaint. that's all--look sharp!" i saluted, and as i was walking towards the door the colonel added: "i will teach you not to come and bother me in future." on my way to barracks i thought of the advice the sergeant _fourrier_ had given me, and i felt distinctly sorry that i had not followed it. at the end of ten days i began to be so exhausted by sleepless nights and the hard physical work we had now to do that i began to feel seriously ill. i also had a relapse of sore throat accompanied with fever, undoubtedly due to all lack of sanitary precautions in the _salle de police_. since the warm weather had come, to the other horrors of the place another was added. fleas and lice came through the boards by thousands, and our rooms were infested with vermin. i went to the medical visit, and the doctor found me so seriously ill that he had to send me to the hospital, promising at the same time that he would do his best to try and get me invalided. a fortnight later he proposed me for _invalidation_, but the special commission before whom i was examined refused to invalid me, but consented to allow me two months' sick leave. i was kept a week longer in hospital, and at the end of that time left the regiment for two months. this interval of respite i spent in switzerland, where i did a good deal of mountain climbing. i can hardly describe my feelings when i had to return to my regiment and to go back to slavery. when i rejoined my corps i found but a few men in barracks, as the regiment was away at the manoeuvres. the fifth squadron alone, which forms the depôt, was left in barracks, and there also remained a few troopers in each squadron, mostly sick men, who were to look after the chargers which had been left behind as unfit for hard work in the field. i tried my best to get permission to join my regiment, but this was not granted me; on the other hand, the major in command of the depôt, who was acting as colonel in the absence of the regiment, selected me to train some of the young horses which had proved refractory. this is the only good time i had as a trooper. i was particularly fond of the work, being allowed to ride whenever i liked, and having permission to use my own hunting-saddle. i had six horses to train, so that i was in the saddle almost the whole day, and had no one to bully me. when the regiment returned, the _volontaires_ were once more put together, and prepared for their final examination, which was to take place in the middle of october. on their return from the manoeuvres the troopers who had completed their five years' service left for their homes amidst great rejoicings. shortly after the departure of the time-expired men (_la classe_) a good many of those who had remained behind broke away from the regiment, but most of them returned before the expiration of six days, the law being that after six days' time a trooper absent without leave becomes a deserter, and is tried by court-martial, the sentence passed on him ranging from one to three years' hard labour. those who absented themselves for less than six days were punished with fifteen days' prison by the colonel, but after some time so many troopers absconded in that way, that, in order to put a stop to the practice, the colonel promised that any man absenting himself without leave in future would get thirty days' prison, and that all the troopers belonging to his company would be confined to barracks for thirty days also. notwithstanding this, one trooper, who had twice absconded within the last four months, ran away once more, and the troopers of his company were duly consigned to barracks during thirty days. when the fellow returned at the end of the fifth day, his comrades, infuriated by the punishment they had received through his misconduct, determined to punish him on their own account, and the lieutenant in command of the _peloton_, when he heard of this, secretly consented to the plan. when the trooper returned, the lieutenant ordered that before he was taken to prison he was to be sent to the room "to change his clothes." the moment he entered he was seized by the other troopers, tied face downwards on to a table, and every one of the twenty-four troopers of the company filed past him, each one dealing him a sharp blow with the buckle end of his charger's girth. he was then untied, and led to the riding-school, where a blanket was in readiness. in this blanket were placed sundry wooden clogs, besides platters and a scabbard or two. the blanket was then held all round by the defaulter's comrades, and he was chucked into it, and sent flying high up into the air perhaps a dozen times. i witnessed the punishment, and wondered how the poor fellow, after being sent flying more than fifteen feet into the air, and then dropping amidst a shower of scabbards, clogs, and platters, back into the blanket, was not killed outright. when the punishment had come to an end the trooper was marched to the prison, or, rather, supported thither. on the way he met his lieutenant and complained bitterly of the treatment he had received, but the officer merely told him that he had fully deserved all he had got. the following day he was so bruised and shaken that he could not rise, and he asked for a doctor. the latter went to see him, but declined to do anything for him, merely relieving him from punishment drill during the next couple of days. at that time there were from twelve to fourteen troopers in prison, so that a _peloton de chasse_ (punishment company) was organised, under the orders of a certain sergeant de cormet, who enjoyed the reputation of being the most severe sergeant of the whole regiment. an episode which occurred during the previous winter may be quoted as an example of his method. it was bitterly cold, and he was drilling the prisoners, making them do the sword exercise and keeping the troopers for five or ten minutes in the same position. he had ordered the second position of the "_coup de sabre vers la droite_," which consists in holding the sword extended to the right at arm's length; at the end of a few minutes the troopers became so tired that none of them were able to hold their bodies straight, and had to put their left shoulders down, and let the points of their swords drop. de cormet, as usual, walked behind them, coolly saying, "trooper gabier, four days more for not holding yourself straight; trooper chirac, your sword is not straight, you will have two days more," and so on. all of a sudden one of the prisoners, a poor weak fellow, said to him: "sergeant, my hands are frozen; will you allow me to blow in them for one minute? i can't hold my sword any longer." "four days for speaking in the ranks," answered cormet, in his monotonous voice. the trooper's fingers were as white as wax, and he soon repeated his request with a similar result. at last, unable to stand the pain any longer, the trooper put his sword under his arm and blew on his fingers. "hold your sword in position at once," said the sergeant; "i shall report you to the colonel." "but, sergeant, i can't," cried the trooper. "you refuse to obey?" said the sergeant. "i can't, i can't," said the trooper, sobbing with pain, and at the same time trying to grasp his sword, but finding himself unable to close his benumbed fingers. again the sergeant ordered him to hold his sword out, but the man burst into tears, and once more sobbed, "i can't, i can't!" thereupon the sergeant commanded another prisoner to carry the sword, and calling out to one of the troopers on guard, ordered him to fetch the corporal, and when the latter came he had the poor fellow conveyed to the cells, and reported him for refusal to obey orders. the trooper was therefore tried by court-martial, and sentenced to _two years' hard labour_! i little dreamt at the time that the day would come when, as will be seen presently, i would have the misfortune to be placed in the power of this fiend. as the day fixed for our final examination approached we were all busy looking through our various books in order to be well up to the subjects in which we were to be examined. our sergeant chiefly made us practise to give the word of command; and when one of us was placed in command of the company, he had, before ordering any movement, to explain fully the way in which such movement ought to be executed. in fact, we were taught to act as sergeants. at last the great day came. the subjects on which we were to be examined were these: dismounted drill, and command. hippology. _voltige._ gymnastics. topography. knowledge of regulations in barracks and in the field. riding. mounted drill, and command. the maximum number of marks which could be gained for each subject was twenty. we were examined by a board of officers, consisting of a major, the captain _instructeur_, our own captain, and one lieutenant. the order in which we were called was settled according to the numbers under which we had been enrolled, so that i came third on the list of troopers; the three _volontaires_ who had been made corporals coming of course before the others. the first subject on which we were examined was dismounted drill. (the corporals could select their own subject, so that their examination was merely nominal.) the two _volontaires_ who were examined before me were told to explain the mere rudiments of the subject, but when my turn came i was ordered to explain and command the most difficult manoeuvres. i did this with credit to myself, and i was further ordered to command sword drill; this i also did well, and i was then sent back to the ranks. with the exception of three or four of the _volontaires_, who bungled most frightfully in explaining the simplest movements, all of us knew our work thoroughly well. we were then taken to the riding-school and examined on hippology; only four or five of us knew anything about this, and d'alvarez, who was a corporal, knew so little about the subject that the lieutenant had to prompt all his answers. we were then dismissed for breakfast, and were told to return at eleven o'clock to the riding-school to be examined on _voltige_ and gymnastics. we were hardly given a chance to show what we could do, however, as the officers were anxious to go and have luncheon. when they returned at p.m. we were taken to the schoolroom, where our proficiency in topography was put to the test. i have never seen anything more ridiculous than this part of the examination, for with the exception of the captain _instructeur_, the officers seemed to know very little about the subject, and most of the _volontaires_ knew still less. we were closely examined on all questions dealing with the duties of sergeants and corporals, in barracks and in the field, and, although the officers who examined us tried their best to put me wrong, i showed myself quite proficient, which evidently disconcerted the officers, as i heard them whispering, "we must give him good marks, but it's a nuisance, you know." "we shall find a way," replied my captain. i did not realise then what this meant, but i understood it quite soon enough. this part of the examination over, we were dismissed for the day, and ordered to be ready for mounted drill, with full kit, the next morning at a.m. at the appointed time, the officers who had examined us the previous day turned up at the barracks, and accompanied by a trumpeter we started for the manoeuvring ground. we had first to ride individually at various paces, and were then ordered to go over the jumps. very little notice was taken of our riding, and while this went on the officers chatted together, hardly bestowing a glance on us. after this we had, each in turn, to take command of the _peloton_, and to explain and command various evolutions according to the officer's orders. i was successful in all the various manoeuvres i was ordered to command; but many of the others made a sad mess of it, especially when they had to wheel their company round, take it at a gallop to a certain point, and then return so as to march past in fours before the major. miscalculation of distances was the commonest source of error. the examination over, we were marched back to barracks, and in the evening my sergeant-major told me that he had seen the marks, and that i was among the first half. i expressed my delight, but he said warmly: "don't crow yet, my boy; they mean to keep you a second year, and they will find a way to do it." i was thunderstruck, for i never thought, for an instant, of such a contingency. i told the sergeant-major that it would be monstrous, considering that i had proved my proficiency. "take my warning," he said, "and don't be astonished if they keep you another year." de lanoy, to whom i went, then said that he did not think that the colonel could possibly keep me, as he would have to keep a good many others who were below me in proficiency if he did so. it was, therefore, with a beating heart that, on the following day, i stood on parade, awaiting the result of the examination, which was to be proclaimed to us by our captain, who had prepared a little speech for the occasion. "i have to congratulate you," he said, "on your proficiency, which is due to the untiring efforts of sergeant legros, whom i hope soon to see duly rewarded. with the exception of two or three of you, i have never had a better or more intelligent set of troopers under my orders. now i will, before reading out to you the result of the examination, explain how it has been arrived at. the maximum of marks allotted for each subject is twenty, and the number of marks gained by each candidate is multiplied by a coefficient fixed according to the relative importance of the subject." he then read out to us the various coefficients (which will be found farther on). "in your previous examinations," he went on, "we did not reckon good conduct, but this being a final examination, and the submission of each trooper to discipline being a matter of such paramount importance, the colonel has decided to give it due prominence, and has, therefore fixed the coefficient at the figure of fifty, which makes altogether the maximum number of marks to be gained . i am glad to add that many of you have obtained more than three-quarters of the possible number of marks, and this, i say once more, is entirely due to the efforts of your able sergeant." the captain then read out the list. at the head of it stood the names of the three _volontaires_ who had been previously appointed corporals, the first being d'alvarez. this made us smile, for, though we all liked him, we knew perfectly well, that if it had not been for the influence of his family, he would have ranked near the end of the list. the two other corporals had worked hard since their promotion, and fully deserved their position. the captain, however, continued to read out name after name, and yet mine had not been reached. i became more and more alarmed, and i turned cold when it came at last, at the very end of the list, with marks only, while the man before me, one of the most vulgar, ignorant, and stupid fellows i ever met, had . all the others looked at me, and felt in their hearts that a gross injustice had been committed. i was aroused from my thoughts by the captain's voice: "decle," he said, "i am sorry to have to communicate bad news to you; but the colonel, after due consideration, has decided that, having regard to the too small amount of marks you have obtained--you see you are the only one who has less than half of the possible maximum--the colonel, i repeat, has decided that you shall be kept back to complete your military education. i am sorry for you, but it cannot be helped. as to the others, those who are already corporals will be promoted to the rank of sergeant, and the next three on the list are promoted to the rank of corporal." thereupon he dismissed us. i went to him, and begged and implored him to ask the colonel to reconsider his decision, but he replied that i was merely wasting my time and his. the blow had fallen, and i felt like a madman! the first thing i did was to obtain a copy of the list, which was posted up in the schoolroom. i then saw how the trick had been played. a few words of explanation will make the device clear. the result of the examination, so far as i was concerned, was as follows: +-----------------------------+--------------+------------+---------+ | |co-efficients.| my marks. | totals. | +-----------------------------+--------------+------------+---------+ |dismounted drill and command | | | | |hippology | | | | |voltige | | | | |gymnastics | | | | |topography | | | | |knowledge of regulations | | | | |riding | | | | |mounted drill and command | | | | | | | +---------+ | grand total | | | | +-----------------------------+--------------+------------+---------+ the highest marks obtained out of a possible were , the lowest marks (given to the _volontaire_ next to me on the list) were . by the actual marks obtained i ought to have been classed the fifth out of fourteen, but as the examiners were determined that i should be the last on the list, the following plan was devised:-- "good conduct" was added to the other items, and a coefficient of no less than fifty was allotted to it. with the exception of two other _volontaires_ besides myself, twenty marks were given to every one for good conduct, thus increasing their totals by _one thousand_! the _volontaire_ who was last but one was given seventeen marks for good conduct, and this, multiplied by fifty, made to be added on to his beggarly , giving him a total of marks. i was given nothing for good conduct, so that i remained with my original marks, and was thus classed last. the regulations stated that _volontaires_, who at the end of the year had failed to show a proficiency sufficient to enable them to obtain a number of marks at least equal to half the possible maximum at the final examination might be detained for a second year--i was therefore detained _according to the regulations_! it was with an almost broken heart that i bade good-bye to all my comrades, and when i watched the train which took them away disappearing in the distance, i felt like a marooned stowaway who watches the departing ship sink below the horizon. when they had gone i went to my room at the hotel, seriously debating whether i should desert or else shoot myself. that i did neither remains a source of wonder to me. footnote: [ ] it is customary in france to designate the wives of superior officers and officials by their husbands' titles; even in good society people will speak of la générale, la colonelle, la commandante, la préfete, la sous-préfete, and so on. chapter xiv i do not intend to enter into many of the details of my second year's service, as this was a mere repetition of what i had already gone through, and i will therefore confine myself to a brief description of that portion of my adventures which may offer some special points of interest. some time elapsed before the arrival of the new _volontaires_, and during this period we had practically no work to do with the exception of "stables." all the sergeants of my squadron, and many of those belonging to other squadrons, had made friends with me, and they all pitied me for the cruel position i was placed in. meanwhile the senior _adjudant_ retired with a pension, and my sergeant-major was appointed in his stead, while sergeant _fourrier_ vaillant became sergeant-major. vaillant was a particular friend of mine, so that with his help, and the support i knew the _adjudant_ would give me, i hoped that if a decent sergeant was put in charge of the _volontaires_ i should soon obtain my discharge. there was no chance of our being entrusted again to the tender mercies of legros, as he had also been appointed sergeant-major. a number of _volontaires_ were drafted into our regiment that year--i believe there were nearly thirty of them. socially and intellectually they were very inferior to my previous comrades. there never existed between them that spirit of comradeship which was so great among the little set to which i belonged. shortly after their arrival a trooper from the first squadron came to tell me that sergeant de cormet wanted to speak to me, and that i was to go to his room at once. i could not imagine what he wanted with me, as i did not belong to his squadron, and i had never had anything to do with the man. i went, however, and when i reached his room i asked him whether it was true that he had sent for me. "yes," he said, "i want to speak to you. i have just heard that i am going to be put in charge of the _volontaires_, and as it appears that nobody has yet been able to break you in, i merely wanted to warn you that i mean to succeed. if ordinary means are not successful, i'll stand no nonsense, and i'll find some way to get you court-martialled. a few years in a gaol would do a lot of good to a swine of your class." i had so far made no reply, but stood with my arms folded on my chest. my face must have expressed my stifled anger, i suppose, for when i took two steps forward the sergeant retreated towards the window. "don't be afraid," i said, "i am not going to touch you--you are not worth it; but now that you have told me what you mean to do, i will also tell you what _i_ mean to do. remember this--you may find a way to get me court-martialled, though i doubt it, but if you do--when i come out, be it in ten years', in fifteen years', or even twenty years' time--i shall kill you." "you dare to threaten me--me a sergeant!" he said. "don't get my blood up; you had better not," i replied; "remember that there are no witnesses here, and if you rouse me i might cause you bodily harm. i am a good deal stronger than you. but i think that this conversation has lasted long enough, and i will only add a few words to what i told you before. i warned you what i would do if you got me court-martialled, but i further warn you that if you bully me while i am under your orders i will punish you when i am no longer a soldier. and now that we quite understand each other i will say 'good afternoon,' only mind," i added, "if you report me for what has taken place here i will deny everything; you have no means of proving your word, and you would not have dared to tell me what you did in presence of witnesses." i returned to my room fairly heart-broken at the idea that i was going to be under the orders of the most cowardly brute in the whole regiment; i had seen the fellow at work when he was drilling the prisoners, and i knew that if i had had a bad time of it while i served under sergeant legros, it would be ten times worse under sergeant de cormet. shortly afterwards the _volontaires_ and the recruits of the year arrived, and being a trooper of a year's standing i was allotted a recruit to whom i was supposed to teach his work. i almost despaired of ever doing anything with the fellow, and in vain i tried to prevent his being bullied, but the stupid chap seemed to do all he could to invite it. "i say, you chaps," he said to the troopers on his arrival, "i am a parisian, you know, and i am not going to stand any nonsense. i have been in a grocer's shop, and i am not a greenhorn. besides, my cousin beaujean has been in a dragoon regiment, and he has told me all about it, so no bullying please, or else you will have to do with jossier--that's my name." i need not say that after this little speech of his, jossier became the butt of all the practical jokers in the room. the scenes i described at the beginning of this book were of course once more renewed, but one of the jokes which was played on my _bleu_ (recruit) was quaint enough to be related. he was in the habit of wearing at night a _bonnet de coton_, similar to the head-gear which was given to us at hospital, but much more bulky. when drawn out to its full length it was fully two feet long, and when he had it on his head the peak stood some eight inches above his head, with an enormous tassel fixed on to it. one evening, after he had gone to sleep, a practical joker set the tassel alight, and being of cotton it began to burn merrily. nearly all the men in the room collected round his bed to see the fun, and hearing a noise he sat up in bed and looked at us in a bewildered way. by this time the tassel was burnt down, and the other part of the head-gear was smouldering away. "well," he said, "you are a nice lot of fools to stand there staring round my bed like a lot of idiots. it's very funny to look at a man, isn't it?" we were all laughing, as he had not yet noticed that his head-gear was on fire; but all of a sudden his speech was interrupted, as he felt an uncomfortable heat near the crown of his head, and having impulsively put his hand to his head he realised what was the matter, and chucked away his _bonnet de coton_. "ah, you swine," he exclaimed, "i'll teach you," and he jumped out of his bed, making a dash for us. unluckily for him, the first man on whom he jumped was piatte, to whom he dealt a blow on the chest. piatte caught hold of him by the arms and legs, and shouted, laughing, "i say, boys, i've caught a flea; let's make it jump!" immediately a blanket was produced, and the recruit tossed up, and when they put him once more on his legs he did not complain, but quietly sneaked into his bed. during the fortnight which elapsed until the _volontaires_ were put together, i was told off by my sergeant-major to drill half a dozen recruits, and at the end of the week i had already got more out of my recruits than any of the corporals who were in charge of the others. the method i employed was to promise my men a bottle of wine if they drilled well, and of course they all did their utmost to gain that reward. captain hermann, who, as the reader will remember, was in command of our squadron, and had been in charge of the _volontaires_, was evidently pleased with me, and actually came to congratulate me. this state of affairs unfortunately lasted only for a fortnight, and at the end of that time the new _volontaires_ were formed into a separate _peloton_, and on account of their number two officers were placed in command of them--captain hermann and lieutenant amy. two sergeants were also detached for this service--sergeant de cormet and sergeant cordier. the latter was a personal friend of mine, and i knew that he would counteract de cormet's bad intentions towards me. no corporal had yet been selected by the colonel, and therefore when the _volontaires_ were assembled for the first time, i took my position to the left of the company, the corporal's place, which, by rights belonged to me as the senior trooper. the previous year when we were formed into a separate _peloton_ there was among us a _volontaire_ who had been detained and who belonged to the lot who had served before us, and legros had always made him do corporal's duty. but evidently de cormet did not mean to treat me in that way, for he ordered me to take my place in the ranks among the others, and he made me go through all the rudiments of the instruction, as if i had been a raw recruit. the other sergeant treated me very differently, and when he took the service the following day he ordered me to act as corporal. lieutenant amy, however, turned up in the middle of the drill and sharply reprimanded the sergeant, ordering that i should be put through the rudiments of the drill absolutely as if i had been a raw recruit. to make things worse sergeant cordier was taken with typhoid fever a few days after he took charge of us, and having had a relapse during his convalescence he was sent home on six months' sick-leave. early in december two corporals were appointed to help de cormet: one of them, lormand, was a schoolfellow of mine, who had enlisted three months before, and had just been promoted to the rank of corporal. i had been doing work with the new _volontaires_ for a fortnight, and sergeant de cormet hadn't yet found it possible to punish me, for lieutenant amy was always present when we drilled, and de cormet himself spent very little time in the schoolroom, leaving one of the corporals in charge of it. as, however, the previous year's regulations as to leave were still in force, de cormet had always refused to let me apply for leave. a few months before, i had attained my majority, and at the beginning of december my solicitors wrote me a most urgent letter pressing me to come to paris without delay, to settle some important matters. i showed this letter to de cormet, but he absolutely declined to grant me leave, and the captain to whom i then went was equally emphatic in his refusal, adding that i should only get leave for the new year provided i was not punished in the interval. as it was most necessary that i should go to paris that week, i went to see the _adjudant_, bernard, my former sergeant-major, and asked him to let me go to paris from saturday afternoon after "stables" until monday morning. he at once promised not to report me missing, and told me to go and settle matters with my sergeant-major. the latter readily acquiesced, and suggested a plan which would enable me to reach paris before the offices were closed. "stables" being over at o'clock, i could by catching the . train reach paris at . , and as the offices do not close till o'clock (saturday half-holidays are unknown in france), i should be in time to transact my business. my sergeant-major, however, remarked that if i wanted to catch the . train i would have no time to go to the hotel to change my regimentals for civilian attire, and therefore suggested that i should dress in civilian clothes in his room and leave barracks by the infantry gate. i had made it a rule whenever i went to paris without leave to wear over my clothes a long blue blouse falling below the knees, with a silk cap (the costume of the lower classes in the north of france), and i also wore a false beard and blue spectacles. i donned this attire in the sergeant-major's room, and in order that i should have no difficulty at the gate he accompanied me there, and told the sergeant that i was a friend of his who was in a hurry to catch his train, and i was thus allowed to pass. i reached the station only just in time, and the train was already moving, so that i had to jump into the carriage nearest at hand, and received a severe shock at finding myself in company with two officers of my regiment. having a newspaper in my pocket, however, i opened it, and held it in front of my face. my disguise was so good that the officers had not recognised me when i jumped into the carriage, but i was afraid that they might become suspicious if i held a newspaper in front of my face during the whole journey. i therefore got out of the carriage at the following station, where i had just time to jump into a second-class compartment. here, to my astonishment, i found my schoolfellow, corporal lormand, also in civilian attire; i knew that he had no leave, and as we had been great chums at school, i did not hesitate to remove my false beard and blue spectacles, which were a great discomfort to me. "well i never!" exclaimed lormand when he recognised me. "your disguise is so good," he added, "that i should never have known you. but how is it that you are going to paris without leave?" "i might put the same question to you," i replied, "as we seem to be both in the same boat." we chatted pleasantly until we reached paris, where we parted company--not, however, without having arranged to lunch together the next day. i returned to my garrison town by the last sunday train and found the _adjudant_, to whom i had wired, waiting for me outside the barracks, so that i should walk in unquestioned. he told me that everything was all right, and that nobody had noticed my absence, so i went to my sergeant-major's room to change my clothes. the next morning, as we were assembled for dismounted drill, de cormet called me to him. "you went to paris yesterday without leave," he said. "no, sergeant," i replied. "i tell you that you went to paris yesterday without leave, and what's more, in civilian attire." "you are making a mistake, sergeant," i again said. "didn't you see decle?" he then asked, turning to corporal lormand. "yes, sergeant, i saw him," replied the latter. "what have you to say to that?" asked de cormet. "nothing, sergeant." "very well," he went on, "i will send you to the prison at once"; and forthwith he had me marched off by the corporal of the guard. i need not say that sergeant de cormet had absolutely no right to send me to prison, but knowing that the captain would always endorse whatever he did, he never hesitated to give us punishments far in excess of those he was entitled to inflict. at breakfast time, after he had dismissed the _volontaires_, he came to the prison, where he found me alone. "now i have come to speak to you, decle," he said. "i have not yet reported the matter either to the lieutenant or to the captain, and if you will tell me the truth i promise you that you shall not be punished. i am fully aware that you went to paris in civilian attire, with leave from your sergeant-major, and i believe with the _adjudant's_ knowledge, but we shall leave the latter out of the question. now if you will make a declaration in the presence of the captain and another witness, saying that you have been to paris with leave from your sergeant-major, you shall not be punished." "will you allow me to think over your offer, sergeant?" i asked. "yes," he said; "i will release you now, and give you till eleven o'clock to make up your mind. you will then come to my room and tell me what you have decided." i was accordingly let out of prison, and pretended to go to my room, but the moment de cormet had disappeared, i rushed to the _adjudants_ room and told him how matters stood. "what do you mean to do?" he asked me. "you need not put such a question to me," i replied. "you ought to know that i would rather get sixty days' prison than give you and my sergeant-major away; what we must do," i added, "is to discuss the situation with sergeant-major vaillant, so that he may be fully aware of what i mean to say, and act accordingly. the _adjudant_ despatched a trooper to call the sergeant-major. when the latter turned up he was greatly concerned to hear what had happened, but i assured him that he need have no fear, and explained my plan to him. i would say that i left barracks on the saturday evening after arranging my bed so that it appeared as if i were sleeping in it when the sergeant of the week passed through the room to call the evening roll. i would also say that the sergeant-major gave me leave not to attend stables on the sunday (which he had a perfect right to do), and that i returned to barracks on sunday night by getting over the wall. i would also explain that i was not reported missing at the sunday evening roll-call, one of my comrades having prepared my bed as i had on the previous night, so that the sergeant of the week did not notice my absence. sergeant-major vaillant remarked that if i told that story i should be punished with special severity, but i said i did not mind in the least so long as i did not get him into trouble." he thanked me profusely. "in the state of mind the colonel is in," he added, "if he found out that i had given you leave he would be certain to reduce me in rank." the _adjudant_ remarked that de cormet's motive was plain, for being first on the list of the sergeants proposed for promotion to sergeant-major's rank, he wanted to avail himself of the chance of getting vaillant reduced to secure his place. at eleven o'clock sharp i went to de cormet's room and found him in the most amiable frame of mind. "well," he said, "i suppose that you have made up your mind to tell the whole truth?" "certainly, sergeant," i replied; "i see no good in shrinking from it, and i will tell you exactly what happened." i then told him the story i had concocted with the sergeant-major and the _adjudant_. "you are telling me lies," he angrily exclaimed. "i can't understand your doing your best to get an exemplary punishment when you can so easily get off scot-free. why don't you confess purely and simply that you had your leave from your sergeant-major?" "i will tell you why, sergeant," i then replied, "and the best of reasons is that i had not his leave, and as there are no witnesses here, you can't use what i am going to say against me. you want me to accuse my sergeant-major so as to get him reduced in rank, because you hope to be appointed in his stead. none but a man as mean as you are would try that sort of game. you can do what you like, but i shall merely repeat what i told you just now, and i once more want you to understand that i had no leave whatever, and that my sergeant-major knew nothing about my going to paris. now do your worst." "oh," he said, "i wanted to do you a good turn, and that's how you take it. you will see what it will cost you! i shall report the matter at once to the captain." he was as good as his word, and in the afternoon the captain turned up at the barracks and sent for me. "i thought some time ago, decle," he said, "when you were doing your work with the squadron, that you were really trying to turn over a new leaf. i find, however, that, on the contrary, you are doing your best to get yourself sent to biribi. what is the meaning of this story that i hear from de cormet about your having gone to paris in ridiculous civilian attire, and with the complicity of your sergeant-major? i have spoken to the latter, who is naturally most indignant, and i am not sure that i shall not have you court-martialled for having basely made a false accusation against one of your superiors." "i have not accused my sergeant-major, sir," i indignantly replied, "though i was asked to do so by the sergeant----" "no further accusations!" interrupted the captain with severity. "sir," i continued, "i do not know what sergeant de cormet may have told you; but, if you will allow me, i will repeat to you what i told him, and freely confess all that i have done." i thereupon once more repeated the story we had concocted. "but," cried the captain, "sergeant de cormet distinctly told me that you had tried to exculpate yourself by asserting that you went to paris with your sergeant-major's leave!" "i swear to you upon my honour that i never said so, sir!" i replied. the captain then sent for de cormet, and told him that i denied having tried to excuse myself by alleging that i had permission from the sergeant-major. "didn't you tell me," said de cormet, "that you were not reported missing on the sunday because you had leave from your sergeant-major?" "certainly," i replied; "i was excused by him from attending stables, but i distinctly told you that i had no other leave: you know it quite well, sergeant, as you----" "oh," quickly interrupted de cormet, addressing the captain, "i suppose, sir, that i misunderstood what decle told me." "but didn't he tell you," replied the captain, "how he deceived the sergeant of the week by making a sham figure in his bed?" "yes, sir, i remember now," said de cormet quietly. "i am afraid that you were too kind to decle," said the captain, "and that you wanted to save him from a severe punishment, and it did not strike you that if i had found out that sergeant-major vaillant had given him leave i would unhesitatingly have asked the colonel to reduce him to the rank of sergeant. as to decle, i will begin by giving him four days' prison, and i will draw up a report at once, which you will take the colonel." i had to hand the whole of my kit to the sergeant _fourrier_, and was then led to the prison. the _adjudant_ came to inform me, later on, that the colonel had altered my punishment to eight days' prison and eight days' cells in solitary confinement. all punishments have to be accompanied by an explanation, showing the reasons why the punishment has been inflicted, and in all cases involving prison the punishment has to be reported to the major-general in command of the brigade to which the regiment belongs. here are the reasons for my punishment as they appeared in the regimental orders of the day:-- "the trooper decle," said the colonel in the regimental orders, "will be punished with eight days' prison, and eight days' cells, for having infamously deceived the sergeant of the week by making a dummy in his bed, for having gone to paris without leave in civilian clothes and in disguise--and for having, notwithstanding the orders previously issued, applied to his sergeant-major for leave not to attend stables instead of demanding such leave from the sergeant in charge of the _volontaires_; for having further deceived the sergeant of the week in getting another trooper to make a dummy in his bed, and for having returned to barracks over the wall. this trooper is warned that unless he amends soon his conduct the colonel will be under the painful necessity of sending him before a _conseil de discipline_." (see p. .) when the _adjudant_ came to communicate this order to me he promised that he would not let me be put in solitary confinement, but that i should spend the fortnight over which my punishment extended in the common prison. he also promised to give orders that a steak should be brought to me from the canteen and placed on the top of my daily rations. he added that as he was being relieved from duty that day he would recommend me to the other _adjudants_, and that my punishment would begin with prison, so that when he took "the week" again on the next monday he could see about arranging that i should not be put in solitary confinement. the worst consequence of the punishment i had just received was that it prevented me from entertaining any hope of being released from active military service after the first examination of the _volontaires_, and i knew that in future i should be treated still more harshly than before. i was chiefly indignant with corporal lormand. to think that a schoolfellow of mine, who professed to be my friend, who had accepted luncheon from me the previous day, could have been mean enough to denounce me! to think that, although he had gone to paris without leave, in civilian attire, like myself, he was not punished, but congratulated by the captain for having "given me away"! all this made me ask myself whether such a thing as common justice existed in the french army. i have seen a great deal of the world since. years have elapsed since all this happened, but from all i have heard from young fellows who have served their time but recently, the system is still just the same. the bullying of privates by corporals and sergeants is as bad as in my time, the officers are jealous of each other, and, instead of encouraging privates so as to make them love their _métier_, they plot and scheme to get promotion, while the corporals and sergeants chiefly strive to find or manufacture defaulters, well knowing that by so doing they will attract their chiefs' attention, and thus get advancement. chapter xv when i was sent to prison there were four other troopers undergoing a similar punishment, but i did not see anything of them until the call for "soup," as they were kept out all day on fatigue duty and punishment drill. before they returned the _adjudant_ came again to see me, and advised me to go to the medical visit the following morning. he told me that he had seen the doctor, and laid my case before him, and that the doctor had promised to exempt me from punishment drill and from fatigue duty. he sent me, too, at my request, some paper and ink, and all the books we had to study for our examinations. i had also smuggled into the prison conway's admirable little guide-book to the highest peaks of the chain of monte rosa, which i meant to translate into french to while away the time. i also went with the corporal of the guard to fetch a straw mattress and a blanket, to which, as previously explained, a prisoner is entitled. in the evening i asked the corporal of the guard to put my name down for the medical visit of the next morning. when the other prisoners returned for their dinner, they were much astonished to find a _volontaire_ as their companion. most of them were undergoing prison for having _tiré une bordée_ (having been absent without leave during five days, and having remained away up to the very last limit they could reach without being proclaimed deserters). these men were thoroughly bad characters, and very different from titi and piatte, who were mere dare-devils; for titi himself, though he had been in prison several times before he joined the regiment, had never been convicted for anything worse than street broils. the awful life of immorality he had led before coming to the regiment was due chiefly to the surroundings among which he had been brought up, but notwithstanding his failings, the fellow would never have committed a theft, and i would not have hesitated to trust him with any amount of money. my present prison companions, however, were of a very different type. none of them, it is true, had been convicted before joining the army, but i soon gathered from their conversation that it was through sheer luck that they had escaped so far. of course, as i was a common trooper like them, and in prison, they spoke quite openly of their past life before me, and even bragged of their misdeeds _pour m'épater_. one of them, the fellow who had received so severe a punishment from his comrades when he was thrashed and tossed in a blanket in the riding-school, had never ceased to speak of the treatment he had received, and he used to swear that if, when his time was out, he ever came across one of his assailants, he would put a knife into him. while we were eating our food he returned once more to the subject, and when i told him not to brag so much about what he would do, he got quite indignant. "you don't believe me, old chap," he exclaimed; "why, don't imagine that it would be the first time! many are the times when i have _chouriné_ (stabbed) a bloke. me and two others we were for a long time in _les boulevards extérieurs_ (a part of paris which at that time was still most dangerous), and a pretty good haul we sometimes made. i remember once an old woman was going home late at night--we knew her well--she owned a good lot of property, and she had been to collect her rents that day. one of us followed her the whole day, and in the evening he came to tell us that she had gone to dinner with her daughter. you bet, we kept a look-out for her. at ten o'clock, sure enough, there she comes. the _sergots_ had just turned up a side-street to make their rounds, and we knew that the coast would be clear for at least a quarter of an hour. we hid in a doorway, and as she passed us bibi le mufle jumps on her from behind, while the other chap who was with me lands her one in the mouth. we laid her on the ground, and i was searching her pocket when she begins to kick up the devil's own row, and shouts 'murder! police!' i couldn't find anything in her pockets, and just then a bloke who had heard her giving tongue comes along, and he begins shouting 'police! murder!' 'oh,' i says, 'i'll soon give him "murder."' what does a bloke deserve who comes and interferes with gentlemen at their business? so i rush at him and i soon stopped his howling with a jab from my _eustace_ (slang word used for big knife). the others, who were busy searching the old woman, never noticed the police who had come round, and although i shouted to warn them that '_les pantes_' (the police) were coming, they couldn't make tracks in time. bibi le mufle tried to run away, but unfortunately he fell over my bloke, and they collared him there. they accused him of having done for the chap, but he swore that it wasn't true. the old woman recovered, and so did the bloke, and you'd never guess what that man did. he swore that it was bibi le mufle who had stabbed him. and the old woman, who was stupid-like when she recovered, swore that only two chaps had attacked her. the others behaved like bricks, they never gave me away, and so i got up a collection to get them a good counsel, and they only got three years; so you see, old chap, i am not afraid to use my knife, and i swear to god that some day or other i'll have the life of one of them chaps who knocked me about as they have, and, what's more, he concluded, _j'en ai soupé du régiment_ (i am sick of the regiment), and i mean to make a clean bolt of it the moment i get out of prison." it will be seen that my prison companions were not very desirable acquaintances. when i went to the medical visit the following morning, the doctor took me apart, and asked me to tell him exactly what i had done to be treated with such extreme severity. i began to tell him the same story as i had told my captain, but he stopped me. "i know," he said, "that you are humbugging me. i heard part of the truth from your sergeant-major, and you may trust to my word that whatever you tell me will go no further." i therefore told him exactly what had happened, and the part sergeant de cormet had played. the doctor replied that it looked as if my sergeant meant to drive me to do something desperate, and he added that he was determined to put a stop to it. he had already given special orders excusing me from fatigue duty and punishment drill, and at my request he also ordered that an extra blanket should be given me. he added that he was disgusted at the way in which i was being treated, that my constitution was being ruined by the harsh treatment i was subjected to, and that he considered that i was unfit for service under such conditions. when i returned to prison my fellow prisoners were doing punishment drill in the barrack-yard, and i felt glad to be rid of their company for the time being. i was busy all day translating conway's book, and the time passed almost pleasantly, as i had at least nobody to bully me. the following day was sunday, and my fellow prisoners were only taken out in the morning, so that their society was inflicted upon me the whole day. de lanoy, who was on guard that day, came to pay me a visit, and took me into the corridor leading into the prison to have a chat with me. i heard some startling news from him--how two sergeants who had just re-enlisted and received their premium of £ had deserted, as also had two or three troopers. he brought me a novel, and advised me to cut off the strings of the binding and to hide the bulk of it inside a loaf of bread, keeping out only a dozen pages at a time, so that in case the captain of the week should visit the prison i could hide these pages inside my shirt, and should they be discovered by the officer i could say that it was waste paper. his advice proved excellent, as that very afternoon the major came to visit the prison. he inquired what all the books i had were, and i replied that they were the regulation books we had to study, and that i had been allowed to bring them into prison so as not to waste my time. i had carefully hidden in a dark corner conway's little book and inserted the pages of my translation into my blotting-pad, so that i was not found out. the major felt me all over, and made me produce the paper inside my shirt, but seeing only a few loose leaves he did not take any more notice of it. during the night piatte and titi were marched into the place. when the door had been closed upon them a candle was lit, and titi embraced me with transports of joy, being evidently in high spirits. "ah, what fun, old fellow!" he cried out. "it's too funny, you know." "what have you been up to again?" i asked. piatte, who was also roaring with laughter, said, "i'll show you." he was in full uniform, and proceeded to take off his tunic, an example which was followed by titi. when they had removed their garments i saw to my amazement that they were both dressed in acrobatic fleshings! i could not help laughing, and asked what on earth it meant. "well," said titi, "we both got midnight leave, and as a fair was going on we thought we would go and have a look round. we soon came across a big tent. 'twas the wrestlers' place, and so i says to piatte, 'let's go in.' it only cost centimes for the first rows, and in we went. they were not a grand lot, you know, these chaps, and piatte says to me, 'why, i could knock any one of them down with one hand.' 'oh,' i says, 'i don't say that i would do it with one hand, but i would jolly well manage to bowl over any one of the boiling.' just then the boss steps into the middle of the ring and says, holding a basket full of five-franc pieces, 'now, gentlemen, if there is any one among you who would like to back himself against me, i'll undertake, if he manages to down me, to hand over to him the contents of this here basket--one hundred francs!'... nobody moved, so i says to piatte, 'shall we have a go?' but piatte, he says, 'oh, we can't go in uniform.' so i says, 'i'll soon settle that,' and i went behind the tent, and i tell one of the chaps to call the guv'nor. 'look here,' i said, 'did you mean what you said just now?' 'i did,' says the boss. 'well, then, there's my chum and me, we'd both like to have a try, but you see this is how things stand--we can't wrestle in uniform, but if you will lend us a costume we are game.' "'oh,' says the guv'nor, 'i can do that, but if so, i can only give you twenty-five francs if you downs me, and in case you don't, you will have to deposit five francs for the loan of the costume.' "piatte says he is quite game, but the guv'nor must make it five francs for the two. he agrees to this, and he takes us to his caravan, where we change our things. while we are doing this, the guv'nor he had gone back to the ring, and announced that two distinguished ammytoors had accepted the challenge, he also goes to the outside of his shanty and shouts out, 'there's going to be a grand match of ammytoors _versus_ professionals!' "at the end of a few minutes he comes and calls us, 'of course,' he says, 'you can't both come on at the same time--which one of you will come first?' "'i'll go first,' piatte says. "'by gad,' the guv'nor then exclaims, as piatte got up from the corner where he was sitting. 'by gad, you ain't much of a show in uniform, but you are a strappin' 'un in fleshings. too heavy a bit, and clumsy-like, but you are the kind of chap i like to measure myself with.' so they goes to the ring, and the guv'nor presents piatte as the distinguished ammytoor who is going to have a go. piatte makes his bow to the spectators, and the fun begins. i watched it from a chink in the tent. at first i didn't like the look of things. he was a fine chap the guv'nor, and he was on his mettle; he had got scientific ways too, which told heavily on piatte, but for all that he did not last long, and piatte felled his man. the crowd got mad like at seeing the guv'nor fairly beaten, and they gave piatte a real ovation. piatte, businesslike, he catches hold of a hat, and makes a collection among the spectators. he got fifteen francs, my boy, and with the twenty-five francs he had won, that made forty. now came my turn, but when i was brought into the ring and presented to the ladies and gentlemen, i noticed two of our lieutenants and a captain who marches in just then. i couldn't go away, but i says to myself that they will never recognise me, and we begin to wrestle. the guv'nor was tired, and he matched me with another chap. my boy, 'twas a fight! it lasted more than twenty minutes, but at last i downed my man, downed him straight and square, and laid him on the two shoulders. when he gets up, the guv'nor, who felt sicklike at having lost his money, shouts 'foul!' all the spectators took my part, and the officers got quite excited, and said he would have to pay the money whether he liked or not. piatte, whose blood was up, he jumped into the ring and threatened to go for the guv'nor if he didn't fork out at once. seeing how things stood, the guv'nor says as he'll abide by the decision of the officers, so they jump into the ring. they hadn't recognised me or piatte up to then, and it was only when one of them comes near me to tell me that i'm in the right, that he stops suddenly, and stares at me, and cries, 'why, you're a dragoon!' "i was so taken aback that at first i didn't know what to say, but seeing that none of the officers belonged to our squadron, i said at last, quite bold like, 'dragoon! sir! you're making a mistake.' "the officer, a lieutenant, then turns to the captain and the other lieutenant, and says, 'why, look, this chap's a dragoon!' "'d--d good fellow, if he is,' said the other lieutenant. "'maybe,' says the captain, 'but we can't have him disgracing his uniform in this way.' he then whispered something to the lieutenants, and while they were talking, piatte sneaked out and went to dress. i slipped off too, but the captain followed me and caught me up at the steps of the caravan. "'it is thus, then,' he said, 'that you disgrace your uniform.' "'beg your pardon, sir,' i says, 'but i didn't disgrace my uniform, for i had no uniform on.' it was a pity i said that, because it made the captain real mad. "'you have the impertinence to reply!' he then cries out; 'i had come here only to lecture you, but as you dare answer me i'll punish you. you will have eight days' _salle de police_ for having exhibited yourselves in public in a disgraceful way.' just then he caught sight of piatte. 'hallo! here's another one!' he says. 'you shall have eight days too.' "'well, sir,' i says, 'if you will just allow me to say so, it was me who answered you, and i didn't mean any impertinence; but if you remember, you said that you only wanted to give me a lecture, and 'twas only because i answered you that you punished me, so would you mind only punishing me, because piatte there never answered anything.' "'you are a plucky one,' said the captain, 'and a good comrade, but i am sorry that i can't do what you ask me. you both have been guilty of the same offence, and you must both be punished, but i'll reduce your punishment to four days' _salle de police_.' "he then wrote something on a card, and told me to give it to the sergeant of the guard. 'twas an order to put us in the lock-up there and then, and you see we had dressed in such a hurry that we forgot to take off our fleshings, and when the guv'nor came to ask for them, the captain, who had waited until we were dressed, told us to go straight to barracks as we were, and i told the guv'nor that he would get back his fleshings when he had paid us the francs he owed us. but it was rare fun, my boy," concluded titi. the following day titi and piatte were brought back to the cells at eleven o'clock in the morning, the colonel having upon the captain's report altered their punishment into fifteen days' prison. during the next few days the _salle de police_ was so crowded at night that, with the exception of the seven prisoners, each of whom had a straw mattress and thus his place marked out, the troopers were so crammed together that they had to lie down on the planks huddled together like herrings in a box. i had already been twelve days in prison when i began to feel extremely ill. i was suffering from fever and dysentery, probably due to the vitiated air of the place, and it is a wonder to me now how we all escaped typhoid fever. i asked for the doctor, and when he had examined me, he gave orders that i should be immediately removed to hospital, where i was detained for a fortnight before i recovered. in february came the usual examination, after which the captain told me that he had hoped to be able to discharge me from the service then, but that my behaviour prevented his doing so. i need not describe for a second time the drudgery of our daily work, which was a mere repetition of what i had gone through the previous year. de cormet never allowed a week to pass without sending me to the _salle de police_ on some pretext or other. lieutenant amy had also taken a great dislike to me, but i am bound to confess that he never punished me except on one occasion. it was during the month of march; i had been ordered to command the company, and i had to get executed the movement of "shoulder arms." i was reciting the theory, and explaining the movement as stated in the regulations, when sergeant de cormet interrupted me in the middle of my explanation, and told me that i was wrong. he made me begin again, and when i once more reached the passage where he had interrupted me, he asked why i altered the text of the regulations. i replied that i did so because the previous year sergeant legros had made us alter the passage, and had made us learn it as i was then reciting it. "so," cried out de cormet, "now you take it upon yourself to alter the regulations which have been drawn up by the highest authorities in the army!" "no, sergeant," i said, "i have not taken it upon myself, but was told to do so." "don't tell lies," retorted the sergeant; "you will have four days' _salle de police_ for not knowing your theory." "but, sergeant," i said, "you can inquire from sergeant-major legros whether i am telling you the truth or not." "you dare answer!" shouted the sergeant. just then lieutenant amy came along, and hearing a row inquired what was the matter. "it's decle, of course, sir," de cormet told him. "what has he done?" queried the lieutenant. "the gentleman finds that the regulations are not correct, and he takes it upon himself to correct them, and has the impertinence to answer me that they are written in bad french." "i am sick of the fellow," replied the lieutenant; "are you mad, decle?" he asked. "no, sir," i answered very calmly, "and i wish to observe that sergeant de cormet has not correctly reported what i just now said to him." "you scoundrel!" exclaimed the lieutenant. "you have the impudence to tell me that your sergeant is a liar! you will have four days' prison." i knew by experience that to complain, or appeal to the colonel, would only mean an increase of my punishment, and i therefore quietly prepared myself to go to prison when i returned to barracks. the overcrowding of the _salle de police_ had become so great by that time that a special lock-up was used for the prisoners, which was similar to the _salle_, but much smaller. i had once more titi for a companion, as he had been up to some more tricks, and he was waiting his trial before _conseil de discipline_, which had been convened to decide whether he should be sent to a punishment battalion in africa to finish his time or service there. he didn't feel much depressed at the idea. "it will be a change, old chap," he used to say to me, "and i don't suppose that i shall be bullied there more than i am here; besides, i have only one year and a half more to serve, and that will soon be over." it was this fact which saved him, and he was acquitted by a majority of one, although the general bestowed sixty days' prison on him for his last prank. (he had for the third time absconded for five days.) i had taken conway's book to the prison, in order to finish its translation, and only ten pages more were left, when one of the majors happened to walk in. the door stood open to admit the trooper who was bringing our food, and i had no time to put away my ms. the major pounced upon it. "that's how you occupy your time," he said; "give me all those papers." i had to hand them over to him, and he tore them up and chucked the pieces into the slop-pail. so ended my first literary attempt. the four days i spent in prison, coupled with the moral state of despair into which i had fallen, had pretty well broken me down in health. i suffered from incessant headaches and rheumatic pains, and i had to be sent to hospital once more on coming out of prison. all my thoughts were by that time concentrated upon devising some means of leaving the hell the regiment had become to me. desertion was out of the question, not that it would have been difficult for me to pass into belgium, or cross over to england, but i had too much respect for myself and my family to turn a common deserter. chapter xvi i have omitted to mention that in compliance with the regulations i had been obliged, before being taken to the prison, to hand over to my sergeant-major whatever money or jewellery i had at the time. accordingly i handed over to sergeant-major vaillant my gold watch and chain, £ in bank-notes, and two valuable rings, only keeping with me a few pounds in gold and silver, which i carefully hid. the day before i was to leave prison, the sergeant-major came to see me, and explained that as he was going away on leave he wanted to give me back my belongings. this he did, and he further reminded me that he owed me a long-standing gambling debt of £ , and this he also handed over to me. he added that he might be a long time away, and that i could render him a great service by lending him some civilian clothes. he had allowed me to keep in his room a suit of clothes and an overcoat, and i told him that he was very welcome to them. i also offered to lend him some money, and suggested his paying me the gambling debt on his return; but he absolutely refused to accept either offer. he then bade me good-bye, and i thought no more of the matter until a week later, when de lanoy having come to see me in hospital, startled me by saying that sergeant-major vaillant had deserted, having absconded the day before i left prison, and that he was further accused by the captain of having stolen francs from the moneys belonging to the squadron. i assured de lanoy that it was quite impossible that vaillant should have stolen the money, and i told him how he had repaid me the large amount i had entrusted him with, and even £ that he owed me, and de lanoy agreed with me that if francs (about _s._) was missing from the squadron money it was a pure mistake, and not a theft. the following day captain hermann, who, as will be remembered, was in command of our squadron, came to the hospital and walked to my bed. "i am afraid, decle," he began, "that you are going to find yourself in queer street. you probably know that sergeant-major vaillant has deserted, but i should like to know if you are aware that he has run off with money belonging to the squadron, and that he has further stolen your civilian clothes?" "yes, sir," i said, "i heard that sergeant-major vaillant had deserted, but he has not stolen my clothes, for the good reason that i lent them to him; and i don't believe either that he has stolen any money from the squadron." "just so," said the captain; "what you have told me fully confirms my information. you have helped the sergeant-major to desert, and you have given him £ to help him to do so." i grew indignant. "i do not know, sir," i replied, "where you derived your information from. far from having received money from me, the sergeant-major came to me while i was in prison and returned the £ i had entrusted him with, together with my jewellery, when i was sent to prison, so that you see that you have been quite misinformed." "it's all very well for you to say so," replied the captain, "but i have only your word for it, while i have distinct information that you lent him £ , and that further he stole your clothes, and that you did not lend them to him. of course you must remember that, if it is proved that you lent the sergeant-major the money i have mentioned, you will be court-martialled as an accessory to his desertion. if you want, however, to avoid the serious consequences of your act, i am prepared to overlook it provided that you swear that sergeant-major vaillant has stolen your clothes." "i am sorry i cannot do so, sir," i replied, "as that would be committing perjury. i have previously lent the sergeant-major my clothes on several occasions, and i also lent them to him in the present instance. as to being court-martialled for having lent him £ , i am in no way afraid of the consequences, for i can prove by my solicitor's account that i did not lend him the money, unless i stole it myself. in fact," i added, "i can produce at once the very bank-notes he handed over to me." and so saying, i pulled my pocket-book from under the pillow, and showed the captain the money. "oh," he said, "i know you've got money, but that does not prove that you did not lend the £ . however, you can please yourself; i have warned you, and whatever happens will be your own fault." "yes, sir," i answered, "i fully understand." the captain retired, but a quarter of an hour later he returned and insisted upon my swearing that the sergeant-major had stolen my clothes. he even went so far as to promise me, or at least to make me understand, that if i pleased him in the matter, he would see that i was released from the regiment after the following examination. but i was obdurate, and frankly told the captain that i quite understood his motives, and realised why he was so anxious that i should give testimony as to the theft of my clothes, for otherwise he would not be able to obtain vaillant's extradition from whatever country he might have taken refuge in, and i once more declared that whatever might be the consequences i would not commit perjury. the captain retired in great wrath. the following day the doctor told me that i would have to be at the _gendarmerie_ at two o'clock. when i arrived there i found an old corporal of the _gendarmes_ sitting at a table, with another _gendarme_ standing near him. he asked for my name, regimental number, and, as usual in france, i had also to give him full particulars about my father and mother. having taken all this down, he told me to put up my right hand, and to swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth. having thus administered the oath to me he began to question me. "you had a suit of civilian clothes?" he first asked. "well," i replied, "i had, and still have, a good many." "why do you have a good many?" "because i did not always wear the same suit." "but you had a suit of clothes which has been stolen from you by the sergeant-major vaillant?" "no," i said, "i have had no suit of clothes stolen from me. i lent sergeant-major vaillant a suit of clothes, if that is what you are driving at." "what!" exclaimed the _gendarme_, evidently much astonished, "how can you say that sergeant-major vaillant did not steal a suit of clothes from you when your captain says he did!" "i don't know what the captain says," i replied, "and what he says does not concern me. i am here on my oath, i have sworn to tell the truth, and all you have to do is to take down my words." "what am i to do?" said the old corporal, turning helplessly to his subordinate. "this is a most serious matter. how on earth can i write down that a dragoon swears that he has had no clothes stolen when his captain says they have been stolen! that is what discipline has come to nowadays," he went on. "when i was in the guards, if my captain had said to me, 'bouchard, some one has stolen your clothes,' i should have said, 'yes, sir!' but now, if the colonel himself were to say to a trooper, 'you're a nigger,' the fellow would reply that he was a white man. and these are the men who are going to lick the prussians! it breaks my old heart to see such goings on." "corporal," i insisted, "whether you like it or not you will have to write down what i say. if you won't i shall decline to sign the declaration, and shall state in writing the reason for my refusal." "i think you had better take down what he says," suggested the _gendarme_, and the corporal, with a sigh, proceeded to write out my deposition. i gave a full account of all i knew about the matter, pointing out that my sergeant-major had, before leaving, returned a large sum of money i had entrusted to him; finally, having read my deposition through carefully, i signed it. when the old _gendarme_ learned incidentally that i had been in prison, he turned to his subordinate and cried exultingly, "of course he has! of course! i knew all along he was a bad un!" and after i had signed the declaration he could not refrain from a farewell shot. "now, youngster," he said impressively, "mark my words, for i don't make a mistake often--you'll come to a bad end. it's always the case with fellows who don't respect their betters. you begin with the regimental prison; then, when your time is up, you soon get a month or two, then a year, and it's not long before you are sent to la nouvelle,[ ] and, if you don't get a 'lifer,' it's ten to one 'the widow'[ ] ends your days." with these encouraging words the _gendarme_ dismissed me, and the sergeant took me back to the hospital, chaffing me unmercifully all the way. i soon discovered that the captain had only threatened me with a court-martial in order to try and induce me to place documents in his hands which would enable him to obtain an extradition warrant against vaillant, who was known to have taken refuge in belgium. my deposition defeated his object, but i afterwards heard that two years later vaillant surrendered, and was only sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment. the charge against him of stealing money belonging to the squadron was withdrawn, my testimony showing that he had no inducement to commit a petty theft. when i left the hospital i entered once more on my duties with the other _volontaires_, but although i did my best to avoid punishments, i was a "marked man." i had the misfortune, too, of being senior _volontaire_, so that whenever we were left without sergeant or corporal in the schoolroom i was held responsible in case the others caused a disturbance or indulged in horseplay. one saturday--kit inspection day--i discovered, when i returned from the stables in the morning, that my great-coat had been stolen. it was the only article of outfit of which i had no duplicate, and after searching for it throughout the room i could not find it. i reported the matter to de lanoy, my sergeant, and he promised that when all the great-coats were unrolled before the inspection he would carefully examine the numbers. although he did this he was, however, unable to trace it. when the officer came to pass the inspection, de lanoy duly reported the matter to him, but the lieutenant merely said that i had no business to have my great-coat stolen, and gave me eight days' _salle de police_. i was determined to find the thief, and after making careful inquiries, i learnt by accident that a trooper from the fourth squadron had been through our room while we were at morning stables. i heard this while we were coming back from afternoon stables, and i accordingly rushed to the fellow's room, and pulling down the great-coat which was rolled up and placed on the shelf above his bed, i unrolled it, and found that it was my own. just then the trooper, a parisian rough, came into the room, and asked me with a volley of oaths what the devil i was doing there. i was in no mood to stand abuse, and i replied in forcible language that he was a thief, and had stolen my great-coat. thereupon he struck at me, and we had a fierce fight. twice he knocked me down, and the second time he kicked me viciously before i could rise: we had closed once more, and i had given him a blow which made his teeth rattle, when the sergeant-major of his squadron, hearing the disturbance, walked into the room. he separated us, and gave each of us four days' _salle de police_ for fighting in the room. i tried to explain to him what had taken place, but he would not listen to me, and sent me back to my room, where i retired--with my great-coat. the following day the colonel ordered "that the troopers gerbal and decle, who had fought in the room, would fight a duel on the monday morning in the riding-school." i have omitted to mention that all troopers at the end of six months had to spend one hour every week in the fencing school, where they were taught fencing with the sword and the foils. a good many of the _volontaires_ used also to take extra lessons, and, for my own part, i used to take one daily. the moment i heard that i was to fight a duel on the following day, i went to the fencing-master to ask his advice. he told me that we should have to fight with cavalry swords, not, however, of the kind we were accustomed to use, but with old-fashioned swords of the pattern. he produced one of these--i had never seen such an unwieldy weapon. the blade was about four feet long, and when you held the sword in your hand, it was so badly balanced that all the weight seemed to be thrown towards the point. the fencing-master explained to me that in regimental duels all strokes were legitimate from the head down to the knee. he then made me practise with the sword in question, but although i was a pretty good fencer, i confess that i was at first absolutely at sea with the weapon i had in my hand. in the evening i took an extra lesson, and got a little more accustomed to the use of the cumbrous sword. [illustration: a duel in the riding-school] the encounter was to take place at a.m. each of us had selected a second, and we were told to come to the riding-school in stable costume, being allowed to use whatever shoes we liked. when i arrived with my second i found the two doctors present, with half a dozen officers and the fencing-master, who had brought the swords. we were told to strip to the waist, our weapons were handed over to us, and the fencing-master, having put us on guard, stood between us, holding in his hand a scabbard with which he was supposed to stop any deadly stroke. my adversary was a regular bully, and of course a coward, and had imbibed a large quantity of brandy to brace himself up, and when we were placed in position i noticed that he was flushed, and that he was shaking all over. his second, noticing the state he was in, whispered to him, "buck up, old man; don't be afraid." "afraid," he replied aloud, "i ain't afraid: it's the cold that gives me the shivers." he was sharply rebuked and warned that he must remain silent. the fencing-master then released our swords, which he held crossed, and gave us the signal "go." i made a few feints and could have easily touched my opponent, but i meant to inflict a serious injury on the ruffian, and did not take advantage of the chances he gave me. the beginning of the duel was rather a farce, as the fellow kept jumping back whenever i made a feint, and at the end of a minute or two he had already retreated ten paces. the fencing-master ordered us to stop, and warned him that if he went on retreating in that way he would stick him in a corner. we were then placed once more in position, and the second round began. my adversary showed a little more pluck this time, and the moment the signal was given he made a cut at my head, but i easily parried it, and in doing so my sword slightly scratched his arm; we had closed, and i was watching the moment when he would step back, to slip my sword alongside his and with a "_une, deux_" to stick him in the ribs. just then, however, his second noticed a drop of blood on his arm, and the duel was once more stopped. the doctor came forward to examine the "wound," but he declared that it was just a scratch, and that we must go on. my adversary raised strong objections to this decision, saying that the duel being _au premier sang_ (to be stopped the moment blood was drawn), and blood having been drawn, he acknowledged that he was beaten, and that ought to put an end to it, as he was not at all keen to bleed me. the officers, the fencing-master, and even his second could not help laughing, and the fencing-master, without replying, placed us once more in position, and for the third time gave us the signal "go!" i was getting very tired, the weight of the sword telling heavily on my wrist, and i determined to put a speedy end to the encounter. i made a series of quick feints, and as the man uncovered himself well i quickly raised my sword to strike him a _coup de flanc_ which would have cut him along the chest from the shoulder to the waist; seeing this the fencing-master put up his scabbard to stop the blow, and instead of striking the man, my sword fell on the fencing-master's scabbard, and just as the fencing-master cried "halt!" my adversary, taking advantage of my defenceless position, stuck the point of his sword in my wrist. the duel was at once stopped, and i dropped my sword, my fingers becoming instantly benumbed. the doctor bandaged my arm and sent me to the dispensary. it was of course a cowardly act, deliberately done, but the same thing constantly happens in military duels, and even when the two adversaries fight quite fairly. good fencers have hardly any chance, as the fencing-master, who is responsible for the conduct of the duel, has to stop any strokes which may possibly endanger the life of one of the adversaries, and when he stops the sword of one of them, the other may not stop in time, and he thus wounds the first. in my case things were still worse, as my adversary had deliberately struck me while i was incapable of defending myself, my sword resting on the fencing-master's scabbard. i must, however, acknowledge that the officers who were present at the duel reported what had taken place, and the ruffian with whom i had been fighting was punished with thirty days' prison. had i been fairly wounded i should have had eight days' _salle de police_ myself for having fought a duel under orders, as in my time it was customary to punish the wounded man, absurd as this may appear. military duels are certainly a most ridiculous custom, as ridiculous indeed as parliamentary duels. it is well known beforehand that neither of the adversaries will be seriously hurt, and therefore the point of fighting at all seems obscure. the idea is, i believe, that duelling acts as a deterrent to fights between soldiers--frenchmen, like most citizens of the other continental nations, considering the use of fists a low and degrading way of settling a quarrel. duels between officers are also frequent, but they can only fight if they hold the same rank; for instance, no captain can fight a duel with a lieutenant, nor can a major challenge a captain. officers must in any case obtain their colonel's leave to fight. no officer, challenged by one of his comrades, would dare to refuse to fight; if he did so, he would probably be severely punished by the colonel and sent to coventry by his comrades. when i reached the dispensary my wound was thoroughly washed. it was only then that it began to hurt me; when the sword penetrated my wrist i did not feel it in the least, the only sensation i had being that of sudden numbness in the fingers. on examination, the wound proved more serious than it had appeared at first, several of the tendons having been severed. i was therefore detained at the infirmary, and after a couple of days inflammation set in, this being due, i believe, to the fact that during one of the stoppages which had occurred in the course of the duel my adversary had stuck his sword in the ground. it must also be remembered that antiseptics were not known then as they are now, so that my wound had only been washed with a solution of salt and water. this duel (if such a name can be given to such a farce) was, i may add, the first and the last i ever fought or shall fight. it seems incredible that such an absurd custom should subsist among civilised nations. it is due, i suppose, to the lack of means of redress found in the continental laws in case of slander or libel. in france, for instance, men in a prominent position are daily insulted and dragged through the mire by unscrupulous journalists (some newspapers making it even a speciality to get hold of society scandals and subsisting upon the hush-money they extort from their victims), yet it is very seldom that action is taken in the courts. it is no exaggeration to say that there are hundreds of men in france who would each have recovered damages amounting to at least one million sterling if all the libels which have appeared against them in the french papers within the last ten years had been published in the english press and brought before a british jury. as it is, £ damages are considered very substantial. this may partly explain why duelling still exists. footnotes: [ ] new caledonia, where convicts sentenced to _travaux forcés_ (penal servitude) are sent. [ ] the guillotine. chapter xvii had been a fortnight in the infirmary, when one morning at ten o'clock one of the sergeants of my squadron ordered me to dress in tunic and _képi_, saying that he had received orders to take me before the _conseil_. this word simply means court, and is applied to the _conseil de discipline_ (regimental court-martial) as well as to the _conseil de réforme_ (invalidation commission), but i had by that time become so accustomed to threats of being sent before a regimental court-martial, that i could only think of that, and asked the sergeant on what charge i was going to be tried. "i can't tell you," he replied, smiling. he was a friend of mine, and i thought him most heartless to ridicule my trouble. in vain i asked him, while i was dressing, to explain what it meant, but he would not, and tortured me by asking in a jocular way how i would like a change of air and surroundings. at last i lost my temper. "it's all very fine," i said, "to chaff a fellow when you know that he is going to be sent for three years and a half to hard labour in algeria. you are simply a brute, that's all i can say." "but suppose i don't know anything of the kind?" he replied, still smiling. "why do you think so?" "well, i suppose, if i am going to be tried before the _conseil de discipline_----" "you ass!" he laughingly replied; "who spoke to you of _conseil de discipline_? aren't there other _conseils_?" i looked astonished. "have you never heard of the _conseil de réforme_?" (invalidation commission) he said. "you don't mean to say----" "yes," he replied, "i do mean to say that you are proposed for _invalidation_, and most likely you will cease to be a dragoon this afternoon." my heart nearly stopped. the corporal in charge of the infirmary came in at that moment (i had been put alone in a small ward of only two beds). "you've heard the news?" he said. i asked him how it had happened, and how i had not heard of it sooner. he proceeded to explain that, for the last two or three months past, our surgeon had meant to have me invalided, but that the surgeon-major of the infantry, who was senior surgeon of the district, had always scratched my name off the list, as he had taken a particular dislike to me, and also wished to spite our surgeon, whom he hated. the previous day this infantry surgeon had been suddenly summoned to his mother's bedside in the south of france, so that surgeon-major lesage (our own surgeon) was in his absence the head of the medical service, and as such he had included me in the list of men proposed for _invalidation_. my joy knew no bounds, and my only fear was that the commission would reject the proposal. i was taken to the hospital with five other dragoons, and on arriving there we found half a dozen men from the line regiment, who were also to be examined. at a.m. the members of the commission arrived, but we did not see them coming, as they entered the room where we were to be examined by another door. at the end of a few minutes a dragoon was called in: he was the breton of whom i spoke at the beginning of this book, who cried so bitterly at the thought of his cow. since he had joined the regiment the poor fellow had gradually been sinking, and he was reduced to a mere skeleton. they did not keep him long, and when he came out he was laughing and crying hysterically. "sergeant," he cried, "oh, sergeant, let me kiss you! i am going to see her again, my cow, and the hens and the fields, the dear old house!" he had put his arms round the sergeant's neck, and was sobbing like a child on his shoulders. he then sat on one of the benches, and kept saying, "i should have died, you know, if they had not sent me home. it's the blessed virgin--she has heard my prayers! i prayed so hard to her, and every sunday i burnt a candle before her altar. i must go and thank her." he then asked the sergeant to let him go to the church, but the latter said that he was not allowed to let him leave the hospital until the commission had retired. "then i will thank her here; she will hear all the same." and so saying the poor fellow knelt down and buried his head in his hands, muttering a prayer. it was so genuine, so simple, and yet so beautiful, that not a single one of those coarse soldiers assembled there thought of chaffing him, although he had been unmercifully derided for saying his prayers in the room at the barracks. in the meantime two other men had been examined, the last one being sent back to his service. then came the turn of a _volontaire_, a poor fellow whose knee-cap had been broken. although the doctors were unanimous in declaring that he would _not be able to walk at all for two years_, and although certificates from two of the greatest french surgeons, who had been sent by his family to operate on him, were produced, stating that he would be lame for life, the commission refused to invalid him! when my turn came my heart was beating so fast that i could hardly speak. one of our majors presided over the commission, of which the other members were two captains and four lieutenants. to my horror, captain hermann was one of them. our surgeon-major, assisted by the assistant surgeon-major of the line regiment, examined each man. i was presented by surgeon-major lesage: "this is trooper decle," he said; "he is absolutely unfit for service. he suffers from general weakness of constitution and heart palpitation." the other doctor examined my heart and confirmed my surgeon-major's diagnosis. the assistant surgeon-major said that he fully shared surgeon-major lesage's views, and was absolutely in favour of my being invalided. "i should like to listen to the fellow's heart myself," remarked the major. "by all means," said the doctor, smiling, for he knew that the major knew nothing of medicine. i stood beside the major and he put his bald head against my chest. of course my heart was beating furiously, as i was in a blue funk about the decision which would be arrived at. "i would be sorry to exchange with him," growled the old major, "he's a regular roarer." "well, gentlemen," said the surgeon-major, "you have heard major vieu confirm what i told you, and i will ask you to pronounce your decision." "allow me to ask you first," said captain hermann, "whether the trooper could not do his service in the infantry?" "i would not have him," replied the infantry doctor. "but supposing we sent him into the transport service," again suggested captain hermann. "no, sir," replied surgeon-major lesage; "you are wasting your time and mine. invalid him, or don't invalid him--that's for you to decide; but i warn you that if you don't invalid him i shall make him finish his term in hospital." "come on, hermann," said the major, half asleep, "we have a lot of others to see; let us vote--i want my lunch." "what do you say?" asked surgeon-major lesage from the youngest lieutenant. "oh, invalid him," he quickly replied. "yes," said the next lieutenant. "yes," said his neighbour. "no," replied the fourth lieutenant, who sat near captain hermann. "decidedly not," said my captain. this looked bad; two nays to three ayes. "better invalid him," said the second captain. "by all means," murmured the major with his eyes shut. i was no longer a trooper! i thought i was going to faint. "invalidation no. ?" queried the doctor. "yes, yes," the major cried, striking his chair with his fist; "but d---- it, let us go on. i want my lunch, and i am off if you don't hurry up." a form was filled in by the dispensary corporal acting as clerk: this was signed, and the doctor told me that my papers would be handed over to me in the evening. when i came out there was no need to ask me what the result was: it was written on my face. "must i congratulate you?" asked the sergeant. "yes," i said, shaking him by the hand; "but tell me," i added, "what does 'invalidation no. ' mean?" "you don't mean to say that they have granted you that! why, man alive! it means a pension of £ a year for life!" i was astounded. half an hour later the commission had retired, and i suggested stopping at a café on our way back to barracks. the sergeant assented, and i offered him and my comrades a bottle of champagne to celebrate this glorious day--the happiest day in my existence, i believe. when i returned to the barracks i met sergeant de cormet in the yard. "where are you coming from?" he cried: "i thought that you were at the infirmary." "yes, sergeant, but i have just come from a turn in the town." "we shall see about that," he answered. "i went out on duty, sergeant." "i'll make sure of that; but in any case," he sneered, "you won't be always at the infirmary, and when you come out you will soon find yourself in the wrong box." "i don't think so, sergeant," i said, laughing; "in fact, i am going to paris to-night." "with whose leave, please?" "superior authorities," i said. "if you mean to laugh at me," he replied in angry tones, "i shall have you consigned to prison." "no, sergeant, no more _salle de police_, prison, or cells for me--in fact, in case i do not see you again, i shall wish you good-bye now, or rather _au revoir_, as i hope i may meet you soon. you see i am no longer a dragoon: i have just been invalided." "it can't be," he said, astounded. "_i_ should have heard of your being proposed for _invalidation_." "you don't hear everything," i replied; "but if you don't believe me, here comes the dispensary corporal, and he has my papers." he did not add a word, and went off shrugging his shoulders eloquently. the news soon spread through the barracks, and many were the congratulations i received. in the afternoon the surgeon-major came to the infirmary, where i expressed my deep thanks to him. he told me that i should have to sleep in the barracks again that night, as an error had been made in drawing up my papers, a pension having been granted to me by mistake. as to this i was quite indifferent, for i would willingly have given more than £ to have secured my release. the surgeon-major also advised me to be very careful until i had received my papers, and changed my uniform for civilian clothes, for until this was done i was still under military law. the following morning my papers were handed over to me, and i returned all my outfit to the regimental stores, making a present to titi and piatte of all such uniforms and kits as were my personal property. i gave twenty francs to the troopers of my _peloton_ to drink my health, and i did not forget my friends titi and piatte. i then took leave of my sergeants, gave a parting kiss to my charger, and stepped into the street, a free man at last! half an hour later i had discarded my uniform for ever. not only had i ceased to be a dragoon, but i had also altogether ceased to belong to the french army. a fortnight later i arrived in england, a country i already loved, and ever since my life has been spent in travelling through the vast domains of the british empire; and i feel proud to think that it has fallen to my lot to be numbered among those who have helped to enlighten englishmen on the glorious work of those great men who have laid the foundation of a gigantic african empire. conclusion it will probably be believed by many readers that in describing my life as a soldier i have at times given the reins to my imagination; but i can only assure them that this is not the case. i have, fortunately or unfortunately, an excellent memory, and the scenes and conversations i have described are ineffaceably engraved on my mind. that much of my narrative is occupied with the constantly recurring punishments that befell me, is not my fault--to have slurred over those punishments would have been to paint a misleading picture of my military career, its most salient feature being omitted. it cannot, at all events, be said with any plausibility that my lot must unfortunately have been cast amongst the scum of the french army. the scum, if any exist, is not to be sought in a cavalry regiment. let me, with reference to this point, briefly indicate the relative _status_ of the three great branches of the service from an educational point of view. although it is now possible to secure a commission through the ranks almost as quickly as through the military schools, a preliminary liberal education is absolutely necessary, especially in the cavalry and artillery, as most difficult examinations have to be passed, and the successful candidates must then spend one year in a special military school, as st. maixant for the infantry, and saumur for the cavalry. before leaving the school a final examination has also to be passed in order to obtain a commission. in case of failure in this, candidates are allowed to remain for another year in the school, but if they are unable to pass at the end of that time, they are sent back to their regiment. to become an officer without passing through the ranks it is necessary to be admitted to the st. cyr military school for the infantry and cavalry, and to the _École polytechnique_ for the artillery. at the end of the second year at st. cyr a competitive examination is undergone, and only those who are at the head of the list have the choice between cavalry and infantry. those who are thus admitted to serve in the cavalry spend their third year in a class apart from the cadets who are to become officers in the line. at the end of the third year the cadets pass a final examination, after which they receive their commission. those who are drafted into the line at once join a regiment, while those who serve in the cavalry have to spend another year in the cavalry school of saumur before joining. it will therefore be seen that cavalry officers are, educationally, picked men. this applies still more strikingly to artillery officers, for these have all passed through the polytechnic school, the highest engineering school in france. after leaving the polytechnic they spend a year at the artillery school of fontainebleau, whence they are drafted into a regiment as full lieutenants. there are cases of artillery officers having worked their way to a commission through the ranks, but these instances are quite exceptional, and it is very seldom that such officers reach a higher rank than that of captain. on the contrary, a large percentage of the infantry officers get their commissions through the ranks. that improvements have been effected since my time i gladly admit. the reforms instituted by the much-abused general boulanger have been already touched upon, and their value must not be under-estimated. to quote but a few of them--he abolished the _salle de police_ for non-commissioned officers, replacing it by confinement to the room. he extended from p.m. to p.m. the time at which non-commissioned officers had to be back in barracks, this time being extended to midnight in the case of re-enlisted n.c.o.s. he allowed the latter a higher pay, a separate room, and the right of wearing clothes made of fine cloth of the same quality as that worn by the officers, and gave non-commissioned officers the right to live outside the barracks. he then withdrew from corporals, sergeants, and other non-commissioned officers the right of punishing privates with _salle de police_, the only punishment they can now inflict being confinement to barracks. unfortunately, however, these regulations can be easily evaded, for when a corporal or a sergeant wants to send a man to the _salle de police_ he has only to report him to the lieutenant of the week, who hardly ever fails to put down whatever punishment the corporal or non-commissioned officer asks him to inflict; or, again, if a corporal or non-commissioned officer wants to have a man punished with _salle de police_ he has only to give the fellow the maximum number of days of "c.b." (confinement to barracks) he is allowed to give, and justify the punishment by a strong motive, and in that case the captain will never fail to transform the punishment into lock-up. general boulanger also added much to the comfort of privates and corporals, by ordering that they should have their meals served at table and presided over by a corporal. the food of the ten to twelve men sitting at each table was to be served in a dish, portions being distributed to each man on an enamelled plate by the corporal or table president. this regulation, which has remained in force ever since, introduces a great improvement on the way we were fed in my time--as will be obvious from my previous description. last, but not least, general boulanger fixed at p.m. instead of p.m., the time at which privates had to return to barracks in the evening. the general's extraordinary popularity is therefore hardly to be wondered at if one remembers that every frenchman has to be a soldier. it is, of course, quite clear that one of the greatest blots in the system i have described--that is to say, the system actually adopted, and not the ideal one depicted in the regulations--is that the cavalry officers trust almost entirely to the sergeants to look after the drill, discipline, and comfort of their men. during my twenty months' service the colonel did not come fifty times to the barracks, and then rarely stayed there for an hour at a time. except during the general yearly inspection, the lieutenant-colonel or majors did not pass once a month through our rooms, and then merely marched through them in a perfunctory manner. the captain in command of my squadron sometimes, it it is true, came to our room, usually on the weekly inspection day, but a fortnight or three weeks often elapsed between his visits. my lieutenant came to our room on the weekly inspection day, but rarely at other times. none of our officers ever came to look at our food. as to the drill, until the squadron drilled together the officers hardly ever troubled themselves about it. during the first five months' preliminary training, troopers were left entirely to the care of the sergeants and corporals, the lieutenants looking on for perhaps a few minutes at a time. when, in april, the troopers began to be drilled in squares marked out on the manoeuvring ground, the officers used to ride over there, and every quarter of an hour or so glanced at the square where their men were riding under the command of a sergeant. "stables" were superintended by the officer of the week, but as in the st and nd squadrons (as well as in the th and th) one officer took the week in turn for the two combined squadrons, he could not be expected to see much of what was going on, among the horses or thereabouts he had to superintend. lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, except when they were on "week" duty, never came to the stables, so that really everything devolved on the sergeants, whose power and responsibility were consequently enormous. another consequence of the french military system is that officers and rank and file alike are absolutely wanting in that _esprit de corps_ which is so remarkable in british regiments. that privates should feel no particular pride in the body to which they are temporarily, and for the most part unwillingly, attached, is not to be wondered at, but in the case of officers a different explanation is forthcoming. strange to say, it is a general rule in the french army that officers, on their promotion to a superior rank, are always sent into another regiment (the only exception occurring in the case of sub-lieutenants, who sometimes--but rarely--remain in the same regiment upon their promotion to the rank of lieutenant). the consequence of this rule is that an officer who reaches the rank of colonel has often served in six different regiments. it even often happens, for instance, that a lieutenant of dragoons is drafted into the hussars on his promotion as a captain, and then passes into the cuirassiers when he becomes a major, being transferred to the chasseurs as lieutenant-colonel, and then being put in command of a regiment of dragoons as colonel. the hard-and-fast lines of social distinction which are drawn between officers of different ranks are also fatal obstacles to the corporate well-being of the regiment. the idea, for instance, that captains would demean themselves if they sat at the same table with lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, and that majors must also form a separate mess, hinders social intercourse between officers of the different ranks, and seems almost to indicate the possibility of subalterns forgetting themselves in the presence of their superior officers. how different the english system, where all officers mess together, meeting in the simple equality of gentlemen! there is a general idea in france that german soldiers are subjected to a much stricter discipline than french soldiers, and that german officers may strike their men and treat them like slaves. i believe this was so at the time of the franco-prussian war, for i then saw such acts of barbarity committed by officers; but the present system is very different. to begin with, no punishment can be inflicted by a non-commissioned officer or even by a lieutenant, captains alone having the right to punish; and i even saw a case, during one of my numerous visits to germany, when the captain commanding a company was severely reprimanded by his colonel, who withdrew from him the right of punishment altogether, because there were too many men punished under his command; the colonel arguing, with much force, that if an officer could not maintain discipline without constantly punishing his men it proved that he did not know how to deal with soldiers, and that therefore he was unfit to decide whether a man ought to be punished or not. so far as my punishments are concerned i have no wish to pose as a martyr, and i acknowledge that some of them were deserved; but if i had been treated like a free human being, and not like a convict--if i had not been bullied, as well as unjustly and unduly punished i should not have become--as i did--desperate, caring little whether i was punished or not. i fully understand and excuse the motives which prompt so many men to desert--men who have neither position nor reputation to maintain--and i frankly declare that, rather than have served another year, i would have become a deserter myself. had war broken out when i was a trooper, i am quite sure that the first battle would have resulted in the death of at least three of our officers and four of our sergeants, and that they would not have fallen under the enemy's bullets. this may be a terrible thing to say, but i knew two troopers who were determined to do the deed. it was not mere brag, for it was by accident that i heard them more than once discussing the matter. in my own case i am persuaded that my captain and my colonel, relying blindly on the n.c.o.s, were honestly convinced that i was a bad character. five years after i left the regiment i met one of my former officers, who was then military attaché to one of the embassies. he did not recognise me, and did not catch my name. in the course of conversation i inquired whether he had known a man named decle, who had served in his regiment. "don't i remember him!" he said. "he was a most incorrigible rogue! my friend captain hermann often spoke to me about him: he was a fellow who would never do any work, and who was most ungrateful. although fairly intelligent, he worked so little that he was classed last at the final examination, and they had to keep him a second year. i remember that there was some talk of sending him before a court-martial, as he once made serious false allegations against his sergeant-major. altogether he was a bad lot. do you know what has become of him?" i replied in the affirmative, and the military attaché asked me somewhat anxiously if i knew him well. "he is my best friend," i replied, "and you are now talking to him." the attaché looked much embarrassed, but i soon put him at his ease, and assured him that i was in no way offended. i told him exactly what had happened, and he acknowledged that it was too true that, in many cases, officers formed their opinion entirely from sergeants' reports, "but," he added helplessly, "what else can we do?" and he really seemed to think the question unanswerable. i had a good opportunity of personally observing the practical working of french military organisation at the time of the madagascar war. everything was at sixes and sevens. plans were made one day and altered the next; the minister of war wanted one thing, the commander-in-chief wanted another; and if these two high authorities had not been seconded by two of the most admirable and practical officers in the french service (general de torcy, and major, now general, bailloud), things would have gone even worse than they did. the intelligence department, too, was conspicuous by its lack of information. the french military authorities did me the honour to consult me on many points, but unfortunately, as it turned out, the advice i gave was rejected by general mercier, then minister of war. i was asked to give my opinion about transport in general, and i first asked how many white men would take part in the expedition, and inquired how the transport of supplies would be organised. the answer was that iron carts, drawn by mules, would be used for the service. i pointed out that the use of such carts would be absolute madness, as i knew by my own experience how easily iron carts are broken, and how impossible it is to repair them, and i added that under the circumstances the army would never be able to go forward unless a road was made. i then inquired how the soldiers' knapsacks would be carried, and general duchesne, the commander-in-chief of the expedition, to whom i put this question, replied that "of course the men would carry them themselves." "in that case," i said, "you may reckon that one half of your force will have died within six months of their landing in madagascar." the general said that it was all nonsense--that the men had carried their knapsacks in the tonkin war, and could do so quite well in madagascar. my prediction unfortunately turned out perfectly correct, and nearly six thousand men died within six months of the beginning of the operations. a road had to be made for the iron carts, and if the natives had not proved arrant cowards, the war would have ended in frightful disaster. it was only due to the untiring energy of colonel bailloud, who was in charge of the transport, that the troops were enabled to receive any supplies. what struck me most, however, in that expedition was the jealousy between the army and the navy. during the tonkin war, the supreme command of the naval and military forces had been vested in admiral corbet, and the military officers strongly objected to being commanded by a sailor. in order, therefore, to avoid a repetition of what had then taken place, the whole of the flotilla which was sent to madagascar was placed under the command of a mere captain, who had to take orders from the general commanding the troops. the navy, of course, resented what they considered a slight, and carefully avoided helping the army in any way. of course they did not openly display their rivalry, but they took good care to give no help whatever to the military chiefs, allowing them to commit the greatest blunders without warning them beforehand. for instance, the war office having decided to use the river betsiboka as far as it was navigable, a large number of steel barges were sent over to menjunka, which was supposed to be at the mouth of the river. unfortunately, the real mouth of the river stood nearly thirty miles farther inland, so that, unless the weather was perfectly calm, the barges were swamped before they had reached the river itself; the water on the other hand being too shallow to enable steamers, except those of the smallest draft, to reach the mouth. when i arrived in madagascar, in a small -ton steamer i had chartered in zanzibar, i was ordered to follow the course of the river as far as i could go, and to make a survey on my way, as none existed. after considerable trouble i managed to get about seventy miles inland, and on my return to menjunka, as i was making my report to the general, the naval officer in command walked into the room just as i was asking the general whether he could allow me twenty-four hours to put my survey on paper. the naval officer inquired what survey i was speaking of, and on being told that it was a survey of the river, he replied that i had been wasting my time, as his officers "had surveyed it long ago, long ago"; and he added that he would send it to the general when he returned to his ship. he knew perfectly well, before i left, that i had been instructed to make a survey, but he had never offered to hand over to the general the map he had in his possession. again, the naval commander was fully aware that a large number of transports were coming, but he carefully abstained from advising the war office that there was only one steam launch at menjunka to land the cargo, and the consequence was that at one time there lay as many as twenty-four steamers in the harbour, with no means of unloading them; an average of £ per day having to be paid for demurrage on each. i could quote scores of similar instances, but it is not my object to write the history of the madagascar campaign. in conclusion, englishmen regard their own "little army" with a just pride, tempered by a consciousness of its more or less obvious defects; but when any comparison is suggested between the british forces and the "bloated armaments" of the continent, the pride is apt to become humility, and deprecatory remarks are made to the effect that we do not, of course, profess to be a great military power. yet how does the case really stand? are these armed multitudes as formidable as mere arithmetic would have us think? france, for instance, prides herself upon being able to put in the field millions of trained men. what does this boast amount to? upon the outbreak of war, in these days of rapid mobilisation, much--perhaps all--would depend upon the troops first in the field. and these troops, upon whose behaviour in the brunt of sudden battle the salvation of their country might depend, would be--not a body of well-trained fighting-men, leavened with veterans, and relying on their leaders with glad confidence--but a crowd of half-taught lads, lacking in thews as well as training, and led--or driven--to battle by officers whom either they have never seen until the day of conflict, or whom they know--and hate. as for the reserves, suffice it to say that officers of the active army refuse to regard them seriously, and consider them merely in the light of civilians playing at soldiering. the officers of the reserve (for the most part promoted privates) have received no military education worthy of the name. the non-commissioned officers and men consider the month they have to serve every other year a hateful episode. awkward in their unaccustomed uniforms, they do not even look like soldiers, and it would take months of training to convert them into such once more. in point of efficiency they are, of course, far inferior to our volunteers. but behind these stands yet another "line of defence"--the territorial army and its reserve--an army composed of men who have a faint recollection that they once were drilled. there is something pathetic, as well as absurd, in picturing these middle-aged citizens in time of war, clad in antiquated uniforms, handling unaccustomed weapons, and painfully, if conscientiously, struggling to acquire a knowledge of new regulations and modern drill. to sum all up, it may be true that providence is still on the side of the big battalions, but chiefly, we think, when those battalions are well officered, well trained, and animated with all the virtues of the soldier. [illustration] appendix a no allusion has been made in the introduction to the pay of officers, nor to the actual cost of the keep of troopers. being unable to find any documents on which to base my calculations, i appealed to m. urbain gohier, the french writer whose authority on this subject is the greatest, and i append the reply which he very kindly sent me: [_translation._] paris, _april , _. dear sir, subjoined are the chief items of the budget for _pay_--which is the same in all branches of the service so far as officers are concerned. as to the average cost of the soldier for maintenance, food, &c., it is impossible to arrive at it. figures have been given from time to time, but they are purely imaginary. expenses of all kinds are scattered under twenty different headings in our budget, and the reporter-general for that of has announced that nobody, either at the war office or in parliament, can accurately dissect the expenditure. the actual pay--of which i give you the amounts--is in practice augmented by a mass of "indemnities," so-called, for residence, travelling, mustering, lodging, high price of food, office expenses, maintenance of dignity, first equipment, &c., varying with the nature of the employment, and the individuals employed. some officers draw their bare pay, whilst others make a large income, of which no official trace can anywhere be found. similarly, in the case of the men: the cost of provisions, firing, lighting, sleeping accommodation, medical treatment in or out of hospital, is reckoned in a lump sum, without distinction between different branches of the service. this extraordinary confusion is cunningly contrived to prevent any control. these are the items of pay: francs. colonel . lieutenant-colonel . major and chef d'escadron . captain . first-lieutenant . second-lieutenant . sub-lieutenant . adjutant . sergeant-major . sergeant . farrier . corporal . trumpeter . trooper . (the n.c.o.s have . francs extra in the field.) note the exactitude of the above figures to a single centime, and yet there may be in addition hundreds or even thousands of francs handled in reality, either in money or in kind. always, &c., (_signed_) urbain gohier. i leave to m. gohier the whole responsibility for these statements, as i am not in a position to test their correctness. i may add, however, that french officers, whatever their faults, have always seemed to me remarkably straightforward in money matters, and even m. gohier--whom i cannot follow in his virulent attacks upon all officers indiscriminately--has never even hinted that any of them enrich themselves by dishonourable means. appendix b accused persons are examined by a _juge d'instruction_ (examining magistrate) _in camera_. prisoners are considered guilty until they can prove their innocence. the examining magistrate can use any means he likes to obtain a confession; he can send a prisoner to solitary confinement (_au secret_) for weeks, if he chooses. he collects all information respecting the prisoner, bewilders him, lies to him if he thinks fit, and can keep him for months in confinement, before committing him for trial or releasing him. in most of the cases which would be disposed of in england by a police magistrate, within twenty-four hours of arrest, the accused is kept, in france, for a period of from one to three months under lock and key, before being tried by the _police correctionnelle_ (police court), and in case of crimes which have to be tried by a jury the preliminary inquiry or _instruction_ lasts from three to _eighteen_ months. three or four years ago in one of the celebrated cases which ended in an acquittal, the _instruction_ of the case lasted eighteen months, during the whole of which time the accused was kept in prison, being for a considerable period in the strictest solitary confinement. it is only during the last two years that a new law has been passed, enabling accused persons to be assisted by counsel during the _instruction_--counsel being present during the examination of the accused. formerly the accused was not allowed to be assisted by counsel until the examination was closed. as i said before, bail does not exist in france, except in rare instances with the approval of the minister for justice. in such cases bail takes the form of a deposit in cash, usually amounting to many hundreds or even thousands of pounds. the _juge d'instruction_ can, however, release a prisoner off hand, or grant him provisional liberty, but this is also very rarely done. limitation in the case of criminal offences, however, exists in france. for offences which entail a maximum punishment of five years' imprisonment, no prosecution can take place after a lapse of three years from the date of the commission of the crime. in the case of felonies (even in the case of murder), no prosecution can take place after thirty years have elapsed since the crime was committed. on the other hand, if a citizen is accused of any crime or felony, and he absconds, he can be tried and sentenced _par contumace_ in his absence. appendix c constitution of a squadron. _captain in command._ _second captain._ _ st peloton_ ( men) st lieutenant (in command) sergeant-major sergeants trumpeter _ nd peloton_ ( men) sub-lieutenant (in command) sergeant _caporal-fourrier_ trumpeter _ rd peloton_ ( men) sub-lieutenant (in command) sergeant trumpeter _ th peloton_ ( men) nd lieutenant (in command) _sergent-fourrier_ sergeants trumpeter each _peloton_ (company) consists of three _escouades_ (squads) of ten men, each under a corporal. _total._ captains. lieutenants. sub-lieutenants. sergeant-major. _sergent-fourrier_. _caporal-fourrier_. sergeants. corporals. trumpeters. troopers. printed by _ballantyne, hanson & co._ london & edinburgh the queen's service being the experiences of a private soldier in the british infantry at home and abroad by horace wyndham late of the --th regt. crown vo, cloth. price s. d. _the academy._--"a really excellent budget of information about army life in all its aspects. we can cordially recommend it to all who take a personal or patriotic interest in the army." _the daily mail._--"a particularly interesting and instructive book about army life in its varied aspects. even mr. kipling may learn a great deal from these enlightening pages." _the daily telegraph._--"the book is full of excellent suggestions on matters both great and small, and should prove of much interest to the general public. mr. wyndham gives a bright and amusing as well as a faithful record, and he renders a real service in bringing home to us the daily life of the men in the queen's service." _the spectator._--"as a description of a phase of existence very little known outside the army itself, and in its inner details only vaguely surmised even by the most careful officers, we think it ought to be very interesting to many readers both inside and outside the army. in all his views the author is wholesome, sane, and intelligent. his discussion of the position of gentlemen in the ranks, and scornful repudiation of the idea of a 'regiment of gentlemen,' are both interesting." _the speaker._--"mr. wyndham's book has, in a high degree, the qualities of truthfulness and modesty; the author makes it his business to tell an unvarnished tale, to put life itself upon the page; and we may safely say that the result of his endeavour is a narrative which can be neglected by no judicious writer upon the subject of life in the british army during recent years." _the pall mall gazette._--"life as a soldier has been described several times before, but never with such effect as in this handy and interesting volume. the interesting matter and common sense contained therein thoroughly recommend it to all interested in the welfare of the army." _literature._--"it is to mr. wyndham's advantage that he is throughout in perfect touch with his subject, instead of treating it from the _olim meminisse_ standpoint, which is generally misleading and sometimes insincere. another point in his favour is that he is up-to-date. his work, as a whole, will probably hold good for some years to come, as not only a readable narrative but also a substantially accurate work of reference." _the outlook._--"no one interested in the contemporary condition or in the future amelioration of the british army can neglect such a book as this, for it affords a remarkable glimpse of military life at the very bottom of the ladder. it is, moreover, both lucid and temperate." _the world._--"gives one a very good notion of the soldier's life at aldershot, the curragh, or gib.--cleaning, drilling, feeding, mounting guard--a life which is so like that of the ordinary housemaid, until the guns begin to shoot. the private's grievances are set forth moderately and convincingly. mr. wyndham's book, giving the soldier's view, should point the way to those whose pressing duty it is to make military service more popular." _the nottingham guardian._--"mr. wyndham is gifted with no inconsiderable power of observation, and writes in a style at once forcible and agreeable. he gives remarkably graphic pictures of life in barracks and in camp, and criticises with the freedom of one who has made the subject a speciality." london: wm. heinemann, bedford st., w.c. memoirs of sergeant bourgogne ( - ) authorised translation, from the french original edited by paul cottin and maurice hÉnault with a frontispiece. vo, cloth. price s. _the review of reviews._--"all imaginative pictures drawn by authors in an attempt to depict war as it really is sink into insignificance beside this actual record of a soldier's daily experience in the rearguard of the army of moscow. the peace societies could desire no more effective literature, and, if they are wise, will do all they can to promote the sale of this book." _the times._--"a vivid narrative of napoleon's ill-starred russian campaign as viewed from the ranks. bourgogne was a shrewd soldier, imbued with the national worship of napoleon, experienced in the wars of the empire, and endowed with a rare narrative power. the dramatic and tragic incidents with which his pages abound are full of attraction." _the pall mall gazette._--"bourgogne is, so to speak, the small-change for de ségur--the vernacular of that classic. the brigadier-general on the staff tells you what the retreat from moscow looked like. the sergeant of the guard was in a position to tell you what it felt like. moreover, the sergeant happens to be an impressionist of the convincing sort. he not only makes you see what he saw, but he perfectly persuades you that he saw it. so it is that the true inwardness of the ghastly _débacle_ is shown up to you with a new vividness by the ingenuous sidelights this literary non-com. has cast upon it." _the morning post._--"these memoirs are well written, full of interest, and abound in dramatic situations. they have, moreover, the recommendation of being admirably rendered into english, and read almost like an english work." _literature._--"ségur tells the story of the disastrous retreat from the officer's point of view. now we have the narrative of the soldier in the ranks. ségur was a man of culture. bourgogne was not always sure of his spelling. yet the sergeant's story is the more vivid of the two. he was no _littérateur_, yet his book, for intensity of feeling, minuteness of description, even lucidity of style, will vie with any romance of war." _the illustrated london news._--"no adventure-story ever written approaches in interest the appalling account of the retreat from moscow given by sergeant bourgogne in his memoirs. poe himself could not invent horrors more ghastly, nor describe them more graphically." _the daily chronicle._--"verily this is a human document of the most terrible and engrossing kind we ever remember to have come across. the annals of war are rich in tales of disaster and suffering, but in none so dreadful as this story of the retreat of napoleon's grand army from moscow. sergeant bourgogne has left us a record, of the campaign from the point of view of the common soldier which must rank as an unconscious masterpiece of naïve and touching war-chronicling and characterisation. his narrative bears the hall-mark of veracity and vivid realism. no romancer could possibly have served up such a gruesome dish of military horrors as has now been placed before us by sergeant bourgogne. even nansen in his 'farthest north' pales in interest before the frosts, the snows, and the cruel winds of this non-commissioned xenophon of the imperial guard. we can heartily recommend this book as one of the most appalling, and at times pathetic, pictures of the horrors of war that was ever penned." london: wm. heinemann, bedford st., w.c. transcriber's notes obvious errors of punctuation and diacritics repaired. hyphen added: head-gear (p. ). hyphen removed: headquarters (p. ). p. : "de" changed to "des" (maréchal des logis chef). p. : "to" added (told us to go to the paymaster's). p. : "arn't" changed to "aren't" (socks aren't regulation). p. : "be" changed to "he" ("now look here, old man," said he). p. : "talking" changed to "taking" (taking off his hat). p. - : duplicate syllable at page boundary removed (hollering). p. : "your're" changed to "you're" (you're holding there). p. : duplicate "that" deleted (tell me that you have come here). ad for "the queen's service": "olium meminisse" changed to "olim meminisse". the reality of war the reality of war a companion to clausewitz by major stewart l. murray late gordon highlanders popular edition edited by a. hilliard atteridge london hodder and stoughton warwick square, e.c. hugh rees, ltd. regent street, s.w. _reprinted in _ editor's preface great books, the masterpieces of the special branch of knowledge with which they deal, are often very big books; and busy men, who have not unlimited time for reading, find it helpful to have some one who will give them a general summary of a famous writer's teaching, and point out the most important passages in which the author himself embodies the very essence of his argument. this is what major murray has done for the most important work on war that was ever written. he does not give a mere dry summary of its contents. he sets forth, in language so plain that even the civilian reader or the youngest soldier can read it with interest, the essence of the teaching of clausewitz, and he embodies in his book the most striking passages of the original work. he adds to each section of his subject some useful criticisms, and at the end of the book he sums up the effect of recent changes on the practice of war. the book is a popular manual of the realities of war, which should be read not only by soldiers, but by every one who takes an intelligent interest in the great events of our time. as to the practical value of the writings of clausewitz, it may be well to quote here the words of mr. spenser wilkinson, the professor of military history at oxford, from his introduction to the original edition of major murray's work: "clausewitz was a prussian officer who first saw fighting as a boy in , and whose experience of war lasted until , when the great war ended. he was then thirty-five and spent the next fifteen years in trying to clear his mind on the subject of war, which he did by writing a number of military histories and a systematic treatise 'on war.' at the age of fifty he tied his manuscripts into a parcel, hoping to work at them again on the conclusion of the duties for which he was ordered from home. a little more than a year later he died at breslau of cholera, and the papers, to which he had never put the finishing touch, were afterwards published by his widow. "part of the value of his work is due to the exceptional opportunities which he enjoyed. when the war of began he had long been the personal adjutant of one of the prussian princes, and an intimate friend of scharnhorst, who was probably the greatest of napoleon's contemporaries. in the period of reorganization which followed the peace of tilsit he made the acquaintance of gneisenau, and of almost all the officers who made their mark in the subsequent wars of liberation. during the years of preparation he was scharnhorst's assistant, first in the ministry of war and then on the general staff. during the campaign of he served with the russian army as a staff officer. thus his experience during the four years of the wars of liberation was that of one who was continually behind the scenes, always in touch with the governments and generals, and therefore better able than any one not so favourably placed to see everything in its proper perspective, and to follow and appreciate the considerations which directed the decisions both of statesmen and of the commanders of armies. his personal character was of the finest mould, and his writings have the sincerity, the absence of which makes it so difficult to rely upon those of napoleon. "the ultimate test of the value of books is time. when clausewitz died, the two books on war which were thought the best were those of the archduke charles of austria and general jomini. to-day the book of clausewitz, 'on war,' easily holds the first place. it is the least technical of all the great books on war; from beginning to end it is nothing but common sense applied to the subject, but for that reason it is the hardest to digest, because common sense or a man's natural instinctive judgment on any subject is exceedingly hard to analyse and put into words. an exceptionally gifted man can go through this process, but few can follow it for any length of time without a distinct effort. "almost every good institution has arisen out of the effort to provide a remedy for some evil, but in the imperfection of human nature nearly every institution brings with it fresh evils, which in their turn have to be counteracted. the modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism and its belief in knowledge, has grafted the examination system upon every form of education from the lowest to the highest. the british army shares in the benefits and in the disadvantages of the system, of which, in the case of an officer, the danger to be guarded against is that it tends to accustom a man to rely rather on his memory than his intelligence, and to lean more on other people's thinking than on his own. clausewitz aimed at producing the very opposite result. he does not offer specific solutions of the various problems of war lest officers, in moments when their business is to decide and to act, should be trying to recall his precepts instead of using their eyes and their wits. his purpose rather is to enable them to understand what war is. he believed that if a man had accustomed himself to think of war as it really is, had got to know the different elements which go to make it up, and to distinguish those that are important from those that are comparative trifles, he would be more likely to know of himself what to do in a given situation, and would be much less likely to confuse himself by trying to remember what some general, long since dead, did on some occasion in which after all the position was by no means the same as that in which he finds himself." what is said here of the soldier actually engaged in war, is true also even of the onlooker who takes a patriotic interest in the progress of a war in which his country is involved. unless he has a clear idea of the real character of modern war, and the principles on which success or failure depend, he will be utterly unable to grasp the significance of the events of which he reads each day. and it is of real importance that in time of war every citizen should judge soundly the course of events, for opinion influences action, and public opinion is made up of the ideas of the units who compose the public. in this connection it is well to bear in mind a point that is often overlooked, a point on which clausewitz insists in a singularly convincing passage--namely, the fact that one of the main objects of a nation waging war is to force the enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission. this fact is sufficient proof of the importance of public opinion being well informed not only as to the course of events, but also as to the principles that give to these events their real significance. contents chapter i page the life of clausewitz chapter ii the influence of clausewitz on modern policy and war chapter iii the writings of clausewitz chapter iv the theory and the practice of war chapter v the magnitude of the effort required in a modern national war chapter vi public opinion in war chapter vii the nature of war chapter viii war as policy chapter ix strategy chapter x the execution of strategy chapter xi tactics chapter xii changes since the days of clausewitz chapter i the life of clausewitz in an endeavour, such as the present, to interest the british public in even the greatest military writer, the first necessity is to show that he was not a mere theorist or bookworm. the wide and varied experience which the british officer gradually gains in so many different parts of the world shows up the weak points of most theories, and produces a certain distrust of them. also a distrust of theory is undoubtedly one of our national characteristics. hence, in order to appeal to the british officer or civilian, a writer must be a practical soldier. such was general clausewitz: a practical soldier of very great experience in the long series of wars to , and one present throughout that most awful of all campaigns, napoleon's russian campaign in . "general karl von clausewitz was born near magdeburg in , and entered the prussian army as fahnenjunker in . he served in the campaigns of - on the rhine. in he entered the military school at berlin as an officer, and remained there till . he here attracted the notice of scharnhorst. in the campaign of he served as aide-de-camp to prince augustus of prussia, was present at the battle of jena, and saw that awful retreat which ended a fortnight later in the surrender at prentzlau. being wounded and captured, he was sent into france as a prisoner till the end of the war." "on his return (in november, ) he was placed on general scharnhorst's staff, and employed on the work then going on for the reorganization of the prussian army. in clausewitz entered the russian service, was employed on the general staff, and was thus able to gain much experience in the most gigantic of all the struggles of his time." "in the spring campaign of (battles of lutzen, bautzen, etc.), he, as a russian officer, was attached to blucher's staff; during the winter campaign he found employment as chief-of-the-staff to count walmoden, who fought against davoust on the lower elbe, and the splendid action of the goerde was entirely the result of his able dispositions. in he again entered the prussian service, and was chief-of-the-staff to the iii. army corps (thielman), which at ligny formed the left of the line of battle, and at wavre covered the rear of blucher's army." "in addition to this, we may say, considerable practical training (note, enormous and varied indeed compared to any obtainable in the present day), he also possessed a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of military history, and also an uncommonly clear perception of general history" (von caemmerer). after the peace he was employed in a command on the rhine. in he became major-general, and was made director of the military school at berlin. here he remained for some years. this was the chief period of his writings. as general von caemmerer, in his "development of strategical science," puts it: "this practical and experienced, and at the same time highly cultured soldier, feels now, in peaceful repose, as he himself confesses, the urgent need to develop and systematize the whole world of thought which occupies him, yet also resolves to keep secret till his death the fruit of his researches, in order that his soul, which is thirsting for _truth_, may be safely and finally spared all temptations from subordinate considerations." in he was appointed director of artillery at breslau, and, having no more time for writing, sealed up and put away his papers, unfinished as they were. in the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff to field-marshal gneisenau's army. in the winter of that year war with france was considered imminent, and clausewitz had prospects of acting as chief of the general staff of the commander-in-chief gneisenau. he then drew up two plans for war with france, which bear the stamp of that practical knowledge of war and adaptation of means to ends which distinguish his writings. in the same year the war scare passed away, the army of gneisenau was disbanded, and clausewitz returned to breslau, where after a few days he was seized with cholera, and died in november, , aged only . his works were published after his death by his widow. chapter ii the influence of clausewitz on modern policy and war from the day of their publication until now the influence of the writings of clausewitz has been steadily growing, till to-day it is impossible to over-estimate the extent of that influence upon modern military and political thought, especially in germany. as general von caemmerer, in his "development of strategical science," says: "karl von clausewitz, the pupil and friend of scharnhorst and the confidant of gneisenau, is in germany generally recognized as the most prominent theorist on war, as the real philosopher on war, to whom our famous victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training." field-marshal moltke was "his most distinguished pupil," and adapted the teaching of clausewitz to the conditions of to-day. general von der goltz, in the introduction to his great work, "the nation in arms," thus describes the veneration which he inspires: "a military writer who, after clausewitz, writes upon the subject of war, runs the risk of being likened to a poet who, after goethe, attempts a _faust_, or, after shakespeare, a _hamlet_. everything important that can be told about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the works which that great military genius has left behind him. although clausewitz has himself described his book as being something as yet incomplete, this remark of his must be taken to mean that he, too, was subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits, and was forced to feel that all he attained lay far beneath his ideal. for us, who knew not what that ideal was, his labours are a complete work. i have, accordingly, not attempted to write anything new, or of universal applicability about the science of warfare, but have limited myself to turning my attention to the military operations of our own day." one can hardly imagine a stronger tribute of admiration. and, as moltke was clausewitz's most distinguished pupil, so also are all those trained in the school of moltke pupils of clausewitz, including the most eminent of modern german military writers, such as general von blume, in his "strategy"; von der goltz, in his "nation in arms" and "the conduct of war," who trained the turkish general staff for the campaign of against greece and the battle of pharsalia, etc.; general von boguslawski; general von verdy du vernois, the father of the study of applied tactics; general von schlichting, in his "tactical and strategical principles of the present"; general meckel, who trained the japanese staff, etc., etc. we all remember the telegram sent to general meckel by marshal oyama after the battle of liao-yang: "we hope you are proud of your pupils." some time ago, when asked to give a lecture at aldershot to the officers of the nd division on clausewitz, it struck me that it would be very interesting, anxious as we all were then to know the causes of the wonderful japanese efficiency and success, if i could obtain a pronouncement from general meckel how far he had been influenced in his teaching by clausewitz. my friend herr von donat did me the favour to write to general von caemmerer and ask him if he could procure me such a pronouncement which i might publish. general meckel, whose death both japan and germany have since had to mourn, most kindly consented, and i esteem it a great honour to be allowed to quote part of his letter. he said: "i, like every other german officer, have, consciously or unconsciously, instructed in the spirit of clausewitz. clausewitz is the _founder_ of that theory of war which resulted from the napoleonic. i maintain that _every one_ who nowadays either makes or teaches war in a modern sense, bases himself upon clausewitz, even if he is not conscious of it." this opinion of general meckel, to whose training of the japanese general staff the success of the japanese armies must be largely attributed, is most interesting. it is not possible to give a stronger or more up-to-date example of the magnitude of the influence of clausewitz. in this connection i should like to make a short quotation from "the war in the far east," by the _times_ military correspondent. in his short but suggestive chapter on "clausewitz in manchuria" he says: "but as all save one of the great battles in manchuria have been waged by the japanese in close accordance with the spirit and almost the letter of clausewitz's doctrine, and as the same battles have been fought by the russians in absolute disregard of them (though his works had been translated into russian by general dragomiroff long before the war), it is certainly worth showing how reading and reflection may profit one army, and how the neglect of this respectable practice may ruin another." "clausewitz in manchuria"! that brings us up to date. it is a far cry for his influence to have reached, and triumphed. reflections clausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers. we may be sure, therefore, that the influence of clausewitz on the continent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than the realm of war. from this thought arise many reflections. it will be sufficient here to suggest one. i would suggest that we should regard every foreign statesman, especially in germany, as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple of clausewitz. that is to say, we should regard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the most pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable part of policy. he will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as commercial struggles. he will consider war also as an instrument of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied accordingly. he will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches, but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his state. he will regard war as the means by which some day his nation shall impose its will upon another nation. he will be prepared to wait and wait, to make "every imaginable preparation," and finally to let loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a whole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and compel submission to its will by force. to talk to such a man of "the evils of war," or of "the burden of armaments"; or to propose to him "disarmament" or "reduction of armed forces," and so forth can only appear to him as the result of "imperfect knowledge." he will not say so, but he will think so, and act accordingly. to the partially instructed opponent of such a man one can only say, "let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall." chapter iii the writings of clausewitz the writings of clausewitz are contained in nine volumes, published after his death in , but his fame rests chiefly on his three volumes "on war," which have been translated by colonel j. j. graham (the last edition edited by colonel f. n. maude, and published by messrs. kegan paul, london). clausewitz calls them "a collection of materials," "a mass of conceptions not brought into form," and states that he intended to revise, and throw the whole into more complete shape. we must lament that he did not live to complete his revision. but, on the other hand, it is perhaps possible that this unfinished state is really an advantage, for it leaves us free to apply his great maxims and principles and mode of thought to the ever-varying conditions of the present and future, unhampered by too complete a crystallization of his ideas written before more modern conditions of railways, telegraphs, and rapid long-ranging arms of precision, etc., arose. it is perhaps this unfinished state which renders clausewitz so essentially in touch with, and a part of, the onward movement and evolution of military thought. for his great aim was "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," without preconception or favour, as far as he could go--essentially "a realist" of war--and what better aim can we set before ourselves? as sir arthur helps has so well put it in his "friends in council," every man needs a sort of central stem for his reading and culture. i wish here to say why i think that clausewitz is admirably adapted to form such a main stem in the military culture of british officers. in the first place there is a lofty sort of tone about his writings which one gradually realizes as one reads them, and which i will not attempt to describe further than by saying that they stamp themselves as the writings of a gentleman of fine character. in the second place it is a book which "any fellow" can read, for there is nothing to "put one off," nothing abstruse or mathematical or formal, no formulæ or lines and angles and technical terms, such as in other writers, jomini, hamley, etc. clausewitz is free from all such pedantries, which for my part, and i dare say for the part of many others, often "put one off" a book, and made one instinctively feel that there was something wrong, something unpractical about it, which rendered it hardly worth the sacrifice of time involved in its study. there is in clausewitz nothing of that kind at all. all those lines and angles and formulæ he dismisses in a few pages as of little practical importance. in the third place clausewitz only goes in for experience and the practical facts of war. as he somewhat poetically puts it, "the flowers of speculation require to be cut down low near the ground of experience, their proper soil."[ ] he is the great apostle of human nature and character as being everything in war. "all war supposes human weakness, and against that it is directed."[ ] i believe that the british officer will find himself in sympathy with the great thinker on war, who asserts that "_of_ _all military virtues energy in the conduct of operations has always conduced most to glory and success of arms_."[ ] in the fourth place, to the practical mind will appeal his denunciation of all elaborate plans, because _time_ is required for all elaborate combinations, and time is just the one thing that an active enemy will not give us,--and his consequent deduction that all plans must be of the simplest possible form. his famous sentence, "_in war all things are simple, but the simple are difficult_,"[ ] gives the key to his writings, for to _overcome those simple yet great difficulties he regards as the art of war_, which can only be done by the military virtues of perseverance, energy, and boldness. in the fifth place he does not want men to be bookworms, for he says: "_theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations in which we can be placed in war_."[ ] and we can all reflect, without reading too many books. also he says: "much reading of history is not required for the above object. the knowledge of a few separate battles, _in their details_, is more useful than a general knowledge of several campaigns. on this account it is more useful to read detailed narratives and journals than regular works of history."[ ] he wants history in detail, not a general smattering and a loose application thereof, which fault he strongly denounces. and he expressly states that the history of the very latest war is the most useful. all of which is very practical, and in accord with what we feel to be true. as he pictures war, "_the struggle between the spiritual and moral forces_ on _both_ sides is the centre of all,"[ ] and to this aspect of the subject he gives much more attention than jomini and most of jomini's disciples. he has freed us once for all from all formalism. the formation of character, careful, practical, detailed study, and thorough preparation in peace, the simplest plans carried out with the utmost perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness in war--these are the practical fruits of his teaching. therefore, i say again, that i do not think that the british officer could possibly find a more interesting or a better guide for the main stem of his reading than clausewitz, nor any one that will appeal to his practical instincts of what is _true_ half so well. i do not believe that he could possibly do better than with clausewitz as main stem, and a detailed study of the latest campaigns and modern technicalities as the up-to-date addition required to transform knowledge into action. i trust that every reader of clausewitz will agree with me in this. chapter iv the theory and the practice of war "moltke, the most gifted pupil of clausewitz," "moltke, who knew clausewitz's book well, and often liked to describe him as the theoretical instructor." as chaucer would say, "what needeth wordes more?" clausewitz has treated practically every chief branch of strategy and tactics (except, of course, the present-day developments of railways, telegraphs, quick-firing guns, smokeless powder, universal service armies, etc.). the whole of his bulky work "on war" is full of interesting and sometimes eloquent and almost poetical passages, of concentrated, pregnant, and far-reaching thoughts on every subject. through all these it is, of course, impossible to follow him in any introduction. one can really do no more than urge all to read clausewitz for themselves, to go to the fountain-head, to the master-work itself. in the short space to which i have restricted myself, i propose, therefore, to concentrate on a few of his leading ideas, reluctantly leaving out many others which are really almost just as good. theory and practice one of the things for which we are most deeply indebted to clausewitz is that he has shown us clearly the proper place of theory in relation to practice. "it should educate the mind of the future leader in war, or, rather, guide him in his _self-instruction_, but _not_ accompany him on to the battlefield; just as a sensible tutor forms and enlightens the opening mind of a youth without therefore keeping him in leading-strings all his life."[ ] again, "in real action most men are guided by the tact of judgment, which hits the object more or less accurately, according as they possess more or less genius. this is the way in which all great generals have acted, and therein partly lay their greatness and their genius, in that they always hit upon what was right by this tact. thus also it will always be in _action_, and so far this tact is amply sufficient. but when it is a question not of acting one's self, but of convincing others _in consultation_, then all depends upon clear conceptions and demonstrations and the inherent relations; and so little progress has been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle course really without any value. clear ideas on these matters are not, therefore, wholly useless."[ ] how true this is any one will admit who reflects for a moment upon the great diversity of opinions on almost every subject held in our army, just because of this want of a central theory common to all. in the domain of tactics it is evident that this holds good even as in strategy, for a common central theory of war will produce a more or less common way of looking at things, from which results more or less common action towards the attainment of the common object. rejection of set and geometrical theories "it should educate the mind of the future leader in war" is what clausewitz demands from a useful theory; but he most expressly and unreservedly rejects every attempt at a method "by which definite plans for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made as if from a machine."[ ] he mocks at bülow's including at first in the one term "base" all sorts of things, like the supply of the army, its reinforcements and equipments, the security of its communications with the home country, and lastly the security of its line of retreat, and then fixing the extent of the base, and finally fixing an angle for the extent of that base: "and all this was done merely to obtain a pure geometrical result utterly useless" (von caemmerer). for the same reason jomini's principle of the inner line does not satisfy him, owing to its mere geometrical nature, although he right willingly acknowledges "that it rests on a sound foundation, on the truth that the combat is the only effectual means in war" (von caemmerer). all such attempts at theory seem to him therefore perfectly useless, "because they strive to work with fixed quantities, while in war everything is _uncertain_, and all considerations must reckon with all kinds of variable quantities; because they only consider _material_ objects, while every action in war is saturated with _moral_ forces and effects; lastly, because they deal only with the action of _one_ party, while war is a constant reciprocal effect of _both_ parties" (von caemmerer). "pity the warrior," says clausewitz, "who is contented to crawl about in this beggardom of rules." "pity the theory which sets itself in opposition to the mind"[ ] (note, the moral forces). a theory to be practically useful clausewitz insists that a useful theory cannot be more than a thorough knowledge of military history and "reflection upon all the situations in which we can be placed in war." "what genius does must be just the best of all rules, and theory cannot do better than to show just how and why it is so." "it is an analytical investigation of the subject which leads to exact knowledge: and if brought to bear on the results of experience, which in our case would be military history, to a _thorough_ familiarity with it. if theory investigates the subjects which constitute war; if it separates more distinctly that which at first sight seems amalgamated; if it explains fully the properties of the means; if it shows their probable effects; if it makes evident the nature of objects; _if it brings to bear all over the field of war the light of essentially critical investigation_,--then it has fulfilled the chief duties of its province. it becomes then a guide to him who wishes to make himself acquainted with war from books; it lights up the whole road for him, facilitates his progress, educates his judgment, and shields him from error."[ ] knowledge must be thorough this clausewitz considers most important. he says that "knowledge of the conduct of war ... _must pass completely into the mind_, and almost cease to be something objective." for in war "the moral reaction, the ever-changing form of things makes it necessary for the chief actor to carry _in himself_ the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge, in order that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of giving the requisite decision _from himself_. knowledge must, by this complete assimilation with his own mind and life, be converted into real power." * * * * * so much for clausewitz, therefore, as the greatest yet the simplest and least theoretical of theorists on war. mark well his comforting dictum that "theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations in which we can be placed in war." that is a task which we have all more or less attempted. therefore we are all more or less theorists. the only question is that of comparative "thoroughness" in our reflections. and it is essentially this "thoroughness" in investigation and reflection towards which clausewitz helps us. like every other habit, the _habit_ of military reflection gradually grows with use; till, fortified and strengthened by detailed knowledge, it gradually becomes power. reflections the theory of war is simple, and there is no reason why any man who chooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or two of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a fair knowledge thereof. he may with reasonable trouble attain to such knowledge of the theory of war as will enable him to follow with intelligent appreciation the discussions of experienced soldier or soldiers. such knowledge as will prevent his misunderstanding the experienced soldier's argument from pure ignorance, and such knowledge as will enable him to understand the military reasons put forward and the military object proposed. to the opinion of such a man all respect will be due. thus, and thus only. it is indeed the plain duty of all who aspire to rule either thus to qualify themselves to understand, or else to abstain from interference with, the military interests of the state. chapter v the magnitude of the effort required in a modern national war this point is here illustrated with more detail from clausewitz than may seem necessary to some, because it is precisely the point regarding modern war which is least understood in this country. "the complete overthrow of the enemy is the natural end of the art of war." "as this idea must apply to both the belligerent parties, it must follow, that there can be no suspension in the military act, and peace cannot take place until one or other of the parties concerned is completely overthrown." this is what clausewitz means by absolute war, that is war carried to its absolute and logical conclusion with the utmost force, the utmost effort and the utmost energy. he then proceeds to show that war, owing "to all the natural inertia and friction of its parts, the whole of the inconsistency, the vagueness and hesitation (or timidity) of the human mind," usually takes a weaker or less absolute form according to circumstances. "all this, theory must admit, but it is its duty to give the foremost place to the absolute form of war, and to use that form as a general point of direction." he then proceeds to show that war finally took its absolute form under napoleon. to-day we may say that war takes its absolute form in the modern great national war, which is waged by each belligerent with the whole concentrated physical and mental power of the nation-in-arms. this requires to be gone into a little more in detail, for it is a most important point. clausewitz in book viii. approaches this part of his subject by an historical survey of war from the time of the roman empire to that of napoleon. he shows how as the feudal system gradually merged into the later monarchical states of europe, armies gradually became less and less national, more and more mercenary. omitting this, we arrive at the seventeenth century. he says: "the end of the seventeenth century, the time of louis xiv., is to be regarded as the point in history at which the standing military power, such as it existed in the eighteenth century, reached its zenith. that military force was based on enlistment and money. states had organized themselves into complete unities; and the governments, by commuting the personal services of their subjects into money payments, had concentrated their whole power in their treasuries. through the rapid strides in social improvements, and a more enlightened system of government, this power had become very great in comparison with what it had been. france appeared in the field with a standing army of a couple of hundred thousand men, and the other powers in proportion." armies were supported out of the treasury, which the sovereign regarded partly as his privy purse, at least as a resource belonging to the government, and not to the people. relations with other states, except with respect to a few commercial subjects, mostly concerned only the interests of the treasury or of the government, not those of the people; at least ideas tended everywhere in that way. the cabinets therefore looked upon themselves as the owners and administrators of large estates, which they were continually seeking to increase, without the tenants on those estates being particularly interested in this improvement. the people, therefore, who in the tartar invasions were everything in war, who in the old republics and in the middle ages were of great consequence, were in the eighteenth century absolutely nothing directly. in this manner, in proportion as the government separated itself more from the people, and regarded itself as the state, war became more and more exclusively a business of the government, which it carried on by means of the money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds it could pick up in its own and neighbouring countries. the army was a state property, very expensive, and not to be lightly risked in battle. "in its signification war was only diplomacy somewhat intensified, a more vigorous way of negotiating, in which battles and sieges were substituted for diplomatic notes." "plundering and devastating the enemy's country were no longer in accordance with the spirit of the age." "they were justly looked upon as unnecessary barbarity." "war, therefore, confined itself more and more, both as regards means and ends, to the army itself. the army, with its fortresses and some prepared positions, constituted a state in a state, within which the element of war slowly consumed itself. all europe rejoiced at its taking this direction, and held it to be the necessary consequence of the spirit of progress." so think many in this country to-day. they are only a hundred years behind the times. "the plan of a war on the part of the state assuming the offensive in those times consisted generally in the conquest of one or other of the enemy's provinces; the plan of the defender was to prevent this. the plan of campaign was to take one or other of the enemy's fortresses, or to prevent one of our own being taken; it was only when a battle became unavoidable for this purpose that it was sought for and fought. whoever fought a battle without this unavoidable necessity, from mere innate desire of gaining a victory, was reckoned a general with too much daring." for armies were too precious to be lightly risked. "winter quarters, in which the mutual relations of the two parties almost entirely ceased, formed a distinct limit to the activity which was considered to belong to one campaign." "as long as war was universally conducted in this manner, all was considered to be in the most regular order." "thus there was eminence and perfection of every kind, and even field-marshal daun, to whom it was chiefly owing that frederick the great completely attained his object, and maria theresa completely failed in hers, notwithstanding that could still pass for a great general." beyond this stage of military thought, many in this country have not yet advanced. * * * * * "thus matters stood when the french revolution broke out; austria and prussia tried their diplomatic art of war; this very soon proved insufficient. whilst, according to the usual way of seeing things, all hopes were placed on a very limited military force in , such a force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. war had suddenly become again an affair of the people, and that of a people numbering thirty millions, every one of whom regarded himself as a citizen of the state." "_by this participation of the people in the war_, instead of a cabinet and an army, a whole nation with its natural weight came into the scale. henceforth the means available--the efforts which might be called forth--had no longer any definite limits; the energy with which the war itself might be conducted had no longer any counterpoise, and consequently the danger to the adversary had risen to the extreme." if only our politicians could learn this old lesson of the french revolution! for many, too many, of them appear to derive their ideas of war to-day from some dim reminiscent recollections of school histories of the wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. to continue: "after all this was perfected by the hand of bonaparte, this military power based on the strength of the whole nation, marched over europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly, that where it only encountered the old-fashioned armies the result was not doubtful for a moment. "a reaction, however, awoke in due time. in spain the war became of itself an affair of the people." in austria. in russia. "in germany prussia rose up the first, made the war a national cause, and without either money or credit, and with a population reduced one-half, took the field with an army twice as strong as in . the rest of germany followed the example of prussia sooner or later." "thus it was that germany and russia, in the years and , appeared against france with about a million of men." "under these circumstances the energy thrown into the conduct of war was quite different." "in eight months the theatre of war was removed from the oder to the seine. proud paris had to bow its head for the first time; and the redoubtable bonaparte lay fettered on the ground." "therefore, since the time of bonaparte, war, through being, first on one side, then again on the other, an affair of the whole nation, has assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer to its real nature, to its absolute perfection. the means then called forth had no visible limit, the limit losing itself in the energy and enthusiasm of the government and its subjects. by the extent of the means, and the wide field of possible results, as well as by the powerful excitement of feeling which prevailed, energy in the conduct of war was immensely increased; the object of its action was the downfall of the foe; and not until the enemy lay powerless on the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop, or to come to any understanding with regard to the mutual objects of the contest. "thus, therefore the element of war, freed from all conventional restrictions, broke loose with all its natural force. the cause was the participation of the people in this great affair of state, and this participation arose partly from the effects of the french revolution on the internal affairs of other countries, partly from the threatening attitude of the french towards all nations. "now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars hereafter in europe will be carried on with the whole power of the states, and, consequently, _will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people_, would be a difficult point to settle. but every one will agree with us that, at least, _whenever great interests are in dispute_, mutual hostility will discharge itself in the same manner as it has done in our times." reflections this is so true, that every war since the days of clausewitz has made its truth more apparent. since he wrote, the participation of the people in war has become, not a revolutionary fact, but an organized fact, an ordinary fact in the everyday life of nations. to-day every state except great britain, securely based on the system of the universal training of its sons to arms, stands ready to defend its interests with the whole concentrated power, physical, intellectual, and material, of its whole manhood. consequently, european war, as clausewitz foresaw, "will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people." the character of such war will be absolute, the object of its action will be the downfall of the foe, and not till the foe (be it great britain or not) lies powerless on the ground will it be supposed possible to stop. in the prosecution of such a national war the means available, the energy and the effort called forth, will be without limits. such must be the conflicts of nations-in-arms. yet, even now, so many years after clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he himself stated, "to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen," the great transformation in the character of modern war, due to the participation of the people therein, has not yet been adequately realized by many men in this country _who ought to know_. it is earnestly to be hoped that they will endeavour to adjust their minds, as regards war, to the fact that we are living, not in the eighteenth century, but in the twentieth, and that they will consider that war has once for all become an affair of the people, that our opponents will be a people-in-arms, using the uttermost means of their whole manhood to crush us, and that disaster can only be prevented by a like utmost effort on our part, by an effort regardless of everything except self-preservation. chapter vi public opinion in war "war belongs, not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the province of social life. it is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from others. it would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to liken it to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again, on its part, may be looked upon as a kind of trade on a great scale. besides, state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creatures in their germs."[ ] these conflicts of interest can bring about gradually such a state of feeling that "even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other." it is an unpleasant fact for the philosopher, for the social reformer, to contemplate, but history repeats and repeats the lesson. still more, "it is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two states that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate--in fact, a perfect explosion." "war is a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements--hatred and animosity--which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason. "the first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, more the general and his army; the third more the government. _the passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence in the peoples._ "these three tendencies are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject. a theory which would leave any one of them out of account would immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality, that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone."[ ] clausewitz is the great thinker, the great realist, the great philosopher of war. his aim was, free from all bias, to get at _the truth of things_. his view of war as a social act, as part of the intercourse of nations, so that occasional warlike struggles can no more be avoided than occasional commercial struggles, is a view which requires to be most carefully pondered over by every statesman. it is based upon the essential fundamental characteristics of human nature, which do not alter. it is not to be lightly set aside by declamation about the blessings of peace, the evils of war, the burden of armaments, and such-like sophistries. to submit without a struggle to injustice or to the destruction of one's vital interests is not in passionate human nature. nor will it ever be in the nature of a virile people. it is indeed to be most sincerely hoped that _arbitration_ will be resorted to more and more as a means of peacefully settling all non-vital causes of dispute. but arbitration has its limits. for _no great nation will ever submit to arbitration any interest that it regards as absolutely vital_. the view of war, therefore, as a social act, as part of the intercourse of nations, with all that it implies, appears to be the only one which a statesman, however much he may regret the fact, can take. it has, therefore, been brought forward here at once, as it underlies the whole subject and is essential to all clear thought thereon. so much for the influence of public opinion in producing war. now for its influence in and during war. "there are three principal objects in carrying on war," says clausewitz. "(_a_) to conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force. "(_b_) to get possession of the material elements of aggression, and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army. "(_c_) _to gain public opinion._[ ] "to attain the first of these objects, the chief operation must be directed against the enemy's principal army, for it must be beaten before we can follow up the other two objects with success. "in order to seize the material forces, operations are directed against those points at which those resources are chiefly concentrated: principal towns, magazines, great fortresses. on the road to these the enemy's principal force, or a considerable part of his army, will be encountered. "public opinion is ultimately gained by great victories, and by the possession of the enemy's capital."[ ] this almost prophetic (as it was in his day) recognition by clausewitz of the vast importance of gaining public opinion _as one of the three great aims in war_, is fundamental. it is just one of those instances of his rare insight into the principles and development of modern national war which make his book of such great and enduring value to us. for since his day europe has become organized into great industrial nations, democracy and popular passion have become more and more a force to be reckoned with, and the gaining and preserving of public opinion in war has become more and more important. it has, in fact, become the statesman's chief business during a great modern national war. it has become necessary for him to study intently war in its relation to industry, and to the industrial millions over whom he presides, or over whom he may preside. reflections ( ) in the time of clausewitz we in britain were a nation of , , , practically self-supporting, and governed by an aristocracy. to-day we are a crowded nation of , , dependent upon over-sea sources for three-fourths of our food, for our raw materials, for our trade, for our staying power, _and_ we are governed by a democracy. in a modern democratic state it will only be possible to carry on the most just and unavoidable war so long as the hardships brought on the democracy by the war do not become intolerable. to prevent these hardships from thus becoming intolerable to the people, to public opinion, will be the task of the modern statesman during war, and this can only be done by wise prevision and timely preparation. _it requires the internal organization of the industrial state for war._ it appears to the _writer_ that internal organization can be subdivided as follows:-- i. an adequate gold reserve. ii. the protection of our ships carrying raw material, food, and exports during their passage on the high seas from the places of origin to the consumers: (a) by the few available cruisers which could be spared from the fighting fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well thought out and prepared scheme of national indemnity (_vide_ blue book thereon); (b) by insuring the distribution to the consumers of food and raw material, after it has arrived in the country, by preparing a thorough organization which would deal with the blocking of any of the principal ports of arrival, and by guarding the vulnerable points of our internal lines of communications to and from the shipping centres. iii. organization of poor law system to bring immediate relief by selling at peace price food to those unable to pay war prices owing to (a) normal poverty ( , , to , , souls), (b) out-of-works, due to effect of war on trade. work and wages the state _must_ guarantee during modern war, and before the state _can_ guarantee these, it is absolutely necessary that it should satisfy itself that the above preparations are actually _in being_. this pre-supposes a more earnest study of the industrial effects of a great national war than has yet been given to the subject by our political leaders. for in the warfare of the present and future the importance of gaining and preserving public opinion, as pointed out by clausewitz, cannot be over-estimated. it is as fundamentally important _to safeguard our own public opinion as it is to attack, weaken, and gain over that of the enemy_. this has not yet passed the stage of thought. but good thoughts are no better than good dreams unless they be put into action. we are waiting for the statesman to do it. there is no great difficulty. ( ) in arousing the national spirit to the requisite height of patriotic self-denial and self-sacrifice, in elevating, preserving, and safe-guarding public opinion during a great national struggle, much may be hoped for from the patriotism of our press. only in fairness to those whose patriotism is self-originating and spontaneous, it must be made compulsory upon all, so that no journal may suffer loss of circulation or pecuniary injury thereby. ( ) there lies a practical task immediately to the hand of our statesmen if they will seriously set themselves to the task of improving the _moral_ of our nation by reforming our education _curriculum_, on the leading principle that the moral is to the physical as three to one in life, and that therefore character-building must be its chief aim. then they will do much towards strengthening us for war, towards carrying out clausewitz's idea of the gaining and preserving of our public opinion in war. chapter vii the nature of war "it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole, because it is particularly necessary that, in the consideration of any of the parts, the whole should be kept constantly in view. we shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by publicists. we shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. war is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. if we would conceive as a unit the countless numbers of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing two wrestlers. each strives by physical force to throw his adversary, and thus to render him incapable of further resistance. "violence arms itself with the inventions of arts and science in order to contend against violence. self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible, and _hardly worth mentioning_, termed _usages of international law_, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. "violence, that is to say physical force, is therefore _the means_; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate _object_. in order to attain this object fully the enemy must first be disarmed: and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory."[ ] now, "philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an adversary without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. however plausible this may appear, _still it is an error which must be extirpated_, for in such dangerous things as war _the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst_. as the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that _he who uses force unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed_, must _obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise_." "to introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity." "we therefore repeat our proposition, that _war is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds_." the political nature of war in endeavouring briefly to describe clausewitz's method of looking at war, one is continually confronted by the difficulty of selecting a few leading ideas out of so many profound thoughts and pregnant passages. however, a selection must be made. i assign the first place to his conception of war as a part of policy, because that is fundamentally necessary to understand his practical way of looking at things. this point of view is as necessary for the strategist as for the statesman, indeed for every man who would understand the nature of war. for otherwise it is impossible to understand the military conduct of many campaigns and battles, in which the political outweighed the military influence, and led to action incomprehensible almost from a purely military point of view. history is full of such examples. clausewitz clearly lays down: "_war is only a continuation of state policy by other means._ this point of view being adhered to will introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and things will be more easily disentangled from each other."[ ] "it is only thus that we can obtain a clear conception of war, for the political view is the _object_, war is the _means_, and the means must always include the object in our conception." "each (nation or government) strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to its will."[ ] owing to the great importance of this point of view, so little understood in this country, i have devoted the next chapter to it alone, so as to bring out clausewitz's view more in detail. we can, therefore, pass on for the present. the culminating point of victory secondly, i select his doctrine of the culminating point of victory, because that is essential in order to understand his division of all wars into two classes, according to how far the attack is likely to be able to extend into the hostile country before reaching its culminating point, where reaction may set in.[ ] "the conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his adversary completely. often, in fact almost _universally, there is a culminating point of victory_. experience shows this sufficiently."[ ] as the attack or invasion progresses it becomes weaker even from its successes, from sieges or corps left to observe fortified places, from the troops required to guard the territory gained, and the lengthening line of communications, from the fact that we are removing further from our resource while the enemy is falling back upon and drawing nearer to his, from the danger of other states joining in to prevent the utter destruction of the defeated nation, from the rousing of the whole nation in extremity to save themselves by a people's war, from the slackening of effort in the victorious army itself, etc., etc. leoben, friedland, austerlitz, moscow, are instances of such a culminating point, and probably in the late russo-japanese war harbin would have proved so, too, if peace had not intervened. clausewitz continues: "it is necessary to know how far it (our preponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and, instead of fresh advantage, reap disaster." he defines it as "_the point at which the offensive changes into the defensive_," and says, "to overstep this point is more than simply a useless expenditure of power yielding no further results, it is a _destructive_ step which causes reaction, and the reaction is, according to all experience, productive of most disproportionate effects."[ ] the reader will find it an interesting exercise to search for this culminating point of victory in historical campaigns, and mark the result where it has been overstepped and where it has not been overstepped. the two classes of wars from this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the two classes into which clausewitz divides all wars. "the two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the complete _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be that we aim at his destruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and, _next_, those in which our aim is merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to account as matters for exchange in the settlement of peace."[ ] all wars, therefore, are wars for the complete destruction of the enemy, _i.e._ "unlimited object," or wars with a "limited object." in the plan of a war it is necessary to settle which it is to be in accordance with our powers and resources of attack compared with the enemy's resources for defence, and where our culminating point of victory is likely to be, on this side of the enemy's capital or beyond it. if the former--then the plan should be one with a "limited object," such as the crimea, manchuria, etc.; if the latter--then the plan should aim at the enemy's total destruction, such as most of napoleon's campaigns, or the allies in , , , or as , or . as clausewitz says: "_now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages_, not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which, by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be. _this, therefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical questions._"[ ] in clausewitz's two plans for war with france in ,[ ] this difference is plain. in the first plan, he considered prussia, austria, the german confederation, and great britain united as allies against france,--and with this great superiority of numbers he plans an attack by two armies, each of , men, one marching on paris from belgium, one on orleans from the upper rhine. in the second plan the political conditions had meanwhile changed; austria and great britain were doubtful, and clausewitz held it accordingly dubious if prussia and the german confederation alone could appear before paris in sufficient strength to guarantee victory in a decisive battle, and with which it would be permissible to venture even beyond paris. so he proposed to limit the object to the conquest of belgium, and to attack the french vigorously the moment they entered that country. which strict limitation of the object within the means available to attain it is characteristic of clausewitz's practical way of looking at things. in each plan, however, a vigorous offensive aiming at a decisive victory was to be adopted. preparation for war the third place, in respect to its present-day importance, i assign to clausewitz's clear statement that-- "if we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal classes, into such as are only _preparations for war_ and into _the war itself_. this distinction must also be made in theory." nothing could be more clearly stated than this, or place in greater honour peace preparations. like his doctrine of the importance of gaining public opinion in war, it is one of those almost prophetic utterances which make clausewitz the germ of modern military evolution. clausewitz, unlike jomini who did not, foresaw to a certain extent (probably owing to his employment in organizing the new prussian short-service army after ) the nation-in-arms of the present day. and, since his time, the greater the forces which have to be prepared, the greater has become the value of preparation for war. it has been continually growing, till to-day it has obtained such overwhelming importance that one may almost say that a modern war is practically (or nearly so) decided _before_ war breaks out, according to which nation has made the greatest and most thorough peace preparations. clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every imaginable preparation." we may nowadays almost go so far as to say that preparation is war, and that that nation which is beaten in preparation is already beaten before the war breaks out. a failure to understand this fact is a fundamental error at the root of the idea of war as held by civilians, for many of them think that speeches are a substitute for preparations. it is plain that these three ideas of clausewitz regarding the nature of war, its political nature, the distinction between wars with an unlimited object and a limited object, and preparations in peace-time, are as much matters for the statesman as for the soldier, and require study and reflection on the part of the former as much as on the part of the latter. friction in war i place friction here before the more detailed consideration of actual war, of war in itself, because it is that which distinguishes war on paper from real war, the statesman's and soldier's part from the part of the soldier only, and is therefore to be fitly treated midway between the two. friction in war is one of clausewitz's most characteristic ideas. he always looks at everything from that point of view, and as friction and the fog of war, and their influence on human nature will always be the chief characteristic of real war as distinguished from theoretical war or war on paper, it is chiefly this habit or mode of thought which makes his writings of such great and permanent value. it is also a habit which we ought sedulously to cultivate in ourselves. "_in war everything is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult_,"[ ] runs his famous saying. why is the simplest thing difficult? because of the friction of war. and how can that friction be minimized? only by force of character, and the military virtues of discipline, perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness. hence the great emphasis which he always and everywhere lays upon character and these military virtues as the deciding factors in war. "_friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which distinguishes real war from war on paper_," he says. each individual of the army "keeps up his own friction in all directions." "the danger which war brings with it, the bodily exertions which it requires, augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the greatest causes of it."[ ] "_this enormous friction is everywhere brought into contact with chance_, and thus facts take place upon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being chance. as an instance of one such chance take the weather. here the fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time,--a battery from firing, or a report from reaching the general. the rain (mud) prevents a battalion from arriving,--or the cavalry from charging effectively, because it had stuck fast in the heavy ground." and so on. consider for examples the foggy mornings of jena or austerlitz, of eylau, the katzbach, grosbeeren, dennewitz, pultusk, dresden, sadowa; or the mud of poland, the snow of russia, or, latest, the mud of manchuria. "_activity in war is movement in a resistant medium._" "_the knowledge of friction is a chief part of that so often talked of experience in war_, which is required in a good general." "it is therefore this friction which makes that which appears easy in war so difficult in reality."[ ] in considering any situation in war we must therefore always add to the known circumstances--friction. war itself in clausewitz's way of looking at war itself i assign at once the first place to his doctrine, "_the destruction of the enemy's military force is the leading principle of war_, and for the whole chapter of positive action _the direct way to the aim_."[ ] this dictum, repeated in many different forms, underlies his whole conception of war. all the old theoretical ideas about threatening by manoeuvring, conquering by manoeuvring, forcing the enemy to retreat by manoeuvring, and so forth, in which his predecessors entangled strategy, and from which even the archduke charles and jomini had not completely freed themselves, he brushes aside by "our assertion is that only great tactical results can lead to great strategical results."[ ] thus he leads and concentrates our thoughts in strategy on the central idea of victory in battle, and frees us once for all from the obscuring veil of lines and angles and geometrical forms by which other writers have hidden that truth. "philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of overcoming and disarming an adversary without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. however plausible this may appear, _it is an error which must be extirpated_, for, in such dangerous things as war, _the errors which spring from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst_."[ ] for "he who uses force unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, _must_ obtain the superiority if his adversary does not act likewise." and the "worst of all errors in wars" is still the idea of war too commonly held by civilians in this country, as witness the outcries which greeted every loss during the south african war, which shows how much clausewitz is needed as a tonic to brace their minds to the reality. "war is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds." "let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed; if a bloody slaughter be a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to war (for avoiding unnecessary war), but not for making the sword we wear blunt and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, till some one steps in with a sword that is sharp, and lops off the arm from our body." simple plans the second place i assign to his doctrine of _the simplest plans_, because time is required for the completion of complicated evolutions, but "a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us have _time_ for wide-reaching skilful combination."[ ] "by this it appears to us that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are complicated is conclusively shown." "we must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike," or the opponent will get his thrust in first. "whenever this is the case, we must ourselves choose the shorter." "therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by complicated plans, _we must always rather endeavour to be beforehand with him by the simplest and shortest_." strategic lines the salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between the numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation, and lines of manoeuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in jomini and his predecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing a part,--for these clausewitz has little respect. in his chapter on "the geometrical element,"[ ] he says, "we therefore do not hesitate to regard it as an established truth that _in strategy more depends upon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on the form of the great lines by which they are connected_."[ ] of course he does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above sentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. he therefore frees us from a great deal of pedantry, and takes us back to the heart of things. friction has been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about its components. danger "an ordinary character never attains to complete coolness" in danger. "danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is necessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under notice here."[ ] bodily exertion clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul." "like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction."[ ] to one who, like clausewitz, had seen the retreat from moscow, the awful passage of the beresina, and the battle of the nations round leipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. had he not seen bodily exertion and hardship break up the grand army into a small horde of stragglers, and destroy the army of kutusoff in almost an equal measure, in , as well as practically ruin the spirit, and largely break up the great army of napoleon in ? as for the effects of bodily exertion on the mind, purpose, and resolution of the general, compare benningsen at eylau after thirty-six hours in the saddle, or napoleon at dresden, by which he lost all the results of his victory. information in war "_the foundation of all our ideas and actions_," but "in a few words, _most reports are false_." "when in the thick of war itself one report follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of probability." in another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual uncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he compares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and groping uncertainly for one another. "these things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war and make it a _resistant medium for every activity_, we have designated danger, bodily exertion, information, and friction."[ ] he never loses sight of this; it pervades everything he writes. the moral and physical "and therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in this book are composed _half of physical, half of moral causes and effects_, and we might say that the physical are almost no more than the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real bright polished weapon."[ ] pages might be filled with extracts showing his opinion that the moral is everything in war, but the reader is already convinced of that. compare napoleon's in war, "the moral is to the physical as three to one." clausewitz regards all military questions from this point. his psychological attitude is what chiefly characterizes clausewitz from all writers who came before him, and which makes his deductions so realistic, so interesting and so valuable for all who come after him. tension and rest in war in order not to weary the reader i will bring this chapter to a conclusion with one or two extracts relating to "tension and rest; the suspension of the act in warfare." this is explanatory of those frequent halts which take place in a campaign, which appear at first sight contradictory to the absolute theory of war. these halts are due to many causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, uncertainty, irresolution, friction, waiting for reinforcements, etc. in this connection one must remember that war is "a chain of battles all strung together, one of which always brings on another." but they seldom follow each other immediately; there is usually a certain pause between. as soon as one battle is gained, strategy makes new combinations in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the next. whilst these new combinations are being developed, or perhaps considered, there may be a greater or less suspension of the act, a longer or shorter halt in the forward movement. then another spring forward. clausewitz has a great many interesting things to say on this subject.[ ] "if there is a suspension of the act in war, that is to say, if neither party for the moment wills anything positive, there is _rest_, and for the moment equilibrium.... as soon as ever one of the parties proposes to himself a new positive object, and commences active steps towards it, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as the enemy opposes this, there is _tension_ of the powers; this lasts until the decision takes place.... this decision, the foundation of which lies always in the battle-combinations which are made on each side, ... is followed by a movement in one or other direction." "it may so happen that both parties, at one and the same time, not only feel themselves too weak to attack, but are so in reality." "wild as is the nature of war it still wears the claims of human weakness, and the contradiction we see here, that man seeks and creates dangers which he fears at the same time, will astonish no one." "if we cast a glance at military history in general, there we find so much the opposite of an incessant advance towards the aim, that _standing still_ and _doing nothing_ is quite plainly the _normal condition_ of an army in the midst of war, _acting_ the _exception_. this must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception. but if military history has this effect by the great body of its events, so also the latest series of wars redeem the view. the war of the french revolution shows only too plainly its reality, and only proves too plainly its necessity. in that war, and especially in the campaigns of bonaparte, the conduct of war attained to that unlimited degree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the element. this degree is therefore possible, and if it is possible then it is necessary." reflections ( ) "hardly worth mentioning"! so that is how clausewitz regards international law, clausewitz to whom in germany "our most famous victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training," and on whom "everybody who to-day either makes or teaches modern war bases himself, even if he is not conscious of it." and we must regard nearly every foreign statesman as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple of clausewitz. it is, therefore, high time that we should cease to pin our faith on international law, or think that it can in any way protect us, if we neglect strongly to protect ourselves. power and expediency are the only rules that the practical politicians of foreign countries recognize, and the only question they ask themselves is, "have we got sufficient power to do this," and if so, "is it expedient to do it?" ( ) treaties, too, what reliance can we place upon them for any length of time? none whatever. for treaties are only considered binding as long as the interests of _both_ contracting parties remain the same. directly circumstances change, and they change constantly, the most solemn treaties are torn up, as russia tore up the treaty of paris, or as austria tore up the treaty of berlin. all history is full of torn-up treaties. and as it has been so it will be. the european waste-paper basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way, and a thing which can any day be thrown into a waste-paper basket is, indeed, a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. only in ourselves can we trust. therefore no treaties at present existing should be allowed in any way to alter or lessen our preparations to enable us to fight _alone_ when necessary. ( ) it cannot be too often repeated, or too much insisted on, that the success or failure of a state policy is dependent upon the amount of armed force behind it. for upon the amount of armed force behind a policy depends the greater or less amount of resistance, of friction, which that policy will meet with on the part of other nations. the prestige of a nation depends upon the general belief in its strength. the less its prestige, the more it will be checked and foiled by its rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded into a war which would have been prevented if its prestige, or armed force, had been greater. on the other hand, the greater its prestige, its armed force, the more reasonable and inclined to a fair compromise are its rivals found. so that the greater the prestige, the armed force, of our nation is, the more likely is it that all our negotiations will be settled by peaceful compromise, and the longer we shall enjoy peace. therefore, under this consideration, those who would reduce our national forces are deeply mistaken, for such action would imperil our prestige, imperil our negotiations, imperil our peace, and perhaps lead eventually to a war that we might otherwise have avoided. therefore no such deeply mistaken economy for us. a few hundred thousand pounds saved would be dear economy indeed if it led, as well it might, to the payment before many years of a war indemnity of £ , , or so. better the evils we know than the far greater evils we know not of. ( ) surprise in war is what we have to fear. there are two sorts of national surprise that we must consider. these are (a) the _surprise by actual hostilities_ taking place before the actual declaration of war, such as the japanese surprise and practical destruction of the fighting force of the russian fleet at port arthur; (b) the _surprise by superior preparation_, silently carried out till all is ready for a decisive blow, whilst we are not ready for equally efficient defence, and then a declaration of war before we have time to get properly ready, as the surprise in this sense of france by germany in . (a) every successful example is always copied, and usually on a larger scale. we may be quite certain that our rivals have taken to heart the lesson of port arthur. it is possible that our next war will open with a similar night attack on our fleet, either just before, or simultaneously with the declaration of war. if it is successful, or even partially successful, it may produce the most grave results, as in the russo-japanese war. it _may_ render possible a naval action with almost equal forces, in which our opponents _might_ be victorious. the invasion of this country on a gigantic scale by , men or more would then follow as a certainty. this is not a probability, but a possibility which requires to be kept in our view. (b) _the surprise by superior preparation_, as i term it, for want of a better name, is a danger to which we are peculiarly liable. as lord salisbury said, "the british constitution is a bad fighting machine," and it is made an infinitely worse fighting machine by the lack of interest which our politicians appear to take in all that appertains to war. hence they are always liable to oppose, as excessive, preparations which are in reality the minimum consistent with national safety. consequently our preparations for war, controlled as they are by those who have no special knowledge of war, are always apt to be insufficient, as were those of france in . in former days this did not perhaps so very much matter, although it resulted in the unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands of british lives and hundreds of millions of british treasure. but still we were able, at this somewhat excessive price, to "muddle through," owing to the heroic efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make bricks without straw and retrieve the mistakes of our policy. for our opponents then conducted war in such a slow way as to give us time to repair _after_ the outbreak of war our lack of preparation _before_ it. but opposed to a modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen and led by generals brought up in the school of napoleon, clausewitz, and moltke--all will be different. in such a war the national forces brought into play are so immense that it is only possible to do so efficaciously if everything has been most carefully prepared and organized beforehand. it is not _possible_ to improvise such organization of national force _after_ the war has begun, for there cannot be sufficient time. if our rival makes adequate preparation before the war to bring to bear in that war the _whole_ of its national force, material, moral, and physical, while we only prepare to bring to bear a _small portion_ thereof, then there will be no time afterwards for us to repair our negligence. the war will be conducted with the utmost energy, and the aim will be to utilize to the utmost the superiority obtained by superior preparation, so as to make the decision as rapid as possible before we have time to recover from the effects of our surprise. that is the danger we have to fear, and to keep ever in mind. chapter viii war as policy "war," says clausewitz, "is only a continuation of state policy by other means." the first question that at once arises in the mind is what is meant by policy. we may safely lay down that state policy is the defence and furtherance of the interests of the nation as a whole amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies towards rest and towards acquisition, and that its instruments are the pen and the sword. there can, of course, be any degree of consistency or fickleness, of strength or weakness, of success or failure, in the policy of a state. clausewitz expressly stated that he hoped "to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen," such, for instance, as the idea that it is possible to consider either policy or war as independent of the other. it is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy if we regard it as continuous both in peace and war, using sometimes peace negotiations, sometimes war negotiations, as circumstances require, to attain the political object. war is only a part of policy, a continuance of the previous negotiations; but the instrument is now the sword and not the pen. as clausewitz says, "_in one word, the art of war, in its highest point of view, is policy; but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes._" war is merely a means whereby a nation attempts to impose its will upon another nation in order to attain a political object. this object is settled by policy, which also orders the war, determines what sort of war it is to be, with what means and resources and expenditure it is to be waged, when its object has been attained, and when it is to cease. in fact, policy prepares, leads up to, orders, supports, guides, and stops the war. as clausewitz said, "_all the leading outlines of a war are always determined by the cabinet--that is, by a political, not a military functionary._" unity of thought is only to be obtained by "the conception that war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself." "and how can we conceive it to be otherwise? does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political relations between different nations and governments? is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts?" "accordingly war can never be separated from political intercourse; and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object." "if war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from policy. if the policy is grand and powerful, so will also be the war, and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its absolute form." "only through this kind of view war recovers unity; only by it can we see _all_ wars of _one_ kind, and it is only through it that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of view from which _great plans_ may be traced out and determined upon." "there is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find out the _right_ point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend the mass of events in their unity from _one_ standpoint; and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency." "we can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests generally of the whole community," and "_wars are in reality only the expressions or manifestations of policy itself_." to the student of history this unity of conception is equally necessary, for it supplies the key to many a military puzzle. without it we can never understand, for instance, napoleon's conduct in , , ; nor without it can we see the compelling reason of many battles, apparently fought against military judgment, such, for instance, as borodino, leipzig, sedan, etc. we have to remember that these and many other battles, as, for instance, ladysmith, were fought from a political, not a military, motive. it is a well-known fact that the strategist frequently has to alter and adapt his plans so as to suit overmastering political necessity. yet many people have failed to draw therefrom the generalization of clausewitz that "war is only a continuation of state policy by other means." but having got it now, let us hold fast to it, with all its consequences. some knowledge of war necessary for statesmen "from this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things a necessary conflict between the political and military interests, and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as _imperfect knowledge_ only. that policy makes demands upon the war which it cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that _it knows the instrument it is going to use_, therefore contrary to a natural and _indispensable supposition_." "_none of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made without an insight into the political relations_; and in reality when people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy on the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different to what they intend. it is not this influence, but the policy itself which should be found fault with. if policy is right, if it succeeds in hitting the object, then it can only act on the war also with advantage; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the object, the cause is to be looked for in a mistaken policy. "it is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes. just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant sometimes says what he does not intend, _so policy, when intending right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views_. "_this has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of political intercourse._" the war minister "before going further we must guard ourselves against a false interpretation of which this is very susceptible. we do not mean to say that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the _principal_ qualification for a war minister. elevation, superiority of mind, strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he must possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another." policy and the means to carry out that policy must harmonize "_if war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy to accommodate itself to the means available for war_, there is only one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are not combined in one person (note, as william of orange, frederick the great, or napoleon), which is to make the chief commander an _ex-officio_ member of the cabinet, that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions." "the influence of any military man except the general-in-chief in the cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able, vigorous action." reflections we shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding dicta of clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree. firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy. secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of his profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering, guiding, and controlling of war. as clausewitz says, "it is an _indispensable supposition_ that policy knows the instrument it is going to use." it is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations between two states cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the political negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued in another form--in the form of war. the statesman still retains control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his object. he is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well as of the peaceful, policy of the nation. thirdly, it is a disputed point how far the influence of policy is theoretically allowable during the course of actual operations, _i.e._ after the war has actually begun. moltke's opinion was that policy should only act at the beginning and at the end of a war, and should keep clear during the actual operations. clausewitz, however, holds that the two are so intimately related that the political influence cannot be lost sight of even during actual operations. between two such authorities we may well hesitate to give a definite opinion, and must seek for the middle way. undoubtedly, in history policy often has really affected the actual operations, as in , , , , macmahon's march to sedan, or bismarck's interference to hurry on the siege of paris in , or ladysmith in the boer war, and in many other cases. that, we must admit. we must also admit that its interference frequently produces a weakening effect on the operations. clausewitz says that that only occurs when the policy itself is wrong. perhaps. but the safest middle way rule appears to be this, that policy should be dominant at the beginning and end of a war, but during actual operations the statesman should exercise the greatest possible restraint, and avoid all interference, except when demanded by _overwhelming political necessity_. fourthly, a politician is bound to study war. he is bound to study war as well as diplomacy, his two instruments. if he only studies how to use one of his two instruments, he will be a poor statesman indeed. it is plain that he must study war, so that he may not try to use an instrument of which he knows nothing. it is not meant, of course, that a politician should study all the details of naval and military matters, but only that he should study the general principles of war, and the means, resources, and forces required to attain the political object of war, through the submission of the enemy. fifthly, in order that the object and the means of policy may harmonize, it is necessary that the one to whom the national interests are entrusted should study the principles of war, so that _he may keep his policy proportionate to the means of enforcing it_. that is to say, he must not propose or commit the nation to a policy which is likely to be strongly opposed by another power, unless he has from careful study and enquiry made certain that he has sufficient armed force at his disposal, in case the opposing nation suddenly challenges his policy and declares war. he should not even consider a policy without _at the same time_ considering with his military and naval advisers the nation's means of enforcing that policy if challenged to do so. he must not think of embarking upon a war, or of provoking another nation to do so, till he has carefully provided sufficient armed force to give a reasonable prospect, if not a certainty, of success. otherwise, sixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war will be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall of the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be great britain or not) lies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as we shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy, the utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,--these points deserve the most serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the destinies of the anglo-saxon race. chapter ix strategy clausewitz defines strategy as "_the use of the battle to gain the object of the war_." war is "a chain of battles all strung together, one of which always brings on another."[ ] the great thing in strategy is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits. "_the best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally; secondly, at the decisive point._"[ ] "in such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating circumstances. the direct result of all this is that the _greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point_.[ ] whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not, we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. this is _the first great principle of strategy_, as well suited for greeks or persians, or for englishmen, or mahrattas, as for french or germans." it sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. how many generals have been ruined in consequence! superiority in numbers what is required for strategic certainty clausewitz says, "it is a fact that we may search modern military history in vain for a battle (except leuthen or rosbach) in which an army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no means uncommon in former times. bonaparte, the greatest general of modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception, that of dresden , had managed to assemble an army superior in numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and when it was impossible for him to do so, as at leipzig, brienne, laon, waterloo, he was beaten."[ ] "from this we may infer, in the present state of europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. now, if we see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even the greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small as well as in great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but which need not be over _two to one_, will be sufficient to _ensure the victory_, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be."[ ] the double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore, the ideal of strategy. "_the superiority of numbers is, therefore, to be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before all_, and as far as possible." if strategy has done this, then it has done its utmost duty. it is then for the tactician to make the most of this superiority thus provided by strategy, and win the victory. strategy then repeats the operation with new combinations suited to the altered circumstances to win the next battle, and so on, till the hostile armed force is destroyed. this _superiority of numbers_ in battle as the _first principle of strategy_ we require, on all occasions in season and out of season, to repeat and repeat. at present we have not the numbers we shall want. we must get them. otherwise we are bound to be inferior in numbers, and "the best strategy" will be possible for our enemies and impossible for us. this rests with our statesmen. the decisive point if the double superiority, or as near the double as possible, at the decisive point is the ideal of strategy ... what is the decisive point? here we owe another debt to clausewitz. jomini, even after napoleon, confuses us with three different sorts of decisive points in a theatre of war, but clausewitz clears the air by asserting only _one_. "but whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against which we are to direct our ultimate operations, _still the conquest and destruction of his army is the surest commencement_ and, _in all cases, the most essential_."[ ] here we have it in a nutshell; wherever the enemy's main force is there is the decisive point, against which we must concentrate all our forces. "there are," said napoleon, "many good generals in europe, but they see too many things at one time. _as for me, i see only one thing, the enemy's chief army, and i concentrate all my efforts to destroy it._" the simultaneous use of all the forces "the rule," says clausewitz, "which we have been endeavouring to set forth is, therefore, that all the forces which are available and destined for a strategic object should be _simultaneously_ applied to it. and this application will be all the more complete the more everything is compressed into one act and one moment."[ ] this he calls "_the law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in strategy_."[ ] "in strategy we can never employ too many forces."[ ] "what can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of force must be regarded in strategy as a means of giving expansion to success." "_no troops should be kept back as a strategic reserve_," but every available man hurried up to the first battlefield, fresh levies being meanwhile formed in rear. as an instance of what not to do, prussia, in , kept back , men in brandenburg and east prussia; they might, if present at jena, have turned defeat into victory, but they were useless afterwards.[ ] a fault so often made may be made again. concentration "it is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point," said napoleon. to concentrate every available man and gun at the decisive point so as to attain superiority there, is not an easy thing, for the enemy will be making a similar attempt. "the calculation of time and space appears the most essential thing to this end. but the calculation of time and space, though it lies universally at the foundation of strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread, is still neither the most difficult nor the most decisive one." "much more frequently the relative superiority, that is the skilful assemblage of superior forces at the decisive point, has its foundation in the right appreciation of those points, in the judicious distribution which by that means has been given to the forces from the very first, and in _the resolution to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the important_. in this respect frederick the great and bonaparte are especially characteristic."[ ] "there is no simpler and more imperative rule for strategy than _to keep all the forces concentrated. no portion to be separated from the main body unless called away by some urgent necessity._ on this maxim we stand firm, and look upon it as a fact to be depended upon."[ ] "_the concentration of the whole force_ (_i.e._ within supporting distance) _should be the rule_, and _every separation or division is an exception which must be justified_."[ ] of course, this does not mean that all the troops are to be kept concentrated in one mass upon one road, but within supporting distance, for he expressly states, "_it is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the course of the action._"[ ] this doctrine, qualified by the last sentence, makes clausewitz the germ of modern military thought, for the last sentence leaves room for all the modern developments of new roads, railways, telegraphs, wire and wireless, and so forth. therefore in war, according to clausewitz, concentration, concentration, concentration, and _every division or detachment is an evil which can only be justified by urgent necessity_. here again we find a simple truth, which, however, the history of all wars shows us to be very difficult to carry out. hence the value of keeping such an imperative maxim always in our minds. the first pitched battle "the more a general takes the field in the true spirit of war, as well as of every other contest, that he must and _will_ conquer, the more will he strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first battle, and hope and strive to win everything by it. napoleon hardly ever entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at once in the first battle."[ ] "_at the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the first battle_, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage to which no one would willingly expose himself, and also because the first decision, though not the only one, still will have the more influence on subsequent events the greater it is in itself."[ ] "the law of the simultaneous use of the forces in strategy lets the principal result (which need not be the final one) take place almost always at the commencement of the great act."[ ] a great victory thus won at the outset will upset all the enemy's plan of campaign and allow us to carry out our own. the first pitched battle is, therefore, the crisis of the rival strategies, and towards its favourable decision all our preparations, all our forces, and all our energies should be directed. this is a point that civilians seem to find hard to grasp. witness all our history, with inadequate forces at the beginning of every war, as even in the latest of our wars--that in south africa. it is a point which our statesmen should very seriously consider. the difficulty of concentrating superior numbers for the first battle is that the enemy will be, or should be, of the same opinion, and will be making equal efforts to win the first battle. so, then, the crisis will be all the more acute, the battle greater, and the result greater. "_we would not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's main force, is the first-born son of war._"[ ] till this is done, the first great victory gained, strategy should think of nothing else. then, and only then, a further combination in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the next. "for we maintain that, with few exceptions, _the victory at the decisive point will carry with it the decision on all minor points_"[ ] over the whole theatre of war. therefore nothing else matters for long, and to victory in the first great battle "everything else must be sacrificed." for concentration can only be obtained by sacrifice. pursuit "once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about rest, not about taking breath, not about re-organizing, etc., but only of pursuit, of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the enemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or whatever else appears as a rallying point for the enemy."[ ] clausewitz points out that this is very difficult, and that to compel his exhausted troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall requires great force of will on the part of the equally exhausted commander. we need only remember that napoleon himself at the supreme crisis of his fate, being physically tired, failed to pursue the allies after his victory at dresden, , whereby he lost all the fruits of his victory, and indeed his last chance of ultimate success. summary of strategic principles leaving out, for the sake of shortness, the rest of his strategical thoughts, i hasten to conclude this sketch with a glance at clausewitz's admirable summary[ ] of strategic principles:-- "_the first and most important maxim which we can set before ourselves is to employ_ all _the forces which we can make available with the_ utmost energy. even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it is extremely unwise not to make it _perfectly certain_. "_the second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible at the point where the_ decisive _blow is to be struck. the success at that point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points._ "_the third principle is not to lose time. rapidity and surprise are the most powerful elements of victory._ "_lastly, the fourth principle is to_ follow up the success _we gain with the_ utmost energy. _the pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the only means of gathering up the fruits of victory._ "the first of these principles is the foundation of all the others. _if we have followed the first principle, we can venture any length with regard to the three others without risking our all._ it gives the means of _continually creating new forces behind us_, and with new forces every disaster may be repaired. _in this, and not in going forward with timid steps, lies that prudence which may be called wise._" these great principles are everything in war, and "due regard being paid to these principles, the form (_i.e._ the geometrical element) in which the operations are carried on is in the end of little consequence." "therefore i am perfectly convinced that whoever calls forth all his powers to appear _incessantly with new masses_, whoever adopts _every imaginable means of preparation_, whoever _concentrates his force at the decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with resolution and energy_, has done all that can be done in a general way for the strategical conduct of the war, and that, unless he is altogether unfortunate in battle, will undoubtedly be victorious in the same measure that his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and energy." reflections when we have got these great simple leading principles of strategy firmly into our heads, the next question is how to make use of our knowledge. for principles are no use unless we apply them. on consideration it appears that there are three ways in which we can all apply these principles with advantage. i. it will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise to apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about, to search for indications of their application in the strategy of each belligerent, how far each commander succeeded, and how far failed to carry them out in their entirety, and where, when, and why he succeeded or failed, and the results of doing or not doing so. also to search for the interaction of the political motive of the war on the military operations, and to see how far the belligerent statesmen gained or failed to gain their political object, according to the comparative degree of preparation they had made for it, and the magnitude of effort which they made or did not make to support it with the whole means of the nation, material, moral and physical. also to see how far the national spirit was aroused or not, and the causes thereof, and to note the greater or less energy, resolution and boldness which was consequently infused into the war. also to note how the thorough application of these great simple principles of strategy shortens the war and thereby reduces its cost ( to ), and how the neglect of them by statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards, lengthens a war and adds to its cost enormously (south africa, etc.). used thus, these principles give us a theoretically correct ground for criticism. ii. these principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for anticipating what the action of our opponents in any future war will be, the measure of the forces they will bring to bear, how they will direct those forces, and the amount of energy, resolution, and boldness with which they will use them against us. it is an axiom always to assume that the enemy will do the best and wisest thing, and to prepare accordingly. iii. these principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for our own counter-preparations. we require to take the most dangerous war which is probable or possible, and make every imaginable preparation to carry out these principles therein. in such a case how are we going to render it possible for our generals to win, and thus save the nation from the irreparable consequences and the huge war indemnity of £ , , or so, which would follow defeat? how are we going to do it? how are we going to render it possible for our generals to employ the best strategy? the ideal of strategy, always to be aimed at, is the double superiority of numbers. how are we going to give our generals that? if we cannot do that, how are we going to give them even any superiority _at all_, so that they may be able to carry out the first principle of strategy? how? or are we going to make no _adequate preparations_ for these three eventualities, and when one of them suddenly comes ask our generals to save us from the fate we have brought upon ourselves, by performing the impossible? it is in this way that a statesman should use these few great simple principles of strategy in order to attain his political object and safeguard the interests of the nation. chapter x the execution of strategy now, as clausewitz teaches it, the theory of war is easy enough to understand. there is no reason--one might almost say no excuse--why every one, soldier or statesman, should not know it fairly well. the great leading principles of strategy are few and simple. there is no reason why every one, soldier and statesman, should not understand and know these few simple principles thoroughly, and have them at his finger ends ready to apply them to the consideration of any military question, past, present, or future. so far all is easy. but when it is a question of carrying out in actual war this easy theory, these simple strategical principles, then it is quite a different matter, then it is a matter of the very greatest difficulty. this is a difference which the mind always finds very hard to grasp, as witness the denunciations with which any failure in execution by a general, no matter how great the real difficulties with which he had to contend, is nearly always greeted. observers rarely make allowances for these difficulties, very largely probably because they do not understand them. the present chapter is devoted to these difficulties of execution in war. the genius for war in clausewitz's great chapter on "the genius for war"[ ] he sets forth the difficulties which confront a general, the character and genius, the driving and animating force, required to overcome the friction of war. it is impossible to abstract it adequately; i can only advise all to read it for themselves. but i will endeavour to give an idea of it. after discussing the various sorts of courage required by a general, physical before danger and moral before responsibility, the strength of body and mind, the personal pride, the patriotism, the enthusiasm, etc., he comes to the unexpected. "_war_," he says, "_is the province of uncertainty. three-fourths of those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty._ here, then, above all other, a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the truth by the tact of its judgment." mark this point, that three-fourths of the things that we as critics after the event know, when all information of the situation has been collected and published, were unknown to the general who had to decide, or only dimly guessed at from a number of contradictory reports. "from this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, _this continual interposition of chance_." "now, if he is to get safely through _this perpetual conflict with the unexpected_, two qualities are indispensable; in the first place _an understanding which, even in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces of inner light_, which _lead to the truth_, and then _the courage to follow this faint light_. the first is expressed by the french phrase _coup d'oeil_; the second is resolution." "resolution is an _act of courage in face of responsibility_." "the forerunner of resolution is an act of the mind making plain the necessity of venturing and thus influencing the will. this quite peculiar direction of the mind, which conquers every other fear in man by the fear of wavering or doubting, is what makes up resolution in strong minds." the vital importance of firmness and resolution, so strongly urged by clausewitz, will be apparent to all if we reflect how even the strongest characters have been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation in war. compare, for instance, york _v._ wartenburg's masterly exposition of napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation in at dresden. also there is required "_the power of listening to reason in the midst of the most intense excitement_, in the storm of the most violent passions." "but to keep to the result of by-gone reflections in opposition to the stream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it, is just the difficulty." "here nothing else can help us but an imperative maxim which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: that maxim is, _in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion and not to give it up till a clear conviction forces us to do so_." "but as soon as difficulties arise, and that must always happen when great results are at stake, then the machine, the army itself, begins to offer a sort of passive resistance, and to overcome this the commander must have great force of will." driving power, such as napoleon's. and also "the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice, which the commander has to contend with in himself." "these are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of the commander have to contend with and overcome, if he is to make his name illustrious." if he is to prevent the downfall of his country. reflections ( ) in connection with these difficulties i would like to put forward a suggestion as to criticism of a general's action in war, which though not exactly clausewitz's, is a corollary from clausewitz. it is this. in reading a war with the clearness and after-knowledge of history nearly all defeats are easily seen to be due to the non-observance of one or other of the few leading principles of strategy referred to in the previous chapter. but we must assume that the defeated general was _familiar_ with that principle, and that his _will_ was to carry it out. what, then, were the difficulties, the friction, which, on any particular day or days, overcame his will and made him sacrifice the principle? this is where most critics fail us. here seems the matter to search for. and could a stronger resolution have enabled him to overcome those difficulties, that friction? and if so, how and by what means? but we must first discover the difficulties and uncertainties of the particular day when his will gave way. take the manchurian campaign as an instance. if we could only have a military history of the campaign of or that of manchuria, written in the form of a series of "appreciations of the situation," so that we know nothing but what the general knew at the time as we read, and if the true state of affairs could be withheld from us till the end, this, i think, would be very instructive and helpful. it would be a more difficult way of writing a military history, but i think that the extra trouble would be repaid by the extra value. so at least it appears. ( ) if we reflect upon the enormous difficulties, so strikingly brought out by clausewitz, which _our_ generals have to contend with and _overcome_ in actual war, it should surely teach us to curb our criticism. it should surely also make us resolve in future to try to aid them as far as is in our power at home, and not thoughtlessly to increase their already stupendous burdens. in the past we at home have much to accuse ourselves of, much to regret. in the past often have we added to the difficulties of our generals, often have we greatly weakened their chances, and increased those of their opponents, often have we, unintentionally, through ignorance cast a weight into the scale against our country. ( ) the ignorance of the public regarding the conduct of war constitutes for us a very serious national danger. if this ignorance were less pronounced, if our statesmen understood the vast importance of information to the enemy, and the equal importance to our generals that this information the enemy should not obtain, then the public craving for information regarding every detail of what occurs in the field, and the demand for the wide publication thereof, would certainly be repressed. nothing occurs in any of our campaigns which is not immediately made known; reports of actions with the fullest details as to the troops engaged, and the casualties that have befallen them, appear in the columns of the press within a few hours of their occurrence. _any efforts, therefore, of our generals_ in the field to maintain _secrecy as to strength, intentions, and movements are deliberately_, though probably unintentionally, _counteracted by their own countrymen_. this is due to pure ignorance of war, no doubt, but the effect of this ignorance is as bad as if it were due to evil intention. in fairness, however, we must admit that, in the past, the immense value of reticence has not been fully appreciated by some of our soldiers themselves, and it were well if, in the future, more attention were directed to the importance of secrecy. the results of such almost criminal stupidity may not be apparent when we are fighting with a savage foe, but if we ever have, as we undoubtedly some day shall have, the misfortune to find ourselves engaged with a civilized power, we may be certain that not only will the operations be indefinitely prolonged, _and their cost enormously increased_, but their successful issue will be for us highly problematical. in this connection it must be remembered that every great power has secret agents in every country, including great britain, and that it will be easy for such a secret agent to telegraph in cypher or in some agreed code to an agent in a neutral state all war information published here, who will telegraph it on at once to the hostile general, who will thus get, within a very short time of its publication in london, perhaps just exactly the information he requires to clear up the strategical or tactical situation for him, and enable him to defeat the combinations of our generals. as a case in point, take macmahon's march on sedan to relieve metz in , where secrecy was absolutely necessary for success, but which became known to the germans by the english newspapers.--result, sedan. that this cannot be allowed is plain. it is believed that the patriotism of our press will welcome any necessary measure to this end if it is made compulsory upon all.[ ] chapter xi tactics some will probably feel inclined to ask what clausewitz, who wrote more than eighty years ago, can possibly have to say about tactics which can be valuable in the twentieth century. it was said by napoleon that tactics change every ten years, according, of course, to the progress of technicalities, etc. weapons indeed change, but there is one thing that never changes, and that is human nature. the most important thing in tactics, the man behind the gun, never alters; in his heart and feelings, his strength and weakness, he is always much the same. therefore, clausewitz's tactical deductions, founded on the immense and varied data supplied by the desperate and long-continued fighting of the revolutionary and napoleonic wars, permeated as they are by his all-pervading psychological or moral view, can never lose their value to us. it is true, no doubt, that our rifles of to-day can be used with effect at a distance ten times as great as the old smooth bores of clausewitz's day, our shrapnel five times as far as his cannon, and that cover and ground play a far more important part now than then, and so on. all these things, of course, considerably modify the tactics of clausewitz. not so much, however, as some text-books would lead us to suppose, which always seem to assume clear ground and clear weather. for, after all, how many combats are fought on ground where there is a very restricted field of fire (_vide_ herbert's "defence of plevna," etc.), or at night? how many battles are fought during rain, or snow, or mist, or fog, which destroys all long range? compare the tremendous fighting with "bullets, bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and even fists," of nogi's attempt to cut the russian line of retreat at mukden, with the hand-to-hand fighting of eylau, friedland, borodino, or with the desperate efforts of the french in to open their line of retreat through maro-jaroslawitz, where all day the masses of troops fought hand-to-hand in the streets, "the town was taken and retaken seven times, and the rival nations fought with the bayonet in the midst of the burning houses" (alison). when it comes to push of pike, as in all great decisions between equally resolute adversaries it is bound to do, the difference between the fighting of clausewitz's day and ours is but small. the most recent instances of all, the hand-to-hand fighting in manchuria, take us back to the napoleonic struggles. therefore, despite the eighty years that have intervened, the writings of clausewitz are still valuable from a tactical point of view, always considering of course the difference in weapons, because of the human heart in battle. his ideas on tactics have largely filtered through his german pupils into our textbooks, minus the psychological or moral note, so that it is not necessary to go at length into the subject, or give a number of extracts. it would be wearisome. i will, however, give a few passages at haphazard as illustrations. flank attacks the endeavour to gain the enemy's line of retreat, and protect our own, on which so much learned erudition has been spent by various writers, he regards as a natural instinct, which will always produce itself both in generals and subalterns. "from this arises, in the whole conduct of war, and especially in great and small combats, a perfect instinct, which is the security of our own line of retreat and the seizure of the enemy's; this follows from the conception of victory, which, as we have seen, is something beyond mere slaughter. in this effort we see, therefore, the first immediate purpose in the combat, and one which is quite universal. no combat is _imaginable_ in which this effort, either in its double or single form, is not to go hand in hand with the plain and simple stroke of force. even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon the enemy without thinking of its line of retreat, and in most cases it will have an eye upon that of the enemy."[ ] "this is a great _natural law_ of the combat," "and so becomes the pivot upon which all strategical and tactical manoeuvres turn." reserves--destructive and decisive act the combat he regards as settled by whoever has the preponderance of moral force at the end; that is, in fresh or only partly used up troops. the combat itself he divides into a destructive and a decisive act. during the long destructive act, or period of fire preparation, the troops engaged gradually wear each other out, and gradually almost cease to count as factors in the decision. "after a fire combat of some hours' duration, in which a body of troops has suffered severe losses--for instance, a quarter or one-third of its numbers--the _débris_ may for the time be looked upon as a heap of cinders. for the men are physically exhausted; they have spent their ammunition; many have left the field with the wounded, though not themselves wounded (compare, for instance, eylau and the battles); the rest think they have done their part for the day, and if they get beyond the sphere of danger, do not willingly return to it. the feeling of courage with which they originally started has had the edge taken off, the longing for the fight is satisfied, the original organization is partly destroyed, and the formations broken up." "so that the amount of moral force lost may be estimated by the amount of the reserves used up, almost as with a foot rule."[ ] this goes on till, "in all probability, only the untouched reserve and some troops which, though they have been in action, have suffered very little, are in reality to be regarded as serviceable, and the remainder (perhaps four-sixths) may be looked upon for the present as a "caput mortuum." therefore the art of the commander he regards as "economy of force" during the destructive period; that is, to employ as few troops as possible, by taking advantage of ground, cover, etc., "to use a smaller number of men in the combat with firearms than the enemy employs," so that a smaller proportionate number of his own are reduced to a "heap of cinders" and more are left, more moral force, for the decision. "hundreds of times," he says, "a line of fire has maintained its own against one twice its strength" (_e.g._ the boers). to do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect demands very skilful handling of the troops, both on the part of the chief and subordinate leaders. with the preponderance thus obtained the commander at last starts the decision. "towards the close of a battle the line of retreat is always regarded with increased jealousy, therefore a threat against that line is always a potent means of bringing on the decision (liao-yang, mukden). on that account, when circumstances permit, the plan of battle will be aimed at that point from the very first." or, "if this wear and tear and exhaustion of the forces has reached a certain pitch, then a rapid advance in concentrated masses on one side against the line of battle of the other" (_i.e._ the napoleonic breaking the centre, of recent years thought almost hopeless, but revived in manchuria with success, in the case of nodzu breaking the centre at mukden). from what precedes it is evident that, as in the preparatory acts, the utmost economy of forces must prevail, so in the decisive act to win the mastery through _numbers_ must be the ruling idea. just as in the preparatory acts endurance, firmness and coolness are the first qualities, so in the decisive act boldness and fiery spirit must predominate. "the difference between these two acts will never be completely lost as respects the whole." "this is the way in which our view is to be understood; then, on the one hand, it will not come short of the reality, and on the other it will direct the attention of the leader of a combat (be it great or small, partial or general) to giving each of the two acts of activity its due share, so that there may be neither precipitation nor negligence. "_precipitation_ there will be if space and time are not allowed for the destructive act. _negligence_ in general there will be if a complete decision does not take place, either from want of moral courage or from a wrong view of the situation."[ ] duration of the combat "even the resistance of an ordinary division of , or , men of all arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably superior in numbers, will last several hours, if the advantages of country are not too preponderating. and if the enemy is only a little or not at all superior in numbers, the combat will last half a day. a corps of three or four divisions will prolong it to double that time; an army of , or , men to three or four times." "these calculations are the result of experience."[ ] as general von caemmerer points out, if these calculations were adhered to in present-day german manoeuvres, as they are now in all war games, tactical exercises, and staff rides, the dangerous dualism of their training, the difference between theory and manoeuvre practice, would cease. attack and defence i have left to the last the consideration of three or four disputed points in clausewitz. in considering these i shall quote a good deal from general von caemmerer's "development of strategical science," as in such matters it is best to quote the most recent authors of established reputation. the most important of these, and the most disputed, is clausewitz's famous dictum that "the defensive is the stronger form of making war." "the defence is the stronger form of war with a negative object; the attack is the weaker form with a positive object."[ ] general von caemmerer says, "it is strange, we germans look upon clausewitz as indisputably the deepest and acutest thinker upon the subject of war; the beneficial effect of his intellectual labours is universally recognized and highly appreciated; but the more or less keen opposition against this sentence never ceases. and yet that sentence can as little be cut out of his work 'on war' as the heart out of a man. our most distinguished and prominent military writers are here at variance with clausewitz. "now, of course, i do not here propose to go into such a controversy. i only wish to point out that clausewitz, in saying this, only meant the defensive-offensive, the form in which he always regards it, both strategically and technically, in oft-repeated explanations all through his works. for instance-- "it is a first maxim never to remain perfectly passive, but to fall upon the enemy in front and flank, even when he is in the act of making an attack upon us."[ ] and again-- "_a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive._ he who does not at once think of it at the right moment, or rather he who does not from the first include this transition in his idea of the defensive, will never understand its superiority as a form of war."[ ] von caemmerer comments thus: "and this conception of the defence by clausewitz has become part and parcel of our army--everywhere, strategically and tactically, he who has been forced into a defensive attitude at once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack. i am thus unable to see how the way in which clausewitz has contrasted attack and defence could in any way paralyse the spirit of enterprise." von caemmerer also justly remarks that, as clausewitz always insisted both in strategy and tactics, neither attack nor defence is pure, but oscillates between the two forms; and as the attack is frequently temporarily reduced to defend itself, and also as no nation can be sure of never being invaded by a superior coalition, it is most desirable to encourage a belief in the strength of the defence, if properly used. in this i think that wellington would probably have agreed. certainly austerlitz and waterloo were examples of battles such as clausewitz preferred. still, one must admit that clausewitz's chapter on "the relations of the offensive and defensive to each other in tactics," book vii. chapter , is the least convincing chapter of his work. strategically, the argument is stronger. it always seems to me that we must remember that clausewitz had taken part in the defensive-offensive in its strongest, most absolute and unlimited form, on the greatest possible scale--the moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated before a single flake of snow fell) of the grand army. if he had lived to complete the revision of his works, it always seems to me that he would have made his theory undeniable by stating that the defensive is the strongest form of war, _if unlimited by space_. what, for instance, would have happened if the japanese had tried to march through siberia on to st. petersburg? but, after all, which of the two is absolutely the stronger form of war, attack or defence, is merely a theoretical abstraction, for, practically, the choice is always settled for us by the pressing necessity of circumstances. and, in this connection, let us always bear in mind clausewitz's dictum: "a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive." the inner line a second disputed point is clausewitz's alleged preference, as a rule, for the inner line in strategy. but it is necessary to remember that that was only due to the conditions of his time, before railways and telegraphs, when it was difficult to communicate between columns acting on concentric lines. and he is not in any way wedded to the inner line, like jomini, but _only_ when circumstances are favourable. he has many sentences from which we may infer that, had he lived in railway and telegraph days, his strategy, like moltke's, his most distinguished pupil, would have aimed at envelopment as a rule. for to bring up troops rapidly by several railways necessitates a broad strategic front, and clausewitz especially lays down rapidity as his second great principle, and says-- "if the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss of time, and the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too great, then the same may be justifiable on these grounds; for _to effect an unnecessary concentration of the forces_ would be contrary to the second principle we have laid down (_i.e._ 'to act as swiftly as possible')."[ ] also: "such separation into several columns as is absolutely necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form, _for that form is natural to the attack, and must not be disregarded without good reason_."[ ] also: "_it is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the action._" so that while the conditions of his time led clausewitz to prefer close concentration and the inner line, like napoleon, yet his reflections led him to propound the germ of the strategy of moltke. substitute for clausewitz's close concentration this: "as close concentration, the combined movements regulated by telegraph, as is compatible with the utmost use of the railways and the greatest rapidity" (as he would certainly have said), and we arrive at moltke's strategy. frontal attacks a third disputed point is his belief in the superior tactical efficiency, under favourable circumstances, of the napoleonic method of breaking the enemy's line in the centre. breaking the line by a frontal attack was, of course, much easier in clausewitz's napoleonic day than it is with the long-ranging arms of our day, and it is only natural that clausewitz in his writings should give it the full tactical importance which it then deserved. his book would not be true to the tactical conditions of his day had he not done so, with rivoli, austerlitz, salamanca, eckmuhl, etc., before his mind. but it seems hardly correct to accuse him of over-partiality to frontal attacks, for he has examined both frontal and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving to each their relative advantages and disadvantages, and concluding: "the envelopment may lead directly to the _destruction_ of the enemy's army, if it is made with very superior numbers and succeeds. if it leads to victory the early results are _in every case_ greater than by breaking the enemy's line. breaking the enemy's line can only lead indirectly to the destruction of the enemy's army, and its effects are hardly shown so much on the first day, but rather strategically afterwards,"[ ] by forcing apart on different lines of retreat the separated fragments of the beaten army. "the breaking through the hostile army by massing our principal force against one point, _supposes an excessive length of front on the part of the enemy_; for in this form of attack the difficulty of occupying the remainder of the enemy's force with few troops is greater, because the enemy's forces nearer to the principal point of attack can easily join in opposing it. now in an attack upon the centre there are such forces on both sides of the attack; in an attack upon a flank, only on one side. the consequence of this is that such a central attack may easily end in a very disadvantageous form of combat, _through a convergent counter-attack_." which is exactly our modern difficulty. "the choice between these two forms of attack must therefore be made according to the existing conditions of the moment. length of front, the nature and direction of the line of retreat, the military qualities of the enemy's troops, and the characteristics of their general, lastly the ground must determine the choice." speaking generally he regards the _concentric_ enveloping form of tactical attack aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as the most efficacious and natural. "on the field of battle itself ... the enveloping form must always be considered the most effectual."[ ] and the _eccentric_ or frontal counter-attack at the extended enveloping attack as the most efficacious and natural form of the defence, such as napoleon's counter-attacks at austerlitz or dresden, or wellington's at salamanca. "and we think that one means is at least as good as the other."[ ] * * * * * now i think that these extracts sufficiently defend clausewitz from the imputation of too great a belief in frontal attacks, and considering the frequent success of such napoleonic attacks in his day, he gives a very fair summing up of the relative advantages and disadvantages thereof, and indeed such as might be written in the present day. indeed the quite abnormal conditions of the boer war produced such a feeling against frontal attacks, and so much loose talk of their being extinct, that it is very useful to turn to clausewitz for a reminder that breaking the centre, whenever the condition he postulates, namely _over-extension of front_ on the enemy's part, is present, will always remain one of the two great forms of decisive attack open to a commander. and as in our day the forces are so enormous that to reach the hostile flank becomes more difficult, and the extension of front becomes so gigantic (a front of several armies on a line of forty to seventy miles perhaps), it is well to consider whether breaking the enemy's centre will not again offer the most advantageous form for the final decisive act, coupled of course, as clausewitz says it always must be, with a strong flank attack. and in these gigantic battles of the future, such as liao-yang and mukden, which we must consider typical of the future, battles which must take several days, during which the troops in the first line become utterly exhausted and used up,--a decisive attack on the centre can well be imagined after the hostile reserves have been decoyed away over a day's march by a strong flank attack. as, for example, nogi's flank attack round mukden followed by nodzu's decisive breaking the centre and capture of mukden itself. so that far from thinking clausewitz's remarks about frontal attacks and breaking the line to be obsolete, it rather appears from the great russo-japanese battles that they are worthy of close study in view of the future. tactical versus strategical envelopment a fourth disputed point is the preference of clausewitz, owing to his insistence on the greatest concentration possible with proper regard for the circumstances, for the tactical envelopment arranged on or near the field to strategical envelopment with divided forces arranged beforehand. in this matter i will again quote general v. caemmerer, who disagrees with him, and says: "clausewitz proclaims the oblique front as the most effective strategic form of attack, ... that is to say, when the whole army with one united front falls upon the strategic _flank_ of the enemy, and, if victorious, cuts him from his line of retreat. but where such a situation cannot be brought about, where our advance has brought us before the strategic _front_ of the enemy, then he sees in the tactical envelopment, in the formation of an offensive flank, the proper means of effectively preparing to push the enemy from his line of retreat, and he distinctly explains that tactical envelopment need not at all be the _consequence_ of strategical envelopment, and need not at all be prepared long beforehand by a corresponding advance of divided forces." clausewitz says, "the consequence of this is that battles fought with enveloping lines, or even with an oblique front, which should properly result from an advantageous relation of the lines of communication, are commonly the result of a moral and physical preponderance."[ ] also "he should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width of front as will admit of their all coming into action together." "such separation into several columns should be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form" (_i.e._ by troops within a day's march of each other). "but it must be only of a tactical nature, for a strategic envelopment, when a great blow is to be struck, is a complete waste of power." general v. caemmerer comments: "he is thus of opinion that the lateral movement of part of the army against the flank of the enemy could without any difficulty still be carried out as initiated by the plan of battle; and in order to understand this idea we must again bear in mind the difference between the fire-effect of then and now. in those days a comparatively short movement made it still possible for a considerable portion of the army to gain the defenders' flank; to-day a lengthy and troublesome operation would be necessary for the same object, and its successful execution would only be counted upon if the defender remained entirely passive, and would neither think of a counter-stroke nor of a corresponding movement of his forces to the threatened flank." without going into this controversy i will, however, quote the excellent reason given by clausewitz for his preference for tactical as opposed to strategical envelopment: "one peculiarity of the offensive battle is the uncertainty, in most cases, as to the position (note, and strength) of the enemy; it is a complete groping about amongst things that are unknown (austerlitz, wagram, hohenlinden, jena, katzbach). the more this is the case the more concentration of forces becomes paramount, and turning a flank to be preferred to surrounding."[ ] it is also well to recollect how many famous generals had been ruined in clausewitz's experience through over-extension or dispersion of their forces. the crushing defeats of napoleon's marshals in the winter of , macdonald at the katzbach, oudinot at gros beeren, ney at dennewitz, which neutralized napoleon's great victory at dresden and began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to this cause. and the weather may, again, have as great influence in shortening resistance and allowing troops to be overwhelmed before the too-distant reinforcements arrive, as it had in those battles. if the weather then prevented the old muskets going off, and enabled the attack to rush the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or snow, by restricting the field of view and fire, may produce the same results. when one thinks of the number of great battles fought in such weather, as they may well be again, one sees an additional reason for carefully considering clausewitz's warning. far from relegating his preference for the tactical as opposed to the strategical envelopment to the region of the obsolete, because of our improved armament, it seems right to give it full weight as a corrective to a perceivable tendency to elevate strategical envelopment (after königgrätz) into a formula for victory. if in the past many great generals have been ruined by over-extension, so may they be again. against this tendency clausewitz will for ever lift his voice. also it remains to be considered, with the huge armies of to-day and the future, such armies as at liao-yang and mukden, such armies as may possibly one day join issue in afghanistan, whether strategical envelopment will be practicable, or whether tactical envelopment, such as general kuroki's tactical enveloping movement on yentai, and the russian line of retreat at liao-yang, or general nogi's tactical enveloping dash northward on hsinminting and the railway at mukden, will not be preferable. perhaps, as a compromise, one might call such a movement strategical-tactical, and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of words. i have not attempted to do more than roughly indicate that the solution of these four disputed tactical questions in clausewitz is to be sought in a study of the latest campaign, as he would have said himself; that is, the campaign in manchuria. for, as the _times_ correspondent in the xlvth chapter, "clausewitz in manchuria," of his book "the war in the far east," observes, "it will be abundantly clear to any one who has followed the great battles in manchuria that the spirit of clausewitz has presided over japanese victories and wept over russian defeats." chapter xii changes since the days of clausewitz in reading clausewitz it is, first, the great principles of the nature of war founded on human nature, which alter not; and, secondly, it is his spirit and practical way of looking at things that we want to assimilate and apply to the problems of to-day, to which end it is necessary to read him always with the changed conditions of to-day in our minds, and think what he would have said under the circumstances. these changes are chiefly:-- ( ) the improved net-work of roads. ( ) railways. ( ) telegraphs, wire and wireless. ( ) improved arms. ( ) aviation ( ) universal service armies. the improved net-work of roads the improved net-work of roads in europe (not, of course, in manchuria, or in afghanistan where we have to consider our future strategy, but in europe), as general v. caemmerer puts it, "now offers to the movements of armies everywhere a whole series of useful roads where formerly one or two only were available," easier gradients, good bridges instead of unreliable ones, etc. so that the march-discipline of that day when concentrated for battle, artillery and train _on_ the roads, infantry and cavalry _by the side_ of the roads, has disappeared. such close concentration is therefore now not possible, as we move all arms _on_ the road, and an army corps with train, or two without, is the most that we can now calculate on bringing into action in one day on one road. railways "railways have, above all, completely altered the term 'base,'" remarks v. caemmerer. "railways carry in a few days men, horses, vehicles, and materials of all kinds from the remotest district to any desired point of our country, and nobody would any longer think of accumulating enormous supplies of all kinds at certain fortified points on his own frontier with the object of basing himself on those points. one does not base one's self any longer on a distinct district which is specially prepared for that object, but upon the whole country, which has become one single magazine, with separate store-rooms. so the term 'base' has now to be considered in this light." it is only when operating in savage or semi-savage countries, where there are no railways, that the old idea of a base applies. as we penetrate deeper and further from our own country into the enemy's, and as a small raiding party can demolish the railway line so as to stop all traffic for days or weeks, it becomes far more necessary than it ever was in clausewitz's day to guard our communications. and armies become more and more sensitive to any attack upon their communications. also "such a line cannot easily be changed, and consequently those celebrated changes of the line of communication in an enemy's country which napoleon himself, on some occasion, declared to be the ablest manoeuvre in the art of war, could scarcely be carried out any more" (v. caemmerer). also concentration by means of several railways demands a broad strategic front, which produces that separation of corps or armies which prepares the way for strategical envelopment, and so on. general von der goltz, in his "conduct of war," says: "the more recent treatises on the conduct of war on a large scale are principally taken up with the mobilization and strategical concentration of armies, a department of strategy which only began to play an important part in modern times. it is the result of a dense net-work of railways in western europe which has rendered it possible to mass large bodies of troops in a surprisingly brief time. each power tries to outdo its neighbours in this respect, ... which gives an opportunity to the strategical specialist to show off his brilliant qualities.... consequently it is now frequently assumed that the whole conduct of war is comprised in this one section of it." this over-estimate is of course an error, which, however, requires to be pointed out. telegraphs the telegraph has very greatly reduced the danger of separation. the great advantage of the inner line in the day of napoleon and of clausewitz was that separated forces could only communicate by mounted messengers, so if the enemy got between them they could not communicate at all, nor act in concert. this the telegraph has completely altered, for as the field telegraph can now be laid as quickly as an army can advance, the most widely separated bodies of troops can every day arrange combined operations by telegraph through, if necessary, a point one hundred or four hundred miles in rear. so that to-day the chief advantage of the inner line has gone, while its chief disadvantage, the possibility of being surrounded, remains. maps we now possess complete detailed ordnance maps of every country in europe, kept up to date by the latest alterations, whereas in the days of clausewitz maps were of the very roughest character, and quite unreliable in comparison. improved arms smokeless powder, quick-firing and long-ranging artillery and rifles, the infantry field of effective fire being ten times, the artillery five times what it was in clausewitz's time, have all to be borne in mind when reading the tactical part of his writings. in consequence, also, cover and the tactical use of ground are of far greater importance now than then, etc., etc., etc. aviation the recent wonderful developments in aviation will obviously almost revolutionize "information in war." to what extent, it is as yet impossible to say. each year will teach us more. the nation-in-arms the nation-in-arms as the common foundation of all armies (except our own), brought up by railways, vastly increases the numbers in a modern battle from what they were in clausewitz's day. compare austerlitz, dresden, leipzig and waterloo, with liao-yang and mukden. it should be so with us also, for as general von der goltz says in "the conduct of war": "the best military organization is that which renders available all the intellectual and material resources of the country in event of war. _a state is not justified in trying to defend itself with only a portion of its strength, when the existence of the whole is at stake._" in great britain the difference which the introduction of this nation-in-arms principle has made in our military strength compared with that of our future opponents, a difference relatively far greater against us than it was in napoleon's and clausewitz's day, is as yet hardly realized by the people, or by our statesmen. people forget the wastage of war, and the necessity for a constant flow of troops to repair that wastage. as von der goltz puts it: "it is characteristic of the strategical offensive that the foremost body of troops of an army, the portion which fights the battles, amounts to only a comparatively small fraction, frequently only _a quarter or even one-eighth_, of the total fighting strength employed, whilst the fate of the whole army throughout depends upon the success or failure of this fraction. _attacking armies melt away like snow in the spring._" to condense his remarks: "in spite of the most admirable discipline, the prussian guard corps lost to men in the marches between the attack on st. privat and the battle of sedan." "napoleon crossed the niemen in with , men, but reached moscow only three months later with only , ." in the spring of , the french crossed the pyrenees with , men, but still marshal massena in the end only brought , men up to the lines of torres vedras, near lisbon, where the decision lay. again, in , the russians put , men in the field, but had barely , left when, at adrianople, a skilfully concluded peace saved them before their weakness became apparent and a reaction set in. in the russians led , across the danube, but they only brought , men--of whom only , were effective, the rest being sick--to the gates of constantinople. in the germans crossed the french frontier with , men, but after only a six weeks' campaign brought but , men to paris. and so on. the result of it all is simple--that a people which is not based on the modern principle of the nation-in-arms cannot for long rival or contend with one that is, for it can neither put an equal (still less a superior) army into the field at the outset (_vide_ clausewitz's first principle), nor even maintain in the field the _inferior_ army it does place there, because it cannot send the ever-required fresh supplies of trained troops. sooner or later this must tell. sooner or later a situation must arise in which the nation based on the obsolete voluntary system _must_ go down before a nation based on the nation-in-arms principle. circumstances change with time, and, as wise lord bacon said long ago, "he that will not adopt new remedies must expect new evils." may we adopt the remedy before we experience the evil! the moral and spiritual forces in war but though these changed conditions must, of course, _modify_ clausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete our circle and leave off where we started) i repeat that, as human nature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three to one in war, clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical philosopher on the actual nature of war, as _the chief exponent of the moral and spiritual forces in war_, will ever remain invaluable in the study of war. consider what unsurpassed opportunities he had for observing and reflecting on the influence of enthusiasm and passion, of resolution and boldness, of vacillation and weakness, of coolness and caution, of endurance and hardship, of patriotism and freedom, of ambition and of glory--on war, either by his own experience or by conversation with other equally experienced soldiers, during that long period of almost endless wars between and . the fervour and enthusiasm and boundless energy of the revolution, which drove the french forward, smashing everything before them, at the beginning; the ambition, military glory, plunder and greed, which animated them later on; the patriotism, religious and loyal devotion, and stern endurance, which nerved the russian hosts then as now; that awful moscow winter campaign, when human nature rose to its highest and sank to its lowest, when the extremes of heroic endurance and selfish callousness were visible side by side; the magnificent uprising of the spirit of liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression in germany, which gave to the prussian recruits and landwehr the same driving force that revolutionary enthusiasm had formerly given to the french; the passing, therefore, in of the moral superiority, the greater driving force, from the french to the allies. clausewitz saw all this; he conversed intimately with such men as scharnhorst and gneisenau, who saw and guided it, too. all his friends had seen it also. no wonder, then, that such an unexampled series of warlike phenomena deeply impressed his reflective mind with the supreme importance of the moral and spiritual factors in war. his opportunities for long-continued observation of warlike phenomena were far greater than those of any writer since his day, and it is to be hoped they will remain so. for we have no desire to see another series of wars such as the napoleonic. it is fortunate for us that there was then such a man as clausewitz to sum up for us so simply and so clearly the accumulated experiences of those long, long years of carnage and devastation. _printed by hazell, watson & viney, ld., london and aylesbury._ footnotes: [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] summary of instruction to h.r.h. the crown prince. [ ] summary of instruction, p. . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] prefatory "notice" by clausewitz. [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] by gaining public opinion, clausewitz means, to force the enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission. [ ] summary of instruction to h.r.h. the crown prince. [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] author's "introduction." [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book viii. chaps. , and . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book viii. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chaps. - . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book v. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book viii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book vi. chap. . [ ] book v. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book viii. chap. . [ ] book viii. chap. . [ ] summary of instruction to h.r.h. the crown prince. [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] this warning as to the consequences of allowing information to be published freely which would be helpful to an enemy was written five years ago. in the present war the prudent reticence of our press, and its loyal co-operation with the government in depriving the enemy of any helpful information, show that the lesson here insisted on has been learned.--editor's note. [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] "guide to tactics," vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book vi. chap. . [ ] summary of instruction to h.r.h. the crown prince. [ ] book vi. chap. . [ ] book viii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] summary of instruction, "guide to tactics," par. . [ ] book vi. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . transcriber's notes: punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed. simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained. ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. page : paragraph ends with: "otherwise," rather than with a period. archive (https://archive.org/) nore: images of the original pages are available through internet archive. see https://archive.org/details/bookofwarmilitar caltiala transcriber's note: text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). changes made are listed at the end of the text. the book of war the military classic of the far east translated from the chinese by captain e. f. calthrop, r.f.a. london john murray, albemarle st., w. contents page introduction the articles of suntzu i. preliminary reckoning ii. operations of war iii. the attack by stratagem iv. the order of battle v. the spirit of the troops vi. emptiness and strength vii. battle tactics viii. the nine changes ix. movement of troops x. ground xi. nine grounds xii. assault by fire xiii. the employment of spies the sayings of wutzu introduction i. the government of a country ii. estimation of the enemy iii. control of the army iv. qualities of the general v. suiting the occasion vi. encouragement of the troops the book of war introduction i written in the fifth century b.c., suntzu and wutzu still remain the most celebrated works on war in the literature of china. while the chariot has gone, and weapons have changed, these ancient masters have held their own, since they deal chiefly with the fundamental principles of war, with the influence of politics and human nature on military operations; and they show in a most striking way how unchanging these principles are. when these books were written, china was a conglomerate of principalities in continual ferment. personal ambition and intrigue, and not the wishes of the people, were the main factors in these wars. patriotism, or a popular cause, could not, therefore, be relied on to maintain the _moral_ of the levies. instead of these, what may be called the force of despair is pointed out as the most powerful agent in giving cohesion and energy to an army. the general is urged to take a vigorous offensive; and to act at a distance from his base, where defeat means disaster, and where desertion is minimised owing to the distance from home. he should, in fact, burn his boats before an action, or, in chinese phrase, act as one who removes the ladder from under those mounted upon the roof. on the other hand, every care must be taken not to render the enemy desperate; and, as an instance of this, sun observes that an opponent should on no account be completely surrounded. a loop-hole of escape weakens the resolution of the general and the energy of his troops. it is interesting to notice that _moral_, or the spirit of the troops, is thus considered a determining factor in war. the chinese are perhaps unusually affected by climatic conditions. as is well known, the umbrella was part of a soldier's equipment; and for the same reasons, the sunny side of high ground is recommended as most suitable for defence, tactical considerations permitting. the large number of bannermen in the chinese army was out of all proportion to the service of standards in providing rallying points. the chief use of banners was to maintain the spirit of the troops. a forest of banners, held erect, gave a feeling of liveliness and security to the ranks, in the same way as a military band, and when sun remarks that the march of an army should be calm like the forest, he is using a simile that is not inappropriate. probably owing to the fact that the profession of arms has never been highly regarded in china, we find that the ruler of the state did not usually take the field, but employed a professional to command the army--one of the masters of war who wandered from state to state at that time with the secrets of victory to impart to the highest bidder. the question of political interference with the general in the field naturally arises under these conditions. the two sages point out, that to unite the nation under firm and just government is the business of the ruler and necessary to victory; but that the general is the best judge of the questions that arise on a distant field, and that all interference with him causes delay and disaster. war meaning ravage, it was essential that the operations should be conducted in the enemy's territory. once there, however, a vigorous offensive is no longer advised. "at first behave with the discretion of a maiden" is the counsel of sun. the enemy must be induced to take the initiative, and when he is worn out by marching, or makes a false move, "then," says the master, "dart in like a rabbit." unlike the tactics of the japanese, in whom the spirit of attack burns so strongly, those of suntzu and wutzu are essentially of the offensive-defensive order--manoeuvre before fighting, and non-committal until the enemy has shown his hand. the business of the general is to avoid encounter in battle until the enemy is no longer capable of offering a successful resistance. the masters do not make, however, the mistake of advocating a passive defensive. suntzu lays down that the division of the forces which this strategy involves, is to be everywhere weak, rendering the army liable to be taken in detail by the concentrated forces of the enemy. it is rather the defence which avoids battle by mobility and manoeuvre, induces the enemy by stratagem to divide his forces, or act in conformity with our wishes, and then falls upon him. with regard to the tactics of the battlefield, the pitched battle, or, in other words, the frontal attack, is considered unworthy of the skilful general. the plan of attack should consist, broadly speaking, in the division of the army into two forces. the enemy is "attracted and engaged by one force, and defeated with the other;" and here we have the containing or secondary attack, and the main or reserve force which decides the battle of to-day--a most striking instance of the continuity of military principles. considerable space is devoted to the influence of ground on war. the passage of defiles and rivers is still conducted in the same way. the many large rivers of china naturally affected military operations; and, among other axioms, it is laid down that the passage of a river should not be disputed, as the enemy will probably give up the attempt, and make the passage untouched at some other point, but that he should be attacked when half his force is across the stream. again, an army should not encamp on a river below the enemy, as it is thereby liable to be inundated, or to have its water poisoned; or the enemy may come down stream and make a sudden attack. while both writers were professional soldiers, they show a fine disinterestedness by repeatedly pointing out that even successful war brings evil in its train. wu remarks that "few are those who have gained power on earth by many victories," and he is insistent that war should not be undertaken until a careful comparison of the two sides shows that victory is certain; and he adds, "the army which conquers makes certain of victory and then attacks, while the army that is defeated fights in the hope of success." hence the importance they assign to intelligence of the enemy, and to the spy; and as the sages dealt with war between members of the same race, the work of spies was greatly facilitated. the spy was treated with great honour by his countrymen, and the fact that many of the national heroes of china were spies, shows that the part that they played was not forgotten. they frequently toiled for years, and rose to high rank in the enemy's service; and thus, by wrong counsel and by spreading mistrust in his ranks, they became a two-edged sword in the hands of the general. "wonderful, indeed, is their power," exclaims sun; but he also reminds us that their management is the most difficult and delicate duty of the general. ii sun and wu are perhaps held in even greater reverence in japan than in china, where war is looked upon as a troublesome phase in national life, and victory in battle is not considered the greatest achievement of a state. far otherwise is it in japan; and successive generations of her soldiers have been brought up on sun and wu. like other arts, mystery was formerly supposed to surround the art of war, a belief that was encouraged by the strategist; and for a considerable time, the few copies of this book, that were brought over from china to japan, were jealously guarded by their possessors. later, as they became known, an army of japanese commentators arose--for chinese literature is thought compressed, to be unfolded in the mind of the reader. to-day sun and wu have given way to the scientific works of european writers, but their sayings have become proverbs, and their influence undoubtedly helped the japanese to victory in the late war. belief in the importance of a knowledge of the enemy and his resources, of preparation and training, had grown out of a long study of these ancient masters; and since it was the vital importance of a successful issue to the japanese which, after all, fired their resolution and carried them through, they proved the sage's words that it is the energy, born of despair, that wins the victory. iii little is known of the life of either master. they were in no sense patriots but professional strategists, continually changing their employer. chinese history tells a famous story about sun. a certain ruler asked sun to give a practical demonstration of his principles in the neighbourhood of the palace, and entrusted him with the women of the court for this purpose. during the operations, the leader of one of the sides did not obey the master's instructions, and her execution was ordered. she happened to be the king's favourite wife, but sun pointed out that the king's wish that her life should be spared was a case of political interference with the general in the field; and the sentence was carried out. wu is represented as a person of low moral character. on two separate occasions, for fear of giving rise to suspicion, he killed one of his wives who belonged to a state with which his employer at the time was at war; and, graver still in the eyes of the chinese historian, he was not present at the death-bed of his mother. e. f. c. note. the translator is indebted to major j. c. somerville for his kind help and criticism. the articles of suntzu i preliminary reckoning the words of sun the master:-- to all nations war is a great matter. upon the army death or life depend: it is the means of the existence or destruction _of the state_. therefore it must be diligently studied. now, in war, besides stratagem and the situation, there are five indispensable matters. the first is called the way;[ ] the second, heaven; the third, earth; the fourth, the leader; the fifth, law. the _way_ or the proper conduct of man. if the ruling authority be upright, the people are united: fearless of danger, their lives are at the service of their lord. _heaven._ yin and yang;[ ] heat and cold; time and season. _earth._ distance; nature; extent; strategic position. the _leader_. intelligence; truth; benevolence; courage and strictness. _law._ partition and ordering of troops. these things must be known by the leader: to know them is to conquer; to know them not is to be defeated. further, with regard to these and the following seven matters, the condition of the enemy must be compared with our own. the seven matters are:-- the virtue of the prince; the ability of the general; natural advantages; the discipline of the armies; the strength of the soldiers; training of the soldiers; justice both in reward and punishment. knowing these things, i can foretell the victor. if a general under me fight according to my plans, he always conquers, and i continue to employ him; if he differ from my plans, he will be defeated and dismissed from my service. wherefore, with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage, and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises victory; but as the moment and method cannot be fixed beforehand, the plan must be modified according to circumstances. war is a thing of pretence: therefore, when capable of action, we pretend disability; when near to the enemy, we pretend to be far; when far away, we pretend to be near. allure the enemy by giving him a small advantage. confuse and capture him. if there be defects, give an appearance of perfection, and awe the enemy. pretend to be strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you. make him angry, and confuse his plans. pretend to be inferior, and cause him to despise you. if he have superabundance of strength, tire him out; if united, make divisions in his camp. attack weak points, and appear in unexpected places. these are the secrets of the successful strategist, therefore they must not be made known beforehand. at the reckoning in the sanctuary before fighting, victory is to the side that excels _in the foregoing matters_. they that have many of these will conquer; they that have few will not conquer; hopeless, indeed, are they that have none. if the condition of both sides with regard to these matters be known, i can foretell the victor. ii operations of war sun the master said:-- now the requirements of war are such that we need a thousand light chariots with four horses each; a thousand leather-covered chariots, and one hundred thousand armoured men; and we must send supplies to distant fields. wherefore the cost at home and in the field, the entertainment of guests, glue and lacquer for repairs, and necessities for the upkeep of waggons and armour are such that in one day a thousand pieces of gold are spent. with that amount a force of one hundred thousand men can be raised:--you have the instruments of victory. but, even if victorious, let the operations long continue, and the soldiers' ardour decreases, the weapons become worn, and, if a siege be undertaken, strength disappears. again, if the war last long, the country's means do not suffice. then, when the soldiers are worn out, weapons blunted, strength gone and funds spent, neighbouring princes arise and attack that weakened country. at such a time the wisest man cannot mend the matter. for, while quick accomplishment has been known to give the victory to the unskilful, the skilful general has never gained advantage from lengthy operations. in fact, there never has been a country which has benefited from a prolonged war. he who does not know the evils of war will not reap advantage thereby. he who is skilful in war does not make a second levy, does not load his supply waggons thrice. war material and arms we obtain from home, but food sufficient for the army's needs can be taken from the enemy. the cost of supplying the army in distant fields is the chief drain on the resources of a state: if the war be distant, the citizens are impoverished. in the neighbourhood of an army prices are high, and so the money of the soldiers and followers is used up. likewise the state funds are exhausted, and frequent levies must be made; the strength of the army is dissipated, money is spent, the citizen's home swept bare: in all, seven-tenths of his income is forfeited. again, as regards state property, chariots are broken, horses worn out, armour and helmet, arrow and bow, spear, shield, pike and fighting tower, waggon and oxen used and gone, so that six-tenths of the government's income is spent. therefore the intelligent general strives to feed on the enemy; one bale of the enemy's rice counts as twenty from our own waggons; one bundle of the enemy's forage is better than twenty of our own. incitement must be given to vanquish the enemy. they who take advantage of the enemy should be rewarded. they who are the first to lay their hands on more than ten of the enemy's chariots should be rewarded; the enemy's standard on the chariots exchanged for our own; the captured chariots mixed with our own chariots and taken into use. the accompanying warriors must be treated well, so that, while the enemy is beaten, our side increases in strength. now the object of war is victory; not lengthy operations, even skilfully conducted. the good general is the lord of the people's lives, the guardian of the country's welfare. iii the attack by stratagem sun the master said:-- now by the laws of war, better than defeating a country by fire and the sword, is to take it without strife. better to capture the enemy's army intact than to overcome it after fierce resistance. better to capture the "lu,"[ ] the "tsu" or the "wu" whole, than to destroy them in battle. to fight and conquer one hundred times is not the perfection of attainment, for the supreme art is to subdue the enemy without fighting. wherefore the most skilful warrior outwits the enemy by superior stratagem; the next in merit prevents the enemy from uniting his forces; next to him is he who engages the enemy's army; while to besiege his citadel is the worst expedient. a siege should not be undertaken if it can possibly be avoided. for, before a siege can be commenced, three months are required for the construction of stages, battering-rams and siege engines; then a further three months are required in front of the citadel, in order to make the "chuyin."[ ] wherefore the general is angered, his patience exhausted, his men surge like ants against the ramparts _before the time is ripe_, and one-third of them are killed to no purpose. such are the misfortunes that sieges entail. therefore the master of war causes the enemy's forces to yield, but without fighting; he captures his fortress, but without besieging it; and without lengthy fighting takes the enemy's kingdom. without tarnishing his weapons he gains the complete advantage. this is the assault by stratagem. by the rules of war, if ten times as strong as the enemy, surround him; with five times his strength, attack; with double his numbers, divide. if equal in strength, exert to the utmost, and fight; if inferior in numbers, manoeuvre _and await the opportunity_; if altogether inferior, offer no chance of battle. a determined stand by inferior numbers does but lead to their capture. the warrior is the country's support. if his aid be entire, the country is of necessity strong; if it be at all deficient, then is the country weak. now a prince may embarrass his army in three ways, namely:-- ignorant that the army in the field should not advance, to order it to go forward; or, ignorant that the army should not retreat, order it to retire. this is to tie the army as with a string. ignorant of military affairs, to rule the armies in the same way as the state. this is to perplex the soldiers. ignorant of the situation of the army, to settle its dispositions. this is to fill the soldiers with distrust. if the army be perplexed and distrustful, then dangers from neighbouring princes arise. the army is confounded, and offered up to the enemy. there are five occasions when victory can be foretold:-- when the general knows the time to fight and when not to fight; or understands when to employ large or small numbers; when government and people are of one mind; when the state is prepared, and chooses the enemy's unguarded moment for attack; when the general possesses ability, and is not interfered with by his prince. these five things are the heralds of victory. it has been said aforetime that he who knows both sides has nothing to fear in a hundred fights; he who is ignorant of the enemy, and fixes his eyes only on his own side, conquers, and the next time is defeated; he who not only is ignorant of the enemy, but also of his own resources, is invariably defeated. iv the order of battle sun the master said:-- the ancient masters of war first made their armies invincible, then waited until the adversary could with certainty be defeated. the causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the enemy's camp. skilful soldiers make defeat impossible, and further render the enemy incapable of victory. but, as it is written, the conditions necessary for victory may be present, but they cannot always be obtained. if victory be unattainable, we stand on the defensive; if victory be sure, we attack. deficiency compels defence; super-abundance permits attack. the skilful in defence crouch, hidden in the deepest shades; the skilful in attack push to the topmost heaven.[ ] if these precepts be observed, victory is certain. a victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the common folk, may not be a true success. to win in fight, and for the kingdom to say, "well done," does not mark the summit of attainment. to lift an autumn fleece[ ] is no proof of strength; the eyes that only see the sun and moon are not the eagle's; to hear the thunder is no great thing. as has been said aforetime, the able warrior gains the victory without desperate and bloody engagements, and wins thereby no reputation for wisdom or brave deeds. to fight is to win, for he attacks only when the enemy has sown the seeds of defeat. moreover, the skilful soldier in a secure position does not let pass the moment when the enemy should be attacked. the army that conquers makes certain of victory, and then seeks battle. the army destined to defeat, fights, trusting that chance may bring success to its arms. the skilful leader is steadfast in the "way"; upholds the law, and thereby controls the issue. touching the laws of war, it is said: first, the rule; second, the measure; third, the tables; fourth, the scales; fifth, the foretelling of victory. for the rule is the survey of land; the measure tells the amount of that land's produce; the tables its population; from the scales their weight or quality is made known; and then can we calculate victory or defeat. the army that conquers as against the army destined to defeat, is as a beam against a feather in the scales. the attack of conquering forces is as the outburst of long-pent-up waters into sunken valleys. such are the orders of battle. v the spirit of the troops sun the master said:-- the control of large numbers is possible, and like unto that of small numbers, if we subdivide them. by means of drum, bell and flag,[ ] the direction of large forces in battle is possible, and like unto the direction of small forces. by the skilful interchange of normal and abnormal manoeuvres are the armies certainly preserved from defeat. the enemy is crushed, like the fall of a grindstone upon an egg, by knowledge of his strength and weakness, and by the employment of truth and artifice. moreover, in battle the enemy is engaged with the normal and defeated by the abnormal force.[ ] the abnormal force, skilfully handled, is like the heaven and earth, eternal; as the tides and the flow of rivers, unceasing; like the sun and moon, for ever interchanging; coming and passing, as the seasons. there are five notes; but by combinations, innumerable harmonies are produced. there are but five colours; but if we mix them, the shades are infinite. there are five tastes, but if we mix them there are more flavours than the palate can distinguish.[ ] in war there are but two forces, the normal and the abnormal; but they are capable of infinite variation. their mutual interchange is like a wheel, having neither beginning or end. they are a mystery that none can penetrate. as the rush of rock-shouldering torrents, so is the spirit of the troops. like the well-judged flight of the falcon, in a flash crushing its quarry, so should the stroke be timed. wherefore the spirit of the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions sudden; like the stretched cross-bow, whose string is released at the touch of the trigger. in the maze and tumult of the battle, there is no confusion; in the thick of action the battle array is impenetrable. if discipline be perfect, disorder can be simulated; if truly bold, we can feign fear; if really strong, we can feign weakness. we simulate disorder by subdivision; fear, by spirit; weakness, by battle formation. we set the enemy in motion by adopting different formations to which he must conform. if we offer the enemy a point of advantage, he will certainly take it: we give him an advantage, set him in motion and then fall upon him. wherefore the good fighter seeks victory from spirit, and does not depend entirely upon the skill of his men. he is careful in his choice, and leaves the rest to battle force; yet, when an opening or advantage shows, he pushes it to its limits. as a log or rock which, motionless on flat ground, yet moves with ever-increasing force when set on an incline, so await the opportunity, and so act when the opportunity arrives. if the general be skilful, the spirit of his troops is as the impetus of a round stone rolled from the top of a high mountain. vi emptiness and strength sun the master said:-- to be the first in the field, and there to await the enemy, is to husband strength. to be late, and hurrying to advance to meet the foe, is exhausting. the good fighter contrives to make the enemy approach; he does not allow himself to be beguiled by the enemy. by offering an apparent advantage, he induces the enemy to take up a position that will cause his defeat; he plants obstructions to dissuade him from acting in such a way as to threaten his own dispositions. if the enemy be at rest in comfortable quarters, harass him; if he be living in plenty, cut off his supplies; if sitting composedly awaiting attack, cause him to move. this may be done by appearing where the enemy is not, and assaulting unexpected points. if we go where the enemy is not, we may go a thousand leagues without exhaustion. if we attack those positions which the enemy has not defended, we invariably take them: but on the defence we must be strong, even where we are not likely to be attacked. against those skilful in attack, the enemy does not know where to defend: against those skilful in defence, the enemy does not know where to attack. now the secrets of the art of offence are not to be easily apprehended, as a certain shape or noise can be understood, of the senses; but when these secrets are once learnt, the enemy is mastered. we attack, and the enemy cannot resist, because we attack his insufficiency; we retire, and the enemy cannot pursue, because we retire too quickly. again, when we are anxious to fight, but the enemy is serenely secure behind high walls and deep moats; we attack some such other place that he must certainly come out to relieve. when we do not want to fight, we occupy an unfortified line; and prevent the enemy from attacking by keeping him in suspense. by making feints, and causing the enemy to be uncertain as to our movements, we unite, whilst he must divide. we become one body; the enemy being separated into ten parts. we attack the divided ten with the united one. we are many, the enemy is few, and in superiority of numbers there is economy of strength. the place selected for attack must be kept secret. if the enemy know not where he will be attacked, he must prepare in every quarter, and so be everywhere weak. if the enemy strengthen his front, he must weaken his rear; if he strengthen his right, his left is weakened; and if he strengthen his left, his right is weakened. everywhere to make preparations, is to be everywhere weak. the enemy is weakened by his extended preparations, and we gain in strength. having decided on the place and day of attack, though the enemy be a hundred leagues away, we can defeat him. if the ground and occasion be not known, the front cannot help the rear; the left cannot support the right, nor the right the left, nor the rear the front. for on occasion, the parts of the army are two score leagues apart, while a distance of four or five leagues is comparatively close. the soldiers of wu[ ] are less than the soldiers of yueh; but as superiority in numbers does not of necessity bring victory, i say, then, that we may obtain the victory. if the enemy be many in number, prevent him from taking advantage of his superiority, and ascertain his plan of operations. provoke the enemy and discover the state of his troops; feint and discover the strength of his position. flap the wings, and unmask his sufficiency or insufficiency. by constant feints and excursions, we may produce on the enemy an impression of intangibility, which neither spies nor art can dispel. the general makes his plans in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy, and puts his hosts in motion; but the multitude cannot appreciate the general's intention; they see the signs of victory, but they cannot discover the means. if a victory be gained by a certain stratagem, do not repeat it. vary the stratagem according to circumstances. an army may be likened to water. water leaves dry the high places, and seeks the hollows. an army turns from strength and attacks emptiness. the flow of water is regulated by the shape of the ground; victory is gained by acting in accordance with the state of the enemy. the shape of water is indeterminate; likewise the spirit of war is not fixed. the leader who changes his tactics in accordance with his adversary, and thereby controls the issue, may be called the god of war. among the five elements[ ] there is no settled precedence; the four seasons come and go; the days are long and short; and the moon waxes and wanes. _so in war there is no fixity._ vii battle tactics sun the master said:-- for the most part, military procedure is as follows:-- the general receives orders from his lord; assembles and settles harmony among the forces, and takes the field. there is nothing more difficult than battle tactics. their difficulty lies in the calculation of time and distance, and the reversal of misfortune. to make the enemy take a circuitous route by a show of gain, and then, whilst starting after him, to arrive before him, is to be a master of the art of manoeuvre. the operations of an army may reap advantage; the wrangles of a multitude are fraught with peril. employing our whole force at one time in order to gain advantage over the enemy, we may not have time enough to gain our object. if we push on with a portion of the force only, the transport is lost. discarding helmet and armour; stopping neither day nor night; marching double distance; doing double work; and finally contending with the enemy at a distance of a hundred leagues: results in the loss of the general. since the strong men arrive first, and the tired drop in rear, only one-tenth of the forces is available. a forced march of fifty leagues to secure an advantage may result in failure to the leader of the vanguard, for only half his men will arrive. after a forced march of thirty leagues to secure an advantage, only two-thirds of the army will be available. further, a lack of ammunition, of supplies, or of stores, may lead to disaster. the ruler who is ignorant of the designs of neighbouring princes, cannot treat with them. he who is ignorant of mountain and forest, defile and marsh, cannot lead an army. he who does not employ a guide, cannot gain advantage from the ground. disguise your movements; await a favourable opportunity; divide or unite according to circumstance. let your attack be swift as the wind; your march calm like the forest;[ ] your occupation devastating as fire. in defence, as a mountain rest firm; like darkness impenetrable to the enemy. let your movements be swift as the lightning. let as many as possible take part in the plunder: distribute the profit from the captured territory. so he who understands the crooked and the straight way conquers. these are the methods of battle tactics. according to the ancient books on war, the drum and bell are used, because the voice does not carry; the flag is used to assist the sight. the use of bell, drum, banner and flag is to attract the united attention of eye and ear. when all are united, the strong are not left to go forward alone, the cowardly are not free to retreat unrestricted. in this way can a multitude be used. therefore in night fighting, beacons and drums are largely used; in day fighting, a great number of banners and flags and the enemy's eyes and ears are confounded. we thus awe his army, and defeat his general's ambition. in the morning the spirits are keen; at midday there is a laziness; in the evening a desire to return. wherefore, he who uses his soldiers well, avoids the time when the spirits are keen; but attacks the enemy when he is languid or seeking his camp. thus should the nature of energy be turned to account. to oppose confusion with order, clamour with quiet, is to have the heart under control. to await an enemy from a distance, to oppose hunger with satiety, rest with fatigue, is the way to husband strength. do not attack where lines of banners wave, nor the serried ranks of battle spread, but patiently await your time. do not attack an enemy on high ground, nor one who has high ground at his back. do not pursue an enemy who is imitating flight; do not attack a spirited enemy. if the enemy offer an allurement, do not take it. do not interfere with an enemy who has struck camp, and is about to retire. when surrounding an enemy, allow him an outlet. do not press a desperate enemy. these are the methods of employing troops. viii the nine changes sun the master said:-- in general, the procedure of war is:--the leader, having received orders from his lord, assembles the armies. do not camp on marshy or low-lying ground; enter into friendly relations with neighbouring states; do not linger in a far country; use stratagem in mountainous and wooded country; on death ground, fight. there are always roads that must be avoided; forces that must not be attacked; castles that must not be besieged; ground that must not be chosen for encounter; orders from the lord that must not be obeyed. the general who knows the nine changes understands the use of troops; on the contrary, he who does not understand them, can make no use of his topographical knowledge. in the management of armies, if the art of the nine changes be understood, a knowledge of the five advantages is of no avail. the wise man considers well both advantage and disadvantage. he sees a way out of adversity, and on the day of victory to danger is not blind. in reducing an enemy to submission, inflict all possible damage upon him; make him undertake useless adventures; also make neighbouring rulers move as you would desire them by tempting them with gain. wherefore in the conduct of war do not depend on the enemy's not coming, but rely on your own preparations; do not count on the enemy not attacking your fortress, but leave nothing undefended. generals must be on their guard against these five dangerous faults:-- blind impetuosity, which leads to death. over-cautiousness, which leads to capture. quick temper, which brings insult. a too rigid propriety, which invites disgrace. over-regard for the troops, which causes inconvenience. these five faults in the leader are disastrous in war. the overthrow of the army and the slaughter of the general arise from them. therefore they must be carefully considered. ix movement of troops sun the master said:-- touching the disposal of troops and observation of the enemy in relation to mountain warfare:-- cross mountains and camp in valleys, selecting positions of safety. place the army on high ground, and avoid an enemy in high places. in relation to water:-- after crossing waters, pass on immediately to a distance. when the enemy is crossing a stream, do not meet and engage him in the waters, but strike when half his force has passed over. do not advance on an enemy near water, but place the army on high ground, and in safety. do not fight when the enemy is between the army and the source of the river. with regard to marshes:-- cross salty marshes quickly; do not linger near them. if by chance compelled to fight in the neighbourhood of a marsh, seek a place where there is water and grass, and trees in plenty in the rear. in open country place the army in a convenient place with rising ground in the right rear; so that while in front lies death, behind there is safety. such is war in flat country. huangti, by observing these things, gained the victory over four princes. as a rule, the soldiers prefer high ground to low. they prefer sunny places to those the sun does not reach. if the health of the troops be considered, and they are encamped on high and sunny ground, diseases will be avoided, and victory made certain. if there be rising ground, encamp on its sunny side and in front of it; for thereby the soldiers are benefited, and the ground used to our advantage. if, owing to rains in the upper reaches, the river become turbulent, do not cross until the waters have quieted. steep and impassable valleys; well-like places; confined places; tangled impenetrable ground; swamps and bogs; narrow passages with pitfalls:--quickly pass from these, and approach them not. cause the enemy to approach near to them, but keep yourself from these places; face them, so that the enemy has them in his rear. if there be near to the army, precipices, ponds, meres, reeds and rushes, or thick forests and trees, search them thoroughly. these are places where the enemy is likely to be in ambush. when the enemy is close, but quiet, he is strong in reliance on natural defences. if the enemy challenge to fight from afar, he wishes you to advance. if the enemy be encamped in open country, it is with some special object in view. movement among the trees shows that the enemy is advancing. broken branches and trodden grass, as of the passing of a large host, must be regarded with suspicion. the rising of birds shows an ambush. startled beasts show that the enemy is stealthily approaching from several sides. high, straight spurts of dust betoken that chariots are coming. long, low masses of dust show the coming of infantry. here and there, thin and high columns of dust are signs that firewood and fodder are being collected. small clouds of dust moving to and fro are signs that the enemy is preparing to encamp for a short time. busy preparations and smooth words show that the enemy is about to advance to attack. big words, and the spurring forward of horsemen, are signs that the enemy is about to retire. an advance of the light chariots to the flanks of the camp is a sign that the enemy is coming forth to fight. without consultation, suddenly to desire an armistice, is a mark of ulterior design. the passing to and fro of messengers, and the forming up of troops, show that the enemy has some movement on foot. an advance, followed by sudden retirement, is a lure to attack. when the enemy use their weapons to rest upon, they are hungry. if the drawers of water drink at the river, the enemy is suffering from thirst. disregard of booty that lies ready at hand is a sign of exhaustion. the clustering of birds round a position shows that it is unoccupied. voices calling in the night betoken alarm. disorder in the army is a sign that the general is disregarded. a changing about of flags and banners is a sign that the army is unsettled. if the officers be angry, it is because the soldiers are tired, _and slow to obey_. the killing of horses for food shows that the enemy is short of provisions. when the cooking-pots are hung up on the wall and the soldiers turn not in again, the enemy is at an end of his resources. exceeding graciousness and familiarity on the part of the general show that he has lost the confidence of the soldiers. frequent rewards show that discipline is at an end. frequent punishments are a sign that the general is in difficulties. the general who first blusters, and then is obsequious, is without perception. he who offers apologies and hostages is anxious for a truce. when both sides, eager for a fight, face each other for a considerable time, neither advancing nor retiring, the occasion requires the utmost vigilance and circumspection. numbers are no certain mark of strength. even if incapable of a headlong assault, if the forces be united, and the enemy's condition ascertained, victory is possible. he who without taking thought makes light of the enemy is certain to be captured. if a general who is strange to the troops punish them, they cease to obey him. if they are not obedient, they cannot be usefully employed. if the troops know the general, but are not affected by his punishments, they are useless. by humane treatment we obtain obedience; authority brings uniformity. thus we obtain victory. if the people have been trained in obedience from the beginning, they respect their leader's commands. if the people be not early trained to obedience, they do not respect their leader's commands. orders are always obeyed, if general and soldiers are in sympathy. x ground sun the master said:-- with regard to the different natures of ground there are:-- open ground; broken ground; suspended ground; defiles; precipices; far countries. open ground is that where either side has liberty of movement: be quick to occupy any high ground in the neighbourhood and consider well the line of supplies. broken ground. advance is easy, but retreat from it is difficult. here, if the enemy be not prepared, we may win: but should he be prepared, and defeat us, and retreat be impossible, then there is disaster. suspended ground. the side that takes the initiative is under a disadvantage. here, if the enemy offer some allurement, we should not advance: but rather, by feigning retreat, wait until he has put forth half his force. then we may attack him with advantage. defiles, make haste to occupy; garrison strongly and await the enemy. should the enemy be before you, and in strength, do not engage him; but if there be unoccupied points, attack him. in precipitous ground quickly occupy a position on a sunny height, and await the enemy. if the enemy be before you, withdraw and do not attack him. if distant from the enemy, and the forces be equal, to take the initiative is disadvantageous. now, these are the six kinds of ground. it is the duty of generals to study them. again, there are six calamities among the troops, arising, not from defect of ground, or lack of opportunity, but from the general's incapacity. these are: repulse, relaxation, distress, disorganisation, confusion and rout. if troops be sent to attack an enemy of equal quality, but ten times their number, they retire discomfited. strong soldiers with weak officers cause relaxation. able officers with feeble soldiers cause distress. enraged senior officers, who fall upon the enemy without orders, and obey not the general because he does not recognise their abilities, produce disorganisation. weak and amiable generals, whose directions and leadership are vague, whose officers' and men's duties are not fixed, and whose dispositions are contradictory, produce confusion. generals, who are unable to estimate the enemy, who oppose small numbers to large, weakness to strength, and who do not put picked men in the van of the army, cause it to be routed. these six things lead to defeat. it is the duty of the general to study them carefully. ground is the handmaid of victory. ability to estimate the enemy, and plan the victory; an eye for steepness, command and distances: these are the qualities of the good general. whosoever knows these things, conquers; he who understands them not, is defeated. if victory be certain from the military standpoint, fight, even if the lord forbid. if defeat be certain from the military standpoint, do not fight, even though the lord commands it. the general who advances, from no thought of his own glory, or retires, regardless of punishment; but only strives for the people's welfare, and his lord's advantage, is a treasure to the state. the good general cares for his soldiers, and lovingly treats them as his children; as a consequence they follow him through deep valleys, and are beside him in death. nevertheless, over-care for the soldiers may cause disobedience; over-attention may make them unserviceable; over-indulgence may produce disorder: they become like spoilt children, and cannot be used. he who is confident of his own men, but is ignorant that the enemy should not be attacked, has no certainty of victory. he who knows that the enemy may be attacked with advantage, but knows not his own men, has no certainty of victory. confidence in the troops, right judgment when to attack the enemy, but ignorance of the ground, bring uncertain victory. the wise soldier, once in motion, does not waver, and is never at a loss. as has been said: "know thyself; know the enemy; fear not for victory." also, if the season and the opportunity be realised, and the ground known, complete victory is certain. xi the nine grounds sun the master said:-- in respect to the conduct of war there are:-- distracting ground; disturbing ground; ground of contention; intersecting ground; path-ridden ground; deeply-involved ground; difficult ground; enclosed ground; death ground. at all times, when the prince fights in his own territory, it is called distracting[ ] ground. that ground a short way inside the enemy's border is called disturbing ground. ground giving advantage to whichever side is in possession, is called ground of contention. ground to which either side has access, is called intersecting ground. ground between three provinces first possession of which enables the peoples of the earth to be controlled, is called path-ridden ground. the interior of the enemy's country with many of his fortified towns in rear, is called deeply-involved ground. mountain and forest, precipices, ravines, marsh and swamp, all places where passage is hard, are called difficult ground. a narrow entrance and winding outlet, where a small number can oppose a large force, is called enclosed ground. that ground where delay means disaster, is called death ground. wherefore, do not fight on distracting ground; do not linger on disturbing ground. if the enemy be in possession of disputed ground, do not attack. in intersecting ground, do not interrupt the highways. at the crossing of highways, cultivate intercourse. when deeply involved, levy and store up the enemy's property. quickly depart from difficult ground. on enclosed ground, use stratagem. on death ground, fight. the skilful fighters of old were at pains to disconnect the enemy's front and rear; they cut asunder small and large forces of the enemy; prevented mutual help between his officers and men; spread mistrust between high and low. they scattered the enemy, and prevented him from concentrating; if his soldiers were assembled, they were without unity. if there be a chance of victory, move; if there be no chance of success, stand fast. if i were asked how a powerful and united force of the enemy should be met, i would say: lay hands on what the enemy cherishes and he will conform to our desires. in war, above all, speed sustains the spirit of the troops. strike before the enemy is ready; and attack his unpreparedness from an unexpected quarter. with regard to war in foreign lands. when strangers in a far country the soldiers are united and are proof against defeat. plunder fertile plains so that the army is fed; be careful of the health of the soldiers; do not tire them uselessly; unite their minds; store up strength; plan well and secretly. if there be no refuge the soldiers will not fly from death. if there be no alternative but death, the soldiers exert themselves to the utmost. in desperate places, soldiers lose the sense of fear. if there be no place of refuge, there will be no wavering. if deeply involved in the enemy's country, there is unity. if it be unavoidable, the soldiers will fight their hardest. even without warnings they are vigilant; they comply without insistence; without stipulations they are tractable; without explicit instructions they will trust the general and obey him. prohibit the discussion of signs and omens, and remove the soldiers' doubts; then to the moment of death they will be undistracted. riches are denied the soldiers, not because money is a bad thing; old age is forbidden them, but not because long life is evil. hardships and danger are the proper lot of the soldier. when the order for attack is given, the collars of those who are sitting may be wet with tears; tears may roll down the cheeks of those reclining; yet these men, in a desperate place, will fight with the courage of chu and kuei. soldiers should be used like the snakes on mt. chang; which, if you hit on the head, the tail will strike you; if you hit the tail, the head will strike you; if you strike its middle, head and tail will strike you together. should any one ask me whether men can be made to move like these snakes, i say, yes. the men of wu and yueh hate each other; yet, if they cross a river in the same boat and a storm overtake them, they help each other like the two hands. the horses may be tied, and the chariot wheels sunk in the mud; but that does not prevent flight. universal courage and unity depend on good management. the best results from both the weak and strong are obtained by a proper use of the ground. the skilful warrior can lead his army, as a man leads another by the hand, because he places it in a desperate position. the general should be calm, inscrutable, just and prudent. he should keep his officers and men in ignorance of his plans, and inform no one of any changes or fresh departures. by changing his camps, and taking devious and unexpected routes, his plans cannot be guessed. as one taking away the ladder from under those mounted upon the roof, so acts the general when his men are assembled to fight. he penetrates into the heart of the enemy's country and then divulges his plans. he drives the army hither and thither like a flock of sheep, knowing not whither they go. therefore the general should assemble the armies, and place them in a desperate position. the different natures of the nine grounds; the suiting of the means to the occasion; the hearts of men: these are things that must be studied. when deep in the interior of a hostile country, there is cohesion; if only on the borders, there is distraction. to leave home and cross the borders is to be free from interference. on distracting ground, unite the soldiers' minds. on disturbing ground, keep together. on disputed ground, try to take the enemy in rear. on intersecting ground, look well to the defences. on path-ridden ground, cultivate intercourse. on deeply-involved ground be careful of supplies. on difficult ground, do not linger. on enclosed ground, close the path of escape. on death ground, show the soldiers that there is no chance of survival. it is the nature of soldiers to defend when surrounded, to fight with energy when compelled thereto, to pursue the enemy if he retreat. he cannot treat with other rulers who knows not their ambitions. he who knows not mountain and forest; cliffs; ravines; lakes and marshes; cannot conduct an army. he who does not use guides, cannot take advantage of the ground. he who has not a complete knowledge of the nine grounds, cannot gain military dominion. the great general, when attacking a powerful nation, prevents the enemy from concentrating his hosts. he overawes the enemy so that other states cannot join against him. he does not struggle for the favour of other states; nor is he careful of their rights. he has confidence in himself, and awes the enemy. therefore he easily takes the fortress, or reduces the country to subjection. in the bestowal of rewards, or in his orders, he is not bound by ancient rule. he manages his forces as though they were one man. orders should direct the soldiers; but while what is advantageous should be made known, what is disadvantageous should be concealed. if the forces be plunged into danger, there is survival; from death ground there is retrieval; for the force in danger gains the victory. discover the enemy's intentions by conforming to his movements. when these are discovered, then, with one stroke, the general may be killed, even though he be one hundred leagues distant. when war is declared, close the barriers; destroy passports; prevent the passage of the enemy's spies; conduct the business of the government with vigilance. take immediate advantage of the enemy's weakness; discover what he most values, and plan to seize it. shape your plans according to rule, and the circumstances of the enemy. at first behave with the discretion of a maiden; then, when the enemy gives an opening, dart in like a rabbit. the enemy cannot defend himself. xii assault by fire sun the master said:-- there are five ways of attack by fire: the first is called barrack burning; the second, commissariat burning; the third, equipment burning; the fourth, store burning; the fifth, the company burning. the moment for the fire assault must be suitable. further, appliances must always be kept at hand. there is a time and day proper for the setting and carrying out of the fire assault; namely: such time as the weather is dry; and a day when the moon is in the quarters of the stars chi, pi, i, chen: for these are days of wind. regard well the developments that will certainly arise from the fire, and act upon them. when fire breaks out inside the enemy's camp, thrust upon him with all speed from without; but if his soldiers be quiet, wait, and do not attack. when the fire is at its height, attack or not, as opportunity may arise. if the opportunity be favourable, set fire to the enemy's camp, and do not wait for it to break out from within. when fire breaks out on the windward side, do not attack from the leeward. wind that rises in the day lasts long. wind that rises in the night time quickly passes away. the peculiarities of the five burnings must be known, and the calendar studied, and, if the attack is to be assisted, the fire must be unquenchable. if water is to assist the attack, the flood must be overwhelming. water may isolate or divide the enemy; fire may consume his camp; but unless victory or possession be obtained, the enemy quickly recovers, and misfortunes arise. the war drags on, and money is spent. let the enlightened lord consider well; and the good general keep the main object in view. if no advantage is to be gained thereby, do not move; without prospect of victory, do not use the soldiers; do not fight unless the state be in danger. war should not be undertaken because the lord is in a moment of passion. the general must not fight because there is anger in his heart. do not make war unless victory may be gained thereby; if there be prospect of victory, move; if there be no prospect, do not move. for passion may change to gladness, anger passes away; but a country, once overturned, cannot be restored; the dead cannot be brought to life. wherefore it is written, the enlightened lord is circumspect, and the good general takes heed; then is the state secure, and the army victorious in battle. xiii the employment of spies sun the master said:-- calling , men to arms, and transporting them a hundred leagues, is such an undertaking that in one day , taels of the citizens' and nobles' money are spent; commotions arise within and without the state; carriers fall down exhausted on the line of march of the army; and the occupations of , [ ] homes are upset. again, for years the armies may face each other; yet the issue may depend on a single day's victory. wherefore, by grudging slight expense in titles and salaries to spies, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's circumstances, is to be without humanity. such a person is no general; he is no assistance to his lord; he is no master of victory. the enlightened ruler and the wise general who act, win, and are distinguished beyond the common, are informed beforehand. this knowledge is not to be got by calling on gods and demons; nor does it come of past experience nor calculation. it is through men that knowledge of the enemy is gained. now the five kinds of spies are these: village spies, inner spies, converted spies, death spies, living spies. if these five means be employed simultaneously, none can discover their working. this is called the mysterious thread: it is the lord's treasure. village spies are such people of the country as give information. inner spies are those of the enemy's officials employed by us. converted spies are those of the enemy's spies in our pay. death[ ] spies are sent to misinform the enemy, and to spread false reports through our spies already in the enemy's lines. living spies[ ] return to report. in connection with the armies, spies should be treated with the greatest kindness; and in dealing out reward, they should receive the most generous treatment. all matters relating to spies are secret. without infinite capacity in the general, the employment of spies is impossible. their treatment requires benevolence and uprightness. except they be observed with the closest attention, the truth will not be obtained from them. wonderful indeed is the power of spies. there is no occasion when they cannot be used. if a secret matter be spoken of before the time is ripe, the spy who told the matter, and the man who repeated the same, should be put to death. if desirous of attacking an army; of besieging a fortress; or of killing a certain person; first of all, learn the names of the general in charge; of his right-hand[ ] men; of those who introduce visitors to the presence; of the gate keeper and the sentries. then set the spies to watch them. seek out the enemy's spies who come to spy on us; give them money; cause them to be lodged and cared for; and convert them to the service. through them we are enabled to obtain spies among the enemy's villagers and officials. by means of the converted spy, we can construct a false story for the death spy to carry to the enemy. it is through the converted spy that we are able to use the five varieties, to their utmost advantage; therefore he must be liberally treated. in ancient times the rise to power of the province of yin was due to ichih, who was sent to the country of hsia. likewise during the foundation of the state of chu, luya lived among the people of shang. wherefore, intelligent rulers and wise generals use the cleverest men as spies, and invariably acquire great merit. the spy is a necessity to the army. upon him the movement of the army depends. the sayings of wutzu introduction now wu, albeit clothed in the raiment of a scholar, was a man skilled in the art of war. and wen, lord of wei, came unto him and said:-- "i am a man of peace, caring not for military affairs." and wu said:-- "your actions are witnesses of your mind; why do your words say not what is in your heart? "you do prepare and dress hides and leather through the four seasons, ornamenting them with red lacquer and the figures of panthers and elephants; which give not warmth in winter, neither in summer, coolness. moreover, you make halberds, [ ] feet long, and pikes feet long, and leather (covered) chariots so large as to fill up the gateways, wheels with ornament, and naves capped with leather. now, these are neither beautiful to the eye nor light in the chase; i know not for what use my lord makes these things. "but, although provided with these instruments of war, if the leader be not competent, a brooding hen might as well strike a badger, or a dog with young challenge the tiger: the spirit of encounter may be present, but there is no end but death. "in ancient times, the prince chengsang cultivated virtue, and put away military things, and his kingdom fell. "the prince yuhu put his trust in numbers, and delighted in war and was driven from the throne. "therefore the enlightened ruler should ponder over these things; encourage learning and virtue in the kingdom, and be prepared against war from without. "to hesitate before the enemy is not a cause for righteousness; remorse for the fallen is not true humanity." and when lord wen heard these words, he himself spread a seat, and his wife offered up a cup, and wu was appointed general before the altar. now, in the defence of hsihe against different states there were fought seventy-six great fights, of which sixty-four were complete victories, and the remainder undecided. and the kingdom grew and stretched , leagues on every side, which was all due to the virtue of wu. i the government of a country and wu the master said:-- the mighty rulers of old first trained their retainers, and then extended their regard to their outlying feudatories. there are four discords:-- discord in the state: then never make war. discord in the army: then do not strike camp. discord in the camp: then do not advance to attack. discord in the battle array: then seek not to decide the issue. therefore, wise rulers who would employ their subjects in great endeavours, should first establish harmony among them. lend not a ready ear to human counsellors, but lay the matter before the altar; seek inside the turtle,[ ] and consider well the time and season. then, if all be well, commit ourselves to the undertaking. if the people know that their lord is careful of their lives, and laments their death beyond all else; then, in the time of danger, the soldiers advance, and, advancing, find glory in death; and in survival after retreat, dishonour. the master said:-- the way must follow the only true path: righteousness lies at the root of achievement and merit. the object of stratagem is to avoid loss and gain advantage. the object of government is to guard enterprise and to preserve the state. if conduct depart from the way, and the undertaking accord not with righteousness, then disaster befalls the mighty. therefore, wise men maintain order by keeping in the way, and governing with righteousness; they move with discretion, and with benevolence they make the people amenable. if these four virtues be practised, there is prosperity; if they be neglected, there is decay. for, when lord tang of cheng defeated lord chieh, the people of hsia rejoiced, and when wu of chou defeated lord chou, the people of yin were not discomfited. and this was because it was ordained by providence and human desire. the master said:-- in the government of a country and command of an army, the inculcation of propriety, stimulation of righteousness, and the promotion of a sense of shame are required. when men possess a sense of shame, they will attack with resolution when in strength, and when few in number defend to the last. but while victory is easy in attack, it is difficult in defence. now, of the fighting races below heaven; those who gained five victories have been worn out; those who have won four victories have been impoverished; three victories have given dominion; two victories have founded a kingdom; and upon one victory an empire has been established. for those who have gained power on earth by many victories are few; and those who have lost it, many. the master said:-- the causes of war are five:-- first, ambition; second, profit; third, overburdened hate; fourth, internal disorder; fifth, famine. again, the natures of war are five:-- first, a righteous war; second, a war of might; third, a war of revenge; fourth, a war of tyranny; fifth, an unrighteous war. the prevention of tyranny and the restoration of order is just; to strike in reliance on numbers is oppression; to raise the standard for reasons of anger is a war of revenge; to quit propriety, and seize advantage is tyranny; when the state is disordered and the people worn out, to harbour designs, and set a multitude in motion, is a war of unrighteousness. there is a way of overcoming each of these five. righteousness is overcome by propriety; might by humanity; revenge by words; tyranny by deception; unrighteousness by strategy. lord wen asked and said:-- "i would know the way to control an army, to measure men, and make the country strong." wu answered and said:-- "the enlightened rulers of antiquity respected propriety between sovereign and people; established etiquette between high and low; settled officials and citizens in close accord; gave instruction in accordance with custom; selected men of ability, and thereby provided against what should come to pass. "in ancient times, prince huan of chi assembled , men at arms, and became chief among the princes; prince wen of chin put , mighty men in the van, and gained his ambition; prince mu of chin gathered together , invincibles, and subdued his neighbouring foes. wherefore, the princes of powerful states must consider their people, and assemble the valiant and spirited men by companies. "those who delight to attack, and to display their valour and fealty should be formed in companies. "those skilful in scaling heights, or covering long distances, and who are quick and light of foot must be collected in companies. "retainers who have lost their rank, and who are desirous of displaying their prowess before their superiors should be gathered into companies. "those who have abandoned a castle, or deserted their trust, and are desirous of atoning for their misconduct, should be collected and formed into companies. "these five bodies form the flower of the army. with , of such troops, if they issue from within, an encompassing enemy can be burst asunder; if they enter from without, a castle can be overthrown." lord wen asked and said:-- "i desire to know how to fix the battle array, render defence secure, and attack with certainty of victory." wu answered and said:-- "to see with the eye is better than ready words. yet, i say, if the wise men be put in authority and the ignorant in low places, then the army is already arranged. "if the people be free from anxiety about their estates, and love their officials, then defence is already secure. "if all the lieges be proud of their lord, and think ill of neighbouring states, then is the battle already won." the lord wen once assembled a number of his subjects to discuss affairs of state: and none could equal him in wisdom, and when he left the council chamber his face was pleased. then wu advanced and said:-- in ancient times, lord chuang of chu once consulted with his lieges, and none were like unto him in wisdom; and when the lord left the council chamber his countenance was troubled. then the duke shen asked and said: "why is my lord troubled?" and he answered: "i have heard that the world is never without sages, and that in every country there are wise men; that good advisers are the foundation of an empire; and friends of dominion. now, if i, lacking wisdom, have no equal among the multitude of my officers, dangerous indeed is the state of chu. it grieves me that whereas prince chuang of chu was troubled in a like case my lord should be pleased." and hearing this lord wen was inwardly troubled. ii estimation of the enemy and lord wen said to wu:-- "chin threatens us on the west; chu surrounds us on the south; chao presses us in the north; chi watches us in the east; yen stops our rear, and han is posted in our front. thus, the armies of six nations encompass us on every side, and our condition is very unpropitious. canst thou relieve my anxiety?" wu answered and said:-- "the path of safety of a state lies first of all in vigilance. now my lord has already taken warning, wherefore misfortunes are yet distant. "let me state the habits of these six countries. the forces of chi are weighty but without solidity; the soldiers of chin are scattered, and fight each of his own accord: the army of chu is well ordered, but cannot endure: the soldiers of yen defend well, but are without dash: the armies of the three chins are well governed, but cannot be used. "the nature of chi is stubborn and the country rich, but prince and officials are proud and luxurious, and neglectful of the common people; government is loose and rewards not impartial; in one camp there are two minds; the front is heavy, but the rear is light. therefore it is ponderous without stability. to attack it, the force must be divided into three parts, and, by threatening it on three sides, its front can be broken. "the nature of chin is strong, the country rugged, and the government firm; rewards and punishments just, the people indomitable, and all have the fighting spirit; wherefore, when separated, each fights of his own accord. "to defeat this people, they must first be tempted by gain to leave their cause, so that the soldiers, greedy of profit, desert their general: then, taking advantage of their disobedience, their scattered forces can be chased, ambushes laid, favourable opportunities taken, and their general captured. "the nature of chu is weak, its territory wide, the government weak, and the people exhausted; the troops are well ordered but of short endurance. "the way to defeat them is to assault their camp, throw it into confusion and crush their spirit, advance softly, and retire quickly; tire them out, avoid a serious encounter, and they may be defeated. "the nature of yen is straightforward; its people are cautious, loving courage and righteousness, and without guile; wherefore they defend but are not daring. "the way to defeat them is to draw close and press them; tease them and pass to a distance; move quickly, and appear in the rear, thus causing bewilderment to their officers and fear in their ranks. our chariots and horsemen will act with circumspection and avoid encounter. thus their general can be captured. "the three chins are the middle kingdom: their nature is peaceful and their rule just. their people are tired of war; their troops are trained, but their leaders are despised; pay is small, and the soldiers lack the spirit of sacrifice, thus they are well governed but cannot be used. "the way to defeat them is to threaten them from afar. if a multitude attack--defend; if they retreat--pursue, and tire them out. "in every army there are mighty warriors with strength to lift the censer, swifter of foot than the war horse; who can take the enemy's standard, or slay his general. if such men be selected, and set apart, cared for and honoured, they are the life of the army. "those who use the five arms[ ] with skill, who are clever, strong and quick, and careless of the enemy, should be given rank and decoration, and used to decide the victory. their parents and families should be cared for, encouraged by rewards, and kept in fear of punishment. these men consolidate the battle array; their presence causes endurance. "if these men be well selected, double their number can be defeated." and lord wen said:-- "it is good!" wu the master said:-- "in the estimation of the enemy there are eight cases when, without consulting the oracles, he may be attacked. "first, an enemy who, in great wind and cold, has risen early, started forth across ice and rivers, and braved stress and hardships. "second, an enemy who, in the height of summer, and in great heat, has risen early, has travelled incessantly, is hungry and without water, and is striving to reach a distance. "third, an enemy who has been encamped long in one place, who is without provisions, when the farmers are vexed and indignant, who has suffered frequent calamities, and whose officers are unable to establish confidence. "fourth, when the enemy's funds are exhausted, fuel and fodder scarce; when the heavens have been overcast by long continued rain; when there is the desire to loot, but no place to loot withal. "fifth, when their numbers are few; when water is scarce; when men and horses are scourged by pestilence, and from no quarter is succour at hand. "sixth, when night falls, and the way is yet far; when officers and men are worn out and fearful, weary and without food, and have laid aside their armour and are resting. "seventh, when the general's authority is weak, the officials false, and the soldiers unsettled; when their army has been alarmed, and no help is forthcoming. "eighth, when the battle formation is not yet fixed, or camp pitched; when climbing a hill, or passing through a difficult place; when half is hidden and half exposed. "an enemy in these situations may be smitten without hesitation. "there are six enemies, that, without consulting oracles, should be avoided. "first, wide and vast territories, and a large and rich population. "second, where the officials care for the people, and bestow bountiful favours and rewards. "third, where rewards are well deserved, punishment accurately apportioned, and operations undertaken only when the time is fitting. "fourth, where merit is recognised and given rank, wise men appointed, and ability employed. "fifth, where the troops are many and their weapons excellent. "sixth, when help is at hand on every side, or from a powerful ally. "for, if the enemy excel in the foregoing, he must be avoided without hesitation. as it is written, if it be judged good, advance; if it be known to be difficult, retreat." and lord wen asked and said:-- "i desire to know how the interior of the enemy can be known from his outer appearance; the form of his camp by observing his advance, and how victory may be determined?" and wu answered and said:-- "if the coming of the enemy be reckless like roaring waters, his banners and pennons disordered, and horses and men frequently looking behind, then ten can be struck with one. panic will certainly seize them. "before the various princes have assembled, before harmony has been established between lord and lieges, before ditches have been dug, or regulations established, and the army is alarmed; wishing to advance, but unable; wishing to retreat, but unable: then the force can strike twice their numbers, and in a hundred fights there is no fear of retreat." lord wen asked:-- "how can the enemy be certainly defeated?" wu answered and said:-- "make certain of the enemy's real condition and quickly strike his weak point; strike an enemy who has just arrived from afar, before his ranks are arranged; or one who has eaten and has not completed his dispositions; or an enemy who is hurrying about, or is busily occupied; or has not made favourable use of the ground, or has let pass the opportunity; or one who has come a long distance, and those in rear are late and have not rested. "strike an enemy who is half across waters; or who is on a difficult or narrow road; or whose flags and banners are in confusion; or who is frequently changing position; or whose general is not in accord with the soldiers; or who is fearful. "all such should be assaulted by the picked men; and the remainder of the army should be divided, and follow after them. they may be attacked at once without hesitation." iii control of the army lord wen said:-- "what is of first importance in operations of war?" wu answered and said:-- "lightness, of which there are four natures, weight, of which there are two natures, and confidence must be clearly comprehended." and wen said:-- "what are these?" and wu answered:-- "if the way be easy, the horses are light of foot; if the horses be light of foot, the chariots travel freely; if the chariots travel easily, men can ride in them without difficulty; if the men be free to move, the fight prospers. if the difficult and easy ways be known, the horses are lightened; if the horses be fed at proper intervals, the chariots are swift; if there be plenty of oil on the axles of the chariots, the riders are quickly conveyed; if the spears be sharp and the armour strong, the men make the fight easy. "large rewards in advance, heavy punishment in retreat, and impartiality in their bestowal are required. "he who well understands these things is the master of victory." and lord wen asked and said:-- "by what means can the army gain the victory?" and wu answered:-- "the foundation of victory is good government." again, wen asked and said:-- "is it not determined by numbers?" and wu replied:-- "if laws and orders be not clear; if rewards and punishments be not just; if the bell be sounded and they halt not, or drum be beaten and men do not advance; even if there be a hundred thousand men at arms, they are of no avail. "where there is order, then there is propriety at rest, and dignity in motion; none can withstand the attack, and retreat forbids pursuit; motion is regulated, and movements to right and left are made in answer to the signal; if the ranks be cut asunder, formation is preserved; if scattered, they are maintained; in fortune or in danger, there is unity; if a number be collected, they cannot be separated; they may be used but not wearied; in whatever situation they are placed, nothing under heaven can withstand them. the army may be called a father and his children." and wu said:-- "in marching, movements and halts must be properly adjusted, suitable occasions for rationing not missed; the strength of men and horses not exhausted. if these three things be observed, the commands of the superior can be carried out; if the commands of the superior be carried out, order is maintained. if advances and halts be without method, victualling unsuitable, horses and men tired and weary--neither unsaddled or housed--it is because the orders cannot be obeyed; if the orders be set aside, there is disorder in the camp, and in battle--defeat." wu the master said:-- "on that depository of corpses, the battlefield, if there be certain expectation of death, there is life; if there be happy expectation of life, there is death. the good general is like unto one sitting in a leaking ship, or lying under a burning roof; the wisest man cannot contrive against him; the strongest man cannot destroy his composure; and the enemy's onslaught can be withstood. for procrastination is the greatest enemy of the general; disasters to the army are born of indecision." wu the master said:-- "men meet their death from lack of ability or unskilfulness. wherefore training is the first requirement of war. one man with a knowledge of war can teach ten; ten men skilled in war can teach one hundred; one hundred can teach one thousand; one thousand can teach ten thousand; and ten thousand men can train an army. "an enemy from a distance should be awaited, and struck at short range; an enemy that is tired should be met in good order; hunger should be opposed by full bellies; the battle formation should be round or square, the men should kneel or stand; go or remain; move to the right or left; advance or retire; concentrate or disperse; close or extend when the signal is given. "all these changes must be learnt, and the weapons distributed. this is the business of the general." wu the master said:-- "in the teaching of war, spears are given to the short; bows and catapults to the tall; banners and standards to the strong; the bell and drum to the bold; fodder and provisions to the feeble; the arrangement of the plan to the wise. men of the same district should be united; and groups and squads should help each other. at one beat of the drum the ranks are put in order; at two beats of the drum, formation will be made; at three beats of the drum, food will be issued; at four beats of the drum, the men will prepare to march; at five beats of the drum, ranks will be formed; when the drums beat together, then the standards will be raised." and lord wen asked and said:-- "what is the way of marching and halting an army?" and wu answered:-- "natural ovens and dragons' heads should be avoided. natural ovens are the mouths of large valleys. dragons' heads are the extremities of large mountains. the green dragons (banners) should be placed on the left, and the white tigers on the right; the red sparrows in front; the snakes and tortoises behind; the pole star (standard) above; and the soldiers will look to the standard. "when going forth to battle, the direction of the wind must be studied; if blowing in the direction of the enemy, the soldiers will be assembled and follow the wind; if a head wind, the position will be strengthened, and a wait made for the wind to change." and lord wen asked and said:-- "in what way should horses be treated?" and wu answered and said:-- "the places where they are kept should be made comfortable; fodder should be suitable and timely. in winter their stables should be warmed, and in summer sheltered from the heat; their coats clipped, their feet carefully pared, their attention directed so that they be not alarmed, their paces regulated, and their going and halting trained; horses and men should be in accord, and then the horses can be used. the harness, the saddle, bit, bridle, and reins must be strong; if the horse be without vice at the beginning, he can be used to the end; if the horse be hungry it is good; if his belly be full, his value decreases; if the sun be falling and the way still long, dismount frequently. for it is proper that the men be worked, but the horses must be used with discretion, so that they may be prepared should the enemy suddenly attack us. "if these things be well known, then there is free passage under heaven." iv qualities of the general wu the master said:-- "the leader of the army is one who is master of both arms and letters. he who is both brave and tender can be entrusted with troops. "in the popular estimation of generals, courage alone is regarded; nevertheless, courage is but one of the qualifications of the leader. courage is heedless in encounter; and rash encounter, which is ignorant of the consequences, cannot be called good. "there are five matters which leaders must carefully consider. "first, reason; second, preparation; third, determination; fourth, vigilance; fifth, simplicity. "with reason, a multitude can be controlled like a small number. "preparedness sees an enemy outside the gate. "determination before the enemy has no thought of life. "even after a victory, vigilance behaves as before the first encounter. "simplicity ensures few regulations, and preserves order. "when the leader receives his orders, he forthwith departs. not until the enemy has been vanquished does he speak of return. this is the duty of the general. "wherefore, from the day of departure of the army, the general seeks glory in death, and dreams not of return in dishonour." wu the master said:-- "in war there are four important influences. "first, spirit; second, ground; third, opportunity; fourth, force. "the military value of the nation's forces--of one hundred times ten thousand fighting men--depends upon the personality of one man alone; this is called the influence of spirit. "when the road is steep and narrow, when there are famous mountains and fastnesses where ten men can defend and one thousand cannot pass them by; such is the influence of ground. "when spies have been skilfully sown, and mounted men pass to and from the enemy's camp, so that his masses are divided, his sovereign and ministers vexed with each other, and superiors and inferiors mutually censorious; this is the moment of opportunity. "when the linch-pins are secure, the oars and sweeps ready for use in the boats, the armed men trained for war, and the horses exercised, we have what is called the influence of force. "he who understands these four matters has the qualifications of a general. furthermore, dignity, virtue, benevolence, courage, are needed to lead the troops, to calm the multitude, to put fear in the enemy, to remove doubts. when orders are issued, the subordinates do not defy them. wheresoever the army is, that place the enemy avoids. if these four virtues be present, the country is strong; if they be not present, the country is overthrown. "of such is the good general." wu the master said:-- "the use of drums and bells is to attract the ear; of flags, standards, and banners to strike the eye; of laws and penalties to put fear in the heart. "to attract the ear the sound must be clear; to strike the eye the colours must be bright. the heart is awed by punishment, therefore punishment must be strict. "if these three matters be not ordered, the state may, peradventure, be preserved, but defeat by the enemy is certain. therefore, as it has been said (if these three things be present), there is no departing from the commands of the general; when he orders, there is no going back from death." wu the master said:-- "the secret of war is, first, to know who is the enemy's general, and to judge his ability. if our plans depend on his dispositions, then success will be achieved without toil. "if their general be stupid, and heedlessly trustful, he may be enticed by fraud; if he be avaricious and careless of his fame, he may be bribed with gifts. if he make unconsidered movements without plan, he should be tired out and placed in difficulties. if the superiors be wealthy and proud, and the inferiors avaricious and resentful, they should be set against each other. an enemy that is undetermined, now advancing and then retreating, whose soldiers have nought wherein to put their trust, should be alarmed, and put to flight. "when an enemy thinks lightly of the general, and desires to return home, the easy roads should be blocked, and the difficult and narrow roads opened; await their coming and capture them. "if their advance be easy and retreat difficult, await their coming and then advance against them. "if their advance be difficult and retreat easy, then press and strike them. "an army that is camped in marshy ground, where there are no water-courses, and long and frequent rains, should be inundated. "an army that is camped in wild marshes, covered with dark and overhanging grass and brambles, and swept by frequent high winds, should be overthrown by fire. "an army that has halted long without moving; whose general and soldiers have grown careless, and neglect precautions, should be approached by stealth, and taken by surprise." lord wen asked, saying:-- "if the two armies be facing each other, and the name of the enemy's general unknown, in what manner can we discover it?" and wu answered and said:-- "a brave man of low degree, lightly but well equipped, should be employed. he should think only of flight and naught of advantage. then, if he observe the enemy's pursuit, if there be first a halt and then an advance, order is established. if we retreat and the enemy pursue, but pretend not to be able to overtake us, see an advantage but pretend not to be aware of it, then their general may be called a wise general, and conflict with him must be avoided. if their army be full of uproar; their banners and standards disordered, their soldiers going about or remaining of their own accord, some in line, others in column; if such an enemy be eager to pursue, and see an advantage which they are desperate to seize, then their general is a fool: even if there be a host, they may be taken." v suiting the occasion lord wen asked and said:-- "if strong chariots, good horses, strong and valiant soldiers suddenly meet the enemy, and are thrown into confusion, and ranks broken, what should be done?" and wu answered and said:-- "in general, the method of fighting is to effect order in daylight by means of flags and banners, pennons and batons; at night by gongs and drums, whistles and flutes. if a signal be made to the left, the troops move to the left; if to the right, they move to the right. advance is made at the sound of the drum; halt at the sound of the gong; one blast of the whistle is for advance, two for the rally. if those who disobey be cut down, the forces are subject to authority. if officers and soldiers carry out orders, a superior enemy cannot exist; no position is impregnable in the attack." lord wen asked and said:-- "what is to be done if the enemy be many and we be few?" and wu answered and said:-- "avoid such an enemy on open ground, and meet him in the narrow way; for, as it is written, if is to stand against , , there is naught better than a pass; if are to hold against , there is nothing better than a steep place; if , are to strike , , there is nothing better than a difficult place. if a small force, with beat of gong and drum, suddenly arise in a narrow way, even a host will be upset. wherefore it is written: 'he who has a multitude seeks the plain, and he who has few seeks the narrow way.'" and lord wen asked and said:-- "a mighty host, strong and courageous, which is on the defence with a mountain behind, a precipice between, high ground on the right, and a river on the left, with deep moats, and high walls, and which has artillery; whose retreat is like the removal of a mountain, advance like the hurricane, and whose supplies are in abundance, is an enemy against whom long defence is difficult. in effect, what should be done in such a case?" and wu answered and said:-- "this indeed is a great question, whose issue depends, not upon the might of chariot and horse, but upon the schemes of a wise man. "let , chariots and , horse, well equipped and with foot-men added to them, be divided into five armies, and a road allotted to each army. "then if there be five armies, and each army take a different road, the enemy will be puzzled, and know not in what quarter to be prepared. if the enemy's defence be strong and united, send envoys quickly to him to discover his intention. if he listen to our advices, he will strike camp and withdraw. but, if he listen not to our advice, but strikes down the messenger, and burns his papers, then divide and attack from five quarters. if victorious, do not pursue; if defeated, flee to a distance. if feigning retreat, proceed slowly, and, if the enemy approach, strike swiftly. "one army will hold the enemy in front, with another cut his rear, two more with gags in their mouths[ ] will attack his weak point, whether on the right or on the left. if five armies thus make alternate onslaughts, success is certain. "this is the way to strike strength." and lord wen asked and said:-- "if the enemy draw near and encompass us, and we would retreat, but there is no way, and in our multitude there is fear, what should be done?" and wu answered and said:-- "in such a case, if we be many and they be few, divide and fall upon them; if the enemy be many and we be few, use stratagem and act according to opportunity; and if opportunities be untiringly seized, even if the enemy be many, he will be reduced to subjection." lord wen asked and said:-- "if, in a narrow valley with steep places on either side, the enemy be met, and they are many and we are few, what should be done?" and wu answered and said:-- "if they be met among hills, woods, in deep mountains, or wide fens, advance quickly, retire swiftly, and hesitate not. if the enemy be suddenly met among high mountains or deep valleys, be the first to strike the drum and fall upon them. let bow and cross bow advance; shoot and capture; observe the state of their ranks; and, if there be confusion, do not hesitate to strike." lord wen asked and said:-- "if the enemy be suddenly met in a narrow place with high mountains on either side, and advance and retreat are alike impossible, what should be done in such a case?" and wu answered and said:-- "this is called war in valleys where numbers are of no avail. the ablest officers should be collected, and set against the enemy. men light of foot and well armed should be placed in front; the chariots divided; the horsemen drawn up, and placed in ambush on four sides, with many leagues between, and without showing their weapons. then, the enemy will certainly make his defence firm, and neither advance or retreat. whereupon, the standards will be raised, and the ranks of banners shown, the mountains left, and camp pitched in the plain. "the enemy will then be fearful, and should be challenged by chariot and horse, and allowed no rest. "this is the method of fighting in valleys." and lord wen asked and said:-- "if the enemy be met in a marsh where the water is out, so that the wheels of the chariots sink in, and the shafts be covered, and the chariots and horsemen overcome by the waters, when there are no boats or oars, and it is impossible either to advance or retreat, what should be done in such a case?" and wu answered and said:-- "this is called water fighting. chariots and horsemen cannot be used, and they must be put for a time on one side. go up to the top of a high place, and look out to the four quarters. then the state of the waters will certainly be seen; their extent, and the deep places and shallows fully ascertained. then, by stratagem, the enemy may be defeated. "if the enemy should cross the waters he should be engaged when half over." and lord wen asked and said:-- "if there has been long continued rain so that the horses sink, and the chariots cannot move; if the enemy appear from four quarters, and the forces are frightened, what is the course in such a case?" and wu answered and said:-- "when wet and overcast, the chariots should halt; when fine and dry, they should arise. seek height, and avoid low places; drive the strong chariots, and choose well the road on which to advance or halt. if the enemy suddenly arise, immediately pursue them." lord wen asked and said:-- "if our fields and pastures be suddenly pillaged, and our oxen and sheep taken, what should be done?" and wu answered and said:-- "lawless enemies that arise are to be feared; defend well and do not reply. when, at sunset, they seek to withdraw, they will certainly be overladen and fearful. striving to return quickly to their homes, connection will be lost. then if they be pursued and attacked, they can be overthrown." wu the master said:-- "the way of attacking the enemy and investing his castle is as follows:-- "when the outlying buildings have been taken, and the assaulting parties enter the innermost sanctuary, make use of the enemy's officials, and take charge of their weapons. let the army on no account fell trees or enter dwellings, cut the crops, slay the six domestic animals, or burn the barns; and show the people that there is no cruel desire. those who wish to surrender, should be received and freed from anxiety." vi encouragement of the troops and lord wen asked and said:-- "if punishment be just and reward impartial, is victory thereby gained?" and wu answered and said:-- "i cannot speak of all the things that concern justice and impartiality, but on these alone dependence cannot be placed. "if the people hear the word of command, or listen to the order with rejoicing; if, when the army be raised, and a multitude assembled, they go forth gladly to the fight; if, in the tumult of the fight, when blade crosses blade, the soldiers gladly die; upon these three things can the lord of the people place his trust." and lord wen said:-- "how can this be brought about?" and wu answered and said:-- "seek out merit, advance and reward it, and encourage those without fame." accordingly lord wen set seats in the garden of the palace in three rows, and made a feast unto his chief retainers. in the first row were set those of chief merit, and on the table were placed the best meats and precious utensils. those of medium merit were set in the middle row, and the utensils on the table were fewer in number. those without merit were set in the last row, and utensils of no value were put before them. and when the feast was over, and they had all departed, the parents, wives, and children of those with merit were given presents outside the gates of the palace according to their degree. further, messengers were sent yearly with gifts to condole with the parents of those who had lost a son in the service of the state, and to show that they were had in remembrance. and after this was carried out for three years, the people of chin gathered an army, and came as far as the western river. and when the soldiers of wei heard this, without waiting for orders, they armed themselves and fell upon them; and they that went forth were , in number. and lord wen called wu and said:-- "the words that you spoke unto me, have they not indeed been carried out?" and wu answered and said:-- "i have heard that there are men, great and small; souls, grand and feeble. "as a trial, let , men, without merit, be collected, and placed under my command against the country of chin. if we fail, the state will be the laughing-stock among the princes, and its power under heaven will be lost. if a desperate robber be hidden in a wide plain, and , men be pursuing him, their glances will be furtive like the owl, looking backward like the wolf, for they are in fear of harm from a sudden onslaught. "one desperate man can put fear in the hearts of a thousand. now, if this host of , men become as a desperate thief, and are led against chin, there is nought to fear." on hearing these words lord wen agreed, and adding further chariots and , horse, the hosts of chin were overthrown, all being due to the encouragement of the troops. on the day before the battle wu gave orders to the forces, saying:-- "the army will attack the enemy's chariots, horse and foot, in accordance with our commands. if the chariots do not capture the enemy's chariots, or the horse those of the enemy's, or the foot the enemy's footmen, even if their army be overthrown, no merit will be gained." therefore on the day of the battle, the orders were simple, and fear of wei shook the heavens. index a abnormal manoeuvres, , advance, followed by retirement, a lure, advantages, the five, ally, war to be avoided, if enemy has powerful, altar, wu made general before, ; difficult matters to be laid before, ambition, one of five causes of war, ambush, likely places for enemy to be in, ammunition, lack of, may cause disaster, anger of officers, cause of, ; not a fit reason for battle, animals, the six domestic, to be preserved by besiegers, apologies, what implied, by general who offers, archers, employment of, in sieges, , _note_ armies, five, alternate onslaughts by, armistice, what betokened by sudden desire for, armour, cost of upkeep of, ; and of renewing, ; condition of, an influence in battle, arms, profession of, not highly regarded in china, ; the five, , _note_ army, control of the, - ; orderly, likened to father and children, articles of suntzu, - assault, by stratagem, attack, proportionate number required for, ; on undefended positions, ; place of, to be kept secret, ; five ways of, by fire, - ; eight cases of, ; reckless, b banners, use of, to inspirit troops, ; used, in day fighting, ; enemy's lines not to be attacked where waving, - ; changing of, ; to be entrusted to strong men, ; wutzu on attraction of, , barrack burning, batons, in day fighting, battle, the order of, - beacons, in night fighting, beasts, startled, indicate stealthy approach, bell, use of, in war, ; a signal to halt, , _note_; wutzu on, ; to be entrusted to the bold, ; use of, attracts ear, benevolence, quality needed by general, birds, rising of, indicates ambush, ; clustering of, round position, shows it unoccupied, bluster in general, bogs, movement of troops regarding, booty, exhaustion betrayed by disregard of, bows, weapons for tall men, broken ground, burning barrack, commissariat, equipment, store, and company, - c calamities, six, among troops, camp, safe position for, ; skilful changes of, castle, wutzu's counsel for investing, catapults, weapons for tall men, causes of war, cautiousness-over, one of five dangerous faults for general, chang mt., illustration of snakes of, changes, the nine, - chariots, number of, required, - ; cost of renewing, ; rewards for taking from enemy, ; advance of light, ; great size of, ; axles of, to be well oiled, cheng, lord tang, of, chengsang, prince, chi, estimation of forces of, ; nature of, chieh, lord, chin, nature of, ; unsuccessfully opposes wei, - chins, the three, - china, profession of arms not highly regarded in, ; large rivers of, affect military operations, chinese, greatly affected by climate, chinese literature, place of suntzu and wutzu in, chinese wars, patriotism not a factor in, chou, wu, of, chu, courage of, ; foundation of state of, ; want of endurance of army of, chuang, of chu, holds consultation, chuyin, use of, in sieges, , and _note_ circumspection, circumstances requiring, cohesion of troops, in interior of hostile country, colours must be bright, in war, commander, professional, in china, commissariat burning, confidence, importance of, in operations, contention, ground of, continuity of military principles illustrated, control of army, - converted spies, cooking pots may betray end of resources, - cost of war, ; of supplying army at distance, courage, universal, dependent on good management, ; not the only attribute necessary to general, ; but nevertheless essential, cowardly, place of the, in action, d daylight fighting, use of flags, banners, pennons, and batons in, death, when only alternative, ensures exertion, death ground, ; fighting on, ; soldiers must recognise conditions of, death spies, , declaration of war, action following, decoration for skill in five arms, defeat, internal causes of, ; skilful soldiers make impossible, ; army destined to, trusts in chance, ; causes of, - defence, long, difficulties in, defensive warfare, when victory unattainable, ; skill in, - deficiency, defence compelled by, despair, energy born of, wins victory, desperate enemy not to be pressed, determination, one of five important matters for general, , dignity, essential for general, discipline, one of seven important matters in war, ; perfection of, leads to simulation, discussion of omens, forbidden, disorder, a cause of defeat, disputed ground, action regarding, distracting ground, action regarding, disturbing ground, action regarding, dragons, green (banners), dragons' heads (mountain extremities), drum, use of, ; in night fighting, ; sounds for advance, ; meaning of different beats of, ; to be entrusted to the bold, ; wutzu on the, , dust, spurts, masses, columns and clouds of, meaning of, e ear, to be attracted in war, earth, one of five indispensable matters in war, , ; the ninth, , and _note_ elements, five, , and _note_ emptiness and strength, - enclosed ground, ; stratagem to be used on, ; action regarding, enemies, six to be avoided, - equipment, umbrella part of chinese soldier's, estimation of enemy, ; wutzu on, - exhaustion, result of lateness in field, ; avoided by good tactics, ; shown by disregard of booty, expectation of life or death, eye, to be struck in war, f famine, a cause of war, faults, five, dangerous for generals, feast, given by wen to guests with high, medium, and deficient merit, feints, use of, , fens, advance in wide, fighting races, consequences of victories by, fire, five modes of assault by, - ; attack on enemy in overgrown marsh land by, flag, use of, in war, ; in day fighting, ; change of, ; wutzu on use of, flanking (or reserve) force, flat country, disposal of troops in, flutes, wutzu on use of, fodder, charge of, given to the feeble, food, taken from enemy, ; obtained by skilful general, ; killing of horses for, ; attack on enemy without, ; charge of, given to the feeble, force, one of four important influences in war, , foreign lands, war in, formation-battle, frontal attack, g general, interference with, ill-advised, ; ability of, one of seven important matters, ; skilful, is steadfast in "way" and "law," ; as "god of war" changes tactics, ; must know the nine changes, ; five faults dangerous for, ; what implied by exceeding graciousness of, ; blustering and obsequious, ; strange to troops, ; weak and amiable, ; calamities due to defects in, ; unable to estimate enemy, ; anxious for people's welfare, ; must be calm, inscrutable, just, and prudent, ; conceals plans, ; must have topographical knowledge and use guides, ; bestows rewards discreetly, ; is not actuated by anger, ; should be in accord with soldiers, ; must not procrastinate, ; wutzu on qualities of, - ; five matters important for, ; of the enemy to be appraised, ; action in accordance with judgment of enemy's, ; how to judge enemy's, - gongs, use of, in war, government of a country, - ; object of, ; good, foundation of victory, ground, influence of, in war, ; marshy, to be avoided for camp, ; action in mountainous and wooded, ; disposal of troops on high, marshy, flat, sunny, steep, boggy, and tangled, - ; object of enemy encamped on open, ; suntzu on, - ; open, - ; broken, ; suspended, ; defiles in, ; precipitous, ; the handmaid of victory, ; results from good use of, ; one of four important influences in war, , ; inundation of enemy on marshy, grounds, the nine, - ; action with regard to, ; knowledge of, necessary to general, guests, entertainment of, costly in war, guides, employment of, necessary, , h halberd, one of the five arms, , _note_ halberds, great length of, - harness, must be strong in all details, health of troops, consideration for, heat, attack on enemy who has endured, heaven, one of five indispensable matters in war, , heaven, the ninth, , _note_ highways, when not to interrupt, horses, killed for food, ; care for, ; treatment of, - hsia, hsihe, defence of, huangti, cause of victory by, humane treatment ensures obedience, hunger, how shown, by use of weapons, ; how to meet, in case of enemy, i ichih, ignorance, three ways of, embarrassing to armies, ; of enemy causes defeat, impartiality, wutzu on, impetuosity, blind, dangerous fault in general, indispensable matters, five, suntzu on, indulgence, ill effects of, influences, four important, in war, initiative, disadvantage of, on suspended ground, inner spies, internal disorder, a cause of war, intersecting ground, ; action on, inundation of enemy, on marshy ground, invincible, how ancient masters made armies, involved ground, , ; action regarding, , j japan, sun and wu revered in, japanese tactics, unlike chinese, ; commentators on chinese literature, javelin, one of the five arms, , _note_ justice, importance of, in rewards and punishment, ; wutzu on, k kingdom, the middle, - kuei, courage of, l lateness in field, cause of exhaustion, law, the, one of five indispensable matters in war, ; includes partition and ordering of troops, ; for defeating a country, or taking it, without strife, ; touching the rule, measure, tables, and scales, and the foretelling of victory, leader, one of five indispensable matters in war, . (_see_ general) letters, general should be master of, light esteem of enemy, result of, lightness, importance of, in operations, ; four natures of, - literature, chinese, place of suntzu and wutzu in, ; japanese commentators on, ; thought compressed in, living spies, , lu, number of men in, , _note_ luya, m manoeuvre, battle avoided by, ; normal and abnormal, , ; master in art of, march, forced, ; should be calm, like forest, marshes, unsuitable for camp, ; disposal of troops regarding, ; attack by fire of enemy encamped in, ; inundation of enemy in, measure, the second law of war, meres, ambush to be expected in, merit, recognition of, by enemy, ; to be sought, advanced, and rewarded, ; lord wen discriminates between guests with and without, messengers, enemy's movements revealed by, midday, time for spirits of troops to flag, middle kingdom, the, - might, war of, modification of military plans, moon, in quarters suitable for attack by fire, - moral of troops, ; use of banners to maintain, motion of troops, dignified, mountain warfare, disposal of troops in, mountains, advance among, movement of troops, - mu, prince of chin, example of, mysterious thread, the, mystery, supposed to surround art of war, n night, fighting in, ; voices calling in, nine changes, the, - nine grounds, the, - ; action with regard to, ; knowledge of, necessary to general, normal manoeuvres, , numbers, proportionate, needed to attack and to divide, ; subdivision of, ; superiority of, an economy of strength, ; no certain mark of strength, ; prince yuhu's trust in, ; tactics regarding differences in, ; of no avail in war in valleys, o obedience ensured by humane conduct, ; early training in, obsequiousness in general, officers, when angered by soldiers, ; weak with strong soldiers, and _vice versa_, officials, who have care for people, omens, discussion of, to be forbidden, open ground, movement on, - opportunity, one of four important influences in war, , oracles, cases for attack, when needless to consult, order of battle, the, - order, importance of, outlet, for retiring enemy, ; from enclosed ground, ovens, natural (mouths of valleys), p pass, when to meet enemy in, passages, narrow, avoidance of, path-ridden ground, - patriotism, not a factor in chinese wars, penalties, wutzu on, pennons, wutzu on use of, pestilence, attack on enemy who endures, pike, one of five arms, , _note_ pillage by enemy, wutzu on, plan of campaign, modifications in, pole star (standard), population, told by tables of laws of war, ; division of, into military groups, , _note_; cases of enemy's large, precipitous ground, occupation of, preparation, one of five important matters for general, - pretence, war a thing of, procedure, military, procrastination, evil of, in war, profit, a cause of war, punishment, frequent, what betokened by, ; when ordered by strange general, q qualities, of the general, - r rank, for those skilful in five arms, reason, one of five important matters for general, regard-over, for troops, dangerous fault, relaxation of troops, repulse, resulting from general's incapacity, requirements of war, - reserve (or flanking) force, rest, propriety in, rewards, justice in according, ; for those who take advantage of enemy, ; frequent, show lack of discipline, ; general's freedom in bestowing, ; for families of skilful in five arms, ; consequence of enemy's wise bestowal of, ; in advance, ; to be given to merit, revenge, war of, riches, why denied to soldiers, right-hand men, , and _note_ righteous war, righteousness, overcome by propriety, ; at root of achievement and merit, rivers of china affect operations, ; encampment on, inundation, and poisoning of, ; not to be crossed when turbulent, ; observation of drawers from, roads to avoid, rule, as to survey of land, ; general above, in bestowing rewards, ; modified by circumstances, s sanctuary, reckoning in, before fighting, scales, in laws of war, secret of war, wutzu on, secret, ground of approaching attack to be kept, shen, duke, shield, one of five arms, , _note_ siege, not to be undertaken, if avoidable, ; misfortunes entailed by, simplicity, one of five important matters for leader, , simulation, use of, situation, important matter in war, snakes (banners), soldiers, training of, ; strength of, sparrows, red (banners), spears, weapons for short men, spies, estimation of, in china, ; suntzu on power of, - ; on titles and salaries to, ; five kinds of, ; of enemy, ; skillfully sown, spirit of troops, - ; compared to torrent, ; good fighter seeks victory from, ; keen in morning, ; sustained by speed, ; influence of, stables, care of, standard of takeda shingen, , _note_ standards to be entrusted to strong men, ; wutzu on use of, strata, chinese division of earth and sky into nine, , _note_ stratagem, the attack by, - ; use of, on enclosed ground, ; importance of, in war, strategy, secrets of, ; how to outwit enemy by, ; assault by, ; in offering apparent advantage, ; not to be repeated, if victorious, steep place, advantage of, store burning, strength, first in field husbands, ; economy of, ; ways of husbanding, strong, place of, with cowardly, sun. (_see_ suntzu.) sunny ground, suntzu, place of, in chinese literature, ; on march of army, ; on offensive action, ; tactics of, unlike japanese, ; disinterested comments on war by, - ; revered in japan, ; influence of, in late japanese war, ; not patriot, but strategist, ; story told of, - ; articles of, - ; on five indispensable matters, ; on operations of war, - ; on attack by stratagem, - ; on order of battle, - ; on spirit of troops, - ; on emptiness and strength, - ; on battle tactics, - ; on the nine changes, - ; on movement of troops, - ; on ground, - ; on the nine grounds, - ; on assault by fire, - ; on the employment of spies, - surprise, case of enemy taken by, survey of land, suspended ground, swamps, movements regarding, sympathy, between general and soldiers, ; consequences of, - t tables of population, tactics, skill in change of, ; difficulty of military, ; battle, - takeda shingen, words on standard of, , _note_ tang, lord, of cheng, temper, quick, dangerous fault in general, tigers, white (banners), tortoises (banners), training, one of seven important military matters, ; wutzu esteems first requirement in war, transport, loss of, through bad tactics, trees, movement among, - truce, apologies betray anxiety for, tsu, number of men in, , _note_ turtle, enquiry by, , and _note_ tyranny, war of, u umbrella, part of chinese soldier's equipment, uniformity, brought about by authority, unity results from position of troops in enemy's land, unrighteous war, v valleys, movement of troops regarding steep, ; advance in, ; war in, victory, how to foretell, ; instruments of, ; the object of war, , ; five heralds of, ; skillful soldiers ensure, ; not always real success, ; how to calculate, ; spirit, great factor in, ; ground handmaid of, ; good government foundation of, vigilance, when especially necessary, ; one of five important matters for general, , village spies, virtue of the prince, one of seven important matters, ; essential for general, virtues, the five, comprised in "the way," , _note_ voices in night, signification of, in war, w waggons, cost of upkeep of, war, evils in train of, - ; a thing of pretence, ; requirements of, - ; quick accomplishment of, desirable, , ; evils of, should be realised, ; victory--not long operations--object of, ; supreme art of, ; no fixity in spirit of, ; action on declaration of, ; five causes of, ; five natures of, ; ways of overcoming five natures of, water, army likened to, ; troops in relation to, ; observation of drawers of, ; isolation or division of enemy by, - ; attack on enemy who lacks, ; striking of enemy when half across, , way, the, an indispensable matter in war, ; skillful leader steadfast in, ; wutzu on, - weapons, the five, , _note_; condition of enemy's important, ; distribution of, to tall, short, strong, bold, feeble, and wise, wei, wen, lord of, ; army of, opposes that of chin, - ; victory by, wen, prince of chin, example of, wen, lord of wei, questions wutzu, ; result of questioning by, ; addresses further questions, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ; treatment by, of guests with great, medium, and deficient merit, ; proposal by wutzu to, whistles, wutzu on use of, wind, question of, in assault by fire, ; attack on enemy who has encountered, ; direction of, to be studied, woods, advance among, words, big or smooth, meaning of, wu, number of men in, , _note_ wu, soldiers of, ; hatred between men of, and those of yueh, wutzu, place of, in chinese literature, ; offensive-defensive tactics of, ; comments disinterestedly on war, - ; revered in japan, ; influence of, in late japanese war, ; not patriot, but strategist, ; instance of low moral character of, ; sayings of, - ; a scholar, but skilled in war, ; made general before altar, ; on controlling army, selecting men, and strengthening country, - ; on distribution of men, ; on battle array, ; gives instance of lord chuang of chu, ; sayings on estimation of the enemy, - ; on eight cases of attack, ; on six enemies to avoid, - ; on judgment of enemy's condition, ; on best time for attack, - ; on control of army, - ; on maintenance of order, ; on expectation of life or death, ; on training, ; on treatment of horses, ; on qualities of general, - ; on four important influences of war, ; on use of bells, drums, flags, standards, banners, laws, and penalties, ; on secret of war, ; advice for case of troops in confusion, ; on numerical differences, ; on division of troops into five armies, - ; on differences of position, ; on war in valleys, ; on water fighting, ; on fighting after long rain, ; on pillage by enemy, ; on investing a castle, ; on impartiality, ; success of counsels of, y yang, principle in chinese philosophy, , _note_ yen, estimation of soldiers of, - ; nature of, yin, principle in chinese philosophy, , _note_ yin, province of, yin, even number, , _note_ yueh, continually at war with wu, , _note_ yuhu, prince, printed at the edinburgh press, and young street footnotes: [ ] the five virtues of humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and faith are known as the way. [ ] the yin and yang are the two principles into which natural phenomena are divided in chinese philosophy. yin is the masculine, active, or light principle, and yang is the feminine, passive, or dark principle. in this connection, day and night, rain, mist and wind are designated. [ ] the chinese army consisted of , , the "lu" of , "tsu" of , and the "wu" of men. [ ] the "chuyin" was a large tower or work constructed to give command over the interior of the enemy's fortress. high poles were also erected, from the top of which archers, each encased in an arrow-proof box and raised by a rope and pulley, shot at the besieged. [ ] literally th heaven, and th earth. the chinese divided the earth and sky each into strata. [ ] an animal's coat is thinnest in autumn. [ ] the drum was used to beat the assembly and in the advance, the bell as a signal to halt. flags were of two kinds, signalling flags and distinguishing banners. [ ] the normal and the abnormal refer to what in modern phrase are termed the frontal or holding force and the flanking or surprise force. [ ] the five cardinal tastes are, acridity, bitterness, sourness, sweetness and saline taste. [ ] sun, as has been said, was a man of wu. wu and yueh were continually at war. [ ] wood, fire, earth, metal and water. [ ] this passage was written on the standard of takeda shingen, one of japan's most famous generals. [ ] this and the following are so called because the men are continually thinking of, and slipping back to their homes. [ ] the population was divided, for military purposes, into groups of eight families. in time of war, each group sent one man into the field, furnished his wants, and provided for his family. therefore if , men are taken, , homes are affected. [ ] so called because they are put to death when the enemy finds out that he has been tricked. [ ] messengers and others, who do not disguise their identity, are included under this heading. [ ] literally, right and left men, _i.e._ they who sat on either side. [ ] all numbers connected with weapons were yin, that is to say--even, or belonging to the negative principle of chinese philosophy from their connection with death. [ ] the back of a turtle was burnt, and the answer was ascertained by the manner in which the shell split. [ ] halberd, shield, javelin, pike, and short pike. [ ] silently. * * * * * * transcriber's note: every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as possible. oe ligatures have been expanded. the following is a list of changes made to the original. the first line is the original line, the second the corrected one. page : reap advantage; the wrangles of a multitude are frought with peril. reap advantage; the wrangles of a multitude are fraught with peril. page : chi answered and said:-- wu answered and said:-- page : "by what means can the army gain the victory? "by what means can the army gain the victory?" page : and lord wu asked and said:-- and lord wen asked and said:-- [illustration: armour of philip ii. madrid. _photograph by hauser & menet._] armour & weapons by charles ffoulkes with a preface by viscount dillon, v.p.s.a. curator of the tower armouries oxford at the clarendon press henry frowde, m.a. publisher to the university of oxford london, edinburgh, new york toronto and melbourne preface writers on arms and armour have approached the subject from many points of view, but, as all students know, their works are generally so large in size, or, what is more essential, in price, that for many who do not have access to large libraries it is impossible to learn much that is required. then again, the papers of the proceedings of the various antiquarian and archaeological societies are in all cases very scattered and, in some cases, unattainable, owing to their being out of print. many writers on the subject have confined themselves to documentary evidence, while others have only written about such examples as have been spared by time and rust. these latter, it may be noted, are, in almost all cases, such as the brasses and effigies in our churches, quite exceptional, representing as they do the defences and weapons of the richer classes. what the ordinary man wore, how he wore it, and how it was made are all questions worthy of attention. the works of our greatest romancers have so little regarded the development of armour, and even to-day such anachronisms are seen in pictures and books, that though many comfortable and picturesque notions may be disturbed by the actual truth, yet the actual truth will be found to be no less interesting than fiction. a handy work, not excessive in size or price, and giving really correct information, seems therefore to be needed and should be popular. such a work is this which mr. ffoulkes has undertaken, and if we recognize what an immense amount of information has to be condensed within the limits of a handbook, i think we shall fully appreciate his endeavours to give an appetite for larger feasts. dillon. tower of london armouries. contents page author's note list of authorities introduction chapter i the age of mail ( - ) chapter ii the transition period ( - ) chapter iii the wearing of armour and its constructional details chapter iv plate armour ( -about ) chapter v horse armour chapter vi the decadence of armour chapter vii weapons index author's note at the request of many of those who attended my course of lectures, delivered before the university of oxford during the lent term, , i have collected and illustrated some of the more important notes dealing with the development of european defensive armour and weapons. these pages are not a mere reprint of those lectures, nor do they aspire to the dignity of a history of armour. they are simply intended as a handbook for use in studying history and a short guide to the somewhat intricate technicalities of the craft of the armourer. no work, even of the smallest dimensions, can be produced at the present day without laying its author under a deep sense of indebtedness to baron de cosson for his numerous notes on helms and helmets, and to viscount dillon for his minute and invaluable researches in every branch of this subject. to this must be added a personal indebtedness to the latter for much assistance, and for the use of many of the illustrations given in this work and also in my course of lectures. charles ffoulkes. oxford, . the following works should be consulted by those who wish to study the subject of armour and weapons more minutely:-- _a critical inquiry into ancient armour_, sir samuel meyrick; _a treatise on ancient armour_, f. grose; _ancient armour_, j. hewitt; _arms and armour_, lacombe (trans. by boutell); _arms and armour_, demmin (trans. by black); _armour in england_, starkie gardner; _waffenkunde_, wendelin boeheim; _guida del amatore di armi antiche_, j. gelli; _dictionnaire du mobilier français_ (vols. ii and vi), viollet-le-duc; _encyclopedia of costume_, planché; _a manual of monumental brasses_, haines; _engraved illustrations of antient armour_, meyrick and skelton; _monumental effigies_, stothard; _the art of war_, c. w. c. oman; _archaeologia_, _the archaeological journal_, _the proceedings of the society of antiquaries_; the catalogues of the armouries of vienna, madrid, paris, brussels, turin, dresden; the wallace collection, london and windsor castle. the author is indebted to the publishers of wendelin boeheim's _waffenkunde_ for the use of the illustrations and , and to messrs. parker, publishers of haines's _monumental brasses_, for the figures on plate iii. introduction as a subject for careful study and exhaustive investigation perhaps no detail of human existence can be examined with quite the same completeness as can the defensive armour and weapons of past ages. most departments of literature, science, and art are still living realities; each is still developing and is subject to evolution as occasion demands; and for this reason our knowledge of these subjects cannot be final, and our researches can only be brought, so to speak, up to date. the defensive armour of europe, however, has its definite limitations so surely set that we can surround our investigations with permanent boundaries, which, as far as human mind can judge, will never be enlarged. we can look at our subject as a whole and can see its whole length and breadth spread out before us. in other aspects of life we can only limit our studies from day to day as invention or discovery push farther their conquering march; but, in dealing with the armour of our ancestors, we know that although we may still indulge in theories as to ancient forms and usages, we have very definitely before us in the primitive beginnings, the gradual development, the perfection, and the decadence or passing away, an absolutely unique progression and evolution which we can find in no other condition of life. the survival of the fittest held good of defensive armour until that very fitness was found to be a source rather of weakness than of strength, owing to changed conditions of warfare; and then the mighty defences of steel, impervious to sword, lance, and arrow, passed away, to remain only as adjuncts of parade and pageant, or as examples in museums of a lost art in warfare and military history. as an aid to the study of history our interest in armour may be considered perhaps rather sentimental and romantic than practical or useful. but, if we consider the history of the art of war, we shall find that our subject will materially assist us, when we remember that the growth of nations and their fortunes, at any rate till recent times, have depended to a large extent on the sword and the strength of the arm that wielded it. there is another aspect of historical study which is of some importance, especially to those who stand on the outskirts of the subject. this aspect one may call the 'realistic view'. the late professors york powell and j. r. green both insisted on the importance of this side of the subject; and we cannot but feel that to be able to visualize the characters of history and to endow them with personal attributes and personal equipment must give additional interest to the printed page and other documentary evidences. when the study of defensive armour has been carefully followed we shall find that the black prince appears to us not merely as a name and a landmark on the long road of time; we shall be able to picture him to ourselves as a living individual dressed in a distinctive fashion and limited in his actions, to some extent, by that very dress and equipment. the cut of a surcoat, the hilt of a sword, the lines of a breastplate, will tell us, with some degree of accuracy, when a man lived and to what nation he belonged; and, at the same time, in the later years, we shall find that the suit of plate not only proclaims the individuality of the wearer, but also bears the signature and individuality of the maker; a combination of interests which few works of handicraft can offer us. from the eleventh to the end of the fourteenth century we have but a few scattered examples of actual defensive armour and arms; and the authenticity of many of these is open to doubt. the reason for this scarcity is twofold. firstly, because the material, in spite of its strength, is liable to destruction by rust and corrosion, especially when the armour is of the interlinked chain type which exposes a maximum surface to the atmosphere. a second reason, of equal if not greater importance, is the fact that, owing to the expense of manufacture and material, the various portions of the knightly equipment were remade and altered to suit new fashions and requirements. perhaps still another reason may be found in the carelessness and lack of antiquarian interest in our ancestors, who, as soon as a particular style had ceased to be in vogue, destroyed or sold as useless lumber objects which to-day would be of incalculable interest and value. for these reasons, therefore, we are dependent, for the earlier periods of our subject, upon those illuminated manuscripts and sculptured monuments which preserve examples of the accoutrements of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. of these, as far as reliability of date is concerned, the incised monumental brasses and sculptured effigies in our churches are the best guides, because they were produced shortly after the death of the persons they represent, and are therefore more likely to be correct in the details of dress and equipment; and, in addition, they are often portraits of the deceased. illuminated manuscripts present more difficulty. the miniature painter of the period was often fantastic in his ideas, and was certainly not an antiquary. even the giants of the renaissance, raphael, mantegna, titian, and the rest, saw nothing incongruous in arming st. george in a suit of milanese plate, or a roman soldier of the first years of the christian epoch in a fluted breastplate of nuremberg make. religious and historical legends were in those days present and living realities and, to the unlearned, details of antiquarian interest would have been useless for instructive purposes, whereas the garbing of mythical or historical characters in the dress of the period made their lives and actions seem a part of the everyday life of those who studied them. this being the case, we must use our judgement in researches among illustrated manuscripts, and must be prepared for anachronisms. for example, we find that in the illustrated froissart in the british museum, known as the 'philip de commines' copy,[ ] the barrier or 'tilt' which separated the knights when jousting is represented in the tournament of st. inglevert. now this tournament took place in the year ; but monstrelet tells us[ ] that the tilt was first used at arras in , that is, some forty years after. this illustrated edition of froissart was produced at the end of the fifteenth century, when the tilt was in common use; so we must, in this and in other like cases, use the illustrations not as examples of the periods which they record, but as delineations of the manners, customs, and dress of the period at which they were produced. the different methods of arming were much the same all over europe; but in england fashions were adopted only after they had been in vogue for some years in france, italy, and germany. we may pride ourselves, however, on the fact that our ancestors were not so prone to exaggeration in style or to the over-ornate so-called decoration which was in such favour on the continent during the latter part of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries. for a fuller study of this subject sir samuel meyrick's great work on ancient armour is useful, if the student bears in mind that the author was but a pioneer, and that many of his statements have since been corrected in the light of recent investigations, and also that the meyrick collection which he so frequently uses to illustrate his remarks is now dispersed through all the museums of europe. of all the authorities the most trustworthy and most minute and careful in both text and illustrations is hewitt, whose three volumes on ancient armour have been the groundwork of all subsequent works in english. some of the more recent writers are prone to use hewitt's infinite care and research without acknowledging the fact; but they have very seldom improved upon his methods or added to his investigations. for the later periods, which hewitt has not covered so fully as he has the earlier portion of his subject, the _catalogues raisonnés_ of the various museums of england and europe will assist the student more than any history that could possibly be compiled. chapter i the age of mail ( - ) with the norman conquest we may be said, in england, to enter upon the iron period of defensive armour. the old, semi-barbaric methods were still in use, but were gradually superseded by the craft of the smith and the metal-worker. this use of iron for defensive purposes had been in vogue for some time on the continent, for we find the monk of st. gall writing bitterly on the subject in his _life of charlemagne_. he says: 'then could be seen the iron charles, helmed with an iron helm, his iron breast and his broad shoulders defended by an iron breastplate, an iron spear raised in his left hand, his right always rested on his unconquered iron falchion. the thighs, which with most men are uncovered that they may the more easily ride on horseback, were in his case clad with plates of iron: i need make no special mention of his greaves, for the greaves of all the army were of iron. his shield was of iron, his charger iron-coloured and iron-hearted. the fields and open places were filled with iron, a people stronger than iron paid universal homage to the strength of iron. the horror of the dungeon seemed less than the bright gleam of the iron. "oh the iron, woe for the iron," was the cry of the citizens. the strong walls shook at the sight of iron, the resolution of old and young fell before the iron.' the difficulty of obtaining and working metal, however, was such that it was only used by the wealthy, and that sparingly. the more common fashion of arming was a quilted fabric of either linen or cloth, a very serviceable protection, which was worn up to the end of the fifteenth century. another favourite material for defensive purposes was leather. we read of the shield of ajax being composed of seven tough ox-hides, and the word 'cuirass' itself suggests a leather garment. now, given either the leather or the quilted fabric, it is but natural, with the discovery and use of iron, that it should have been added in one form or another to reinforce the less rigid material. and it is this reinforcing by plates of metal, side by side with the use of the interlaced chain armour, which step by step brings us to the magnificent creations of the armourer's craft which distinguish the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. sir samuel meyrick[ ] leads us into endless intricacies with his theories of the various kinds of defensive armour in use at the time of the conquest; but these theories must of necessity be based only upon personal opinion, and can in no way be borne out by concrete examples. if we take the pictured representations of armour as our guide we find certain arrangements of lines which lead us to suppose that they indicate some peculiar arrangement of metal upon a fabric. the first and oldest of these varieties is generally called 'scale' or imbricate armour. we find this represented on the trajan column, to give only one of the many examples of its use in very early times. that it was a very pliant and serviceable defence we may judge from the fact that, with some alteration in its application, it formed the distinguishing feature of the brigandine of the fifteenth century. the scales were sewn upon a leather or quilted garment, the upper row overlapping the lower in such a manner that the attachment is covered and protected from injury (plate i, ). the scales were either formed with the lower edge rounded, like the scales of a fish, or were feather-shaped or square. another method of reinforcing the leather defence has been named the 'trellice' coat. it is always difficult to discover exactly what the primitive draughtsman intended to represent in the way of fabrics, and it is quite open to question whether these diagonal lines may not merely suggest a quilting of linen or cloth. if it is intended to represent leather the trellice lines would probably be formed of thongs applied on to the groundwork with metal studs riveted in the intervening spaces (plate i). this arrangement of lines is very common on the bayeux tapestry. [illustration: plate i . model of scale armour . from bib. nat. paris ms xiiith cent. . model of trellice . from bayeux tapestry . model of ringed armour . from harl. ms. brit. mus. , xith cent. . model of mail . from the album of wilars de honecort. xiiith cent. . model of banded mail . model of banded mail after meyrick. . model of banded mail after waller . romance of alexander bib. nat. paris. circ. . figure on buttress of s. mary's church, oxford.] another variety to be found in early illuminated manuscripts goes by the name of 'ringed' armour. it is quite probable that the circular discs may have been solid, but on the other hand, from the practical point of view, a ring gives equal protection against a cutting blow, and is of course much lighter. the illustration of this form of defensive armour is of rather earlier date than that at which we commence our investigations, but it appears with some frequency in manuscripts of the twelfth century. mr. j. g. waller, in his article on the hauberk of mail in _archaeologia_, vol. lix, is of opinion that all these arrangements of line represent interlinked chain armour. if this is the case chain-mail must have been much more common than we imagine. from the very nature of its construction and the labour expended on its intricate manufacture it would surely, at least in the earlier periods, have been only the defence of the wealthy. when we examine the protective armour of primitive races we find quilted and studded garments used, even at the present day, so it seems far more probable that our illustrations represent some similar forms of defensive garments than that they are all incompetent renderings of the fabric of chain-mail only. that the making of chain-mail must have been laborious in the extreme we may judge from the fact that the wire which formed the links had to be hammered out from the solid bar or ingot. as far as can be gathered, the art of wire-drawing was not practised till the fourteenth century, at which time rudolph of nuremberg is credited with its discovery. the roughly-hammered strips were probably twisted spirally round an iron or wood core and then cut off into rings of equal size (fig. ). the ends of the rings were flattened and pierced, and, when interlaced, the pierced ends were riveted together or sometimes, as is the case with oriental mail, welded with heat. links that are 'jumped', that is with the ends of the ring merely butted together and not joined, generally show either that the mail is an imitation, or that it was used for some ceremonial purpose; for this insecure method of fixing would be useless in the stress and strain of battle or active service. the most usual method of interlinking the rings is for each ring to join four others, as will be seen in the drawing on plate i, no. . no. on the same plate shows the mail as more generally depicted in illuminations. when we consider the inexperience of the scribes and illustrators of the middle ages we must admit that this representation of a very intricate fabric is not only very ingenious but follows quite the best modern impressionist doctrines. portions of chain-mail survive in most armouries and museums, but their provenance is generally unknown, and much that is of oriental origin is passed off as european. chain-mail itself comes in the first instance from the east, but when it was introduced into europe is difficult, if not impossible, to state. it is certainly represented as worn by the scythians and parthians on the trajan column, and is probably of greater antiquity still. [illustration: fig. . probable method of making links for mail.] from the beginning of the thirteenth century, for about sixty or seventy years, we find a curious arrangement of lines intended to represent a form of defensive armour, both in illuminated manuscripts and also on carved monuments (plate i, , ). mr. waller, in the article on the hauberk referred to above, gives it as his opinion that this 'banded mail', as it is called, was but a variety of the ordinary interlinked mail; but if we examine the illuminations of the period we shall find that it is shown side by side with the representation of what all authorities admit to be chain-mail. no. on plate i shows the arm and leg defences to be formed of this banded mail, while the head is protected with the ordinary chain-mail. we have then to try and discover how these horizontal bands dividing each row of links in the mail can be shown in a practical form. meyrick vaguely suggests a row of rings sewn edgeways on the body garment and threaded with a leather thong (plate i, ), with the under fabric caught up between the rows of rings and formed into a piping through which a cord was threaded. this theory has been quoted by viollet-le-duc in his _dictionnaire du mobilier français_, by dr. wendelin boeheim in his _waffenkunde_, and by more recent writers; but none of these authorities seems to have taken the trouble to test its practicability. the human body being rounded, the tendency of these edge-sewn rings would be to 'gape' and thus give an opening for the weapon. in addition to this, the number of rings so used would make the weight of the defence, hanging as it did from the shoulders alone, almost insupportable. a third and perhaps the most conclusive of all the arguments against meyrick's theory is that we frequently find the inside of a banded mail coif shown with the same markings as the outside, which aspect would be impossible if the rings were arranged as he suggests. from models specially made for this work we find that if leather was used at all it must be after the manner of no. on plate i. here the rings are covered with the leather on both sides, so that there is no possibility of their gaping, and, in addition, the leather being pressed against the rings, on the outside by wear and usage and on the inside from the pressure of the body, would show ring-markings on front and back which might be represented in the manner shown in the illustration. the drawback to this theory is not only the weight of such a defence, but also the heat from lack of ventilation. by far the most practical theory put forward is that of mr. waller,[ ] who gives an illustration of a piece of oriental mail with leather thongs threaded through each alternate row of rings. this gives a certain solidity to the net-like fabric and yet does not add appreciably to its weight. no. on plate i shows this arrangement drawn from a model, and when we compare it with the figures below, taking into consideration the difficulty of representing such a fabric, we are forced to admit that this last theory is the most practical. this is especially so in no. ; for the mail covering for the head is probably made in one piece with that of the arms and legs, but the leather thongs have been omitted on the head and hands to give greater ease of movement. before leaving the subject of fabrics it may be well to warn those who consult meyrick that this author is rather prone to enunciate theories of the different forms of mail which, like that of the banded mail, do not work well in practice. he mentions, among many other varieties, what he calls 'mascled' mail. he asserts that this was formed of lozenge-shaped plates cut out in the centre and applied to linen or leather. he says that it was so called from its likeness to the meshes of a net (lat. _macula_). now when we consider that the word 'mail' itself comes to us from the latin 'macula', through the french 'maille' and the italian 'maglia', we find that meyrick's 'mascled mail' is but a tautological expression which can best be applied to the net-like fabric of the interlinked chain defence, and so his 'mascled mail' would more correctly be styled a 'mascled coat', and this coat would probably be formed of the chain variety as resembling the meshes of a net more closely than any other fabric. double mail is sometimes to be met with on carved monuments, and this would be constructed in the same manner as the single mail; but two links would be used together in every case where one is used in the single mail. having briefly described the varieties of fabric and material which were in use at the time of the conquest for defensive armour, we may pass to the forms in which those materials were made up. the first garment put on by the man-at-arms was the tunic, which was a short linen shirt reaching usually to just above the knee; it is often shown in miniatures of the period beneath the edge of the coat of mail. at one period the tunic appears to have been worn inconveniently long, if we are to judge from the seals of richard i, in which it is shown reaching to the feet. this long under-garment was quite given up by the beginning of the thirteenth century, and those representations of joan of arc which show a long under-tunic falling from beneath the breastplate are based upon no reliable authority. next to the tunic was worn the gambeson, called also the wambais and aketon, a quilted garment, either used as the sole defence by the foot-soldier, or, by the knight, worn under the hauberk to prevent the chain-mail from bruising the body under the impact of a blow. the gambeson is shown on fig. , appearing beneath the edge of the hauberk just above the knee. the hauberk, which was worn over the gambeson, was the chief body defence. it is true that we read of a 'plastron de fer', which seems to have been a solid metal plate worn over the breast and sometimes at the back; but it was invariably put on either under the hauberk itself or over the hauberk, but always beneath the jupon or surcoat, which at this period was the outermost garment worn. in either case it was not exposed to view, so it is impossible to tell with any degree of accuracy what was its shape or how it was fixed to the wearer. hewitt[ ] gives two illustrations of carved wooden figures in bamberg cathedral, which show a plastron de fer worn over the jupon, which seems to be studded with metal. the figures were executed about the year . the form of the hauberk, as shown on the bayeux tapestry, was of the shirt order (plate i, , ). it was usually slit to the waist, front and back, for convenience on horseback, and the skirts reached to the knee, thus protecting the upper leg. it is perhaps needless to point out that the extreme weight of mail with its thick padded undergarment made the use of a horse a necessity, for the weight was all borne upon the shoulders, and was not, as is the case with suits of plate, distributed over the limbs and body of the wearer. the sleeves of the hauberk were sometimes short; sometimes they were long and ended in fingerless mittens of mail. the three varieties of sleeve are shown on plate i, while the mittens turned back to leave the hand bare appear on the setvans brass (plate iii, ). wace, the chronicler, seems to suggest different forms of defensive habiliments, for we find mention of a short form of the hauberk, called the haubergeon. in his _roman de rou_ he writes of duke william at the battle of senlac:-- sun boen haubert fist demander,[ ] while of bishop odo he says:-- un haubergeon aveit vestu de sor une chemise blanche. the fact that he mentions the tunic ('chemise blanche') seems to imply that it was seen beneath the hem of the haubergeon, which would not be the case with the long-skirted hauberk. occasionally in illuminated manuscripts the hauberk is shown slit at the sides; but for what purpose it is difficult to imagine, for it would impede the wearer when walking and would make riding an impossibility. the defences of the leg, made of mail like the hauberk, seem to have been used, at first, only by the nobles, if the bayeux tapestry is taken as a guide. the common soldiers wore linen or leather swathings, sometimes studded with metal, but in appearance closely resembling the modern puttee. the upper portion of the leg was protected at a later period with chaussons, while the defences from knee to foot were called chausses. wace mentions 'chauces de fer', but we must remember, as was noticed in the introduction, that wace wrote some seventy years after the conquest, and probably described the accoutrements worn at his own time. the bayeux tapestry is nearer the period, as far as we can date it with any correctness, but here we are hampered to some extent by the crude methods of the embroideress. the chaussons are not often shown in illuminations, for the long-skirted hauberk covers the leg to the knee; but the chausses appear in all pictorial and sculptured records of the period, made either of mail or of pourpointerie, that is fabric studded with metal. towards the end of the thirteenth century the chaussons and chausses were made in one stocking-like form covering the foot; this is shown on plate i, , . in the first of these illustrations only the front of the leg is covered, and the chausses are laced at the back. as the manufacture of mail progressed the whole of the wearer's person came to be protected by it. in addition to the coverings of the body we find continuations that protected arms and legs, and in course of time the neck and head were protected with a coif or hood of mail, which is shown in use in plate i, no. , and thrown back on the shoulders on no. . although of no protective use, the surcoat is so essentially part of the war equipment of the knight that it needs more than a passing notice. it first appears on royal seals at the beginning of the thirteenth century, in the reign of king john. some modern writers have suggested that it was first used in the crusades to keep the sun off the mail; however this may be, we have written proof that it was of use in protecting the intricate fabric of chain armour from the wet, which by rusting the metal played havoc with its serviceability. it will be seen in different lengths in the figures on plate i. in _the avowynge of king arthur_, stanza , we find-- with scharpe weppun and schene gay gowns of grene, to hold thayre armur clene and were[ ] hitte fro the wete. like the hauberk, the surcoat was slit to the waist in front and behind for convenience on horseback, and was usually girt at the waist with a cord or belt. it was frequently decorated with the armorial bearings of the wearer. when the barrel helm was worn, concealing the whole face, some such cognizance was necessary that the knight might be recognized. the setvans brass (plate iii) shows the armorial device powdered over the surcoat. the headpiece characteristic of the norman conquest is the conical nasal helm. we should draw a distinction between the helmet and the helm. the former is, of course, a diminutive of the latter. at the time of the norman conquest the head covering would rank rather as a helmet, as it did not entirely cover the face. the norman helmet was conical, usually formed of four triangular pieces of metal plate riveted in a ring and meeting at the apex. sometimes a nasal or nose-guard was added (plate i, , ). that this nasal must have been broad enough to conceal the face to a great extent we may judge from the story how the norman soldiers believed their leader to be killed, and how william, raising his helm, rode along the lines crying 'i am here, and by god's help i shall conquer'. the bayeux tapestry illustrates this incident. on some of the conqueror's seals we find the helmet tied on with laces. earflaps were sometimes added, as may be seen on the chessmen found in the isle of lewis, now in the british museum. [illustration: fig. . from the effigy of hugo fitz eudo, kirkstead, lincs., thirteenth century.] [illustration: fig. . from a figure in the cathedral at constance, thirteenth century.] [illustration: fig. . from the great seal of alexander ii of scotland, thirteenth century.] [illustration: fig. . brit. mus. roy. ms. . d. i, thirteenth century.] during the twelfth century the helmet gradually became the helm. the ear-flaps were fixed, becoming an integral part of the defence, and closed round to join the nasal, this arrangement forming at length the ventail or visor. this gives us what is known as the 'barrel helm' (fig. ), in which the whole head is enclosed and the only opening in the front is the 'ocularium' or vision slit. next we have the same kind of helm with the addition of holes for breathing in the lower portion (fig. ). in some varieties the back of the helm is shorter than the front, as on fig. , and in this kind also we sometimes find breathing holes added. the great seals of the kings are a most useful guide in discovering the accoutrements of each period, and especially so for the helms and helmets, which are easier to distinguish than the more minute details of dress and equipment. it will be understood that in time the flat-topped helm was given up in favour of the 'sugar-loaf' helm (fig. ), as it is generally called, when we consider the importance of a 'glancing surface' in armour. although thickness of material was of some importance in defensive armour, this providing of surfaces from which a weapon would slip was considered to be of supreme importance by the armour-smiths of later periods. in the conical helm, as indeed in nearly all great helms, the vision and breathing apertures were pierced in the plates of the helm itself and were not part of a movable visor, as was the case in the helmet. the weight of these helms must have been great; for they do not seem to have been bolted on to the shoulders, as were the fifteenth and sixteenth century tilting helms, but to have rested upon the crown of the head. the drawing on plate i, no. , shows a padded cap which was worn under the mail to protect the head from pressure. on no. of the same plate we see the helm being put on over the mail coif; the padded cap is worn under the mail. for tournaments the helm was sometimes made of toughened leather, which was called 'cuirbouilli' from the fact that it was prepared by being boiled in oil and then moulded to shape. this material was very strong and serviceable and was used, as we shall see later on, for reinforcing the chain armour and also for horse armour. it was generally decorated with gilding and painting. for the tournament held at windsor in we find mention of 'xxxviii galee de cor'.[ ] as we have shown, these great helms were not attached to the body armour and were thus liable to be struck off in battle. in order to recover them a chain was sometimes stapled to the helm and fastened to the waist or some portion of the body armour (fig. ). the usual form of helmet in the twelfth century is the cup-shaped headpiece of which the cervellière is a typical example (fig. ). it was either worn as the sole defence or was used in conjunction with the helm as an under-cap. the wide-rimmed hat of iron is found all through the period of defensive armour with which we deal. it appears in the thirteenth century (fig. ) and is also to be found in the fifteenth. there is an example of one of these war-hats (_eisenhut_) in the museum at nuremberg. [illustration: fig. . detail from the brass of sir roger de trumpington, trumpington, camb., .] [illustration: fig. . from the monument to johan le botiler, st. bride's, glamorganshire, .] [illustration: fig. . add. ms. . , f. , thirteenth century.] the shield at the time of the conquest was kite-shaped. it was long enough to cover the body and legs of the warrior when mounted, but it must have been a most inconvenient adjunct to his accoutrements. as we have seen in the monk of st. gall's records, the shield was sometimes made of iron; but the more usual material was wood covered with leather or the tough cuirbouilli. its broad flat surface was from the earliest times used by the painter to display his art, which at first was not systematized, but consisted of geometrical patterns and strange birds and beasts that had no special meaning. as time went on each knight retained the device which was borne upon his shield and came to be recognized by it, and from this sprung the complicated science of heraldry, which has survived, with all its intricate detail, to the present day. the surface of the shield was often bowed so that it embraced the body of the wearer. that some must have been flat we may suppose from the fact that the soldiers in the bayeux tapestry are represented as using them for trays to carry cups and plates at the 'prandium'. in st. lucy's chapel, at christ church cathedral in oxford, in the window depicting the martyrdom of st. thomas of canterbury, are to be seen two varieties of decorated shields. two of the knights bear shields painted with geometrical designs, while fitz urse carries a shield on which are three bears' heads erased, a punning cognizance from the name of the wearer. the date of the window is about the end of the thirteenth century. the shield was attached to the wearer by a thong passing round the neck, called the guige. when not in use it was slung by this thong on the back. when in use the arm and hand passed through the short loops called enarmes (fig. ). the royal blazon first appears on the shield in the reign of richard i. occasionally we find circular shields depicted in illuminations; but they were generally used by the foot-soldiers. as the development of defensive armour proceeds we shall find that the shield becomes smaller, and in time is discarded, the body defences being made sufficient protection in themselves. [illustration: fig. . from the _romance of alexander_, f. , bod. lib., fourteenth century.] [illustration: fig. . a, a. enarmes. b. guige.] chapter ii the transition period ( - ) it will be readily understood that the change from mail to plate armour was not brought about at once. difficulty of manufacture, expense, and conservatism in idea, all retarded the innovation. some progressive knight might adopt a new fashion which did not come into general use till many years after, in the same manner that, from force of circumstances, or from a clinging to old methods, we find an out-of-date detail of armour like the coif of mail, shown on the brass of sir w. molineux, appearing in , or the sleeved hauberk in the dresden museum which was worn without plate defences for the arms by herzog august at the battle of mühlberg in . acting on the method adopted in the preceding chapter, we may first consider the materials used during the beginning of the transition period, and afterwards we shall show how those materials were made up. during the fourteenth century iron, leather, whalebone, and quilted fabrics were all employed for defensive purposes. the illustration from the _romance of alexander_ (fig. ) shows the gambeson still worn under the mail, and the legs are covered in one instance with a metal-studded or pourpointed defence; a second figure wears what appears to be scale armour, while the third has no detail shown upon the legs, which may be an oversight on the part of the artist, or may suggest that plain hose were worn. iron was used for the mail and scale armour and was also employed in making a pliable defence called splinted armour, which at a later period became the brigandine (plate ii). there are several of these brigandines to be found in the armouries of england and europe, but the majority of them date about the middle of the fifteenth century. as will be seen in the illustration, the brigandine was made of small plates of iron or steel overlapping upwards and riveted on to a canvas-lined garment of silk or velvet. the plates were worn on the inside in most cases, and the rivet heads which showed on the silk or velvet face were often gilded, thus producing a very brilliant effect. [illustration: plate ii (outside.) (inside.) brigandine in the musée d'artillerie, paris.] we find many references to these splinted defences in the inventories of the period, which form a valuable source of information on the subject of details of armour. the inventory of humphrey de bohun,[ ] earl of hereford, taken in , gives:--'une peire de plates coverts de vert velvet.' again, in one of the inventories of the exchequer, ,[ ] is noted:--'une peire de plates covert de rouge samyt.' the inventory of piers gaveston, dated , a document full of interesting details, has[ ]:--'une peire de plates enclouez et garniz d'argent.' the 'pair of plates' mentioned in these records refers to the front and back defences. in the accounts of payments by sir john howard we find in the year , _s._ _d._ paid for , 'bregander nayles'.[ ] brass was employed for decorative purposes on the edges of the hauberk, or was fashioned into gauntlets, as may be seen in the gauntlets of the black prince, preserved at canterbury. chaucer writes in the 'rime of sir thopas':-- his swerdes shethe of yvory, his helm of laton bright. laton, or latten, was a mixed metal, much resembling brass, used at this period for decorative purposes. whalebone was employed for gauntlets and also for swords used in the tournament. froissart uses the words 'gands de baleine' in describing the equipment of the troops of philip von arteveld at the battle of rosbecque. quilted garments were still worn, either as the sole defence or as a gambeson under the mail. as late as the year we find regulations of louis xi of france ordering these coats of defence to be made of from to folds of linen.[ ] leather, either in its natural state or boiled and beaten till it could be moulded and then allowed to dry hard, was frequently used at this period for all kinds of defensive armour. in chaucer's 'rime of sir thopas', from which we have quoted before, occur the words, 'his jambeux were of quirboilly.' the jambeaux were coverings for the legs. this quirboilly, cuirbully, or cuirbouilli, when finished was an exceedingly hard substance, and was, on account of its lightness as compared to metal, much used for tournament armour and for the barding or defence for the horse. in the roll of purchases for the windsor park tournament, held in , mention is made of cuirasses supplied by milo the currier, who also furnished helms of the same material.[ ] in the inventory of sir simon burley, beheaded in , we find under 'armure de guerre':--'un palet (a headpiece) de quierboylle.' there is a light leather helmet of the 'morion' type, dated sixteenth century, in the zeughaus at berlin. banded mail still appears in drawings or on monuments up to the end of the fourteenth century. we may now turn to the making up of these varied materials, and will endeavour, step by step, to trace the gradual evolution of the full suit of plate from the first additions of plate defence to mail till we find that the mail practically disappears, or is only worn in small portions where plate cannot be used. [illustration: fig. . from roy. ms. . g. vi, f. , fourteenth century.] [illustration: fig. . bib. nat., paris, _lancelot du lac_, fourteenth century.] setting aside the plastron de fer, which, as has been noticed, is seldom shown in representations of armour, we find the first additional defence was the poleyne or knee-cop. we must suppose that there was good reason for thus reinforcing the mail defence on this part of the body. probably this was due to the fact that the shield became shorter at this period, and also because the position of the wearer when mounted exposed the knee, a very delicate piece of anatomy, to the attacks of the foot-soldier (fig. ). poleynes are mentioned in a wardrobe account of edward i in . they were frequently made of cuirbouilli, and this material is probably intended in the illustration (plate iii, ), as elaborately decorated metal is rarely met with at this period. at the end of the thirteenth century appear those curious appendages known as ailettes. on plate iii, , the figure is shown wearing the poleynes and also the ailettes. for practical purposes they are represented on recumbent figures as worn at the back, but in pictorial illustrations they are invariably shown on the outside of the shoulder. some writers consider that they were solely used for ornament, presumably because they are generally shown decorated with heraldic blazons. against this, however, we may place the fact that they are depicted in representations of battles, and in queen mary's psalter ( . b. vii in the british museum) the combatants wear plain ailettes. the german name for the ailettes (_tartschen_) suggests also that they were intended for shoulder-guards. fourteenth-century inventories abound with references to ailettes. in the roll of purchases for windsor park tournament are mentioned thirty-eight pair of ailettes to be fastened with silk laces supplied by one richard paternoster. in the piers gaveston inventory before quoted are: 'les alettes garnis et frettez de perles.' these, of course, would be only for ceremonial use. the illustration (fig. ) shows different forms of ailette, and occasionally we find the lozenge-shaped, and once (brit. mus. roy. ms. . a. xxii, fol. ) they assume a cruciform shape. the attachment of the ailettes with the laces referred to in the windsor park inventory is shown on fig. . in the _chroniques de charlemaine_, preserved in the bibliothèque royale at brussels, the ailettes appear to be laced to the side of the helmet. this occurs in so many of the miniatures that it must be taken as a correct presentment of this detail in arming. it may be, however, that, as this manuscript was produced in the year , it recorded a later method of using the ailette which, _per se_, disappears about the middle of the fourteenth century, as far as monumental records exist. the next addition of plate to the equipment of mail seems to have been on the legs. the only monumental brass that gives this fashion of arming is the northwode brass at minster, sheppey. as the legs are of later date than the rest of the brass, although most probably correct in design, it may be better to trust to a monument which is intact, as is the statue of gulielmus berardi, , which is carved in the cloister of the annunziata convent, florence (fig. ). here we find the front of the leg entirely protected by plates which may be intended for metal, but which, from their ornate decoration, seem rather to suggest cuirbouilli. these jambeaux, or, as they are sometimes called, bainbergs or beinbergs, of leather have been before referred to as mentioned by chaucer. returning to monumental brasses again, we find on the gorleston brass (plate iii, ) that the plate additions are still more increased. besides the poleynes and the ailettes there are traces of plate jambs on the legs, and the arms are protected by plates and circular discs on shoulder and elbow. [illustration: plate iii . sir john d'aubernoun, , stoke d'abernon, surrey . sir robt. de setvans, , chartham, kent . a member of the de bacon family, c. , gorleston, suffolk . sir john d'aubernoun, stoke d'abernon, surrey . william de aldeburgh, c. , aldborough, yorks . a knight, c. , laughton, lincolnshire.] after ailettes are rarely met with. on no. of plate iii these details seem to be advanced in some points, and are shown with the methods of attaching them to the wearer. the rerebrace is strapped over the mail, and the disc at the bend of the coude or elbow-piece is held in place by aiguillettes or laces--called at a later period arming-points. the poleynes overlap the jambs, and so cover the junction of the two pieces, and the latter are held to the leg with straps. the solerets are among the earliest examples of a defence of laminated plates, that is, of strips of metal riveted upon leather in order to give more ease of movement than would be possible with a solid plate. the vambrace is worn under the sleeve of the hauberk, and not, as in the preceding example, over the mail. this figure is especially interesting because it shows the different garments worn with the armour of this period. above the knees appears the tunic; over this comes the hauberk of mail, in this instance banded mail; over the hauberk are shown the upper pourpoint, a quilted garment, and, above this, the surcoat, or, as this variety is called, the cyclas. the difference between the surcoat proper and the cyclas is that the former is of even length all round, while the latter is shorter in front than behind (see also fig. ). the coif of mail has now given place to the camail, which does not cover the head, but is attached to the helmet, and is not joined to the hauberk, but hangs over the cyclas. [illustration: fig. . gulielmus berardi, florence, .] [illustration: fig. . bib. nat., paris, _tristan and iseult_, fourteenth century.] in the next example (plate iii, ) we find the mail still worn on the legs and arms, but on the latter the vambrace and the coude plate seem to be hinged in the manner adopted during the period of full armour. the upper part of the leg is protected by studded pourpointerie, which was frequently employed as being of more convenience on horseback. these thigh defences were called the cuisses. the bascinet is shown and also the short surcoat or jupon. the brass of an unknown knight (plate iii, ) is typical of what has come to be known as the 'camail' period. the arm-and leg-pieces completely enclose the limb and are fastened with hinges and straps as in the later periods. the gauntlets show the gadlings, or knuckle-knobs, which are a marked feature of this period, and the whole suit is richly decorated with engraved borders. some writers divide the transition period of armour into 'surcoat', 'cyclas', 'jupon', and 'tabard'. this, however, seems unnecessary if we are considering only the development of defensive armour, and not the whole question of costume. the camail is so marked a detail of the knightly equipment that it may reasonably be used to describe the fashion in armour from about to . in this example the figure is clad in complete plate, though the hauberk is worn beneath, as may be seen at the lower edge of the jupon and also in the '_vif de l'harnois_', or portion of the body at the armpit, which was unprotected by plate. in some instances this vital spot was protected by a circular, oval, crescent-shaped, or square plate attached by laces, which modern writers call the rondel, but which viscount dillon, in a most interesting article, proves to have been the moton or besague[ ] (fig. ). the effigy of the black prince at canterbury is a good example of the armour of this period, but it is interesting to note that, while the monumental brasses frequently give such details as straps, buckles, &c., this effigy shows no constructional detail whatever. we find that in spain there were minute regulations drawn up as to the manner in which a deceased warrior might be represented on his tomb. the details of sheathed or unsheathed sword, helm, spurs, &c., all had some significant reference to his life and achievements.[ ] it is almost superfluous to point out that those details which referred to the knight's captivity, or the fact that he had been vanquished, were more honoured in the breach than in the observance. [illustration: fig. . brass of sir t. de s. quentin, harpham, yorks, .] [illustration: fig. . knightly figure in ash church, kent, fourteenth century.] [illustration: fig. . bib. nat., paris, _tite-live_, .] the armour of this period was often richly decorated with engraving, as may be seen on the brass to an unknown knight at laughton, lincs., and also on the monument to sir hugh calverley at bunbury, cheshire. of the jupon, king rené, in his _livre des tournois_, about the year , writes that it ought to be without fold on the body, like that of a herald, so that the cognizance, or heraldic blazon, could be better recognized. the jupon of the black prince, preserved at canterbury and admirably figured in _monumenta vetusta_, vol. vii, is embroidered with the royal arms, and is quilted with cotton padding. so general is the use of the jupon at this period that it is a matter of some conjecture as to what form the body armour took that was worn under it. the effigy of a knight in ash church, kent (fig. ), elucidates this mystery and shows, through openings of the jupon, horizontal plates or splints riveted together. in fig. we see these plates worn without the jupon. the term jazeran is often applied to such armour. [illustration: fig. . _a._ the camail attached to the helm. _b._ the camail showing the staples.] [illustration: fig. . bib. nat., paris, _tite-live_, .] the camail, or hood of mail, which we have before referred to, was separate from the hauberk, and during the fourteenth century was worn over the jupon. it was attached to the bascinet by vervelles or staples which fitted into openings in the helmet. a lace was passed through these staples, as is shown on fig. . from a french manuscript of the early fifteenth century (fig. ) we see how the camail was kept from 'riding' over the shoulders. in the little wooden statuette of st. george of dijon, which is a most useful record of the armour of this period, we find that, in addition, the camail is fastened to the breast with aiguillettes. the great heaume, or helm, of the fourteenth century differs but little from those of the late thirteenth century which were noticed in a preceding chapter. the shape was either of the sugar-loaf order or a cylinder surmounted by a truncated cone (fig. ). notable examples of actual specimens in england at the present day are the helms of sir richard pembridge at hereford cathedral and the helm of the black prince, surmounted by a crest of wood and cuirbouilli, preserved at canterbury. in an inventory of louis hutin, made in , we find: 'ii heaummes d'acier, item v autres dans li uns est dorez.' this seems to suggest that the gilded helm was of some other material than steel, possibly leather. it is rare to come across constructional detail in illuminations, but the illustration (fig. ) from a french manuscript of about the year shows a method of attaching the helm to the wearer's body. in the preceding chapter we noticed the chain used for this purpose on the trumpington brass. [illustration: fig. . fourteenth-century helm, zeughaus, berlin.] [illustration: fig. . bib. nat., paris, _tite-live_, .] the most popular of the light helmets at this period was the bascinet. it appears on nearly every monumental brass that depicts a military figure, and is an essential part of that style of equipment known as the 'camail'. the later form of bascinet has a movable visor which is known among armour collectors as the 'pig-faced' bascinet (plate v). sometimes the hinge is at the top, and sometimes, as in no. of this plate, the visor is pivoted at the sides. froissart calls the visor 'carnet' and 'visière'. in the bohun inventory, before referred to, are given: 'ii bacynettes, lun covert de quir lautre bourni.' this shows that while some helmets were of polished metal, others were covered with leather, and indeed silk and velvet as fancy dictated. frequent references to these 'covers' for helmets occur in inventories and wills. the helmet and other portions of the suit of plate armour were sometimes tinned to prevent rust, as is shown in one of the dover castle inventories of :--'xiii basynetz tinez.' sometimes, in the case of royalty or princes of rank, the bascinet was encircled with a fillet or crown of gold and gems. among the payments of etienne de fontaine, in , are mentioned crowns for 'quarente grosses perles pour garnir le courroye du basinet de monsieur le dauphin'. the orle, or wreath worn turban-wise round the bascinet, is sometimes shown, as on fig. , of a decorative nature. it is supposed by some writers to have been devised to take the pressure of the great helm from the head, for the helm was often worn, as in the preceding century, over a lighter headpiece. from the usual position of the orle, however, and from the fact that it is invariably shown highly decorated and jewelled, this explanation can hardly hold good, for a padding worn as shown in the illustration would not be of much service in keeping off the pressure of the helm, and of course the jewelled decoration would be destroyed at once. another theory is that the orle was made by wrapping the lambrequin or mantling--which hung from the back of the helmet and which is still used in heraldic drawings--much in the same manner as the modern puggaree is worn in india. in this illustration appears also the gorget of plate that was worn over the throat and chin with the bascinet. [illustration: plate iv _photograph by hauser & menet_ jousting armour of charles v. madrid.] [illustration: fig. . the orle, from the monument of sir h. stafford, bromsgrove, kent, .] the shields of the fourteenth century present an infinite variety in shape and decoration. the heraldic blazoning has by this time been systematized into somewhat of a science, which in germany especially was carried to extravagant extremes. the long kite-shaped shield is to be found in records of the period, but the more common forms were the short pointed shield as shown on plate iii, and that which was rounded at the lower edge. frequently the shield is represented as 'bouché', or notched, at the top right-hand corner, to enable the wearer to point his lance through this opening without exposing his arm or body to attack. in the inventory of louis hutin are mentioned 'iii ecus pains des armes le roy, et un acier', which shows that the shield was sometimes made of steel, though usually it was fashioned of wood and faced with leather, or of cuirbouilli. in a transcript of vegecius (brit. mus. roy. ms. . a. xii) the young knight is advised to have 'a shelde of twigges sumewhat rounde'. the shield of the black prince at canterbury is pointed at the lower edge, and is made of wood faced with leather, on which are set out the royal arms in gesso-duro or plaster relief. chapter iii the wearing of armour and its constructional details before proceeding to examine the suit of full plate, with all its interesting details and differences as exemplified in the various armouries of england and europe, it will be well to make clear the main principles which governed the manufacture of such armour. we should remember that the whole history of our subject is one long struggle of defensive equipment against offensive weapons. this is brought out clearly at the present day in the navy, where the contest between gun and armour-plating is the dominant factor in naval construction. as the weapons of the middle ages became more serviceable, the armour was increased in weight. the longbow and the crossbow marked distinct periods in the development of defensive armour; for so important a factor did these weapons become, especially the latter, that they were used for testing the temper of the metal, large or small weapons being used as occasion demanded. those writers who are prone to generalize upon such subjects tell us that the invention of gunpowder sounded the knell of defensive armour, but this is by no means accurate, for guns were used in sieges as early as , and, as we shall find farther on in this chapter, the armour of the late sixteenth century was proved by pistol shot. the result of the improvement of firearms was that for many years armour became heavier and thicker till the musket was perfected, and then it was found that even highly-tempered steel would not resist the impact of a bullet. it is a safe assertion to make that a full suit of plate armour at its finest period--the fifteenth century--is the most perfect work of craftsmanship that exists. [illustration: fig. .] [illustration: fig. . maximilian breastplate and taces.] [illustration: fig. . coude or elbow-cop.] this assertion is not made without fully considering the real value of such work, which must fulfil all those essentials without which no true work of craftsmanship can have any merit. the first of these is that the work should fulfil its object in the best possible manner; secondly, that it should be convenient and simple in use; thirdly, that it should proclaim its material; and fourthly, and this is by no means the least important, that any decoration should be subservient to its purpose. to take our axioms in the order given, it may appear to the casual student that if armour were sufficiently thick it would naturally fulfil its primary reason for existence. but we find, on careful examination of plate armour, that there are other considerations which are of equal, if not greater importance. of these the most noticeable is the 'glancing surface'. it is somewhat difficult to exemplify this by a line-drawing, though it is easy to do so with an actual example. referring to the maximilian breastplate (fig. ), we find that a lance, the thrusting weapon much favoured in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, would, on striking the breast be deflected along the grooved channel nearest to the point of impact till it reached the raised edge either at the top or at the sides, when it would be conducted safely off the body of the wearer. the same surface is to be noticed on all helms and helmets after the twelfth century, the rounded surfaces giving no sure hold for cutting or thrusting weapons. the coude (fig. ) shows this same glancing surface used to protect the elbow, and, again, the fan-shaped plate on the outside of the knee effects the same result (see frontispiece).[ ] the great jousting helms are so constructed that the lance-point should glance off them when the wearer is in the proper jousting position, that is, bent forward at such an angle that the eyes come on a level with the ocularium or vision slit (plate v, ). these helms are also made of plates varying in thickness as the part may be more exposed to attack. the great helm in the possession of captain lindsay of sutton courtenay, near abingdon, has a skull-plate nearly a quarter of an inch thick, for, in the bending position adopted by the wearer, this portion of the helm would be most exposed to the lance. the back-plate is less than half that thickness. this helm is one of the heaviest in existence, for it weighs lb. oz. again, we may notice the overlapping lames or strips of steel that are so frequently used for pauldron, rerebrace, vambrace, soleret, and gauntlet; all present the same surface to the opposing weapon, and, except in the case of the taces, where the overlapping from necessity of form must be in an inverse direction, the chance of a weapon penetrating the joints is reduced to a minimum (fig. ). a portion of the pauldron which is designed for this glancing defence, and for this only, is the upstanding neck- or shoulder-guard which is so generally described as the passe-guard. it is curious, with the very definite information to hand (supplied by viscount dillon in the _archaeological journal_, vol. xlvi, p. ), that even the most recent writers fall into the same mistake about the name of this defence. space will not admit of quoting more fully viscount dillon's interesting paper; but two facts cited by him prove conclusively that the passe-guard is quite another portion of the armour. in the tower inventory of appears the entry, 'one armour cap-a-pe engraven with a ragged staffe, made for ye earle of leisester, a mainfere, passguard and maineguard and gantlett.' now it is hardly reasonable to suppose that this ridge on the pauldron should be specially mentioned as the passe-guard without any notice of the pauldron itself. in the additional notes to the above article viscount dillon gives, from a list of payments made in connexion with jousts held on october , , ' yards of cheshire cotton at _d._ for lining the king's pasguard.' that the neck-guard to which we refer should need lining on the inside, where it did not even touch the helmet, we may dismiss at once; and that the lining should be on the outside is of course absurd. as far as can be gathered from recent research the passe-guard is a reinforcing piece for the right elbow, used for jousting. it was lined to protect the ordinary arm defence underneath from being scratched, and also to lessen the shock to the wearer if it were struck. it is to be hoped, from this reiteration of viscount dillon's researches, that at any rate one of the many errors of nomenclature in armour may be corrected. [illustration: plate v . bascinet from the tomb of the black prince, canterbury, xivth. cent. . visored bascinet from the statuette of s. george, dijon, xivth. cent. . salade, royal armoury, turin, xvth. cent. . salade with visor and beavor, musee de la porte de hal, brussels, xvth. cent. . the brocas helm, rotunda woolwich xvth.-xvith. cent. . armet, royal armoury, turin . burgonet, brit. mus. xvith. cent. . burgonet and buffe, royal armoury, turin xvith. cent. . morion, brussels, xvith. cent. . cabasset, turin, xvith. cent. . lobster-tailed pot helmet, turin, xviith. cent.] with regard to the thickness of plate armour, we should remember that it was forged from the solid ingot, and was not rolled in sheets as is the material of to-day from which so many forgeries are manufactured. the armourer was therefore able to graduate the thickness of his material, increasing it where it was most needed, and lessening it in those parts which were less exposed. with regard to the proving of armour an article in _archaeologia_, vol. li, also by viscount dillon, is of great interest as showing the indifferent skill of the english ironsmiths of the sixteenth century. in a discussion arose as to the quality of the english iron found in shropshire as compared to the 'hungere' iron which came from innsbruck. after some delay sir henry lee, master of the tower armouries, arranged a test, and two breastplates were prepared, of equal make and weight. two pistol charges of equal power were fired at the test breastplates, with the result that the foreign armour was only slightly dented, while the english plate was pierced completely, and the beam on which it rested was torn by the bullet. a bascinet in the tower, which belonged to henry viii, bears two indented marks, signifying that it was proof against the large crossbow. in the musée d'artillerie in paris, a suit made for louis xiv bears proof marks which are treated as the centres for floriated designs (plate viii). no excuse need be offered for thus borrowing from papers by viscount dillon and other writers in _archaeologia_ and the _archaeological journal_, for these publications are not always at hand to those interested in the subject of armour and equipments. they are, however, indispensable for careful study; for they contain reports of the most recent discoveries and investigations of the subject, and are written, for the most part, by men whose expert knowledge is at once extensive and precise. [illustration: plate vi _photograph by viscount dillon._ engraved suit of armour given to henry viii by the emperor maximilian. tower.] another detail of importance in connexion with the protective power of armour occurs in the great jousting helms, which invariably present a smooth surface on the left side, even when there may be some opening, for ventilation or other purposes, on the right. the reason for this was that the jouster always passed left arm to left arm with the lance pointed across the horse's neck. it was therefore important that there should be no projection or opening on the left side of the helm in which the lance-point could possibly be caught. we next turn our attention to convenience in use. under this head the armourer had to consider that the human body makes certain movements of the limbs for walking and riding, or fighting with arm and hand. he had so to construct the different portions of the suit that they should allow of all these movements without hindrance; and at the same time he had to endeavour to protect the body and limbs while the movements were taking place. the arrangements for pivoting elbow- and knee-joints need scarcely be detailed; for it will be seen by a glance at any suit of plate armour how the cuisse and jamb are pivoted on to the genouillière, and move with the leg to a straight or bent position without allowing these plates to escape from under the genouillière. the coude is sometimes pivoted in the same manner, but more often it is rigid and of such circumference that the arm can bend within it and yet be very adequately protected. in the overlapping lames or strips of metal which give ease of movement to the upper arm, the hands, the waist, and the foot, we find that much careful work and calculation was needed to ensure comfort to the wearer. on the foot, the toepiece and four or more arches of metal overlap upwards on to a broader arch, while above this three or more arches overlap downwards, thus allowing the toe-joint and ankle to be bent at the same time (fig. ). in a suit in the tower, made for prince henry, son of james i, all the arches of the soleret overlap downwards. this points to a certain decadence in the craftsmanship of the armourer of the period, though the excuse might be offered for him that the suit was intended only for use on horseback. there are generally one, two, or more of these movable lames joining the genouillière to the jamb, and above this the cuisse to the genouillière to give greater flexibility to the knee fastenings. the separate arm- and leg-pieces are, when made in two halves to encircle the limb, hinged on the outside and closed with strap and buckle, or with locking hook or bolt on the inside. this, of course, is to ensure greater protection to these fastenings, especially on horseback. higher up again we get the tuilles or taces, which, from the fact that to adapt themselves to the human form they must narrow at the waist and spread out below, overlap upwards. from the taces are hung the tassets, with strap and buckle, which give increased protection to the upper leg, and yet are not in any way rigid. when the tassets are made of more than one plate they are attached to each other by a most ingenious arrangement of straps and sliding rivets. on the inner edge of each plate the rivets are attached to a strap on the under side; but the outer edge, requiring more compression of the lames together, is furnished with rivets fixed firmly in the uppermost plate and working loose in a slot in the back plate, thus allowing an expansion or contraction of half an inch or more to each lame. it is somewhat difficult to explain this ingenious arrangement in words, but fig. will show how the straps and rivets are set. when the tassets were discarded about the end of the sixteenth century the cuisses were laminated in this way from waist to knee. [illustration: plate vii . passe-guard . grand-guard . tilting cuisse . half suit for the stechzeug, nuremberg - a. polder mitton b. lance rest c. queue] [illustration: fig. . soleret.] [illustration: fig. . method of using sliding rivets.] the gauntlet is generally found with a stiff cuff, and from wrist to knuckles the plates in narrow arches overlap towards the arm, where they join a wider plate which underlaps the cuff. the knuckle-plate is usually ridged with a rope-shaped crest or with bosses imitating the knuckles. the fingers are protected by small plates, from four on the fourth finger to six on the second finger (in some examples there are more or less), which overlap from knuckle to finger-tip. the thumb is covered in like manner, but has a lozenge-shaped plate to connect it to the cuff. this metal hand-covering was sewn on to a leather glove or attached to it with leather loops (fig. ). the vambrace is generally rigid, either a solid tube or hinged on the outside and fastened on the inside by straps or hooks. it is held to the lower edge of the coude by a rivet. the lower portion of the rerebrace is also tubular, while the upper portion, where it joins the pauldron, is often laminated, with the plates overlapping, downwards as a rule, though there are instances of these plates overlapping upwards. they are joined in the same way as the laminated tassets by a riveted strap on the inner side, and by sliding rivets at the back, thus giving the arm freedom of movement forwards in the direction most needed, but less freedom towards the back. these sliding rivets working in slots have come to be called 'almain' rivets from the fact that the almain rivet, a light half suit of armour, was put together to a great extent by this method. these suits will be referred to later in the chapter. [illustration: fig. . gauntlet.] [illustration: fig. . turning 'lock-pins'.] [illustration: fig. . gorget.] the pauldron is hung on the shoulder by a strap from the gorget or the breastplate, or it is pierced with a hole which fits over a pin fixed in one of these portions of the armour. in most suits of plate of the fifteenth and early sixteenth century that portion of the pauldron which covers the breastplate is larger on the left side than on the right. the reason for this is that the position of the lance when held 'in rest', that is couched for the charge, necessitates a certain curtailment of the front plate of the pauldron, and, at the same time, the left arm being held rigid at the bridle, and being exposed to the attacking weapon, requires more protection than does the right, which, when using the lance, was guarded by the vamplate or metal disc fixed to the lance above the grip. breast- and back-pieces are held together on the shoulders and sides by straps, but the lames of the taces, and in some cases the breast and back themselves, are fastened with turning pins which play an important part in holding the suit together (fig. ). the gorget (fig. ) is made in two halves, each composed of a single plate or, sometimes, of two or three horizontal lames. the two portions are united by a loose-working rivet on the left side and are joined by a turning pin on the right. the gorget was worn either over or under the breast- and backplates. perhaps the most ingeniously contrived suit in existence, which completely protects the wearer and at the same time follows the anatomical construction of the human body, is that made for henry viii for fighting on foot in the lists. it is numbered xxviii in the armoury of the tower. there are no parts of the body or limbs left uncovered by plate, and every separate portion fits closely to its neighbour with sliding rivets and turning pins to give the necessary play for the limbs. it is composed of pieces and weighs lb. the wearing of the bascinet, salade, burgonet, and like helmets needs no detailed description. in the preceding chapter we noticed the method of attaching the camail to the bascinet. when the great helm was made a fixture in the fifteenth century, as distinct from the loose or chained helms of preceding periods, it was either bolted to the breast and back, as on plate vii, or it was fastened by an adjustable plate which shut over a locking pin, as shown on plate v, , and a somewhat similar arrangement at the back, or a strap and buckle, held it firmly in place, while if extra rigidity was needed it was supplied by straps from the shoulders to the lugs shown in the drawing of the brocas helm on plate v. the armet, or close helmet, fits the shape of the head to such an extent that it must be opened to be put on. this is arranged by hingeing the side plates to the centre, and, when fixed, fastening them with a screw at the back to which a circular disc is added as a protection to this fastening (fig. ). the armet shown on plate v opens in the front and when closed is fastened with a spring hook. the different parts of the armet are the ventail, a, and vue, b, which together make the visor; the skull, c; and the beavor, d (plate v, ). having now arrived at some understanding of the construction of the suit of armour we will pass on to the wearing of the suit. a man could not wear his ordinary clothes under his armour; the friction of the metal was too great. in spite of the excellence of workmanship of the armourer any thin substance was bound to be torn, so a strong fabric was chosen which is called in contemporary records fustian. whether it at all resembled the modern fabric of that name it is difficult to determine, but certainly the wearing powers of this material or of corduroy would be admirably adapted for the purpose. chaucer writes in the prologue to the _canterbury tales_, line : of fustyan he wered a gepoun aile bysmoterud with his haburgeoun. this would refer to the rust-stains that penetrated through the interstices of the mail. in hall's _chronicles_ (p. ) is mentioned a levy of troops ordered for the wars in france in , for which it was enjoined: 'item every man to hav an armyng doublet of ffustyean or canvas', and also 'a capp to put his scull or sallet in'. these last were coverings for the helmets which we have noted on page . the helmets had linings, either riveted to the metal or worn separately as a cap. the tilting helm was provided with a thick padded cap with straps to keep it in its place. some of these caps exist in the museum at vienna. [illustration: fig. . armet.] king rené, in his _livre des tournois_, advises a pourpoint or padded undergarment to be put on under the body armour, 'stuffed to the thickness of three fingers on the shoulders for there the blows fall heaviest.' it seems that in brabant and the low countries the blows fell heavier, or that the combatants were less hardy, for he advises for them a thickness of four fingers, filled with cotton. viscount dillon mentions in his armour notes[ ] the fact that a 'stuffer of bacynetts' accompanied henry v to agincourt. he also quotes a letter from james croft to cecil on july , , which states that a man cannot keep his corselet and pay for the wear and tear of his clothes due to the rubbing of the body armour, under _d._ per day. sir john smith, in his _animadversions_ ( ), writes: 'no man should wear any cut doublets, as well in respect that the wearing of armour doth quickly fret them out, and also by reason that the corners and edges of the lames and joints of the armour do take such hold upon such cuttes as they do hinder the quick and sudden arming of men.' an interesting description of the arming of a man, entitled, '_howe a manne schall be armed at hys ese when he schall fighte on foote_,' is preserved in the _life of sir john astley_ (a manuscript in the possession of lord hastings).[ ] the knight is first dressed in a doublet of fustian, lined with satin, which is cut with holes for ventilation. this satin was to keep the roughness of the fustian from the wearer's body; for he wore no shirt under it. the doublet was provided with gussets of mail, or vuyders, attached under the armpit and at the bend of the elbow by arming points or laces. these mail gussets were to protect the parts not covered by the plate armour. the 'portrait of an italian nobleman' by moroni, in the national gallery, shows the figure dressed in this arming doublet. a pair of thick worsted hose were worn, and shoes of stout leather. it must be noticed here that the soleret, or sabaton as it is sometimes called, covered only the top of the foot, and had understraps which kept it to the sole of the shoe. first the sabatons were put on, then the jambs, genouillière and cuisses, then the skirt or breech of mail round the waist. this is sometimes known as the brayette. then the breast-and backplates were buckled on with the accompanying taces, tassets, and garde-rein or plates to protect the loins. after this the arm defences, and, if worn over the breastpiece, the gorget; and, finally, the helmet completed the equipment. the sword was buckled on the left side and the dagger on the right. the armour for jousts and tourneys was much heavier than the hosting or war harness. from the fact, which has been previously noticed, that the combatants passed each other on the left, this side of the armour was reinforced to such a degree that in time it presented a totally different appearance from the right side (see plate vii). the weight of jousting armour was so great that it was impossible for the wearer to mount without assistance. de pluvinel, in his _maneige royal_ ( ), gives an imaginary conversation between himself and the king (louis xiv) as follows:-- _the king._ 'it seems to me that such a man would have difficulty in getting on his horse, and being on to help himself.' _de pluvinel._ 'it would be very difficult, but with this arming the matter has been provided for. in this manner at triumphs and tourneys there ought to be at the two ends of the lists a small scaffold, the height of a stirrup, on which two or three persons can stand, that is to say, the knight, an armourer to arm him, and one other to help him. the knight being armed and the horse brought close to the stand, he easily mounts him.' reference has been made to the fact that modern writers call the sliding rivet the 'almain' rivet. whenever mentioned in inventories and such-like documents, the almain rivet stands for a suit of light armour. garrard, in his _art of warre_ ( ), distinctly says, 'the fore part of a corselet and a head peece and tasses is the almayne rivet.' among the purchases made on the continent by henry viii in may be noted , almain rivets, each consisting of a salet, a gorget, a breastplate, a backplate, and a pair of splints (short taces). in the inventory of the goods of dame agnes huntingdon, executed at tyburn for murdering her husband in , we find 'sex score pare of harness of alman rivets'. the 'pare', of course, refers to the breast- and backplates. the word alman, almaine, or almain, shows that the invention of this light armour and the sliding rivets which were used in its construction came from germany. that the wearing of armour caused grave inconvenience to some, while to others it seems to have been no hindrance at all, we may gather from the following historical incidents. in king louis of hungary, fleeing from the battle of mohacz, was drowned while crossing the danube because of the weight of his armour. on the other hand we find that robert de vere, earl of oxford, when forced to fly at the battle of radcot bridge, escaped easily by swimming the river to safety in full armour. we should remember that the weight of plate armour was less felt than that of mail, because the former was distributed over the whole body and limbs, while the latter hung from the shoulders and waist alone. king henry v, in courting queen katharine, says:--'if i could win a lady at leapfrog, or by vaulting into my saddle with my armour on my back,' which seems to imply that this feat was at any rate a possibility. oliver de la marche describes galliot de balthasin in as leaping clear out of his saddle 'armé de toute'. we may safely consign sir walter scott's description of the feasting knights to the realms of poetic licence, for he writes:-- they carved at the meal with gloves of steel and drank the red wine through their helmets barred. now if there were two portions of the knight's equipment which would be put off at the first opportunity, and which could be assumed the most rapidly, they were the helmet and gauntlets. to drink through a visored helmet is a practical impossibility. the word beavor, which is generally derived from the italian _bevere_, to drink, has been considered by baron de cosson, with far more probability, to be derived from the old french _bavière_ (originally = a child's bib, from _bave_, saliva). the cleaning of armour is frequently alluded to in inventories. in the dover castle inventory of is mentioned 'i barrelle pro armaturis rollandis'. chain-mail was rolled in barrels with sand and vinegar to clean it, just as, inversely, barrels are cleaned in the country at the present day by rolling chains in them. the mending and cleaning of armour was of the first importance, and the travelling knight took with him an armourer who was provided with such things as 'oil for dressing my lord's harness, a thousand armyng nayles (rivets) a payre of pynsores, pomyshe (pumice stone), fylles, a hammer and all other stuffe and tools belonginge to an armorer'.[ ] we can gather but little of the methods of the armourers in their work. it was so important a craft that its operations were most jealously guarded, and the term 'mystery', which was applied to the trade gilds of the middle ages, can be most fittingly given to that of the armour-smith. in the _weisskunig_ of hans burgkmair, the noted german engraver, appears an interesting woodcut of the young maximilian in the workshop of conrad seusenhofer, the famous armourer. in the text the master-smith is described as being anxious to make use of the 'forbidden art', but the young king replies, 'arm me according to my own taste, for it is i, not you, who have to take part in the tournament.' what this forbidden art may have been we have no suggestion given us. it seems, from this account, to be more than likely that seusenhofer possessed some mechanical means for stamping out armour plate; for it goes on to say, 'so this young king invented a new art for warriors' armour, so that in the workshop front pieces and hinder pieces were made at once. how wonderful and skilful was this king!' a most interesting album of designs by one 'jacobe', who has been identified by the late herr wendelin boeheim as jacobe topf, is now, after many vicissitudes, in the art library of the victoria and albert museum, south kensington. from the somewhat naïve treatment of the designs they can hardly be considered to be working drawings, but were more probably sketches submitted to the different patrons of the armourer and kept for reference. the album has been reproduced in facsimile, with a preface giving its history and verifying the suits drawn on its pages, by viscount dillon, curator of the tower armouries. space will not admit of more notice of this unique volume. its author seems to have worked almost entirely for the nobles of the court of queen elizabeth; only two of the designs were made for foreigners. of the famous armourers of italy, the missaglias, negrolis, and campi; and of the great colman family, seusenhofer and wolf, the master-craftsmen of germany, we can do no more than mention the names. experts in armour, like baron de cosson and herr boeheim, have in the various archaeological journals of england and germany brought to light many interesting facts about these armourers, but the confines of this handbook do not admit of detailed quotation, nor, indeed, is it necessary to study these details till the primary interest in defensive armour has been aroused. when this has been achieved the student will certainly leave no records unexamined in following to its farthest extremes this most fascinating study.[ ] [illustration: fig. . archer wearing jack. from the beauchamp pageants, fifteenth century.] it is almost superfluous to discuss the third of our axioms, namely, that which concerns the confession of material. all armour of the best periods does this to the full. it is only under the blighting influence of the renaissance that we find metal so worked that it resembles woven fabrics, or, worse still, the human form and features. the limited space at our disposal precludes us from investigating the various coats of fence, or body protections of quilted fabrics with metal, horn, and other materials added. mention has been made in the chapter on the transition of the brigandine, which formed a very serviceable defence without being so unwieldy as the suit of plate. there are several of these brigandines in english and european armouries. these defences weigh as much as lb., and are made of many small pieces of metal. an example in the tower contains , .[ ] fig. , from the beauchamp pageants (cotton ms., julius e. iv), shows an archer of the year wearing the jack over a shirt of mail. the jack was used by the rank and file, and was stuffed and wadded or composed of plates of metal or horn laced together with string between layers of leather or linen. chapter iv plate armour ( -about ) it is so very rare to be able to fix the date of a suit of armour at a particular year that we are forced, in dividing our periods of defensive armour with any degree of minuteness, to have recourse to the records existing in monumental effigies. the earliest brasses which show the whole suit of plate without camail or jupon are those of one of the d'eresby family at spilsby, lincolnshire, and of sir john wylcotes at great tew, oxon., both dated . in these brasses we find that the camail has become the standard of mail, or collarette, worn under the gorget of plate. the hauberk is seen beneath the taces and, in the former brass, in the '_défaut de la cuirasse_', or unprotected part at the junction of arm and body. in the great tew brass this part is protected by oval plates which, as we have noticed in a preceding chapter, are called motons or besagues. hewitt does not seem to have come across these terms in the course of his very minute investigations, but calls them croissants or gouchets. he quotes a passage from mathieu de coucy's _history of charles vii_ (p. ) which runs:--'au-dessous du bras at au vif de son harnois, par faute et manque d'y avoir un croissant ou gouchet.' haines, in his _monumental brasses_, mentions the moton, but assigns this name to a piece of plate rarely met with, shaped to fit under the right armpit only. with the disappearance of the jupon we see the body defence exposed to view. the breastplate is globular in form, and below the waist we see the taces or laminated strips of plate overlapping each other, which at this early period were attached to a leather lining. as we have seen in the chapter on the construction of armour, at a later period these taces were held together by sliding rivets, which allowed a certain amount of vertical play. plate armour, during the earlier years of the fifteenth century, was naturally in a somewhat experimental state, and we find frequent examples of the old forms and fashions in contemporary representations. about the year appears a distinct style, called 'gothic', which, of all types of defensive armour, is perhaps the most graceful. this term, 'gothic,' is as inappropriate, in the relation which it bore, to armour as to architecture; but its use is so general that we must perforce adopt it for want of a better. the salient points of gothic armour are the sweeping lines embossed on its surfaces (plate viii). the cuirass is generally made in two pieces, an upper and a lower, which allows more freedom for the body. from the taces are hung tassets, ending in a point towards the lower edge. the later form of gothic breastplate is longer, and the taces fewer in number. armour was so frequently remade to suit later fashions, or, from lack of antiquarian interest, so often destroyed, that there is little of this gothic armour existing in england, except those suits which have been acquired from the continent by private collectors or public museums. almost all of them are incomplete, or, if complete, have been restored--particularly the leg armour--at a recent date. perhaps the finest example of this style is to be found on the 'beauchamp' effigy in st. mary's church, warwick. space will not allow of a full account of the documents connected with the making of this magnificent figure, which was executed by will. austin, a bronze-founder, and bartholomew lambespring, a goldsmith, in , fifteen years after the death of the earl. all these interesting details are given very fully in blore's _monumental remains_. to students of the constructional side of armour this monument is particularly valuable because all the fastenings, rivets, and straps are conscientiously portrayed, not only on the front, but also at the back. charles stothard, the antiquary, when making drawings of the figure for his work on _monumental effigies_, turned it over and discovered this example of the care and technical ability of the makers. the breastplate is short, and consequently the taces are more numerous than when the breastplate is longer. they consist of five lames. from the taces hang four tassets, two bluntly pointed in front, and two much shorter, and more sharply pointed, over the hip-bones. the taces are hinged at the side for convenience in putting on and off. the coudes are large and of the butterfly-wing type, and the sollerets are of normal length. in many of the gothic suits these sollerets, following the custom in civil dress, were extravagantly long and pointed. this form is called 'à la poulaine', while the shorter kind are known as 'demi-poulaine'. some writers are apt to confuse this term 'poulaine' with 'poleyne', the knee-cop used in the earlier days of the transition period; it is needless to point out that they are quite distinct. baron de cosson has put forward a most interesting theory in connexion with this effigy. he finds a close resemblance between the armour here portrayed and that shown in the picture of st. george, by mantegna, in the accademia at venice. the earl of warwick, who is represented on this monument, is known to have been at milan in his youth, and to have taken part in tournaments at verona; so it is more than probable that he ordered his armour from the milanese armourers, of whom the famous missaglia family were the chief craftsmen, and who made some fine suits of this gothic style. [illustration: plate viii armour of ( ) archduke sigismond of tyrol, , ( ) louis xiv of france, .] the next distinctive style to be noticed is called the 'maximilian'. it can hardly be said that this new design was evolved from the gothic, though of necessity there must be a certain similarity between them, at least in constructional detail. it is more likely, when we consider the individuality of the young maximilian, especially as recorded in hans burgkmair's _weisskunig_, and his interest in every art, craft, and trade, that it was a fashion made, so to speak, to order. the maximilian period of armour may be said to last from about to . it is distinguished by the radiating fluted channels that spread from a central point in the breastpiece, closely resembling the flutings of the scallop-shell (fig. ). the main lines of the suit are heavier and more clumsy than those of the gothic variety. the breastplate is shorter, globose in form, and made in one piece as distinct from the gothic breastplate, which was generally composed of an upper and lower portion. the pauldrons are larger and the upstanding neck-guards more pronounced. the coude and genouillière are both smaller than in the gothic suit, and fit more closely to the limbs. in imitation of the civilian dress the solleret becomes shorter and broader in the toe. this variety is known as the 'bec de cane' or 'bear-paw' soleret. some writers use the term sabaton for the foot-defence of this period. this term is found (sabataynes) in the hastings manuscript referred to in the preceding chapter. the pauldrons of the maximilian suit are generally of unequal size; that for the right arm being smaller, to admit of the couching of the lance under the armpit (fig. ). the tassets are made in two or more pieces, connected with the strap and sliding rivet described in the preceding chapter. the fluting on the maximilian armour is not without practical purpose, for, besides presenting the 'glancing' surface, which has been before referred to, it gives increased strength and rigidity without much extra weight. a modern example of this is to be found in the corrugated iron used for roofing, which will stand far greater pressure than will the same thickness of metal used flat. [illustration: fig. . gothic suit. turin armoury.] [illustration: fig. . maximilian suit. vienna armoury, .] it is at this period of the history of defensive armour that we first find traces of that decadence which later on permeated every art and craft with its pernicious poison. it is to be found in the imitating of fabrics and also of the human face in metal. there exist suits of plate in many museums, both in england and on the continent, in which the puffings and slashings of the civilian attire are closely copied in embossed metal, entirely destroying the important glancing surfaces on which we have laid such stress. it is alleged that this fashion in civilian dress was intended to suggest, by the cutting of the material to show an undergarment beneath, that the wearer was a fighting man who had seen rough service. if this be the case it is the more reprehensible that metal should be treated in a similar manner; for hard usage would dent, but it would not tear. a portion of one of these debased suits is drawn on fig. . it must not be supposed that all armour at this period was fluted. there was still a good deal which had a plain surface, and this plain armour continued to be used after the maximilian armour had been given up. it may have been that the evil genius of the renaissance pointed to the plain surfaces as excellent fields for the skill of the decorator, a field which the strongly-marked flutings of the maximilian armour could not offer. at first this decoration was confined to engraved borders, or, if the design covered the whole suit, it was so lightly engraved that the smooth surface was in no way impaired, though perhaps some of the dignified simplicity of the plain metal was lost. an instance of this proper application of ornament to armour is to be found in the 'seusenhofer' suit in the tower (plate vi), made to the order of the emperor maximilian for henry viii. it is one of the finest suits of this period in existence. the ornament is lightly engraved all over it, and includes representations of the legends of st. george and st. barbara. instead of taces and tassets the lower part of the body and the thighs are protected by steel bases made in folds to imitate the skirts worn in civilian dress. it will be remembered that in the preceding chapter a conversation between seusenhofer and the young maximilian was quoted, and when we study this suit carefully we feel that the young king did wisely in the choice of his master-armourer. the craftsman's poinçon or mark is to be found at the back of the helmet. if space but permitted we might devote many pages to the work of the great armour-smiths as exemplified in the armouries of madrid and vienna. it is difficult, at this period of history, to generalize at all satisfactorily. each suit is, in many ways, distinct from its neighbour, just as the character and personality of the wearers differed. the young maximilian's words to seusenhofer, 'arm me according to my own taste,' is true of every suit that we examine, for it is evident that each man had his own favourite fashion or, from physical necessity, was provided with some special variation from the usual form. an instance of this may be noted in the barendyne helm at haseley church, near thame, in which an extra plate has been added at the lower edge of the helm to suit the length of neck of the last wearer. as the experience of the armourer increased, and as the science of war developed, the armed man trusted more to the fixed defences of his person than to the more primitive protection of the movable shield. in the tilt-yard and also in war the mounted man endeavoured to present his left side to his adversary. on consideration the reason for this will be plain, for the right arm was required to be free and, as far as possible, unhampered by heavy armour, but the left arm, held at rest at the bridle, could be covered with as heavy defences as the wearer might choose. this form of unequal arming is well shown on the frontispiece. the left shoulder wears a large pauldron with a high neck-guard, and the elbow wears the passe-guard which we have noticed in detail in the preceding chapter. the leg armour in this suit should be noticed, for it is extremely fine and graceful in line, and yet proclaims its material. the suit of henry viii (plate vi) is a good specimen of armour of the maximilian period, but without the flutings which generally distinguish this style of plate. the neck-guards are high and the large coudes show the glancing surface plainly. this detail also is shown on the fan plates at the genouillières, which in the tower inventories are called by the more english term 'knee-cops'. the bridle-hand of the rider wears the manifer (main-de-fer). those writers who still follow blindly the incorrect nomenclature of meyrick give the name mainfaire or manefer to the crinet or neck defence of the horse. how this absurd play upon words can ever have been taken seriously passes understanding. the manifer is solely the rigid iron gauntlet for the bridle-hand, where no sudden or complicated movement of the wrist or fingers was needed; another instance of the difference in arming the two sides of the body. this difference of arming is more noticeable in the jousting armour, for in military sports, especially during the sixteenth century, the object of the contestants was to score points rather than to injure each other. we find, therefore, such pieces as the grand-guard, and with it the volant piece, the passe-guard, the poldermitton--so called from its likeness to the 'épaule de mouton', and worn over the bend of the right arm--and the various reinforcing breastplates which were screwed on to the left side of the tilting suit to offer a more rigid defence and also to present additional glancing surface to the lance-point. in some varieties of joust a small wooden shield was fastened to the left breast, and when this was the case the heavy pauldron was dispensed with. the large vamplate (plate xi) sufficiently protected the right arm from injury. the nuremberg suit (plate vii) shows this form of arming for the joust. the great helm is firmly screwed to the back and breast, the two holes on the left side of the breastplate are for the attachment of the shield, the rigid bridle-cuff, covers the left hand, and the curved elbow-guard--this is not the passe-guard--protects the bend of the left arm as the poldermitton protects the right. the large circular disc defends the _vif de l'harnois_, and is _bouché_ or notched at its lower end to allow the lance to be couched, resting on the curved lance-rest in front and lodged under the queue at the back. the legs, in this variety of joust, were not armed; for the object of the jousters was to unhorse each other, and it was necessary to have perfect freedom in gripping the horse's sides. sometimes a great plate of metal, curved to cover the leg, was worn to protect the wearer from the shock of impact. this was called the dilge, or tilting cuisse, which is shown on plate viii behind the figure of count sigismond, and also on plate vii. the large-bowed saddle also was used for this end. there is one of these saddles in the tower which measures nearly feet in height. behind the saddle-bow are two rings which encircled the rider's legs. it is needless to point out that in this form of joust the object was to break lances and not to unhorse; for, if the latter were intended, the rider stood a good chance of breaking his legs owing to his rigid position in the saddle. the tonlet suit (fig. ) was used solely for fighting on foot. the bell-shaped skirt of plate was so constructed with the sliding rivets or straps which have been before referred to, that it could be pulled up and down. sometimes the lower lame could be taken off altogether. when fighting with axes or swords in the lists this plate skirt presented a glancing surface to the weapon and protected the legs. the tonlet is variously called by writers upon armour, bases, lamboys, or jamboys; of the two latter terms jamboys is the more correct. the bases were originally the cloth skirts in vogue in civilian dress at the time of henry viii, and when defensive armour followed civilian fashion the name came to be applied to the steel imitation. [illustration: fig. . tonlet suit. madrid.] [illustration: fig. . war suit, . vienna armoury.] towards the end of the sixteenth century we find the weight of the war harness gradually decrease. the richly-ornamented suits which mark this period were in no way suited for any practical purpose and were used only for parades. extended campaigns and long marches necessitated lighter equipment, and we find in contemporary records instances, not only of the men-at-arms discarding their armour owing to its inconvenience, but also of commanders ordering them to lighten their equipment for greater rapidity of movement. sir richard hawkins, in his _observations_ on his voyage into the south sea ( ), writes: 'i had great preparation of armours as well of proofe as of light corsletts, yet not a man would use them, but esteemed a pott of wine a better defence than an armour of proofe.' again, sir john smythe, in his _instructions, observations and orders militarie_ ( ), writes: ... 'i saw but very few of that army (at the camp at tilbury) that had any convenience of apparrell to arme withal.' edward davies, in , mentions the fact that men armed 'with a heavie shirt of mail and a burganet, by that time they have marched in the heat of summer or deepe of winter ten or twelve english miles, they are apt more to rest than readie to fight'. as early as the year we find that at the battle of auray sir hugh calverley ordered his men to take off their cuisses that they might move more rapidly. in the armour of the late sixteenth century one of the chief points of difference from the former fashions is to be found in the cuisses. whereas these defences were formerly made of one, or possibly two plates, we now find them laminated from waist to knee and joined by the strap and sliding rivet arrangement which we have noted in the arm defences and tassets. the tassets are now no longer used (fig. ). very soon the jambs were given up in favour of buff boots, and when once this was established the next step was the half suit which will be noticed in a succeeding chapter. [illustration: plate ix design for a suit of armour for sir henry lee, from the _almain armourer's album_.] after the fourteenth century the great helm was but seldom used for war, but for jousting it was still retained, and, as this form of military sport was practised more scientifically, so the weight and shape of the helm were made to suit the necessary conditions. the brocas helm (plate v) is the finest example of english helm of this period; it weighs lb. the other known examples of home manufacture are the westminster helm, which was discovered in the triforium of westminster abbey in , and weighs lb. oz.; the dawtray helm at petworth ( lb. oz.); the barendyne helm at haseley, near thame ( - / lb.); the fogge helm at ashford, sussex ( lb.); the wallace helm, in the collection at hertford house ( lb.); and the great headpiece in the possession of captain lindsay of sutton courtenay, abingdon, which turns the scale at lb. oz. it will be seen from the weight of these helms that they could only be used for the jousting course and were put off on the first opportunity. the details of their construction have been noticed in chapter iii. on referring to plate v it will be seen that the bascinet was the precursor of the salade, which may be considered the typical headpiece of the fifteenth century. the rear peak of the bascinet is prolonged over the neck, and in a later form of german origin the peak is hinged to allow the wearer to throw back his head with ease. the ocularium, or vision slit, is sometimes cut in the front of the salade, but more often it is found in a pivoted visor which could be thrown back. the beavor is generally a separate piece strapped round the neck or, in tilting, bolted to the breastplate. some writers call this the mentonière, but this name should rather be applied to the tilting breastplate which also protected the lower portion of the face. shakespeare uses the term beavor very loosely, and frequently means by it the whole helmet. the german 'schallern', or salade, so called from its shell-like form, seems to have been evolved from the chapel-de-fer or war-hat by contracting the brim at the sides and prolonging it at the back. in fact, in chastelain's account of the fight between jacques de lalain and gérard de roussillon the salade worn by messire jacques is described as 'un chapeau de fer d'ancienne façon'.[ ] the salade was often richly decorated. baron de cosson, in the preface to the catalogue of helmets exhibited at the archaeological institute in june, [ ], instances a salade made for the duke of burgundy in , which was valued at , crowns of gold. more modest decoration was obtained by covering the salade with velvet and fixing ornaments over this of gilded iron or brass. there are several of these covered salades in the various collections in england and on the continent. sometimes the salade was painted, as we see in an example in the tower. the armet, or close helmet, followed the salade, and is mentioned by oliver de la marche as early as .[ ] the name is supposed to be a corruption of 'heaumet', the diminutive of 'heaume', the great helm of the fourteenth century.[ ] whereas the salade is in form a hat-like defence, the armet fits the head closely and can only be put on by opening the helmet, as is shown on plate v and fig. . the various parts of the armet have been already described in chapter iii. the armet does not appear in monumental effigies in england before the reign of henry viii. the english were never in a hurry to take up new fashions in armour; being to a large extent dependent on the work of foreign craftsmen, they seem to have waited to prove the utility of an innovation before adopting it. against this, however, we must place the fact that in the picture at hampton court of the meeting of henry viii and maximilian, the english are all shown wearing armets, while the germans still wear the salade. the armet on the seusenhofer suit in the tower, which has been noticed in this chapter, is a very perfect example of this style of headpiece. the burgonet is an open helmet, and, as the name implies, of burgundian origin. to those students who consult meyrick it is advisable to give a word of warning as to this author's theory of the burgonet. he assumes that it is a variety of the armet, but with a grooved collar which fitted over the gorget. his authority for this assertion is a single reference in the _origines des chevaliers armoriés et heraux_, by fauchet.[ ] space will not allow of the investigation of this authority, but baron de cosson in the catalogue above quoted effectively disposes of meyrick's theory.[ ] the salient points of the burgonet, as may be seen on plate v, are the umbril or brim projecting over the eyes, and the upstanding comb or (in some cases) three combs that appear on the skull-piece. in the best examples these combs are forged with the skull out of one piece of metal, a _tour de force_ in craftsmanship that could hardly be surpassed. the ear-flaps are hinged at the sides, and at the base of the skull is fixed the panache, or plume-holder. the faceguard, when used with the burgonet, is called the buffe,[ ] and, like the beavor worn with the salade, is held in place by a strap round the neck. this form of helmet was chiefly used by light cavalry. the morion and the cabasset are both helmets worn by foot-soldiers, and appear about the middle of the sixteenth century. the cabasset is generally to be distinguished by the curious little point projecting from the apex. often the comb and upturned brim of the morion are extravagant in form and tend to make the helmet exceedingly heavy and inconvenient. [illustration: fig. . pavis. cotton ms. julius e. iv, .] the shields of the fifteenth and sixteenth century were more for display than for use, except in the tilt-yard. as we have seen, the development of plate armour, especially on the left side, made the shield not only unnecessary, but also inconvenient. in the joust, however, where it was important that the lance should find no hold on a vital part of the body, such as the juncture of the arm, the shield was used to glance the weapon off, or, where unhorsing was the object, it was ribbed with diagonally crossing ridges to give the lance-point a surer hold. the pavis or pavoise (fig. ) was more generally used by archers and crossbowmen as a cover. a good specimen of the pavis exists in the ashmolean museum at oxford, and there are two large examples of heavier make with peepholes for the archer, and wooden props as shown in our illustration, at brussels and berlin. [illustration: plate x _photograph by viscount dillon._ horse armour of the emperor maximilian. tower.] chapter v horse armour the fully-equipped knight, whether in the cumbrous garments of mail or in the more adaptable suit of plate, was so entirely dependent on his horse, both in active warfare and in the tilt-yard, that some notice of the defences of the destrier or war-horse is necessary in this short examination of the history of defensive armour. on the bayeux tapestry there is no suggestion of armour of any kind upon the horses, but wace writes in the _roman de rou_ (line , )-- vint williame li filz osber son cheval tot covert de fer. we should remember, however, that wace wrote in the second half of the twelfth century and, like the other chroniclers of the middle ages, both in picture and text, portrayed his characters in the dress of his own time. the trapper of mail shown on fig. is taken from stothard's drawing of one of the paintings in the painted chamber at westminster, now destroyed.[ ] these decorations are supposed to have been executed about the year . here the horse is shown covered with a most inconvenient housing of mail, which can hardly have been in very general use, in this particular form at any rate; for it would be almost impossible for a horse to walk, let alone to trot or gallop, with such a defence. the textile trapper was, of course, lighter, and was used merely for ornament and display, though it may have been designed, as the surcoat was, to protect the mail defence beneath from wet. jean chartier, in his _histoire de charles vi_ (p. ), states that sometimes these rich trappings or housings were, after the death of their owner, bequeathed to churches, where they were used for altar hangings, or inversely, when trappings were needed, the churches were despoiled of their embroideries to provide them. [illustration: fig. . trapper of mail, from the painted chamber, westminster, thirteenth century.] [illustration: fig. . ivory chessman, from hewitt's _ancient armour_, fourteenth century.] the mailed horse appears as early as the roman period, and is shown on the column of trajan, but in europe he does not seem to have been commonly in use much before the thirteenth century. as the man was sometimes defended entirely by garments of quilted fabrics, so the horse also wore pourpointed housings. we can only surmise, from the folds and lines shown on seals or drawings, which variety is intended; but the stiff lines of the housing on the seal of roger de quinci, earl of winchester ( - ), and its raised lozenges, seem to suggest a thicker substance than does the more flowing drapery on fig. . matthew paris, in describing the battle of nuova croce in , writes that 'a credible italian asserted that milan with its dependencies raised an army of six thousand men-at-arms with iron-clad horses'. an ordinance of philip the fair, in , provides that every holder of an estate of livres rental should furnish a man at-arms well mounted on a horse 'couvert de couvertures de fer ou de couverture pourpointe'. the caparisoned horse first appears on royal seals in the reign of edward i. in the roll of purchases of windsor park tournament ( ), the horses are provided with parchment crests, and the clavones or rivets used for fixing these crests are mentioned in the wardrobe accounts of edward i in : 'cum clavis argenti pro eodem capello.' the earliest note we have of a rigid defence for the horse is in the windsor roll, which contains the following item:--'d milon le cuireur xxxviij copita cor de similitud' capit equoz.' this headpiece was of leather, either used in its natural state or as cuirbouilli, and seems to be the material suggested in the ivory chessman (fig. ) illustrated in hewitt (vol. ii, p. ). in the will of the earl of surrey ( ) is mentioned a breastpiece of leather for a horse. in the fifteenth century we find the horse protected with plate like his rider, and usually the lines of the barding or horse armour follow those of the man. fig. shows the armed horse with the various portions of his defence named. [illustration: fig. . horse armour. a, chamfron; b, crinet; c, peytral; d, flanchards; e, arçon; f, cantel; g, crupper; h, tail-guard; j, metal rein-guard; k, glancing-knob.] the chamfron is sometimes provided with hinged cheek-plates and usually has a holder for a plume. on the forehead are often shown the arms of the owner or a tapered spike. angellucci, in his preface to the catalogue of the turin armoury, differentiates between the chamfron (tesera) and the frontale or plate protecting the front of the head alone. there are fine suits of gothic horse armour both in the musée d'artillerie in paris and also in the wallace collection at hertford house. the latter is one of the best-arranged mounted suits in existence. the different pieces of the horse armour bear the delicate sweeping lines embossed on the surface in the same way that the armour of the man is treated. the restored linings of leather and skin show how the horse was protected from the chafing of the metal. the peytral or poitrel is hung from the neck and withers, and is frequently provided with large bosses, called _bossoirs_, _pezoneras_, or _glancing-knobs_, to direct the lance-thrust away from the horse. it is often hinged in three pieces. the flanchards hang from the saddle on either side, and are sometimes, as on plate iv and the frontispiece, curved upwards in the centre to admit of the use of the spur. the back of the horse is protected by the croupière or crupper, which is made up of several pieces riveted or hinged together. the root of the tail is covered by a tubular plate called the gardequeue, which is often moulded into the form of a dragon or dolphin. all these plates were lined with leather or wadded with cotton to prevent chafing. often, however, cuirbouilli was used instead of metal and was richly decorated with painting and gilding. a picture of the battle of pavia in the ashmolean museum, oxford, shows many of these painted bards, and the same material is doubtless intended in the relief of the battle of brescia on the visconti monument at pavia. these leather bards have entirely disappeared and are not to be found in any collections except for a portion of a crupper of this material in the tower. the saddle, with its high arciones or peaks, back and front, was in itself an efficacious protection for the waist and loins. the term cantle is sometimes used for either plate, but it is generally accepted as the name for the rear peak. both this part and the front plate are often covered with metal. the great jousting saddles have been noticed in the preceding chapter. the reins are protected from being cut by hinged plates, as shown on plate x.[ ] these pieces constitute the armour of the horse as usually found in museums and in painting and sculpture. there is, however, in the zeughaus in vienna a curious portrait of harnischmeister albrecht, dated . the horse on which he rides is armed completely with plate except for an aperture in the flanchards for using the spur. the legs are covered with hinged and bolted defences very similar to those of the armour for men. it might be supposed that this was but a fantastic idea of the painter, if viscount dillon had not discovered a cuissard, or thigh-piece, which much resembles those shown on the picture, in the musée de la porte de hal, brussels. in the days of the decadence, when the craft of the armourer was to a great extent overwhelmed by the riotous fancy of the decorator, the horse shared with his rider in this display. the armour shown on plate x, known as the burgundian armour from the badges of the emperor maximilian which adorn it, does not offend in this respect, because the embossing serves to give rigidity to the metal without interfering with its defensive qualities. the same may be said of the barding shown on the frontispiece, but on plate iv the loss of dignity in line, and the embossed hemisphere--which, for its purpose, should be smooth--show the beginning of the decay in constructional skill. the highly ornamented pageant armour made for the elector christian ii, now in the dresden museum, though extraordinarily perfect in workmanship, should be classed rather as the work of goldsmith or sculptor than as that of the armourer. chapter vi the decadence of armour [illustration: fig. . grotesque helmet, sixteenth century. nuremberg.] in the practice of any of the crafts, or applied arts as they are now called, the surest and most manifest signs of decadence are to be found in two aspects of that craft. the first of these is that which refers to the material used. with regard to armour this consideration is faithfully adhered to in most examples of the armourer's work up to the end of the fifteenth century; but by the beginning of the sixteenth century we find the craftsman becoming wearied of his technical perfection and the simplicity and constructional dignity which invariably accompanies such perfection. his efforts are now directed to fashioning his metal into such forms as in no way suggest his material, but only show a certain meretricious skill in workmanship. fig. shows a very favourite form of this artistic incoherence. the defensive properties of the helmet are in no way increased, but rather are annulled by presenting hollows and projections where before a smooth surface existed. it is superfluous to point out the grotesque and bizarre effect of this human face in metal.[ ] another instance of this wilful disregard of material is to be noticed in those suits which imitate the puffed and slashed dress in fashion for civilian wear during the sixteenth century. many of these suits exist in english and european armouries, which proves that they were popular, but to the true craftsman there is something degrading in the efforts of the expert ironworker, expending his energies, not to produce a finely constructed piece of work, but rather to imitate the seams and pipings of the work of a tailor or dressmaker; and, however much we may admire his technical skill, we must, perforce, place his artistic aspirations side by side with the 'grainer and marbler' who was so conspicuous a factor in domestic decoration in the middle of the nineteenth century. fig. shows this decadence carried to its furthest pitch. by the middle of the sixteenth century the renaissance, which had been, in the first instance, the birth of all that is best in european art and craftsmanship, became a baneful influence. the expert painter, having mastered the intricacies of his art, turned them into extravagant channels and exaggerated action; foreshortened figures and optical illusions took the place of the dignified compositions of the earlier period. nor could the crafts escape this deadly poison. to the credit of the craftsmen we may hope that the luxurious indulgence and ostentatious display of the princely patron was the cause of decadence in the crafts, rather than the inclination of the workers themselves. still the fact remains that, as soon as the plain and constructionally sound work began to be overspread with ornament, architecture, metal-work, wood-carving, and all the allied arts began to be debased from their former high position. with the decoration of armour its practical utility began to decline. it must be admitted, however, that one reason for the decoration was that armour was, by degrees, less and less used for war and only retained for pageant, joust, and parade in which personal display and magnificence were demanded. [illustration: fig. . puffed suit, sixteenth century. vienna.[ ]] [illustration: fig. . casque after negroli, sixteenth century. paris.] the engraved and inlaid suits of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, although they offend the craftsman's eye as does the decorated bicycle of the oriental potentate to-day, do not transgress that important law, on which so much stress has been laid, of offering a glancing surface to the opposing weapon. it is when we come to the embossed suits with their hollows and projections that we find the true character of armour lost and the metal used only as a material for exhibiting the dexterity of the workman without any consideration for its use or construction. this interference with the glancing surface is noticeable in the suit illustrated in fig. , but even here there is some excuse, in that the designer had reason for his embossing of the metal--if the imitation of the puffed suit was to be carefully portrayed. the same, however, cannot be urged for those suits which are simply covered with ornament with no purpose, little meaning, and less composition or design. if we set aside our opinions as to the suitability of the ornament, we are compelled to admire the wonderful technical skill which produced such pieces as the suit made for king sebastian of portugal by anton pfeffenhauser of augsburg, and now in the madrid armoury. here every deity of olympus, the allegorical figures of justice, strength, and the cardinal virtues, crowd together with navigation, peace, and victory; roman warriors fighting with elephants are found among amorini, satyrs, and tritons; while every inch of the metal not devoted to this encyclopaedia of history and legend is crowded with foliage and scroll-work of that debased and unnatural form which has become the branding mark of this period of the renaissance. [illustration: fig. . pageant shield, sixteenth century. vienna.] it will be sufficient to give one example of this prostitution of art and craftsmanship. this helmet after negroli (fig. ), and a similar example, signed by negroli, at madrid, show how the canons of the armourer's craft were ignored at this period. it is true that the casque still provides a metal covering for the head, and that the comb gives an additional protection to the skull, but when we examine the embossed figures at the side--and marvellously good the embossing is--we find lodgements for the sword or spear which would most certainly help to detach the helmet from its wearer. as to the comb, it may fairly be cited as an example of all that is artistically worst in the late renaissance. its technical merits only emphasize this. the warrior is laid on his back to suit the required shape of the helmet, and to give point to his position his hair is held by two figures whose attributes seem to suggest that intercrossing of birds, beasts, and fishes which delighted the decadent mind of the period. the figures are human to the waist and end in a dolphin's tail. angels' wings spring from their shoulders and leopards' claws from the junction of tail and waist. not content with this outrage to the dignity of art, the craftsman ends his warrior in an architectural base which has not even the slight merit of probability which the tail of the merman might offer. in short it is an example of technical skill at its highest, and artistic perception at its lowest point. the shield from the vienna collection (fig. ) is another example, like king sebastian's suit, of meaningless decoration. the strap work does not in any way follow the lines of the shield, and the female figures seem to be introduced only to show that the craftsman could portray the human form in steel as easily as he could the more conventional ornament. as the armourer, weary of constructional skill, turned to ornament as a means of showing to what further extent his powers could expand, so, with this change in his point of view, his constructional skill itself declined. the headpiece, which in the golden age of the armourer was forged in as few pieces as possible, is in the late seventeenth century made of many pieces, as the art of skilful forging declines. the ingenious articulations of the soleret are changed, and the foot is cased in plates which, overlapping only in one direction, preclude the easy movement of the wearer. the fine lines of leg and arm defences, which in the fifteenth and sixteenth century follow the shape of the limbs, give place to straight tubular plates which can only be likened to the modern stove-pipe. the grace and symmetry of the gothic suit shown on plate viii, especially the leg armour, exemplify this merit of the best period of armour, while the suit made for louis xiv, and the gilt suit of charles i in the tower, offend in the opposite direction. another sure indication of the decadence of the craftsman is to be found in the imitation of constructional detail with no practical purpose. examples of this may be seen in late seventeenth-century armour, where a single plate is embossed to represent several overlapping plates or lames, and also in the plentiful use of '_clous perdus_' or false rivets which are scattered broadcast on some suits in places where no rivets are needed. to turn from the degradation of the simplicity and constructional perfection of armour to the reasons which led to its gradual disuse, we find that, after the gothic period, armour became heavier, partly because of the shock tactics in vogue on active service and partly because, in the case of jousting armour, strength and great weight were needed to protect the wearer from vital injury, and partly because the improvement of firearms necessitated extra defence. the temper of the metal used was such that it would resist a pistol shot, as we have noticed in chapter iii; and on examining the surface of the metal we find, as in the pembridge helm, that it is of so fine a texture that a modern knife will not leave a scratch when testing it. therefore we must regard the weight of armour as one of the chief reasons for its disuse. again, military tactics necessitated forced marches and longer expeditions than before; or at any rate it was discovered that when engaging in long expeditions the troops were chafed and hindered by their armour. it is somewhat curious to note that as the leg was the first part of the body to be armed with plate, so the leg armour was the first to be discarded. the jambs were the first pieces to go, and were replaced, in the case of the mounted man, by thick buff leather boots. the tassets were prolonged to the knee or--to describe this portion of the armour in a different way--the cuisses themselves were formed of riveted lames and the tassets discarded. the helmet at the latter end of the seventeenth century is generally open and of the burgonet type. the breastplate is usually short and projects downwards at the lower portion after the fashion of the 'peascod' doublet of civilian wear. as early as , at the siege of zutphen, we find officers discarding their armour and keeping only the cuirass. from the hatfield mss. we learn that a penny a day was allowed to each soldier in , over and above his pay, for the wearing and carriage of his armour, because it had become the custom for the troops to give their accoutrements to the baggage-carriers when on the march: 'a matter both unseemly for soldiers and also very hurtful unto the armour by bruising and breaking thereof, whereby it becometh unserviceable.' in cruso's _militarie instructions for the cavallrie_ ( ), we find that the arquebusiers had wholly left off their armour in favour of buff coats. turner's _pallas armata_ ( ) mentions the armour of officers as 'a headpiece, a corslet and a gorget, the captain having a plume of feathers in his helmet, the lieutenant not'. further on we read, 'now the feathers you may peradventure find, but the headpiece for the most part is laid aside.' fig. shows that half armour was still worn during the commonwealth, but by the restoration very little was retained except for ceremonial use. as far as can be gleaned from contemporary letters and histories, charles i never wore either the somewhat cumbrous gilt suit which is shown at the tower or the more graceful half suit of blued steel in which vandyke represented him in his equestrian portrait. all the metal defence we can be sure he actually wore is a steel broad-brimmed hat covered with velvet. the headpiece used by the cavalry during the civil war is of the same type as no. on plate iv, a variety of the burgonet with a movable nasal. the breastplate continued to be worn during the wars of marlborough, but that, too, was discarded when the efficacy of the musket proved its uselessness. the last survival of plate armour is to be found in the gorget. this became smaller as the uniform was changed, and in the end was simply a small crescent of brass hung at the neck. it was worn by infantry officers up to the year , at which date it was given up in england. [illustration: fig. . cromwellian pikeman. tower.] the last official use of full plate armour was at the coronation of george iv, when the king's champion, dymoke, entered westminster hall and threw down the gauntlet to challenge those who disputed the king's right to the crown. the suit worn on this occasion belonged originally to sir christopher hatton, captain of the guard to queen elizabeth, and was made by jacobe,[ ] whose designs for armour have been referred to in chapter iii. the suit is now in the guard room at windsor. the guardia nobile of the pope still wear the picturesque half armour of the sixteenth century. the cuirass and helmet of the household cavalry of the present day are not survivals, for they were introduced at the time of the coronation of george iv. the study of defensive armour and weapons must of necessity need much careful comparison of examples and investigation of documentary evidence, but, even when undertaken only superficially, it will add greatly to the interest of modern history and of the arts of war. costume can only be studied from pictorial and sculptured records, but in the case of armour we have, after a certain period, actual examples not only of historical but also of personal interest. with modern methods of arrangement and with the expert care of those most learned in this subject these examples will be an ever-present record which may be examined with more interest than might be bestowed upon many branches of the applied arts; because, in addition to the interest centred in the personality of the wearers, we have the sure signs of the master-craftsman which are always evident in good craftsmanship, and, not infrequently, the sign-manual of the worker himself. chapter vii weapons the sword. at the time of the conquest the sword was straight, broad in blade, two-edged and pointed. the quillons were straight and the grip ended in a pommel which, as far as we can judge from illustrated records, was square, round, lozenge-shaped or trefoiled (fig. ). there is not much change in the general lines of the sword during the twelfth century except in the form of the pommel. [illustration: fig. . sword-hilts.] in the thirteenth century the point, instead of starting abruptly at the extreme end of the blade, is of a more gradual form, showing that the use of the sword for thrusting was more general than in the previous centuries. the grip seems to be very short for the proper balance of the weapon, if we may judge from those shown on plate iii, , , . [illustration: fig. . a, pommel; b, grip; c, knuckle-bow; d, d, quillons; e, counter-guard; f, pas d'âne; g, ricasso; h, blade.] [illustration: fig. . schiavona.] the quillons curve upwards towards the point and the pommel is frequently decorated with the badge or arms of the owner. the symbol of the cross is frequently found on the sword-pommel. at this period the handle and scabbard are frequently enriched with ornamental metal-work set with gems, as we find on the monument of king john in worcester cathedral. the cruciform shape of the sword-hilt continues through the fourteenth century without much radical change in its construction, but in the fifteenth century we find the 'pas d'âne', which is formed of two rings curving above the quillons on each side of the ricasso, or squared part of the blade above the hilt (fig. ). it is usual to describe the sword as it is held for use in hand; that is with the point as the highest part and the pommel as the lowest. after the fifteenth century sword-play began to be studied as a science, and we find that, besides being used for offensive purposes, the sword-hilt was so designed as to be a defence in itself. from this we get all the guards and counterguards, which are so varied and intricate that it would require more space than is at our disposal to treat of them with any degree of completeness. [illustration: fig. . two-hand sword.] the type of sword that was thus developed by practice in its use was purely for thrusting purposes. the sword for cutting alone is generally simpler in form. the cutilax, falchion, dussack, and cutlas are all weapons of this order and generally have a simple hilt. the modern claymore is really an adaptation of the italian schiavona (fig. ), and is in no way derived from the claymore proper, the two-hand sword of the middle ages. this great weapon, often as much as feet in length from point to pommel, was used by foot-soldiers, and special military arrangements were made for the space given to its users, who required a good sweeping distance between each man (fig. ). the hand-and-half sword is a variety of cross-hilted sword, in which the grip is sufficiently long for two or three fingers of the left hand to be used to assist the right hand in delivering a swinging cut. the early dagger is of much the same form as the sword; it was worn on the right side with the sword on the left. one variety of the dagger was called the miséricorde. it was finely pointed and, as its name grimly implies, was intended to penetrate the joints of the armour to give the _coup de grâce_ to the fallen knight. the main-gauche is also of the dagger order, but has a broad knuckle-guard and long straight quillons. it was used in conjunction with the rapier in duels with the point upwards, more as a means of warding off the sword-thrust than for actual stabbing. the anelace and cinquedea are broad-bladed short weapons used for stabbing only. the baselard was the short sword carried by civilians in the fifteenth century. of staff weapons the principal is, of course, the lance. at the time of the conquest and up to the fourteenth century the shaft of the lance was of even thickness with lozenge- or leaf-shaped point. during the fourteenth century we find the shaft swelling just above the grip and then tapering below it. plate xi, , shows the lance provided with a vamplate or shield, which protected the hand and made the right gauntlet unnecessary. tilting lances are sometimes as much as feet in length, and one specimen in the tower weighs lb. an engraving by lucas cranach ( - ), which depicts a tourney or mêlée of knights, shows the combatants preceded by squires on horseback who support these weighty lances till the moment of impact, when, it is presumed, they moved aside out of danger. the lance-point was sharp for active service, but for tournaments it was supposed to be blunted. this practice, however, was so often neglected that ordinances were framed enjoining the use of the coronal or trefoiled button, which is shown on plate xi, . the other long-shafted staff weapons may be divided into those for stabbing and those for cutting. the gisarme is a long-handled weapon which some writers consider to have been much the same as the pole-axe. from wace we learn that it was sharp, long, and broad.[ ] it was in all probability a primitive form of the bill. this was also a broad-bladed weapon and was used only by foot-soldiers. it seems to have been evolved from the agricultural scythe. the godendag was the name given by the flemings to the halbard. it had an axe-blade with curved or straight spikes at the back and a long point to terminate the shaft. in this detail it differed from the pole-axe. the halbard proper was used as early as the thirteenth century and appears in the designs from the painted chamber at westminster figured by stothard.[ ] from the seventeenth century onwards it was used only for ceremonial purposes and was richly decorated. it was carried on parade by infantry drum-majors in england as late as . it was much favoured by the swiss, who armed the front rank of the footmen with this weapon. those used for parade purposes are elaborately engraved on the blades, while the shafts are often covered with velvet and studded with gilded nails. these ornate weapons are used still by the gentlemen-at-arms on state occasions. the voulge is a primitive weapon evolved from an agricultural implement of the same class as the hedging bill in use at the present day. the lochaber axe is of much the same form; its distinguishing feature being the hook at the top of the shaft, which was used in scaling walls. the glaive is also a broad-bladed weapon, but where the bill and gisarme are more or less straight towards the edge, the glaive curves backwards. it is often to be found richly engraved for show purposes. in french writings the word glaive is sometimes loosely used for lance or sword. the stabbing or thrusting long-shafted weapons include the lance, spear, and javelin. after these the most important is the pike. this is very similar to the spear, but was used exclusively by foot-soldiers. in the seventeenth century it was carried by infantry interspersed among the arquebusiers. there are several works on pike-drill and treatises on its management. lord orrery, in his _art of war_, comments on the differences in length and recommends that all should be - / feet long. the shaft was made of seasoned ash and the head was fastened with two cheeks of iron, often feet long, which ran down the shaft to prevent the head being cut off by cavalry. at the butt-end was a spike for sticking into the ground when resisting cavalry. in a treatise entitled _the art of training_ ( ) directions are given that the 'grip' of the shaft should be covered with velvet to afford a sure hold for the hand. this grip was called the armin. there are also suggestions that a tassel should be fixed midway to prevent the rain running down the shaft and so causing the hand to slip. when we consider that the pikeman had to keep the cavalry at bay while the arquebusier was reloading--a lengthy process--we can understand the importance of these regulations. the pike was carried by the colour-sergeants in the british army at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and was last used in the french army in . the spontoon is a species of half-pike, which was carried by the colour-sergeants in the british army up to the end of the eighteenth century, if not longer. the spetum and the ranseur are often confused. the names are usually given to those weapons which have sharp lateral projections fixed at a more or less acute angle to the point. they could not be used for cutting, but used for thrusting they inflicted terrible wounds. the partizan is somewhat of the same order, but is known best in museums in its decorated form as used in ceremonial parades. these show-weapons were used by the judge's guard in oxford up to , and are still carried by the yeomen of the guard on state occasions. [illustration: plate xi . voulge . halbard . glaive . ranseur or spetum . partizan . spontoon . gisarme . pike . mace . lochaber axe . pole axe . holy water sprinkler . bill . lance and vamplate . lance points for war and joust, madrid . sections of lance shafts, tower] [illustration: fig. . morning star.] the bayonet, although introduced in france in , is so essentially a part of the firearm that we need do no more than mention it among the thrusting weapons. the scope of this work will not allow of any notice of firearms; that subject, owing to modern developments, is too wide to be treated in a few sentences. of short-handled weapons the club or mace is to be found on the bayeux tapestry, and is generally quatrefoil or heart-shaped at the head. the mace was the weapon of militant ecclesiastics, who thus escaped the denunciation against 'those who fight with the sword'. it is generally supposed that the gibet was of the same order. wace, in the _roman de rou_ (line ), writes:-- et il le gibet seisi ki a sun destre bras pendi. the mace was usually carried slung by a loop to the saddle-bow or on the right wrist, so that, when sword or lance were lost, it could be used at once. a less ornamental weapon is the holy-water sprinkler. this is formed of a ball of iron studded with sharp projecting spikes, and fixed upon a long or short handle. the morning star is akin to the military flail, a weapon derived from the agricultural implement of that name. it is much the same as the holy-water sprinkler, except that the spiked ball is not socketed on the handle but hangs from a chain (fig. ). the names of these two weapons are often transposed, but we propose to adhere to the nomenclature used in the tower armouries as being more likely to be correct. the war-hammer and battle-axe need but little description. they were generally used by horsemen, and their general form only varies in detail from implements in use at the present day. the pole-axe was a weapon in great request for jousting on foot, in the 'champ clos'. the blade is much like the halbard, but at the back is a hammer-shaped projection with a roughened surface. the longbow may be said to have gained the battles of senlac, crecy, and agincourt, and so ranks as one of the most important of english weapons. it was from - / to feet in length and was made of yew, or, when this wood was scarce, of witch hazel. it is a popular tradition in the country that the yew-trees which were so important for the manufacture of this weapon were grown in churchyards because they were poisonous to cattle, and the churchyards were the only fenced-in spaces. there is, however, no documentary evidence to support this. the string was of hemp or silk. the archer carried twenty-four 'clothyard' shafts in his belt and wore a wrist-guard called a bracer to protect his wrist from the recoil of the string. these bracers were of ivory or leather and were often decorated. the arrows were tipped with the goose-quill, but roger ascham, in his _toxophilus_, writes that peacock arrows were used 'for gayness'. so notable were the english bow-makers for their productions that in we find the pope sending to this country for bows. the crossbow or arbalest is first heard of in the twelfth century, and at this date was considered so 'unfair' a weapon that the popes forbade its use. innocent ii in fulminated against this barbarous weapon, but allowed of its use by christians against infidels. by the end of the thirteenth century, however, it was in general use. at first the crossbow was strung by hand; but when it was made more powerful, mechanical means had to be resorted to to bend the bow, which was often of steel. there are two varieties of war crossbows: that strung with the 'goat's-foot' lever, which is shown on fig. , and a heavier kind called the arbalest '_à tour_', which was strung with a cog-wheel and ratchet arrangement called the moulinet or windlass (fig. ). the arbalest '_à cric_' is a larger form of this variety. the archer using these heavy weapons was entrenched behind a pavis or shield fixed in the ground as shown on fig. . the quarel or bolt used for the crossbow is shorter and thicker than that used for the longbow. [illustration: fig. . crossbow and goat's-foot lever.] [illustration: fig. . crossbow and windlass.] of the other projectile-hurling weapons, such as the fustibal or sling, the different forms of catapult used in siege operations, and the innumerable varieties of firearm, we have no space to write. the former, being mostly fashioned of wood and cordage, are seldom to be met with in museums, and we can only judge of their design and use from illuminated miniatures and paintings. the firearm, being, as it is, subject to further development, cannot be taken into full consideration in this work except so far as it affected the defensive armour and in time ousted the staff-weapon. with this bare enumeration of the principal weapons in use from the twelfth to the eighteenth century we draw our all too meagre notes to a conclusion. the subject is so vast, because each example is distinct in itself and because no general rule holds absolutely good for all, that many volumes might be produced with advantage on each epoch of the defences and weapons of europe. no better advice to the would-be student can be given than that of baron de cosson in the introduction to the catalogue of helmets and mail (_arch. journ._, vol. xxxvii). he writes: 'for the study of ancient armour to be successfully pursued it is of primary importance that a careful examination be made of every existing specimen within our reach.... every rivet-hole and rivet in a piece must be studied and its use and object thought out. the reasons for the varied forms, thicknesses, and structure of the different parts must have special attention.... this alone will enable us to derive full profit from our researches into ancient authors and our examination of ancient monuments. this preliminary study will alone enable us to form a sound opinion on two important points. first, the authority to be accorded to any given representation of armour in ancient art ... whether it was copied from real armour or whether it was the outcome of the artist's imagination; and also whether a piece of existing armour is genuine or false, and whether or no it is in its primitive condition.' to this may be added that in studying armour at its best epoch, that is during the fifteenth century, we find the dignity of true craftsmanship proclaimed, and utility and grace attained without the addition of that so-called decoration which with the advent of the renaissance was the bane of all the crafts. index a aiguillettes, , . ailettes, , . aketon, . albrecht, harnischmeister, horse-armour of, . almain rivets, ; suits of, . anelace, . angellucci, on horse armour, . arbalest, _à cric_, ; _à tour_, ib. arciones, . armet, earliest use in england, ; parts of, , . armin, . arming-doublet, . arming-points, . armour: allowance for wear and tear, ; convenience in use of, ; details of construction of, ; engraved, ; essential points in its manufacture, ; fastenings of, ; for tournaments reinforced on left side, ; heavier on left side, ; inconvenience of, , ; last official use of, ; making of, ; method of putting on, ; puffed, ; reason for increased weight, ; testing of, ; wearing of, . armourers, names of, ; workshop, . ascham, roger, _toxophilus_, . ashmolean museum, pavis at, . _astley, life of sir j._, . august, herzog, armour of, . auray, battle of, . austin, will., . b bainbergs or beinbergs, . balthasin, galliot de, . bamberg, wooden figures at, . banded mail, . barding, . barrel helm, , . bascinet, ; of henry viii, proof marks on, ; 'pig-faced,' ; precursor of salade, . baselard, . bases, ; of steel, . battle-axe, . bayeux tapestry, , , , , , . bayonet, . beauchamp effigy, ; pageants, . beavor, ; derivation of, . berardi, gulielmus, monument of at florence, . berlin zeughaus, . besague, , . bill, . black prince, effigy of, ; gauntlets of, ; helm of, ; jupon of, ; shield of, . blore, _monumental remains_, . boeheim, wendelin, _waffenkunde_, , . bossoirs, . bracer, . brayette, , (_note_). breast- and back-pieces, fastenings of, ; discarded, . breech of mail, . bregander nayles, . brescia, battle of, on visconti monument at pavia, . brigandine, , , . brussels, horse cuissard at, . buffe, . burgkmair, hans, _weisskunig_, , . burgonet, , . burgundian horse armour in tower, . burgundy, enriched salade of duke of, . c cabasset, . calverley, sir h., at battle of auray, ; monument of, . camail, , . cantle, . cap worn under helm, . carnet, . cervellière, . chain-mail harmed by rain, . chamfron, . chapel-de-fer, . charlemagne, armour of, . charles i, armour of, , . chartier, jean, describes horse trappings, . chaucer, , , , . chausses, . chaussons, . christ church, oxford, window at, . christian ii, enriched armour of elector, at dresden, . _chroniques de charlemaine_, . cinquedea, . clavones, . claymore, . 'cloth-yard' arrow, . 'clous perdus,' . coat of defence, . coif of mail, . coronal, . coronation of george iv, , . corrugated iron similar to maximilian armour, . cosson, baron de, , , , ; advice to students of armour, ; disputes meyrick's theory of burgonet, . coucy, mathieu de, . coude, , . covers to helmets, . cranach, lucas, tilting lances drawn by, . croissants, . crossbow, used for proving armour, ; varieties of, . crossbows forbidden by the popes, . crupper or croupière, . crusades, . cruso on the discarding of armour, . cuirass of leather, . cuirbouilli, ; crest of, ; helms of, ; horse armour of, ; leg armour of, ; poleynes of, ; shields of, . cuissard, ; for horse, . cuisses, , ; laminated, , ; taken off in battle, ; for tilting, . cutilax, . cutlas, . cyclas, . d dagger, . davies, edward, . 'defaut de la cuirasse,' . destrier, . dilge, . dillon, viscount, , , , , , , . dussack, . dymoke, . e edward i, wardrobe account of, , . eisenhut, . elbow-cop, . enarmes, . eresby, d', brass of, . f falchion, . fauchet, reference to burgonet, . fitz urse, shield of, . flanchards, . fontaine, etienne de, helmet of, . froissart, , , . frontale, as distinct from chamfron, . fustian worn under armour, . fustibal, . g gadlings, . gambeson, , , . gardequeue, . garde-rein, . garrard, _art of warre_, . gauntlet, ; of black prince, ; construction of, . genouillière, . gibet, . gisarme, . glaive, . glancing-knobs, . glancing surface, ; on helm, . godendag, . gorget, ; survival of, . gorleston brass, . gothic armour, ; horse armour in wallace collection, ; symmetry of, . gouchets, . grand-guard, . grip of lance, ; sword, . guardia nobile of the pope, . guige, . guns first used, . h haines, rev. h., _monumental brasses_, . halbard, . hall, _chronicles_, . hand-and-half sword, . hatfield ms. as to wear and tear of armour, . hatton, suit of sir c., . haubergeon, . hauberk, ; sleeves of, ; worn under plate, . hawkins, sir r., _observations_, . helm, great, or heaume, , ; barendyne, at haseley, , ; brocas, at woolwich, , ; caps worn under, , ; chained to body, ; construction of jousting, - ; dawtray, at petworth, ; decorated, ; fogge, at ashford, ; method of fixing, ; pembridge, ; 'sugar-loaf,' ; at sutton courtenay, , ; wallace collection, ; westminster, . helmet, covers for, ; grotesque, ; jewelled, ; norman, ; tied with laces, ; tinned to prevent rust, . henry v, . henry viii and maximilian, helmets worn at the meeting of, ; suit for fighting on foot, ; suit made by seusenhofer, . heraldic devices on shields, . hewitt, john, , , ; ivory chessman illustrated by, . holy-water sprinkler, . horse armour, complete suit of, . horse trappings and church embroideries, ; first shown on english seals, . hosting harness, . household cavalry, . 'hungere' iron, . i imbricate armouries, . inventory of humphrey de bohun, , ; sir simon burley, ; dover castle, ; louis hutin, , ; piers gaveston, , ; tower armouries, . j jack, . jacobe, , . jambeaux, . jamboys, . jambs, ; discarded, . jazeran armour, . joan of arc, . john, king, . jupon, ; of black prince, . k knee-cop, . l lalain, jacques de, . lambespring, bartholomew, . lamboys. _see_ jamboys. lambrequin, . lames, . lance, . laton, or latten, used for armour, . leather, used for armour, ; horse armour, ; morion at berlin, . lee, sir henry, tests armour, . leg armour, of horse at brussels, ; of plate, introduced and discarded, . lewis, isle of, ivory chessmen found at, . lochaber axe, . longbow, . louis, king of hungary, death by drowning of, . louis xiv, armour of, ; proof marks on armour of, . m mace, . madrid, . mail, banded, ; chain, ; cleaning of, ; 'mascled,' ; method of making, . main-guard, . mainfaire, wrong use of, . manifer or mainfere, , . main-gauche, . mantegna, st. george by, . mantling, . marche, oliver de la, . maximilian i, ; armour, ; horse armour of, in the tower, . mentonière, . meyrick, sir samuel, , ; theory of banded mail, , ; theory of mascled mail, , ; theory of burgonet, . miséricorde, . missaglias, . mohacz, battle of, . molineux, sir w., brass of, . monstrelet, . morion, ; of leather at berlin, . morning star, . moroni, portrait by, . moton, , . moulinet, . mühlberg, armour worn at the battle of, . n nasal, . negroli, helmet by, . northwode brass, . nuova croce, battle of, . nuremberg, tilting suit at, . o ocularium, , . odo, bishop, . orle, . orrery, lord, _art of warre_, . p painted chamber, designs in the, , . palette, . _pallas armata._ _see_ turner. panache, . paris, matthew, . partizan, . pas d'âne, . passe-guard, , , . pauldron, , , . pavia, picture of battle of, at oxford, . pavis or pavoise, , . peascod doublet, . pezoneras, . pfeffenhauser, suit by, . philip the fair, ordinance of, . pike, ; last use of, . plastron-de-fer, , . plates, pair of, . pluvinel, de, _maneige royal_, . poitrel or peytral, . poldermitton, . pole-axe, ; used in 'champs clos', . poleynes, , , , . pommel of sword, . pourpointerie, ; for tourneys, . puffed armour, . q quarel, . queue, . quillons, , . r radcot bridge, battle of, . ranseur, . rein-guards of metal, . renaissance, decadence of the armour of the, . rené, king, , . rerebrace, , ; construction of, . ricasso, . richard i, ; shield of, . ringed armour, . rivets, sliding, . _roman de rou._ _see_ wace. rondel, , . rosbecque, battle of, . roussillon, gerard de, . s sabatons or sabataynes, , . saddle for jousting, in the tower, . st. gall, monk of, , . st. george, statuette of, at dijon, . salade, evolved from bascinet, ; decorated and painted, . scale armour, , . schiavona, . scott, poetic licence of sir walter, . sebastian, parade suit of king, . senlac, battle of, . setvans brass, . seusenhofer, ; suit by, in the tower, , . shield, temp. norman conquest, ; fourteenth century, ; faced with gesso, ; of twigs, . sigismund, armour of count, . smythe, sir john, _animadversions_, , . solerets, , ; construction of, ; 'à la poulaine,' ; 'bear-paw,' ; 'bec de cane,' ; 'demi-poulaine,' . spain, regulations as to monuments in, . spetum, . splinted armour, ; on ash monument, . spontoon, . standard of mail, . stothard, charles, , . surcoat, , . surrey, earl of, horse armour in will of, . swords, ; and dagger play, , . t taces, ; construction of, . tassets, ; and cuisses combined, ; discarded, . tonlet, . topf, , . tournament, of st. inglevert, ; armour, ; helms, ; and swords, ; at windsor park, , , , ; crests used at, . trapper, of mail, ; textile, . trellice coat, . trumpington brass, , . tuilles, . tunic, , . turner, _pallas armata_, . turning pins, . two-hand sword, . u umbril, . upper pourpoint, . v vambrace, , ; construction of, . vamplate, , . vegecius, . ventail, . vere, escape of robert de, . vervelles, . vienna, painting of horse armour at, ; pageant shield at, . vif de l'harnois, . viollet-le-duc, _dictionnaire du mobilier français_, . visière, . visor, . volant piece, . voulge, . vuyders, . w wace, _roman de rou_, , , , , . waller, j. g., , . wambais, . war-hammer, . war-hat, . warwick, earl of, . whalebone, used for gauntlets and swords, . william the conqueror, , . windsor park. _see_ tournament. wylcotes, sir john, brass of, . z zutphen, armour discarded at siege of, . oxford: printed at the clarendon press by horace hart, m.a. footnotes: [ ] harl. ms. , brit. mus. [ ] vi. , trans. johnes, . [ ] _archaeologia_, xix. - . [ ] _archaeologia_, lix. [ ] _ancient armour_, ii. . [ ] _roman de rou_, . et seq. [ ] protect. [ ] _archaeologia_, xvii. [ ] _arch. journ._, ii. . [ ] vol. iii. p. . [ ] _new foedera_, ii. . [ ] _arch. journ._, lx. - . [ ] _arch. journ._, lx. - . [ ] _archaeologia_, xvii. [ ] _arch. journ._, lxiv. - . [ ] carderera, _iconografia_. [ ] the terms 'coude' and 'genouillière', 'palette', and such-like words of french origin, are open to some objection in an english work when 'elbow-cop', 'knee-cop', or 'poleyne' and 'rondel' can be substituted. they are only employed here because of their general use in armouries at the present day, and because the english words are of rarer occurrence and are less likely to be met with by those beginning the study of armour. 'cuisse' and 'cuissard', however, are always used for the thigh-pieces, and no anglicized term is found in contemporary writings unless it be 'quysshews.' [ ] _arch. journ._, lx. [ ] _archaeologia_, vol. lvii; _arch. journ._, vol. iv. [ ] _arch. journ._, vol. lx. [ ] boeheim, _meister der waffenschmiedkunst_; de cosson, _arch. journ._, vol. xlviii. [ ] _arch. journ._, lx. [ ] g. chastelain, p. . [ ] _arch. journ._, xxxvii. [ ] oliver de la marche, p. . [ ] n.e. dict, gives armette, a diminutive of arme. armez is also found. [ ] paris, , fol. . see cat. of helmets, _arch. journ._, xxxvii. [ ] _arch. journ._, xxxvii. [ ] the term _bufe_ is sometimes wrongly used for the upright shoulder-guards on the pauldron. [ ] _monumenta vetusta_, vol. vi. [ ] this is _not_ the 'garde-rein'. see p. . [ ] that this fashion in helmets was a general one we may judge from the fact that most armouries possess examples of these human-faced helmets. [ ] this suit is shown with the brayette attached; which for obvious reasons is exhibited in most armouries separate from the suit. [ ] considered to be the same as topf. [ ] '... granz gisarmes esmolues' (_roman de rou_, l. ). '... gisarmes lunges è lées' (ib., l. ). [ ] _monumenta vetusta_, vol. vi. books for collectors _with frontispieces and many illustrations_ _large crown vo, cloth._ chats on english china. by arthur hayden. chats on old furniture. by arthur hayden. chats on old prints. (how to collect and value old engravings.) by arthur hayden. chats on costume. by g. woolliscroft rhead. chats on old lace and needlework. by e. l. lowes. chats on oriental china. by j. f. blacker. chats on old miniatures. by j. j. foster, f.s.a. chats on english earthenware. by arthur hayden. chats on autographs. by a. m. broadley. chats on pewter. by h. j. l. j. massÉ, m.a. chats on postage stamps. by fred. j. melville. chats on old jewellery and trinkets. by maciver percival. chats on cottage and farmhouse furniture. by arthur hayden. chats on old coins. by fred. w. burgess. chats on old copper and brass. by fred. w. burgess. chats on household curios. by fred. w. burgess. chats on old silver. by arthur hayden. chats on japanese prints. by arthur davison ficke. chats on military curios. by stanley c. johnson. _in preparation._ chats on bargains. by charles e. jerningham. chats on old clocks and watches. by arthur hayden. london: t. fisher unwin, ltd. new york: f. a. stokes company. chats on military curios [illustration: bronze medallion of the duke of wellington.] _frontispiece._ chats on military curios by stanley c. johnson m.a., d.sc., f.r.e.s. with eighty illustrations new york frederick a. stokes company publishers to g. m. j. this book is gratefully dedicated (_all rights reserved_) printed in great britain contents page list of illustrations chapter i introduction preliminary considerations--where to search for curios--what to search for--specializing--undesirable curios--the catalogue of the royal united service museum--public collections of military curios chapter ii regimental nomenclature household cavalry--dragoon guards--cavalry--artillery --engineers--guards--infantry, both past and present nomenclature--other units chapter iii regimental crests the fascination of regimental crests--how to plan a collection of crests--the changes which crests undergo--the meaning of crests--mottoes on crests, and their meanings chapter iv military uniforms the growth of uniforms--the effect of the decline in armour on uniforms--the part played by elizabeth--uniforms in the time of the civil war--in charles ii's reign--james ii--the first two georges--uniforms in the peninsular war--the close-fitting uniforms of george iv--the changes which were brought about in william iv's time--later changes-- peculiarities of the military dress of to-day chapter v armour the scarcity of good armour--considerations for the collector--counterfeit armour--the twelve periods in armour--the characteristics of each period--glossary chapter vi weapons buying specimens--storing them--hand culverins--the serpentin--the wheel-lock--the flint-lock--the rifle--swords--the effect of armour on swords--swords with historical associations--other weapons chapter vii early british war medals how to arrange a collection of medals--factors which influence the value of a medal--the earliest medals--the first english medal--the first english military medal--the forlorn hope medal--the dunbar medal--the culloden medal--medals granted by the honourable east india company--the pope's medal, --the emperor francis ii of germany's medal, --the seringapatam medal--the egyptian medal, --the rodriguez medal--the nepaul medal--the maida medal--the peninsular officers' medal chapter viii military medals struck by the mint campaign medals considered--waterloo--burmah--china-- cabul--jellalabad--scinde--meanee--sobroan--the men's peninsular medal--punjab--indian general service medals-- south africa, - ; also - --baltic--crimea--indian mutiny--abyssinia--new zealand--later awards chapter ix military decorations awarded for special services the necessity for special awards--the victoria cross--the order of merit--the "distinguished conduct in the field" award--the distinguished service order--the meritorious service award--the long service and good conduct award--the "best shot" medal--volunteer decorations--other decorations chapter x military medallions general considerations--the "lost wax" process--hadrian's medallions--renaissance examples--simon, the medallist--wyon's work--public collections--some noted medallions described chapter xi military prints the period - --works including military prints--where to search for bargains--the kind of print most sought after--works including fine military prints--bunbury-- gillray chapter xii memorial brasses of military interest classes of military brasses--rubbings and how to make them--floor brasses, their characteristics--palimpsest brasses--what may be learnt from brasses--mural tablets chapter xiii autographs of great soldiers the fascination of autograph collecting--points which influence the value of an autograph--autographs classified--a "schomberg" letter--the notes scribbled by airey at balaclava--general hints--prices of autographs chapter xiv war postage stamps the earliest war stamps--stamps used in the crimean war--the british army post office corps--the sudan expedition--the south african campaign--the great war--recent war stamps and post-marks--indian war stamps--other war stamps chapter xv war money french obsidional notes--mafeking notes--the napoleonic assignats--charles ii and university plate--mints at carlisle, beeston, scarborough, newark, colchester, and pontefract--irish gun money chapter xvi curios made by prisoners of war objects recently made in holland--the napoleonic prisoners at norman cross, perth, dartmoor, stapleton, liverpool, and greenland valleyfield chapter xvii miscellaneous military curios considerations respecting miscellaneous curios--battlefield souvenirs--regimental colours--odds and ends of dress equipment--books and newspapers of military interest--royal souvenirs--official military documents--gruesome relics--relics of the great war chapter xviii a history of one's collection reasons for compiling a history of one's collection--the part played by photographs--armour suggested as an example--material for grangerizing bibliography index illustrations list of plates a bronze medallion of the duke of wellington _frontispiece_ page queen victoria's chocolate box sent to the soldiers fighting in south africa, princess mary's christmas box sent to the soldiers fighting in france and belgium, badge of the queen's (royal west surrey regiment) nd foot badge of the duke of edinburgh's (wiltshire regiment) badge of the king's (liverpool regiment) badge of the royal warwickshire regiment badge of the royal dublin fusiliers badge of the royal fusiliers (city of london regiment) badge of the seaforth highlanders ( th battalion) badge of the royal regiment of artillery some regimental buttons a horse amulet bearing the device of the royal fusiliers helmet plate of the royal marine light infantry a sleeve from a coat of the old nd (south middlesex) volunteer regiment a belt buckle from the same regiment a flint-lock pistol the action part of the above the barrel of a gun ornamented with a twin head of minerva an old powder-flask a south african pom-pom shell and a martini-henri cartridge cartridges as used in the great war. from left to right: german, french, belgian, and british an old sword with straight cross-guards an italian dagger having a replica of the famous column of st. mark for grip royalist badge worn by the partisans of charles i the crimean medal the general service medal, - the afghan medal south african medal, - the indian mutiny medal the china medal, - the egyptian medal, - the sutlej medal the punjab medal the third indian general service medal the queen and king's south african medals, - (the same reverse was used for both pieces) a check to corsican assurance by cruikshank napoleon's carriage arriving at the london museum by cruikshank a singular trait of buonaparte's favourite mameluke by cruikshank a battlefield souvenir picked up on the plains of flanders (the same helmet is shown with and without the cloth covering) a battlefield souvenir bearing verses showing the bloodthirsty nature of the tyrolese peasant and soldier an old mug bearing the famous picture depicting "the death of wolfe" a soldier's communication posted during the south african war a similar communication from "somewhere in france" a post-card received from a soldier in france bearing stereotyped greetings money of the great rebellion, - ( . newark sixpence-- . colchester gold half unite-- . pontefract two-shilling piece-- . ormond half-crown-- . dublin crown of charles ii) gun money of james ii ( . sixpence-- . sixpence-- . shilling-- . shilling-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown) gun money of james ii ( . shilling-- . shilling-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . crown-- . crown-- . limerick farthing) paper money of the french republic, obsidional half-franc note of epernay obsidional franc note of epernay a newspaper poster which told of welcome news a set of bone dominoes carved by prisoners taken in the napoleonic wars, and interned in the neighbourhood of peterborough an interesting broadside printed at the famous catnach press, being one of a series describing incidents in the life of a soldier illustrations in the text armour headgear weapons a medallion struck in honour of julius cÆsar medallion commemorating the victory of the battle of the boyne medallion commemorating the fall of james ii two marlborough medallions medallion commemorating the battle of oudenarde medallion commemorating the surrender of lille medallion commemorating the battle of dunblane medallion commemorating the battle of dettingen medallion commemorating the battle of minden the oldest english brass facsimile of a portion of a letter written by cromwell to lenthall, announcing the victory of naseby autograph letter written by napoleon iii to william i of germany after the battle of sedan some autographs of noted soldiers some historic post-marks used on military correspondence a cutting from "the times" of november , _acknowledgment_ _the author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to dr. philip nelson for the loan of the valuable coins which figure in the illustrations on pages , , and ; to mr. tom satterthwaite for the loan of many of the medals depicted in these pages; to mr. leonard baggott for the loan of arms; to messrs. henry sotheran for permission to reproduce three cruikshank prints; to messrs. spink & son for permission to reproduce the royalist badge; also to mr. edwin johnson, b.sc., and mr. james pryor for the loan of various curios included in the following pages._ _the author also wishes to state that in forming his own collection of military curios he has gained much helpful assistance from "the connoisseur"; from c. h. ashdown's "british and foreign arms and armour"; from j. h. mayo's "medals and decorations of the british army and navy"; from d. h. irwin's "war medals and decorations"; from ralph nevill's "british military prints"; from edward beaumont's works dealing with brasses; and from the authorities of the royal united service museum._ chapter i introduction preliminary considerations--where to search for curios--what to search for--specializing--undesirable curios--the catalogue of the royal united service museum--public collections of military curios for centuries past the collection of military curios has been the select pastime of men of title and soldiers of rank. lately, however, owing to the war and the great spread of interest in all things pertaining to it, the circle of collectors has considerably widened, until to-day few things are more treasured by connoisseurs than the thousand and one souvenirs and emblems which emanate from our army. most forms of collecting require the expenditure of much capital, but this is not one of the drawbacks which confront the seeker after military curios. for a few pence an old-fashioned bayonet can be picked up; a rifle bearing a date in last century will cost but a trifle more, whilst such odds and ends as badges and tunic buttons may be had for almost nothing. of course, a good deal depends on knowing where to search for treasures. the old curiosity shops are capital hunting-grounds, but second-hand dealers who make a practice of buying up the contents of whole houses are even better. these people seem to get an accumulation of odd material which is difficult to classify, and therefore hard to sell. it is hidden away among these effects that the collector will probably alight upon his finest discoveries. some of our own experiences in the matter of bargain finding may be worth detailing. at rag fair, last christmas, we were asked half a guinea for six perfect but very much begrimed medals, one of which was for the defence of lucknow. needless to add, the set was worth many pounds when cleaned and fitted with fresh ribbons. on a stall in farringdon road we recently picked up a few helmet badges, some of which bore the old regimental numbers used prior to , at twopence apiece. and elsewhere a few weeks back we chanced upon a bag full of military buttons, for which the dealer asked a shilling. if we wish to form our collections quickly the best plan will be to get in touch with one of the first-class firms who regularly keep an exhaustive stock of military curios, and who can supply almost anything we need; but for our part we prefer to enter upon the work slowly and pick up treasures here and there at tempting prices. doubtless there are capital hunting-grounds where bargains may be found in almost every town, but in london our favourite haunts are rag fair, held on fridays in the caledonian meat market; the stalls in farringdon road, hounsditch, and middlesex street; the shops in praed street; and, lastly, charing cross road--the latter only for books and prints. of course a good deal of material may be obtained cheaply by keeping an eye on the bargain advertisements found in certain newspapers. _the bazaar, exchange and mart_, for instance, regularly contains notices of guns, medals, autographs, and such-like objects for sale, often at prices ridiculously low. it is thus clear that there is no lack in the sources of supply if only we can get in touch with them. with many forms of collecting there is a certain sameness about the things collected which is apt to produce monotony: with military curios, however, the treasures cover so wide a field that no such drawback can exist. the following list will give a fair idea of the different objects which come within our present range:-- medals, helmet and cap-badges, tunic buttons, armour pieces, firearms, weapons of all kinds as long as they have a military connection, medallions struck to celebrate military events, autographs of famous soldiers, original documents relating to army work, military pictures and prints, newspaper cuttings referring to military matters, obsolete uniforms including such fragments as sabre-taches, gorgets, epaulettes, etc., and, lastly, stamps and post-marks which have franked the correspondence of soldiers on active service. the list is a somewhat lengthy one, and to endeavour to amass a representative collection of all the things enumerated would be a formidable task. it is, therefore, much the wisest plan either to collect the above objects in a general way, specializing at the same time in two or three definite directions, or else to collect everything possible pertaining to one definite regiment. the latter method is, of course, the one which appeals most to army men and their immediate friends. those of us who elect to confine our attentions to regimental collecting should first procure a history of the regiment selected. from this work we shall then be able to find out what battles our chosen unit has fought in; what particular history it possesses; what noted soldiers have brought it fame; where it has been quartered from time to time; what customs specially belong to it; what changes have been made in its dress, and so forth. such knowledge will afford us much help; it will teach us what objects to seek for and what to pass over. we shall not be led to search, say, for a ghuznee medal if our chosen regiment was formed later than , nor shall we hunt through the files of _the times_ for wellington's dispatches concerning the battle of waterloo if our regiment took no part in the campaign. * * * * * there are one or two kinds of military curios which we should not attempt to collect. first, we should avoid all such large objects as take up more house-room than we can afford to spare them, and secondly, we should refrain from accepting objects the genuineness of which it is impossible to verify. concerning this latter class, it may be appropriate to mention that we have never visited the battlefield of waterloo without meeting a particularly eloquent man who always tells us that he has just had the good fortune to dig up some trophy or other of the famous fight. naturally he is prepared to let us share in his good fortune, and consequently names a price for the article. needless to say, the country of origin of the trophy is germany, and the date of construction some time in the twentieth century. probably, other battlefields besides the one at waterloo are infested with unscrupulous curio vendors, so that the collector will be well advised if he refrains from purchasing any article unless properly authenticated--especially on battlefields. [illustration: queen victoria's chocolate box sent to the soldiers fighting in south africa, .] [illustration: princess mary's christmas box sent to the soldiers fighting in france and belgium, .] in many branches of collecting comprehensive catalogues have been published which enable the student to classify, arrange, and price every piece among his treasures. with military curios, however, no such publications exist, but a very useful guide is the official catalogue issued by the royal united service museum in whitehall. the museum itself is well worth frequent visits, for it is only by constant inspection of such exhibits as those displayed in this gallery that we can get to know of the existence of certain curios and of the shape, texture, and pattern of others. the museum possesses particularly fine exhibits of medals, even of the earlier types; of uniforms, especially head-pieces; of regimental banners, and such weapons as swords and rifles. the united service museum is by no means the only treasure-house of interest to collectors of military curios. the tower of london, the wallace collection, and the rotunda at woolwich, each possess much that is worth inspecting in the way of armour and weapons, whilst the british museum has a collection of medals which is almost unique. the traveller on the continent will find many instructive exhibits in the musée d'artillerie at paris, the rijks museum at amsterdam, and the national museum at copenhagen. chapter ii regimental nomenclature household cavalry--dragoon guards--cavalry--artillery--engineers --guards--infantry, both past and present nomenclature--other units the composition of the british army is a matter concerning which the lay reader knows but little. as many regiments will be mentioned by name in the following pages, it is very necessary that the various divisions be given in tabulated form for purposes of reference. without such a list the collecting of badges, crests, and other devices cannot be performed methodically nor can we study the various forms of dress with anything like precision. the following list consists of one hundred and fourteen units, many of which may be sub-divided into regulars, territorials, and cadets. where such sub-divisions exist separate badges are worn. it must also be mentioned that each battalion in certain regiments boasts of a distinct device of its own. the different badges worn to-day in the king's army are therefore considerably above two hundred in number:-- household cavalry: st life guards. nd life guards. royal horse guards. dragoon guards: st dragoon guards (king's). nd dragoon guards (queen's bays). rd dragoon guards (prince of wales's). th dragoon guards (royal irish). th dragoon guards (princess charlotte of wales's). th dragoon guards (carabineers). th dragoon guards (princess royal's). cavalry: st royal dragoons. nd dragoons (royal scots greys). rd king's own hussars. th queen's own hussars. th royal irish lancers. th inniskilling dragoons. th queen's own hussars. th king's royal irish hussars. th queen's royal lancers. th prince of wales's own royal hussars. th prince albert's own hussars. th prince of wales's royal lancers. th hussars. th king's hussars. th the king's hussars. th the queen's lancers. th duke of cambridge's own lancers. th queen mary's own hussars. th queen alexandra's own royal hussars. th hussars. st empress of india's lancers. royal artillery. royal engineers. guards: grenadier guards. coldstream guards. scots guards. irish guards. welsh guards. infantry: (n.b.--following each horizontal mark the old regimental nomenclature is appended. it will be seen that in many cases two of the old regiments were joined together to form one of the new.) royal scots (lothian regiment)-- st or royal scots. queen's (royal west surrey)-- nd or queen's royal. buffs (east kent)-- rd east kent. king's own (royal lancaster)-- th or king's own. northumberland fusiliers-- th or northumberland foot regiment. royal warwickshire regiment-- th or st warwickshire foot regiment. royal fusiliers (city of london regiment)-- th regiment of foot or royal fuzileers.[ ] [ ] the old spelling is retained. king's (liverpool regiment)-- th or king's regiment. norfolk regiment-- th east norfolk. lincolnshire regiment-- th north lincolnshire. devonshire regiment-- th north devonshire. suffolk regiment-- th or east suffolk. prince albert's (somersetshire light infantry)-- th or st somersetshire. prince of wales's own (west yorkshire regiment)-- th or buckinghamshire regiment. east yorkshire regiment-- th yorkshire (east riding). bedfordshire regiment-- th or bedfordshire regiment. leicestershire regiment-- th or leicestershire regiment. royal irish regiment-- th or royal irish regiment. alexandra, princess of wales's own (yorkshire regiment)-- th or st yorkshire (north riding). lancashire fusiliers-- th or east devonshire. royal scots fusiliers-- st or royal north british fuzileers. cheshire regiment-- nd or cheshire regiment. royal welsh fusiliers-- rd or royal welsh fuzileers. south wales borderers-- th or warwickshire regiment. king's own scottish borderers-- th or king's own borderers. cameronians (scottish rifles)-- th or cameronians; also perthshire volunteers. royal inniskilling fusiliers-- th or inniskilling regiment. gloucestershire regiment-- th or north gloucestershire; also st or south gloucestershire. worcestershire regiment-- th worcestershire; also th or herefordshire. east lancashire regiment-- th or cambridgeshire regiment; also th or nd nottinghamshire regiment. east surrey regiment-- st or huntingdonshire regiment; also th or glasgow lowland regiment. duke of cornwall's light infantry-- nd or cornwall regiment; also th or south devonshire regiment. duke of wellington's (west riding regiment)-- th regiment; also rd or st yorkshire (west riding regiment). (this is the only regiment named after a person not of royal blood.) border regiment-- th or cumberland; also th or westmoreland regiment. royal sussex regiment-- th or sussex regiment. hampshire regiment-- th or north hampshire; also th or south hampshire. south staffordshire regiment-- th or st staffordshire; also th or staffordshire volunteers. dorsetshire regiment-- th dorsetshire; also th or west norfolk. prince of wales's volunteers (south lancashire regiment)-- th or nd somersetshire; also nd regiment. welsh regiment-- st regiment of foot; also th or south lincolnshire. black watch (royal highlanders)-- nd or royal highland regiment; also rd highland regiment. oxfordshire and buckinghamshire light infantry-- rd or monmouthshire regiment; also nd or oxfordshire regiment. essex regiment-- th or east essex; also th or west essex regiment. sherwood foresters (nottinghamshire and derbyshire regiment)-- th or nottinghamshire. loyal north lancashire regiment-- th or lancashire regiment; also st regiment. northamptonshire regiment-- th northamptonshire; also th rutlandshire. princess charlotte of wales's (royal berkshire regiment)-- th or hertfordshire regiment; also th or berkshire regiment. queen's own (royal west kent regiment)-- th or west kent; also th or queen's own regiment. king's own (yorkshire light infantry)-- st or nd yorkshire (west riding). king's (shropshire light infantry)-- rd or shropshire regiment; also bucks volunteers. duke of cambridge's own (middlesex regiment)-- th or west middlesex; also th or east middlesex. king's royal rifle corps-- th or royal american regiment. duke of edinburgh's (wiltshire regiment)-- nd or wilts regiment; also prince of wales's tipperary regiment. manchester regiment-- rd or west suffolk; also th regiment. prince of wales's (north staffordshire regiment)-- th or nd staffordshire; also th regiment york and lancaster regiment-- th or nd yorkshire north riding regiment; also th york and lancaster regiment. durham light infantry-- th or durham regiment. highland light infantry-- st and th highland regiment. seaforth highlanders (ross-shire buffs, the duke of albany's)-- nd; also th highland regiment. gordon highlanders-- th highland regiment; also nd regiment. queen's own cameron highlanders-- th regiment of cameron highlanders. royal irish rifles-- rd regiment; also royal county down regiment. princess victoria's (royal irish fusiliers)-- th or prince of wales's own irish regiment; also th regiment. connaught rangers-- th regiment or connaught rangers; also th regiment. princess louise's (argyll and sutherland highlanders)-- st regiment; also rd regiment. prince of wales's leinster regiment (royal canadians)-- th or his royal highness the prince regent's county of dublin regiment. royal munster fusiliers-- st or duke of york's irish regiment; also th regiment. royal dublin fusiliers-- nd regiment. rifle brigade-- th regiment. [illustration: badge of the queen's (royal west surrey regiment) nd foot.] [illustration: badge of the duke of edinburgh's (wiltshire regiment).] [illustration: badge of the king's (liverpool regiment).] [illustration: badge of the royal warwickshire regiment.] other units: royal marine artillery. royal marine infantry. army service corps. royal army medical corps. army veterinary corps. army ordnance corps. army pay corps. chapter iii regimental crests the fascination of regimental crests--how to plan a collection of crests--the changes which crests undergo--the meaning of crests--mottoes on crests, and their meanings the crest or badge worn by a soldier is probably one of his most cherished possessions, for it is at once the symbol of his regiment and the mascot which urges him on to fame and victory. it is but little wonder, then, that such emblems, so jealously preserved, should prove of deep interest to the collector of military curios. in our own case, and we suppose it was much the same in those of our readers, army crests fascinated us long before we had a clear perception of what an army really was. in our early school-days, buttons bearing the various regimental devices attracted us; later our collection extended a welcome to cap-badges whilst to-day it contains such treasures as the crests on waist-belts, crossbelt-plates, helmets, collar-plates, and even those on the metal flaps of sabretaches. a collection of regimental badges should be planned on scientific lines, otherwise the treasured possessions will lose much of their interest. in the first place, the various specimens should be classified: buttons should be arranged in one group, cap-badges in another, belt-plates in another, and so on. the second grouping should be based upon the standing of the regimental unit. all the buttons worn by the regular army, for instance, should be placed in one sub-division; all those of the territorial army in another; and, as obsolete specimens are still procurable, sub-divisions should be reserved for the volunteer force, the old militia, and special forces which have been raised on special occasions. of course the badges should be arranged according to the precedence accorded to the regiments for which they stand; thus, in the case of the regular army, the household cavalry should receive priority and be followed by the dragoon guards; then the cavalry of the line should take third place, whilst the fourth and fifth places should be given to the royal artillery and royal engineers. the guards should be placed sixth, and the infantry of the line seventh. badges of each of these divisions should then be arranged according to the seniority of the regiment. the army list and the chapter on "regimental nomenclature" will give valuable help on this point. finally, where regiments possess various badges for the different companies, these must be arranged in numerical order. in planning a collection, it is well to remember that badges are constantly changing their patterns, not in fundamental ways, it is true, but in ways which are quite sufficient to add zest to the hobby of collecting. battle honours, for instance, have been frequently added in the past, whilst many changes are sure to take place in the future, on this score alone, as a result of the great war with germany. after the boer war, additions were made to the scrolls which encircle many regimental badges, and the same may be said of the peninsular, marlborough's wars, and every great campaign in which the british army has figured. thus it is clear that a collection of devices such as we have here in mind is full of interest, not only from the military and antiquarian but also the historical point of view. [illustration: badge of the royal dublin fusiliers. badge of the royal fusiliers (city of london regiment). badge of the seaforth highlanders ( th battalion). badge of the royal regiment of artillery.] in addition to the gradual changes which have arisen, it must be mentioned that in the names of many regiments underwent changes and the badges suffered material alterations in consequence. before the year in question, each army unit was known by its number and the crests bore distinguishing numerals. thus the wiltshire badge, which to-day depicts the duke of edinburgh's monogram within a circle, bore the figures " " instead up till . the collector will find these early devices of much interest, but, as a rule, they are fairly hard to obtain. unless the collector has ideas of his own as to how the badges should be mounted, it will be a capital plan to cover a board with black velvet and pin the medal emblems to it. when complete, the board should be framed with a moulding having a fairly deep rebate. the effect will be pleasing; the frame can be used as a wall ornamentation, and, what is most important, the badges themselves will be protected, as far as possible, from the deteriorating influences of the atmosphere. * * * * * a study of the designs given on the crests forms, of course, an interesting pastime. probably the first point which the student will notice is that certain specimens bear the king's sign--e.g. the king's dragoon guards and the grenadier guards--consequently, all such badges must inevitably suffer alteration on the demise of the reigning sovereign. all royal regiments, with a single exception, bear the royal crown, though crowns of various types are borne by other units than royal ones. light infantry regiments invariably display a horn. grenades form part of the devices worn by the grenadier guards, the royal artillery, and the fusilier regiments. most of the irish units display the harp, and the welsh the dragon, but in connection with this latter class, it must be mentioned that the buffs (east kent) are also proud of a dragon; this, however, was given them for services rendered in china. britannia, one of our most cherished allegorical figures, is seen on but a single crest: that of the norfolks. it was awarded to this unit for gallantry at almanza in . the spaniards in the peninsular war nicknamed the men of this regiment the "holy boys," as they mistook the figure of britannia for that of the virgin mary. a castle and key figure on many regimental devices. all those which display them fought at gibraltar and received permission to incorporate these objects in their crest in memory of the services which they performed there. a striped rose forms part of a great many badges. it is a sign of the union after the war of the roses. animals are favourite emblems. the lion, the symbol of our island race, naturally figures most frequently, but elephants, horses, tigers, and stags are great favourites. it is not always possible to tell why such and such a regiment has chosen a particular animal for incorporation in its device, but, more often than not, the design may be traced back to the family escutcheon of a nobleman who had some hand in raising the unit. a case in point is the cat encircled by the motto _sans peur_, which the men of the th battalion of the seaforth highlanders wear on their caps. this creature has long ornamented the crest of the house of sutherland, and the sutherlands claim guardianship over this particular unit. in other cases, an animal has been selected because it is specially appropriate. for instance, the sherwood foresters, soldiers who recall robin hood and the good old-fashioned chase, display an ambling stag, whilst regiments associated with long service in india have adopted an elephant or tiger. but the most appropriate badge of all is that worn by the royal army medical corps. in this instance, we have a snake coiled around a rod. the snake, as every reader knows, was the particular mascot carried by Æsculapius, the god of healing, whilst the same reptile was used by moses in the wilderness to free the children of israel from the ailments which proved so troublesome to them. the fleeting horse, borne by the king's own hussars, the fifth dragoon guards, and the royal fusiliers, is the white horse of hanover, and was incorporated in the crests to remind us of services rendered against the jacobites. the paschal lamb on the "queen's" was the badge of catherine of braganza, wife of charles ii. the sphinx, as every one knows, indicates special services in egypt. * * * * * the mottoes incorporated in certain of the regimental crests are not without interest. the following, with their english equivalents, are worth noting:-- pro rege et patria--for king and country. quis separabit?--who shall separate? quo fata vocant--whither fate calls. spectemur agendo--let us be judged by our actions. nemo me impune lacessit--no one provokes me with impunity. nec aspera terrent--difficulties do not terrify us. mente et manu--with mind and hand. pristinæ virtutis memores--the memory of former valour. viret in æternum--flourishes for ever. quo fas et gloria ducunt--where right and glory lead. vel exuviæ triumphant--arms surely triumphant. semper fidelis--always faithful. virtutis namurcensis præmium--the reward of valour at namur. omnia audax--to dare all. nisi dominus frustra--without god, it is vain. virtutis fortuna comes--fortune the friend of valour. primus in indis--first in the indies. gwell angau na chyurlydd--rather death than shame. aucto splendore resurgo--i rise with increased splendour. celer et audax--swift and bold. cuidich'n righ--assist the king. faugh-a-ballach--clear the way. in arduis fidelis--in danger, faithful. [illustration: some regimental buttons.] chapter iv military uniforms the growth of uniforms--the effect of the decline in armour on uniforms--the part played by elizabeth--uniforms in the time of the civil war--in charles ii's reign--james ii--the first two georges--uniforms in the peninsular war--the close-fitting uniforms of george iv--the changes which were brought about in william iv's time--later changes--peculiarities of the military dress of to-day one of the most interesting tasks which the collector of military curios can set himself is to trace out, by all available means, the growth of army uniforms from earliest times to the present day. in prosecuting such self-imposed work, the sources of information which will have to be studied are almost without limit, ranging from contemporary drawings, prints, statues, the writings of such chroniclers as stowe, to, of course, the actual uniforms themselves. our knowledge of the metamorphoses of military dress is very imperfect, and this research work will be all the more valuable in consequence. at first thought it is a little surprising to learn that the earliest official mention of a distinguishing uniform for english soldiers occurs among the ordinances of henry viii, but when we consider that armour in various styles was largely used until tudor times, the fact is not so striking. isolated instances of uniformed soldiers can be traced before this period; hannibal, we know, raised the famous white and crimson spanish regiments, and then, of course, there were the crusaders, who wore the ordinary clothes of the times, ornamented with crosses of distinctive colours. with the decline of armour, retainers went into battle robed in the cloth liveries of their masters, whilst the mercenaries wore the usual dress of civilians. the drawback to such an arrangement was obvious. men could never tell who were their friends and who their foes, and unnecessary slaughter was consequently committed. it was not long before leaders provided their followers with scarves of distinctive colours; sometimes they were appropriately chosen, at others they were merely distinctive. but even this plan gave little satisfaction, for our history books of the period are crowded with tales of men who donned the enemy's colours and were thus able to surprise their opponents. [illustration: helmet plate of the royal marine light infantry.] as a result of these conditions, henry viii decided to clothe some, at least, of his soldiers in distinctive uniforms; he selected white coats emblazoned with the red cross of st. george. speaking of other soldiers of this reign, probably later levies, stubbs remarks that the doublets which they wore "reached down to the middle of the thighs, though not always quite so low, being so hard quilted, stuffed, bombasted, and sewed as they can neither work nor yet well play in them, through the excessive heat and the stiffness thereof. therefore are they forced to wear them loose about them. they are stuffed with four, five, or six pounds of bombast at the least, and made of satin, taffeta, silk, grograine, gold, silver, and what not." from the antiquarian's point of view this dress must have indeed proved attractive, though the soldier of to-day will hardly recognize any redeeming features in it. [illustration: a horse amulet bearing the device of the royal fusiliers.] elizabeth, as all students of history know, paid great attention to dress; not only in matters concerning her own person, but also in those affecting her court and followers. accordingly, we find that a decree, ordering a body of lancashire men to be raised for service in ireland, stated that "the soldiers shall be given convenient doublets and hose and also a cassock of some motley or other sad green colour or russet; also every soldier to have five shillings to provide a mantle in ireland besides his livery coat." another interesting quotation, taken from lawrence archer's "british army records," mentions sir john harrington as stating that an officer's kit in elizabeth's time consisted of-- cassock of broad cloth. canvass doublet with silk lining and buttons. shirts. bands. pairs of stockings at s. d. each. pairs of shoes. pair of venetians with silver lace (i.e. trousers). when the civil war broke out, the royalists or cavaliers wore a very picturesque though hardly serviceable uniform; it consisted of a doublet of silk, satin, or velvet with large loose sleeves slashed up the front, the collar covered by a falling band of lace, whilst a short cloak was carelessly worn on one shoulder. long breeches tucked into boots, the uppers of which were loose and curled over,[ ] added to the picturesque appearance of the warriors. a flemish beaver, with a distinctive hatband and an elaborate feather, was the usual headgear. the silk doublet, it should be added, was often replaced by a buff coat in war-time. [ ] apparently this slovenly looking boot was used in order to prevent the leg from being crushed in a battle charge. the commonwealth, of course, brought sober clothing which, at least, was more protective and useful than that associated with the tudor and stuart periods. in charles ii's time the military uniform, as we know it to-day, began to materialize. it is true that during the early part of charles's reign the soldiers wore the pre-commonwealth styles, but when the king began to form certain regiments, which still exist at the present moment, a need for definite uniforms became manifest. thus, in , the earl of oxford raised the horse guards and provided them with a picturesque blue uniform, and in the third buffs was formed and soon earned for itself this distinctive name as its accoutrements were fashioned from buffalo leather. james ii introduced few changes. it is worth mentioning, however, that wigs became fashionable in this period, and large hats adorned with waving feathers were worn to suit the style of coiffure. sewn into the crown of these hats, skull caps made of iron were frequently found. in , according to a contemporary authority, the coats and breeches of the sergeants and ordinary soldiers were, in most cases, grey, whilst the coats of drummer boys were purple. the shape of these costumes followed the civilian styles of the period. when anne came to the throne, armour which had not been entirely abolished completely died out, and the foot soldiers wore a comfortable scarlet coat with distinctive facings, a cocked hat, breeches, and long black gaiters reaching just above the knees, with a strap below the knee to hold them in position. the cavalry also wore a cocked hat and large boots. some officers wore a wide-brimmed hat, turned up on two sides and decked with gay feathers.[ ] [ ] luard, "a history of the dress of the british soldier," p. . the first two georges introduced many ideas from abroad, the most striking of which was the mitre helmet, worn even to-day by certain central european regiments. the men who were provided with this headgear were certainly picturesque in appearance; the royal fusiliers, for instance, wore a high mitred helmet, elaborately ornamented with regimental devices, a long tail coat, buttoned back at the front in a way which is reminiscent of the present french infantry, knee breeches, cloth leggings, and a plain bandolier carrying a bag, much after the fashion of a sabretache. with the exception of his hat, which was clumsy and gave no protection either against weather or onslaughts, his uniform was comfortable though weighty. george iii discarded the low boots and leggings for knee-boots, but these were soon given up for low boots and long trousers. the buttons on the uniform of the heavy dragoons, also, were replaced by hooks and eyes, whilst the light dragoons lost nearly all theirs. in addition, their helmet was replaced by a felt shako. curiously enough, the hussar, who wore five rows of heavy buttons on his jacket and five more rows on the little pelisse which he slung loosely over his left arm, was allowed to keep all his cumbersome ornamentation. the peninsular war brought many changes, but these were more variations of the set styles than complete alterations in shapes and colours, probably the result of requiring large quantities of outfits for the war, in the quickest possible time. luard, writing of this period, says[ ]: "the officers of the army of the peninsula ran into great extremes of fashion; and as there was a difficulty, frequently, in procuring articles of dress exactly according to regulations, considerable latitude was of necessity granted. an officer of the th dragoons, who was very fond of being gaily dressed, was always searching for silver lace, and whenever he went into a town and returned to the camp, on being questioned regarding what articles of food were to be procured, invariably answered: 'i don't know, but i found some silver lace.'" [ ] luard, "a history of the dress of the british soldier," p. . directly following the napoleonic wars it was felt prudent for the sake of peace to garrison a british army of occupation in france. four cavalry regiments crossed the channel, the th, th, th, and rd light dragoons being selected. the dress which these soldiers wore was a jacket similar to that of the ordinary light dragoons, but with the addition, for the officers, of an embroidered cuff and collar, a pair of enormous epaulettes, and an aiguillette. the cap was very high with a square top, made of cane covered with cloth of the colour of the facings of the regiment, a brass plate in front and a plume at the top of it. the privates' dress corresponded to that of the officers, but brass scales were worn on the shoulders instead of epaulettes. the cossack shape of trousers was worn by the officers, very full around the waist but gradually tapering down to the foot.[ ] [ ] luard, "a history of the dress of the british soldier," p. . george iv, as is popularly known, gave much thought to matters of dress. he held that wrinkles in a uniform entirely spoiled all appearance of correct military bearing. the soldiers of his time were therefore expected to put on their clothes and have all fullness cut out. luard says that the consequence was that the coats of the privates, as well as those of the officers, were made so tight that freedom of action was much restricted, and the infantry could with difficulty handle their muskets, whilst the cavalry could scarcely do sword exercise. there is no doubt that, though the uniforms of this date were uncomfortable, they were of a smart and attractive appearance. the officers in the rifle corps, for instance, wore a tight-fitting green outfit with silver facings, relieved by a bright scarlet belt. the boots were of black leather, and reached almost up to the knees. the hat was somewhat like the highland bonnets of to-day. the officers in the th hussars were a trifle more showy in appearance. they had a blue coat with gilt-braided plastron, and a pelisse on the left arm. the trousers were red and skin-tight, and fastened under the instep to keep them from creeping up the leg. the hat was a shako surmounted by a large dark plume. in the st foot guards the officer's coat was red, and had tails; there were epaulettes on the shoulders and a white bandolier across the breast. the hat was a high-decked shako of glossy material. william iv's reign was marked by the rise and subsequent decline of enormous bear-skins. william also decreed that the whole of the army, with the exception of the artillery and riflemen, should be dressed in scarlet, the national colour. when victoria came to the throne she restored the blue dress to the light dragoons, but not to the lancers nor to the th regiment. the household cavalry were given helmets with weeping plumes fixed to the apexes. a little later "pill-boxes" became fashionable amongst the majority of the regiments. in most of the distinctive and, in many cases, historic facings were taken from the various regiments, and blue was given to the royal regiments and white to the others. the change seems to us, who look at the matter in the light of the antiquarian and historian, as a retrograde one, which should be deprecated in every way. to-day all the regiments of the regular british army wear scarlet uniforms, with the following exceptions:-- . _blue uniforms_--royal horse guards; th dragoon guards; king's own hussars; queen's own hussars; royal irish lancers; king's irish hussars; queen's royal lancers; prince of wales's own hussars; prince albert's own hussars; prince of wales's royal lancers; th, th, th, th, th, and th hussars; th and st lancers; royal artillery; royal marine infantry; army service corps; royal army medical corps; army veterinary corps; army ordnance corps; army pay corps. . _green uniforms_--cameronians; king's royal rifle corps; royal irish rifles; rifle brigade. in the above notes we have merely given a rough sketch of the growth of the military uniform as it has affected the british soldier. to elaborate this information by tracing the various changes, both great and small, which have been applied to army clothing is a work of intense interest and historical value. the task is best undertaken by the curio collector, who can build up the necessary knowledge from his self-made collection of military prints, illustrated books, photographs, and actual uniforms. we do not suggest that any one reader should undertake the whole task himself; it is far better to select a particular regiment or a class of regiment, or even a particular article of dress, and trace its history with minute precision. the results achieved in this way would indeed prove valuable. before concluding this chapter the following questions bearing on military dress may prove of interest; they are typical of the thousand and one queries which the student should ask himself:-- . why do the drummers in the guards wear fleurs-de-lys on their tunics? . which regiments still wear black in memory of wolfe? . why do the northumberland fusiliers wear a red and white feather hackle in their caps? . why does the gloucester regiment wear a badge on both the back and front of their hats? . why has the "flash" survived with the royal welsh fusiliers? . why does the privilege exist with the oxfordshire and buckinghamshire light infantry of wearing shirt collars with the uniform? [illustration: a sleeve from a coat of the old nd (south middlesex) volunteer regiment.] [illustration: a belt buckle from the same regiment.] chapter v armour the scarcity of good armour--considerations for the collector--counterfeit armour--the twelve periods in armour--the characteristics of each period--glossary there is much that is fascinating in the study of armour, and the seeker after military curios will do well to consider the advisability of making a collection of armour pieces. in praise of this particular form of treasure-hunting we could write a good deal, but, as space is necessarily limited, it will be wise to content ourselves, at the outset, with stating the drawbacks rather than the advantages which attend this hobby. in the first case, really good complete suits of period armour are scarce, and consequently command enormous sums. of course there is no reason why detached pieces should not be collected: these can be obtained freely and at reasonable prices. probably the best bargains are to be had at country-house sales, where the specimens are not sufficiently numerous to warrant the attendance of london dealers. but the smaller bric-à-brac shops, especially those off the beaten track, often contain oddments which may be picked up at tempting prices. the second drawback concerns questions of space. armour collecting takes up a good deal of room and, in these days of small suburban houses and town flats, it is not every one who can house such treasures without causing them untold damage. the third point is the most serious of all; it may be stated briefly. there are so many dangerous forgeries to be met with that the untutored collector may become bewildered and so lose his love for the hobby. upon the continent there are thriving factories where armour, of the rarest kinds, is imitated, not for sale as reproductions but in order to cheat the uninitiated. the antique appearance is imparted to the bright metal surfaces by artfully smearing with lithographic ink and then dabbing with muriatic acid. the ink protects the parts which it covers from the corrosive action of the acid, and when the metal is subsequently washed and greased it has the exact appearance of an aged piece of armour, eaten and worn by time. how is the amateur to detect such worthless specimens when he runs across them? under the title of "forgeries that were not forged," _the connoisseur_,[ ] a few years ago, made some very pertinent remarks on this subject. "foreign museums are not entirely free from the presence of forgeries," the article began; "in paris may be seen suits and parts of suits which will not satisfy the connoisseur in the matter of freedom from faking. at berlin at least one suit will strike the observer as decidedly not what it claims to be. at stockholm, among the interesting objects in the lifrustkammer are many pieces which one regrets are not real. and if in public collections many pieces arouse scepticism, how much more so is it the case with private collections, where all the geese are swans." [ ] may , p. . "in the tower of london, on the upper shelf of one of the cases, is a row of helms and helmets described as copies or trophy work. these certainly exemplify the expression 'forgeries that were not forged.' they were bought for the national collection between the years and , and were then no doubt considered valuable examples of ancient armour. one, indeed, figured at manchester in among the treasures of art. in them we may observe every rule of the construction of real armour violated, and further insulted by artificial rust and injuries. "it may be asked, in the words of the song, 'how shall i my true love know?' and seeing how much more trouble is taken to deceive than to detect deceit, it is difficult to lay down any complete system of defence for the collector from the ever-increasing attacks of the forger." it is certain, however, that the best way of detecting forgeries is to get acquainted with the styles of armour that were worn at certain periods, to find out what processes were available for constructing the armour at these periods, what uses each section of the armour was put to, and how it was fitted on to the rest of the suit. of course, a good deal may be learnt from visits to public collections. the uninitiated collector is, therefore, advised to study the specimens shown in the tower, the royal united service museum, the wallace collection, and the rotunda at woolwich. on the continent there are many fine displays, not only of armour but also of weapons, notably at the musée d'artillerie, paris, the industrial museum of vienna, the copenhagen national museum, and the rijks museum at amsterdam. these are all well worth inspecting. * * * * * having discussed matters concerned with the collecting of armour, we will now turn to questions relating to the actual armour itself. armour may be conveniently divided into twelve periods, as follows[ ]:-- i. pre-norman. ii. norman period to . iii. the chain mail period, - . iv. chain mail reinforced, - . v. the cyclas period, - . vi. the studded and splintered armour period, - . vii. the camail and jupon period, - . viii. the surcoatless period, - . ix. the tabard period, - . x. the transition period, - . xi. maximilian armour, - . xii. the half-armour period, after . [ ] there are various ways of classifying armour, but we have here followed (class i excepted) ashdown in "british and foreign arms and armour." [illustration: armour headgear] =the pre-norman period= is, in reality, composed of a number of preparatory eras which paved the way for the norman period, the first to use complete suits of protective covering. the greeks with their boeotian helms and cuirasses, the romans with their "skullcap" helmets, the saxons and danes with their head, chest, and leg coverings, all led up to the armour as we see it depicted by the bayeux tapestry. this period is of little interest to collectors, as specimens are quite unobtainable. =the norman period= introduced the peculiar but distinctive helmet, conical in shape and provided with a nose protection or "nasal." the body covering was worn from head to toes, the feet and legs being enveloped in "chausses" made of a pliable substance provided with a generous supply of metal studs. the shield was, of course, an important feature of the norman dress; it was more or less heart-shaped, and bent so as to fit round the body. =the chain mail period.=--between and the armour suit underwent considerable changes. the norman conical helmet gave place to the heaume, which usually had a flat surface, squared at the top, curved lines under the chin, and peepholes or ocularia in front. a surcoat or tunic, without sleeves, which was fitted over the usual armour, was also a feature of this era. but, of course, the introduction of chain mail was the outstanding point of interest. =chain mail reinforced.=--this period saw the gradual introduction of heaumes with curved crowns, often bearing ornamental devices, or ailettes to protect the shoulders and neck, of banded mail, and of chain mail reinforced with sections of plate. =the cyclas period.=--"probably at no time in the history of defensive armour," says ashdown,[ ] "has it presented a more picturesque appearance than during the brief ten years of the cyclas period. fitting closely to the figure, the various garments followed the outlines of the human form, and in no parts showed any marked peculiarities or eccentricities. the evolution of the style was undoubtedly derived from the experience gained during the chain mail period, when that defence was proved to be ineffectual against the terrible effects of lance and sword. both of these weapons, even if they did not actually pierce the mail, either bruised the body or broke bones, and thereby incapacitated the wearer; while the protection afforded by the loosely hanging folds of the surcoat of previous periods, especially against sword-cuts, had been duly noted. hence, during the cyclas period we meet with the introduction of multitudinous coverings, whereby the lance, the sword, and the arrow were opposed by plate and mail, and by various padded garments of a textile nature." [ ] "british and foreign arms and armour," p. . [illustration: a flint-lock pistol.] [illustration: the action part of the above.] =the studded and splintered armour period.=--this form of armour directly owes its introduction to the conflicts between the english and french, and the ideas for improvement which were prompted by actual experience on the battlefield. the style was none other than a piecing together of the best features of chain mail, plate, and cuir-bouilli. the bascinets of this time were unusual, having much the appearance of metal hoods, provided or not provided with visors. the surcoat and the chausses were essential features of the period. =the camail and jupon period.=--this is probably one of the most interesting and picturesque periods in the history of armour. the headgear was usually pointed and fitted down closely over the ears, but left the face free. laced to the helmet and falling over the shoulders was a plastron of camail which protected the throat and neck from violence. the jupon was a garment which covered the body from the camail to just above the knees. it consisted of whatever material the wearer thought was the most impervious to blows, with, usually, a velvet covering, embroidered with a heraldic device. =the surcoatless period= is easily recognized, as it was the earliest period in which a full set of armour was worn with no textile covering placed over it.[ ] a feature of note was the loss of the camail throat-guard and the introduction of a light sheet-metal gorget. the camail was, undoubtedly, an efficient safeguard, but it was extremely weighty and so caused much inconvenience to the wearer. [ ] ashdown, "british and foreign arms and armour," p. . =the tabard period= saw the introduction of many changes, which had for their object the greater protection of the armoured soldier; but the most distinguishing feature was the arrival of the tabard, a kind of sleeved surcoat, which covered the wearer down to the knees. it was of no fighting value, but gave dignity to those who displayed it. the salade also belongs to this period, both those with and those without visors, as well as the pauldron, a protection for the elbow, and the palette, which shielded the underneath portion of the shoulder-joint. =the transition period= brought helmets which, by reason of their movable visors, cheek-pieces, and mentonnières, gave greater safety to the head. but the period is more readily distinguished by the mail skirt, which was worn suspended from the waist. of this period ashdown writes: "very important alterations occurred in armour of this period, differentiating it from that of the preceding. the great pauldrons, exaggerated coudières, and general angularity, and one might almost say prickliness, of the later tabard period was modified to a smoother and rounder style, while it lost entirely that remarkable beauty of form which, however much distorted by fanciful additions, characterized the gothic armour as a whole. the beautiful flutings and ornamental curves disappeared to make way for a heavy, cumbersome style indicative of german stolidity, and in direct antagonism to the mobile quickness and agility suggested by the majority of suits dating from the latter half of the previous century."[ ] [ ] "british and foreign arms and armour," p. . =maximilian armour.=--with the gradual employment of gunpowder even the best kinds of armour lost their military value, and, consequently, the sixteenth century saw a decline in the use of steel suits for purposes of warfare. there was no reason, however, why steel-clad men should not continue to be seen at tilting tournaments, even though the arquebus had proved its value in dealing death and destruction. consequently we find that armour was still used during this century at these functions of chivalry, and it was the kind favoured by emperor maximilian which was mostly worn--hence the name. its outstanding features were excessive ornamentation and artistic finish. =the half-armour period.=--this is the period during which steel dress was gradually dying out. "the period exhibits a brutal strength and crudity in armour which forcibly suggests boiler-plate work. the defences were simply made to cover the vital parts of the body with the maximum amount of efficiency, without any consideration whatever for gracefulness of outline or beauty of surface."[ ] the metal covering of these times was obviously fashioned with the idea of making a compromise between protection and mobility, and it gradually dwindled until the head alone was safeguarded. [ ] ashdown, "british and foreign arms and armour," p. . so passed away the armour which, as james i once said, was a very useful invention, for it saved not only the wearer from being killed, but it was so hampering that it prevented him from killing any one else. * * * * * many technical terms are used in armoury which need explaining. the following are those which occur most frequently:-- =barded.=--a horse fully armoured. =bascinet.=--a helmet which protected the back of the head and neck. =brassarts.=--plate armour for the upper part of the arm, reaching from the shoulder to the elbow, sometimes in a single piece, sometimes in a series of overlapping plates. =brigandine.=--armour worn at one time by brigands--hence the name. it consisted of a foundation of quilted leather, upon which was sewn a number of small metal plates, and thus formed a good defence for the body against the sword and the pike. =burgonet.=--a fifteenth-century helmet, usually round to fit the head, but provided with a peak to protect the eyes. =cabasset.=--like the morion, it was a simple metal hat with a dome-shaped crown and a brim. it had no visor, gorget, neck-guard, etc. =chain mail.=--a covering which consisted of an endless number of rings laced one into the other. each ring had four others threaded into it. the individual rings were known as "grains d'orge." =chamfrien.=--the metal covering for a horse's face; often provided with a spike. =chausses.=--the metal leggings used in armour. =corslet.=--a suit of armour worn chiefly by pikemen. the word was used, not only to denote the body covering but the whole outfit from head to knees. =coudière.=--an elbow guard. =crinière.=--a number of plates hooked together to guard a horse's neck; it rested on the mane. =cuirass.=--armour for the breast and back, consisting of two plates united at the sides of the body. they were originally fashioned out of leather (_cuir_ = leather). =espalière.=--covering for the shoulders and the upper part of the arm. =gauntlet.=--the protection used for covering the hands. =genouillière.=--flexible knee pieces with joints reminiscent of those possessed by lobsters. =gorget.=--a protection for the throat; it also sustained the weight of the whole armour outfit. =greeves.=--plate armour for the legs. =haubergeon.=--a coat made probably of plate or chain mail but without sleeves. =hauberk.=--this was a complete covering of mail from head to foot, consisting of a hood joined to a jacket, with sleeves, breeches, stockings, and shoes of double chain mail, to which were added gauntlets. =heaume.=--a head covering, introduced in the chain-mail period. (see p. ). =hufden.=--a head piece which fitted closely round the skull; it was worn by archers in queen elizabeth's time. =jazeran.=--a hauberk which was covered with overlapping plates. =mentonnière.=--a portion of the head piece which protected the chin and the lower part of the face. =morion.=--see cabasset. =ocularium.=--the peep-hole of the helmet. =palette.=--a shield or covering used to protect the arm and shoulder-joint. =pauldrons.=--pieces of armour for the shoulders; the origin of epaulettes. =plate mail.=--this consisted of a number of small lamenæ of metal, commonly iron, which were so arranged as to slightly overlap like the scales of a fish. usually a leather foundation was provided. =poitrinal.=--the covering for a horse's hindquarters; a guard against sword slashes. =pot.=--a cabasset or morion. =rerebrace.=--a protection for the part between the elbows and shoulders. =rondelle.=--a guard for the inner side of the arm which wields the weapon. =salade.=--a light casque, sometimes provided with a visor, but without crest. =sollerets.=--overlapping plates which formed the shoe of an armed knight. cf. chausses. =tapul.=--the perpendicular ridge down the middle of a breastplate. =targe.=--a shield. =tassets.=--a series of flexible plates hooked to the skirt of the cuirass, protecting the thighs. =visor.=--the movable face-guard of a helmet. [illustration: the barrel of a gun ornamented with a twin head of minerva.] [illustration: an old powder-flask.] chapter vi weapons buying specimens--storing them--hand culverins--the serpentin--the wheel-lock--the flint-lock--the rifle--swords--the effect of armour on swords--swords with historical associations--other weapons of all the antiques which are to be found in an average bric-à-brac shop there is probably nothing upon which the dealer is so ignorant as the class of military curio which comes under the head of weapons; as a consequence, we find that the ruling prices for these relics of the battlefield are either excessively dear or ridiculously cheap. there is nothing in this state of things to cause the collector of weapons to grumble, for if he be wise he will add to his treasures when a bargain is to be had, but not when specimens are dear. the process makes collecting a somewhat slow business, but it enables us to get together a whole host of interesting things at a very small cost. a few weeks ago the writer spent an afternoon in going round to the antique shops in a certain quarter of london. here are some of the prices which he was asked, and which he considers were out of reason. for a rifle used by kruger's men, £ ; worth at the most half this sum. for a rifle and bayonet said to have been used at waterloo, £ . for a sixteenth-century sword, s. the sword was so heavy that it would have almost fetched this price as old metal. for an eighteenth-century flint-lock, not in good condition, £ . needless to add, that while the writer was not impelled to purchase the flint-lock, he snapped up the sword eagerly. the collector of weapons must be very careful how he stores his treasures. to leave, say, a bayonet where it can be handled by children is almost a criminal act; to buy a firearm and not examine the charging chamber immediately is, if anything, a trifle more unscrupulous. thoughtlessness has accounted for a good many tragedies, and so it ought to be the determination of the curio-hunter to see that his treasures are stored out of harm's way. swords, bayonets, rifles, and other lengthy weapons are conveniently kept on the walls of living-rooms, and if placed horizontally and fairly high up are safe and ornamental. smaller things, such as daggers and pistols, are better preserved in glass cases. steel implements which, when exposed continuously to the air, are apt to deteriorate, should be carefully cleaned and then coated with a thin layer of copal varnish. if the varnish be painted on sparingly and no patches are left uncoated, the metal will remain bright permanently, and only require an occasional dusting. if the specimen which is to be treated is rusty, it should be carefully gone over previously with emery, but should it have a chased, engraved, or damascened surface, it will be advisable to soak it in benzine for a week or more, and then give it a rubbing until a sufficient polish has been obtained. [illustration: a south african pom-pom shell and a martini-henri cartridge.] [illustration: cartridges as used in the great war. (from left to right: german, french, belgian, and british.)] * * * * * of the weapons with which we shall deal in these pages, probably firearms are the most interesting. such implements have been in use among armies for many centuries, but as cannon and other large pieces possess little interest for the collector, on account of their size, it will be convenient to omit the earliest firearms and speak first of hand culverins. this weapon consisted of a small tube of ½ to ¾ in. internal diameter, fixed to a straight piece of wood or welded to an iron handle. at the close of the fifteenth century it was extensively employed. in culverins were in the army of edward iv, after his landing at ravenspur, yorkshire. the smallest hand patterns, weighing lb., were used on horseback, whilst heavier weapons of sixty odd pounds' weight were manipulated by foot soldiers and fired from trestles or tripods.[ ] [ ] see article on "firearms" in _chambers's encyclopædia_. the culverin may be seen in a variety of makes; some possess a touch-hole and flash-pan at the side, whilst the earlier kinds have no flash-pan at all. in some the barrel is circular, whilst in others it is hexagonal or octagonal. of course, specimens are only to be found in museums, and are seldom obtainable for private collections. early in the sixteenth century the culverin gave place to the serpentin, which, in turn, was slightly modified and became the famous match-lock. to fire the culverin, the attendant had to stand with a lighted match over the touch-hole, but in the serpentin the igniter was gripped by a lever which descended into the flash-pan. the match-lock had the flash-pan covered by a lid, which gave a certain amount of protection to the sparking action in wet or windy weather. the next innovation was the wheel-lock, a weapon which possessed a metal disc provided with a serrated edge. by winding up the disc and using the trigger to release it, it was possible to make the serrated wheel fly round at a considerable rate. as the rough teeth revolved, they scraped against a piece of flint and so produced sparks, which flew into the flash-pan and caused ignition of the powder charge. the system was certainly an ingenious one, but the cost of making these elaborate pieces of mechanism militated against the general use of the wheel-lock for army purposes. after the wheel-lock came the flint-lock. this style of arm possessed a hammer which was provided with a "flint-cock." when released, the flint and the steel came into violent contact, and produced sparks which flew into the touch-powder. the flint-lock was commonly used in the netherlands, and was brought to england by william of orange, remaining in use until .[ ] specimens are obtainable for private collections, but early patterns are of some rarity and fairly expensive. the later history of the hand firearm used in the army is interesting. "in a patent was taken out for making rifles in england. in the first half of the next century benjamin robins, a gunsmith, who died in , made an alteration in the centre of gravity in the rifle by placing it nearer the forepart, and he also made the bullets oval instead of round. he discovered the true theory of the rifle: 'that the spinning of a rifle ball, like the rotation of an arrow, kept the axis of either in the same direction throughout their flight, and, to a great extent, prevented the irregularities caused by the inequalities in the substance of the bullet when driven from a shot-gun or musket.' but strangely enough robins, though by far the ablest writer on projectiles of his own and many succeeding generations, exercised but a slight influence on his contemporaries. the government of his day was not moved by his representations, or convinced by his theory. the ministers of that day were slow in adopting improvements, a common failing of ministers as a body, and riflemen were unknown among english troops until the necessity for them was made evident in the american war. the rifle was necessary to the existence of the backwoodsmen. practice made them excellent shots, and when the colonial irregulars were able to obtain suitable cover, regular troops could not stand before them. after a time foreign aid was resorted to. hessian, hanoverian, and danish riflemen were engaged to serve against the revolted colonists; and it was not until upwards of ten years after the independence of america was recognized that the first english rifle regiment was formed."[ ] [ ] see article on "firearms" in _chambers's encyclopædia_. [ ] w. g. clifford, "peeps at the british army," p. . during the first half of the nineteenth century all infantry regiments, with the exception of the rifle corps, were served with smooth-bored muskets, but after the minié rifle was universally used. this weapon showed a distinct advance, but it had one serious drawback--it was heavy, as many of the men who fought in the crimea learned by bitter experience. in the long enfield rifle, a much lighter implement, was given to our soldiers. this was followed in by the short pattern enfield; in by the snider; in by the martini-henri; in by the enfield-martini; in by the lee-metford, mark i, and the mark ii in ; whilst to-day the service pattern is the lee-enfield, mark iii. * * * * * swords are interesting weapons from the collector's point of view. as the antique specimens were stoutly made, of material that did not easily perish, it is quite possible to buy them, two or three hundred years old, at no very great cost. it is not an easy matter to detect the date of a sword, but the armed figures on old prints, drawings, coins, etc., often hint at the period of construction. the bayeux tapestry, for instance, enables us to see that the norman pattern was of simple design, being straight, rather short, tapering and double-edged, whilst the handle was merely a grip with but little protection. this shape of sword, it may be said, was used for some three or four hundred years, and even in the majority of the specimens were much the same. it is true that by this time the quillons were becoming curved towards the blade, probably so that a slash would be arrested before it reached the knuckle of the soldier who received the blow. of the sword of this period ashdown writes: "the sword was attached to the belt at the uppermost part of the scabbard, and hung perpendicularly at the left side. it generally had a wheel pommel and a swelling grip, with quillons either straight or drooping slightly towards the blade. the latter was about an inch and a half broad at the hilt, thirty inches in length, and tapered to the point, while the section was either of a flattened or a lozenge shape. it was double-edged, and had a grip of varying dimensions, ranging from four inches in length to an extent which, in some examples, almost suggests a two-handed weapon, or the hand-and-a-half or bastard sword of a later period. the pommel, grip, and scabbard were at times elaborately enriched with a profusion of ornament. a new weapon was introduced at this period, the misericorde or dagger of mercy, used for dispatching a fallen foe whose wounds were beyond all surgical aid. it was a straight dagger, with no guard as a rule, and having both the hilt and scabbard curiously ornamented; the blade had but one edge, the section being triangular."[ ] [ ] "arms and armour," p. . [illustration: weapons . sword of time of norman conquest. . sword of fifteenth century. . court sword of eighteenth century. . basket of cavalry sword, nineteenth century. . cutlas sabre, fifteenth century. . glaive. . bill. . halberd. . pole axe-head. . head of two-handed sword. ] as armour became more developed so changes appeared in the sword. the implement of medium weight was no longer serviceable against well-tempered metal suits; accordingly, the sword became heavy and ponderous, so that it might smash where it would not be able to cut. so heavy were specimens made that they needed two hands to wield them, and as this prevented a shield being supported, the quillons were so shaped as to give extra protection. this was the origin of the basket hilts of present patterns. [illustration: an old sword with straight cross-guards.] [illustration: an italian dagger having a replica of the famous column of st. mark for grip.] some swords are worthy of note on account of their shape and age, but others claim attention by reason of their historical associations. in the royal united service museum there are many that are worth seeing from the latter point of view. one in particular may be mentioned. the exhibit bears the following inscription: "sword of admiral villeneuve, commander-in-chief of the combined fleets of france and spain, surrendered to lord collingwood at the battle off cape trafalgar, october , . it was offered to captain atcherley, of the marines. atcherley refused to accept it, and took villeneuve in his boat that he might surrender to captain pellew. admiral villeneuve, having been taken prisoner, was sent to england, where he was detained until may , ." * * * * * beyond firearms and swords the collector may find many treasures among such weapons as daggers, bayonets, lances, battle-axes, pikes, spears, boomerangs, assegais, and native clubs. it should always be remembered, however, that the weapons used by british forces, past and present, are of more interest and value than those coming from savage races. chapter vii early british war medals how to arrange a collection of medals--factors which influence the value of a medal--the earliest medals--the first english medal--the first english military medal--the forlorn hope medal--the dunbar medal--the culloden medal--medals granted by the honourable east india company--the pope's medal, --the emperor francis ii of germany's medal, --the seringapatam medal--the egyptian medal, --the rodriguez medal--the nepaul medal--the maida medal--the peninsular officers' medal the dignity which enshrines a collection of war medals is something greater and fuller than that which can be ascribed to almost any other branch of curio collecting. coins, china, furniture, and prints are all fascinating in their way, but none seem to have the same depth of interest as is possessed by the average collection of war medals. to handle one of these tokens of strife and bloodshed is to call up feelings of reverence and honour for the man who spent his energies so freely in earning it, and it is probably on account of this extrinsic quality that war medals are so highly prized among connoisseurs. with many forms of collecting, the different specimens that are available are so numerous as to be overwhelming, but this drawback cannot act as a deterrent to the would-be medal collector. british medals have been fashioned with a sparing hand, and their number is more or less limited. many of them, it is true, are extremely costly, whilst a select few are quite prohibitive in price--a matter which, perhaps, adds to the zest of collecting. the best method of storing these treasures is to follow the plan adopted by coin-collectors, and to range them on trays in the shallow drawers of coin-cabinets. where the pieces are few in number, it is a good plan to mount them on a board covered with black velvet, and to frame them just as one does a picture. to have no particular method of keeping them, to leave them lying loose in drawers, or to place them as casual ornaments in curio or china cabinets is decidedly wrong, for a few scratches, a fall, or a little rough handling will often reduce considerably the value of a specimen. for the benefit of the uninitiated, it may be well to mention that not only does the value of a medal depend upon its state of preservation--that is to say, whether it is in mint condition, slightly rubbed, much worn, scratched, battered, re-engraved, etc.--but also upon the number of clasps that go with it. it must not be thought that collectors tolerate the indiscriminate adding of clasps to claspless medals. a medal that was awarded with, say, one additional honour cannot be turned into a three-clasp decoration by purchasing two clasps from a dealer and placing them upon the slide ribbon. the medal in question, if it be less than a hundred years old, has the name of the original possessor engraved upon the flange, and by turning to the medal rolls the number of clasps issued with the particular decoration can be found. another factor which affects the value of a medal is the regiment to which it was issued. a medal given to a private in a crack regiment will possess a greater value than an identical medal awarded to a private in a less noted one. the rank of the recipient is also taken into account; this, however, is perhaps only natural. [illustration: royalist badge worn by the partisans of charles i.] * * * * * medals were known to the ancients. the greeks, for instance, have left behind them many interesting specimens which can still be seen in our public museums, but none of them were given as recompenses for military bravery. the ordinary soldier of these early days had no status, and therefore received no rewards, whilst the leaders were given crowns of laurel, bracelets, and neck chains of gold for the services they rendered. it was queen elizabeth who first thought of giving medals to british fighting men, and it was the crews of the ships which sailed out to meet the armada that received them. the first medals to be given for military, as distinct from naval, honours were struck by charles i. probably the very earliest award made by this king was the medal presented to sir robert welch, an officer in the royalist cavalry, whose bravery in recovering the standard from the parliamentary forces at edge hill excited the admiration of every member in his party. charles gave orders for many other medals to be struck, but most of them were presented to officers holding high posts who had performed special services in times of peace as well as war. many of these decorations were fashioned in single copies, and as practically none of them bore any inscriptions beyond the title and motto of the king, it is impossible to ascribe them to any definite act of military value. they were all oval in shape, whilst the designs showed considerable artistic merit. all these medals were intended to be worn suspended around the neck, or fixed brooch-like in the hat. usually, the ribbons which were worn with them could be selected by the possessor at will, no fixed pattern being officially decreed, as obtains in present times. as may be expected, specimens belonging to this early period are now extremely costly, but they are often obtainable at public sales. a fine collection of them may be inspected in the medal-room at the british museum. charles i evidently had great faith in the value of decorations, for we find that towards the latter part of his reign he instituted a general medal, known popularly as the forlorn hope medal, which was to be awarded much on the lines which regulate the granting of the victoria cross to-day. the warrant which announced these awards ran as follows:-- "charles r. trusty and well beloved, we greet you well, whereas we have received information that those soldiers which have been forward to serve us in the forlorn-hope, are not looked upon according to their merited valour and loyal service. we do, therefore, require, that from henceforward, the commander-in-chief both of horse and foot, which lead up the forlorn-hope upon whom also we mean to bestow special tokens of our princely favour, do signify in writing the names of those soldiers whom they find most forward in serving us, their king and country, that care may be taken to reward their deservings and make them specially known to all our good subjects. for which end we have thought fit to require sir william parkhurst, kt., and thomas bushell, esq., wardens of the mint, to provide from time to time certain badges of silver, containing our royal image, and that of our dearest son, prince charles, to be delivered to wear on the breast of every man who shall be certified under the hands of their commander-in-chief to have done us faithful service in the forlorn-hope. "and we do, therefore, most straightly command that no soldier at any time do sell, nor any of our subjects presume to buy, or wear, any of these said badges, other than they to whom we shall give the same, and that under such pain and punishment as the council of war shall think fit to inflict if any shall presume to offend against this our royal command. and we further require the said commanders and wardens of our mint to keep several registers of the names of those, and of their country, for whom they shall give their certificate. given at our court, at oxford, the th day of may, ." it is unfortunate that what records were presumably kept, under these orders, were destroyed by a disastrous fire which took place at oxford in . thus we neither know how many specimens of the forlorn hope medal were distributed, nor do we even know for certain the exact design it bore. a number of identical copies exist of a medallion bearing the profile of king charles on the obverse, and that of prince charles on the reverse, and this is usually considered to be the award in question. the dunbar medal, the next to call for attention, is of special interest, as it was the first british award to be given to every member of the fighting forces, whether man or officer. this attractive decoration was struck in in two sizes, a small gold piece for officers and a large copper one for distribution among the ranks. both bore the same design, namely, cromwell's profile and the inscription "word.at.dunbar. the lord of hosts. septem. y. . .," on the obverse, and a view, in exaggerated perspective, of parliament in full assembly on the reverse. a curious letter, referring to the design of this medal, and written by the protector, is still extant. it explains that cromwell while in scotland received a visit from the artist chosen by parliament to execute the design. the artist went to beg a few sittings of the great leader with a view to producing a faithful portrait-likeness. but cromwell was extremely loath to allow his features to be displayed upon the medal, and advanced all manner of excuses, probably owing to feelings of over-sensitiveness. in the end he was prevailed upon, and the medal bore his profile as stated above. this incident is of special interest, as historians have seldom, if ever, mentioned in discussing the character of this able soldier that one of his qualities was modesty. * * * * * after dunbar came a lengthy period during which many medals were struck; they were all, however, of an individual character, being awarded to leaders for personal services. culloden, which was fought on april , , was the next event to call for a special issue of medals. to commemorate the young pretender's rout, oval medals in gold and silver were struck. it is presumed that the gold pieces were awarded to leaders of the highest rank, whilst the silver ones went to those of lesser importance. it is certain, however, that no awards were made to the common soldiers. the design was remarkably bold and imposing; the obverse bore a simple profile of the duke of cumberland with short curly hair and the word "cumberland," whilst the reverse showed an unclothed full-length figure of apollo, looking to the left. the inscription "actum est ilicet perut" and, also in latin, "battle of culloden, april th, ," appeared on the reverse. this medal was one of the first to be issued with a definitely prescribed pattern for the ribbon. the warrant effecting its issue stated that "it was to be worn round the necks of officers by means of a crimson ribbon having a narrow green border." the medal is exceedingly rare, but of the few copies known to exist one, fortunately, may be seen among the treasures of the british museum, and another in the royal united service museum. * * * * * the history of british and indian medals is so interwoven that it is impossible to study the first without knowing something of the latter. it may even be claimed that much which affected the fashioning and awarding of late eighteenth-century decorations given by the authorities at bombay has since been copied by our authorities at home. the most obvious point bearing on this contention deals with the shape of the medals. before the indian examples, all of which were circular, were struck, the british patterns invariably appeared oval in form, whilst most of the subsequent issues have been circular. again, the allegorical designs of patriotic themes, which our most recent medals bear, had their early origin in the sepoy tableaux which decorated the reverse of the indian medals. the reverse side of british medals before the indian specimens were issued usually depicted the features of a royal personage, a coat of arms, or, perhaps, a sailing vessel. but the greatest influencing factor of the indian medals was the method of granting them. every soldier from the highest general down to the lowest fighter received an award. in england quite a different custom prevailed. with the single exception of the dunbar medal, no english soldier was ever awarded a royal medal until waterloo, unless his conduct had been unusually brave and he had merited some special recognition. the controversy which raged round wellington's campaigns as to whether the ordinary men as a class should or should not receive decorations was finally settled by remembering the sepoys of india. if it were good for these soldiers to receive them, then our british fighting men must have them as well. such was the popular opinion which prevailed. [illustration: the crimean medal.] * * * * * the pioneer medal from india is usually spoken of as the decoration awarded for services at poona, but, as no specimens are known to exist, there is reasonable doubt as to whether the decoration was ever struck. the records, however, state plainly that the bombay council decided to give medals to all the officers among the grenadier-sepoys who went with colonel egerton to quell a native rising in poona. in , a campaign in deccan took place against tippoo sahib and his father. a medal was afterwards minted by the honourable east india company and presented to all officers and men forming the bengal army. there were gold and silver specimens, vast numbers of both being struck. the obverse showed britannia, leaning forward, offering a wreath to a fort flying a british flag. the reverse bore a persian inscription. a second encounter with tippoo sahib, known as the mysore campaign, took place in - . the medals which were subsequently struck for the officers and men who served under colonel cockerell were made in gold and silver and were intended to be worn around the neck, suspended by a yellow silk cord. the obverse depicted a sepoy grasping a half-unfurled british flag, trampling at the same time on the enemy's colours; the reverse bore the inscription, "for services in mysore, a.d. - ." if medals were ever dearly won, those of the mysore campaign seem to have been, for many stories have been told of the great daring shown by cockerell's men. thomas carter in his work on "war medals" writes as follows: "one of the most dashing exploits in the war of mysore was the capture of bangalore, the second city in the dominions of tippoo. it was enclosed by a high wall and a deep ditch, and the gate was covered by a close thicket of indian thorns. the attack was made without any examination of the ground, and the troops in advancing and endeavouring to force an entrance were exposed to a destructive fire of musketry. colonel moorhouse, one of the best officers in the service, fell mortally wounded. at length, lieutenant ayre, a man of diminutive stature, succeeded in forcing his way through the shattered gate; which gallant action being observed by general meadows, he shouted to the stormer, 'well done! now, whiskers, try, if you can, to follow and support the little gentleman.' this animated appeal succeeded: the troops rushed through the gate into the town and drove out the enemy at the point of the bayonet." it is now necessary to speak of two medals of a slightly different nature to any of the foregoing. in mentioning the first, we must recall the work undertaken by the th lancers in , when one section of the regiment went to corsica and, landing, captured the bastia, whilst another section went forward to the italian coast and entered the harbour of civitavecchia. for the protection thus afforded him, pope pius vi gave a dozen of the officers gold medals suitably inscribed. these decorations, it must be added, were not officially recognized in england, and the recipients received no permission to wear them when in uniform. in the year , another case of british soldiers receiving a foreign decoration occurred. in this instance, emperor francis ii of germany was the donor of a gold medal and a chain pendant to each of eight officers of the th light dragoons. the emperor had fallen into a precarious position at villiers-en-crouché, a small settlement near cambray, and, had it not been for the heroic and persistent efforts of the english, he would certainly have been captured by the french, who were massed in great numbers. the awards were made as a thank-offering for his lucky escape. unlike the pope's decorations, those of francis ii were recognized by the english army authorities, and the recipients were allowed to wear them when parading in full dress. the following letter may be quoted in reference to the matter[ ]:-- "to lord dorchester, colonel of the th dragoons. _may , ._ my lord,--the emperor of germany having been pleased to present each of the officers of the th regiment, under your lordship's command, who distinguished themselves in so gallant a manner by their spirited attack upon the enemy, with a very inferior force, on the th april, , near cambray, a gold medal has been struck by his imperial majesty's orders, on the occasion, as a particular mark of the sense he entertained of the signal service thereby rendered to the allied army. i have therefore the honour, by order of his royal highness the commander-in-chief to signify to your lordship his majesty's pleasure that the above-mentioned officers shall be permitted to wear the said medals constantly with their uniforms, as an honorary badge of their bravery in the field of action, and an inducement to all others to imitate, on every favourable occasion, their glorious example. i have, etc., wm. fawcett, _adjutant-general_." [ ] d. h. irwin, "war medals," p. . from this time until the peninsular campaign almost all the medals which we have to record--many of them of a highly interesting nature--were awarded to native troops by the honourable east india company. the first, dated , reminds us of the gradual expansion of the british empire. it was struck to commemorate the capture of ceylon from the dutch, - . the medal was made in gold and silver in calcutta and was given, probably exclusively, to the bengal native artillery--one of those sections of the native indian army of which the east india company was justly proud. the medal was unusually plain, there being no pictorial design, but merely the inscription, "for service at the island of ceylon, a.d. - ," on the obverse, and a persian inscription on the reverse. it may be said that questions were asked by those in authority as to how so severe a pattern came to be chosen, and the reply was given that as no exceptional feats occurred during the campaign, a simple design was deemed most suitable. the reason seems unconvincing. [illustration: the general service medal, - .] [illustration: the afghan medal.] [illustration: south african medal, - .] the siege and capture of seringapatam, which culminated in the death of that arch-enemy, tippoo sahib, was the occasion for issuing a madras medal, according to a general order dated july , . gold pieces were given to senior officers, silver gilt pieces to field officers, silver pieces to junior officers, bronze pieces to the rank and file of the british force, and tin pieces to sepoys. the design was attractive: on the obverse appeared a landscape view of our gallant men storming seringapatam, whilst a lion overwhelming a tiger filled the reverse. the medal was not made in calcutta, as was usually the case with the indian decorations, but at birmingham. collectors have often been at a loss to know how the indian awards were intended to be worn. in reference to the seringapatam distinction, mayo, in "medals and decorations of the british army and navy," says: "there is no doubt that they were issued unmounted, and as no directions had been given by the authorities the details as to ribbon and mountings devolved on the recipients, who exercised their own discretion and taste. it is, however, probable that the european officers wore them as the gold medals for the peninsular and other campaigns were worn--i.e. round the neck, or at the button-hole, according to rank. some added a clasp bearing the word seringapatam. "three patterns of ribbon, at least, appear to have been used, viz. red with blue borders, yellow watered, and plain red. that the first was used under some sort of authority is gathered from a discussion which took place between the madras government and the commander-in-chief in , on the occasion of the distribution of the medals awarded to the native troops in the first burmese war. the commander-in-chief had proposed that a piece of red ribbon with blue borders should be issued with each medal. the government assented to the issue of the ribbon but objected to the pattern on the ground of its resemblance to the waterloo ribbon. to this the commander-in-chief replied that the ribbon he had proposed was common to all medals granted by his majesty in modern times, and was considered to be the medal ribbon of england. he added: 'the medals of seringapatam and java are both suspended from it, and both are so worn with the sanction of his majesty.' this is authoritative evidence of the medal being worn with the only military ribbon then in use. "lord harris, who commanded at seringapatam, wore his medal, gold, suspended round his neck by the red, blue-bordered ribbon, as the gold medal was worn by general officers. a bust of his lordship was exhibited at the royal military exhibition, at chelsea in . this showed the medal worn round the neck, with a clasp inscribed 'seringapatam.'" a second seringapatam medal, almost similar in design to the first, was struck in and presented to british as well as native troops by order of the east india company. this decoration was made at calcutta. the next medal takes us to egypt and recalls to mind a number of desperate encounters between the english and french. in the year an army of , british soldiers, under sir ralph abercrombie, had been assembled in the peninsula. the french were already massed there in great numbers, being more than double our strength. on march , , a bloody contest took place at alexandria, and abercrombie fell mortally wounded. reinforcements were necessary, and these were supplied by the east india company, which dispatched an expeditionary force of native troops with commendable promptitude. on returning to india in , the government of bombay promised the men a campaign medal--that is to say, a medal would be granted to each individual who set out to fight for the british cause. nine years elapsed before the medal was struck, but it is gratifying to know that specimens were given to the descendants of all soldiers whose demise had taken place in the meantime. sixteen gold and , silver copies were struck at a cost of r. . . the obverse of this award showed a sepoy holding a union jack, whilst in the background the tents of the indian camp were revealed. a persian inscription filled the exergue (i.e. the section of the circular face of the medal cut off from the rest by a straight line). the reverse revealed a wooden british ship nearing the coast, presumably of egypt. the date, mdccci, was added. the turkish sultan, also, gave a medal to the british soldiers who took part in this campaign. it is usually spoken of as "the order of the crescent." these early years of the nineteenth century brought the english into many unfortunate conflicts with our present allies, the french. no sooner was strife at an end in egypt than we once more met our gallant rivals, this time in the islands of rodrigues, bourbon, and mauritius. it was in the years - , under the command of general j. abercromby, who led the th and th madras infantry, also the th bombay infantry, and vice-admiral bertie, who brought a squadron of ships, that a strong force met and defeated the french. the medal which was afterwards awarded to all natives who took part in the engagement was inscribed, "this medal was conferred in commemoration of the bravery and fidelity exhibited by the sepoys of the english company in the capture of the islands of rodrigues, bourbon, and mauritius in the year of hegira, ." the date as reckoned by the english calendar was also given. the obverse revealed a sepoy standing with our national flag in one hand and a rifle in the other. a cannon was shown just behind him, whilst the background depicted an expanse of sea. gold and silver pieces were struck by the calcutta mint. the following order in council of the year is of interest:-- "on the occasion of the approaching return from the late french islands of the volunteers from bengal, fort st. george, and bombay, to the presidencies to which they respectively belong, his excellency the vice-president in council considers it to be no less an act of justice than of indispensable duty to record the high sense he entertains of the services performed by the native soldiery, who were employed in concert with his majesty's troops in the reduction of the islands of rodriguez, bourbon, and mauritius. he is pleased to signify his approbation of the distinguished merits of the volunteers by conferring honorary medals on all the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, troopers, sepoys, gaulundauze, and gun lascars employed on that service." closely following on the declaration of peace in the three above-mentioned islands of the indian ocean came trouble with the dutch in java. as was usual, a joint army of home and native troops was dispatched to the scene of conflict. a victory was gained in , and on february , , seven thousand medals were struck by the east india company at calcutta, for distribution among the indian troops. the british regiments, the th, th, th, th, and th foot, took part in the expedition but, following the usual custom, received no awards. the particulars of this indian medal were as follows: obverse--sepoys storming fort cornelis, upon which was prominently displayed a flagstaff bearing a british flag above, presumably, a dutch flag with the word cornelis printed above the scene. reverse--a persian inscription and august mdcccx. java conquered. xxvi. the nepaul medal was the next to be struck by the honourable east india company. it bears the date of . in granting this award, a departure was made from the usual custom of giving a decoration to every soldier, or his heirs, who actually set out from home with an expeditionary force. in this case, the medal was granted, first, to officers who reached the fighting area and, second, to the men who conducted themselves with conspicuous bravery. mayo says that the feeling was probably gaining ground that too many medals were being struck and their value was becoming lessened in consequence. this he suggests was the reason for restricting the number on this occasion. the obverse of the nepaul medal showed a stirring picture of hills, strongly fortified, with cannon in the foreground and an array of bayonets just coming into view. the reverse consisted of a persian inscription. after nepaul, a long period followed during which no campaign medals were awarded to indian troops. certain individual awards were made to officers, but as in each case less than twenty pieces were struck, we consider it unnecessary to record them in detail. at this point we must retrace our steps to the year and speak of the battle of maida, which may be described as an outlying encounter in the napoleonic campaigns. to celebrate sir john stuart's victory over the forces led by general regnier, a medal was struck and presented to thirteen of the highest officers. the award in itself was unimportant, but as it was practically the first royal medal to be given to british soldiers since the time of culloden, it must be looked upon as an epoch-making decoration. we must admit that nelson's men at trafalgar had received awards, and certain regiments which took part in various napoleonic wars were provided with coveted distinctions, but in every case they were planned and paid for by private individuals and so cannot rank in any way as royal medals. it is perhaps interesting to record, in parenthesis, that the trafalgar medals were given to the recipients by an engineer of birmingham named matthew boulton. the last award to be described in this chapter is the peninsular medal. two sizes, both in gold, were struck and presented to officers. no men received them. the designs of both were: obverse--britannia, seated on a globe, holding out a palm; a couchant lion beside her. reverse--a laurel wreath framing the name of one of the following battles: roleia, vimeira, sahagun, benevente, corunna, martinique, talavera, guadaloupe, busaco, barrosa, fuentes d'onoro, albuera, java, ciudad rodrigo, badajoz, salamanca, fort detroit, vittoria, pyrenees, st. sebastian chateauguay, nivelle, nive, orthes, and toulouse. the name and rank of the recipient was engraved upon the edge. the larger medal was awarded to general officers and was provided with an attachment for wearing around the neck, a crimson ribbon with blue edging being specified. the smaller medal was given to junior officers who took command in cases where their superior-commanders had been disabled. this award was provided with a buckle and ribbon as above and was intended for wear upon the breast. both the large and small medals were conferred for service in one engagement. for a second or third engagement bars were provided. these, it may be added, in parenthesis, were the first bars given to british soldiers. when an officer received distinctions in more than three engagements he was awarded the peninsular cross instead of the foregoing circular medals. this distinction was struck in gold and had much the same shape and design as was afterwards selected for the victoria cross. the lion on the former, however, faces to the right, whilst on the latter it looks to the left. in this chapter we have traced the history of british medals from their inception in the reign of elizabeth down to the stormy times of the duke of wellington. the period was marked by the paucity of awards made to british troops. popular opinion, however, was gradually forcing its influence during the latter years of the period upon the authorities who withheld them, and the following chapter shows how agitations coming from non-military quarters caused a complete change of policy in the granting of these coveted distinctions. [illustration: the indian mutiny medal.] chapter viii military medals struck by the mint campaign medals considered--waterloo--burmah--china--cabul-- jellalabad--scinde--meeanee--sobraon--the men's peninsular medal--punjab--indian general service medals--south africa, - ; also - --baltic--crimea--indian mutiny--abyssinia-- new zealand--later awards in these days when the deeds of brave men, whether they be of high or low rank, are acclaimed with equal praise, it is extremely difficult to understand the feelings which actuated the authorities a hundred or more years ago when awarding military medals. parliament, though it was supposed to represent the masses, decided time after time in these early years of the nineteenth century that decorations were only meant for soldiers of rank and that the common men had neither claim nor title to them. the usual plea was that the ordinary soldier had been paid for his services, and there the nation's obligation to him was at an end. somehow or other, the authorities seem to have shut their eyes to the fact that the same argument could be applied with equal force to the commanders of the army. it is somewhat lamentable to note that even so grand a soldier as the duke of wellington argued in favour of withholding rewards from the rank and file, and his opinion, we may be sure, had great influence in certain high quarters. but in spite of the decided opinions held by those in authority, there was a strong party of agitators who opposed these narrow views. to them must be accredited much, for in face of every conceivable obstacle they left no stone unturned until the coveted awards were shared by men as well as commanders. in the early days which followed waterloo this little band displayed particular activity. "are our ordinary soldiers, fresh home from the belgian battlefields, to go unrewarded as the peninsular heroes have done?" was their constant cry. the people took up the matter, and only when absolutely forced to did parliament agree to strike a medal for all ranks of the victorious army. the official decree ran as follows:-- "the prince regent has been graciously pleased in the name and on behalf of his majesty to command that in commemoration of the brilliant and decisive victory of waterloo, a medal shall be conferred upon every officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier upon that occasion. by command of his royal highness the prince regent. frederick, _commander-in-chief_." undoubtedly the innovation of rewarding the rank and file as well as the officers created much satisfaction. the people openly displayed their approval, the soldiers were pleased beyond measure, and the press spoke of the change as a step in the right direction; such, at any rate, is the impression one gathers from reading articles bearing on the matter in contemporary numbers of the _quarterly review_. the waterloo medal bore on the obverse a profile of george and the inscription "george p. regent." on the reverse was a winged figure of victory seated upon a rectangular scroll bearing the word "waterloo," and the date "june , ." the reverse design was obviously copied from a coin of elias which is exhibited in the british museum. the ribbon was of red silk flanked with blue edges. this material was passed through a circular ring and not through a horizontal slot, as is customary to-day. the award was received by all grades of men who were present at the battle of ligny, june th; quatre bras, june th; waterloo, june th; as well as by certain forces which were posted in the rear of the battlefield on june th. certain german troops were also decorated with this award. the collector will often come across specimens of this medal, which are provided with slots instead of rings for holding the ribbon in position. many of the original recipients preferred this latter method of attachment and made the alteration themselves. such specimens, therefore, are not in strict accordance with the official pattern and are in consequence of less value than the unaltered kind. some ten years elapsed before the next medal, styled the first burmah medal, - , was struck. this being an indian award, no royal features were portrayed. on the obverse was a palm-tree and an army storming an eastern city, probably rangoon; there was also a persian inscription in the exergue. on the reverse, a lion was encountering a white elephant, and a british flag waved prominently in the background. the decoration was struck in gold for officers, and silver for men of other standing. for the first time with indian medals, a definite ribbon, red and blue, was prescribed. the earliest award to bear the head of queen victoria was the china medal of . the features portrayed on this specimen were similar to those shown on a medallion executed by william wyon in , and struck to commemorate victoria's first visit to the city of london as queen. her majesty evinced a great liking for this rendering of her features, and consequently it was used for the coinage, the postage stamps, and, lastly, the medals. the reverse side revealed a group of arms of various kinds. the ribbon was red, edged with yellow. it was given both to soldiers and sailors. this award may be confused with a later china medal of the same design. the earlier pattern, however, bears the year under the word china in the exergue, whilst the - pattern has no date at all. also, no bars were furnished with the earlier specimen, but as many as six may be found on the latter. writing of the thrilling incidents which crowded the first campaign, carter describes one of them in the following words: "the west gate had been blown in by captain pears, the commanding engineer. a body of tartars, having been driven into one division of the western outwork, refused to surrender, when most of them were either shot or destroyed in the burning houses, several of which had been set on fire by the enemy or by the british guns. major-general bartley subsequently proceeded with a body of troops consisting of the th and part of the th regiment, when a hot engagement ensued with about one thousand tartars, who, under cover of some enclosures, opened a destructive fire on the soldiers as they were filing round the walls. the leading division of the th dashed down the ramparts, while the th pushed on. as a result, the enemy was soon dispersed, although some fought with great desperation. "from the sun becoming so overpowering it was found impossible to move with men already fatigued by their exertions, many of whom died from the intense heat. the troops, therefore, remained in occupation of the gates until six o'clock, when several parties were pushed into the tartar city and to the public offices. on passing through the city and suburbs, the painful spectacle presented itself of hundreds of the dead bodies of men, women, and children lying in the houses, numerous families having destroyed themselves sooner than outlive the disgrace of their city being captured by foreigners." the second chinese war resulted from a cumulation of depredatory movements on the part of the natives, but the capture of the _arrow_, a vessel flying the british flag, was directly responsible for the declaration of hostilities. the next medal struck at the mint was awarded to the soldiers who took arms in , in cabul. the obverse bore the wyon head of victoria, whilst the reverse was issued in four patterns as follows:-- . a wreath encircling the inscription "candahar, ." . a wreath encircling the word "ghuznee," and another encircling the word "cabul." . a wreath encircling the inscription "candahar, ghuznee, cabul, ." . a wreath encircling the inscription "cabul, ." the ribbon attached to all the varieties was of the rainbow pattern which has since become familiar on indian medals. a native medal was also struck at the mint for distribution among the indian troops. instead of victoria's bust a trophy of arms surmounting the inscription "invicta, mdcccxlii," filled the obverse side. after cabul came the jellalabad rising. to celebrate the victories of this campaign, a medal was struck at calcutta and distributed to all soldiers who took part in the various actions. the design was considered unsatisfactory; the obverse bore a simple mural crown, the upper edge of which resembled the embattled coping of a castle, whilst the reverse showed the date "vii april ," in bold but plain lettering. in consequence of the dissatisfaction which the medal caused, another was struck by the mint in london and sent out to the troops in . an order was issued at the same time stating that all recipients of the calcutta award could have their decoration changed for the london award on making formal application. curiously enough, the soldiers who had grumbled at the pattern of the earlier medal showed little desire to become recipients of the newer piece, and in only a few cases was the exchange made. the london striking is consequently somewhat rare. the mint medal bore the wyon head of victoria surrounded with the words "victoria vindex," whilst the rear showed a graceful figure of victory, with wings, holding a flag and a laurel wreath. the words "jellalabad, vii april mdcccxlii" encircled the figure. the rainbow ribbon of india suspended the medal. the early forties were troublous times in india. hardly twelve months after jellalabad had been fought and won, a medal was earned by our brave troops in the province of scinde. referring to this campaign, mayo quotes the following interesting letter:-- "colonial office, downing street. _ th july, ._ my lord, i have the honour to acquaint your lordships, that the queen, being desirous of commemorating the signal success obtained by the force under the command of major-general sir charles napier, in scinde, has been graciously pleased to command that a medal, to resemble as nearly as possible that proposed for the troops employed in afghanistan, should be conferred upon the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers in her majesty's service, who were engaged in the battles of meeanee and hyderabad. without anticipating the course which the court of directors of the east india co. may propose to take for commemorating the success of the company's troops in scinde, i think it nevertheless right to add that her majesty would readily permit the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the company's army to whom the court of directors might think proper to grant medals in commemoration of the battles of meeanee and hyderabad to wear such medals in all parts of her majesty's dominions. i have etc., stanley, _the presidency of the indian board_." the mint medal issued in march bore the wyon head of victoria, with the words "victoria regina" on the obverse, but of the reverse there were three patterns. the first showed a laurel wreath and crown encircling the word "meeanee"; the second had the word "hyderabad" substituted; whilst the third gave both battles, namely "meeanee and hyderabad." the rainbow ribbon was again employed. before turning to the next medal, it is pleasant to recall the duke of wellington's brief eulogy of sir charles napier's campaign, which he addressed to the house of lords. "sir charles napier moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces, he transported his guns under circumstances of extreme difficulty and in a most extraordinary manner, and he cut off a retreat of the enemy which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their positions." meeanee was fought on february th, and hyderabad on march , . [illustration: the china medal, - .] [illustration: the egyptian medal, - .] two years after scinde, the sutlej campaign was waged between british troops and sikhs. the mint medal struck to commemorate our victories was the second award to carry clasps or bars--the officers' peninsular medal being the first. the obverse again showed wyon's head of victoria: the reverse displayed a stirring picture of victory holding out a wreath, with a stack of arms at her feet. the words "army of the sutlej" encircled the allegory. of the exergue on the reverse, there were four different types: the first read "moodkee, "; the second, "ferozeshuhur, "; the third, "aliwal, "; and the fourth, "sobraon, ." the general order which regulated the granting of this decoration stated that soldiers who took part in more than one engagement were to receive the medal engraved with the name of their earliest encounter, whilst bars were to be added for subsequent victories. from this it is clear that the sobraon medal cannot be found with any bars. bars, the decree stated, were to be worn in the following order, counting upwards from the medal: ferozeshuhur, aliwal, and sobraon. naturally, no bars for moodkee were issued. curious as it may seem, the next decoration to be struck by the mint was the rankers' peninsular medal. it will be remembered that on the conclusion of wellington's campaign in spain two gold pieces were issued for officers, but that no awards were presented to the ordinary soldiers. this arrangement pleased neither the men nor the officers, who knew how much the country was indebted to the rank and file. as a consequence, the question of the men's medal was constantly discussed in parliament. in , the matter was thoroughly debated upon in the lower house, but the opposers urged with a certain amount of success that wellington had decided years ago that no award should be granted. sir charles napier's answer to this lame argument was to the point. "it is never too late to do a good thing," he retorted amidst the applause of his followers. two years later, in , the matter was again before the house, and, probably because queen victoria was somewhat partial to the granting of distinctions when merited, a favourable decision was arrived at. the men were to have the medal so long withheld from them, as the following general order of june , , explains:-- "her majesty having been graciously pleased to command that a medal should be struck to record the services of her fleets and armies during the wars commencing , and ending in , and that one should be conferred upon every officer, non-commissioned officer and soldier of the army who was in any battle or siege, to commemorate which medals have been struck by command of her majesty's royal predecessors and have been distributed to the general or superior officers of the general armies and corps of troops engaged, in conformity with the regulations of the army at that time in force...." the order was somewhat lengthy and involved, but its chief clauses were: (_a_) men should receive medals and clasps for all engagements figuring on the superior officers' medals and clasps of - , and (_b_) relatives of men since deceased could claim the award on production of sufficient title. the medals were issued to , claimants in . in , the duke of richmond suggested that the troops in egypt, who had fought with great bravery, should also receive the distinction, and the queen graciously consented to recognize their services. in this case, however, the relatives of dead soldiers could not claim the award. there is much about the rankers' peninsular medal which is unsatisfactory. in the first place, the reverse bears the figure of victoria crowning the duke of wellington. as he took no part in many of the contributory campaigns, and as his veto so long delayed the granting of the decoration, some other design would have been more appropriate. again, the date placed in the exergue, - , is much too vague. and lastly, the head of victoria on the obverse has often caused confusion, as she did not ascend the throne until some three years after the campaign had come to a welcome close. the punjab award, - , is probably one of the most artistic pieces of work emanating from the london mint. on the obverse was the familiar wyon head of victoria, surrounded by the words "victoria regina," whilst on the reverse was a stirring tableau representing sikhs presenting their arms to major-general sir walter raleigh gilbert at rawul pindee. the ribbon was blue, striped with two narrow lines of yellow. there were three clasps: chilianwala, mooltan, and goojerat. the most desperate encounter in this campaign was the battle of chilianwala, during which the brigade under brigadier pennycuick and lieutenant-colonel brookes was led to make a disastrous charge owing to a misunderstanding. the th regiment suffered terribly, and their medals are now extremely valuable in consequence. in , queen victoria, in furtherance of her policy of rewarding unrecognized actions of the past, decided to issue an indian general service medal to cover the following feats of arms:-- storm of allighur--september , . battle of delhi--september , . battle of assaye--september , . siege of asseerghur--october , . battle of laswarree--november , . battle of argaum--november , . siege and storm of gawilghur--december , . defence of delhi--october . battle of deig--november , . capture of deig--december , . war of nepaul-- . battle of kirkee and battle and capture of poona--november . battle of seetabuldee and battle and capture of nagpoor--november and december . battle of maheidpoor--december , . defence of corygaum--january , . war in ava-- - . siege and storm of bhurtpoor--january . the following are the particulars of the medal:-- _obverse_--wyon's head of victoria, with the inscription "victoria regina." _reverse_--victory, seated. a palm-tree in front of her. _ribbon_--sky blue. _clasps_--twenty-three in number. it is curious to note that the reverse bears the date - , though the above list of engagements restricts the years to - . this is due to the fact that the list was revised after the dies had been put in hand, and certain of the earlier battles were deleted on the advice of the duke of wellington. a second indian general service medal was issued in and subsequently as conditions demanded. it should be mentioned that the authorities had grown to view the constant striking of fresh medals for indian service with a certain amount of disfavour, and the standard design was introduced in order to prevent a multiplicity of patterns. the measure may have proved satisfactory to those in authority, but it certainly had grave disadvantages of a more or less obvious character. the ribbon, for instance, was similar through all the years of the issue, and when worn with undress or civilian clothes conveyed little meaning. the following clasps were issued:-- pegu; persia; north-west frontier; umbeyla; bhootan; looshai; perak, ; jowaki, ; naga, ; burma, , , and ; sikkim, ; hazara, and ; chin-lushai, ; samana, ; north-west frontier, ; hunza, ; lushgai, ; wazeristan, . the value of the piece varies considerably, according to the clasps provided with it. the description of the second indian general service award is:-- _obverse_--wyon's head of victoria, with the inscription "victoria regina." _reverse_--victory crowning a naked warrior. _ribbon_--three strips of red and two of blue, all of equal width. another general medal, first issued in the early fifties, was the south african medal. it will be remembered that in - certain british regiments were engaged in putting down kaffir risings. when a decoration was struck for them, queen victoria decreed that the soldiers who fought in the earlier kaffir risings in and - should also receive the award. the design, which was the same for all, bore the wyon head on the obverse, and a crouching lion with the words "south africa" and the date " " on the reverse. the ribbon was orange, streaked with four blue lines. for the campaign, the th, nd, and th foot regiments were decorated. for the - campaign, the recipients were the th dragoon guards, the rifle brigade, the th, th, th, th, th, and st foot regiments. for the - campaign, the following were honoured: the nd, th, th, rd, th, rd, th, st foot, the rifle brigade, the th lancers, and various marines. by noting the recipient's regiment, engraved on the medal edge, it is possible, in most cases, to decide for which particular campaign the award was made. it may be convenient to state here that the south african decoration was re-issued in - . the design was similar to the original, except that the exergue contained a picture of kaffir arms instead of the date " ." with this issue clasps bearing the following years were given: , , , - , - , and - - . the next medal was that presented for the baltic. it was given largely to the navy, but the army received its share, as the letter here quoted from mayo plainly shows:-- "admiralty, _june , _. her majesty having been graciously pleased to signify her commands that a medal shall be granted to the officers and crews of her majesty's ships as well as to such officers and men of her majesty's army as were employed in the operations in the baltic in the years - , the lords commissioners of the admiralty hereby give notice of the same." the obverse of the award was again embellished by the familiar head engraved by wyon, whilst the reverse depicted britannia seated. the inscription "baltic, - ," surrounded her. the ribbon was yellow, flanked with narrow edges of blue. after the baltic came the crimea award. this is certainly one of the finest productions which the london mint has ever given us. the well-known picture of victoria filled the obverse, whilst a splendid allegorical group, depicting victory crowning a roman soldier, ornamented the reverse. the clasps were more decorative than usual, taking the form of elongated oak-leaves held in position by minute acorns. they were five in number and bore the designations of alma, balaklava, inkerman, sebastopol, and azoff (the latter only for naval victories). the ribbon was light blue, edged with yellow. the medal commands but a very low price--considering how important was the victory which it commemorates--unless it bears the bar for balaklava. if provided with this honour, and engraved for one of the cavalry regiments which took part in the famous charge, its value is considerable. the last award to be paid for by the honourable east india company was the indian mutiny medal of - . this, of course, is one of the finest pieces which could enter the medallist's collection, yet it is procurable for a very modest sum, unless it bears the clasp for the defence of lucknow, when it is somewhat costly. the obverse shows victoria's profile, as before, whilst the reverse displays britannia seated on a lion, with the word "india" printed around the edge. the ribbon is silver grey, with two bars of red. the clasps are five in number: delhi, defence of lucknow, relief of lucknow, lucknow, and central india. the medal was presented, generally, to soldiers in the th lancers and the bengal horse artillery, besides many civilians. in - , a medal for abyssinia was minted. in some measure it was an interesting award, as the usual head of victoria was superseded by another design, engraved by j. s. wyon and a. b. wyon. in this case the royal features were portrayed within a small circle, which was surrounded by a star having nine points. in the angles formed by the points of the star the letters a-b-y-s-s-i-n-i-a were printed. the reverse was a simple circular wreath. there were no clasps, and the ribbon--silver grey and red in colour--was passed through a circular ring, joined to the medal by a royal crown fashioned in silver. in , a much-belated decoration was struck for distribution among the soldiers and sailors who fought against the maoris in new zealand in - and - . the expeditionary force was landed in , in order to uphold the rights of british settlers, who complained that after purchasing allotments of land they were denied their title. the maori chiefs disclaimed all knowledge of such practices, but when a british magistrate presented a formal complaint to a certain wairau chief, he was murdered. this seems to have been a signal for other native chiefs to rise and maltreat the europeans generally. the british force, it may be added, only arrived in time to prevent a wholesale massacre of the settlers from the motherland. the obverse of the medal bore a new head of victoria, wearing widow's weeds; the reverse showed a wreath, and the inscription "new zealand, virtutis honor: - ." for reasons which are not clear, a few pieces were struck bearing no date. the ribbon was blue and red. * * * * * as the historical incidents relating to the medals of recent issue are generally known, it will only be necessary in the following cases to describe the designs of the medals themselves. =canada=, - .--yet another profile of queen victoria, with inscription "victoria regina et imperatrix." on the reverse, a wreath of maple-leaves and a canadian ensign. clasps--fenian raid, ; fenian raid, ; red river, . ribbon--two bars of red and one of grey. =ashanti=, - .--still another profile of queen victoria, with inscription "victoria regina." the reverse bore a group of british soldiers fighting savages in a wood, the work of e. j. poynter, r.a. clasps--coomassie; - ; - ; ; - . ribbon--yellow and black. =afghanistan=, - .--another profile of queen victoria, with inscription "victoria regina et imperatrix." on the reverse, a fine picture of indian soldiers proceeding through a mountain pass, in which an elephant is prominently displayed. the sketch was made by randolph caldecott. clasps--ali musjid; peiwar-kotal; charasia; ahmed khel; kabul; kandahar. ribbon--green and plum. [illustration: the sutlej medal.] [illustration: the punjab medal.] [illustration: the third indian general service medal.] =cape of good hope general service.=--on the obverse, victoria with widow's weeds and small crown. on the reverse, the words "cape of good hope," surmounting a lion and unicorn. clasps--bechuanaland; basutoland; transkei. ribbon--blue and yellow. =egypt=, - .--head of victoria, as on the ashanti medal, on obverse, and sphinx, with inscription "egypt, ," on the reverse. clasps--alexandria; tel-el-kebir; suakin; el teb; tamaai; el teb-tamaai; the nile, - ; abou klea; kirbekan; suakin, ; tofrek; gemaizah; toski, . ribbon--grey and blue. =north-west canada=, .--obverse, as for egypt. reverse, maple wreath, and inscription "north-west canada, ." clasp--saskatchewan. ribbon--grey with two red stripes. =west africa=, - .--head as in previous case. reverse, british soldiers fighting savages in a forest. seventeen clasps. ribbon--black and yellow. =matabeleland=, .--a fresh head of victoria on the obverse, and a wounded lion, with the inscription "matabeleland" on the reverse. no clasps. ribbon--orange and blue in seven stripes. =central africa=, - .--medal as for west africa. one clasp. "central africa, - ." ribbon--plum, silver, and black. =third india general service medal=, - .--victoria in widow's weeds on obverse, and a british and indian soldier grasping a standard on reverse. six clasps. ribbon--yellow green and plum red. =sudan=, .--head and shoulders profile of victoria on obverse, and on reverse a winged figure of victory grasping a flag in either hand and "sudan" printed beneath her feet. no clasps. ribbon--a thin red stripe separating two wide bars of yellow and black. there is also a khedive's sudan medal which british soldiers have permission to wear. =east and central africa=, - .--obverse, as for sudan. reverse, britannia pointing to the rising sun. a lion accompanies her. clasps--lubwa's uganda; - ; ; uganda, . ribbon--orange and red in two wide bars. =china=, .--victoria in profile on obverse; a pile of arms, a shield, a palm-tree, and the latin quotation "armis exposcere pacem" on the reverse. clasps--taku forts; defence of the legations; relief of pekin. ribbon--a wide red band flanked with yellow edges. =first south africa=, - .--the queen's head on the obverse, as in previous case. victory offering a laurel crown to an army of british soldiers. twenty-six clasps. ribbon--orange flanked with blue, which in turn is flanked with red. =second south africa=, - .--the first campaign medal to bear king edward's profile. reverse, as for previous award. clasps--south africa, ; south africa, . ribbon--equal strips of green, silver, and orange. =ashanti=, .--obverse, as for second south africa. reverse, a lion trampling on native weapons, and a scroll with the word "ashanti." clasp--kumassi. ribbon--three strips of black and two of green. =east african general service=, - .--obverse, as before. reverse, victory, with a lion, pointing to the rising sun. fourteen clasps. ribbon--black, yellow, and green bars. =fourth india general service=, - .--obverse, as before. reverse and ribbon, as for the third india general service medal. clasp--waziristan, - . ribbon--three strips of crimson and two of green. =tibet=, - .--obverse, as before. reverse, the heights of tibet crowned by a fortress. clasp--gyantse. ribbon--green, silver, and plum colour. chapter ix military decorations awarded for special services the necessity for special awards--the victoria cross--the order of merit--the "distinguished conduct in the field" award--the distinguished service order--the meritorious service award--the long service and good conduct award--the "best shot" medal--volunteer decorations--other decorations the reader who has noted the facts set out in the two previous chapters will remember how, in the earliest days of medal awarding, the general plan was to decorate none but the soldiers who had performed exceptional service, and that, as time wore on, the idea developed into granting medals to all who took part in warfare, irrespective of the merits of each individual. the latter plan must certainly be considered the more satisfactory, for personal bravery is so frequent a quality displayed on the battlefield that all who take part in these life-and-death struggles should, of necessity, receive a token of the king's recognition. but though the granting of campaign medals was a step in the right direction, it tended to level up the ordinary brave soldier and the soldier possessing exceptional merit, and this, of course, was a principle unsympathetic to english feeling. accordingly, we find that running side by side with the campaign medals are decorations for special merit. undoubtedly the most popular and the most coveted of all such awards is the v.c. the victoria cross was instituted by a royal warrant of january , --during the crimean war, in fact--and its inception was largely due to the thoughtfulness of queen victoria and the prince consort. the cross itself is severe and plain in design, but loses nothing on this account; it was formerly struck from the metal of old cannon taken in the campaign against the russians, but to-day we can only claim that its metal composition once formed part of artillery pieces of some kind or other. the pattern is too well known to need description, but it may be added that the shape and design were modelled on the peninsular gold cross. the ribbon is crimson for the army and blue for the navy. the victoria cross may be won by soldiers of all ranks; when awarded to non-commissioned officers and privates it carries with it an annuity of £ , though this sum may be increased in special cases. if the medal be sold during the life-time of the recipient the pension can be withdrawn, and if the possessor be convicted in the civil or military courts for any but trivial offences, the same punishment may be enforced. there are many rules regulating the granting of this coveted award; the following are perhaps the most interesting:-- "it is ordained that the cross shall only be awarded to those officers or men who have served us in the presence of the enemy, and shall then have performed some signal act of valour or devotion to their country. "it is ordained with a view to place all persons on a perfectly equal footing in relation to eligibility for the decoration, that neither rank, nor long service, nor wounds, nor any other circumstance or condition whatsoever, save the merit of conspicuous bravery, shall be held to establish a sufficient claim to the honour. "it is ordained that in the event of a gallant and daring act having been performed by a squadron not under in number, or by a brigade, regiment, troop, or company in which the admiral, general, or other officer commanding such force may deem that all are equally brave and distinguished, and that no special selection can be made by them; then in such case, the admiral, general, or other officer commanding, may direct, that for any such body of sailors or soldiers, one officer shall be selected by the officers engaged for the decoration; and in like manner one petty officer or non-commissioned officer shall be selected by the petty officers and non-commissioned officers engaged; and two seamen or private soldiers or marines shall be selected by the seamen or private soldiers or marines engaged respectively for the decoration, and the names of those selected shall be transmitted ... to the admiral or general officer commanding, who shall in due manner confer the decoration as if the acts were done under his own eye." there has been much discussion of late as to whether bars are ever awarded with the victoria cross. undoubtedly, these additional marks of valour are at times given, but instances where they have been received are rare. it should perhaps be stated definitely, that where a second act of sufficient bravery is performed before the cross is conferred, details of the second act are engraved with details of the first upon the rear of the medal, but where the second act is carried out after the medal has been conferred, a bar is awarded and the £ grant increased to £ . the fourth clause of the royal warrant of january , , makes this point quite clear:-- "it is ordained that any one who after having received the cross shall again perform an act of bravery which, if he had not received such cross, would have entitled him to it, such further act shall be recorded by a bar attached to the ribbon by which the cross is suspended, and for every additional act of bravery an additional bar may be added." the brave deeds which have been rewarded by grants of the victoria cross make thrilling reading, but space cannot be spared here for recounting the most stirring of them. a brief description of each award is given in mr. d. hastings irwin's book "war medals and decorations," whilst mr. philip a. wilkin's "history of the victoria cross" also contains much valuable information. before turning to the next medal, it may be interesting to add that crosses are often granted after death; a case in point was that of lord roberts's son who fell at colenso in . another decoration awarded for bravery is the order of merit, which was instituted in . unlike other awards, it was divided into three classes; the third class being granted for the first conspicuous act of gallantry, the second class for a repetition of such act, and the first class for a third instance. the decoration was made in three patterns, each of which was one and a half inches in diameter. the shape was an eight-rayed star. the centre of the award consisted of two crossed swords, around which was written "reward for valour," on a background of blue enamel. the first-class decoration was made in gold and bore a gold wreath; the second-class was silver with a gold wreath; and the third-class, silver with a silver wreath. all were to be worn on the left breast. a money grant formed part of the award, and it is worth noting that the widow of a recipient drew the annuity for three years after her husband's death. a third decoration for bravery is the "distinguished conduct in the field" award. this was instituted by royal warrant on june , , for sergeants, and by a later warrant (december , ) for all non-commissioned officers and privates. the decoration was given to mark "the sovereign's sense of the distinguished service and gallant conduct in the field of the army then serving in the crimea" and since. by an amending warrant of february , , a bar could be earned by performing a subsequent act of gallantry. the methods of selecting recipients was as follows:-- the commanding officer of each cavalry regiment could, if he thought fit, select one sergeant, two corporals, and four privates for decoration, whilst an officer of an infantry regiment could select one sergeant, four corporals, and ten privates. the award originally carried with it a grant of £ in the case of sergeants, £ in the case of corporals, and £ in the case of privates--sums which were banked until the time when the soldiers took their discharge. the medal was fashioned in silver; the obverse bore a military trophy of arms in the centre of which was the shield of the reigning sovereign, whilst the reverse was lettered "for distinguished conduct in the field." the ribbon was red, blue, and red in equal strips. it was worn on the left breast. the medal, as now awarded, bears a profile of the reigning monarch instead of the trophy of arms, and recipients are offered either a gratuity of £ on discharge, or an increase of sixpence per day on their pension allowance. in , the "distinguished service order" was instituted. the initial royal warrant affecting this order, under date of september , , said: "whereas we have taken into our royal consideration that the means of adequately rewarding the distinguished service of officers in our naval and military services who have been honourably mentioned in dispatches are limited. now, for the purpose of attaining an end so desirable as that of rewarding individual instances of meritorious or distinguished service in war, we have instituted a new naval and military order of distinction which we are desirous should be highly prized by the officers of our naval and military services." [illustration: the queen and king's south african medals, - . (the same reverse was used for both pieces.)] the order consists of a gold cross shaped out of a circle of conspicuous and pleasing design. the metal is gold, but the surface is enamel-coated. the predominant colouring is white, but a gold edging, a green wreath, and a red centre lend effectiveness to the design. both faces are decorated, the obverse with a crown, and the reverse with the royal cypher. the ribbon, which is crimson edged with blue, is bounded both top and bottom by a gold bar. the last award to be mentioned here for brave conduct is the meritorious service medal, which is now superseded by the "distinguished conduct in the field" medal. this award received royal sanction in for the army, and in for the marines. the warrant said:-- "we deem it expedient to afford a greater encouragement to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of our army who may have distinguished themselves, or who may have given good, faithful, and efficient service. "it is our further will and pleasure that a sum not exceeding £ , a year be distributed for the purpose of granting annuities as rewards for distinguished or meritorious service to sergeants who are now, or who may be hereafter in the service, either while serving or after discharge with or without pension, in sums not exceeding £ : which may be held during service, and together with pension." the medal earned but little popularity as it was awarded, not only for bravery, but for exemplary conduct in peace times. now the "distinguished conduct in the field" medal was preferred in cases of bravery, and the "long service and good conduct" medal was preferred in cases of exemplary conduct: thus its use was limited, and the authorities withdrew it a few years after the first issue. the long service and good conduct medal was the earliest award which could be earned in times of peace. it was first issued on july , , by william iv. the obverse bore a military trophy of arms and the king's escutcheon, whilst the reverse was inscribed "for long service and good conduct." the most recent copies bear a profile of the royal sovereign on the obverse. the ribbon is crimson. the medal was intended for non-commissioned officers and men who had been discharged in receipt of gratuities after serving twenty-one years in the infantry or twenty-four in the cavalry. to-day, eighteen years' exemplary service only is required, and there is a gratuity of £ on discharge. special regulations at the outset affected the granting of the "long service" medal to the marines. the commandant of the division of royal marines, the warrant ran, may annually recommend a certain number of men of meritorious conduct for the "good conduct and long service" medal with a gratuity as follows:-- sergeant who shall have served ten years as such £ . corporal who shall have served seven years as such, £ . private, £ . the men to be recommended must have completed twenty-one years of actual service, have borne an irreproachable character, and have never been convicted by a court-martial. in a decoration was instituted for the "best shot" in the infantry regiments. it was awarded annually by competition, and carried with it a money grant of £ . as the award was discontinued in , specimens are rare, and seldom available for purchase. the obverse of the medal bore poynter's draped profile of victoria, whilst the reverse showed fame placing a wreath on the head of a warrior. the earlier copies are found in bronze, the later ones in silver. the ribbon was somewhat gaudy, consisting of seven strips, three narrow ones of black, white, and black, then a wide one of red, and finally three more narrow ones of black, white, and black. * * * * * volunteer decorations are numerous and one or two collectors of our acquaintance have specialized in them and gathered together series of much value and interest. the earliest volunteer specimens which we have seen are those which came from corps raised during the napoleonic times of trouble, especially those which dated from the period when an invasion of england was feared. at this time there were some hundreds of volunteer corps throughout the land, many of them were only small organizations, it is true, but the old lists tell us that the volunteers aggregated some , men in all. the force as a whole was well organized and well equipped, and proficiency was encouraged by the granting of medals and decorations. these awards were not granted by royal warrant but by the patrons of each corps, though official sanction was always obtained previously. on this account we may look upon the medals as properly authenticated specimens well worth collecting. most of the volunteer medals which we have seen of this period bear dates between and , whilst many of them are highly artistic and ornamental. we have seen specimens given by the following corps--the names are worth mentioning if only to show the quarters in which the bodies were raised:-- the bank of england volunteers. the bermondsey volunteers. the broad street ward volunteers. the essex volunteer cavalry. hans town association volunteers. loyal cork volunteers. sadler's sharpshooters. walthamstow volunteers. of recent volunteer awards the volunteer officers' decoration is probably the best known. the royal warrant which proclaimed its issue, under date of july , , said:-- "whereas it is our royal desire to reward for long and meritorious service of officers of proved capacity in our volunteer force: now for the purpose of attaining this end, we have instituted, constituted, and created, and by these presents to us, our heirs and successors, constitute and create a new decoration which we are desirous should be highly prized by officers of our volunteer force: and we are graciously pleased to make, ordain and establish the following rules and ordinances for the government of the same which shall from henceforth be observed and kept." then followed eight clauses, of which the following is the chief:-- "it is ordained that no person shall be eligible for this decoration nor be nominated thereto unless he is or was a commissioned officer and has served twenty years in our volunteer force, is recommended by the commanding officer of the corps in which he has served, and is duly certified by the district military authorities in which the corps is located as having been an efficient and thoroughly capable officer, in every way deserving of such decoration: provided nevertheless and we do hereby declare that half of any time during which an officer of our volunteer force may have served in the ranks of our said force shall reckon as qualifying service towards the twenty years required as aforesaid." the decoration consisted of a striking oval badge: the edge was a silver oak wreath, whilst the royal cypher and crown, in outline, filled the centre. a green ribbon was provided with a silver bar flanking its topmost edge. two years after the officers' decoration received sanction a similar award, known as the "volunteer long service medal," was provided primarily for the men. the medal was granted to all volunteers--including officers who had served in the ranks, but who had not qualified for the previous medal--on completion of twenty years' service in the volunteer force, provided that they were actually serving on january , , and that the commanding officer recommended such award. service in the militia or imperial yeomanry could be reckoned towards the required period of years. the obverse of the medal bore a profile of the reigning sovereign (in the case of queen victoria, the bust was designed much after the style of that chosen for the jubilee silver coinage); the reverse consisted of a scroll, with the words "for long service in the volunteer force" arranged among palm and laurel sprays. the medal was silver, and the ribbon green. the last decoration with which we shall deal at length is the national rifle association's medal, which was awarded to the best shot in the volunteer force. there were three pieces, one each of gold, silver, and bronze, which could be competed for annually. the awards were instituted in the year . the medal was of very fine design. the obverse revealed a bygone english soldier in possession of a bow, and a volunteer holding a rifle; both figures were standing. the reverse bore a circular wreath, within which the words "the national rifle association" and the date were inscribed. * * * * * there are other decorations which it is well to mention by name. they are:-- . the imperial yeomanry long service medal, which demands ten years' service and ten trainings. . the militia long service medal, which is granted to non-commissioned officers and men who have served eighteen years and completed fifteen trainings. . the territorial force efficiency medal, which has taken the place of one of the volunteer medals mentioned above. . the jubilee medal. . the coronation medal. . the military cross, awarded for distinguished and meritorious service. chapter x military medallions general considerations--the "lost wax" process--hadrian's medallions--renaissance examples--simon, the medallist--wyon's work--public collections--some noted medallions described from the days when roman militarism dominated the world down to the present time, the deeds of successful soldiers have been commemorated by the striking of medallions. needless to say these metal pieces, which so admirably recall the outstanding events in war and soldiery, are highly prized by antiquarians, and the labour spent in gathering together a collection of them is richly rewarded. medallions have been fashioned from all the usual metals, but gold, silver, copper, bronze, and lead have been generally employed. the processes followed in making them have been as numerous as the metals: ordinary casting was, at one time, the favourite method, but striking, engraving, and hand modelling have all been employed in turn. mediæval medallists often resorted to the "lost wax"[ ] process, and extremely fine work they were enabled to turn out by this means. [ ] perhaps it will be well to briefly explain this system of founding, as it is not generally understood. adeline in "the art dictionary," p. , describes it as follows:-- "a process of bronze founding in which the core is covered with an accurate representation of the object to be cast in wax, the wax being of the intended thickness of the metal. the wax is then coated with a porous clay, and the whole mass is put in a pit and baked. during the process of baking the wax melts and runs off through apertures left for the purpose. the space left after the wax is melted is occupied by the metal. this, the oldest method of bronze founding, is probably the best, and in the present day it is being pretty generally adopted. in the method, which for some time has been in vogue, the core was made of the exact size of the object to be cast and afterwards pared down, so as to leave space for the metal to run in between the core and the mould." the earliest medallions date from very remote times, but the hadrian era may be considered the period in which these souvenirs of memorable actions first became popular. from hadrian's time to the fall of the roman empire they were struck to commemorate every deed of note, but after the decline we hear little of them until the renaissance, when such italian artists as pisano and guaciolotti revived their popularity. from the renaissance onwards, the art of medallion-making flourished in italy under the guidance of benvenuto cellini, of albert dürer in germany, and of jacques primavera in france, but it was not until the time of henry viii that english workers turned their attention to this pleasing way of marking important military and civil events. of course, we find medallions commemorating glorious deeds which took place in periods other than those mentioned; in such cases, the pieces were probably struck long after the occurrence took place. it is a little difficult to know what specimens to include and what to exclude from a collection of medallions, as there are no official issues, and as any metal worker can flood the market with original designs of his own or with facsimiles of rare and ancient strikings of bygone artists. personally, we think that any medallion which is artistically fashioned and which commemorates an event of interest to us is worth adding to the collection, but, of course, we must learn to know the difference between an original and a counterfeit specimen. this, however, is too intricate a science to explain here, but can be learnt from works written by numismatists, with a fair amount of application. no catalogues exist of the english medallions issued since henry viii's time, but the pieces which are the most interesting were struck by:-- . simon, who grew to fame in the reign of charles ii. he engraved the royal seals and executed many fine medallions. . rawlings. . the wyon family. william wyon, the most renowned of at least three engravers of this family, engraved the royal seals, the peninsular medals, and the dies for the first postage stamps, besides many medallions of a military and civil interest. collectors of these metal souvenirs should examine the exhibits in the british museum and the royal united service museum, whilst an occasional glance in the windows of messrs. spink & sons in piccadilly will often reveal specimens of more than ordinary interest. this well-known firm issue a monthly circular which contains much of interest to the reader who is intent on adding valuable specimens to his collection. a few illustrations depicting some of the most noted medallions may be given with advantage. the specimen below, one of the oldest in existence, was struck in gold to commemorate the glorious deeds of julius cæsar. speaking of the medallion, plutarch says:-- "julius cæsar, on his return to rome, after having won a successful issue at the battle of pharsalus, was named the 'liberator, the head of the fatherland, the permanent dictator,' and received for the first time, the title of emperor. the senators, wishing to reward him for the humane treatment which he accorded those who fought against him, during the civil wars, erected a temple of mercy, circular in shape, supported by six columns, in the middle of which is the figure of 'concord' holding in the right hand the horn of plenty and in the left a spear." [illustration] the first medallion given on this page was struck to commemorate the victory gained by william iii at the battle of the boyne. the obverse shows a familiar portrait of the king, whilst the reverse depicts him in the act of crossing the river at the head of his troops. [illustration] the next medallion shows james ii on the obverse, and an orange-tree laden with fruit by the side of an old oak, falling to the ground, on the reverse. the piece was evidently struck to commemorate the fall of james ii, and the supremacy of the house of orange. [illustration] the fourth medallion is one of the numerous specimens which were struck to do honour to marlborough and his victorious army. the obverse shows prince eugène and the duke, who are likened to the roman deliverers, castor and pollux. on the reverse, a picture representing the rout of the french and the surrender of marshal tallard at blenheim is given. [illustration] [illustration] the fifth piece illustrated here was struck to commemorate the battle of ramilies. on one side the battle is represented at the moment of victory; on the other is an emblematic representation of the union of england and holland. behind the figure of england, on a pillar inscribed with the first three letters of his name, stands a bust of marlborough, and opposite is another of d'ouwerkerke. [illustration] another specimen in the marlborough series is given below. the obverse represents marlborough and eugène as castor and pollux whilst the reverse presents a view of the battle and town of oudenarde. [illustration] [illustration] the medallion given at the foot of the previous page was struck to commemorate the surrender of lille in . victory is shown, on the front face, taking the civic crown from the head of a prostrate female, who represents the city of lille, whilst the under face depicts britannia, with the Ægis, striking france with terror. the eighth medallion commemorates the battle of dumblane. [illustration] the ninth medallion was struck in honour of the victory gained at the battle of dettingen on june , , whilst the tenth, given below, commemorates the victory of minden, gained on august , . [illustration] [illustration: a check to corsican assurance. by cruikshank.] chapter xi military prints the period - --works including military prints--where to search for bargains--the kind of print most sought after--works including fine military prints--bunbury--gillray in the following notes we do not propose to go deeply into the lore of print collecting, as the matter is too involved for treatment in these pages, and also because such admirable books as "chats on old prints," by arthur hayden, already cover the ground. here we propose to talk of military prints as they affect the general collector of military curios. printed pictures of soldiers and soldiery are to be found dating back almost to the days of caxton, but those coming within the period - seem to be the most interesting. probably this is due, in the main, to three reasons. first, the period was one of much military unrest, and people's interests were largely centred on the army. secondly, the costumes of the various regiments were attractive and showy, and lent themselves to pictorial treatment. and thirdly, the art of printing had reached a stage when reproductions were no longer so expensive as to be almost prohibitive in price. most of the prints which we have seen of this period were originally published as illustrations to books, a good number were issued as sets in portfolios, whilst a few were sold separately. the books which contain these military pictures, especially when the latter are coloured, fetch high prices, but fortunately the collector can become conversant with these gems of the printer's art in such treasure-houses as the british museum and the south kensington museum. those of us who can afford to buy perfect copies of such illustrated works will find admirable collections for sale at messrs. maggs brothers, in the strand; messrs. robson & co., in coventry street, w.c.; and messrs. henry sotheran & co., in piccadilly. but though these works, illustrated with military prints, are costly, the collector of moderate means may gather together quite an extensive collection of the pictures, torn from the complete works, at no great outlay. it may seem surprising to all of us who are curio-lovers but it is a fact that there are still people who are so ignorant of the value of books and pictures that they will snatch out the illustrations from priceless volumes and sell the former for a few coppers, throwing away the letterpress. only the other day we were talking with a friendly collector who showed us a batch of ackermann's coloured plates which he had obtained for a few pence each, although the actual value was, at the least, half a guinea per copy. the collector, therefore, must be on the look-out for bargains of this nature; he will find them in the portfolios which usually encumber the doorways of the second-hand booksellers in charing cross road, praed street, museum street, shaftesbury avenue, and the stalls along farringdon road. in these interesting quarries he will assuredly make discoveries from time to time; so he will if he keeps an eye on establishments of a similar nature in the outskirts of london. [illustration: napoleon's carriage arriving at the london museum. by cruikshank.] a few general words on the value of military prints may be of interest. those which depict types of soldiers are generally more sought after than those representing battle scenes; those of noted commanders are, of course, valuable, but representations of little-known commanders, wearing perhaps court rather than military dress, are not in much demand. pictures in which soldiers play a minor part are also of little interest to the collector of military curios, as there is always a possibility that the uniforms have been drawn more with the idea of being picturesque than accurate. machine-coloured pictures are, of course, highly treasured, as they give a much better idea of the uniforms than do monochromes. when hand-coloured there is no guarantee of correct impression; in fact such pictures are often glaringly misleading. * * * * * having made these preliminary remarks, it may be well to point out some of the best-known works containing military prints. "the british military library," published not later than , in two volumes, contains some score or more of accurately drawn plates representing types of the british army. they are well executed, though the figures appear a trifle stiff and wooden. spooner's "military and naval uniforms," by mansion and eschauzier, seventy plates in colour, dating from . these are probably some of the finest representations of early nineteenth-century uniforms that the collector can possess. the dresses are accurately depicted, but the artists do not excel when drawing galloping horses. ackermann's "costumes of the british and indian armies," by various artists. some sixty odd coloured plates, dating from . the plates include not only the uniforms of the regular army, but also the indian army and the volunteer force. this is a very fine collection. cannon's "historical records of the british army." a monumental work in sixty-eight volumes, but the coloured plates are occasionally found loose. the pictures are in two series: (_a_) cavalry, and (_b_) infantry; they depict regimental dress of the period - . w. heath's "military costumes of the british cavalry." a set of sixteen coloured plates, of the year . e. hull's "costumes of the british army in ." some seventy odd lithographs of fairly pleasing character. they appear to be drawn with complete accuracy. "military costumes of europe." a work published in two volumes in . nearly a hundred coloured plates are included, about a quarter of which are of british uniforms. thomas rowlandson's "loyal volunteers of london" ( ). a most interesting work full of coloured plates showing the uniforms of the non-regular units at the close of the eighteenth century. students of military dress should pay special attention to this interesting gallery of pictures. lieutenant-colonel luard's "history of the dress of the british soldier." fifty uncoloured and not very attractive plates ( ). the work contains much interesting matter in the letterpress, however, and the plates, though plain, are useful to students of military dress. ralph nevill's "british military prints" is of recent production. (_the connoisseur_ publishing co., , s.). this work contains a sumptuous array of coloured and uncoloured reproductions of old prints, many of which are far more attractive than the originals. it is a book that the student should undoubtedly possess. * * * * * so far, the prints of which we have spoken have all been of a serious nature, but the period under consideration was marked by the rise of two clever caricaturists, named henry bunbury and james gillray, who require some mention. the works of these two artists are but little known, in spite of the fact that some authorities consider them equal to any of the satirical efforts of the famous hogarth. bunbury and gillray are of interest to the collector of military prints because many of their pictures dealt with soldiers and soldiering. we cannot claim that the detail of the uniforms which figure in all the pictures of these two artists are absolutely correct, but they certainly do not display any glaring errors which are likely to mislead. bunbury was a friend of sir joshua reynolds and also of hoppner, he thus moved in the artists' circle of the day. "during the time he was living in suffolk, he was prominently associated with the county militia; and no doubt it was at this period that ideas for humorous military sketches presented themselves. 'the militia meeting,' 'recruits,' and 'the deserter' may be mentioned among these, while a story is told in connection with another sketch that is characteristic of bunbury's readiness with his pencil. a young private of his regiment applied for a pass in order to visit the lady of his affections. the application having come before mr. bunbury, he not only signed the pass, but drew a comical sketch on the permit, representing the meeting of the amorous couple, to the great amusement of the officers to whom the pass was presented. "in , political relations between england and america were very strained, in consequence of which militia camps were formed in various parts of the country. henry bunbury, as an officer of the suffolk militia, was ordered to join his camp at coxheath. all sorts of caricatures from all sorts of pencils (most of them anonymous) satirize the military mania of the time. naturally bunbury was not behind the rest, and many sketches of a military character, evidently drawn by him at this time, are still in existence. bunbury's wonderful talent in making these sketches of a martial kind appears to have been recognized at the time, for an exhibition of his military drawings was organized in and held at somerset house."[ ] [ ] herbert ewart, in _the connoisseur_, june , pp. - . gillray, the second artist mentioned above, was the son of a soldier who fought at fontenoy, and thus his thoughts were constantly turned to military subjects. though his satirical drawings dealt with the various topics of the day--his works were published between and --he seems to have lost no opportunity of showing his spleen for the french, and napoleon in particular. we have a long list of such artistic effusions of which the following may be mentioned: . fighting for the dunghill: or jack tar settling citoyen françois. . buonaparte, hearing of nelson's victory, swears by his sword to extirpate the english from off the earth. . general result of buonaparte's attack upon ibrahim bey's rear guard. . britannia between death and the doctor. . the surrender of ulm: or buonaparte and general mack coming to a right understanding. . the new dynasty: or the little corsican gardener planting a royal pippin-tree. . apotheosis of the corsican phoenix. in the foregoing, we have merely touched upon the subject of collecting military prints, but enough has been said in these few pages to show that this branch of curio-hunting is full of fascination and deep interest and is well worth the attention, not only of readers who possess artistic feeling, but of those who are desirous of adding to their store of knowledge concerning the military dress of bygone periods. [illustration: a singular trait of buonaparte's favourite mameluke. by cruikshank.] chapter xii memorial brasses of military interest classes of military brasses--rubbings, and how to make them--floor brasses: their characteristics--palimpsest brasses--what may be learnt from brasses--mural tablets in many of our churches and public buildings are to be found numerous memorial brasses which possess undoubted interest for the collector of military curios. these memorials of the dead largely fall into two classes: those which are let into floors, and those which are fixed to walls. the former class, as a rule, are of some antiquity, are memorials to individuals rather than to groups of soldiers, and are to be found almost entirely in churches. the latter class are modern, are often erected to a number of soldiers, and are located in such public buildings as town halls and guild halls as well as churches. the floor brasses, as a rule, are flat but often deeply engraved, whilst the mural tablets are lightly engraved and frequently embellished with a sculptured framework. to obtain facsimiles of memorial brasses, many collectors take "rubbings" of them, much after the fashion that children imitate coins by superimposing a sheet of paper and running a soft pencil over the covered surface. the necessary outfit for making a rubbing consists, first and foremost, of a permit obtained from the proper authorities, a supply of heel-ball, as sold by any leather dealer or cobbler, a small clothes brush, a duster, and some paper. the latter must not be too flimsy nor too stout, and it must be large enough to cover the brass. a roll of light grey wallpaper usually serves admirably, but there are times when the width of the roll is too narrow for the brass. in these cases, a full-size sheet of paper as used by printers should be procured. the first operation is to wipe away all dust and foreign matter from the metal surface; this is a very necessary precaution when the tablet is a floor-inset the next thing is to place the sheet of paper in position; if the memorial is fixed to the wall, the sheet must be held by an assistant, or at the expense of much arm-aching by the person who does the rubbing; if the tablet is let into the floor, two weights placed at the head of the brass serve the purpose admirably. the actual rubbing should be performed by drawing the heel-ball lightly across the brass. the movement should always be made in the same direction, or the lines will appear scratchy and confusing. it is best to complete a little patch first, and not go over the whole area before finishing any part of it; if this be done, there will be more chance of completing the work without shifting the paper. it is not a bad idea to force the paper by means of the palm of the hand into the recesses of the brass before commencing to rub; this will help to keep the sheet from moving. some collectors make their rubbings intensely dark, that is, they do not leave off when the brown stage has been reached. others are content to stop rubbing when the detail is just visible, completing the work at home by filling all the flat areas with a wash of indian ink. either plan is good, but the former is more useful in cases where the tracery is involved, whilst the latter provides a somewhat smarter effect when carefully executed. rubbings may be stored in cardboard tubes, one in each tube, but many enthusiasts mount their black pictures on canvas and rollers. the latter plan is certainly the better one, but it is an expensive and tedious business which will not appeal to all. small rubbings, it need hardly be added, make capital pictures for framing, looking very attractive if a white margin is preserved, and the frame made of a narrow black moulding. * * * * * floor brasses were first used on the continent, many originating in flanders and some in brittany. the earliest specimens in england date from the thirteenth century, though beaumont states that the finest specimens belong to the fourteenth century. he also mentions that the fifteenth-century specimens were small, thin, and more ornate, whilst in the sixteenth century the art became debased by a surfeit of commonplace specimens. the majority of the english brasses are located in the eastern counties and the home counties, where, in fact, stone was not easily and cheaply obtained. the most curious of all floor brasses, the same writer states,[ ] are those which are called palimpsests. these were originally laid down to the memory of a certain individual, but were subsequently taken up, re-engraved, and then used to commemorate some one else. nearly all are post-reformation--a fact which speaks for itself. [ ] beaumont, in "memorial brasses," p. . after the dissolution of the monasteries, the abbeys fell into decay, and any engraver who wanted a brass appears to have taken it from the nearest ruin and adapted it to his requirements. palimpsest brasses were readapted in three ways:-- . plates were re-engraved on the reverse side. . the old figure was used again without alteration, a new inscription and shield (if any) being added. . the original engraving was modified, fresh lines and shading being introduced to adapt it to contemporary fashion. one of the finest examples of this latter kind of palimpsest brasses is a specimen which was made to honour the memory of sir walter and lady curson, at waterperry, oxon. the original was engraved in , but subsequently altered to suit the style of armour and costume which prevailed in . another interesting palimpsest is mentioned by fairbank.[ ] "it occurs in ticehurst church, sussex. it has been made use of to commemorate john wyborne, esquire, and his two wives. the second wife, his widow, made her will in , and she ordered a stone to be placed over herself and her husband; and this is what the executors did. they took a small slab bearing a brass figure of a man in armour, which had been engraved about ; there was no room for figures of the two wives of the same size as the figure already there, so they had a small figure placed on each side, little larger than half the size of the central one, and replaced the original inscription by one commemorating john wyborne, who died , and his two wives; their figures were engraved about ." [ ] f. r. fairbank, in _the connoisseur_. [illustration: the oldest english brass. to the memory of sir john d'abernon. date . at guildford, surrey.] * * * * * brasses are of great educational value in so much as many reveal interesting points in connection with matters concerning dress and armour. but the student is warned against putting too much trust in the dates which they bear, for specimens were often laid down before the death of the person whose memory they perpetuate. the date of death and the style of decoration might thus be, in such cases, at variance historically. beaumont says:[ ]-- "examples of this feature are to be found at thame, oxon, and lambourne, berks. this is especially noticeable in the case of shroud brasses, which were generally engraved and fixed during the lifetime of the person commemorated, the object being to remind him of his final bourne; in these cases blank spaces were usually left for the insertion of the date of death." [ ] "memorial brasses," p. . [illustration: a battlefield souvenir picked up on the plains of flanders. (the same helmet is shown with and without the cloth covering.)] the earliest english brasses were shaped around the figures they portrayed, and if canopies or frames were added, these were fitted in separate pieces. all foreign brasses and later english ones, however, were cut into rectangular pieces. these and other such indications are the surest guides to the true date of construction. among the thousands of brasses in this country, many of which are of military interest, the following are worthy of mention:-- . at felbrigge, to the memory of sir symon ffelbrygge; date, . he is dressed in plate armour, and holds the royal standard. his garter is prominently shown. a canopy surmounts his figure. . at trumpington. this is a favourite specimen with cambridge undergraduates. . at trotton, sussex, to the memory of thomas camoys and elizabeth, his consort; date, . camoys achieved fame at agincourt; his wife was a mortimer. a canopy surmounts each figure. . at west hanney, to the memory of humfrie cheynie; date, . this brass is peculiar; the figure, which is small, stands on a metal rectangle bearing a scriptural text. a rectangular metal frame is placed around the figure, but at some distance. . at ilminster, to the memory of nicholas and dorothy wadham; date, . nicholas is given a ringed cuirass and lamboys over his mail skirt. he stands upon a tablet bearing an inscription which explains that he was the founder of wadham college, oxford. of later mural tablets we need say but little, for there is hardly a cathedral or parish church in the kingdom which is not the proud possessor of one or more specimens. as a rule, these memorials point to the valorous deeds which soldiers of the neighbourhood have performed for their king and country. the south african war, it will be remembered, added considerably to their number, whilst the conflict now raging has already made its contributions. chapter xiii autographs of great soldiers the fascinations of autograph collecting--points which influence the value of an autograph--autographs classified--a "schomberg" letter--the notes scribbled by airey at balaklava--general hints--prices of autographs ninety-nine out of every hundred autographs which find their way into collectors' albums are said to be those of actresses, who are popular favourites to-day but not to-morrow. as a consequence, autograph collecting is seldom considered a serious hobby worthy of the attention of serious-minded people. this seems a great pity, for if letters and documents written and signed by real celebrities are collected, not only may much pleasure be gained from the pastime, but a great deal of instruction as well. the wise collector will find that his best plan is to specialize in one definite direction, and if he follows our advice he will limit his interests to autographs of great soldiers. perhaps he will argue that military signatures are so seldom met with, and so expensive to obtain when they are offered for sale, that his treasures will not accumulate fast enough. this, however, is a matter on which he need have no fears, especially now that the great european conflict has created so vast an output of military correspondence. the value of an autograph naturally depends on a number of factors. the eminence of the writer is, of course, the first consideration, but the price will also depend on whether the signature is normally written, whether it was written before notoriety came to the writer, and the state of preservation of both paper and ink. can the celebrity be considered a prolific letter-writer? this is another question which influences the value of an autograph, for according to the rarity of an individual's signatures, so will the price be affected. we say, above, that the eminence of a writer is the first consideration in deciding the value of his signature. we should be very diffident, however, at explaining just what factors make for eminence. it certainly is not rank alone, nor even ability; perhaps we may best describe it as being in the "public eye." the autograph-hunter does not seek for signatures alone: he casts around for entire letters, documents, and signed papers of every description; it is thus clear that the importance of the communication plus the autograph should be taken into account when pricing treasures. for the sake of convenience, we may classify the specimens in our collections under the following heads:-- . signatures, unaccompanied by other written matter. . signatures appended to short letters or documents; the body of the matter being typed, printed, or written by a private secretary. . signatures appended to short letters or documents which have been wholly written by the celebrity in question. (such are known to collectors as holographs.) . as no. , but letters or documents of some length. [illustration: facsimile of a portion of the letter written by cromwell to lenthall, speaker of the house of commons, announcing the victory of naseby. (_from the original in the british museum._)] of the above four classes, the specimens coming within the first are obviously the least valuable, for they are the most frequently met. copies may be found on the fly-leaves of books, on photographs of celebrities, etc. the second class, unfortunately, is gradually ousting the third class, since the typewriter is speedily becoming universally used for all but private letters. specimens in the second class are worth a trifle more than those in the first, and a great deal less than those of the third. specimens in class are those which the average collector should aim most at securing; those in class are a trifle too unwieldy for all but the advanced collector. [illustration: a battlefield souvenir. the mug bears two verses of poetry which are somewhat significant, as they reveal the character of the tyrolese peasant and soldier. translated, they run as follows:-- eagle, tyrolese eagle, why are you so red? is it from the sunshine? is it from the red sparkling wine? it is from the red blood of my enemies that i am so red. there are, of course, many ways of arranging an autograph collection, but on no account should the specimens be fixed to the album without adding comments on both the subject-matter of the ms. and the identity of the author. the following letter is given as a specimen. the original is to be found in the royal united service museum:-- "lisburne, _ th march, _. gentlemen, i have this day written another for the battering gunns and morters to be sent over hither. but now having the matter under further consideration doe think it expedient and necessary for their majesties service to send an express herewith. and it is to direct you immediately on receipt hereof to cause eight guns of eighteen and twenty foure pounders with all their equepage, furniture and stores with a good proporcon of boms to be shipped on board a very good, light and nimble saylor. and that the capt. or master be ordered to sayle with them directly for the lough of bellfast. for that wee cannot undertake with any sort of reasonable accomodacon the siege of the fort of charlemount untill those gunns arrive here. and with worke i would gladly have furnished before his majesties coming hither wherefore i pray use all dilligence and expedicon in dispatching away thence the said shipps so fraighted as is herein afore expressed. i am, gentlemen, your very loving friend and servant, schomberg." the letter, we must add, is written in a splendidly clear hand by a clerk, and signed by schomberg. it therefore belongs to class above. under such a document, we might comment as follows: note the quaint grammatical forms, also the spelling which clearly shows that orthography was not an exact science two hundred odd years ago. the use of capital letters is also curious. lastly, we may point out the apparently effeminate ending given to the letter. as to the identity of schomberg, we might write: "marshall schomberg was one of william iii's generals who took part in the irish campaign against james ii. he captured carrickfergus, belfast, newry, and dundalk, although his troops consisted of raw levies. during the battle of the boyne he assisted william in gaining a brilliant victory, but was unfortunately slain towards the end of the encounter." * * * * * [illustration: _translation._ my dear brother, not being allowed to die among my troops, it only remains for me to place my sword in the hands of your majesty. i am your majesty's good brother, napoleon. sedan, _sept. , _. autograph letter written by napoleon iii to william i of germany after the battle of sedan.] as one would expect, the subject-matter of a letter greatly affects its value. the following epistle, written by lord dorchester, is therefore of more than ordinary consideration.[ ] [ ] the original may be seen in the royal united service museum. "culford, _dec. th, _. dear fox, i was only in town for four days and besides the hurry which always attends such a visit to london, i was under the necessity of going to court on wednesday, thursday and friday, which put it out of my power to call on you. from the contemptible effort of the insurrection itself in point of numbers and characters of persons concerned, to the wish of which no importance could have been attached in the minds of the public, but for the unfortunate murder of the worthy and truly respectable lord ----, and for the still more contemptible preparation of arms, or plan of operations on the part of the rebels, it did not appear to me that any blame could be attached either to the civil or military departments of the irish government for not having taken more efficient precautionary measures. from the documents you transmitted to me, it is clear that no blame can be imputed to you, and from my intimate knowledge of some of the persons confidentially employed in the civil line, i should with difficulty believe any charge of want of activity or capacity in that quarter. it is certainly a mark of weakness in a government to create unnecessary alarms, and it has the ill effect of shaking the public confidence. in this business, however, the irish administration appears rather to have erred on the other side, but i am persuaded that this error proceeded from a recollection of the mischiefs which a very contrary line of conduct had produced a few years ago in that unfortunate country. i shall send your papers by the coach by my porter in town, and direct him to forward them to you. believe me, with great regard, dear fox, most faithfully yours, cornwallis." of still greater value are the following priceless notes, scribbled in pencil during action, by major-general sir richard airey, k.c.b., q.m.g., and sent to the earl of lucan who commanded the cavalry division at balaklava, october , . "(_a_) cavalry to take ground to left of nd line of redouts occupied by turks. rd. airey, _q.m.-genl_." "(_b_) cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover heights. they will be supported by infantry which has been ordered to advance on two fronts. r. airey." "(_c_) lord raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. troop of horse artillery may accompany. french cavalry is on your left. immediate. r. airey."[ ] [ ] these three most interesting autograph notes are also to be seen in the royal united service museum. before concluding these notes we may give some general hints. preserve all facsimile signatures which are to be found; they are useful for purposes of comparison when doubtful originals come along. the signature should never be cut from a document; the whole sheets should be preserved. an original letter ought not to be pasted on to the album. it is far better to fix it in position by slipping it under "ears" or bands of paper pasted to the pages. to restore a faded signature, dab it carefully with a solution of hot tincture of gall containing a trace of dissolved potassium chlorate. when dry, dab it with a pad moistened in ordinary lime water. the process is simple, but it is well to experiment on a useless specimen before treating valuable ones. valuable documents which are torn and perhaps crumbling may be prevented from deteriorating further by sandwiching between two sheets of glass, and binding with passe-partout edging. in deciding whether a document is genuine or not, the composition of the ink and the texture of the paper should be taken into consideration. forgers find great difficulty in matching papers made more than fifty years ago. great care should be used to discriminate between the autographs of people possessing similar names (e.g. kitchener, the writer on cookery matters, must not be confounded with kitchener, the soldier). [illustration: william of orange. duke of wellington. general wolfe. earl roberts. king albert of belgium. general sir ralph abercromby. george washington. some autographs of noted soldiers.] * * * * * lastly, it may be useful to give a list of some of the prices realized by military and allied autographs at public sales, etc., in order that the collector may gain some rough idea of the value of his treasures. (a.l.s. means autograph letter, signed; d.s. means document, signed; l.s. means letter, the signature only of which is in the handwriting of the celebrity.) _abercromby, sir ralph._--british general; killed in egypt, . d.s., s. d. a.l.s., with portrait attached, £ . _allen, capt. wm._--of the niger expedition. a.l.s., s. _alva, ferd. alvarez, duke of._--spanish general; oppressed the netherlands; executed the counts egmont and horn. l.s., two guineas. _amalfi, duke of._--imperial marshal commander-in-chief after wallenstein. died, . l.s., s. _anne, queen._--d.s., a privy council letter; signed also by buckingham, schomberg, and nine other peers, s. d. _auchmuty, sir samuel._--english general; died, . d.s., s. _barkstead, colonel john._--cromwell's governor of the tower, executed . d.s., s. d. _barrington, viscount._--secretary of war; died, . a.l.s., s. d. _beaver, p. capt._--with nelson at trafalgar. a.l.s., s. d. _blücher._--the famous prussian field-marshal. l.s., s. _bonaparte, c. louis napoleon._--emperor. a.l.s., two guineas. _burnaby, capt. fred._--author of "a ride to khiva." a.l.s., s. d. _charles i._--king of england. d.s., £ s. _cromwell, oliver._--d.s., £ . _dorchester, lord guy carleton._--l.s., s. _egmont and horn, counts._--executed by duke of alva. l.s., signed by both. sixteen guineas. _gordon, general._--killed in the soudan. a.l.s., two guineas. _kempenfelt, admiral._--perished in the royal george. d.s., one guinea.[ ] [ ] h. t. scott, "autograph collecting," part iii. [illustration: an old mug bearing the famous picture depicting "the death of wolfe."] chapter xiv war postage stamps the earliest war stamps--stamps used in the crimean war--the british army post office corps--the sudan expedition--the south african campaign--the great war--recent war stamps and post-marks--indian war stamps--other war stamps among the many thousand varieties of postage stamps which philatelists treasure few can compare in point of interest with those which have carried letters from the firing line to the fireside. such specimens are sought after not merely by the stamp-collector, but by the general collector of military curios. war postage stamps date back to the middle of the sixteenth century, their originator being a certain johann von taxis who, a few years before the death of martin luther, obtained permission to carry letters from civilians in germany to members of a german expeditionary force then fighting in italy. the frank marks which this royal prince applied to the correspondence entrusted to him, constitute the first war postage stamps of which we have any record. of british war stamps, probably the earliest specimens are those which came to england on the letters written by the soldiers who fought in the crimea. soon after the british army was landed on the shores of the black sea, the government sent out eleven postal officials, who established a head office at constantinople and branch depots at balaklava and scutari. the staff was properly equipped with all the necessary impedimenta for maintaining a postal service between the expeditionary army and the people at home. letters from england were received and transmitted to the various regimental headquarters; mails for the mother-country were gathered in and sent on their journey westwards, whilst supplies of unused adhesive stamps were retailed to the soldiers at the three offices mentioned above. the stamps which the officials sold comprised the following then current british specimens:-- d. red, issue, no perforations, with small crown as watermark. d. reddish-brown, issue, perforated, with large crown as watermark. d. blue, issue, no perforations, with small crown as watermark. d. blue, issue, perforated, with large crown as watermark. d. rose-carmine, issue, with large garter as watermark. d. lilac, issue, with embossed head. specimens of the above which franked the correspondence of members of the crimean expeditionary force may be recognized by the distinctive obliteration marks which were as follows:-- . a crown placed between two stars with straight bars above and below, the whole forming an oval. . a star placed between the cyphers; then as no. . . a circle containing the inscription "post office, british army," together with the date. [illustration: a soldier's communication posted during the south african war.] [illustration: a similar communication from "somewhere in france."] in , a british army post office corps was formed by colonel du plat taylor for service under general wolseley in egypt. the men were chosen from the old th middlesex, a regiment better known as the post office volunteers. the party landed at alexandria, but soon proceeded to ismailia where a base was established. from these headquarters a number of field offices sprang up, but their positions altered as the army moved forward. there is no doubt that the duties performed by this postal corps gave much satisfaction, both to the troops and the authorities at home, for its services were again requisitioned when the suakim expedition set out under the leadership of sir gerald graham. the stock of stamps taken to egypt consisted of the current d. lilac and ½d. blue of england, but those used during the expedition were obliterated by a hand stamp bearing either a number of dots shaped to form a small lozenge, or a circle containing the inscription "british army post office, egypt," and the date. obliterations bearing dates in belong to the suakim expedition. when kitchener went to the sudan in , the egyptian government set up a postal department at wadi haifa camp for the special use of the british and egyptian forces. the stamps sold on this occasion were the current egyptian labels, but they were overprinted with the word "soudan" in both french and arabic. unfortunately, many forged overprints have been added to genuine egyptian stamps of the higher values, so that collectors must be cautious when purchasing specimens. of the work of the army post office corps in south africa during the last boer war much interesting matter could be written. mr. f. j. melville gives the following description in his capital book "the postage stamp in war" (price one shilling). "major sturgeon was succeeded in the command of the army postal corps by his second in command, captain viall. on the death of the latter in , captain g. w. treble of the london postal service took the command, which he held at the outbreak of the south african war in , aided by captain w. price (now colonel w. price, c.m.g., in command of the army post office with the british expeditionary force in france) and lieutenant h. m'clintock, these latter officers belonging to the secretary's office of the g.p.o., london. a first portion of the company with captain treble left england with general buller and his staff, and the rest followed on october st, and several further detachments went out with later contingents. in south africa they had a very wide area to cover. at the outset captain treble established himself with the headquarters of the inspector-general of communications in cape colony, and moved about keeping in close touch with the movements of the forces, an important part of his duties being to forward to the various offices the information necessary to ensure the correct circulation of the mails. captain price was at cape town, and lieutenant m'clintock at pietermaritzburg. "the british military mails were made up in the london g.p.o. in special bags addressed to the army post office, and sent to the g.p.o. at cape town, in which building the detachment of the army postal corps under captain price had established its base office. the bags containing military mails were handed over to the army base post office at cape town, whence they were distributed to the various military post offices established at the centres of the troops, and to field post offices with each brigade or division in the field. in the return direction the soldiers' letters were handed in at field post offices and forwarded through various channels, sometimes ordinary and ofttimes military, to the base at cape town, whence they were dispatched to england in the ordinary way." early in , the average weekly mail from london to the field forces was bags of letters, post-cards, etc., and boxes of parcels; the incoming mail from the field forces was bags of letters per week. in a letter dated from cape town, february th, from lieutenant preece, who went out with reinforcements for the army post office corps in february, are some interesting glimpses of the difficulties of the work of this service:-- "price, of the post office corps, met us and told us (captain) palmer was to leave at once for kimberley with men, (captain) labouchere and (lieutenant) curtis to proceed on to natal with men, and i was to take the remainder ashore here (cape town) and stop to help at the base. at . on monday morning i marched off with my men to the main barracks, and bade good-bye to the good ship _canada_ and her merry cargo. after lodging the men in barracks i went off to the g.p.o., where i found price and his men ensconced in one huge wing, overwhelmed with work, and at breaking-down point. the mails every week increase now, and we have , pieces of mail matter to sort and distribute every week, over a country larger than france, among a shifting population of soldiers, each of whom expects to get his letters as easily as he gets his rations. it is a vast job, and we have done wonderfully so far with a totally inadequate staff." for readers who require further details of the army post office arrangements during the boer war, it may be mentioned that the contemporary reports of the postmaster-general contain very full and interesting accounts. such reports, if out of print, can usually be perused in the better-class public libraries. the stamps which franked the soldiers' letters were usually of the british lilac penny variety, bearing the familiar head of queen victoria, whilst the obliterations were circular or hexagonal, and contained the inscription "army post office, south africa." but the bulk of the letters reached england with no adhesive stamp, the words, "on active service, no stamps available," proving a sufficient passport in cases where supplies were genuinely unprocurable. envelopes which are stampless, but which bear one or other of the south african field postmarks, command a fair value, and copies should figure in every collection specially devoted to war stamps. when bloemfontein fell into the hands of the british the stock of orange free state adhesives was overprinted v.r.i. and, later on, e.r.i., and when the union jack was unfurled in pretoria the stamps of the south african republic were provided with similar overprints. all these labels were used by the civilians as well as the military authorities; and as many of the soldiers posted their communications in the ordinary letter-boxes, it is impossible to decide which possess a war interest and which do not. among the most treasured adhesives provided by the south african war are the "mafeking besieged" issues. as is well known, certain of these were produced by a photographic process and revealed the portrait of general baden-powell. gibbons urges collectors to be wary in purchasing copies, as numerous well-executed forgeries emanated from kimberley and cape town, and many officers and men returning home from the front were swindled by the dishonest dealers. [illustration: some historic post-marks used on military correspondence. . and . crimean postmarks. . napier's abyssian expedition, - . . egyptian campaign, . . dongola expedition. . and . south african war, . . british army in france, . . canadian " " . indian " " ] on the outbreak of the european war in august , the army post office corps again became active, and the quantity of letters and parcels which it was called upon to handle from the very outset must be described as prodigious. it is quite impossible to record all the varieties of british military stamps and post-marks which have resulted from these hostilities, but they may be classified under the following heads:-- . stamps of the united kingdom bearing postmarks indicating use in france, belgium, and other foreign countries. . post-marks of the army post office at the base or in the field. there are numerous varieties. . censor marks applied to envelopes, etc. . postmarks applied to correspondence from prisoners of war and aliens' camps. of course, many interesting colonial varieties have also resulted from the war. the following are among the most highly prized:-- . gold coast stamps obliterated with post-marks from togoland. . german colonials from samoa overprinted g.r.i. . new zealand stamps bearing the overprint "samoa." . german colonials from togo overprinted "anglo-french occupation." . canadian stamps obliterated with post-marks bearing the inscription "canadian overseas expeditionary force." . indian stamps overprinted i.e.f. (indian expeditionary force). whilst speaking of indian stamps, it may be appropriate to mention that the army postal service possessed by our troops in this asiatic empire is probably the most carefully planned in the whole world. from a field service manual[ ] on "posts and telegraphs" we have been able to glean a few details respecting the organization and establishment of the indian military post offices. in times of peace, a stock of tents and equipment sufficient for the supply of three base post offices, first-class field post offices, second-class field post offices, and for the supervising staff is kept in store at lahore in the charge of the postal department of the punjab. [ ] quoted from _stamp collecting_, december , . on the outbreak of war the military postal service is organized by the director-general of posts and telegraphs in india according to the requirements of the army authorities. the supervising staff is selected by him from a roll of european volunteers for such service maintained in his office, the full war establishment consisting of directors or deputy-directors, assistant-directors, inspectors, and postmasters. the rest of the establishment is selected by the postmaster-general of the punjab. one director or deputy-director, two assistant-directors, and four inspectors constitute the normal postal personnel of an expeditionary force. they wear the ordinary field service uniform of the indian army according to their respective ranks, distinguished by the word "post" on the shoulder-straps. the following extracts from the indian army order, no. , dated november , , are of interest:-- " . the director or deputy-director, or, in his absence, the postmaster-general under whose orders he is to work, should, on receipt of the first intimation that a force is to be mobilized, take the earliest opportunity to consult the general officer appointed to command the force, as to the postal requirements of the force in respect of the number of field post offices, the classes of postal business to be undertaken, the establishment to be provided, etc. as far as possible, the wishes of the general officer commanding should be carried out. " . the director-general will arrange that the treasury nearest to the base office is supplied with about ten times its normal supply of ordinary postage stamps (including post-cards and envelopes) together with a suitable supply of service stamps (including post-cards and envelopes); and that a sufficient stock is maintained throughout the campaign. the base post office should thus be in a position to supply at once the postage stamps required in the field post offices. if there is no treasury at hand, a sufficient supply of postage stamps of all descriptions must be kept at the base post office. the base post office will be supplied with an iron safe, or two, if necessary. " . the requisite stamps, scales, bags, and other articles of stock sufficient for six months' requirements will be furnished to the base post office for its own use, and for distribution, under the orders of the director or deputy-director, to field post offices. section b shows the books, forms, stamps, etc., required for field post offices. all books, forms, and articles of stock should be packed in the prescribed mule trunks, each of which, when packed, should not exceed one maund in weight. the books, forms, and stamps required by the base post office will be the same as those used by a head office in india performing the same classes of business; but in addition to the ordinary stamps it will be supplied with a special 'postage cancelled' stamp." * * * * * of foreign war stamps, the international quarrels of the last fifty years have produced quite an interesting array. envelopes posted in paris during the siege of bearing the words "par ballon monté" are much prized by collectors. less sought after are the alsace and lorraine stamps which were primarily issued for use by the invading german troops of . their low price is probably due to the fact that the dies were printed from long after the stamps were withdrawn from currency. from the balkans we, of course, have many specimens which enrich our collections. italy, also, has given us war stamps bearing the overprints "bengasi" and "tripoli di barberia." if we turn to the united states, many interesting postal relics will be discovered of the civil war, whilst numerous varieties of more recent stamps from the states are to be found showing post-marks referring to the spanish war in the philippines and cuba. then there are japanese adhesives which were used in china during the fighting which led to the peace of shimonoseki, and, of course, the japanese issues which the troops used whilst engaging the russians must not be overlooked. lastly, we may point to south and central america, a continent where war labels are almost as plentiful as those issued in times of peace. [illustration: a post-card received from a soldier in france bearing stereotyped greetings.] in the foregoing notes we have merely indicated, in a general way, the sources from which war stamps have emanated. sufficient, however, has been said to show that these relics of strife and bloodshed provide material for the collector of a highly fascinating character. chapter xv war money french obsidional notes--mafeking notes--the napoleonic assignats--charles ii and university plate--mints at carlisle, beeston, scarborough, newark, colchester, and pontefract--irish gun money just as there are many postage stamps which owe their origin to the stern necessities of war, so there are a great number of coins, tokens, notes, etc., which have found their way into circulation as a result of the belligerent attitude of armies. all such examples of war money are extremely interesting and well worth collecting. the conflict which is raging at the time of writing has already produced a certain amount of war money, notably in the northern part of france. in this area many small towns and villages have found themselves despoiled of their metal currency, with the consequence that paper money has been issued, under authority, to meet the temporary demands of the outraged inhabitants. among the illustrations of this book, two such paper notes, coming from epernay, are included; it is safe to say that in time to come these and similar issues will be much sought for. another interesting case of paper money which owed its inception to the needs of war is the mafeking currency, issued by baden-powell during the famous siege by the boers, which lasted from october , , to may , . the face value of the mafeking notes was £ , s., s., and s., but copies now change hands at considerably enhanced prices. the issue of paper money is no new idea; the french resorted to the practice in napoleon's time, as they had also done during the life of the republic which came into being on september , . this latter body issued notes, termed "assignats," of five different denominations, ranging in value from about a sovereign to forty pounds. the assignats, it may be stated, were dishonoured by the succeeding government, and people who held them lost their money. the writer possesses a few specimens which were given him, many years ago, by an old french lady whose family had fallen from affluence to humble circumstances solely through the dishonouring of these paper notes. but the most interesting war currency which we have so far discovered is the obsidional money of the great rebellion of - . historical data of this period is too well known to need repetition here, and it is sufficient to say that charles, after he suffered defeat at naseby, was forced to withdraw his troops to certain castles and towns throughout the land. from these strongholds he made occasional sallies, but a depleted exchequer always hampered his movements. [illustration: money of the great rebellion, - . ( . newark sixpence-- . colchester gold half unite-- . pontefract two-shilling piece-- . ormond half-crown-- . dublin crown of charles ii.)] in order to obtain sufficient money to finance the army, charles begged the universities of oxford and cambridge to give him their collections of plate, which he intended to melt down and recast as silver currency. "the university of oxford and the majority of its colleges sent their plate, which was safely conveyed to the king, but that of the university of cambridge was not sent, although many of the individual colleges contributed theirs. the treasures of st. john's and magdalen, however, never reached their destination, but were seized by cromwell whilst in transit to nottingham."[ ] charles had many wealthy followers, however, and these were only too ready to help on the cause of the royalists by sacrificing their silver ware. [ ] dr. nelson, "obsidional money of the great rebellion," p. . with such supplies of metal the king was able to establish mints at carlisle, beeston castle, scarborough, lathom house, newark, colchester, and pontefract. the money supplied by these mints was used for paying the soldiers and buying material; it was also more or less honoured in the surrounding villages. "the coins were usually struck upon irregular pieces of plate, cut from trenchers, platters, cups, etc., of silver, in place of being struck upon flans specially prepared by melting down the plate. this is only what one would expect, under the trying circumstances in which the various garrisons found themselves placed. that this was the case is clearly proved by the many examples existing, upon which traces of the original decoration are still visible, in some instances even, particularly upon examples issued at scarborough, the rim of the dish being still to be seen at the edge of the piece."[ ] [ ] dr. nelson, "obsidional money of the great rebellion," p. . dr. philip nelson tells us that about christmas-time, , the inhabitants of carlisle were asked to take their silver plate to the mint, situated in the town, which they cheerfully did. the quantity of silver plate which was so obtained amounted to , oz. it was made up of the following items, which possess for the reader of to-day both a pathetic and an amusing interest. the item of "widdow orpheur, four spoons," truly a case of the widow's mite, and sir henry fletcher's tankard, tumbler, and wine "bowles" strike us as being particularly worthy of note. _may the th_ a list of all the plaite brought in to be coyned with the weight thereof. will: atkinson. alder one winde mill boule, a oz. trencher salt & three spoones wt / widdow craister one beare boule one beaker one wine boule and six spoones wt / julien aglionby one boule wt / edmond kidd bowles wt / thomas kidd one boule wt / will: wilson tenner one bowle one beaker wt / thomas lowrie spoones wt robert sewell one spoone wt / collnell kirkebride one bowle spoones wt mary carlile one bowle and spoones wt / edward dalton one bowle one tumbler & peeces of broken plate wt / mrs chambers beare boules and one wine boule wt / mr glaisters beare bowles & spoones wt / widdow baines junior one bowle spoones wt / / thomas jackson one bowle & spoones wt / / thomas monke one bowle wt josph jefferson one bowle wt mr edward orpheur one bowle spoons wt / john orbell bowles one gilt bowle and spoones wt / widdow orpheur spoons wt / mr edward fountaìne one bowle one salt and spoones wt / mr richard wilson gilt bowle wt / thomas craggill wine bowles and silver spoons wt henry monke one beaker spoons wt / thomas tallentyre one bowle spoones wt / captaine aglionby one bowle wt / / sir thomas glemham candlesticks wt / mr george barwicke one bowle spoones wt / robert james one bowle wt / isabeil holliday one sugardish wt / sir henry fletcher one tankard one salt tumbler wine bowles spoones wt / / capt: cape beare bowles gilt salts one colledge pott one can gilt one gilt beaker wt mr fredericke tonstall one dozen / of plate wt mrs tullie spoones wt / john tomlinson one bowle wt edward james one bowle wt / / sr will: dalston one greate salt one lesser salt one bowle spoones wt / mr leo: dykes one bowle one tankard spoones wt / mr lewis west bowle wt / / sr tho: dacre bowles wt / capt johnson one tankard one salt wt the citties plate flaggons gilt bowles one gilt salt beare bowles wt -------------- / / received in plate oz - / - / at s per oz delivered to mr dykes i resting in or hands i - - stamped out of oz. - / - / at s per oz gayned by coyning at s per oz lost in meltynge and working (endorsed) may the th . a note of plate coyned the carlisle money had the appearance of roughly made coinage, but that coming from the beeston mint was innocent of even such resemblance. at this mint, thin pieces of silver were cut into fragments, weighed and then stamped with whatever value tallied with the weight. thus we find not only two-shilling pieces, shilling pieces, and so on, but sevenpenny pieces, tenpenny pieces, and pieces valued at thirteen-pence. there was, we may add, but one face to all these coins. the beeston money did not bear any wording to show that it was coined at this castle, but simply bore a stamped impression of the castle gateway. the scarborough mint was no better equipped than that at beeston, and what we have said of the latter applies also to the former. there is just this to be mentioned of the scarborough pieces: "the reverse of the coins is blank, save for the few specimens which bear engraved upon them the words obs-scarborough- , which engraving, however, may possibly not be contemporary with the siege, but may have been added subsequently, as a memorial, about the date of the restoration."[ ] [ ] dr. nelson, "obsidional money of the great rebellion," p. . the newark money was much better fashioned. it was not circular nor irregular, but lozenge-shaped. the front faces usually bore the royal crown, the letters c.r., and the value in pence, whilst the rear faces showed the date and the words obs-newark. there were no coins for odd amounts as there were at beeston. [illustration: gun money of james ii. ( . sixpence-- . sixpence-- . shilling-- . shilling-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown.)] colchester turned out various grades of money. the gold half-unite was circular and of fairly good workmanship, but the silver shilling and the silver nine-penny piece were shaped variously and poor in quality. the best coinage of all came from pontefract, where the siege money was struck not only for charles i but also for charles ii. the designs were all enclosed within a circle, but the shape of the metal was circular, lozenge-shaped, and hexagonal. both faces of the coins were ornamented. * * * * * other siege money which we must note came from ireland, and grew out of the rebellion, headed by phelim o'neill, which rose in , when some forty thousand men, women, and children were cruelly massacred by the confederated catholics. this self-constituted body--followers of charles--drew up many decrees: we need mention here but one:-- "it is this day ordered by this assembly, that coin and plate shall be raised and established in this kingdom, according to the rates and values hereafter mentioned, and that there shall be forthwith coined the sum of four thousand pounds, to pass currant in and through this kingdom, according to a proclamation." accordingly, special coinage was struck at kilkenny, bandon, kinsale, youghal, and cork, whilst lord inchquin and the marquis of ormond minted money which was popularly named after them. the inchquin coins possess no claims to beauty nor even good workmanship, but the ormond money is certainly bold in design and fair in construction. another interesting case of war money being coined arose out of the appearance of james ii in ireland during the early part of the year . james had previously issued a patent for minting money to sir john knox, but on arriving in ireland he seized the latter's coining apparatus and set up his own mints in dublin and limerick. a most interesting proclamation which he published in the year explained the measures he proposed to adopt for debasing the coinage; we give it _in extenso_:-- "whereas, for remedy of the present scarcity of money in this our kingdom, and that our standing forces may be the better paid and subsisted, and that our subjects of this realm may be the better enabled to pay and discharge the taxes, excise, customs, rents, and other debts and duties, which are or shall be hereafter payable to us: we have ordered a certain quantity of copper and brass money to be coyned to pass currant in this our kingdom during our pleasure, in six penny pieces: each piece having on one side the effigies or figure of our head, with this inscription round jacobus ii dei gratia, and upon the other side, the stamp or impression of cross-sceptres and a crown between j.r. with vi above, the month wherein they are coyned below, with this inscription round, mag. brit. fran. & hiber. rex. , and fringed round, each of the said pieces to be of the metal of copper and brass; all which pieces of money we have thought fit, by the advice of our privy council, to make currant money within this our kingdom. we do therefore hereby publish and declare, by the advice aforesaid, that the said pieces of copper and brass coyned, or hereafter to be coyned by our said order marked and stampt as aforesaid, shall pass during our pleasure, as currant money amongst all our subjects within our realm, and in all payments to be made either to us, or from us, or to or from any of our subjects within this kingdom, according to the rates following: that is to say, each of the said pieces called six penny pieces, marked and stamped as aforesaid, to pass for six pence: the said pieces to pass at the rates aforesaid, for the interest which hereafter shall fall due for such mortgages and debts due by records, bills, bonds, or obligations, and likewise for any of the said principal debts so secured where the debtor or his goods are, or shall be taken in execution for the same, and we do hereby strictly charge and command all and every of our subjects of this kingdome to take and receive in all payments to be made to them (excepting as aforesaid) the said pieces of money according to the rates aforesaid, hereby declaring that such of our subjects within this kingdom as shall refuse the said pieces of copper and brass money at the rates aforesaid (excepting as aforesaid) being tendered to them for payment, shall be punished according to the utmost rigour of the law, as contemners of our royal prerogative and command. provided always, that this our proclamation shall not be construed, to oblige any merchant or merchants, importing any goods into this kingdom, to receive upon the first sale of such goods so imported, any of the said copper or brass money: and whereas we have caused the said copper and brass money to be made currant money for present necessity, and therefore do not intend that the same shall continue for any long time. we do, by this our royal proclamation, promise and engage to all our subjects here that as soon as the said money shall be decried and made null, that we shall thereupon receive from all and every our subjects within this kingdom such proportion of the said money as shall be, and remain in their respective hands at the time the same shall be so decried and made null: and at the same time either allow for the same to them the value thereof, at the rates aforesaid, out of what rent, duties or debts, they respectively shall owe to us, or to make them full satisfaction for the same according to the rates aforesaid, in gold or silver of the currant coyne of this kingdom. given at our court, at dublin-castle, the eighteenth day of june, , and in the fifth year of our reign. by the king." [illustration: gun money of james ii. ( . shilling-- . shilling-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . crown-- . crown-- . limerick farthing.)] a certain amount of trouble was, of course, experienced by the king in obtaining sufficient supplies of metal to meet his somewhat rapacious lust for coining. after his own stores were exhausted he cast around for additional supplies and the following candid letter reveals his method of procedure:-- "our will and pleasure is, that you forthwith deliver to the commissioners of the mint those two brass canons now lying in the court of this our castle marked etc. weighing etc. and for soe doeing this shall be your warrant. given at our court at dublin-castle, this eleventh day of july, , and in the fifth year of our reign. to our trusty and wel-beloved cozen and counsellor justin lord viscount mount cashel, master general of our ordnance." this second letter, dealing with the same matter, is also worthy of note:-- "sir, we have great occasion for his majesty's use to procure as much hamered or forged copper and brass as your parts can afford, and judging by the decay of trade and desolation of the country, that there may bee a great deale in your district or port, we desire you, by yourself and officers, to inform us presently what quantity you may bee able to furnish us with, and what the currant prices are of each. and whatever you can gett, buy at the best rates you can, and as soon as you have four or five hundred weight pray send it to us the commissioners of his majesty's mint, at the mint-house in capel-street, dublin, and what you pay shall bee allowed you in your accounts at the custom house, so doing you'll oblige, yours, &c." a third letter, which we give below, was written by one of the king's emissaries who, with other trusty servants, was sent out to scour the country for further supplies of metal suitable for coining into gun-money. "limerick, _jan. the th, _. sir, last tuesday, the carriages parted from hence with six thousand six hundred weight of gunn mettle, six hundred a quarter and two pounds of fine pewter, and a thousand weight of steele, they will be eleven or twelve days a goeing because the roads are very deep--the pewter cost ten pence per pound, and steele six pence. you may expect very soone a farther supply of mettle for i have made an agreement with two eminent dealers from corke who have five or six thousand weight of copper and brass which they are to send here. i must have an order from the lords of the treasury, for sending it to your mint: there are foure or five broken bells in the country, which i can have if you send an order for seizing them for the king's use: there is an useless cannon at gallway, and one or two at kingsaile: i forgot to send you some of our coyne as you desired, by the next occasion i will not faile. i cannot buy fine pewter now under eleven or twelve pence the pound, for they say that you give fourteen or fifteen pence in dublin, the rates for carriage from hence to dublin is eight shillings the hundred weight. i rest your humble servant, wat plunkett. to john trindar esq." summing up james's treatment of the coinage in ireland, dr. nelson says: "such a debasement of a country's coinage as we have seen above must ever be regarded as a sign of national weakness: also, from the sense of insecurity so engendered, it must inevitably bring disaster in its train, and such a fate overtook the cause of james alike in ireland and in england. it was doubtless the intention of king james to redeem his gun-money coins, month by month, as opportunity permitted. circumstances, however, decreed otherwise, as after the battle of the boyne he departed for france and was compelled to leave his adherents to their fate."[ ] [ ] dr. nelson, "the coinage of ireland in copper, tin, and pewter," p. . with the advent of william and mary, the gun-money of james was re-valued at rates which were practically ruinous to those who held any but small quantities of it. the proclamation ran as follows:-- "having taken into our consideration the great oppressions and abuses committed by our enemies in this our kingdom of ireland, by coyning and making currant brass money of copper or mixt metal, and raising the value thereof to an extravagant height, thereby to enable them to continue the war against us, and to impoverish our loving subjects in our said kingdom: we have therefore thought it necessary to put stop thereto, and to the end that such part of the said copper or mix't metal money, which remains in the hands of our said subjects, may not be wholly lost, we have thought fit to reduce the former value of the said copper money, to the value or standard of the like copper money formerly currant in this our kingdom, and accordingly we do hereby will and require all our subjects, within our said kingdom of ireland, to take and receive all such copper or mix't metal money, lately coined in the mint erected in our city of dublin, at the several and respective valuations following, and that the same do pass currant in exchange of money, and for all manner of goods and provisions whatsoever, and shall be received by all the officers and collectors of our customs, excise, or other branches of our revenue accordingly, viz. "the large half-crown of copper money, together with the crown pieces, of like metal and weight, lately stamp'd shall pass at one penny sterling. "the small half-crown of copper, lately stamp'd shall pass at three farthings. "the large copper shilling shall pass at a half-penny sterling. "the small shilling, lately stamped, and sixpence, shall pass each at one farthing. "and our will and pleasure is, that all such pewter pence, as have been lately coyned in the said mint, shall pass for half-pence, and all the half-pence of the like metal, stamped in the said mint, shall pass currant for farthings. "which several sorts of coyn shall be deemed as currant money at the rates before mentioned, in all payments whatsoever within this our kingdom. given at our camp by dublin, this tenth day of july, , in the second year of our reign." [illustration: paper money of the french republic, .] in the limited space at our disposal, we have not been able to give more than an outline sketch of the various moneys under discussion. the student, however, will find detailed accounts of every coin issued during the great rebellion, and later by james ii in ireland, in dr. philip nelson's two most interesting works, (_a_) "the obsidional money of the great rebellion," and (_b_) "the copper coinage of ireland." chapter xvi curios made by prisoners of war objects recently made in holland--the napoleonic prisoners at norman cross, perth, dartmoor, stapleton, liverpool, and greenland valleyfield ever since the days when enemy soldiers and sailors were first interned for protracted periods of time, it has been a practice for the incarcerated men to while away the tedium by making little odds and ends of things as souvenirs. their wares are often of extreme interest, as they help us to gain some idea of the class of people who have been interned on particular occasions and the ability and skill they possessed. at the present moment, objects of no little interest are gradually finding their way into england, which have been made by the men interned in holland who evacuated antwerp after its fall, and, no doubt, many will be the treasures which our brave soldiers will bring back with them when they are freed from the concentration camps in germany. needless to say, all such curios will be valued by the collector more and more as time rolls on. in the present chapter, we shall confine our remarks to the handiwork of the french and spanish prisoners captured during the napoleonic wars, because sufficient of it has been preserved to engage the attention of the treasure-hunter. one word of caution is necessary, at the outset: such objects are easily counterfeited, and, on this account, must only be bought from reputable people unless documentary proof of genuineness is forthcoming. the napoleonic prisoners were quartered in various districts of england, and for many years on end, thus our statements can only be made generally. the chief settlement was at norman cross, near peterborough, and, though the huge and dingy buildings which served as prisons no longer stand, the place is marked by a cross which was unveiled on july , . the craft of the peterborough prisoners ranked high, as visitors to the local museums will readily acknowledge. their wares were chiefly made out of the beef-bones left over from their rations. the writer treasures a most exquisitely made set of dominoes carved from bone and ornamented by brush, quill, and knife which came from this settlement. a photograph of the set is given among the illustrations of the present work, but the delicate tracery and the coloured panels of the box have lost much of their charm in the process of reproduction. there is nothing unfinished about the dominoes; each is perfectly squared and the dots are scooped out and coloured with black enamel. when one remembers that the tools at the disposal of the workers were few and primitive, their productions must be accepted as truly marvellous. another example of the work of these men which is worth mentioning is to be seen in the peterborough museum; it consists of a miniature bone or perhaps ivory guillotine, perfect in every detail. [illustration: obsidional half-franc note of epernay.] [illustration: obsidional franc note of epernay.] perhaps it will be well to mention that the inhabitants of peterborough displayed much interest in the frenchmen's art, and a regular market was held daily within the prison walls from ten to midday, whilst history records that as much as two hundred pounds was given in a week for these curios. at perth, another of the concentration centres, the products of the prisoners consisted of carved boxes, wooden and bone puzzles, toys and strawplait goods. indeed, the skill which the men displayed in this latter class of production was so high that it outclassed all local work of a similar nature. from straw which was dipped in various coloured dyes these clever workmen made tableaux of a most gorgeous nature and framed them with carefully shaped pieces of wood. they also dug up the clay in the courtyards and modelled it into little statuettes of sailors, soldiers, and people of notoriety, whilst they cut pieces from their clothes and worked them into ornamental slippers. their ingenuity did not stop here, for they forged bank-notes to while away their tedious hours, and foisted them on to those who came to the prison market. in this matter the following quotation from the _perth courier_ of september , , is interesting:[ ]-- "we are sorry to learn that the forgery of notes of various banks is carried on by prisoners at the depôt, and that they find means to throw them into circulation by the assistance of profligate people who frequent the market. the eagerness of the prisoners to obtain cash is very great, and as they retain all they procure they have drained the place almost entirely of silver, so that it has become a matter of difficulty to get change of a note. "last week a woman coming from the market at the depôt was searched by an order of captain moriarty, when there was found about her person pieces of base money in imitation of bank tokens (of which the prisoners are suspected to have been the fabricators), to the amount of £ s. after undergoing examination, the woman was committed to gaol." [ ] here quoted from abell, "prisoners of war in britain." the perth prisoners earned for themselves a very bad name, for not only did they counterfeit bank-notes, copies of which are still to be found by collectors, but they fell to all sorts of dishonest practices. a favourite ruse of theirs was to bargain with a customer and then offer to wrap up the goods which were about to change hands. the wrapping-up process was completed out of the unwary purchaser's view, but instead of enclosing the curio they included a lump of clay or piece of wood of similar shape. if the customer came back to complain, the seller was seldom found, and even when he was discovered it took a deal of threatening and verbal eloquence to obtain redress from the defaulter, whose one security was the iron railings which separated him from the outside world. the prisoners at dartmoor also made knick-knacks, but the governor here forbade the sale of woollen mittens, gloves, straw hats or bonnets, plaited straw, shoes, and articles made out of prison stores. at stapleton, outside bristol, the bootmakers of the neighbourhood complained of the sale of shoes in the prison market the prison-made article, however, was usually more a thing of ornamentation than of use, and so the bootmakers' complaint seems somewhat unwarranted. at liverpool, the frenchmen made trinkets, crucifixes, card-boxes, toys, snuff-boxes, horsehair rings, and hair watch-chains, using their own hair in the manufacture of the two latter articles. at the greenland valleyfield prison, the making of straw into strawplait was for a while a profitable pastime, as the following passage shows:[ ]-- "the employer gave out the straw and paid for the worked article, three sous per 'brasse,' a little under six feet. some men could make twelve 'brasses' a day. beaudoin (a sergeant-major of the st line regiment) set to work at it, and in the course of a couple of months became an adept. after four years came the remonstrance of the country people that this underpaid labour by untaxed men was doing infinite injury to them; the government prohibited the manufacture and much misery among the prisoners resulted. from this prohibition resulted the outside practice of smuggling straw into the prison and selling it later as the manufactured article; and a very profitable industry it must have been, for we find that, during the trial of matthew wingrave in , for engaging in the strawplait trade with the prisoners at valleyfield, it came out that wingrave, who was an extensive dealer in the article, had actually moved up there from bedfordshire on purpose to carry on the trade and had bought cornfields for the purpose." [ ] abell, "prisoners of war in britain," p. . thus it is clear that the curios made by prisoners of war embrace a wide range of interesting objects, and that there is much fascination to be had in collecting them. the reader who would know more of the lives, the romances, and the sufferings of these unfortunate men should read francis abell's capital book bearing the title "prisoners of war in britain." [illustration: a newspaper poster which told of welcome news.] [illustration: a set of bone dominoes carved by prisoners taken in the napoleonic wars and interned in the neighbourhood of peterborough.] chapter xvii miscellaneous military curios considerations respecting miscellaneous curios--battlefield souvenirs--regimental colours--odds and ends of dress equipment-- books and newspapers of military interest--royal souvenirs-- official military documents--gruesome relics--relics of the great war among the most acceptable military curios are those which may be classed as miscellaneous; they range from fragments of "black marias" to chocolate tins, and prussian helmets to early copies of the army list. treasures which come under this head are to be found at almost every turn--in sale-rooms, in the shop windows of second-hand dealers, in cottages and mansions, in local museums--almost everywhere, in fact. curiously enough, the military treasures which may be described as miscellaneous are usually to be picked up very cheaply, for there is a much smaller demand for them than there is for such groups of things as medals, firearms, and armour and, of course, the price is regulated by the demand. there is one axiom which must be always kept in view when purchasing odd military curios. it is not sufficient to know, in our own minds, that a certain article is genuine; we must know enough to be able to prove the fact to other collectors or else the "selling-price" value of the treasure will be little more than nothing. of course, with such things as medals, autographs, weapons, etc., it is merely the work of an expert to say whether a certain specimen is genuine or not, but no amount of careful examination can ever decide the authenticity of a certain souvenir said to belong, perhaps, to wellington, or the genuineness of a shot which was supposed to have caused the death of such and such a great soldier. relics of this nature must be backed with good documentary evidence or their value can be but trifling. a case in point may be given by way of an example:-- a soldier recently showed the writer a pocket-knife, bearing the coat-of-arms of cologne, which he picked up on the battlefield of ypres. the soldier naturally valued the knife for its associations, but as a military curio its worth was no more than that of a second-hand, much used, pocket-knife since he could in no way prove how he found it. * * * * * for the sake of method, we have grouped the miscellaneous curios with which we shall deal under certain heads, the first of which is "battlefield souvenirs." these trophies of war are, of course, full of interest; the present conflict has given us a good many specimens such as prussian helmets, german infantry caps, and shells of various calibre. they should all be highly prized as long as they are in good condition and their identity can be established. there are many interesting battlefield souvenirs to be seen in the royal united service museum. one is the railway-station board from tel-el-kebir, which stood in the midst of the fighting on september , , when the british, , strong, attacked and stormed arabi's entrenchments defended by , egyptians. another is a leaden ball found on the spot where major-general james wolfe received his mortal wound on the plains of abraham at the taking of quebec, . a third souvenir is a grape shot found on an embankment on the island of capri, and believed to have been one of those used by the french in the siege of the island. capri, it may be said, was held by the british under sir hudson lowe from to . in the latter year, king murat of naples sent a force of french troops, under general lemarque, to besiege the island, and took it after thirteen days' siege. yet another souvenir which may be described as from the battlefield is an officer's memorandum book. captain f. w. lyons, of the south staffordshire regiment, had this book in his breast-pocket whilst attacking the stockade on the tumbiling river, in penang, in , when it was struck by a bullet with no worse result to captain lyons than a severe bruise on the chest. a fifth exhibit is a piece of the gate of hougomont, which was riddled with bullets during the fighting at waterloo. the last to be mentioned here is a gun used in mafeking during the siege. this gun, so the description added to the exhibit runs, was made in the railway workshops at mafeking during the siege. the core is a steel steam-pipe, round which were lapped bars of iron, which were hammered and turned into their present condition. the trunnions and breech are castings of brass. for the castings, a blast furnace was improvised out of an iron water-tank lined with fire-bricks, the draught being forced through the pipe of a vacuum brake off a railway carriage. the shells of the gun were similarly cast, and were loaded with powder, and exploded by a slow match which was ignited by the flame of the discharge. the powder was also manufactured in mafeking. on one occasion the breech blew out, and was repaired and fixed with the stout iron holding-bands which may be seen connecting the breech to the trunnion-block. the gun was nicknamed "the wolf" after colonel baden-powell, whose nickname this was among the people of the north. =regimental colours.=--under this heading a number of most interesting relics of the battlefield may be grouped. it is true that specimens are never available for the private collector of military curios, but as most cathedrals and many museums possess examples, we cannot pass them over without some mention. the royal united service museum houses a score or more of these trophies of war, but probably the most attractive are the following:-- . drapeau du ^e régiment, formerly le régiment la fére, formed in , taken at bastia, . it is one of the earliest french colours known to be in existence. it is white, with a tri-colour of blue, white, and red in the upper canton, showing that it belonged to the st battalion. it has also a tri-colour border of blue, white, and red on either of the three edges. . drapeau des volontaires du département de la corse, - . also taken at bastia in . it is a tri-colour of blue, white, and red, the blue being on the top, and then the colours white and red. on the one side, within a wreath, are the words "viver, liber. i. o. morire," in gold, evidently the corsican patois for "je meurs pour vivre libre," and on the reverse "republica francese." . a guidon of the nd regiment, , taken in wellington's victory over the french at salamanca. it was brought home and laid at the feet of his royal highness the prince regent by captain lord clinton, th light dragoons, aide-de-camp to the earl of wellington. . a quartette of guidons of the rd light dragoons, circa - , believed to have led the regiment in its celebrated charge at talavera in . the regiment was in anson's brigade, which was ordered by sir arthur wellesley to attack villatte's division, and the rd, starting at a canter and increasing their speed as they advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but in a few minutes came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not perceptible at a distance. the regiment plunged down without a check, men and horses rolling over each other in dreadful confusion. the survivors mounted the opposite bank, by twos and threes, and rallying passed through the midst of villatte's columns, which poured in a fire from each side, and fell upon a brigade of french chasseurs in the rear. the combat was fierce, but short; for fresh troops came up when the rd, already overmatched, could scarcely hold up against the chasseurs. the regiment lost two hundred and seven men and officers, or about half the number that went into action. the facings of the regiment being crimson the first guidon was, as usual, of that hue. for distinction's sake, though hardly in accordance with the regulations, the other guidons were blue. it is impossible to decide with exact certainty the date when they were made, but probably soon after the regiment was renumbered, in .[ ] [ ] the description of these colours are those given with the exhibits. =odds and ends of dress equipment.=--of curios coming within this class the collector should be able to gather quite an abundance of valuable material, ranging from, say, royalist powder-flasks to the sashes worn by celebrated soldiers on historic occasions. the royal united service museum, that treasure-house of military curios, has the following interesting exhibits worthy of mention under this head:-- . the dress worn by tippoo sahib, sultan of mysore, during the siege of seringapatam, in . it is thickly padded with leather, and the head-dress, which has the appearance of green velvet, is in reality a very effective helmet. . a cavalry cloak which belonged to captain nolan, th hussars, who fell in the charge at balaklava. captain nolan was a.d.c. to the quartermaster-general, when he conveyed to brigadier-general the earl of cardigan the famous order for the charge of the light brigade. . an officer's silk sash used in supporting sir john moore when carried in a blanket from the battlefield of coruña to the citadel after he was mortally wounded on january , . . a civilian's hat worn by lieutenant-general sir thomas picton, who commanded the third division at the battle of vittoria, june , , when the french army was totally defeated by the allied armies. he wore the civilian head-dress owing to inflammation of the eyes. . a saddle used by field-marshal prince blücher von wahlstadt at the battle of waterloo. . an umbrella of king prempeh, who was taken prisoner by the british troops under colonel sir francis scott at coomassie in . the umbrella was presented to her late majesty queen victoria.[ ] [ ] the descriptions are those given with the exhibits at the museum. =books and newspapers of military interest.=--in this class quite a wide range of matter is to be found. books on military subjects containing fine illustrations, especially when coloured, are always valuable, and if more than seventy or eighty years old are never likely to depreciate in worth. when the illustrations depict army dress or refer to implements of warfare, the books should be especially prized. volumes having for the subjects the descriptions of battles or accounts of tactics are, however, not sought for, as a rule. the army list must not be forgotten. early copies--the first appeared in --are eagerly snapped up whenever offered for sale--as many soldiers of rank endeavour to secure complete sets of them. [illustration: light horse volunteers, of london and westminster. the committee of this corps', considering with serious attention the present critical, situation of the country, and conceiving that every well-wisher to its constitution and government would be desirous of affording his individual support at this period, (and particularly should his majesty's endeavours to conclude a safe and honourable peace with our enemies prove ineffectual), have thought it proper to make known to the public the following abstract of the rules and regulations unanimously agreed to by the corps, viz.--this corps, instituted in , and revived in , consists, when complete, of gentlemen, commanded by two field officers, six captains, six lieutenants, six cornets, and an adjutant, chosen from among themselves and commissioned by his majesty; subject to be called out in case of invasion, appearance of invasion, or insurrection, and to do duty in the metropolis only, or within the distance of ten miles. when not on actual service, all matters are regulated by a committee of twelve privates and nine officers; and in case of death or resignation, a private may be elected to any rank in the corps. the first expense for uniforms, arms, accoutrements and horse furniture, does not amount to l, and the annual subscription is only ten guineas, which may be considered as amply compensated by the following advantages:-- every gentleman is taught riding, fencing, and the swords exercise on horseback by the best masters, in the pay of the corps. he is exempted from the militia, the tax for one horse, and the powder tax (if he chooses to avail himself of that privilege), and also the ballot for the proposed supernumerary militia and cavalry. his horse is broke and kept in constant exercise at the stables of the corps (should he prefer sending him there), where he stands at less expense than at livery. there are no expensive meetings, and the attendance at such as are occasionally appointed by the committee, is always optional. the corps is composed in general of men of extensive business, and the hours of exercise are regulated in such a manner as seldom to prove of any inconvenience. it is only necessary to attend the drills till a certificate of being fit for duty is obtained from the commanding officer. the civil and military regulations of the corps more at large may be perused by applying to the secretary, or any gentleman of the committee. _no. , strand_, by order, _nov_, , . edw. hughes, sec. a cutting from _the times_ of november , , which is of much interest, as it shows that problems of recruiting were just as difficult of solution a century and a quarter ago as they are to-day.] newspapers containing news of special military interest are worth obtaining. the issues of _the times_ which tell of the successes of trafalgar and waterloo are notoriously valuable, but the reprinted copies must not be mistaken for the original leaflets. there is, of course, no need to confine one's collection to copies of _the times_. in this matter, the news contained by the journal is more to be considered than the dignity of the journal itself. =royal souvenirs.=--in the time of waterloo the soldier in the ranks received few of the little considerations which we now feel are the hero's just reward. tommy was paid for his work and there the matter ended. to-day, however, the position has changed. we, who stay at home, can hardly think enough of those who are fighting our battles: such is the spirit shown by every one from the king down to the humblest citizen living within the realm. with such a feeling abroad it is not to be wondered at that members of the royal family have, in recent times, made little presents to our fighting men, knowing full well how much the recipients will treasure them. under this heading we may mention the queen victoria chocolate tin which the late queen gave to soldiers in the boer war, the chocolate or tobacco tin which princess mary presented, full of good things, to the soldiers during christmas, , and lastly the christmas card which the king and queen sent to the fighting men on land and sea at the same festive season. these and all such souvenirs are, of course, to be highly prized by the collector. =official military documents.=--undoubtedly a good many documents of a military bearing are to be found if collectors only know where to search for them. the more important papers, such as plans of battlefields and commanders' messages, are naturally prized by those who own them, but there is a wide field for the collector among the documents of lesser importance. within this class we should include all kinds of official correspondence, passports to enter fortified towns, passes to enable journalists to penetrate beyond certain lines, and proclamations, printed and otherwise. it will thus be seen that the scope of the collection is almost without limit. a good many treasures coming under this head are to be found in the whitehall museum, already spoken of. two are worthy of special notice. the first is a pass issued to lieutenant j. whiteley, th foot, when a french prisoner of war at verdun, dated december , . it runs as follows:-- "place de verdun. _permission de sortir de la place._ il est permit à mr. whitley, prisonnier de guerre de sortir de la place par les portes, chaussée de metz, à condition de rentrer chaque jour avant leur fermeture. la présente permission est pour lui seul. verdun, décembre, . le commandant du dépôt des prisonniers de guerre anglais." (_signature illegible._) the above is interesting in so much as it enables us to gather that those who were unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner by the french were treated as men of honour and with as few irksome restrictions as possible. the second treasure is a map of the theatre of war (the waterloo campaign, ) saturated with the blood of lieutenant-general sir thomas picton, who was killed during the battle. the map was taken from the pocket of his coattee on the following morning by his servant, henry barnes. * * * * * so far we have marshalled our curios under certain more or less convenient headings, but some of them refuse all attempts at classification; they are no less attractive on this account, however. were we to reserve a space for gruesome relics, the following exhibit, to be seen in the royal united service museum, would certainly deserve mention. it is the king of ashanti's execution bowl, which formed part of the spoils taken from prempeh by the expedition under colonel sir francis scott in . the bowl, which is of brass, resembles an ordinary bath-tub in appearance and size, and is about five feet in diameter. on the rim are four small lions and a number of knobs, evidently intended as an ornamentation, and would appear to be of moorish origin. there is a gap in the continuity of knobs to allow a space for the victim to insert his neck preparatory to execution. the bowl was fully described by bowdich in his account of ashanti in . coomassie, where the bowl was taken, means the city of death; it possessed three places of execution--one at the palace for private executions, one on the parade ground for public executions, and a third, named bantama, where the bowl was found, for fetish sacrifices. any great public occasion was seized upon as an excuse for human sacrifice, such as the harvest festival, at which large numbers of victims were offered. the king also went every quarter to pay homage to the shade of his ancestors at bantama, and on each occasion the death of twenty men over the great bowl was demanded. the blood of the victims was allowed to putrefy in the bowl, the leaves of certain herbs being added; it was considered a very valuable fetish medicine. king prempeh was accustomed to watching the sacrifices seated in a chair with the queen-mother seated on a stool on his left, being sheltered from the sun by a large umbrella.[ ] [ ] "museum catalogue," p. . before concluding this chapter on miscellaneous curios, it may be well to give a list of suggested objects, bearing on the great war, which might be reasonably included in a collection of war mementoes and relics:-- blue-books and similar official correspondence, both british and foreign. copies of newspapers containing accounts of the outstanding incidents of the war. photographs of the greater events, i.e. the sinking of the _blücher_. recruiting posters. posters describing hostile and friendly aircraft. printed proclamations. letters from soldiers at the front. war postage stamps, including the various red cross stamps. the king and queen's christmas card to the soldiers. princess mary's chocolate box. various kinds of ammunition used by the allies and the enemy. aeroplane darts. permits given to journalists to enter the various battle zones. official stamps of the press censor. cartoons from _punch_. paper money issued owing to the hostilities. portions of uniforms, i.e. prussian helmets, buttons and badges of british and foreign soldiers. souvenirs made by interned soldiers. toys constructed by belgian refugees, and composite flags made by combining the devices of the various allies. [illustration: an interesting broadside printed at the famous catnach press, being one of a series describing incidents in the life of a soldier.] chapter xviii a history of one's collection reasons for compiling a history of one's collection--the part played by photographs--armour suggested as an example--material for grangerizing in this concluding chapter we have a suggestion to make to the collector of ample leisure moments; briefly, it is that he should draw up a history of his treasures. such a work has many valuable advantages; first, it helps to co-ordinate the pieces which our collection contains; second, it provides work of a fascinating nature; third, it leads us to hunt through books and collections and so increases our knowledge; and fourth, it provides us with a kind of catalogue of our treasures which should prove of value for insurance and other purposes of identification. collectors of most kinds of curios are able to keep their specimens in methodical array. the philatelist, for instance, preserves his stamps within the covers of one or more albums; the print-lover places his pictures in portfolios, whilst the china-collector uses a cabinet for housing his treasures. the collector of military curios, however, cannot adopt any of these methodical arrangements, for it is impossible to assemble, we will say, armour, postage stamps, medals, and badges with any pretence of order. this is where the history of one's collection steps in; it describes the pieces and explains where each is to be found. * * * * * the first stage in making such a history consists in procuring photographs or well-executed drawings of every specimen in our collection. photographs are, of course, much more useful than drawings, and as nearly every house boasts of a camera nowadays the former should not be hard to obtain. the prints should be mounted in a loose-leaf album, the pages of which must be much larger than the prints. mounting may be performed in many ways, but it will be well to use a photographic paste, to use it sparingly, and to paste the whole of the backs of the prints. the third step consists in adding written matter under and around the prints. this data should describe not only the article portrayed, that is to say, its use, its sequence among other similar things, its composition, and so on, but also where and how it was personally obtained, what was paid for it, and in what particular place it is kept. personally, we do not think that a history should be limited to an account of the pieces figuring in our collection, but that a welcome should be extended to brief descriptions, both written and pictorial, of specimens which we hope to obtain as well as interesting specimens which we can never hope to obtain owing to their unique condition. the wider history will prove more complete and, therefore, more valuable; it will also serve as an indicator of the things which we do not yet possess but which are procurable by the average collector. * * * * * by way of an example, let us say that the reader has a small collection of armour and weapons and that he proposes to draw up a history of these interesting objects. the first thing would be to photograph each of the specimens in his collection and to mount them in an album as described above. naturally, there would be many periods unrepresented in the collection, and pictures of these he should endeavour to find among the magazines and books that are available. as a discovery is made it should be carefully cut out and added to the history. of course, when an additional piece of armour or a weapon is procured, its photograph should replace any print of a similar article which may already figure in the album. the grangerite, for such is the name given to a person who creates a history on these lines, is often spoken of as one who mutilates valuable books to give birth to a volume of his own. we may say at once that we do not suggest that mutilation of any kind should be countenanced. the grangerite who needs extra illustrations can find material, in abundance, for his work in all sorts of quarters without tearing prints from volumes of worth. the old book-shop with its penny boxes and print portfolios provides all the pictures that are necessary in the ordinary way whilst back numbers of _the connoisseur_ are veritable gold-mines when representations of any kind of curio are needed. but the grangerite must learn to search for material in all sorts of unexpected quarters. armour, in many cases, adorns the heroes which grace our public statues in london (e.g. the black prince at westminster), therefore, he should procure picture post-cards of such monuments. again, many coins bear allegorical figures which include arms and armour in various forms. in this matter it is worth mentioning that the british museum has on sale a large stock of picture post-cards depicting the coins reposing in its galleries. these, of course, the grangerite should procure. lastly, we may mention that royal seals, church brasses, and even postage stamps often portray the warrior in shining armour and are worth noting by the grangerite. * * * * * such, in outline, is the task of drawing up a history of one's collection. the work is fascinating and the _magnum opus_, when perfected, is of considerable value. need more be said? bibliography bibliography works dealing with military crests, badges, uniforms, etc. ackermann, r. costumes of the british and indian armies. a collection of coloured plates. . army clothing regulations. part i. regular forces. (wyman.) . atkinson, j. a. a picturesque representation of the naval, military, and miscellaneous costumes of great britain: with coloured plates. . colnaghi,--. costumes of the army of the british empire according to the regulations of . . crests of the british army. a coloured chart issued by gale and polden. price s. crests of the british army. (six packets of crests arranged in book form.) gale and polden. price s. fairbairn, j. crests of the families of great britain and ireland. fores. yeomanry costume: with illustrations. . fox-davies, a. c. armorial families, . th edition. many coloured plates and otherwise profusely illustrated. (a valuable work, especially for students desirous of noting the early connection between noble families and regiments.) hull, e. costumes of the british army in : many plates. . knight and butters. crests of great britain and ireland. vols. lawrence-archer, j. the british army: its records, badges, devices, etc. . lienhardt and humbert. les uniformes de l'armée française. luard, john. a history of dress of the british soldier. . martens and norie. costumes of the british army and volunteer corps. coloured plates. . military uniforms under the head of "uniforms." article in _encyclopædia britannica_. (a capital survey of the subject.) perry, o. l. ranks and badges in the army. . smith, c. h. costumes of the british army. (a fine collection of coloured plates.) . spooner. costumes of the british army: with many coloured plates, by m. a. hayes. vols. . uniforms of europe, past and present. four coloured plates depicting about army dresses. _encyclopædia britannica_, th edition, vol. . walton, colonel c. british army. (regimental dress histories.) works dealing with arms and armour. anderson, j. ancient scottish weapons. (edinburgh.) . armour. a capital survey of the subject in _chambers's encyclopædia_. arrows and arrow makers. (published by judd and detweiler, washington.) . ashdown, c. h. british and foreign arms and armour. . azan, p. les premières mitrailleuses, - . . belloc, hilaire. the book of the bayeux tapestry. . berthelot, m. p. e. explosive materials, to which is added a short sketch of gunpowder. (new york.) . bethel, a. h. modern guns and gunnery. blanch, h. j. a century of guns. . bond, h. treatise on military small arms. . boutell. arms and armour. . brett, e. j. pictorial record of arms and armour. . burton. the book of the sword. . calvert, a. f. spanish arms and armour: an account of the royal armoury of madrid. . (not a mere guide-book.) campbell, lord a. notes on swords from culloden. . catalogue of the museum of artillery in the rotunda, woolwich. . (stationery office publication.) church, w. c. american arms and ammunition. article in _scribner's monthly_, vol. xxix. p. . clephan, r. c. defensive armour and weapons and engines of war of mediæval times and of the renaissance. . demmin, auguste. illustrated history of arms and armour. . (about two thousand illustrations, making the work a most useful reference book.) diener, schoenberg alfons. die waffen der wartburg mit waffen und marken. abbildungen auf tafeln in orthochromatischem lichtdruck. (berlin.) . dillon, viscount. guide to tower of london, with a description of the armoury. . egerton, w. a description of indian and oriental armour. . ffoulkes, charles. armour and weapons. . ffoulkes, charles. european arms and armour in the university of oxford. . plates. ffoulkes, charles. the armourer and his craft from the eleventh to the sixteenth century. . diagrams and plates. firearms. a capital survey of the subject in _chambers's encyclopædia_. forgeries that were not forged. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iii. p. . gardner, j. s. armour in england. (portfolio monographs.) . gardner, j. s. foreign armour in england. (portfolio monographs.) . gaythorpe, h. notes on the rampside sword. . greener, w. w. the gun and its development. . hartley, c. gasquoine. the madrid royal armoury. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iv. p. . hendley, t. h. damascening on steel and iron. . hewitt, j. ancient armour and weapons in europe, vols. . hutton, a. the sword and the centuries. . joly, h. l. japanese sword mounts. . keller, m. l. the anglo-saxon weapon. names treated archæologically and etymologically. . kelly, francis m. arms and armour at the national gallery. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iii. p. . kimball, w. w. small arms of european armies. article in _scribner's monthly_, vol. vi. p. . laking, guy f. catalogue of oriental arms and armour in the wallace collection. . list of books and photographs in the national art library illustrating armour and weapons. (victoria and albert museum.) . maindron, g. r. m. les armes. . marks, e. c. r. evolution of modern small arms. . mason, v. l. new weapons of the united states army. article in _the century magazine_, vol. , p. . mayne, c. b. the infantry weapon and its use in war. . meyrick. ancient armour in europe. . nugent, w. t. art ornamentation upon armour. article in _the magazine of art_, vol. , p. . sandars, horace. the weapons of the iberians. . sandringham arms and armour. (the indian collection presented to edward vii, when prince of wales. - .) . sargeaunt, b. e. weapons: a brief discourse on hand weapons other than firearms. . sawyer, c. w. firearms in american history, - . . seton-karr, sir henry. ammunition. article in _encyclopædia britannica_, th edition, vol. . text-book of small arms. (government publication.) . treatise on ammunition: especially for army service. (stationery office publication.) . walsh, j. h. weapons of war. westropp, m. s. d. arms and armour. . wilkinson. engines of war. works dealing with medals, decorations, and medallions adams, j. h. some rare napoleonic medals. article in _cosmopolitan_, vol. , p. . armand, a. les médailleurs italiens des quinzième et seizième siècles. vols. . carter, t. war medals of the british army, . (historical as well as technical information.) catalogue of the bowles collection, at bristol, of tokens, coins, and medals. bristol. . catalogue of the coins, tokens, medals, dies, and seals in the museum of the mint. vols. . elvin, c. n. handbook of the orders of chivalry, war medals, and other decorations. . fabriczy, c. von. italian medals. . fisher, j. f. american medals. (mass. hist. coll. d. series , .) grueber, h. a. guide to the exhibition of english medals in the british museum, . hawkins, e. medallic illustrations of the history of great britain and ireland to the death of george ii. vols. . irwin, d. h. war medals and decorations issued to the british forces since . (this book is specially recommended.) list of books and pamphlets in the national art library (victoria and albert museum) on coins and medals. . mayo, j. h. medals and decorations of the british army and navy. vols. . (most of the actual documents relating to the issue of the various medals are quoted verbatim.) medallions. notice des monuments exposés dans le département des médailles. bibliothèque nationale, paris. . medals of honor as a recognition of gallantry. article in _harper's weekly_, april , . medals of the british army. a coloured chart issued by gale and polden. price s. myer, i. the waterloo medal. (philadelphia.) . patrick r. w. c. catalogue of the medals of scotland. . poole, stanley lane-. coins and medals. . poole, stanley lane-. coins and medals: their place in history and art. . simon, t. medals, coins, great seals, impressions from the works of t. simon, - . . simonis, j. l'art du médailleur en belgique. . (brussels.) spink & son. hints to collectors of coins and medals. . steward, w. augustus. war medals and their histories. . steward, w. augustus. war medals won by boys. article in _the boy's own paper_, vol. xxxvii. p. . tancred, g. historical record of medals conferred on the british navy, army, and auxiliary forces. . weber, f. p. medals of the nineteenth century relating to england by foreign artists. . whalley, j. l. gold war medals. . works dealing with military prints (the collector of military prints will find many interesting items listed under the head of "crests, badges, and uniforms.") ashton, john. english caricature and satire on napoleon i. . british volunteers, or a general history of the formation and establishment of the volunteer and associated corps. with coloured plates. . broadley, a. m. napoleon in caricature, - . . campion, g. b. principal evolutions of the royal horse artillery. coloured plates. . cannon, r. historical records of the british army. contains a sumptuous collection of coloured reprints representing the various regiments of the army. . connolly, t. j. w. history of the royal sappers and miners. coloured plates. . cruikshank, g. life of napoleon, by w. h. ireland, and plates by g. cruikshank. . daubrawa, h. de. costumes of the indian army. coloured plates. . davenport, lieutenant-colonel. the light horse drill for the volunteer corps. uncoloured plates. (a valuable work.) . dayes, e. the first regiment of the foot guards. coloured plates. (also companion volumes of the second and third regiments.) ewart, herbert. henry brinbury, caricaturist. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. vi. p. . gillray, james. caricatures, comprising the best political and humorous satires of the reign of george iii. (six hundred large engravings.) . gunn, maurice j. print restoration and picture cleaning. (with chapters on "print fakes and their detection" and "prints to collect.") hayden, arthur. chats on old prints. heath, w. a collection of coloured plates of the costumes of the british cavalry and infantry regiments. . nevill, ralph. british military prints. (a valuable guide for collectors of military pictures.) . works dealing with military brasses beaumont, edward. ancient memorial brasses. . beaumont, edward. three interesting hampshire brasses. (reprinted from the hampshire field club society's papers.) . boutell, c. monumental brasses and slabs. . boutell, c. the monumental brasses of great britain. . brasses of england. (antiquary's books.) . druitt, h. manual of costume as illustrated by monumental brasses. . fisher, thomas. drawings of brasses in some kentish churches. . griffin, ralph. some indents of lost brasses in kent, canterbury cathedral, rochester cathedral, saltwood church. . gunther, r. f. a description of brasses and other funeral monuments in the chapel of magdalen college, oxford. . haines. a manual of monumental brasses. . hudson. the brasses of northamptonshire. . macklin, herbert. monumental brasses. . macklin, herbert. the brasses of england. . stoke d'abernon manor house. (describes the oldest brass in england.) article in _the country home_, vol. i. p. . stothard. monumental effigies of great britain. . suffling, ernest r. english church brasses of the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries. (contains over two hundred illustrations.) transactions of the monumental brass society, . waller. a series of monumental brasses. . ward, j. brasses. (cambridge shilling manual.) . works dealing with autographs broadley, a. m. chats on autographs. . scott, henry t. autograph collecting. scott, h. t. rational autograph collecting. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. i. p. . works dealing with war postage stamps armstrong, d. b. postage stamps of war. . johnson, stanley c. peeps at postage stamps. . (chapter xiii.) melville, fred j. chats on postage stamps. . melville, fred j. the postage stamp in war. . nankivell, edward j. south african war stamps. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. i. p. . works of a miscellaneous character of interest to collectors of military curios abell, francis. prisoners of war in britain, - . . (includes an interesting account of objects made by prisoners during their confinement.) alexander, sir j. e. life of the duke of wellington. vols. . atkinson, captain j. the a b c of the army. . baily, j. t. herbert. napoleon. (published by _the connoisseur_.) barnard. companion to english history. (middle ages.) . (especially the chapters on "costume, military and civil"; and also "the growth of firearms.") broadley, a. m. the collectanea napoleonica: being a catalogue of the collection of autographs, historical documents, broadsides, caricatures, drawings, maps, music, portraits, naval and military views, etc., relating to napoleon i and his times, - . formed by a. m. broadley. . catalogue of the royal united service museum. . (not only a catalogue but a reference book containing much useful information on military curios.) clifford, w. g. the british army. (the "peeps" series.) . cope cornford, l. the black watch: the story of the regiment. (wayfarers' library.) . de lacy lacy, c. the history of the spur. (issued by _the connoisseur_.) fortescue. a history of the british army. . freeth, frank. some old english delft dishes. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iii. p. . grose. military antiquities, . (though some of the information contained in this volume has been discredited, the work is, none the less, one that the student should carefully note.) hodgkin, john e. rariora collected between - . vols. (published by sampson, low, marston.) hood, george. famous fighting regiments. johnson, stanley c. saturday with my camera. (chapter xxxiii, which deals with the photography of curios such as medals, brasses, etc.) king albert's book. a tribute to the belgian king and people from representative men and women throughout the world. hodder and stoughton. . price s. lillingston, leonard w. the art of extra-illustration. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iv. p. . lillingston, leonard w. the catnach press. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iii. p. . lumsden, sir p. lumsden of the guides. (publisher, mr. murray.) morris and jordan. an introduction to the study of local history and antiquities. . nelson, philip, dr. the copper coinage of ireland. . nelson, philip, dr. the obsidional money of the rebellion. . scott, s. the british army: its origin, progress, and equipment, . smith, sir harry. the autobiography of. (publisher, mr. murray.) willoughby, leonard. naworth castle. (an account of the military curios of the castle.) article in _the country home_, vol. vi. p. . willson, beckles. portraits and relics of general wolfe. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. xxiii. p. . index index abyssinian medal, airey's balaklava notes, - american war, use of rifles in, armour, armour, decline of, armour, drawbacks in collecting, armour, effects of, on swords, armour, forged, - armour, glossary of terms, - armour, periods in, army list, army post office corps, , - autographs of noted soldiers, autographs, the care of, autographs, the price of, - autographs, the value of, ashantis, king of, execution bowl, - assignats, badges, - badges, mottoes on, - badges, mounting and preserving, badges, special distinctions borne by, - balaklava notes, - baltic medal, bargains advertised in newspapers, bargains in armour, battlefield souvenirs, , - battle honours, battle of boyne, medallion, bayeux tapestry, bayonet, beeston siege money, bengasi stamps, "best-shot" medal, "black marias," black prince, statue of, blenheim, medallion, blücher, saddle used by, blue uniforms, bone objects made by prisoners, - books containing fine military prints, - book which saved soldier's life, brass, oldest english, british museum, , , , bunbury, - burmah medal, buttons, camail armour, camoys, thomas and elizabeth, brass to the memory of, carlisle siege money, cavalier's dress, ceylon medal, chain-mail period, chain-mail reinforced, cheynie, humfrie, brass to the memory of, china medal, chocolate box, colchester siege money, colours, regimental, commonwealth, dress of, copenhagen national museum, coronation medal, crimea medal, crimea war, , cromwell and medals, cromwell, letter written by, culloden medal, culverins, - curios of the great war enumerated, - cyclas period, d'abernon, sir john, brass to memory of, dartmoor, prisoners at, deccan medal, decorations, the need for special, detecting forged armour, dettingen medallion, distinguished conduct in the field decoration, , distinguished service order, documents, official, dorchester, lord, letter written by, dress, dunbar medal, dunblane medallion, early medallions, edge hill, battle of, egyptian medal, - egypt, military post office in, - enfield-martini rifles, enfield rifles, epernay paper money, fall of james ii, medallion, ffelbrygge, sir symon, brass to the memory of, flash, fleurs-de-lys on tunics, flint-lock, , floor brasses, - forged armour, - forlorn-hope medal, francis ii of germany, medal awarded by, ghuznee medal, , gillray, - glossary of terms in armour, - gloucester regiment, double badge worn by, grangerizing, grape-shot from capri, great rebellion, money of, greenland valleyfield, prisoners at, green uniforms, guidons, gun money, gun used in mafeking, hackles worn by northumberland fusiliers, half-armour period, helmets, - holographs, hougomont, portion of gate of, household cavalry, uniform of, hyderabad medal, i.e.f. stamps, indian general service medal, indian mutiny medal, indian postal arrangements on active service, - industrial museum, vienna, interned soldiers in holland, irish siege money, java medal, jellalabad medal, - jubilee medal, julius cæsar medallion, jupon period in armour, kruger rifle, lee-enfield rifles, lee-metford rifles, lille, surrender of, medallion, liverpool, prisoners at, long service medal, lost-wax process, lucknow medals, , mafeking, gun used in, mafeking paper money, mafeking stamps, maida medal, martini-henri rifles, mary's, princess, christmas box, match-lock, - mauritius medal, maximilian armour, medallists, - medal, the first british, medals, growth in awarding of, medals, care of, medals, recent campaign, - meeanee medal, meritorious service decoration, military cross, militia, badges of the, militia medal, minié rifles, moore, sir john, the sash of, mottoes on badges, - mural tablets, musée d'artillerie, paris, , musket, mysore medal, napoleon iii, letter written by, napoleonic prisoners, napoleonic wars, influence on uniforms of, naseby, letter referring to the battle of, national museum, copenhagen, nepaul medal, newark siege money, newspapers containing military dispatches, new zealand medal, norman armour, norman cross, prisoners at, obsidional money, order of merit, ordinance, the first, regulating uniforms, oudenarde medallion, palimpsests, "par ballon monté" correspondence, peninsular medal, , , , peninsular war, influence on uniforms, perth, prisoners at, poona medal, pope pius vi, medal awarded by, post-marks, , post office volunteers, precedence in the army, prempeh, umbrella belonging to, pre-norman armour, punjab medal, rag fair, ramilies medallion, recruiting notice, regimental collecting, regimental colours, regular army, badges of, restoring autographs, rifles, rifle-corps uniform, rifles, inventor of, rijks museum, amsterdam, , rotunda, woolwich, , royal army medical corps, badge of, royal fusiliers uniform, royal united service museum, , , , , , , , , rubbings, how to make, - st. george, red cross on uniforms, salamanca, battle of, scarborough siege money, schomberg, letter by, scinde medal, seaforth highlanders, badge of, sedan, letter referring to the battle of, seringapatam medal, - serpentin, simon, the medallist, snider rifles, south african medal, south african war, , south kensington museum, spanish war, stamps of the, - stamps used in crimean war, stapleton, prisoners at, storing weapons, straw-plait made by prisoners, studded and splintered armour, sudan campaign, surcoatless period armour, surrender of lille, medallion, sutlej medal, swords, , , swords, historic, tabard period in armour, talavera, battle of, taxis, johann von, letter-carrier, tel-el-kebir railway name plate, territorial army, badges of the, territorial medals, thame, brass at, ticehurst, brass at, tippo sahib, dress worn by, tower of london, , - transition period in armour, tripoli di barberia stamps, uniforms, blue, uniforms, green, uniforms, influence of ann on, ; of charles ii, ; of elizabeth, ; of george iii, ; of george iv, ; of james ii, ; of queen victoria, ; of william iv, uniforms, earliest, - victoria cross, - volunteer decorations, - volunteer force, badges of the, v.r.i. stamps, wadham, nicholas and dorothy, brass to memory of, wadi halfa post office, wallace collection, , war stamps, recent, waterloo, , , waterloo, bayonet used at, waterloo medal, waterperry, brass at, wheel-locks, william and mary re-valued the gun money, wiltshire regiment badge, wolfe, bullet which killed, wyon's medallions, yeomanry decorations, young pretender's defeat, medallion commemorating the, unwin brothers, limited, the gresham press, woking and london transcriber's notes: . italics has been converted to _text_. . bold has been converted to =text=. machiavelli with an introduction by henry cust. m.p. volume i the art of war translated by peter whitehorne the prince translated by edward dacres london published by david nutt at the sign of the phoenix long acre edinburgh: t. and a. constable, printers to his majesty to my friend charles whibley h.c. introduction [sidenote: the life of a day.] 'i am at my farm; and, since my last misfortunes, have not been in florence twenty days. i spent september in snaring thrushes; but at the end of the month, even this rather tiresome sport failed me. i rise with the sun, and go into a wood of mine that is being cut, where i remain two hours inspecting the work of the previous day and conversing with the woodcutters, who have always some trouble on hand amongst themselves or with their neighbours. when i leave the wood, i go to a spring, and thence to the place which i use for snaring birds, with a book under my arm--dante or petrarch, or one of the minor poets, like tibullus or ovid. i read the story of their passions, and let their loves remind me of my own, which is a pleasant pastime for a while. next i take the road, enter the inn door, talk with the passers-by, inquire the news of the neighbourhood, listen to a variety of matters, and make note of the different tastes and humours of men. 'this brings me to dinner-time, when i join my family and eat the poor produce of my farm. after dinner i go back to the inn, where i generally find the host and a butcher, a miller, and a pair of bakers. with these companions i play the fool all day at cards or backgammon: a thousand squabbles, a thousand insults and abusive dialogues take place, while we haggle over a farthing, and shout loud enough to be heard from san casciano. 'but when evening falls i go home and enter my writing-room. on the threshold i put off my country habits, filthy with mud and mire, and array myself in royal courtly garments. thus worthily attired, i make my entrance into the ancient courts of the men of old, where they receive me with love, and where i feed upon that food which only is my own and for which i was born. i feel no shame in conversing with them and asking them the reason of their actions. 'they, moved by their humanity, make answer. for four hours' space i feel no annoyance, forget all care; poverty cannot frighten, nor death appal me. i am carried away to their society. and since dante says "that there is no science unless we retain what we have learned" i have set down what i have gained from their discourse, and composed a treatise, _de principalibus_, in which i enter as deeply as i can into the science of the subject, with reasonings on the nature of principality, its several species, and how they are acquired, how maintained, how lost. if you ever liked any of my scribblings, this ought to suit your taste. to a prince, and especially to a new prince, it ought to prove acceptable. therefore i am dedicating it to the magnificence of giuliano.' [sidenote: niccolò machiavelli.] such is the account that niccolò machiavelli renders of himself when after imprisonment, torture, and disgrace, at the age of forty-four, he first turned to serious writing. for the first twenty-six or indeed twenty-nine of those years we have not one line from his pen or one word of vaguest information about him. throughout all his works written for publication, there is little news about himself. montaigne could properly write, 'ainsi, lecteur, je suis moy-mesme la matière de mon livre.' but the matter of machiavelli was far other: 'io ho espresso quanto io so, e quanto io ho imparato per una lunga pratica e continua lezione delle cose del mondo.' [sidenote: the man.] machiavelli was born on the rd of may . the period of his life almost exactly coincides with that of cardinal wolsey. he came of the old and noble tuscan stock of montespertoli, who were men of their hands in the eleventh century. he carried their coat, but the property had been wasted and divided. his forefathers had held office of high distinction, but had fallen away as the new wealth of the bankers and traders increased in florence. he himself inherited a small property in san casciano and its neighbourhood, which assured him a sufficient, if somewhat lean, independence. of his education we know little enough. he was well acquainted with latin, and knew, perhaps, greek enough to serve his turn. 'rather not without letters than lettered,' varchi describes him. that he was not loaded down with learned reading proved probably a great advantage. the coming of the french, and the expulsion of the medici, the proclamation of the republic ( ), and later the burning of savonarola convulsed florence and threw open many public offices. it has been suggested, but without much foundation, that some clerical work was found for machiavelli in or even earlier. it is certain that on july , , he was appointed chancellor and secretary to the dieci di libertà e pace, an office which he held till the close of his political life at fall of the republic in . [sidenote: official life.] the functions of his council were extremely varied, and in the hands of their secretary became yet more diversified. they represented in some sense the ministry for home, military, and especially for foreign affairs. it is impossible to give any full account of machiavelli's official duties. he wrote many thousands of despatches and official letters, which are still preserved. he was on constant errands of state through the florentine dominions. but his diplomatic missions and what he learned by them make the main interest of his office. his first adventure of importance was to the court of caterina sforza, the lady of forlì, in which matter that astute countess entirely bested the teacher of all diplomatists to be. in he smelt powder at the siege at pisa, and was sent to france to allay the irritations of louis xii. many similar and lesser missions follow. the results are in no case of great importance, but the opportunities to the secretary of learning men and things, intrigue and policy, the court and the gutter were invaluable. at the camp of cæsar borgia, in , he found in his host that fantastic hero whom he incarnated in _the prince_, and he was practically an eye-witness of the amazing masterpiece, the massacre of sinigaglia. the next year he is sent to rome with a watching brief at the election of julius ii., and in is again sent to negotiate with the pope. an embassy to the emperor maximilian, a second mission to the french king at blois, in which he persuades louis xii. to postpone the threatened general council of the church ( ), and constant expeditions to report upon and set in order unrestful towns and provinces did not fulfil his activity. his pen was never idle. reports, despatches, elaborate monographs on france, germany, or wherever he might be, and personal letters innumerable, and even yet unpublished, ceased not night nor day. detail, wit, character-drawing, satire, sorrow, bitterness, all take their turn. but this was only a fraction of his work. by duty and by expediency he was bound to follow closely the internal politics of florence where his enemies and rivals abounded. and in all these years he was pushing forward and carrying through with unceasing and unspeakable vigour the great military dream of his life, the foundation of a national militia and the extinction of mercenary companies. but the fabric he had fancied and thought to have built proved unsubstantial. the spoilt half-mutinous levies whom he had spent years in odious and unwilling training failed him at the crowning moment in strength and spirit: and the fall of the republic implied the fall of machiavelli and the close of his official life. he struggled hard to save himself, but the wealthy classes were against him, perhaps afraid of him, and on them the medici relied. for a year he was forbidden to leave florentine territory, and for a while was excluded from the palazzo. later his name was found in a list of anti-medicean conspirators. he was arrested and decorously tortured with six turns of the rack, and then liberated for want of evidence. [sidenote: after his fall.] for perhaps a year after his release the secretary engaged in a series of tortuous intrigues to gain the favour of the medici. many of the stories may be exaggerated, but none make pleasant reading, and nothing proved successful. his position was miserable. temporarily crippled by torture, out of favour with the government, shunned by his friends, in deep poverty, burdened with debt and with a wife and four children, his material circumstances were ill enough. but, worse still, he was idle. he had deserved well of the republic, and had never despaired of it, and this was his reward. he seemed to himself a broken man. he had no great natural dignity, no great moral strength. he profoundly loved and admired dante, but he could not for one moment imitate him. he sought satisfaction in sensuality of life and writing, but found no comfort. great things were stirring in the world and he had neither part nor lot in them. by great good fortune he began a correspondence with his friend francesco vettori, the medicean ambassador at rome, to whom he appeals for his good offices: 'and if nothing can be done, i must live as i came into the world, for i was born poor and learnt to want before learning to enjoy.' before long these two diplomats had co-opted themselves into a kind of secret cabinet of europe. it is a strange but profoundly interesting correspondence, both politically and personally. nothing is too great or too small, too glorious or too mean for their pens. amid foolish anecdotes and rather sordid love affairs the politics of europe, and especially of italy, are dissected and discussed. leo x. had now plunged into political intrigue. ferdinand of spain was in difficulty. france had allied herself with venice. the swiss are the ancient romans, and may conquer italy. then back again, or rather constant throughout, the love intrigues and the 'likely wench hard-by who may help to pass our time.' but through it all there is an ache at machiavelli's heart, and on a sudden he will break down, crying, però se aleuna volta io rido e canto facciol, perchè non ho se non quest' una via da sfogare il mio angoscioso pianto. vettori promised much, but nothing came of it. by the correspondence died away, and the ex-secretary found for himself at last the true pathway through his vale of years. [sidenote: the true life.] the remainder of machiavelli's life is bounded by his books. he settled at his villa at san casciano, where he spent his day as he describes in the letter quoted at the beginning of this essay. in he began to attend the meetings of the literary club in the orti oricellarii, and made new and remarkable friends. 'era amato grandamente da loro ... e della sua conversazione si dilettavano maravigliosamente, tenendo in prezzo grandissimo tutte l'opere sue,' which shows the personal authority he exercised. occasionally he was employed by florentine merchants to negotiate for them at venice, genoa, lucca, and other places. in cardinal medici deigned to consult him as to the government, and commissioned him to write the history of florence. but in the main he wrote his books and lived the daily life we know. in he went to rome to present his history to clement vii., and was sent on to guicciardini. in he was busy once more with military matters and the fortification of florence. on the nd of june he died at florence immediately after the establishment of the second republic. he had lived as a practising christian, and so died, surrounded by his wife and family. wild legends grew about his death, but have no foundation. a peasant clod in san casciano could not have made a simpler end. he was buried in the family chapel in santa croce, and a monument was there at last erected with the epitaph by doctor ferroni--'tanto nomini nullum par elogium.' the first edition of his complete works was published in , and was dedicated to lord cowper. [sidenote: his character.] what manner of man was machiavelli at home and in the market-place? it is hard to say. there are doubtful busts, the best, perhaps, that engraved in the 'testina' edition of , so-called on account of the portrait. 'of middle height, slender figure, with sparkling eyes, dark hair, rather a small head, a slightly aquiline nose, a tightly closed mouth: all about him bore the impress of a very acute observer and thinker, but not that of one able to wield much influence over others.' such is a reconstruction of him by one best able to make one. 'in his conversation,' says varchi, 'machiavelli was pleasant, serviceable to his friends, a friend of virtuous men, and, in a word, worthy to have received from nature either less genius or a better mind.' if not much above the moral standard of the day he was certainly not below it. his habits were loose and his language lucid and licentious. but there is no bad or even unkind act charged against him. to his honesty and good faith he very fairly claims that his poverty bears witness. he was a kind, if uncertain, husband and a devoted father. his letters to his children are charming. here is one written soon before his death to his little son guido.--'guido, my darling son, i received a letter of thine and was delighted with it, particularly because you tell me of your full recovery, the best news i could have. if god grants life to us both i expect to make a good man of you, only you must do your fair share yourself.' guido is to stick to his books and music, and if the family mule is too fractious, 'unbridle him, take off the halter and turn him loose at montepulciano. the farm is large, the mule is small, so no harm can come of it. tell your mother, with my love, not to be nervous. i shall surely be home before any trouble comes. give a kiss to baccina, piero, and totto: i wish i knew his eyes were getting well. be happy and spend as little as you may. christ have you in his keeping.'--there is nothing exquisite or divinely delicate in this letter, but there are many such, and they were not written by a bad man, any more than the answers they evoke were addressed to one. there is little more save of a like character that is known of machiavelli the man. but to judge him and his work we must have some knowledge of the world in which he was to move and have his being. * * * * * [sidenote: state of italy.] at the beginning of the sixteenth century italy was rotten to the core. in the close competition of great wickedness the vicar of christ easily carried off the palm, and the court of alexander vi. was probably the wickedest meeting-place of men that has ever existed upon earth. no virtue, christian or pagan, was there to be found; little art that was not sensuous or sensual. it seemed as if bacchus and venus and priapus had come to their own again, and yet rome had not ceased to call herself christian. [sidenote: superstition.] 'owing to the evil ensample of the papal court,' writes machiavelli, 'italy has lost all piety and all religion: whence follow infinite troubles and disorders; for as religion implies all good, so its absence implies the contrary. to the church and priests of rome we owe another even greater disaster which is the cause of her ruin. i mean that the church has maintained, and still maintains italy divided.' the papacy is too weak to unite and rule, but strong enough to prevent others doing so, and is always ready to call in the foreigner to crush all italians to the foreigner's profit, and guicciardini, a high papal officer, commenting on this, adds, 'it would be impossible to speak so ill of the roman court, but that more abuse should not be merited, seeing it is an infamy, and example of all the shames and scandals of the world.' the lesser clergy, the monks, the nuns followed, with anxious fidelity, the footsteps of their shepherds. there was hardly a tonsure in italy which covered more than thoughts and hopes of lust and avarice. religion and morals which god had joined together, were set by man a thousand leagues asunder. yet religion still sat upon the alabaster throne of peter, and in the filthy straw of the meanest calabrian confessional. and still deeper remained a blind devoted superstition. vitellozzo vitelli, as machiavelli tells us, while being strangled by cæesar borgia's assassin, implored his murderer to procure for him the absolution of that murderer's father. gianpaolo baglioni, who reigned by parricide and lived in incest, was severely blamed by the florentines for not killing pope julius ii. when the latter was his guest at perugia. and when gabrino fondato, the tyrant of cremona, was on the scaffold, his only regret was that when he had taken his guests, the pope and emperor, to the top of the cremona tower, four hundred feet high, his nerve failed him and he did not push them both over. upon this anarchy of religion, morals, and conduct breathed suddenly the inspiring breath of pagan antiquity which seemed to the italian mind to find its finest climax in tyrannicide. there is no better instance than in the plot of the pazzi at florence. francesco pazzi and bernardo bandini decided to kill lorenzo and giuliano de' medici in the cathedral at the moment of the elevation of the host. they naturally took the priest into their confidence. they escorted giuliano to the duomo, laughing and talking, and playfully embraced him--to discover if he wore armour under his clothes. then they killed him at the moment appointed. [sidenote: pagan influence.] nor were there any hills from which salvation might be looked for. philosophy, poetry, science, expressed themselves in terms of materialism. faith and hope are ever the last survivors in the life of a man or of a nation. but in italy these brave comforters were at their latest breath. it is perhaps unfair to accept in full the judgment of northern travellers. the conditions, training, needs of england and germany were different. in these countries courage was a necessity, and good faith a paying policy. subtlety could do little against a two-handed sword in the hands of an angry or partially intoxicated giant. climate played its part as well as culture, and the crude pleasures and vices of the north seemed fully as loathsome to the refined italian as did the tortuous policy and the elaborate infamies of the south to their rough invaders. alone, perhaps, among the nations of europe the italians had never understood or practised chivalry, save in such select and exotic schools as the casa gioiosa under vittorino da feltre at mantua. the oath of arthur's knights would have seemed to them mere superfluity of silliness. _onore_ connoted credit, reputation, and prowess. _virtù_, which may be roughly translated as mental ability combined with personal daring, set the standard and ruled opinion. 'honour in the north was subjective: _onore_ in italy objective.' individual liberty, indeed, was granted in full to all, at the individual's risk. the love of beauty curbed grossness and added distinction. fraud became an art and force a science. there is liberty for all, but for the great ones there is licence. and when the day of trial comes, it is the churchmen and the princes who can save neither themselves nor man, nor thing that is theirs. to such a world was machiavelli born. to whom should he turn? to the people? to the church? to the princes and despots? but hear him:-- 'there shall never be found any good mason, which will beleeve to be able to make a faire image of a peece of marble ill hewed, but verye well of a rude peece. our italian princes beleeved, before they tasted the blowes of the outlandish warre, that it should suffice a prince to know by writinges, how to make a subtell aunswere, to write a goodly letter, to shewe in sayinges, and in woordes, witte and promptenesse, to know how to canvas a fraude, to decke themselves with precious stones and gold, to sleepe and to eate with greater glory then other: to kepe many lascivious persons about them, to governe themselves with their subjects, covetously and proudely: to roote in idlenes, to give the degrees of the exercise of warre for good will, to dispise if any should have shewed them any laudable waie, minding that their wordes should bee aunswers of oracles: nor the sely wretches were not aware that they prepared themselves to be a pray to whome so ever should assaulte them. hereby grew then in the thousand fowre hundred and nintie and fowre yere, the great feares, the sodaine flightes and the marveilous losses: and so three most mighty states which were in italie, have bene dievers times sacked and destroyed. but that which is worse, is where those that remaine, continue in the very same errour, and liev in the verie same disorder and consider not, that those who in olde time would keepe their states, caused to be done these thinges, which of me hath beene reasoned, and that their studies were, to prepare the body to diseases, and the minde not to feare perills. whereby grewe that cæsar, alexander, and all those men and excellent princes in olde time, were the formost amongst the fighters, going armed on foote: and if they lost their state, they would loose their life, so that they lievd and died vertuously.' such was the clay that waited the moulding of the potter's hand. 'posterity, that high court of appeal, which is never tired of eulogising its own justice and discernment,' has recorded harsh sentence on the florentine. it is better to-day to let him speak for himself. [sidenote: _the prince_.] the slender volume of _the prince_ has probably produced wider discussion, more bitter controversy, more varied interpretations and a deeper influence than any book save holy writ. kings and statesmen, philosophers and theologians, monarchists and republicans have all and always used or abused it for their purposes. written in , the first year of machiavelli's disgrace, concurrently with part of the _discorsi_, which contain the germs of it, the book represents the fulness of its author's thought and experience. it was not till after machiavelli's death, that it was published in , by order of clement vii. meanwhile, however, in manuscript it had been widely read and favourably received. [sidenote: its purpose.] the mere motive of its creation and dedication has been the theme of many volumes. machiavelli was poor, was idle, was out of favour, and therefore, though a republican, wrote a devilish hand-book of tyranny to strengthen the medici and recover his position. machiavelli, a loyal republican, wrote a primer of such fiendish principles as might lure the medici to their ruin. machiavelli's one idea was to ruin the rich: machiavelli's one idea was to oppress the poor: he was a protestant, a jesuit, an atheist: a royalist and a republican. and the book published by one pope's express authority was utterly condemned and forbidden, with all its author's works, by the express command of another ( ). but before facing the whirlwind of savage controversy which raged and rages still about _the prince_, it may be well to consider shortly the book itself--consider it as a new book and without prejudice. the purpose of its composition is almost certainly to be found in the plain fact that machiavelli, a politician and a man of letters, wished to write a book upon the subject which had been his special study and lay nearest to his business and bosom. to ensure prominence for such a book, to engage attention and incidentally perhaps to obtain political employment for himself, he dedicated it to lorenzo de' medici, the existing and accepted chief of the state. but far and above such lighter motives stood the fact that he saw in lorenzo the only man who might conceivably bring to being the vast dream of patriotism which the writer had imagined. the subject he proposed to himself was largely, though not wholly, conditioned by the time and place in which he lived. he wrote for his countrymen and he wrote for his own generation. he had heard with his ears and seen with his eyes the alternate rending anarchy and moaning paralysis of italy. he had seen what agricola had long before been spared the sight of. and what he saw, he saw not through a glass darkly or distorted, but in the whitest, driest light, without flinching and face to face. 'we are much beholden,' writes bacon, 'to machiavelli and others that wrote what men do, and not what they ought to do.' he did not despair of italy, he did not despair even of italian unity. but he despaired of what he saw around him, and he was willing at almost any price to end it. he recognised, despite the nominal example of venice, that a republican system was impossible, and that the small principalities and free cities were corrupt beyond hope of healing. a strong central unifying government was imperative, and at that day such government could only be vested in a single man. for it must ever be closely remembered, as will be pointed out again, that throughout the book the prince is what would now be called the government. and then he saw with faithful prophecy, in the splendid peroration of his hope, a hope deferred for near four hundred years, he saw beyond the painful paths of blood and tyranny, a vision of deliverance and union. for at least it is plain that in all things machiavelli was a passionate patriot, and _amo la patria mia più dell' anima_ is found in one of the last of many thousand letters that his untiring pen had written. the purpose, then, of _the prince_ is to lay down rules, within the possibilities of the time, for the making of a man who shall create, increase, and maintain a strong and stable government. this is done in the main by a plain presentation of facts, a presentation condensed and critical but based on men and things as they actually were. the ethical side is wholly omitted: the social and economical almost entirely. the aspect is purely political, with the underlying thought, it may be supposed, that under the postulated government, all else will prosper. [sidenote: the book; new states.] machiavelli opens by discussing the various forms of governments, which he divides into republics and principalities. of the latter some may be hereditary and some acquired. of hereditary states he says little and quotes but one, the duchy of ferrara. he then turns to his true subject, the acquisition and preservation of states wholly new or new in part, states such as he saw himself on every side around him. having gained possession of a new state, he says, you must first extirpate the family of your predecessor. you should then either reside or plant colonies, but not trust to garrisons. 'colonies are not costly to the prince, are more faithful and cause less offence to the subject states: those whom they may injure being poor and scattered, are prevented from doing mischief. for it should be observed that men ought either to be caressed or trampled out, seeing that small injuries may be avenged, whereas great ones destroy the possibility of retaliation: and so the damage that has to be inflicted ought to be such that it need involve no fear of reprisals.' there is perhaps in all machiavelli no better example of his lucid scientific method than this passage. there is neither excuse nor hypocrisy. it is merely a matter of business calculation. mankind is the raw material, the state is the finished work. further you are to conciliate your neighbours who are weak and abase the strong, and you must not let the stranger within your gates. above all look before as well as after and think not to leave it to time, _godere li benefici del tempo_, but, as did the romans, strike and strike at once. for illustration he criticises, in a final and damning analysis, the career of louis xii. in italy. there was no canon of statecraft so absolute that the king did not ignore it, and in inevitable nemesis, there was no ultimate disaster so crowning as not to be achieved. [sidenote: conquests.] after observing that a feudal monarchy is much less easy of conquest than a despotism, since in the one case you must vanquish many lesser lordships while in the other you merely replace slaves by slaves, machiavelli considers the best method of subjugating free cities. here again is eminent the terrible composure and the exact truth of his politics. a conquered free city you may of course rule in person, or you may construct an oligarchy to govern for you, but the only safe way is to destroy it utterly, since 'that name of liberty, those ancient usages of freedom,' are things 'which no length of years and no benefits can extinguish in the nation's mind, things which no pains or forethought can uproot unless the citizens be utterly destroyed.' hitherto the discussion has ranged round the material politics of the matter, the acquisition of material power. machiavelli now turns to the heart of his matter, the proper character and conduct of a new prince in a new principality and the ways by which he shall deal most fortunately with friend and foe. for fortune it is, as well as ability, which go to the making of the man and the maintenance of his power. [sidenote: cæsar borgia.] in the manner of the day moses, cyrus, romulus, and theseus are led across the stage in illustration. the common attribute of all such fortunate masters of men was force of arms, while the mission of an unarmed prophet such as savonarola was foredoomed to failure. in such politics machiavelli is positive and ruthless: force is and must be the remedy and the last appeal, a principle which indeed no later generation has in practice set at naught. but in the hard dry eyes of the florentine secretary stood, above all others, one shining figure, a figure to all other eyes, from then till now, wrapped in mysterious and miasmatic cloud. in the pages of common history he was a tyrant, he was vicious beyond compare, he was cruel beyond the inquisition, he was false beyond the father of lies, he was the antichrist of rome and he was a failure: but he was the hero of niccolò machiavelli, who, indeed, found in cæsar borgia the fine flower of italian politics in the age of the despots. son of the pope, a prince of the church, a duke of france, a master of events, a born soldier, diplomatist, and more than half a statesman, cæsar seemed indeed the darling of gods and men whom original fortune had crowned with inborn ability. machiavelli knew him as well as it was possible to know a soul so tortuous and secret, and he had been present at the most critical and terrible moments of cæsar's life. that in despite of a life which the world calls infamous, in despite of the howling execrations of all christendom, in despite of ultimate and entire failures, machiavelli could still write years after, 'i know not what lessons i could teach a new prince more useful than the example of his actions,' exhibits the ineffaceable impressions that cæsar borgia had made upon the most subtle and observant mind of modern history. [sidenote: cæsar's career.] cæsar was the acknowledged son of pope alexander by his acknowledged mistress vannozza dei cattani. born in , he was an archbishop and a cardinal at sixteen, and the murderer of his elder brother at an age when modern youths are at college. he played his part to the full in the unspeakable scandals of the vatican, but already 'he spoke little and people feared him.' ere long the splendours of the papacy seemed too remote and uncertain for his fierce ambition, and, indeed, through his father, he already wielded both the temporal and the spiritual arms of peter. to the subtlety of the italian his spanish blood had lent a certain stern resolution, and as with julius and sulla the lust for sloth and sensuality were quickened by the lust for sway. he unfrocked himself with pleasure. he commenced politician, soldier, and despot. and for the five years preceding alexander's death he may almost be looked upon as a power in europe. invested duke of romagna, that hot-bed of petty tyranny and tumult, he repressed disorder through his governor messer ramiro with a relentless hand. when order reigned, machiavelli tells us he walked out one morning into the market-place at cesena and saw the body of ramiro, who had borne the odium of reform, lying in two pieces with his head on a lance, and a bloody axe by his side. cæsar reaped the harvest of ramiro's severity, and the people recognising his benevolence and justice were 'astounded and satisfied.' but the gaze of the borgia was not bounded by the strait limits of a mere italian duchy. whether indeed there mingled with personal ambition an ideal of a united italy, swept clean of the barbarians, it is hard to say, though machiavelli would have us believe it. what is certain is that he desired the supreme dominion in italy for himself, and to win it spared neither force nor fraud nor the help of the very barbarians themselves. with a decree of divorce and a cardinal's hat he gained the support of france, the french duchy of valentinois, and the sister of the king of navarre to wife. by largesse of bribery and hollow promises he brought to his side the great families of rome, his natural enemies, and the great condottieri with their men-at-arms. when by their aid he had established and extended his government he mistrusted their good faith. with an infinity of fascination and cunning, without haste and without rest, he lured these leaders, almost more cunning than himself, to visit him as friends in his fortress of sinigaglia. 'i doubt if they will be alive to-morrow morning,' wrote machiavelli, who was on the spot. he was right. cæsar caused them to be strangled the same night, while his father dealt equal measure to their colleagues and adherents in rome. thenceforth, distrusting mercenaries, he found and disciplined out of a mere rabble, a devoted army of his own, and having unobtrusively but completely extirpated the whole families of those whose thrones he had usurped, not only the present but the future seemed assured to him. he had fulfilled the first of machiavelli's four conditions. he rapidly achieved the remaining three. he bought the roman nobles so as to be able to put a bridle in the new 'pope's mouth.' he bought or poisoned or packed or terrorised the existing college of cardinals and selected new princes of the church who should accept a pontiff of his choosing. he was effectively strong enough to resist the first onset upon him at his father's death. five years had been enough for so great an undertaking. one thing alone he had not and indeed could not have foreseen. 'he told me himself on the day on which (pope) julius was created, that he had foreseen and provided for everything else that could happen on his father's death, but had never anticipated that, when his father died, he too should have been at death's door.' even so the fame and splendour of his name for a while maintained his authority against his unnumbered enemies. but soon the great betrayer was betrayed. 'it is well to cheat those who have been masters of treachery,' he had said himself in his hours of brief authority. his wheel had turned full cycle. within three years his fate, like that of charles xii., was destined to a foreign strand, a petty fortress, and a dubious hand. given over to spain he passed three years obscurely. 'he was struck down in a fight at viana in navarre ( ) after a furious resistance: he was stripped of his fine armour by men who did not know his name or quality and his body was left naked on the bare ground, bloody and riddled with wounds. he was only thirty-one.' and so the star of machiavelli's hopes and dreams was quenched for a season in the clouds from which it came. [sidenote: the lesson.] it seems worth while to sketch the strange tempestuous career of cæsar borgia because in the remaining chapters of _the prince_ and elsewhere in his writings, it is the thought and memory of valentinois, transmuted doubtless and idealised by the lapse of years, that largely inform and inspire the perfect prince of machiavelli. but it must not be supposed that in life or in mind they were intimate or even sympathetic. machiavelli criticises his hero liberally and even harshly. but for the work he wanted done he had found no better craftsman and no better example to follow for those that might come after. morals and religion did not touch the purpose of his arguments except as affecting policy. in policy virtues may be admitted as useful agents and in the chapter following that on cæsar, entitled, curiously enough, 'of those who by their crimes come to be princes,' he lays down that 'to slaughter fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be devoid of honour, pity and religion cannot be counted as merits, for these are means which may lead to power but which confer no glory.' cruelty he would employ without hesitation but with the greatest care both in degree and in kind. it should be immediate and complete and leave no possibility of counter-revenge. for it is never forgotten by the living, and 'he deceives himself who believes that, with the great, recent benefits cause old wrongs to be forgotten.' on the other hand 'benefits should be conferred little by little so that they may be more fully relished.' the cruelty proper to a prince (government, for as ever they are identical) aims only at authority. now authority must spring from love or fear. it were best to combine both motives to obedience but you cannot. the prince must remember that men are fickle, and love at their own pleasure, and that men are fearful and fear at the pleasure of the prince. let him therefore depend on what is of himself, not on that which is of others. 'yet if he win not love he may escape hate, and so it will be if he does not meddle with the property or women-folk of his subjects.' when he must punish let him kill. 'for men will sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their estate.' and moreover you cannot always go on killing, but a prince who has once set himself to plundering will never stop. this is the more needful because the only secure foundation of his rule lies in his trust of the people and in their support. and indeed again and again you shall find no more thorough democrat than this teacher of tyrants. 'the people own better broader qualities, fidelities and passions than any prince and have better cause to show for them.' 'as for prudence and stability, i say that a people is more stable, more prudent, and of better judgment than a prince.' if the people go wrong it is almost certainly the crime or negligence of the prince which drives or leads them astray. 'better far than any number of fortresses is not to be hated by your people.' the support of the people and a national militia make the essential strength of the prince and of the state. [sidenote: national defence.] the chapters on military organisation may be more conveniently considered in conjunction with _the art of war_. it is enough at present to point out two or three observations of machiavelli which touch politics from the military side. to his generation they were entirely novel, though mere commonplace to-day. national strength means national stability and national greatness; and this can be achieved, and can only be achieved, by a national army. the condottiere system, born of sloth and luxury, has proved its rottenness. your hired general is either a tyrant or a traitor, a bully or a coward. 'in a word the armour of others is too wide or too strait for us: it falls off us, or it weighs us down.' and in a fine illustration he compares auxiliary troops to the armour of saul which david refused, preferring to fight goliath with his sling and stone. [sidenote: conduct of the prince.] having assured the external security of the state, machiavelli turns once more to the qualities and conduct of the prince. so closely packed are these concluding chapters that it is almost impossible to compress them further. the author at the outset states his purpose: 'since it is my object to write what shall be useful to whosoever understands it, it seems to me better to follow the practical truth of things rather than an imaginary view of them. for many republics and princedoms have been imagined that were never seen or known to exist in reality. and the manner in which we live and in which we ought to live, are things so wide asunder that he who suits the one to betake himself to the other is more likely to destroy than to save himself.' nothing that machiavelli wrote is more sincere, analytic, positive and ruthless. he operates unflinchingly on an assured diagnosis. the hand never an instant falters, the knife is never blunt. he deals with what is, and not with what ought to be. should the prince be all-virtuous, all-liberal, all-humane? should his word be his bond for ever? should true religion be the master-passion of his life? machiavelli considers. the first duty of the prince (or government) is to maintain the existence, stability, and prosperity of the state. now if all the world were perfect so should the prince be perfect too. but such are not the conditions of human life. an idealising prince must fall before a practising world. a prince must learn in self-defence how to be bad, but like cæsar borgia, he must be a great judge of occasion. and what evil he does must be deliberate, appropriate, and calculated, and done, not selfishly, but for the good of the state of which he is trustee. there is the power of law and the power of force. the first is proper to men, the second to beasts. and that is why achilles was brought up by cheiron the centaur that he might learn to use both natures. a ruler must be half lion and half fox, a fox to discern the toils, a lion to drive off the wolves. merciful, faithful, humane, religious, just, these he may be and above all should seem to be, nor should any word escape his lips to give the lie to his professions: and in fact he should not leave these qualities but when he must. he should, if possible, practise goodness, but under necessity should know how to pursue evil. he should keep faith until occasion alter, or reason of state compel him to break his pledge. above all he should profess and observe religion, 'because men in general judge rather by the eye than by the hand, and every one can see but few can touch.' but none the less, must he learn (as did william the silent, elizabeth of england, and henry of navarre) how to subordinate creed to policy when urgent need is upon him. in a word, he must realise and face his own position, and the facts of mankind and of the world. if not veracious to his conscience, he must be veracious to facts. he must not be bad for badness' sake, but seeing things as they are, must deal as he can to protect and preserve the trust committed to his care. fortune is still a fickle jade, but at least the half our will is free, and if we are bold we may master her yet. for fortune is a woman who, to be kept under, must be beaten and roughly handled, and we see that she is more ready to be mastered by those who treat her so, than by those who are shy in their wooing. and always, like a woman, she gives her favours to the young, because they are less scrupulous and fiercer and more audaciously command her to their will. [sidenote: the appeal.] and so at the last the sometime secretary of the florentine republic turns to the new master of the florentines in splendid exhortation. he points to no easy path. he proposes no mean ambition. he has said already that 'double will that prince's glory be, who has founded a new realm and fortified it and adorned it with good laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples.' but there is more and better to be done. the great misery of men has ever made the great leaders of men. but was israel in egypt, were the persians, the athenians ever more enslaved, down-trodden, disunited, beaten, despoiled, mangled, overrun and desolate than is our italy to-day? the barbarians must be hounded out, and italy be free and one. now is the accepted time. all italy is waiting and only seeks the man. to you the darling of fortune and the church this splendid task is given, to and to the army of italy and of italians only. arm italy and lead her. to you, the deliverer, what gates would be closed, what obedience refused! what jealousies opposed, what homage denied. love, courage, and fixed fidelity await you, and under your standards shall the voice of petrarch be fulfilled: virtu contro al furore prenderà l'arme e fia il combatter corto: chè l'antico valore negl' italici cor non è ancor morto. such is _the prince_ of machiavelli. the vision of its breathless exhortation seemed then as but a landscape to a blind man's eye. but the passing of three hundred and fifty years of the misery he wept for brought at the last, almost in perfect exactness, the fulfilment of that impossible prophecy. [sidenote: the attack.] there is no great book in the world of smaller compass than _the prince_ of machiavelli. there is no book more lucidly, directly, and plainly written. there is no book that has aroused more vehement, venomous, and even truculent controversy from the moment of its publication until to-day. and it is asserted with great probability that _the prince_ has had a more direct action upon real life than any other book in the world, and a larger share in breaking the chains and lighting the dark places of the middle ages. it is a truism to say that machiavellism existed before machiavelli. the politics of gian galeazzo visconti, of louis xi. of france, of ferdinand of spain, of the papacy, of venice, might have been dictated by the author of _the prince_. but machiavelli was the first to observe, to compare, to diagnose, to analyse, and to formulate their principles of government. the first to establish, not a divorce, but rather a judicial separation between the morals of a man and the morals of a government. it is around the purpose and possible results of such a separation in politics, ethics, and religion that the storm has raged most fiercely. to follow the path of that storm through near four centuries many volumes would be needed, and it will be more convenient to deal with the more general questions in summing up the influence of machiavelli as a whole. but the main lines and varying fortunes of the long campaign may be indicated. during the period of its manuscript circulation and for a few years after its publication _the prince_ was treated with favour or at worst with indifference, and the first mutterings were merely personal to the author. he was a scurvy knave and turncoat with neither bowels nor conscience, almost negligible. but still men read him, and a change in conditions brought a change in front. he had in _the prince_, above all in the _discorsi_, accused the church of having ruined italy and debauched the world. in view of the writer's growing popularity, of the reformation and the pagan renaissance, such charges could no longer be lightly set aside. the churchmen opened the main attack. amongst the leaders was cardinal pole, to whom the practical precepts of _the prince_ had been recommended in lieu of the dreams of plato, by thomas cromwell, the _malleus monachorum_ of henry viii. the catholic attack was purely theological, but before long the jesuits joined in the cry. machiavelli was burnt in effigy at ingoldstadt. he was _subdolus diabolicarum cogitationum faber_, and _irrisor et atheos_ to boot. the pope himself gave commissions to unite against him, and his books were placed on the index, together, it must be admitted, with those of boccaccio, erasmus, and savonarola so the company was goodly. but meanwhile, and perhaps in consequence, editions and translations of _the prince_ multiplied apace. the great figures of the world were absorbed by it. charles v., his son, and his courtiers studied the book. catherine de medici brought it to france. a copy of _the prince_ was found on the murdered bodies of henry iii. and henry iv. richelieu praised it. sextus v. analysed it in his own handwriting. it was read at the english court; bacon was steeped in it, and quotes or alludes to it constantly. hobbes and harrington studied it. but now another change. so then, cried innocent gentillet, the huguenot, the book is a primer of despotism and rome, and a grammar for bigots and tyrants. it doubtless is answerable for the massacre of st. bartholomew. the man is a _chien impur_. and in answer to this new huntsman the whole protestant pack crashed in pursuit. within fifty years of his death _the prince_ and machiavelli himself had become a legend and a myth, a haunting, discomforting ghost that would not be laid. machiavellism had grown to be a case of conscience both to catholic and protestant, to theologian, moralist, and philosopher. in spain the author, damned in france for his despotism and popery, was as freshly and freely damned for his civil and religious toleration. in england to the cavaliers he was an atheist, to the roundheads a jesuit. christina of sweden annotated him with enthusiasm. frederick the great published his _anti-machiavel_ brimming with indignation, though it is impossible not to wonder what would have become of prussia had not the prussian king so closely followed in practice the precepts of the florentine, above all perhaps, as voltaire observed, in the publication of the _anti-machiavel_ itself. no doubt in the eighteenth century, when monarchy was so firmly established as not to need machiavelli, kings and statesmen sought to clear kingship of the supposed stain he had besmirched them with. but their reading was as little as their misunderstanding was great, and the florentine secretary remained the mysterious necromancer. it was left for rousseau to describe the book of this 'honnête homme et bon citoyen' as 'le livre des républicains,' and for napoleon, the greatest of the author's followers if not disciples, to draw inspiration and suggestion from his florentine forerunner and to justify the murder of the due d'enghien by a quotation from _the prince_. 'mais après tout,' he said, 'un homme d'etat est-il fait pour être sensible? n'est-ce pas un personnage--complètement excentrique, toujours seul d'un côté, avec le monde de l'autre?' and again 'jugez done s'il doit s'amuser à ménager certaines convenances de sentiments si importantes pour le commun des hommes? peut-il considérer les liens du sang, les affections, les puérils ménagements de la société? et dans la situation où il se trouve, que d'actions séparées de l'ensemble et qu'on blâme, quoiqu'elles doivent contribuer au grand oeuvre que tout le monde n'aperçoit pas? ... malheureux que vous êtes! vous retiendrez vos éloges parce que vous craindrez que le mouvement de cette grande machine ne fasse sur vous l'effet de gulliver, qui, lorsqu'il déplaçait sa jambe, écrasait les lilliputiens. exhortez-vous, devancez le temps, agrandissez votre imagination, regardez de loin, et vous verrez que ces grands personnages que vous croyez violents, cruels, que sais-je? ne sont que des politiques. ils se connaissent, se jugent mieux que vous, et, quand ils sont réellement habiles, ils savent se rendre maîtres de leurs passions car ils vont jusqu'à en calculer les effets.' even in his carriage at waterloo was found a french translation of _the prince_ profusely annotated. [sidenote: the defence.] but from the first the defence was neither idle nor weak. the assault was on the morals of the man: the fortress held for the ideas of the thinker. he does not treat of morals, therefore he is immoral, cried the plaintiff. has he spoken truth or falsehood? is his word the truth and will his truth prevail? was the rejoinder. in germany and italy especially and in france and england in less degree, philosophers and critics have argued and written without stint and without cease. as history has grown wider and more scientific so has the preponderance of opinion leaned to the florentine's favour. it would be impossible to recapitulate the arguments or even to indicate the varying points of view. and indeed the main hindrance in forming a just idea of _the prince_ is the constant treatment of a single side of the book and the preconceived intent of the critic. bacon has already been mentioned. among later names are hobbes, spinoza, leibnitz. herder gives qualified approval, while fichte frankly throws down the glove as _the prince's_ champion. 'da man weiss dass politische machtfragen nie, am wenigsten in einem verderbten volke, mit den mitteln der moral zu lösen sind, so ist es unverständig das buch von fürsten zu verschreien. macchiavelli hatte einen herrscher zu schildern, keinen klosterbruder.' the last sentence may at least be accepted as a last word by practical politicians. ranke and macaulay, and a host of competent germans and italians have lent their thought and pens to solve the riddle in the florentine's favour. and lastly, the course of political events in europe have seemed to many the final justification of the teaching of _the prince_. the leaders of the risorgimento thought that they found in letters, 'writ with a stiletto,' not only the inspirations of patriotism and the aspirations to unity, but a sure and trusted guide to the achievement. germany recognised in the author a schoolmaster to lead them to unification, and a military instructor to teach them of an armed people. half europe snatched at the principle of nationality. for in _the prince_, machiavelli not only begat ideas but fertilised the ideas of others, and whatever the future estimation of the book may be, it stands, read or unread, as a most potent, if not as the dominant, factor in european politics for four hundred years. [sidenote: the _discorsi_.] the _discorsi_, printed in rome by blado, , are not included in the present edition, as the first english translation did not appear until , when almost the entire works of machiavelli were published by an anonymous translator in london. but some account and consideration of their contents is imperative to any review of the florentine's political thoughts. such discorsi and relazioni were not uncommon at the time. the stronger and younger minds of the renaissance wearied of discussing in the lovely gardens of the rucellai the ideas of plato or the allegories of plotinus. the politics of aristotle had just been intelligibly translated by leonardo bruni ( ). and to-day the young ears and eyes of florence were alert for an impulse to action. they saw glimpses, in reopened fields of history, of quarries long grown over where the ore of positive politics lay hid. the men who came to-day to the orti oricellarii were men versed in public affairs, men of letters, historians, poets, living greatly in a great age, with raphael, michael angelo, ariosto, leonardo going up and down amongst them. machiavelli was now in fair favour with the medici, and is described by strozzi as _una persona per sorgere_ (a rising man). he was welcomed into the group with enthusiasm, and there read and discussed the _discorsi_. nominally mere considerations upon the first decade of livy, they rapidly encircled all that was known and thought of policy and state-craft, old and living. [sidenote: their plan.] written concurrently with _the prince_, though completed later, the _discorsi_ contain almost the whole of the thoughts and intents of the more famous book, but with a slightly different application. '_the prince_ traces the progress of an ambitious man, the _discorsi_ the progress of an ambitious people,' is an apt if inadequate criticism. machiavelli was not the first italian who thought and wrote upon the problems of his time. but he was the first who discussed grave questions in modern language. he was the first modern political writer who wrote of men and not of man, for the prince himself is a collective individuality. 'this must be regarded as a general rule,' is ever in machiavelli's mouth, while guicciardini finds no value in a general rule, but only in 'long experience and worthy discretion.' the one treated of policy, the other of politics. guicciardini considered specifically by what methods to control and arrange an existing government. machiavelli sought to create a science, which should show how to establish, maintain, and hinder the decline of states generally conceived. even cavour counted the former as a more practical guide in affairs. but machiavelli was the theorist of humanity in politics, not the observer only. he distinguished the two orders of research. and, during the italian renaissance such distinction was supremely necessary. with a crumbled theology, a pagan pope, amid the wreck of laws and the confusion of social order, _il sue particolare_ and _virtù_, individuality and ability (energy, political genius, prowess, vital force: _virtù_ is impossible to translate, and only does not mean virtue), were the dominating and unrelenting factors of life. niccolò machiavelli, unlike montesquieu, agreed with martin luther that man was bad. it was for both the wittenberger and the florentine, in their very separate ways, to found the school and wield the scourge. in the naked and unashamed candour of the time guicciardini could say that he loathed the papacy and all its works. 'for all that, he adds, 'the preferments i have enjoyed, have forced me for my private ends to set my heart upon papal greatness. were it not for this consideration, i should love martin luther as my second self.' in the _discorsi_, machiavelli bitterly arraigns the church as having 'deprived italians of religion and liberty.' he utterly condemns savonarolà, yet he could love and learn from dante, and might almost have said with pym, 'the greatest liberty of the kingdom is religion. thereby we are freed from spiritual evils, and no impositions are so grievous as those that are laid upon the soul.' [sidenote: religion.] the florentine postulates religion as an essential element in a strong and stable state. perhaps, with gibbon, he deemed it useful to the magistrate. but his science is impersonal. he will not tolerate a church that poaches on his political preserves. good dogma makes bad politics. it must not tamper with liberty or security. and most certainly, with dante, in the _paradiso_, he would either have transformed or omitted the third beatitude, that the meek shall inherit the earth. with such a temperament, machiavelli must ever keep touch with sanity. it was not for him as for aristotle to imagine what an ideal state should be, but rather to inquire what states actually were and what they might actually become. he seeks first and foremost 'the use that may be derived from history in politics'; not from its incidents but from its general principles. his darling model of a state is to be found where dante found it, in the roman republic. the memory and even the substance of dante occur again and again. but dante's inspiration was spiritual: machiavelli's frankly pagan, and with the latter fortune takes the place of god. dante did not love the papacy, but machiavelli, pointing out how even in ancient rome religion was politic or utilitarian, leads up to his famous attack upon the roman church, to which he attributes all the shame and losses, political, social, moral, national, that italy has suffered at her hands. and now for the first time the necessity for italian unity is laid plainly down, and the church and its temporal power denounced as the central obstacles. in religion itself the secretary saw much merit. 'but when it is an absolute question of the welfare of our country, then justice or injustice, mercy or cruelty, praise or ignominy, must be set aside, and we must seek alone whatever course may preserve the existence and liberty of the state.' throughout the _discorsi_, machiavelli in a looser and more expansive form, suggests, discusses, or re-affirms the ideas of _the prince_. there is the same absence of judgment on the moral value of individual conduct; the same keen decision of its practical effect as a political act. but here more than in _the prince_, he deals with the action and conduct of the people. with his passion for personal and contemporary incarnation he finds in the swiss of his day the romans of republican rome, and reiterates the comparison in detail. feudalism, mercenaries, political associations embodied in arts and guilds, the temporal power of the church, all these are put away, and in their stead he announces the new and daring gospel that for organic unity subjects must be treated as equals and not as inferiors. 'trust the people' is a maxim he repeats and enforces again and again. and he does not shrink from, but rather urges the corollary, 'arm the people.' indeed it were no audacious paradox to state the ideal of machiavelli, though he nominally preferred a republic, as a limited monarchy, ruling over a nation in arms. no doubt he sought, as was natural enough in his day, to construct the state from without rather than to guide and encourage its evolution from within. it seemed to him that, in such an ocean of corruption, force _was_ a remedy and fraud no sluttish handmaid. 'vice n'est-ce pas,' writes montaigne, of such violent acts of government, 'car il a quitté sa raison à une plus universelle et puissante raison.' even so the prince and the people could only be justified by results. but the public life is of larger value than the private, and sometimes one man must be crucified for a thousand. despite all prejudice and make-belief, such a rule and practice has obtained from the assemblies of athens to the parliaments of the twentieth century. but machiavelli first candidly imparted it to the unwilling consciences and brains of men, and it is he who has been the chosen scape-goat to carry the sins of the people. his earnestness makes him belie his own precept to keep the name and take away the thing. in this, as in a thousand instances, he was not too darkly hidden; he was too plain. 'machiavelli,' says one who studied the florentine as hardly another had done, 'machiavelli hat gesündigt, aber noch mehr ist gegen ihn gesündigt worden.' liberty is good, but unity is its only sure foundation. it is the way to the unity of government and people that the thoughts both of _the prince_ and the _discorsi_ lead, though the incidents be so nakedly presented as to shock the timorous and vex the prurient, the puritan, and the evil thinker. the people must obey the state and fight and die for its salvation, and for the prince the hatred of the subjects is never good, but their love, and the best way to gain it is by 'not interrupting the subject in the quiet enjoyment of his estate.' even so bland and gentle a spirit as the poet gray cannot but comment, 'i rejoice when i see machiavelli defended or illustrated, who to me appears one of the wisest men that any nation in any age hath produced.' [sidenote: the art of war.] throughout both _the prince_ and the _discorsi_ are constant allusions to, and often long discussions on, military affairs. the army profoundly interested machiavelli both as a primary condition of national existence and stability, and also, as he pondered upon the contrast between ancient rome and the florence that he lived in, as a subject fascinating in itself. his _art of war_ was probably published in . before that date the florentine secretary had had some personal touch both with the theory and practice of war. as a responsible official in the camp before pisa he had seen both siege work and fighting. having lost faith in mercenary forces he made immense attempts to form a national militia, and was appointed chancellor of the nove della milizia. in switzerland and the tyrol he had studied army questions. he planned with pietro navarro the defence of florence and prato against charles v. at verona and mantua in , he closely studied the famous siege of padua. from birth to death war and battles raged all about him, and he had personal knowledge of the great captains of the age. moreover, he saw in italy troops of every country, of every quality, in every stage of discipline, in every manner of formation. his love of ancient rome led him naturally to the study of livy and vegetius, and from them with regard to formations, to the relative values of infantry and cavalry and other points of tactics, he drew or deduced many conclusions which hold good to-day. indeed a german staff officer has written that in reading the florentine you think you are listening to a modern theorist of war. but for the theorist of those days a lion stood in the path. the art of war was not excepted from the quick and thorough transformation that all earthly and spiritual things were undergoing. gunpowder, long invented, was being applied. armour, that, since the beginning, had saved both man and horse, had now lost the half of its virtue. the walls of fortresses, impregnable for a thousand years, became as matchwood ramparts. the mounted man-at-arms was found with wonder to be no match for the lightly-armoured but nimble foot-man. the swiss were seen to hold their own with ease against the knighthood of austria and burgundy. the free companies lost in value and prestige what they added to their corruption and treachery. all these things grew clear to machiavelli. but his almost fatal misfortune was that he observed and wrote in the mid-moment of the transition. he had no faith in fire-arms, and as regards the portable fire-arms of those days he was right. after the artillery work at ravenna, novara, and marignano it is argued that he should have known better. but he was present at no great battles, and pike, spear, and sword had been the stable weapons of four thousand years. these were indeed too simple to be largely modified, and the future of mechanisms and explosives no prophet uninspired could foresee. and indeed the armament and formation of men were not the main intent of machiavelli's thought. his care in detail, especially in fortifications, of which he made a special study, in encampments, in plans, in calculations, is immense. nothing is so trivial as to be left inexact. [sidenote: the new model.] but he centred his observation and imagination on the origin, character, and discipline of an army in being. he pictures the horror, waste, and failure of a mercenary system, and lays down the fatal error in italy of separating civil from military life, converting the latter into a trade. in such a way the soldier grows to a beast, and the citizen to a coward. all this must be changed. the basic idea of this astounding secretary is to form a national army, furnished by conscription and informed by the spirit of the new model of cromwell. all able-bodied men between the ages of seventeen and forty should be drilled on stated days and be kept in constant readiness. once or twice a year each battalion must be mobilised and manoeuvred as in time of war. the discipline must be constant and severe. the men must be not only robust and well-trained, but, above all, virtuous, modest, and disposed to any sacrifice for the public good. so imbued should they be with duty and lofty devotion to their country that though they may rightly deceive the enemy, reward the enemy's deserters and employ spies, yet 'an apple tree laden with fruit might stand untouched in the midst of their encampment.' the infantry should far exceed the cavalry, 'since it is by infantry that battles are won.' secrecy, mobility, and familiarity with the country are to be objects of special care, and positions should be chosen from which advance is safer than retreat. in war this army must be led by one single leader, and, when peace shines again, they must go back contented to their grateful fellow-countrymen and their wonted ways of living. the conception and foundation of such a scheme, at such a time, by such a man is indeed astounding. he broke with the past and with all contemporary organisations. he forecast the future of military europe, though his own italy was the last to win her redemption through his plans. 'taken all in all,' says a german military writer, 'we may recognise machiavelli in his inspired knowledge of the principles of universal military discipline as a true prophet and as one of the weightiest thinkers in the field of military construction and constitution. he penetrated the essence of military technique with a precision wholly alien to his period, and it is, so to say, a new psychological proof of the relationship between the art of war and the art of statecraft, that the founder of modern politics is also the first of modern military classics.' but woe to the florentine secretary with his thoughts born centuries before their time. as in _the prince_, so in the _art of war_, he closes with a passionate appeal of great sorrow and the smallest ray of hope. where shall i hope to find the things that i have told of? what is italy to-day? what are the italians? enervated, impotent, vile. wherefore, 'i lament mee of nature, the which either ought not to have made mee a knower of this, or it ought to have given mee power, to have bene able to have executed it: for now beeing olde, i cannot hope to have any occasion, to be able so to doo: in consideration whereof, i have bene liberall with you who beeing grave young men, may (when the thinges said of me shall please you) at due times, in favoure of your princes, helpe them and counsider them. wherin i would have you not to be afraied, or mistrustfull, because this province seemes to bee altogether given to raise up againe the things deade, as is seene by the perfection that poesie, painting, and writing, is now brought unto: albeit, as much as is looked for of mee, beeing strooken in yeeres, i do mistrust. where surely, if fortune had heretofore graunted mee so much state, as suffiseth for a like enterprise, i would not have doubted, but in most short time, to have shewed to the world, how much the auncient orders availe: and without peradventure, either i would have increased it with glory, or lost it without shame.' [sidenote: _the history of florence_.] in machiavelli was an ageing and disappointed man. he was not popular with any party, but the medici were willing to use him in minor matters if only to secure his adherence. he was commissioned by giulio de medici to write a history of florence with an annual allowance of florins. in he completed his task and dedicated the book to its begetter, pope clement vii. in the history, as in much of his other work, machiavelli enriches the science of humanity with a new department. 'he was the first to contemplate the life of a nation in its continuity, to trace the operation of political forces through successive generations, to contrast the action of individuals with the evolution of causes over which they had but little control, and to bring the salient features of the national biography into relief by the suppression of comparatively unimportant details.' he found no examples to follow, for villani with all his merits was of a different order. diarists and chroniclers there were in plenty, and works of the learned men led by aretino, written in latin and mainly rhetorical. the great work of guicciardini was not published till years after the secretary's death. machiavelli broke away from the chronicle or any other existing form. he deliberately applied philosophy to the sequence of facts. he organised civil and political history. he originally intended to begin his work at the year , the year of the return of cosimo il vecchio from exile and of the consolidation of medicean power on the ground that the earlier periods had been covered by aretino and bracciolini. but he speedily recognised that they told of nothing but external wars and business while the heart of the history of florence was left unbared. the work was to do again in very different manner, and in that manner he did it. throughout he maintains and insistently insinuates his unfailing explanation of the miseries of italy; the necessity of unity and the evils of the papacy which prevents it. in this book dedicated to a pope he scants nothing of his hatred of the holy see. for ever he is still seeking the one strong man in a blatant land with almost absolute power to punish, pull down, and reconstruct on an abiding foundation, for to his clear eyes it is ever the events that are born of the man, and not the man of the events. he was the first to observe that the ghibellines were not only the imperial party but the party of the aristocrats and influential men, whereas the guelphs were the party not only of the church but of the people, and he traces the slow but increasing struggle to the triumph of democracy in the ordinamenti di giustizia ( ). but the triumph was not final. the florentines were 'unable to preserve liberty and could not tolerate slavery.' so the fighting, banishments, bloodshed, cruelty, injustice, began once more. the nobles were in origin germanic, he points out, the people latin; so that a racial bitterness gave accent to their hate. but yet, he adds impartially, when the crushed nobility were forced to change their names and no longer dared be heard 'florence was not only stripped of arms but likewise of all generosity.' it would be impossible to follow the history in detail. the second, seventh and eighth books are perhaps the most powerful and dramatic. outside affairs and lesser events are lightly touched. but no stories in the world have been told with more intensity than those of the conspiracies in the seventh and eighth books, and none have given a more intimate and accurate perception of the modes of thought and feeling at the time. the history ends with the death of lorenzo de medici in . enough has been said of its breadth of scope and originality of method. the spirit of clear flaming patriotism, of undying hope that will not in the darkest day despair, the plangent appeal to italy for its own great sake to rouse and live, all these are found pre-eminently in the history as they are found wherever machiavelli speaks from the heart of his heart. of the style a foreigner may not speak. but those who are proper judges maintain that in simplicity and lucidity, vigour, and power, softness, elevation, and eloquence, the style of machiavelli is 'divine,' and remains, as that of dante among the poets, unchallenged and insuperable among all writers of italian prose. [sidenote: other works.] though machiavelli must always stand as a political thinker, an historian, and a military theorist it would leave an insufficient idea of his mental activities were there no short notice of his other literary works. with his passion for incarnating his theories in a single personality, he wrote the _life of castruccio castracani_, a politico-military romance. his hero was a soldier of fortune born lucca in , and, playing with a free hand, machiavelli weaves a life of adventure and romance in which his constant ideas of war and politics run through and across an almost imaginary tapestry. he seems to have intended to illustrate and to popularise his ideals and to attain by a story the many whom his discourses could not reach. in verse machiavelli was fluent, pungent, and prosaic. the unfinished _golden ass_ is merely made of paragraphs of the _discorsi_ twined into rhymes. and the others are little better. countless pamphlets, essays, and descriptions may be searched without total waste by the very curious and the very leisurely. the many despatches and multitudinous private letters tell the story both of his life and his mind. but the short but famous _novella di belfagor arcidiavolo_ is excellent in wit, satire, and invention. as a playwright he wrote, among many lesser efforts, one supreme comedy, _mandragola_, which macaulay declares to be better than the best of goldoni's plays, and only less excellent than the very best of molière's. italian critics call it the finest play in italian. the plot is not for nursery reading, but there are tears and laughter and pity and anger to furnish forth a copious author, and it has been not ill observed that _mandragola_ is the comedy of a society of which _the prince_ is the tragedy. [sidenote: the end.] it has been said of the italians of the renaissance that with so much of unfairness in their policy, there was an extraordinary degree of fairness in their intellects. they were as direct in thought as they were tortuous in action and could see no wickedness in deceiving a man whom they intended to destroy. to such a charge--if charge it be--machiavelli would have willingly owned himself answerable. he observed, in order to know, and he wished to use his knowledge for the advancement of good. to him the means were indifferent, provided only that they were always apt and moderate in accordance with necessity, a surgeon has no room for sentiment: in such an operator pity were a crime. it is his to examine, to probe, to diagnose, flinching at no ulcer, sparing neither to himself or to his patient. and if he may not act, he is to lay down very clearly the reasons which led to his conclusions and to state the mode by which life itself may be saved, cost what amputation and agony it may. this was machiavelli's business, and he applied his eye, his brains, and his knife with a relentless persistence, which, only because it was so faithful, was not called heroic. and we know that he suffered in the doing of it and that his heart was sore for his patient. but there was no other way. his record is clear and shining. he has been accused of no treachery, of no evil action. his patriotism for italy as a fatherland, a dream undreamt by any other, never glowed more brightly than when italy lay low in shame, and ruin, and despair. his faith never faltered, his spirit never shrank. and the italy that he saw, through dark bursts of storm, broken and sinking, we see to-day riding in the sunny haven where he would have her to be. henry cust. contents page the arte of warre the prince the arte of warre written first in italian by nicholas machiavell and set forthe in englishe by peter whitehorne studient at graies inne with an addicion of other like marcialle feates and experimentes as in a table in the ende of the booke maie appere _menfss. iulij_. to the moste highe, and excellent princes, elizabeth, by the grace of god, quene of englande, fraunce, and irelande, defender of the faithe, and of the churche of englande, and irelande, on yearth next under god, the supreme governour. although commonlie every man, moste worthie and renoumed soveraine, seketh specially to commend and extolle the thing, whereunto he feleth hymself naturally bent and inclined, yet al soche parciallitie and private affection laid aside, it is to bee thought (that for the defence, maintenaunce, and advauncemente of a kyngdome, or common weale, or for the good and due observacion of peace, and administracion of justice in the same) no one thinge to be more profitable, necessarie, or more honourable, then the knowledge of service in warre, and dedes of armes; bicause consideryng the ambicion of the worlde, it is impossible for any realme or dominion, long to continue free in quietnesse and savegarde, where the defence of the sweard is not alwaies in a readinesse. for like as the grekes, beyng occupied aboute triflyng matters, takyng pleasure in resityng of comedies, and soche other vain thinges, altogether neclecting marciall feates, gave occasion to philip kyng of macedonia, father to alexander the great, to oppresse and to bring theim in servitude, under his subjeccion, even so undoubtedly, libertie will not be kepte, but men shall be troden under foote, and brought to moste horrible miserie and calamitie, if thei givyng theim selves to pastymes and pleasure, forssake the juste regarde of their owne defence, and savegarde of their countrie, whiche in temporall regimente, chiefly consisteth in warlike skilfulnesse. and therefore the aunciente capitaines and mightie conquerours, so longe as thei florished, did devise with moste greate diligence, all maner of waies, to bryng their men to the perfect knowledge of what so ever thing appertained to the warre: as manifestly appereth by the warlike games, whiche in old time the princes of grecia ordained, upon the mount olimpus, and also by thorders and exercises, that the aunciente romaines used in sundrie places, and specially in campo martio, and in their wonderful sumptuous theaters, whiche chiefly thei builded to that purpose. whereby thei not onely made their souldiours so experte, that thei obtained with a fewe, in faightyng againste a greate houge multitude of enemies, soche marveilous victories, as in many credible histories are mencioned, but also by the same meanes, their unarmed and rascalle people that followed their campes, gotte soche understandyng in the feates of warre, that thei in the daie of battaile, beeyng lefte destitute of succour, were able without any other help, to set themselves in good order, for their defence againste the enemie, that would seke to hurte theim, and in soche daungerous times, have doen their countrie so good service, that verie often by their helpe, the adversaries have been put to flight, and fieldes moste happely wone. so that thantiquitie estemed nothing more happie in a common weale, then to have in the same many men skilfull in warlike affaires: by meanes whereof, their empire continually inlarged, and moste wonderfully and triumphantly prospered. for so longe as men for their valiauntnesse, were then rewarded and had in estimacion, glad was he that could finde occasion to venter, yea, and spende his life, to benefite his countrie: as by the manly actes that marcus curcius, oracius cocles, and gaius mucius did for the savegarde of rome and also by other innumerable like examples dooeth plainly appeare. but when through long and continuall peace, thei began to bee altogether given to pleasure and delicatenesse, little regardyng marciall feates, nor soche as were expert in the practise thereof: their dominions and estates, did not so moche before increase and prospere, as then by soche meanes and oversight, thei sodainly fell into decaie and utter ruine. for soche truly is the nature and condicion, bothe of peace and warre, that where in governemente, there is not had equalle consideration of them bothe, the one in fine, doeth woorke and induce, the others oblivion and utter abholicion. wherfore, sith the necessitie of the science of warres is so greate, and also the necessarie use thereof so manifeste, that even ladie peace her self, doeth in maner from thens crave her chief defence and preservacion, and the worthinesse moreover, and honour of the same so greate, that as by prose we see, the perfecte glorie therof, cannot easely finde roote, but in the hartes of moste noble couragious and manlike personages, i thought most excellente princes, i could not either to the specialle gratefiyng of your highnesse, the universall delight of all studious gentlemen, or the common utilitie of the publike wealth, imploie my labours more profitablie in accomplishyng of my duetie and good will, then in settyng foorthe some thing, that might induce to the augmentyng and increase of the knowledge thereof: inespecially thexample of your highnes most politike governemente over us, givyng plaine testimonie of the wonderfull prudente desire that is in you, to have your people instructed in this kinde of service, as well for the better defence of your highnesse, theim selves, and their countrie, as also to discourage thereby, and to be able to resist the malingnitie of the enemie, who otherwise would seeke peradventure, to invade this noble realme or kyngdome. when therfore about x. yeres paste, in the emperours warres against the mores and certain turkes beyng in barberie, at the siege and winnyng of calibbia, monesterio and africa, i had as well for my further instruction in those affaires, as also the better to acquainte me with the italian tongue, reduced into englishe, the booke called the arte of warre, of the famous and excellente nicholas machiavell, whiche in times paste he beyng a counsailour, and secretarie of the noble citee of florence, not without his greate laude and praise did write: and havyng lately againe, somwhat perused the same, the whiche in soche continuall broiles and unquietnesse, was by me translated, i determined with my self, by publishyng thereof, to bestowe as greate a gift (sins greater i was not able) emongeste my countrie men, not experte in the italian tongue, as in like woorkes i had seen before me, the frenchemen, duchemen, spaniardes, and other forreine nacions, moste lovyngly to have bestowed emongeste theirs: the rather undoubtedly, that as by private readyng of the same booke, i then felt my self in that knowledge marveilously holpen and increased, so by communicatyng the same to many, our englishemen findyng out the orderyng and disposyng of exploictes of warre therein contained, the aide and direction of these plaine and briefe preceptes, might no lesse in knowledge of warres become incomperable, then in prowes also and exercise of the same, altogether invincible: which my translacion moste gracious soveraine, together with soche other thynges, as by me hath been gathered, and thought good to adde thereunto, i have presumed to dedicate unto youre highnes: not onely bicause the whole charge and furniture of warlike counsailes and preparacions, being determined by the arbitremente of governours and princes, the treatise also of like effecte should in like maner as of right, depende upon the protection of a moste worthie and noble patronesse, but also that the discourse it self, and the woorke of a forrein aucthour, under the passeport and safeconduite of your highnes moste noble name, might by speciall aucthoritie of the same, winne emongest your majesties subjectes, moche better credite and estimacion. and if mooste mightie queen, in this kind of philosophie (if i maie so terme it) grave and sage counsailes, learned and wittie preceptes, or politike and prudente admonicions, ought not to be accompted the least and basest tewels of weale publike. then dare i boldely affirme, that of many straungers, whiche from forrein countries, have here tofore in this your majesties realme arrived, there is none in comparison to bee preferred, before this worthie florentine and italian, who havyng frely without any gaine of exchaunge (as after some acquaintaunce and familiaritie will better appeare) brought with hym moste riche, rare and plentiful treasure, shall deserve i trust of all good englishe lishe hartes, most lovingly and frendly to be intertained, embraced and cherished. whose newe englishe apparell, how so ever it shall seme by me, after a grosse fasion, more fitlie appoincted to the campe, then in nice termes attired to the carpet, and in course clothyng rather putte foorthe to battaile, then in any brave shewe prepared to the bankette, neverthelesse my good will i truste, shall of your grace be taken in good parte, havyng fashioned the phraise of my rude stile, even accordyng to the purpose of my travaile, whiche was rather to profite the desirous manne of warre, then to delight the eares of the fine rethorician, or daintie curious scholemanne: moste humblie besechyng your highnes, so to accept my labour herein, as the first fruictes of a poore souldiours studie, who to the uttermoste of his smalle power, in the service of your moste gracious majestie, and of his countrie, will at al tymes, accordyng to his bounden duetie and allegeaunce, promptlie yeld hym self to any labour, travaile, or daunger, what so ever shal happen. praiyng in the mean season the almightie god, to give your highnes in longe prosperous raigne, perfect health, desired tranquilitie, and against all your enemies, luckie and joifull victorie. your humble subject and dailie oratour, peter whitehorne. the proheme of nicholas machiavell, citezein and secretarie of florence, upon his booke of the arte of warre, unto laurence philippe strozze, one of the nobilitie of florence. there have laurence, many helde, and do holde this opinion, that there is no maner of thing, whiche lesse agreeth the one with the other, nor that is so much unlike, as the civil life to the souldiours. wherby it is often seen, that if any determin in thexercise of that kinde of service to prevaile, that incontinent he doeth not only chaunge in apparel, but also in custome and maner, in voice, and from the facion of all civil use, he doeth alter: for that he thinketh not meete to clothe with civell apparell him, who wil be redie, and promt to all kinde of violence, nor the civell customes, and usages maie that man have, the whiche judgeth bothe those customes to be effeminate, and those usages not to be agreable to his profession: nor it semes not convenient for him to use the civill gesture and ordinarie wordes, who with fasing and blasphemies, will make afraied other menne: the whiche causeth in this time, suche opinion to be moste true. but if thei should consider thauncient orders, there should nothing be founde more united, more confirmable, and that of necessitie ought to love so much the one the other, as these: for as muche as all the artes that are ordeined in a common weale, in regarde or respecte of common profite of menne, all the orders made in the same, to live with feare of the lawe, and of god should be vaine, if by force of armes their defence wer not prepared, which, well ordeined, doe maintain those also whiche be not well ordeined. and likewise to the contrarie the good orders, without the souldiours help, no lesse or otherwise doe disorder, then the habitacion of a sumptuous and roiall palais, although it wer decte with gold and precious stones, when without being covered, should not have wherewith to defende it from the raine. and if in what so ever other orders of cities and kyngdomes, there hath been used al diligence for to maintain men faithfull, peaceable, and full of the feare of god, in the service of warre, it was doubled: if for in what man ought the countrie to seke greater faith, then in him, who must promise to die for the same? in whom ought there to bee more love of peace, then in him, whiche onely by the warre maie be hurte? in whome ought there to bee more feare of god, then in him, which every daie committyng himself to infinite perilles, hath moste neede of his helpe? this necessitie considered wel, bothe of them that gave the lawes to empires, and of those that to the exercise of service wer apoincted, made that the life of souldiours, of other menne was praised, and with all studie folowed and imitated. but the orders of service of war, beyng altogether corrupted, and a greate waie from the auncient maners altered, there hath growen these sinisterous opinions, which maketh men to hate the warlike service, and to flie the conversacion of those that dooe exercise it. albeit i judgeing by the same, that i have seen and redde, that it is not a thyng impossible, to bryng it again to the auncient maners, and to give it some facion of the vertue passed, i have determined to the entente not to passe this my idell time, without doyng some thyng, to write that whiche i doe understande, to the satisfaction of those, who of aunciente actes, are lovers of the science of warre. and although it be a bold thing to intreate of the same matter, wher of otherwise i have made no profession, notwithstanding i beleve it is no errour, to occupie with wordes a degree, the whiche many with greater presumpcion with their deedes have occupied: for as muche as the errours that i maie happen to make by writing, may be without harme to any man corrected: but those the whiche of them be made in doyng cannot be knowen without the ruine of empires. therefore laurence you ought to consider the qualitie of this my laboure, and with your judgement to give it that blame, or that praise, as shall seeme unto you it hath deserved. the whiche i sende unto you, as well to shewe my selfe gratefull, although my habilitie reche not to the benefites, which i have received of you, as also for that beyng the custome to honour with like workes them who for nobilitie, riches, wisedome, and liberalitie doe shine: i knowe you for riches, and nobilitie, not to have many peeres, for wisedome fewe, and for liberalitie none. the arte of warre the table of certain principall thinges, contained in this woorke of machiavel in the firste booke why a good man ought not to exersise warfare as his arte, deedes of armes ought to be used privatly in time of peace for exersise, and in time of warre for necessetie and renoume, the strength of an armie is the footemen, the romaines renued their legions and had men in the flower of their age, whether men of armes ought to be kept, what is requisete for the preparyng of an armie, out of what contrie souldiers ought to be chosen, souldiers ought to bee chosen, by thaucthoritie of the prince, of suche men as be his oune subjectes, the difference of ages, that is to be taken in the chosinge of souldiours for the restoring of an olde power and for the making of a newe, the weapons or power that is prepared, of the naturall subjectes, of a common weale bringeth profit and not hurte, what cause letted the venetians, that they made not a monarchi of the worlde, how an armie maye bee prepared in the countrie, where were no exersise of warre, the custome that the romaines used, in the chosyng of their souldiours, the greater number of men is best, whether the multitude of armed men ar occation of confusion and of dissorder, how to prohibite, that the capitaines make no discension, in the seconde booke what armour the antiquetie used, the occation of the boldenes of the duchemen, whiche maner of armyng menne is better either the duche or romaine fasion, diverse examples of late dayes, an example of tigran, whether the footemen or the horsemen ought to bee estemed moste, the cause whie the romaines were overcome of the parthians, what order, or what vertue maketh, that footemen overcum horsemen, howe the antiquitie exersised their men to learne them to handle their weapons, what the antiquitie estemed moste happie in a common weale, the maner, of maintainyng the order, what a legion is, of grekes called a falange, and of frenchemen catterva, the devision of a legion, and the divers names of orders, the order of batellraye, and the manner of appoincting the battels, how to order, cccc.l. men to doo some severall feate, the fation of a battaile that the suisers make like a crosse, what carriages the capitaines ought to have, and the number of carriages requisite to every band of men, diverse effectes caused of diverse soundes, whereof cometh the utilitie, and the dissorder of the armies that are now a daies, the manner of arminge men, the number of carriages that men of armes and lighte horsemen ought to have, in the thirde booke the greatest dissorder that is used now a dayes in the orderinge of an armie, how the romaines devided their armie in hastati, principi and triarii, the manner that the romaines used to order them selves agayne in the overthrow, the custom of the greekes, a maine battaile of suissers, how manie legions of romaine citesens was in an ordinarie armie, the manner how to pitche a fielde to faighte a battaile, of what number of faighting men an armie oughte to be, the description of a battaile that is a faighting, an exsample of ventidio faighting against the parthians, an example of epaminondas, how the artillerie is unprofitable, how that a maine battaile of suissers cannot ocupie more then fower pikes, how the battailes when thei cum to be eight or ten, maye be receyved in the verie same space, that received the fyve, the armes that the standarde of all tharmie ought to have, divers examples of the antiquetie, in the fowerth booke whether the fronte of the armie ought to bee made large, to how many thinges respecte ought to be had, in the ordringe of an armie, an example of scipio, in what place a capitain maie order his armie with savegarde not to be clene overthrowen, aniball and scipio praised for the orderynge of their armies, cartes used of the asiaticans, diverse examples of the antiquitie, the prudence which the capitaine ought to use, in the accidence that chaunse in faightinge, what a capitaine ought to doo, that is the conqueror, or that is conquered, a capitaine ought not to faighte the battaile, but with advauntage, excepte he be constrained, how to avoide the faightinge of the fielde, advertismentes that the capitaine ought to have, speakyng to souldiers helpeth muche to make them to be curagious and bolde, whether all the armie ought to bee spoken unto, or onely to the heddes thereof, in the fyveth booke the manner how to leade an armie gowinge thorough suspected places, or to incounter the enemie, an example of aniball, wether any thing oughte to bee commaunded with the voise or with the trompet, the occations why the warres made now a dayes, doo impoverish the conquerors as well as the conquered, credite ought not to be given to thinges which stand nothinge with reason, the armie ought not to knowe what the capitaine purposeth to doo, diverse examples, in the sixte booke the maner how to incampe an armie, how brode the spaces and the wayes ought to be within the campe, what waye ought to be used when it is requiset to incampe nere the enemie, how the watche and warde ought to be apoincted in the campe, and what punishmente they ought to have that doo not their dutie, how the romanies prohibited women to be in their armies and idell games to be used, how to incampe accordinge to the nomber of men, and what nomber of menne maie suffise againste, what so ever enemie that wer, how to doo to be assured, of the fideletie of those that are had in suspition, what a capitaine ought to doo beinge beseged of his enemies, example of coriliano and others, it is requiset chiefly for a capitain to kepe his souldiers punished and payed, of aguries, moste excellent advertismentes and pollicies, the occation of the overthrowe of the frenchmen at garigliano, in the seventh booke cities are strong, either by nature or by industrie, the maner of fortificacion, bulwarkes ought not to be made oute of a towne distante from the same, example of genoa, of the countes catherin, the fation of percullesies used in almaine, howe the battelmentes of walles were made at the first, and how thei are made now adaies, the provisions that is mete to bee made, for the defence of a towne, divers pollicies, for the beseginge and defendinge of a toune or fortres, secrete conveing of letters, the defence againste a breache, generall rules of warre, the first booke of the arte of warre of nicholas machiavel, citezein and secretarie of florence, unto laurence philip strozze one of the nobiltie of florence. the first booke forasmuch as i beleve that after death, al men maie be praised without charge, al occasion and suspecte of flatterie beyng taken awaie, i shal not doubte to praise our cosimo ruchellay, whose name was never remembred of me without teares, havyng knowen in him those condicions, the whiche in a good frende or in a citezien, might of his freendes, or of his countrie, be desired: for that i doe not knowe what thyng was so muche his, not excepting any thing (saving his soule) which for his frendes willingly of him should not have been spent: i knowe not what enterprise should have made him afraide, where the same should have ben knowen to have been for the benefite of his countrie. and i doe painly confesse, not to have mette emongest so many men, as i have knowen, and practised withal, a man, whose minde was more inflamed then his, unto great and magnificent thynges. nor he lamented not with his frendes of any thyng at his death, but because he was borne to die a yong manne within his owne house, before he had gotten honour, and accordynge to his desire, holpen any manne: for that he knewe, that of him coulde not be spoken other, savyng that there should be dead a good freende. yet it resteth not for this, that we, and what so ever other that as we did know him, are not able to testifie (seeyng his woorkes doe not appere) of his lawdable qualities. true it is, that fortune was not for al this, so muche his enemie, that it left not some brief record of the readinesse of his witte, as doeth declare certaine of his writinges, and settyng foorthe of amorous verses, wherin (although he were not in love) yet for that he would not consume time in vain, til unto profounder studies fortune should have brought him, in his youthfull age he exercised himselfe. whereby moste plainly maie be comprehended, with how moche felicitie he did describe his conceiptes, and how moche for poetrie he should have ben estemed, if the same for the ende therof, had of him ben exercised. fortune having therfore deprived us from the use of so great a frende, me thinketh there can bee founde no other remedie, then as muche as is possible, to seke to enjoye the memorie of the same, and to repeate suche thynges as hath been of him either wittely saied, or wisely disputed. and for as much as there is nothyng of him more freshe, then the reasonyng, the whiche in his last daies signior fabricio collonna, in his orchard had with him, where largely of the same gentilman were disputed matters of warre, bothe wittely and prudently, for the moste parte of cosimo demaunded, i thought good, for that i was present there with certain other of our frendes, to bring it to memorie, so that reading the same, the frendes of cosimo, whiche thether came, might renewe in their mindes, the remembraunce of his vertue: and the other part beyng sorie for their absence, might partly learne hereby many thynges profitable, not onely to the life of souldiours, but also to civil mennes lives, which gravely of a moste wise man was disputed. therfore i saie, that fabricio collonna retournyng out of lombardie, where longe time greatly to his glorie, he had served in the warres the catholike kyng, he determined, passyng by florence, to rest himself certain daies in the same citee, to visite the dukes excellencie, and to see certaine gentilmen, whiche in times paste he had been acquainted withal. for whiche cause, unto cosimo it was thought beste to bid him into his orchard, not so muche to use his liberalitee, as to have occasion to talke with him at leasure, and of him to understande and to learne divers thinges, accordyng as of suche a man maie bee hoped for, semyng to have accasion to spende a daie in reasonyng of suche matters, which to his minde should best satisfie him. then fabricio came, accordyng to his desire, and was received of cosimo together, with certain of his trustie frendes, emongest whome wer zanoby buondelmonti, baptiste palla, and luigi allamanni, all young men loved of him and of the very same studies moste ardente, whose good qualities, for as muche as every daie, and at every houre thei dooe praise themselves, we will omit. fabricio was then accordyng to the time and place honoured, of all those honours, that thei could possible devise: but the bankettyng pleasures beyng passed, and the tabel taken up, and al preparacion of feastinges consumed, the which are sone at an ende in sight of greate men, who to honorable studies have their mindes set, the daie beyng longe, and the heate muche, cosimo judged for to content better his desire, that it wer well doen, takyng occasion to avoide the heate, to bring him into the moste secret, and shadowest place of his garden. where thei beyng come, and caused to sit, some upon herbes, some in the coldest places, other upon litle seates which there was ordeined, under the shadow of moste high trees, fabricio praiseth the place, to be delectable, and particularly consideryng the trees, and not knowyng some of them, he did stande musinge in his minde, whereof cosimo beeyng a ware saied, you have not peradventure ben acquainted with some of these sortes of trees: but doe not marvell at it, for as muche as there bee some, that were more estemed of the antiquitie, then thei are commonly now a daies: and he tolde him the names of them, and how barnardo his graundfather did travaile in suche kinde of plantyng: fabricio replied, i thought it shuld be the same you saie, and this place, and this studie, made me to remember certaine princes of the kyngdome of naples, whiche of these anncient tillage and shadow doe delight. and staiyng upon this talke, and somewhat standyng in a studdie, saied moreover, if i thought i should not offende, i woud tell my opinion, but i beleeve i shall not, commonyng with friendes, and to dispute of thynges, and not to condemne them. how much better thei should have doen (be it spoken without displeasure to any man) to have sought to been like the antiquitie in thinges strong, and sharpe, not in the delicate and softe: and in those that thei did in the sunne, not in the shadowe: and to take the true and perfecte maners of the antiquitie: not those that are false and corrupted: for that when these studies pleased my romaines, my countrie fell into ruin. unto which cosimo answered. but to avoide the tediousnesse to repeate so many times he saied, and the other answered, there shall be onely noted the names of those that speakes, without rehersing other. then cosimo saied, you have opened the waie of a reasoning, which i have desired, and i praie you that you will speake withoute respecte, for that that i without respecte will aske you, and if i demaundyng, or repliyng shall excuse, or accuse any, it shal not be to excuse, or accuse, but to understande of you the truth. fabricio. and i shall be very well contented to tell you that, whiche i understand of al the same that you shall aske me, the whiche if it shall be true, or no, i wil report me to your judgemente: and i will be glad that you aske me, for that i am to learne, as well of you in askyng me, as you of me in aunswerynge you: for as muche as many times a wise demaunder, maketh one to consider many thynges, and to knowe many other, whiche without havyng been demaunded, he should never have knowen. cosimo. i will retourne to thesame, that you said first, that my graundfather and those your princes, should have doen more wisely, to have resembled the antiquitie in hard thinges, then in the delicate, and i will excuse my parte, for that, the other i shall leave to excuse for you. i doe not beleve that in his tyme was any manne, that so moche detested the livyng in ease, as he did, and that so moche was a lover of the same hardenesse of life, whiche you praise: notwithstandyng he knewe not how to bee able in persone, nor in those of his sonnes to use it, beeyng borne in so corrupte a worlde, where one that would digresse from the common use, should bee infamed and disdained of every man: consideryng that if one in the hottest day of summer being naked, should wallowe hymself upon the sande, or in winter in the moste coldest monethes upon the snowe, as diogenes did, he should be taken as a foole. if one, (as the spartans were wonte to doe) should nourishe his children in a village, makyng them to slepe in the open aire, to go with hedde and feete naked, to washe them selves in the colde water for to harden them, to be able to abide moche paine, and for to make theim to love lesse life, and to feare lesse death, he should be scorned, and soner taken as a wilde beast, then as a manne. if there wer seen also one, to nourishe himself with peason and beanes, and to despise gold, as fabricio doeth, he should bee praised of fewe, and followed of none: so that he being afraied of this present maner of livyng, he left thauncient facions, and thesame, that he could with lest admiracion imitate in the antiquitie, he did. fabricio. you have excused it in this parte mooste strongly: and surely you saie the truthe: but i did not speake so moche of this harde maner of livyng, as of other maners more humaine, and whiche have with the life now a daies greater conformitie. the whiche i doe not beleve, that it hath been difficulte to bryng to passe unto one, who is nombred emongest princes of a citee: for the provyng whereof, i will never seke other, then thexample of the romaines. whose lives, if thei wer well considred, and thorders of thesame common weale, there should therin be seen many thinges, not impossible to induce into a cominaltie, so that it had in her any good thing. cosimo. what thynges are those, that you would induce like unto the antiquitie. fabricio. to honour, and to reward vertue, not to despise povertie, to esteme the maners and orders of warfare, to constrain the citezeins to love one an other, to live without sectes, to esteme lesse the private, than the publike, and other like thinges, that easily might bee with this time accompanied: the which maners ar not difficult to bring to passe, when a man should wel consider them, and entre therin by due meanes: for asmoche as in thesame, the truth so moche appereth, that every common wit, maie easely perceive it: which thing, who that ordeineth, doth plant trees, under the shadowe wherof, thei abide more happie, and more pleasantly, then under these shadowes of this goodly gardeine. cosimo. i will not speake any thyng againste thesame that you have saied, but i will leave it to bee judged of these, whom easely can judge, and i will tourne my communicacion to you, that is an accusar of theim, the whiche in grave, and greate doynges, are not followers of the antiquitie, thinkyng by this waie more easely to be in my entent satisfied. therfore, i would knowe of you whereof it groweth, that of the one side you condempne those, that in their doynges resemble not the antiquitie? of the other, in the warre, whiche is your art, wherin you are judged excellent, it is not seen, that you have indevoured your self, to bryng the same to any soche ende, or any thyng at all resembled therein the auncient maners. fabricio. you are happened upon the poincte, where i loked: for that my talke deserved no other question: nor i desired other: and albeit that i could save my self with an easie excuse, not withstandyng for my more contentacion, and yours, seyng that the season beareth it, i will enter in moche longer reasoning. those men, whiche will enterprise any thyng, ought firste with all diligence to prepare theim selves, to be ready and apte when occasion serveth, to accomplish that, which thei have determined to worke: and for that when the preparacions are made craftely, thei are not knowen, there cannot be accused any man of any negligence, if firste it be not disclosed by thoccasion: in the which working not, is after seen, either that there is not prepared so moche as suffiseth, or that there hath not been of any part therof thought upon. and for as moche as to me there is not come any occasion to be able, to shewe the preparacions made of me, to reduce the servise of warre into his auncient orders, if i have not reduced it, i cannot be of you, nor of other blamed: i beleve this excuse shuld suffise for answere to your accusement. cosimo. it should suffice, when i wer certain, that thoccasion were not come. fabricio. but for that i know, that you maie doubt whether this occasion hath been cum, or no, i will largely (when you with pacience will heare me) discourse what preparacions are necessary first to make, what occasion muste growe, what difficultie doeth let, that the preparacions help not, and why thoccasion cannot come, and how these things at ones, which some contrary endes, is most difficill, and most easie to do. cosimo. you cannot do bothe to me, and unto these other, a thing more thankfull then this. and if to you it shall not be tedious to speake, unto us it shal never be grevous to heare: but for asmoch as this reasonyng ought to be long, i will with your license take helpe of these my frendes: and thei, and i praie you of one thyng, that is, that you will not bee greved, if some tyme with some question of importaunce, we interrupte you. [sidenote: why a good man ought never to use the exercise of armes, as his art.] fabricio. i am moste well contented, that you cosimo with these other younge men here, doe aske me: for that i beleve, that youthfulnes, will make you lovers of warlike thinges, and more easie to beleve thesame, that of me shalbe saied. these other, by reason of havyng nowe their hedde white, and for havyng upon their backes their bloude congeled, parte of theim are wonte to bee enemies of warre, parte uncorrectable, as those, whom beleve, that tymes, and not the naughtie maners, constraine men to live thus: so that safely aske you all of me, and without respecte: the whiche i desire, as well, for that it maie be unto me a little ease, as also for that i shall have pleasure, not to leave in your mynde any doubt. i will begin at your woordes, where you saied unto me, that in the warre, that is my arte, i had not indevoured to bryng it to any aunciente ende: whereupon i saie, as this beyng an arte, whereby men of no maner of age can live honestly, it cannot bee used for an arte, but of a common weale: or of a kyngdome: and the one and the other of these, when thei bee well ordeined, will never consente to any their citezeins, or subjectes, to use it for any arte, nor never any good manne doeth exercise it for his particulare arte: for as moche as good he shall never bee judged, whom maketh an excersise thereof, where purposing alwaies to gaine thereby, it is requisite for hym to be ravenyng, deceiptfull, violente, and to have many qualities, the whiche of necessitie maketh hym not good: nor those menne cannot, whiche use it for an arte, as well the greate as the leaste, bee made otherwise: for that this arte doeth not nourishe them in peace. wherfore thei ar constrained either to thinke that there is no peace, or so moche to prevaile in the tyme of warre, that in peace thei maie bee able to kepe them selves: and neither of these two thoughtes happeneth in a good man: for that in mindyng to bee able to finde himself at all tymes, dooe growe robberies, violence, slaughters, whiche soche souldiours make as well to the frendes, as to the enemies: and in mindyng not to have peace, there groweth deceiptes, whiche the capitaines use to those, whiche hire them, to the entent the warre maie continue, and yet though the peace come often, it happeneth that the capitaines beyng deprived of their stipendes, and of their licencious livyng, thei erecte an ansigne of adventures, and without any pitie thei put to sacke a province. have not you in memorie of your affaires, how that beyng many souldiours in italie without wages, bicause the warre was ended, thei assembled together many companies, and went taxyng the tounes, and sackyng the countrie, without beyng able to make any remedie? have you not red, that the carthagenes souldiours, the first warre beyng ended which thei had with the romaines, under matho, and spendio, twoo capitaines, rebelliously constituted of theim, made more perillous warre to the carthaginens, then thesame whiche thei had ended with the romaines? in the time of our fathers, frances sforza, to the entente to bee able to live honourably in the time of peace, not only beguiled the millenars, whose souldiour he was, but he toke from them their libertie and became their prince. like unto him hath been all the other souldiours of italie whiche have used warfare, for their particulare arte, and albeeit thei have not through their malignitie becomen dukes of milein, so moche the more thei deserve to bee blamed: for that although thei have not gotten so moch as he, thei have all (if their lives wer seen) sought to bring the like thynges to passe. sforza father of fraunces, constrained quene jone, to caste her self into the armes of the king of aragon, havyng in a sodain forsaken her, and in the middest of her enemies, lefte her disarmed, onely to satisfie his ambicion, either in taxyng her, or in takyng from her the kyngdome. braccio with the verie same industrie, sought to possesse the kyngdome of naples, and if he had not been overthrowen and slaine at aquila, he had brought it to passe. like disorders growe not of other, then of soche men as hath been, that use the exercise of warfare, for their proper arte. have not you a proverbe, whiche fortefieth my reasons, whiche saieth, that warre maketh theves, and peace hangeth theim up? for as moche as those, whiche knowe not how to live of other exercise, and in the same finding not enie man to sustayne theym, and havyng not so moche power, to knowe how to reduce theim selves together, to make an open rebellion, they are constrayned of necessetie to robbe in the highe waies, and justice is enforced to extinguishe theim. cosimo. you have made me to esteme this arte of warfare almoste as nothyng, and i have supposed it the moste excellentes, and moste honourableste that hath been used: so that if you declare me it not better, i cannot remaine satisfied: for that when it is thesame, that you saie, i knowe not, whereof groweth the glorie of cesar, of pompei, of scipio, of marcello, and of so many romaine capitaines, whiche by fame are celebrated as goddes. fabricio. i have not yet made an ende of disputyng al thesame, that i purposed to propounde: whiche were twoo thynges, the one, that a good manne could not use this exercise for his arte: the other, that a common weale or a kingdome well governed, did never permitte, that their subjectes or citezeins should use it for an arte. aboute the firste, i have spoken as moche as hath comen into my mynde: there remaineth in me to speake of the seconde where i woll come to aunswere to this your laste question, and i saie that pompey and cesar, and almoste all those capitaines, whiche were at rome, after the laste carthagenens warre, gotte fame as valiaunt men, not as good, and those whiche lived before them, gotte glorie as valiaunte and good menne: the whiche grewe, for that these tooke not the exercise of warre for their arte: and those whiche i named firste, as their arte did use it. and so longe as the common weale lived unspotted, never any noble citezein would presume, by the meane of soche exercise, to availe thereby in peace, breakyng the lawes, spoilyng the provinces, usurpyng, and plaiyng the tyraunte in the countrie, and in every maner prevailyng: nor any of how lowe degree so ever thei were, would goe aboute to violate the religion, confederatyng theim selves with private men, not to feare the senate, or to followe any tirannicall insolence, for to bee able to live with the arte of warre in all tymes. but those whiche were capitaines, contented with triumphe, with desire did tourne to their private life, and those whiche were membres, would be more willyng to laie awaie their weapons, then to take them, and every manne tourned to his science, whereby thei gotte their livyng: nor there was never any, that would hope with praie, and with this arte, to be able to finde theim selves. of this there maie be made concernyng citezeins, moste evidente conjecture, by the ensample of regolo attillio, who beyng capitain of the romaine armies in affrica, and havyng as it wer overcome the carthegenens, he required of the senate, licence to retourne home, to kepe his possessions, and told them, that thei were marde of his housbandmen. whereby it is more clere then the sunne, that if thesame manne had used the warre as his arte, and by meanes thereof, had purposed to have made it profitable unto him, havyng in praie so many provinces, he would not have asked license, to returne to kepe his feldes: for as moche as every daie he might otherwise, have gotten moche more, then the value of al those possessions: but bicause these good men and soche as use not the warre for their arte, will not take of thesame any thing then labour, perilles, and gloris, when thei are sufficiently glorious, thei desire to returne home, and to live of their owne science. concernyng menne of lowe degree, and common souldiours, to prove that thei kepte the verie same order, it doeth appeare that every one willingly absented theim selves from soche exercise, and when thei served not in the warre, thei would have desired to serve, and when thei did serve, thei would have desired leave not to have served: whiche is wel knowen through many insamples, and inespecially seeyng how emonge the firste privileges, whiche the romaine people gave to their citezeins was, that thei should not be constrained against their willes, to serve in the warres. therefore rome so long as it was well governed, whiche was untill the commyng of graccus, it had not any souldiour that would take this exercise for an arte, and therefore it had fewe naughtie, and those few wer severely punished. then a citee well governed, ought to desire, that this studie of warre, be used in tyme of peace for exercise, and in the time of warre, for necessitie and for glorie: and to suffer onely the common weale to use it for an arte, as rome did, and what so ever citezein, that hath in soche exercise other ende, is not good, and what so ever citee is governed otherwise, is not well ordeined. cosimo. i remain contented enough and satisfied of thesame, whiche hetherto you have told, and this conclusion pleaseth me verie wel whiche you have made, and as muche as is loked for touching a common welth, i beleve that it is true, but concerning kinges, i can not tell nowe, for that i woulde beleve that a kinge would have about him, whome particularly should take suche exercise for his arte. fabricio. a kingdome well ordred ought moste of all to avoide the like kinde of men, for only thei, are the destruction of their king, and all together ministers of tiranny, and alledge me not to the contrarie anie presente kingdome, for that i woll denie you all those to be kingdomes well ordered, bicause the kingdomes whiche have good orders, give not their absolute empire unto their king, saving in the armies, for as much as in this place only, a quicke deliberation is necessarie, and for this cause a principall power ought to be made. in the other affaires, he ought not to doe any thing without councell, and those are to be feared, which councell him, leaste he have some aboute him which in time of peace desireth to have warre bicause they are not able without the same to live, but in this, i wilbe a little more large: neither to seke a kingdome altogether good, but like unto those whiche be nowe a daies where also of a king those ought to be feared, whiche take the warre for theire art, for that the strength of armies without any doubte are the foote menne: so that if a king take not order in suche wise, that his men in time of peace may be content to returne home, and to live of their owne trades, it will follow of necessitie, that he ruinate: for that there is not found more perilous men, then those, whiche make the warre as their arte: bicause in such case, a king is inforsed either alwaies to make warre, or to paie them alwaies, or else to bee in perill, that they take not from him his kingdome. to make warre alwaies, it is not possible: to paie them alwaies it can not be: see that of necessitie, he runneth in peril to lese the state. the romaines (as i have saide) so long as they were wise and good, would never permitte, that their citizeins should take this exercise for their arte, although they were able to nurrishe them therin alwaies, for that that alwaies they made warre: but to avoide thesame hurte, whiche this continuall exercise might doe them, seyng the time did not varie, they changed the men, and from time to time toke such order with their legions, that in xv. yeres alwaies, they renewed them: and so thei had their men in the floure of their age, that is from xviij. to xxxiij. yeres, in which time the legges, the handes, and the yes answere the one the other, nor thei tarried not till there strengthe should decaie, and there naghtines increase, as it did after in the corrupted times. for as muche as octavian first, and after tiberius, minding more their own proper power, then the publicke profite, began to unarme the romaine people, to be able easely to commaunde them, and to kepe continually those same armies on the frontries of the empire: and bicause also they judged those, not sufficient to kepe brideled the people and romaine senate, they ordeined an armie called pretoriano, which laie harde by the walles of rome, and was as a rocke on the backe of the same citie. and for as much as then thei began frely to permitte, that suche men as were apoincted in suche exercises, should use the service of warre for their arte, streight waie the insolence of theim grewe, that they became fearful unto the senate, and hurtefull to the emperour, whereby ensued suche harme, that manie were slaine thorough there insolensie: for that they gave, and toke awaie the empire, to whome they thought good. and some while it hapned, that in one self time there were manie emperours, created of divers armies, of whiche thinges proceded first the devision of the empire, and at laste the ruine of the same. therefore kinges ought, if thei wil live safely, to have there souldiours made of men, who when it is time to make warre, willingly for his love will go to the same, and when the peace cometh after, more willingly will returne home. whiche alwaies wilbe, when thei shalbe men that know how to live of other arte then this: and so they ought to desire, peace beyng come, that there prince doo tourne to governe their people, the gentilmen to the tending of there possessions, and the common souldiours to their particular arte, and everie one of these, to make warre to have peace, and not to seke to trouble the peace, to have warre. cosimo. truely this reasonyng of yours, i thinke to bee well considered, notwithstanding beyng almost contrarie to that, whiche till nowe i have thought, my minde as yet doeth not reste purged of all doubte, for as muche as i see manie lordes and gentelmen, to finde them selves in time of peace, thorough the studies of warre, as your matches bee, who have provision of there princes, and of the cominaltie. i see also, almost al the gentelmen of armes, remaine with neir provision, i see manie souldiours lie in garison of cities and fortresses, so that my thinkes, that there is place in time of peace, for everie one. fabricio. i doe not beleve that you beleve this, that in time of peace everie man may have place, bicause, put case that there coulde not be brought other reason, the small number, that all they make, whiche remaine in the places alledged of you, would answer you. what proporcion have the souldiours, whiche are requiset to bee in the warre with those, whiche in the peace are occupied? for as much as the fortreses, and the cities that be warded in time of peace, in the warre are warded muche more, unto whome are joyned the souldiours, whiche kepe in the fielde, whiche are a great number, all whiche in the peace be putte awaie. and concerning the garde of states, whiche are a small number, pope july, and you have shewed to everie man, how muche are to be feared those, who will not learne to exercise any other art, then the warre, and you have for there insolence, deprived them from your garde, and have placed therin swisers, as men borne and brought up under lawes, and chosen of the cominaltie, according to the true election: so that saie no more, that in peace is place for everie man. concerning men at armes, thei al remaining in peace with their wages, maketh this resolution to seme more difficulte: notwithstandyng who considereth well all, shall finde the answere easie, bicause this manner of keping men of armes, is a corrupted manner and not good, the occasion is, for that they be men, who make thereof an arte, and of them their should grow every daie a thousande inconveniencies in the states, where thei should be, if thei were accompanied of sufficient company: but beyng fewe, and not able by them selves to make an armie, they cannot often doe suche grevous hurtes, neverthelesse they have done oftentimes: as i have said of frances, and of sforza his father, and of braccio of perugia: so that this use of keping men of armes, i doe not alowe, for it is a corrupte maner, and it may make great inconveniencies. cosimo. woulde you live without them? or keping them, how would you kepe them? [sidenote: a kinge that hath about him any that are to much lovers of warre, or to much lovers of peace shal cause him to erre.] fabricio. by waie of ordinaunce, not like to those of the king of fraunce: for as muche as they be perilous, and insolent like unto ours, but i would kepe them like unto those of the auncient romaines, whom created their chivalry of their own subjectes, and in peace time, thei sente them home unto their houses, to live of their owne trades, as more largely before this reasoning ende, i shal dispute. so that if now this part of an armie, can live in such exercise, as wel when it is peace, it groweth of the corrupt order. concerning the provisions, which are reserved to me, and to other capitaines, i saie unto you, that this likewise is an order moste corrupted: for as much as a wise common weale, ought not to give such stipendes to any, but rather thei ought to use for capitaines in the warre, their citezeins, and in time of peace to will, that thei returne to their occupations. likewise also, a wise king either ought not to give to suche, or giving any, the occasion ought to be either for rewarde of some worthy dede, or else for the desire to kepe suche a kinde of man, as well in peace as in warre. and bicause you alledged me, i will make ensample upon my self, and saie that i never used the warre as an arte, for as muche as my arte, is to governe my subjectes, and to defende them, and to be able to defende them, to love peace, and to know how to make warre, and my kinge not so muche to rewarde and esteeme me, for my knowledge in the warre, as for the knowledge that i have to councel him in peace. then a king ought not to desire to have about him, any that is not of this condicion if he be wise, and prudently minde to governe: for that, that if he shal have about him either to muche lovers of peace, or to much lovers of warre, they shall make him to erre. i cannot in this my firste reasoning, and according to my purpose saie more, and when this suffiseth you not, it is mete, you seke of them that may satisfie you better. you maie now verie well understand, how difficulte it is to bringe in use the auncient maners in the presente warres, and what preparations are mete for a wise man to make, and what occasions ought to be loked for, to be able to execute it. but by and by, you shall know these things better, if this reasoning make you not werie, conferring what so ever partes of the auncient orders hath ben, to the maners nowe presente. cosimo. if we desired at the first to here your reason of these thinges, truly thesame whiche hetherto you have spoken, hath doubled our desire: wherefore we thanke you for that we have hard, and the rest, we crave of you to here. fabricio. seyng that it is so your pleasure, i will begin to intreate of this matter from the beginning, to the intent it maye be better understode, being able by thesame meane, more largely to declare it. the ende of him that wil make warre, is to be able to fight with every enemy in the fielde and to be able to overcum an armie. to purpose to doe this, it is convenient to ordeine an hoost. to ordein an hoost, their must be found menne, armed, ordered, and as well in the small, as in the great orders exercised, to knowe howe to kepe araie, and to incampe, so that after bringing them unto the enemie, either standing or marching, they maie know how to behave themselves valiantly. in this thing consisteth all the industrie of the warre on the lande, whiche is the most necessarie, and the most honorablest, for he that can wel order a fielde against the enemie, the other faultes that he should make in the affaires of warre, wilbe borne with: but he that lacketh this knowledge, although that in other particulars he be verie good, he shal never bring a warre to honor: for as muche as a fielde that thou winnest, lesing? img doeth cancell all other thy evill actes: so like wise lesing it, all thinges well done of thee before, remaine vaine. therfore, beyng necessarie first to finde the menne, it is requiset to come to the choise of them. they whiche unto the warre have given rule, will that the menne be chosen out of temperate countries, to the intente they may have hardines, and prudence, for as muche as the hote countrey, bredes prudente men and not hardy, the colde, hardy, and not prudente. this rule is good to be geven, to one that were prince of all the world, bicause it is lawfull for him to choose men out of those places, whiche he shall thinke beste. but minding to give a rule, that every one may use, it is mete to declare, that everie common weale, and every kingdome, ought to choose their souldiours out of their owne countrie, whether it be hote, colde, or temperate: for that it is scene by olde ensamples, how that in every countrie with exercise, their is made good souldiours: bicause where nature lacketh, the industry supplieth, the which in this case is worthe more, then nature, and taking them in other places, you shal not have of the choise, for choise is as much to saie, as the best of a province, and to have power to chuse those that will not, as well as those that wil serve. wherfore, you muste take your choise in those places, that are subjecte unto you, for that you cannot take whome you liste, in the countries that are not yours, but you muste take suche as will goe with you. cosimo. yet there maie bee of those, that will come, taken and lefte, and therefore, thei maie be called chosen. [sidenote: oute of what countrie is best to chuse souldiours to make a good election.] fabuicio. you saie the truthe in a certaine maner, but consider the faultes, whiche soche a chosen manne hath in himselfe, for that also many times it hapneth, that he is not a chosen manne. for those that are not thy subjectes, and whiche willyngly doe serve, are not of the beste, but rather of the worste of a province, for as moche as if any be sclanderous, idell, unruly, without religion, fugetive from the rule of their fathers, blasphemours, dise plaiers, in every condicion evill brought up, bee those, whiche will serve, whose customes cannot be more contrarie, to a true and good servise: albeit, when there bee offered unto you, so many of soche men, as come to above the nomber, that you have appoincted, you maie chuse them: but the matter beyng naught, the choise is not possible to be good: also, many times it chaunceth, that thei be not so many, as will make up the nomber, whereof you have nede, so that beyng constrained to take them al, it commeth to passe, that thei cannot then bee called chosen men, but hired souldiours. with this disorder the armies of italie, are made now a daies, and in other places, except in almaine, bicause there thei doe not hire any by commaundemente of the prince, but accordyng to the will of them, that are disposed to serve. then consider now, what maners of those aunciente armies, maie bee brought into an armie of men, put together by like waies. cosimo. what waie ought to bee used then? fabricio. the same waie that i saied, to chuse them of their owne subjectes, and with the auethoritie of the prince. cosmo. in the chosen, shall there bee likewise brought in any auncient facion? fabricio. you know well enough that ye: when he that should commaunde theim, were their prince, or ordinarie lorde, whether he were made chief, or as a citezein, and for the same tyme capitaine, beyng a common weale, otherwise it is harde to make any thyng good. cosimo. why? fabricio. i will tell you a nane: for this time i will that this suffise you, that it cannot be wrought well by other waie. [sidenote: whether it be better to take menne oute of townes or out of the countrie to serve.] cosimo. having then to make this choyse of men in their owne countries, whether judge you that it be better to take them oute of the citie, or out of the countrie? fabricio. those that have written of such matters, doe all agree, that it is best to chuse them out of the countrie, being men accustomed to no ease, nurished in labours, used to stonde in the sunne, to flie the shadow, knowing how to occupy the spade, to make a diche, to carrie a burden, and to bee without any deceite, and without malisiousnes. but in this parte my opinion should be, that beyng two sortes of souldiours, on foote, and on horsebacke, that those on foote, should be chosen out of the countrie, and those on horseback, oute of the cities. [sidenote: of what age souldiours ought to bee chosen.] cosimo. of what age would you choose them? fabricio. i would take them, when i had to make a newe armie, from xvii. to xl. yeres: when it were made alredy, and i had to restore them, of xvii. alwaies. cosimo. i doe not understonde well this distinction. fabricio. i shall tell you: when i should ordaine an hooste to make warre, where were no hooste alredy, it should be necessarie to chuse all those men, which were most fitte and apte for the warre, so that they were of servisable age, that i might bee able to instructe theim, as by me shalbe declared: but when i would make my choise of menne in places, where a powre were alredy prepared, for suppliyng of thesame, i would take them of xvii. yeres: for as much as the other of more age be alredy chosen and apoincted. cosimo. then woulde you prepare a power like to those whiche is in our countrie? fabricio. ye truly, it is so that i would arme them, captaine them, exercise and order them in a maner, whiche i cannot tell, if you have ordred them so. cosimo. then do you praise the keping of order? fabricio. wherefore would you that i should dispraise it? cosimo. bicause many wise menne have alwaies blamed it. fabricio. you speake against all reason, to saie that a wise man blameth order, he maie bee well thought wise, and be nothyng so. cosimo. the naughtie profe, which it hath alwaies, maketh us to have soche opinion thereof. fabricio. take hede it be not your fault, and not the kepyng of order, the whiche you shall knowe, before this reasonyng be ended. cosimo. you shall doe a thyng moste thankfull, yet i will saie concernyng thesame, that thei accuse it, to the entente you maie the better justifie it. thei saie thus, either it is unprofitable, and we trustyng on the same, shall make us to lese our state, or it shall be verteous, and by thesame meane, he that governeth may easely deprive us thereof. thei alledge the romaines, who by meane of their owne powers, loste their libertie. thei alledge the venicians, and the frenche king, whiche venicians, bicause thei will not be constrained, to obeie one of their owne citezeins, use the power of straungers: and the frenche kyng hath disarmed his people, to be able more easely to commaunde them, but thei whiche like not the ordinaunces, feare moche more the unprofitablenesse, that thei suppose maie insue thereby, then any thyng els: the one cause whiche thei allege is, bicause thei are unexperte: the other, for that thei have to serve par force: for asmoche as thei saie, that the aged bee not so dissiplinable, nor apte to learne the feate of armes, and that by force, is doen never any thyng good. [sidenote: by what meanes souldiours bee made bolde and experte.] fabricio. all these reasons that you have rehearsed, be of men, whiche knoweth the thyng full little, as i shall plainly declare. and firste, concernyng the unprofitablenesse, i tell you, that there is no service used in any countrie more profitable, then the service by the subjectes of thesame nor thesame service cannot bee prepared, but in this maner: and for that this nedeth not to be disputed of, i will not lese moche tyme: bicause al thensamples of auncient histores, make for my purpose, and for that thei alledge the lacke of experience, and to use constraint: i saie how it is true, that the lacke of experience, causeth lacke of courage, and constrainte, maketh evill contentacion: but courage, and experience thei are made to gette, with the maner of armyng theim, exercisyng, and orderyng theim, as in proceadyng of this reasonyng, you shall heare. but concernyng constrainte, you ought to understande, that the menne, whiche are conducted to warfare, by commaundement of their prince, thei ought to come, neither altogether forced, nor altogether willyngly, for as moche as to moche willyngnesse, would make thinconveniencies, where i told afore, that he should not be a chosen manne, and those would be fewe that would go: and so to moche constraint, will bring forth naughtie effectes. therefore, a meane ought to be taken, where is not all constrainte, nor all willingnesse: but beyng drawen of a respecte, that thei have towardes their prince, where thei feare more the displeasure of thesame, then the presente paine: and alwaies it shall happen to be a constrainte, in maner mingled with willingnesse, that there cannot growe soche evil contentacion, that it make evill effectes. yet i saie not for all this, that it cannot bee overcome, for that full many tymes, were overcome the romaine armies, and the armie of aniball was overcome, so that it is seen, that an armie cannot be ordained so sure, that it cannot be overthrowen. therefore, these your wise men, ought not to measure this unprofitablenesse, for havyng loste ones, but to beleve, that like as thei lese, so thei maie winne, and remeadie the occasion of the losse: and when thei shall seke this thei shall finde, that it hath not been through faulte of the waie, but of the order, whiche had not his perfeccion and as i have saied, thei ought to provide, not with blamyng the order, but with redressing it, the whiche how it ought to be doen, you shall understande, from poinct to poinct. concernyng the doubte, leste soche ordinaunces, take not from thee thy state, by meane of one, whiche is made hedde therof, i answere, that the armure on the backes of citezeins, or subjectes, given by the disposicion of order and lawe, did never harme, but rather alwaies it doeth good, and mainteineth the citee, moche lenger in suretie, through helpe of this armure, then without. rome continued free cccc. yeres, and was armed. sparta viii.c. many other citees have been disarmed, and have remained free, lesse then xl. for as moche as citees have nede of defence, and when thei have no defence of their owne, thei hire straungers, and the straunges defence, shall hurte moche soner the common weale, then their owne: bicause thei be moche easier to be corrupted, and a citezein that becommeth mightie, maie moche soner usurpe, and more easely bryng his purpose to passe, where the people bee disarmed, that he seketh to oppresse: besides this, a citee ought to feare a greate deale more, twoo enemies then one. thesame citee that useth straungers power, feareth at one instant the straunger, whiche it hireth, and the citezein: and whether this feare ought to be, remember thesame, whiche i rehearsed a little a fore of frances sforza. that citee, whiche useth her own proper power, feareth no man, other then onely her owne citezein. but for all the reasons that maie bee saied, this shall serve me, that never any ordeined any common weale, or kyngdome, that would not thinke, that thei theim selves, that inhabite thesame, should with their sweardes defende it. and if the venicians had been so wise in this, as in all their other orders, thei should have made a new monarchie in the world, whom so moche the more deserve blame, havyng been armed of their first giver of lawes: for havyng no dominion on the lande, thei wer armed on the sea, where thei made their warre vertuously, and with weapons in their handes, increased their countrie. but when thei were driven to make warre on the lande, to defende vicenza, where thei ought to have sent one of their citezens, to have fought on the lande, thei hired for their capitain, the marques of mantua: this was thesame foolishe acte, whiche cut of their legges, from climyng into heaven, and from enlargyng their dominion: and if thei did it, bicause thei beleved that as thei knewe, how to make warre on the sea, so thei mistrusted theim selves, to make it on the lande, it was a mistruste not wise: for as moche as more easely, a capitain of the sea, whiche is used to fight with the windes, with the water, and with men, shall become a capitaine of the lande, where he shall fight with men onely, then a capitaine of the lande, to become a capitain of the sea. the romanies knowyng how to fight on the lande, and on the sea, commyng to warre, with the carthaginens, whiche were mightie on the sea, hired not grekes, or spaniardes, accustomed to the sea, but thei committed thesame care, to their citezeins, whiche thei sent on the land, and thei overcame. if thei did it, for that one of their citezeins should not become a tiraunt, it was a feare smally considered: for that besides thesame reasons, whiche to this purpose, a little afore i have rehearsed, if a citezein with the powers on the sea, was never made a tiraunt in a citee standyng in the sea, so moche the lesse he should have been able to accomplishe this with the powers of the lande: whereby thei ought to se that the weapons in the handes of their citezeins, could not make tirantes: but the naughtie orders of the governement, whiche maketh tirannie in a citee, and thei havyng good governement, thei nede not to feare their owne weapons: thei toke therefore an unwise waie, the whiche hath been occasion, to take from them moche glorie, and moche felicitie. concernyng the erroure, whiche the kyng of fraunce committeth not kepyng instructed his people in the warre, the whiche those your wise men alledge for ensample, there is no man, (his particulare passions laied a side) that doeth not judge this fault, to be in thesame kyngdome, and this negligence onely to make hym weake. but i have made to greate a digression, and peradventure am come out of my purpose, albeit i have doen it to aunswere you, and to shewe you, that in no countrie, there can bee made sure foundacion, for defence in other powers but of their owne subjectes: and their own power, cannot be prepared otherwise, then by waie of an ordinaunce, nor by other waie, to induce the facion of an armie in any place, nor by other meane to ordein an instruction of warfare. if you have red the orders, whiche those first kynges made in rome, and inespecially servio tullo, you shall finde that the orders of the classi is no other, then an ordinaunce, to bee able at a sodaine, to bryng together an armie, for defence of thesame citee. but let us retourne to our choise, i saie againe, that havyng to renewe an olde order, i would take them of xvii. havyng to make a newe armie, i would take them of all ages, betwene xvii. and xl. to be able to warre straight waie. [sidenote: of what science soldiours ought to bee chosen.] cosimo. would you make any difference, of what science you would chuse them? fabricio. the aucthours, which have written of the arte of warre, make difference, for that thei will not, that there bee taken foulers, fishers, cookes, baudes, nor none that use any science of voluptuousnesse. but thei will, that there bee taken plowmen, ferrars, smithes, carpenters, buchars, hunters, and soche like: but i would make little difference, through conjecture of the science, concernyng the goodnesse of the man, notwithstandyng, in as moche as to be able with more profite to use theim, i would make difference, and for this cause, the countrie men, which are used to till the grounde, are more profitable then any other. next to whom be smithes, carpentars, ferrars, masons, wherof it is profitable to have enough: for that their occupacions, serve well in many thynges: beyng a thyng verie good to have a souldiour, of whom maie be had double servise. [sidenote: howe to chose a souldiour.] cosimo. wherby doe thei knowe those, that be, or are not sufficient to serve. fabricio. i will speake of the maner of chusing a new ordinaunce, to make an armie after, for that parte of this matter, doeth come also to be reasoned of, in the election, which should be made for the replenishing, or restoring of an old ordinaunce. i saie therfore, that the goodnesse of one, whiche thou muste chuse for a souldiour, is knowen either by experience, thorough meane of some of his worthy doynges, or by conjecture. the proofe of vertue, cannot be founde in men whiche are chosen of newe, and whiche never afore have ben chosen, and of these are founde either fewe or none, in the ordinaunce that of newe is ordeined. it is necessarie therefore, lackyng this experience, to runne to the conjecture, whiche is taken by the yeres, by the occupacion, and by the personage: of those two first, hath been reasoned, there remaineth to speake of the thirde. and therefore, i saie how some have willed, that the souldiour bee greate, emongest whom was pirrus. some other have chosen theim onely, by the lustinesse of the body, as cesar did: whiche lustinesse of bodie and mynde, is conjectured by the composicion of the members, and of the grace of the countenaunce: and therefore, these that write saie, that thei would have the iyes lively and cherefull, the necke full of sinowes, the breaste large, the armes full of musculles, the fingers long, little beallie, the flankes rounde, the legges and feete drie: whiche partes are wont alwayes to make a manne nimble and strong, whiche are twoo thynges, that in a souldiour are sought above al other. regarde ought to bee had above all thynges, to his customes, and that in hym bee honestie, and shame: otherwise, there shall bee chosen an instrumente of mischief, and a beginnyng of corrupcion: for that lette no manne beleve that in the dishoneste educacion, and filthy minde, there maie take any vertue, whiche is in any parte laudable. and i thinke it not superfluous, but rather i beleve it to bee necessarie, to the entente you maie the better understande, the importaunce of this chosen, to tell you the maner that the romaine consuls, in the beginnyng of their rule, observed in the chosing of their romain legions: in the whiche choise of men, bicause thesame legions were mingled with old souldiours and newe, consideryng the continuall warre thei kepte, thei might in their choise procede, with the experince of the old, and with the conjecture of the newe: and this ought to be noted, that these men be chosen, either to serve incontinently, or to exercise theim incontinently, and after to serve when nede should require. but my intencion is to shew you, how an armie maie be prepared in the countrie, where there is no warlike discipline: in which countrie, chosen men cannot be had, to use them straight waie, but there, where the custome is to levie armies, and by meane of the prince, thei maie then well bee had, as the romaines observed, and as is observed at this daie emong the suisers: bicause in these chosen, though there be many newe menne, there be also so many of the other olde souldiours, accustomed to serve in the warlike orders, where the newe mingled together with the olde, make a bodie united and good, notwithstanding, that themperours after, beginning the staciones of ordinarie souldiours, had appoincted over the newe souldiours, whiche were called tironi, a maister to exercise theim, as appeareth in the life of massimo the emperour. the whiche thyng, while rome was free, not onely in the armies, but in the citee was ordeined: and the exercises of warre, beyng accustomed in thesame, where the yong men did exercise, there grewe, that beyng chosen after to goe into warre, thei were so used in the fained exercise of warfare, that thei could easely worke in the true: but those emperours havyng after put doune these exercises, thei wer constrained to use the waies, that i have shewed you. therefore, comyng to the maner of the chosen romain, i saie that after the romain consulles (to whom was appoincted the charge of the warre) had taken the rule, myndyng to ordeine their armies, for that it was the custome, that either of them should have twoo legions of romaine menne, whiche was the strength of their armies, thei created xxiiii. tribunes of warre, and thei appoincted sixe for every legion, whom did thesame office, whiche those doe now a daies, that we call conestables: thei made after to come together, all the romain men apte to beare weapons and thei put the tribunes of every legion, seperate the one from the other. afterwarde, by lot thei drewe the tribes, of whiche thei had firste to make the chosen, and of thesame tribe thei chose fower of the best, of whiche was chosen one of the tribunes, of the first legion, and of the other three was chosen, one of the tribunes of the second legion, of the other two there was chosen one of the tribunes of the third, and the same last fell to the fowerth legion. after these iiij, thei chose other fower, of which, first one was chosen of the tribunes of the seconde legion, the seconde of those of the thirde, the thirde of those of the fowerth, the fowerth remained to the first. after, thei chose other fower, the first chose the thirde, the second the fowerth, the thirde the fiveth, the fowerth remained to the seconde: and thus thei varied successively, this maner of chosyng, so that the election came to be equall, and the legions wer gathered together: and as afore we saied, this choise might bee made to use straighte waie, for that thei made them of men, of whom a good parte were experiensed in the verie warfare in deede, and all in the fained exercised, and thei might make this choise by conjecture, and by experience. but where a power must be ordeined of newe, and for this to chuse them out of hande, this chosen cannot be made, saving by conjecture, whiche is taken by consideryng their ages and their likelinesse. cosimo. i beleve all to be true, as moche as of you hath been spoken: but before that you procede to other reasonyng, i woll aske of you one thing, which you have made me to remember: saiyng that the chosen, that is to be made where men were not used to warre, ought to be made by conjecture: for asmoche as i have heard some men, in many places dispraise our ordinaunce, and in especially concernyng the nomber, for that many saie, that there ought to bee taken lesse nomber, whereof is gotten this profite, that thei shall be better and better chosen, and men shal not be so moche diseased, so that there maie bee given them some rewarde, whereby thei maie bee more contented, and better bee commaunded, whereof i would understande in this parte your opinion, and whether you love better the greate nomber, than the little, and what waie you would take to chuse theim in the one, and in the other nomber. fabricio. without doubte it is better, and more necessary, the great nomber, then the little: but to speake more plainly, where there cannot be ordeined a great nomber of men, there cannot be ordeined a perfect ordinaunce: and i will easely confute all the reasons of them propounded. i saie therefore firste, that the lesse nomber where is many people, as is for ensample tuscane, maketh not that you have better, nor that the chosen be more excellent, for that myndyng in chosing the menne, to judge them by experience, there shall be founde in thesame countrie moste fewe, whom experience should make provable, bothe for that fewe hath been in warre, as also for that of those, mooste fewe have made triall, whereby thei might deserve to bee chosen before the other: so that he whiche ought in like places to chuse, it is mete he leave a parte the experience, and take them by conjecture. then being brought likewise into soche necessitie, i would understande, if there come before me twentie young men of good stature, with what rule i ought to take, or to leave any: where without doubte, i beleve that every man will confesse, how it is lesse errour to take them al, to arme theim and exercise theim, beyng not able to knowe, whiche of theim is beste, and to reserve to make after more certaine chosen, when in practisyng theim with exercise, there shall be knowen those of moste spirite, and of moste life: which considered, the chusing in this case a fewe, to have them better, is altogether naught. concernyng diseasing lesse the countrie, and men, i saie that the ordinaunce, either evill or little that it bee, causeth not any disease, for that this order doeth not take menne from any of their businesse, it bindeth them not, that thei cannot go to doe any of their affaires: for that it bindeth them onely in the idell daies, to assemble together, to exercise them, the whiche thyng doeth not hurt, neither to the countrie, nor to the men, but rather to yong men it shall bryng delite: for that where vilie on the holy daies thei stande idell in tipplyng houses, thei will go for pleasure to those exercises, for that the handlyng of weapons, as it is a goodly spectacle, so unto yong men it is pleasaunt. concernyng to bee able to paie the lesse nomber, and for this to kepe theim more obediente, and more contented, i answere, how there cannot be made an ordinaunce of so fewe, whiche maie be in maner continually paied, where thesame paiment of theirs maie satisfie them. as for ensample, if there were ordeined a power of v. thousande men, for to paie them after soche sorte, that it might be thought sufficient, to content them, it shal bee convenient to give theim at least, ten thousaunde crounes the moneth: first, this nomber of men are not able to make an armie, this paie is intolerable to a state, and of the other side, it is not sufficiente to kepe men contented, and bounde to be able to serve at al times: so that in doyng this, there shall be spent moche, and a small power kept, whiche shall not be sufficient to defend thee, or to doe any enterprise of thine. if thou shouldest give theim more, or shouldest take more, so moche more impossibilitie it should be, for thee to paie theim: if thou shouldest give them lesse, or should take lesse, so moche the lesse contentacion should be in them, or so moche the lesse profite thei shal bring thee. therfore, those that reason of makyng an ordinaunce, and whilest thei tary at home to paie them, thei reason of a thing either impossible, or unprofitable, but it is necessarie to paie them, when thei are taken up to be led to the warre: albeit, though soche order should somewhat disease those, in time of peace, that are appoincted in thesame, which i se not how, there is for recompence all those benefites, whiche a power brynges, that is ordeined in a countrie: for that without thesame, there is nothyng sure. i conclude, that he that will have the little nomber, to be able to paie them, or for any of the other causes alledged of you, doeth not understande, for that also it maketh for my opinion, that every nomber shall deminishe in thy handes, through infinite impedimentes, whiche men have: so that the little nomber shall tourne to nothing: again havyng thordinaunce greate, thou maiest at thy pleasure use fewe of many, besides this, it must serve thee in deede, and in reputacion and alwaies the great nomber shall give thee moste reputacion. more over, makyng the ordinaunce to kepe menne exercised, if thou appoincte a fewe nomber of men in many countries, the handes of men bee so farre a sonder, the one from the other, that thou canst not without their moste grevous losse, gather them together to exercise them, and without this exercise, the ordinaunce is unprofitable, as hereafter shall be declared. cosimo. it suffiseth upon this my demaunde, that whiche you have saied: but i desire now, that you declare me an other doubt. thei saie, that soche a multitude of armed men, will make confusion, discension and disorder in the countrie where thei are. [sidenote: how to provid againste soche inconveniences as souldiours maie cause.] fabricio. this is an other vaine opinion, the cause wherof, i shall tell you: soche as are ordeined to serve in the warres, maie cause disorder in twoo maners, either betwene them selves, or against other, whiche thinges moste easely maie be withstode, where the order of it self, should not withstande it: for that concernyng the discorde emong theim selves, this order taketh it waie, and doeth not nourishe it, for that in orderyng them, you give them armour and capitaines. if the countrie where you ordein them, bee so unapte for the warre, that there are not armours emong the men of thesame, and that thei bee so united, that thei have no heddes, this order maketh theim moche fearser against the straunger, but it maketh them not any thyng the more disunited, for that men well ordered, feare the lawe beyng armed, as well as unarmed, nor thei can never alter, if the capitaines, which you give them, cause not the alteracion, and the waie to make this, shall be tolde now: but if the countrie where you ordein them, be warlike and disunited, this order onely shal be occasion to unite them: bicause this order giveth them armours profitable for the warre, and heddes, extinguishers of discencion: where their owne armours bee unprofitable for the warres, and their heddes nourishers of discorde. for that so sone as any in thesame countrie is offended, he resorteth by and by to his capitain to make complaint, who for to maintain his reputacion, comforteth hym to revengement not to peace. to the contrary doeth the publike hed, so that by this meanes, thoccasion of discorde is taken awaie, and the occasion of union is prepared, and the provinces united and effeminated, gette utilitie, and maintain union: the disunited and discencious, doe agree, and thesame their fearsnesse, which is wont disordinately to worke, is tourned into publike utilitie. to minde to have them, to doe no hurt against other, it ought to bee considered, that thei cannot dooe this, except by meane of the heddes, whiche governe them. to will that the heddes make no disorder, it is necessarie to have care, that thei get not over them to much auctoritie. and you must consider that this auctoritie, is gotten either by nature, or by accidente: and as to nature, it behoveth to provide, that he which is boren in one place, be not apoincted to the men billed in the same, but be made hedde of those places, where he hath not any naturall aquaintance: and as to the accident, the thing ought to be ordeined in suche maner, that every yere the heddes maie be changed from governement to goverment: for as muche as the continuall auctoritie over one sorte of menne, breedeth among them so muche union, that it maie turne easely to the prejudice of the prince: whiche permutations howe profitable they be to those who have used theim, and hurtefull to them that have not observed theim, it is well knowen by the kingdome of the assirians, and by the empire of the romaines: where is seene, that the same kingdome indured a m. yeres without tumulte, and without any civill warre: whiche preceded not of other, then of the permutations, whiche from place to place everie yere thesame capitaines made, unto whome were apoincted the charge of the armies. nor for any other occasion in the romaine empire, after the bloud of cesar was extinguished, there grewe so many civill warres, betwene the capitaines of the hostes, and so many conspiracies of the forsaied capitaines against the emperours, not onely kepyng continually still those capitaines alwayes in one governement. and if in some of those firste emperoures, of those after, whom helde the empire with reputacion, as adriane, marcus, severus, and soche like, there had been so moche foresight, that thei had brought this custome of chaungyng the capitaines in thesame empire, without doubte it should have made theim more quiete, and more durable: for that the capitaines should have had lesse occasion to make tumultes, the emperours lesse cause to feare, and the senate in the lackes of the successions, should have had in the election of the emperour, more aucthoritie, and by consequence should have been better: but the naughtie custome, either for ignoraunce, or through the little diligence of menne, neither for the wicked, nor good ensamples, can be taken awaie. cosimo. i cannot tell, if with my questionyng, i have as it were led you out of your order, bicause from the chusyng of men, we be entred into an other matter, and if i had not been a little before excused, i should thinke to deserve some reprehension. [sidenote: the nomber of horsemen, that the romanies chose for a legion, and for a consailes armie.] fabricio. let not this disquiete you, for that all this reasonyng was necessary, myndyng to reason of the ordinaunce, the which beyng blamed of many, it was requsite to excuse it, willyng to have this first parte of chusyng men to be alowed. but now before i discend to the other partes, i will reason of the choise of men on horsebacke. of the antiquitie, these were made of the moste richeste, havyng regard bothe to the yeres, and to the qualitie of the man, and thei chose ccc. for a legion, so that the romain horse, in every consulles armie, passed not the nomber of vi. c. cosimo. would you make an ordinaunce of hors, to exercise them at home, and to use their service when nede requires? [sidenote: the choosing and ordering of horsemen, that is to be observed at this present.] fabricio. it is most necessary, and it cannot be doen otherwise, minding to have the power, that it be the owne proper, and not to purpose to take of those, which make thereof an art. cosimo. how would you choose them? fabricio. i would imitate the romans, i would take of the richest, i would give them heads or chief captains, in the same manner, as nowadays to other is given, and i would arm them and exercise them. cosimo. to these should it be well to give some provision? fabricio. yea marie, but so much only as is necessary to keep the horse, for as much as bringing to thy subjects expenses, they might justly complain of thee, therefore it should be necessary, to pay them their charges of their horse. cosimo. what number would you make? and how would you arme them? fabricio. you pass into another matter. i will tell you in convenient place, which shall be when i have told you, how footmen ought to be armed, and how a power of men is prepared, for a day of battle. the second booke [sidenote: howe the romaines armed their souldiers and what weapons thei used.] i beleeve that it is necessarye, men being founde, to arme them, and minding to doo this, i suppose that it is a needefull thing to examine, what armoure the antiquitie used, and of the same to chose the best. the romanes devided their foote men in heavie and lighte armed: those that were light armed, they called by the name of veliti: under this name were understoode all those that threwe with slinges, shot with crossebowes, cast dartes, and they used the most parte of them for their defence, to weare on their heade a murion, with a targaet on their arme: they fought out of the orders, and farre of from the heavie armed, which did weare a head peece, that came downe to their shoulders, a corselet, which with the tases came downe to the knees, and they had the legges and armes, covered with greaves, and vambraces, with a targaet on the left arme, a yarde and a halfe long, and three quarters of a yarde brode, whiche had a hoope of iron upon it, to bee able to sustaine a blowe, and an other under, to the intente, that it being driven to the earth, it should not breake: for to offende, they had girte on their left flanke a swoorde, the length of a yearde and a naile, on their righte side, a dagger: they had a darte in every one of their handes, the which they called pilo, and in the beginning of the fight, they threwe those at the enemie. this was the ordering, and importaunce of the armours of the romanes, by the which they possessed all the world. and although some of these ancient writers gave them, besides the foresayde weapons, a staffe in their hande like unto a partasen, i cannot tell howe a heavy staff, may of him that holdeth a targaet be occupied: for that to handle it with both hands, the targaet should bee an impediment, and to occupye the same with one hande, there can be done no good therewith, by reason of the weightynesse thereof: besides this, to faight in the strong, and in the orders with such long kinde of weapon, it is unprofitable, except in the first front, where they have space enough, to thrust out all the staffe, which in the orders within, cannot be done, for that the nature of the battaile (as in the order of the same, i shall tell you) is continually to throng together, which although it be an inconvenience, yet in so doing they fear lesse, then to stande wide, where the perill is most evident, so that all the weapons, which passe in length a yarde and a halfe, in the throng, be unprofitable: for that, if a man have the partasen, and will occupye it with both handes, put case that the targaet let him not, he can not hurte with the same an enemy, whom is upon him, if he take it with one hande, to the intent to occupy also the targaet, being not able to take it, but in the middest, there remayneth so much of the staff behind, that those which are behinde him, shall let him to welde it. and whether it were true, either that the romans had not this partasen, or that having it, did little good withal, read all the battailes, in the historye thereof, celebrated of titus livius, and you shall see in the same, most seldom times made mencion of partasens, but rather alwaies he saieth, that the dartes being thrown, they laid their hands on their sweardes. therefore i will leave this staffe, and observe, concerning the romanes, the swoorde for to hurte, and for defense the targaet, with the other armours aforesaide. [sidenote: a brave and a terrible thing to the enemies.] the greekes did not arme them selves so heavyly, for their defense, as the romans dyd: but for to offend the enemies, they grounded more on their staves, then on their swoordes, and in especiallye the fallangye of macedonia, which used staves, that they called sarisse, seven yardes and a halfe long, with the which they opened the rankes of their enemies, and they keept the orders in their fallangy. and although some writers saie, that they had also the targaet, i can not tell (by the reasons aforesayde) howe the sarisse and they coulde stande together. besides this, in the battaile that paulus emilius made, with persa king of macedonia, i do not remember, that there is made any mention of targaettes, but only of the sarisse, and of the difficultie that the romane armie had, to overcome them: so that i conjecture, that a macedonicall fallange, was no other wise, then is now a dayes a battaile of suizzers, the whiche in their pikes have all their force, and all their power. the romanes did garnish (besides the armours) the footemen with feathers; the whiche thinges makes the fight of an armie to the friendes goodly, to the enemies terrible. the armour of the horsemen, in the same first romane antiquitie, was a rounde targaet, and they had their head armed, and the rest unarmed: they had a swoorde and a staffe, with an iron head onely before, long and small: whereby it happened, that they were not able to staye the targaet, and the staffe in the incountring broke, and they through being unarmed, were subjecte to hurtes: after, in processe of time, they armed them as the footemen, albeit they used the targaette muche shorter, square, and the staffe more stiffe, and with twoo heades, to the entente, that breaking one of the heades, they mighte prevaile with the other. with these armours as well on foote, as on horsebacke, the romanes conquered all the worlde, and it is to be beleeved, by the fruiet thereof, whiche is seene, that they were the beste appointed armies, that ever were: and titus livius in his history, doeth testifie verye often, where comming to comparison with the enemies armies, he saieth: but the romanes, by vertue, by the kinde of their armours, and piactise in the service of warre, were superiours: and therfore i have more particularly reasoned of the armours of conquerours, then of the conquered. but nowe mee thikes good, to reason onelye of the manner of arming men at this presente. footemen have for their defence, a breast plate, and for to offende, a launce, sixe yardes and three quarters long, which is called a pike, with a swoorde on their side, rather rounde at the poinct, then sharpe. this is the ordinarie arming of footemen nowe a dayes, for that fewe there be, which have their legges armed, and their armes, the heade none, and those fewe, beare insteede of a pike, a halberde, the staffe whereof as you know, is twoo yardes and a quarter long, and it hath the iron made like an axe. betweene them, they have harkebutters, the which with the violence of the fire, do the same office, which in olde time the slingers did, and the crosseboweshoters. this maner of arming, was found out by the dutchemen, inespeciallye of suizzers, whom being poore, and desirous to live free, they were, and be constrayned to fight, with the ambition of the princes of almaine, who being riche, were able to keepe horse, the which the same people could not do for povertye. wherby it grewe, that being on foote, minding to defende them selves from the enemies, that were on horsebacke, it behooveth them to seeke of the aunciente orders, and to finde weapons, whiche from the furie of horses, should defende them: this necessitie hath made either to be maintayned, or to bee founde of them the aunciente orders, without whiche, as everye prudente man affirmeth, the footemen is altogether unprofitable. therefore, they tooke for their weapon the pike, a moste profitable weapon, not only to withstande horses, but to overcome them: and the dutchemen have by vertue of these weapons, and of these orders, taken such boldnesse, that xv. or xx. thousande of them, will assault the greatest nomber of horse that maye be: and of this, there hath beene experience enough within this xxv. yeres. and the insamples of their vertue hath bene so mightie, grounded upon these weapons, and these orders, that sence king charles passed into italie, everye nation hath imitated them: so that the spanish armies, are become into most great reputation. cosimo. which maner of arming, do you praise moste, either these dutchemens, or the auncient romanes? [sidenote: whether the romanes maner in arming of men, be better then the arming of men, that is used nowe a daies.] fabricio. the romane without doubte, and i will tell the commoditie, and the discommoditie of the one, and the other. the dutche footemen, are able to withstande, and overcome the horses: they bee moste speedie to marche, and to be set in araye, being not laden with armours: of the other part, they be subjecte to all blowes, both farre of, and at hande: because they be unarmed, they bee unprofitable unto the battaile on the lande, and to everye fighte, where is strong resistaunce. but the romanes withstoode, and overcame the horses, as well as the dutchemen, they were safe from blowes at hande, and farre of, being covered with armours: they were also better able to charge, and better able to sustaine charges, having targaettes: they might more aptly in the preace fight with the swoorde, then these with the pike, and though the dutchemen have likewise swoordes, yet being without targaets, they become in suche case unprofitable: the romanes might safelye assault townes, having their bodies cleane covered with armour, and being better able to cover themselves with their targaettes. so that they had no other incommoditie, then the waightynesse of their armours, and the pain to cary them: the whiche thinges thei overcame, with accustomyng the body to diseases, and with hardenyng it, to bee able to indure labour. and you knowe, how that in thinges accustomed, men suffer no grief. and you have to understand this, that the footemen maie be constrained, to faight with footemen, and with horse, and alwaies those be unprofitable, whiche cannot either sustain the horses, or beyng able to sustain them, have notwithstandyng neede to feare the footemen, whiche be better armed, and better ordeined then thei. now if you consider the duchemen, and the romaines, you shall finde in the duchemen activitie (as we have said) to overcome the horses, but greate dissavauntage, when thei faighte with menne, ordeined as thei them selves are, and armed as the romaines were: so that there shall be this advauntage more of the one, then of thother, that the romaines could overcome the men, and the horses, the duchemen onely the horses. cosimo. i would desire, that you would come to some more particulare insample, whereby wee maie better understande. [sidenote: an ensample whiche proveth that horsemen with staves, cannot prevaile against footemen with pikes, and what great advauntage the armed have, againste the unarmed. the victory of carminvola against the duchemen.] fabricio. i saie thus, that you shall finde in many places of our histories, the romain footemen to have overcome innumerable horses, and you shall never finde, that thei have been overcome of men on foote, for default that thei have had in their armour, or thorowe the vantage that the enemie hath had in the armours: for that if the maner of their armyng, should have had defaulte, it had been necessarie, that there should folowe, the one of these twoo thynges, either that findyng soche, as should arme theim better then thei, thei should not have gone still forwardes, with their conquestes, or that thei should have taken the straungers maners, and should have left their owne, and for that it folowed not in the one thing, nor in the other, there groweth that ther maie be easely conjectured, that the maner of their armyng, was better then thesame of any other. it is not yet thus happened to the duchemen, for that naughtie profe, hath ben seen made them, when soever thei have chaunsed to faight with men on foote prepared, and as obstinate as thei, the whiche is growen of the vauntage, whiche thesame have incountred in thenemies armours. philip vicecounte of milaine, being assaulted of xviii. thousande suizzers, sent against theim the counte carminvola, whiche then was his capitaine. he with sixe thousande horse, and a fewe footemen, went to mete with them, and incounteryng theim, he was repulsed with his moste greate losse: wherby carminvola as a prudente man, knewe straight waie the puisaunce of the enemies weapons, and how moche against the horses thei prevailed, and the debilitie of the horses, againste those on foote so appoincted: and gatheryng his men together again, he went to finde the suizzers, and so sone as he was nere them, he made his men of armes, to a light from their horse, and in thesame mane, faightyng with them he slue theim all, excepte three thousande: the whiche seyng them selves to consume, without havyng reamedy, castyng their weapons to the grounde, yelded. cosimo. whereof cometh so moche disavauntage? [sidenote: the battailes when thei are a faightyng, doe throng together.] fabricio. i have a little afore tolde you, but seyng that you have not understoode it, i will rehearse it againe. the duchemen (as a little before i saied unto you) as it were unarmed, to defende themselves, have to offende, the pike and the swearde: thei come with these weapons, and with their orders to finde the enemies, whom if thei bee well armed, to defende theim selves, as were the menne of armes of carminvola, whiche made theim a lighte on foote, thei come with the sweard, and in their orders to find them, and have no other difficultie, then to come nere to the suizzers, so that thei maie reche them with the sweard, for that so sone as thei have gotten unto them, thei faight safely: for asmoche as the duch man cannot strike thenemie with the pike, whom is upon him, for the length of the staffe, wherefore it is conveniente for hym, to put the hande to the sweard, the whiche to hym is unprofitable, he beyng unarmed, and havyng against hym an enemie, that is all armed. whereby he that considereth the vantage, and the disavantage of the one, and of the other, shall see, how the unarmed, shall have no maner of remeady, and the overcommyng of the firste faight, and to passe the firste poinctes of the pikes, is not moche difficulte, he that faighteth beyng well armed: for that the battailes go (as you shall better understande, when i have shewed you, how thei are set together) and incounteryng the one the other, of necessitie thei thrust together, after soche sorte, that thei take the one thother by the bosome, and though by the pikes some bee slaine, or overthrowen, those that remain on their feete, be so many, that thei suffice to obtaine the victorie. hereof it grewe, that carminvola overcame them, with so greate slaughter of the suizzers, and with little losse of his. cosimo. consider that those of carminvola, were men of armes, whom although thei wer on foote, thei were covered all with stele, and therefore thei wer able to make the profe thei did: so that me thinkes, that a power ought to be armed as thei, mindyng to make the verie same profe. fabricio. if you should remember, how i tolde you the romaines were armed, you would not thynke so: for as moche as a manne, that hath the hedde covered with iron, the breaste defended of a corselet, and of a targaet, the armes and the legges armed, is moche more apt to defende hymself from the pike, and to enter emong them, then a man of armes on foote. i wil give you a little of a late ensample. there wer come out of cicelie, into the kyngdome of naples, a power of spaniardes, for to go to finde consalvo, who was besieged in barlet, of the frenchemen: there made against theim mounsier de vhigni, with his menne of armes, and with aboute fower thousande duchemen on foote: the duchemen incountered with their pikes lowe, and thei opened the power of the spaniardes: but those beyng holp, by meane of their bucklers and of the agiletie of their bodies, mingled togethers with the duchemen, so that thei might reche them with the swearde, whereby happened the death, almoste of all theim, and the victorie to the spaniardes. every man knoweth, how many duchemen were slaine in the battaile of ravenna, the whiche happened by the verie same occasion: for that the spanishe souldiours, got them within a swerdes length of the duche souldiours, and thei had destroied them all, if of the frenche horsemen, the duchemen on foote, had not been succored: notwithstandyng, the spaniardes close together, brought themselves into a safe place. i conclude therefore, that a good power ought not onely to be able, to withstande the horses, but also not to have fear of menne on foote, the which (as i have many tymes saied) procedeth of the armours, and of the order. [sidenote: how to arme men, and what weapons to appoincte theim, after the romaine maner, and duche facion.] cosimo. tell therefore, how you would arme them? fabricio. i would take of the romaine armours, and of the duchemennes weapons, and i would that the one haulfe, should bee appoincted like the romaines, and the other haulfe like the duchemen: for that if in sixe thousande footemen (as i shall tell you a little hereafter) i should have thre thousande men with targaettes, after the romain maner, and two thousande pikes, and a thousand harkebutters, after the duche facion, thei should sufice me: for that i would place the pikes, either in the fronte of the battaile, or where i should feare moste the horses, and those with the targaetes and sweardes, shall serve me to make a backe to the pikes, and to winne the battaile, as i shall shewe you: so that i beleeve, that a power thus ordayned, should overcome at this daye, any other power. cosimo. this which hath beene saide, sufficeth concerning footemen, but concerning horsemen, wee desire to understand which you thinke more stronger armed, either ours, or the antiquitie. [sidenote: the victorie of lucullo, against tiarane king of armenia; for what pupose horsemen be most requisite.] fabricio. i beleeve that in these daies, having respect to the saddelles bolstered, and to the stiroppes not used of the antiquitie, they stande more stronglye on horsebacke, then in the olde time: i thinke also they arme them more sure: so that at this daye, a bande of men of armes, paysing very muche, commeth to be with more difficultie withstoode, then were the horsemen of old time: notwithstanding for all this, i judge, that there ought not to be made more accompt of horses, then in olde time was made, for that (as afore is sayde) manye times in our dayes, they have with the footemen receyved shame and shall receyve alwayes, where they incounter, with a power of footemen armed, and ordered, as above hath bene declared. tigrane king of armenia, had againste the armie of the romanes, wherof was capitayne lucullo, cl. thousande horsemen, amongest the whiche, were many armed, like unto our men of armes, which they called catafratti, and of the other parte, the romanes were about sixe thousande, with xxv. thousand footemen: so that tigrane seeing the armie of the enemies, saide: these be horses enough for an imbassage: notwithstanding, incountering together, he was overthrowen: and he that writeth of the same fighte, disprayseth those catafratti, declaring them to be unprofitable; for that hee sayeth, because they had their faces covered, they had muche a doe to see, and to offende the enemie, and they falling, being laden with armour coulde not rise up again, nor welde themselves in any maner to prevaile. i say therefore, that those people or kingdomes, whiche shall esteeme more the power of horses, then the power of footemen be alwaies weake, and subjecte to all ruine, as by italie hath been seene in our time, the whiche hath beene taken, ruinated, and over run with straungers, through not other fault, then for having taken litle care, of the service on foote, and being brought the souldiours therof, all on horsebacke. yet there ought to bee had horses, but for seconde, and not for firste foundaion of an armie: for that to make a discovery, to over run and to destroy the enemies countrie, and to keepe troubled and disquieted, the armie of the same, and in their armours alwayes, to let them of their victuals, they are necessary, and most profitable: but concerning for the daye of battaile, and for the fighte in the fielde, whiche is the importaunce of the warre, and the ende, for which the armies are ordeined, they are more meeter to follow the enemie being discomfited then to do any other thing which in the same is to be done, and they bee in comparison, to the footemen much inferiour. cosimo. there is happened unto mee twoo doubtes, the one, where i knowe, that the parthians dyd not use in the warre, other then horses, and yet they devided the worlde with the romanes: the other is, that i woulde that you should shewe, howe the horsemen can be withstoode of footemen, and wherof groweth the strength of these, and the debilitie of those? [sidenote: the reason why footmen are able to overcome horsemen; how footmen maie save them selves from horsemen; the exercise of souldiours, ought to be devided into thre partes; what exercises the auncient common weales used to exercise their youth in, and what commoditie insued thereby; how the antiquitie, learned their yong soldiours, to handell their weapons; what thantiquitie estemed moste happie in a common weale; mouster maisters; for thexercisyng of yong men unexperte.] fabricio. either i have tolde you, or i minded to tell you, howe that my reasoning of the affaires of warre, ought not to passe the boundes of europe: when thus it is, i am not bounde unto you, to make accompte of the same, which is used in asia, yet i muste saye unto you thus, that the warring of the parthians, was altogether contrarye, to the same of the romanes: for as muche as the parthians, warred all on horsebacke, and in the fight, they proceeded confusedlye, and scattered, and it was a maner of fighte unstable, and full of uncertaintie. the romanes were (it maye be sayde) almoste al on foote, and thei fought close together and sure, and thei overcame diversly, the one the other, according to the largenesse, or straightnesse of the situation: for that in this the romaines were superiours, in thesame the parthians, whom might make greate proofe, with thesame maner of warryng, consideryng the region, which thei had to defende, the which was moste large: for as moche as it hath the sea coaste, distant a thousande miles, the rivers thone from thother, twoo or three daies journey, the tounes in like maner and the inhabitauntes few: so that a romaine armie heavie and slowe, by meanes of their armoures, and their orders, could not over run it, without their grevous hurt (those that defended it, being on horsebacke mooste expedite) so that thei were to daie in one place, and to morowe distaunt fiftie miles. hereof it grewe, that the parthians might prevaile with their chivalrie onely, bothe to the ruine of the armie of crassus, and to the perill of thesame, of marcus antonius: but i (as i have told you) doe not intende in this my reasonyng, to speake of the warfare out of europe, therfore i will stand upon thesame, whiche in times past, the romaines ordained, and the grekes, and as the duchemen doe now adaies. but let us se to the other question of yours, where you desire to understande, what order, or what naturall vertue makes, that the footemen overcome the horsmen. and i saie unto you first that the horses cannot go, as the footmen in every place: thei are slower then the footemen to obeie, when it is requisite to alter the order: for as moche, as if it be nedefull, either goyng forward, to turne backwarde, or tournyng backwarde, to go forwarde, or to move themselves standing stil, or goyng to stand still, without doubt, the horsemen cannot dooe it so redilie as the footemen: the horsemen cannot, being of some violence, disordained, returne in their orders, but with difficultie, although thesame violence cease, the whiche the footemen dooe moste easely and quickly. besides this, it happeneth many tymes, that a hardie manne shall be upon a vile horse, and a coward upon a good, whereby it foloweth, that this evill matchyng of stomackes, makes disorder. nor no man doeth marvell, that a bande of footemenne, susteineth all violence of horse for that a horse is a beaste, that hath sence, and knoweth the perilles, and with an ill will, will enter in them: and if you consider, what force maketh theim go forwarde, and what holdeth them backwarde, you shall se without doubt thesame to be greater, whiche kepeth them backe, then that whiche maketh them go forwardes: for that the spurre maketh theim go forwarde, and of the other side, either the swearde, or the pike, kepeth theim backe: so that it hath been seen by the olde, and by the late experience, a bande of footemen to bee moste safe, ye, invinsible for horses. and if you should argue to this, that the heate, with whiche thei come, maketh theim more furious to incounter who that would withstande them, and lesse to regard the pike, then the spurre: i saie, that if the horse so disposed, begin to see, that he must run upon the poincte of the pike, either of himself, he wil refrain the course so that so sone as he shall feele himself pricked, he will stande still atones, or beeyng come to theim, he will tourne on the right, or on the lefte hande. whereof if you wil make experience, prove to run a horse against a walle: you shall finde fewe, with what so ever furie he come withall, will strike against it. cesar havyng in fraunce, to faighte with the suizzers, a lighted, and made every manne a light on foote, and to avoide from the araies, the horses, as a thyng more meete to flie, then to faight. but notwithstandyng these naturall impedimentes, whiche horses have, thesame capitaine, whiche leadeth the footemen, ought to chuse waies, whiche have for horse, the moste impedimentes that maie bee, and seldome tymes it happeneth, but that a manne maie save hymself, by the qualitie of the countrie: for that if thou marche on the hilles, the situacion doeth save thee from thesame furie, whereof you doubt, that thei go withail in the plain, fewe plaines be, whiche through the tillage or by meanes of the woddes, doe not assure thee: for that every hillocke, every bancke, although it be but small, taketh awaie thesame heate, and every culture where bee vines, and other trees, lettes the horses: and if thou come to battaile, the very same lettes happeneth, that chaunceth in marchyng: for as moche as every little impedemente, that the horse hath, abateth his furie. one thyng notwithstandyng, i will not forgette to tell you, how the romaines estemed so moche their orders, and trusted so moche to their weapons, that if thei shuld have had, to chuse either so rough a place to save theim selves from horses, where thei should not have been able, to raunge their orders, or a place where thei should have nede, to feare more of horses, but ben able to deffende their battaile, alwaies thei toke this, and left that: but bicause it is tyme, to passe to the armie, having armed these souldiours, accordyng to the aunciente and newe use, let us see what exercises the romaines caused theim make, before the menne were brought to the battaile. although thei be well chosen, and better armed, thei ought with moste greate studie be exercised, for that without this exercise, there was never any souldiour good: these exercises ought to be devided into three partes, the one, for to harden the bodie, and to make it apte to take paines, and to bee more swifter and more readier, the other, to teach them, how to handell their weapons, the third, for to learne them to kepe the orders in the armie, as well in marchyng, as in faightyng, and in the incampyng: the whiche be three principall actes, that an armie doeth: for asmoche, as if an armie marche, incampe, and faight with order, and expertly, the capitaine leseth not his honoure, although the battaile should have no good ende. therfore, all thauncient common weales, provided these exercises in maner, by custome, and by lawe, that there should not be left behinde any part thereof. thei exercised then their youth, for to make them swift, in runnyng, to make theim readie, in leapyng, for to make them strong, in throwyng the barre, or in wrestlyng: and these three qualities, be as it were necessarie in souldiours. for that swiftnesse, maketh theim apte to possesse places, before the enemie, and to come to them unloked for, and at unwares to pursue them, when thei are discomfaicted: the readinesse, maketh theim apte to avoide a blowe, to leape over a diche, to winne a banke: strength, maketh them the better able to beare their armours, to incounter the enemie, to withstande a violence. and above all, to make the bodie the more apte to take paines, thei used to beare greate burthens, the whiche custome is necessarie: for that in difficulte expedicions it is requisite many tymes, that the souldiour beside his armours, beare vitualles for many daies, and if he were not accustomed to this labour, he could not dooe it: and without this, there can neither bee avoided a perill, nor a victorie gotten with fame. concernyng to learne how to handell the weapons, thei exercised theim, in this maner: thei would have the yong menne, to put on armour, whiche should waie twise as moche, as their field armour, and in stede of a swearde, thei gave them a cudgell leaded, whiche in comparison of a verie swearde in deede, was moste heavie; thei made for every one of them, a poste to be set up in the ground, which should be in height twoo yardes and a quarter, and in soche maner, and so strong, that the blowes should not slur nor hurle it doune, against the whiche poste, the yong man with a targaet, and with the cudgell, as against an enemie did exercise, and some whiles he stroke, as though he would hurte the hedde, or the face, somewhile he retired backe, an other while he made forewarde: and thei had in this exercise, this advertisment, to make theim apt to cover theim selves, and to hurte the enemie: and havyng the counterfaight armours moste heavy, their ordinarie armours semed after unto them more lighter. the romanies, would that their souldiours should hurte with the pricke, and not with the cutte, as well bicause the pricke is more mortalle, and hath lesse defence, as also to thentent that he that should hurt, might lye the lesse open, and be more apt to redouble it, then with cuttes. dooe not marvaile that these auncient men, should thinke on these small thynges, for that where the incounteryng of men is reasoned of, you shall perceive, that every little vauntage, is of greate importaunce: and i remember you the same, whiche the writers of this declare, rather then i to teache you. the antiquitie estemed nothing move happie, in a common weale, then to be in thesame, many men exercised in armes: bicause not the shining of precious stones and of golde, maketh that the enemies submit themselves unto thee, but onely the fear of the weapons: afterwarde the errours whiche are made in other thynges, maie sometymes be corrected, but those whiche are dooen in the warre, the paine straight waie commyng on, cannot be amended. besides that, the knowlege to faight, maketh men more bold, bicause no man feareth to doe that thing, which he thinketh to have learned to dooe. the antiquitie would therefore, that their citezeins should exercise themselves, in all marcial feates, and thei made them to throwe against thesame poste, dartes moche hevier then the ordinarie: the whiche exercise, besides the makyng men expert in throwyng, maketh also the arme more nimble, and moche stronger. thei taught them also to shote in the long bowe, to whorle with the sling: and to all these thynges, thei appoincted maisters, in soche maner, that after when thei were chosen for to go to the warre, thei were now with mynde and disposicion, souldiours. nor there remained them to learn other, then to go in the orders, and to maintain them selves in those, either marchyng, or faightyng: the whiche moste easely thei learned, mingeling themselves with those, whiche had long tyme served, whereby thei knewe how to stande in the orders. cosimo. what exercises would you cause theim to make at this present? [sidenote: the exercises that souldiers ought to make in these daies; the exercise of swimmyng; tiber, is a river runnyng through rome the water wher of will never corrupte; thexercise of vautyng, and the commoditie thereof; an order that is taken in certain countries, concerning exercises of warre; what knowledge a souldiour ought to have; a cohorte is a bande of men; of what nomer and of what kind of armours and weapons, a maine battaile ought to bee, and the distributing and appoinetyng of thesame; veliti are light armed men; thecapitaines that ar appointed to every band of men; twoo orders observed in an armie; how a captain muste instructe muste instructe his souldiours how thei ought to governe themselves in the battaile.] fabricio. a good many of those, whiche have been declared, as runnyng, and wrestlyng, makyng theim to leape, makyng theim to labour in armours, moche heavier then the ordinarie, making them shoote with crosse bowes, and longe bowes, whereunto i would joyne the harkabus, a newe instrument (as you know) verie necessarie, and to these exercises i would use, al the youth of my state, but with greater industrie, and more sollicitatenesse thesame parte, whiche i should have alreadie appoincted to serve, and alwaies in the idell daies, thei should bee exercised. i would also that thei should learne to swimme, the whiche is a thyng verie profitable: for that there be not alwaies bridges over rivers, boates be not alwaies readie: so that thy army not knowyng howe to swime, remaineth deprived of many commodities: and many occasions to woorke well, is taken awaie. the romaines for none other cause had ordained, that the yong men should exercise them selves in campus martius, then onely, for that havyng tiber at hande, thei might, beyng weried with the exercise on lande, refreshe theim selves in the water, and partly in swimmyng, to exercise them selves. i would make also, as the antiquitie, those whiche should serve on horsebacke to exercise, the whiche is moste necessarie, for that besides to know how to ride, thei muste knowe how on horsebacke thei maie prevaile of them selves. and for this thei had ordeined horses of wood, upon the which thei practised, to leape by armed, and unarmed, without any helpe, and on every hande: the whiche made, that atones, and at a beck of a capitain, the horsmen were on foote, and likewise at a token, thei mounted on horsebacke. and soche exercises, bothe on foote and on horsebacke, as thei were then easie to bee doen, so now thei should not be difficult to thesame common weale, or to thesame prince, whiche would cause them to be put in practise of their yong men. as by experience is seen, in certaine citees of the weste countrie, where is kepte a live like maners with this order. thei devide all their inhabiters into divers partes: and every parte thei name of the kinde of those weapons, that thei use in the warre. and for that thei use pikes, halbardes, bowes, and harkebuses, thei call them pike menne, halberders, harkebutters, and archars: therefore, it is mete for all the inhabiters to declare, in what orders thei will be appoincted in. and for that all men, either for age, or for other impedimentes, be not fitte for the warre, every order maketh a choise of men, and thei call them the sworen, whom in idell daies, be bounde to exercise themselves in those weapons, wherof thei be named: and every manne hath his place appoincted hym of the cominaltie, where soche exercise ought to be made: and those whiche be of thesame order, but not of the sworen, are contributaries with their money, to thesame expenses, whiche in soche exercises be necessarie: therfore thesame that thei doe, we maie doe. but our smal prudence dooeth not suffre us, to take any good waie. of these exercises there grewe, that the antiquitie had good souldiours, and that now those of the weste, bee better men then ours: for as moche as the antiquitie exercised them, either at home (as those common weales doe) or in the armies, as those emperours did, for thoccasions aforesaied: but we, at home will not exercise theim, in campe we cannot, bicause thei are not our subjectes, and for that we are not able to binde them to other exercises then thei them selves liste to doe: the whiche occacion hath made, that firste the armies bee neclected, and after, the orders, and that the kyngdomes, and the common weales, in especially italians, live in soche debilitie. but let us tourne to our order, and folowyng this matter of exercises, i saie, how it suffiseth not to make good armies, for havyng hardened the men, made them strong, swift, and handsome, it is nedefull also, that thei learne to stande in the orders, to obeie to signes, to soundes, and to the voice of the capitain: to knowe, standyng, to retire them selves, goyng forwardes, bothe faightyng, and marchyng to maintain those: bicause without this knowlege, withal serious diligence observed, and practised, there was never armie good: and without doubt, the fierce and disordered menne, bee moche more weaker, then the fearfull that are ordered, for that thorder driveth awaie from men feare, the disorder abateth fiercenesse. and to the entente you maie the better perceive that, whiche here folowyng shalbe declared, you have to understande, how every nation, in the orderyng of their men to the warre, have made in their hoste, or in their armie, a principall member, the whiche though thei have varied with the name, thei have little varied with the nomber of the menne: for that thei all have made it, betwene sixe and viii. m. men. this nomber of men was called of the romaines, a legion, of grekes a fallange, of frenchemen caterva: this verie same in our tyme of the suizzers, whom onely of the auncient warfare, kepe some shadowe, is called in their tongue that, whiche in ours signifieththe maine battaile. true it is, that every one of them, hath after devided it, accordyng to their purposes. therefore me thinkes beste, that wee grounde our talke, upon this name moste knowen, and after, according to the aunciente, and to the orders now adaies, the beste that is possible to ordaine it; and bicause the romaines devided their legion, whiche was made betwene five and sixe thousande men, in ten cohortes, i will that wee devide our main battaile, into ten battailes, and that we make it of sixe thousande menne on foote, and we will give to every battaile, ccccl. men, of whiche shall be, cccc. armed with heavie armour, and l. with light armour: the heavie armed, shall be ccc. targettes with sweardes, and shalbe called target men: and c. with pikes, whiche shalbe called ordinarie pikes: the light armed shalbe, l. men armed with harkabuses, crosse bowes, and partisans, and smal targaettes, and these by an aunciente name, were called ordinarie veliti: all of the ten battailes therefore, comes to have three thousande targaet men, a thousande ordinarie pikes, cccc. ordinarie veliti, all whiche make the nomber of fower thousande and five hundred men. and we saied, that we would make the maine battaile of six thousande; therefore there must be added an other thousande, five hundred men, of whiche i will appoinet a thousande with pikes, whom i will call extraordinarie veliti, and thus my menne should come (as a little before i have saied) to bee made halfe of targaetes, and halfe of pikes and other weapons. i would appoinete to everie battaile, or bande of men, a conestable, fower centurions and fouretic peticapitaines, and moreover a hedde to the ordinarie veliti. with five peticapitaines; i would give to the thousande extraordinarie pikes, three conestabelles, ten centurions, and a hundred peticapitaines; to the extraodrinarie veliti, two conestabelles, v. centurions, and l. peticapitaines: i would then apoinet a generall hed, over all the main battaile: i would that every conestable should have an ansigne, and a drum. thus there should be made a manne battaile of ten battailes, of three thousande targaet men, of a thousande ordinarie pikes, of a thousande extraordinarie of five hundred ordinarie veliti, of five hundred extraordinarie, so there should come to bee sixe thousande men, emongeste the whiche there should bee m.d. peticapitaines, and moreover, xv. conestables, with xv. drummes, and xv. ansignes, lv. centurions, x. heddes of the ordinarie veliti, and a capitaine over all the maine battaile with his asigne and drume, and i have of purpose repeated this order the oftener, to the intent, that after when i shall shewe you, the maners of orderyng the battailes, and tharmies, you should not be confounded: i saie therefore, how that, that king, or that common weale, whiche intendeth to ordeine their subjectes to armes, ought to appoincte theim with these armoures and weapons, and with these partes, and to make in their countrie so many maine battailes, as it were able: and when thei should have ordained them, according to the forsaid distribucion, minding to exercise them in the orders, it should suffice to exercise every battaile by it self: and although the nomber of the men, of every one of them, cannot by it self, make the facion of a juste armie, notwithstandyng, every man maie learne to dooe thesame, whiche particularly appertaineth unto hym: for that in the armies, twoo orders is observed, the one, thesame that the men ought to doe in every battaile, and the other that, whiche the battaile ought to doe after, when it is with the other in an armie. and those men, whiche doe wel the first, mooste easely maie observe the seconde: but without knowyng thesame, thei can never come to the knowlege of the seconde. then (as i have saied) every one of these battailes, maie by them selves, learne to kepe the orders of the araies, in every qualitie of movyng, and of place, and after learne to put them selves togethers, to understande the soundes, by meanes wherof in the faight thei are commaunded, to learne to know by that, as the gallics by the whissell, what ought to be doen, either to stande still, or to tourne forward, or to tourne backwarde or whiche waie to tourne the weapons, and the face: so that knowyng how to kepe well the araie, after soche sorte, that neither place nor movyng maie disorder them, understandyng well the commaundementes of their heddes, by meanes of the sounde, and knowyng quickly, how to retourne into their place, these battailes maie after easly (as i have said) beyng brought many together, learne to do that, whiche all the body together, with the other battailes in a juste armie, is bounde to dooe. and bicause soche universall practise, is also not to bee estemed a little, ones or twise a yere, when there is peace, all the main battaile maie be brought together, to give it the facion of an whole armie, some daies exercisyng theim, as though thei should faight a fielde, settyng the fronte, and the sides with their succours in their places. and bicause a capitaine ordeineth his hoste to the fielde, either for coumpte of the enemie he seeth, or for that, of whiche without seyng he doubteth, he ought to exercise his armie in the one maner, and in the other, and to instructe theim in soche sorte, that thei maie knowe how to marche, and to faight, when nede should require, the wyng to his souldiours, how thei should governe theim selves, when thei should happen to be assaulted of this, or of that side: and where he ought to instructe theim how to faight againste the enemie, whom thei should see: he must shewe them also, how the faight is begun, and where thei ought to retire: being overthrowen, who hath to succeade in their places, to what signes, to what soundes, to what voices, thei ought to obeie, and to practise them in soche wise in the battaile, and with fained assaultes, that thei may desire the verie thyng in deede. for that an armie is not made coragious, bicause in thesame be hardie menne, but by reason the orders thereof bee well appoineted: for as moche as if i be one of the first faighters, and do knowe, beyng overcome, where i maie retire, and who hath to succeade in my place, i shall alwaies faight with boldnes, seing my succour at hand. if i shall be one of the seconde faighters, the first being driven backe, and overthrowen, i shall not bee afraied, for that i shall have presuposed that i maie bee, and i shall have desire to be thesame, whiche maie give the victory to my maister, and not to bee any of the other. these exercises bee moste necessarie, where an armie is made of newe, and where the old armie is, thei bee also necessarie: for that it is also seen, how the romaines knew from their infancie, thorder of their armies, notwithstandyng, those capitaines before thei should come to thenemie, continually did exercise them in those. and josephus in his historie saieth, that the continuall exercises of the romaine armies, made that all thesame multitude, whiche folowe the campe for gain, was in the daie of battaile profitable: bicause thei all knewe, how to stande in the orders, and to faight kepyng the same: but in the armies of newe men, whether thou have putte theim together, to faight straight waie, or that thou make a power to faight, when neede requires, without these exercises, as well of the battailes severally by themselves, as of all the armie, is made nothing: wherefore the orders beying necessarie, it is conveniente with double industrie and laboure, to shewe them unto soche as knoweth them not, and for to teache it, many excellent capitaines have travailed, without any respecte. cosimo. my thinkes that this reasoning, hath sumwhat transported you: for asmoche, as havyng not yet declared the waies, with the whiche the battailes bee exercised, you have reasoned of the whole armie, and of the daie of battaile. [sidenote: the chief importance in the exercisyng of bandes of men; three principall for thorderyng of menne into battaile raie; the manner how to bryng a bande of men into battaile raie after a square facion; the better waie for the ordring of a band of men in battaile raie, after the first facion; how to exercise men, and to take soche order, whereby a band of men that were by whatsoever chance disordred maye straighte wai be brought into order againe; what advertisement ought to bee used in tourning about a whole bande of menne, after soche sorte, as though it were but one bodie; how to order a band of menne after soche sort that thei maie make their front againste thenemie of whiche flanke thei list; how a band of man oughte to be ordered, when in marchyng thei should bee constrained to faighton their backes.] fabricio. you saie truth, but surely thoccasion hath been the affection, whiche i beare to these orders, and the grief that i feele, seyng thei be not put in use: notwithstanding, doubt not but that i will tourne to the purpose: as i have saied, the chief importaunce that is in thexercise of the battailes, is to knowe how to kepe well the armies: and bicause i tolde you that one of these battailes, ought to bee made of fower hundred men heavie armed, i wil staie my self upon this nomber. thei ought then to be brought into lxxx. rankes, and five to a ranke: afterward goyng fast, or softly, to knit them together, and to lose them: the whiche how it is dooen, maie bee shewed better with deedes, then with wordes. which nedeth not gretly to be taught, for that every manne, whom is practised in servise of warre, knoweth how this order procedeth, whiche is good for no other, then to use the souldiours to keepe the raie: but let us come to putte together one of these battailes, i saie, that there is given them three facions principally, the firste, and the moste profitablest is, to make al massive, and to give it the facion of two squares, the second is, to make it square with the front horned, the thirde is, to make it with a voide space in the middest: the maner to put men together in the first facion, maie be of twoo sortes, tho together in the first facion, maie be of twoo sortes, thone is to double the rankes, that is, to make the seconde ranke enter into the first, the iiii. into the third, the sixt into the fift, and so foorth, so that where there was lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, thei maie become xl. rankes, x. to a ranke. afterward cause theim to double ones more in thesame maner, settyng the one ranke into an other, and so there shall remain twentie rankes, twentie men to a ranke: this maketh twoo squares aboute, for as moche as albeit that there bee as many men the one waie, as in the other, notwithstandyng to wardes the hedde, thei joine together, that the one side toucheth the other: but by the other waie, thei be distant the one from the other, at least a yarde and a haulfe, after soche sorte, that the square is moche longer, from the backe to the fronte, then from the one side to thother: and bicause we have at this presente, to speake often of the partes afore, of behinde, and of the sides of these battailes, and of all the armie together, knowe you, that when i saie either hedde or fronte, i meane the parte afore, when i shall saie backe, the part behind, when i shall saie flankes, the partes on the sides. the fiftie ordinarie veliti of the battaile, muste not mingle with the other rankes, but so sone as the battaile is facioned, thei shalbe set a long by the flankes therof. the other waie to set together the battaile is this, and bicause it is better then the firste, i will set it before your ives juste, how it ought to bee ordeined. i beleve that you remember of what nomber of menne, of what heddes it is made, and of what armours thei are armed, then the facion, that this battaile ought to have, is (as i have saied) of twentie rankes, twentie men to a ranke, five rankes of pikes in the front, and fiftene rankes of targaettes on the backe, twoo centurions standying in the fronte, twoo behinde on the backe, who shall execute the office of those, whiche the antiquitie called tergiductori. the conestable with the ansigne, and with the drumme, shall stande in thesame space, that is betwene the five rankes of the pikes, and the fiftene of the targeaettes. of the peticapitaines, there shall stande one upon every side of the ranckes, so that every one, maie have on his side his men, those peticapitaines, whiche shalbe on the left hande, to have their men on the right hand, those peticapitaines, whiche shall be on the right hand, to have their menne on the left hande: the fiftie veliti, muste stande a long the flankes, and on the backe of the battaile. to mynde now, that this battaile maie be set together in this facion, the men goyng ordinarily, it is convenient to order them thus. make the men to be brought into lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, as a little afore we have said, leavyng the veliti either at the hedde, or at the taile, so that thei stande out of this order: and it ought to be ordeined, that every centurion have behinde his back twentie rankes, and to bee nexte behinde every centurion, five rankes of pikes, and the reste targaettes. the conestable shall stande with the drum, and the ansigne, in thesame space, whiche is betwene the pikes, and the targaettes of the seconde centurion, and to occupie the places of three targaette men. of the peticapitaines, twentie shall stand on the sides of the rankes, of the first centurion, on the lefte hande, and twentie shall stande on the sides of the rankes, of the last centurion on the right hande. and you muste understande, that the peticapitaine, whiche hath to leade the pikes, ought to have a pike, and those that leade the targaettes, ought to have like weapons. then the rankes beyng brought into this order, and mindyng in marchyng, to bryng them into battaile, for to make the hedde, the first centurion must be caused to stande still, with the firste twentie rankes, and the seconde to proceade marchyng, and tournyng on the right hand, he must go a long the sides of the twentie rankes that stande still, till he come to bee even with the other centurion, where he must also stande still, and the thirde centurion to procede marchyng, likewise tournyng on the right hand, and a long the sides of the rankes that stande still, must go so farre, that he be even with the other twoo centurions, and he also standyng still, the other centurion must folowe with his rankes, likewise tournyng on the right hande, a longe the sides of the rankes that stande still, so farre that he come to the hed of the other, and then to stand still, and straight waie twoo centurions onely, shall depart from the front, and go to the backe of the battaile, the whiche cometh to bee made in thesame maner, and with thesame order juste, as a little afore i have shewed you. the veliti muste stande a long, by the flankes of thesame, accordyng as is disposed in the first waie, whiche waie is called redoublyng by right line, this is called redoublyng by flanke: the first waie is more easie, this is with better order, and commeth better to passe, and you maie better correcte it, after your owne maner, for that in redoublyng by righte line, you muste bee ruled by the nomber, bicause five maketh ten, ten twentie, twentie fourtie, so that with redoublyng by right line, you cannot make a hedde of fiftene, nor of five and twentie, nor of thirtie, nor of five and thirtie, but you must go where thesame nomber will leade you. and yet it happeneth every daie in particulare affaires, that it is convenient to make the forwarde with sixe hundred, or eight hundred men, so that to redouble by right line, should disorder you: therefore this liketh me better: that difficultie that is, ought moste with practise, and with exercise to bee made easie. therefore i saie unto you, how it importeth more then any thyng, to have the souldiours to know how to set themselves in araie quickly, and it is necessarie to keepe theim in this battaile, to exercise theim therin, and to make them to go apace, either forward or backward, to passe through difficulte places, without troublyng thorder: for asmoche as the souldiours, whiche can doe this well, be expert souldiours, and although thei have never seen enemies in the face, thei maie be called old souldiours, and contrariwise, those whiche cannot keepe these orders, though thei have been in a thousande warres, thei ought alwaies to be reputed new souldiours. this is, concernyng setting them together, when thei are marching in small rankes: but beyng set, and after beyng broken by some accident or chaunce, whiche groweth either of the situacion, or of the enemie, to make that in a sodaine, thei maie come into order againe, this is the importaunce and the difficultie, and where is nedefull moche exercise, and moche practise, and wherin the antiquitie bestowed moche studie. therefore it is necessarie to doe twoo thynges, firste to have this battaile full of countersignes, the other, to keepe alwaies this order, that those same men maie stand alwaies in the ranke, which thei were firste placed in: as for insample, if one have begon to stande in the seconde, that he stande after alwaie in that, and not onely in that self same rancke, but in that self same place: for the observyng whereof (as i have saied) bee necessarie many countersignes. in especially it is requisite, that the ansigne bee after soche sorte countersigned, that companyng with the other battailes, it maie be knowen from theim, accordyng as the conestable, and the centurions have plumes of fethers in their heddes differente, and easie to be knowen, and that whiche importeth moste, is to ordaine that the peticapitaines bee knowen. whereunto the antiquitie had so moche care, that thei would have nothing els written in their hedde peces, but the nomber that thei were named by, callyng them firste, seconde, thirde, and fourthe xc. and yet thei were not contented with this, but made every souldiour to have written in his targaet, the nomber of the ranke, and the nomber of the place, in whiche ranke he was appoineted. then the menne being countersigned thus, and used to stande betwene these limites, it is an easie thyng, thei beyng disordered, to sett theim all againe quickly into order: considering, that the ansigne standyng still, the centurions, and the peticapitaines maie gesse their places by the iye, and beyng brought the left of the left, the right of the right, with their accustomed distance, the souldiours led by their rule, and by the differences of the cognisances, maie be quickly in their proper places, no otherwise, then as if the boordes of a tunne should bee taken a sunder, whiche beyng first marked, moste easely maie bee set together again, where thesame beyng not countersigned, were impossible to bryng into order any more. these thynges, with diligence and with exercise, are quickely taught, and quickly learned, and beyng learned, with difficultie are forgotten: for that the newe menne, be led of the olde, and with tyme, a province with these exercises, may become throughly practised in the war. it is also necessarie to teache theim, to tourne theim selves all at ones, and when neede requires, to make of the flankes, and of the backe, the fronte, and of the front, flankes, or backe, whiche is moste easie: bicause it suffiseth that every manne doe tourne his bodie, towardes thesame parte that he is commaunded, and where thei tourne their faces, there the fronte commeth to bee. true it is, that when thei tourne to any of the flanckes, the orders tourne out of their proporcion: for that from the breast to the backe, there is little difference, and from the one flancke to the other, there is verie moche distance, the whiche is al contrarie to the ordinarie order of the battaile: therefore it is convenient, that practise, and discrecion, doe place them as thei ought to be: but this is small disorder, for that moste easely by themselves, thei maie remedie it. but that whiche importeth more, and where is requisite more practise, is when a battaile would tourne all at ones, as though it were a whole bodie, here is meete to have greate practise, and greate discrecion: bicause mindyng to tourne, as for insample on the left hande, the left corner must stande still, and those that be next to hym that standeth still, muste marche so softly, that thei that bee in the right corner, nede not to runne: otherwise all thing should be confounded. but bicause it happeneth alwaies, when an armie marcheth from place to place, that the battailes, whiche are not placed in the front, shall be driven to faight not by hedde, but either by flancke, or by backe, so that a battaile muste in a sodaine make of flancke, or of backe, hedde: and mindyng that like battailes in soche cace, maie have their proporcion, as above is declared, it is necessarie, that thei have the pikes on thesame flancke, that ought to be hedde, and the peticapitaines, centurions, and conestables, to resorte accordyngly to their places. therefore to mynde to dooe this, in plasyng them together, you must ordeine the fower skore rankes, of five in a ranke, thus: set all the pikes in the first twentie rankes, and place the peticapitaines thereof, five in the first places, and five in the last: the other three score rankes, whiche come after, bee all of targaettes, whiche come to bee three centuries. therefore, the first and the laste ranke of every centurion, would be peticapitaines, the conestable with the ansigne, and with the drumme, muste stande in the middest of the first centurie of targaettes, and the centurions in the hed of every centurie. the bande thus ordained, when you would have the pikes to come on the left flancke, you must redouble centurie by centurie, on the right flancke: if you would have them to come on the right flancke, you must redouble theim on the lefte. and so this battaile tourneth with the pikes upon a flancke, and the conestable in the middeste: the whiche facion it hath marchyng: but the enemie commyng, and the tyme that it would make of flancke hedde, it nedeth not but to make every man to tourne his face, towardes thesame flancke, where the pikes be, and then the battaile tourneth with the rankes, and with the heddes in thesame maner, as is aforesaied: for that every man is in his place, excepte the centurions, and the centurions straight waie, and without difficultie, place themselves: but when thei in marchyng, should bee driven to faight on the backe, it is convenient to ordein the rankes after soch sorte, that settyng theim in battaile, the pikes maie come behinde, and to doe this, there is to bee kepte no other order, then where in orderyng the battaile, by the ordinarie, every centurie hath five rankes of pikes before, to cause that thei maie have them behind, and in all the other partes to observe thorder, whiche i declared firste. cosimo. you have tolde (if i dooe well remember me) that this maner of exercise, is to bee able to bryng these battailes together into an armie, and that this practise, serveth to be able to order theim selves in the same: but if it should happen, that these ccccl. men, should have to doe an acte seperate, how would you order them? [sidenote: how a battaile is made with twoo hornes; the orderyng of a battaile with a voide space in the middeste.] fabricio. he that leadeth them, ought then to judge, where he will place the pikes, and there to put them, the whiche doeth not repugne in any part to the order above written: for that also, though thesame bee the maner, that is observed to faighte a fielde, together with thother battailes, notwithstandyng it is a rule, whiche serveth to all those waies, wherein a band of menne should happen to have to doe: but in shewyng you the other twoo waies of me propounded, of ordering the battailes, i shal also satisfie you more to your question: for that either thei are never used, or thei are used when a battaile is a lone, and not in companie of other, and to come to the waie of ordering them, with twoo hornes, i saie, that thou oughteste to order the lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, in this maner. place in the middest, one centurion, and after hym xxv. rankes, whiche muste bee with twoo pikes on the lefte hande, and with three targaettes on the right, and after the first five, there must be put in the twentie folowyng, twentie peticapitaines, all betwene the pikes, and the targaettes, excepte those whiche beare the pike, whom maie stand with the pikes: after these xxv. rankes thus ordered, there is to be placed an other centurion, and behinde hym fiftene rankes of targaettes: after these, the conestable betwene the drum and the ansigne, who also must have after him, other fiftene rankes of targaettes: after this, the thirde centurion must be placed, and behinde hym, xxv. rankes, in every one of whiche, ought to bee three targaettes on the lefte flancke, and twoo pikes on the right, and after the five first rankes, there must be xx. peticapitaines placed betwene the pikes, and the targaettes: after these rankes, the fowerth centurion must folowe. intendying therefore, of these rankes thus ordered, to make a battaile with twoo hornes, the first centurion must stand still, with the xxv. rankes, whiche be behinde him, after the second centurion muste move, with the fiftene rankes of targaettes, that bee behinde hym, and to tourne on the right hande, and up by the right flancke of the xxv. rankes, to go so farre, that he arrive to the xv. ranke, and there to stande still: after, the conestable muste move, with the fiftene rankes of targaettes, whiche be behinde hym, and tournyng likewise on the right hande, up by the right flancke of the fiftene rankes, that wer firste moved, muste marche so farre, that he come to their heddes, and there to stand stil: after, the thirde centurion muste move with the xxv. rankes, and with the fowerth centurion, whiche was behinde, and turnyng up straight, must go a long by the right flanck of the fiftene last rankes of the targaettes, and not to stande still when he is at the heddes of them, but to followe marchyng so farre, that the laste ranke of the xxv. maie come to be even with the rankes behinde. and this dooen, the centurion, whiche was hedde of the firste fiftene rankes of targaettes, must go awaie from thens where he stoode, and go to the backe in the lefte corner: and thus a battaile shall be made of xxv. rankes, after twentie men to a rank, with two hornes, upon every side of the front, one horn, and every one, shall have ten rankes, five to a ranke, and there shall remain a space betwene the twoo hornes, as moche as containeth ten men, whiche tourne their sides, the one to thother. betwene the two hornes, the capitain shall stande, and on every poinct of a horne, a centurion: there shall bee also behinde, on every corner, a centurion: there shal be twoo rankes of pikes, and xx. peticapitaines on every flancke. these twoo hornes, serve to kepe betwene theim the artillerie, when this battaile should have any withit, and the cariages: the veliti muste stande a long the flankes, under the pikes. but mindyng to bring this horned battaile, with a voide space in the middeste, there ought no other to bee doen, then of fiftene rankes, of twentie to a ranke, to take eight rankes, and to place them on the poinctes of the twoo hornes, whiche then of hornes, become backe of the voide space, in this place, the cariages are kept, the capitain standeth, and the ansigne, but never the artillerie, the whiche is placed either in the front, or a long the flankes. these be the waies, that a battaile maie use when it is constrained to passe alone through suspected places: notwithstandyng, the massive battaile without hornes, and without any soche voide place is better, yet purposyng to assure the disarmed, the same horned battaile is necessarie. the suizzers make also many facions of battailes, emong which, thei make one like unto a crosse: bicause in the spaces that is betwen the armes therof, thei kepe safe their harkebuters from the daunger of the enemies: but bicause soche battailes be good to faight by theim selves, and my intente is to shew, how many battailes united, do faight with thenemie, i wil not labour further in describing them. cosimo. my thinkes i have verie well comprehended the waie, that ought to be kept to exercise the men in these battailes: but (if i remember me well) you have saied, how that besides the tenne battailes, you joyne to the maine battaile, a thousande extraordinarie pikes, and five hundred extraordinarie veliti: will you not appoincte these to be exercised? [sidenote: to what purpose the pikes and velite extraordinarie must serve.] fabricio. i would have theim to bee exercised, and that with moste great diligence: and the pikes i would exercise, at leaste ansigne after ansigne, in the orders of the battailes, as the other: for as moche as these should doe me more servise, then the ordinarie battailes, in all particulare affaires: as to make guides, to get booties, and to doe like thynges: but the veliti, i would exercise at home, without bringing them together, for that their office being to faight a sonder, it is not mete, that thei should companie with other, in the common exercises: for that it shall suffice, to exercise them well in the particular exercises. thei ought then (as i firste tolde you, nor now me thynkes no labour to rehearse it againe) to cause their men to exercise them selves in these battailes, whereby thei maie knowe how to kepe the raie, to knowe their places, to tourne quickly, when either enemie, or situacion troubleth them: for that, when thei knowe how to do this, the place is after easely learned, which a battaile hath to kepe, and what is the office thereof in the armie: and when a prince, or a common weale, will take the paine, and will use their diligence in these orders, and in these exercisyng, it shall alwaies happen, that in their countrie, there shall bee good souldiours, and thei to be superiours to their neighbours, and shalbe those, whiche shall give, and not receive the lawes of other men: but (as i have saied) the disorder wherein thei live, maketh that thei neclecte, and doe not esteme these thynges, and therefore our armies be not good: and yet though there were either hed, or member naturally vertuous, thei cannot shewe it. cosimo. what carriages would you, that every one of these battailes should have? [sidenote: neither centurion nor peticapitaine, ought not to ride; what carriages the capitaines ought to have, and the nomber of carrages requisite to every bande of menne.] fabricio. firste, i would that neither centurion, nor peticapitain, should be suffered to ride: and if the conestable would nedes ride, i would that he should have a mule, and not a horse: i would allowe hym twoo carriages, and one to every centurion, and twoo to every three peticapitaines, for that so many wee lodge in a lodgyng, as in the place therof we shall tell you: so that every battaile will come to have xxxvi. carriages, the whiche i would should carrie of necessitie the tentes, the vesselles to seeth meate, axes, barres of iron, sufficient to make the lodgynges, and then if thei can carry any other thyng, thei maie dooe it at their pleasure. cosimo. i beleve that the heddes of you, ordeined in every one of these battailes, be necessarie: albeit, i would doubt, lest that so many commaunders, should confounde all. [sidenote: without many capitaines, an armie cannot be governed; to what purpose ansignes ought to serve; for what purpose drummes oughte to bee used; the propertie that soundes of instrumentes have in mens myndes.] fabricio. that should bee, when it were not referred to one man, but referryng it, thei cause order, ye and without theim, it is impossible to governe an armie: for that a wall, whiche on every parte enclineth, requireth rather to have many proppes, and thicke, although not so strong, then fewe, though thei were strong: bicause the vertue of one a lone, doeth not remedie the ruine a farre of. and therefore in tharmies, and emong every ten men, it is convenient that there bee one, of more life, of more harte, or at leaste wise of more aucthoritie, who with stomacke, with wordes, and with example, maie kepe them constante, and disposed to faight, and these thynges of me declared, bee necessarie in an armie, as the heddes, the ansignes, and the drummes, is seen that wee have theim all in our armies, but none doeth his office. first to mynde that the peticapitaines doe thesame, for whiche thei are ordeined, it is necessarie (as i have said) that there bee a difference, betwene every one of them and their men, and that thei lodge together, doyng their duties, standyng in thorder with them: for that thei placed in their places, bee a rule and a temperaunce, to maintaine the raies straight and steddie, and it is impossible that thei disorder, or disorderyng, dooe not reduce themselves quickly into their places. but we now adaies, doe not use them to other purpose, then to give theim more wages, then to other menne, and to cause that thei dooe some particulare feate: the very same happeneth of the ansigne bearers, for that thei are kept rather to make a faire muster, then for any other warlike use: but the antiquitie used theim for guides, and to bryng theim selves againe into order: for that every man, so sone as the ansigne stoode still, knewe the place, that he kept nere to his ansigne, wherunto he retourned alwaies: thei knewe also, how that the same movyng, or standyng, thei should staie, or move: therfore it is necessarie in an armie, that there be many bodies, and every bande of menne to have his ansigne, and his guide: wherfore havyng this, it is mete that thei have stomackes inough, and by consequence life enough. then the menne ought to marche, accordyng to the ansigne: and the ansigne to move, accordyng to the drumme, the whiche drumme well ordered, commaundeth to the armie, the whiche goyng with paces, that answereth the tyme of thesame, will come to kepe easilie thorders: for whiche cause the antiquitie had shalmes, flutes, and soundes perfectly tymed: for as moche as like as he that daunseth, proceadeth with the tyme of the musick, and goyng with thesame doeth not erre, even so an armie obeiyng, in movyng it self to thesame sounde, doeth not disorder: and therefore, thei varied the sounde, accordyng as thei would varie the mocion, and accordyng as thei would inflame, or quiete, or staie the mindes of men: and like as the soundes were divers, so diversly thei named them: the sounde dorico, ingendered constancie, the sounde frigio, furie: whereby thei saie, that alexander beyng at the table, and one soundyng the sounde frigio, it kendled so moche his minde, that he laied hande on his weapons. all these maners should be necessarie to finde again: and when this should bee difficulte, at least there would not be left behind those that teache the souldiour to obeie, the whiche every man maie varie, and ordeine after his owne facion, so that with practise, he accustome the eares of his souldiours to knowe it: but now adaies of this sounde, there is no other fruicte taken for the moste part, then to make a rumour. cosimo. i would desire to understande of you, if ever with your self you have discourced, whereof groweth so moche vilenesse, and so moche disorder, and so moche necligence in these daies of this exercise? [sidenote: a notable discourse of the aucthour, declaryng whereof groweth so moche vilenes disorder and necligence in these daies, concernyng the exercises of warre.] fabricio. with a good will i will tell you thesame, that i thinke. you knowe how that of the excellente men of warre, there hath been named many in europe, fewe in affric, and lesse in asia: this grewe, for that these twoo laste partes of the worlde, have had not paste one kyngdome, or twoo, and fewe common weales, but europe onely, hath had many kyngdomes, and infinite common weales, where menne became excellent, and did shewe their vertue, accordyng as thei were sette a woorke, and brought before their prince, or common weale, or king that he be: it followeth therefore, that where be many dominions, there rise many valiaunt menne, and where be fewe, fewe. in asia is founde ninus, cirus, artasercses, mithridates: and verie fewe other, that to these maie be compared. in africk, is named (lettyng stande thesame auncient egipt) massinissa, jugurta, and those capitaines, whiche of the carthaginens common weale were nourished, whom also in respecte to those of europe, are moste fewe: bicause in europe, be excellente men without nomber, and so many more should be, if together with those should bee named the other, that be through the malignitie of time extincte: for that the worlde hath been moste vertuous, where hath been moste states, whiche have favoured vertue of necessitie, or for other humaine passion. there rose therfore in asia, fewe excellente menne: bicause thesame province, was all under one kyngdome, in the whiche for the greatnesse thereof, thesame standing for the moste parte of tyme idell, there could not growe men in doynges excellent. to africke there happened the verie same, yet there were nourished more then in asia, by reason of the carthaginens common weale: for that in common weales, there growe more excellent men, then in kingdomes, bicause in common weales for the most part, vertue is honoured, in kyngdomes it is helde backe: wherby groweth, that in thone, vertuous men are nourished, in the other thei are extincte. therefore he that shall consider the partes of europe, shall finde it to have been full of common weales, and of princedomes, the whiche for feare, that the one had of the other, thei wer constrained to kepe lively the warlike orders, and to honor them, whiche in those moste prevailed: for that in grece, besides the kyngdome of the macedonians, there were many common weales, and in every one of theim, were bred moste excellente men. in italie, were the romaines, the sannites, the toscanes, the gallie cisalpini. fraunce, and almainie, wer ful of common weales and princedomes. spaine likewise: and although in comparison of the romaines, there are named fewe other, it groweth through the malignitie of the writers, whom folowe fortune, and to theim for the moste parte it suffised, to honour the conquerours: but it standeth not with reason, that betwene the sannites, and the toscanes, whom fought cl. yeres with the romaine people, before thei wer overcome, there should not growe exceadyng many excellente menne. and so likewise in fraunce, and in spaine: but that vertue, whiche the writers did not celebrate in particuler menne, thei celebrated generally in the people, where thei exalte to the starres, the obstinatenesse that was in them, to defende their libertie. beyng then true, that where bee moste dominions, there riseth moste valiaunt menne, it foloweth of necessitie, that extinguishyng those, vertue is extincte straighte waie, the occasion decaiyng, whiche maketh menne vertuous. therefore, the romaine empire beyng after increased, and havyng extinguished all the common weales, and princedomes of europe, and of afrike, and for the moste part those of asia, it lefte not any waie to vertue, excepte rome: whereby grewe, that vertuous menne began to be as fewe in europe, as in asia: the whiche vertue, came after to the laste caste: for as moche, as all the vertue beyng reduced to roome, so sone as thesame was corrupted, almoste all the worlde came to bee corrupted: and the scithian people, were able to come to spoile thesame empire, the whiche had extinguished the vertue of other, and knewe not howe to maintaine their owne: and after, although through the inundacion of those barberous nacions, thesame empire was devided into many partes, this vertue is not renued: [sidenote: the causes why the aunciente orders are neclected.] the one cause is, for that it greveth theim moche, to take againe the orders when thei are marde, the other, bicause the maner of livyng now adaies, having respect to the christian religion, commaundeth not thesame necessitie to menne, to defende themselves, whiche in olde tyme was: for that then, the menne overcome in warre, either were killed, or remained perpetuall slaves, where thei led their lives moste miserably: the tounes overcome, either were rased, or the inhabiters thereof driven out, their goodes taken awaie, sent dispersed through the worlde: so that the vanquished in warre, suffered all extreme miserie: of this feare, men beyng made afraied, thei wer driven to kepe lively the warlike exercises, and thei honoured soche as were excellente in theim: but nowe adaies, this feare for the moste part is not regarded: of those that are overcom, fewe bee killed, none is kepte longe in prison: for that with facelitie, thei are sette at libertie: the citees also, whiche a thousande tymes have rebelled, are not destroied, the men wherof, are let a lone with their goodes, so that the greateste hurte that is feared, is but a taske: in so moche, that men will not submit them selves to the orders of warre, and to abide alwaies under those, to avoide the perilles whereof thei are little afraied: again these provinces of europe, be under a verie fewe heddes, in respecte as it hath been in times past: for that al fraunce, obeieth one kyng, al spain, an other: italie is in fewe partes, so that the weake citees, are defended with leanyng to hym that overcometh, and the strong states, for the causes aforesaied, feare no soche extreme ruine. cosimo. yet ther hath ben seen many tounes that have ben sacked within this xxv. yeres, and lost their dominions, whose insample, ought to teache other how to live, and to take again some of those old orders. fabricio. you saie true: but if you note what tounes have gone to sacke, you shall not finde that thei have been the heddes of states, but of the members; as was seen sacked tortona, and not milaine: capua, and not napelles, brescia, and not venice, ravenna, and not roome: the whiche insamples maketh those that governe, not to chaunge their purposes, but rather maketh them to stande more in their opinion, to be able to redeme again all thynges with taskes, and for this, thei will not submit theim selves to the troubles of thexercises of warre, semyng unto them partly not necessarie, partly, an intrinsicate matter, whiche thei understande not: those other, whiche bee subjectes to them, whom soche insamples ought to make afraied, have no power to remedie it: and those princes, that have ones loste their estates, are no more able, and those which as yet kept them, know not, nor wil not. bicause thei will without any disease rain by fortune, and not by their vertue: for that in the worlde beyng but little vertue, thei see fortune governeth all thynges. and thei will have it to rule theim, not thei to rule it. and to prove this that i have discoursed to bee true, consider almaine, in the whiche, bicause there is many princedomes, and common weales, there is moche vertue, and all thesame, whiche in the present service of warre is good, dependeth of the insamples of those people: who beyng all gellious of their states, fearing servitude, the which in other places is not feared, thei all maintaine theim selves lordes, and honourable: this that i have saied, shall suffice to shewe the occacions of the presente utilitie, accordyng to my opinion: i cannot tell, whether it seeme thesame unto you, or whether there be growen in you any doubtyng. cosimo. none, but rather i understande all verie well: onely i desire, tournyng to our principall matter, to understande of you, how you would ordein the horses with these battailes, and how many, and how thei should be governed, and how armed. [sidenote: the armyng of horsemen; the weapons that light horsmenne should have; the nombre of horsmen requisite for a maine bataille of six thousand men; the nombre of carrages that men of armes and light horsmen ought to have.] fabricio. you thinke peraventure, that i have left it behinde: whereat doe not marvell, for that i purpose for twoo causes, to speake therof little, the one is, for that the strengthe, and the importaunce of an armie, is the footemen, the other is, bicause this part of service of warre, is lesse corrupted, then thesame of footemen. for that though it be not stronger then the old, yet it maie compare with thesame, nevertheles ther hath been spoken a little afore, of the maner of exercisyng them. and concernyng tharmyng them, i would arme them as thei doe at this present, as wel the light horsemen, as the menne of armes: but the light horsemen, i would that thei should be all crossebowe shuters, with some harkebutters emong them: the whiche though in the other affaires of warre, thei bee little profitable, thei be for this most profitable, to make afraied the countrie menne, and to drive them from a passage, that were kept of them: bicause a harkebutter, shall feare them more, then twentie other armed. but commyng to the nomber, i saie, that having taken in hand, to imitate the service of warre of the romaines, i would not ordein more then three hundred horse, profitable for every maine battaile, of whiche i would that there were cl. men of armes, and cl. light horsmen, and i would give to every one of these partes, a hedde, making after emong them fiftene peticapitaines for a bande, givyng to every one of them a trompet, and a standarde: i would that every ten menne of armes, should have five carriages, and every ten light horsemen twoo, the whiche as those of the footemen, should carrie the tentes, the vesselles, and the axes, and the stakes, and the rest of their other harneis. nor beleve not but that it is disorder, where the menne of armes have to their service fower horse, bicause soche a thyng is a corrupt use: for that the men of armes in almaine, are seen to bee with their horse alone, every twentie of theim, havyng onely a carte, that carrieth after them their necessary thynges. the romaine horsemen, were likewise a lone: true it is, that the triary lodged nere them, whiche wer bound to minister helpe unto theim, in the kepyng of their horses the whiche maie easely be imitated of us, as in the distributyng of the lodgynges, i shall shewe you. thesame then that the romaines did, and that whiche the duchmen doe now a daies, we maie doe also, ye, not doyng it, we erre. these horses ordained and appoincted together with a main battaile, maie sometymes be put together, when the battailes bee assembled, and to cause that betwene theim bee made some sight of assault, the whiche should be more to make them acquainted together, then for any other necessitie. but now of this part, there hath been spoke sufficiently, wherefore let us facion the armie, to be able to come into the field against the enemie, and hope to winne it: whiche thyng is the ende, for whiche the exercise of warre is ordeined, and so moche studie therein bestowed. the thirde booke cosimo. seeing that we chaunge reasonyng, i will that the demaunder be chaunged: bicause i would not be thought presumptuous, the which i have alwaies blamed in other: therfore, i resigne the dictatorship, and give this aucthoritie to hym that will have it, of these my other frendes. zanobi. we would be moste glad, that you should procede, but seyng that you will not, yet tell at leaste, whiche of us shall succede in your place. cosimo. i will give this charge to signor fabricio. fabricio. i am content to take it, and i will that we folowe the venecian custome, that is, that the youngeste speake firste: bicause this beyng an exercise for yong men, i perswade my self, that yong menne, bee moste apt to reason thereof, as thei be moste readie to execute it. cosimo. then it falleth to you luigi: and as i have pleasure of soche a successour, so you shal satisfie your self of soche a demaunder: therefore i praie you, let us tourne to the matter, and let us lese no more tyme. [sidenote: the greateste disorder that is used now a daies in pitching of a fielde; the order how a romain legion was appoincted to faight; the maner that the grekes used in their falangi, when thei fought against their enemies; the order that the suizzers use in their main battailes when thei faight; howe to appoincte a main battaile with armour and weapons, and to order thesame after the greke and romain maner.] fabricio. i am certain, that to mynde to shewe wel, how an armie is prepared, to faight a fielde, it should be necessarie to declare, how the grekes, and the romaines ordeined the bandes of their armies: notwithstandyng, you your selves, beeyng able to rede, and to consider these tnynges, by meanes of the auncient writers. i will passe over many particulars: and i will onely bryng in those thynges, whiche i thinke necessarie to imitate, mindyng at this tyme, to give to our exercise of warre, some parte of perfection: the whiche shall make, that in one instant, i shall shewe you, how an armie is prepared to the field, and how it doeth incounter in the verie faight, and how it maie be exercised in the fained. the greatest disorder, that thei make, whiche ordeine an armie to the fielde, is in giving them onely one fronte, and to binde them to one brunt, and to one fortune: the whiche groweth, of havyng loste the waie, that the antiquitie used to receive one bande within an other: bicause without this waie, thei can neither succour the formoste, nor defende them, nor succede in the faight in their steede: the whiche of the romaines, was moste excellently well observed. therefore, purposyng to shewe this waie, i saie, how that the romaines devided into iii. partes every legion, in hastati, prencipi, and triarii, of which, the hastati wer placed in the first front, or forward of the armie, with thorders thicke and sure, behinde whom wer the prencipi, but placed with their orders more thinne: after these, thei set the triarii, and with so moche thinnes of orders, that thei might, if nede wer, receive betwene them the prencipi, and the hastati. thei had besides these, the slingers, and crosbowshoters, and the other lighte armed, the whiche stoode not in these orders, but thei placed them in the bed of tharmie, betwene the horses and the other bandes of footemen: therefore these light armed, began the faight, if thei overcame (whiche happened seldom times) thei folowed the victorie: if thei were repulced, thei retired by the flanckes of the armie, or by the spaces ordained for soche purposes, and thei brought them selves emong the unarmed: after the departure of whom, the hastati incountered with the enemie, the whiche if thei saw themselves to be overcome, thei retired by a little and little, by the rarenesse of thorders betwene the prencipi, and together with those, thei renued the faight if these also wer repulced, thei retired al in the rarenesse of the orders of the triarii, and al together on a heape, began againe the faight: and then, if thei were overcome, there was no more remeady, bicause there remained no more waies to renue them again. the horses stoode on the corners of the armie, to the likenes of twoo winges to a bodie, and somewhiles thei fought with the enemies horses, an other while, thei rescued the fotmen, according as nede required. this waie of renuyng theim selves three tymes, is almoste impossible to overcome: for that, fortune muste three tymes forsake thee, and the enemie to have so moche strengthe, that three tymes he maie overcome thee. the grekes, had not in their falangi, this maner of renuyng them selves, and although in those wer many heddes, and many orders, notwithstandyng, thei made one bodie, or els one hedde: the maner that thei kepte in rescuyng the one the other was, not to retire the one order within the other, as the romaines, but to enter the one manne into the place of the other: the which thei did in this maner. their falange brought into rankes, and admit, that thei put in a ranke fiftie menne, commyng after with their hedde againste the enemie, of all the rankes the foremoste sixe, mighte faight: bicause their launces, the whiche thei called sarisse, were so long, that the sixt ranke, passed with the hedde of their launces, out of the first ranke: then in faightyng, if any of the first, either through death, or through woundes fell, straight waie there entered into his place, thesame man, that was behinde in the second ranke, and in the place that remained voide of the seconde, thesame man entred, whiche was behind hym in the thirde, and thus successively, in a sodaine the rankes behinde, restored the faultes of those afore, so that the rankes alwaies remained whole, and no place of the faighters was voide, except the laste rankes, the whiche came to consume, havyng not menne behinde their backes, whom might restore theim: so that the hurte that the first rankes suffered, consumed the laste, and the firste remained alwaies whole: and thus these falangi by their order, might soner be consumed, then broken, for that the grosse bodie, made it more immovable. the romaines used at the beginnyng the falangi, and did set in order their legions like unto them: after, this order pleased them not, and thei devided the legions into many bodies, that is, in bandes and companies: bicause thei judged (as a little afore i saied) that thesame bodie, should have neede of many capitaines, and that it should be made of sunderie partes, so that every one by it self, might be governed. the maine battailes of the suizzers, use at this present, all the maners of the falangi, as well in ordryng it grosse, and whole, as in rescuyng the one the other: and in pitchyng the field, thei set the main battailes, thone to the sides of the other: and though thei set them the one behinde the other, thei have no waie, that the firste retiryng it self, maie bee received of the seconde, but thei use this order, to the entent to bee able to succour the one thother, where thei put a maine battaile before, and an other behinde thesame on the right hande: so that if the first have nede of helpe, that then the other maie make forewarde, and succour it: the third main battaile, thei put behind these, but distant from them, a harkebus shot: this thei doe, for that thesaid two main battailes being repulced, this maie make forwarde, and have space for theim selves, and for the repulced, and thesame that marcheth forward, to avoide the justling of the one the other: for asmoche as a grosse multitude, cannot bee received as a little bodie: and therefore, the little bodies beyng destincte, whiche were in a romaine legion, might be placed in soche wise, that thei might receive betwene theim, and rescue the one the other. and to prove this order of the suizzers not to be so good, as the auncient romaines, many insamples of the romain legions doe declare, when thei fought with the grekes falangi, where alwaies thei were consumed of theim: for that the kinde of their weapons (as i have said afore) and this waie of renuyng themselves, could do more, then the massivenesse of the falangi. havyng therefore, with these insamples to ordaine an armie, i have thought good, partly to retaine the maner of armyng and the orders of the grekes falangi, and partely of the romain legions: and therfore i have saied, that i would have in a main battaile, twoo thousande pikes, whiche be the weapons of the macedonicall falangi, and three thousande targaettes with sweardes, whiche be the romain weapons: i have devided the main battaile, into x. battailes, as the romaines their legion into ten cohortes: i have ordeined the veliti, that is the light armed, to begin the faight, as the romaines used: and like as the weapons beyng mingled, doe participate of thone and of the other nacion, so the orders also doe participate: i have ordained, that every battaile shall have v. rankes of pikes in the fronte, and the rest of targaettes, to bee able with the front, to withstande the horses, and to enter easely into the battaile of the enemies on foot, having in the firste fronte, or vawarde, pikes, as well as the enemie, the whiche shall suffice me to withstande them, the targaettes after to overcome theim. and if you note the vertue of this order, you shal se al these weapons, to doe fully their office, for that the pikes, bee profitable against the horses, and when thei come against the footemenne, thei dooe their office well, before the faight throng together, bicause so sone as thei presse together, thei become unprofitable: wherefore, the suizzers to avoide this inconvenience, put after everye three rankes of pikes, a ranke of halberdes, the whiche they do to make roome to the pikes, which is not yet so much as suffiseth. then putting our pikes afore, and the targaettes behinde, they come to withstande the horses, and in the beginning of the fight, they open the rayes, and molest the footemen: but when the fight is thrust together, and that they become unprofitable, the targaettes and swoords succeede, which may in every narowe place be handled. luigi. wee looke nowe with desire to understande, howe you would ordeyne the armie to fighte the fielde, with these weapons, and with these order. [sidenote: the nomber of men that was in a counsulles armie; how the romaines placed their legions in the field; how to order an armie in the fielde to fighte a battaile, according to the minde of the authour; how the extraordinary pikes bee placed in the set battaile; the place where thextraordinarie archars and harkebutters, and the men of armes and lighte horsmen ought to stande when the field is pitched, and goeth to faighte the battaile; the ordinarie archars and harkebutters are placed aboute their owne battailes; the place where the generall hedde of a maine battaile muste stande, when thesame power of men is appoincted to faight; what menne a general capitain of a maine battaile oughte to have aboute hym; the place wher a general capitain of all thearmie must stand when the battaile is ready to be fought and what nomber of chosen men oughte to be aboute hym; how many canons is requisite for an armie, and of what sise they ought to bee; where the artillerie ought to be placed when thearmie is reedie to fight; an armie that were ordered as above is declared, maie in fighting, use the grekes maner, and the roman fashion; to what purpose the spaces that be betwene every bande of men do serve.] fabricio. and i will not nowe shewe you other, then this: you have to understande, how that in an ordinarye romane armie, which they call a consull armie, there were no more, then twoo legions of romane citezens which were sixe hundred horse, and about aleven thousande footemen: they had besides as many more footemen and horsemen, whiche were sente them from their friends and confiderates, whome they divided into twoo partes, and called the one, the right horne and the other the left horne: nor they never permitted, that these aiding footemen, should passe the nomber of the footemen of their legions, they were well contented, that the nomber of those horse shoulde be more then theirs: with this armie, which was of xxii. thousand footemen, and about twoo thousande good horse, a consul executed all affaires, and went to all enterprises: yet when it was needefull to set against a greater force, twoo consulles joyned together with twoo armies. you ought also to note in especially, that in all the three principall actes, which an armie doth that is, to march, to incampe, and to fight, the romanes used to put their legions in the middeste, for that they woulde, that the same power, wherein they most trusted, shoulde bee moste united, as in the reasoning of these three actes, shall be shewed you: those aiding footemen, through the practise they had with the legion souldiours, were as profitable as they, because they were instructed, according as the souldiours of the legions were, and therefore, in like maner in pitching the field, they pitched. then he that knoweth how the romaines disposed a legion in their armie, to fight a field, knoweth how they disposed all: therefor, having tolde you how they devided a legion into three bandes, and how the one bande received the other, i have then told you, how al tharmie in a fielde, was ordained. wherefore, i minding to ordain a field like unto the romaines, as they had twoo legions, i will take ii. main batailes, and these being disposed, the disposicion of all an armie shalbe understode therby: bycause in joyning more men, there is no other to be doen, then to ingrosse the orders: i thinke i neede not to rehearse how many men a maine battaile hath, and howe it hath ten battailes, and what heades bee in a battaile and what weapons they have, and which be the ordinarie pikes and veliti, and which the extraordinarie for that a litle a fore i told you it destinctly, and i willed you to kepe it in memorie as a necessarie thing to purpose, to understande all the other orders: and therfore i will come to the demonstracion of the order without repeating it any more: me thinkes good, that the ten battailes of one main battaile be set on the left flanke, and the tenne other, of the other main battaile, on the right: these that are placed on the left flanke, be ordeined in this maner, there is put five battailes the one to the side of the other in the fronte, after suche sorte, that betweene the one and the other, there remaine a space of three yardes, whiche come to occupie for largenesse cvi. yardes, of ground, and for length thirtie: behinde these five battailes, i would put three other distante by right line from the firste thirtie yardes: twoo of the whiche, should come behinde by right line, to the uttermoste of the five, and the other should kepe the space in the middeste, and so these three, shall come to occupie for bredth and length, as moche space, as the five doeth. but where the five have betwene the one, and the other, a distaunce of three yardes, these shall have a distance of xxv. yardes. after these, i would place the twoo last battailes, in like maner behinde the three by right line, and distaunte from those three, thirtie yardes, and i would place eche of theim, behinde the uttermoste part of the three, so that the space, whiche should remain betwen the one and the other, should be lxviii. yardes: then al these battailes thus ordered, will take in bredth cvi. yardes, and in length cl. thextraordinarie pikes, i would deffende a long the flanckes of these battailes, on the left side, distante from them fiftene yardes, makyng cxliij. rankes, seven to a ranke, after soche sorte, that thei maie impale with their length, all the left sixe of the tenne battailes in thesame wise, declared of me to be ordained: and there shall remain fourtie rankes to keepe the carriages, and the unarmed, whiche ought to remaine in the taile of the armie, distributyng the peticapitaines, and the centurions, in their places: and of the three conestables, i would place one in the hedde, the other in the middeste, the third in the laste ranke, the whiche should execute the office of a tergiductore, whom the antiquitie so called hym, that was appoincted to the backe of the armie. but retournyng to the hedde of the armie, i saie how that i would place nere to the extraordinarie pikes, the veliti extraordinarie, whiche you knowe to be five hundred, and i would give them a space of xxx. yardes: on the side of these likewise on the left hande, i would place the menne of armes, and i would thei should have a space of a cxii. yardes: after these, the light horsemen, to whom i would appoinct as moche ground to stande in, as the menne of armes have: the ordinarie veliti, i would leave about their owne battailes, who should stand in those spaces, whiche i appoincte betwene thone battaile and thother: whom should be as their ministers, if sometyme i thought not good to place them under the extraordinarie pikes: in dooyng or not doyng whereof, i would proceade, accordyng as should tourne best to my purpose. the generall hedde of all the maine battaile, i would place in thesame space, that were betwene the first and the seconde order of the battailes, or els in the hedde, and in thesame space, that is betwene the laste battaile of the firste five, and the extraordinarie pikes, accordyng as beste should serve my purpose, with thirtie or fourtie chosen men about hym, that knewe by prudence, how to execute a commission, and by force, to withstande a violence, and thei to be also betwen the drumme and the ansigne: this is thorder, with the whiche i would dispose a maine battaile, whiche should bee the disposyng of halfe the armie, and it should take in breadth three hundred fourscore and twoo yardes, and in length as moche as above is saied, not accomptyng the space, that thesame parte of the extraordinarie pikes will take, whiche muste make a defence for the unarmed, whiche will bee aboute lxxv. yardes: the other maine battaile, i would dispose on the righte side, after the same maner juste, as i have disposed that on the lefte, leavyng betwene the one main battaile, and thother, a space of xxii. yardes: in the hedde of whiche space, i would set some little carriages of artillerie, behynde the whiche, should stande the generall capitaine of all the armie, and should have about hym with the trumpet, and with the capitaine standerde, twoo hundred menne at least, chosen to be on foote the moste parte, emongest whiche there should be tenne or more, mete to execute all commaundementes, and should bee in soche wise a horsebacke, and armed, that thei mighte bee on horsebacke, and on foote, accordyng as neede should require. the artillerie of the armie, suffiseth ten cannons, for the winning of townes, whose shotte shoulde not passe fiftie pounde: the whiche in the fielde should serve mee more for defence of the campe, then for to fight the battaile: the other artillerie, should bee rather of ten, then of fifteene pounde the shotte: this i would place afore on the front of all the armie, if sometime the countrie should not stande in such wise, that i mighte place it by the flancke in a sure place, where it mighte not of the enemie be in daunger: this fashion of an armie thus ordered, may in fighting, use the order of the falangi, and the order of the romane legions: for that in the fronte, bee pikes, all the men bee set in the rankes, after such sorte, that incountering with the enemie, and withstanding him, maye after the use of the falangi, restore the firste ranckes, with those behinde: on the other parte, if they be charged so sore, that they be constrayned to breake the orders, and to retire themselves, they maye enter into the voide places of the seconde battailes, which they have behinde them, and unite their selves with them, and making a new force, withstande the enemie, and overcome him: and when this sufficeth not, they may in the verie same maner, retire them selves the seconde time, and the third fight: so that in this order, concerning to fight, there is to renue them selves, both according to the greeke maner, and according to the romane: concerning the strength of the armie, there cannot be ordayned a more stronger: for as much, as the one and the other borne therof, is exceedingly well replenished, both with heades, and weapons, nor there remayneth weake, other then the part behinde of the unarmed, and the same also, hath the flanckes impaled with the extraordinarie pikes: nor the enemie can not of anye parte assaulte it, where he shall not finde it well appointed, and the hinder parte can not be assaulted: because there can not bee an enemie, that hath so much puissaunce, whome equallye maye assault thee on everye side: for that hee having so great a power, thou oughtest not then to matche thy selfe in the fielde with him: but when he were three times more then thou, and as well appointed as thou, hee doth weaken him selfe in assaulting thee in divers places, one part that thou breakest, will cause all the reste go to naughte: concerning horses, although he chaunce to have more then thine, thou needest not feare: for that the orders of the pikes, which impale thee, defende thee from all violence of them, although thy horses were repulced. the heades besides this, be disposed in such place, that they may easyly commaunde, and obeye: the spaces that bee between the one battaile, and the other, and betweene the one order, and the other, not onely serve to be able to receyve the one the other, but also to give place to the messengers, whiche should go and come by order of the capitayne. and as i tolde you firste, howe the romanes had for an armie, aboute foure and twentie thousande men, even so this oughte to bee: and as the other souldiours tooke ensample of the legions, for the maner of fighting, and the fashion of the armie, so those souldiours, whiche you shoulde joyne to oure twoo mayne battailes, oughte to take the forme and order of them: whereof having put you an ensample, it is an easye matter to imitate it, for that increasing, either twoo other mayne battailes unto the armie, or as many other souldiours, as they bee, there is no other to bee done, then to double the orders, and where was put tenne battailes on the lefte parte, to put twentie, either ingrossing, or distending the orders, according as the place, or the enemie shoulde compell thee. luigi. surelye sir i imagine in suche wise of this armie, that mee thinkes i nowe see it, and i burne with a desire to see it incounter, and i woulde for nothing in the worlde, that you shoulde become fabius maximus intendyng to kepe the enemie at a baie, and to deferre the daie of battaile: bicause i would saie worse of you, then the romain people saied of hym. [sidenote: the descripcion of a battaile that is a faightyng.] fabricio. doubt not: doe you not heare the artillerie? ours have alredie shotte, but little hurte the enemie: and thextraordinarie veliti, issuyng out of their places together with the light horsemen, moste speadely, and with moste merveilous furie, and greateste crie that maie be, thei assaulte the enemie: whose artillerie hath discharged ones, and hath passed over the heddes of our footemen, without doyng them any hurt, and bicause it cannot shoote the seconde tyme, the veliti, and our horsemen, have nowe gotten it, and the enemies for to defende it, are come fore warde, so that neither our ordinaunce, nor thenemies, can any more doe their office. se with how moche vertue, strengthe and agilitie our men faighteth, and with how moche knowledge through the exercise, whiche hath made them to abide, and by the confidence, that thei have in the armie, the whiche, see, how with the pace therof, and with the men of armes on the sides, it marcheth in good order, to give the charge on the adversarie: see our artillerie, whiche to give theim place, and to leave them the space free, is retired by thesame space, from whens the veliti issued: see how the capitaine incourageth them, sheweth them the victorie certain: see how the veliti and light horsemen bee inlarged, and retourned on the flanckes of tharmie, to seke and view, if thei maie by the flanck, doe any injurie to the adversaries: behold how the armies be affronted. se with how moche valiauntnesse thei have withstode the violence of thenemies, and with how moche silence, and how the capitain commaundeth the menne of armes, that thei sustain, and not charge, and that thei breake not from the order of the footemen: see how our light horsemen be gone, to give the charge on a band of the enemies harkebutters, whiche would have hurt our men by flancke, and how the enemies horse have succoured them, so that tourned betwene the one and the other horse, thei cannot shoote, but are faine to retire behinde their owne battaile: see with what furie our pikes doe also affront, and how the footemen be now so nere together the one to the other, that the pikes can no more be occupied: so that according to the knowlege learned of us, our pikes do retire a little and a little betwen the targaettes. se how in this while a great bande of men of armes of the enemies, have charged our men of armes on the lefte side, and how ours, accordyng to knowlege, bee retired under the extraordinarie pikes, and with the help of those, giving again a freshe charge, have repulced the adversaries, and slain a good part of them: in so moche, that thordinarie pikes of the first battailes, be hidden betwene the raies of the targaettes, thei havyng lefte the faight to the targaet men: whom you maie see, with how moche vertue, securitie, and leasure, thei kill the enemie: see you not how moche by faightyng, the orders be thrust together? that thei can scarse welde their sweardes? behold with how moche furie the enemies move: bicause beyng armed with the pike, and with the swerd unprofitable (the one for beyng to long, the other for findyng thenemie to well armed) in part thei fall hurt or dedde, in parte thei flie. see, thei flie on the righte corner, thei flie also on the lefte: behold, the victorie is ours. have not we wonne a field moste happely? but with more happinesse it should bee wonne, if it were graunted me to put it in acte. and see, how there neded not the helpe of the seconde, nor of the third order, for our first fronte hath sufficed to overcome theim: in this part, i have no other to saie unto you, then to resolve if any doubt be growen you. [sidenote: questions concerning the shotyng of ordinaunce.] luigi. you have with so moche furie wonne this fielde that i so moche mervaile and am so astonied, that i beleve that i am not able to expresse, if any doubt remain in my mynde: yet trustyng in your prudence, i will be so bolde to tell thesame that i understande. tell me firste, why made you not your ordinaunce to shoote more then ones? and why straighte waie you made them to retire into tharmie, nor after made no mension of them? me thought also, that you leveled the artillerie of the enemie high, and appoincted it after your own devise: the whiche might very well bee, yet when it should happen, as i beleve it chaunseth often, that thei strike the rankes, what reamedie have you? and seyng that i have begun of the artillerie, i will finishe all this question, to the intente i nede not to reason therof any more. i have heard many dispraise the armours, and the orders of the aunciente armies, arguyng, how now a daies, thei can doe little, but rather should bee altogether unprofitable, havyng respecte to the furie of the artillerie: bicause, this breaketh the orders, and passeth the armours in soche wise, that it semeth unto them a foolishenesse to make an order, whiche cannot bee kepte, and to take pain to beare a harneis, that cannot defende a man. [sidenote: an aunswere to the questions that were demaunded, concernyng the shoting of ordinaunce; the best remedie to avoide the hurte that the enemie in the fielde maie doe with his ordinaunce; a policie against bowes and dartes; nothyng causeth greater confusion in an armie, than to hinder mennes fightes; nothing more blindeth the sight of men in an armie, then the smoke of ordinaunce; a policie to trouble the enemies sight; the shotte of greate ordinaunce in the fielde, is not moche to bee feared of fotemenne; bicause menne of armes stand closer together then light horsmen, thei ought to remaine behinde the armie till the enemies ordinaunce have done shootyng; the artillerie is no let, why the auncient orders of warfar ought not to be used in these daies.] fabricio. this question of yours (bicause it hath many heddes) hath neede of a long aunswere. it is true, that i made not thartillery to shoote more than ones, and also of thesame ones, i stoode in doubte: the occasion was, for asmoche as it importeth more, for one to take hede not to be striken, then it importeth to strike the enemie. you have to understande, that to purpose that a pece of ordinaunce hurte you not, it is necessarie either to stande where it cannot reche you, or to get behinde a wall, or behinde a banke: other thing there is not that can witholde it: and it is nedefull also, that the one and the other be moste strong. those capitaines whiche come to faight a field, cannot stand behind a wal, or behind bankes, nor where thei maie not be reached: therfore it is mete for them, seyng thei cannot finde a waie to defende them, to finde some mean, by the whiche thei maie be least hurte: nor thei cannot finde any other waie, then to prevente it quickly: the waie to prevent it, is to go to finde it out of hande, and hastely, not at leasure and in a heape: for that through spede, the blowe is not suffered to bee redoubled, and by the thinnesse, lesse nomber of menne maie be hurt. this, a bande of menne ordered, cannot dooe; bicause if thesame marche hastely, it goweth out of order: if it go scattered, the enemie shall have no paine to breake it, for that it breaketh by it self: and therfore, i ordered the armie after soche sorte, that it might dooe the one thyng and the other: for as moche as havyng set in the corners thereof, a thousande veliti, i appoincted that after that our ordinaunce had shotte, thei should issue out together with the light horsemen, to get the enemies artillerie: and therfore, i made not my ordinance to shoote again, to the intente, to give no tyme to the enemie to shoote: bicause space could not be given to me, and taken from other men, and for thesame occasion, where i made my ordinaunce not to shoote the seconde tyme, was for that i would not have suffered the enemie to have shot at al, if i had could: seyng that to mynde that the enemies artillerie be unprofitable, there is no other remedie, but to assaulte it spedely: for as moche as if the enemies forsake it, thou takeste it, if thei will defende it, it is requisite that thei leave it behind, so that being possessed of enemies, and of frendes, it cannot shoote. i would beleve, that with out insamples these reasons should suffice you, yet beyng able to shewe olde ensamples, to prove my saiynges true, i will. ventidio commyng to faight a field with the parthians, whose strength for the moste part, consisted in bowes and arrowes, he suffered theim almoste to come harde to his campe, before he drewe out his armie, the whiche onely he did, to be able quickly to prevent them: and not to give them space to shoote. cesar when he was in fraunce, maketh mencion, that in faighting a battaile with the enemies, he was with so moche furie assaulted of them, that his menne had no time to whorle their dartes, accordyng to the custome of the romaines: wherfore it is seen, that to intende, that a thyng that shooteth farre of, beyng in the field, doe not hurte thee, there is no other remedy, then with as moche celeritie as maie bee, to prevente it. an other cause moved me to procede, without shotyng the ordinaunce, whereat peradventure you will laugh: yet i judge not that it is to be dispraised. ther is nothyng that causeth greater confusion in an armie, then to hinder mennes fightes: whereby many moste puisaunte armies have been broken, by meanes their fighte hath been letted, either with duste, or with the sunne: yet there is nothyng, that more letteth the sight then the smoke that the artillerie maketh in shotyng: therfore, i would thinke that it wer more wisedome, to suffer the enemie to blinde hymself, then to purpose (thou being blind) to go to finde hym: for this cause, either i would not shote, or (for that this should not be proved, considering the reputacion that the artillerie hath) i would place it on the corners of the armie, so that shootyng, it should not with the smoke thereof, blinde the front of thesame, whiche is the importaunce of my men. and to prove that it is a profitable thyng, to let the sight of the enemie, there maie be brought for insample epaminondas, whom to blind the enemies armie, whiche came to faight with hym, he caused his light horsemen, to run before the fronte of the enemies, to raise up the duste, and to lette their sight, whereby he gotte the victorie. and where it semeth unto you, that i have guided the shot of the artillerie, after my owne devise, making it to passe over the heddes of my men, i answer you, that most often tymes, and without comparison, the greate ordinaunce misse the footemen, moche soner than hitte theim: for that the footemen are so lowe, and those so difficult to shoote; that every little that thou raisest theim, thei passe over the heddes of men: and if thei be leveled never so little to lowe, thei strike in the yearth, and the blowe cometh not to theim: also the unevenesse of the grounde saveth them, for that every little hillocke, or high place that is, betwene the men and thordinance, letteth the shot therof. and concernyng horsmen, and in especially men of armes, bicause thei ought to stand more close together, then the light horsemen, and for that thei are moche higher, maie the better be stroken, thei maie, untill the artillerie have shotte, be kepte in the taile of the armie. true it is, that the harkebutters doe moche more hurt, and the field peces, then the greate ordinance, for the whiche, the greatest remedy is, to come to hande strokes quickly: and if in the firste assaulte, there be slaine some, alwaies there shall bee slaine: but a good capitaine, and a good armie, ought not to make a coumpte of a hurte, that is particulare, but of a generall, and to imitate the suizzers, whom never eschue to faight, beyng made afraied of the artillerie: but rather punishe with death those, whiche for feare thereof, either should go out of the ranke, or should make with his body any signe of feare. i made them (so sone as thei had shotte) to bee retired into the armie, that thei might leave the waie free for the battaile: i made no more mencion of theim, as of a thyng unprofitable, the faight beyng begun. you have also saied, that consideryng the violence of this instrument, many judge the armours, and the auncient orders to be to no purpose, and it semeth by this your talke, that men now a daies, have founde orders and armours, whiche are able to defend them against the artillerie: if you knowe this, i would bee glad that you would teache it me: for that hetherto, i never sawe any, nor i beleve that there can any be founde: so that i would understande of soche men, for what cause the souldiours on foote in these daies, weare the breastplate, or the corselet of steele, and thei on horsebacke go all armed: bicause seyng that thei blame the aunciente armyng of men as unprofitable, considryng the artillery, thei ought to despise also this? i would understande moreover, for what occasion the suizzers, like unto the auncient orders, make a battaile close together of sixe, or eight thousande menne, and for what occasion all other have imitated theim, this order bearyng the verie same perill, concernyng the artillerie, that those other should beare, whiche should imitate the antiquitie. i beleve thei should not knowe what to answere: but if you should aske soche souldiours, as had some judgement, thei would aunswere first, that thei go armed, for that though thesame armoure defende theim not from the artillerie: it defendeth them from crossebowes, from pikes, from sweardes, from stones, and from all other hurt, that commeth from the enemies, thei would answere also, that thei went close together, like the suizzers, to be able more easely to overthrow the footemen, to be able to withstand better the horse and to give more difficultie to the enemie to breake them: so that it is seen, that the souldiours have to fear, many other thynges besides the ordinance: from which thynges, with the armours, and with the orders, thei are defended: whereof foloweth, that the better that an armie is armed, and the closer that it hath the orders, and stronger, so moche the surer it is: so that he that is of thesame opinion, that you saie, it behoveth either that he bee of smalle wisedome, or that in this thyng, he hath studied verie little: for as moche as if we see, that so little a parte of the aunciente maner of armyng, whiche is used now a daies, that is the pike, and so little a parte of those orders, as are the maine battailes of the suizzers, dooe us so moche good, and cause our armies to bee so strong, why ought not we to beleve, that the other armours, and thother orders whiche are lefte, be profitable? seyng that if we have no regard to the artillerie, in puttyng our selves close together, as the suizzers, what other orders maie make us more to feare thesame? for as moche as no order can cause us so moche to feare thesame, as those, whiche bryng men together. besides this, if the artillerie of the enemies should not make me afraied, in besiegyng a toune, where it hurteth me with more safegarde, beyng defended of a wall, i beyng not able to prevente it, but onely with tyme, with my artillerie to lette it, after soche sorte that it maie double the blowe as it liste, why should i feare thesame in the field, where i maie quickly prevent it? so that i conclude thus, that the artillerie, according to my opinion, doeth not let, that the aunciente maners cannot be used, and to shewe the auncient vertue: and if i had not talked alreadie with you of this instrument, i would of thesame, declare unto you more at length: but i will remit my self to that, whiche then i saied. luigi. wee maie now understande verie well, how moche you have aboute the artillerie discoursed: and in conclusion, my thinkes you have shewed, that the preventyng it quickly, is the greatest remedie, that maie be had for thesame, beyng in the fielde, and havyng an armie againste you. upon the whiche there groweth in me a doubte: bicause me thinkes, that the enemie might place his ordinaunce in soche wise, in his armie, that it should hurt you, and should be after soche sort garded of the footemen, that it could not be prevented. you have (if you remember your self well) in the orderyng of your armie to faight, made distaunces of three yardes, betwene the one battaile and the other, makyng those distaunces fiftene, whiche is from the battailes, to thextraordinarie pikes: if thenemie, shuld order his armie like unto yours, and should putte the artillerie a good waie within those spaces, i beleve that from thens, it should hurte you with their moste greate safegard: bicause menne can not enter into the force of their enemies to prevent it. [sidenote: a generall rule againste soche thynges as cannot bee withstoode.] fabricio. you doubt moste prudently, and i will devise with my self, either to resolve you the doubte, or shewe you the remedie: i have tolde you, that continually these battailes, either through goyng, or thorowe faightyng, are movyng, and alwaies naturally, thei come to drawe harde together, so that if you make the distaunces of a small breadth, where you set the artillerie, in a little tyme thei be shootte up, after soche sort, that the artillerie cannot any more shoote: if you make theim large, to avoide this perill, you incurre into a greater, where you through those distances, not onely give commoditie to the enemie, to take from you the artillerie, but to breake you: but you have to understande, that it is impossible to keepe the artillerie betwene the bandes, and in especially those whiche go on carriages: for that the artillerie goeth one waie, and shooteth an other waie: so that havyng to go and to shoote, it is necessary, before thei shote, that thei tourne, and for to tourne theim, thei will have so moche space, that fiftie cartes of artillerie, would disorder any armie: therfore, it is mete to kepe them out of the bandes, where thei may be overcome in the maner, as a little afore we have shewed: but admit thei might be kept, and that there might be found a waie betwen bothe, and of soche condicion, that the presyng together of men should not hinder the artillerie, and were not so open that it should give waie to the enemie, i saie, that it is remedied moste easely, with makyng distances in thy armie against it, whiche maie give free passage to the shot of those, and so the violence thereof shall come to be vain, the which maie be doen moste easely: for asmoche, as the enemie mindyng to have his artillerie stand safe, it behoveth that he put them behinde, in the furthest part of the distances, so that the shot of the same, he purposyng that thei hurt not his owne men, ought to passe by right line, and by that very same alwaies: and therefore with givyng theim place, easely thei maie bee avoided: for that this is a generall rule, that to those thynges, whiche cannot be withstoode, there must bee given waie, as the antiquitie made to the eliphantes, and to the carres full of hookes. i beleve, ye, i am more then certaine, that it semeth unto you, that i have ordered and wonne a battaile after my own maner: notwithstanding, i answeer unto you this, when so moche as i have saied hetherto, should not suffice, that it should be impossible, that an armie thus ordered, and armed, should not overcome at the first incounter, any other armie that should bee ordained, as thei order the armies now adaies, whom most often tymes, make not but one front, havyng no targaettes, and are in soche wise unarmed, that thei cannot defende themselves from the enemie at hand, and thei order theim after soche sorte, that if thei set their battailes by flanck, the one to the other, thei make the armie thinne: if thei put the one behind the other, havyng no waie to receive the one the other, thei doe it confusedly, and apt to be easly troubled: and although thei give three names to their armies, and devide them into thre companies, vaward, battaile, and rereward, notwithstandyng it serveth to no other purpose, then to marche, and to distinguis the lodgynges: but in the daie of battaile, thei binde them all to the first brunte, and to the first fortune. luigi. i have noted also in the faightyng of your fielde, how your horsemen were repulced of the enemies horsemen: for whiche cause thei retired to the extraordinaire pikes: whereby grewe, that with the aide of theim, thei withstode, and drave the enemies backe? i beleve that the pikes maie withstande the horses, as you saie, but in a grosse and thicke maine battaile, as the suizzers make: but you in your army, have for the hedde five rankes of pikes, and for the flancke seven, so that i cannot tell how thei maie bee able to withstande them. [sidenote: a battaile how greate so ever it bee, cannot atones occupy above v. rankes of pikes.] fabricio. yet i have told you, how sixe rankes of pikes wer occupied at ones, in the macedonicall falangi, albeit you ought to understande, that a maine battaile of suizzers, if it were made of a thousande rankes, it cannot occupie more then fower, or at the most five: bicause the pikes be sixe yardes and three quarters longe, one yarde and halfe a quarter, is occupied of the handes, wherefore to the firste ranke, there remaineth free five yardes and a half, and a halfe quarter of pike: the seconde ranke besides that whiche is occupied with the hande, consumeth a yarde and half a quarter in the space, whiche remaineth betwene the one ranke and thother: so that there is not left of pike profitable, more then fower yardes and a halfe: to the thirde ranke, by this verie same reason, there remaineth three yardes and a quarter and a halfe: to the fowerth, twoo yardes and a quarter: to the fift one yard and halfe a quarter: the other rankes, for to hurte, be unprofitable, but thei serve to restore these firste rankes, as we have declared, and to bee a fortificacion to those v. then if five of their rankes can withstande the horse, why cannot five of ours withstande theim? to the whiche also there lacketh not rankes behinde, that doeth sustain and make them the very same staie, although thei have no pikes as the other. and when the rankes of thextraordinarie pikes, which are placed on the flanckes, should seme unto you thinne, thei maie bee brought into a quadrante, and put on the flancke nere the twoo battailes, whiche i set in the laste companie of the armie: from the whiche place, thei maie easely altogether succour the fronte, and the backe of the armie, and minister helpe to the horses, accordyng as nede shall require. luigi. would you alwaies use this forme of order, when you would pitche a fielde. [sidenote: an advertiement concernyng the pitchying of a field.] fabricio. no in no wise: for that you ought to varie the facion of the armie, according to the qualitie of the situacion, and the condicion and quantitie of the enemie, as before this reasonyng dooe ende, shall bee shewed certaine insamples: but this forme is given unto you, not so moche as moste strongeste of all, where in deede it is verie strong, as to the intente that thereby you maie take a rule, and an order to learne to knowe the waies to ordeine the other: for as moche, as every science hath his generalitie, upon the whiche a good part of it is grounded. one thing onely i advise you, that you never order an armie, after soche sorte, that those that faight afore, cannot bee sucoured of theim, whiche be set behind: bicause he that committeth this errour, maketh the greateste parte of his armie to bee unprofitable, and if it incounter any strength, it cannot overcome. luigi. there is growen in me, upon this parte a doubte. i have seen that in the placyng of the battailes, you make the fronte of five on a side, the middeste of three, and the last partes of twoo, and i beleve, that it were better to ordain them contrariwise: for that i thinke, that an armie should with more difficultie bee broken, when he that should charge upon it, the more that he should entre into the-same, so moche the stronger he should finde it: and the order devised of you, me thinkes maketh, that the more it is entered into, so moche the weaker it is founde. [sidenote: how the front of the armie ought to bee made; how the middell part of the armie ought to be ordered.] fabricio. if you should remember how to the triarii, whom were the thirde order of the romain legions, there were not assigned more then sixe hundred men, you would doubt lesse, havyng understode how thei were placed in the laste companie: for that you should see, how i moved of this insample, have placed in the last companie twoo battailes, whiche are nine hundred men, so that i come rather (folowyng the insample of the romaine people) to erre, for havyng taken to many, then to fewe: and although this insample should suffice, i will tell you the reason, the which is this. the first fronte of the armie, is made perfectly whole and thicke, bicause it must withstande the brunt of the enemies, and it hath not to receive in it any of their felowes: and for this, it is fitte that it bee full of menne: bicause a fewe menne, should make it weake, either thinnesse, or for lacke of sufficiente nomber: but the seconde companie, for as moche as it must first receive their frendes, to sustain the enemie, it is mete that it have greate spaces, and for this it behoveth, that it be of lesse nomber then the first: for that if it wer of greater nomber, or equall, it should bee conveniente, either not to leave the distaunces, the whiche should be disorder, or leavyng theim, to passe the boundes of thoseafore, the whiche should make the facion of the armie unperfecte: and it is not true that you saie, that the enemie, the more that he entereth into the maine battaile, so moche the weaker he findeth it: for that the enemie, can never faight with the seconde order, except the first be joined with thesame: so that he cometh to finde the middest of the maine battaile more stronger, and not more weaker, havyng to faight with the first, and with the seconde order altogether: the verie same happeneth, when the enemie should come to the thirde companie: for that there, not with twoo battailes, whiche is founde freshe, but with all the maine battaile he must faight: and for that this last part hath to receive moste men, the spaces therof is requisite to be greatest, and that whiche receiveth them, to be the leste nomber. [sidenote: the orderyng of the hinder part of tharmy.] luigi. it pleaseth me thesame that you have told: but answere me also this: if the five first battailes doe retire betwene the three seconde battailes, and after the eight betwene the twoo thirde, it semeth not possible, that the eight beyng brought together, and then the tenne together, maie bee received when thei bee eight, or when thei be tenne in the verie same space, whiche received the five. [sidenote: the retire of the pikes, to place the targaet men.] fabricio. the first thyng that i aunswere is, that it is not the verie same space: for that the five have fower spaces in the middeste, whiche retiryng betwene the thre, or betwene the twoo, thei occupie: then there remaineth thesame space, that is betwene the one maine battaile and other and thesame that is, betwene the battailes, and the extraordinarie pikes, al the whiche spaces makes largenesse: besides this, it is to bee considered, that the battailes kepe other maner of spaces, when thei bee in the orders without beyng altered, then when thei be altered: for that in the alteracion: either thei throng together, or thei inlarge the orders: thei inlarge theim, when thei feare so moche, that thei fall to fliyng, thei thrust them together, when thei feare in soche wise, that thei seke to save them selves, not with runnyng a waie, but with defence: so that in this case, thei should come to be destingueshed, and not to be inlarged. moreover, the five rankes of the pikes, that are before, so sone as thei have begun the faighte, thei ought betwene their battailes to retire, into the taile of the armie, for to give place to the targaet men, that thei maie faighte: and thei goyng into the taile of the armie, maie dooe soche service as the capitain should judge, were good to occupie theim aboute, where in the forward, the faight beyng mingled, thei should otherwise bee altogether unprofitable. and for this the spaces ordained, come to bee for the remnaunte of the menne, wide inough to receive them: yet when these spaces should not suffice, the flankes on the sides be men, and not walles, whom givyng place, and inlargyng them selves, maie make the space to containe so moche, that it maie bee sufficient to receive theim. [sidenote: how the pikes that are placed on the flankes of the armie ought to governe them selves when the rest of the armie is driven to retire.] luigi. the rankes of the extraordinarie pikes, whiche you place on the flanckes of the armie, when the first battailes retire into the second, will you have them to stande still, and remain with twoo homes to the armie? or will you that thei also retire together, with the battailes? the whiche when thei should do, i see not how thei can, havyng no battailes behinde with distaunces that maie receive them. [sidenote: thexercise of the army in generall; the nomber that is mete to be written in the ansigne of every band of men; the degrees of honours in an armie, whiche soche a man ought to rise by, as should bee made a generall capitain.] fabricio. if the enemie overcome theim not, when he inforceth the battailes to retire, thei maie stande still in their order, and hurte the enemie on the flanck, after that the firste battailes retired: but if he should also overcome theim, as semeth reason, beyng so puisaunte, that he is able to repulce the other, thei also ought to retire: whiche thei maie dooe excellently well, although thei have not behinde, any to receive them: bicause from the middest thei maie redouble by right line, entring the one ranke into the other, in the maner whereof wee reasoned, when it was spoken of the order of redoublyng: true it is, that to mynde redoublyng to retire backe, it behoveth to take an other waie, then thesame that i shewed you: for that i told you, that the second ranke, ought to enter into the first, the fowerth into the thirde, and so foorth: in this case, thei ought not to begin before, but behinde, so that redoublyng the rankes, thei maie come to retire backewarde not to tourne forward: but to aunswere to all thesame, that upon this foughten field by me shewed, might of you bee replied. i saie unto you again, that i have ordained you this armie, and shewed this foughten field for two causes, thone, for to declare unto you how it is ordered, the other to shewe you how it is exercised: thorder, i beleve you understande moste well: and concernyng the exersice, i saie unto you, that thei ought to be put together in this forme, as often times as maie be: for as moche as the heddes learne therby, to kepe their battailes in these orders: for that to particulare souldiours, it appertaineth to keepe well the orders of every battaile, to the heddes of the battailes, it appertaineth to keepe theim well in every order of the armie, and that thei knowe how to obeie, at the commaundement of the generall capitain: therefore, it is conveniente that thei knowe, how to joyne the one battaile with thother, that thei maie knowe how to take their place atones: and for this cause it is mete that thansigne of every battaile, have written in some evident part, the nomber therof: as well for to be able to commaunde them, as also for that the capitain, and the souldiours by thesame nomber, maie more easely knowe theim againe: also the maine battailes, ought to be nombred, and to have the nomber in their principal ansigne: therefore it is requisite, to knowe of what nomber the maine battaile shall be, that is placed on the left, or on the right horne of what nombers the battailes bee, that are set in the fronte, and in the middeste, and so foorthe of the other. the antiquitie would also, that these nombers should bee steppes to degrees, of honors of the armies: as for insample, the first degree, is the peticapitain, the seconde, the hedde of fiftie ordinarie veliti, the thirde, the centurion, the fowerth, the hedde of the first battaile, the fifte, of the second, the sixt, of the thirde, and so forthe, even to the tenth battaile, the whiche must be honoured in the seconde place, nexte the generall capitaine of a maine battaile: nor any ought to come to thesame hedde, if first, he have not risen up by all these degrees. and bicause besides these heddes, there be the three conestables of the extraordinarie pikes, and twoo of the extraordinarie veliti, i would that thei should be in the same degree of the conestable of the first battaile: nor i would not care, that there were sixe men of like degree, to thintent, that every one of them might strive, who should doe beste, for to be promised to be hedde of the seconde battaile. then every one of these heddes, knowyng in what place his battaile ought to be sette in, of necessitie it must folowe, that at a sounde of the trompette, so sone as the hedde standarde shall bee erected, all the armie shall be in their places: and this is the first exercise, whereunto an armie ought to bee accustomed, that is to set theim quickly together: and to doe this, it is requisite every daie, and divers times in one daie, to set them in order, and to disorder them. luigi. what armes would you that thansignes of all the armie, shoul'd have beside the nomber? [sidenote: the armes that oughte to bee in the standarde, and in the ansignes of an armie; the second and thirde exercise of an armie; the fowerth exercise of an armie; the soundes of the instrumentes of musicke, that the antiquitie used in their armies; what is signified by the sounde of the trompet.] fabricio. the standarde of the generall capitaine oughte to have the armes of the prince of the armie, all the other, maie have the verie same armes, and to varie with the fieldes, or to varie with the armes, as should seme beste to the lorde of the armie: bicause this importeth little, so that the effect growe, that thei be knowen the one from the other. but let us passe to the other exercise: the which is to make them to move, and with a convenient pace to marche, and to se, that marehyng thei kepe the orders. the third exercise is, that thei learne to handle themselves in thesame maner, whiche thei ought after to handle theimselves in the daie of battaile, to cause the artillerie to shoote, and to bee drawen out of the waie, to make the extraordinarie veliti to issue out, after a likenes of an assault, to retire theim: to make that the firste battailes, as though thei wer sore charged, retire into the spaces of the second: and after, all into the thirde, and from thens every one to retourne to his place: and in soche wise to use theim in this exercise, that to every manne, all thyng maie be knowen, and familiar: the which with practise, and with familiaritie, is brought to passe moste quickly. the fowerth exercise is, that thei learne to knowe by meane of the sounde, and of the ansigne, the commaundemente of their capitaine: for as moche as that, whiche shall be to them pronounced by voice, thei without other commaundemente, maie understande: and bicause the importaunce of this commaundement, ought to growe of the sounde, i shall tell you what soundes the antiquitie used. of the lacedemonians, accordyng as tucidido affirmeth, in their armies were used flutes: for that thei judged, that this armonie, was moste mete to make their armie to procede with gravetie, and with furie: the carthaginens beyng moved by this verie same reason, in the first assaulte, used the violone. aliatte kyng of the lidians, used in the warre the violone, and the flutes: but alexander magnus, and the romaines, used hornes, and trumpettes, as thei, that thought by vertue of soche instrumentes, to bee able to incourage more the myndes of souldiours, and make theim to faight the more lustely: but as we have in armyng the armie, taken of the greke maner, and of the romaine, so in distrihutyng the soundes, we will keepe the customes of the one, and of the other nacion: therefore, nere the generall capitain, i would make the trompettes to stand, as a sounde not onely apt to inflame the armie, but apte to bee heard in all the whole tumoult more, then any other sounde: all the other soundes, whiche should bee aboute the conestables, and the heddes of maine battailes i would, that thei should bee smalle drummes, and flutes, sounded not as thei sounde theim now but as thei use to sounde theim at feastes. the capitaine then with the trompet, should shewe when thei must stande still, and go forward, or tourne backward, when the artillerie must shoote, when the extraordinarie veliti must move, and with the varietie or distinccion of soche soundes, to shewe unto the armie all those mocions, whiche generally maie bee shewed, the whiche trompettes, should bee after followed of the drummes, and in this exercise, bicause it importeth moche, it behoveth moche to exercise the armie. concernyng the horsemen, there would be used likewise trompettes, but of a lesse sounde, and of a divers voice from those of the capitaine. this is as moche as is come into my remembraunce, aboute the order of the armie, and of the exercise of thesame. luigi. i praie you let it not be grevous unto you to declare unto me an other thyng, that is, for what cause you made the light horsmen, and the extraordinarie veliti, to goe with cries, rumours, and furie, when thei gave the charge? and after in the incountering of the rest of tharmie, you shewed, that the thing folowed with a moste greate scilence? and for that i understande not the occasion of this varietie, i would desire that you would declare it unto me. [sidenote: the cries, and rumours, wher with the firste charge is given unto the enemies, and the silence that ought to bee used after, when the faight is ones begunne.] fabricio. the opinion of auncient capitaines, hath been divers about the commyng to handes, whether thei ought with rumour to go a pace, or with scilence to go faire and softely: this laste waie, serveth to kepe the order more sure, and to understande better the commaundementes of the capitaine: the firste, serveth to incourage more the mindes of men: and for that i beleve, that respecte ought to bee had to the one, and to the other of these twoo thynges, i made the one goe with rumour, and thother with scilence: nor me thinkes not in any wise, that the continuall rumours bee to purpose: bicause thei lette the commaundementes, the whiche is a thyng moste pernicious: nor it standeth not with reason, that the romaines used, except at the firste assaulte to make rumour: for that in their histories, is seen many tymes to have happened, that through the wordes, and comfortinges of the capitain the souldiours that ranne awaie, were made to stande to it, and in sundrie wise by his commaundemente, to have varied the orders, the whiche should not have followed, if the rumoures had been louder then his voyce. the fowerth booke luigi. seng that under my governement, a field hath been wonne so honourably, i suppose that it is good, that i tempt not fortune any more, knowyng how variable, and unstable she is: and therefore, i desire to give up my governement, and that zanobi do execute now this office of demaundyng, mindyng to followe the order, whiche concerneth the youngeste: and i knowe he will not refuse this honoure, or as we would saie, this labour, as well for to doe me pleasure, as also for beyng naturally of more stomach than i: nor it shall not make hym afraied, to have to enter into these travailes, where he maie bee as well overcome, as able to conquere. zanobi. i am readie to do what soever shall please you to appoinete me, although that i desire more willingly to heare: for as moche as hetherto, your questions have satisfied me more, then those should have pleased me, whiche in harkenyng to your reasonyng, hath chaunced to come into my remembraunce. but sir, i beleve that it is good, that you lese no tyme, and that you have pacience, if with these our ceremonies we trouble you. fabricio. you doe me rather pleasure, for that this variacion of demaunders, maketh me to knowe the sundrie wittes and sunderie appetites of yours: but remaineth there any thyng, whiche seemeth unto you good, to bee joyned to the matter, that alreadie hath been reasoned of? zanobi. twoo thinges i desire, before you passe to an other parte: the one is, to have you to shewe, if in orderyng armies, there needeth to bee used any other facion: the other, what respectes a capitaine ought to have, before he conducte his men to the faight, and in thesame an accidente risyng or growyng, what reamedie maie be had. [sidenote: to deffende moche the fronte of an armie, is most perillous; what is beste for a capitaine to dooe, where his power is, moche lesse then thenemies power; a general rule; the higher grounde ought to be chosen; an advertisement not to place an armie wher the enemie maie se what the same doeth; respectes for the sonne and winde; the variyng of order and place maie cause the conquered to become victorius; a policie in the ordering of men and pitchyng of a fielde; how to compasse about the enemies power; how a capitaine maie faight and bee as it were sure, not to be overcome; how to trouble the orders of the enemie; what a capitaine oughte to dooe when he hath not so many horsmen as the enemie; a greate aide for horsemen; the policies used betwene aniball and scipio.] fabricio. i will inforce my self to satisfie you, i will not answere now distinctly to your questions: for that whileste i shall aunswere to one, many tymes it will come to passe, that i muste aunswere to an other. i have tolde you, how i have shewed you a facion of an armie, to the intent, that accordyng to thesame, there maie bee given all those facions, that the enemie, and the situacion requireth: for as moche as in this case, bothe accordyng to the power thereof, and accordyng to the enemie, it proceadeth: but note this, that there is not a more perillous facion, then to deffende moche the front of tharmie, if then thou have not a most puisant, and moste great hoste: otherwise, thou oughtest to make it rather grosse, and of small largenesse, then of moche largenes and thin: for when thou hast fewe men in comparison to thenemie, thou oughtest to seke other remedies, as is to ordain thine army in soche a place, wher thou maiest be fortefied, either through rivers, or by meanes of fennes, after soch sort, that thou canst not bee compassed aboute, or to inclose thy self on the flanckes with diches, as cesar did in fraunce. you have to take in this cace, this generall rule, to inlarge your self, or to draw in your self with the front, according to your nomber, and thesame of the enemie. for thenemies being of lesse nomber, thou oughtest to seke large places, havyng in especially thy men well instructed: to the intent thou maiest, not onely compasse aboute the enemie, but to deffende thy orders: for that in places rough and difficulte, beyng not able to prevaile of thy orders, thou commeste not to have any advauntage, hereby grewe, that the romaines almoste alwaies, sought the open fieldes, and advoided the straightes. to the contrarie, as i have said, thou oughtest to doe, if thou hast fewe menne, or ill instructed: for that then thou oughteste to seeke places, either where the little nomber maye be saved, and where the small experience dooe not hurte thee: thou oughtest also to chuse the higher grounde, to be able more easily to infest them: notwithstandyng, this advertisment ought to be had, not to ordaine thy armie, where the enemie maie spie what thou doest and in place nere to the rootes of the same, where the enemies armie maie come: for that in this case, havyng respecte unto the artillerie, the higher place shall gette thee disadvauntage: bicause that alwaies and commodiously, thou mightest of the enemies artillerie bee hurte, without beyng able to make any remedy, and thou couldest not commodiously hurte thesame, beyng hindered by thine owne men. also, he that prepareth an armie to faight a battaile, ought to have respecte, bothe to the sunne, and to the winde, that the one and the other, doe not hurte the fronte, for that the one and the other, will let thee the sight, the one with the beames, and the other with the duste: and moreover, the winde hindereth the weapons, whiche are stroken at the enemie, and maketh their blowes more feable: and concerning the sunne, it sufficeth not to have care, that at the firste it shine not in the face, but it is requisite to consider, that increasyng the daie, it hurte thee not: and for this, it should bee requsite in orderyng the men, to have it all on the backe, to the entente it should have to passe moche tyme, to come to lye on the fronte. this waie was observed of aniball at canne, and of mario against the cimbrians. if thou happen to be moche inferiour of horses, ordaine thine armie emongeste vines, and trees, and like impedimentes, as in our time the spaniardes did, when thei overthrewe the frenchmenne at cirignuola. and it hath been seen many times, with all one souldiours, variyng onely the order, and the place, that thei have become of losers victorers: as it happened to the carthageners, whom havyng been overcome of marcus regolus divers tymes, were after by the counsaill of santippo a lacedemonian, victorious: whom made them to go doune into the plaine, where by vertue of the horses, and of eliphantes, thei were able to overcome the romaines. it semes unto me, accordyng to the auncient insamples that almoste all the excellente capitaines, when thei have knowen, that the enemie hath made strong one side of his battaile, thei have not set against it, the moste strongest parte, but the moste weakest, and thother moste strongest thei have set against the most weakest: after in the beginning the faighte, thei have commaunded to their strongest parte, that onely thei sustaine the enemie, and not to preace upon hym, and to the weaker, that thei suffer them selves to be overcome, and to retire into the hindermoste bandes of the armie. this breadeth twoo greate disorders to the enemie: the firste, that he findeth his strongest parte compassed about, the second is, that semyng unto him to have the victorie, seldome tymes it happeneth, that thei disorder not theim selves, whereof groweth his sodain losse. cornelius scipio beyng in spain, againste asdruball of carthage, and understanding how to asdruball it was knowen, that he in the orderyng the armie, placed his legions in the middest, the whiche was the strongest parte of his armie, and for this how asdruball with like order ought to procede: after when he came to faighte the battaile, he chaunged order, and put his legions on the hornes of the armie, and in the middest, placed all his weakeste men: then commyng to the handes, in a sodain those men placed in the middeste, he made to marche softly, and the hornes of the armie, with celeritie to make forwarde, so that onely the hornes of bothe the armies fought, and the bandes in the middest, through beyng distaunt the one from the other, joyned not together, and thus the strongest parte of scipio, came to faight with the weakest of asdruball, and overcame hym. the whiche waie was then profitable, but now havyng respect to the artillerie, it cannot be used: bicause the same space, whiche should remain in the middest, betwene the one armie and the other, should give tyme to thesame to shoote: the whiche is moste pernicious, as above is saied: therefore it is requisite to laie this waie aside, and to use, as a little afore we saied, makyng all the armie to incounter, and the weakest parte to give place. when a capitaine perceiveth, that he hath a greater armie then his enemie, mindyng to compasse hym aboute, before he be aware let hym ordaine his fronte equall, to thesame of his adversaries, after, so sone as the faight is begun, let hym make the fronte by a little and little to retire, and the flanckes to deffende, and alwaies it shall happen, that the enemie shal find hymself, before he be aware compassed about. when a capitain will faight, as it wer sure not to be broken, let hym ordaine his armie in place, where he hath refuge nere, and safe, either betwene fennes, or betwene hilles, or by some strong citee: for that in this case, he cannot bee followed of the enemie, where the enemie maie be pursued of him: this poincte was used of aniball, when fortune began to become his adversarie, and that he doubted of the valiauntnesse of marcus marcello. some to trouble the orders of the enemie, have commaunded those that were light armed, to begin the faight, and that beyng begunne, to retire betwene the orders: and when the armies were after buckled together, and that the fronte of either of them were occupied in faightyng, thei have made theim to issue out by the flanckes of the battaile, and thesame have troubled and broken. if any perceive hymself to bee inferiour of horse, he maie besides the waies that are alredie shewed, place behinde his horsemen a battaile of pikes, and in faightyng take order, that thei give waie to the pikes, and he shall remain alwaies superiour. many have accustomed to use certain fotemenne lighte armed, to faighte emong horsemen, the whiche hath been to the chivalrie moste greate helpe. of all those, which have prepared armies to the field, be moste praised aniball and scipio, when thei fought in africk: and for that aniball had his armie made of carthaginers, and of straungers of divers nacions, he placed in the first fronte thereof lxxx. elephantes, after he placed the straungers, behinde whom he sette his carthaginers, in the hindermoste place, he putte the italians, in whom he trusted little: the whiche thing he ordained so, for that the straungers havyng before theim the enemie, and behinde beyng inclosed of his men, could not flie: so that being constrained to faight thei should overcome, or wearie the romaines, supposyng after with his freshe and valiaunte men, to be then able easely to overcome the romaines, beeyng wearied. against this order, scipio set the astati, the prencipi, and the triarii, in the accustomed maner, to bee able to receive the one the other, and to rescue the one the other: he made the fronte of the armie, full of voide spaces, and bicause it should not be perceived but rather should seme united, he filled them ful of veliti, to whom he commaunded, that so sone as the eliphantes came, thei should avoide, and by the ordinarie spaces, should enter betwene the legins, and leave open the waie to the eliphauntes, and so it came to passe, that it made vaine the violence of theim, so that commyng to handes, he was superiour. zanobi. you have made me to remember, in alledging me this battaile, how scipio in faighting, made not the astati to retire into thorders of the prencipi, but he devided theim, and made theim to retire in the hornes of the armie, to thintent thei might give place to the prencipi, when he would force forwarde: therfore i would you should tell me, what occasion moved hym, not to observe the accustomed order. [sidenote: cartes full of hookes made to destroie the enemies; the remedy that was used against cartes full of hookes; the straunge maner that silla used in orderyng his army against archelaus; how to trouble in the faighte the armie of the enemies; a policie of caius sulpitius, to make his enemies afraied; a policie of marius againste the duchmenne; a policie of greate importaunce, while a battaile is a faightyng; how horsemen maie bee disordered; how the turke gave the sophie an overthrowe; how the spaniardes overcame the armie of amilcare; how to traine the enemie, to his destruccion; a policie of tullo hostilio and lucius silla in dessemlyng of a mischaunce; sertorius slue a man for telling him of the death of one of his capitaines; howe certaine captaines have staied their men that hath been running awaie; attillius constrained his men that ran awaie to tourne again and to faight; how philip king of macedonia made his men afraied to run awaie; victorie ought with all celeritie to bee folowed; what a capitaine ought to dooe, when he should chaunce to receive an overthrowe; how martius overcame the armie of the carthaginers; a policie of titus dimius to hide a losse, whiche he had received in a faight; a general rule; aniball; scipio; asdruball; a capitaine ought not to faight without advantage, excepte he be constrained; how advauntage maie bee taken of the enemies; furie withstode, converteth into vilenesse; what maner of men a capitaine ought to have about him continually, to consult withall; the condicions of the capitain of the enemies, and of those that are about hym is moste requisite to bee knowen; a timerous army is not to be conducted to faight; how to avoide the faightyng of a fielde.] fabricio. i will tell you. aniball had putte all the strengthe of his armie, in the seconde bande: wherefore scipio for to set againste thesame like strengthe, gathered the prencipi and the triarii together: so that the distaunces of the prencipi, beyng occupied of the triarii, there was no place to bee able to receive the astati: and therefore he made the astati to devide, and to go in the hornes of the armie, and he drewe them not betwene the prencipi. but note, that this waie of openyng the first bande, for to give place to the seconde, cannot bee used, but when a man is superiour to his enemie: for that then there is commoditie to bee able to dooe it, as scipio was able: but beyng under, and repulced, it cannot be doen, but with thy manifest ruine: and therefore it is convenient to have behinde, orders that maie receive thee, but let us tourne to our reasonyng. the auncient asiaticans, emongest other thynges devised of them to hurt the enemies, used carres. the whiche had on the sides certaine hookes, so that not onely thei served to open with their violence the bandes, but also to kill with the hookes the adversaries: against the violence of those, in thre maners thei provided, either thei sustained theim with the thickenesse of the raies, or thei received theim betwene the bandes, as the eliphantes were received, or els thei made with arte some strong resistence: as silla a romaine made againste archelaus, whom had many of these cartes, whiche thei called hooked, who for to sustaine theim, drave many stakes into the grounde, behinde his first bandes of men, whereby the cartes beyng stopped, lost their violence. and the newe maner that silla used against hym in orderyng the armie, is to bee noted: for that he put the veliti, and the horse, behinde, and all the heavie armed afore, leavyng many distaunces to be able to sende before those behinde, when necessite required: whereby the fight beyng begun, with the helpe of the horsemen, to the whiche he gave the waie, he got the victorie. to intende to trouble in the faight the enemies armie, it is conveniente to make some thyng to growe, that maie make theim afraied, either with showyng of newe helpe that commeth, or with showyng thynges, whiche maie represente a terrour unto theim: after soche sorte, that the enemies begiled of that sight, maie be afraied, and being made afraied, thei maie easely bee overcome: the whiche waies minutio rufo used, and accilio glabrione consulls of rome. caius sulpitius also set a greate many of sackes upon mules, and other beastes unprofitable for the warre, but in soche wise ordained, that thei semed men of armes, and he commaunded, that thei should appere upon a hill, while he were a faightyng with the frenchemen, whereby grewe his victorie. the verie same did marius, when he foughte against the duchemen. then the fained assaultes availyng moche, whilest the faight continueth, it is conveniente, that the very assaultes in deede, dooe helpe moche: inespecially if at unwares in the middest of the faight, the enemie might bee assaulted behinde, or on the side: the whiche hardely maie be doen, if the countrie helpe thee not: for that when it is open, parte of thy men cannot bee hid, as is mete to bee doen in like enterprises: but in woddie or hille places, and for this apt for ambusshes parte of thy men maie be well hidden, to be able in a sodain, and contrary to thenemies opinion to assaut him, whiche thyng alwaies shall be occasion to give thee the victorie. it hath been sometyme of greate importaunce, whilest the faighte continueth, to sowe voices, whiche doe pronounce the capitaine of thenemies to be dedde, or to have overcome on the other side of the armie: the whiche many times to them that have used it, hath given the victorie. the chivalrie of the enemies maie bee easely troubled, either with sightes, or with rumours, not used: as creso did, whom put camelles againste the horses of the adversaries, and pirrus sette againste the romaine horsemen eliphantes, the sighte of whiche troubled and disordered them. in our time, the turke discomfited the sophi in persia, and the soldane in surria with no other, then with the noise of harkabuses, the whiche in soche wise, with their straunge rumours, disturbed the horses of those, that the turke mighte easely overcome them: the spaniardes to overcome the armie of amilcare, put in the firste fronte cartes full of towe drawen of oxen, and comming to handes, thei kindeled fire to thesame, wherfore the oxen to flie from the fire, thrust into the armie of amilcar, and opened it. thei are wonte (as we have saied) to begile the enemie in the faight, drawyng him into their ambusshes, where the countrie is commodious for the same purpose, but where it were open and large, many have used to make diches, and after have covered them lightly with bowes and yearth, and lefte certain spaces whole, to be able betnene those to retire: after, so sone as the faight hath been begunne, retiryng by those, and the enemie folowing them, hath fallen in the pittes. if in the faight there happen thee, any accident that maie feare thy souldiours, it is a moste prudente thyng, to knowe how to desemble it, and to pervert it to good, as tullo hostilio did, and lucius silla: whom seyng while thei fought, how a parte of his men wer gone to the enemies side, and how thesame thing had verie moche made afraied his men, he made straighte waie throughout all the armie to be understoode, how all thing proceded, accordyng to his order: the whiche not onely did not trouble the armie, but it increased in them so moche stomack, that he remained victorious. it happened also to silla, that havyng sente certaine souldiours to doe some businesse, and thei beyng slain he saied, to the intent his armie should not be made afraied thereby, that he had with crafte sent theim into the handes of the enemies, for that he had found them nothyng faithfull. sertorius faightyng a battaile in spaine, slue one, whom signified unto hym the death of one of his capitaines, for feare that tellyng the very same to other, he should make theim afraied. it is a moste difficult thyng, an armie beyng now moved to flie, to staie it, and make it to faight. and you have to make this distinccion: either that it is all moved, and then to be impossible to tourne it, or there is moved a parte thereof, and then there is some remedie. many romain capitaines, with making afore those whiche fled, have caused them to staie, making them ashamed of running awaie, as lucius silla did, where alredy parte of his legions beyng tourned to flight, driven awaie by the men of mithridates, he made afore them with a swearde in his hande criyng: if any aske you, where you left your capitaine, saie, we have left hym in boecia, where he faighteth. attillius a consull set againste that ran awaie, them that ranne not awaie, and made them to understande, that if thei would not tourne, thei should be slaine of their frendes, and of their enemies. philip of macedonia understanding how his men feared the scithian souldiours, placed behinde his armie, certaine of his moste trustie horsemen, and gave commission to theim, that thei should kill whom so ever fledde: wherfore, his men mindyng rather to die faightyng, then fliyng, overcame. many romaines, not so moche to staie a flight, as for to give occasion to their men, to make greater force, have whileste thei have foughte, taken an ansigne out of their owne mennes handes, and throwen it emongeste the enemies, and appoincted rewardes to hym that could get it again. i doe not beleve that it is out of purpose, to joyne to this reasonyng those thynges, whiche chaunce after the faight, in especially beyng brief thinges, and not to be left behinde, and to this reasonyng conformable inough. therefore i saie, how the fielde is loste, or els wonne: when it is wonne, the victorie ought with all celeritie to be folowed, and in this case to imitate cesar, and not aniball, whom staiyng after that he had discomfited the romaines at canne, loste the empire of rome: the other never rested after the victorie, but folowed the enemie beyng broken, with greater violence and furie, then when he assalted hym whole: but when a capitaine dooeth loese, he ought to see, if of the losse there maie growe any utilite unto hym, inespecially if there remain any residue of tharmie. the commoditie maie growe of the small advertisment of the enemie, whom moste often times after the victorie, becometh negligent, and giveth thee occasion to oppresse hym, as marcius a romaine oppressed the armie of the carthaginers, whom having slain the twoo scipions, and broken their armie, not estemyng thesame remnaunt of menne, whiche with marcius remained a live, were of hym assaulted and overthrowen: for that it is seen, that there is no thing so moche to bee brought to passe, as thesame, whiche the enemie thinketh, that thou canst not attempte: bicause for the moste parte, men bee hurte moste, where thei doubt leaste: therefore a capitain ought when he cannot doe this, to devise at least with diligence, that the losse bee lesse hurtfull, to dooe this, it is necessarie for thee to use meanes, that the enemie maie not easely folowe thee, or to give him occasion to make delaie: in the first case, some after thei have been sure to lese, have taken order with their heddes, that in divers partes, and by divers waies thei should flie, havyng appoincted wher thei should after assemble together: the which made, that thenemie (fearing to devide the armie) was faine to let go safe either all, or the greatest part of them. in the seconde case, many have cast before the enemie, their dearest thinges, to the entent that he tariyng about the spoile, might give them more laisure to flie. titus dimius used no small policie to hide the losse, whiche he had received in the faight, for asmoche as havyng fought untill night, with great losse of his menne, he made in the night to be buried, the greatest part of them, wherefore in the mornyng, the enemies seyng so many slaine of theirs, and so fewe of the romaines, belevyng that thei had the disavauntage, ran awaie. i trust i have thus confusedly, as i saied, satisfied in good part your demaunde: in dede about the facions of the armies, there resteth me to tell you, how some tyme, by some capitaines, it hath been used to make theim with the fronte, like unto a wedge, judgyng to bee able by soche meane, more easely to open the enemies armie. against this facion, thei have used to make a facion like unto a paire of sheres, to be able betwene thesame voide place, to receive that wedge, and to compasse it about, and to faight with it on every side: whereupon i will that you take this generall rule, that the greatest remedie that is used againste a devise of the enemie, is to dooe willingly thesame, whiche he hath devised that thou shalt dooe perforce: bicause that doyng it willingly, thou doest it with order, and with thy advauntage, and his disadvauntage, if thou shouldest doe it beyng inforced, it should be thy undoyng: for the provyng whereof, i care not to reherse unto you, certain thynges alredy tolde. the adversary maketh the wedge to open thy bandes: if thou gowest with them open, thou disorderest hym, and he disordereth not thee. aniball set the elephantes in the fronte of his armie, to open with theim the armie of scipio. scipio went with it open, and it was the occasion of his victorie, and of the ruine of hym. asdruball placed his strongest men in the middest of the fronte of his armie, to overthrowe scipios menne: scipio commaunded, that by them selves thei should retire and he broke theim: so that like devises when thei are foreseen, bee the causes of the victorie of him, against whom thei be prepared. there remaineth me also, if i remember my self well, to tell you what respectes a capitaine ought to have, before he leade his men to faight: upon whiche i have to tell you firste, how a capitaine ought never to faight a battaile, except he have advauntage, or be constrained. the vantage groweth of the situacion, of the order, of havyng more, or better menne: the necessitie groweth when thou seest how that not faightyng, thou muste in any wise lose, as should bee for lackyng of money, and for this, thy armie to bee ready all maner of waies to resolve, where famishemente is ready to assaulte thee, where the enemie looketh to bee ingrosed with newe men: in these cases, thou oughtest alwaies to faight, although with thy disadvauntage: for that it is moche better to attempte fortune, where she maie favour thee, then not attemptyng, to see thy certaine ruine: and it is as grevous a faulte in this case, in a capitain not to faight, as to have had occasion to overcome, and not to have either knowen it through ignoraunce, or lefte it through vilenesse. the advauntages some tymes the enemie giveth thee, and some tymes thy prudence: many in passyng rivers have been broken of their enemie, that hath been aware thereof, whom hath taried, till the one halfe hath been of the one side, and the other halfe on the other, and then hath assaulted them: as cesar did to the suizzers, where he destroied the fowerth parte of theim, through beyng halfe over a river. some tyme thy enemie is founde wearie, for havyng folowed thee to undescritely, so that findyng thy self freshe and lustie, thou oughtest not to let passe soche an occasion: besides this, if the enemie offer unto thee in the mornyng betymes to faight, thou maiest a good while deferre to issue out of thy lodgyng, and when he hath stoode long in armour, and that he hath loste that same firste heate, with the whiche he came, thou maiest then faight with him. this waie scipio and metellus used in spaine: the one against asdruball, the other against sertorius. if the enemie be deminished of power, either for havyng devided the armie, as the scipions in spain, or for some other occasion, thou oughteste to prove chaunce. the greateste parte of prudent capitaines, rather receive the violence of the enemies, then go with violence to assalte them: for that the furie is easely withstoode of sure and steddie menne, and the furie beyng sustained, converteth lightly into vilenesse: thus fabius did againste the sannites, and against the galles, and was victorious and his felowe decius remained slain. some fearing the power of their enemies, have begun the faight a little before night, to the intent that their men chaunsyng to bee overcome, might then by the helpe of the darkenesse thereof, save theim selves. some havyng knowen, how the enemies armie beyng taken of certaine supersticion, not to faight in soche a tyme, have chosen thesame tyme to faighte, and overcome: the whiche cesar observed in fraunce, againste arionistus, and vespasian in surrie, againste the jewes. the greatest and moste importaunte advertismente, that a capitaine ought to have, is to have aboute hym faithfull menne, that are wise and moste expert in the warre, with whom he must continually consulte and reason of his men, and of those of the enemies, whiche is the greater nomber, whiche is beste armed, or beste on horsebacke, or best exercised, whiche be moste apte to suffer necessitie, in whom he trusteth moste, either in the footemen, or in the horsemen: after thei ought to consider the place where thei be, and whether it be more to the purpose for thenemie, then for him: which of theim hath victualles moste commodious: whether it be good to deferre the battaile, or to faight it: what good might bee given hym, or taken awaie by tyme: for that many tymes, souldiours seyng the warre to be delaied, are greved, and beyng wearie, in the pain and in the tediousnesse therof, wil forsake thee. it importeth above all thyng, to knowe the capitain of the enemies, and whom he hath aboute hym, whether he be rashe, or politike, whether he be fearfull, or hardie: to see how thou maiest truste upon the aidyng souldiours. and above all thyng thou oughtest to take hede, not to conducte the armie to faight when it feareth, or when in any wise it mistrusteth of the victorie: for that the greatest signe to lose, is thei beleve not to be able to winne: and therfore in this case, thou oughtest to avoide the faightyng of the fielde, either with doyng as fabius maximus, whom incampyng in strong places, gave no courage to aniball, to goe to finde hym, or when thou shouldest thinke, that the enemie also in strong places, would come to finde thee, to departe out of the fielde, and to devide the menne into thy tounes to thentent that tediousnesse of winnyng them, maie wearie hym. zanobi. cannot the faightyng of the battaile be otherwise avoided, then in devidyng the armie in sunderie partes and placyng the men in tounes? [sidenote: fabius maximus.] fabricio. i beleve that ones alreadie, with some of you i have reasoned, how that he, that is in the field, cannot avoide to faight the battaile, when he hath an enemie, which will faight with hym in any wise, and he hath not, but one remedie, and that is, to place him self with his armie distant fiftie miles at leaste, from his adversarie, to be able betymes to avoide him, when he should go to finde hym. for fabius maximus never avoided to faight the battaile with aniball, but he would have it with his advauntage: and aniball did not presume to bee able to overcome hym, goyng to finde hym in the places where he incamped: where if he had presupposed, to have been able to have overcome, it had been conveniente for fabius, to have fought the battaile with hym, or to have avoided. [sidenote: philip king of macedonia, overcome by the romaines; how cingentorige avoided the faightyng of the fielde with cesar; the ignorance of the venecians; what is to be doen wher soldiours desire to faight, contrary to their capitaines minde; how to incourage souldiers; an advertisment to make the soldiour most obstinately to faight.] philip kyng of macedonia, thesame that was father to perse, commyng to warre with the romaines, pitched his campe upon a verie high hill, to the entent not to faight with theim: but the romaines wente to find hym on thesame hill, and discomfaited hym. cingentorige capitain of the frenche menne, for that he would not faight the field with cesar, whom contrarie to his opinion, had passed a river, got awaie many miles with his men. the venecians in our tyme, if thei would not have come to have fought with the frenche kyng, thei ought not to have taried till the frenche armie, had passed the river addus, but to have gotten from them as cingentorige, where thei havyng taried knewe not how to take in the passyng of the men, the occasion to faight the battaile, nor to avoide it: for that the frenche men beyng nere unto them, as the venecians went out of their campe, assaulted theim, and discomfited theim: so it is, that the battaile cannot bee avoided, when the enemie in any wise will faight, nor let no man alledge fabius, for that so moche in thesame case, he did flie the daie of battaile, as aniball. it happeneth many tymes, that thy souldiours be willyng to faight, and thou knoweste by the nomber, and by the situacion, or for some other occasion to have disadvauntage, and desirest to make them chaunge from this desire: it happeneth also, that necessitie, or occasion, constraineth thee to faight, and that thy souldiours are evill to be trusted, and smally disposed to faight: where it is necessarie in thone case, to make theim afraied, and in the other to incourage theim: in the firste case, when perswacions suffiseth not, there is no better waie, then to give in praie, a part of them unto thenemie, to thintent those that have, and those that have not fought, maie beleve thee: and it may very wel be doen with art, thesame which to fabius maximus hapned by chaunce. tharmie of fabius (as you knowe) desired to faight with aniballs armie: the very same desire had the master of his horses: to fabius it semed not good, to attempte the faight: so that through soche contrary opinions, he was fain to devide the armie: fabius kept his men in the campe, the other fought, and commyng into great perill, had been overthrowen, if fabius had not rescued him: by the whiche insample the maister of the horse, together with all the armie, knewe how it was a wise waie to obeie fabius. concernyng to incourage theim to faight, it should be well doen, to make them to disdain the enemies, shewyng how thei speake slaunderous woordes of them, to declare to have intelligence with them, and to have corrupted part of them, to incampe in place, where thei maie see the enemies, and make some light skirmishe with them, for that the thyng that is dailie seen, with more facilitie is despised: to shewe theim to bee unworthie, and with an oracion for the purpose, to reprehende them of their cowardnesse, and for to make them ashamed, to tell theim that you will faight alone, when thei will not beare you companie. and you ought above all thyng to have this advertismente, mindyng to make the souldiour obstinate to faight, not to permitte, that thei maie send home any of their substaunce, or to leave it in any place, till the warre bee ended, that thei maie understande, that although fliyng save their life, yet it saveth not theim their goodes, the love whereof, is wonte no lesse then thesame, to make men obstinate in defence. zanobi. you have tolde, how the souldiours maie be tourned to faight, with speakyng to theim: doe you meane by this, that all the armie must bee spoken unto, or to the heddes thereof? [sidenote: it is requisite for excellent capitaines to bee good orators; alexander magnus used openly to perswade his armie; the effecteousnes of speking; souldiours ought to be accustomed to heare their capitaine speake; how in olde time souldiers were threatened for their faltes; enterprises maie the easelier be brought to passe by meanes of religion; sertorius; a policie of silla; a policie of charles the seventh king of fraunce against the englishmen; how souldiers maiebee made to esteme little their enemies; the surest wai to make souldiours moste obstinat to faight; by what meanes obstinatenesse to faighte is increased.] fabricio. to perswade, or to diswade a thyng unto fewe, is verie easie, for that if woordes suffise not, you maie then use aucthoritie and force: but the difficultie is, to remove from a multitude an evill opinion, and that whiche is contrary either to the common profite, or to thy opinion, where cannot be used but woordes, the whiche is meete that thei be heard of every man, mindyng to perswade them all. wherfore, it was requisite that the excellente capitaines were oratours: for that without knowyng how to speake to al the army, with difficultie maie be wrought any good thing: the whiche altogether in this our tyme is laied aside. rede the life of alexander magnus, and you shall see how many tymes it was necessarie for hym to perswade, and to speake publikly to his armie: otherwise he should never have brought theim, beyng become riche, and full of spoile, through the desertes of arabia, and into india with so moche his disease, and trouble: for that infinite tymes there growe thynges, wherby an armie ruinateth, when the capitain either knoweth not, or useth not to speake unto thesame, for that this speakyng taketh awaie feare, in courageth the mindes, increaseth the obstinatenes to faight, discovereth the deceiptes, promiseth rewardes, sheweth the perilles, and the waie to avoide theim, reprehendeth, praieth, threatened, filleth full of hope, praise, shame, and doeth a those thynges, by the whiche the humaine passions are extincte or kendled: wherefore, that prince, or common weale, whiche should appoincte to make a newe power, and cause reputacion to their armie, ought to accustome the souldiours thereof, to heare the capitain to speake, and the capitain to know how to speake unto them. in kepyng desposed the souldiours in old tyme, to faight for their countrie, the religion availed moche, and the othes whiche thei gave them, when thei led theim to warfare: for as moche as in al their faultes, thei threatned them not onely with those punishementes, whiche might be feared of men but with those whiche of god might be looked for: the whiche thyng mingled with the other religious maners, made many tymes easie to the auncient capitaines all enterprises, and will doe alwaies, where religion shall be feared, and observed. sertorius prevailed, by declaryng that he spake with a stagge, the whiche in goddes parte, promised hym the victorie. silla saied, he spoke with an image, whiche he had taken out of the temple of apollo. many have tolde how god hath appered unto them in their slepe, whom hath admonished them to faight. in our fathers time, charles the seventh kyng of fraunce, in the warre whiche he made againste the englishemen, saied, he counsailed with a maide, sent from god, who was called every where the damosell of fraunce, the which was occacion of his victorie. there maie be also used meanes, that maie make thy men to esteme little the enemie, as agesilao a spartaine used, whom shewed to his souldiours, certain persians naked, to the intent that seyng their delicate members, thei should not have cause to feare them. some have constrained their men to faight through necessitie, takyng awaie from them all hope of savyng theim selves, savyng in overcommyng. the whiche is the strongest, and the beste provision that is made, to purpose to make the souldiour obstinate to faight: whiche obstinatenesse is increased by the confidence, and love of the capitaine, or of the countrie. confidence is caused through the armour, the order the late victorie, and the opinion of the capitaine. the love of the countrie, is caused of nature: that of the capitain, through vertue, more then by any other benefite: the necessities maie be many, but that is strongest, whiche constraineth thee; either to overcome, or to dye. the fiveth booke [sidenote: how the romaines marched with their armies; how the romaines ordered their armie when it happened to be assaulted on the waie; how the main battailes ought to marche; the orderyng of an armie after soche sorte, that it maie marche safelie through the enemies countrie and be alwaies in a redines to faight; the place in the armie wher the bowmen and harkabutters are appoincted; the place in the armie wher thextraordinarie pikes are appoincted. the place in the armie wherthe generall capitain must be; where the artillerie must be placed. the light horsmenne must be sente before to discover the countrie and the menne of armes to come behind tharmy; a generall rule concernyng horse; wher the carriages and the unarmed are placed; the waie must be made plaine wher the armie shall marche in order; how many miles a day an armie maie marche in battaile raie, to bee able to incampe before sunne set; the orderyng of the armie, when it is assaulted on the vawarde; the orderyng of tharmie when thenemie commes to assaulte it behinde; how the armie is ordered when it is assaulted of any of the sides; doen when the army is assaulted on twoo sides.] fabricio. i have shewed you, how an armi, is ordained to faight a fielde with an other armie, which is seen pitched against it, and have declared unto you, howe the same is overcome, and after many circumstaunces, i have likewise shewed you, what divers chaunces, maie happen about thesame, so that me thinkes tyme to shewe you now, how an armie is ordered, againste thesame enemie, whiche otherwise is not seen, but continually feared, that he assaulte thee: this happeneth when an armie marcheth through the enemies countrie, or through suspected places. firste, you must understande, how a romaine armie, sent alwaies ordinarely afore, certaine bandes of horsemen, as spies of the waie: after followed the right horne, after this, came all the carriages, whiche to thesame apperteined, after this, came a legion, after it, the carriages therof, after that, an other legion, and next to it, their carriages, after whiche, came the left horne, with the carriages thereof at their backe, and in the laste part, folowed the remnaunte of the chivalrie: this was in effecte the maner, with whiche ordinarily thei marched: and if it happened that the armie were assaulted in the waie on the fronte, or on the backe, thei made straight waie all the carriages to bee drawen, either on the right, or on the lefte side, accordyng as chaunsed, or as thei could beste, havyng respecte to the situacion: and all the men together free from their impedimentes, made hedde on that parte, where the enemie came. if thei were assaulted on the flancke, thei drue the carriages towardes thesame parte that was safe, and of the other, thei made hedde. this waie beyng well and prudently governed, i have thought meete to imitate, sending afore the light horsemen, as exploratours of the countrie: then havyng fower maine battailes i would make them to marche in araie, and every one with their carriages folowyng theim. and for that there be twoo sortes of carriages, that is partainyng to particulare souldiours, and partainyng to the publike use of all the campe, i would devide the publike carriages into fower partes, and to every maine battaile, i would appoinct his parte, deviding also the artillerie into fower partes, and all the unarmed, so that every nomber of armed menne, should equally have their impedimentes. but bicause it happeneth some times, that thei marche through the countrie, not onely suspected, but so daungerous, that thou fearest every hower to be assaulted, thou art constrained for to go more sure, to chaunge the forme of marchyng, and to goe in soche wise prepared, that neither the countrie menne, nor any armie, maie hurte thee, findyng thee in any parte unprovided. in soche case, the aunciente capitaines were wont, to marche with the armie quadrante, whiche so thei called this forme, not for that it was altogether quadrante, but for that it was apte to faight of fower partes, and thei saied, that thei wente prepared, bothe for the waie, and for the faight: from whiche waie, i will not digresse, and i will ordaine my twoo maine battailes, whiche i have taken for to make an armie of, to this effect. mindyng therefore, to marche safely through the enemies countrie, and to bee able to aunswere hym on every side, when at unwares the armie might chaunce to be assaulted, and intendyng therefore, accordyng to the antiquitie, to bryng thesame into a square, i would devise to make a quadrant, that the rome therof should be of space on every part clix. yardes, in this maner. first i would put the flanckes, distant the one flanck from the other, clix. yardes, and i would place five battailes for a flancke, in a raie in length, and distant the one from the other, twoo yardes and a quarter: the whiche shall occupie with their spaces, every battaile occupiyng thirtie yardes, clix. yardes. then betwen the hedde and the taile of these two flanckes, i would place the other tenne battailes, in every parte five, orderyng them after soche sorte, that fower should joyne to the hedde of the right flanck, and fower to the taile of the lefte flancke, leaving betwene every one of them, a distance of thre yardes: one should after joyne to the hedde of the lefte flancke, and one to the taile of the right flancke: and for that the space that is betwene the one flancke and the other, is clix. yardes, and these battailes whiche are set the one to the side of the other by breadth, and not by length, will come to occupie with the distaunces one hundred yardes and a halfe yarde, there shall come betwene theim fower battailes, placed in the fronte on the right flancke, and the one placed in thesame on the lefte, to remaine a space of fiftie and eighte yardes and a halfe, and the verie same space will come to remaine in the battailes, placed in the hinder parte: nor there shall bee no difference, saving that the one space shall come on the parte behind towardes the right horne, and thother shall come on the parte afore, towardes the lefte home. in the space of the lviii. yardes and a halfe before, i would place all the ordinarie veliti, in thesame behinde, the extraordinarie, which wil come to be a thousande for a space, and mindyng to have the space that ought to be within the armie, to be every waie clix. yardes, it is mete that the five battailes, whiche are placed in the hedde, and those whiche are placed in the taile, occupie not any parte of the space, whiche the flanckes keepe: and therefore it shall be convenient, that the five battailes behinde, doe touche with the fronte, the taile of their flanckes, and those afore, with the taile to touche he hedde, after soche sorte, that upon every corner of the ame armie, there maie remaine a space, to receive an other battaile: and for that there bee fower spaces, i would take fower bandes of the extraordinarie pikes, and in every corner i would place one, and the twoo ansignes of the foresaied pikes, whiche shall remain overplus, i would sette in the middest of the rome of this armie, in a square battaile, on the hedde whereof, should stande the generall capitaine, with his menne about him. and for that these battailes ordeined thus, marche all one waie, but faight not all one waie, in puttyng them together, those sides ought to be ordained to faight, whiche are not defended of thother battailes. and therfore it ought to be considered, that the five battailes that be in the front, have all their other partes defended, excepte the fronte: and therfore these ought to bee put together in good order, and with the pikes afore. the five battailes whiche are behinde, have all their sides defended, except the parte behinde, and therefore those ought to bee put together in soche wise, that the pikes come behind, as in the place therof we shall shewe. the five battailes that bee in the right flancke, have all their sides defended, except the right flancke. the five that be on the left flanck, have all their partes defended, excepte the lefte flancke: and therefore in orderyng the battailes, thei ought to bee made, that the pikes maie tourne on the same flanck, that lieth open: and the peticapitaines to stand on the hedde, and on the taile, so that nedyng to faight, all the armour and weapons maie be in their due places, the waie to doe this, is declared where we reasoned of the maner of orderyng the battailes. the artillerie i would devide, and one parte i would place without, on the lefte flancke, and the other on the right. the light horsemen, i would sende afore to discover the countrie. of the menne of armes, i would place part behinde, on the right home, and parte on the lefte, distante about thirtie yardes from the battailes: and concerning horse, you have to take this for a general rule in every condicion, where you ordaine an armie, that alwaies thei ought to be put, either behinde, or on the flanckes of thesame: he that putteth them afore, over against the armie, it behoveth hym to doe one of these twoo thinges, either that he put them so moche afore, that beyng repulced, thei maie have so moche space, that maie give them tyme, to be able to go a side from thy footemen, and not to runne upon them, or to order them in soche wise, with so many spaces, that the horses by those maie enter betwene them, without disorderyng them. nor let no man esteme little this remembraunce, for as moche as many capitaines, whom havyng taken no hede thereof, have been ruinated, and by themselves have been disordered, and broken. the carriages and the unarmed menne are placed, in the rome that remaineth within the armie, and in soche sorte equally devided, that thei maie give the waie easely, to whom so ever would go, either from the one corner to the other, or from the one hedde, to the other of the armie. these battailes without the artillerie and the horse, occupie every waie from the utter side, twoo hundred and eleven yardes and a halfe of space: and bicause this quadrante is made of twoo main battailes, it is convenient to distinguishe, what part thone maine battaile maketh, and what the other: and for that the main battailes are called by the nomber, and every of theim hath (as you knowe) tenne battailes, and a generall hed, i would cause that the first main battaile, should set the first v. battailes therof in the front, the other five, in the left flanck, and the capitain of the same should stande in the left corner of the front. the seconde maine battaile, should then put the firste five battailes therof, in the right flanck, and the other five in the taile, and the hedde capitain of thesame, should stande in the right corner, whom should come to dooe the office of the tergiductor. the armie ordained in this maner, ought to be made to move, and in the marchyng, to observe all this order, and without doubte, it is sure from all the tumultes of the countrie men. nor the capitain ought not to make other provision, to the tumultuarie assaultes, then to give sometyme commission to some horse, or ansigne of veliti, that thei set themselves in order: nor it shall never happen that these tumultuous people, will come to finde thee at the drawyng of the swerd, or pikes poincte: for that men out of order, have feare of those that be in araie: and alwaies it shall bee seen, that with cries and rumours, thei will make a greate assaulte, without otherwise commyng nere unto thee, like unto barking curres aboute a mastie. aniball when he came to the hurte of the romaines into italie, he passed through all fraunce, and alwaies of the frenche tumultes, he took small regarde. mindyng to marche, it is conveniente to have plainers and labourers afore, whom maie make thee the waie plaine, whiche shall bee garded of those horsemen, that are sent afore to viewe the countrie: an armie in this order maie marche tenne mile the daie, and shall have tyme inough to incampe, and suppe before sunne goyng doune, for that ordinarely, an armie maie marche twentie mile: if it happen that thou be assaulted, of an armie set in order, this assaulte cannot growe sodainly: for that an armie in order, commeth with his pace, so that thou maiest have tyme inough, to set thy self in order to faight the field, and reduce thy menne quickly into thesame facion, or like to thesame facion of an armie, which afore is shewed thee. for that if thou be assaulted, on the parte afore, thou needeste not but to cause, that the artillerie that be on the flanckes, and the horse that be behinde, to come before, and place theimselves in those places, and with those distaunces, as afore is declared. the thousande veliti that bee before, must go out of their place, and be devided into ccccc. for a parte, and go into their place, betwene the horse and the hornes of tharmy: then in the voide place that thei shal leave, the twoo ansignes of the extraordinarie pikes muste entre, whiche i did set in the middest of the quadrante of the armie. the thousande veliti, whiche i placed behinde, must departe from thesame place, and devide them selves in the flanckes of the battailes, to the fortificacion of those: and by the open place that thei shal leave, all the carriages and unarmed menne must go out, and place themselves on the backe of the battaile. then the rome in the middeste beyng voided, and every man gone to his place: the five battailes, whiche i placed behinde on the armie, must make forward in the voide place, that is betwene the one and the other flanck, and marche towardes the battailes, that stand in the hedde, and three of theim, muste stande within thirtie yardes of those, with equall distances, betwene the one and the other, and the other twoo shal remain behinde, distaunte other thirtie yardes: the whiche facion maie bee ordained in a sodaine, and commeth almoste to bee like, unto the firste disposicion, whiche of tharmy afore we shewed. and though it come straighter in the fronte, it commeth grosser in the flanckes, whiche giveth it no lesse strength: but bicause the five battailes, that be in the taile, have the pikes on the hinder parte, for the occasion that before we have declared, it is necessarie to make theim to come on the parte afore, mindyng to have theim to make a backe to the front of tharmie: and therfore it behoveth either to make them to tourne battaile after battaile, as a whole body, or to make them quickly to enter betwen thorders of targettes, and conduct them afore, the whiche waie is more spedy, and of lesse disorder, then to make them to turn al together: and so thou oughtest to doe of all those, whiche remain behind in every condicion of assault, as i shal shewe you. if it appere that thenemie come on the part behinde, the first thyng that ought to bee dooen, is to cause that every man tourne his face where his backe stode, and straight waie tharmie cometh to have made of taile, hed, and of hed taile: then al those waies ought to be kept, in orderyng thesame fronte, as i tolde afore. if the enemie come to incounter the right flancke, the face of thy armie ought to bee made to tourne towardes thesame side: after, make all those thynges in fortificacion of thesame hedde, whiche above is saied, so that the horsemen, the veliti, and the artillerie, maie be in places conformable to the hed thereof: onely you have this difference, that in variyng the hed of those, which are transposed, some have to go more, and some lesse. in deede makyng hedde of the right flancke, the veliti ought to enter in the spaces, that bee betwene the horne of the armie, and those horse, whiche were nerest to the lefte flancke, in whose place ought to enter, the twoo ansignes of the extraordinarie pikes, placed in the middest: but firste the carriages and the unarmed, shall goe out by the open place, avoidyng the rome in the middest, and retiryng themselves behinde the lefte flancke, whiche shall come to bee then the taile of the armie: the other veliti that were placed in the taile, accordyng to the principall orderyng of the armie, in this case, shall not move: bicause the same place should not remaine open, whiche of taile shall come to be flancke: all other thyng ought to bee dooen, as in orderyng of the firste hedde is saied: this that is told about the makyng hed of the right flanck, must be understode to be told, havyng nede to make it of the left flanck: for that the very same order ought to bee observed. if the enemie should come grose, and in order to assaulte thee on twoo sides, those twoo sides, whiche he commeth to assaulte thee on, ought to bee made stronge with the other twoo sides, that are not assaulted, doublyng the orders in eche of theim, and devidyng for bothe partes the artillerie, the veliti, and the horse. if he come on three or on fower sides, it is necessarie that either thou or he lacke prudence: for that if thou shalt bee wise, thou wilte never putte thy self in place, that the enemie on three or fower sides, with a greate nomber of men, and in order, maie assault thee: for that mindyng, safely to hurte thee, it is requisit, that he be so great, that on every side, he maie assault thee, with as many men, as thou haste almoste in al thy army: and if thou be so unwise, that thou put thy self in the daunger and force of an enemie, whom hath three tymes more menne ordained then thou, if thou catche hurte, thou canste blame no man but thy self: if it happen not through thy faulte, but throughe some mischaunce, the hurt shall be without the shame, and it shal chaunce unto thee, as unto the scipions in spaine, and to asdruball in italie but if the enemie have not many more men then thou, and intende for to disorder thee, to assaulte thee on divers sides, it shal be his foolishnesse, and thy good fortune: for as moche as to doe so, it is convenient, that he become so thinne in soche wise, that then easely thou maiste overthrow one bande, and withstande an other, and in short time ruinate him: this maner of ordering an armie against an enemie, whiche is not seen, but whiche is feared, is a necessarie and a profitable thing, to accustome thy souldiours, to put themselves together, and to march with soche order, and in marchyng, to order theimselves to faight, accordyng to the first hedde, and after to retourne in the forme, that thei marched in, then to make hedde of the taile, after, of the flanckes, from these, to retourne into the first facion: the whiche exercises and uses bee necessarie, mindyng to have an armie, throughly instructed and practised: in whiche thyng the princes and the capitaines, ought to take paine. nor the discipline of warre is no other, then to knowe how to commaunde, and to execute these thynges. nor an instructed armie is no other, then an armie that is wel practised in these orders: nor it cannot be possible, that who so ever in this time, should use like disciplin shall ever bee broken. and if this quadrante forme whiche i have shewed you, is somewhat difficulte, soche difficultnesse is necessarie, takyng it for an exercise: for as moche as knowyng well, how to set theim selves in order, and to maintaine theim selves in the same, thei shall knowe after more easely, how to stand in those, whiche should not have so moche difficultie. zanobi. i beleve as you saie, that these orders bee verie necessarie, and i for my parte, knowe not what to adde or take from it: true it is, that i desire to know of you twoo thynges, the one, if when you will make of the taile, or of the flancke hedde, and would make them to tourne, whether this be commaunded by the voice, or with the sounde: thother, whether those that you sende afore, to make plain the waie, for the armie to marche, ought to be of the verie same souldiours of your battailes, or other vile menne appoincted, to like exercise. [sidenote: commaundementes of capitaines being not wel understoode, maie be the destruction of an armie; respect that is to be had in commaundementes made with the sounde of the trompet; in commaundmentes made with the voice, what respect is to be had; of pianars.] fabricio. your firste question importeth moche: for that many tymes the commaundementes of capitaines, beyng not well understoode, or evill interpreted, have disordered their armie: therfore the voices, with the whiche thei commaunde in perilles, ought to bee cleare, and nete. and if thou commaunde with the sounde, it is convenient to make, that betwene the one waie and the other, there be so moche difference, that the one cannot be chaunged for the other: and if thou commaundest with the voice, thou oughteste to take heede, that thou flie the general voices, and to use the particulares, and of the particulars, to flie those, whiche maie be interpreted sinisterly. many tymes the saiyng backe, backe, hath made to ruinate an armie; therfore this voice ought not to be used, but in steede therof to use, retire you. if you will make theim to tourne, for to chaunge the hedde, either to flanck, or to backe, use never to saie tourne you, but saie to the lefte, to the right, to the backe, to the front: thus all the other voices ought to be simple, and nete, as thrust on, march, stande stronge, forwarde, retourne you: and all those thynges, whiche maie bee dooen with the voice, thei doe, the other is dooen with the sounde. concernyng those menne, that must make the waies plaine for the armie to marche, whiche is your seconde question, i would cause my owne souldiours to dooe this office, as well bicause in the aunciente warfare thei did so, as also for that there should be in the armie, lesser nomber of unarmed men, and lesse impedimentes: and i would choose out of every battaile, thesame nomber that should nede, and i would make theim to take the instrumentes, meete to plaine the grounde withall, and their weapons to leave with those rankes, that should bee nereste them, who should carrie them, and the enemie commyng, thei shall have no other to doe, then to take them again, and to retourne into their araie. zanobi. who shall carrie thinstrumentes to make the waie plaine withall? fabricio. the cartes that are appoincted to carrie the like instrumentes. zanobi. i doubte whether you should ever brynge these our souldiours, to labour with shovell or mattocke, after soche sorte. [sidenote: the victualles that thantiquitie made provision of, for their armies.] fabricio. all these thynges shall bee reasoned in the place thereof, but now i will let alone this parte, and reason of the maner of the victualing of the armie: for that me thinketh, havyng so moche traivailed theim, it is tyme to refreshe them, and to comfort them with meate. you have to understande, that a prince ought to ordaine his armie, as expedite as is possible, and take from thesame all those thynges, whiche maie cause any trouble or burthen unto it, and make unto hym any enterprise difficulte. emongest those thynges that causeth moste difficultie, is to be constrained to keepe the armie provided of wine, and baked bread. the antiquitie cared not for wine, for that lackyng it, thei dranke water, mingeled with a little vinegre, to give it a taste: for whiche cause, emong the municions of victualles for the hoste, vineger was one, and not wine. thei baked not the breade in ovens, as thei use for citees, but thei provided the meale, and of thesame, every souldiour after his owne maner, satisfied hym self, havyng for condimente larde and baken, the whiche made the breade saverie, that thei made, and maintained theim strong, so that the provision of victualles for the armie, was meale, vineger, larde, and bacon, and for the horses barley. thei had ordinarely heardes of greate beastes and small, whiche folowed the armie, the whiche havyng no nede to bee carried, caused not moche impedimente. of this order there grewe, that an armie in old time, marched somtymes many daies through solitarie places, and difficulte, without sufferyng disease of victualles: for that thei lived of thyngs, whiche easely thei might convey after them. to the contrarie it happeneth in the armies, that are now a daies, whiche mindyng not to lacke wine, and to eate baked breade in thesame maner, as when thei are at home, whereof beyng not able to make provision long, thei remaine often tymes famished, or though thei be provided, it is dooen with disease, and with moste greate coste: therfore i would reduce my armie to this maner of living: and i would not that thei should eate other bread, then that, which by themselves thei should bake. concernyng wine, i would not prohibite the drinkyng thereof, nor yet the commyng of it into the armie, but i would not use indevour, nor any labour for to have it, and in the other provisions, i would governe my self altogether, like unto the antiquitie: the whiche thing, if you consider well, you shall see how moche difficultie is taken awaie, and how moche trouble and disease, an armie and a capitaine is avoided of, and how moche commoditie shall bee given, to what so ever enterprise is to bee dooen. zanobi. we have overcome thenemie in the field, marched afterward upon his countrie, reason would, that spoiles be made, tounes sacked, prisoners taken, therefore i would knowe how the antiquitie in these thynges, governed them selves. [sidenote: the occasions why the warres made nowe adaies, doe impoverishe the conquerors as well as the conquered; the order that the romaines toke, concerning the spoile and the booties that their souldiours gotte; an order that the antiquitie tooke, concernyng their soldiours wages.] fabricio. beholde, i will satisfie you. i beleve you have considered, for that once alredie with some of you i have reasoned, howe these present warres, impoverishe as well those lordes that overcome, as those that leese: for that if the one leese his estate, the other leeseth his money, and his movables: the whiche in olde time was not, for that the conquerour of the warre, waxed ritche. this groweth of keepyng no compte in these daies of the spoiles, as in olde tyme thei did, but thei leave it to the discreacion of the souldiours. this manner maketh twoo moste great disorders: the one, that whiche i have tolde: the other that the souldiour becometh more covetous to spoyle, and lesse observeth the orders: and manie times it hath been seen, howe the covetousnesse of the praye, hath made those to leese, whome were victorious. therefore the romaines whiche were princes of armies, provided to the one and to the other of these inconvenienses, ordainyng that all the spoyle should apertaine to the publicke, and that the publicke after should bestowe it, as shoulde be thought good: and therfore thei had in tharmie the questours, whom were as we would say, the chamberlaines, to whose charge all the spoyle and booties were committed: whereof the consull was served to geve the ordinarie pay to the souldiours, to succour the wounded, and the sicke, and for the other businesse of the armie. the consull might well, and he used it often, to graunte a spoyle to soldiours: but this grauntyng, made no disorder: for that the armie beyng broken all the pray was put in the middest, and distributed by hedde, accordyng to the qualitee of everie man: the which maner thei constituted, to thintente, that the soldiours should attend to overcome, and not to robbe: and the romaine legions overcame the enemies, and folowed them not, for that thei never departed from their orders: onely there folowed them, the horsemenne with those that were light armed, and if there were any other souldiours then those of the legions, they likewyse pursued the chase. where if the spoyle shoulde have ben his that gotte it, it had not ben possible nor reasonable, to have kepte the legions steddie, and to withstonde manie perils; hereby grewe therefore, that the common weale inritched, and every consull carried with his triumphe into the treasurie, muche treasure, whiche all was of booties and spoiles. an other thing the antiquetie did upon good consideration, that of the wages, whiche they gave to every souldiour, the thirde parte they woulde shoulde be laied up nexte to him, whome carried the ansigne of their bande, whiche never gave it them againe, before the warre was ended: this thei did, beyng moved of twoo reasons, the first was to thintente, that the souldiour should thrive by his wages, because the greatest parte of them beyng yonge men, and carelesse, the more thei have, so muche the more without neede thei spende, the other cause was, for that knowyng, that their movabelles were nexte to the ansigne, thei should be constrained to have more care thereof, and with more obstinatenesse to defende it: and this made them stronge and to holde together: all which thynges is necessarie to observe, purposinge to reduce the exercise of armes unto the intier perfection therof. zanobi. i beleeve that it is not possible, that to an armie that marcheth from place to place, there fal not perrilous accidentes, where the industerie of the capitaine is needefull, and the worthinesse of the souldiours, mindyng to avoyde them. therefore i woulde be glad, that you remembring any, would shew them. [sidenote: captaines mai incurre the daunger of ambusshes twoo maner of wayes; how to avoide the perill of ambusshes; howe ambusshes have ben perceived; howe the capitaine of the enemies ought to be esteemed; where men be in greatest perill; the description of the countrey where an army muste marche, is most requiset for a capitaine to have; a most profitable thyng it is for a capitayne to be secrete in all his affaires; an advertisment concernyng the marchyng of an armie; the marching of an armie ought to be ruled by the stroke of the drumme; the condicion of the enemie ought to be considered.] fabricio. i shall contente you with a good will, beyng inespetially necessarie, intendyng to make of this exercise a perfecte science. the capitaines ought above all other thynges, whileste thei marche with an armie, to take heede of ambusshes, wherein they incurre daunger twoo waies, either marchynge thou entrest into them, or thoroughe crafte of the enemie thou arte trained in before thou arte aware. in the first case, mindyng to avoide suche perill, it is necessarie to sende afore double warde, whome may discover the countrey, and so muche the more dilligence ought to be used, the more that the countrey is apte for ambusshes, as be the woddie or hilly countries, for that alwaies thei be layd either in a wodde, or behind a hille: and as the ambusshe not forseene, doeth ruin thee, so forseyng the same, it cannot hurte thee. manie tymes birdes or muche duste have discovered the enemie: for that alwayes where the enemie cometh to finde thee, he shall make great duste, whiche shall signifie unto thee his comyng: so often tymes a capitaine seyng in the places where he ought to passe, doves to rise, or other of those birdes that flie in flockes, and to tourne aboute and not to light, hath knowen by the same the ambusshe of the enemies to be there, and sendynge before his men, and sertainely understandyng it, hath saved him selfe and hurte his enemie. concernyng the seconde case, to be trained in, (which these our men cal to be drawen to the shot) thou ought to take heede, not straight way to beleve those thinges, which are nothyng reasonable, that thei be as they seeme: as shoulde be, if the enemie should set afore thee a praie, thou oughtest to beleeve that in the same is the hooke, and that therin is hid the deceipte. if many enemies be driven away by a fewe of thine, if a fewe enemies assaulte manie of thine, if the enemies make a sodeine flight, and not standynge with reason, alwaies thou oughtest in suche cases to feare deceipte, and oughtest never to beleeve that the enemie knoweth not how to doe his businesse, but rather intendyng that he may begile thee the lesse, and mindyng to stand in lesse peril, the weaker that he is, and the lesse craftier that the enemie is, so muche the more thou oughtest to esteeme him: and thou muste in this case use twoo sundrie poinctes, for that thou oughtest to feare him in thy minde and with the order, but with wordes, and with other outewarde demonstracion, to seeme to dispyse him: because this laste way, maketh that the souldiours hope the more to have the victorie: the other maketh thee more warie, and lesse apte to be begyled. and thou hast to understand, that when men marche thoroughe the enemies countrey, they ar in muche more, and greater perils, then in fayghtyng the fielde: and therefore the capitaine in marchyng, ought to use double diligence: and the first thyng that he ought to doo, is to get described, and payncted oute all the countrie, thorough the which he must marche, so that he maye know the places, the number, the distances, the waies, the hilles, the rivers, the fennes, and all the quallites of them: and to cause this to bee knowen, it is convenient to have with him diversly, and in sundrie maners such men, as know the places, and to aske them with diligence, and to se whether their talke agree, and accordyng to the agreyng therof, to note: he oughte also to sende afore the horsemen, and with them prudente heddes, not so muche to discover the enemie, as to viewe the countrey, to se whether it agree with the description, and with the knowledge that they have of the same. also the guydes that are sente, ought to be kepte with hope of rewarde, and feare of paine. and above all thynges it ought to be provided, that the armie knowe not to what businesse he leadeth them: for that there is nothyng in the warre more profitable, then to keepe secret the thynges that is to be dooen: and to thintente a suddeine assaulte dooe not trouble thy soldiours, thou oughteste to see them to stande reddie with their weapons, because the thynges that ar provided for, offend lesse. manie for to avoyde the confusion of marchyng, have placed under the standerde, the carriages, and the unarmed, and have commaunded them to folow the same, to the intente that in marchyng needyng to staye, or to retire, they might dooe it more easely, which thyng as profitable, i alowe very muche. also in marchyng, advertismente ought to be had, that the one parte of the armie goe not a sunder from the other, or that thoroughe some goyng fast, and some softe, the armie become not slender: the whiche thynges, be occation of dissorder: therfore the heddes muste be placed in suche wise, that they may maintaine the pace even, causing to goe softe those that goe to fast, and to haste forward the other that goe to sloe, the whiche pace can not bee better ruled, then by the stroke of the drumme. the waies ought to be caused to be inlarged, so that alwaies at least a bande of iiii. hundred men may marche in order of battaile. the custome and the qualitie of the enemie ought to be considered, and whether that he wil assaulte thee either in the mornyng, or at none or in the evenynge, and whether he be more puisante with fotemen or horsemen, and accordyng as thou understandest, to ordeine and to provide for thy self. but let us come to some particular accidente. it hapneth sometime, that thou gettyng from the enemie, because thou judgest thy selfe inferiour, and therfore mindynge not to faight with him, and he comyng at thy backe, thou arivest at the banke of a river, passyng over the which, asketh time, so that the enemie is redie to overtake thee and to fayght with thee. some, which chaunsing to bee in suche perill, have inclosed their armie on the hinder parte with a diche, and fillyng the same full of towe, and firyng it, have then passed with the armie without beyng able to be letted of the enemie, he beyng by the same fire that was betwene them held backe. [sidenote: annone of carthage.] zanobi. i am harde of beliefe, that this fyre coulde stay theim, in especially because i remember that i have harde, howe annone of carthage, beyng besieged of enemies, inclosed him selfe on the same parte, with wodde, which he did set on fire where he purposed to make eruption. wherfore the enemies beyng not intentive on the same parte to looke to him, he made his armie to passe over the same flame, causing every man to holde his target before his face for to defend them from the fire, and smoke. [sidenote: nabide a spartayne; quintus luttatius pollecie to passe over a river; how to passe a ryver without a bridge; a polecie of cesar to passe a river, where his enemie beyng on the other side therof sought to lette hym.] fabricio. you saye well: but consider you howe i have saied, and howe annone did: for as muche as i saied that they made a diche, and filled it with towe, so that he, that woulde passe over the same, should be constrained to contende with the diche and with fire: annone made the fire, without the diche, and because he intended to passe over it, he made it not great, for that otherwise without the diche, it shoulde have letted him. dooe you not knowe, that nabide a spartan beyng besieged in sparta of the romaines, set fire on parte of his towne to let the way to the romaines, who alredie wer entred in? and by meane of the same flame not onely hindered their way, but drave them oute: but let us turne to our matter. quintus luttatius a romaine, havyng at his backe the cimbri, and commyng to a river, to thentente the enemie should give him time to passe over, semed to geve time to them to faight with him: and therfore he fained that he would lodge there, and caused trenches to be made, and certaine pavilions to be erected, and sent certayne horsemen into the countrie for forredge: so that the cimbrise beleevyng, that he incamped, they also incamped, and devided them selves into sundrie partes, to provide for victuals, wherof luttatius being aware, passed the river they beyng not able to let him. some for to passe a river havynge no bridge, have devided it, and one parte they have turned behynde their backes, and the other then becomynge shalower, with ease they have passed it: when the rivers be swift, purposyng to have their footemen to passe safely, they place their strongest horses on the higher side, that thei may sustain the water, and an other parte be lowe that may succour the men, if any of the river in passyng should be overcome with the water: they passe also rivers, that be verie deepe, with bridges, with botes, and with barrelles: and therfore it is good to have in a redinesse in an armie wherewith to be able to make all these thynges. it fortuneth sometime that in passyng a river, the enemie standynge agaynst thee on the other banke, doeth let thee: to minde to overcome this difficultie, i know not a better insample to folow, then the same of cesar, whome havynge his armie on the banke of a river in fraunce, and his passage beynge letted of vergintorige a frenche man, the whiche on the other side of the river had his men, marched many daies a longe the river, and the like did the enemie: wherfore cesar incamping in a woddie place, apte to hide men, he tooke out of every legion three cohortes, and made them to tarie in the same place, commaundynge theim that so soone as he was departed, they shoulde caste over a bridge, and should fortefie it, and he with his other menne folowed on the waye: wherfore vergintorige seyng the number of the legions, thinkyng that there was not left anie parte of theim behinde, folowed also his way: but cesar when he supposed that the bridge was made, tourned backewarde, and findynge all thinges in order, passed the river without difficultee. zanobi. have ye any rule to know the foordes? [sidenote: how to know the foordes of a river.] fabricio. yea, we have: alwaies the river, in that parte, whiche is betwene the water, that is stilleste, and the water that runneth fastest, there is least depth and it is a place more meete to be looked on, then any other where. for that alwaies in thesame place, the river is moste shallowest. the whiche thyng, bicause it hath been proved many tymes, is moste true. zanobi. if it chaunce that the river hath marde the foorde, so that the horses sincke, what reamedy have you? [sidenote: howe to escape oute of a straight where the same is besette with enemies; howe lutius minutius escaped out of a strayght wherin he was inclosed of his enemies; howe some capitaynes have suffered them selves to be compassed aboute of their enemies; a polecie of marcus antonius; a defence for the shotte of arrowes.] fabricio. the remedie is to make hardels of roddes whiche must be placed in the bottome of the river, and so to passe upon those: but let us folowe our reasonyng. if it happen that a capitain be led with his armie, betwen two hilles, and that he have not but twoo waies to save hymself, either that before, or that behinde, and those beyng beset of thenemies, he hath for remidie to doe the same, which some have doen heretofore: that which have made on their hinder parte a greate trenche, difficult to passe over, and semed to the enemie, to mynde to kepe him of, for to be able with al his power, without neding to feare behinde, to make force that waie, whiche before remaineth open. the whiche the enemies belevyng, have made theim selves stronge, towardes the open parte, and have forsaken the inclosed and he then castyng a bridge of woode over the trenche, for soche an effect prepared, bothe on thesame parte, with out any impedimente hath passed, and also delivered hymself out of the handes of the enemie. lucius minutus a consul of rome, was in liguria with an armie, and was of the enemies inclosed, betwene certaine hilles, whereby he could not go out: therefore he sente certaine souldiours of numidia on horsebacke, whiche he had in his armie (whom were evill armed, and upon little leane horses) towardes the places that were kepte of the enemies, whom at the first sight made the enemies, to order theim selves together, to defende the passage: but after that thei sawe those men ill apoincted, and accordyng to their facion evill horsed, regardyng theim little, enlarged the orders of their warde, wherof so sone as the numidians wer a ware, givyng the spurres to their horses, and runnyng violently upon theim, passed before thei could provide any remedy, whom beyng passed, destroied and spoiled the countrie after soche sorte, that thei constrained the enemies, to leave the passage free to the armie of lucius. some capitaine, whiche hath perceived hymself to be assaulted of a greate multitude of enemies, hath drawen together his men, and hath given to the enemie commoditie, to compasse hym all about, and then on thesame part, whiche he hath perceived to be moste weake, hath made force, and by thesame waie, hath caused to make waie, and saved hymself. marcus antonius retiryng before the armie of the parthians, perceived how the enemies every daie before sunne risyng, when he removed, assaulted him, and all the waie troubled hym: in so moch, that he determined not to departe the nexte daie, before none: so that the parthians beleving, that he would not remove that daie, retourned to their tentes. whereby marcus antonius might then all the reste of the daie, marche without any disquietnesse. this self same man for to avoide the arrowes of the parthians, commaunded his men, that when the parthians came towardes them, thei should knele, and that the second ranke of the battailes, should cover with their targaettes, the heddes of the firste, the thirde, the seconde, the fowerth the third, and so successively, that all the armie came, to be as it were under a pentehouse, and defended from the shotte of the enemies. this is as moche as is come into my remembraunce, to tell you, which maie happen unto an armie marchyng: therefore, if you remember not any thyng els, i will passe to an other parte. the sixthe booke zanobi. i beleve that it is good, seyng the reasonyng must be chaunged, that baptiste take his office, and i to resigne myne, and wee shall come in this case, to imitate the good capitaines (accordyng as i have nowe here understoode of the gentilman) who place the beste souldiours, before and behinde the armie, semyng unto theim necessarie to have before, soche as maie lustely beginne the faight, and soche as behinde maie lustely sustaine it. now seyng cosimus began this reasonyng prudently, baptiste prudently shall ende it. as for luigi and i, have in this middeste intertained it, and as every one of us hath taken his part willingly, so i beleve not, that baptiste wil refuse it. baptiste. i have let my self been governed hetherto, so i minde to doe still. therfore be contente sir, to folowe your reasonyng, and if we interrupte you with this practise of ours, have us excused. [sidenote: how the grekes incamped; howe the romaines incamped; the maner of the incamping of an armie; the lodging for the generall capitaine.] fabricio. you dooe me, as all readie i have saied, a moste greate pleasure; for this your interrupting me, taketh not awaie my fantasie, but rather refresheth me. but mindyng to followe our matter i saie, how that it is now tyme, that we lodge this our armie, for that you knowe every thyng desireth reste and saftie, bicause to reste, and not to reste safely, is no perfecte reste: i doubte moche, whether it hath not been desired of you, that i should firste have lodged them, after made theim to marche, and laste of all to faight, and we have doen the contrary: whereunto necessitie hath brought us, for that intendyng to shewe, how an armie in going, is reduced from the forme of marching, to thesame maner of faightyng, it was necessarie to have firste shewed, how thei ordered it to faight. but tournyng to our matter, i saie, that minding to have the campe sure, it is requisite that it be strong, and in good order: the industrie of the capitaine, maketh it in order, the situacion, or the arte, maketh it stronge. the grekes sought strong situacions, nor thei would never place theim selves, where had not been either cave, or bancke of a river, or multitude of trees, or other naturall fortificacion, that might defende theim: but the romaines not so moche incamped safe through the situacion, as through arte, nor thei would never incampe in place, where thei should not have been able to have raunged all their bandes of menne, accordyng to their discipline. hereby grewe, that the romaines might kepe alwaies one forme of incamping, for that thei would, that the situacion should bee ruled by them, not thei by the situacion: the which the grekes could not observe, for that beyng ruled by the situacion, and variyng the situacion and forme, it was conveniente, that also thei should varie the maner of incampyng, and the facion of their lodgynges. therefore the romaines, where the situacion lacked strength thei supplied thesame with arte, and with industrie. and for that i in this my declaracion, have willed to imitate the romaines, i will not departe from the maner of their incamping, yet not observyng altogether their order, but takyng thesame parte, whiche semeth unto me, to be mete for this present tyme. i have told you many tymes, how the romaines had in their consull armies, twoo legions of romaine men, whiche were aboute a leven thousande footemen, and sixe hundred horsemen, and moreover thei had an other leven thousande footemen, sente from their frendes in their aide: nor in their armie thei had never more souldiers that were straungers, then romaines, excepte horsemenne, whom thei cared not, though thei were more in nomber then theirs: and in all their doynges, thei did place their legions in the middeste, and the aiders, on the sides: the whiche maner, thei observed also in incampyng, as by your self you maie rede, in those aucthoures, that write of their actes: and therefore i purpose not to shewe you distinctly how thei incamped, but to tell you onely with what order, i at this presente would incampe my armie, whereby you shall then knowe, what parte i have taken out of the romaine maners. you knowe, that in stede of twoo romaine legions, i have taken twoo maine battailes of footemen, of sixe thousande footemen, and three hundred horsemen, profitable for a maine battaile, and into what battailes, into what weapons, into what names i have devided theim: you knowe howe in orderyng tharmie to marche, and to faight, i have not made mencion of other men, but onely have shewed, how that doublyng the men, thei neded not but to double the orders: but mindyng at this presente, to shew you the maner of incampyng, me thinketh good not to stande onely with twoo maine battailes, but to bryng together a juste armie, made like unto the romaines, of twoo maine battailes, and of as many more aidyng men: the whiche i make, to the intent that the forme of the incampyng, maie be the more perfect, by lodgyng a perfecte armie: whiche thyng in the other demonstracions, hath not semed unto me so necessarie. purposing then, to incampe a juste armie, of xxiiii. thousande footemen, and of twoo thousande good horsemenne, beeyng devided into fower maine battailes, twoo of our owne menne, and twoo of straungers, i would take this waie. the situacion beyng founde, where i would incampe, i would erecte the hed standarde, and aboute it, i would marke out a quadrant, whiche should have every side distante from it xxxvii. yardes and a half, of whiche every one of them should lye, towardes one of the fower regions of heaven, as easte, weste, southe, and northe: betwene the whiche space, i would that the capitaines lodgyng should be appoincted. and bicause i beleve that it is wisedom, to devide the armed from the unarmed, seyng that so, for the moste parte the romaines did, i would therefore seperate the menne, that were cumbered with any thing, from the uncombered. i would lodge all, or the greatest parte of the armed, on the side towardes the easte, and the unarmed, and the cumbred, on the weste side, makyng easte the hedde, and weste the backe of the campe, and southe, and northe should be the flanckes: and for to distinguishe the lodgynges of the armed, i would take this waie. i would drawe a line from the hedde standarde, and lead it towardes the easte, the space of ccccc.x. yardes and a half: i would after, make two other lines, that should place in the middeste the same, and should bee as longe as that, but distante eche of theim from it a leven yardes and a quarter: in the ende whereof, i would have the easte gate, and the space that is betwene the twoo uttermoste lines, should make a waie, that should go from the gate, to the capitaines lodging, whiche shall come to be xxii. yardes and a halfe broad, and cccclxxii. yardes and a halfe longe, for the xxxvii. yardes and a halfe, the lodgyng of the capitaine will take up: and this shall bee called the capitaine waie. then there shall be made an other waie, from the southe gate, to the northe gate, and shall passe by the hedde of the capitaine waie, and leave the capitaines lodgyng towardes theaste, whiche waie shalbe ix.c.xxxvii. yardes and a halfe long (for the length therof wilbe as moche as the breadth of all the lodgynges) and shall likewise be xxii. yardes and a half broad, and shalbe called the crosse waie. then so sone as the capitaines lodgyng, were appoincted out, and these twoo waies, there shall bee begun to be appoincted out, the lodginges of our own two main battailes, one of the whiche, i would lodge on the right hand of the capitaines waie, and the other, on the lefte: and therefore passing over the space, that the breadth of the crosse waie taketh, i would place xxxii. lodgynges, on the lefte side of the capitain waie, and xxxii. on the right side, leavyng betwene the xvi. and the xvii. lodgyng, a space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, the whiche should serve for a waie overthwart, whiche should runne overthwarte, throughout all the lodgynges of the maine battailes as in the distributyng of them shall bee seen. [sidenote: the lodgings for the men of armes, and their capitaine; note, which is breadth and whiche length in the square campe; the lodgings for the lighte horsemen, and their capitain; the lodgings for the footemen of twoo ordinary main battailes; the lodgings for the conestables; the nomber of footemen appoincted to every lodging; the lodynges for the chiefe capitaines of the maine battayles and for the treasurers, marshals and straungers; lodginges for the horsemen, of the extraordinarie mayne battailes; the lodgynges for the extraordinarie pykes and veliti; how the artillerie must be placed in the campe; lodgynges for the unarmed men, and the places that are apoineted for the impedimentes of the campe.] of these twoo orders of lodgynges in the beginnyng of the head, whiche shall come to joygne to the crosse waye, i would lodge the capitaine of the men of armes, in the xv. lodgynges, which on everie side foloweth next, their men of armes, where eche main battaile, havyng a cl. men of armes, it will come to ten men of armes for a lodgyng. the spaces of the capitaines lodgynges, should be in bredth xxx. and in length vii. yardes and a halfe. and note that when so ever i sai bredeth, it signifieth the space of the middest from southe to northe, and saiyng length, that whiche is from weste to easte. those of the men of armes, shoulde be xi. yardes and a quarter in length, and xxii. yardes and a halfe in bredeth. in the other xv. lodgynges, that on everie syde should folowe, the whiche should have their beginnyng on the other side of the overthwarte way, and whiche shall have the very same space, that those of the men of armes had, i woulde lodge the light horsemen: wherof beynge a hundred and fiftie, it will come to x. horsemen for a lodgyng, and in the xvi. that remaineth, i woulde lodge their capitaine, gevynge him the verie same space, that is geven to the capitain of the men of armes: and thus the lodginges of the horsemen of two maine battailes, will come to place in the middest the capitaine way, and geve rule to the lodginges of the footemen, as i shall declare. you have noted how i have lodged the ccc. horsemen of everie main battaile with their capitaines, in xxxii. lodgynges placed on the captaine waie, havynge begun from the crosse waie, and how from the xvi. to the xvii. there remaineth a space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, to make awaie overthwarte. mindyng therefore to lodge the xx. battailes, which the twoo ordinarie maine battailes have, i woulde place the lodgyng of everie twoo battailes, behinde the lodgynges of the horsemen, everie one of whiche, should have in length xi. yardes and a quarter, and in bredeth xxii. yardes and a half as those of the horsemens, and shoulde bee joigned on the hinder parte, that thei shoulde touche the one the other. and in every first lodgyng on everie side which cometh to lie on the crosse waie, i woulde lodge the counstable of a battaile, whiche should come to stand even with the lodgyng of the capitayne of the men of armes, and this lodgyng shall have onely of space for bredeth xv. yardes, and for length vii. yardes and a halfe. in the other xv. lodgynges, that on everie side followeth after these, even unto the overthwarte way, i would lodge on everie part a battaile of foote men, whiche beyng iiii. hundred and fiftie, there will come to a lodgyng xxx. the other xv. lodgynges, i woulde place continually on every side on those of the light horse men, with the verie same spaces, where i woulde lodge on everie part, an other battaile of fote men, and in the laste lodgyng, i would place on every parte the conestable of the battaile, whiche will come to joigne with the same of the capitaine of the lighte horsemen, with the space of vii. yardes and a halfe for length, and xv. for bredeth: and so these two firste orders of lodgynges, shal be halfe of horsemen, and halfe of footemen. and for that i woulde (as in the place therof i have tolde you) these horse menne shoulde be all profitable, and for this havynge no servauntes whiche in kepyng the horses, or in other necessarie thynges might helpe them, i woulde that these footemen, who lodge behynde the horse, should bee bounde to helpe to provide, and to keepe theim for their maisters: and for this to bee exempted from the other doynges of the campe. the whiche maner, was observed of the romanies. then leavyng after these lodgynges on everie parte, a space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, whiche shoulde make awaye, that shoulde be called the one, the firste waye on the righte hande, and the other the firste waie on the lefte hand, i woulde pitche on everie side an other order of xxxii. double lodgynges, whiche should tourne their hinder partes the one againste the other with the verie same spaces, as those that i have tolde you of, and devided after the sixtenth in the verie same maner for to make the overthwarte waie, where i would lodge on every side iiii. battailes of footemen, with their constables in bothe endes. then leavyng on every side an other space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, that shoulde make a waie, whiche shoulde be called of the one side, the seconde waie on the right hande, and on the other syde, the seconde way on the lefte hande, i would place an other order on everie side of xxxii. double lodgynges, with the verie same distance and devisions, where i would lodge on everie side, other iiii. battailes with their constables: and thus the horesemenne and the bandes of the twoo ordinarie maine battailes, should come to be lodged in three orders of lodgynges, on the one side of the capitaine waie, and in three other orders of lodgynges on the other side of the capitaine waie. the twoo aidyng maine battels (for that i cause them to be made of the verie same nation) i woulde lodge them on everie parte of these twoo ordinarie maine battailes, with the very same orders of double lodgynges, pitchyng first one order of lodgynges, where should lodge halfe the horsemen, and half the foote men, distance xxii. yardes and a halfe from the other, for to make a way whiche should be called the one, the thirde waie on the right hande, and the other the thirde waie on the lefte hande. and after, i woulde make on everie side, twoo other orders of lodgynges, in the verie same maner destinguesshed and ordeined, as those were of the ordinarie maine battelles, which shall make twoo other wayes, and they all should be called of the numbre, and of the hande, where thei should be placed: in suche wyse, that all this side of the armie, shoulde come to be lodged in xii. orders of double lodgynges, and in xiii. waies, reckenynge captaine waie, and crosse waie: i would there should remayne a space from the lodgynges to the trenche of lxxv. yardes rounde aboute: and if you recken al these spaces, you shall see that from the middest of the capitaines lodgyng to the easte gate, there is dx. yardes. now there remaineth twoo spaces, whereof one is from the capitaines lodgyng to the southe gate, the other is from thense to the northe gate: whiche come to be (either of them measurynge them from the poincte in the middest) cccc.lxxvi. yardes. then takyng out of everie one of these spaces xxxvii. yardes and a halfe, whiche the capitaynes lodgynge occupieth, and xxxiiii. yardes everie waie for a market place, and xxii. yardes and a halfe for way that devides everie one of the saied spaces in the middest, and lxxv. yardes, that is lefte on everie part betweene the lodgynges and the trenche, there remaineth on every side a space for lodginges of ccc. yardes broade, and lxxv. yardes longe, measurynge the length with the space that the captaines lodgynge taketh up. devidynge then in the middest the saied lengthe, there woulde be made on every hande of the capitaine xl. lodgynges xxxvii. yardes and a halfe longe, and xv. broade, whiche will come to be in all lxxx. lodgynges, wherin shall be lodged the heddes of the maine battailes, the treasurers, the marshalles of the fielde, and all those that shoulde have office in the armie, leavyng some voide for straungers that shoulde happen to come, and for those that shall serve for good will of the capitaine. on the parte behinde the capitaines lodgynge, i would have a way from southe to northe xxiii. yardes large, and shoulde be called the bed way, whiche shall come to be placed a longe by the lxxx. lodgynges aforesayd: for that this waie, and the crosseway, shall come to place in the middest betweene them bothe the capitaines lodgynge, and the lxxx. lodgynges that be on the sides therof. from this bed waie, and from over agaynst the captaines lodgyng, i would make an other waie, which shoulde goe from thens to the weste gate, lykewyse broade xxii. yardes and a halfe, and should aunswer in situation and in length to the captaine way, and should be called the market waie. these twoo waies beynge made, i woulde ordeine the market place, where the market shall bee kepte, whiche i woulde place on the head of the market way over against the capitaines lodgynge, and joigned to the head way, and i woulde have it to be quadrante, and woulde assigne lxxxx. yardes and three quarters to a square: and on the right hande and lefte hande, of the saied market place, i would make two orders of lodginges, where everie order shal have eight double lodginges, which shall take up in length, ix. yardes, and in bredeth xxii. yardes and a halfe, so that there shall come to be on every hande of the market place, xvi. lodgynges that shall place the same in the middest which shall be in al xxxii. wherin i woulde lodge those horsemen, which shoulde remaine to the aidyng mayne battailes: and when these should not suffise, i woulde assigne theim some of those lodginges that placeth between them the capitaines lodgynge, and in especially those, that lie towardes the trenche. there resteth now to lodge the pikes, and extraordinarie veliti, that everie main battaile hath, which you know accordynge to our order, how everie one hath besides the x. battailes m. extraordinarie pikes, and five hundreth veliti: so that the twoo cheefe maine battailes, have two thousande extraordinarie pikes, and a thousande extraordinarie veliti, and the ayders as many as those, so that yet there remaineth to be lodged, vi. m. menne, whome i woulde lodge all on the weste side, and a longe the trenche. then from the ende of the hed waye, towardes northe, leavyng the space of lxxv. yardes from them to the trenche, i woulde place an order of v. double lodgynges, whiche in all shoulde take up lvi. yardes in lengthe, and xxx. in bredeth: so that the bredeth devided, there will come to everie lodgyng xi. yardes and a quarter for lengthe, and for bredeth twoo and twentie yardes and a half. and because there shall be x. lodgynges, i will lodge three hundred men, apoinctyng to every lodging xxx. men: leavyng then a space of three and twentie yardes and a quarter, i woulde place in like wise, and with like spaces an other order of five double lodgynges, and againe an other, till there were five orders of five double lodgynges: which wil come to be fiftie lodgynges placed by right line on the northe side, every one of them distante from the trenche lxxv. yardes, which will lodge fifteene hundred men. tournyng after on the lefte hande towardes the weste gate, i woulde pitche in all the same tracte, whiche were from them to the saied gate, five other orders of double lodgynges, with the verie same spaces, and with the verie same maner: true it is, that from the one order to the other, there shall not be more then a xi. yardes and a quarter of space: wherin shall be lodged also fifteene hundred men: and thus from the northe gate to the weste, as the trenche turneth, in a hundred lodginges devided in x. rewes of five double lodgynges in a rowe, there will be lodged all the pikes and extraordinarie veliti of the cheefe maine battayles. and so from the west gate to the southe, as the trenche tourneth even in the verie same maner, in other ten rewes of ten lodgynges in a rewe, there shall be lodged the pikes, and extraordinarie veliti of the aidyng mayne battailes. their headdes or their counstables may take those lodgynges, that shal seeme unto them moste commodious, on the parte towardes the trenche. the artillerie, i woulde dispose throughoute all the campe, a longe the banke of the trenche: and in all the other space that shoulde remaine towardes weste, i woulde lodge all the unarmed, and place all the impedimentes of the campe. and it is to be understoode, that under this name of impedimentes (as you know) the antiquitee mente all the same trayne, and all those thynges, which are necessarie for an armie, besides the souldiours: as are carpenters, smithes, masons, ingeners, bombardiers, althoughe that those might be counted in the numbre of the armed, herdemen with their herdes of motons and beeves whiche for victuallyng of the armie, are requiset: and moreover maisters of all sciences, together with publicke carriages of the publicke munition, whiche pertaine as well to victuallyng, as to armynge. nor i would not distinguishe these lodginges perticularly, only i would marke out the waies which should not be occupied of them: then the other spaces, that betweene the waies shall remaine, whiche shall be fower, i woulde appoincte theim generally for all the saied impedimentes, that is one for the herdemen, the other for artificers and craftes men, the thirde for publicke carriages of victuals, the fowerth for the municion of armour and weapons. the waies whiche i woulde shoulde be lefte without ocupiyng them, shal be the market waie, the head waye, and more over a waie that shoulde be called the midde waye, whiche should goe from northe to southe, and should passe thoroughe the middest of the market waie, whiche from the weste parte, shoulde serve for the same purpose that the overthwarte way doeth on the east parte. and besides this, a waye whiche shall goe aboute on the hinder parte, alonge the lodgynges of the pikes and extraordinarie veliti, and all these wayes shall be twoo and tweentie vardes and a halfe broade. and the artilerie, i woulde place a longe the trenche of the campe, rounde aboute the same. baptiste. i confesse that i understand not, nor i beleeve that also to saye so, is any shame unto me, this beyng not my exercise: notwithstandyng, this order pleaseth me muche: onely i woulde that you shoulde declare me these doubtes: the one, whie you make the waie, and the spaces aboute so large. the other, that troubleth me more, is these spaces, whiche you apoincte oute for the lodgynges, howe they ought to be used. [sidenote: the campe ought to be all waies of one facion.] fabricio. you must note, that i make all the waies, xxii. yardes and a halfe broade, to the intente that thorowe them, maie go a battaile of men in araie, where if you remember wel, i tolde you how every bande of menne, taketh in breadth betwene xviii. and xxii. yardes of space to marche or stande in. nowe where the space that is betwene the trenche, and the lodgynges, is lxxv. yardes broade, thesame is moste necessarie, to the intent thei maie there order the battailes, and the artillerie, bothe to conducte by thesame the praies, and to have space to retire theim selves with newe trenches, and newe fortificacion if neede were: the lodginges also, stande better so farre from the diches, beyng the more out of daunger of fires, and other thynges, whiche the enemie, might throwe to hurte them. concernyng the seconde demaunde, my intent is not that every space, of me marked out, bee covered with a pavilion onely, but to be used, as tourneth commodious to soch as lodge there, either with more or with lesse tentes, so that thei go not out of the boundes of thesame. and for to marke out these lodginges, there ought to bee moste cunnyng menne, and moste excellente architectours, whom, so sone as the capitaine hath chosen the place, maie knowe how to give it the facion, and to distribute it, distinguishyng the waies, devidyng the lodgynges with coardes and staves, in soche practised wise, that straight waie, thei maie bee ordained, and devided: and to minde that there growe no confusion, it is conveniente to tourne the campe, alwaies one waie, to the intente that every manne maie knowe in what waie, in what space he hath to finde his lodgyng: and this ought to be observed in every tyme, in every place, and after soche maner, that it seme a movyng citee, the whiche where so ever it goweth, carrieth with it the verie same waies, the verie same habitacions, and the verie same aspectes, that it had at the firste: the whiche thing thei cannot observe, whom sekyng strong situacions, must chaunge forme, accordyng to the variacion of the grounde: but the romaines in the plaine, made stronge the place where thei incamped with trenches, and with rampires, bicause thei made a space about the campe, and before thesame a ditche, ordinary broad fower yardes and a halfe, and depe aboute twoo yardes and a quarter, the which spaces, thei increased, according as thei intended to tarie in a place, and accordyng as thei feared the enemie. i for my parte at this presente, would not make the listes, if i intende not to winter in a place: yet i would make the trenche and the bancke no lesse, then the foresaied, but greater, accordyng to necessitie. also, consideryng the artellerie, i would intrench upon every corner of the campe, a halfe circle of ground, from whens the artillerie might flancke, whom so ever should seke to come over the trenche. in this practise in knowyng how to ordain a campe, the souldiours ought also to be exercised, and to make with them the officers expert, that are appoincted to marke it out, and the souldiours readie to knowe their places: nor nothyng therein is difficulte, as in the place thereof shall bee declared: wherefore, i will goe forewarde at this tyme to the warde of the campe, bicause without distribucion of the watche, all the other pain that hath been taken, should be vain. baptiste. before you passe to the watche, i desire that you would declare unto me, when one would pitche his campe nere the enemie, what waie is used: for that i knowe not, how a man maie have tyme, to be able to ordaine it without perill. fabricio. you shall understande this, that no capitaine will lye nere the enemie, except he, that is desposed to faight the fielde, when so ever his adversarie will: and when a capitaine is so disposed, there is no perill, but ordinarie: for that the twoo partes of the armie, stande alwaies in a redinesse, to faight the battaile, and thother maketh the lodginges. the romaines in this case, gave this order of fortifiyng the campe, unto the triarii: and the prencipi, and the astati, stoode in armes. this thei did, for as moche as the triarii, beyng the last to faight, might have time inough, if the enemie came, to leave the woorke, and to take their weapons, and to get them into their places. therfore, accordyng unto the romaines maner, you ought to cause the campe to be made of those battailes, whiche you will set in the hinder parte of the armie, in the place of the triarii. but let us tourne to reason of the watche. [sidenote: theantiquitie used no scoutes; the watche and warde of the campe.] i thinke i have not founde, emongest the antiquitie, that for to warde the campe in the night, thei have kepte watche without the trenche, distaunte as thei use now a daies, whom thei call scoutes: the whiche i beleve thei did, thinkyng that the armie might easely bee deceived, through the difficultie, that is in seeyng them againe, for that thei might bee either corrupted, or oppressed of the enemie: so that to truste either in parte, or altogether on them, thei judged it perillous. and therefore, all the strength of the watche, was with in the trenche, whiche thei did withall diligence kepe, and with moste greate order, punished with death, whom so ever observed not thesame order: the whiche how it was of them ordained, i will tell you no other wise, leaste i should bee tedious unto you, beyng able by your self to see it, if as yet you have not seen it: i shall onely briefly tell that, whiche shall make for my purpose, i wold cause to stand ordinarely every night, the thirde parte of the armie armed, and of thesame, the fowerth parte alwaies on foote, whom i would make to bee destributed, throughout all the banckes, and throughout all the places of the armie, with double warde, placed in every quadrante of thesame: of whiche, parte should stande still, parte continually should go from the one corner of the campe, to the other: and this order, i would observe also in the daie, when i should have the enemie nere. [sidenote: dilligence ought to be used, to knowe who lieth oute of the campe, and who they be that cometh of newe; claudius nero; the justice that ought to be in a campe. the fauts that the antiquitie punisshed with death; where greate punishementes be, there oughte likewise to bee great rewardes; it was no marvel that the romaines became mightie princes; a meane to punishe and execute justice, without raising tumultes; manlius capitolinus; souldiours sworen to kepe the discipline of warre.] concernyng the givyng of the watche worde, and renuyng thesame every evening, and to doe the other thynges, whiche in like watches is used, bicause thei are thynges well inough knowen, i will speake no further of them: onely i shall remember one thyng, for that it is of greate importaunce, and whiche causeth great saulfgarde observyng it, and not observyng it, moche harme: the whiche is, that there be observed greate diligence, to knowe at night, who lodgeth not in the campe, and who commeth a newe: and this is an easie thing to see who lodgeth, with thesame order that wee have appoincted: for as moche as every lodgyng havyng the determined nomber of menne, it is an easie matter to see, if thei lacke, or if there be more menne: and when thei come to be absente without lisence, to punishe them as fugetives, and if there bee more, to understande what thei be, what they make there, and of their other condicions. this diligence maketh that the enemie cannot but with difficultie, practise with thy capitaines, and have knowlege of thy counsailes: which thing if of the romaines, had not been diligently observed, claudius nero could not, havyng aniball nere hym, depart from his campe, whiche he had in lucania, and to go and to retourne from marca, without aniball should have firste heard thereof some thyng. but it suffiseth not to make these orders good, excepte thei bee caused to bee observed, with a greate severtie: for that there is nothyng that would have more observacion, then is requisite in an armie: therefore the lawes for the maintenaunce of thesame, ought to be sharpe and harde, and the executour therof moste harde. the romaines punished with death him that lacked in the watch, he that forsoke the place that was given hym to faight in, he that caried any thynge, hidde out of the campe, if any manne should saie, that he had doen some worthy thing in the faight, and had not doen it, if any had fought without the commaundemente of the capitaine, if any had for feare, caste awaie his weapons: and when it happened, that a cohorte, or a whole legion, had committed like fault, bicause thei would not put to death all, thei yet tooke al their names, and did put them in a bagge, and then by lotte, thei drue oute the tenthe parte, and so those were put to death: the whiche punishemente, was in soche wise made, that though every man did not feele it every man notwithstandyng feared it: and bicause where be greate punishementes, there ought to be also rewardes, mindyng to have menne at one instant, to feare and to hope, thei had appoincted rewardes to every worthie acte: as he that faighting, saved the life of one of his citezeins, to hym that firste leapte upon the walle of the enemies toune, to hym that entered firste into the campe of the enemies, to hym that had in faightyng hurte, or slaine the enemie, he that had stroken him from his horse: and so every vertuous act, was of the consulles knowen and rewarded, and openly of every manne praised: and soche as obtained giftes, for any of these thynges, besides the glorie and fame, whiche thei got emongest the souldiours, after when thei returned into their countrie, with solemne pompe, and with greate demonstracion emong their frendes and kinsfolkes, thei shewed them. therefore it was no marveile, though thesame people gotte so moche dominion, having so moche observacion in punishemente, and rewarde towardes theim, whom either for their well doyng, or for their ill doyng, should deserve either praise or blame: of whiche thynges it were convenient, to observe the greater parte. nor i thinke not good to kepe secrete, one maner of punishmente of theim observed, whiche was, that so sone as the offendour, was before the tribune, or consulle convicted, he was of the same lightely stroken with a rodde: after the whiche strikyng, it was lawfull for the offendour to flie, and to all the souldiours to kill hym: so that straight waie, every man threwe at hym either stones, or dartes, or with other weapons, stroke hym in soche wise, that he went but little waie a live, and moste fewe escaped, and to those that so escaped, it was not lawfull for them to retourne home, but with so many incommodities, and soche greate shame and ignomie, that it should have ben moche better for him to have died. this maner is seen to be almoste observed of the suizzers, who make the condempned to be put to death openly, of thother souldiours, the whiche is well considered, and excellently dooen: for that intendyng, that one be not a defendour of an evill doer, the greateste reamedie that is founde, is to make hym punisher of thesame: bicause otherwise, with other respecte he favoureth hym: where when he hymself is made execucioner, with other desire, he desireth his punishemente, then when the execucion commeth to an other. therefore mindyng, not to have one favored in his faulte of the people, a greate remedie it is, to make that the people, maie have hym to judge. for the greater proofe of this, thinsample of manlius capitolinus might be brought, who being accused of the scenate, was defended of the people, so longe as thei were not judge, but becommyng arbitratours in his cause, thei condempned hym to death. this is then a waie to punishe, without raisyng tumultes, and to make justise to be kepte: and for as moche as to bridell armed menne, neither the feare of the lawes, nor of menne suffise not, the antiquitie joined thereunto the aucthoritie of god: and therefore with moste greate ceremonies, thei made their souldiours to sweare, to kepe the discipline of warre, so that doyng contrariewise, thei should not onely have to feare the lawes, and menne, but god: and thei used all diligence, to fill them with religion. [sidenote: women and idell games, were not suffered by the antiquitie, to bee in their armies.] baptiste. did the romaines permitte, that women might bee in their armies, or that there might be used these idell plaies, whiche thei use now a daies. fabricio. thei prohibited the one and thother, and this prohibicion was not moche difficulte: for that there were so many exercises, in the whiche thei kept every daie the souldiours, some whiles particularely, somewhiles generally occupied that thei had no time to thinke, either on venus, or on plaies, nor on any other thyng, whiche sedicious and unproffitable souldiours doe. baptiste. i am herein satisfied, but tell me, when the armie had to remove, what order kepte thei? [sidenote: ordre in the removing the armie by the soundes of a trumpet.] fabricio. the chief trumpet sounded three tymes, at the firste sound, thei toke up the tentes, and made the packes, at the seconde, thei laded the carriage, at the thirde, thei removed in thesame maner aforsaied, with the impedimentes after every parte of armed men, placyng the legions in the middeste: and therefore you ought to cause after thesame sorte, an extraordinarie maine battaile to remove: and after that, the particulare impedimentes therof, and with those, the fowerth part of the publike impedimentes, which should bee all those, that were lodged in one of those partes, whiche a little afore we declared: and therfore it is conveniente, to have every one of them, appointed to a maine battaile, to the entente that the armie removyng, every one might knowe his place in marchyng: and thus every maine battaile ought to goe awaie, with their owne impedimentes, and with the fowerth parte of the publike impedimentes, followyng after in soche maner, as wee shewed that the romaines marched. baptiste. in pitchyng the campe, had thei other respectes, then those you have tolde? [sidenote: respectes to be had for incampyng; how to choose a place to incampe; how to avoide diseases from the armie; the wonderfull commoditie of exercise; the provision of victualles that ought alwaies to bee in a readinesse in an armie.] fabricio. i tell you again, that the romaines when thei encamped, would be able to kepe the accustomed fashion of their maner, the whiche to observe, thei had no other respecte: but concernyng for other consideracions, thei had twoo principall, the one, to incampe theim selves in a wholesome place, the other, to place themselves, where thenemie could not besiege theim, nor take from them the waie to the water, or victualles. then for to avoide infirmitie, thei did flie from places fennie, or subjecte to hurtfull windes: whiche thei knewe not so well, by the qualitie of the situacion, as by the face of the inhabitours: for when thei sawe theim evill coloured, or swollen, or full of other infeccion, thei would not lodge there: concernyng thother respecte to provide not to be besieged, it is requisite to consider the nature of the place, where the friendes lye, and thenemies, and of this to make a conjecture, if thou maiest be besieged or no: and therefore it is meete, that the capitaine be moste experte, in the knowlege of situacions of countries, and have aboute him divers men, that have the verie same expertenes. thei avoide also diseases, and famishment, with causyng the armie to kepe no misrule, for that to purpose to maintain it in health, it is nedefull to provide, that the souldiours maie slepe under tentes, that thei maie lodge where bee trees, that make shadowe, where woodde is for to dresse their meate, that thei go not in the heate, and therefore thei muste bee drawen out of the campe, before daie in summer, and in winter, to take hede that thei marche not in the snowe, and in the froste, without havyng comoditie to make fire, and not to lack necessarie aparel, nor to drink naughtie water: those that fall sicke by chaunce, make them to bee cured of phisicions: bicause a capitain hath no reamedie, when he hath to faight with sicknesse, and with an enemie: but nothing is so profitable, to maintaine the armie in health, as is the exercise: and therfore the antiquitie every daie, made them to exercise: wherby is seen how muche exercise availeth: for that in the campe, it kepeth thee in health, and in the faight victorious. concernyng famishemente, it is necessarie to see, that the enemie hinder thee not of thy victualles, but to provide where thou maieste have it, and to see that thesame whiche thou haste, bee not loste: and therefore it is requisite, that thou have alwaies in provision with the armie, sufficiente victuall for a monethe, and then removyng into some strong place, thou muste take order with thy nexte frendes, that daily thei maie provide for thee, and above al thinges bestowe the victual with diligence, givyng every daie to every manne, a reasonable measure, and observe after soche sorte this poincte, that it disorder thee not: bicause all other thyng in the warre, maie with tyme be overcome, this onely with tyme overcometh thee: nor there shall never any enemie of thyne, who maie overcome thee with famishemente, that will seeke to overcome thee with iron. for that though the victory be not so honourable, yet it is more sure and more certaine: then, thesame armie cannot avoide famishemente, that is not an observer of justice, whiche licenciously consumeth what it liste: bicause the one disorder, maketh that the victualls commeth not unto you, the other, that soche victuall as commeth, is unprofitably consumed: therefore thantiquitie ordained, that thei should spende thesame, whiche thei gave, and in thesame tyme when thei appoincted: for that no souldiour did eate, but when the capitaine did eate: the whiche how moche it is observed of the armies nowe adaies, every manne knoweth, and worthely thei can not bee called menne of good order and sober, as the antiquitie, but lasivious and drunkardes. baptiste. you saied in the beginnyng of orderynge the campe, that you woulde not stande onely uppon twoo maine battailes, but woulde take fower, for to shewe how a juste armie incamped: therfore i would you shoulde tell me twoo thynges, the one, when i shoulde have more or lesse men, howe i ought to incampe them, the other, what numbre of souldiours should suffice you to faight against what so ever enemie that were. [sidenote: howe to lodge in the campe more or lesse menne, then the ordinarie; the nombre of men that an army ought to be made of, to bee able to faighte with the puisantest enemie that is; howe to cause men to do soche a thing as shold bee profitable for thee, and hurtfull to them selves; howe to overcome menne at unwares; how to tourne to commoditie the doynges of soche, as use to advertise thy enemie of thy proceadynges; how to order the campe, that the enemie shal not perceive whether the same bee deminished, or increased; a saiyng of metellus; marcus crassus; how to understand the secretes of thy enemie; a policie of marius, to understande howe he might truste the frenchmen; what some capitaines have doen when their countrie have been invaded of enemies; to make the enemie necligente in his doynges; silla asdruball; the policie of aniball, where by he escaped out of the danger of fabius maximus; a capitayne muste devise how to devide the force of his enemies; how to cause the enemie to have in suspect his most trusty men; aniball coriolanus; metellus against jugurte; a practis of the romayne oratours, to bryng aniball out of credit with antiochus; howe to cause the enemie to devide his power; howe titus didius staied his enemies that wer going to incounter a legion of men that were commyng in his ayde; howe some have caused the enemie to devide his force; a policie to winne the enemies countrie before he be aware; howe to reforme sedicion and discorde; the benefitte that the reputacion of the capitaine causeth, which is only gotten by vertue; the chiefe thyng that a capitayne ought to doe; when paie wanteth, punishment is not to be executed; the inconvenience of not punisshynge; cesar chaunsynge to fall, made the same to be supposed to signifi good lucke; religion taketh away fantasticall opinions; in what cases a capitaine ought not to faight with his enemie if he may otherwyse choose; a policie of fulvius wherby he got and spoyled his enemies campe; a policie to disorder the enemie; a policie to overcome the enemie; a policie; how to beguile the enemie; howe mennonus trained his enemies oute of stronge places to bee the better able to overcom them.] fabricio. to the first question i answer you, that if the armie be more or lesse, then fower or sixe thousande souldiours, the orders of lodgynges, may bee taken awaie or joined, so many as suffiseth: and with this way a man may goe in more, and in lesse, into infinite: notwithstandynge the romaines, when thei joigned together twoo consull armies, thei made twoo campes, and thei tourned the partes of the unarmed, thone against thother. concernyng the second question, i say unto you, that the romaines ordinary armie, was about xxiiii. m. souldiours: but when thei were driven to faight against the greatest power that might be, the moste that thei put together, wer l. m. with this number, thei did set against two hundred thousand frenchemen, whome assaulted them after the first warre, that thei had with the carthageners. with this verie same numbre, thei fought againste anniball. and you muste note, that the romaines, and the grekes, have made warre with fewe, fortefiyng themselves thorough order, and thorough arte: the west, and the easte, have made it with multitude: but the one of these nacions, doeth serve with naturall furie: as doe the men of the west partes, the other through the great obedience whiche those men have to their kyng. but in grece, and in italy, beyng no naturall furie, nor the naturall reverence towardes their king, it hath been necessary for them to learne the discipline of warre, the whiche is of so muche force, that it hath made that a fewe, hath been able to overcome the furie, and the naturall obstinatenesse of manie. therefore i saie, that mindyng to imitate the romaines, and the grekes, the number of l. m. souldiers ought not to bee passed, but rather to take lesse: because manie make confucion, nor suffer not the discipline to be observed, and the orders learned, and pirrus used to saie, that with xv. thousande men he woulde assaile the worlde: but let us pas to an other parte. we have made this our armie to winne a field and shewed the travailes, that in the same fight may happen: we have made it to marche, and declared of what impedimentes in marchyng it may be disturbed: and finally we have lodged it: where not only it ought to take a littell reste of the labours passed, but also to thinke howe the warre ought to be ended: for that in the lodgynges, is handeled many thynges, inespecially thy enemies as yet remainyng in the fielde, and in suspected townes, of whome it is good to be assured, and those that be enemies to overcome them: therfore it is necessarie to come to this demonstracion, and to passe this difficultie with the same glorie, as hitherto we have warred. therfore comynge to particular matters, i saie that if it shoulde happen, that thou wouldest have manie men, or many people to dooe a thyng, whiche were to thee profittable, and to theim greate hurte, as should be to breake downe the wall of their citie, or to sende into exile many of them, it is necessarie for thee, either to beguile them in such wise that everie one beleeve not that it toucheth him: so that succouryng not the one the other, thei may finde them selves al to be oppressed without remedie, or els unto all to commaunde the same, whiche they ought to dooe in one selfe daie, to the intente that every man belevyng to be alone, to whome the commaundement is made, maie thinke to obey and not to remedie it: and so withoute tumulte thy commaundement to be of everie man executed. if thou shouldest suspecte the fidelitie of anie people, and woulde assure thee, and overcome them at unawares, for to colour thy intente more easelie, thou canst not doe better, then to counsel with them of some purpose of thine, desiryng their aide, and to seeme to intende to make an other enterprise, and to have thy minde farre from thinkyng on them: the whiche will make, that thei shall not think on their owne defence, beleevyng not that thou purposest to hurte them, and thei shal geve thee commoditie, to be able easely to satisfie thy desire. when thou shouldest perceive, that there were in thine armie some, that used to advertise thy enemie of thy devises, thou canst not doe better, myndynge to take commoditie by their traiterous mindes, then to commen with them of those thynges, that thou wilte not doe, and those that thou wilt doe, to kepe secret, and to say to doubte of thynges, that thou doubtest not, and those of whiche thou doubtest, to hide: the which shall make thenemie to take some enterprise in hand, beleving to know thy devises, where by easly thou maiest beguile and opresse hym. if thou shouldest intende (as claudius nero did) to deminishe thy armie, sendynge helpe to some freende, and that the enemie shoulde not bee aware therof, it is necessarie not to deminishe the lodgynges, but to maintayne the signes, and the orders whole, makyng the verie same fires, and the verye same wardes throughout all the campe, as wer wont to be afore. lykewise if with thy armie there should joigne new men, and wouldest that the enemie shoulde not know that thou werte ingrosed, it is necessarie not to increase the lodgynges: because keepyng secrete doynges and devises, hath alwaies been moste profitable. wherfore metellus beyng with an armie in hispayne, to one, who asked him what he would doe the nexte daie, answered, that if his sherte knew therof, he would bourne it. marcus craussus, unto one, whome asked him, when the armie shoulde remove, saied beleevest thou to be alone not to here the trumpet? if thou shouldest desire to understande the secretes of thy enemie, and to know his orders, some have used to sende embassadours, and with theim in servauntes aparel, moste expertest men in warre: whom havynge taken occasion to se the enemies armie, and to consider his strengthe and weakenesse, it hath geven them oportunitie to overcome him. some have sente into exile one of their familiars, and by meanes of the same, hath knowen the devises of his adversarie. also like secrettes are understoode of the enemies when for this effecte there were taken any prisoners. marius whiche in the warre that he made with the cimbrie, for to know the faieth of those frenchmen, who then inhabited lombardie, and were in leage with the romaine people, sent them letters open, and sealed: and in the open he wrote, that they shoulde not open the sealed, but at a certaine time, and before the same time demaundyng them againe, and finding them opened, knew thereby that their faithe was not to be trusted. some capitaines, being invaded, have not desired to goe to meete the enemie, but have gone to assaulte his countrey, and constrained him to retorne to defende his owne home: the whiche manie times hath come wel to passe, for that those soldiours beginnyng to fil them selves with booties, and confidence to overcome, shall sone make the enemies souldiours to wexe afraide, when they supposynge theim selves conquerours, shal understand to become losers: so that to him that hath made this diversion, manie times it hath proved well. but onely it may be doen by him, whiche hath his countrey stronger then that of the enemies, because when it were otherwise, he should goe to leese. it hath been often a profitable thyng to a capitaine, that hath been besieged in his lodgynges by the enemie, to move an intreatie of agreemente, and to make truse with him for certaine daies: the which is wonte to make the enemies more necligente in all doynges: so that avaylynge thee of their necligence, thou maiest easely have occacion to get thee oute of handes. by this way silla delivered him selfe twise from the enemies: and with this verie same deceipte, asdruball in hispayne got oute of the force of claudious nero, whome had besieged him. it helpeth also to deliver a man out of the daunger of the enemie, to do some thyng beside the forsaied, that may keepe him at a baye: this is dooen in two maners, either to assaulte him with parte of thy power, so that he beyng attentive to the same faight, may geve commoditie to the reste of thy men to bee able to save theim selves, or to cause to rise some newe accidente, which for the strayngenesse of the thynge, maie make him to marvell, and for this occasion to stande doubtefull, and still: as you knowe howe anniball dyd, who beynge inclosed of fabius maximus, tied in the nighte small bavens kindeled beetweene the hornes of manie oxen, so that fabius astonied at the strangenesse of the same sight, thought not to lette him at all the passage. a capitayne oughte amonge all other of his affaires, with al subtiltie to devise to devide the force of the enemie, either with makyng him to suspecte his owne menne, in whome he trusteth, or to give him occasion, that he maye seperate his menne, and therby to be come more weake. the fyrste way is dooen with keepyng saulfe the thynges of some of those whiche he hath aboute him, as to save in the warre their menne and their possessions, renderynge theim their children, or other their necessaries withoute raunsome. you know that anniball havynge burned all the fieldes aboute rome, he made onely to bee reserved saulfe those of fabius maximus. you know how coriolanus comyng with an armie to rome, preserved the possessions of the nobilitie, and those of the comminaltie he bourned, and sacked. metellus havinge an armie againste jugurte, all the oratours, whiche of jugurte were sente him, were required of him, that they woulde geve him jugurte prisoner, and after to the verie same men writyng letters of the verie same matter, wrought in suche wise, that in shorte tyme jugurte havyng in suspecte all his counsellours, in diverse maners put them to death. anniball beynge fled to antiochus, the romaine oratours practised with him so familiarly, that antiochus beyng in suspecte of him, trusted not anie more after to his counselles. concernyng to devide the enemies men, there is no more certainer waie, then to cause their countrie to be assaulted to the intente that being constrained to goe to defende the same, they maie forsake the warre. this way fabius used havynge agaynst his armie the power of the frenchemen, of the tuscans, umbries and sannites. titus didius havyng a few men in respecte to those of the enemies, and lookynge for a legion from rome, and the enemies purposinge to goe to incounter it, to the intente that they should not goe caused to bee noised through all his armie, that he intended the nexte daie to faighte the field with the enemies: after he used means, that certaine of the prisoners, that he had taken afore, had occasion to runne awaie. who declaryng the order that the consull had taken to faighte the nexte daie, by reason wherof the enemies beyng afraide to deminishe their owne strength, went not to incounter the same legion, and by this way thei wer conducted safe. the which means serveth not to devide the force of the enemies, but to augmente a mans owne. some have used to devide the enemies force, by lettyng him to enter into their countrie, and in profe have let him take manie townes, to the intente that puttynge in the same garrisons, he might thereby deminishe his power, and by this waie havynge made him weake, have assaulted and overcomen him. some other mindyng to goe into one province, have made as though they woulde have invaded an other, and used so much diligence, that sodenly entryng into the same, where it was not doubted that they woulde enter, they have first wonne it, before the ennemie coulde have time to succour it: for that thy enemie beynge not sure, whether thou purposest to tourne backe, to the place fyrste of thee threatned, is constrained not to forsake the one place, to succour the other, and so many times he defendeth neither the one nor the other. it importeth besides the sayde thynges to a capitaine, if there growe sedicion or discorde amonge the souldiours, to knowe with arte howe to extynguishe it: the beste waie is to chastise the headdes of the faultes, but it muste be doen in such wise, that thou maiest first have oppressed them, before they be able to be aware: the way is if they be distante from thee, not onely to call the offenders, but together with theim all the other, to the entente that not beleevynge, that it is for any cause to punishe them, they become not contumelius, but geve commoditie to the execution of the punishemente: when thei be present, thou oughtest to make thy selfe stronge with those that be not in faulte, and by meane of their helpe to punishe the other. when there hapneth discorde amonge them, the beste waye is, to bryng them to the perill, the feare whereof is wonte alwaies to make them agree. but that, which above all other thynge kepeth the armie in unitee, is the reputacion of the capitaine, the whiche onely groweth of his vertue: because neither bloud, nor authoritie gave it ever without vertue. and the chiefe thyng, whiche of a capitain is looked for to be doen, is, to keepe his souldiours punisshed, and paied: for that when so ever the paie lacketh, it is conveniente that the punisshement lacke: because thou canst not correcte a souldiour, that robbeth, if thou doest not paie him, nor the same mindynge to live, cannot abstaine from robbynge: but if thou paiest him and punisshest him not, he beecometh in everie condicion insolente: for that thou becomest of small estimacion, where thou chaunsest not to bee able to maintaine the dignitie of thy degree, and not mainetainyng it, there foloweth of necessitee tumulte, and discorde, whiche is the ruine of an armie. olde capitaines had a troubell, of the which the presente be almoste free, whiche was to interprete to their purpose the sinister auguries: because if there fell a thunderbolte in an armie, if the sunne were darkened or the moone, if there came an erthequake, if the capitaine either in gettyng up, or in lightynge of his horse fell, it was of the souldiours interpreted sinisterously: and it ingendred in them so moche feare, that comynge to faight the fielde, easely they should have lost it: and therefore the aunciente capitaines so sone as a lyke accidente grewe, either they shewed the cause of the same, and redused it to a naturall cause, or they interpreted it to their purpose. cesar fallyng in africa, in comyng of the sea saied, africa i have taken thee. moreover manie have declared the cause of the obscuryng of the moone, and of earthquakes: which thing in our time cannot happen, as well because our men be not so supersticious, as also for that our religion taketh away altogether such opinions: al be it when they should chaunse, the orders of the antiquitie ought to be imitated. when either famishement, or other naturall necessitie, or humaine passion, hath broughte thy enemie to an utter desperation, and he driven of the same, cometh to faight with thee, thou oughtest to stande within thy campe, and as muche as lieth in thy power, to flie the faight. so the lacedemonians did against the masonians, so cesar did against afranio, and petreio. fulvius beyng consul, against the cimbrians, made his horsemen manie daies continually to assaulte the enemies, and considered how thei issued out of their campe for to folow them: wherfore he sette an ambusshe behinde the campe of the cimbrians, and made them to be assaulted of his horsmen, and the cimbrians issuyng oute of their campe for to follow them. fulvio gotte it, and sacked it. it hath ben of great utilitie to a capitaine, havyng his armie nere to the enemies armie, to sende his menne with the enemies ansignes to robbe, and to burne his owne countrey, whereby the enemies beleevynge those to bee menne, whiche are come in their aide, have also runne to helpe to make them the pray: and for this disorderyng them selves, hathe therby given oportunitie to the adversary to overcome them. this waie alexander of epirus used againste the illirans and leptenus of siracusa against the carthaginers and bothe to the one and to the other, the devise came to passe most happely. manie have overcome the enemie, gevyng him occasion to eate and to drinke oute of measure, fayning to have feared, and leaving their campes full of wyne and herdes of cattell, wherof the enemie beyng filled above all naturall use, have then assaulted him, and with his destruction overthrowen him. so tamirus did against cirus, and tiberius graccus agaynst the spaniardes. some have poysoned the wine, and other thynges to feede on, for to be able more easely to overcome them. i saied a littel afore how i founde not, that the antiquetie kepte in the night scoutes abroade, and supposed that they did it for to avoide the hurte, whiche might growe therby: because it is founde, that through no other meane then throughe the watche man, whiche was set in the daie to watche the enemie, hath been cause of the ruin of him, that set him there: for that manie times it hath hapned, that he beyng taken, hath been made perforce to tell theim the token, whereby they might call his felowes, who commyng to the token, have been slaine or taken. it helpeth to beguile the enemie sometime to varie a custome of thine, whereupon he having grounded him self, remaineth ruinated: as a capitaine did once, whome usinge to cause to be made signes to his men for comynge of the enemies in the night with fire, and in the daie with smoke, commaunded that withoute anie intermission, they shoulde make smoke and fire, and after commynge upon them the enemie, they should reste, whome beleevyng to come without beynge seen, perceivyng no signe to be made of beyng discovered, caused (through goeyng disordered) more easie the victorie to his adversarie. mennonus a rodian mindynge to drawe from stronge places the enemies armie, sente one under colour of a fugitive, the whiche affirmed, howe his armie was in discorde, and that the greater parte of them wente awaie: and for to make the thynge to be credited, he caused to make in sporte, certaine tumultes amonge the lodgynges: whereby the enemie thvnkyng thereby to be able to discomfaighte them, assaultynge theim, were overthrowen. [sidenote: the enemie ought not to be brought into extreme desperacion; how lucullus constrained certaine men that ran awaie from him to his enemies, to fayght whether they wold or not.] besides thesaied thynges, regarde ought to be had not to brynge the enemie into extreme desperacion: whereunto cesar had regarde, faightyng with the duchemen, who opened them the waie, seyng, howe thei beyng not able to flie, necessitie made them strong, and would rather take paine to followe theim, when thei fled, then the perill to overcome them, when thei defended them selves. lucullus seyng, how certaine macedonian horsemenne, whiche were with hym, went to the enemies parte, straight waie made to sounde to battaile, and commaunded, that the other men should folowe hym: whereby the enemies beleving, that lucullus would begin the faight, went to incounter the same macedonians, with soche violence, that thei were constrained to defende themselves: and so thei became against their willes, of fugetives, faighters. it importeth also to knowe, how to be assured of a toune, when thou doubteste of the fidelitie thereof, so sone as thou haste wonne the fielde, or before, the whiche certain old insamples maie teache thee. [sidenote: a policie wher by pompey got a towne; how publius valerius assured him self of a towne; a policie that alexander magnus used to be assured of all tracia, which philip kynge of spaine did practise to be asured of england when he wente to sainct quintens; examples for capitaines to winne the hartes of the people.] pompei doubtyng of the catinensians, praied them that thei would bee contente, to receive certaine sicke menne, that he had in his armie, and sendyng under the habite of sicke persones, most lustie menne, gotte the toune. publius valerius, fearyng the fidelitie of the epidannians, caused to come, as who saieth, a pardon to a churche without the toune, and when al the people wer gone for pardon, he shutte the gates, receivyng after none in, but those whom he trusted. alexander magnus, mindyng to goe into asia, and to assure himself of thracia, toke with him all the principall of thesame province, givyng theim provision, and he set over the common people of thracia, men of lowe degree, and so he made the princes contented with paiyng theim, and the people quiete, havyng no heddes that should disquiete them: but emong all the thynges, with the whiche the capitaines, winne the hartes of the people, be the insamples of chastitie and justice, as was thesame of scipio in spaine, when he rendered that yong woman, moste faire of personage to her father, and to her housebande: the whiche made him more, then with force of armes to winne spain. cesar having caused that woodde to bee paied for, whiche he had occupied for to make the listes, about his armie in fraunce, got so moche a name of justice, that he made easier the conquest of thesame province. i cannot tell what remaineth me, to speake more upon these accidentes, for that concerning this matter, there is not lefte any parte, that hath not been of us disputed. onely there lacketh to tell, of the maner of winnyng, and defendyng a toune: the whiche i am readie to doe willingly, if you be not now wearie. baptiste. your humanitie is so moche, that it maketh us to followe our desires, without beyng afraied to be reputed presumptuous, seyng that you liberally offer thesame, whiche we should have been ashamed, to have asked you: therefore, we saie unto you onely this, that to us you cannot dooe a greater, nor a more gratefuller benefite, then to finishe this reasonyng. but before that you passe to that other matter, declare us a doubte, whether it bee better to continewe the warre, as well in the winter, as thei use now adaies, or to make it onely in the sommer, and to goe home in the winter, as the antiquitie did. [sidenote: warre ought not to be made in winter; rough situacions, colde and watrie times, are enemies to the oder of warre; an overthrowe caused by winter.] fabricio. see, that if the prudence of the demaunder were not, there had remained behinde a speciall part, that deserveth consideracion. i answere you againe, that the antiquitie did all thynges better, and with more prudence then wee: and if wee in other things commit some erroure, in the affaires of warre, wee commit all errour. there is nothing more undiscrete, or more perrillous to a capitayne, then to make warre in the winter, and muche more perrill beareth he, that maketh it, then he that abideth it: the reason is this. all the industrie that is used in the discipline of warre, is used for to bee prepared to fighte a fielde with thy enemie, because this is the ende, whereunto a capitayne oughte to goo or endevour him selfe: for that the foughten field, geveth thee the warre wonne or loste: then he that knoweth best how to order it, and he that hath his army beste instructed, hath moste advauntage in this, and maye beste hope to overcome. on the other side, there is nothing more enemie to the orders, and then the rough situacions, or the colde watery time: for that the rough situacions, suffereth thee not to deffende thy bandes, according to thee discipline: the coulde and watery times, suffereth thee not to keepe thy men together, nor thou canst not bring them in good order to the enemy: but it is convenient for thee to lodge them a sunder of necessitie, and without order, being constrayned to obeye to castells, to boroughes, and to the villages, that maye receyve thee, in maner that all thy laboure of thee, used to instructe the army is vaine. nor marvayle you not though now a daies, they warre in the winter, because the armies being without discipline, know not the hurt that it dooth them, in lodging not together, for that it is no griefe to them not to be able to keepe those orders, and to observe that discipline, which they have not: yet they oughte to see howe much harme, the camping in the winter hath caused, and to remember, how the frenchmen in the yeare of oure lorde god, a thousande five hundred and three, were broken at gariliano of the winter, and not of the spaniardes: for as much as i have saide, he that assaulteth, hath more disadvauntage then he that defendeth: because the fowle weather hurteth him not a littell, being in the dominion of others and minding to make warre. for that he is constrayned, either to stande together with his men, and to sustaine the incommoditie of water and colde, or to avoide it to devide his power: but he that defendeth, may chuse the place as he listeth, and tary him with his freshe men: and he in a sodayne may set his men in araye, and goo to find a band of the enemies men, who cannot resiste the violence of them. so the frenchemen were discomfited, and so they shall alwayes be discomfited, which will assaulte in the winter an enemye, whoo hath in him prudence. then he that will that force, that orders, that discipline and vertue, in anye condition availe him not, let him make warre in the fielde in the winter: and because that the romaines woulde that all these thinges, in which they bestowed so much diligence, should availe them, fleedde no otherwise the winter, then the highe alpes, and difficulte places, and whatsoever other thing shoulde let them, for being able to shewe their arte and their vertue. so this suffiseth to your demaund, wherefore we wil come to intreate of the defending and besieging of tounes, and of their situacions and edifications. the seventh booke [sidenote: tounes and fortresses maie be strong twoo waies; the place that now a daies is moste sought to fortifie in; how a toune walle ought to bee made; the walle of a toune ought to bee high, and the diche within, and not without; the thickenes that a toune walle ought to bee of, and the distaunces betwene everie flancker, and of what breadth and deapth the dich ought to bee; how the ordinaunce is planted, for the defence of a toune; the nature of the batterie.] you oughte to knowe, how that tounes and fortresses, maie bee strong either by nature, or by industrie; by nature, those bee strong, whiche bee compassed aboute with rivers, or with fennes, as mantua is and ferrara, or whiche bee builded upon a rocke, or upon a stepe hille, as monaco, and sanleo: for that those that stande upon hilles, that be not moche difficulct to goe up, be now a daies, consideryng the artillerie and the caves, moste weake. and therfore moste often times in building, thei seke now a daies a plain, for to make it stronge with industrie. the firste industrie is, to make the walles crooked, and full of tournynges, and of receiptes: the whiche thyng maketh, that thenemie cannot come nere to it, bicause he maie be hurte, not onely on the front, but by flancke. if the walles be made high, thei bee to moche subjecte to the blowes of the artillerie: if thei be made lowe, thei bee moste easie to scale. if thou makeste the diches on the out side thereof, for to give difficultie to the ladders, if it happen that the enemie fill them up (whiche a great armie maie easely dooe) the wall remaineth taken of thenemie. therefore purposyng to provide to the one and thother foresaid inconveniences, i beleve (savyng alwaies better judgement) that the walle ought to be made highe, and the diche within, and not without. this is the moste strongeste waie of edificacion, that is made, for that it defendeth thee from the artillerie, and from ladders, and it giveth not facilitie to the enemie, to fill up the diche: then the walle ought to be high, of that heighth as shall bee thought beste, and no lesse thick, then two yardes and a quarter, for to make it more difficult to ruinate. moreover it ought to have the toures placed, with distances of cl. yardes betwen thone and thother: the diche within, ought to be at leaste twoo and twentie yardes and a halfe broad, and nine depe, and al the yearth that is digged out, for to make the diche, muste be throwen towardes the citee, and kepte up of a walle, that muste be raised from the bottome of the diche, and goe so high over the toune, that a man maie bee covered behinde thesame, the whiche thing shal make the depth of the diche the greater. in the bottome of the diche, within every hundred and l. yardes, there would be a slaughter house, which with the ordinaunce, maie hurte whom so ever should goe doune into thesame: the greate artillerie that defende the citee, are planted behinde the walle, that shutteth the diche, bicause for to defende the utter walle, being high, there cannot bee occupied commodiously, other then smalle or meane peeses. if the enemie come to scale, the heigth of the firste walle moste easely defendeth thee: if he come with ordinaunce, it is convenient for hym to batter the utter walle: but it beyng battered, for that the nature of the batterie is, to make the walle to fall, towardes the parte battered, the ruine of the walle commeth, finding no diche that receiveth and hideth it, to redouble the profunditie of thesame diche: after soche sorte, that to passe any further, it is not possible, findyng a ruine that with holdeth thee, a diche that letteth thee, and the enemies ordinaunce, that from the walle of the diche, moste safely killeth thee. onely there is this remedie, to fill the diche: the whiche is moste difficulte to dooe, as well bicause the capacitie thereof is greate, as also for the difficultie, that is in commyng nere it, the walle beeyng strong and concaved, betwene the whiche, by the reasons aforesaied, with difficultie maie be entered, havyng after to goe up a breache through a ruin, whiche giveth thee moste greate difficultie, so that i suppose a citee thus builded, to be altogether invinsible. baptiste. when there should bee made besides the diche within, a diche also without, should it not bee stronger? fabricio. it should be without doubt, but mindyng to make one diche onely, myne opinion is, that it standeth better within then without. baptiste. would you, that water should bee in the diches, or would you have them drie? [sidenote: a drie diche is moste sureste.] fabricio. the opinion of men herein bee divers, bicause the diches full of water, saveth thee from mines under grounde, the diches without water, maketh more difficulte the fillyng of them: but i havyng considered all, would make them without water, for that thei bee more sure: for diches with water, have been seen in the winter to bee frosen, and to make easie the winnyng of a citee, as it happened to mirandola, when pope julie besieged it: and for to save me from mines, i would make it so deepe, that he that would digge lower, should finde water. [sidenote: an advertisemente for the buildyng and defending of a toune or fortresse; small fortresses cannot bee defended; a toune of war or fortresse, ought not to have in them any retiring places; cesar borgia; the causes of the losse of the fortresse of furlie, that was thought invincible; howe the houses that are in a toune of war or fortresse ought to be builded.] the fortresses also, i would builde concernyng the diches and the walles in like maner, to the intent thei should have the like difficultie to be wonne. one thyng i will earnestly advise hym, that defendeth a citee: and that is, that he make no bulwarkes without distaunte from the walle of thesame: and an other to hym that buildeth the fortresse, and this is, that he make not any refuge place in them, in whiche he that is within, the firste walle beyng loste, maie retire: that whiche maketh me to give the firste counsaile is, that no manne ought to make any thyng, by meane wherof, he maie be driven without remedie to lese his firste reputacion, the whiche losyng, causeth to be estemed lesse his other doinges, and maketh afraied them, whom have taken upon theim his defence, and alwaies it shall chaunce him this, whiche i saie, when there are made bulwarkes out of the toune, that is to bee defended, bicause alwaies he shall leese theim, little thynges now a daies, beyng not able to bee defended, when thei be subject to the furie of ordinance, in soche wise that lesyng them, thei be beginning and cause of his ruine. when genua rebelled againste king leus of fraunce, it made certaine bulwarkes alofte on those hilles, whiche bee about it, the whiche so sone as thei were loste, whiche was sodainly, made also the citee to be loste. concernyng the second counsaile, i affirme nothyng to be to a fortresse more perilous, then to be in thesame refuge places, to be able to retire: bicause the hope that menne have thereby, maketh that thei leese the utter warde, when it is assaulted: and that loste, maketh to bee loste after, all the fortresse. for insample there is freshe in remembraunce, the losse of the fortresse of furly, when catherin the countesse defended it againste cesar borgia, sonne to pope alexander the vi. who had conducted thether the armie of the king of fraunce: thesame fortresse, was al full of places, to retire out of one into an other: for that there was firste the kepe, from the same to the fortresse, was a diche after soche sorte, that thei passed over it by a draw bridge: the fortresse was devided into three partes, and every parte was devided from the other with diches, and with water, and by bridges, thei passed from the one place to the other: wherefore the duke battered with his artillerie, one of the partes of the fortresse, and opened part of the walle: for whiche cause maister jhon casale, whiche was appoincted to that warde, thought not good to defende that breache, but abandoned it for to retire hymself into the other places: so that the dukes men having entered into that parte without incounter, in a sodaine thei gotte it all: for that the dukes menne became lordes of the bridges, whiche went from one place to an other. thei loste then this fortresse, whiche was thought invinsible, through two defaultes, the one for havyng so many retiryng places, the other, bicause every retiryng place, was not lorde of the bridge thereof. therefore, the naughtie builded fortresse, and the little wisedome of them that defended it, caused shame to the noble enterprise of the countesse, whoe had thought to have abidden an armie, whiche neither the kyng of naples, nor the duke of milaine would have abidden: and although his inforcementes had no good ende, yet notwithstandyng he gotte that honoure, whiche his valiauntnesse had deserved: the whiche was testified of many epigrammes, made in those daies in his praise. therefore, if i should have to builde a fortresse, i would make the walles strong, and the diches in the maner as we have reasoned, nor i would not make therein other, then houses to inhabite, and those i would make weake and lowe, after soche sorte that thei should not let him that should stande in the middest of the market place, the sight of all the walle, to the intente that the capitain might see with the iye, where he maie succour: and that every manne should understande, that the walle and the diche beyng lost, the fortresse were lost. and yet when i should make any retiryng places, i would make the bridges devided in soche wise, that every parte should be lorde of the bridges of his side, ordainyng, that thei should fall upon postes, in the middest of the diche. baptiste. you have saied that littel thynges now a daies can not bee defended, and it seemed unto me to have understoode the contrarie, that the lesser that a thyng wer, the better it might be defended. [sidenote: the fortifiyng of the entrance of a toune.] fabricio. you have not understoode well, because that place cannot be now a daies called stronge, wher he that defendeth it, hath not space to retire with new diches, and with new fortificacions, for that the force of the ordinance is so much, that he that trusteth uppon the warde of one wall and of one fortification only, is deceived: and because the bulwarkes (mindyng that they passe not their ordinarie measure, for that then they shoulde be townes and castels) be not made, in suche wise that men maie have space within them to retire, thei are loste straight waie. therefore it is wisdom to let alone those bulwarkes without, and to fortifie thenterance of the toune, and to kever the gates of the same with turnyngs after suche sort, that men cannot goe in nor oute of the gate by right line: and from the tournynges to the gate, to make a diche with a bridge. also they fortifie the gate, with a percullis, for to bee abell to put therin their menne, when they be issued out to faight, and hapnyng that the enemies pursue them, to avoide, that in the mingelynge together, they enter not in with them: and therfore these be used, the which the antiquitie called cattarratte, the whiche beyng let fall, exclude thenemies, and save the freendes, for that in suche a case, men can do no good neither by bridges nor by a gate, the one and the other beynge ocupied with prease of menne. baptiste. i have seene these perculleses that you speake of, made in almayne of littell quarters of woodde after the facion of a grate of iron, and these percullises of ouers, be made of plankes all massive: i woulde desire to understande whereof groweth this difference, and which be the strongest. [sidenote: battelments ought to be large and thicke and the flanckers large within.] fabricio. i tell you agayne, that the manners and orders of the warre, throughe oute all the worlde, in respecte to those of the antiquitie, be extinguesshed, and in italye they bee altogether loste, for if there bee a thing somewhat stronger then the ordinarye, it groweth of the insample of other countries. you mighte have understoode and these other may remember, with howe muche debilitie before, that king charles of fraunce in the yere of our salvation a thousande cccc. xciiii. had passed into italie, they made the batelmentes not halfe a yarde thicke, the loopes, and the flanckers were made with a litle opening without, and muche within, and with manye other faultes whiche not to be tedious i will let passe: for that easely from thinne battelments the defence is taken awaye, the flanckers builded in the same maner, moste easylye are opened: nowe of the frenchemen is learned to make the battelment large and thicke, and the flanckers to bee large on the parte within, and to drawe together in the middeste of the wall, and then agayn to waxe wider unto the uttermost parte without: this maketh that the ordinaunce hardlye can take away the defence. therfore the frenchmen have, manye other devises like these, the whiche because they have not beene seene of our men, they have not beene considered. among whiche, is this kinde of perculles made like unto a grate, the which is a greate deale better then oures: for that if you have for defence of a gate a massive parculles as oures, letting it fall, you shutte in your menne, and you can not though the same hurte the enemie, so that hee with axes, and with fire, maye breake it downe safely: but if it bee made like a grate, you maye, it being let downe, through those holes and through those open places, defende it with pikes, with crosbowes, and with all other kinde of weapons. baptiste. i have seene in italye an other use after the outelandishe fashion, and this is, to make the carriage of the artillery with the spokes of the wheele crooked towardes the axeltree. i woulde knowe why they make them so: seeming unto mee that they bee stronger when they are made straighte as those of oure wheeles. [sidenote: neither the ditche, wall tillage, nor any kinde of edificacion, ought to be within a mile of a toune of warre.] fabricio. never beleeve that the thinges that differ from the ordinarie wayes, be made by chaunce: and if you shoulde beleeve that they make them so, to shewe fayrer, you are deceaved: because where strength is necessarie, there is made no counte of fayrenesse: but all groweth, for that they be muche surer and muche stronger then ours. the reason is this: the carte when it is laden, either goeth even, or leaning upon the righte, or upon the lefte side: when it goeth even, the wheeles equally sustayne the wayght, the which being equallye devided betweene them, doth not burden much, but leaning, it commeth to have all the paise of the cariage on the backe of that wheele upon the which it leaneth. if the spokes of the same be straight they wil soone breake: for that the wheele leaning, the spokes come also to leane, and not to sustaine the paise by the straightnesse of them, and so when the carte goeth even, and when they are least burdened, they come to bee strongest: when the carte goeth awrye, and that they come to have moste paise, they bee weakest. even the contrarie happeneth to the crooked spokes of the frenche cartes, for that when the carte leaning upon one side poincteth uppon them, because they bee ordinary crooked, they come then to bee straight, and to be able to sustayne strongly al the payse, where when the carte goeth even, and that they bee crooked, they sustayne it halfe: but let us tourne to our citie and fortresse. the frenchemen use also for more safegarde of the gates of their townes, and for to bee able in sieges more easylye to convey and set oute men of them, besides the sayde thinges, an other devise, of which i have not seene yet in italye anye insample: and this is, where they rayse on the oute side from the ende of the drawe bridge twoo postes, and upon either of them they joigne a beame, in suche wise that the one halfe of them comes over the bridge, the other halfe with oute: then all the same parte that commeth withoute, they joygne together with small quarters of woodde, the whiche they set thicke from one beame to an other like unto a grate, and on the parte within, they fasten to the ende of either of the beames a chaine: then when they will shutte the bridge on the oute side, they slacke the chaines, and let downe all the same parte like unto a grate, the whiche comming downe, shuttethe the bridge, and when they will open it, they drawe the chaines, and the same commeth to rise up, and they maye raise it up so much that a man may passe under it, and not a horse, and so much that there maye passe horse and man, and shutte it againe at ones, for that it falleth and riseth as a window of a battelment. this devise is more sure than the parculles, because hardely it maye be of the enemye lette in such wise, that it fall not downe, falling not by a righte line as the parculles, which easely may be underpropped. therfore they which will make a citie oughte to cause to be ordained all the saide things: and moreover aboute the walle, there woulde not bee suffered any grounde to be tilled, within a myle thereof, nor any wall made, but shoulde be all champaine, where should be neither ditch nor banck, neither tree nor house, which might let the fighte, and make defence for the enemie that incampeth. [sidenote: noote; the provision that is meete to be made for the defence of a toune.] and noote, that a towne, whiche hathe the ditches withoute, with the banckes higher then the grounde, is moste weake: for as muche as they make defence to the enemye which assaulteth thee, and letteth him not hurte thee, because easely they may be opened, and geve place to his artillerye: but let us passe into the towne. i will not loose so muche time in shewing you howe that besides the foresayde thinges, it is requisite to have provision of victualles, and wherewith to fight, for that they be thinges that everye man underdeth, and without them, all other provision is vaine: and generally twoo thinges oughte to be done, to provide and to take the commoditie from the enemie that he availe not by the things of thy countrey: therfore the straw, the beastes, the graine, whiche thou canste not receive into house, ought to be destroied. also he that defendeth a towne, oughte to provide that nothing bee done tumultuouslye and disordinatelye, and to take suche order, that in all accidentes everye man maye knowe what he hath to doo. [sidenote: what incoragethe the enemy most that besiegeth a toune; what he that besiegeth and he that defendeth oughte to doo; advertisementes for a besieged towne; howe the romaines vitaled casalino besieged of aniball; a policie for the besieged.] the order that oughte to be taken is thus, that the women, the olde folkes, the children, and the impotent, be made to keepe within doores, that the towne maye be left free, to yong and lustie men, whom being armed, must be destributed for the defence of the same, appointing part of them to the wall, parte to the gates, parte to the principall places of the citie, for to remedie those inconveniences, that might growe within: an other parte must not be bound to any place, but be ready to succour all, neede requiring: and the thing beeing ordained thus, with difficultie tumulte can growe, whiche maye disorder thee. also i will that you note this, in the besieging and defending of a citie, that nothing geveth so muche hoope to the adversarye to be able to winne a towne, as when he knoweth that the same is not accustomed to see the enemie: for that many times for feare onely without other experience of force, cities have bene loste: therefore a man oughte, when he assaulteth a like citie, to make all his ostentacions terrible. on the other parte he that is assaulted, oughte to appoincte to the same parte, whiche the enemie fighteth againste, strong men and suche as opinion makethe not afraide, but weapons onely: for that if the first proofe turne vaine, it increaseth boldenesse to the besieged, and then the enemie is constrained to overcome them within, with vertue and reputacion. the instrumentes wherwith the antiquitie defended townes, where manie: as balistes, onagris, scorpions, arcubalistes, fustibals, slinges: and also those were manie with which thei gave assaultes. as arrieti, towers, musculi plutei, viney, falci, testudeni, in steede of which thynges be now a daies the ordinance, the whiche serve him that bessegeth, and him that defendeth: and therfore i will speake no forther of theim: but let us retourne to our reasonyng and let us come to particular offences. they ought to have care not to be taken by famine, and not to be overcome through assaultes: concernyng famin, it hath ben tolde, that it is requiset before the siege come, to be well provided of vitualles. but when a towne throughe longe siege, lacketh victuals, some times hath ben seen used certaine extraordinarie waies to be provided of their friendes, whome woulde save them: inespeciall if through the middest of the besieged citie there runne a river, as the romaines vittelled their castell called casalino besieged of anibal, whom being not able by the river to sende them other victual then nuttes, wherof castyng in the same great quantitie, the which carried of the river, without beyng abel to be letted, fedde longe time the casalinians. some besieged, for to shew unto the enemie, that they have graine more then inough and for to make him to dispaire, that he cannot, by famin overcome theim, have caste breade oute of the gates, or geven a bullocke graine to eate, and after have suffered the same to be taken, to the intent that kilde and founde full of graine, might shewe that aboundance, whiche they had not. on the other parte excellent capitaines have used sundrie waies to werie the enemie. [sidenote: a policie of fabius in besieging of a toune; a policie of dionisius in besiegynge of a toune.] fabius suffered them whome he besieged, to sowe their fieldes, to the entente that thei should lacke the same corne, whiche they sowed. dionisius beynge in campe at regio, fained to minde to make an agreement with them, and duryng the practise therof he caused him selfe to be provided of their victuales, and then when he had by this mean got from them their graine, he kepte them straight and famished them. [sidenote: howe alexander wanne leucadia.] alexander magnus mindyng to winne leucadia overcame all the castels aboute it, and by that means drivyng into the same citie a great multitude of their owne countrie men, famished them. [sidenote: the besieged ought to take heed of the first brunte; the remedie that townes men have, when the enemies ar entred into the towne; how to make the townes men yeelde.] concernynge the assaultes, there hath been tolde that chiefely thei ought to beware of the firste bronte, with whiche the romaines gotte often times manie townes, assaultyng them sodainly, and on every side: and thei called it _aggredi urbem corona_. as scipio did, when he wanne newe carthage in hispayne: the which brunte if of a towne it be withstoode, with difficultie after will bee overcome: and yet thoughe it should happen that the enemie were entred into the citie, by overcomynge the wall, yet the townes men have some remedie, so thei forsake it not: for as much as manie armies through entring into a toune, have ben repulced or slaine: the remedie is, that the townes men doe keepe them selves in highe places, and from the houses, and from the towers to faight with them: the whiche thynge, they that have entered into the citie, have devised to overcome in twoo manners: the one with openyng the gates of the citie, and to make the waie for the townes men, that thei might safely flie: the other with sendynge foorthe a proclamacion, that signifieth, that none shall be hurte but the armed, and to them that caste their weapons on the grounde, pardon shall be graunted: the whiche thynge hath made easie the victorie of manie cities. [sidenote: how townes or cities are easelie wonne; how duke valentine got the citie of urbine; the besieged ought to take heede of the deciptes and policies of the enemie; how domitio calvino wan a towne.] besides this, the citees are easie to bee wonne, if thou come upon them unawares: whiche is dooen beyng with thy armie farre of, after soche sort, that it be not beleved, either that thou wilte assaulte theim, or that thou canst dooe it, without commyng openly, bicause of the distance of the place: wherefore, if thou secretely and spedely assaulte theim, almoste alwaies it shall followe, that thou shalte gette the victorie. i reason unwillingly of the thynges succeded in our tyme, for that to me and to mine, it should be a burthen, and to reason of other, i cannot tel what to saie: notwithstanding, i cannot to this purpose but declare, the insample of cesar borgia, called duke valentine, who beyng at nocera with his menne, under colour of goyng to besiege camerino, tourned towardes the state of urbin, and gotte a state in a daie, and without any paine, the whiche an other with moche time and cost, should scante have gotten. it is conveniente also to those, that be besieged, to take heede of the deceiptes, and of the policies of the enemie, and therefore the besieged ought not to truste to any thyng, whiche thei see the enemie dooe continually, but let theim beleve alwaies, that it is under deceipte, and that he can to their hurte varie it. domitio calvino besiegyng a toune, used for a custome to compasse aboute every daie, with a good parte of his menne, the wall of the same: whereby the tounes menne, belevyng that he did it for exercise, slacked the ward: whereof domicius beyng aware, assaulted and overcame them. [sidenote: a policie to get a towne.] certaine capitaines understandyng, that there should come aide to the besieged, have apareled their souldiours, under the ansigne of those, that should come, and beyng let in, have gotte the toune. [sidenote: how simon of athens wan a towne; a policie to get a towne; how scipio gotte certaine castels in afrike.] simon of athens set fire in a night on a temple, whiche was out of the toune, wherefore, the tounes menne goyng to succour it, lefte the toune in praie to the enemie. some have slaine those, whiche from the besieged castle, have gone a foragyng, and have appareled their souldiours, with the apparell of the forragers, whom after have gotte the toune. the aunciente capitaines, have also used divers waies, to destroie the garison of the toune, whiche thei have sought to take. scipio beyng in africa, and desiring to gette certaine castles, in whiche were putte the garrisons of carthage, he made many tymes, as though he would assaulte theim, albeit, he fained after, not onely to abstaine, but to goe awaie from them for feare: the whiche aniball belevyng to bee true, for to pursue hym with greater force, and for to bee able more easely to oppresse him, drewe out all the garrisons of theim: the whiche scipio knowyng, sente massinissa his capitaine to overcome them. [sidenote: howe pirrus wan the chiefe citie of sclavonie; a policie to get a towne; how the beseiged are made to yelde; howe to get a towne by treason; a policie of aniball for the betraiyng of a castell; how the besieged maie be begiled; how formion overcame the calcidensians; what the besieged muste take heede of; liberalitie maketh enemies frendes; the diligence that the besieged ought to use in their watche and ward.] pirrus makyng warre in sclavonie, to the chiefe citee of the same countrie, where were brought many menne in garrison, fained to dispaire to bee able to winne it, and tourning to other places, made that the same for to succour them, emptied it self of the warde, and became easie to bee wonne. many have corrupted the water, and have tourned the rivers an other waie to take tounes. also the besieged, are easely made to yelde them selves, makyng theim afraied, with signifiyng unto them a victorie gotten, or with new aides, whiche come in their disfavour. the old capitaines have sought to gette tounes by treason, corruptyng some within, but thei have used divers meanes. sum have sente a manne of theirs, whiche under the name of a fugetive, might take aucthoritie and truste with the enemies, who after have used it to their profite. some by this meanes, have understode the maner of the watche, and by meanes of the same knowledge, have taken the toune. some with a carte, or with beames under some colour, have letted the gate, that it could not bee shutte, and with this waie, made the entrie easie to the enemie. aniball perswaded one, to give him a castle of the romaines, and that he should fain to go a huntyng in the night, makyng as though he could not goe by daie, for feare of the enemies, and tournyng after with the venison, should put in with hym certaine of his menne, and so killyng the watchmen, should give hym the gate. also the besieged are beguiled, with drawyng them out of the toune, and goyng awaie from them, faining to flie when thei assault thee. and many (emong whom was anibal) have for no other intente, let their campe to be taken, but to have occasion to get betwene theim and home, and to take their toune. also, thei are beguiled with fainyng to departe from them, as formion of athens did, who havyng spoiled the countrie of the calcidensians, received after their ambassadours, fillyng their citee with faire promises, and hope of safetie, under the which as simple menne, thei were a little after of formione oppressed. the besieged ought to beware of the men, whiche thei have in suspecte emong them: but some times thei are wont, as well to assure them selves with deserte, as with punishemente. marcellus knoweyng how lucius bancius a nolane, was tourned to favour aniball so moche humanitie and liberalitie, he used towardes him, that of an enemie, he made him moste frendely. the besieged ought to use more diligence in the warde, when the enemie is gone from theim, then when he is at hande. and thei ought to warde those places, whiche thei thinke, that maie bee hurt least: for that many tounes have been loste, when thenemie assaulteth it on thesame part, where thei beleve not possible to be assaulted. and this deceipt groweth of twoo causes, either for the place being strong, and to beleve, that it is invinsible, or through craft beyng used of the enemie, in assaltyng theim on one side with fained alaroms, and on the other without noise, and with verie assaltes in deede: and therefore the besieged, ought to have greate advertisment, and above all thynges at all times, and in especially in the night to make good watche to bee kepte on the walles, and not onely to appoincte menne, but dogges, and soche fiearse mastives, and lively, the whiche by their sente maie descrie the enemie, and with barkyng discover him: and not dogges onely, but geese have ben seen to have saved a citee, as it happened to roome, when the frenchemen besieged the capitoll. [sidenote: an order of alcibiades for the dew keping of watch and warde.] alcibiades for to see, whether the warde watched, athense beeyng besieged of the spartaines, ordained that when in the night, he should lifte up a light, all the ward should lift up likewise, constitutyng punishmente to hym that observed it not. [sidenote: the secrete conveighyng of letters; the defence against a breach; how the antiquitie got tounes by muining under grounde.] isicrates of athens killed a watchman, which slept, saiyng that he lefte him as he found him. those that have been besieged, have used divers meanes, to sende advise to their frendes: and mindyng not to send their message by mouth, thei have written letters in cifers, and hidden them in sundrie wise: the cifers be according, as pleaseth him that ordaineth them, the maner of hidyng them is divers. some have written within the scaberde of a sweard: other have put the letters in an unbaked lofe, and after have baked the same, and given it for meate to hym that caried theim. certaine have hidden them, in the secreteste place of their bodies: other have hidden them in the collor of a dogge, that is familiare with hym, whiche carrieth theim: some have written in a letter ordinarie thinges, and after betwene thone line and thother, have also written with water, that wetyng it or warming it after, the letters should appere. this waie hath been moste politikely observed in our time: where some myndyng to signifie to their freendes inhabityng within a towne, thinges to be kept secret, and mindynge not to truste any person, have sente common matters written, accordyng to the common use and enterlined it, as i have saied above, and the same have made to be hanged on the gates of the temples, the whiche by countersignes beyng knowen of those, unto whome they have been sente, were taken of and redde: the whiche way is moste politique, bicause he that carrieth them maie bee beguiled, and there shall happen hym no perill. there be moste infinite other waies, whiche every manne maie by himself rede and finde: but with more facilitie, the besieged maie bee written unto, then the besieged to their frendes without, for that soche letters cannot be sent, but by one, under colour of a fugetive, that commeth out of a toune: the whiche is a daungerous and perilous thing, when thenemie is any whit craftie: but those that sende in, he that is sente, maie under many colours, goe into the campe that besiegeth, and from thens takyng conveniente occasion, maie leape into the toune: but lette us come to speake of the present winnyng of tounes. i saie that if it happen, that thou bee besieged in thy citee, whiche is not ordained with diches within, as a little before we shewed, to mynde that thenemie shall not enter through the breach of the walle, whiche the artillerie maketh: bicause there is no remedie to lette thesame from makyng of a breache, it is therefore necessarie for thee, whileste the ordinance battereth, to caste a diche within the wall which is battered, and that it be in bredth at leaste twoo and twentie yardes and a halfe, and to throwe all thesame that is digged towardes the toun, whiche maie make banke, and the diche more deper: and it is convenient for thee, to sollicitate this worke in soche wise, that when the walle falleth, the diche maie be digged at least, fower or five yardes in depth: the whiche diche is necessarie, while it is a digging, to shutte it on every side with a slaughter house: and when the wall is so strong, that it giveth thee time to make the diche, and the slaughter houses, that battered parte, commeth to be moche stronger, then the rest of the citee: for that soche fortificacion, cometh to have the forme, of the diches which we devised within: but when the walle is weake, and that it giveth thee not tyme, to make like fortificacions, then strengthe and valiauntnesse muste bee shewed, settyng againste the enemies armed menne, with all thy force. this maner of fortificacion was observed of the pisans, when you besieged theim, and thei might doe it, bicause thei had strong walles, whiche gave them time, the yearth beyng softe and moste meete to raise up banckes, and to make fortificacions: where if thei had lacked this commoditie, thei should have loste the toune. therefore it shall bee alwaies prudently doen, to provide afore hand, makyng diches within the citee, and through out all the circuite thereof, as a little before wee devised: for that in this case, the enemie maie safely be taried for at laisure, the fortificacions beyng redy made. the antiquitie many tymes gotte tounes, with muinyng under ground in twoo maners, either thei made a waie under grounde secretely, whiche risse in the toune, and by thesame entered, in whiche maner the romaines toke the citee of veienti, or with the muinyng, thei overthrewe a walle, and made it ruinate: this laste waie is now a daies moste stronge, and maketh, that the citees placed high, be most weake, bicause thei maie better bee under muined: and puttyng after in a cave of this gunne pouder, whiche in a momente kindelyng, not onely ruinateth a wall, but it openeth the hilles, and utterly dissolveth the strength of them. [sidenote: the reamedie against caves or undermuinynges; what care the besieged ought to have; what maketh a citee or campe difficulte to bee defended; by what meanes thei that besiege ar made afraied; honour got by constancie.] the remedie for this, is to builde in the plain, and to make the diche that compasseth thy citee, so deepe, that the enemie maie not digge lower then thesame, where he shall not finde water, whiche onely is enemie to the caves: for if thou be in a toune, which thou defendest on a high ground, thou canst not remedie it otherwise, then to make within thy walles many deepe welles, the whiche be as drouners to thesame caves, that the enemie is able to ordain against thee. an other remedie there is, to make a cave againste it, when thou shouldeste bee aware where he muineth, the whiche waie easely hindereth hym, but difficultly it is foreseen, beyng besieged of a craftie enemie. he that is besieged, ought above al thinges to have care, not to bee oppressed in the tyme of reste: as is after a battaile fought, after the watche made, whiche is in the mornyng at breake of daie, and in the evenyng betwen daie and night, and above al, at meale times: in whiche tyme many tounes have been wonne, and armies have been of them within ruinated: therefore it is requisite with diligence on all partes, to stande alwaies garded, and in a good part armed. i will not lacke to tell you, how that, whiche maketh a citee or a campe difficult to be defended, is to be driven to kepe sundred all the force, that thou haste in theim, for that the enemie beyng able to assaulte thee at his pleasure altogether, it is conveniente for thee on every side, to garde every place, and so he assaulteth thee with all his force, and thou with parte of thine defendest thee. also, the besieged maie bee overcome altogether, he without cannot bee, but repulced: wherefore many, whom have been besieged, either in a campe, or in a toune, although thei have been inferiour of power, have issued out with their men at a sodaine, and have overcome the enemie. this marcellus of nola did: this did cesar in fraunce, where his campe beeyng assaulted of a moste great nomber of frenchmen, and seeyng hymself not able to defende it, beyng constrained to devide his force into many partes, and not to bee able standyng within the listes, with violence to repulce thenemie: he opened the campe on thone side, and turning towardes thesame parte with all his power, made so moche violence against them, and with moche valiantnes, that he vanquisshed and overcame them. the constancie also of the besieged, causeth many tymes displeasure, and maketh afraied them that doe besiege. pompei beyng against cesar, and cesars armie beeyng in greate distresse through famine, there was brought of his bredde to pompei, whom seyng it made of grasse, commaunded, that it should not bee shewed unto his armie, least it shoulde make them afraide, seyng what enemies they had against theim. nothyng caused so muche honour to the romaines in the warre of aniball, as their constancie: for as muche as in what so ever envious, and adverse fortune thei were troubled, they never demaunded peace, thei never made anie signe of feare, but rather when aniball was aboute rome, thei solde those fieldes, where he had pitched his campe, dearer then ordinarie in other times shoulde have been solde: and they stoode in so much obstinacie in their enterprises, that for to defende rome, thei would not raise their campe from capua, the whiche in the verie same time that roome was besieged, the romaines did besiege. i knowe that i have tolde you of manie thynges, the whiche by your selfe you might have understoode, and considered, notwithstandyng i have doen it (as to daie also i have tolde you) for to be abell to shewe you better by meane therof, the qualitie of this armie, and also for to satisfie those, if there be anie, whome have not had the same commoditie to understand them as you. nor me thinkes that there resteth other to tell you, then certaine generall rules, the whiche you shal have moste familiar, which be these. [sidenote: generall rules of warre.] the same that helpeth the enemie, hurteth thee: and the same that helpeth thee, hurteth the enemie. he that shall be in the warre moste vigilant to observe the devises of the enemie, and shall take moste payne to exercise his armie, shall incurre least perilles and maie hope moste of the victorie. never conducte thy men to faight the field, if first them hast not confirmed their mindes and knowest them to be without feare, and to be in good order: for thou oughteste never to enterprise any dangerous thyng with thy souldiours, but when thou seest, that they hope to overcome. it is better to conquere the enemie with faminne, then with yron: in the victorie of which, fortune maie doe much more then valiantnesse. no purpose is better then that, whiche is hidde from the enemie untill thou have executed it. to know in the warre how to understande occasion, and to take it, helpeth more then anie other thynge. nature breedeth few stronge menne, the industrie and the exercise maketh manie. discipline maie doe more in warre, then furie. when anie departe from the enemies side for to come to serve thee, when thei be faithfull, thei shalbe unto thee alwaies great gaines: for that the power of thadversaries are more deminisshed with the losse of them, that runne awaie, then of those that be slaine, although that the name of a fugetive be to new frendes suspected, to olde odius. better it is in pitchyng the fielde, to reserve behynde the first front aide inoughe, then to make the fronte bigger to disperse the souldiours. he is difficultely overcome, whiche can know his owne power and the same of the enemie. the valiantenesse of the souldiours availeth more then the multitude. some times the situacion helpeth more then the valiantenesse. new and sudden thynges, make armies afrayde. slowe and accustomed thinges, be littell regarded of them. therfore make thy armie to practise and to know with small faightes a new enemie, before thou come to faight the fielde with him. he that with disorder foloweth the enemie after that he is broken, will doe no other, then to become of a conquerour a loser. he that prepareth not necessarie victualles to live upon, is overcome without yron. he that trusteth more in horsemen then in footemen, more in footemen then in horsemen, must accommodate him selfe with the situacion. when thou wilte see if in the daie there be comen anie spie into the campe, cause everie man to goe to his lodgynge. chaunge purpose, when thou perceivest that the enemie hath forseene it. [sidenote: how to consulte.] consulte with many of those thinges, which thou oughtest to dooe: the same that thou wilt after dooe, conferre with fewe. souldiours when thei abide at home, are mainteined with feare and punishemente, after when thei ar led to the warre with hope and with rewarde. good capitaines come never to faight the fielde, excepte necessitie constraine theim, and occasion call them. cause that thenemies know not, how thou wilte order thy armie to faight, and in what so ever maner that thou ordainest it, make that the firste bande may be received of the seconde and of the thirde. in the faight never occupie a battell to any other thyng, then to the same, for whiche thou haste apoineted it, if thou wilt make no disorder. the sodene accidentes, with difficultie are reamedied: those that are thought upon, with facilitie. [sidenote: what thynges are the strength of the warre.] men, yron, money, and bread, be the strengthe of the warre, but of these fower, the first twoo be moste necessarie: because men and yron, finde money and breade: but breade and money fynde not men and yron. the unarmed riche man, is a bootie to the poore souldiour. accustome thy souldiours to dispise delicate livyng and lacivius aparell. this is as muche as hapneth me generally to remember you, and i know that there might have ben saied manie other thynges in all this my reasonynge: as should be, howe and in howe manie kinde of waies the antiquitie ordered their bandes, how thei appareled them, and how in manie other thynges they exercised them, and to have joygned hereunto manie other particulars, the whiche i have not judged necessarie to shew, as wel for that you your self may se them, as also for that my intente hath not been to shew juste how the olde servis of warre was apoincted, but howe in these daies a servis of warre might be ordained, whiche should have more vertue then the same that is used. wherfore i have not thought good of the auncient thynges to reason other, then that, which i have judged to suche introduction necessarie. i know also that i might have delated more upon the service on horsebacke, and after have reasoned of the warre on the sea: for as muche as he that destinguissheth the servis of warre, saieth, how there is an armie on the sea, and of the lande, on foote, and on horsebacke. of that on the sea, i will not presume to speake, for that i have no knowledge therof: but i will let the genoues, and the venecians speake therof, whome with like studies have heretofore doen great thinges. also of horses, i wil speake no other, then as afore i have saied, this parte beynge (as i have declared) least corrupted. besides this, the footemen being wel ordained, which is the puissance of the armie, good horses of necessitie will come to be made. [sidenote: provisions that maie bee made to fill a realme full of good horse; the knowledge that a capitaine oughte to have.] onely i counsel him that would ordayne the exercise of armes in his owne countrey, and desireth to fill the same with good horses, that he make two provisions: the one is, that he destribute mares of a good race throughe his dominion, and accustome his menne to make choise of coltes, as you in this countrie make of calves and mules: the other is, that to thentente the excepted might finde a byer, i woulde prohibet that no man should kepe a mule excepte he woulde keepe a horse: so that he that woulde kepe but one beaste to ride on, shoulde be constrained to keepe a horse: and moreover that no man should weare fine cloathe except he which doeth keepe a horse: this order i under stande hath beene devised of certaine princes in our time, whome in short space have therby, brought into their countrey an excellente numbre of good horses. aboute the other thynges, as much as might be looked for concernynge horse, i remit to as much as i have saied to daie, and to that whiche they use. peradventure also you woulde desire to understand what condicions a capitaine ought to have: wherof i shal satisfie you moste breeflie: for that i cannot tell how to chose anie other man then the same, who shoulde know howe to doe all those thynges whiche this daie hath ben reasoned of by us: the which also should not suffise, when he should not knowe howe to devise of him selfe: for that no man without invencion, was ever excellent in anie science: and if invencion causeth honour in other thynges, in this above all, it maketh a man honorable: for everie invention is seen, although it were but simple, to be of writers celebrated: as it is seen, where alexander magnus is praised, who for to remove his campe moste secretely, gave not warnyng with the trumpette, but with a hatte upon a launce. and was praised also for havyng taken order that his souldiours in buckelynge with the enemies, shoulde kneele with the lefte legge, to bee able more strongly to withstande their violence: the whiche havyng geven him the victorie, it got him also so muche praise, that all the images, whiche were erected in his honour, stoode after the same facion. but because it is tyme to finishe this reasonyng, i wil turne againe to my first purpose, and partly i shall avoide the same reproche, wherin they use to condempne in this towne, such as knoweth not when to make an ende. [sidenote: the auctor retorneth to his first purpose and maketh a littel discorse to make an ende of his reasonyng.] if you remembre cosimus you tolde me, that i beyng of one side an exalter of the antiquitie, and a dispraiser of those, which in waightie matters imitated them not, and of the other side, i havynge not in the affaires of war, wherin i have taken paine, imitated them, you coulde not perceive the occasion: wherunto i answered, how that men which wil doo any thing, muste firste prepare to knowe how to doe it, for to be able, after to use it, when occasion permitteth: whether i doe know how to bryng the servis of warre to the auncient manners or no, i will be judged by you, whiche have hearde me upon this matter longe dispute wherby you may know, how much time i have consumed in these studies: and also i beleeve that you maie imagen, how much desire is in me to brynge it to effecte: the whiche whether i have been able to have doen, or that ever occasion hath been geven me, most easely you maie conjecture: yet for to make you more certaine and for my better justificacion, i will also aledge the occasions: and as much as i have promised, i will partely performe, to shew you the difficultie and the facelitie, whiche bee at this presente in suche imitacions. [sidenote: a prince may easelie brynge to intiere perfection the servis of warre; two sortes of capitaines worthie to bee praysed.] therfore i saie, how that no deede that is doen now a daies emong men, is more easie to be reduced unto the aunciente maners, then the service of warre: but by them onely that be princes of so moche state, who can at least gather together of their owne subjectes, xv. or twentie thousande yong menne: otherwise, no thyng is more difficulte, then this, to them whiche have not soche commoditie: and for that you maie the better understande this parte, you have to knowe, howe that there bee of twoo condicions, capitaines to bee praised: the one are those, that with an armie ordained through the naturalle discipline thereof, have dooen greate thynges: as were the greater parte of the romaine citezeins, and suche as have ledde armies, the which have had no other paine, then to maintaine them good, and to se them guided safely: the other are they, whiche not onely have had to overcome the enemie, but before they come to the same, have been constrained to make good and well ordered their armie: who without doubte deserve muche more praise, then those have deserved, which with olde armies, and good, have valiantely wrought. of these, such wer pelopida, and epaminonda, tullus hostillius, phillip of macedony father of alexander, cirus kyng of the percians, graccus a romaine: they all were driven first to make their armies good, and after to faighte with them: they all coulde doe it, as well throughe their prudence, as also for havynge subjectes whome thei might in like exercises instruct: nor it shuld never have ben otherwise possible, that anie of theim, though they had ben never so good and ful of al excellencie, should have been able in a straunge countrey, full of men corrupted, not used to anie honest obedience, to have brought to passe anie laudable worke. it suffiseth not then in italie, to know how to governe an army made, but first it is necessarie to know how to make it and after to know how to commaunde it: and to do these things it is requisit they bee those princes, whome havyng much dominion, and subjectes inoughe, maie have commoditie to doe it: of whiche i can not bee, who never commaunded, nor cannot commaunde, but to armies of straungers, and to men bounde to other, and not to me: in whiche if it be possible, or no, to introduce anie of those thynges that this daie of me hath ben reasoned, i will leave it to your judgement. albeit when coulde i make one of these souldiours which now a daies practise, to weare more armur then the ordinarie, and besides the armur, to beare their owne meate for two or three daies, with a mattocke: when coulde i make theim to digge, or keepe theim every daie manie howers armed, in fained exercises, for to bee able after in the verie thyng in deede to prevaile? when woulde thei abstaine from plaie, from laciviousnesse, from swearynge, from the insolence, whiche everie daie they committe? when would they be reduced into so muche dissepline, into so much obedience and reverence, that a tree full of appels in the middest of their campe, shoulde be founde there and lefte untouched? as is redde, that in the auncient armies manie times hapned. what thynge maye i promis them, by meane wherof thei may have me in reverence to love, or to feare, when the warre beyng ended, they have not anie more to doe with me? wher of maie i make them ashamed, whiche be borne and brought up without shame? whie shoulde thei be ruled by me who knowe me not? by what god or by what sainctes may i make them to sweare? by those that thei worship, or by those that they blaspheme? who they worship i knowe not anie: but i knowe well they blaspheme all. how shoulde i beleeve that thei will keepe their promise to them, whome everie hower they dispise? how can they, that dispise god, reverence men? then what good fashion shoulde that be, whiche might be impressed in this matter? and if you should aledge unto me that suyzzers and spaniardes bee good souldiours, i woulde confesse unto you, how they be farre better then the italians: but if you note my reasonynge, and the maner of procedyng of bothe, you shall see, howe they lacke many thynges to joygne to the perfection of the antiquetie. and how the suyzzers be made good of one of their naturall uses caused of that, whiche to daie i tolde you: those other are made good by mean of a necessitie: for that servyng in a straunge countrie, and seemyng unto them to be constrained either to die, or to overcome, thei perceivynge to have no place to flie, doe become good: but it is a goodnesse in manie partes fawtie: for that in the same there is no other good, but that they bee accustomed to tarie the enemie at the pike and sweardes poincte: nor that, which thei lacke, no man should be meete to teache them, and so much the lesse, he that coulde not speake their language. [sidenote: the auctor excuseth the people of italie to the great reproche of their prynces for their ignorance in the affaires of warre.] but let us turne to the italians, who for havynge not had wise princes, have not taken anie good order: and for havyng not had the same necessitie, whiche the spaniardes have hadde, they have not taken it of theim selves, so that they remaine the shame of the worlde: and the people be not to blame, but onely their princes, who have ben chastised, and for their ignorance have ben justely punisshed, leesinge moste shamefully their states, without shewing anie vertuous ensample. and if you will see whether this that i say be trew: consider how manie warres have ben in italie since the departure of kyng charles to this day, where the war beyng wonte to make men warlyke and of reputacion, these the greater and fierser that they have been, so muche the more they have made the reputacion of the members and of the headdes therof to bee loste. this proveth that it groweth, that the accustomed orders were not nor bee not good, and of the newe orders, there is not anie whiche have knowen how to take them. nor never beleeve that reputacion will be gotten, by the italians weapons, but by the same waie that i have shewed, and by means of theim, that have great states in italie: for that this forme maie be impressed in simple rude men, of their owne, and not in malicious, ill brought up, and straungers. nor there shall never bee founde anie good mason, whiche will beleeve to be able to make a faire image of a peece of marbell ill hewed, but verye well of a rude peece. [sidenote: a discription of the folishenesse of the italian princes; cesar and alexander, were the formoste in battell; the venecians and the duke of ferare began to have reduced the warfare to the aunciente maners; he that despiseth the servis of warre, despiseth his own welthe.] our italian princes beleved, before thei tasted the blowes of the outlandishe warre, that it should suffice a prince to knowe by writynges, how to make a subtell answere, to write a goodly letter, to shewe in saiynges, and in woordes, witte and promptenesse, to knowe how to canvas a fraude, to decke theim selves with precious stones and gold, to slepe and to eate with greater glorie then other: to keepe many lascivious persones aboute them, to governe theim selves with their subjectes, covetuously and proudely: to rotte in idlenesse, to give the degrees of the exercise of warre, for good will, to despise if any should have shewed them any laudable waie, minding that their wordes should bee aunswers of oracles: nor the sely wretches were not aware, that thei prepared theim selves to bee a praie, to whom so ever should assaulte theim. hereby grewe then in the thousande fower hundred nintie and fower yere, the greate feares, the sodain flightes, and the marveilous losses: and so three most mightie states which were in italie, have been divers times sacked and destroied. but that which is worse, is where those that remaine, continue in the verie same erroure, and live in the verie same disorder, and consider not, that those, who in old time would kepe their states, caused to be dooen these thynges, which of me hath been reasoned, and that their studies wer, to prepare the body to diseases, and the minde not to feare perilles. whereby grewe that cesar, alexander, and all those menne and excellente princes in old tyme, were the formoste emongest the faighters, goyng armed on foote: and if thei loste their state, thei would loose their life, so that thei lived and died vertuously. and if in theim, or in parte of theim, there might bee condempned to muche ambicion to reason of: yet there shall never bee founde, that in theim is condempned any tendernesse or any thynge that maketh menne delicate and feable: the whiche thyng, if of these princes were redde and beleved, it should be impossible, that thei should not change their forme of living, and their provinces not to chaunge fortune. and for that you in the beginnyng of this our reasonyng, lamented your ordinaunces, i saie unto you, that if you had ordained it, as i afore have reasoned, and it had given of it self no good experience, you might with reason have been greved therewith: but if it bee not so ordained, and exercised, as i have saied, it maie be greeved with you, who have made a counterfaite thereof, and no perfecte figure. the venecians also, and the duke of ferare, beganne it, and followed it not, the whiche hath been through their faulte, not through their menne. and therfore i assure you, that who so ever of those, whiche at this daie have states in italie, shall enter firste into this waie, shall be firste, before any other, lorde of this province, and it shall happen to his state, as to the kyngdome of the macedonians, the which commyng under philip, who had learned the maner of settyng armies in order of epaminondas a thebane, became with this order, and with these exercises (whileste the reste of grece stoode in idlenesse, and attended to risite comedes) so puisant, that he was able in few yeres to possesse it all, and to leave soche foundacion to his sonne, that he was able to make hymself, prince of all the world. he then that despiseth these studies, if he be a prince, despiseth his princedome: if he bee a citezein, his citee. wherefore, i lamente me of nature, the whiche either ought not to have made me a knower of this, or it ought to have given me power, to have been able to have executed it: for now beyng olde, i cannot hope to have any occasion, to bee able so to dooe: in consideracion whereof, i have been liberall with you, who beeyng grave yong menne, maie (when the thynges saied of me shall please you) at due tymes in favour of your princes, helpe theim and counsaile them, wherein i would have you not to bee afraied, or mistrustfull, bicause this province seemes to bee altogether given, to raise up againe the thynges dedde, as is seen by the perfeccion that poesie, paintyng, and writing, is now brought unto: albeit, as moche as is looked for of me, beyng strooken in yeres, i do mistruste. where surely, if fortune had heretofore graunted me so moche state, as suffiseth for a like enterprise, i would not have doubted, but in moste shorte tyme, to have shewed to the worlde, how moche the aunciente orders availe: and without peradventure, either i would have increased it with glory, or loste it without shame. * * * * * the ende of the seventh and laste booke of the arte of warre, of nicholas machiavell, citezein and secretarie of florence, translated out of italian into englishe: by peter whitehorne, felow of graise inne. nicholas machiavel, citezein and secretarie of florence, to the readers to thentente that such as rede this booke maie without difficultie understande the order of the battailes, or bandes of men, and of the armies, and lodgynges in the campe, accordynge as they in the discription of theim are apoincted, i thinke it necessarie to shewe you the figure of everie one of them: wherefore it is requiset firste, to declare unto you, by what poinctes and letters, the footemen, the horsemen, and everie other particuler membre are set foorthe. know therfore that .} signifieth {targetmen. '} {pikemen. c} {a capitaine of ten men. v} {veliti ordinarie. (those men that shoot with harcabuses or bowes) r} {veliti extraordinari. c} {a centurion or captaine of a hundred men. k} {a constable or a captaine of a band of fower hundred and fiftie men. h} {the hed captain of a maine battel. g} {the general captaine of the whole armie. t} {the trompet. d} {the drum. b} {the ansigne. s} {the standerde. m} {men of armes. l} {light horsemen. a} {artillerie or ordinance. in the first figure nexte folowyng, is discribed the forme of an ordinarie battaile or bande of fower hundred and fiftie men, and in what maner it is redoubled by flanke. and also how with the verie same order of lxxx. rankes, by chaungyng onely to the hinder parte the five rankes of pikes which were the formost of everie centurie, thei maye likewise in bringyng them in battaile raie, come to bee placed behinde: whiche may be doen, when in marchyng, the enemies should come to assaulte them at their backes: accordynge as the orderyng therof is before declared. fol. . in the seconde figure, is shewed how a battaile or bande of men is ordered, whiche in marchyng should be driven to faight on the flanke: accordyng as in the booke is declared. fol. . in the thirde figure, is shewed how a battaile or bande of men, is ordered with two hornes, fol. , and after is shewed how the same maie be made with a voide place in the middest: accordynge as the orderyng therof, in the booke moste plainely is declared, fol. . in the fowerth figure, is shewed the forme or facion of an armie apoincted to faight the battaile with the enemies: and for the better understandynge thereof, the verie same is plainlier set foorthe in the figure next unto it, wherby the other two figures next folowyng maie the easier be understoode: accordynge as in the booke is expressed. fol. . in the fifte figure, is shewed the forme of a fower square armie: as in the booke is discribed. fol. . in the sixte figure, is shewed howe an armie is brought from a fower square facion, to the ordinarie forme, to faight a fielde: accordyng as afore is declared. fol. . in the seventh figure, is discribed the maner of incamping: according as the same in the booke is declared. fol. . the firste figure this is the maner of ordering of cccc. men, into lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, to bring them into a iiii square battaile with the pikes on the front, as after foloweth. c c'''' c'''' c'''' c'''' c'''' c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... c ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... c ''''c ''''c ''''c ''''c ''''c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c this is the foresaied lxxx. rankes of iiii. c. men brought into a fower square battaile with the pikes on the fronte. and the fiftie veliti on the sides and on the backe. c c vc''''''''''''''''''cv vc''''''''''''''''''cv vc''''''''''''''''''cv vc''''''''''''''''''cv vc''''''''''''''''''cv vc........dkb.......cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv c v v v v v v v v v v c the seconde figure this is the maner of ordering of cccc. men, into lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, to bring them into a iiii square battaile with the pikes on the side, as after foloweth. c ccccc ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ccccc c ccccc ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ccccc c ccccc ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ccccc c ccccc ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ccccc this is the foresaied lxxx. rankes of iiii. c. men brought into a fower square battaile with the pikes on the side. cvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvc cccccccccccccccccccc v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' cccccccccccccccccccc cvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvc the thyrde figure these are the nombers of rankes appoincted to make the horned battaile of, and the square battaile with the voide space in the middest, as after foloweth. ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ............... ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ............... cccccccccccccccccccc.....c...............c ......................... ............... ......................... ............... ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ccccccccccccccccccccc.....c ......................... ......................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............d ...............k ...............b ............... ............... ............... ............... ......................... ......................... ccccccccccccccccccccc.....c ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ............... ......................... ............... ......................... ...............ccccccccccccccccccccc.....c ............... ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ............... ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ccccccccccccccccccccc.....c ......................... ......................... ....... ........ ....... ........ ....... ........ ....... d ........ ....... k ........ ....... b ........ ....... ........ ....... ........ ....... ........ ....... ........ ......................... ......................... ccccccccccccccccccccc.....c ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''' the fourth figure a a a a a a llm mcrccc cu,,uccu,,uccu,,uccu,,uccu,,uca llm mrrr,,, vu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uva llm mrrrdkb vdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bv lltksdkb,,, vc..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv t g llm mrrr,,, vc..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv lll ktm mrrr,,, vc..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv .... lsm mcr(,,, cu..uccu..uccu..uccu..uccu..uc llm m ,,, llm m ,,, ..... llm m ,,, dhb llm m ,,, ..... ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, cu..uc cu..uc cu..uc ,,, vu,,uv vu,,uv vu,,uv ,,, vdk bv vdk bv vdk bv cdkbc vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv ,, vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv ,,, cu..uc cu..uc cu..uc ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, cu,,uc cu,,uc ,,, vu,,uv vu,,uv ,,, vdk bv vdk bv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv dkb vu..uv vu..uv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv c c cu..uc cu..uc the cariages and the unarmed. a a a a a a a cu,,uccu,,uccu,,uccu,,uccu,,uc c ccrcm mll a vu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uv ,,,rrrm mll m vdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bv dkbrrrm mll s vu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv ,,,dkbm mll llvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv ,,,rrrtksll ..vu.. vvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv ,,,rrrm mtk cu..uccu..uc ..uccu..uccu..uc ,,,rrrm msl ,,, m mll ,,, m mll dhb ,,, m mll .... ,,, m mll ,,, ,,, ,,, cu,,uc cu,,uc cu,,uc ,,, vu,,uv uv,,uv uv,,uv ,,, vdk bv vdk bv vdk bv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv cdkbc vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv ,,, cu..uc cu..uc cu..uc ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, cu,,uc cu,,uc ,,, vu,,uv uv,,uv ,,, vdk bv vdk bv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv dkb vu..uv vu..uv ,,, cu..uc cu..uc c c the fift figure a ) ,,,, c) ,,,, c) ,,,, 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dkb.. .. dkb,, a ,,,,.... ....,,,, a ,,,,.... ....,,,, ) n n nc ) n n nc ) u u uc ) u u uc a ,,,,.... ....,,,, a ,,,,.... .... ....,,,, ,, dkb.. d hb .. dkb,, ,,,,.... .... .. dkb,, a ,,,,.... ....,,,, a ) n n nc ) n n nc ) ,,,, c)....c ) r) rc rc )....c)....c)....c)....c) ,,,, c u ,,,, uu....urrrrrrrrrrrru....uu....uu....uu....uu ,,,, c a u ,,,, uu....urr dkb dkb ru....uu....uu....uu....uu ,,,, u a u dkb uu dkbu rrrrrrrrrrru dkbnu dkbuu dkbuu dkbuu dkb u u ,,,, uu,,,,urr dkb dkb ru,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu ,,,, u u ,,,, uu,,,,u rrrrrrrrrrru,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu ,,,, u a ) ,,,, c),,,,c ) r) rc rc ),,,,u),,,,c),,,,c),,,,c) ,,,, c a mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmtksmmm mmmtksmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm a a a a a mmmmmmmm cvc)u, ,uc)u, ,uc)u, ,uc)u,,uc)u, mmmmmmmm vvvru, ,urru, ,urru, ,urru,,urru,, mmmmmmmm vvvrudkburrudkburrd k brrdk brrudk mmmtksmmmvvvru. .urru. .urru. .urru..urru.. mmmmmmmm vvvru. .ruur. .urru. .urru..urru.. mmmmmmmm vvv)u. .uc)u. .uc)u. .uc)u..uccu . mmmmmmmm vvv),,,,,c dkbr,,,...r .... .lll vvvr,dkb..r dhb . .m vvvr,,,...r .... ...t vvvr,,,...r .... vvv),,,...c vvv),,,...c vvvr,,,...r )u, ,uc )u,, )vcr,dkb .r ru. ,ur ru,, r,,,...r rudkbur ru,d r,,,...r ru. .ur ru.. r,,,...r ru. .ur ru.. ),,,...c )u. .uc )u. ),,,...c r,,,...r r,dkb..r r,,,...r r,,,...r ),,,...c ),,,...c r,,,...r )u. .uc r,dkb..r ru, ,ur r,,,...r rudkbur r,,,...r ru. .ur ),,, ..c ru. .ur ),,,...c )u. .uc r,,,...r )u. .uc r,,dkb.r r,,,...r r,,,...r ),,, ..c ),,,,,,c r,,,,,,r r, dkb,r r,,,,,,r r,,,,,,r ),,,,,,c a a a a a ,uc)u, ,uc)u, ,uc)u, ,uc)u, ,uc)v) mmmmmmmm ,urru, ,urru, ,urru, ,urru, ,urvvv mmmmmmmm b,rr,dkb,rr,dkb,rr,dkb,rr dkb rvvv mmmmmmmm .urru. .urru. .urru. .urru. .urvvvmmmtkfmmm .urru. .urru. .urru. .urru. .urvvv mmmmmmmm .uc)u. .uc)u. .uc)u. .uccu. .u)vvv mmmmmmmm )...,,cvvv mmmmmmmm .ll.. .... r...,,,rdkb .m. dhb r.dkb, rvvv gs.. .... r...,,,rvvv .... r...,,,rvvv )... ,,cvvv ,uc )u. .uc )... ,,cvvv ,ur ru, ,ur r...,,,rvvv kb,r r,dkb,r r.dkb, rc ) ,ur ru. .ur r...,,,r ,ur ru. .ur r...,,,r ,uc )u. .u) )... ,,c )... ,,c r...,,,r r.dkb, r r...,,,r r...,,,r )...,,,c )...,,,c )u, ,uc r...,, r ru, ,ur r.dkb, r r,dkb,r r...,,,r ru. .ur r...,,,r ru. .ur )... ,,c )u. .uc )... ,,c r...,,,r r.dkb, r r...,,,r r...,,,r )... ,,c ),,, ,,c r,,,,,,r r,dkb, r r,,,,,,r r,,,,,,r ),,, ,,c nicholas machiavel's prince translated out of italian into english by e.d. with some animadversions noting and taxing his errors to the most noble and illustrious, james duke of lenox, earle of march, baron of setrington, darnly, terbanten, and methuen, lord great chamberlain and admiral of scotland, knight of the most noble order of the garter, and one of his majesties most honourable privy counsel in both kingdomes. poysons are not all of that malignant and noxious quality, that as destructives of nature, they are utterly to be abhord; but we find many, nay most of them have their medicinal uses. this book carries its poyson and malice in it; yet mee thinks the judicious peruser may honestly make use of it in the actions of his life, with advantage. the lamprey, they say, hath a venemous string runs all along the back of it; take that out, and it is serv'd in for a choyce dish to dainty palates; epictetus the philosopher, sayes, every thing hath two handles, as the fire brand, it may be taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt: the other being laid hold on, will cleave to the very flesh, and the smart of it will pierce even to the heart. sin hath the condition of the fiery end; the touch of it is wounding with griefe unto the soule: nay it is worse; one sin goes not alone but hath many consequences. your grace may find the truth of this in your perusal of this author: your judgement shall easily direct you in finding out the good uses of him: i have pointed at his chiefest errors with my best endeavors, and have devoted them to your graces service: which if you shall accept and protect, i shall remain your graces humble and devoted servant, edward dacres. the epistle to the reader. questionless some men will blame me for making this author speak in our vulgar tongue. for his maximes and tenents are condemnd of all, as pernicious to all christian states, and hurtfull to all humane societies. herein i shall answer for my self with the comoedian, _placere studeo bonis quam plurimis, et minimé multos lædere_: i endeavor to give content to the most i can of those that are well disposed, and no scandal to any. i grant, i find him blamed and condemned: i do no less my self. reader, either do thou read him without a prejudicate opinion, and out of thy own judgement taxe his errors; or at least, if thou canst stoop so low, make use of my pains to help thee; i will promise thee this reward for thy labor: if thou consider well the actions of the world, thou shalt find him much practised by those that condemn him; who willingly would walk as theeves do with close lanternes in the night, that they being undescried, and yet seeing all, might surprise the unwary in the dark. surely this book will infect no man: out of the wicked treasure of a mans own wicked heart, he drawes his malice and mischief. from the same flower the bee sucks honey, from whence the spider hath his poyson. and he that means well, shall be here warnd, where the deceitfull man learnes to set his snares. a judge who hath often used to examine theeves, becomes the more expert to sift out their tricks. if mischief come hereupon, blame not me, nor blame my author: lay the saddle on the right horse: but _hony soit qui mal y pense_: let shame light on him that hatcht the mischief. the prince nicholas machiavelli, to the magnificent laurence sonne to peter of medicis health. they that desire to ingratiate themselves with a prince, commonly use to offer themselves to his view, with things of that nature as such persons take most pleasure and delight in: whereupon we see they are many times presented with horses and armes, cloth of gold, pretious stones, and such like ornaments, worthy of their greatness. having then a mind to offer up my self to your magnificence, with some testimony of my service to you, i found nothing in my whole inventory, that i think better of, or more esteeme, than the knowlege of great mens actions, which i have learned by a long experience of modern affairs, and a continual reading of those of the ancients. which, now that i have with great diligence long workt it out, and throughly sifted, i commend to your magnificence. and, however i may well think this work unworthy of your view; yet such is your humanity, that i doubt not but it shall find acceptance, considering, that for my part i am not able to tender a greater gift, than to present you with the means, whereby in a very short time you may be able to understand all that, which i, in the space of many years, and with many sufferances and dangers, have made proof and gaind the knowledge of. and this work i have not set forth either with elegancy of discourse or stile, nor with any other ornament whereby to captivate the reader, as others use, because i would not have it gain its esteem from elsewhere than from the truth of the matter, and the gravity of the subject. nor can this be thought presumption, if a man of humble and low condition venture to dilate and discourse upon the governments of princes; for even as they that with their pensils designe out countreys, get themselves into the plains below to consider the nature of the mountains, and other high places above; and again to consider the plains below, they get up to the tops of the mountains; in like manner to understand the nature of the people, it is fit to be a prince; and to know well the dispositions of princes, sutes best with the understanding of a subject. your magnificence then may be pleased, to receive this small present, with the same mind that i send it; which if you shall throughly peruse and consider, you shall perceive therein that i exceedingly wish, that you may attain to that greatness, which your own fortune, and your excellent endowments promise you: and if your magnificence from the very point of your highness shall sometime cast your eyes upon these inferior places, you shall see how undeservedly i undergoe an extream and continual despight of fortune. the table of the chapters chap. . how many sorts of principalities there are, and how many wayes they are attained to, chap. . of hereditary principalities, chap. . of mixt principalities, chap. . wherefore darius his kingdome, taken by alexander, rebelled not against his successors after alexanders death, chap. . in what manner cities and principalities are to be governed, which before they were conquered, lived under their own laws, chap. . of new principalities that are conquered by ones own armes and valor, chap. . of new principalities gotten by fortune and other mens forces, chap. . concerning those who by wicked means have attaind to a principality, chap. . of the civil principality, chap. . in what manner the forces of all principalities ought to be measured, chap. . concerning ecclesiastical principalities, chap. . how many sorts of military discipline there be; and touching mercenary soldiers, chap. . of auxiliary soldiers, mixt and natives, chap. . what belongs to the prince touching military discipline, chap. . of those things in respect whereof men, and especially princes are prais'd or disprais'd, chap. . of liberality and miserableness, chap. . of cruelty and clemency, and whether it is better to be belov'd or feared, chap. . in what manner princes ought to keep their word, chap. . that princes should take a care not to incur contempt or hatred, chap. . whether the citadels and many other things, which princes make use of, are profitable or dammageable, chap. . how a prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation, chap. . touching princes secretaries, chap. . that flatterers are to be avoyded, chap. . wherefore the princes of italy have lost their states, chap. . how great power fortune hath in humane affairs, and what means there is to resist it, chap. . an exhortation to free italy from the barbarions, the prince written by nicholas machiavelli, secretary and citizen of florence. chap. i how many sorts of principalities there are, and how many wayes they are attained to. all states, all dominions that have had, or now have rule over men, have been and are, either republiques or principalities. principalities are either hereditary, whereof they of the blood of the lord thereof have long time been princes; or else they are new; and those that are new, are either all new, as was the dutchy of millan to francis sforce; or are as members adjoyned to the hereditary state of the prince that gains it; as the kingdom of naples is to the king of spain. these dominions so gotten, are accustomed either to live under a prince, or to enjoy their liberty; and are made conquest of, either with others forces, or ones own, either by fortune, or by valor. chap. ii of hereditary principalities. i will not here discourse of republiques, because i have other where treated of them at large: i will apply my self only to a principality, and proceed, while i weave this web, by arguing thereupon, how these principallities can be governed and maintained. i say then that in states of inheritance, and accustomed to the blood of their princes, there are far fewer difficulties to keep them, than in the new: for it suffices only not to transgress the course his ancestors took, and so afterward to temporise with those accidents that can happen; that if such a prince be but of ordinary industry, he shall allwaies be able to maintain himself in his state, unless by some extraordinary or excessive power he be deprived thereof; and when he had lost it, upon the least sinister chance that befalls the usurper, he recovers it again. we have in italy the duke of ferrara for example hereof, who was of ability to resist the venetians, in the year , and to withstand pope julius in the tenth for no other reason, than because he had of old continued in that rule; for the natural prince hath fewer occasions, and less heed to give offence, whereupon of necessity he must be more beloved; and unless it be that some extravagant vices of his bring him into hatred, it is agreeable to reason, that naturally he should be well beloved by his own subjects: and in the antiquity and continuation of the dominion, the remembrances and occasions of innovations are quite extinguished: for evermore one change leaves a kind of breach or dent, to fasten the building of another. chap. iii of mixt principalities. but the difficulties consist in the new principality; and first, if it be not all new, but as a member, so that it may be termed altogether as mixt; and the variations thereof proceed in the first place from a natural difficulty, which we commonly finde in all new principalities; for men do willingly change their lord, beleeving to better their condition; and this beliefe causes them to take armes against him that rules over them, whereby they deceive themselves, because they find after by experience, they have made it worse: which depends upon another natural and ordinary necessity, forcing him alwaies to offend those, whose prince he newly becomes, as well by his soldiers he is put to entertain upon them as by many other injuries, which a new conquest draws along with it; in such manner as thou findest all those thine enemies, whom thou hast endammaged in the seizing of that principality, and afterwards canst not keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it, for not being able to satisfie them according to their expectations, nor put in practice strong remedies against them, being obliged to them. for however one be very well provided with strong armies, yet hath he alwaies need of the favor of the inhabitants in the countrey, to enter thereinto. for these reasons, lewis the twelfth, king of france, suddenly took milan, and as soon lost it; and the first time lodwick his own forces served well enough to wrest it out of his hands; for those people that had opened him the gates, finding themselves deceived of their opinion, and of that future good which they had promised themselves, could not endure the distastes the new prince gave them. true it is, that countreys that have rebelled again the second time, being recovered, are harder lost; for their lord, taking occasion from their rebellion, is less respective of persons, but cares only to secure himself, by punishing the delinquents, to clear all suspicions, and to provide for himself where he thinks he is weakest: so that if to make france lose milan the first time, it was enough for duke lodwick to make some small stir only upon the confines; yet afterwards, before they could make him lose it the second time, they had need of the whole world together against him, and that all his armies should be wasted and driven out of italy; which proceeded from the forenamed causes: however though both the first and second time it was taken from him. the generall causes of the first we have treated of; it remains now that we see those of the second; and set down the remedies that he had, or any one else can have that should chance to be in those termes he was, whereby he might be able to maintain himself better in his conquest than the king of france did. i say therefore, that these states which by conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their conqueror, are either of the same province and the same language, or otherwise; and when they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially when they are not used to live free; and to enjoy them securely, it is enough to have extinguished the princes line who ruled over them: for in other matters, allowing them their ancient conditions, and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them, men ordinarily live quiet enough; as we have seen that burgundy did, britany, gascony, and normandy, which so long time continued with france: for however there be some difference of language between them, yet can they easily comport one with another; and whosoever makes the conquest of them, meaning to hold them, must have two regards; the first, that the race of their former prince be quite extinguished; the other, that he change nothing, neither in their lawes nor taxes, so that in a very short time they become one entire body with their ancient principality. but when any states are gaind in a province disagreeing in language, manners, and orders, here are the difficulties, and here is there need of good fortune, and great industry to maintain them; and it would be one of the best and livelyest remedies, for the conqueror to goe in person and dwell there; this would make the possession hereof more secure and durable; as the turk hath done in greece, who among all the other courses taken by him for to hold that state, had he not gone thither himself in person to dwell, it had never been possible for him to have kept it: for abiding there, he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings, and forthwith can remedy them; whereas being not there present, they are heard of when they are grown to some height, and then is there no help for them. moreover, the province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thither: the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the prince near at hand, whereupon have they more reason to love him, if they mean to be good; and intending to do otherwise, to fear him: and forrein princes will be well aware how they invade that state; insomuch, that making his abode there, he can very hardly lose it. another remedy, which is also a better, is to send colonies into one or two places, which may be as it were the keys of that state; for it is necessary either to do this, or to maintain there many horse and foot. in these colonies the prince makes no great expence, and either without his charge, or at a very small rate, he may both send and maintain them; and gives offence only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses, to bestow them on those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that state; and those that he offends, remaining dispersed and poore, can never hurt him: and all the rest on one part, have no offence given them, and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet: on the other side, they are wary not to erre, for fear it befalls not them, as it did those that were dispoild. i conclude then, that those colonies that are not chargeable, are the more trusty, give the less offence; and they that are offended, being but poor and scattered, can do but little harme, as i have said; for it is to be noted, that men must either be dallyed and flattered withall, or else be quite crusht; for they revenge themselves of small dammages; but of great ones they are not able; so that when wrong is done to any man, it ought so to be done, that it need fear no return of revenge again. but in lieu of colonies, by maintaining soldiers there, the expence is great; for the whole revenues of that state are to be spent in the keeping of it; so the conquest proves but a loss to him that hath got it, and endammages him rather; for it hurts that whole state to remove the army from place to place, of which annoyance every one hath a feeling, and so becomes enemie to thee; as they are enemies, i wis, who are outraged by thee in their own houses, whensoever they are able to do thee mischief. every way then is this guard unprofitable. besides, he that is in a different province, (as it is said) should make himself head and defender of his less powerfull neighbors, and devise alwaies to weaken those that are more mighty therein, and take care that upon no chance there enter not any foreiner as mighty as himself; for it will alwaies come to pass, that they shall be brought in by those that are discontented, either upon ambition, or fear; as the etolians brought the romans into greece; and they were brought into every countrey they came, by the natives; and the course of the matter is, that so soon as a powerfull stranger enters a countrey, all those that are the less powerfull there, cleave to him, provoked by an envy they beare him that is more mighty than they; so that for these of the weaker sort, he may easily gain them without any pains: for presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that he hath gotten: he hath only to beware that these increase not their strengths, nor their authorities, and so he shall easily be able by his own forces, and their assistances, to take down those that are mighty, and remain himself absolute arbitre of that countrey. and he that playes not well this part, shall quickly lose what he hath gotten; and while he holds it, shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations. the romans in the provinces they seiz'd on, observed well these points, sent colonies thither, entertained the weaker sort, without augmenting any thing their power, abated the forces of those that were mighty, and permitted not any powerfull forreiner to gain too much reputation there. and i will content my self only with the countrey of greece for example hereof. the achayans and etolians were entertained by them, the macedons kingdome was brought low, antiochus was driven thence, nor ever did the achayans or etolians deserts prevail so far for them, that they would ever promise to enlarge their state, nor the perswasions of philip induce them ever to be his friends, without bringing him lower; nor yet could antiochus his power make them ever consent that he should hold any state in that countrey: for the romans did in these cases that which all judicious princes ought to do, who are not only to have regard unto all present mischiefs, but also to the future, and to provide for those with all industry; for by taking order for those when they are afarre off, it is easie to prevent them; but by delaying till they come near hand to thee, the remedy comes too late; for this malignity is grown incurable: and it befalls this, as the physicians say of the hectick feaver, that in the beginning it is easily cur'd, but hardly known; but in the course of time, not having been known in the beginning, nor cured, it becomes easie to know, but hard to cure. even so falls it out in matters of state; for by knowing it aloof off (which is given only to a wise man to do) the mischiefs that then spring up, are quickly helped; but when, for not having been perceived, they are suffered to increase, so that every one sees them, there is then no cure for them: therefore the romans, seeing these inconvenients afar off, alwaies prevented them, and never sufferd them to follow; for to escape a war, because they knew that a war is not undertaken, but deferred for anothers advantage; therefore would they rather make a war with philip and antiochus in greece, to the end it should not afterwards be made with them in italy, though for that time they were able to avoid both the one and the other, which they thought not good to do: nor did they approve of that saying that is ordinarily in the mouthes of the sages of our dayes, _to enjoy the benefits of the present time_; but that rather, to take the benefit of their valor and wisdome; for time drives forward everything, and may bring with it as well good as evil, and evil as good. but let us return to france, and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by them: and we will speak of lewis, and not of charles, as of whom by reason of the long possession he held in italy we better knew the wayes he went: and you shall see he did the clean contrary to what should have been done by him that would maintain a state of different language and conditions. king lewis was brought into italy by the venetians ambition, who would have gotten for their shares half the state of lombardy: i will not blame his comming, or the course he took, because he had a mind to begin to set a foot in italy; but having not any friends in the country, all gates being barred against him, by reason of king charles his carriage there, he was constrained to joyn friendship with those he could; and this consideration well taken, would have proved lucky to him, when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any error. the king then having conquered lombardy, recovered presently all that reputation that charles had lost him; genua yeelded to him, the florentines became friends with him; the marquess of mantua, the duke of ferrara, the bentivolti, the lady of furli, the lord of faenza, pesaro rimino, camerino, and piombino, the lucheses, pisans and sienses, every one came and offered him friendship: then might the venetians consider the rashness of the course they had taken, who, only to get into their hands two townes in lombardy, made the king lord of two thirds in italy. let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the king have maintained his reputation in italy, if he had followed these aforenamed rules, and secured and defended those his friends, who because their number was great, and they weak and fearful, some of the church, and others of the venetians were alwaies forced to hold with him, and by their means he might easily have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest: but he was no sooner got into milan, than he took a quite wrong course, by giving ayd to pope alexander, to seize upon romania, and perceiv'd not that by this resolution he weakned himself, ruining his own friends, and those had cast themselves into his bosom, making the church puissant, by adding to their spiritual power, they gaind their authority, and so much temporal estate. and having once got out of the way, he was constrained to go on forward; insomuch as to stop alexanders ambition, and that he should not become lord of all tuscany, of force he was to come into italy: and this sufficed him not, to have made the church mighty, and taken away his own friends; but for the desire he had to get the kingdome of naples, he divided it with the king of spain: and where before he was the sole arbitre of italy, he brought in a competitor, to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country, and all that were ill affected to him, might have otherwhere to make their recourse: and whereas he might have left in that kingdome some vice-king of his own, he took him from thence, to place another there, that might afterward chace him thence. it is a thing indeed very natural and ordinary, to desire to be of the getting hand: and alwaies when men undertake it, if they can effect it, they shall be prais'd for it, or at least not blam'd: but when they are not able, and yet will undertake it, here lies the blame, here is the error committed. if france then was able with her own power to assail the kingdome of naples, she might well have done it; but not being able, she should not have divided it: and if the division she made of lombardy with the venetians, deserv'd some excuse, thereby to set one foot in italy; yet this merits blame, for not being excused by that necessity. lewis then committed these five faults; extinguisht the feebler ones, augmented the state of another that was already powerful in italy, brought thereinto a very puissant forreiner, came not thither himself to dwell there, nor planted any colonies there: which faults while he liv'd, he could not but be the worse for; yet all could not have gone so ill, had he not committed the sixt, to take from the venetians their state; for if he had not enlarg'd the churches territories nor brought the spaniard into italy, it had bin necessary to take them lower; but having first taken those other courses, he should never have given way to their destruction; for while they had been strong, they would alwaies have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of lombardy. for the venetians would never have given their consents thereto, unless they should have been made lords of it themselves; and the others would never have taken it from france, to give it them: and then they would never have dar'd to go and set upon them both together. and if any one should say, that king lewis yeelded romania to alexander, and the kingdome of naples to spain, to avoid a war; i answer with the reasons above alledged, that one should never suffer any disorder to follow, for avoiding of a war; for that war is not sav'd, but put off to thy disadvantage. and if any others argue, that the king had given his word to the pope, to do that exploit for him, for dissolving of his marriage, and for giving the cardinals cap to him of roan; i answer with that which hereafter i shall say touching princes words, how they ought to be kept. king lewis then lost lombardy, for not having observ'd some of those termes which others us'd, who have possessed themselves of countries, and desir'd to keep them. nor is this any strange thing, but very ordinary and reasonable: and to this purpose i spake at nantes with that french cardinal, when valentine (for so ordinarily was cæsar borgia pope alexanders son call'd) made himself master of romania; for when the cardinal said to me, that the italians understood not the feats of war; i answered, the frenchmen understood not matters of state: for had they been well vers'd therein, they would never have suffer'd the church to have grown to that greatness. and by experience we have seen it, that the power hereof in italy, and that of spain also, was caused by france, and their own ruine proceeded from themselves. from whence a general rule may be taken, which never, or very seldom fails, _that he that gives the means to another to become powerful, ruines himself_; for that power is caus'd by him either with his industry, or with his force; and as well the one as the other of these two is suspected by him that is grown puissant. chap. iv wherefore darius his kingdome taken by alexander, rebelled not against alexanders successors after his death. the difficulties being consider'd, which a man hath in the maintaining of a state new gotten, some might marvaile how it came to pass, that alexander the great subdued all asia in a few years; and having hardly possessed himself of it, died; whereupon it seemed probable that all that state should have rebelled; nevertheless his successors kept the possession of it, nor found they other difficulty in holding it, than what arose among themselves through their own ambition. i answer, that all the principalities whereof we have memory left us, have been governed in two several manners; either by a prince, and all the rest vassals, who as ministers by his favor and allowance, do help to govern that kingdom; or by a prince and by barons, who not by their princes favor, but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree. and these kinds of barons have both states of their own, and vassals who acknowledge them for their lords; and bare them a true natural affection. those states that are govern'd by a prince and by vassals, have their prince ruling over them with more authority; for in all his countrey, there is none acknowledged for superior, but himself: and if they yeeld obedience to any one else, it is but as to his minister and officer, nor beare they him any particular good will. the examples of these two different governments now in our dayes, are, the turk, and the king of france. the turks whole monarchy is govern'd by one lord, and the rest are all his vassals; and dividing his whole kingdom into divers sangiacques or governments, he sends several thither, and those he chops and changes, as he pleases. but the king of france is seated in the midst of a multitude of lords, who of old have been acknowledg'd for such by their subjects, and being belov'd by them, enjoy their preheminencies; nor can the king take their states from them without danger. he then that considers the one and the other of these two states, shall find difficulty in the conquest of the turks state; but when once it is subdu'd, great facility to hold it. the reasons of these difficulties in taking of the turks kingdom from him, are, because the invader cannot be called in by the princes of that kingdom, nor hope by the rebellion of those which he hath about him, to be able to facilitate his enterprize: which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid; for they being all his slaves, and oblig'd to him, can more hardly be corrupted; and put case they were corrupted, little profit could he get by it, they not being able to draw after them any people, for the reasons we have shewed: whereupon he that assails the turk, must think to find him united; and must rather relie upon his own forces, than in the others disorders: but when once he is overcome and broken in the field, so that he cannot repair his armies, there is nothing else to be doubted than the royal blood, which being once quite out, there is none else left to be feard, none of the others having any credit with the people. and as the conqueror before the victory could not hope in them; so after it, ought he not to fear them. the contrary falls out in kingdoms governed as is that of france: for it is easie to be enterd by the gaining of any baron in the kingdom; for there are alwaies some malecontents to be found, and those that are glad of innovation. those for the reasons alledg'd are able to open thee a way into that state, and to further thy victory, which afterwards to make good to thee, draws with it exceeding many difficulties, as well with those that have ayded thee, as those thou hast supprest. nor is it enough for thee to root out the princes race: for there remaine still those lords who quickly will be the ring-leaders of new changes; and in case thou art not able to content these, nor extinguish them, thou losest that state, whensoever the occasion is offerd. now if thou shalt consider what sort of government that of darius was, thou shalt find it like to the turks dominion, and therefore alexander was necessitated first to defeat him utterly, and drive him out of the field; after which victory darius being dead, that state was left secure to alexander, for the reasons we treated of before: and his successors, had they continued in amity, might have enjoy'd it at ease: nor ever arose there in that kingdome other tumults, than those they themselves stir'd up. but of the states that are order'd and grounded as that of france, it is impossible to become master at such ease: and from hence grew the frequent rebellions of spain, france, and greece against the romans, by reason of the many principalities those states had: whereof while the memory lasted, the romans were alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them; but the memory of them being quite wip't out, by the power and continuance of the empire, at length they enjoy'd it securely; and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another, each of one them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces, according as their authority had gain'd them credit therein: and that because the blood of their ancient lords was quite spent, they acknowledg'd no other but the romans. by the consideration then of these things, no man will marvaile that alexander had so little trouble to keep together the state of asia; and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest, as pyrrhus, and many others; which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour, but from the difference of the subject. chap. v in what manner cities and principalities are to be govern'd, which, before they were conquer'd, liv'd under their own laws. when those states that are conquered, as it is said, have been accustomed to live under their own laws, and in liberty, there are three wayes for a man to hold them. the first is to demolish all their strong places; the other, personally to goe and dwell there; the third, to suffer them to live under their own laws, drawing from them some tribute, and creating therein an oligarchy, that may continue it in thy service: for that state being created by that prince, knowes it cannot consist without his aid and force, who is like to doe all he can to maintain it; and with more facility is a city kept by meanes of her own citizens, which hath been us'd before to live free, than by any other way of keeping. we have for example the spartans and the romans; the spartans held athens and thebes, creating there an oligarchy: yet they lost it. the romans to be sure of capua, carthage, and numantia, dismantell'd them quite, and so lost them not: they would have kept greece as the spartans had held them, leaving them free, and letting them enjoy their own laws; and it prospered not with them: so that they were forc'd to deface many cities of that province to hold it. for in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under, than by demolishments; and whoever becomes master of a city us'd to live free, and dismantells it not, let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it; for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of liberty for refuge, and the ancient orders it had; which neither by length of time, nor for any favours afforded them, are ever forgotten; and for any thing that can be done, or order'd, unlesse the inhabitants be disunited and dispers'd, that name is never forgotten, nor those customes: but presently in every chance recourse is thither made: as pisa did after so many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the florentines. but when the cities or the provinces are accustomed to live under a prince, and that whole race is quite extirpated: on one part being us'd to obey; on the other, not having their old prince; they agree not to make one from among themselves: they know not how to live in liberty, in such manner that they are much slower to take armes; and with more facility may a prince gaine them, and secure himselfe of them. but in republiques there is more life in them, more violent hatred, more earnest desire of revenge; nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them, or suffer them to rest; so that the safest way, is, either to ruine them, or dwell among them. chap. vi of new principalities, that are conquer'd by ones own armes and valour. let no man marvaile, if in the discourse i shall make of new principalities, both touching a prince, and touching a state, i shall alledge very famous examples: for seeing men almost alwayes walk in the pathes beaten by others, and proceed in their actions by imitation; and being that others wayes cannot bee exactly follow'd, nor their vertues, whose patterne thou set'st before thee, attain'd unto; a wise man ought alwayes to tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons, and imitate those that have been the most excellent: to the end that if his vertue arrive not thereto, at least it may yeeld some favour thereof, and doe as good archers use, who thinking the place they intend to hit, too farre distant, and knowing how farr the strength of their bow will carry, they lay their ayme a great deale higher than the mark; not for to hit so high with their arrow, but to bee able with the help of so high an aime to reach the place they shoot at. i say, that in principalities wholly new, where there is a new prince, there is more and lesse difficulty in maintaining them, as the vertue of their conquerour is greater or lesser. and because this successe, to become a prince of a private man, presupposes either vertue, or fortune; mee thinks the one and other of these two things in part should mitigate many difficulties; however he that hath lesse stood upon fortune, hath maintain'd himselfe the better. moreover it somewhat facilitates the matter in that the prince is constrain'd, because he hath not other dominions, in person to come and dwell there. but to come to these who by their own vertues, and not by fortune, attain'd to be princes; the excellentest of these are moses, cyrus, romulus, theseus, and such like; and though of moses we are not to reason, he onely executing the things that were commanded him by god; yet merits he well to be admir'd, were it only for that grace that made him worthy to converse with god. but considering cyrus, and the others, who either got or founded kingdomes, we shall find them all admirable; and if there particular actions and lawes be throughly weigh'd, they will not appeare much differing from those of moyses, which he receiv'd from so sovraigne an instructer. and examining their lives and actions, it will not appeare, that they had other help of fortune, than the occasion, which presented them with the matter wherein they might introduce what forme they then pleas'd; and without that occasion, the vertue of their mind had been extinguish'd; and without that vertue, the occasion had been offer'd in vaine. it was then necessary for moses to find the people of israel slaves in Ægypt, and oppress'd by the Ægyptians, to the end that they to get out of their thraldome, should bee willing to follow him. it was fit that romulus should not be kept in albia, but expos'd presently after his birth, that he might become king of rome, and founder of that city. there was need that cyrus should find the persians discontented with the medes government, and the medes delicate and effeminate through their long peace. theseus could not make proof his vertue, had not he found the athenians dispers'd. these occasions therefore made these men happy, and their excellent vertue made the occasion be taken notice of, whereby their countrey became enobled, and exceeding fortunate. they, who by vertuous waies, like unto these, become princes, attain the principality with difficulty, but hold it with much ease; and the difficulties they find in gaining the principality, arise partly from the new orders and courses they are forc'd to bring in, to lay the foundation of their state, and work their own security. and it is to be consider'd, how there is not any thing harder to take in hand, nor doubtfuller to succeed, nor more dangerous to mannage, than to be the chief in bringing in new orders; for this chief finds all those his enemies, that thrive upon the old orders; and hath but luke warme defenders of all those that would do well upon the new orders, which luke-warme temper proceeds partly from fear of the opposers who have the laws to their advantage; partly from the incredulity of the men who truly beleeve not a new thing, unless there be some certain proof given them thereof. whereupon it arises, that whensoever they that are adversaries, take the occasion to assayle, they do it factiously; and these others defend but cooly, so that their whole party altogether runs a hazzard. therefore it is necessary, being we intend throughly to discourse this part, to examine if these innovators stand of themselves, or if they depend upon others; that is, if to bring their work to effect, it be necessary they should intreat, or be able to constrain; in the first case they allwayes succeed ill, and bring nothing to pass; but when they depend of themselves, and are able to force, then seldom it is that they hazzard. hence came it that all the prophets that were arm'd, prevail'd; but those that were unarm'd, were too weak: for besides what we have alledg'd, the nature of the people is changeable, and easie to be perswaded to a matter; but it is hard also to settle them in that perswasion. and therefore it behoves a man to be so provided, that when they beleeve no longer, he may be able to compel them thereto by force. moses, cyrus, theseus, and romulus would never have been able to cause their laws to be obey'd, had they been disarm'd; as in our times it befel fryer jerome savanarola, who perished in his new constitutions, when the multitude began not to beleeve him; neither had he the means to keep them firme, that had beleev'd; not to force beleefe in them that had not beleev'd him. wherefore such men as these, in their proceedings find great difficulty, and all their dangers are in the way, and these they must surmount by their vertue; but having once master'd them, and beginning to be honored by all, when they have rooted those out that envi'd their dignities, they remain powerful, secure, honorable, and happy. to these choice examples, i will add one of less remark; but it shall hold some proportion with them, and this shall suffice me for all others of this kind, which is hiero the siracusan. he of a private man, became prince of siracusa, nor knew he any other ayd of fortune than the occasion: for the siracusans being oppress'd, made choyce of him for their captain, whereupon he deserv'd to be made their prince: and he was of such vertue even in his private fortune, that he who writes of him, sayes, he wanted nothing of reigning, but a kingdom; this man extinguish'd all the old soldiery, ordaind the new; left the old allyances, entertained new; and as he had friendship, and soldiers that were his own, upon that ground he was able to build any edifice; so that he indured much trouble in gaining, and suffered but little in maintaining. chap. vii of new principalities, gotten by fortune, and other mens forces. they who by fortune only become princes of private men, with small pains attain to it, but have much ado to maintain themselves in it; and find no difficulty at all in the way, because they are carried thither with wings: but all the difficulties arise there, after they are plac'd in them. and of such sort are those who have an estate given them for money, by the favor of some one that grants it them: as it befell many in greece, in the cities of jonia, and hellespont; where divers princes were made by darius, as well for his own safety as his glory; as also them that were made emperors; who from private men by corrupting the soldiers, attaind to the empire. these subsist meerly upon the will, and fortune of those that have advanced them; which are two voluble and unsteady things; and they neither know how, nor are able to continue in that dignity: they know not how, because unless it be a man of great understanding and vertue, it is not probable that he who hath always liv'd a private life, can know how to command: neither are they able, because they have not any forces that can be friendly or faithful to them. moreover those states that suddenly fall into a mans hands, as all other things in nature that spring and grow quickly, cannot well have taken root, nor have made their correspondencies so firm, but that the first storm that takes them, ruines them; in case these, who (as it is said) are thus on a sudden clambred up to be princes, are not of that worth and vertue as to know how to prepare themselves to maintain that which chance hath cast into their bosoms, and can afterwards lay those foundations, which others have cast before they were princes. for the one and the other of these wayes about the attaining to be a prince, by vertue, or by fortune, i will alledge you two examples which have been in the dayes of our memory. these were francis sforza, and cæsar borgia; francis by just means and with a great deal of vertue, of a private man got to be duke of millan; and that which with much pains he had gaind, he kept with small ado. on the other side cæesar borgia (commonly termed duke valentine) got his state by his fathers fortune, and with the same lost it; however that for his own part no pains was spar'd, nor any thing omitted, which by a discreet and valorus man ought to have been done, to fasten his roots in those estates, which others armes or fortune had bestowed on him; for (as it was formerly said) he that lays not the foundations first, yet might be able by means of his extraordinary vertues to lay them afterwards, however it be with the great trouble of the architect, and danger of the edifice. if therefore we consider all the dukes progresses, we may perceive how great foundations he had cast for his future power, which i judge a matter not superfluous to run over; because i should not well know, what better rules i might give to a new prince, than the pattern of his actions; and however the courses he took, availd him not, yet was it not his fault, but it proceeded from an extraordinary and extream malignity of fortune. pope alexander the sixt, desiring to make the duke his son a great man, had a great many difficulties, present and future: first he saw no way there was whereby he might be able to make him lord of any state, that was not the churches; and if he turnd to take that from the church, he knew that the duke of milan, and the venetians would never agree to it; for faenza and riminum were under the venetians protection. moreover, he saw that the armes of italy, and those whereof in particular he might have been able to make some use, were in their hands, who ought to fear the popes greatness; and therefore could not any wayes rely upon them: being all in the orsins and colonies hands, and those of their faction. it was necessary then, that those matters thus appointed by them should be disturbed, and the states of italy disordered, to be able safely to master part of them, which he then found easie to do, seeing the venetians upon three considerations had us'd the means to bring the french men back again into italy: which he not only did not withstand, but furthered, with a resolution of king lewis his ancient marriage. the king then past into italy with the venetians ayd, and alexanders consent; nor was he sooner arrived in milan, than the pope had soldiers from him for the service of romania, which was quickly yeelded up to him upon the reputation of the kings forces. the duke then having made himself master of romania, and beaten the colonies, desiring to hold it, and proceed forward, two things hindered him: the one, his own soldiers, which he thought were not true to him; the other, the french mens good wills; that is to say, he feared that the princes soldiers, whereof he had served himself, would fail him, and not only hinder his conquest, but take from him what he had gotten; and that the king also would serve him the same turn. he had experience of the orsini upon an occasion, when after the taking of faenza he assaulted bolonia, to which assault he saw them go very cold. and touching the king, he discovered his mind, when having taken the dutchy of urbin, he invaded tuscany; from which action the king made him retire; whereupon the duke resolved to depend no more upon fortune, and other mens armes. and the first thing he did, was, to weaken the orsini, and colonnies factions in rome: for he gain'd all their adherents that were gentlemen, giving them large allowances, and honoring them according to their qualities with charges and governments; so that in a few months the good will they bare to the parties was quite extinguisht, and wholly bent to the duke. after this, he waited an occasion to root out the orsini, having before dispersed those of the family of colonnia, which fell out well to his hand; and he us'd it better. for the orsini being too late aware, that the dukes and the churches greatness was their destruction, held a council together in a dwelling house of theirs in the country adjoyning to perusia. from thence grew the rebellion of urbin, and the troubles of romania, and many other dangers befell the duke, which he overcame all with the help of the french: and having regained his reputation, trusting neither france, nor any forrein forces, to the end he might not be put to make trial of them again, he betook himself to his sleghts; and he knew so well to disguise his intention, that the orsins, by the mediation of paul orsine, were reconciled to him, to whom the duke was no way wanting in all manner of courtesies whereby to bring them into security, giving them rich garments, money, and horses, til their own simplicities led them all to sinigallia, into his hands. these heads being then pluck'd off, and their partisans made his friends; the duke had laid very good foundations, to build his own greatness on, having in his power all romania with the dutchy of urbin, and gained the hearts of those people, by beginning to give them some relish of their well being. and because this part is worthy to be taken notice of, and to be imitated by others, i will not let it escape. the duke, when he had taken romania, finding it had been under the hands of poor lords who had rather pillag'd their subjects, than chastis'd or amended them, giving them more cause of discord, than of peace and union, so that the whole countrey was fraught with robberies, quarrels, and other sorts of insolencies; thought the best way to reduce them to termes of pacification, and obedience to a princely power, was, to give them some good government: and therefore he set over them one remiro d'orco, a cruel hasty man, to whom he gave an absolute power. this man in a very short time setled peace and union amongst them with very great reputation. afterwards the duke thought such excessive authority serv'd not so well to his purpose, and doubting it would grow odious, he erected a civil judicature in the midst of the countrey, where one excellent judge did preside, and thither every city sent their advocate: and because he knew the rigors past had bred some hatred against him, to purge the minds of those people, and to gain them wholly to himself, he purpos'd to shew, that if there was any cruelty used, it proceeded not from any order of his, but from the harsh disposition of his officers. whereupon laying hold on him, at this occasion, he caus'd his head to be struck off one morning early in the market place at cesena, where he was left upon a gibbet, with a bloody sword by his side; the cruelty of which spectacle for a while satisfied and amaz'd those people. but to return from whence we have digressd: i say, that the duke finding himself very strong, and in part out of doubt of the present dangers, because he was arm'd after his own manner, and had in some good measure suppress'd those forces, which, because of their vicinity, were able to annoy him, he wanted nothing else to go on with his conquest, but the consideration of france: for he knew, that the king, who now, though late, was advis'd of his error, would never suffer him: and hereupon he began to seek after new allyances, and to waver with france, when the french came towards naples against the spaniards, who then besieged gagetta; and his design was only to be out of their danger, which had been effected for him, had pope alexander lived. and thus were his businesses carried touching his present estate. as for the future, he had reason to doubt lest the new successor to the papacy would not be his friend, and would endeavor to take that from him that alexander had bestowed on him; and he thought to provide for this foure waies: first by rooting out the races of all those lords he had dispoyled, whereby to take those occasions from the pope. secondly, by gaining all the gentlemen of rome, whereby he might be able with those to keep the pope in some awe. thirdly, to make the colledge of cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might be. fourthly, by making of so large conquests, before the popes death, as that he might be able of himself to withstand the first fury of his enemies. three of these fowre at pope alexanders death he had effected, and the fourth he had neare brought to a point. for of those lords he had stript, he put to death as many as he could come at, and very few escap'd him: he gaind him the roman gentlemen: and in the colledge he had made a great faction. and touching his new conquest, he had a designe to become lord of tuscany. and he had possessed himself already of perusia, and pombin, and taken protection of pisa: and so soon as he should have cast off his respect to france (which now he meant to hold no longer) being the french were now driven out of the kingdome of naples by the spaniards, so that each of them was forc'd to buy his friendship at any termes; he was then to leap into pisa. after this lucca and siena were presently to fall to him, partly for envy to the florentines, and partly for fear. the florentines had no way to escape him: all which, had it succeeded with him, as without question it had, the very same year that alexander dy'd, he had made himself master of so great forces, and such reputation, that he would have been able to have stood upon his own bottom, without any dependance of fortune, or resting upon others helps, but only upon his own strength and valor. but alexander dy'd five years after that he had begun to draw forth his sword: and left him setled only in the state of romania, with all his other designes in the ayre, sick unto death, between two very strong armies of his enemies; and yet was there in this duke such a spirit and courage; and he understood so well, how men are to be gaind, and how to be lost, and so firm were the grounds he had laid in a short time, that, had he not had those armies upon his back, or had been in health, he would have carried through his purpose in spight of all opposition; and that the foundations he grounded upon were good, it appeard in that romania held for him above a moneth, and he remained secure in rome, though even at deaths doore: and however the baglioni, vitelli, and orsini came into rome; yet found they none would take their parts against him. and this he was able to have effected, that if he could not have made him pope whom be would, he could have hindred him that he would not should be pope. but had he been in health when alexander dy'd, every thing had gone easily with him; and he told me on that day that julius the second was created pope, that he had fore-thought on all that which could happen, in case his father chanc'd to dye, and for every thing provided its remedy, this onely excepted, that he foresaw not that he should at the same time be brought unto deaths dore also. having then collected all the dukes actions, me thinks i could not well blame him, but rather (as i have here done) set him as a pattern to be followed by all those who by fortune and others armes have been exalted to an empire. for he being of great courage, and having lofty designes, could not carry himself otherwise; and the only obstacle of his purposes was the brevity of alexanders life, and his own sickness. whoever therefore deemes it necessary in his entrance into a new principality, to secure himself of his enemies, and gain him friends, to overcome either by force or by cunning, to make himself beloved, or feared of his people, be followed and reverenced by his soldiers, to root out those that can, or owe thee any hurt, to change the ancient orders with new wayes, to be severe, and yet acceptable, magnanimous, and liberall; to extinguish the unfaithfull soldiery, and create new; to maintain to himself the armities of kings and princes, so that they shall either with favor benefit thee, or be wary how to offend thee; cannot find more fresh and lively examples than the actions of this man. he deserves to be found fault withall for the creation of julius the second, wherein an evil choice was made for him: for, as it is said, not being able to make a pope to his mind, he could have withheld any one from being pope; and should never have consented that any one of those cardinals should have got the papacy, whom he had ever done harme to; or who having attaind the pontificate were likely to be afraid of him: because men ordinarily do hurt either for fear, or hatred. those whom he had offended, were among others, he who had the title of st. peter ad vincula, colonna, st. george, and ascanius; all the others that were in possibility of the popedome, were such as might have feard him rather, except the cardinal of roan, and the spaniards; these by reason of their allyance and obligation with him, the other because of the power they had, having the kingdome of france on their party; wherefore the duke above all things should have created a spanyard pope, and in case he could not have done that, he should have agreed that roan should have been, and not st. peter ad vincula. and whoever beleeves, that with great personages new benefits blot on the remembrance of old injuries, is much deceiv'd. the duke therefore in this election, was the cause of his own ruine at last. till wee come to this seaventh chapter, i find not any thing much blame-worthy, unlesse it be on ground he layes in the second chapter; whereupon hee builds most of this fabrick, viz. that subjects must either be dallyed or flatterd withall, or quite crusht. whereby our author advises his prince to support his authority with two cardinall vertues, dissimulation, and cruelty. he considers not herein that the head is but a member of the body, though the principall; and the end of the parts is the good of the whole. and here he goes against himselfe in the twenty sixt chapter of his rep. . . where hee blames philip of macedon for such courses, terming them very cruell, and against all christian manner of living; and that every man should refuse to be a king, and desire rather to live a private life, than to reigne so much to the ruine of mankind. the life of cæsar borgia, which is here given as a paterne to new princes, we shall find to have been nothing else but a cunning carriage of things so, that he might thereby first deceive and inveigle, and then suppresse all those that could oppose or hinder his ambition. for if you runne over his life, you shall see the father pope alexander the sixt and him, both imbarqued for his advancement, wherein they engag'd the papall authority, and reputation of religion; for faith and conscience these men never knew, though they exacted it of others: there was never promise made, but it was only so farre kept as servd for advantage; liberality was made use of: clemency and cruelty, all alike, as they might serve to worke with their purposes. all was sacrific'd to ambition; no friendship could tye these men, nor any religion: and no marvell: for ambition made them forget both god and man. but see the end of all this cunning: though this cæsar borgia contrived all his businesse so warily, that our author much commends him, and hee had attaind neere the pitch of his hopes, and had provided for each misadventure could befall him its remedy; policy shewd it selefe short-sighted; for hee foresaw not at the time of his fathers death, he himself should bee brought unto deaths doore also. and me thinks this example might have given occasion to our author to confesse, that surely there is a god that ruleth the earth. and many times god cutts off those cunning and mighty men in the hight of their purposes, when they think they have neare surmounted all dangers and difficulties. 'to the intent that the living may know, that the most high ruleth in the kingdome of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.' daniel. . . chap. viii concerning those who by wicked meanes have attaind to a principality. but because a man becomes a prince of a private man two wayes, which cannot wholly be attributed either to fortune or vertue, i think not fit to let them passe me: howbeit the one of them may be more largely discoursed upon, where the republicks are treated of. these are, when by some wicked and unlawfull meanes a man rises to the principality; or when a private person by the favour of his fellow citizens becomes prince of his countrey. and speaking of the first manner, it shall be made evident by two examples, the one ancient, the other moderne, without entring otherwise into the justice or merit of this part; for i take it that these are sufficient for any body that is forc'd to follow them. agathocles the sicilian, not of a private man onely, but from a base and abject fortune, got to be king of siracusa. this man borne but of a potter, continued alwayes a wicked life throughout all the degrees of this fortune: neverthelesse he accompanied his lewdnesse with such a courage and resolution, that applying himselfe to military affaires, by the degrees thereof he attained to bee prætour of siracusa, and being setled in that degree, and having determined that he would become prince, and hold that by violence and without obligation to any other, which by consent had been granted him: and to this purpose haveing had some private intelligence touching his designe with amilcar the carthaginian, who was imployd with his army in sicily, one morining gatherd the people together and the senate of syracusa, as if he had some what to advise with them of matters belonging to the commonwealth, and upon a signe given, caus'd his souldiers to kill his senatours, and the richest of the people; who being slaine, he usurp'd the principality of that city without any civill strife: and however he was twice broken by the carthaginians, and at last besieged, was able not onely to defend his own city, but leaving part of his own army at the defence thereof, with the other invaded affrique, and in a short time freed siracusa from the siege, and brought the carthaginians into extreme necessity, who were constraind to accord with him, be contented with the possession of affrique, and quitt sicily to agathocles. he then that should consider the actions and valour of this man, would not see any, or very few things to be attributed unto fortune; seeing that as is formerly sayd, not by any ones favour, but by the degrees of service in warre with many sufferings and dangers, to which he had risen, he came to the principality; and that hee maintained afterwards with so many resolute and hazardous undertakings. yet cannot this be term'd vertue or valour to slay his own citizens, betray his friends, to be without faith, without pitty, without religion, which wayes are of force to gaine dominion, but not glory: for if agathocles his valour bee well weighd, in his enturing upon, and comming off from dangers, and the greatnesse of his courage, in supporting and mastering of adversities, no man can see why he should be thought any way inferiour even to the ablest captaines. notwithstanding his beastly cruelty and inhumanity with innumerable wickednesses, allow not that he should be celebrated among the most excellent men. that cannot then be attributed to fortune or vertue, which without the one or the other was attaind to by him. in our dayes, while alexander the sixth held the sea, oliverotte of fermo, who some few yeeres before had been left young by his parents, was brought up under the care of an uncle of his on the mothers side, called john foliani, and in the beginning of his youth given, by him to serve in the warres under paulo vitelli: to the end that being well instructed in that discipline, he might rise to some worthy degree in the warrs. afterwards when paulo was dead, he served under vitellozzo his brother, and in very short time, being ingenious, of a good personage, and brave courage, he became one of the prime men among the troops he served in: but thinking it but servile to depend upon another, he plotted by the ayd of some citizens of fermo (who lik'd rather the thraldome of their city than the liberty of it) and by the favour of the vitelli, to make himselfe master of fermo; and writ to john foliani, that having been many yeeres from home, he had a mind to come and see him and the city, and in some part take notice of his own patrimony; and because he had not imployd himselfe but to purchase honour, to the end his citizens might perceive, that he had not vainely spent his time, he had a desire to come in good equipage and accompanied with a hundred horse of his friends and servants; and he intreated him that he would be pleasd so to take order, that he might be honourably received by the inhabitants of fermo, which turnd as well to his honor that was his uncle, as his that was the nephew. in this, john faild not in any office of courtesie due to his nephew: and caused him to be well receivd by them of fermo, and lodged him in his own house: where having passed some dayes, and stayd to put in order somewhat that was necessary for his intended villany, he made a very solemne feast, whether he invited john foliani, and all the prime men of fermo: and when all their chear was ended, and all their other entertainments, as in such feasts it is customary, oliverotto of purpose mov'd some grave discourses; speaking of the greatnesse of pope alexander, and cæsar his son, and their undertakings; where unto john and the others making answer, he of a sudden stood up, saying, that those were things to be spoken of in a more secret place, and so retir'd into a chamber, whether john and all the other citizens followd him; nor were they sooner set downe there, than from some secret place therein camp forth diverse souldiers, who slew john and all the others: after which homicide oliverotto got a horsebacke and ravaged the whole towne, and besieged the supreme magistrate in the palace, so that for feare they were all constraind to obey him, and to settle a government, whereof hee made himselfe prince; and they being all dead who, had they been discontented with him, could have hurt him; he strengthned himselfe with new civill and military orders, so that in the space of a yeer that he held the principality, he was not only secure in the city of fermo, but became fearefull to all his neighbours; and the conquest of him would have prov'd difficult, as that of agathocles, had he not let himselfe been deceivd by cæsar borgia, when at sinigallia, as before was said, he took the orsini and vitelli: where he also being taken a yeere after he had committed the parricide, was strangled together with vitellozzo (whome he had had for master both of his vertues and vices.) some man might doubt from whence it should proceed, that agathocles, and such like, after many treacheries and crueltyes, could possibly live long secure in his own countrey, and defend himselfe from his forrein enemies, and that never any of his own citizens conspir'd against him, seeing that by means of cruelty, many others have never been able even in peaceable times to maintaine their states, much lesse in the doubtfull times of warre. i beleeve that this proceeds from the well, or ill using of those cruelties: they may bee termd well us'd (if it bee lawfull to say well of evill) that are put in practice only once of necessity for securities sake, not insisting therein afterwards; but there is use made of them for the subjects profit, as much as may be. but those that are ill us'd, are such as though they bee but few in the beginning, yet they multiply rather in time, than diminish. they that take that first way, may with the help of god, and mens care, find some remedy for their state, as agathocles did: for the others, it is impossible they should continue. whereupon it is to be noted, that in the laying hold of a state, the usurper thereof ought to runne over and execute all his cruelties at once, that he be not forced often to returne to them, and that he may be able, by not renewing of them, to give men some security, and gaine their affections by doing them some courtesies. hee that carries it otherwise, either for fearefullnesse, or upon evill advice, is alwayes constraind to hold his sword drawne in his hand; nor ever can hee rely upon his subjects, there being no possibility for them, because of his daily and continuall injuries, to live in any safety: for his injuries should bee done altogether, that being seldomer tasted, they might lesse offend; his favours should bee bestowd by little, and little to the end they might keep their taste the better; and above all things a prince must live with his subjects in such sort, that no accident either of good or evill can make him vary: for necessity comming upon him by reason of adversities, thou hast not time given thee to make advantage of thy cruelties; and the favours which then thou bestowest, will little help thee, being taken as if they came from thee perforce, and so yeeld no returne of thanks. chap. ix of the civill principality. but comming to the other part, when a principall citizen, not by villany, or any other insufferable violence, but by the favour of his fellow-citizens becomes prince of his native countrey: which we may terme a civill principality; nor to attaine hereunto is vertue wholly or fortune wholly necessary, but rather a fortunate cunning: i say, this principality is climb'd up to, either by the peoples help, or the great mens. for, in every city we finde these two humours differ; and they spring from this, that the people desire not to be commanded nor oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are desirous to command and oppresse the people: and from these two several appetites, arise in the city one of these three effects, either a principality, or liberty, or tumultuary licentiousnesse. the principality is caused either by the people, or the great ones, according as the one or other of these factions have the occasion offerd; for the great ones seeing themselves not able to resist the people, begin to turne the whole reputation to one among them, and make him prince, whereby they may under his shadow vent their spleenes. the people also, not being able to support the great mens insolencies, converting the whole reputation to one man, create him their prince, to be protected by his authority. he that comes to the principality by the assistance of the great ones, subsists with more difficulty, than he that attaines to it by the peoples favour; for he being made prince, hath many about him, who account themselves his equalls, and therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure. but he that gaines the principality by the peoples favor, finds himselfe alone in his throne, and hath none or very few neare him that are not very supple to bend: besides this, the great ones cannot upon easie termes be satisfied, or without doing of wrong to others, where as a small matter contents the people: for the end which the people propound to themselves, is more honest than that of the great men, these desiring to oppresse, they only not to be oppressed. to this may be added also, that the prince which is the peoples enemy, can never well secure himselfe of them, because of their multitude; well may hee bee sure of the nobles, they being but a few. the worst that a prince can look for of the people become his enemy, is to be abandoned by them: but when the great ones once grow his enemies, he is not only to feare their abandoning of him, but their making of a party against him also: for there being in them more forecast and craft, they alwayes take time by the forelocks whereby to save themselves, and seeke credit with him who they hope shall get the mastery. the prince likewise is necessitated alwayes to live with the same people, but can doe well enough without the same great men; he being able to create new ones, and destroy them again every day, and to take from them, and give them credit as he pleases: and to cleare this part, i say, that great men ought to be considerd two wayes principally, that is, if they take thy proceedings so much to heart, as to engage their fortunes wholly in thine, in case they lye not alwayes catching at spoyle, they ought to be well honourd and esteem'd: those that bind themselves not to thy fortune, are to be considerd also two wayes; either they doe it for lack of courage, and naturall want of spirit, and then shouldst thou serve thy selfe of them, and of them especially that are men of good advice; for if thy affaires prosper, thou dost thy selfe honour thereby; if crost, thou needst not feare them: but when they oblige not themselves to thee of purpose, and upon occasion of ambition, it is a signe they think more of themselves than of thee: and of these the prince ought to beware, and account of them as his discoverd enemyes: for alwayes in thy adversity they will give a hand too to ruine thee. therefore ought hee that comes to be prince by the peoples favour, keepe them his friends: which he may easily doe, they desiring only to live free from oppression: but he that becomes prince by the great mens favour, against the will of the people, ought above all things to gaine the people to him, which he may easily effect, when he takes upon him their protection: and because men when they find good, where they look for evill, are thereby more endered to their benefactour, therefore growes the people so pliant in their subjection to him, as if by their favours he had attaind his dignity. and the prince is able to gaine them to his side by many wayes, which because they vary according to the subject, no certaine rule can be given thereupon; wherefore we shall let them passe i will only conclude, that it is necessary for a prince to have the people his friend; otherwise in his adversities he hath no helpe. nabis prince of the spartans supported the siege of all greece, and an exceeding victorious army of the romans, and against those defended his native countrey and state, and this suffic'd him alone, that as the danger came upon him, he secur'd himself of a fewer; whereas if the people had been his enemy, this had nothing availd him. and let no man think to overthrow this my opinion with that common proverb, that he who relyes upon the people, layes his foundation in the dirt; for that is true where a private citizen grounds upon them, making his account that the people shall free him, when either his enemyes or the magistrates oppresse him: in this case he should find himself often deceiv'd, as it befell the gracchyes in rome, and in florence george scali: but he being a prince that grounds thereupon, who can command, and is a man of courage, who hath his wits about him in his adversityes, and wants not other preparations, and holds together the whole multitude animated with his valour and orders, shall not prove deceiv'd by them, and shall find he hath layd good foundations. these principalityes are wont to be upon the point of falling when they goe about to skip from the civil order to the absolute: for these princes either command of themselves, or by the magistrate; in this last case their state is more weak and dangerous, because they stand wholly at the will and pleasure of these citizens, who then are set over the magistrates, who especially in adverse times are able with facility to take their state from them either by rising up against them, or by not obeying them; and then the prince is not at hand in those dangers to take the absolute authority upon him: for the citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the magistrates, are not like in those fractions to obey his: and in doubtfull times he shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom he may trust; for such a prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in peaceable times, when the citizens have need of the state; for then every one runs, and every one promises, and every one will venture his life for him, where there is no danger neare; but in times of hazzard, when the state hath need of citizens, there are but few of them then, and so much the more is this experience dangerous, in that it can be but once made. therefore a prudent prince ought to devise a way whereby his citizens alwayes and in any case and quality of time may have need of his government, and they shall alwaies after prove faithfull to him. chap. x in what manner the forces of all principalities ought to be measured. it is requisite in examining the quality of those principalities, to have another consideration of them, that is, if a prince have such dominions, that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of himself, or else whether he hath alwaies need of another to defend him. and to cleer this point the better, i judge them able to stand of themselves, who are of power either for their multitudes of men, or quantity of money, to bring into the field a compleat armie, and joyn battel with whoever comes to assail them: and so i think those alwaies to stand in need of others help, who are not able to appear in the field against the enemy, but are forc'd to retire within their walls and guard them. touching the first case, we have treated already, and shall adde somwhat thereto as occasion shall require. in the second case, we cannot say other, save only to encourage such princes to fortifie and guard their own capital city, and of the countrey about, not to hold much account; and whoever shall have well fortified that town, and touching other matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects, as hath been formerly said, and hereafter shall be, shall never be assaild but with great regard; for men willingly undertake not enterprises, where they see difficulty to work them through; nor can much facility be there found, where one assails him, who hath his town strong and wel guarded, and is not hated of his people. the cities of germany are very free; they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them; and they obey the emperor, when they please, and they stand not in fear, neither of him nor any other potentate about them: for they are in such a manner fortified, that every one thinks the siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious: for all of them have ditches, and rampires, and good store of artillery, and alwaies have their publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeer: besides this, whereby to feed the common people, and without any loss to the publick, they have alwaies in common whereby they are able for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city, and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves: they hold up also the military exercises in repute, and hereupon have they many orders to maintain them. a prince then that is master of a good strong city, and causeth not himself to be hated, cannot be assaulted; and in case he were, he that should assail him, would be fain to quit him with shame: for the affairs of the world are so various, that it is almost impossible that an army can lie incampt before a town for the space of a whole yeer: and if any should reply, that the people having their possessions abroad, in case they should see them a fire, would not have patience, and the tedious siege and their love to themselves would make them forget their prince: i answer that a prince puissant and couragious, will easily master those difficulties, now giving his subjects hope, that the mischief will not be of durance; sometimes affright them with the cruelty of their enemies, and other whiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy. besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their countrey, upon his arrival, and at those times while mens minds are yet warme, and resolute in their defence: and therefore so much the less ought a prince doubt: for after some few dayes, that their courages grow coole, the dammages are all done, and mischiefs received, and there is no help for it, and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their prince, thinking he is now more bound to them, their houses having for his defence been fired, and their possessions wasted; and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they do, as for those they receive; whereupon if all be well weigh'd, a wise prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his citizens hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege, when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition. chap. xi concerning ecclesiastical principalities. there remains now only that we treat of the ecclesiastical principalities, about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten: for they are attained to either by vertue, or fortune; and without the one or the other they are held: for they are maintaind by orders inveterated in the religion, all which are so powerfull and of such nature, that they maintain their princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live. these only have an estate and defend it not; have subjects and govern them not; and yet their states because undefended, are not taken from them; nor their subjects, though not govern'd, care not, think not, neither are able to aliene themselves from them. these principalities then are only happy and secure: but they being sustained by superior causes, whereunto humane understanding reaches not, i will not meddle with them: for being set up and maintained by god, it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them. yet if any man should ask me whence it proceeds, that the church in temporal power hath attaind to such greatness, seeing that till the time of alexander the sixt, the italian potentates, and not only they who are entituled the potentates, but every baron and lord though of the meanest condition in regard of the temporality, made but small account of it; and now a king of france trembles at the power thereof; and it hath been able to drive him out of italy, and ruine the venetians; and however this be well known, me thinks it is not superstitious in some part to recall it to memory. before that charles king of france past into italy, this countrey was under the rule of the pope, venetians, the king of naples, the duke of milan, and the florentines. these potentates took two things principally to their care; the one, that no forreiner should invade italy; the other that no one of them should inlarge their state. they, against whom this care was most taken, were the pope and the venetians; and to restrain the venetians, there needed the union of all the rest, as it was in the defence of ferrara; and to keep the pope low, they served themselves of the barons of rome, who being divided into two factions, the orsini and colonnesi, there was alwaies occasion of offence between them, who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the pope, held the popedome weak and feeble: and however sometimes there arose a couragious pope, as was sextus; yet either his fortune, or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities, and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof; for in ten years, which time, one with another, popes ordinarily liv'd, with much ado could they bring low one of the factions. and if, as we may say, one had near put out the colonnesi, there arose another enemy to the orsini, who made them grow again, so that there was never time quite to root them out. this then was the cause, why the popes temporal power was of small esteem in italy; there arose afterwards pope alexander the sixt, who of all the popes that ever were, shewed what a pope was able to do with money and forces: and he effected, by means of his instrument, duke valentine, and by the ocasion of the french mens passage, all those things which i have formerly discoursed upon in the dukes actions: and however his purpose was nothing at all to inlarge the church dominions, but to make the duke great; yet what he did, turnd to the churches advantage, which after his death when the duke was taken away, was the heir of all his pains. afterwards succeeded pope julius, and found the church great, having all romania, and all the barons of rome being quite rooted out, and by alexanders persecutions, all their factions worne down; he found also the way open for the heaping up of moneys, never practised before alexanders time; which things julius not only follow'd, but augmented; and thought to make himself master of bolonia, and extinguish the venetians, and chase the french men out of italy: and these designes of his prov'd all lucky to him, and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the church, and in no private regard: he kept also the factions of the orsins and colonnesi, in the same state he found them: and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration; yet two things have held them quiet; the one the power of the church, which somewhat affrights them; the other because they have no cardinals of their factions, who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them: nor shall these parties ever be at rest, while they have cardinals; because they nourish the factions both in rome, and abroad; and the barons then are forced to undertake the defence of them: and thus from the prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the barons. and now hath pope leo his holiness found the popedome exceeding puissant, of whom it is hoped, that if they amplified it by armes, he by his goodness, and infinite other vertues, will much more advantage and dignifie it. chap. xii how many sorts of military discipline there are and touching mercenary soldiers. having treated particularly of the qualities of those principalities, which in the beginning i propounded to discourse upon, and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being, and shewd the waies whereby many have sought to gain, and hold them, it remains now that i speak in general of the offences and defences, that may chance in each of the forenamed. we have formerly said that it is necessary for a prince to have good foundations laid; otherwise it must needs be that he go to wrack. the principal foundations that all states have, as well new, as old, or mixt, are good laws, and good armes; and because there cannot be good laws, where there are not good armes; and where there are good armes, there must needs be good laws, i will omit to discourse of the laws, and speak of armes. i say then that the armes, wherewithall a prince defends his state, either are his own, or mercenary, or auxiliary, or mixt. those that are mercenary and auxiliar, are unprofitable, and dangerous, and if any one holds his state founded upon mercenary armes, he shall never be quiet, nor secure, because they are never well united, ambitious, and without discipline, treacherous, among their friends stour, among their enemies cowardly; they have no fear of god, nor keep any faith with men; and so long only defer they the doing of mischief, till the enemy comes to assul thee; and in time of peace thou art despoyled by them, in war by thy enemies: the reason hereof is, because they have no other love, nor other cause to keep them in the field, but only a small stipend, which is not of force to make them willing to hazard their lives for thee: they are willing indeed to be thy soldiers, till thou goest to fight; but then they fly, or run away; which thing would cost me but small pains to perswade; for the ruine of italy hath not had any other cause now a dayes, than for that it hath these many years rely'd upon mercenary armes; which a good while since perhaps may have done some man some service, and among themselves they may have been thought valiant: but so soon as any forrein enemy appeared, they quickly shewed what they were. whereupon charles the king of france, without opposition, made himself master of all italy: and he that said, that the causes thereof were our faults, said true; but these were not those they beleeved, but what i have told; and because they were the princes faults, they also have suffered the punishment. i will fuller shew the infelicity of these armes. the mercenary captains are either very able men, or not: if they be, thou canst not repose any trust in them: for they will alwaies aspire unto their own proper advancements, either by suppressing of thee that art their lord, or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose: but if the captain be not valorous, he ordinarily ruines thee: and in case it be answered, that whoever shall have his armes in his hands, whether mercenary or not, will do so: i would reply, that armes are to be imployed either by a prince, or common-wealth. the prince ought to go in person, and performe the office of a commander: the republick is to send forth her citizens: and when she sends forth one that proves not of abilities, she ought to change him then; and when he does prove valorous, to bridle him so by the laws, that he exceed not his commission. and by experience we see, that princes and republiques of themselves alone, make very great conquests; but that mercenary armes never do other than harme; and more hardly falls a republick armed with her own armes under the obedience of one of her own citizens, than one that is armed by forrein armes. rome and sparta subsisted many ages armed and free. the swissers are exceedingly well armed, and yet very free. touching mercenary armes that were of old, we have an example of the carthagians, who near upon were oppress'd by their own mercenary soldiers, when the first war with the romans was finished; however the carthagians had their own citizens for their captains. philip of macedon was made by the thebans after epaminondas his death, general of their armies; and after the victory, he took from them liberty. the milaneses when duke philip was dead, entertaind francis sforza into their pay against the venetians, who having vanquisht their enemie at caravaggio, afterwards joyned with them, where by to usurp upon the milaneses his masters. sforza his father, being in joan the queen of naples pay, left her on a sudden disarmed; whereupon she, to save her kingdom, was constraind to cast her self into the king of arrragon's bosome. and in case the venetians and the florentines have formerly augmented their state with these kind of armes, and their own captains, and yet none of them have ever made themselves their princes, but rather defended them: i answer, that the florentines in this case have had fortune much their friend: for of valorous captains, which they might any way fear, some have not been victors, some have had opposition, and others have laid the aim of their ambitions another way. he who overcame not, was john aouto, of whose faith there could no proof be made, being he vanquisht not; but every one will acknowledge, that, had he vanquisht, the florentines were at his discretion. sforza had alwaies the bracceschi for his adversaries, so that they were as a guard one upon another. francis converted all his ambition against lombardy. braccio against the church, and the kingdome of naples. but let us come to that which followed a while agoe. the florentines made paul vitelli their general, a throughly advis'd man, and who from a private fortune had rose to very great reputation: had he taken pisa, no man will deny but that the florentines must have held fast with him; for had he been entertained in their enemies pay, they had no remedy; and they themselves holding of him, of force were to obey him. the venetians, if we consider their proceedings, we shall see wrought both warily and gloriously, while themselves made war, which was before their undertakings by land, where the gentlemen with their own commons in armes behav'd themselves bravely: but when they began to fight by land, they lost their valor, and follow'd the customes of italy; and in the beginning of their enlargement by land, because they had not much territory, and yet were of great reputation, they had not much cause to fear their captains; but as they began to extend their bounds, which was under their commander carminiola, they had a taste of this error: for perceiving he was exceeding valorous, having under his conduct beaten the duke of milan; and knowing on the other side, how he was cold in the war, they judg'd that they could not make any great conquest with him; and because they neither would, nor could cashier him, that they might not lose what they had gotten, they were forced for their own safeties to put him to death. since they have had for their general bartholomew of berganio, robert of st. severin, the count of petilian, and such like: whereby they were to fear their losses, as well as to hope for gain: as it fell out afterwards at vayla, where in one day they lost that, which with so much pains they had gotten in eight hundred years: for from these kind of armes grow slack and slow and weak gains; but sudden and wonderfull losses: and because i am now come with these examples into italy, which now these many years, have been governd by mercenary armes, i will search deeper into them, to the end that their course and progress being better discoverd, they may be the better amended. you have to understand, that so soon as in these later times the yoak of the italian empire began to be shaken off, and the pope had gotten reputation in the temporality, italy was divided into several states: for many of the great cities took armes against their nobility; who under the emperors protection had held them in oppression; and the pope favored these, whereby he might get himself reputation, in the temporality; of many others, their citizens became princes, so that hereupon italy being come into the churches hands as it were, and some few republicks, those priests and citizens not accustomed to the use of armes, began to take strangers to their pay. the first that gave reputation to these soldiers was alberick of como in romania. from his discipline among others descended brachio and sforza, who in their time were the arbitres of italy; after these followed all others, who even till our dayes have commanded the armes of italy; and the success of their valor hath been, that it was overrun by charles, pillaged by lewis, forc'd by ferdinand, and disgrac'd by the swissers. the order which they have held, hath been, first whereby to give reputation to their own armes to take away the credit of the infantry. this they did, because they having no state of their own, but living upon their industry, their few foot gave them no reputation, and many they were not able to maintain; whereupon they reduc'd themselves to cavalery, and so with a supportable number they were entertained and honored: and matters were brought to such termes, that in an army of twenty thousand soldiers you should not find two thousand foot. they had moreover us'd all industry to free themselves and their soldiers of all pains and fear, in their skirmishes, not killing, but taking one another prisoners, and without ransome for their freedom; they repaired not all to their tents by night, nor made palizado or trench thereabout, nor lay in the field in the summer: and all these things were thus contrived and agreed of among them in their military orders, whereby (as is said) to avoid pains and dangers, insomuch as they have brought italy into slavery and disgrace. chap. xiii of auxiliary soldiers, mixt, and native. the auxiliary forces, being the other kind of unprofitable armes, are, when any puissant one is called in, who with his forces comes to assist and defend thee; such as in these later times did pope julius use, who having seen the evil proof of his mercenary soldiers in the enterprize of ferrara, applied himself to the auxiliaries, and agreed with ferdinand king of spain, that with his forces he should aid him. these armes may be profitable and advantagious for themselves; but for him that calls them in, hurtfull; because in losing, thou art left defeated; and conquering, thou becomest their prisoner. and however that of these examples the ancient stories are full fraught; yet will i not part from this of pope julius the second, which is as yet fresh: whose course could not have been more inconsiderate, for the desire he had to get ferrara, putting himself wholly into strangers hands: but his good fortune caused another cause to arise, that hindred him from receiving the fruit of his evil choice; for his auxiliaries being broken at ravenna, and the swissers thereupon arriving, who put the conquerors to flight beyond all opinion, even their own and others, he chanced not to remain his enemies prisoner, they being put to flight, nor prisoner to his auxiliaries, having vanquished by other forces than theirs. the florentines being wholly disarmed, brought ten thousand french to pisa for to take it: by which course they ran more hazzard, than in any time of their troubles. the emperor of constantinople, to oppress his neighbors, brought into greece ten thousand turks, who when the war was ended, could not be got out thence, which was the beginning of greeces servitude under the infidels. he then that will in no case be able to overcome, let him serve himself of these armes; for they are much more dangerous than the mercenaries; for by those thy ruine is more suddenly executed; for they are all united, and all bent to the obedience of another. but for the mercenaries to hurt thee, when they have vanquished, there is no more need of time, and greater occasion, they not being all united in a body, and being found out and paid by thee, wherein a third that thou mak'st their head, cannot suddenly gaine so great authority, that he can endammage thee. in summe, in the mercenaries their sloth and lazinesse to fight is more dangerous: in the auxiliaries their valour. wherefore a wise prince hath alwayes avoyded these kind of armes, and betaken himselfe to his owne, and desired rather to loss with his owne, than conquer with anothers, accounting that not a true victorie which was gotten with others armes. i will not doubt to alleadge cæsar borgia, and his actions. this duke entred into romania with auxiliarie armes, bringing with him all french souldiers: but afterwards not accounting those armes secure, bent himselfe to mercenaries, judging lesse danger to be in those, and tooke in pay the orsini and the vitelli, which afterwards in the proof of them, finding wavering, unfaithful, and dangerous, he extinguishd, and betook himselfe to his owne; and it may easily be perceiv'd what difference there is between the one and the other of these armes, considering the difference that was between the dukes reputation, when he had the french men alone, and when he had the orsini and vitelli; but when he remaind with his own, and stood of himselfe, we shall find it was much augmented: nor ever was it of grate esteeme, but when every one saw, that he wholly possessed his owne armes. i thought not to have parted from the italian examples of late memory; but that i must not let passe that of hiero the siracusan, being one of those i formerly nam'd. this man (as i said before) being made general of the siracusans forces, knew presently that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were hirelings, as our italians are; and finding no way either to hold, or cashier them made them all bee cut to peeces, and afterwards waged warre with his owne men, and none others. i will also call to memory a figure of the old testament serving just to this purpose. when david presented himselfe before saul to goe to fight with goliah the philistins champion, saul to encourage him, clad him with his owne armes, which david when he had them upon back, refused, saying, he was not able to make any proofe of himself therein, and therefore would goe meet the enemy with his own sling and sword. in summe, others armes either fall from thy shoulders, or cumber or streighten thee. charls the seventh, father of lewis the eleventh, having by his good fortune and valour set france at liberty from the english, knew well this necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes, and settled in his kingdome the ordinances of men at armes, and infantry. afterwards king lewis his sonne abolisht those of the infantry, and began to take the swissers to pay; which errour follow'd by the others, is (as now indeed it appeares) the cause of that kingdomes dangers. for having given reputation to the swissers, they have renderd all their own armes contemptible; for this hath wholly ruind their foot, and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes: for being accustomed to serve with the swissers, they think they are not able to overcome without them. from whence it comes that the french are not of force against the swissers, and without them also against others they use not to adventure. therefore are the french armies mixt, part mercenaries, and part natives, which armes are farre better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries, and much inferiour to the natives; and let the said example suffice for that: for the kingdome of france would have been unconquerable, if charles his order had been augmented and maintaind: but men in their small wisdome begin a thing, which then because it hath some favour of good, discovers not the poyson that lurkes thereunder, as i before said of the hectick feavers. wherefore that prince which perceives not mischiefes, but as they grow up, is not truely wise; and this is given but to few: and if we consider the first ruine of the romane empire, we shall find it was from taking the goths first into their pay; for from that beginning the forces of the romane empire began to grow weak, and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them. i conclude then that without having armes of their owne, no principality can be secure, or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune, not having valour to shelter it in adversity. and it was alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men, that nothing is so weak and unsetled, as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces: which are those that are composed of thy subjects, or citizens, or servants; all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary; and the manner how to order those well, is easie to find out, if those orders above nam'd by me, shall be but run over, and if it shall be but consider'd, how philip alexander the great his father, and in what manner many republicks and princes have armd and appointed themselves, to which appointments i referre my selfe wholly. chap. xiv what belongs to the prince touching military discipline. a prince then ought to have no other ayme, nor other thought, nor take any thing else for his proper art, but warr, and the orders and discipline thereof: for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that commands, and is of so great excellency, that not only those that are borne princes, it maintains so; but many times raises men from a private fortune to that dignity. and it is seene by the contrary, that when princes have given themselves more to their delights, than to the warres, they have lost their states; and the first cause that makes thee lose it, is the neglect of that arte; and the cause that makes thee gaine it, is that thou art experienc'd and approvd in that arte. francis sforza by being a man at armes, of a private man became duke of milan; and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines belonging to those imployments of princes, became private men. for among other mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee, it causes thee to be contemnd, which is one of those disgraces, from which a prince ought to keepe himselfe, as hereafter shall be sayd: for from one that is disarmd to one that is armd there is no proportion; and reason will not, that he who is in armes, should willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurnishd of them, and that he that is disarmd should be in security among his armed vassalls; for there being disdaine in the one, and suspicion in the other, it is impossible these should ever well cooperate. and therefore a prince who is quite unexperienced in matter of warre, besides the other infelicities belonging to him, as is said, cannot be had in any esteeme among his souldiers, nor yet trust in them. wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of warre, and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre; which he may be able to doe two wayes; the one practically, and in his labours and recreations of his body, the other theoretically. and touching the practick part, he ought besides the keeping of his own subjects well traind up in the discipline and exercise of armes, give himselfe much to the chase, whereby to accustome his body to paines, and partly to understand the manner of situations, and to know how the mountaines arise, which way the vallyes open themselves, and how the plaines are distended flat abroad, and to conceive well the nature of the rivers, and marrish ground, and herein to bestow very much care, which knowledge is profitable in two kinds: first he learnes thereby to know his own countrey, and is the better enabled to understand the defence thereof, and afterwards by meanes of this knowledge and experience in these situations, easily comprehends any other situation, which a new he hath need to view, for the little hillocks, vallies, plaines, rivers, and marrish places. for example, they in tuscany are like unto those of other countries: so that from the knowledge of the site of one country, it is easie to attain to know that of others. and that prince that wants this skill, failes of the principall part a commander should be furnisht with; for this shows the way how to discover the enemy, to pitch the camp, to lead their armies, to order their battells, and also to besiege a town at thy best advantage, philopomenes prince of the achayans, among other praises writers give him, they say, that in time of peace, he thought not upon any thing so much as the practise of warre; and whensoever he was abroad in the field to disport himselfe with his friends, would often stand still, and discourse with them, in case the enemies were upon the top of that hill, and we here with our army, whether of us two should have the advantage, and how might we safely goe to find them, keeping still our orders; and if we would retire our selves, what course should we take if they retir'd, how should we follow them? and thus on the way, propounded them all such accidents could befall in any army; would heare their opinions, and tell his owne, and confirme it by argument; so that by his continuall thought hereupon, when ever he led any army no chance could happen, for which he had not a remedy. but touching the exercise of the mind, a prince ought to read histories, and in them consider the actions of the worthiest men, marke how they have behav'd themselves in the warrs, examine the occasions of their victories, and their losses; wherby they may be able to avoyd these, and obtaine those; and above all, doe as formerly some excellent man hath done, who hath taken upon him to imitate, if any one that hath gone before him hath left his memory glorious; the course he took, and kept alwaies near unto him the remembrances of his actions and worthy deeds: as it is said, that alexander the great imitated achilles; cæsar alexander, and scipio cyrus. and whoever reads the life of cyrus, written by xenophon, may easily perceive afterwards in scipio's life how much glory his imitation gaind him, and how much scipio did conforme himselfe in his chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality with those things, that are written by xenophon of cyrus. such like wayes ought a wise prince to take, nor ever be idle in quiet times, but by his paines then, as it were provide himself of store, whereof he may make some use in his adversity, the end that when the times change, he may be able to resist the stormes of his hard fortune. chap. xv of those things, in respect whereof, men, and especially princes, are praised, or dispraised. it now remaines that we consider what the conditions of a prince ought to be, and his termes of government over his subjects, and towards his friends. and because i know that many have written hereupon; i doubt, lest i venturing also to treat thereof, may be branded with presumption, especially seeing i am like enough to deliver an opinion different from others. but my intent being to write for the advantage of him that understands me, i thought it fitter to follow the effectuall truth of the matter, than the imagination thereof; and many principalities and republiques, have been in imagination, which neither have been seen nor knowne to be indeed: for there is such a distance between how men doe live, and how men ought to live; that he who leaves that which is done, for that which ought to be done, learnes sooner his ruine than his preservation; for that man who will professe honesty in all his actions, must needs goe to ruine among so many that are dishonest. whereupon it is necessary for a prince, desiring to preserve himselfe, to be able to make use of that honestie, and to lay it aside againe, as need shall require. passing by then things that are only in imagination belonging to a prince, to discourse upon those that are really true; i say that all men, whensoever mention is made of them, and especially princes, because they are placed aloft in the view of all, are taken notice of for some of these qualities, which procure them either commendations or blame: and this is that some one is held liberal, some miserable, (miserable i say, nor covetous; for the covetous desire to have, though it were by rapine; but a miserable man is he, that too much for bears to make use of his owne) some free givers, others extortioners; some cruell, others pitious; the one a leaguebreaker, another faithfull; the one effeminate and of small courage, the other fierce and couragious; the one courteous, the other proud; the one lascivious, the other chaste; the one of faire dealing, the other wily and crafty; the one hard, the other easie; the one grave, the other light; the one religious, the other incredulous, and such like. i know that every one will confesse, it were exceedingly praise worthy for a prince to be adorned with all these above nam'd qualities that are good: but because this is not possible, nor doe humane conditions admit such perfection in vertues, it is necessary for him to be so discret, that he know how to avoid the infamie of those vices which would thrust him out of his state; and if it be possible, beware of those also which are not able to remove him thence; but where it cannot be, let them passe with lesse regard. and yet, let him not stand much upon it, though he incurre the infamie of those vices, without which he can very hardly save his state: for if all be throughly considerd, some thing we shall find which will have the colour and very face of vertue, and following them, they will lead the to thy destruction; whereas some others that shall as much seeme vice, if we take the course they lead us, shall discover unto us the way to our safety and well-being. the second blemish in this our authours book, i find in his fifteenth chapter: where he instructs his prince to use such an ambidexterity as that he may serve himselfe either of vertue, or vice, according to his advantage, which in true pollicy is neither good in attaining the principality nor in securing it when it is attaind. for politicks, presuppose ethiques, which will never allow this rule: as that a man might make this small difference between vertue, and vice, that he may indifferently lay aside, or take up the one or the other, and put it in practise as best conduceth to the end he propounds himselfe. i doubt our authour would have blamd davids regard to saul when sam. . in the cave he cut off the lap of sauls garment, and spared his head; and afterwards in the . when he forbad abishai to strike him as he lay sleeping. worthy of a princes consideration is that saying of abigal to david sam. . . 'it shall come to passe when the lord shall have done to my lord according to all that he hath spoken concerning thee, and shall have appointed thee ruler over israel, that this shall be no grief to thee, nor offence of heart unto my lord, that thou hast forborne to shed blood, etc.' for surely the conscience of this evill ground whereupon they have either built, or underpropped their tyranny, causes men, as well _metus_ as _spes in longum projicere_, which sets them a work on further mischiefe. chap. xvi of liberality, and miserablenesse. beginning then at the first of the above mentioned qualities, i say that it would be very well to be accounted liberall: neverthelesse, liberality used in such a manner, as to make thee be accounted so, wrongs thee: for in case it be used vertuously, and as it ought to be, it shall never come to be taken notice of, so as to free thee from the infamie of its contrary. and therefore for one to hold the name of liberal among men, it were needfull not to omit any sumptuous quality, insomuch that a prince alwayes so dispos'd, shall waste all his revenues, and at the end shall be forc'd, if he will still maintaine that reputation of liberality, heavily to burthen his subjects, and become a great exactour; and put in practise all those things that can be done to get mony: which begins to make him hatefull to his subjects, and fall into every ones contempt, growing necessitous: so that having with this liberality wrong'd many, and imparted of his bounty but to a few; he feels every first mischance, and runs a hazard of every first danger: which he knowing, and desiring to withdraw himself from, incurs presently the disgrace of being termed miserable. a prince therefore not being able to use this vertue of liberality, without his own damage, in such a sort, that it may be taken notice of, ought, if he be wise, not to regard the name of miserable; for in time he shall alwaies be esteemed the more liberal, seeing that by his parsimony his own revenues are sufficient for him; as also he can defend himself against whoever makes war against him, and can do some exploits without grieving his subjects: so that he comes to use his liberality to all those, from whom he takes nothing, who are infinite in number; and his miserableness towards those to whom he gives nothing, who are but a few. in our dayes we have not seen any, but those who have been held miserable, do any great matters; but the others all quite ruin'd. pope julius the second, however he serv'd himself of the name of liberal, to get the papacy, yet never intended he to continue it, to the end he might be able to make war against the king of france: and he made so many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax, because his long thrift supplyed his large expences. this present king of spain could never have undertaken, nor gone through with so many exploits, had he been accounted liberal. wherefore a prince ought little to regard (that he may not be driven to pillage his subjects, that he may be able to defend himself, that he may not fall into poverty and contempt, that he be not forced to become an extortioner) though he incurre the name of miserable; for this is one of those vices, which does not pluck him from his throne. and if any one should say, cæsar by his liberality obtained the empire, and many others (because they both were, and were esteemd liberal) attaind to exceeding great dignities. i answer, either thou art already come to be a prince, or thou art in the way to it; in the first case, this liberality is hurtful; in the second, it is necessary to be accounted so; and cæsar was one of those that aspired to the principality of rome. but if after he had gotten it, he had survived, and not forborne those expences, he would quite have ruined that empire. and if any one should reply; many have been princes, and with their armies have done great exploits, who have been held very liberal. i answer, either the prince spends of his own and his subjects, or that which belongs to others: in the first, he ought to be sparing; in the second, he should not omit any part of liberality. and that prince that goes abroad with his army, and feeds upon prey, and spoyle, and tributes, and hath the disposing of that which belongs to others, necessarily should use this liberality; otherwise would his soldiers never follow him; and of that which is neither thine, nor thy subjects, thou mayest well be a free giver, as were cyrus, cæsar and alexander; for the spending of that which is anothers, takes not away thy reputation, but rather adds to it, only the wasting of that which is thine own hurts thee; nor is there any thing consumes itself so much as liberality, which whilest thou usest, thou losest the means to make use of it, and becomest poore and abject; or to avoid this poverty, an extortioner and hatefull person. and among all those things which a prince ought to beware of is, to be dispised, and odious; to one and the other of which, liberality brings thee. wherefore there is more discretion to hold the stile of miserable, which begets an infamy without hatred, than to desire that of liberal, whereby to incurre the necessity of being thought an extortioner, which procures an infamy with hatred. chap. xvii of cruelty, and clemency, and whether it is better to be belov'd, or feard. descending afterwards unto the other fore-alledged qualities, i say, that every prince should desire to be held pitiful, and not cruel. nevertheless ought he beware that he ill uses not this pitty. cæsar borgia was accounted cruel, yet had his cruelty redrest the disorders in romania, setled it in union, and restored it to peace, and fidelity: which, if it be well weighed, we shall see was an act of more pitty, than that of the people of florence, who to avoyd the terme of cruelty, suffered pistoya to fall to destruction. wherefore a prince ought not to regard the infamy of cruelty, for to hold his subjects united and faithfull: for by giving a very few proofes of himself the other way, he shall be held more pittiful than they, who through their too much pitty, suffer disorders to follow, from whence arise murthers and rapines: for these are wont to hurt an intire universality, whereas the executions practised by a prince, hurt only some particular. and among all sorts of princes, it is impossible for a new prince to avoyd the name of cruel, because all new states are full of dangers: whereupon virgil by the mouth of dido excuses the inhumanity of her kingdom, saying, _res dura et regni novitas me talia cogunt moliri et latè fines custode tenere._ my hard plight and new state force me to guard my confines all about with watch and ward. nevertheless ought he to be judicious in his giving belief to any thing, or moving himself thereat, nor make his people extreamly afraid of him; but proceed in a moderate way with wisdome, and humanity, that his too much confidence make him not unwary, and his too much distrust intolerable; from hence arises a dispute, whether it is better to be belov'd or feard: i answer, a man would wish he might be the one and the other: but because hardly can they subsist both together, it is much safer to be feard, than be loved; being that one of the two must needs fail; for touching men, we may say this in general, they are unthankful, unconstant, dissemblers, they avoyd dangers, and are covetous of gain; and whilest thou doest them good, they are wholly thine; their blood, their fortunes, lives and children are at thy service, as is said before, when the danger is remote; but when it approaches, they revolt. and that prince who wholly relies upon their words, unfurnished of all other preparations, goes to wrack: for the friendships that are gotten with rewards, and not by the magnificence and worth of the mind, are dearly bought indeed; but they will neither keep long, nor serve well in time of need: and men do less regard to offend one that is supported by love, than by fear. for love is held by a certainty of obligation, which because men are mischievous, is broken upon any occasion of their own profit. but fear restrains with a dread of punishment which never forsakes a man. yet ought a prince cause himself to be belov'd in such a manner, that if he gains not love, he may avoid hatred: for it may well stand together, that a man may be feard and not hated; which shall never fail, if he abstain from his subjects goods, and their wives; and whensoever he should be forc'd to proceed against any of their lives, do it when it is to be done upon a just cause, and apparent conviction; but above all things forbeare to lay his hands on other mens goods; for men forget sooner the death of their father, than the loss of their patrimony. moreover the occasions of taking from men their goods, do never fail: and alwaies he that begins to live by rapine, finds occasion to lay hold upon other mens goods: but against mens lives, they are seldome found, and sooner fail. but where a prince is abroad in the field with his army, and hath a multitude of soldiers under his government, then is it necessary that he stands not much upon it, though he be termed cruel: for unless he be so, he shall never have his soldiers live in accord one with another, nor ever well disposed to any brave piece of service. among hannibals actions of mervail, this is reckoned for one, that having a very huge army, gathered out of several nations, and all led to serve in a strange countrey, there was never any dissention neither amongst themselves, nor against their general, as well in their bad fortune as their good. which could not proceed from any thing else than from that barbarous cruelty of his, which together with his exceeding many vertues, rendred him to his soldiers both venerable and terrible; without which, to that effect his other vertues had served him to little purpose: and some writers though not of the best advised, on one side admire these his worthy actions, and on the otherside, condemn the principal causes thereof. and that it is true, that his other vertues would not have suffic'd him, we may consider in scipio, the rarest man not only in the dayes he liv'd, but even in the memory of man; from whom his army rebel'd in spain: which grew only upon his too much clemency, which had given way to his soldiers to become more licentious, than was well tollerable by military discipline: for which he was reprov'd by fabius maximus in the senate, who termed him the corrupter of the roman soldiery. the locrensians having been destroyed by a lieutenant of scipio's, were never reveng'd by him, nor the insolence of that lieutenant punisht; all this arising from his easie nature: so that one desiring to excuse him in the senate, said, that there were many men knew better how to keep themselves from faults, than to correct the faults of other men: which disposition of his in time would have wrong'd scipio's reputation and glory, had he therewith continu'd in his commands: but living under the government of the senate, this quality of his that would have disgrac'd him not only was conceal'd, but prov'd to the advancement of his glory. i conclude then, returning to the purpose of being feard, and belov'd; insomuch as men love at their own pleasure, and to serve their own turne, and their fear depends upon the princes pleasure, every wise prince ought to ground upon that which is of himself, and not upon that which is of another: only this, he ought to use his best wits to avoid hatred, as was said. chap. xviii in what manner princes ought to keep their words. how commendable in a prince it is to keep his word, and live with integrity, not making use of cunning and subtlety, every one knows well: yet we see by experience in these our dayes, that those princes have effected great matters, who have made small reckoning of keeping their words, and have known by their craft to turne and wind men about, and in the end, have overcome those who have grounded upon the truth. you must then know, there are two kinds of combating or fighting; the one by right of the laws, the other meerly by force. that first way is proper to men, the other is also common to beasts: but because the first many times suffices not, there is a necessity to make recourse to the second; wherefore it behooves a prince to know how to make good use of that part which belongs to a beast, as well as that which is proper to a man. this part hath been covertly shew'd to princes by ancient writers; who say that achilles and many others of those ancient princes were intrusted to chiron the senator, to be brought up under his discipline: the moral of this, having for their teacher one that was half a beast and half a man, was nothing else, but that it was needful for a prince to understand how to make his advantage of the one and the other nature, because neither could subsist without the other. a prince then being necessitated to know how to make use of that part belonging to a beast, ought to serve himself of the conditions of the fox and the lion; for the lion cannot keep himself from snares, nor the fox defend himself against the wolves. he had need then be a fox, that he may beware of the snares, and a lion that he may scare the wolves. those that stand wholly upon the lion, understand not well themselves. and therefore a wise prince cannot, nor ought not keep his faith given when the observance thereof turnes to disadvantage, and the occasions that made him promise, are past. for if men were all good, this rule would not be allowable; but being they are full of mischief, and would not make it good to thee, neither art thou tyed to keep it with them: nor shall a prince ever want lawfull occasions to give colour to this breach. very many modern examples hereof might be alledg'd, wherein might be shewed how many peaces concluded, and how many promises made, have been violated and broken by the infidelity of princes; and ordinarily things have best succeeded with him that hath been nearest the fox in condition. but it is necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition, and to be able to fain and dissemble throughly; and men are so simple, and yeeld so much to the present necessities, that he who hath a mind to deceive, shall alwaies find another that will be deceivd. i will not conceal any one of the examples that have been of late. alexander the sixth, never did any thing else than deceive men, and never meant otherwise, and alwaies found whom to work upon; yet never was there man would protest more effectually, nor aver any thing with more solemn oaths, and observe them less than he; nevertheless, his cousenages all thriv'd well with him; for he knew how to play this part cunningly. therefore is there no necessity for a prince to be endued with all above written qualities, but it behooveth well that he seem to be so; or rather i will boldly say this, that having these qualities, and alwaies regulating himself by them, they are hurtfull; but seeming to have them, they are advantageous; as to seem pittiful, faithful, mild, religious, and of integrity, and indeed to be so; provided withall thou beest of such a composition, that if need require to use the contrary, thou canst, and knowest how to apply thy self thereto. and it suffices to conceive this, that a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things, for which men are held good; he being often forc'd, for the maintenance of his state, to do contrary to his faith, charity, humanity, and religion: and therefore it behooves him to have a mind so disposd, as to turne and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes; and as formerly i said, not forsake the good, while he can; but to know how to make use of the evil upon necessity. a prince then ought to have a special care, that he never let fall any words, but what are all season'd with the five above written qualities, and let him seem to him that sees and hears him, all pitty, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, all religion; nor is there any thing more necessary for him to seem to have, than this last quality: for all men in general judge thereof, rather by the sight, than by the touch; for every man may come to the sight of him, few come to the touch and feeling of him; yvery man may come to see what thou seemest, few come to perceive and understand what thou art; and those few dare not oppose the opinion of many, who have the majesty of state to protect them: and in all mens actions, especially those of princes wherein there is no judgement to appeale unto men, forbeare to give their censures, till the events and ends of things. let a prince therefore take the surest courses he can to maintain his life and state: the means shall alwaies be thought honorable, and commended by every one; for the vulgar is over-taken with the appearance and event of a thing: and for the most part of people, they are but the vulgar: the others that are but few, take place where the vulgar have no subsisteance. a prince there is in these dayes, whom i shall not do well to name, that preaches nothing else but peace and faith; but had he kept the one and the other, several times had they taken from him his state and reputation. in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth chap, our author descends to particulars, perswading his prince in his sixteenth to such a suppleness of disposition, as that upon occasion he can make use either of liberality or miserableness, as need shall require. but that of liberality is to last no longer than while he is in the way to some designe: which if he well weigh, is not really a reward of vertue, how ere it seems; but a bait and lure to bring birds to the net. in the seventeenth chap, he treats of clemency and cruelty, neither of which are to be exercis'd by him as acts of mercy or justice; but as they may serve to advantage his further purposes. and lest the prince should incline too much to clemency, our author allows rather the restraint by fear, than by love. the contrary to which all stories shew us. i will say this only, cruelty may cut of the power of some, but causes the hatred of all, and gives a will to most to take the first occasion offerd for revenge. in the eighteenth chap, our author discourses how princes ought to govern themselves in keeping their promises made: whereof he sayes they ought to make such small reckoning, as that rather they should know by their craft how to turne and wind men about, whereby to take advantage of all winds and fortunes. to this i would oppose that in the fifteenth psal. v. . he that sweareth to his neighbor, and disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance. it was a king that writ it, and me thinks the rule he gave, should well befit both king and subject: and surely this perswades against all taking of advantages. a man may reduce all the causes of faith-breaking to three heads. one may be, because he that promised, had no intention to keep his word; and this is a wicked and malitious way of dealing. a second may bee, because hee that promisd, repents of his promise made; and that is grounded on unconstancy, and lightness in that he would not be well resolved before he entred into covenant. the third may be, when it so falls out, that it lyes not in his power that made the promise to performe it. in which case a man ought to imitate the good debter, who having not wherewithall to pay, hides not himself, but presents his person to his creditor, willingly suffering imprisonment. the first and second are very vitious and unworthy of a prince: in the third, men might well be directed by the examples of those two famous romans, regulus and posthumius. i shall close this with the answer of charles the fifth, when he was pressed to break his word with luther for his safe return from wormes; _fides rerum promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet, tamen apud imperatorem cam consistere oportet_. though truth be banisht out of the whole world, yet should it alwaies find harbour in an emperors breast. [sidenote: _gulielmus xenocarus_ in vit. car. quinti.] chap. xix that princes should take a care, not to incurre contempt or hatred. but because among the qualities, whereof formerly mention is made, i have spoken of those of most importance, i will treat of the others more briefly under these qualityes that a prince is to beware, as in part is above-said, and that he fly those things which cause him to be odious or vile: and when ever he shall avoid this, he shall fully have plaid his part, and in the other disgraces he shall find no danger at all. there is nothing makes him so odious, as i said, as his extortion of his subjects goods, and abuse of their women, from which he ought to forbear; and so long as he wrongs not his whole people, neither in their goods, nor honors, they live content, and he hath only to strive with the ambition of some few: which many waies and easily too, is restrain'd. to be held various, light, effeminate, faint-hearted, unresolv'd, these make him be contemnd and thought base, which a prince should shun like rocks, and take a care that in all his actions there appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and valor; and that in all the private affairs of his subjects, he orders it so, that his word stand irrevocable: and maintain himself in such repute, that no man may think either to deceive or wind and turn him about: that prince that gives such an opinion of himself, is much esteemed, and against him who is so well esteemed, hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects, or by forreiners any invasion, when once notice is taken of his worth, and how much he is reverenced by his subjects: for a prince ought to have two fears, the one from within, in regard of his subjects; the other from abroad, in regard of his mighty neighbors; from these he defends himself by good armes and good friends; and alwayes he shall have good friends, if he have good armes; and all things shall alwaies stand sure at home, when those abroad are firme, in case some conspiracy have not disturbed them; and however the forrein matters stand but ticklishly; yet if he have taken such courses at home, and liv'd as we have prescribed, he shall never be able (in case he forsake not himself) to resist all possibility, force and violence, as i said nabis the spartan did: but touching his subjects, even when his affairs abroad are setled, it is to be fear'd they may conspire privily; from which a prince sufficiently secure himself by shunning to be hated or contemned, and keeping himself in his peoples good opinion, which it is necessary for him to compass, as formerly we treated at large. and one of the powerfullest remedies a prince can have against conspiracies, is, not to be hated nor dispised by the universality; for alwaies he that conspires, beleeves the princes death is acceptable to the subject: but when he thinks it displeases them, he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter; for the difficulties that are on the conspirators side, are infinite. by experience it is plain, that many times plots have been laid, but few of them have succeeded luckily; for he that conspires, cannot be alone, nor can he take the company of any, but of those, who he beleeves are malecontents; and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a malecontent, thou givest him means to work his own content: for by revealing thy treason, he may well hope for all manner of favour: so that seeing his gain certain of one side; and on the other, finding only doubt and danger, either he had need be a rare friend, or that he be an exceeding obstinate enemy to the prince, if he keeps his word with thee. and to reduce this matter into short termes: i say, there is nothing but jealousie, fear, and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to affright him; but on the princes part, there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the defences of his friends and the state, which do so guard him, that to all these things the peoples good wills being added, it is unpossible any one should be so head-strong as to conspire; for ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his mischiefe, in this case he is also to feare afterwards, having the people for his enemy when the fact is commited, and therefore for this cause, not being able to hope for any refuge. touching this matter, many examples might be brought; but i will content my selfe to name one which fell out in the memory of our fathers. annibal bentivolii, grand father of this annibal who now lives, that was prince in bolonia, being slaine by the canneschi that conspir'd against him, none of his race being left, but this john, who was then in swadling clouts; presently the people rose upon this murder, and slew all the canneschi which proceeded from the popular affection, which the family of the bentivolii held then in bolonia: which was so great, that being there remain'd not any, now anniball was dead, that was able to manage the state; and having notice that in florence there was one borne of the bentivolii, who till then was taken for a smiths sonne: the citizens of bolonia went to florence for him, and gave the government of their city to him, which was rul'd by him, untill john was of fit yeares to governe. i conclude then, that a prince ought to make small account of treasons, whiles he hath the people to friend: but if they be his enemies and hate him, he may well feare every thing, and every one. and well ordered states, and discreet princes have taken care withall diligence, not to cause their great men to fall into desperation, and to content the people, and so to maintaine them: for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a prince. among the kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes, is that of france, and therein are found exceeding many good orders, whereupon the kings liberty and security depends: of which the chiefe is the parliament, and the authority thereof: for he that founded that kingdome, knowing the great mens ambition and insolence; and judgeing it necessary there should be a bridle to curbe them; and on the other side knowing the hatred of the commonalty against the great ones, grounded upon feare, intending to secure them, would not lay this care wholly upon the king, but take this trouble from him, which he might have with the great men, in case he favourd the commonalty; or with the commonalty, in case he favourd the great men; and thereupon set up a third judge, which was that, to the end it should keep under the great ones, and favour the meaner sort, without any imputation to the king. it was not possible to take a better, nor wiser course then this; nor a surer way to secure the king, and the kingdome. from whence we may draw another conclusion worthie of note, that princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation; and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour. here againe i conclude, that a prince ought to make good esteeme of his nobility; but not thereby to incur the commons hatred: it would seeme perhaps to many, considering the life and death of many romane emperours, that they were examples contrary to my opinion, finding that some have liv'd worthily, and shewd many rare vertues of the minde, and yet have lost the empire, and been put to death by their owne subjects, conspiring against them. intending then to answer these objections, i shall discourse upon the qualities of some emperours, declaring the occasions of their ruine, not disagreeing from that which i have alledgd; and part thereof i will bestow on the consideration of these things, which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times: and it shall suffice me to take all those emperours that succeeded in the empire from marcus the philosopher to maximinus, who were mercus and commodus his sonne, pertinax, julian, severus, antonius, caracalla his sonne, macrinus, heliogabalus, alexander, and maximin. and first it is to be noted, that where in the other principalities, they are to contend only with the ambition of the nobles, and the insolence of the people; the romane emperours had a third difficulty, having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers, which was so hard a thing, that it caused the ruine of many, being hard to satisfy the souldiers, and the people; for the people love their quiet, and therefore affect modest princes; and the souldiers love a prince of a warlike courage, that is insolent, cruell, and plucking from every one: which things they would have them exercise upon the people, whereby they might be able to double their stipends, and satisfie their avarice and cruelty: whence it proceeds, that those emperours who either by nature or by art, had not such a reputation, as therewith they could curbe the one and the other, were alwayes ruind: and the most of them, specially those who as new men came to the principality, finding the difficulty of those two different humours, applyed themselves to content the souldiers, making small account of wronging the people, which was a course then necessary; for the princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one, ought first endeavour that they incurre not the hatred of any whole universality; and when they cannot attaine thereunto, they are to provide with all industry, to avoyd the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty. and therefore those emperors, who because they were but newly call'd to the empire, had need of extraordinary favours, more willingly stuck to the soldiers, than to the people; which neverthelesse turnd to their advantage, or otherwise, according as that prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them. from these causes aforesayd proceeded it, that marcus pertinax, and alexander, though all living modestly, being lovers of justice, and enemies of cruelty, courteous and bountifull, had all from marcus on ward, miserable ends; marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured: for he came to the empire by inheritance, and was not to acknowledge it either from the soldiers, nor from the people: afterwards being accompanyed with many vertues, which made him venerable, he held alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their limits, and was never either hated, or contemnd. but pertinax was created emperour against the soldiers wills, who being accustomed to live licentiously under commodus, could not endure that honest course that pertinax sought to reduce them to: whereupon having gotten himself hatred, and to this hatred added contempt, in that he was old, was ruind in the very beginning of his government. whence it ought to be observed, that hatred is gaind as well by good deeds as bad; and therefore as i formerly said, when a prince would maintaine the state, he is often forced not to be good: for when that generality, whether it be the people, or soldiers, or nobility, whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee, is corrupted, it behoves thee to follow their humour, and content them, and then all good deeds are thy adversaries. but let us come to alexander who was of that goodnesse, that among the prayses given him, had this for one, that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the empire, he never put any man to death, but by course of justice; neverthelesse being held effeminate, and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruled by his mother, and thereupon fallen into contempt, the army conspird against him. now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of commodus, severus, antonius, caracalla, and maximinus, you shall find them exceeding cruell, and ravinous, who to satisfie their soldiers, forbeare no kinde of injury that could be done upon the people; and all of them, except severus, came to evill ends: for in severus, there was such extraordinary valour, that while he held the soldiers his freinds, however the people were much burthend by him, he might alwayes reigne happily: for his valour rendred him so admirable in the souldiers and peoples sights; that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd, and those others reverencing and honoring him. and because the actions of this man were exceeding great, being in a new prince, i will briefly shew how well he knew to act the foxes and the lions parts; the conditions of which two, i say, as before, are very necessary for a prince to imitate. severus having had experience of julian the emperours sloth, perswaded his army (whereof he was commander in sclavonia) that they should doe well to goe to rome to revenge pertinax his death, who was put to death by the imperiall guard; and under this pretence, not making any shew that he aspird unto the empire, set his army in march directly towards rome, and was sooner come into italy, than it was knowne he had mov'd from his station. being ariv'd at rome, he was by the senate chosen emperour for feare, and julian slaine. after this beginning, two difficulties yet remaind to severus, before he could make himselfe lord of the whole state; the one in asia, where niger the generall of those armies had gotten the title of emperour, the other in the west with albinus, who also aspird to the empire: and because he thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both, he purposed to set upon niger, and cozen albinus, to whom he writ, that being elected emperour by the senate, he would willingly communicate it with him; and thereupon sent him the title of cæsar, and by resolution of the senate, tooke him to him for his colleague; which things were taken by albinus in true meaning. but afterwards when severus had overcome and slaine niger, and pacified the affaires and in the east, being returned to rome, he complaind in the senate of albinus, how little weighing the benefits received from him, he had sought to slay him by treason, and therefore was he forc'd to goe punish his ingratitude: afterwards he went into france, where he bereft him both of his state and life, whoever then shall in particular examine his actions, shall finde he was a very cruell lion, and as crafty a fox: and shall see that he was alwayes feard and reverenc'd by every one, and by the armies not hated; and shall nothing marvell that he being a new man, was able to hold together such a great empire: for his extraordinary reputation defended him alwayes from that hatred, which the people for his extortions might have conceiv'd against him. but antonius his sonne, was also an exceeding brave man, and endued with most excellent qualities, which causd him to be admird by the people, and acceptable to the souldiers, because he was a warlike man, enduring all kind of travell and paines, despising all delicate food, and all kinde of effeminacy, which gaind him the love of all the armies: neverthelesse his fiercenesse and cruelty were such, and so hideous, having upon many particular occasions put to death a great part of the people of rome, and all those of alexandria, that he grew odious to the world, and began to be feard by those also that were neare about him; so that he was slaine by a centurion in the very midst of his army. where it is to be noted, that these kinde of deaths, which follow upon the deliberation of a resolv'd and obstinate minde, cannot by a prince be avoyded: for every one that feares not to dye, is able to doe it; but a prince ought to be lesse afraid of it because it very seldome falls out. only should he beware not to doe any extreame injury to any of those of whom he serves himself, or that he hath near about him in any imployment of his principality, as antonius did: who had reproachfully slaine a brother of that centurion; also threatned him every day, and neverthelesse entertaind him still as one of the guards of his body, which was a rash course taken, and the way to destruction, as befell him. but let us come to commodus for whom it was very easie to hold the empire, by reason it descended upon him by inheritance, being marcus his sonne, and it had been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps, and then had he contented both the people and the soldiers: but being of a cruell and savage disposition, whereby to exercise his actions upon the people, he gave himselfe to entertaine armies, and those in all licentiousnesse. on the other part not maintaining his dignity, but often descending upon the stages to combate with fencers, and doing such other like base things, little worthy of the imperiall majesty, he became contemptible in the soldiers sight; and being hated of one part, and despisd of the other, he was conspird against, and slaine. it remaines now, that we declare maximinus his conditions, who was a very warlike man; and the armies loathing alexanders effeminacy, whereof i spake before, when they had slain him, chose this man emperour, who not long continued so, because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt; the one because he was very base, having kept cattell in thrace, which was well knowne to every one, and made them to scorne him; the other, because in the beginning of his principality having delayd to goe to rome, and enter into possession of the imperiall throne, he had gaind the infamy of being thought exceeding cruell, having by his prefects in rome, and in every place of the empire, exercisd many cruelties, insomuch that the whole world being provok'd against him to contempt for the basenesse of his blood; on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd against him for feare of his crulty; first affrica, afterwards the senate, with all the people of rome and all italy, conspired against him, with whom his own army took part; which incamping before aquileya, and finding some difficulty to take the town, being weary of his cruelties, and because they saw he had so many enemies, fearing him the lesse, slew him. i purpose not to say any thing either of heliogabalus, macrinus, or julian, who because they were throughly base, were sudenly extinguished: but i will come to the conclusion of this discourse; and i say, that the princes of our times have lesse of this difficulty to satisfie the soldiers extraordinarily in their government; for notwithstanding that there be some considerations to be had of them, yet presently are those armies dissolved, because none of these princes do use to maintaine any armies together, which are annex'd and inveterated with the governments of the provinces, as were the armies of the romane empire. and therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the soldiers than the people, it was because the soldiers were more powerfull than the people: now is it more necessary for all princes, (except the turk and the souldan) to satisfie their people than their soldiers, because the people are more mighty than they; wherein i except the turk, he alwayes maintaining about his person foot, and horse, upon which depends the safety and strength of his kingdome; and it is necessary that laying aside all other regard of his people, he maintaine these his friends. the souldans kingdome is like hereunto, which being wholy in the souldiers power, he must also without respect of his people keep them his friends. and you are to consider, that this state of the souldans differs much from all the other principalities: for it is very like the papacy, which cannot be termd an hereditary principality: nor a new principality: for the sons of the deceasd prince are not heires and lords thereof, but he that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the authority in them. and this order being of antiquity, cannot be termd a new principality, because therein are none of those difficulties that are in new ones: for though the prince be new, yet are the orders of that state ancient, and ordaind to receive him, as if he were their hereditary prince. but let us returne to our matter; whosoever shall consider our discourse before, shall perceive that either hatred, or contempt have caus'd the ruine of the afore-named emperors; and shall know also, from it came that part of them proceeding one way, and part a contrary; yet in any of them the one had a happy success, and the others unhappy: for it was of no availe, but rather hurtful for pertinax and alexander, because they were new princes, to desire to imitate marcus, who by inheritance came to the principality: and in like manner it was a wrong to caracalla, commodus, and maximus, to imitate severus, because none of them were endued with so great valor as to follow his steps therein. wherefore a new prince in his principality cannot well imitate marcus his actions; nor yet is it necessary to follow those of severus: but he ought make choyce of those parts in severus which are necessary for the founding of a state; and to take from marcus those that are fit and glorious to preserve a state which is already established and setled. chap. xx whether the citadels and many other things which princes often make use of, are profitable or dammageable. some princes, whereby they might safely keep their state, have disarmed their subjects; some others have held the towns under their dominion, divided into factions; others have maintain'd enmities against themselves; others have appli'd themselves to gain them, where they have suspected at their entrance into the government; others have built fortresses; and others again have ruined and demolished them: and however that upon all these things, a man cannot well pass a determinate sentence, unless one comes to the particulars of these states, where some such like determinations were to be taken; yet i shall speak of them in so large a manner, as the matter of it self will bear. it was never then that a new prince would disarme his own subjects; but rather when he hath found them disarmed, he hath alwaies arm'd them. for being belov'd, those armes become thine; those become faithful, which thou hadst in suspicion; and those which were faithful, are maintaind so; and thy subjects are made thy partisans; and because all thy subjects cannot be put in armes, when thou bestowest favors on those thou armest, with the others thou canst deal more for thy safety; and that difference of proceeding which they know among them, obliges them to thee; those others excuse thee, judgeing it necessary that they have deservd more, who have undergone more danger, and so have greater obligation: but when thou disarmst them, thou beginst to offend them, that thou distrustest them, either for cowardise, or small faith; and the one or the other of those two opinions provokes their hatred against thee; and because thou canst not stand disarmed, thou must then turn thy self to mercenary soldiery, whereof we have formerly spoken what it is, and when it is good; it can never be so much as to defend thee from powerful enemies, and suspected subjects; therefore as i have said, a new prince in a new principality hath alwaies ordaind them armes. of examples to this purpose, histories are full. but when a prince gains a new state, which as a member he adds to his ancient dominions, then it is necessary to disarme that state, unless it be those whom thou hast discoverd to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof; and these also in time and upon occasions, it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate, and so order them, that all the arms of thy state be in the hands of thy own soldiers, who live in thy ancient state near unto thee. our ancestors and they that were accounted sages, were wont to say that it was necessary to hold pistoya in factions, and pisa with fortresses; and for this cause maintaind some towns subject to them in differences, whereby to hold it more easily. this, at what time italy was ballanc'd in a certain manner, might be well done; but mee thinks it cannot now a dayes be well given for a precept; for i do not beleeve, that divisions made can do any good; rather it must needs be, that when the enemy approaches them, cities divided are presently lost; for alwaies the weaker part will cleave to the forrein power, and the other not be able to subsist. the venetians (as i think) mov'd by the aforesaid reasons, maintaind the factions of the guelfes and gibellins, in their townes; and however they never suffered them to spill one anothers blood, yet they nourish'd these differences among them, to the end that the citizens imployd in these quarrels, should not plot any thing against them: which as it proved, never serv'd them to any great purpose: for being defeated at vayla, presently one of those two factions took courage and seizd upon their whole state. therefore such like waies argue the princes weakness; for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions; for they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace, being they are able by means thereof more easily to mannage their subjects: but war comming, such like orders discover their fallacy. without doubt, princes become great, when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them; and therefore fortune especially when she hath to make any new prince great, who hath more need to gain reputation than an hereditary prince, causes enemies to rise against him, and him to undertake against them: to the end he may have occasion to master them, and know that ladder, which his enemies have set him upon, whereby to rise yet higher. and therefore many think, that a wise prince when he hath the occasion, ought cunningly to nourish some enmity, that by the suppressing thereof, his greatness may grow thereupon. princes, especially those that are new, have found more faith and profit in those men, who in the beginning of their state, have been held suspected, than in those who at their entrance have been their confidents. pandulphus petrucci, prince of siena, governd his state, more with them that had been suspected by him, than with the others. but of this matter we cannot speak at large, because it varies according to the subject; i will only say this, that those men, who in the beginning of a principality were once enemies, if they be of quality so that to maintain themselves they have need of support, the prince might alwaies with the greatest facility gain for his; and they are the rather forced to serve him faithfully, insomuch as they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds to cancel that sinister opinion, which was once held of them; and so the prince ever draws from these more advantage, than from those, who serving him too supinely, neglect his affairs. and seing the matter requires it, i will not omit to put a prince in mind, who hath anew made himself master of a state, by means of the inward helps he had from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that favor'd him to favor him, if it be not a natural affection towards him; for if it be only because they were not content with their former government, with much pains and difficulties shall he be able to keep them long his friends, because it will be impossible for him to content them. by these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and modern affaires, searching into the cause hereof, we shall find it much more easie to gain those men for friends, who formerly were contented with the state, and therefore were his enemies: than those, who because they were not contented therewith, became his fiends, and favor'd him in getting the mastery of it. it hath been the custome of princes, whereby to hold their states more securely, to build citadels, which might be bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them, and so to have a secure retreat from the first violences. i commend this course, because it hath been used of old; notwithstanding nicholas vitelli in our dayes hath been known to demolish two citadels in the town of castello, the better to keep the state; guidubaldo duke of urbin being to return into his state, out of which he was driven by cæsar borgia, raz'd all the fortresses of that countrey, and thought he should hardlyer lose that state again without them. the bentivolii returning into bolonia, used the like courses. citadels then are profitable, or not, according to the times; and if they advantage thee in one part, they do thee harme in another; and this part may be argued thus. that prince who stands more in fear of his own people than of strangers, ought to build fortresses: but he that is more afraid of strangers than of his people, should let them alone. against the house of sforza, the castle of milan, which francis sforza built, hath and will make more war, than any other disorder in that state: and therefore the best citadel that may be, is not to incurre the peoples hatred; for however thou holdest a fortress, and the people hate thee, thou canst hardly scape them; for people, when once they have taken armes, never want the help of strangers at their need to take ther parts. in our dayes we never saw that they ever profited any prince, unless it were the countess of furli, when count hieronymo of furli her husband was slain; for by means thereof she escap'd the peoples rage, and attended aid from milan, and so recover'd her state: and then such were the times that the stranger could not assist the people: but afterwards they serv'd her to little purpose, when cæsar borgia assaild her, and that the people which was her enemy, sided with the stranger. therefore both then, and at first, it would have been more for her safety, not to have been odious to the people, than to have held the fortresses. these things being well weigh'd then, i will commend those that shall build up fortresses, and him also that shall not; and i will blame him, howsoever he be, that relying upon those, shall make small account of being hated by his people. chap. xxi how a prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation. there is nothing gains a prince such repute as great exploits, and rare tryals of himself in heroick actions. we have now in our dayes ferdinand king of arragon the present king of spain: he in a manner may be termed a new prince; for from a very weak king, he is now become for fame and glory, the first king of christendome, and if you shall wel consider his actions, you shall find them all illustrious, and every one of them extraordinary. he in the beginning of his reign assaild granada, and that exploit was the ground of his state. at first he made that war in security, and without suspicion he should be any waies hindred, and therein held the barons of castiglias minds busied, who thinking upon that war, never minded any innovation; in this while he gaind credit and authority with them, they not being aware of it; was able to maintain with the church and the peoples money all his soldiers, and to lay a foundation for his military ordinances with that long war, which afterwards gaind him exceeding much honor. besides this, to the end he might be able hereamong to undertake greater matters, serving himself alwaies of the colour of religion, he gave himself to a kind of religious cruelty, chasing and dispoyling those jewes out of the kingdome; nor can this example be more admirable and rare: under the same cloke he invaded affrick and went through with his exploit in italy: and last of all hath he assaild france, and so alwaies proceeded on forwards contriving of great matters, which alwaies have held his subjects minds in peace and admiration, and busied in attending the event, what it should be: and these his actions have thus grown, one upon another, that they have never given leisure to men so to rest, as they might ever plot any thing against them. moreover it much avails a prince to give extraordinary proofes of himself touching the government within, such as those we have heard of bernard of milan, whensoever occasion is given by any one, that may effectuate some great thing either of good or evil, in the civil government; and to find out some way either to reward or punish it, whereof in the world much notice may be taken. and above all things a prince ought to endeavor in all his actions to spread abroad a fame of his magnificence and worthiness. a prince also is well esteemed, when he is a true friend, or a true enemy; when without any regard he discovers himself in favor of one against another; which course shall be alwaies more profit, than to stand neuter: for if two mighty ones that are thy neighbors, come to fall out, or are of such quality, that one of them vanquishing, thou art like to be in fear of the vanquisher, or not; in either of these two cases, it will ever prove more for thy profit, to discover thy self, and make a good war of it: for in the first case, if thou discoverest not thy selfe, thou shalt alwaies be a prey to him that overcomes, to the contentment and satisfaction of the vanquisht; neither shalt thou have reason on thy side, nor any thing else to defend or receive thee. for he that overcomes, will not have any suspected friends that give him no assistance in his necessity: and he that loses, receives thee not, because thou wouldest not with thy armes in hand run the hazzard of his fortune. antiochus passed into greece, thereunto induc'd by the etolians, to chace the romans thence: and sent his ambassadors to the achayans, who were the romans friends, to perswade them to stand neuters; on the other side the romans moved them to joyne armes with theirs: this matter came to be deliberated on in the council of the achayans, where antiochus his ambassador encouraged them to stand neuters, whereunto the romans ambassador answerd; touching the course, that is commended to you, as best and profitablest for your state, to wit, not to intermeddle in the war between us, nothing can be more against you: because, not taking either part, you shall remain without thanks, and without reputation a prey to the conqueror. and it will alwaies come to pass that he who is not thy friend, will requite thy neutrality; and he that is thy friend, will urge thee to discover thy self by taking arms for him: and evil advised princes; to avoyd the present dangers, folow often times that way of neutrality, and most commonly go to ruine: but when a prince discovers himself strongly in favor of a party; if he to whom thou cleavest, overcomes; however that he be puissant, and thou remainest at his disposing, he is oblig'd to thee, and there is a contract of friendship made; and men are never so openly dishonest, as with such a notorious example of dishonesty to oppress thee. besides victories are never so prosperous, that the conqueror is like neglect all respects, and especially of justice. but if he to whom thou stickst, loses, thou art received by him; and, while he is able, he aydes thee, and so thou becomest partner of a fortune that may arise again; the second case, when they that enter into the lists together, are of such quality, that thou needest not fear him that vanquisheth, so much the more is it discretion in thee to stick to him; for thou goest to ruine one with his assistance, who ought to do the best he could to save him, if he were well advised; and he overcomming, is left at thy discretion; and it is unpossible but with thy ayd he must overcome. and here it is to be noted, that a prince should be well aware never to joyn with any one more powerfull than himself, to offend another, unless upon necessity, as formerly is said. for when he overcomes, thou art left at his discretion, and princes ought avoid as much as they are able, to stand at anothers discretion. the venetians took part with france against the duke of milan, and yet could have avoided that partaking, from which proceeded their ruine. but when it cannot be avoyded, as it befel the florentines when the pope and the king of spain went both with their armies to lombardy, there the prince ought to side with them for the reasons aforesaid. nor let any state think they are able to make such sure parties, but rather that they are all doubtfull; for in the order of things we find it alwaies, that whensoever a man seeks to avoid one inconvenient, he incurs another. but the principal point of judgement, is in discerning between the qualities of inconvenients, and not taking the bad for the good. moreover a prince ought to shew himself a lover of vertue, and that he honors those that excel in every art. afterwards ought he encourage his citizens, whereby they may be enabled quickly to exercise their faculties as well in merchandise, and husbandry, as in any other kind of traffick, to the end that no man forbear to adorne and cultivate his possessions for fear that he be despoyled of them; or any other to open the commerce upon the danger of heavy impositions: but rather to provide rewards for those that shall set these matters afoot, or for any one else that shall any way amplifie his city or state. besides he ought in the fit times of the year entertain the people with feasts and maskes; and because every city is devided into companies, and arts, and tribes, he ought to take special notice of those bodies, and some times afford them a meeting, and give them some proof of his humanity, and magnificence; yet withall holding firme the majestie of his state; for this must never fail in any case. chap. xxii touching princes secretaries. it is no small importance to a prince, the choyce he makes, of servants being ordinarily good or bad, as his wisdome is. and the first conjecture one gives of a great man, and of his understanding, is, upon the sight of his followers and servants he hath about him, when they prove able and faithful, and then may he alwaies be reputed wise because he hath known how to discern those that are able, and to keep them true to him. but when they are otherwise, there can be no good conjecture made of him; for the first error he commits, is in this choyce. there was no man that had any knowledge of antonio of vanafro, the servant of pandulfus petrucci prince of sicily, who did not esteem pandulfus for a very discreet man, having him for his servant. and because there are three kinds of understandings; the one that is advised by it self; the other that understands when it is informed by another; the third that neither is advised by it self nor by the demonstration of another; the first is best, the second is good, and the last quite unprofitable. therefore it was of necessity, that if pandulfus attaind not the first degree, yet he got to the second; for whenever any one hath the judgement to discerne between the good and the evil, that he does and sayes, however that he hath not his distinction from himself, yet still comes he to take notice of the good or evil actions of that servant; and those he cherishes, and these he suppresses; insomuch that the servant finding no means to deceive his master, keeps himself upright and honest. but how a prince may throughly understand his servant, here is the way that never fails. when thou seest the servant study more for his own advantage than thine, and that in all his actions, he searches most after his own profit; this man thus qualified, shall never prove good servant, nor canst thou ever relie upon him: for he that holds the sterne of the state in hand, ought never call home his cares to his own particular, but give himself wholly over to his princes service, nor ever put him in minde of any thing not appertaining to him. and on the other side the prince to keep him good to him, ought to take a care for his servant, honoring him, enriching, and obliging him to him, giving him part both of dignities and offices, to the end that the many honors and much wealth bestowed on him, may restrain his desires from other honors, and other wealth, and that those many charges cause him to fear changes that may fall, knowing he is not able to stand without his master. and when both the princes and the servants are thus disposed, they may rely the one upon the other: when otherwise, the end will ever prove hurtfull for the one as well as for the other. chap. xxiii that flatterers are to be avoyded. i will not omit one principle of great inportance, being an errour from which princes with much difficulty defend themselves, unlesse they be very discreet, and make a very good choice; and this is concerning flatterers; whereof all writings are full: and that because men please themselves so much in their own things, and therein cozen themselves, that very hardly can they escape this pestilence; and desiring to escape it, there is danger of falling into contempt; for there is no other way to be secure from flattery, but to let men know, that they displease thee not in telling thee truth: but when every one hath this leave, thou losest thy reverence. therefore ought a wise prince take a third course, making choyce of some understanding men in his state, and give only to them a free liberty of speaking to him the truth; and touching those things only which he inquires of, and nothing else; but he ought to be inquisitive of every thing, and hear their opinions, and then afterwards advise himself after his own manner; and in these deliberations, and with every one of them so carrie himself, that they all know, that the more freely they shall speak, the better they shall be liked of: and besides those, not give eare to any one; and thus pursue the thing resolved on, and thence continue obstinate in the resolution taken. he who does otherwise, either falls upon flatterers, or often changes upon the varying of opinions, from whence proceeds it that men conceive but slightly of him. to this purpose i will alledge you a moderne example. peter lucas a servant of maximilians the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said that he never advised with any body, nor never did any thing after his own way: which was because he took a contrary course to what we have now said: for the emperor is a close man, who communicates his secrets to none, nor takes counsel of any one; but as they come to be put in practise, they begin to be discovered and known, and so contradicted by those that are near about him; and he as being an easy man, is quickly wrought from them. whence it comes that what he does to day, he undoes on the morrow; and that he never understands himself what he would, nor what he purposes, and that there is no grounding upon any of his resolutions. a prince therefore ought alwayes to take counsell, but at his owne pleasure, and not at other mens; or rather should take away any mans courage to advise him of any thing, but what he askes: but he ought well to aske at large, and then touching the things inquird of, be a patient hearer of the truth; and perceiving that for some respect the truth were conceald from him, be displeased thereat. and because some men have thought that a prince that gaines the opinion to bee wise, may bee held so, not by his owne naturall indowments, but by the good counsells he hath about him; without question they are deceivd; for this is a generall rule and never failes, that a prince who of himselfe is not wise, can never be well advised, unlesse he should light upon one alone, wholly to direct and govern him, who himself were a very wise man. in this case it is possible he may be well governd: but this would last but little: for that governor in a short time would deprive him of his state; but a prince not having any parts of nature, being advised of more then one, shall never be able to unite these counsels: of himself shall he never know how to unite them; and each one of the counsellers, probably will follow that which is most properly his owne; and he shall never find the meanes to amend or discerne these things; nor can they fall out otherwise, because men alwayes prove mischievous, unlesse upon some necessity they be forc'd to become good: we conclude therefore, that counsells from whencesoever they proceed, must needs take their beginning from the princes wisdome, and not the wisdome of the prince from good counsells. in this chapter our authour prescribes some rules how to avoyd flattery, and not to fall into contempt. the extent of these two extreames is so large on both sides, that there is left but a very narrow path for the right temper to walke between them both: and happy were that prince, who could light on so good a pilote as to bring him to port between those rocks and those quicksands. where majesty becomes familiar, unlesse endued with a super-eminent vertue, it loses all awfull regards: as the light of the sunne, because so ordinary, because so common, we should little value, were it not that all creatures feele themselves quickned by the rayes thereof. on the other side, _omnis insipiens arrogantiâ et plausibus capitur_, every foole is taken with his owne pride and others flatteryes: and this foole keeps company so much with all great wise men, that hardly with a candle and lantern can they be discernd betwixt. the greatest men are more subject to grosse and palpable flatteries; and especially the greatest of men, who are kings and princes: for many seek the rulers favour. _prov._ . . for there are divers meanes whereby private men are instructed; princes have not that good hap: but they whose instruction is of most importance, so soone as they have taken the government upon them, no longer suffer any reproovers: for but few have accesse unto them, and they who familiary converse with them, doe and say all for favour. isocrat, to nicocles, all are afraid to give him occasion of displeasure, though by telling him truth. to this purpose therefore sayes one; a prince excells in learning to ride the great horse, rather than in any other exercise, because his horse being no flatterer, will shew him he makes no difference between him and another man, and unlesse he keepe his seate well, will lay him on the ground. this is plaine dealing. men are more subtile, more double-hearted, they have a heart and a heart neither is their tongue their hearts true interpreter. counsell in the heart of man is like deepe waters; but a man of understanding will draw it out. _prov._ . . this understanding is most requisite in a prince, inasmuch as the whole globe is in his hand, and the inferiour orbes are swayed by the motion of the highest. and therefore surely it is the honour of a king to search out such a secret: _prov._ . . his counsellours are his eyes and eares; as they ought to be dear to him, so they ought to be true to him, and make him the true report of things without disguise. if they prove false eyes, let him pluck them out; he may as they use glasse eyes, take them forth without paine, and see never a whit the worse for it. the wisdome of a princes counsellours is a great argument of the princes wisdome. and being the choyce of them imports the princes credit and safety, our authour will make him amends for his other errours by his good advice in his chap. whether i referre him. chap. xxiv wherefore the princes of italy have lost their states. when these things above said are well observ'd, they make a new prince seeme as if he had been of old, and presently render him more secure and firme in the state, than if he had already grown ancient therein: for a new prince is much more observd in his action, than a prince by inheritance; and when they are known to bee vertuous, men are much more gaind and oblig'd to them thereby, than by the antiquity of their blood: for men are much more taken by things present, than by things past, and when in the present they find good, they content themselves therein, and seeke no further; or rather they undertake the defence of him to their utmost, when the prince is not wanting in other matters to himself; and so shall he gaine double glory to have given a beginning to a new principality, adornd, and strengthnd it with good lawes, good arms, good friends, and good examples; as he shall have double shame, that is born a prince, and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it. and if we shall consider those lords, that in italy have lost their states in our dayes, as the king of naples, the duke of milan, and others; first we shall find in them a common defect, touching their armes, for the reasons which have been above discoursd at length. afterwards we shall see some of them, that either shall have had the people for their enemies; or be it they had the people to friend, could never know how to assure themselves of the great ones: for without such defects as these, states are not lost, which have so many nerves, that they are able to maintaine an army in the feld. philip of macedon, not the father of alexander the great, but he that was vanquished by titus quintius, had not much state in regard of the greatnesse of the romanes and of greece that assail'd him; neverthelesse in that he was a warlike man and knew how to entertaine the people, and assure himself of the nobles, for many yeares he made the warre good against them: and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him, yet the kingdome remaind in his hands still. wherefore these our princes who for many yeares had continued in their principalities, for having afterwards lost them, let them not blame fortune, but their own sloth; because they never having thought during the time of quiet, that they could suffer a change (which is the common fault of men, while faire weather lasts, not to provide for the tempest) when afterwards mischiefes came upon them, thought rather upon flying from them, than upon their defence, and hop'd that the people, weary of the vanquishers insolence, would recall them: which course when the others faile, is good: but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that: for a man wou'd never go to fall, beleeving another would come to take him up: which may either not come to passe, or if it does, it is not for thy security, because that defence of his is vile, and depends not upon thee; but those defences only are good, certaine, and durable, which depend upon thy owne selfe, and thy owne vertues. chap. xxv how great power fortune hath in humane affaires, and what meanes there is to resist it. it is not unknown unto me, how that many have held opinion, and still hold it, that the affaires of the world are so governd by fortune, and by god, that men by their wisdome cannot amend or alter them; or rather that there is no remedy for them: and hereupon they would think that it were of no availe to take much paines in any thing, but leave all to be governd by chance. this opinion hath gain'd the more credit in our dayes, by reason of the great alteration of things, which we have of late seen, and do every day see, beyond all humane conjecture: upon which, i sometimes thinking, am in some parte inclind to their opinion: neverthelesse not to extinguish quite our owne free will, i think it may be true, that fortune is the mistrisse of one halfe of our actions; but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half, or little lesse. and i liken her to a precipitous torrent, which when it rages, over-flows the plaines, overthrowes the trees, and buildings, removes the earth from one side, and laies it on another, every one flyes before it, every one yeelds to the fury thereof, as unable to withstand it; and yet however it be thus, when the times are calmer, men are able to make provision against these excesses, with banks and fences so, that afterwards when it swels again, it shall all passe smoothly along, within its channell, or else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurtfull. in like manner befals it us with fortune, which there shewes her power where vertue is not ordeind to resist her, and thither turnes she all her forces, where she perceives that no provisions nor resistances are made to uphold her. and if you shall consider italy, which is the seat of these changes, and that which hath given them their motions, you shall see it to be a plaine field, without any trench or bank; which had it been fenc'd with convenient vertue as was germany, spain or france; this inundation would never have causd these great alterations it hath, or else would it not have reach'd to us: and this shall suffice to have said, touching the opposing of fortune in generall. but restraining my selfe more to particulars, i say that to day we see a prince prosper and flourish and to morrow utterly go to ruine; not seeing that he hath alterd any condition or quality; which i beleeve arises first from the causes which we have long since run over, that is because that prince that relies wholly upon fortune, runnes as her wheele turnes. i beleeve also, that he proves the fortunate man, whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the time; and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ: for we see that men, in the things that induce them to the end, (which every one propounds to himselfe, as glory and riches) proceed therein diversly; some with respects, others more bold, and rashly; one with violence, and th'other with cunning; the one with patience, th'other with its contrary; and every one of severall wayes may attaine thereto; we see also two very respective and wary men, the one come to his purpose, and th'other not; and in like maner two equally prosper, taking divers course; the one being wary the other head-strong; which proceeds from nothing else, but from the quality of the times, which agree, or not, with their proceedings. from hence arises that which i said, that two working diversly, produce the same effect: and two equaly working, the one attains his end, the other not. hereupon depends the alteration of the good; for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience, times and affaires turne so favourably, that the carriage of his businesse prove well, he prospers; but if the times and affaires chance, he is ruind, because he changes not his manner of proceeding: nor is there any man so wise, that can frame himselfe hereunto; as well because he cannot go out of the way, from that whereunto nature inclines him: as also, for that one having alwayes prosperd, walking such a way, cannot be perswaded to leave it; and therefore the respective and wary man, when it is fit time for him to use violence and force, knows not how to put it in practice, whereupon he is ruind: but if he could change his disposition with the times and the affaires, he should not change his fortune. pope julius the second proceeded in all his actions with very great violence, and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding that in all of them he had happy successe. consider the first exploit he did at bolonia, even while john bentivolio lived: the venetians were not well contented therewith; the king of spaine likewise with the french, had treated of that enterprise; and notwithstanding al this, he stirrd up by his own rage and fiercenesse, personally undertook that expedition: which action of his put in suspence and stopt spaine and the venetians; those for feare, and the others for desire to recover the kingdome of naples; and on the other part drew after him the king of france; for that king seeing him already in motion, and desiring to hold him his friend, whereby to humble the venetians, thought he could no way deny him his souldiers, without doing him an open injury. julius then effected that with his violent and heady motion, which no other pope with all humane wisdome could ever have done; for if he had expected to part from rome with his conclusions settled, and all his affaires ordered before hand, as any other pope would have done, he had never brought it to passe: for the king of france would have devised a thousand excuses, and others would have put him in as many feares. i will let passe his other actions, for all of them were alike, and all of them prov'd lucky to him; and the brevity of his life never sufferd him to feele the contrary: for had he litt upon such times afterwards, that it had been necessary for him to proceed with respects, there had been his utter ruine; for he would never have left those wayes, to which he had been naturally inclind. i conclude then, fortune varying, and men continuing still obstinate to their own wayes, prove happy, while these accord together: and as they disagree, prove unhappy: and i think it true, that it is better to be heady than wary; because fortune is a mistresse; and it is necessary, to keep her in obedience to ruffle and force her: and we see, that she suffers her self rather to be masterd by those, than by others that proceed coldly. and therefore, as a mistresse, shee is a friend to young men, because they are lesse respective, more rough, and command her with more boldnesse. i have considered the chapter, as representing me a full view of humane policy and cunning: yet me thinks it cannot satisfie a christian in the causes of the good and bad successe of things. the life of man is like a game at tables; skill availes much i grant, but that's not all: play thy game well, but that will not winne: the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play. examine this; play never so surely, play never so probably, unlesse the chance thou castest, lead thee forward to advantage, all hazards are losses, and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch. the sum of this is set down in ecclesiastes chap. . v. . the race is not to the swift, nor the battell to the strong: neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance hapeneth to them all. our cunning author for all his exact rules he delivere in his books, could not fence against the despight of fortune, as he complaines in his epistle to this booke. nor that great example of policy, duke valentine, whome our author commends to princes for his crafts-master, could so ruffle or force his mistresse fortune, that he could keep her in obedience. man can contribute no more to his actions than vertue and wisdome: but the successe depends upon a power above. surely there is the finger of god; or as prov. . v. . 'the lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the lord.' it was not josephs wisdome made all things thrive under his hand; but because the lord was with him; and that which he did, the lord made it to prosper, gen. . surely this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence, which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes, as that their effects prove answerable, and sometimes (that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes) the success returns with such a supereminency of worth, that it far exceeds the vertue of the ordinary causes. chap. xxvi an exhortation to free italy from the barbarians. having then weighed all things above discours'd, and devising with my self, whether at this present in italy the time might serve to honor a new prince, and whether there were matter that might minister occasion to a wise and valorous prince, to introduce such a forme, that might do honor to him, and good to the whole generality of the people in the countrey: me thinks so many things concurre in favor of a new prince, that i know not whether there were ever any time more proper for this purpose. and if as i said, it was necessary, desiring to see moses his vertue, that the children of israel should be inthrald in Ægypt; and to have experience of the magnanimity of cyrus his mind, that the persians should be oppress'd by the medes; and to set forth the excellency of theseus, that the athenians should be dispersed; so at this present now we are desirous to know the valor of an italian spirit, it were necessary italy should be reduc'd to the same termes it is now in, and were in more slavery than the hebrews were; more subject than the persians, more scatterd than the athenians; without head, without order, battered, pillaged, rent asunder, overrun, and had undergone all kind of destruction. and however even in these later dayes, we have had some kind of shew of hope in some one, whereby we might have conjectur'd, that he had been ordained for the deliverance hereof, yet it prov'd afterwards, that in the very height of all his actions he was curb'd by fortune, insomuch that this poore countrey remaining as it were without life, attends still for him that shall heal her wounds, give an end to all those pillagings and sackings of lombardy, to those robberies and taxations of the kingdome, and of tuscany, and heal them of their soars, now this long time gangren'd. we see how she makes her prayers to god, that he send some one to redeem her from these barbarous cruelties and insolencies. we see her also wholly ready and disposed to follow any colours, provided there be any one take them up. nor do we see at this present, that she can look for other, than your illustrious family, to become cheiftain of this deliverance, which hath now by its own vertue and fortune been so much exalted, and favored by god and the church, whereof it now holds the principality: and this shall not be very hard for you to do, if you shall call to mind the former actions, and lives of those that are above named. and though those men were very rare and admirable, yet were they men, and every one of them began upon less occasion than this; for neither was their enterprize more just than this, nor more easie; nor was god more their friend, than yours. here is very great justice: for that war is just, that is necessary; and those armes are religious, when there is no hope left otherwhere, but in them. here is an exceeding good disposition thereto: nor can there be, where there is a good disposition, a giant difficulty, provided that use be made of those orders, which i propounded for aim and direction to you. besides this, here we see extraordinary things without example effected by god; the sea was opened, a cloud guided the way, devotion poured forth the waters, and it rain'd down manna; all these things have concurred in your greatness, the rest is left for you to do. god will not do every thing himself, that he may not take from us our free will, and of that glory that belongs to us. neither is it a marvel, if any of the aforenamed italians have not been able to compass that, which we may hope your illustrious family shall: though in so many revolutions of italy, and so many feats of war, it may seem that the whole military vertue therein be quite extinguisht; for this arises from that the ancient orders thereof were not good; and there hath since been none that hath known how to invent new ones. nothing can so much honor a man rising anew, as new laws and new ordinances devised by him: these things when they have a good foundation given them, and contain in them their due greatness, gain him reverence and admiration; and in italy their wants not the matter wherein to introduce any forme. here is great vertue in the members, were it not wanting in the heads. consider in the single fights that have been, and duels, how much the italians have excel'd in their strength, activity and address; but when they come to armies, they appear not, and all proceeds from the weakness of the chieftaines; for they that understand the managing of these matters, are not obeyed; and every one presumes to understand; hitherto there having not been any one so highly raised either by fortune or vertue, as that others would submit unto him. from hence proceeds it, that in so long time, and in so many battels fought for these last past years, when there hath been an army wholly italian, it alwaies hath had evil success; whereof the river tarus first was witness, afterwards alexandria, capua, genua, vayla, bolonia, mestri. your illustrious family then being desirous to tread the footsteps of these worthyes who redeem'd their countreys, must above all things as the very foundation of the whole fabrick, be furnished with soldiers of your own natives: because you cannot have more faithful, true, nor better soldiers; and though every one of them be good, all together they will become better when they shall find themselves entertained, commanded, and honored by their own prince. wherefore it is necessary to provide for those armes, whereby to be able with the italian valor to make a defence against forreiners. and however the swisse infantry and spanish be accounted terrible; yet is there defect in both of them, by which a third order might not only oppose them, but may be confident to vanquish them: for the spaniards are not able to indure the horse, and the swisse are to feare the foot, when they incounter with them, as resolute in the fight as they; whereupon it hath been seen, and upon experience shall be certain, that the spaniards are not able to beare up against the french cavalery, and the swisses have been routed by the spanish foot. and though touching this last, there hath not been any entire experience had, yet was there some proof thereof given in the battel of ravenna, when the spanish foot affronted the dutch battalions, which keep the same rank the swisses do, where the spaniards with their nimbleness of body, and the help of their targets entred in under their pikes, and there stood safe to offend them, the dutch men having no remedy: and had it not been for the cavalery that rusht in upon them, they had quite defeated them. there may then (the defect of the one and other of these two infantries being discoverd) another kind of them be anew ordained, which may be able to make resistance against the horse, and not fear the foot, which shall not be a new sort of armes, but change of orders. and these are some of those things which ordained a new, gain reputation and greatness to a new prince. therefore this occasion should not be let pass, to the end that italy after so long a time may see some one redeemer of hers appear. nor can i express with what dearness of affection he would be received in all those countreys which have suffered by those forrein scums, with what thirst of revenge, with what resolution of fidelity, with what piety, with what tears. would any gates be shut again him? any people deny him obedience? any envy oppose him? would not every italian fully consent with him? this government of the barbarians stinks in every ones nostrils. let your illustrious family then undertake this worthy exployt with that courage and those hopes wherewith such just actions are to be attempted; to the end that under your colours, this countrey may be enabled, and under the protection of your fortune that saying of petrarch be verifyed. _virtù contr' al fuore prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto: che l'antico valore ne gli italici cor non è morto._ vertue against fury shall advance the fight, and it i' th' combate soon shall put to flight: for th' old roman valor is not dead, nor in th' italians brests extinguished. finis 	of the digital library@villanova university 	(http://digital.library.villanova.edu/)) 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 how to fence. 	 	 containing 	 	 full instruction 	 	 for 	 	 fencing 	 	 and the 	 	 use of the broadsword; 	 	 also 	 	 instruction in archery	 	 	 described with 	 	 twenty-one practical 	 	 illustrations. 	 	 	 a complete book. 	 	 	 new york: 	 	 frank tousey	 publisher	 	 	 and north moore street. 	 	 	 	 	 entered according to act of congress	 in the year 	 by 	 	 frank tousey	 	 	 in the office of the librarian of congress at washington	 d. c. 	 	 	 	 	table of contents 	 	 	 how to fence 	 broadsword exercise 	 archery 	 hurdle racing 	 vaulting with pole	 or pole-leaping 	 throwing the hammer 	 putting the shot 	 	 	 	 	[illustration] 	 	 	 	 	how to fence. 	 	 	fencing is the art of using the small-sword	 or rapier. the small-sword 	has a straight blade	 about thirty-two inches in length outside the 	guard	 and is fashioned for _thrusting_ only. although it is an art of 	the greatest antiquity	 very great improvements have been made in it 	during the last half-century	 chiefly by french masters	 who excel those 	of all other countries. this has been attributed to various causes; by 	some to the agility and acknowledged power of rapid physical action 	possessed by this nation; by others	 to their natural vivacity and 	mental quickness. in my opinion	 however	 a more direct and powerful 	cause may be traced in the great encouragement and universal patronage 	which it has ever received from every grade of a chivalrous and military 	people. every regiment has its _maitre d'armes_	 and every barrack its 	fencing-school. indeed	 in so important a light was the proper teaching 	of this art held	 that one of the french kings (louis xiv.) granted 	letters-patent to twenty eminent masters	 who alone were permitted to 	teach in paris. when a vacancy occurred	 no interest and no favor could 	enable a candidate to obtain this privilege: he had to fence in public 	with six of these chosen masters	 and if by any of them he was beaten by 	two distinct hits	 he was considered unqualified to teach in the 	capital. 	 	independent of its value as the scientific use of the sword--the 	gentleman's weapon of defense	 _par excellence_--fencing stands 	unrivaled as an _exercise_; and it is in this sense that it will now be 	treated. the most eminent physicians which this country have produced	 	have all	 in the most earnest manner	 recommended it to the attention of 	the young. thus	 dr. clive says: 	 	muscular exertion is essential in perfecting the form of the body, and those exercises which require the exercise of the greatest number of muscles are the most conducive to this end. fencing causes more muscles to act at the same time than most other exercises. it promotes the expansion of the chest, and improves respiration, whereby the functions of the most important organs of the body are more perfectly performed. 	 	sir anthony carlisle uses similar language: 	 	according to my judgment, the exercise of fencing tends to promote bodily health, and the development of athletic powers. it is likewise apparent that the attitudes and exertions of fencing are conducive to the manly forms and muscular energies of the human figure. 	 	again	 sir everard home	 in still stronger terms: 	 	of all the different modes in which the body can be exercised, there is none, in my judgment, that is capable of giving strength and velocity, as well as precision, to the action of all the voluntary muscles of the body in an equal degree as the practice of fencing, and none more conducive to bodily health. 	 	i shall give one more extract from another physician of equal eminence	 	dr. babbington: 	 	i am of opinion that, in addition to the amusement which this exercise (fencing) affords, it is particularly calculated to excite in young persons a greater degree of energy and circumspection than they might otherwise possess; and it is obvious that, in respect of health, that mode of exertion is _superior to all others_, which, while it gives motion and activity to every part of the body, produces at the same time corresponding interest in the mind. 	 	sir john sinclair	 dr. pemberton	 &c.	 speak in terms equally 	recommendatory. 	 	to avoid all danger in the lessons and practice	 foils are substituted 	for real swords. strong wire masks are worn on the face	 a well-padded 	glove on the hand; and the upper part of the body	 at which alone the 	thrusts are aimed	 is protected by a strong jacket	 the right side and 	collar of which should be of leather. 	 	the first movement a beginner has to learn	 is the manner of placing 	himself in the position called 	 	 	the guard. 	 	it is from this position that all movements are made	 whether offensive 	or defensive. let the beginner be placed with his knees straight	 his 	feet at right angles	 heel to heel; the right foot	 right side	 and face 	directed to the master. the body must be held upright and firm	 the arms 	hanging down by the side	 but easily and without constraint	 the left 	hand holding the foil a few inches beneath its guard. next	 let him 	bring the right hand across the body	 and seize the foil-handle; by a 	second movement	 bring the foil above the head	 the hands separating as 	they ascend	 until both arms be nearly extended upwards and outwards. 	here pause. this may be called the _first position_ of the guard. 	 	these movements should be frequently practiced	 as they accustom the 	arms to move independently of the body	 flatten the joints of the 	shoulders	 and give prominence to the chest. 	 	to arrive at the _second position_ of the guard	 the right arm	 with the 	foil	 is brought down to the front	 until the right elbow is a little 	above and in advance of the waist; the fore-arm and foil sloping 	upwards; the point of the foil being the height of the upper part of the 	face; then	 by a second movement	 the learner must sink down	 separating 	the knees	 and stepping forward with the right foot fourteen or sixteen 	inches; for	 of course	 the guard of a tall man will be wider than that 	of a short one. however	 his own comfort in the position will direct him 	as to the distance; and the general rule is	 that the knee of the left 	leg will jut over the toes of the left foot	 and the right leg from 	ankle to knee be perpendicular. it is in this position that he will 	receive all attacks from an adversary	 and from this position will all 	his own attacks be made. also in this position will he 	 	[illustration] 	 	 	advance 	 	upon an adversary	 when beyond hitting distance. the step in the advance 	is usually about that of the width of the guard	 although of course this 	would vary with circumstances. the step is made by advancing the right 	foot the distance i have named; and on its reaching the ground	 the left 	foot is brought up	 and takes its place. to 	 	 	retreat	 	 	the reverse of the above movement is made. the left foot takes the lead	 	stepping to the rear about as far as the right had stepped to the front; 	the right occupying its place on its taking up its new position. the 	next movement	 	 	 	the longe	 	 	[illustration] 	 	is a very important movement	 and is rather difficult to make properly	 	and fatiguing to practice. indeed	 the first movements in fencing are 	the most trying to the learner; and he must not be discouraged if he 	fails to do them correctly at first--practice only will give him this 	power. the longe is that extension of body which accompanies every 	attack	 and is thus made:--the right arm is extended straight from the 	shoulder	 the arm and blade being on the same level; by a second 	movement	 the right foot is raised from the ground	 and a step made 	forward	 about eighteen inches in length	 while the left remains firmly 	planted in its place. at the instant that this step is made	 the left 	hand is allowed to fall within a few inches of the left thigh	 and the 	left knee is stiffened back until the leg is perfectly straight. 	 	the thigh of the right leg will now be in a position nearly horizontal; 	from the knee downwards perpendicular. having executed the longe	 the 	next movement to be made is 	 	 	the recover; 	 	that is	 to return from the position of the longe to that of the guard	 	and is thus effected:--the left arm is nimbly thrown up to its place	 	the right arm drawn in	 and the left knee re-bent. these movements must 	be made at the same time	 as it is their _united_ action that enables a 	person to recover from so extended a position as the longe quick enough 	to avoid a thrust if his own attack has failed. 	 	these movements must be frequently practiced before any others are 	attempted--the guard	 the advance	 the retreat	 the longe	 and the 	recover; and when the learner has attained some proficiency in them	 he 	may begin the more delicate movements of attack and defense. of these i 	will now speak. 	 	 	the engage. 	 	it is customary for adversaries	 on coming to the guard	 to _engage_	 	or to join blades	 on what is called the _inside_	 that is	 the _right_ 	side; although there are occasions on which it is advisable to engage on 	the _outside_	 or on the left; otherwise called the _quarte_ or _tierce_ 	sides. 	 	[illustration] 	 	two men thus opposed to each other will at once perceive that there are 	two lines of attack open to them	 _i. e._ the line inside and the line 	outside the blade--these	 and no more. but these may be	 and in fencing 	are	 subdivided into inside above the hand	 and inside under the hand	 	and the same subdivision for outside. this gives four lines of 	attack--or	 to speak more simply	 gives four openings through which an 	adversary may be assailed. now	 to protect each of these assailable 	points	 are four defensive movements	 called 	 	 	parades. 	 	each opening has its own parade or defense	 and each parade will guard 	its own opening	 and	 strictly speaking	 no other. the opening inside 	above the hand is defended by two parades. 	 	as its name imports	 the first and most natural parade is that of 	_prime_. the action of drawing the sword from its sheath is almost 	exactly the movement made use of in the parade of prime. 	 	in this parade the hand is raised as high as the forehead	 so that the 	fencer can see his opponent's face under his wrist. the blade of the 	foil is almost horizontal	 but the point is rather lowered towards the 	ground. as this parade will throw the right side of the body open to the 	adversary's sword	 it is good play to disengage from left to right	 and 	deliver a rapid thrust at the adversary	 in order to anticipate him 	before he can bring his own sword round for another thrust. his point 	will be thrown far out of line	 so that he is behind-hand in point of 	time. 	 	this is a very useful parade for fencers of short stature	 as they can 	sometimes get in their blade under their adversary's arm	 after they 	have parried his thrust. 	 	the other parade is that of 	 	 	quarte. 	 	it is thus formed. on the approach of the point of an adversary's blade 	(and how these approaches are made i will presently explain)	 the right 	hand is moved a few inches--three or four will be enough--across the 	body on the inside	 the hand being neither depressed nor raised	 and the 	foil being kept on the same slope as in the guard. this guards the body 	on the inside above the hand	 but (and here comes an important law in 	fencing) the very movement which has guarded the body on one side has 	exposed it on the other; this is the case with all the simple parades. 	 	[illustration] 	 	[illustration] 	 	suppose	 now	 that the exposed part _outside above_ the hand were 	assailed	 then the defense for it is the parade of 	 	 	tierce. 	 	it is formed by turning the hand with the nails downwards	 and crossing 	to the opposite side some six or eight inches	 the hand and point at the 	same elevation as before; this will guard this opening. if	 however	 the 	attack has been made _under_ instead of over the hand	 then the proper 	parade would have been _seconde_. 	 	[illustration] 	 	[illustration] 	 	there is another method of parade called _quarte_ over the arm--which is 	executed by making about the same parade as in tierce	 with this 	exception--first	 the hand is retained in its original position	 with 	the nails upwards	 and secondly	 the point is not raised over the eye of 	the adversary. 	 	[illustration] 	 	it is rather more delicate than tierce	 but wants its power and energy. 	the ripostes	 or reply thrusts	 are made as they would have been had the 	parade been that of tierce. 	 	 	seconde 	 	is formed by turning the hand in the same position in which it was 	turned for tierce	 but the point of the foil slopes as much downwards as 	in tierce it did upwards; the direction and distance for the hand to 	traverse being the same. again	 had the attack been delivered at none of 	these	 but at the _inside under_ the hand	 then the proper parade would 	have been 	 	 	demi-cercle	 	 	which	 as its name expresses	 is a half-circle	 described by a sweep of 	the blade traversing the _under_ line. next comes the parade of 	 	 	octave. 	 	in this parade the hand is held as in quarte; the hilt of the foil is 	kept lower than that of the opponent: the blade is almost horizontal	 	the point being only slightly lower than the hilt	 and directed towards 	the body of the adversary. 	 	[illustration] 	 	octave is extremely useful when the fencer misses his parade of 	demi-cercle	 as there is but a short distance for the point to traverse	 	and it generally meets the blade of the adversary before the point can 	be properly fixed. moreover	 it brings the point so near the adversary's 	body	 that he will not venture to make another thrust until he has 	removed the foil. 	 	thus i have enumerated	 and partly explained	 the forms and uses of 	these four parades: they are called simple parades	 to distinguish them 	from another set of defensive movements	 called 	 	 	contre-parades. 	 	i have said and shown that a man standing foil in hand	 in the position 	of the guard	 is exposed in four distinct places to thrusts from an 	adversary within longeing distance. i have also shown that he has a 	defense for each of these exposed places; but if a man has but _one_ 	defense for each assailable part	 then his adversary	 knowing beforehand 	what the defense must be	 would be prepared beforehand to deceive him. 	but if he has a reserve--if he has a _second_ defense for each 	part--then the adversary cannot tell what the defense will be	 until his 	attack	 false or real	 is begun. 	 	to meet this contingency	 a second series of defenses have been devised	 	which are of an entirely different nature from the _simple_ parades. 	 	again	 as each of the simple parades is framed to guard only one 	opening	 it was found desirable that the contre-parades should be of a 	more comprehensive character. they are therefore devised so that each is 	capable of protecting the entire front. it is evident that this object 	could not be attained without the sacrifice of quickness	 because a 	larger space must be traversed	 and therefore more time is occupied with 	a contre than a simple parade. 	 	to know one contre-parade is virtually to know all	 as they are all 	formed on the same plan. they are all full circles in the position of 	hand and direction of foil of the different simple parades; or more 	clearly speaking	 each simple parade has a contre-parade; there are	 	therefore	 four simple and four contre-parades	 which may be thus 	arranged: 	 	 quarte contre de quarte. 	 	 tierce contre de tierce. 	 	 seconde contre de seconde. 	 	 demi-cercle contre de cercle. 	 	i have said that a contre-parade is a full circle in the position of 	hand and direction of blade of its simple; thus	 contre de quarte is 	made by retaining the hand in the position of quarte	 while the foil 	describes a circle descending on the inside	 and returning by the 	outside to the place of its departure. so with all the others	 the foil 	_following the direction of the simple_ parade	 of which it is the 	contre. these complete the entire system of defenses. 	 	i now come to the movements of an opposite nature	 namely	 the 	 	 	attacks	 	 	and shall begin with the most simple of them. i will again suppose two 	adversaries standing _en guard_	 within longeing distance of each other: 	now the most simple movement that the attacking party could make would 	be 	 	 	the straight thrust 	 	to the outside or inside	 according to his line of engagement. i have	 	in describing the longe	 in effect described the straight thrust; it is 	but a longe in a straight line	 taking care	 however	 to feel firmly the 	adversary's blade	 but taking care also not to press or lean on it 	during the delivering of the thrust. 	 	next in character comes 	 	 	the disengagement. 	 	this attack is made by dropping the point of the foil beneath the 	adversary's blade	 and raising it on the opposite side	 at the same 	time	 rising with the arm fully extended; on the completion of the 	extension the longe is made and the thrust delivered. 	 	 	the one-two 	 	is but a double disengagement	 the first being but a feint or false 	attack	 to induce the adversary to form a parade to cover the part 	threatened	 for the covering of one part of the body exposes the 	opposite; the second disengagement is made to take advantage of this 	exposure. the arm is extended half-way on the first	 and then wholly on 	the second	 to be immediately followed by the longe. 	 	 	the beat and thrust. 	 	this is another variety of attack. supposing the adversary's blade to be 	firmly joined to yours	 when you wished to deliver a _straight thrust_	 	there would then be danger of your falling upon his point. this danger 	is avoided by giving a slight beat on his blade the instant preceding 	your extension of arm	 of course to be followed _en suite_ by the longe. 	 	the companion attack to this one is 	 	 	the beat and disengagement. 	 	the _beat_ here takes the character of the first disengagement in 	_one-two_	 _i. e._ becomes a _feint_	 and is intended to induce the 	adversary to return to the place he occupied when the beat was made. you 	then immediately pass to the opposite side of his blade in the manner 	described in the _disengagement_. 	 	it will be seen that all these movements pass _under_ the adversary's 	blade. however	 there are certain situations in the _assault_	 as a 	fencing about is called	 when an adversary is more assailable _over the 	point_ than under the blade; for this purpose there is what the french 	call the _coupe sur peint_	 or 	 	 	cut over the point. 	 	it is thus made:--by the action of the hand	 and without drawing it back 	at all	 the foil is raised and brought down on the opposite side of the 	adversary's blade	 the arm being extended during its fall to the 	horizontal position	 on attaining which the longe is delivered. 	 	 	cut over and disengagement 	 	is on the same principal as the _one-two_ and the _beat and 	disengagement_. on the adversary opposing the first movement (the cut) 	with a parade	 the second movement (the disengagement) is made to the 	opposite side	 to be followed	 of course	 by the longe	 the extension of 	the arm being divided between the two movements. 	 	these attacks are called simple attacks	 because they may be parried by 	one or more simple parades	 according to the number of movements in the 	attack. in fact	 every attack can be parried	 and every parade can be 	deceived; it is the _additional_ movement last made which hits or 	guards. 	 	thus	 you threaten by a disengagement to the outside; your adversary 	bars your way effectually by the parade of _tierce_; you make a second 	disengagement to the inside	 which is now exposed from the very fact of 	the outside being guarded (for both lines of attack cannot be guarded at 	the same time)	 thus converting your attack into _one-two_; but if your 	adversary parries quarte on your _second_ movement	 your attack would be 	warded off. this can be carried much further	 but the above will	 i 	think	 be sufficient to explain the nature of simple parades and 	attacks. 	 	to deceive a _contre_-parade	 a separate movement	 called a 	 	 	double	 	 	has been invented; it is very simple in principle	 and admirably answers 	the purpose. for instance if you were to threaten your adversary by a 	disengagement to the outside	 and if	 instead of tierce	 he parried 	_contra de quarte_	 the double is then made by your making a _second_ 	disengagement _to the same side as the first_	 for it will be found that 	his _contra de quarte_ has replaced the blade in the positions they 	occupied previous to your disengagement. you will then have an opening	 	and may finish the attack by the longe. 	 	as all the contra-parades are on the same plan and principle	 so are all 	the doubles. of course	 it is understood that you will make all the 	movements of the double _en suite_	 and without allowing your 	adversary's blade to overtake yours. 	 	 	all feints. 	 	the foregoing movements having been well practiced in the lesson	 the 	next step is that of _all feints_ and _all parades_	 and may be 	practiced either with a master or fellow-pupil. the practice consists of 	one pupil standing on the defensive _entirely_	 while another assumes 	the offensive	 and attacks him with _all_ the _feints_ of which he is 	master	 the other	 of course	 defending with all his parades. it is 	excellent practice	 as it accustoms the pupil to think for himself 	gradually	 he having thus but one set of movements to think about. he is 	therefore enabled to make them boldly	 without having to encounter 	unknown movements from his adversary. 	 	it also enables him to see the extent of his resources	 both for attack 	and defense. when he can both attack and defend with some presence of 	mind	 he may then begin 	 	 	the assault; 	 	that is	 he may encounter an adversary	 to attack or defend as occasion 	presents. he is then left to his own resources entirely. the following 	 	 	general advice	 	 	given by a very eminent fencer and excellent teacher	 cannot fail to be 	of use: 	 ill soon sink down quite easily. second position.--this is accomplished by placing the right foot smartly in front, about sixteen or fourteen inches before the left. (see fig. .) he must accustom himself to balance himself so perfectly on his left foot that he can place the right either before or behind it, without losing his balance. [illustration: _fig. ._] third position.--the third position must then be learned. this consists of stepping well forward with the right foot, until the left knee is quite straight, and the right knee exactly perpendicularly placed over the right foot. great care must be taken to keep the heels exactly in the same line and the body perfectly upright. (see fig. .) these preliminaries having been settled, the learner stands upright before the target. a sword is then put into his hand, and the target is explained as follows:-- [illustration: _fig. ._] target. the interior lines represent the cuts. cut one being directed from no. diagonally through the target, coming out at . cut two is the same, only from left to right. three is made upwards diagonally, and four is the same, only in the opposite direction. cut five is horizontally through the target from right to left, and six from left to right. cut seven is perpendicularly downwards. care must be taken that the cuts are fairly given with the edge. the swords drawn on the target represent the guards. the seventh guard ought, however, not to be made directly across, but must have the point directly rather forwards and downwards, as a cut glides off the blade, and can be instantly answered either by a thrust or by cut . the two dark circles represent the places where the thrusts take effect. [illustration] the learner begins by taking the sword in his right hand, having its edge toward the target and its back resting on his shoulder. his right arm is bent at right angles, and the elbow against his side. the left hand must rest upon the hip, the thumb being to the rear. at the word-- cuts and guards. cuts. _cut_ .--the young swordsman extends his right arm, and makes the cut clear through the target. when the point has cleared the target, continue the sweep of the sword, and by the turn of the wrist bring it with its back on the left shoulder, its edge towards the left. the arm is then ready for _cut_ .--bring the sword from to , continue the movement of the sword, and turn the wrist so that the point is below the right hip and the edge towards the ground. [illustration] _cut_ .--cut through the target diagonally, bringing the sword from no. to no. , and bring the sword onwards, so that it rests with the edge downwards, and point below the left hip. at [illustration: _first point._] _cut_ .--cut from to , and bring the sword round until its point is over the right shoulder, and its edge well to the right. _cut_ .--at the word five, make a horizontal cut from to , and sweep the sword round until it rests on the left shoulder, with its edge to the left, and its point well over the shoulder. _cut_ .--cut horizontally through the target from to , and bring the sword over the head with the edge upwards, and its point hanging over the back. from this position,-- _cut_ .--make a downward stroke until the sword reaches the center of the target. arrest it there, and remain with the arm extended, waiting for the word. points. first point.--draw back the sword, until the right wrist is against the right temple, the edge of the sword being upwards. make a slight pause, and then thrust smartly forward toward the center of the target, raising the right wrist as high as no. , and pressing the left shoulder well back. second point.--turn the wrist round to the left, so that the edge comes upwards, draw the hand back until it rests on the breast, and give the point forwards, to the center of the target, raising the hand as before. third point.--give the handle of the sword a slight twist in the hand to the right, so that the edge again comes uppermost, and the guard rests against the back of the hand. draw back the hand until it rests against the right hip, and deliver it forward towards the spot at the bottom of the target, raising the wrist as high as the spot in the center. the object in raising the wrist is to deceive the eye of the opponent, who will be more likely to notice the position of your wrist than of your point. in all the thrusts, the left shoulder should be rather brought forward before the point is given, and pressed well back while it is being delivered. [illustration: _second point._] guards. wait after the third point has been delivered for the word, defend.--at this word draw up the hand smartly, and form the first guard. make the other guards in succession as they are named, while the instructor proves their accuracy by giving the corresponding cuts. the guards must be learned from the target, by placing the sword in exactly the same position as those delineated. the guards are these: [illustration: _third point._] a first guard. e fifth. b second. f sixth. c third. g seventh. d fourth. the two spots h and i mark the places towards which the points are made, h for the first and second point, i for the third. parry. the parry or parade of a thrust is executed with the back of the sword. the firmest way of parrying is to hold the sword perpendicular, with its edge to the right and its hilt about the height of and close to the right shoulder; then, by sweeping the sword round from left to right, any thrust within its sweep is thrown wide of the body. the parry is executed with the wrist, and not with the arm, which must not move. hanging guard. when the pupil is acquainted with both cuts and guards, he should learn the hanging guard, a most useful position, as it keeps the body well hidden under the sword, and at the same time leaves the sword in a good position to strike or thrust. it is accomplished in the following way:--step out to the second position, raise the arm until the hand is just over the right foot, and as high as the head. the edge of the sword is upwards, and the point is directed downwards and towards the left. the left shoulder is pressed rather forward, and the neck and chest drawn inward. [illustration] in this position, the swordsman is in a position to receive or make an attack as he may think fit. it is rather fatiguing at first, owing to the unaccustomed position of the arm and head, but the fatigue is soon overcome, and then it will be found that there is no attitude which gives equal advantages. there are two other modes of standing on guard, each possessing their peculiar advantages. these are, the inside and outside guard. the inside guard is made as follows: inside guard. stand in the second position, having the wrist of the right hand nearly as low as the waist, the hand being exactly over the right foot. the point of the sword is raised as high as the eyes, and the edge is turned inwards. outside guard. the outside guard is formed in the same manner as the inside, with the exception that the edge of the sword is turned well outwards. to get to the hanging guard, the words are given as follows:--inside guard--outside guard--guard. attack and defense. the swordsman having learned thus far, is taught to combine the three movements of striking, thrusting, and guarding, by the following exercise:-- . inside guard. . outside guard. . guard. . cut one. . first guard. . cut two. . second guard. . cut three. . third guard. . cut four. . fourth guard. . cut five. . fifth guard. . cut six. . sixth guard. . cut seven. . seventh guard. . first point. [prepare for the point in first position.] two. [thrust in third position.] . second point. [prepare for it in first position.] two. [thrust in third position.] . third point. [prepare.] two. [thrust.] . parry. [prepare to parry in first position.] two. [parry.] . guard. the young swordsman must remember that in this, as in all the exercises, the cuts and points must be given in the third position, as in the accompanying illustration, which shows the swordsman just as he has delivered the seventh cut, and is waiting for the next word before he resumes the first position. the guards, on the contrary, are given in the first position, as is seen in the figure on p. , which illustrates the seventh guard. these exercises are always learned with the single-stick, or basket-hilted cudgel, in order to avoid the dangers which would be inevitable if the sword were used. but as the single-stick is only an imitation of the sword, i will give the method of getting the sword out of the sheath into any position required. draw swords. the first word of command is _draw swords_. at the word _draw_, seize the sheath just below the hilt, with the left hand, and raise the hilt as high as the hip, at the same time grasping the hilt with the right hand, turning the edge of the sword to the rear, and drawing it partially from the sheath, to insure its easy removal. [illustration: _seventh cut._] at the word _swords_, draw the blade smartly out of the scabbard, throwing the point upwards, at the full extent of the arm, the edge being still to the rear. recover swords. the wrist is now smartly lowered until it is level with the chin, the blade upright, and the edge to the left. this is the position of recover swords. the elbow must be kept close to the body as in the cut. [illustration: _seventh guard._] carry swords. the wrist is now sharply lowered until the arm hangs at its full length, the wrist being in the line with the hip, the edge of the sword to the front, and its back resting in the hollow of the shoulder, the fingers lightly holding the hilt. the left hand hangs at the side until the word _inside guard_, when it is placed on the left hip. slope swords. at the word _swords_, raise the right hand smartly, until it forms a right angle at the elbow. return swords. at the word, raise the blade until it is perpendicular, move the hilt to the hollow of the left shoulder, drop the point of the sword into the scabbard (which has been grasped by the left hand and slightly raised), at the same time turning the edge to the rear. pause an instant, and send the sword smartly into the sheath, removing both hands as the hilt strikes against the mouth of the scabbard; drop them to the side, with the palms outwards, and in the first position. [illustration: _recover swords._] practices. there are many exercises with the broadsword, called _practices_. i have given one of them, which is to be practiced alone; but when the pupil has attained some confidence in the use of his weapon, he must be placed opposite another pupil, and they must go through them, each taking the attack and defense in turn. the young swordsman must be provided with a very stout wire mask, which defends the face and part of the neck, and which should be worked in a kind of helmet above, to guard against the disastrous consequences of receiving the seventh guard. no practices, loose or otherwise, should be permitted without the masks, as neither party would be able to cut or thrust with proper confidence. second practice. this is very useful in teaching the point and parry, as well as giving steadiness on the feet. two boys are placed opposite each other, at just such a distance, that when perfectly erect they can touch the hilt of their adversary's sword with the point of their own. the one who gives the first point is called front rank (there may be a dozen in each rank, each having tried the distance to his right by extending his sword), and the one who gives first parry is called rear rank. word of command. front rank. rear rank. guard hanging guard hanging guard third point prepare to give prepare to parry third point point { give third point, } parry third point, { and when parried } and prepare to { spring back to the } give third point { first position, { and prepare to { parry { parry third point, } give third point, point { and prepare for } and prepare to { third point } parry point, &c. &c. this should be continued until both are weary. both swordsmen should learn to do it more rapidly every time they practice. next time of going through it, front rank and rear rank change places, as they must do in all the practices. third practice. word of command. front rank. rear rank. guard hanging guard hanging guard leg cut four cut seven inside guard inside guard inside guard leg cut six [at leg] cut six [at neck] outside guard outside guard outside guard leg cut five [at leg] cut five [at neck] guard hanging guard hanging guard slope swords slope swords slope swords in this and the other practices the cuts must be delivered in the third position, and the guards in the first. in the third and fourth practices the cuts must be given lightly, as many of them are not intended to be guarded, but merely to show the powers of the sword in various positions. fourth practice. word of command. front rank. rear rank. guard hanging guard hanging guard head seventh cut seventh guard head seventh guard cut seven leg fourth cut seventh guard leg seventh guard fourth cut head seventh cut seventh guard head seventh guard seventh cut guard hanging guard hanging guard slope swords slope swords slope swords in this and the preceding exercise, the power of shifting the leg is shown. if two swordsmen attack each other, and no. strikes at the leg of no. , it will be better for no. not to oppose the cut by the third or fourth guard, but to draw back the leg smartly, and cut six or seven at the adversary's head or neck. in loose play, as it is called, _i. e._, when two parties engage with swords without following any word of command, but strike and guard as they can, both players stand in the second position, because they can either advance or retreat as they choose, and can longe out to the third position for a thrust or a cut, or spring up to the first position for a guard with equal ease. it is often a kind of trap, to put the right leg more forward than usual, in order to induce the adversary to make a cut at it. when he does so, the leg is drawn back, the stroke passes harmless, and the deceived striker gets the stick of his opponent on his head or shoulders. we now come to a very complicated exercise, called the fifth practice. word of command. front rank. rear rank. draw swords draw swords draw swords inside guard inside guard inside guard outside guard outside guard outside guard guard hanging guard hanging guard head seventh cut seventh guard head seventh guard seventh cut arm second cut [at arm] second guard head seventh guard seventh cut head seventh cut seventh guard arm second guard second cut [at arm] head seventh cut seventh guard head seventh guard seventh cut right side sixth cut sixth guard head seventh guard seventh cut head seventh cut seventh guard right side sixth guard sixth cut guard hanging guard hanging guard this practice is capital exercise, and looks very imposing. all these practices ought to be so familiar that the words of command are not needed, the only word required being first, second, or third practices, as the case may be. i can remember once, that two of my pupils had attained such a mastery of their weapons that we used often to go through the practice with real swords. on one occasion, we were acting a charade, and my eldest pupil and myself were enacting the part of two distinguished foreigners (country unknown) who were to get up a fight. so we began by a little quarrel, and finally drew our swords and set hard to work at the fifth practice, which we could do with extreme rapidity, and without the use of words of command. the spectators were horrified, and the ladies greatly alarmed; for there seems to be no particular order in that practice, and an inexperienced eye would certainly fancy that the combatants were in earnest. fort and feeble. the half of the sword-blade next the hilt is called the "fort," because it is the strongest place on which the cut of an adversary can be received. always parry and guard with the fort of your sword, as, if you try to guard a cut with the "feeble," which is the remaining half of the blade, your guard will be forced, and the cut take effect. drawing cut. the drawing cut is made best with a curved sword, and is executed by placing the edge of the sword on the object, and drawing it over it until it is severed. a good large mangel-wurzel is capital practice. place the root loose on a table, stand at arm's-length from it, lay the edge of the sword lightly on it, and slice the root by repeatedly drawing the sword over it. this is very difficult, although it looks easy enough, and is sure to jar the arm from the wrist to the shoulder the first time or two, while the sword glides off as if the root were cased in polished steel. however, a little practice will soon overcome the difficulty. this cut is much in use among the sikhs. general advice. never look at your own sword, but watch the eye and sword-wrist of your opponent. remember that the great point in this exercise, as in fencing, is to gain time. endeavor, therefore, to advance your point nearer your adversary than his is to you. begin the assault out of distance, so that neither party can complain of being taken by surprise. if the two parties exchange a cut or a thrust at the same moment, the one who gave his cut or thrust in the third position is victorious. when a cut or thrust is made, the one who receives it passes his sword, _i. e._, stick, into his left hand, and his opponent comes to inside guard. always spring back to the second position after delivering a cut or thrust. keep the line of direction carefully, or you will leave an open space for the adversary to get his sword into. last and most important,--don't lose your temper! archery. implements of the craft. for the purposes of the archer the following implements are required, which may be obtained at any of the principal makers in new york or boston--first, the bow; secondly, the arrow; thirdly, a quiver, pouch, and belt; fourthly, a tassel and grease-pot; fifthly, an arm-guard or brace, and a shooting glove; sixthly, a target or targets; and seventhly, a scoring card. the bow is the most important article in archery, and also the most expensive. it is usually from five to six feet in length, made of a single piece of yew, or of lancewood and hickory glued together back to back. the former suits gentlemen the best, and the latter being more lively is better adapted for the short, sharp pull of the ladies. the wood is gradually tapered, and at each end is a tip of horn, the one from the upper end being longer than the other or lower one. the strength of bows is marked in pounds, varying from to lbs. ladies' bows are from to lbs. in strength, and those of gentlemen from to lbs. one side of the bow is flat, called its "back;" the other rounded, is called the "belly;" and nearly in the middle, where the hand should take the hold, it is lapped round with velvet, and that part is called the "handle." in each of the tips of horn is a notch for the string called "the nock." bowstrings are made of hemp or flax, the former being the better material; for though at first they stretch more, yet they wear longer, and stand a harder pull as well as being more elastic in the shooting. in applying a fresh string to a bow, be careful in opening it not to break the composition that is on it; cut the tie, take hold of the eye, which will be found ready-worked at one end, let the other part hang down, and pass the eye over the upper end of the bow. if for a lady, it may be held from to - / inches below the nock; if for a gentleman, half an inch lower, varying it according to the length and strength of the bow; then run your hand along the side of the bow and string to the bottom nock, turn it round that and fix it by the noose, called the "timber noose," taking care not to untwist the string in making it. this noose is merely a simple turn back and twist without a knot, but it is better seen than described. when strung, a lady's bow will have the string about or - / inches from the belly; and a gentleman's about half an inch more. the part opposite the handle, is bound round with waxed silk, in order to prevent its being frayed by the arrow. as soon as a string becomes too soft and the fibers too straight, rub it with bees-wax, and give it a few turns in the proper direction, so as to shorten it and twist its strands a little tighter; a spare string should always be provided by the shooter. the arrows are differently shaped by the various makers; some being of uniform thickness throughout, while others are protuberant in the middle; some, again, are larger at the point than at the feather end, which i believe to be the best form for shooting; and others are quite the reverse. they are now invariably made of white deal, with points of iron or brass riveted on, but generally having a piece of heavy wood spliced on to the deal between it and the point, by which their flight is improved. at the other end a piece of horn is inserted, in which is a notch for the string; and they are armed with three feathers glued on, one of which is of a different color to the others, and is intended to mark the proper position of the arrow when placed on the string--this one always pointing from the bow. these feathers, properly applied, give a rotary motion to the arrow which causes its flight to be straight. they are generally from the wing of the turkey or goose. the length and weight vary; the latter being marked in sterling silver coin, stamped on the arrow in plain figures. it is usual to paint a crest, or a distinguishing ring or rings, on the arrow just above the feathers, by which they may be known in shooting at the target. the quiver is merely a tin case painted green, and is intended for the security of the arrows when not in use. the pouch and belt are worn round the waist, and the latter contains those arrows which are actually being shot. a pot to hold grease for touching the glove and string, and a tassel to wipe the arrows, are hung to the belt. the grease is composed of deer-suet, or of beef-suet, and bees-wax melted together. instead of a leather belt, ladies use a cord and tassels round the waist, to which the pouch, of a different shape to that adopted by gentlemen, is hooked; and this, again, has the grease-pot suspended to it. the arm is protected from the blow of the string by the brace, a broad guard of strong leather buckled on by two straps. a shooting-glove, also of thin tubes of leather, is attached to the wrist by three flat pieces ending in a circular strap buckled round it. this glove prevents that soreness of the fingers which soon comes on after using the bow without it. the target consists of a circular thick mat of straw covered with canvas, painted in a series of circles. it is usually from three feet six inches to four feet in diameter; the middle is about six or eight inches in diameter, gilt, and called "the gold;" the next is called "the red," after which comes the "inner white," then "the black," and finally, "the outer white." these targets are mounted upon triangular stands, at distances apart of from to yards; being the usual shooting distance. a scoring-card is provided with columns for each color, which are marked with a pin, as here indicated. the usual score for a gold hit, ; the red, ; inner white, ; black, , and outer white, . the use of the bow. to bend and string the bow properly, the following directions will be serviceable, and the young archer should pay particular attention to them, since a neglect of these cautions will often lead to a fracture of the bow by bending it the wrong way: take the bow by the _handle_, in the _right_ hand. place the bottom end upon the ground, resting against the hollow of the inside of the right foot, keeping the flat side of the bow (called the _back_) towards your person; the left foot should be advanced a little, and the right placed so that the bow cannot slip sideways. place the heel of the left hand upon the upper limb of the bow, below the eye of the string. now, while the fingers and thumb of the left hand slide this eye towards the notch in the horn, and the heel _pushes_ the limb away from the body, the right hand _pulls_ the handle towards the person, and thus resists the action of the left, by which the bow is bent, and at the same time the string is slipped into the "nock," as the notch is termed. take care to keep the three outer fingers free from the string, for if the bow should slip from the hand, and the string catch them, they will be severely pinched. if shooting in frosty weather, warm the bow before a fire, or by friction with a woolen cloth. if the bow has been lying by for a long time, it should be well rubbed with boiled linseed oil before using. to unstring the bow, hold it as in stringing; then press down the upper limb exactly as before, and as if you wished to place the eye of the string in a higher notch; this will loosen the string and liberate the eye, when it must be lifted out of the nock by the forefinger, and suffered to slip down the limb. before using the bow, hold it in a perpendicular direction, with the string towards you, and see if the line of the string cuts the middle of the bow; if not, shift the eye and noose of the string to either side, so as to make the two lines coincide. this precaution prevents a very common cause of defective shooting, which is the result of an uneven string throwing the arrow on one side. after using it, unstring it; and if a large party is shooting, after every end it should be liberated from its state of tension; but in this respect there is a great difference in different bows, some good ones soon getting cast from their true shape, and others, though inferior bows, bearing any ordinary amount of tension without damage. the general management of the bow should be on the principle that damp injures it, and that any loose floating ends interfere with its shooting. it should, therefore, be kept well varnished, and in a water-proof case, and it should be carefully dried after shooting in damp weather. if there are any ends hanging from the string cut them off pretty close, and see that the whipping in the middle of the string is close and well-fitting. the case should be hung up against a dry internal wall, not too near fire. in selecting the bow, be careful that it is not too strong for your power, and that you can draw the arrow to its head without any trembling of the hand. if this cannot be done after a little practice, the bow should be changed for a weaker one, for no arrow will go true if it is discharged by a trembling hand. in selecting arrows, be careful that they are not too long. for a bow of feet inches, the arrows should be about feet inches in length. for a lady's bow of feet inches, the arrow should measure about feet. in shooting, keep the longer limb of the bow upwards, as the bow is liable to be broken if used the other way, and the wrapping of the string does not coincide with the upper part of the handle. bows may be broken either from the above circumstance, or by overdrawing them, or by snapping the string without an arrow in it, or by the string breaking; and if a bow stands all these trials, it is to be prized as a sound and good bit of stuff. after an arrow has been shot into the target or the ground, be particularly careful to withdraw it, by laying hold close to its head, and by twisting it round as it is withdrawn in the direction of its axis. without this precaution it may be easily bent or broken. in shooting at the target, the first thing to be done is to nock the arrow--that is, to place it properly on the string. in order to effect this, take the bow in the left hand, with the string towards you, the upper limb being towards the right. hold it horizontally while you take the arrow by the middle, pass it on the _under_ side of the string and the _upper_ side of the bow, till the head reaches two or three inches past the left hand; hold it there with the forefinger or thumb while you remove the right hand down to the nock. turn the arrow till the cock-feather comes uppermost; then pass it down the bow, and fix it on the nocking point of the string. in doing this, all contact with the feathers should be avoided, unless they are rubbed out of place, when they may be smoothed down by passing them through the hand from the point towards the nock. the attitude for shooting should be graceful as well as serviceable. the body should be at right angles with the target; but the face must be turned over the left shoulder, so as to be opposed to it. the feet are to be flat on the ground, with the heels a little apart, the left foot turned towards the mark; the head and chest inclined a _little_ forward, so as to present a full bust, but not bent at all below the waist. in drawing the bow, proceed as follows: _ st method._--take hold of the bow with the left hand, having the elbow straight; then, having placed the arrow as directed in the last paragraph, and having the finger-stalls or shooting-glove on, put a finger on each side of the arrow on the string and the thumb on the opposite side, so as to steady it; then raise all at the full length of the arm till the right hand reaches nearly to the level of the shoulder, and the left is opposite the target, when, by drawing the one to the ear, and the other towards the target, the arrow is brought to a direct line with the bull's-eye, and at that moment it is released. _ nd method._--draw the arrow as before, but pause when the arrow is fully extended to the head, and take aim. this, however, requires a very strong arm, and also a strong bow, or there will be a quivering of the muscles, which is communicated to the arrow; beside the danger of breaking the bow. the loosing must be quick, and the string must leave the fingers smartly and steadily, the bow hand at that moment being held as firm as a vise, upon which the goodness of the flight mainly depends. the following directions should be attended to strictly, if good shooting is to be attained:-- .--fix the attention steadily upon the object, and disregard all external objects, which are liable otherwise to distract the eye at the moment of shooting. .--in drawing the bow, in order to secure the arrow in its place, turn the bow a little obliquely, so that the handle and your knuckles will together form a groove for the arrow to run in. when it falls off, it is from the string being held too far up by the fingers, which causes it to twist in the drawing, and the arrow is thereby thrown off from resting against the bow. the proper length is midway between the ends and the first joint of the fingers. three fingers may be used, but the arrow should be between the first and second. .--in taking aim, two points must be attended to, viz: the lateral _direction_ and the _distance_, because there is no bow which will drive an arrow many yards perfectly _point-blank_, and, consequently, a slight elevation must in all cases be made, and for long distances, with weak bows, a very considerable one. it requires great experience to manage the elevation properly, and much must depend upon the exact strength of the bow, and the distance of the shot. with regard to the lateral direction, it is materially affected by the wind, and this must always be allowed for if there is any stirring; and if it is in the line of the targets, one end will require much less elevation than the other. .--fix the eyes on the mark, and not on the arrow. avoid all such expedients as putting a mark on the glove to aim by. do not look from the mark to the arrow and back again. the proper plan is to keep both eyes open, and look steadily at the mark, while with the hands the bow is raised or lowered in accordance with what the _mind thinks_ is the proper direction. .--if an arrow falls off the string, and the archer can reach it with his bow, it is not shot: but if he cannot, it must be counted as such. target-shooting. the targets are fixed exactly opposite each other, at yards or perhaps more apart. the stands, when properly placed, are each called "an end." the proper number of arrows, as fixed by the rules, are then shot from each end by all the party assembled, when all proceed to pick up or extract their arrows, the marker scoring for each before drawing them from the target, after which the party shoot back again to the other end, and so on until the whole number of ends have been shot. butt-shooting. butts are built of long sods of turf pressed together. the form of the base is an oblong square, being about or feet on the front side, and feet wide at the ends. the height is generally about feet, and the depth diminishes gradually from the bottom to the top. when more than two are wanted they are ranged in sets; each set consists of four, ranged at the distance of yards apart, and forming a chain of lengths of , , , and yards; but so disposed as not to stand in the way of the archers when shooting at any of the lengths. against the front of the butt is placed the mark, which is a circular piece of thin white pasteboard, fastened by a peg through the middle. the size of this, for yards, is four inches in diameter; for yards, inches; and so on increasing in diameter in proportion to the distance. shots in the butt missing the mark are not scored; and he who makes the greatest number of hits is the winner. if two are alike, the nearest to the central peg is the successful one. roving. this is so called because the archers rove from place to place, and have no fixed target, but shoot at trees or any other object which presents itself. the winner of the first shot chooses the next, and so on; the distance being from to yards; and all arrows falling within five bow-lengths scoring, if nearer to the mark than the adversary's arrow. flight-shooting. flight-shooting is merely a trial of distance, and he who can shoot the furthest is the winner of the trial. clout-shooting. the clout is a small white target of pasteboard, about twelve inches in diameter, which is slipped into a cleft stick, and this is stuck into the ground obliquely, so as to bring the lower edge of the clout to the ground. the distance is generally from to score-yards, and the same rules apply as in roving. cross-bow shooting. cross-bows are bows set in a frame which receives the arrow or bolt, and they are set and discharged by a trigger after taking aim. they are, however, now seldom used except for rook-shooting; and even there the pea-rifle has almost entirely superseded them. rules of archery meetings. the rules by which archery meetings are governed are partly the same as in all other similar societies, and partly peculiar to this craft. the former consist of those which regulate the election of members, providing for refreshments, &c., which vary according to circumstances, and need not here be specified. the latter are generally as follows:-- .--that a "lady paramount" be annually elected. .--that there be -- meetings in each year, the gentleman at whose house the meeting takes place to be president; and that every member intending to shoot should be on the ground by -- o'clock. the shooting to commence at -- and to terminate at --. .--that all members intending to shoot shall appear in the uniform of the club; and that a silver badge be worn by every member of the society, or a forfeit will be enforced for such omission. .--that the secretary do send out cards at least a month before each day of meeting, acquainting the members with the day and place of meeting. .--that there shall be four prizes at each meeting, two for each sex; the first for numbers, the second for hits, and that no person shall be allowed to have both on the same day. the sum of ---- dollars to be placed at the disposal of the "lady paramount" for prizes at each meeting. .--that the winner of a prize, or prizes, shall lose a ring for each prize won. but that a ring be given back after any subsequent meeting at which such member shall shoot without winning. .--that in case of a tie for hits, numbers shall decide; and in case of a tie for numbers, hits shall decide. .--that the decision of the "lady paramount" shall be final. .--two prizes to be given at each meeting for strangers, of the value of --. .--that there be a challenge prize of the value of --, and that a commemorative silver ornament be presented to winners of the challenge prize, to which a clasp be added on future occasions. .--that the distance for shooting be and yards, and that -feet targets be used. .--that each shooter be allowed to shoot -- arrows, distinctly marked or colored. dress. the usual dress for ladies peculiar to archery is in most cases a green jacket worn over white; sometimes, however, the color is black. the gentlemen's costume is not generally fixed in archery clubs, but sometimes a green suit is the club uniform. expenses. the expenses of archery are not usually great, though a good many arrows will be lost or spoiled during a season's shooting, especially if the grass is not kept mown very close. bows and all the other paraphernalia last a long while; and, with the exception of the arrows, the first cost may be considered to be the only one, over and above the subscription to the club, to which most archers like to belong, competition being the essence of the sport. hurdle racing. . the usual distance, yards, over ten hurdles, regulation height, three feet six inches upright, not less than or more than feet apart, first hurdle must be placed yards from the scratch-mark. . hurdles must be cleared with a jump, touching the hands to the hurdle will be declared foul, and the offender disqualified. . hurdle races may be arranged for any distance and any height of hurdle. . each contestant must keep in his direct line of starting, or as near so as circumstances will permit. any deviation from such line will subject the offender to disqualification. note.--there are three requisites to make a good hurdler: speed, spring, and judgment; speed to cover the ground, spring to jump the hurdles, and judgment to measure the steps between the hurdles. it is one of the many healthful exercises in athletics, but requires much practice and experience; beginners should make their first effort at two feet six inches. great care must be taken not to touch the top bar, as it virtually throws you out of the race and may cause injury. vaulting with pole, or pole-leaping. . the uprights should be nine feet apart, and the bar placed on pins projecting two inches. . the pole must fall so as not to touch the bar. . a competitor touching the bar without causing it to fall shall be considered to have cleared it. . the height of bar at starting shall be determined by a majority of the contestants. . competitors will be allowed three trials at each height. . the bar shall be raised at the discretion of a majority of the contestants, and so continued until only one competitor vaults over it, who shall be declared the victor. . when a competitor knocks the bar down, the rotation rule must be enforced, as in the running high jump. . three balks shall be called "no vault," and must be recorded as one of the three trials. note.--this graceful and manly exercise has of late years been greatly abused, not so much for want of rules, as it was and is to have these rules enforced. we have seen two men, at three different meetings, claim the right to the grounds and time of at least one of the judges for from two to three hours, whereas, had the rules been strictly enforced, one would have gained a victory or both been disqualified. gentlemen judges, please remember these contestants appear before an audience (who pay admission) to perform, not to practice, and when they insist upon keeping the bar at a height that delays the games, they should be disqualified under the rules. throwing the hammer. . the hammer-head shall be of solid iron, perfectly round, standard weights, and pounds, exclusive of handle. length of handle three feet six inches over all. the handle should be made from split _white hickory wood_. . the competitor must stand at the scratch with one foot touching the scratch-mark. he is at liberty to throw with one or both hands. . touching the ground, over the scratch-mark, with any portion of the body before the hammer strikes, shall be declared "no throw," and must be recorded as one of the three trials. . permitting the hammer to carry a competitor from his balance or letting the hammer go out of time must stand as one of the three trials. . when the head and handle strike the ground at the same time the head or iron is the measuring mark, at the first break of the ground made by it. should the handle strike first, one length of the handle, in a direct line with the throw, must be added. the measurement must be from the scratch-mark, midway between the thrower's feet, to the first break, in accordance with above rules. note.--in soft or clay bottom there is no difficulty in getting accurate measurement, but in quick or shifting sand close attention is required. putting the shot. . the shot must be of solid iron and perfectly round, standard weight pounds. the shot must be put from the shoulder with one hand, not thrown from the side or under swing. . competitors will take their position between two parallel lines, said lines being seven feet apart. passing the toe-mark, or touching the ground outside of the mark, with any part of the body before the shot strikes the ground, will be judged and recorded a foul, "no put," and must stand as one of the three trials. . each competitor is entitled to three trials. the measurement shall be from the scratch-line or mark opposite the toe-print to the first or nearest break of the ground made by the shot. note.--the object being to see how many feet and inches the competitors can put, in accordance with the above rules, not how straight they can put. 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" page , changed "there fore" to "therefore" page , reformatted fractions (e.g. - becomes - / ) page , added missing comma after "red" page , changed "al lowed" to "allowed" page , added missing period after none trinity site by the u.s. department of energy national atomic museum, albuquerque, new mexico contents: the first atomic test. jumbo. schmidt-mcdonald ranch house. notes. bibliography. the national atomic museum. the first atomic test on monday morning july , , the world was changed forever when the first atomic bomb was tested in an isolated area of the new mexico desert. conducted in the final month of world war ii by the top-secret manhattan engineer district, this test was code named trinity. the trinity test took place on the alamogordo bombing and gunnery range, about miles south of the manhattan project's headquarters at los alamos, new mexico. today this , square mile range, partly located in the desolate jornada del muerto valley, is named the white sands missile range and is actively used for non-nuclear weapons testing. before the war the range was mostly public and private grazing land that had always been sparsely populated. during the war it was even more lonely and deserted because the ranchers had agreed to vacate their homes in january . they left because the war department wanted the land to use as an artillery and bombing practice area. in september , a remote by square mile portion of the north-east corner of the bombing range was set aside for the manhattan project and the trinity test by the military. the selection of this remote location in the jornada del muerto valley for the trinity test was from an initial list of eight possible test sites. besides the jornada, three of the other seven sites were also located in new mexico: the tularosa basin near alamogordo, the lava beds (now the el malpais national monument) south of grants, and an area southwest of cuba and north of thoreau. other possible sites not located in new mexico were: an army training area north of blythe, california, in the mojave desert; san nicolas island (one of the channel islands) off the coast of southern california; and on padre island south of corpus christi, texas, in the gulf of mexico. the last choice for the test was in the beautiful san luis valley of south-central colorado, near today's great sand dunes national monument. based on a number of criteria that included availability, distance from los alamos, good weather, few or no settlements, and that no indian land would be used, the choices for the test site were narrowed down to two in the summer of . first choice was the military training area in southern california. the second choice, was the jornada del muerto valley in new mexico. the final site selection was made in late august by major general leslie r. groves, the military head of the manhattan project. when general groves discovered that in order to use the california location he would need the permission of its commander, general george patton, groves quickly decided on the second choice, the jornada del muerto. this was because general groves did not want anything to do with the flamboyant patton, who groves had once described as "the most disagreeable man i had ever met."[ ] despite being second choice the remote jornada was a good location for the test, because it provided isolation for secrecy and safety, was only miles south of los alamos, and was already under military control. plus, the jornada enjoyed relatively good weather. the history of the jornada is in itself quite fascinating, since it was given its name by the spanish conquerors of new mexico. the jornada was a short cut on the camino real, the king's highway that linked old mexico to santa fe, the capital of new mexico. the camino real went north from mexico city till it joined the rio grande near present day el paso, texas. then the trail followed the river valley further north to a point where the river curved to the west, and its valley narrowed and became impassable for the supply wagons. to avoid this obstacle, the wagons took the dubious detour north across the jornada del muerto. sixty miles of desert, very little water, and numerous hostile apaches. hence the name jornada del muerto, which is often translated as the journey of death or as the route of the dead man. it is also interesting to note that in the late th century, the spanish considered their province of new mexico to include most of north america west of the mississippi! the origin of the code name trinity for the test site is also interesting, but the true source is unknown. one popular account attributes the name to j. robert oppenheimer, the scientific head of the manhattan project. according to this version, the well read oppenheimer based the name trinity on the fourteenth holy sonnet by john donne, a th century english poet and sermon writer. the sonnet started, "batter my heart, three-personed god."[ ] another version of the name's origin comes from university of new mexico historian ferenc m. szasz. in his book, the day the sun rose twice, szasz quotes robert w. henderson head of the engineering group in the explosives division of the manhattan project. henderson told szasz that the name trinity came from major w. a. (lex) stevens. according to henderson, he and stevens were at the test site discussing the best way to haul jumbo (see below) the thirty miles from the closest railway siding to the test site. "a devout roman catholic, stevens observed that the railroad siding was called 'pope's siding.' he [then] remarked that the pope had special access to the trinity, and that the scientists would need all the help they could get to move the ton jumbo to its proper spot."[ ] the trinity test was originally set for july , . however, final preparations for the test, which included the assembly of the bomb's plutonium core, did not begin in earnest until thursday, july . the abandoned george mcdonald ranch house located two miles south of the test site served as the assembly point for the device's core. after assembly, the plutonium core was transported to trinity site to be inserted into the thing or gadget as the atomic device was called. but, on the first attempt to insert the core it stuck! after letting the temperatures of the core and the gadget equalize, the core fit perfectly to the great relief of all present. the completed device was raised to the top of a -foot steel tower on saturday, july . during this process workers piled up mattresses beneath the gadget to cushion a possible fall. when the bomb reached the top of the tower without mishap, installation of the explosive detonators began. the -foot tower (a surplus forest service fire-watch tower) was designated point zero. ground zero was at the base of the tower. as a result of all the anxiety surrounding the possibility of a failure of the test, a verse by an unknown author circulated around los alamos. it read: from this crude lab that spawned a dud. their necks to truman's ax uncurled lo, the embattled savants stood, and fired the flop heard round the world.[ ] a betting pool was also started by scientists at los alamos on the possible yield of the trinity test. yields from , tons of tnt to zero were selected by the various bettors. the nobel prize-winning ( ) physicist enrico fermi was willing to bet anyone that the test would wipe out all life on earth, with special odds on the mere destruction of the entire state of new mexico! meanwhile back at the test site, technicians installed seismographic and photographic equipment at varying distances from the tower. other instruments were set up for recording radioactivity, temperature, air pressure, and similar data needed by the project scientists. according to lansing lamont in his book day of trinity, life at trinity could at times be very exciting. one afternoon while scientists were busily setting up test instruments in the desert, the tail gunner of a low flying b- bomber spotted some grazing antelopes and opened up with his twin. -caliber machine guns. "a dozen scientists,... under the plane and out of the gunner's line of vision, dropped their instruments and hugged the ground in terror as the bullets thudded about them."[ ] later a number of these scientists threatened to quit the project. workers built three observation points . miles ( , yards), north, south, and west of ground zero. code named able, baker, and pittsburgh, these heavily-built wooden bunkers were reinforced with concrete, and covered with earth. the bunker designated baker or south , served as the control center for the test. this is where head scientist j. robert oppenheimer would be for the test. a fourth observation point was the test's base camp, (the abandoned dave mcdonald ranch) located about ten miles southwest of ground zero. the primary observation point was on compania hill, located about miles to the northwest of trinity near today's stallion range gate, off nm . the test was originally scheduled for a.m., monday july , but was postponed to : due to a severe thunderstorm that would have increased the amount of radioactive fallout, and have interfered with the test results. the rain finally stopped and at : : a.m. mountain war time, the device exploded successfully and the atomic age was born. the nuclear blast created a flash of light brighter than a dozen suns. the light was seen over the entire state of new mexico and in parts of arizona, texas, and mexico. the resultant mushroom cloud rose to over , feet within minutes, and the heat of the explosion was , times hotter than the surface of the sun! at ten miles away, this heat was described as like standing directly in front of a roaring fireplace. every living thing within a mile of the tower was obliterated. the power of the bomb was estimated to be equal to , tons of tnt, or equivalent to the bomb load of , b- , superfortresses! after witnessing the awesome blast, oppenheimer quoted a line from a sacred hindu text, the bhagavad-gita: he said: "i am become death, the shatterer of worlds."[ ] in los alamos miles to the north, a group of scientists' wives who had stayed up all night for the not so secret test, saw the light and heard the distant sound. one wife, jane wilson, described it this way, "then it came. the blinding light [no] one had ever seen. the trees, illuminated, leaping out. the mountains flashing into life. later, the long slow rumble. something had happened, all right, for good or ill."[ ] general groves' deputy commander, brigadier general t. f. farrell, described the explosion in great detail: "the effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous, and terrifying. no man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. the lighting effects beggared description. the whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. it was golden, purple, violet, gray, and blue. it lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined..."[ ] immediately after the test a sherman m- tank, equipped with its own air supply, and lined with two inches of lead went out to explore the site. the lead lining added tons to the tank's weight, but was necessary to protect its occupants from the radiation levels at ground zero. the tank's passengers found that the -foot steel tower had virtually disappeared, with only the metal and concrete stumps of its four legs remaining. surrounding ground zero was a crater almost , feet across and about ten feet deep in places. desert sand around the tower had been fused by the intense heat of the blast into a jade colored glass. this atomic glass was given the name atomsite, but the name was later changed to trinitite. due to the intense secrecy surrounding the test, no accurate information of what happened was released to the public until after the second atomic bomb had been dropped on japan. however, many people in new mexico were well aware that something extraordinary had happened the morning of july , . the blinding flash of light, followed by the shock wave had made a vivid impression on people who lived within a radius of miles of ground zero. windows were shattered miles away in silver city, and residents of albuquerque saw the bright light of the explosion on the southern horizon and felt the tremor of the shock waves moments later. the true story of the trinity test first became known to the public on august , . this is when the world's second nuclear bomb, nicknamed little boy, exploded , feet over hiroshima, japan, destroying a large portion of the city and killing an estimated , to , of its inhabitants. three days later on august , a third atomic bomb devastated the city of nagasaki and killed approximately , more japanese. the nagasaki weapon was a plutonium bomb, similar to the trinity device, and it was nicknamed fat man. on tuesday august , at p.m. eastern war time, president truman made a brief formal announcement that japan had finally surrendered and world war ii was over after almost six years and million deaths! on sunday, september , , trinity site was opened to the press for the first time. this was mainly to dispel rumors of lingering high radiation levels there, as well as in hiroshima and nagasaki. led by general groves and oppenheimer, this widely publicized visit made trinity front page news all over the country. trinity site was later encircled with more than a mile of chain link fencing and posted with signs warning of radioactivity. in the early s most of the remaining trinitite in the crater was bulldozed into a underground concrete bunker near trinity. also at this time the crater was back filled with new soil. in the trinitite was removed from the bunker, packed into -gallon drums, and loaded into trucks belonging to the atomic energy commission (the successor of the manhattan project). trinity site remained off-limits to military and civilian personnel of the range and closed to the public for many years, despite attempts immediately after the war to turn trinity into a national monument. in about people attended the first trinity site open house sponsored by the alamogordo chamber of commerce and the missile range. two years later, a small group from tularosa, nm visited the site on the th anniversary of the explosion to conduct a religious service and pray for peace. regular visits have been made annually in recent years on the first saturday in october instead of the anniversary date of july , to avoid the desert heat. later trinity site was opened one additional day on the first saturday in april. the site remains closed to the public except for these two days, because it lies within the impact areas for missiles fired into the northern part of the range. in , range officials erected a modest monument at ground zero. built of black lava rock, this monument serves as a permanent marker for the site and as a reminder of the momentous event that occurred there. on the monument is a plain metal plaque with this simple inscription: "trinity site where the world's first nuclear device was exploded on july , ." during the annual tour in , a second plaque was added below the first by the national park service, designating trinity site a national historic landmark. this plaque reads, "this site possesses national significance in commemorating the history of the u.s.a." jumbo lying next to the entrance of the chain link fence that still surrounds trinity site are the rusty remains of jumbo. jumbo was the code name for the -ton thermos shaped steel and concrete container designed to hold the precious plutonium core of the trinity device in case of a nuclear mis-fire. built by the babcock and wilcox company of barberton, ohio, jumbo was feet long, feet, inches in diameter, and with steel walls up to inches thick. the idea of using some kind of container for the trinity device was based on the fact that plutonium was extremely expensive and very difficult to produce. so, much thought went into a way of containing the lb. plutonium core of the bomb, in case the , lbs. of conventional high explosives surrounding the core exploded without setting off a nuclear blast, and in the process scattering the costly plutonium (about million dollars worth) across the dessert. after extensive research and testing of other potential containment ideas, the concept of jumbo was decided on in the late summer of . however, by the spring of , after jumbo had already been built and transported (with great difficulty) to the trinity site by the eichleay corporation of pittsburgh, it was decided not to explode the trinity device inside of jumbo after all. there were several reasons for this new decision: first, plutonium had become more readily (relatively) available; second, the project scientists decided that the trinity device would probably work as planned; and last, the scientists realized that if jumbo were used it would adversely affect the test results, and add tons of highly radioactive material to the atmosphere. not knowing what else to do with the massive million dollar jumbo, it was decided to suspend it from a steel tower yards from ground zero to see how it would withstand the trinity test. jumbo survived the approximately kiloton trinity blast undamaged, but its supporting -foot tall steel tower was flattened. two years later, in an attempt to destroy the unused jumbo before it and its million dollar cost came to the attention of a congressional investigating committee, manhattan project director general groves ordered two junior officers from the special weapons division at sandia army base in albuquerque to test jumbo. the army officers placed eight -pound conventional bombs in the bottom of jumbo. since the bombs were on the bottom of jumbo, and not the center (the correct position), the resultant explosion blew both ends off jumbo. unable to totally destroy jumbo, the army then buried it in the desert near trinity site. it was not until the early s that the impressive remains of jumbo, still weighing over tons, were moved to their present location. schmidt-mcdonald ranch house the schmidt-mcdonald ranch house is located two miles south of ground zero. the property encompasses about three acres and consists of the main house and assorted outbuildings. the house, surrounded by a low stone wall, was built in by franz schmidt, a german immigrant and homesteader. in the s schmidt sold the ranch to george mcdonald and moved to florida. the ranch house is a one-story, , square-foot adobe (mud bricks) building. an ice house is located on the west side along with an '- " deep underground cistern. a by . foot stone addition, which included a modern bathroom, was added onto the north side in the s. east of the house there is a large, divided concrete water storage tank and a windmill. south of the windmill are the remains of a bunkhouse, and a barn which also served as a garage. further to the east are corrals and holding pens for livestock. the mcdonalds vacated their ranch house and their thousands of acres of marginal range land in early when it became part of the alamogordo bombing and gunnery range. the old house remained empty until manhattan project personnel arrived in . then a spacious room in the northeast corner of the house was selected by the project personnel for the assembly of the plutonium core of the trinity device. workmen installed work benches, tables, and other equipment in this large room. to keep the desert dust and sand out, the room's windows and cracks were covered with plastic and sealed with tape. the core of the bomb consisted of two hemispheres of plutonium, (pu- ), and an initiator. according to reports, while scientists assembled the initiator and the pu- hemispheres, jeeps were positioned outside with their engines running for a quick getaway if needed. detection devices were used to monitor radiation levels in the room, and when fully assembled the core was warm to the touch. the completed core was later transported the two miles to ground zero, inserted into the bomb assembly, and raised to the top of the tower. the trinity explosion on monday morning, july , did not significantly damage the mcdonald house. even though most of the windows were blown out, and the chimney was blown over, the main structure survived intact. years of rain water dripping through holes in the metal roof did much more damage to the mud brick walls than the bomb did. the nearby barn did not fare as well. the trinity test blew part of its roof off, and the roof has since totally collapsed. the ranch house stood empty and deteriorating for years until when the us army stabilized it to prevent any further damage. the next year, the department of energy and the army provided funds for the national park service to completely restore the house to the way it appeared in july, . when the work was completed, the house with many photo displays on trinity was opened to the public for the first time in october during the semi-annual tour. the schmidt-mcdonald ranch house is part of the trinity national historic landmark. footnotes [footnote : szasz, ferenc. the day the sun rose twice. albuquerque: university of new mexico press, . p. .] [footnote : hayward, john, ed. john donne: complete poetry and selected prose. new york: random house, inc., . p. .] [footnote : szasz, the day the sun rose twice, p. .] [footnote : wyden, peter. day one: before hiroshima and after. new york: simon and schuster, . p. .] [footnote : lamont, lansing. day of trinity. new york: atheneum, . p. - .] [footnote : kunetka, james w. city of fire: los alamos and the atomic age, - . albuquerque: university of new mexico press, . p. .] [footnote : wilson, jane s. and charlotte serber, eds. standing by and making do: women in wartime los alamos. los alamos: los alamos historical society, . p. x, xi.] [footnote : brown, anthony cave, and charles b. macdonald. the secret history of the atomic bomb. new york: dell, . p. .] bibliography bainbridge, kenneth t. trinity. los alamos: los alamos scientific laboratory, (la- -h), . brown, anthony cave, and charles b. macdonald. the secret history of the atomic bomb. new york: dell, . compton, arthur holly. atomic quest: a personal quest. new york: oxford university press, . fanton, jonathan f., stoff, michael b. and williams, r. hal editors. the manhattan project: a documentary introduction to the atomic age. philadelphia: temple university press, . feis, herbert. japan subdued: the atomic bomb and the end of the war in the pacific. princeton: princeton university press, . groves, leslie r. now it can be told: the story of the manhattan project. new york: da capo press, . hersey, john. hiroshima. new york: alfred a. knopf, . jette, eleanor. inside box . los alamos: los alamos historical society, . kunetka, james w. city of fire: los alamos and the atomic age, - . albuquerque; university of new mexico press, . lamont, lansing. day of trinity. new york: athenaeum, . rhodes, richard. the making of the atomic bomb. new york: simon and schuster, . skates, john ray. the invasion of japan: alternative to the bomb. columbia; university of south carolina press, . smyth, henry dewolf. atomic energy for military purposes. princeton: princeton university press, . szasz, ferenc. the day the sun rose twice. albuquerque: university of new mexico press, . tibbets, paul w. flight of the enola gay. reynoldsburg, ohio: buckeye aviation book company, . williams, robert c. klaus fuchs, atom spy. cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press, . wilson, jane s. and serber, charlotte, eds. standing by and making do: women in wartime los alamos. los alamos: los alamos historical society, . wyden, peter. day one: before hiroshima and after. new york: simon and schuster, . the national atomic museum, kirtland air force base, albuquerque, new mexico since its opening in , the objective of the national atomic museum has been to provide a readily accessible repository of educational materials, and information on the atomic age. in addition, the museum's goal is to preserve, interpret, and exhibit to the public memorabilia of this age. in late the museum was chartered by congress as the united states' only official atomic museum. prominently featured in the museum's high bay is the story of the manhattan engineer district, the unprecedented . billion dollar scientific-engineering project that was centered in new mexico during world war ii. the manhattan project as it was more commonly called, developed, built, and tested the world's first atomic bomb in new mexico. this display also includes casings similar to the only atomic bombs ever used in warfare. dropped on the japanese cities of hiroshima and nagasaki, these two bombs helped bring world war ii to an end in mid-august . the story of the manhattan project's three secret cities, hanford, washington, los alamos, new mexico, and oak ridge, tennessee, is also presented in this area. a portion of the museum, the low bay, is devoted to exhibits on the research, development, and use of various forms of nuclear energy. historical and other traveling exhibits are also displayed in this area. also found in the low bay is the museum's store, which is operated by the museum's foundation. adjacent to the low bay is the theater. the featured film is david wolpers classic production, ten seconds that shook the world. this excellent film is a -minute documentary on the manhattan project. other films relating to the history of the atomic age are available for viewing and checkout from the library. next to the theater is the library/department of energy public reading room, containing government documents that are available to the public for in-library research. the library also has many nuclear related books available for reference and checkout. located around the outside of the museum are a number of large exhibits. these include the boeing b- b jet bomber that dropped the united states' last air burst h-bomb in , and a -mm ( inches) atomic cannon, once america's most powerful field artillery. also found in this area is a navy ta- c (a modified a- b) corsair ii fighter-bomber, a veteran of the vietnam war. many other nuclear weapons systems, rockets, and missiles are found in this area. in front of the museum are a pair of navy terrier missiles. the terrier was the navy's first operational surface to air missile. to the south of the museum, next to the visitors parking lot, is a republic f- d thunderchief fighter-bomber. further south is a world war ii boeing b- superfortress. this plane is similar to the b- 's, enola gay and bockscar that dropped the atomic bombs on japan. the national atomic museum, is open a.m. to p.m. daily, except for new years day, easter, thanksgiving, and christmas. the museum is located at wyoming blvd. se, on kirtland air force base, albuquerque, new mexico. guided tours for groups are available by calling ( ) - in advance. admission and tours are free, and cameras are always welcome! trinity site: - . a national historic landmark white sands missile range, new mexico contents: radiation at trinity site. how to get to trinity site. trinity site national historic landmark. the manhattan project. the theory. building a test site. jumbo. bomb assembly. the test. after the explosion. it's the schmidt house. afterwards. white sands missile range. reading list. "the effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous, and terrifying. no man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. the lighting effects beggared description. the whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun." brig. gen. thomas farrell radiation at trinity site in deciding whether to visit ground zero at trinity site, the following information may prove helpful to you. radiation levels in the fenced, ground zero area are low. on an average the levels are only times greater than the region's natural background radiation. a one-hour visit to the inner fenced area will result in a whole body exposure of one-half to one milliroentgen. to put this in perspective, a u.s. adult receives an average exposure of milliroentgens every year from natural and medical sources. for instance, the department of energy says we receive between and milliroentgens every year from the sun and from to milliroentgens every year from our food. living in a brick house adds milliroentgens of exposure every year compared to living in a frame house. finally, flying coast to coast in a jet airliner gives an exposure of between three and five milliroentgens on each trip. although radiation levels are low, some feel any extra exposure should be avoided. the decision is yours. it should be noted that small children and pregnant women are potentially more at risk than the rest of the population and are generally considered groups who should only receive exposure in conjunction with medical diagnosis and treatment. again, the choice is yours. at ground zero, trinitite, the green, glassy substance found in the area, is still radioactive and must not be picked up. typical radiation exposures for americans per the national council on radiation protection on hour at ground zero = / mrem cosmic rays from space = mrem at sea level per year radioactive minerals in rocks and soil = mrems per year radioactivity from air, water, and food = anywhere from to mrem per year about mrem per chest x-ray and mrem for whole-mouth dental x- rays smoking one pack of cigarettes a day for one year = mrem miscellaneous such as watch dials and smoke detectors = mrem per year how to get to trinity site trinity site, where the world's first atomic bomb was exploded in , is normally open to the public twice a year--on the first saturday in april and october. trinity is located on the northern end of the , -square-mile white sands missile range, n.m., between the towns of carrizozo and socorro, n.m. there are two ways of entering the restricted missile range on tour days. visitors can enter through the range's stallion range center which is five miles south of highway . the turnoff is miles east of san antonio, n.m., and miles west of carrizozo, n.m. the stallion gate will be open a.m. to p.m. visitors arriving at the gate between those hours will receive handouts and will be allowed to drive unescorted the miles to trinity site. the road is paved and marked. the other way of entering the missile range is by travelling with a caravan sponsored by the alamogordo (n.m.) chamber of commerce. the caravan forms at the otero county fairgrounds in alamogordo and leaves at a.m. visitors entering this way will travel as an escorted group with military police to and from trinity site. the drive is miles round trip. there are no service station facilities on the missile range. the caravan is scheduled to leave trinity site at : p.m. for the return to alamogordo. the caravan may leave later if there is a large number of vehicles in the returning caravan. in , an additional open house will be conducted on july , the th anniversary of the trinity test. visitors may enter the missile range through the stallion range center gate from to a.m. there will be no caravan leaving from alamogordo, n.m., for this event. the early hours will allow visitors to be on-site at : : a.m., the time the trinity site detonation occurred, and should help visitors avoid the -plus degree afternoon temperatures common here in july. included on the trinity site tour is ground zero where the atomic bomb was placed on a -foot steel tower and exploded on july , . a small monument now marks the spot. visitors also see the mcdonald ranch house where the world's first plutonium core for a bomb was assembled. the missile range provides historical photographs and a fat man bomb casing for display. there are no ceremonies or speakers. portable toilet facilities are available on site. hot dogs and sodas are sold at the parking lot. cameras are allowed at trinity site, but their use is strictly prohibited anywhere else on white sands missile range. for more information, contact the white sands missile range public affairs office at ( ) - / . trinity site national historic landmark trinity site is where the first atomic bomb was tested at : : a.m. mountain war time on july , . the kiloton explosion not only led to a quick end to the war in the pacific but also ushered the world into the atomic age. all life on earth has been touched by the event which took place here. the , -acre area was declared a national historic landmark in . the landmark includes base camp, where the scientists and support group lived; ground zero, where the bomb was placed for the explosion; and the mcdonald ranch house, where the plutonium core to the bomb was assembled. on your visit to trinity site you will be able to see ground zero and the mcdonald ranch house. in addition, on your drive into the trinity site area you will pass one of the old instrumentation bunkers which is beside the road just west of ground zero. the manhattan project the story of trinity site begins with the formation of the manhattan project in june . the project was given overall responsibility of designing and building an atomic bomb. at the time it was a race to beat the germans who, according to intelligence reports, were building their own atomic bomb. under the manhattan project three large facilities were constructed. at oak ridge, tenn., huge gas diffusion and electromagnetic process plants were built to separate uranium from its more common form, uranium . hanford, wash. became the home for nuclear reactors which produced a new element called plutonium. both uranium and plutonium are fissionable and can be used to produce an atomic explosion. los alamos was established in northern new mexico to design and build the bomb. at los alamos many of the greatest scientific minds of the day labored over the theory and actual construction of the device. the group was led by dr. j. robert oppenheimer who is credited with being the driving force behind building a workable bomb by the end of the war. the theory los alamos scientists devised two designs for an atomic bomb--one using the uranium and another using the plutonium. the uranium bomb was a simple design and scientists were confident it would work without testing. the plutonium bomb worked by compressing the plutonium into a critical mass which sustains a chain reaction. the compression of the plutonium ball was to be accomplished by surrounding it with lens-shaped charges of conventional explosives. they were designed to all explode at the same instant. the force is directed inward, thus smashing the plutonium from all sides. in an atomic explosion, a chain reaction picks up speed as atoms split, releasing neutrons plus great amounts of energy. the escaping neutrons strike and split more atoms, thus releasing still more neutrons and energy. in a nuclear explosion this all occurs in a millionth of a second with billions of atoms being split. project leaders decided a test of the plutonium bomb was essential before it could be used as a weapon of war. from a list of eight sites in california, texas, new mexico and colorado, trinity site was chosen as the test site. the area already was controlled by the government because it was part of the alamogordo bombing and gunnery range which was established in . the secluded jornado del muerto was perfect as it provided isolation for secrecy and safety, but was still close to los alamos. building a test site in the fall of soldiers started arriving at trinity site to prepare for the test. marvin davis and his military police unit arrived from los alamos at the site on dec. , . the unit set up security checkpoints around the area and had plans to use horses to ride patrol. according to davis the distances were too great and they resorted to jeeps and trucks for transportation. the horses were sometimes used for polo, however. davis said that capt. bush, base camp commander, somehow got the soldiers real polo equipment to play with but they preferred brooms and a soccer ball. other recreation at the site included volleyball and hunting. davis said capt. bush allowed the soldiers with experience to use the army rifles to hunt deer and pronghorn. the meat was then cooked up in the mess hall. leftovers went into soups which davis said were excellent. of course, some of the soldiers were from cities and unfamiliar with being outdoors a lot. davis said he went to relieve a guard at the mockingbird gap post and the soldier told davis he was surprised by the number of "crawdads" in the area considering it was so dry. davis gave the young man a quick lesson on scorpions and warned him not to touch. throughout other personnel arrived at trinity site to help prepare for the test. carl rudder was inducted into the army on jan. , . he said he passed through four camps, took basic for two days and arrived at trinity site on feb. . on arriving he was put in charge of what he called the "east jesus and socorro light and water company." it was a one-man operation--himself. he was responsible for maintaining generators, wells, pumps and doing the power line work. a friend of rudder's, loren bourg, had a similar experience. he was a fireman in civil life and ended up trained as a fireman for the army. he worked as the station sergeant at los alamos before being sent to trinity site in april . in a letter bourg said, "i was sent down here to take over the fire prevention and fire department. upon arrival i found i was the fire department, period." as the soldiers at trinity site settled in they became familiar with socorro. they tried to use the water out of the ranch wells but found it so alkaline they couldn't drink it. in fact, they used navy salt-water soap for bathing. they hauled drinking water from the fire house in socorro. gasoline and diesel was purchased from the standard bulk plant in socorro. according to davis, they established a post office box, number , in socorro so getting their mail was more convenient. the trips into town also offered them the chance to get their hair cut in a real barbershop. if they didn't use the shop, sgt. greyshock used horse clippers to trim their hair. jumbo the bomb design to be used at trinity site actually involved two explosions. first there would be a conventional explosion involving the tnt and then, a fraction of a second later, the nuclear explosion, if a chain reaction was maintained. the scientists were sure the tnt would explode, but were initially unsure of the plutonium. if the chain reaction failed to occur, the tnt would blow the very rare and dangerous plutonium all over the countryside. because of this possibility, jumbo was designed and built. originally it was feet long, feet in diameter and weighed tons. scientists were planning to put the bomb in this huge steel jug because it could contain the tnt explosion if the chain reaction failed to materialize. this would prevent the plutonium from being lost. if the explosion occurred as planned, jumbo would be vaporized. jumbo was brought to pope, n.m., by rail and unloaded. a specially built trailer with wheels was used to move jumbo the miles to trinity site. as confidence in the plutonium bomb design grew it was decided not to use jumbo. instead, it was placed in a steel tower about yards from ground zero. the blast destroyed the tower, but jumbo survived intact. today jumbo rests at the entrance to ground zero so all can see it. the ends are missing because, in , the army detonated eight -pound bombs inside it. because jumbo was standing on end, the bombs were stacked in the bottom and the asymmetry of the explosion blew the ends off. to calibrate the instruments which would be measuring the atomic explosion and to practice a countdown, the manhattan scientists ran a simulated blast on may . they stacked tons of tnt onto a -foot wooden platform just southeast of ground zero. louis hemplemann inserted a small amount of radioactive material from hanford into tubes running through the stack of crates. the scientists hoped to get a feel for how the radiation might spread in the real test by analyzing this test. the explosion destroyed the platform, leaving a small crater with trace amounts of radiation in it. bomb assembly on july the two hemispheres of plutonium were carried to the george mcdonald ranch house just two miles from ground zero. at the house, brig. gen. thomas farrell, deputy to maj. gen. leslie groves, was asked to sign a receipt for the plutonium. farrell later said, "i recall that i asked them if i was going to sign for it shouldn't i take it and handle it. so i took this heavy ball in my hand and i felt it growing warm, i got a certain sense of its hidden power. it wasn't a cold piece of metal, but it was really a piece of metal that seemed to be working inside. then maybe for the first time i began to believe some of the fantastic tales the scientists had told about this nuclear power." at the mcdonald ranch house the master bedroom had been turned into a clean room for the assembly of the bomb core. according to robert bacher, a member of the assembly team, they tried to use only tools and materials from a special kit. several of these kits existed and some were already on their way to tinian, the island in the pacific which was the base for the bombers. the idea was to test the procedures and tools at trinity as well as the bomb itself. at one minute past midnight on friday, july , the explosive assembly left los alamos for trinity site. later in the morning, assembly of the plutonium core began. according to raemer schreiber, robert bacher was the advisor and marshall holloway and philip morrison had overall responsibility. louis slotin, boyce mcdaniel and cyril smith were responsible for the mechanical assembly in the ranch house. later holloway was responsible for the mechanical assembly at the tower. in the afternoon of the th the core was taken to ground zero for insertion into the bomb mechanism. the bomb was assembled under the tower on july . the plutonium core was inserted into the device with some difficulty. on the first try it stuck. after letting the temperatures of the plutonium and casing equalize the core slid smoothly into place. once the assembly was complete many of the men took a welcome relief and went swimming in the water tank east of the mcdonald ranch house. the next morning the entire bomb was raised to the top of the foot steel tower and placed in a small shelter. a crew then attached all the detonators and by p.m. it was complete. the test three observation points were established at , yards from ground zero. these were wooden shelters protected by concrete and earth. the south bunker served as the control center for the test. the automatic firing device was triggered from there as key men such as dr. robert oppenheimer, head of los alamos, watched. none of the manned bunkers are left. many scientists and support personnel, including gen. leslie groves, head of the manhattan project, watched the explosion from base camp which was ten miles southwest of ground zero. all the buildings at base camp were removed after the test. most visiting vips watched from compania hill, miles northwest of ground zero. the test was scheduled for a.m. july , but rain and lightning early that morning caused it to be postponed. the device could not be exploded under rainy conditions because rain and winds would increase the danger from radioactive fallout and interfere with observation of the test. at : a.m. the crucial weather report came through announcing calm to light winds with broken clouds for the following two hours. at : the countdown started and at : : the device exploded successfully. to most observers the brilliance of the light from the explosion--watched through dark glasses--overshadowed the shock wave and sound that arrived later. hans bethe, one of the contributing scientists, wrote "it looked like a giant magnesium flare which kept on for what seemed a whole minute but was actually one or two seconds. the white ball grew and after a few seconds became clouded with dust whipped up by the explosion from the ground and rose and left behind a black trail of dust particles." joe mckibben, another scientist, said, "we had a lot of flood lights on for taking movies of the control panel. when the bomb went off, the lights were drowned out by the big light coming in through the open door in the back." others were impressed by the heat they immediately felt. military policeman davis said, "the heat was like opening up an oven door, even at miles." dr. phillip morrison said, "suddenly, not only was there a bright light but where we were, miles away, there was the heat of the sun on our faces....then, only minutes later, the real sun rose and again you felt the same heat to the face from the sunrise. so we saw two sunrises." after the explosion although no information on the test was released until after the atomic bomb was used as a weapon against japan, people in new mexico knew something had happened. the shock broke windows miles away and was felt by many at least miles away. army officials simply stated that a munitions storage area had accidentally exploded at the alamogordo bombing range. the explosion did not make much of a crater. most eyewitnesses describe the area as more of a small depression instead of a crater. the heat of the blast did melt the desert sand and turn it into a green glassy substance. it was called trinitite and can still be seen in the area. at one time trinitite completely covered the depression made by the explosion. afterwards the depression was filled and much of the trinitite was taken away by the nuclear energy commission. to the west of the monument is a low structure which is protecting an original portion of the crater area. trinitite is visible through openings in the roof. it's the schmidt house the george mcdonald ranch house sits within an 'x ' low stone wall. the house was built in by franz schmidt, a german immigrant, and an addition was constructed on the north side in the 's by the mcdonalds. there is a display about the schmidt family in the house during each open house. the ranch house is a one-story, , square-foot building. it is built of adobe which was plastered and painted. an ice house is located on the west side along with an underground cistern which stored rain water running off the roof. at one time the north addition contained a toilet and bathtub which drained into a septic tank northwest of the house. there is a large, divided water storage tank and a chicago aeromotor windmill east of the house. the scientists and support people used the north tank as a swimming pool during the long hot summer of . south of the windmill are the remains of a bunkhouse and a barn which was part garage. further to the east are corrals and holding pens. the buildings and fixtures east of the house have been stabilized to prevent further deterioration. the ranch was abandoned in when the alamogordo bombing and gunnery range took over the land to use in training world war ii bombing crews. the house stood empty until the manhattan project support personnel arrived in early . inside the house the northeast room (the master bedroom) was designated the assembly room. work benches and tables were installed. to keep dust and sand out of instruments and tools, the windows were covered with plastic. tape was used to fasten the edges of the plastic and to seal doors and cracks in the walls. the explosion, only two miles away, did not significantly damage the house. most of the windows were blown out, but the main structure was intact. years of rain water dripping through holes in the roof did much more damage. the barn did not do as well. during the trinity test the roof was bowed inward and some of the roofing was blown away. the roof has since collapsed. the house stood empty and deteriorating until when the u.s. army stabilized the house to prevent any further damage. shortly after, the department of energy and u.s. army provided the funds for the national park service to completely restore the house. the work was done in . all efforts were directed at making the house appear as it did on july , . afterwards the story of what happened at trinity site did not come to light until after the second atomic bomb was exploded over hiroshima, japan, on august . president truman made the announcement that day. three days later, august , the third atomic bomb devastated the city of nagasaki, and on august the japanese surrendered. trinity site became part of what was then white sands proving ground. the proving ground was established on july , , as a test facility to investigate the new rocket technology emerging from world war ii. the land, including trinity site and the old alamogordo bombing range, came under the control of the new rocket and missile testing facility. interest in trinity site was immediate. in september press tours to the site started. one of the famous photos of ground zero shows robert oppenheimer and general leslie groves surrounded by a small group of reporters as they examine one of the footings to the foot tower on which the bomb was placed. that picture was taken sept. . the exposed footing is still visible at ground zero. on sept. - , george cremeens, a young radio reporter from krnt in des moines, visited the site with soundman frank lagouri. they flew over the crater and interviewed dr. kenneth bainbridge, trinity test director, and capt. howard bush, base camp commander. back in iowa, cremeens created four -minute reports on his visit which aired sept. , , and . a -minute composite was made and aired on the abc radio network. for his work cremeens received a local peabody award for "outstanding reporting and interpretation of the news." at first trinity site was encircled with a fence and radiation warning signs were posted. the site remained off-limits to military and civilian personnel of the proving ground and closed to the public. in the atomic energy commission let a contract to clean up the site. much of the trinitite was scraped up and buried. in september about people attended the first trinity site open house. a few years later a small group from tularosa visited the site on an anniversary of the explosion to conduct a religious service and prayers for peace. similar visits have been made annually in recent years on the first saturday in october. in the inner oblong fence was added. in the corridor barbed wire fence which connects the outer fence to the inner one was completed. jumbo was moved to the parking lot in . visits to the site are now made in april and october because it is generally so hot in july on the jornada del muerto. white sands missile range white sands missile range has developed from a simple desert testing site for the v- into one of the most sophisticated test facilities in the world. the mission of white sands missile range begins with a customer--a service developer, or another federal agency, which is ready to find out if engineers and scientists have built something which will perform according to job specifications. it ends when an exhaustive series of tests has been completed and a data report has been delivered to the customer. between the beginning and the end of the test program, be it the army tactical missile system or newly designed automobiles, range employees are involved in every operation connected with the customer and his product. the range can and does provide everything from rat traps to telephones, from equipment hoists and flight safety to microsecond timing. we shake, rattle and roll the product, roast it, freeze it, subject it to nuclear radiation, dip it in salt water and roll it in the mud. we test its paint, bend its frame and find out what effect its propulsion material has on flora and fauna. in the end, if it's a missile, we fire it, record its performance and bring back the pieces for post mortem examination. all test data is reduced and the customer receives a full report. for more information on trinity site or white sands missile range contact: public affairs office (stews-pa) white sands missile range white sands missile range, n.m. - reading list the day the sun rose twice, by ferenc szasz, university of new mexico press, . manhattan: the army and the atomic bomb, by vincent jones, center of military history, u. s. army. trinity, by kenneth bainbridge, los alamos publication (la- -h). the making of the atomic bomb, by richard rhodes, simon and schuster, . now it can be told, by general leslie groves, da capo press, . day one, by peter wyden, simon and schuster, . city of fire: los alamos and the atomic age, - , by james kunetka, university of new mexico press, . los alamos - : the beginning of an era, los alamos publication (lasl- - ). day of trinity, by lansing lamont, atheneum. radiological survey and evaluation of the fallout area from the trinity test: chupadera mesa and white sands missile range, n. m., los alamos publication (la- -ms). life magazine, august and september , . time magazine, august and , . twenty-five years in the rifle brigade. by the late william surtees, quartermaster. william blackwood, edinburgh; and t. cadell, strand, london. mdcccxxxiii. edinburgh: printed by ballantyne and company, paul's work, canongate. to major-gen. sir andrew f. barnard, k.c.b. and k.c.h. and the officers of the rifle brigade, these remains of my deceased brother are most respectfully dedicated, by their obliged and most obedient servant, john surtees. prefatory notice. the author of the following narrative entered the army in early life. he commenced his military career in , as a private soldier in the northumberland militia; and in the following year he volunteered into the pompadours. in this regiment he first faced the enemy, during the expedition to holland under the duke of york. on getting his discharge from the pompadours, in , he again entered the service as a private in the rifle brigade, to which he was attached for a period of twenty-five years. from his steady conduct, and ardent love for his profession, he was soon advanced from the ranks, and, after various intermediate steps, was appointed quartermaster; a situation which he held as long as he continued in the corps, enjoying the respect and esteem of his brother officers of all ranks, as is amply testified by the letters which form the appendix to this volume. though, as quartermaster, the author was not called by duty to join in battle, yet he lost no opportunity of entering the scene of action, or of placing himself in a favourable situation for observing what was passing. it is unnecessary to enumerate the arduous services of the rifle brigade from to . during the whole of that period the author was actively engaged with his corps. the narrative is faithfully--indeed literally--printed from the author's ms. as he left it at his death. the critical reader may therefore detect various inaccuracies which, had life been spared to the author, would probably have been corrected; but he will find much to approve, and, hackneyed as narratives of the peninsular war have become, he will also find much that is new. there is no embellishment in the style of the author's composition, but there is a quiet defoe-like sincerity and simplicity characteristic of his pages, and a strain of unaffected piety, that is very pleasing; and the scenes and descriptions which he gives, though sometimes singularly chosen, and reported quite with a manner of his own, are on the whole portrayed with strong graphic effect. one word, however, before closing,--our author is never vulgar. a severe pulmonary affection compelled him to quit his corps in . he retired to corbridge, his native village, where he arrived on the th of october in that year, and continued there, respected and beloved, and constantly engaged in acts of benevolence, till the period of his death, th may, . _november , ._ contents. chapter i. page. birth and parentage--enters the militia--volunteers into the line--joins the army destined for holland--the troops embark at deal--land at the helder--laxity of discipline--march for schagen--detachment under sir ralph abercromby sent to surprise hoorne--hoorne surrenders, chapter ii. the russian allies carry bergen--allow themselves to be surprised, and the whole army forced to retire to their former position--skirmishing in the vicinity of old patten--the russians endeavour to force their way back to bergen--the russian and british forces joined--the enemy forced to abandon egmont-op-zee--alkmaar surrenders--the troops advance to egmont binnen--skirmishing--general engagement--the enemy repulsed--the forces retire to zaand wyck--armistice concluded--return to england, chapter iii. arrive in england--the pompadours embark for ireland--arrive at kinsale--privations in ireland in --peace concluded--our author resolves to return home, but ultimately volunteers into the rifle corps or th--embarks for england, and joins his regiment at sussex--is promoted, chapter iv. made pay-sergeant--moral reflections--wreck of a dutch east indiaman--reduced officers--war with france in --encampment at thorncliffe under the command of general sir john moore--encampment broke up, november --embark for germany, october --vicissitudes at sea--land at cuxhaven--march to bremen--outposts established--retrograde movements, in consequence of the defeat of the allied forces at austerlitz--the allied forces evacuate germany--re-embarkation of the troops--the rifle corps, or th, land at yarmouth, chapter iv.* our author made quartermaster-sergeant of the d battalion, which he joins at feversham, kent--expedition to denmark--embark at deal--land at vedbeck, zealand--partial engagements--siege of copenhagen--a division under sir arthur wellesley advance to kioge--copenhagen capitulates--amnesty between the danish forces in the island of zealand, and the british--the british evacuate denmark--embark at copenhagen--arrive in the downs--land at deal, chapter v. our author marries--the battalion to which he belongs ordered to join the expedition fitting out for corunna--movements of the army in spain--return to england, chapter vi. volunteering--farther promotion--embarks for portugal, with two companies of the second battalion--debark at cadiz--advance to the isla--the french occupy all the adjacent towns, except cadiz and isla--cannonading--spanish army--detachment of the allied army sent round by gibraltar and chiclana, to take the enemy in the rear of his works, and compel him either to fight or abandon them--come up with a portion of the enemy in the vicinity of veger--bravery of the british--the enemy repulsed with great loss, but, from the apathy and misconduct of general la pena, and the spaniards under his command, the french are allowed to retain their works in the vicinity of cadiz, chapter vii. the d battalion of the pompadours ordered to proceed to portugal--our author visits england--returns to portugal, and joins his regiment at rodrigo--the army move towards badajos--siege of badajos--badajos surrenders--insubordination among the troops--quelled by the prompt measures of lord wellington, chapter viii. the army leave badajos on the th of april, and move into quarters near the river agueda, where they remain, till the th of june--advance towards salamanca, which, with the exception of three forts, the enemy had evacuated--the forts invested--the main bodies of both armies bivouack within a mile and a half of each other, in the vicinity of monte rubio and morisco--the forts of salamanca surrender--the main body of the enemy retire to tordesillas--movements of the army, chapter ix. preparations for the field--amusements in winter quarters--grand review--advance of the army in pursuit of the enemy--come up with their rearguard in the vicinity of hornilla de camino--skirmishing--encounter with the st brigade of the enemy, who are beaten, and forced to retreat--our army advance in pursuit--an affair between the rearguard of the enemy and our th brigade--vittoria--general engagement--the enemy defeated--remarks, chapter x. advance in pursuit of the enemy--our forces retreat, in order to counteract soult's movements for the succour of pamplona--total defeat of soult in the several actions near pamplona--our forces again advance--come up with the retreating enemy at the bridge of yanzi--the enemy take up a position, behind vera--a considerable body of the enemy attached at the pass of echallar, and forced to retreat, chapter xi. the author, from a mistake, loses his servants for a few days--a feast of death--a feast of life--fighting near st sebastian--singular instance of spanish bravery--st sebastian is captured, but no details given, the author not having been present--attack of the pass of vera, chapter xii. the british army advance farther into france--pass the nive--soult's plans baffled--two or three battalions of the nassau and frankfort regiments come over from the french--french politesse--threatened attack by the french--battle of the nive--account of the basques, chapter xiii. the author's battalion quartered in aurantz on d january --the cantonments at aurantz broke up on the th february, and the campaign of commenced--farther advance into france--skirmishing with the enemy--military manoeuvres--battle of orthes--defeat and pursuit of the enemy--succession of attacks on them--they are driven from their position in and near tarbes--skirmishing at tournefoile--the enemy retire towards toulouse, chapter xiv. the british army cross the garonne--advance on toulouse--prepare for the attack--the attack--spaniards driven back--battle very hot--french completely defeated--soult evacuates toulouse, and tardily adheres to the bourbons, chapter xv. author's happy state during and --character of the veritable french--british distributed over the country--civility of the inhabitants of grissolles--amusements in quarters--the british prepare to quit france, chapter xvi. author's battalion embark for england--land at plymouth--expect to be again ordered on foreign service--order received--embark, with other troops, for america--land at pine island, chapter xvii. proceed to attack the enemy, and capture one of their picquets--advance in search of a bivouack--alarmed by shots in front--fired on by an american schooner--captain hallen severely attacked--manoeuvres on both sides--ruse of the enemy--fighting continues--enemy repulsed at all points--courage of the british--battery brought into play--activity of the enemy, chapter xviii. british army told off into brigades--advance, and are hotly received--heroism of a young artillery officer--we take up a fresh position--the enemy work incessantly in raising an extensive breastwork--two batteries erected, from which our heavy ship artillery are brought to bear against it, but without effect--the enemy also place their ship guns on batteries--colonel lambert arrives with the th and d regiments--preparations for a grand attack on the enemy's lines, which entirely fails, and the british are repulsed with great loss, chapter xix. bravery and success of colonel thornton--negotiation for leave to transport the wounded across the river--insult offered to the british--they retreat--our army embark, and determine to make an attack upon mobile--proceed in the direction of mobile bay--a brigade detached to reduce fort boyer--the fort surrenders, the garrison becoming prisoners of war--intelligence of a treaty of peace being concluded at ghent--cessation of hostilities, chapter xx. ratification of the treaty of peace--exchange of prisoners--our troops embark for england--when off the coast of ireland, receive intelligence of bonaparte's escape from elba--the author and his battalion reach the downs, and proceed to thorncliffe--embark for france--arrive at paris, and occupy the champs elysées--review of the russian guards--russian discipline--british troops reviewed--accident to prince blucher--amusements in paris--the allied forces, except the army of occupation, leave paris--the author's battalion embark for england--reach dover, and return to thorncliffe--he obtains leave of absence, and visits his family--his battalion ordered to ireland--sets out to join it, accompanied by his wife, who dies three days after they reach dublin--his battalion reduced--joins the first battalion at gosport, which is ordered to scotland--arrive at leith, and march to glasgow--the author returns home in ill health--his father dies--joins his battalion again--winters at home--his battalion ordered to ireland--joins it at belfast--they occupy different stations during the whiteboy insurrection--six companies of his battalion ordered to nova scotia, but the author remains with the other four companies--he is shortly ordered to proceed to nova scotia--his health declines--returns home in consequence, takes advantage of lord palmerston's bill, and retires on full pay, appendix.--testimonials.--no. . from lieutenant-colonel duffy--no. . from major travers--no. . from officers of the d battalion--no. . from lieut.-colonel ross, c.b.--no. . from lieut.-col. smith, c.b.--no. . from officers of the st battalion rifle brigade--no. . from colonel norcott, c.b.--no. . from lieut.-col. fullarton, c.b.--no. . from lieut.-col. balvaird--no. . from major-general sir a. f. barnard, k.c.b.--no. . from major logan--no. . from lieut.-col. beckwith, c.b.--no. . from lieut.-general the hon. sir wm. stewart, g.c.b.--no. . from major eeles--no. . from major-general sir t. s. beckwith, k.c.b., twenty-five years in the rifle brigade. chapter i. birth and parentage--enters the militia--volunteers into the line--joins the army destined for holland--the troops embark at deal--land at the helder--laxity of discipline--march for schagen--detachment under sir ralph abercromby sent to surprise hoorne--hoorne surrenders. i was born on the th of august, , in the village of corbridge, in the county of northumberland; of parents who may be said to have been among the middle classes, my father being a tradesman. they gave me such an education as was customary with people of their station in life; viz. reading, writing, and arithmetic. my mother having sprung from a pious race, was the first to implant in my mind any sense of religion; indeed, it is to the spiritual seed sown in my heart by her during my youth, that i am indebted, under god, for having been brought, many years afterwards, to consider my ways, and to turn to him. nevertheless, being naturally of a sensual and wicked disposition, i, as might be expected, spent a dissolute youth, which often caused great pain and uneasiness to my good and pious mother. but i did not continue long under the paternal roof; for, having from my infancy a great predilection for a military life, i embraced almost the first opportunity that offered, after i became sufficiently grown, to enter into the militia of my native county. i enlisted on the th of november, , being then little more than seventeen years of age. i entered this service with the determination that, should i not like a soldier's life, i would then, after remaining a few years in it, return home; but, if i did like it, to volunteer into the line, and make that my occupation for life. it will readily be believed that this undutiful step affected deeply my excellent parents; for though my father was not _then_ a religious man, he had a heart susceptible of the tenderest feelings; and i really believe that no parents ever felt more deeply the combined emotions of tender regret at my leaving them so young, and for such a purpose, and at the disgrace which my wayward conduct had, as they imagined, brought upon myself. but though evil in itself, god overruled it for good to me, and, i trust, to them also. i would here remark that the life of a soldier was by no means considered in my native village, at that time, as at all creditable; and when i sometimes in my boyhood used to exhibit symptoms of a military inclination, i was often taunted with the then opprobrious expression, "ay, thou likes the smell of poother," intimating thereby that i was likely to disgrace myself by going for a soldier. i left my family in much grief in the beginning of , and marched with several other recruits to join my regiment at chelmsford in essex, where we arrived in about a month, and where i began my military career. i always liked a soldier's life, consequently i did not suffer from many of those parts of it which are so unpleasant to those of a contrary disposition; and, as i took pleasure in it, i of course made more progress in acquiring a knowledge of my duty than some others who set out with me. i was early placed in the first squad, an honour which i considered no trifling one in those days,--but none of us finished our drill; for, in july of the same year, an order was issued, permitting such men as chose to extend their services, to volunteer into the line, in order to recruit the army then destined for holland. we had previously marched from chelmsford to colchester, a distance of twenty-one miles, which march was to me, i think, the severest i ever underwent; for being young, and totally unaccustomed to any thing like it, the weight of the musket, bayonet, accoutrements, and knapsack, appeared, towards the latter end of the march, to be almost intolerable; but i kept up, although excessively tired. this will show how necessary it is at all times to accustom troops, destined for service, to move in such order as they will be expected to do when they take the field--for, if unaccustomed to the carriage of the knapsack, and to frequent marches with it for exercise, they will be utterly unable to perform any movement against, or in the face of an enemy, with that celerity necessary to ensure success. i volunteered, with several of my comrades, into the th regiment, or pompadours, so called from their facings being madame pompadour's favourite colour, and we set off (carried in waggons to accelerate our movements) for canterbury, which we reached in two days and one night, having travelled without making a halt; and there we joined the skeleton of our regiment, just then returned from the west indies, where twice, during the war, it had been nearly exterminated by disease. in a few days after our arrival, a selection was made throughout the volunteers for fit subjects for the light company, when, fortunately, both myself and william sutherland (who had been in the same company with me in the militia, and who, from our names and size being so nearly similar, had always stood next me in the ranks) were chosen for this, in my mind, honourable service. i felt not a little proud at my advancement, as i considered it, (and as i believe the generality of soldiers consider it,) to be made a light-bob. the regiment had not at this time either arms, appointments, or clothing; but, being in a few days sent off to barham downs, where the army for holland was assembled and encamped, we soon after were supplied with the necessary equipment, and commenced without delay to drill and get the men in readiness for embarkation. at this time the flank companies of all those regiments destined for holland were separated from their battalions, and formed into what are termed flank battalions. that in which my company was placed consisted of eleven light companies, the command of which was given to lieut.-col. sharpe, of the th regiment, an experienced and gallant veteran, who had commanded a similar battalion in the eastern district, under the earl of chatham. the grenadier battalion was composed of an equal number of grenadier companies, and belonged to the same regiments to which ours belonged. before our arrival on barham downs, the first division of the expedition, under sir ralph abercromby, had sailed; and we soon after were called out to fire a _feu de joie_ for their capture of the dutch fleet, and their having effected a landing and gained a victory near the helder. nothing could be more brilliant than our display upon this occasion appeared to me--we were nearly , strong, i imagine, and, being formed in one extensive line, the firing of the _feu de joie_ produced a fine effect. to my non-military readers, perhaps, it will be necessary to explain what is termed a _feu de joie_. the usual mode is, when formed in line, for the fire to commence by signal with the right file of the whole, and each of those on their left take it up rapidly in succession, so that, to a looker-on, it has the appearance of a wild-fire running along the line; but on this occasion we heightened the effect, by beginning with the right of the front rank only, and when it had passed along by the front, the left-hand man of the rear rank took it up, and so it passed along by the rear to the right again. it appeared to me, at that time, certainly the finest sight i had ever witnessed. every heart present was elated with joy, and beat high to be led on to share in those glorious achievements which we were then celebrating; but, alas! we were then ignorant that we were as unfit at that time to suffer the toils and privations of a campaign, as if we had never seen a soldier; we were all young, and inexperienced in the highest degree, and our discipline, as might be naturally expected, was far from good; for, being an army hastily collected from every regiment of militia in the kingdom, the officers of course neither had that knowledge of the characters of their men, which is so essential, nor had the latter that confidence in their officers, which only a service together for some length of time can engender, and which is absolutely necessary to secure an unreserved and active obedience to their commands. but the period of our embarkation fast approached; previously to which, we were reviewed by his royal highness the duke of york, (who was destined to command us,) accompanied by several others of the royal family, and by general sir charles grey, my countryman. i believe they all expressed themselves highly satisfied with our appearance and movements, and hoped that we would shortly add fresh laurels to those already gained by our forerunners. as it was expected to be a service of only a short duration, it was determined that the men should embark in what is called "light marching" or "service order," that is, with only about half the usual complement of necessaries, consequently every soldier had to leave a considerable portion of his things behind him; and, in order to deposit them safely, empty casks were procured for each company, into which every man was ordered to stow his extra things, after being properly packed and labelled with his name, &c. this rather grieved me, for i had brought with me from home as good a kit (as the soldiers term it) as any in the army. my dear mother had prepared me shirts fine enough for any officer, and abundance of them, but of those thus left i never saw one afterwards. during our stay in this camp, i never enjoyed better health or greater lightness of spirits, forgetful or heedless of the deep and lasting anguish which my late rash step must naturally inflict upon the hearts of my tender and affectionate parents; but i was no doubt stimulated to this thoughtless forgetfulness of them, by witnessing the animating scenes around me, where all was bustle and high anticipation of more glorious doings. we marched from this camp to deal, where we embarked in transports already prepared to receive us. as soon as we arrived we were instantly put on board, but never shall i forget the effect which the sight of the sea, and such a number of ships of various sizes and descriptions, had upon me; for before this i had never been near the sea, although i had marched from the north to the south of england. but, to add to all the strange things which then met my view, we were instantly on marching down put into a large boat that lay high upon the beach; which, when filled with troops, they run down into the sea with astonishing rapidity, turning my stomach, as we entered the water, completely topsy-turvy. the effect of all this can better be conceived than described; we were immediately rowed off to, and put on board our transport, which happened to be a brig called the zephyr of shields. here also every thing was quite new to me; but all was met and performed with the highest spirits, so far as sea-sickness permitted. we remained on board two or three days before the fleet was ready for sea; but at length we sailed with a favourable breeze, and in two or three days more we made the coast of holland, and soon afterwards came to anchor within the texel. every thing being ready for landing, and the helder being in our possession, we disembarked there on the th of september, , having been just one week on board. we were formed on landing near the town, and waited till some others had disembarked, before we moved off. among those regiments which landed, i remember the th was one. this regiment, after coming on shore, was drawn up close to us; they had not been long landed before the men began with their knives to cut off each other's hair, which then was worn in the shape of a club; this was done without any orders from their officers, and appeared to me, i confess, such a breach of discipline, as i could not have anticipated; for though on the whole it was an improvement, as later usage has shown, yet i apprehend for a body of soldiers, without any permission from higher authority, to take upon them to break through the long-established custom of the service, was such an utter renunciation of all obedience to authority, as directly to threaten with destruction the best interests of the army to which they belonged; however, at such a time it would perhaps have been attended with still worse consequences to have made an example of the offenders, although, had stricter discipline been enforced from the outset, i feel assured the army in general would have benefited by it. towards evening, we moved forward through the town of helder, and proceeded on our route towards schagen, and halted for the night on the road, and where such as could find houses, of which there were a few straggling ones in the neighbourhood, got into them. i awoke in the night, and still fancied myself on board ship; for the wind and rain were beating violently against the little hovel into which a few of us had crept, and i imagined it was the dashing of the sea against the bow of the vessel. indeed so strong was this imagination, that when i got up, i literally could not stand steady, not having been long enough on board, to acquire what is termed my "sea legs;" that is, i had not learned the art of standing steady when the vessel heeled; and, strange as it may appear to a person who has never been at sea, i believe most landsmen have the same feeling for some short time after being put on shore. we had each man been supplied with a blanket while in camp on barham downs, but had no proper or uniform mode of carrying them; we had no great-coats, but made use of the blanket sometimes as a substitute in the morning, when we turned out to proceed on our march. we certainly made a strange appearance. some had their blankets thrown around them, others had them twisted up like a horse collar, and tied over their shoulders in the manner of a plaid; while some had them stuffed into, and others tied on to the top of their knapsack; in short, we appeared like any thing but _regular_ troops. we moved forward as soon as we were formed, and early in the day reached schagen-bruck, where his royal highness stood to inspect us as we marched past. near this place we fell in with some of the russian regiments, they having landed nearly at the same time, and of which nation there were, i believe, about , troops expected to join our army. but if we appeared irregular and grotesque, i know not well how to describe them; their riflemen were shod with boots very much resembling those of our fishermen, coming up considerably higher than the knee; thus rendering them, i should imagine, incapable of celerity of movement, one of the chief requisites in a rifle corps; they also wore large cocked hats and long green coats. their grenadiers were dressed more apropos, having high sugar-loaf shaped caps, mounted with a great deal of brass, and projecting forward at the top, with long coats, and gaiters reaching above the knee. their regular infantry were nearly similar to the grenadiers, only they wore cocked hats instead of caps. the regiment which we saw on this occasion had with it, i should think, full half as many followers as soldiers, some of whom carried immensely large copper kettles; others the provisions, and others the officers' baggage; in short, these were the scullions, the cooks, and, as it were, the beasts of burden of the regiment; but this was a bad system, for it increased by one half the number of mouths to fill, and must have been attended with the worst consequences when provisions were scarce. the officers, i remember, carried what was formerly used in our service, a long sort of pole, with a head like a halberd, and called, i believe, a "spontoon." this, on passing a general at a review, the officer twists and twirls around his head, precisely as a drum-major in our service does his cane. when we had passed his royal highness at the bridge, we moved forward to the town of schagen, and took up our quarters in the church. i thought this extremely odd, as i had been accustomed to view so sacred an edifice with more reverence than to suppose they would quarter soldiers in it; but we were stowed in it as thick as we could well be, and made the best of our quarters; some taking the chancel, others the vestry, and some the body of the church; nay, some even took up their lodging in the reading-desk and pulpit. we could contrive to make out the lord's prayer in dutch, but could not well proceed further, although there is much similarity between that language and the english of my native county. here, for the first time, we learnt that our brigade was what was called the _reserve_, and commanded by colonel m'donald of the th regiment; but on this occasion and in egypt, the reserve was not what is generally understood by that term, for in both places it was composed of some of the best troops in the expedition, and was generally first called into action. on this occasion, the reserve consisted of the d welsh fusileers, the th regiment, the grenadier battalion before mentioned, and our light battalion. we remained here till the th, when towards evening we were ordered under arms, having been previously supplied with provisions; and, after every preliminary was adjusted, we set forward on our march towards the city of hoorne, situated on the zuyder zee. of our destination, the men, of course, were totally ignorant, but no doubt the officers knew. it turned out that about troops had been appointed for this service, the execution of which was intrusted to that gallant old veteran, and hitherto successful general, sir ralph abercromby. the intention was to make a rapid and extensive flank movement during the night, and surprise and capture the said city, while his royal highness was to attack the enemy in front. we moved off as it became dark, but such was the state of the roads that it became the most trying and distressing march that i believe ever troops undertook; the roads were literally knee deep in mud in most places, while every now and then they were rendered nearly impassable, both by the enemy having broken down the bridges over the innumerable canals and dikes which intersect this country, and these canals in many places having overflowed their banks. none but those who have experienced this or something similar, can form an idea of the fatigue attending a night march in such a country, where the column is large. we marched, i think, in sections of about eight file, that is, with eight men abreast in the front rank, and the like number in the rear rank covering them. conceive, then, your arriving at an obstacle which the darkness of the night multiplies a hundred-fold. not more than one man will attempt to pass this obstacle at the same time, and he has to grope his way; consequently all the other fifteen men must stand still, or nearly so, till he is over, before they each move on in turn. multiply this by the sections behind, and you will have a halt for the rear of probably an hour or more; standing all this while nearly up to the knees in mire; or, what is worse, as each regiment has accomplished the task of getting over, this of course causes the others in the rear to be drawing up towards it by degrees, so that probably you are compelled to stand (or, if you choose, you may lie down in the mud) for a quarter of an hour, or more perhaps; and then move on again for the space of a few hundred yards, and then another halt; so that could you lie down to enjoy a little rest, the constant cry of "forward" resounding in your ears, just as you begin to close your eyes, renders it the most tiresome and trying situation that i know of. it is true, the head of the column does not suffer in an equal proportion with those in the rear, or a night march in an enemy's country would be a dangerous operation. during this march, i remember, when the road was extremely deep, some one on the right of my section called out that there was an excellent path a little beyond him; when one poor fellow moved in that direction, but had not made many steps, till souse he went into a deep canal. whether the man who called out had been actually deceived by the smooth surface of the water, which appeared in the dark like a nice level road; or whether he did it through mischief, i know not, but the poor simpleton who followed his advice paid dearly for his curiosity, being with some difficulty extricated from his uncomfortable situation. i may observe that these canals or dikes skirt both sides of every road in this part of holland, and are even made use of as fences for the fields, there not being any hedges or walls that i remember to have seen. about break of day we reached the city, which at once surrendered; but just before daylight, i became so excessively weary that i could not continue in the ranks any longer; indeed men had been dropping out for some hours before, so that, i suppose, when the head of the column reached hoorne, one half the number had fallen out; for it was beyond the powers of human nature to sustain such excessive fatigue. i, with two or three others, got behind a house that stood by the roadside, and laid ourselves down on a paved footpath which led from the back-door. never in my life did i experience a greater luxury than this appeared to be, where something hard, and that would keep me out of the deep and filthy mire, could be found to rest upon. i laid me down and slept as soundly as ever i did in my life for about an hour, which quite refreshed me. we then got up and set off with all despatch to overtake the column, which we came up with and joined just as they halted after reaching the city. none of the troops entered the place, i believe; but my battalion being towards the rear of the column, was at a considerable distance from it. all now lay down to rest, and such as had houses near them occupied them; but those who had not, chose the driest parts of the canal bank or road, and all were soon buried in profound sleep, excepting those who were placed on guard. chapter ii. the russian allies carry bergen--allow themselves to be surprised, and the whole army forced to retire to their former position--skirmishing in the vicinity of old patten--the russians endeavour to force their way back to bergen--the russian and british forces joined--the enemy forced to abandon egmont-op-zee--alkmaar surrenders--the troops advance to egmont binnen--skirmishing--general engagement--the enemy repulsed--the forces retire to zaand wyck--armistice concluded--return to england. from daylight we had heard a heavy and constant cannonade towards our right and rear. his royal highness, with the remainder of the army, as was before intimated, had moved forward and attacked the main body of the enemy; but as i did not witness this action, i forbear to relate what i heard concerning it, further than this, that the russians who attacked the enemy posted in the neighbourhood of bergen, having by some mismanagement allowed themselves to be surprised after having carried that village, the whole army had been obliged to retire to their former position. in consequence of this failure, i believe, we were ordered towards evening to fall in, and (what appeared annoying in the extreme) to retrace our weary footsteps by the same dirty road by which we had advanced. nearly the same fatigue and misery were endured as in our advance; but the column did not keep so much together as before, the men falling out by hundreds, so that the stoppages were not quite so great. we did not return to schagen after our retreat, but were cantoned in some villages in front of that town; and a few days afterwards we were moved to the right of schagen, through schagen-bruck, to a farm hamlet called zaand wyck. here we remained till the st of october; but i should not omit to mention, that we had, during the intervening period, several marches, all of which were made by night, and in which similar sufferings and fatigue were endured as in the march to hoorne. this, it may probably be remembered, was one of the wettest autumns almost upon record; and in these marches we generally had the full benefit of the torrents which fell in this naturally wet country. i have actually seen the water running out at the bottom of the men's trowsers like that from the gutter which carries the rain from the roof of a house. when we had not a night march, we invariably had to be at our alarm post an hour before daybreak,--and that being about four miles distant from our quarter at this time, we never had what may be called a full night's rest. military men will know that the custom of being at the alarm post before daybreak is almost universal; for, that being the usual time of attack, it behoves those who are apprehensive of a visit from the enemy to be on the look-out, and to be prepared to receive them when they come--here they remain, till, as the vulgar phrase goes, "you can see a white horse a mile off," that is, till it is clear daylight, and they have ascertained that no enemy is in the neighbourhood; after which, if all be quiet, they retire to their quarters. our accommodations at zaand wyck may be said to have been good, for our officers had a farm-house to live in, and we had a good dry barn and other outhouses to lie down in; and in which i enjoyed some comfortable nights' lodgings. but on the st of october, in the afternoon, we were ordered to fall in, it having been previously intimated to us that we might probably have a brush with the enemy. we were, of course, all life and glee on receiving the information, and the usual quantity of provisions having been issued, and every other preparation made in the night, we moved off by the same road by which we had usually advanced to our alarm post. this we passed, and then entered a most unpleasant country to march through; it being nearer the enemy, of course all bridges and other communications had been destroyed. as we moved on, a little after daylight we were overtaken by the th light dragoons, on which we were ordered to open to the right and left to let them pass us. they seemed in high spirits, and some of them cried out, as they passed us, "go on, my lads, lather them well, and we'll come up and shave them." sir walter scott mentions this saying as made use of by some of the cavalry at waterloo, as if it were at that time new; but i can assure him it is as old as , if not much older, for i certainly heard it used on this occasion, and i know not but it may have been said long before. the cavalry inclined, after passing us, to their left, while we kept down towards the sea; and soon after, on ascending a small eminence, we got a view of the village of old patten, where we discovered about , or , of our army drawn up near the sea-beach. we passed them, and moved forward in the direction of a high range of sand-hills, which commenced about a mile beyond the village, and which overlooked all the plain below. here the enemy was posted, and i was told that they began as soon as we were within reach to cannonade us; but from the heads of the men in front, i could not perceive any appearance of such cannonade, nor do i believe that any of their shot reached us. a little farther on, however, we met a russian yager, or rifleman, coming back and holding out his hand, which had been wounded, and from which the blood was flowing pretty copiously. this was the first blood that i had ever seen as drawn in hostile conflict, and it certainly produced a somewhat strange effect upon me; it showed plainly that we were in the immediate vicinity of that enemy we had so often talked about, and whom we hoped to conquer; that now the time had arrived which would infallibly prove what every man, boaster or not, was made of; and that it might happen that it was my lot to fall. having reflected (rather confusedly i own) on the passing scene before me, and offered up an occasional prayer to him who alone can cover the head in the day of battle, we now approached the bottom of this sandy eminence, when my company was ordered to unfix bayonets, (for we had previously primed and loaded,) and dash on at double quick time till we came in contact with the enemy. no time was left for reflection now, the immediate duty we had to perform occupied all our attention fully; we soon got into a smart fire from the enemy's riflemen, which we found was the only description of troops, except a few artillery, that we had to contend with, their main bodies of heavy infantry being on the right and left of this sandy range, which in some places was about a mile in breadth, in others more or less. after the fight had fairly commenced, we kept but little order, owing partly to the want of discipline and experience in our people, and partly to the nature of the ground, which was rugged and uneven in the extreme, being one continued range of sand-hills, with hollows more or less deep between them; and partly it may be attributed to the ardour of our young men, who pressed on perhaps too rapidly. we continued to advance, and never once made a retrograde movement, the enemy regularly retiring from height to height on our approach; but they had greatly the advantage over us in point of shooting, their balls doing much more execution than ours; indeed it cannot be wondered at, for they were all riflemen, trained to fire with precision, and armed with a weapon which seldom fails its object if truly pointed; while we were (what shall i say) totally ignorant of that most essential part of a soldier's duty. they consequently suffered little from our fire; but we could not believe this, and tried to persuade ourselves they had either buried their dead in the sand before we came up to them, or carried them off as they retreated; but experience has since taught me to know that we then must have done them little harm. about the middle of the day, as i and a young man of the name of thomas bambrough (a countryman of my own, and who had volunteered with me,) were moving on in company, in passing through one of the valleys to an opposite height, we were assailed by a little volley from a group of the enemy which we discovered on a hill in front of us; one of which shots took effect in poor bambrough's thigh just about the ham; he instantly fell, and roared out most piteously; i laid down my musket and endeavoured to hoist him on my back, in order to take him out of the fire, which they now poured in without intermission; but in this i failed, for he was so completely disabled by the wound, as to be rendered totally helpless, and it was so extremely painful that he could not bear the least movement. i felt constrained to leave him, although i did so with reluctance, telling him that i would push on to the height we had first in view, to which i then perceived some more of our men had advanced, and would drive the enemy from their position; of course all this was not literally told him, but something to that effect was said; and i found that the moment i left him they ceased to fire on him; and, as i promised, we did drive off the enemy. shortly after, some of our own people came up to where poor bambrough lay, and carried him off to the rear; he was sent to an hospital, where he soon after died, they not being able, i understand, to extract the ball. soon after this, there were some tremendous volleys of musketry heard on our left, apparently down in the plain below us. i, with one or two others, now inclined a little towards the left, in order to have a peep at the troops there, so hotly opposed to each other, in doing which, we still kept our line in front of the enemy's skirmishers. we found it was the russian army endeavouring to force their way towards the village of bergen, the scene of their former disaster; but they were most distressingly retarded by the innumerable canals or ditches, by which the country was so intersected, and which were generally impassable by fording. on some occasions i could perceive, when they had found an entrance into an enclosure, and had fought their way to the farther side of it, they were obliged to retrace their steps, and get out by the same way by which they had entered, the enemy all this while pouring into them a close and destructive fire. this appeared to me to be most trying to their patience, and very disheartening; but they bore it with great steadiness. meantime, our own heavy troops were advancing on the right by the sea-beach, where was a plain of sand, of perhaps from to yards in breadth; the sand-hills between the two wings, as i said before, being swept by us, assisted by a small corps of russian riflemen. we moved on till we got a little in advance of the russian army, (which, from the obstacles they had to contend with, did not make very rapid progress,) and immediately over the village of bergen, which stood on the plain, close under the sand-hills. here, the enemy being in possession of considerable field-works, plied us pretty plenteously with shells from their howitzers, (their guns they could not elevate sufficiently to reach us,) but from which we suffered very little; for our people being much extended, and the sand being deep, the bursting of the shells was attended with very little mischief. indeed, for a long time, i did not know what they were; for, having several times heard a loud explosion pretty near, i actually looked round to see the gun, which i imagined had fired, but could perceive nothing but a cloud of smoke rising from the spot, and the small bushes and herbs about it on fire. i thought it strange, and it was not till it was several times repeated, that we discovered what it really was, for my comrades were equally ignorant with myself. at length, towards the close of the afternoon, a loud and heavy fire of musketry broke out on our right, which continued for a considerable time, and then ceased. this was our heavy infantry, who had advanced by the sea-shore, and who had now approached the village of egmont-op-zee, where the enemy made a most determined stand, but at last were driven back with great slaughter, and our people took possession of the town. from this place the battle derives its name. a little after dark, the enemy abandoned bergen also, so that we ceased any longer to be annoyed by their shells, which they continued to throw while they held possession of the place. but a short while before they retired, one was thrown, which pitched just close over my company, (for we had then been collected, and were formed in close order immediately above the town,) and where colonel sharpe and another officer were walking; it lay for a second or two hissing and burning, and might be expected every moment to explode. their road lay close past it; the veteran however took no notice of it, but continued his walk and conversation the same as if nothing had occurred, and without going an inch out of his way. it burst with a tremendous report, but fortunately without doing either of them the least injury. i confess i thought it rather _too brave_; for it appeared to me that he might have walked a little farther from it, or stopped for a moment or two without any imputation on his courage; but people do not all see things exactly alike. our loss in this action was but trifling, considering the extent of the operations. we had in my company only about fourteen or fifteen men killed and wounded; among the latter were my two countrymen, bambrough, as before noticed, and sutherland. one man of our company, i was told, in charging a fieldpiece, was struck down by the wind of the ball, and which, although it did not touch him, brought blood from his mouth, nose, and ears; he never after thoroughly recovered the effects of it. i do not remember ever to have felt more fatigued than i did after this day's work. we had marched before commencing the action, i should think, twelve miles or more. we had been kept upon the run the greater part of the day, and had fought over nearly as much more ground, through loose sand, sometimes nearly up to the middle of the leg, and over ground so extremely uneven, that a few miles of leisurely walking on such, would be more than i should be able to accomplish now; and we had been nearly all the day deprived of every sort of liquid, for our canteens were soon emptied of what little they contained in the morning, and having myself fired nearly rounds of ammunition, the powder of which, in biting off the ends of the cartridges, had nearly choked me. what would i not have given for a good drink? i felt completely exhausted, and laid me down with the others with great good-will on the top of one of the sand-hills. but the night proved extremely wet, so that every one of us was very soon as completely soaked as if he had been dragged through a river; and, to crown my misfortunes, i was without a blanket. here i must confess my folly, that others similarly situated may profit by my experience. soon after the commencement of the action a rumour was spread along the line of skirmishers, that the duke, seeing the very arduous duty we had to perform, had said, "never mind, my lads, if your knapsacks are any encumbrance to you, and impede your running, throw them off, and i will take care you shall be furnished with others." no sooner did this silly report reach my ears, than i, with many others, equally simple, believed it, without taking time to consider that if even it were true, a knapsack and a blanket, (for they were together,) to be useful should be at hand when wanted. but, simpleton like, away went knapsack and blanket, and i felt greatly relieved in getting rid of such a burden, and now pushed on after the enemy with increased vigour, trying at the same time to persuade myself the report was true; although i own i occasionally had my doubts on the subject. but night came on, as i have said, and such a one as i have seldom seen for wet, and then i plainly perceived that i had played the young soldier. an officer of ours of the name of lacy, who had formerly been the captain of the northumberland light company, and who volunteered with us, offered any man half a guinea for the use of a blanket for that night only, but without being able to obtain one: this will give some idea of the kind of night it was. i had nothing for it, but just to put the cock of my musket between my knees, to keep it as dry as possible, and lay myself down as i was. i endeavoured to get as close as i could to one who had a blanket, and lay down with my head at his feet, which he had covered up very comfortably with his blanket. the rain pelted so heavily and so incessantly on my face, that i ventured after a while to pull a little corner of this man's blanket just to cover my cheek from the pitiless storm, and in this situation snatched a comfortable nap; but he awakening in the night, and finding that i had made free with the corner of his blanket, rudely pulled it from off my face, and rolled it round his feet again. i was fain to lie still and let it pelt away, and even in this exposed situation i got some sleep, so completely were the powers of nature exhausted by fatigue. at length morning arose and showed us to ourselves, and such a group of sweeps we had seldom seen. our clothing was literally all filth and dirt; our arms the colour of our coats with rust; and our faces as black as if we had come out of a coal-pit. in biting off the ends of the cartridges, there are generally a few grains of powder left sticking on the lips and about the mouth; these, accumulated as they must have been by the great quantity of ammunition each of us had fired, and with the profuse perspiration we were in during the heat of the day, added to the wet which fell upon us during the night, had caused the powder to run all over our faces; so that in the morning we cut the most ludicrous figure imaginable. however we immediately set about getting our arms again in trim, for though the enemy had left us masters of the field of action, they were not far distant from us. we soon got our firelocks again in fighting order; that is, they would go off, though the brightness, on which a clean soldier piques himself, was gone past recovery at this time. i now felt rather sore from firing my piece so often; the recoil against my shoulder and breast had blackened them, and rendered them rather painful, and the middle finger of my right hand was completely blackened and swoln from the same cause. at this time it was reported that a sad accident had occurred in our battalion; a soldier of one of our companies, in cleaning his musket, had by some awkwardness allowed it to go off, and an officer being immediately in front of where he was standing, the ball had taken effect upon him, and killed him on the spot. after getting ourselves brushed up a little, the whole battalion was brought together, and moved to the right into the town of egmont-op-zee, where the guards and some other regiments had been since the evening before, after beating the enemy out of it, as i before mentioned. we remained here for that day, during which alkmaar surrendered, and then advanced to the village of egmont binnen, or egmont-op-hoof, i am not certain which it is called, a few miles in front, and close by the sea. i omitted to mention, that our fight of the d took place over the ground from which lord duncan's victory derived its name, _i. e._ camperdown. this headland, i fancy, we must have passed during that day's operations--but to return. we remained in egmont binnen till the morning of the th, when my battalion was ordered to fall in and march towards the outposts, a few miles in front, in order, as we understood, to relieve our grenadier battalion, which had been out since the day before. we advanced by the sea-shore, but had not gone far before we saw and heard unequivocal signs that we should have something more than outpost duty to perform; the fact is, the enemy was rapidly advancing, their force in front having been greatly augmented by reinforcements; but when about two miles from the village, we met a soldier of the th light dragoons bringing in a french officer, whom he had taken prisoner. he belonged to the chasseurs-à-cheval, a sort of mounted light troops, who can act either as infantry or cavalry, as occasion may require. when we met them, and while they stood talking for a moment, i could not help thinking it would have made a fine subject for a painting; for the officer was most superbly dressed in dark green, with a richly embroidered pouch-belt over his shoulder, and with a deep cut across his cheek, from which the blood was streaming over an extremely handsome face; indeed he was altogether a most interesting figure, and, contrasted with the rough features and haughty bearing of the proud trooper who had taken him, produced a fine effect. the fellow gave his horse a slap over the flank with the flat of his sword, and set off with his prisoner, crying out, that there were plenty more of them to take, and that he would soon return and bring in another. as we advanced, we could plainly perceive the enemy in front, skirmishing with our grenadiers, and we also saw that they possessed a pretty strong body of cavalry--a species of troops we had not encountered on the d. we could distinctly perceive the cavalry wading into the sea as far as their horses could go, in order, as we imagined, to see past the point of a projecting sand-hill, which obstructed their view of the beach beyond it; but when they perceived that the force which was advancing against them was not great, they attacked our grenadiers with increased vivacity, and we soon after came in contact with them, for they were advancing with as great rapidity as if no force was in front to oppose them. we soon perceived that they were nearly four times our numbers, and were obliged to adopt such a _ruse de guerre_ as is frequently practised by the weaker party, but which had no effect, i am sorry to say, on this occasion,--that is, while one part of our force was skirmishing, the remainder got behind sand-hills a little in rear, and letting the men's heads just show over their tops, as if standing in columns of battalions, tried to induce the enemy to believe that each separate body which appeared was of that force; but no, johnny (as the soldiers sometimes call the french) was not so easily gulled, for they had previously ascertained pretty accurately the strength of our force in front of them, by the operation of the cavalry before mentioned. they therefore pressed on us with the most desperate fury, and in overwhelming numbers. we maintained the action as well as our limited means permitted, and for a while kept tolerable order; but as the fight became hotter, and the disparity of force more apparent, i regret to say, our young troops fell into considerable disorder and confusion. this giving the enemy greater confidence, of course he availed himself of it, and attacked us with redoubled impetuosity; and, i lament to say, our dismayed and disheartened young soldiers fell from one degree of confusion to another, till at length all order seemed entirely lost amongst us; and what was at first a rather regular retreat, became at last a disorderly flight; for wherever an attempt was made to check the ardour of the enemy, the immense inequality of force they possessed soon completely overthrew the few that stood; and many were the brave fellows, both officers and men, who fell in this unequal contest, without their having the slightest chance of successfully opposing our impetuous foe. the flight now became more like a race than any thing else, and i imagine they drove us not less than three or four miles without giving us time to breathe; but when we had reached within about a mile of the village we had left in the morning, we perceived some regiments advancing to our succour; among them was the d, which advanced in line, and showed so good and steady a front as quite delighted us. we could also perceive to our left, that the russians had become engaged with the force in front of them, and were holding it at bay; indeed by this time the action had extended considerably into the country, and some others of the british troops, i understand, were soon engaged. on the coming up of the reinforcement, the d in particular, our straggling and broken troops, which had been so wofully beaten, now united, and again advanced upon the enemy; and when the d had given them a volley or two, the french gave way and retreated with as great precipitation as they had advanced. in short the tables were turned upon them, and the pursuit of them now was equally rapid with our retreat before them a short while previously; and before the action ceased, we had driven them considerably beyond where we encountered them in the morning. night scarcely put an end to the action, for the firing continued long after dark, each party being directed by the fire from the arms of their opponents; the unwillingness to desist on our part, i attribute to a desire of revenge for the disgrace they had inflicted on us in the morning. towards the evening it came on exceedingly wet. nothing could surpass the steadiness and fine appearance of the d, on entering into action; but they were all old soldiers, while our two battalions were composed altogether, i may say, of volunteers from the militia, who had as little idea of service in the field, as if newly taken from the plough. i would just remark here, that from what i have witnessed upon different occasions, i should never be inclined to put very much confidence in raw troops of whatever nation, or of what stuff soever they may be composed, for it is certain, that without being at all deficient in point of courage, they have not that confidence in their own powers which soldiers who are inured to service possess; and if hastily or hotly set upon, while without the aid and example of others more experienced than themselves, it is many chances to one i think that they will give way. so it was on this occasion. nothing could exceed the materials of which these two battalions were composed, had they had the advantage of a little more experience; and no troops could fight better than they did, after gaining the support and countenance of the old regiments which were sent to reinforce them. but i confess with shame, we showed a great want of nerve in the early part of the day, although to any troops the occasion must have been one of severe trial. when the retreat had degenerated into a flight, and every one seemed intent only on making the best of his way to the rear, i, with some others who were among the hills, imagined we could get on faster if we took to the sea-beach, which, although it also was composed of deep sand, yet was level, and could not be so very fatiguing as climbing the innumerable hills over which we had to retreat. away we accordingly set for the beach; but we had forgotten to calculate that if the beach would facilitate our retreat, it also would the enemy's advance. this we soon discovered, for we had scarcely descended from the hills when we found ourselves almost surrounded by the enemy; and it was not without the utmost exertion in our power that we were enabled to effect our escape, the balls flying thicker about us during our short stay here than they had done all the day before. my haversack was a great encumbrance to me on this occasion, for, having lost my knapsack as before related, i was obliged to stuff every thing i possessed into this inconvenient bag; which, hanging so low as to knock against my thighs, greatly impeded my progress to the rear, and had nigh got me lodged in a french prison. a girl, who had followed a grenadier belonging to my regiment when he volunteered out of the militia, accompanied her protector during the whole of this day's operations, and shared equally with him every danger and fatigue to which he was exposed, and no argument could prevail upon her to leave him till the whole business was over, and till the battalion to which her sweetheart belonged was sent to the rear at night. i am not certain whether it was his royal highness's intention to have fought this day, or whether the action was brought on fortuitously; but certainly, although we began the fight under very unfavourable circumstances, and things looked rather awkward at one part of the day, no army ever got a more complete drubbing than the french did before the business terminated. i have since learnt that the action became general along the whole line towards the close of the day. thus ended the last affair between the british and french troops during that unfortunate expedition. the next day we fell back upon egmont binnen, leaving sufficiently strong outposts to occupy the ground we had taken, and this day i was fortunate enough to pick up the shell of an artilleryman's knapsack who had been killed in one of the late fights; but for necessaries i was totally destitute, and began soon after to feel the effects of my folly in throwing away my own. a little before midnight of the evening of the th, we were again ordered under arms with all dispatch and without noise, and had no doubt it was for the purpose of advancing as before, so as to reach the enemy's line by daylight next morning. how great then was our surprise and disappointment, when we turned our faces towards the rear, and filed out of the village by the road leading towards our old quarters! we moved on in silence till we reached egmont-op-zee, where the flashes from a large coal fire erected by way of lighthouse, shed a melancholy gleam over our columns as we passed beneath the hill on which it was erected. here also by the sea lay innumerable dead bodies, both of men and horses, together with broken tumbrils and other sad emblems of the devastation which a few days previously had been made on this very ground; for here it was that the heat and principal part of the action of the d took place, when the heavy columns of the opposing armies came in contact with each other. it would not be easy to describe our feelings as we moved sadly and silently along, knowing, as we now did, that we were for ever abandoning all the advantages that we had hitherto gained, after so much toil, privations, and loss as we had suffered; but it was useless to repine. our leaders must know better than we could possibly do, what state the army was in, and what likelihood remained of effecting the object for which we came into the country; our duty therefore was to obey, without questioning the propriety of our present movement, however unpleasant it might be to our feelings. we passed by old patten, near to which the action of the d commenced, and finally returned to our old quarters at zaand wyck, which we reached some time next day, and where i found my comrade sutherland, who had been here for some days; his wound, which was through the shoulder, not having disabled him from making his way thus far. he had some mutton already cooked, of which i partook with great relish, for i needed refreshment much; and after taking a swig out of his canteen, i laid me down and slept most soundly, rejoiced and thankful that i had so comfortable a home to return to. we remained in this quarter only a day or two, and then our brigade was removed towards the left of the line, which, as well as i remember, rested upon kolhorn. my battalion occupied the village of basingohorn, to which we had retired on a former occasion; i mean on our retreat from hoorne. this was one of the villages farthest in advance, consequently it became an outpost. a night or two passed quietly, but on the second or third night, a firing commenced from the advanced sentries all along the line. whether the enemy had merely been making a reconnoissance, or whether they had intended to advance in force, and our discovering them altered their plan, i know not, but think the former the more probable; but be as it may, it had the effect of turning out our whole line of outposts, which, as might be expected, prepared to give them the best reception we were able. i remember on this occasion putting in two balls when we were ordered to load, as i was determined not to spare them, for i (with all my comrades i believe) felt sore at having been obliged to yield up all the advantages we had gained, to an enemy which we certainly did not consider as having fairly won them from us in action, but who were more indebted to the severity of the weather, producing such disastrous consequences on our young army, than to their prowess in the field. they retired, however, without giving us an opportunity of welcoming them in the manner we intended. a few days after this, on the th october, it came to my turn to be one of the advanced sentries. about break of day, while musing of many things, of home with all its comforts, and contrasting it with my then rather uncomfortable situation, i was suddenly aroused from my reverie by the beating of drums and sounding of trumpets and music, &c., all along the french line. i could not conjecture the cause of all this, for although it is customary to sound and beat the réveille at this hour, yet never having heard the french do so before, i concluded something more than ordinary had occurred to cause them to do so on this occasion, and i need hardly inform my reader that i kept a good look-out, in order that they should not catch us napping. in a short while, however, the mystery was cleared up; for an officer of ours came round all the advanced sentries to tell us, that, as an armistice had been concluded, we were not any longer to prevent the country-people from passing and repassing, as we had formerly had orders to do. i imagine the festive noises which i heard arose from this circumstance having taken place, for i believe the french were tired enough of the business, although they had now become in some measure the assailants; or else the cessation of hostilities allowed them to resume their wonted custom of beating the réveille in the morning. seeing we had failed in our attempt to wrest the country from the french, and that no hope now remained of our ever being in a condition to effect it, the prospect of returning home once more became a pleasing consideration, and i fully gave way to it. my comrades also now began to turn their thoughts homeward, and cheerfulness once more beamed on countenances which for some days past had been rather gloomy. but by this time the dysentery had made sad ravages among our young and inexperienced soldiery, for on a day soon after this, we could in my company muster on parade only eighteen men out of one hundred, of which it was composed at the outset. this inefficiency was caused principally by disease, although we had certainly lost a fair proportion in the field. it was therefore well that our removal to a more favourable soil was about speedily to take place; and wisely had his royal highness acted in agreeing to evacuate a country, the climate of which had been so extremely prejudicial to his army. about this time also, i began to have my personal trials and sufferings; for now i began to feel the full effect of my folly on the d inst., in throwing away my knapsack, for i had not a change of any description, and the consequence may be easily conjectured. filth and vermin now began to add poignancy to my other sufferings, but i bore up against them all as well as i was able; and i have reason to thank god, that the strength of a good constitution enabled me to continue my duty without yielding for one day to the accumulated effects of these disagreeables. soon after this also, the good people of england, commiserating our uncomfortable situation, sent out presents of flannel shirts and shoes, which arrived most opportunely. i was not fortunate enough to obtain one of the former necessary articles, but my sergeant kindly put me down for a pair of shoes, of which i stood in great need, and now beg to return my best thanks to the kind friends who sent them, although at the time we expected we should have to pay for them. in a short while after this, the grenadiers and light battalions were broken up, and each company returned and joined its own proper regiment. we joined ours (the th) at a weeshaus (or poorhouse), situated on the great canal which connects this part of holland with alkmaer, and not far from schagen-bruck. here we were occupied for a few days in putting things in the best order we could, previous to our embarkation. about the d november we marched for the helder, from whence we went on board. on our way down, one of my comrades, who was not over scrupulous in expressing his sentiments, was railing bitterly against the mismanagement (as he imagined) of the expedition, and saying, "he hoped the next time we came to that country, should we ever come again, that we would leave it under more favourable circumstances." general manners (to whose brigade we now belonged) was riding close behind, unknown to this complainer, and overheard every word he said. when the soldier had finished, the general most good-naturedly rode up to him, and began to argue the matter with him. "why," says he, "although we are leaving the country, it is not from the enemy having compelled us to do so from his superior bravery or success in the field, for we have fought only five actions since landing, and in four of these we have been the conquerors; it is owing solely to the great sickness and consequent inefficiency of the army that we have been compelled to this measure." i could not but admire the affability and kindness of the general, and was fully satisfied myself, and so were all who heard him, of, i believe, the justness of the remarks he made. we reached the helder the same day, where we remained doing duty till the th november, on which we embarked on board his majesty's ship romney, of fifty guns, commanded by captain lawford, (afterwards by sir home popham.) she was only a small vessel of her class, and yet our whole regiment was put on board her; we indeed were not very strong, but she was crowded beyond measure, for many, nay, most of the troops had not literally lying room, each company having barely the space between two guns, which, i should think, is not more than twelve feet at the utmost, and even here the sailors, whether with or without orders i know not, slung their hammocks over us. i particularly remember this being the case, for i had the second night, by way of securing room to stretch myself, lain down between decks early in the evening, and had had some little repose, when a sailor, whose hammock was slung right over me, and while standing and making it, put his foot right on my cheek, and stood there till he had finished. i know not whether he knew that it was a human head he was treading on, but i judged it best to be as quiet as possible; preferring the pain of bearing his weight on my head, rather than, by moving or crying out, to incur the risk of his foot slipping, and peeling the skin off my face. the voyage was fortunately short, for in seven days we landed at yarmouth, glad and rejoiced that this unpleasant and ill-fated expedition was terminated. i know not whether my reader is old enough to remember the autumn of which i have been speaking, but to me it appeared one of the wettest and most uncomfortable that i ever remember; and it was here, while exposed to its effects, that were laid, most probably, the seeds of that severe pulmonic affection from which i have since suffered so much. chapter iii. arrive in england--the pompadours embark for ireland--arrive at kinsale--privations in ireland in --peace concluded--our author resolves to return home, but ultimately volunteers into the rifle corps or th--embarks for england, and joins his regiment at sussex--is promoted. we landed at yarmouth on the th november, and the next day marched to norwich, where we remained a few days, and where we found the people remarkably kind and attentive to our comforts; and, indeed, we now cut a most sorry figure, being literally nothing but rags and dirt; it was certainly a sad tax on the good landlords on whom we were billeted, to be compelled to find us lodgings, for we never left the beds unoccupied by some of the uncomfortable companions of our travels when we arose in the morning. i here began to find myself very unwell, for though i had borne up against sickness in the field, i could not now receive my food without feeling the most afflicting nausea, my stomach being completely out of order; and it was no wonder, for we had been compelled for several weeks past to drink the brackish water of the ditches of holland, no springs (that ever i saw) being there to be found, and the little water in their wells, when we arrived in the country, being speedily exhausted. we had also been deprived of salt nearly all the time of our sojourn in that country, one of the greatest privations that i know of. through the nursing of my kind landlady, however, i gradually regained my appetite, and with it my health, for which i have reason to be truly thankful to him who has ever dealt so mercifully with me. in a few days we left norwich on our route to chelmsford, and on our way passed through bury st edmunds, where my late regiment, the northumberland militia, was quartered; they vied with each other in showing us kind attentions, but our miserable appearance put the soldiers of this regiment sadly out of love with the regular service. we did not remain at chelmsford long, but marched again for horsham in sussex, on which occasion i for the first time had a view of the metropolis, as we passed through it, by way of whitechapel and london bridge, &c. at horsham we were quartered during the remainder of this winter. about the th or th of february , we marched for portsmouth, where we embarked for ireland on the th. on this occasion the regiment was put on board two first-rate frigates; the endymion was that on which the left wing went on board, but i do not recollect the name of the other. an agreement was entered into between the two captains, i understood, to sail for fifty guineas, they both being considered fast vessels; our destination was cork; they were to start together, and the first there of course to be the winner. we sailed with a favourable breeze, and got on most delightfully, having, soon after sailing, parted from our antagonist, and passing, if i recollect right, inside the isles of scilly, we in a few days drew near our destined port. but on the th, as we were pushing on with all our might, having every stitch of sail set, a squall came on so suddenly, that, before she could be stripped of her superfluous clothing, she was actually running bows under water, the sea entering the bow-ports, and making its way along between decks, like to wash every thing away before it. at this time the log was hove, and we were going at the (i believe) unparalleled rate of fifteen knots an hour. but unfortunately for our captain, the vessel was completely driven out of her course, and towards evening we entered the harbour of kinsale, thus losing the fifty guineas, although we were no doubt the better sailer. this was the first gale i had experienced, and i did not relish it; but when we entered the harbour, where the water was quite smooth, the sensation i felt was most delightful, after having been buffeted most violently by the sea without. the next day we landed, and were billeted in kinsale, and here i had the first view of irishmen and irish manners. i need not attempt to describe them; for could i, so many have done it before me, that the subject is almost exhausted. in a day or two after landing, we marched to cork, where the right wing had been landed, and with which we of course formed a junction. we remained in ireland from this time till the peace of was concluded, and were quartered successively in the towns of cork, kilkenny, clonmel, fermoy, and kinsale; but as there was nothing which could interest a reader that occurred to me during this period, i shall pass it over in silence, save mentioning the following:--in the year , it is well known the utmost distress was experienced by the poor of both countries, a scarcity, the effects of the wet harvest of , having grievously afflicted all the british dominions. but in ireland, the sufferings of the poor were great, beyond the conception of an englishman who has not witnessed them, and many hundreds of them, i believe, actually perished of want. but my tale relates more immediately to my own sufferings and those of my comrades; for we had then but what was termed a "black shilling a day," that is twelve pence irish, an english or white shilling, or hog, going in that country for thirteen pence; we had not then any beer money either, but had solely this black shilling to subsist on. meat at this time was no less than d. per lb., of which each man received half a pound; bread was d. per lb., of which we also got half a pound. this half pound of bread, and half pound of meat, and that not of the best, was all we had to live on, and do our duty, which was not always of the easiest description. the remainder of our shilling was taken to furnish necessaries, washing, pipeclay, &c., for i do not remember that we ever laid in any sort of vegetables for the pot. potatoes were out of the question, for they were no less than three shillings a stone of fourteen pounds. although we did not absolutely suffer want, the reader will perceive that we were but sparely dieted; the consequence was, innumerable robberies of potato fields, and gardens, &c., in the neighbourhood of our quarters; and many were the men that got punished for this crime, but it could not be put a stop to, for hunger is not easily borne. indeed, on one occasion, i myself was seduced, by the persuasion of my comrades and by the cravings of hunger, into the commission of this crime. i remember well i was on what was termed the commissariat guard, a short distance from the town of fermoy, when my companions, thinking it a favourable opportunity for procuring something to eat, prevailed upon me to accompany them to a garden near the bridge, into which we entered, and each of us returned loaded with a fine cabbage, and which afforded us an excellent meal after our relief from guard. it is impossible to justify such an act, but the reader will be convinced, i trust, that sheer hunger alone urged me to the perpetration of this crime. others, i have no doubt, were equally ill off, who did not resort to such disgraceful means of satisfying their hunger, but bore it with patient resignation. i believe that such was the case, and take shame to myself for yielding either to the calls of nature or the solicitations of my companions, some others of whom were not so scrupulous. during this distressing season i sold a watch which had formerly been my father's, and with which i felt extremely loath to part. i also received a little money from home, all, or nearly all, of which was expended in procuring food. the hedges and fields, &c. in the vicinity, were ransacked in all directions, for the purpose of procuring bramble-berries, nettles, &c. &c.; in short, for any thing that was eatable. such was our situation during several months, while under the command of lieut.-col. skinner, who, although an excellent officer, had little idea of disposing of a soldier's pay to the best advantage; but latterly we were commanded by major keating, who, making the comfort of the soldiers under his command his continual study and delight, soon adopted a system which secured to us plenty in comparison of our former state. he left off the meat and bread save occasionally, and procured for us plenty of oatmeal and milk, by which means our wasted bodies began shortly after to resume quite another appearance. we were quartered at lap's island, in cork, when the news arrived of peace having been concluded; and as the bulk of the regiment had volunteered from the militia for five years, or during the war, measures were taken for discharging all those who did not re-enlist either into their own or other regiments. my mind was fully made up to return home; for although, as i said before, i never repented of having entered the regular service, yet i knew that the anxiety of my dear parents for my return was so great, that i had settled it fully in my own mind to leave the army. another reason operated with me partly in forming this resolution--i had persuaded myself that i ought to have been promoted--for i judged myself fully capable of conducting the duties of a non-commissioned officer, and i flattered myself my conduct had been generally unexceptionable; but i was disappointed, for the great numbers in my company, who were judged both more deserving and better qualified, and withal better-looking soldiers, put it out of the question for me to look forward to promotion. i was in this state when an officer and a party of the rifle corps arrived at cork, to receive such of the men of the different regiments then about to be discharged, as chose to volunteer, for this novel, and, as some thought, dangerous service. i cannot account for the impulse with which i was urged on, from the moment i had seen one of the men, to enter this corps. something strange seemed to push me on, contrary to the full determination to return home, which had possessed me an hour before. i will not attempt to account for it, but such was the fact. i immediately, with some others of my regiment, gave in my name as a volunteer for the rifle corps, and was in consequence in a day or two sworn into that corps, in which i have ever considered it an honour to serve, and which i have reason to thank a kind and overruling providence i ever entered. no news of course could be so afflictive to my dear parents, as to hear of the last rash and irretrievable step which i had taken. it had wellnigh broken their hearts, for they fully calculated on my returning home, as i had written to that effect. judge then of their surprise and sorrow, when they learnt that i had entered, what was deemed by some, a condemned corps, and that for life--and that the west indies would no doubt soon be my grave. on my leaving the th, the officers of my company expressed their regret that i should quit the regiment, and told me, that although the mode hitherto pursued of keeping all the best-looking men in the light company had kept many from obtaining promotion, who otherwise would have been made non-commissioned officers, yet that mode was no longer to be adhered to, and that i might shortly expect to be promoted into another company, if i would consent to remain. i thanked them, and told them i had made up my mind, on which they each gave me a certificate as to character, &c., recommending me to the officers of my new corps, and which were of service to me afterwards. the sergeant who had been sent to receive us, at once became my stanch friend, and employed me, as the party was now become pretty strong, to act as a non-commissioned officer. every thing went on quite smoothly, and i felt happy in my new corps, and in my new employment. we marched soon after to waterford, and thence to passage, and there embarked for the isle of wight, and without encountering any remarkable event arrived at cowes on the th june, ; here we remained a day or two, and then marched for the regiment in sussex. we found them at east bourne, although blatchington was their quarter, but they had been sent out of it on account of the assizes or election, i do not remember which. we immediately commenced our light drill, in which i took great delight; but most of all i liked the shooting at the target. as recruits, we were first drilled at what is termed the horse, _i. e._ a machine to assist young riflemen in taking aim. at this i pleased my commanding-officer so much the first time i tried, that he ordered me to the front, and told me to load, and fire at the target. i did, and made a pretty good shot, hitting pretty near the bull's eye; on which he made me load again and fire, and hitting that also, he made me go on till i had fired ten rounds, all of which hit the target, and two of which had struck the bull's eye. the distance indeed was only fifty yards, but for a recruit, that is, a person unaccustomed to rifle-shooting, he called it a wonderful exhibition, and in consequence he gave me sixpence out of his pocket, and ordered me home. i thought the reward quite inadequate, so natural is it for us to overrate our own deservings. this officer (major wade) was one of the best shots himself that i have almost ever seen. i have known him, and a soldier of the name of smeaton, hold the target for each other at the distance of yards, while the other fired at it, so steady and so accurate was both their shooting. i continued to maintain my character as a good shot, which in a rifle corps is a great recommendation, and proceeded in acquiring a knowledge of my other duties with such steadiness as obtained the approbation of my officers. we soon after marched to chatham--and while there, several non-commissioned officers being employed on the recruiting service, i was employed in doing the duty of one, having been appointed what is termed a "chosen man." i must record the manner of my appointment. an acting-sergeant was doing the duty of pay-sergeant of our company, but he took it into his head to go all wrong, spending the money intrusted to him for the payment of the men. he of course was deprived of the situation; and on this occasion it was, that the officer commanding the company came to me one day, and said to me, "surtees, i shall be _forced_ to make you a chosen man." i thanked him, but could not help reflecting on the strange mode of expressing himself which he had adopted. the fact is, i believe, without thinking about the opinion i must form of the compliment he was paying me, he had been indeed forced to it, for he had no one to pay the company besides; and as i was not yet dismissed from the drill, it was an unprecedented measure. but he need not have told the _whole_ truth on this occasion, for i should have been no worse a non-commissioned officer, had he been more complimentary; but he was a _plain_ man, and not much given to compliment. on our march hither, some of the men broke into the plate chest of the officers' mess, while the baggage stopped in maidstone; one man was discovered, and tried for it, and sentenced to receive lashes, all of which he took at one standing, and that without evincing much suffering; this was the most i ever saw inflicted at one time. we marched again from chatham in september, and on the d of october arrived at thorncliffe. while here, my parents interested mr beaumont, m.p. for my native county, to solicit my discharge from the honourable colonel stewart, my then commanding-officer, they paying the regulated sum to the government. the colonel sent for me, and talked with me on the subject, and argued most forcibly in favour of my remaining in the regiment, saying he had intended to promote me the first vacancy; and that he had no doubt whatever of seeing me one day an officer. i own my views were not so sanguine; but his reasoning prevailed, and i consented to remain. soon after, an opportunity offering, i was appointed corporal on the th of the same month. here again i had disappointed my beloved and tender parents, for it was not without considerable trouble and difficulty they obtained the interference of mr beaumont, and now i had again thrown cold water on all their endeavours to obtain my discharge. i fear i have much to answer for, as respects my conduct towards them. may god forgive me! chapter iv. made pay-sergeant--moral reflections--wreck of a dutch east indiaman--reduced officers--war with france in --encampment at thorncliffe under the command of general sir john moore--encampment broke up, november, --embark for germany, october, --vicissitudes at sea--land at cuxhaven--march to bremen--outposts established--retrograde movements, in consequence of the defeat of the allied forces at austerlitz--the allied forces evacuate germany--re-embarkation of the troops--the rifle corps, or th, land at yarmouth. having given satisfaction as a corporal, i was shortly after appointed acting-sergeant; and in that capacity also, having pleased my officers, i was, on a vacancy occurring on the th of february following, appointed sergeant, and given the payment of a company. my head was almost turned by such rapid promotion, and i began in earnest to contemplate the possibility of my colonel's predictions being one day verified. kind providence watched over me, however, and kept me from being too much elated, and of committing myself as i otherwise might have done. indeed i many times did commit things which, if strictly searched into, would have brought censure upon me, and lowered the high opinion that both myself and others entertained of me; but nothing that openly violated the law by which i was then governed (although many of god's laws i daily transgressed) was done by me. i was at this time, although careful to secure the good opinion of my officers, little solicitous to please him who had alone lavished all this bounty upon me. indeed i believe i was as ungodly at this time as i ever remember to have been, and yet he caused me to prosper. oh! how i ought to feel shame and confusion of face at the recollection of such abused goodness and mercy! may he pardon me for christ's sake! a short while before my appointment as sergeant, a most melancholy occurrence took place in the neighbourhood of our cantonment. a large dutch east indiaman, outward bound to batavia, and full of troops, in passing down channel, mistook, i understand, the light at dungeness for one on the french coast, and in consequence stood in towards dymchurch wall instead of keeping out to sea. as might be expected, she was not long in striking on the wall, running with her bow quite close under the road, and in an instant, almost, went to pieces; and although numbers of people were early at the spot, and some, i believe, at the very moment she struck, they could render the unfortunate sufferers no effectual aid, although only a few yards distant from them. out of about persons on board, only seven men were saved. many poor fellows, i understand, attempted to swim on shore, some on planks, and others without any aid; but such was the tremendous swell, and the general destruction of the ship so rapid, that only those seven before mentioned succeeded; and they not without being all more or less injured by pieces of the wreck. an admiral, i understood, was on board, and perished; several beautiful females were afterwards cast ashore among the dead, the wives or daughters, no doubt, of some on board; they were for the most part nearly naked, so that it is conjectured they had been in bed. as might be expected, the allurement to plunder so valuable a wreck was not resisted by the natives of this part of the coast, but colonel stewart humanely placed strong bodies of the regiment at different points where the wreck had drifted, to secure as much of the property as he could for the dutch government, and also to collect and bring in the numerous dead bodies which floated along the shore; all of which he had decently interred in the churchyard at thorncliffe, and had the poor wounded survivors taken into hospital, where every care was taken of them. indeed nothing could exceed the unremitting attention which he paid both to the dead and living on this most melancholy occasion, and for which he received, as he well merited, the thanks of the dutch government. about this period we had several individuals serving in the corps as soldiers, who had been officers in the army during the late war, but who, from different causes, had been reduced to the necessity of enlisting as private soldiers. the first that i remember was a person of the name of conway welch, who, i understood, had been an officer, and i think the adjutant of the surrey rangers. he got on to the rank of corporal, but, being excessively wild, i believe he never attained a higher rank. i do not remember what became of him. the second was called hughes; he was, i believe, when he enlisted, actually in the receipt of half-pay as a lieutenant of the line. he was a person of good conduct, and was soon promoted to the rank of corporal, and the colonel took him for his own private clerk, or secretary, as he was denominated; but he did not remain long in this situation, for he was shortly after called upon full pay of his rank in the army. i believe his case was a singular one. the third unfortunate individual was of the name of tait. he had been a captain in the caithness legion, but reduced when the regiment was broken up at the peace. he conducted himself extremely well for some time after he came into the regiment, and got on so far as to become pay-sergeant of a company. but in this situation, having considerable sums at his command, he became involved through his dissipation, and being unable to extricate himself from his difficulties, he adopted the fatal resolution of committing suicide, and accordingly, when quartered at woodbridge, he one day retired to his room, loaded his rifle, and blew out his brains. the story of the fourth individual is a scarcely less melancholy one. his name was m'laughlan. i had known him while serving in my late regiment, as he had been an officer in the light company of the th regiment, and stood next in the light battalion to the company to which i belonged. he, shortly before our embarkation for holland, got involved, through a gambling transaction i heard, and was in consequence obliged to dispose of his commission, which, it would appear from this, he had originally purchased. but interest was made in his behalf, and he was permitted to accompany his regiment to holland in the capacity of a volunteer, and he accordingly assumed the firelock and bayonet in place of his former weapon, the sword. he was fortunate enough to obtain another commission before the return of the troops to england, but how he became deprived of that i have been unable to learn. but about the latter end of , he enlisted as a private in my corps. his conduct here was far from good, and he consequently never rose higher, for he was continually in scrapes from his dissipated habits; and becoming tired of the restraint laid upon him by the strict discipline which our excellent commanding-officer enforced, he one day made an attempt to desert and join the french at boulogne, and was picked up by one of our cruisers in endeavouring to cross the channel in an open boat. he was brought back handcuffed, and lodged in the guard-house one day when i happened to be sergeant commanding the guard. as i looked on him, i could not help reflecting on the strange vicissitudes which attend some men in their passage through life. here was a person whom i had known only a few years before while encamped on barham downs, a gay and handsome young officer, moving in the circle of men of gallantry and honour; and now behold him a wretched culprit, stretched on the wooden guard-bed, manacled like a felon. in contrasting his miserable situation with my own so much happier lot, what ample cause had i for gratitude to that kind and indulgent providence, which had preserved me from those excesses, which entailed so much misery on others. he was shortly after tried by a general court-martial, and transported as a felon for life. i understand a sister of his was at thorncliffe at the time of his trial, &c., the wife of a brevet lieutenant-colonel in the th regiment. what must she have felt! it will be recollected that, in , war again broke out between this country and france, as my preceding story had intimated. the army was consequently augmented again, and my corps, till now called the "rifle corps," was made the th. this year a camp was formed on thorncliffe, under the command of that able general and excellent man sir john moore. this was termed by some the "vanguard of england," for here it was that the then threatened invasion of this country by bonaparte must most likely have taken place, it being immediately opposite to the grand camp then forming at boulogne. daily rencontres took place between our cruisers and his far-famed flotilla; and on one occasion, the belief that he was sending forth his invincible host was so great, that our camp was struck, the troops turned out, and received each man his sixty rounds of ammunition; the waggons and carts were all put in immediate requisition, and the inhabitants were flying in all directions. but to our disappointment, i will not say whether disagreeable or otherwise, it all ended in smoke; it happened to have been some of his flotilla making a movement along the coast, which had been set on by our cruisers and pretty roughly handled. we remained in this camp till the th of november, i think, having occasionally before this period had our tents blown from over our heads by the autumnal gales. the next year a more formidable camp was formed on the same ground, the force having been augmented by a second line, composed of regiments of militia. this year also, like the last, passed over without witnessing the long-threatened invasion of old england, although bonaparte, in the pride of his heart and the vanity of his mind, had begun to erect a monument near boulogne, to commemorate that glorious achievement. my regiment, on the breaking up of the camp, marched into hythe barracks, where we remained till the month of april, . in the spring of this year another volunteering from the militia into regiments of the line was ordered, on which occasion i was selected by my commanding-officer, lieut.-colonel beckwith, to accompany lieutenant evans, of the regiment, down to my native county, to receive such men of the militia regiments there as chose to enter the th. on this occasion we were very successful, having obtained between seventy and eighty men from the different regiments in the north. it was on this occasion that i had the first opportunity, since i became a soldier, of visiting my native village, and my greatly-distressed parents and family. i need not describe the meeting that took place between us, on my first seeing them--it will be better conceived than told;--suffice it to say, joy and sorrow were strangely mingled together--joy to see me once more safe and sound--but sorrow that the line of life i had adopted should so soon, so very soon, call upon me to part from them again. in fact, i could only remain with them three days, at the end of which, i had orders to join my party at morpeth. with this respectable batch of volunteers we marched, and joined the regiment at canterbury, whither it had been removed during our absence, and, on our arrival, received the thanks of our commanding-officer for our exertions. here, and at this time, a second battalion to the th was formed, the sergeant-majorship of which i was in hopes of obtaining; but in this i was disappointed, for a sergeant, who was both much older than me, and had much stronger claims than i could pretend to, was selected for the situation; and although he did not turn out so well afterwards as was expected, yet these circumstances ought to have satisfied me at the time that no injustice was done me by bestowing it upon him. but such was my folly, and the over-high opinion i entertained of my own merits, that i could not quietly acquiesce in this most just arrangement; and foolishly imagining myself ill-used, the chagrin of which drove me to the adoption of one of the worst expedients possible, i immediately took to drinking and to the neglect of my proper duties, thinking, like an ass as i was, that i should thus revenge myself for my supposed ill-usage, forgetting that it was only on myself that this revenge could ultimately fall. however, the same good providence which has mercifully and so continually watched over me, stepped in to my aid in this my most dangerous situation; for one day my captain, who had always been my friend, sent for me, and urged upon me the folly and the baseness of my present conduct, and the unhappy consequences to myself that were likely to result from persisting in a course so absurd and blame-worthy. this, with my own reasoning on the subject, brought me at length to a better disposition of mind, and induced me once more to resume my duties with cheerfulness and alacrity. i have mentioned this circumstance, because i believe i was nearer at this time to falling into my original nothingness, than i ever have been, either before or since; and i have no doubt that many an excellent non-commissioned officer and soldier have been involved in the like error, who have not been so fortunate as i was in escaping its consequences. from canterbury we marched to brabourn lees barracks, in the same county, where we remained till some time in october, when we were called upon to embark for lower germany. during our stay at brabourn lees, a circumstance occurred which called forth an exhibition of as great magnanimity, on the part of colonel beckwith, as i almost ever remember to have witnessed: we had received about irish volunteers, who were wild and ungovernable in the extreme; a party of these, in strolling about one day, had fallen in with mrs beckwith, with her maid and child, taking a walk along the ashford road. not knowing, i imagine, who the lady and her maid were, they set on and assaulted them in the most violent and outrageous manner, proceeding to such lengths as perhaps delicacy forbids to mention. it was, i believe, discovered who they were. accordingly, the next day, the colonel formed the battalion into a square, and proceeded to relate the circumstance to the regiment; "but," says he, "although i know who the ruffians are, i will not proceed any farther in the business, because it was _my own wife_ that they attacked; but, had it been the wife of the meanest soldier in the regiment, i solemnly declare i would have given you every lash which a court-martial might have sentenced you." such a trait of generous forbearance is not often met with; but by this, and similar instances of liberal feeling, he completely gained the heart of every soldier in the battalion, a thing not always attainable by very excellent commanding-officers. about the latter end of october, , we marched to ramsgate, and there embarked, as before noticed, for germany. it was my lot, on this occasion, to be put on board a small and ill-shaped collier brig, called the jane of shields, but the master i have forgot. she was a most miserable sailer, making on a wind almost as much lee as head-way, and in every respect ill adapted for the transport service. we had not been many days at sea before we lost the fleet, and in our endeavours to find it again were at one time on the coast of jutland. all this time we had been beating against a contrary wind; but while here, the wind became favourable, and we appeared to have nothing to do but to bear away for the mouth of the elbe, which river it was our destination to enter; but unfortunately, by some mismanagement, we fell quite away to leeward of it, and got entangled between the mainland and the island of wangeroog, not far from the mouth of jade river, instead of the elbe. while in this uncomfortable situation, it came on to blow a tremendous gale, which rendered our position not only most unpleasant, but extremely perilous, for we were embayed, and the wind blowing on a lee shore, and the vessel became almost unmanageable, her bad sailing becoming distressingly more apparent the more she was put on her mettle. in the midst of the confusion attendant on such circumstances, the master (with what intention i know not, whether to drown dull care, or to fortify him against his exposure to the watery element) went down below, and swallowed the best part of a bottle of brandy. in doing which, his corner cupboard, with all its contents, came rattling down about his ears. he would fain have had me to pledge him, but i begged to be excused. the consequence was, he became quite drunk at the time when all his abilities as a seaman were likely to be called into operation; but he probably saw things clearest after having his eye wet. my commanding-officer now became quite alarmed for the safety of the troops, seeing the master had incapacitated himself, as he conceived, for the management of the vessel; and, after a consultation among our officers, an attempt was made to deprive him of the command, and intrust it to the mate, who had in this case, in order to save as many of the troops as possible, determined on running the vessel high and dry, as he termed it, on the sandy beach, near the jade river. at this proposal, however, the master stormed and blasphemed like a madman, swearing there was neither soldier nor sailor on board the ship but himself. he went so far, and became so outrageous, that our commanding-officer talked of hanging him up at the yard-arm; but it being a ticklish thing to take the command of a ship from the person legally authorized to exercise it, the major did not enforce the wishes of the officers. the poor mate sat down on the companion and cried like a child, partly owing to the abuse the captain gave him, and partly, i imagine, from the hopelessness of our situation. the captain, in his refusal to yield up the command, told the major he had been several times wrecked, and had been, i know not how many times, exposed for a considerable length of time in the water; and that he was not afraid to encounter it again. this, however, was but poor consolation to landsmen, who had not been accustomed to such duckings. a desperate case requires a desperate remedy--so our captain thought--for he instantly clapped on the vessel the square mainsail, which every moment threatened to carry away the mast, and in which case, nothing could have prevented our destruction; however, providence so ordered it, that she bore it through the gale, and he, after putting her on the outward tack, continued to stand from the land till he imagined he had completely weathered wangeroog; but at midnight, when he ordered to put about the ship, had it not been for the cabin-boy providentially seeing close to leeward of us the light of wangeroog, we should instantly have been upon the rocks. this will show either what a bad sailer the vessel was, or how far the master had miscalculated the distance; for he imagined himself by this time to be quite clear of all the land, and considerably out to sea. he continued, after this providential escape, to stand on the same tack, and just cleared the island; and in the morning, the wind having somewhat abated, and shifted a little in our favour, we were enabled, soon after, to lay our course. we arrived in the elbe, and landed at cuxhaven on the th of november, , the day on which our fleet there was celebrating the victory of trafalgar--clouded indeed it was by the death of the hero who fell while achieving it--yet glorious to the nation to which that fleet belonged. we, immediately after landing, marched for dorum, a village twelve or fourteen miles distant, and from thence by osterholtz and bremer lehe to the city of bremen. on our arrival there, (my battalion forming the advanced guard,) we found the gates were shut against us; a prussian garrison was in the town, the commandant of which seemingly did not know how to act, whether to admit us as allies, or not, the policy of his government at that time being so extremely ambiguous. colonel beckwith, who commanded the advance, was not however easily to be deterred from executing his orders, and he hesitated not to tell them, that if they did not choose to admit us peaceably, force should be resorted to to gain an entrance. this had the desired effect, for the gate was soon after thrown open, and we were received by the authorities of the town, and by the inhabitants in general, with the warmest expressions of friendship and cordial attachment; the prussian officers, all the while looking on, apparently not over-well pleased with the conduct of their hosts; they were soon afterwards, however, withdrawn from the territory, and we then remained sole occupiers of this part of the country. our army assembled in this city in considerable force, when it becoming necessary to establish outposts in advance, my battalion was sent out first to the town of delmenhorst, and subsequently a part of it to the city of oldenburg, and the remainder to the town of wildishausen; to this latter place two companies were detached, under the command of major travers, and to which he appointed me to act as sergeant-major. we did not remain long in this situation, but were again recalled from wildishausen to delmenhorst, and afterwards sent to join the other companies at oldenburg. here we staid some time, during which we experienced the most unbounded hospitality and kindness from the whole of the inhabitants, but more particularly from the duke. he actually did not know how sufficiently to express his friendly disposition towards our officers in general,--his kindness also extended to the soldiers,--for when we afterwards received an order to retrograde again to delmenhorst, he sent forward to the half-way house refreshments of every description, for both officers and men; and the night before we left this hospitable city, he gave a splendid ball in honour of the officers of our corps, to which, of course, every inhabitant of a suitable rank was invited. nay, i heard, and have no reason to doubt the correctness of the report, that he wrote to the burgomaster of bremen, to which city we again retired, to endeavour, if possible, to have us quartered in his immediate neighbourhood, in the best part of the town, for that not only the officers, but the soldiers of the corps, were perfect gentlemen; indeed, the conduct of the battalion at this time, under its kind and excellent commanding-officer, was such as to entitle it to the highest praise. our retreat on this occasion, i understood, was rendered necessary, in consequence of the defeat of the allied forces at austerlitz, and of the fatal termination by that sanguinary action of the campaign in that part of germany. although i am no prophet, i predicted at this period what the result would be to the king of prussia, whose hesitating and equivocal conduct kept him aloof from taking an active part, when his co-operation might have been of the utmost advantage to the general cause. it required no second sight to perceive, that when bonaparte could clear his hands of his present antagonists, he would not hesitate for a moment to turn his arms against a monarch on whom he could not cordially rely, and whose dominions offered such a strong temptation to an ambitious and aspiring mind like his. we continued to occupy bremen till towards the beginning of february , when the whole army gradually drew down towards our place of embarkation, for the purpose of evacuating the country, our stay now having been rendered useless by the unsuccessful and unfortunate turn which the allied affairs had taken. my battalion covered the retreat of the army; but as great numbers of the german legion, which formed part of the british force in this country, were deserting and returning to their homes, we were sent away into the interior to endeavour to intercept such of them as might pass by the villages we occupied, and restore them to the army. we took some, but not many; and soon after we also retired, and went on board at cuxhaven, and again returned to england, landing at yarmouth on the th of the same month. during the whole of my military career, i never witnessed so cordial an attachment to the british name and character, as was manifested during this service, by the good people among whom we had been residing. nothing was too good for us--and nothing was left undone by them to render us comfortable and happy. it is true they have their vices like other people; but barring one or two peculiar to continental nations, i believe them to be, generally speaking, as moral as any people among whom it has been my lot to sojourn. but, oh! with what shame and sorrow do i look back on the part i acted at this period--how profligate and abandoned was my conduct at the very time that a kind and gracious providence was showering its choicest blessings upon me! but, alas, i paid no regard to the remonstrances of conscience, which i endeavoured and succeeded in drowning in debauchery and intemperance. chapter iv.* our author made quartermaster-sergeant of the d battalion, which he joins at feversham, kent--expedition to denmark--embark at deal--land at vedbeck, zealand--partial engagements--siege of copenhagen--a division under sir arthur wellesley advance to kioge--copenhagen capitulates--amnesty between the danish forces in the island of zealand, and the british--the british evacuate denmark--embark at copenhagen--arrive in the downs--land at deal. we landed, as i before stated, at yarmouth, and proceeded by way of lowestoft to woodbridge, in suffolk, in the barracks of which my battalion was quartered. here also was the d regiment, that which i had seen act so nobly in holland: and as it was determined by its commanding-officer to give the regiment some idea of light movements, i was selected for the purpose of instructing their non-commissioned officers. but i did not long continue to instruct them, for in the may following, an offer was made me by colonel beckwith of the situation of sergeant-major in the cornwall miners, a regiment of militia, with the prospect, he told me, of shortly becoming adjutant. this, however, after due consideration, i declined accepting--preferring to remain in a regiment and service which i liked so well, and in which i hoped one day to rise to something higher than my present situation. i believe my conduct on this occasion was approved, for not long after, it was intimated to me, that the offer i had refused, had been made to the quartermaster-sergeant of our second battalion, and that he had, after some hesitation, accepted it, thus leaving his situation open for me. accordingly, i departed for the purpose of joining that battalion, and entering on my new duties. i joined it at feversham, in kent. my means increasing, the sinfulness of my course of life was increased in proportion. it is true, i generally performed my various military duties to the satisfaction of my superiors; but could not at all times please my present commanding-officer, against whose wish and inclination i had been appointed to my present situation; he naturally wishing to have a person of his own selection. soon after this, an expedition being ordered for south america, of which three companies of my present battalion were to form a part, i waited on him, and requested him to permit me to accompany them in the capacity of acting quartermaster. he said no; but if i chose to resign my present situation, and go as a sergeant, he would permit me. this i of course declined, as it would have been paying a bad compliment indeed to my benefactor, colonel beckwith, thus to give up for nothing what he had been at pains to procure for me. this, and some other little things which occurred about the same time, proved to me that i was no favourite with my new lieutenant-colonel, and that it behoved me to be very guarded in my conduct. we were, after this, removed to brabourn lees again, and remained there, without any occurrence arising, till we were summoned to take part in the expedition fitting out for denmark. we accordingly repaired to deal, where we embarked on the th of july, , and shortly after sailed for our destination. we arrived in the sound about the th of august, where the whole fleet was assembled; one of the largest i had yet seen. on the th, every thing having been previously got ready, we landed at the village of vedbeck, in the island of zealand, about ten or twelve miles below copenhagen. it was a most beautiful and glorious sight to witness the debarkation of the first division, or advanced guard, to which my battalion belonged. the most perfect arrangements had been made by sir home popham, who superintended the landing of the troops; and nothing could exceed the beauty and regularity in which the different divisions of boats approached the shore, covered by some small brigs and bombs, which had orders to clear the beach by grape shot, of any enemy that might appear. some light artillery also landed with us, prepared for immediate action, for it was not known but the danes might attempt to oppose our landing, they having rejected every overture on the part of our commanders for the delivery of their fleet. after landing, mine and the first battalion of my regiment were sent forward in the direction of copenhagen; and on this occasion, i for the first time saw the illustrious general, who has since made the world resound with his exploits. he commanded us, who formed the advance, and directed our two battalions during the operations of the day. but we met with no force of the enemy, save a small patrol of cavalry, which passed in front of us, and then retired towards the city; this showed that they were observing our movements. we halted for the night at a village called, i think, lingbye, on the great road from copenhagen towards elsineur. we rested on our arms all night, and early in the morning moved forward on the copenhagen road, and about mid-day took up cantonments within a long gun-shot of the city, and began to invest the place. all was quiet till about three o'clock in the afternoon, when a general cry of turn out, set the whole of our people in motion. a considerable body of the enemy were advancing from the town, and by this time had attacked the advanced picquets on our left, towards the sea-shore; but instant succour being sent, they maintained their ground. the force opposed to the enemy was but small, consisting of two companies of the th regiment, four of the d, and four of my battalion, with two light fieldpieces; in all not more than men, while the danes were near . nevertheless, the moment the armies came in contact, they instantly gave way, leaving a considerable number of killed and wounded behind them, and retreated into the town. on this occasion, i attached myself to my commanding-officer, who, with the surgeon, and some others of the staff, advanced with one of the guns on the great road, having some of our companies on each flank. he gave me his glass to take care of, with which i soon after busied myself in watching the motions of the enemy. i discovered at a short distance to our left and front, a considerable body of troops, dressed in long red coats, which i knew could not be british, for that description of dress had long been laid aside by us; i accordingly began, pointing them out as an excellent mark for the artillery, which was then with us; but i had scarcely spoken, when an officer present, cried out, after looking, did i wish the artillery to fire on our own people? the colonel also made some severe and reproachful remarks, telling me, if i would fight, to go and take a rifle. i said nothing; but he had scarcely finished his harangue, when a round shot came directly from this body of supposed british troops, which nigh carried away one of the legs of the first officer who spoke. the enemy were soon repulsed, and the troops retired again to their former cantonments. after their troops retreated, a body of their gun-boats advanced against some of our small craft which happened to be rather close in shore, but their attack occasioned little injury, the distance being considerable. the next morning the enemy opened a heavy and rather destructive fire of artillery upon our outposts, by which we lost an officer of artillery and several men; their fire was chiefly directed against what was called the windmill battery, which was our farthest advance at this time. on the th, my battalion was moved farther to the right, and nearer the town; there was constant firing between the advanced posts of the two armies, and this continued for several days, during which the investment of the city was proceeding with, and batteries, &c. marked out for the purpose of bombarding it. all kinds of ordnance stores were at the same time disembarked, and sent off to the army with the utmost dispatch. in short, nothing could exceed the vigour with which the siege was now prosecuted, after the final rejection of pacific overtures by the danish general. on the th, we were ordered under arms at two o'clock in the morning, and immediately advanced, driving in the enemy's outposts, with the view of carrying our works nearer the town. in this movement we experienced considerable opposition and suffered some loss, from their guns on the town walls, and from musketry from the windows. we this day established two strong and well advanced batteries, and at night set fire to a windmill in their possession, which obstructed our view of some of their works. during the whole of the th, there was a constant fire both of artillery and fire-arms, by which one of the light battalions of the german legion suffered rather severely. my battalion relieved them at the outposts a little before dark, and was fortunate enough not to lose a man, where they had lost considerable numbers. on the th, a corps or division of the army was assembled, and placed under the immediate orders of sir arthur wellesley. it consisted of the following regiments, viz. d, d, d, th, and th battalion king's german legion, with six squadrons of german cavalry, and some artillery, and was destined to advance against a body of the enemy composed principally of militia, which had been for some time past collecting in the neighbourhood of kioge. at three o'clock p.m., we started from the neighbourhood of copenhagen, the troops making their way through the country to the left of the great road to roskild. i had charge of the baggage, which was carried on light german waggons, the bodies of which are formed chiefly of wicker-work, and are so light and easy of draught that the natives travel in them in the same manner nearly of our coaches--they going sometimes at a considerable rate. i found it impracticable to continue in the same direction the troops had gone, for they presently left all traces of a road, and struck right across the country--and as i knew i should be expected to have the baggage with them that night if possible, i determined to run all hazards, and proceed along the great high-road in hopes of afterwards being enabled to find them out--accordingly i moved forward, and presently passed the outposts of the german cavalry stationed in the direction of roskild; the men, i doubt not, wondering at my temerity in pushing on with a few baggage waggons, where they were all on the alert with swords drawn, and with carbines and pistols loaded. i own it was a hazardous undertaking, for a very small party of the enemy would easily have captured both me and my baggage; but i knew my commanding-officer to be such a person as to pay little attention to excuses of any kind when he wished a thing to be done, and withal he loved his comforts, and would not have been easily pacified had he been deprived of them. fortunately, after advancing for some miles beyond the outposts of our army before mentioned, i fell in with a road branching off towards the left, apparently in the very direction the troops had taken. till i reached this point, i had advanced with considerable caution, and slowly; determined, if any enemy should appear in front, to endeavour to effect a retreat. but now, having left the great road, and taken that which i judged would bring me to the neighbourhood of those i was seeking, i accordingly ordered all my guards to mount, and set off at a brisk trot, keeping a good look-out to my right flank, for fear of surprise, and fortunately fell in with the division at the very moment it was entering the road by which i had come. i received great credit for my generalship, and was complimented by the officers of my corps, they being the only people in the division, i believe, who had the comfort of their baggage that night. the name of the village where we halted is caughstrup. the next day we continued to advance in the direction of kioge, and in the afternoon we reached a village which i forget the name of, and where evident traces appeared of the enemy having shortly left it; indeed, we found two or three stragglers in the village, who were of course made prisoners. we halted outside the village for the night. a short while before we reached this village, i saw a body of troops dressed in red, marching on our right flank, at right angles to the road by which we were advancing, and which i instantly concluded must be a part of the enemy's force, as we had no troops in that direction. but remembering the rebuke i received on the th for interfering with concerns that did not belong to me, i shut my mouth in silence, and did not, i believe, mention the matter. it is evident it was a part of the enemy's force, for the general's information led him to take that very same direction the next day; and that being towards roskild, we set out and reached that city in the afternoon, but found the enemy had again given us the slip, and doubled back to nearly the same place from whence we had started. the next morning about three o'clock we left roskild, and took the road for kioge, near which it was now ascertained the enemy had come to a resolution to make a stand. i forgot to mention that previous to this our force had been divided and formed into two brigades; the d, d, our st battalion, and some cavalry and artillery, remaining under the command of sir arthur; while the d, the th german legion, and our five companies, with the remainder of the cavalry, were put under the command of baron linsengen, one of the generals of the german legion. sir arthur's people had not been with us for a day or two back, but where i do not exactly know. but this morning it was arranged that his brigade was to march directly upon kioge and attack it in front, while we fetched a circuit behind, and came upon a part of their force stationed in a forest or wood behind the town--and thus cut off their retreat. but the poor creatures were unable to stand above a round or two, and almost immediately broke and fled in all directions. as we approached the wood we were destined to attack, the appearance was certainly rather formidable; for from the immense cloud of dust they raised in performing their movements, we calculated on meeting with a considerable body of troops; and indeed, just as we approached the wood, our cavalry laid hold of an officer of their horse, dressed partly in uniform and partly as a civilian. from him we obtained information that they had in the field , men; of which were armed with pikes, cavalry, and the remainder consisted of artillery and infantry. he must, i think, have overrated their numbers, or surely they might have made some sort of a stand against men, the strength of our division. on sir arthur attacking them in the town of kioge, they stood, as before said, only for a round or two, and fled, many of them coming in contact afterwards with our brigade; but from the extent of (and intricate roads through) the wood, very few of them were made prisoners; till towards evening, when a company of my battalion, with some of the german cavalry, overtook a considerable body in the village of herfolge, apparently the rearguard of the enemy. in this village they made a stand, getting into the churchyard, which afforded an excellent position, it being considerably higher than any other part of the village. here also they soon began to waver, and after a few shots from our people, they all laid down their arms and became prisoners of war. their numbers were men, with officers, and major-general oxholm, the second in command of this part of the danish army. a considerable quantity of artillery, small arms, baggage, and provisions, &c., with two stands of colours, fell into the hands of the captors on this occasion. these poor creatures were instantly sent off as prisoners, and put on board our ships at copenhagen; many of them apparently quite glad that they had done with fighting. great numbers of them had nothing better by way of shoeing than wooden clogs--a very inconvenient kind i should imagine for a rapid retreat. the loss of the british during this day's operations was, as might be expected, quite trifling. i had this day followed the ill-natured advice of my commanding-officer on a former occasion, and had taken a rifle, but had little opportunity of using it, not having fired more than eight or ten shots. my battalion halted in the village of herfolge for the night, and the next morning moved forward towards the town of kingsted, that being the direction in which the broken fragments of the danish army had retired. our two battalions had been employed all the day of the th, after the first onset, in scouring the woods from kioge to herfolge. we continued this service on the th also, and took numbers of poor creatures who had been engaged in yesterday's operations, but who had not yet been able totally to divest themselves of their military habiliments, although apparently anxious to do so. we reached kingsted on the st, and finding that the only regular part of the late army had retired into one of the islands in the great belt, and that the militia portion had totally disbanded itself, we halted here till the fall of copenhagen, which took place on the th of september. but to prevent surprise from any lurking parties of the enemy, which might still have kept together, and to deprive them of the means of injuring us, strong detachments were sent out to scour the country, and to bring in all the military arms they could discover. a party of this description, consisting of cavalry, and of my battalion mounted on light waggons, traversed the country for a considerable distance, and returned after having discovered and taken possession of ten pieces of ordnance of small calibre, and forty rifles belonging to the kallundburg rifle company, with several muskets. they also gained correct information respecting the regular troops that had been lately opposed to us, and found they had retired into the islands of falstar and meon. on the capitulation of copenhagen, terms of amity and peace were entered into between the danish forces in the island of zealand and the british; but these did not extend to the islands before mentioned, nor to the other parts of his danish majesty's dominions; consequently, we still remained at war with such of his forces as were not included in the capitulation; and he might at any time have collected an army, had he been able, and attacked us without any infringement of those terms. it behoved our generals, therefore, to watch against any attempt of this nature; and accordingly strong outposts were established all along the belt, composed principally of the men of our two battalions. the st battalion occupied kallundburg, slagelse, korsoer, and skielskiore; whilst the following towns and ports were occupied by my battalion, viz. mestyed, lundbye, wordingburg and prestoe; thus forming a complete chain of posts around the west and south coasts of the island. we remained so posted till the th of october, by which time the greater part of the naval stores taken in the dockyard having been taken on board, and the period fast approaching for our evacuation of the country, we began to retire towards copenhagen, which we reached on the th, and immediately embarked on board the princess caroline, a danish seventy-four which had been surrendered with the others of that fleet, and which are mentioned below.[ ] we remained in the roads till the th, when the fleet dropped down towards the sound; and on the st the whole passed the castle of elsineur, with a favourable and pleasant breeze, the british ensign waving proudly from the lofty masts of their late gallant fleet; it must have been an extremely galling sight for them (the danes) to witness, and i dare say they did not pray for many benedictions on our heads; i pitied them from the bottom of my heart. on taking leave of this country, i could not help remarking on the great similarity between its inhabitants and the germans about bremen--kind-hearted, hospitable, and inoffensive in the highest degree; and although suffering at that time so severely from the policy of our country, they were high in our praises as individuals and as a nation. i have great cause to speak well of those innocent and worthy people, for i have seldom experienced more kindness and attention than was shown me by them whenever circumstances rendered such kindness and attention suitable, particularly at nestyde, where i met a young man who had formerly been in the west indies, where he had learnt to speak a little english, (for of danish i could not understand a word.) he introduced me to one worthy man, who had been an officer, and fought in the famous action of kioge above narrated. poor fellow, he felt heartily ashamed of the sorry attempt they had made to act the part of an army, and i daresay would gladly have blotted from his memory for ever the recollection of the ridiculous part they had acted. i was not aware of this circumstance at first, and when it was brought upon the tapis in the course of conversation, (my young friend being interpreter,) i unluckily said, that "any man armed with a bludgeon only, could easily beat three such soldiers." i felt quite ashamed of myself afterwards, when i discovered that he, poor man, had made one in that memorable action; but he took it all in good part, apparently conscious of the justness of my remark. indeed, i was partly led on to use such expressions by the young fellow condemning so bitterly their conduct, and which i afterwards would have given something to have unsaid. he, however, bore no resentment, and kindly took me home and introduced me to his wife, and requested me to salute her with a kiss. i hesitated, thinking that i could not have understood him right, and feeling awkward in such a situation; but my young friend assured me it was the custom there to do so, on which i of course complied. they are, in my opinion, an extremely moral race of people, no vices that i know of being practised by them, save occasionally a little drunkenness by some few individuals. i heartily wish them well. we sailed, as i said before, on the st of october, and had fine weather till we arrived in yarmouth roads. we passed one sunday on our voyage home, at a certain hour of which our pious naval commander (lord gambier) made signal for the whole fleet to lay to, and have divine service, that is, in such ships as there were chaplains on board of. this caused the irreligious and profligate part of our people on board the princess caroline to blaspheme and storm at a terrible rate, for being so long detained when the wind was so fair. it happened, when we arrived in the roads at yarmouth, or near there, i think it was on the galloper sand, that a tremendous gale began to blow, which baffled all exertions to withstand it. we cast out the anchors, but without effect, for we ran away with them both, and in the endeavour to vere out cable, or rather by the rapidity with which it was dragged out of the ship by the force of the wind, our bits caught fire, which with considerable difficulty were got extinguished after great exertions. during the gale, i understand a sailor was blown off the foreyard; and nearly at the same moment a woman, one of our corporals' wives, fell down the hatches into the hold, and broke her back, of which, indeed, she afterwards recovered, but never after regained her upright posture. those scoffing gentlemen before mentioned, attributed the whole of our misfortunes to the delay occasioned by the divine service before adverted to, and were not sparing of invective against the individual who caused its performance, forgetful, it would seem, that _he_, whom that commander invoked on that day, holds the winds in his hand, and can at pleasure let them loose upon an ungodly fleet, whether for correction or judgment, at what time, and in what manner, best pleases him. i doubt not the excellent commander alluded to has been a blessing to many. may he long continue to ornament the exalted station he fills! we weighed again after the storm abated, and proceeded round to the downs, and the next day, the th of november, landed at deal, and from thence marched to our old quarters at hythe barracks. footnote: [ ] list of ships and vessels captured at copenhagen, th september, . guns. christian the seventh, neptune, waldemer, princess sophia fredrica, justice, heir apparent frederick, crown prince frederick, frien, oden, three crowns, shield, crown princess maria, denmark, norway, princess caroline, conqueror, norge, dalmakin, pirle, wory wife, liberty, iris, rotar, denry, mayed, triton, fredrington, kline belt, st thomas, tylto, elbe, eydeman, gluckstadt, sarp, glowman, nid elvin, dolphin, marcur, cousier, flying fish, total, together with eleven gun boats, with two guns each in the bow, and fourteen do with one gun in the bow and one astern. chapter v. our author marries--the battalion to which he belongs ordered to join the expedition fitting out for corunna--movements of the army in spain--return to england. some little time after our return from the baltic, i obtained a short leave of absence, for the purpose of visiting my parents, and the other members of my family; and, during my stay in my native village, contracted a marriage with a young woman whom i had known from my boyhood, she having been one of my earliest schoolfellows. i cannot say that i enjoyed in the marriage state that happiness which i expected from it, partly owing to the frequent and long separations which my calling rendered unavoidable, and partly from other causes which have no connexion with my narrative. i believe, during the eight years which my wife lived after our union, i spent more than six of these in absence from her. at the expiration of my leave, we set off to join the regiment, which still remained at hythe, where we remained till the beginning of september following, when my battalion having again been ordered for foreign service in the expedition fitting out for corunna, it became indispensable that my poor wife should return to northumberland, and remain under the protection of her parents, till my return, should it please god to spare me. this, no doubt, was a severe trial to us both, but particularly to her, who had such a journey to undertake, alone and unprotected, and she at the time far advanced in pregnancy; but, however distressing, it must be undertaken, and i unfortunately could not be spared from the regiment, for our orders were to proceed immediately to ramsgate, for embarkation. we parted, after i had accompanied her as far as i was able, and seeing her safely stowed in the coach. it may be supposed that a new-married pair, under such circumstances, would part with heavy and afflicted hearts. my battalion embarked at ramsgate on the th of september. on this occasion, i was very fortunate in getting on board an excellent transport, called the nautilus, of shields, commanded by captain watson (my wife's maiden name), and the steward, a native of the hermitage, a place within four miles of my home. of course, we were mutually glad to meet each other, and often talked over old northumbrian stories, which recalled delightful recollections of our younger years. the fleet in which we sailed rendezvoused at falmouth, whence we took our departure, and arrived at corunna on the th of october. on our passage, when we made cape ortegal, a pilot-boat came off, in which were the first spaniards i remember to have seen; certainly, they did not prepossess me greatly in favour of their countrymen, but they are now so well known in england, that a description of those i here saw, would be only to repeat what has been so often and so much better told by others. we landed at corunna, as before said, on the th, and a day or two after, proceeded up the country, halting for the first night at betanzos. our force consisted of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in all, about , men, and was commanded by general sir david baird, and intended to co-operate, or form a junction, with that under sir john moore, then in portugal, and who was then advancing into spain. my battalion, and some companies of the first battalion of my regiment, formed the advanced guard, a situation which i consider the most enviable of any in the army--for here all is untried, and, as it were, unbroken ground; every thing is fresh, and although attended sometimes with a little more danger of being cut off while separated from the main body, yet possessing so many countervailing advantages, that i hesitate not to say it is the most desirable post of any in an army. at betanzos, we began to experience the great defectiveness of our commissariat department, at this period of our history; for the gentleman sent forward to provide our two battalions with food, was so utterly unacquainted with his business, that he was actually afraid to make an attempt to issue provisions. although bread had been baked by order of the spanish authorities, he not understanding, as he said, the spanish weights and measures, durst not issue any thing without his own, which were behind; but it was evident the troops could not remain without provisions. we were here, as in most of the towns we afterwards passed through, lodged in convents, the officers generally either being quartered on the inhabitants of the town, or lodged by the monks in their cells. on these occasions the men occupied only the corridors, into which straw was generally put by the authorities of the place, the men lying as close as pigs in a sty, which indeed was necessary to keep each other warm; but these lodgings were not to be complained of, as clean straw, and shelter overhead in that country, are no contemptible quarters. we moved forward by fair and easy stages, by way of lugo, villa franca, cacabelos, and astorga; this latter place we reached on the th november, but during the march, we had experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining supplies both of provisions and the means of transport. this is a considerable town, containing probably about inhabitants. both it and lugo are surrounded by old moorish walls, which may formerly have been considered strong, but which, according to the present mode of warfare, would offer but a feeble resistance to a besieging army. it contains a number of convents, both in the town and suburbs, and, of course, a proportionate number of idle monks, &c. here, as in many towns in spain, they have a curious mode of keeping out of their houses unwelcome visiters; for the doors being all made remarkably strong, and kept constantly shut, you cannot enter till the inmates have first reconnoitred you through an aperture above the door, made for the purpose; and it is not till they are satisfied who you are, and with your business, that they will open the door, which they generally do by a cord communicating with the latch from their peep-hole above. here we were pretty plentifully supplied with provisions, and rested for some days, my battalion having been pushed forward to a village called zalada, about a league in front of the town. after having been refreshed by a few days' rest, my battalion was again pushed forward, and occupied the town of labeneza, about four leagues in front of astorga, while the main body of the army assembled in and around that town; but we had not remained more than a few days in labeneza, before a report arrived of the enemy being in our front, and advancing in force; and we were consequently recalled to zalada, in order to form a junction with our main body. not long after this, about the latter end of november, orders were received from sir john moore, for our division to retreat and fall back upon corunna. this measure, i understand, was rendered necessary, in consequence of the spanish armies having been completely beaten and dispersed, so that nothing remained to oppose an overwhelming french force, which it was ascertained had entered spain, but the few british troops comprising the armies under sir john moore, and ours. we accordingly set to the right-about, and fell back as far as cacabelos, the main body occupying villa franca and its neighbourhood. this movement was not by any means liked by any of us; for, independent of its being so uncongenial to the spirit of britons to turn their backs upon an enemy, we felt disappointed at what we saw and heard of the celebrated spanish patriots. we had been given to understand that the whole nation was up in arms against the french, and that we should have been received, on entering their country, as liberators, and treated as brethren, but in both these points we were miserably disappointed; for, instead of a hearty welcome on our arrival, we could with great difficulty obtain leave to land, and still more to obtain the necessary supplies of carriages and provisions to enable us to come forward; and with regard to the patriotism of the people, whatever might have been their good-will to act in defence of their beloved country and ferdinand, they appeared as little likely as any people i had ever seen, to effect any thing against such an enemy as the french. in fact, those of them who formed their armies, at least of those straggling parties we so often met, could be called nothing better than mere rabble--no organization, no subordination, but every one evidently pursued that plan which seemed right in his own eyes. while we remained at cacabelos, (a place famous for good wine,) many were the schemes adopted by some of our bibbers, to obtain a sufficient quantum of this excellent beverage. i understand they occasionally borrowed each other's clothes; that is, a d man would borrow a rifleman's green jacket, and _vice versa_, and go and steal, or in some other illegal mode obtain, a camp-kettle full or two; and when the owner came to point out the person who had robbed him, of course he could not be found. we had not remained above a day or two in our new quarters, before an express arrived from sir john moore, with orders for us to advance again immediately; and which, notwithstanding we had little or no prospect of assistance and co-operation from the patriots, was cheerfully complied with. we retraced our former steps, passing through astorga and labeneza, and reached benevente on the th december. our cavalry, consisting of the th, th, and th hussars, under lord paget, had by this time come up from corunna, and had been pushed forward to join sir john moore's force; they fell in with a party of the french cavalry at the town of rueda, not far from tordesillas, and of which they either killed, or took prisoners, nearly the whole; in fact, through the whole of this service, nothing could exceed the gallantry and intrepid conduct of our cavalry under his lordship. at this town, as well as at astorga and villa franca, depots of provisions began to be formed soon after our arrival. on the th december, we again advanced from benevente, in order to form a junction with sir john moore's army, and passing through valderas, majorga, and sahagun, we reached the convent of trianon, about a league in front of the latter place. on the th, here the two forces were united, and a fresh distribution into brigades took place. ours, under brigadier-general crawford, was termed the light brigade, and consisted of the st battalion d, d battalion d, and the d battalion of my regiment. the whole army was assembled in this neighbourhood, and consisted of about , men, the whole _now_ under the command of sir john moore. previous to our arrival at sahagun, lord paget, with a part of the th and th hussars, discovered that a considerable body of the enemy's cavalry occupied that town. he therefore detached the th by a circuitous road, while he with the th approached it by the more direct one. they were, however, discovered by the french before reaching the town, which gave the enemy time to turn out and form to receive the attack. his lordship, when a favourable opportunity offered, charged the french, who were greatly superior in numbers, and completely overthrew them, taking two colonels, eleven other officers, and about men. on the evening of the d, the whole army was put in motion, with an intention, it was said, of attacking marshal soult, who, with a corps of about or , men, was posted behind the river carrion, his head-quarters being at saldanha. the spanish general romana, was to take a part in this movement; his small and sadly inefficient force had approached the left of our army, or rather we had drawn towards his position, and he was, i believe, perfectly willing to lend all the assistance in his power, in the contemplated attack; but our general, i fancy, did not calculate upon any material help, from a force so greatly out of order as his was said to be. soon after dark, the troops fell in; and as it was understood an attack was going to be made on the enemy, every pulse beat high, in expectation of soon congratulating each other on a victory. all was life and animation; and the necessary preparations, by the light of our blazing fires, for such an event as a battle, after the many long and harassing marches we had had, gave an interesting appearance to the scene. when all was ready, the troops moved forward. it was a cold and bitter night, and there were some small brooks on the road. an officer of my battalion, who was not very well, when he came to one of those, instead of marching straight through, as it appears had been ordered, went a little way round by the bridge, although not off the road. a certain general officer, who happened to be there at the time, observed it, and getting into a great rage at the officer leaving his section, made him turn back, and march through and through repeatedly, by way of punishment. such a mode of treating an officer, certainly appeared rather harsh; but this general piqued himself on his being able to make his brigade better marchers than any other troops in the army; and in this he certainly succeeded, although it was not without frequent exhibitions, such as the above. our people had not gone far, however, till they were countermanded, and returned back to our convent. i rather think the main body of the army had not moved out of their cantonments; but ours being the advanced brigade, it was necessary we should move before the others. it appears sir john moore, just before he intended to set out, had received information, not only of soult having been greatly reinforced, but that several strong corps of the french army were marching directly upon us, by which, should he delay only a few days, we should be completely surrounded, and cut off from a retreat. this was most distressing information, for never was an army more eager to come in contact with the enemy than ours was at this moment, and never was there a fairer prospect of success, had things remained as they were; but now, instead of honour and glory being acquired, by showing the french what british troops could do in the field, it was evident nothing remained but to commence a retrograde movement, the worst and most unpleasant, in a british soldier's view, of any other. winter had now completely set in; the face of the country being covered with deep snow, the weather was unusually severe. our prospect, therefore, was by no means a pleasant one. to commence a retreat in front of a greatly superior force, and with the probability that other french armies might be before us, and intercept our retreat upon the sea, which was distant from us nearly miles, with the country in our rear being already exhausted of every thing that could contribute to our support, and with such excessively bad weather to perform the retreat in, rendered it, i may say, as unpleasant a situation as troops could well be placed in. added to which, our commissariat was by no means so efficient in those days as they have latterly become; and our troops in general being young, and unaccustomed to privation, it was but too obvious, that should the retreat continue long, many would be the disasters attending it. on christmas day, our brigade, as the rear of the infantry, commenced its uncomfortable retreat, and continued marching till late at night, when we reached a convent near majorga. the next day, although we started early, we only reached the village of st miguel about midnight. here i had considerable difficulty with the baggage. i had had charge of it all day, my guard being composed of officers' servants, &c., who, the moment they got into the village, set off to their masters, and left me alone with the mules, the troops having, by the time i got in, all lain down to sleep. several of the muleteers had been pressed into the service against their wills, and of course would have made their escape whenever an opportunity offered. i was therefore compelled to drive them all into the churchyard, and watch them myself, till luckily, after waiting in this situation a considerable time, without daring to go to sleep after the fatigues of such a day, some men happened to wander in that direction in search of meat, by whom i sent to our quartermaster to request he would send a guard, which he did soon after, and i had the happiness to be allowed to throw myself down and take some rest. this day lord paget had another brush with the french cavalry, who, being apprized of our retreat, had advanced to majorga. he attacked them with that gallantry which shone so conspicuously in the cavalry during the whole of this service, and completely overthrew them, killing and wounding many, and taking a number prisoners; in this affair the th hussars were engaged, and behaved nobly. the next day we reached castro gonzales, and castro pipa. at the latter village, my battalion halted for the night and the next day. these two villages command the passage over the river eslar, they being about equidistant from the bridge, and something more than a mile apart on high ground over the river, which runs about a league in front of benevente. here we were obliged to remain during the time mentioned, in order that the heavy divisions of the army might get sufficiently forward before we moved. i had still the charge of the baggage, and not knowing where my battalion was to be quartered for the night, i had crossed the eslar to the benevente side, till i learnt long after dark that castro pipa was its quarters. i consequently turned back and recrossed the river, and just as i reached the end of the bridge, i heard a shot immediately in my front. the d regiment guarded the bridge. it turned out to be a patrol of the enemy's cavalry who had come close to the top of the slope leading down to the bridge, and where a double sentry of the d was posted. by some accident these two men were not loaded; the french dragoons were consequently permitted to come close up to them without their being able to give any alarm. one of them, however, run his bayonet into one of the frenchmen's horses, and retreated, but the other was not only cut down with the sabre, but had a pistol fired at him, which was the report i had just heard. i saw the wounded man, who was severely hurt, but whether he survived or not i know not. when i reached castro pipa, my commanding-officer would scarcely credit the report i gave him, conceiving it impossible the french could be such near neighbours. i was a good deal chagrined at his suspecting my veracity, but he had never been what i may call a friendly commanding-officer to me, as the story of the rifle at copenhagen will prove; indeed, as i had been put into the situation i held contrary to his wish, it was hardly to be expected that he would show himself very friendly. during the night, however, our quarters were beat up, not indeed by the enemy, but by our brigadier, who was not sparing of his censure for our want of alertness in turning out. indeed, we neither had so good a look-out as we ought to have kept, nor did we get under arms with that promptitude which was desirable, and from the cause before assigned; that is, that our commandant did not believe the enemy was so near. i own i was not sorry that the general paid us such a visit, as it not only put us more upon our guard, a thing so indispensably necessary in the presence of an enemy, but it gave me some satisfaction for the dishonour put upon me by disbelieving my information. the enemy did not disturb us during the remainder of the night, and next morning the brigade was assembled on the height above, and in front of the bridge; considerable bodies of the enemy's cavalry appearing in the plain before us. some skirmishing between our people and the enemy took place, but nothing of any importance occurred. our brigade was left in this position to cover the working party who were preparing to blow up the bridge, at which they worked all day; during the night our people were withdrawn from the farther side, and the explosion soon after took place, but the destruction of the bridge was by no means so effectual as was wished and expected. when we turned out in the morning to move towards the bridge, i (still having charge of my battalion's baggage) discovered that a vast quantity of excellent biscuit was stored up in an empty house in the village, which, no doubt, had been baked for the purpose of supplying the magazine at benevente; and as our people had been but very indifferently supplied with bread since we commenced the retreat, i determined to load a bullock-cart with it, and try to get it to a place of safety, where i hoped to be able to issue it to them. i accordingly took a cart and two bullocks, there being plenty in the village, and apparently without owners, for the inhabitants had mostly either abandoned the place on the appearance of the french, or had hid themselves. i loaded the cart, but still i wanted a person to drive it; and although i used both promises and threats, i could not prevail upon any person to go with me. i therefore mounted the cart myself, and using my sword by way of a goad, i entered the river at a place which looked like a ford, and had the good fortune to reach the other side in safety. i mention this to show that so much importance need not have been attached to the destruction of the bridge, as both here, and near castro gonzales, the river was perfectly fordable, for near the latter place the french cavalry forded it on the following morning. i now made my way to benevente, where i remained during the day of the th; and at night, as before hinted, the troops which had been guarding the bridge arrived, leaving cavalry piquets on the plain between the town and the river. the next morning our people left benevente, and as i was a little behind them with the baggage, on my reaching a height in rear of the town, i observed in the plain in front a considerable body of the enemy's cavalry, who had, as before stated, crossed the river near castro gonzales, and were advancing towards the town, opposed, though feebly at first, by the few of our cavalry left there on piquet; but the cavalry regiments which were in town quickly turning out to their support, they were at length completely able to oppose, and finally overthrow them. during the time i remained here, i saw our brave dragoons make three most gallant and successful charges against superior numbers of the enemy, completely breaking and dispersing the different bodies against which the charges were made. the enemy appeared to be drawn up in different lines, the front one of which was that always charged; and i observed, that as our people advanced upon them, they were always received with a fire either from the carbines or pistols of the enemy, but this never appeared in the least to check the ardour of the charge, for in a minute or two after i observed the french troops retired in confusion, and formed behind the other lines. at length they were completely driven back to the ford by which they had crossed; and in a charge now made upon them, general le febvre, with about seventy men, fell into our people's hands. these troops were a part of bonaparte's imperial guard, and the flower of his army, being fine-looking men, dressed in dark-green long coats, with high bear-skin caps, and mustaches, which gave them a formidable appearance. it was said that bonaparte was looking on at this affair, and witnessed the defeat of his hitherto invincible old guard; it is certain that he slept the night before at villalpando, a place only four leagues distant from the field. i now set off and overtook the baggage and the bullock cart, not having had an opportunity of issuing the biscuit; but before i had proceeded above a few miles, the bullocks knocked up, and notwithstanding every exertion i found it impossible to get them any farther. thus was i reluctantly compelled to abandon a cart-load of excellent biscuit, after having had so much trouble with it, at the time when i knew it was greatly needed by my hungry fellow soldiers, and to whom it would have been a most welcome offering. on this day's march, a most lamentable number of stragglers were overtaken by us, we being in rear of all the infantry; they had either fallen out from excessive fatigue, or from having (as in too many instances) drunk too much; indeed, the destruction of the magazine of provisions at the place we had left, enabled too many of them to obtain by one means or other considerable quantities of spirits, and which, of course, rendered them incapable of marching. this was a long and wearisome day's journey of nearly thirty miles; we did not reach labeneza till late at night, where a considerable quantity of ammunition was obliged to be destroyed, the animals failing which drew it. the next day we reached our old quarters at zalada, a league in front of astorga, where we halted for the night, the remainder of the brigade going into the town. it was to this village, it may be remembered, that we were sent on our first advance, and subsequently after our first retreat from labeneza; but besides these movements from the village and back again, during the time we remained in it, we almost every morning had orders to pack up and move a short distance out of the place. this was done no doubt to accustom us to a ready turning out, as till this period our baggage had been transported on bullock-carts; but now we had mules, and it was necessary to accustom those whose duty it was, to load the mules with dispatch. but on every occasion of this kind, the inhabitants always imagined we were actually going to leave them, and the moment we were clean gone, as they thought, they set to work and rung the church bell with all their might. this was either to testify their regret at losing our company, or to evince their gratitude to heaven for having got rid of such a band of heretics, by which their most pure and holy dwellings had been defiled; it was laughable to see the long faces they put on when we, so contrary to their hopes and expectations, always returned to our wretched and uncomfortable quarters. during the whole of the time we remained in this village, i, as a staff-sergeant, could find no better lodgings than a dirty open shed; the reader will therefore judge how ill the privates must have been off. our fellows began about this time to pick up little bits of spanish, and would often exercise their ability to converse in the native tongue, by telling the inhabitants that we were certainly going to "_marcha manana_", that is, to march to-morrow, so that it became quite a by-word, which annoyed our hosts not a little. if i mistake not, the padre of this village was a great knave, and did not scruple to help himself to such things as he had a mind for, belonging to our officers, whenever a fit opportunity presented itself. the next day, the st, we moved into astorga, where we halted for an hour or two, till the destruction of the magazine there was completed, although nothing but rum remained; and here i witnessed such a brutal and swinish eagerness for drink as was quite disgusting. the rum casks were ordered to be staved, and to let the contents run out on the street, that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy: thus the rum which had cost so much trouble in bringing up all the way from corunna was about to be lost for ever; a thing most heart-rending to the numerous soldiers looking on, who loved it so dearly. however, they were determined not to lose all, for when the heads of the casks were knocked in, and their contents permitted to run in streams down the gutters, some of those brutes deliberately took off their greasy caps, and laving up the rum and the mud together, drank, or rather ate, the swinish mixture. what noble soldiers would our country produce, were not that detestable vice of drunkenness so common among us; but to it how many have i seen deliberately sacrifice their own and country's honour, nay their very life itself, rather than forego the beastly gratification! all this morning we had been told to keep a sharp look-out on the leon side of astorga, for the enemy was every moment expected to make his appearance from that quarter; however, we were not disturbed during the short time we remained. we here fell in with a considerable body of romana's army, apparently all confusion, and destitute of every thing. we understood that they were not to be marched in the same line we were taking, but that it had been concerted between the two generals that our route should be kept free; however, here, and for several days afterwards, we suffered greatly from their contiguity. we continued our march from astorga the same day, and reached at night the village of foncevadon, about twenty miles distant. here we pigged in as well as we were able, there being only five or six houses; but as we had a few tents with us, we managed not amiss. till now our brigade had formed the rear of the infantry, there being some cavalry in rear of us; but it was now determined that ours and the light german brigade under brigadier-general charles alten, should strike off from the great road, and take the route for orense and vigo. this was done, i understand, with a view to secure a passage across the minho at the former place, should sir john, with the main army, be compelled to retreat in that direction, and probably with the view also of drawing off a part of the enemy's overwhelming force from the pursuit of that body, and to induce them to follow us into the mountains. notwithstanding this, they continued to pursue sir john on the great road, whilst they left us free altogether. i beg to notice here, that both mr gifford and mr moore (sir john's brother), have fallen into a trifling error respecting the period of our separation from the main body, they both making us be detached before our arrival at astorga, whereas it was not till we had passed a day's march beyond it that we were sent off. the thing is of no consequence, only it is as well to be correct. the next day, the st of january , we marched by a most difficult road through the mountains, to ponferrada, situated about a league to the left of the great road to corunna, on which the main army was retreating. when we got in, our commissary immediately made a requisition to the alcalde of the town, to provide bread for the two brigades, as we began to be in most fearful want. he promised to set the bakers to work immediately, and in a few hours, he said, the bread would be ready. we called on him repeatedly, without obtaining any, he still alleging it was not yet quite ready, and putting us off from time to time, till midnight, when the patience of our commissary being fairly worn out, he yielded to the anger so naturally inspired by such shuffling conduct, and used some strong language to the alcalde. whereupon, we discovered at once that he had been only amusing us with promises he did not intend to fulfil; and told the commissary that he did not fear any of his threats, for that, as romana's army had now also entered the town, he had no doubt they would protect him, and revenge any insult offered to him. the commissary had indeed talked about hanging him for his double-dealing, and leaving the troops utterly starving; but if he could have got any bread ready, it is most natural to suppose he would prefer letting his own countrymen have it; this, however, as might be expected, had a most pernicious effect upon our suffering soldiers, for when provisions could not be procured in the regular and ordinary mode, it is evident they would take them wherever they were to be found--for hunger is not easily borne, accompanied by incessant fatigue. in the morning, when we turned out to continue our march towards orense, we heard a heavy firing towards our right and front, and this proved to be an attack made by the enemy's light troops upon our first battalion, who, with some cavalry, had been left in cacabelos as a rearguard. our first battalion gained great credit for their conduct on this occasion. the force of the enemy greatly exceeded ours, yet our people drove them back with great loss, killing general colbert, who commanded the advance. this was done by a noted pickle of the name of tom plunkett, who, fearless of all danger to himself, got sufficiently nigh to make sure of his mark, and shot him, which, with the fire of the others, caused great havoc in the enemy's ranks, and set them flying to the rear much faster than they advanced. our situation was thus, in a manner, in rear of the enemy's advance guard, yet they did not turn in our direction. cacabelos was distant from us only about a league. our road this day lay over high and almost inaccessible mountains, deeply covered with snow. on the top of one of these, as our general was passing the column, a cry was passed from the rear to open out to allow him to pass, the road being very narrow. one of our men, as the general came near, happened to say, loud enough for him to hear, that "he had more need to give us some bread," or words to that effect, which so exasperated the general, that he instantly halted the whole brigade, ordered the man to be tried by a drum-head court-martial, and flogged him on the spot. it was a severe, but perhaps necessary discipline, in order to check in the bud the seeds of murmuring and insubordination, although i own it appeared harsh. our march was a long and toilsome one indeed, and did not terminate till about ten at night, when we reached st domingo-flores, where nothing could be procured but a very small quantity of black bread, the village being quite small. tired with the journey, we felt rather inclined to sleep than eat; and, wet and dirty as we were, we laid ourselves down till dawn, when we commenced another such day's march, and reached at night the village of la rua. during these two days, want and fatigue had compelled many to fall out, some of whom, no doubt, perished in the snow on the bleak mountains, over which our road, or rather path, had lain; others fell into the hands of the enemy, and some few rejoined us after having obtained some little refreshment from the natives. it would but be a repetition of the privations and fatigues we underwent, to notice all that befell us on our way thence to orense, which place we reached on the th of january, having previously pushed on, by double forced marches, a few hundred men, to take possession of the bridge over the minho at this place. here we remained a day, and obtained provisions, then much needed by us all, for the men had been literally starving for several days past. we had time and opportunity here also to strip and change our linen, that is, those who had a change; the others washed the shirt they took off, sitting without one till it was dry. indeed, by this time we were in a most miserable plight; our shoes, of course, were nearly all worn out, and many travelling barefoot; and our clothes, as might be expected, were ragged and filthy in the extreme; indeed they could not be otherwise, for i suppose none of us had put any thing off since we commenced the retreat. this day's rest, however, refreshed us greatly, and enabled us to perform the remainder of our toilsome journey with more comfort; indeed, since we had secured the passage of the minho, and thus prevented the enemy from getting in before us, our minds were more at ease, for strong apprehensions were entertained that the french would have detached a corps from their main body to seize this pass, and thus cut off our retreat to vigo. a part of romana's army entered orense before we left it, worse, if possible, in point of appearance than ourselves; but they, in their best days, are more like an armed mob than regularly organized soldiers. it is a pity that romana did not adopt the plan pointed out to him by sir john moore, either to retire into the asturias with his army unbroken, or hang upon the flanks of the enemy as he passed through the mountains; and which he could have done with ease and safety, for these fellows could live where regular troops would starve, and there was no doubt but the peasantry would have assisted their countrymen with all their means. this would have in some measure retarded the too rapid progress of the french, and probably been the means of saving to our country one of its bravest and most skilful generals. some of our men who had been compelled to stop behind from fatigue and starvation, rejoined us here, having generally been assisted by the peasantry, who gave them food, and helped them forward. on the th, in the morning, we left orense, crossing the minho to the north side of that river, and continued our march to the town of ribadavia, situated at the junction of the rivers avia and minho, both of which, from the melting of the snow, and the immense quantities of rain that had fallen, were greatly swollen. so much so, that when i approached the town with the baggage, (the troops having gone on before,) and which i did not reach till near midnight, i found the road completely overflowed with water; and being without a guide, i could not of course in the night be certain where the road lay, the whole bank of the river being completely under water. we were in consequence obliged to climb the mountains to our left, and proceed in the best manner we were able with the loaded mules; but so precipitous were they in one place, that a load of ammunition slid off the mule's back, and the casks rolled rapidly down the hill towards the river. i durst not venture to leave them, although my chance of finding them in such a situation appeared small indeed; however, we halted the remainder of the mules, while a few of us set off down the steep in the direction we had seen them go, and after a long and anxious groping in every hollow of the rocky mountain, succeeded in recovering them; but the powder in them, and indeed nearly all the ammunition we had, was rendered completely useless, from the constant heavy rain that had fallen. i am almost astonished that no accident happened to either man or beast in this perilous journey, for our feet literally "stumbled upon the dark mountains," without either guide or path, and where the ground was most uneven and dangerous. we however at length reached our destination, wet and weary enough, and, just as we entered the town, were informed that the corridor of one of the convents where two of our companies were sleeping, had just fallen to the ground with a tremendous crash, and that several men had had their limbs broken by the fall; i do not remember that any were killed. it being so late, i could not procure any kind of quarter, so i was fain to sit down by the side of a fire kindled in the yard of this convent for the remainder of the night. we next morning resumed our journey, and in three days more from this place we reached vigo. on this last day's march we had a pretty high eminence to ascend at some distance from the town, from which the view of the town, the shipping, and the sea, broke all at once upon us. it was a most delightful prospect, and it was highly amusing to observe the joy which seemed to animate the woe-worn countenances of our ragged and dirty soldiers. fellows without a shoe or a stocking, and who before were shuffling along with sore and lacerated feet like so many lame ducks, now made an attempt to dance for joy; laughter and mirth, and the joke, now succeeded to the gloomy silence with which they had in general prosecuted their wearisome journey for several days past, as the friendly element before them promised shortly to put a period to long and toilsome wanderings. indeed, although i am a bad sailor, and suffer always severely when at sea, i do not remember ever to have witnessed a sight which inspired me with greater pleasure than the shipping and the sea did on this occasion. the fleet of transports for the army under sir john moore, was just clearing the bay as we came in sight, but we observed that a sufficient number remained at vigo to transport us to our native land, a place we sorely longed for, as we had often contrasted the happiness and security and comfort of our friends at home, with the poverty and misery we had lately witnessed in the country we were leaving; and this no doubt increased our anxiety for the change. we marched into vigo, and were soon after put on board the vessels destined to receive us. it was my fortune to be sent on board the alfred, , with two of our companies; a great number of men were still behind, for even the few last days' marches had deprived us of many who till then had braved the toils and privations of the journey, but who now had fairly sunk under exhaustion. the commodore, therefore, remained as long in the bay as it was safe, sending the stragglers as they arrived on board the different ships; but within a few days after our arrival, the enemy entered the town, which of course precluded all hope of more escaping. we consequently weighed and stood out towards the outer bay, where we again came to anchor. a russian ship-of-war was in a small harbour in this bay, which it was intended to board and cut out. as we were then, i believe, on rather bad terms with that nation, never did i witness such alacrity and delight as our tars on board the alfred manifested when buckling on their cutlasses for the occasion, and i feel certain that if confidence in themselves would tend to insure the victory, no men had a better chance of succeeding; but from some cause or other with which i am unacquainted, the enterprise was abandoned. on the st january we weighed and stood out to sea; but a gale coming on we were obliged to come to anchor again under the shelter of the isle of bagona. we did not get to sea till the th, but on the th we spoke a frigate going out to lisbon with general dyatt on board, who informed us of the fatal business at corunna. indeed the people on board this ship had, from vague reports, greatly magnified our loss on that occasion, telling us that the whole army had been nearly cut to pieces, and that very few indeed had been able to effect their escape. we each, of course, mourned for his particular friends, not doubting but they had fallen among the rest. i think it was the same night on which we saw this ship, a fatal accident had very nigh taken place. our captain was the commodore, and the captain of the hindostan store-ship had charge of the rear of the fleet; his place was consequently always behind all the other vessels. some time after dark, however, our look-out people gave notice of a large vessel on our starboard quarter. we shortened sail and let her come up pretty close to us, and made the private signal, but no answer was returned. at length, when near enough, we hailed her, but still no answer. an order was now given to stand to quarters and prepare for action, not doubting she was an enemy which had got among the fleet. the guns were accordingly run out, the matches lit, and every thing prepared for action. she appeared a large ship, but of what force they could not guess. again she was hailed, and again she disregarded it. our first lieutenant was now fully convinced she was an enemy, and pleaded hard with the captain to give the word fire, but the captain said he would hail her once more, and if she did not answer he would fire. providentially they heard us this time, and answered it was the hindostan. what they had been about i know not, for we were quite near each other; and had she received our broadside, as was the intention had she not then answered, it is most probable she would have gone down; at all events the consequences must have been awful, for she had the whole of the d regiment on board, besides her own crew. our captain certainly censured him in no very mild terms for leaving his station in the rear, and getting to the very head of the fleet. she was a very lofty ship, and carried forty-four guns i believe, and had not less than men on board, many of whom must have suffered had we fired upon her. a few days after this we encountered a most tremendous gale, and came in sight of the english coast, somewhere near the lizard or the start; but our master not knowing exactly where he was, we stood off again towards the french coast. the next day the gale was if possible more severe, and the ship rolled so much that they were afraid her guns would break loose from their lashings, in consequence of which large spikes were driven in behind the wheels of each gun-carriage to prevent such an accident. in this situation, i know not whether i did not almost wish myself on the snowy mountains of galicia again, rather than where i was, so miserable a sailor am i, and so much do i suffer from sea-sickness. the fleet was by this time completely scattered, every one making the best shift he could for himself; some got into plymouth, some reached portsmouth, and some, i believe, foundered in the gale, among which, if i mistake not, was a brig, on board of which my two companies had been first embarked, but were subsequently removed to the alfred, and some of the german legion, i think, put on board her. at length we made the isle of wight, and subsequently spithead, which we reached on the st, and the next day landed once more on the happy shore of our native britain. thankful indeed i ought to have been for the ever watchful care of an indulgent and kind providence, who had brought me safely through the toils and sufferings under which so many more robust and hardy than myself had sunk; but, alas! i had then no sense of the gratitude due for such unmerited favours, and instead of rendering thanks to him who had thus preserved me, i entered, with all the eagerness of a person devoid of reason and religion, into every vice and sensuality that presented itself. i here learnt with sorrow the great loss which my friends in the first battalion had sustained, but glad nevertheless that it was not to the extent we apprehended, and that none of my particular friends had fallen. we left portsmouth, and returned to our old quarters at hythe, in kent, passing again on the road my native county militia at battle, in sussex, as i did at bury, on my return from holland; and truly our appearance on this occasion was, if possible, more deplorable than on the former. however, our tattered and worn-out habiliments had the effect of inspiring some of my countrymen in that regiment with a desire of sharing in the glory, as they termed it, of suffering so much in the defence of our beloved country; and they accordingly made up their minds to volunteer into our corps the first opportunity that offered, and which they put in execution that same year, as will be told hereafter. we took up our abode in the comfortable barracks at hythe, and immediately set about putting every thing in order, and truly much was wanting to fit us again for duty as soldiers. chapter vi. volunteering--farther promotion--embarks for portugal, with two companies of the second battalion--debark at cadiz--advance to the isla--the french occupy all the adjacent towns, except cadiz and the isla--cannonading--spanish army--detachment of the allied army sent around by gibraltar and chiclana, to take the enemy in the rear of his works, and compel him either to fight or abandon them--come up with a portion of the enemy in the vicinity of veger--bravery of the british--the enemy repulsed with great loss, but, from the apathy and misconduct of general la pena, and the spaniards under his command, the french are allowed to retain their works in the vicinity of cadiz. in april of this year, an order was issued to allow the militia regiments to volunteer, for the purpose of filling up the regiments of the line; and i was sent by colonel beckwith (our two battalions being then both at hythe) to receive those who chose to volunteer from the northumberland militia before-mentioned, which had now been removed to ipswich. lieutenant beckwith had the charge of our party, but proceeded _incog._ to ipswich, the general orders not permitting officers of the line to be seen in the quarters of the militia. on our arrival at ipswich, i had the pleasure of obtaining the names of thirty fine young fellows, among whom the patriots formerly mentioned of course were included. several other militia regiments in this district also gave volunteers to us, so that in three days, from the commencement of the volunteering, we obtained upwards of men; and had we not, by an order from the horse-guards, been precluded from taking any more, i doubt not we should have obtained several hundreds besides, for our regiment alone had near eighty names down for us, who were not allowed to enter from the above cause. indeed the commander-in-chief, sir david dundas, (afterwards our colonel,) appeared quite astonished, and not well pleased, that we had run away with so many men when others wanted them so much. he was obliged, however, to grant us a d battalion, as we had so many more men than were required to fill up the st and d; and our respected colonel, major-general coote manningham, dying about this time of the fatigue he had undergone in spain, sir david took us to himself, and became our colonel-in-chief, giving the command of the d battalion to my respected (and now lamented) friend and benefactor, major-general the honourable william stewart. the lieutenant-colonelcy was given to major norman m'leod, our senior major, and only two or three other steps were given to the officers of the regiment, although it was alone owing to their exertions in obtaining men, and to the high character the regiment had acquired, that such numbers had volunteered into it. it becomes not me to censure or criticise the measures of government, but i cannot help thinking that more favour was certainly due to the corps as a body. for myself, i ought and must speak with gratitude, not of them, but of that kind providence which has favoured me so far, so very far, beyond my deserts, for, on the th of june following, i was appointed quartermaster of the d battalion. our st battalion was again sent out to join the army in portugal, while mine was sent to brabournlees to equip and drill our new levies. every exertion was made to this effect, and the battalion was soon completed and rendered fit for service. here my wife joined me again, the child to which she gave birth in my absence having died when six weeks old. this was the only child she ever had, and it was perhaps a providential dispensation, for she was extremely delicate, and by no means a healthy person, and it is not unlikely her offspring might have inherited her disease, that is, an affection of the chest. we had only lived a few months together, till another call for service separated us again. in june , we received orders to send out to cadiz two companies of my battalion, together with the commanding-officer and staff, three others having been already sent thither in the spring. the melancholy business of parting with my wife was again to be gone through; but on this occasion i was favoured by being permitted to accompany her to london, where, parting from her with a heavy heart, i took my place for chichester, at which place my detachment would be quartered next day, on their way to portsmouth. i omitted to mention, that lieutenant-colonel barnard of the st or royals, had exchanged with lieutenant-colonel m'leod some time previous, and he consequently was now going out as my commanding-officer. we embarked at portsmouth on the th july, on board the mercury frigate, armed _en flute_, and commanded by captain tancock. we had a favourable passage, and landed at cadiz on the th of that month. this city, it may be remembered, was besieged at this time by a french army under marshal victor; consequently, when we arrived, we were amused by seeing immense shells flying from one party to the other, but without doing any serious injury to either, the distance being too great to produce any effect of moment. as we came in sight of cadiz, the view was most enchanting, for the city appeared as if composed of lofty and elegant snow-white buildings, apparently rising from the bosom of the ocean, for the land on which it is built cannot be seen at a distance; added to which, the numerous and beautiful towns about the bay, and a little beyond it, rendered it a most delightful scene. on the right was cadiz, with its lofty lighthouse, and its strong sea-walls rising out of the water; on the left was rota, an apparently neat little town. farther up the bay, on the same side, was port st mary's, and beyond that porto real, both considerable towns. in the centre rises the isla de leon, now called st ferdinand; beyond that chiclana, composed of the elegant country residences of the more wealthy cadiz merchants; and, in the distance, towering on the mountains behind, the dazzling white town of medina sidonia shining in the sun; indeed altogether imagination can scarcely picture to itself a more interesting _coup-d'oeil_, the scene being closed by the lofty snow-clad mountains of ronda. we landed at cadiz, and remained for the night in the barracks situated in the barrier, on the land-side of the town, and which is remarkably strong, the fortifications being composed of solid masonry, and the barracks all bomb-proof. i suffered dreadfully from the myriads of fleas which preyed upon me during the night, and was glad when morning appeared. we marched next day to the isla, (be it observed the town is called by that name as well as the island on which it and cadiz are situated,) distant from cadiz about seven miles; the island is of a most singular form, being about ten miles broad at the end next the continent, from which it is separated by the river santi petri; immediately below the town of isla it begins to narrow very rapidly, forming from thence to cadiz nothing more than a narrow sand-bank, in some places not more than a hundred yards across, and on which a causeway has been built to connect the two places. we took up our abode in the isla, where the spanish government, such as it was, at this time resided; and here i witnessed the first opening of the spanish cortes in , which was attended with all the pomp and show of a truly roman catholic people. _te deums_ and other pompous and brilliant ceremonies marked the event; indeed, here we had an opportunity of seeing a great number of the grandees of the spanish nation, for, as i said before, the government had retired to this place from madrid, and most of the courtiers and others attached to the government had assembled here, together with the deputies from the different provinces; altogether the scenes we witnessed here were sometimes very imposing. the french occupied all the towns before named save cadiz and isla, their advanced piquets being thrown forward to near the river santi petri, except near the bridge of luaza, which is the only communication across from the island to the mainland; here our pickets were advanced a considerable distance beyond the bridge upon a causeway on which is the road leading to seville, through a broad salt marsh on the banks of the river; it is here about two miles wide, and utterly impassable, except to those who know the footpaths across it, being intersected at every few paces by deep salt-pits or pans. the enemy, as mentioned before, had their sentries at some parts pretty far into the centre of this marsh, and there were some fellows in the spanish service called by the name of "creepers," they obtaining their livelihood by killing sea-fowl and other animals in this marsh; and so dexterous were they at this _creeping_, that they could steal upon the birds unperceived, which enabled them to get them with ease. sometimes a fellow of this calling would set off on a _creeping_ excursion, and instead of bagging a wild-duck, or some other such bird, would plunge his stiletto into the heart of an unsuspecting french sentry, and leave him weltering in his gore. this was a noble exploit in their estimation, and marks strongly the character of the spaniard, who, inured to blood by the frequency of their bull-fights and other similar exhibitions, hesitates not a moment at assassination if urged on by what he deems his own or country's wrongs; this inhuman act, of course, was perpetrated in the dark. i may mention, in connexion with this, that on the christmas of , it was reported that sixteen people had been assassinated in isla alone, on the evening or night before; it is probable the number may have been exaggerated, but the thing was such an almost everyday occurrence that it appeared not to excite the least horror at its atrocity. i had occasion to go down the town during the christmas day, and i saw still lying at the corner of one of the most frequented streets, one of the unhappy beings who had thus fallen. no one seemed inclined to own him; and his body, foul with blood and dust, was thus permitted to remain in the public streets without any enquiry being made with respect to the perpetrator of so foul a deed. in truth they are, as it were, trained up to this recklessness of human life from their infancy, for in the town of isla there was a sort of naval academy, where a number of boys, from perhaps eight to twelve years of age, were educated; these urchins were permitted to wear swords, and it is really astonishing how desirous they appeared to make use of them, for they could scarcely ever pass along the streets without trying the sharpness of their points upon the backs of pigs or dogs, or any other unfortunate animal that came in their way. the french also occupied a long low tongue of land which stretches out into the bay of cadiz, taking its rise from between port st mary's and porto real, and extending to within about two and a half miles of cadiz, and about one from puntalis, a fort erected on the island opposite the extremity of this low tongue; this is called the trocadero, since become famous as the field on which the duke d'angouleme, and prince carignan of naples, gained so many honours. on the point of this tongue the enemy's principal batteries were erected, and from thence they contrived occasionally, but not often, and never with any great effect, to throw shells into the town of cadiz. the mortar now in st james' park, called the "prince regent's bomb," was cast at seville on purpose to enable them to reach the town, no ordnance of common dimensions being capable of throwing a shell so far; but it did not answer the end proposed, or at least the effect expected from it, for it was imagined by them, that if they could once succeed in throwing shells into the city, the inhabitants would become so alarmed that they would compel the military to surrender. this, however, was far from being realized, although they did throw a few in; but the distance being so great, they were necessarily thrown much at random, some of them falling short of the town, others flying completely over into the bay near the lighthouse on the other side, and some few, as i said, falling in the city, but from which very few casualties occurred.[ ] i am told they were obliged to have the mortar slung in chains at the time of firing it, the concussion being so great as to destroy the bed in which it was fixed. as may be supposed, there was constant war between our fort puntalis, before mentioned, and the enemy's batteries on this point; in fact our people had orders to throw a thirteen-inch shell every quarter of an hour, besides the occasional firing from the guns and other mortars when any thing appeared on the opposite side; and you may be certain the french were not behind us in the expenditure of ammunition; they were remarkably fond of firing what are termed salvos, that is, volleys of artillery. on one occasion i happened to be looking out from a high tower near isla, called the tore alto, and while all was deep and profound silence, and i happened to be looking towards the point of trocadero, in a moment the smoke rose from at least pieces of artillery, fired by signal, and the noise they made was tremendous. our poor little fort of puntalis appeared almost enveloped in the dust raised by the striking of the shot, and the smoke from them which fell about it, and seemed as if almost deprived of power by so sudden and unexpected a salute; but she began at length to return the compliment, although feebly in comparison of the tremendous volley she had received. this and such like were of frequent occurrence, scarcely a day passing without something interesting taking place. to enable us to cope in some measure with the french, a large double fortified sea-mortar was brought from gibraltar, which threw thirteen-inch shells. it was brought up to the back of the town of isla, near some powder magazines, and an attempt made there to throw some shells over to the trocadero. the first trial, an empty shell was put in, with not less than thirty-two pounds of powder in the chamber. on firing it, the shell flew all to atoms, from the violent shock occasioned by so great a quantity of powder; and the shell being too weak for that description of mortar, another was tried filled with sand, to give it more weight and solidity; this answered the purpose, for it fell on the land on the opposite coast, but still, from the great range, much uncertainty must naturally attend the practice, and it was eventually given up. the next day, however, we were saluted from the opposite side with both shot and shell, the french thus showing us that they were better able to play at long bowls than we were; neither, however, did their practice continue, for there was nothing at the point where their shot and shells fell to be injured by them, the magazines before noticed being now empty. on another occasion an attack was made by our people on the trocadero itself, where it was reported the french had got a considerable number of boats, &c., laid up on shore, about half-way between the point and porto real; our folks took gun-boats and boats with rockets, the intention being to set fire to the enemy's craft. they accordingly advanced in good style, keeping as far, however, as possible out of the range of the french batteries at the point, which, as they were directed towards cadiz and puntalis, could not easily bring their artillery to bear upon our boats. they reached the place where it was said the french craft was lying, and fired a considerable number of rockets, but without being able to effect any thing farther than burning one boat, i believe. as they were returning, however, they met the french commander, who had been down to the point in a light boat, and he, like a brave fellow, determined to run completely the gauntlet rather than return, keeping as close in shore, however, as possible. the whole of our gun-boats fired at him as he passed, and knocked the water up about him in all directions without ever once touching him, although, to look at him, one would have imagined it impossible he could escape; but here the old soldier's adage was verified, for there was still more room to miss than to hit him, and he accordingly escaped scot-free. while here, i had a most ample opportunity of closely viewing the spanish army, great numbers being stationed in and about the isla, and great numbers constantly coming into and going out of the place, after receiving such equipment as the government was able to provide for them. nothing could exceed the hardy and robust appearance of the men in general; and had they been clothed, appointed, and disciplined like either their enemies or their allies, there could not have been a finer soldiery. i cannot, however, say so much for their officers; most of them appeared to be utterly unfit and unable to command their men. those who had the means, seemed to think of nothing else but dressing like apes or mountebanks, and intriguing with the women. it was really absurd and ludicrous to see the strange figures they generally made themselves. in one regiment alone you might have observed more different uniforms than both we and the french have in all our armies. one would have had on a blue coat turned up with red, with a chaco and a straight sword, the uniform prescribed for officers of the infantry, i believe; the next would have most likely had on a hussar dress, with an enormous sabre dangling by his side; another would have had a red coat, a fourth yellow, a fifth white, and so on. in short, all the colours of the rainbow were generally exhibited in the uniforms of one regiment's officers; and every one of them appeared to vie with the other who could make the greatest harlequin of himself, whilst those of them who were mounted would caper and prance about the streets like so many fools, riding with their legs at full stretch, and the toe of the boot (if they had one) just touching the stirrup, and drawing the reins continually through the fingers of their right hand; and if by any chance an ape of this kind came near the window of his dulcinea, and thought there was a likelihood of her seeing him, i pitied the poor foot-passengers who might happen to be near him, for he would make his unfortunate rosinante prance and caper by the immense long bit in its mouth, and the pieces of iron in the shape of spurs on his (shoes perhaps), till the poor animal was like to fall under him. in short, they had all the pride, arrogance, and self-sufficiency of the best officers in the world, with the very least of all pretension to have an high opinion of themselves; it is true they were not all alike, but the majority of them were the most haughty, and at the same time the most contemptible creatures in the shape of officers, that i ever beheld. it was, therefore, not to be expected that the soldiers would or could look upon them with that degree of respect and reverence so essential to a due maintenance of subordination in an army. about the month of february , it was concerted between the spanish government and general graham, who commanded us, to undertake an expedition which should land in the vicinity of gibraltar; and being there reinforced by some troops from that fortress, the whole should move forward in the direction of chiclana, and, taking the enemy in the rear of his works, compel him either to abandon them or fight a battle. accordingly, on the th of that month, we embarked on board some small vessels that had been fitted up for the occasion in the bay of cadiz, and, sailing soon after, we reached algeziras, ten miles on this side of gibraltar, and landed there on the th. our force consisted of a brigade of artillery, with ten guns; two battalions of foot guards; the th, th, and th regiments; a battalion composed of flank companies from gibraltar; two companies of the th regiment, and two of the th portuguese regiment, with six companies of our corps and one squadron of cavalry,--in all about men. the spanish army, under the command of general la pena, (who, being senior officer, directed the whole,) consisted of two divisions,--in all from ten to eleven thousand. we were not allowed to take any baggage with us, consequently we could not expect much comfort during the service, which was expected to be short. the day we landed we bivouacked on a height near algeziras, and the next morning moved on towards tarifa, where we remained for that day and the next, to allow time to get the artillery and cavalry horses on shore. here i observed a strange custom among the females of this place, the remains, i apprehend, of the moorish fashion, (which no doubt would continue longer in this place than others, it being immediately opposite to and in sight of africa.) the spanish women all wear what they term a mantilla, that is, a kind of scarf made of cloth, generally black, which they throw over their heads lengthwise, letting the two ends come over their shoulders, and meeting and crossing on the breast, it forms a sort of head-dress which shows only the face, and keeps them close and snug about the head; but here, they bring it so far forward as to completely cover the face, leaving nothing but a very small hole in front of their left eye (i think it is), at which they peep out, without showing any part of the face. colonel brown of the th, who was then a most wild and eccentric character, although now i understand completely altered, could not relish this hiding of their beauty by the modest dames of tarifa. all, therefore, that he met in the streets he stopped, and made them open the mantilla, that he might have a fair peep at them, to the great scandal of the good ladies of this still moorish town, and which, had it been on any other occasion, might have been attended with unpleasant consequences to himself. when every thing was ready we moved forward from tarifa, and halted for the night on a height about twelve miles distant. the next day we reached casas vejas, or "old houses," where we bivouacked on a scrubby hill, the weather being very bitter, which we felt in all its force, having no covering whatever. next day we had to cross a considerable lake of fresh water, by a sort of ford which crossed it about the middle. we had started before daylight, and, through some mismanagement, did not reach this lake till near mid-day, although it was only a few miles distant from our last night's quarters. one division of the spaniards led the column, and another was behind us, we being thus in the centre, as being the least thought of probably by our spanish commander-in-chief; for indeed we had often heard it said in and about isla, "what fine-looking and well-disciplined soldiers the british are!--what a pity they cannot fight!" so thought la pena, probably; but by two o'clock the first division of spaniards had not near got over the lake, at which the patience of our general was so completely exhausted, that he requested the spanish general to allow him to bring forward the british troops, to show him the way how he and they would act. my battalion led the van, and were ordered to march straight through it without any picking of steps, and to go forward in regular sections, one man supporting another. they went in and marched right through it, as if it had been plain ground, the water taking them generally about mid-deep. the rest of the british army followed, and were all through in less than half an hour; a one-horse cart, indeed, stuck fast in the middle of it, from the wheels having got entangled between the large stones at the bottom. general graham seeing this, instantly dismounted, and, plunging in, set his shoulder to the wheel, and fairly lifted it clear of the obstruction. la pena, and those about him, after witnessing the example set them by our general and his troops, seemed really ashamed of their former conduct, and, setting to in good earnest, they contrived to urge their soldiers and officers to take the water with more freedom, and before dark the whole army had got over. while we were so long detained by the first division of spaniards getting across, i, with several other mounted people, rode forward to the ford, to ascertain the cause of our stoppage for so long a time. the spaniards were going into the water one at a time,--here one, and there one,--while the creatures of officers were making the men carry them on their backs. had the whole army acted thus, we should not have got over before daylight next morning. when all were across, and the columns formed, we moved forward, and reached the neighbourhood of veger, which stands on a high hill not far distant from the memorable cape trafalgar. we halted in an olive-grove below the town, and bivouacked for the night; it was bitter cold, and the troops could find but little wood for firing, which they much needed, from having got so completely wet in crossing the lake. we remained at veger all the next day, and a little after dark commenced our march. we being now in the neighbourhood of the enemy, it became necessary to conceal our movements as much as possible. during the night we passed the fishing town of conil, and, keeping near the coast, we arrived the next morning on the plain of chiclana. i quote from our general's dispatch, as it states the thing in a much more clear and satisfactory manner than i could do. he says,--"after a night march of sixteen hours from the camp (bivouack) near veger, we arrived on the morning of the th on the low ridge of barossa, about four miles from the santi petri river. this height extends inland about a mile and a half, continuing on the north the extensive heathy plain of chiclana. a great pine-forest skirts the plain, and circles round the height at some distance, terminating down towards santi petri, the intermediate space between the north side of the height and the forest being uneven and broken." the two spanish divisions had preceded us, who, after having rested a while on the plain, moved down towards the santi petri, where a bridge was to be thrown over by the troops in the isla de leon, and thus open a communication between the two armies, that is, between those inside the island and us. the general goes on to say,--"a well-conducted and successful attack on the rear of the enemy's lines, near santi petri, by the vanguard of the spanish army under brigadier-general ladrizabel, having opened the communication with the isla de leon, i received general la pena's directions to move down from the position of barossa to that of the torre de bermesa, about half-way to the santi petri river, over which a bridge had been lately established. this latter position occupies a narrow woody ridge, the right on the sea-cliff, and the left falling down to the almanza creek, on the edge of the marsh; a hard sandy beach gives an easy communication between the western points of these two positions. "my division being halted on the eastern slope of the barossa height, was marched about twelve o'clock through the wood towards bermesa, (cavalry patrols having previously been sent towards chiclana, without meeting with the enemy.) on the march i received notice that the enemy had appeared in force on the plain, and was advancing towards the heights of barossa. as i considered that position as the key of santi petri, i immediately countermarched, in order to support the troops left for its defence; and the alacrity with which this manoeuvre was executed, served as a favourable omen. it was, however, impossible, in such intricate and difficult ground, to preserve order in the columns, and there never was time to restore it entirely. but before we could get ourselves quite disentangled from the wood, the troops on the barossa hill were seen returning from it, while the enemy's left wing was rapidly ascending. at the same time his right wing stood on the plain, on the edge of the wood, within cannon-shot. a retreat in the face of such an enemy, already within reach of the easy communication by the sea-beach, must have involved the whole allied army in all the danger of being attacked during the unavoidable confusion of the different corps arriving on the narrow ridge of bermesa nearly at the same time. "trusting to the known heroism of british troops, regardless of the numbers and position of the enemy, an immediate attack was determined on. major duncan soon opened a powerful battery of ten guns in the centre. brigadier-general dilkes, with the brigade of guards, lieutenant-colonel brown's (of the th) flank battalion, lieutenant-colonel norcott's two companies of the d rifle corps, and major acheson, with a part of the th, (separated from the regiment in the wood,) formed on the right. "colonel wheately's brigade, (consisting of the th, th, and th,) with three companies of the coldstream guards, under lieutenant-colonel jackson (separated likewise from his battalion in the wood), and lieutenant-colonel barnard's flank battalion (being two companies th, two ditto th portuguese, and four of third battalion th) formed on the left. as soon as the infantry was thus hastily got together, the guns advanced to a more favourable position, and kept up a destructive fire. the right wing proceeded to the attack of general ruffin's division on the hill, while lieutenant-colonel barnard's flank battalion, and lieutenant-colonel bush's detachment of the th portuguese, were warmly engaged with the enemy's tirailleurs on our left. "general laval's division, notwithstanding the havoc made by major duncan's battery, continued to advance in very imposing masses, opening his fire of musketry, and was only checked by that of the left wing. the left wing now advanced firing. a most destructive charge, by the three companies of the guards and the th regiment, supported by all the remainder of the wing, decided the defeat of general laval's division. "the eagle of the th regiment of light infantry, which suffered immensely, and a howitzer, rewarded this charge, and remained in possession of major gough of the th regiment. these attacks were zealously supported by colonel bilson with the th regiment, and lieutenant-colonel prevost with a part of the th. a reserve, formed beyond the narrow valley, across which the enemy was closely pursued, next shared the same fate, and was routed by the same means. "meanwhile, the right wing was not less successful. the enemy, confident of success, met general dilkes on the ascent of the hill, and the contest was sanguinary; but the undaunted perseverance of the brigade of guards, of lieutenant-colonel brown's battalion, and of lieutenant-colonel norcott's and major acheson's detachments, overcame every obstacle, and general ruffin's division was driven from the heights in confusion, leaving two pieces of cannon. "no expressions of mine could do justice to the conduct of the troops throughout--nothing less than the almost unparalleled exertions of every officer, the invincible bravery of every soldier, and the most determined devotion of the honour of his majesty's arms in all, could have achieved this brilliant success against such a formidable enemy, so posted. in less than an hour and a half from the commencement of the action, the enemy was in full retreat. the retiring divisions met, halted, and seemed inclined to form; a new and more advanced position of our artillery quickly dispersed them. the exhausted state of the troops made pursuit impossible. a position was taken up on the eastern side of the hill; and we were strengthened on our right by the return of two spanish regiments, that had been attached before to my division, but which i had left on the hill, and which had been ordered to retire. "an eagle, six pieces of cannon, the general of division ruffin, and the general of brigade rousseau, wounded and taken; the chief of the staff, general bellegarde, and aide-de-camp of marshal victor, and the colonel of the th regiment, with many other officers killed, and several wounded and taken prisoners, the field covered with the dead bodies of the enemy, attest that my confidence in this division was nobly repaid. the animated charges of the th regiment were most conspicuous. lieutenant-colonel barnard, (twice wounded,) and the officers of his flank-battalion, executed the duty of skirmishing in advance with the enemy in a masterly manner; and were ably seconded by lieutenant-colonel bush, of the th portuguese, who (likewise twice wounded) fell into the enemy's hands, but was afterwards rescued." the dispatch contains many more acknowledgments, which, as they have no connexion with my narrative, i have omitted. i beg now to make such remarks and observations as may tend to throw light upon the different parts of the foregoing dispatch. the two spanish battalions attached to our division, together with lieutenant-colonel brown's flank-battalion, were left upon the height of barossa, when we moved down into the wood, in order to secure that position till we had possessed ourselves of the height of bermesa; but we had not left the plain more than half an hour, i think, and descended into the wood, till an officer came galloping after us, saying the french had debouched from the wood, and were moving on to the high ground in our rear, and had attacked the troops left there for its defence. orders were instantly given us to countermarch, and to get on to the plain and into action as soon as possible. in coming about, one of the guns got entangled with a pine-tree; there was no time to disengage it, and setting to with the whip, they pushed the horses forward, and tore up the tree completely by the roots, although one of considerable size. i thought (as our general says) it appeared a good omen, and that a trifling obstacle would not be allowed to impede their career. when we reached the plain, and perceived the enemy, never did a finer sight present itself. they were manoeuvring on the high ground before us; and as home says, "the hill they gained, and moving on its top, of more than mortal size, towering, they seemed an host angelic, clad in burning arms." those immediately in front of my battalion were the famed th regiment, and consisted of two battalions of men each; one was composed of grenadiers, and the other of voltigeurs, or light infantry. the grenadiers had long waving red plumes in their caps, at least a foot in length; while the light infantry had feathers of the same length and make, but green, with yellow tops. the whole of the french army had on their best or holyday suits of clothing, with their arms as bright as silver, and glancing in the sun as they moved in column, gave them really a noble and martial appearance. we had no sooner cleared the wood than we inclined to our left, and went immediately at them. major duncan's guns commenced playing upon their column the moment he could get a clear piece of ground. the two companies of the th, attached to my battalion, were taken to cover and remain with the guns. our people extended as we went up the hill, the portuguese supporting us in the rear; and in a very short time we were hotly engaged with the fellows with the beautiful green feathers, many of which fell on the ground in a short time. as we advanced, the battalions to our right and in rear of us got formed in line, and moving forward in fine style, took up stronger ground in advance; the guns in the centre also moving onward, and causing dreadful havoc in the enemy's ranks. early in the action my horse was killed, being shot in the head, which ball, had his head not stopped it, would in all probability have entered my body. he fell like a stone. i then went on and joined the ranks, and finding a rifle of a man that had just fallen, (poor little croudace's servant, who afterwards fell himself,) i took a few shots at them in revenge for my horse. at this time the grenadier battalion of the th, with their waving red plumes, began to advance in close column, the drums beating all the time the _pas de charge_. they were supported by other columns in their rear, together with one, the french th, which they sent into the wood to try to turn our left. the th advanced, notwithstanding the galling fire kept up by our people and the portuguese, every shot almost of which must have told, as they were in a solid body, not more than from to yards' distance. our people were of course compelled to give way to this imposing column, when the regiments on our right and in our rear, opening out upon them a destructive fire, and the th and guards immediately after attacking them with the bayonet, their rout and discomfiture was complete. the th, which suffered most, and from whom the eagle was taken, never yet got into line--nor did they intend, i believe--but advanced as a solid body, (occasionally firing from their front,) till, coming in contact with the regiments above mentioned, and in this state receiving the charge, their loss was excessive, for they could not get away. i understand, when the th charged, ensign keogh of that regiment made the first attempt to wrench the eagle from the officer who carried it; but in so doing he was run through by several of those who supported it, and fell lifeless to the ground. sergeant masterson of that regiment then dashed at it, and was more fortunate, he succeeding in securing it. i understand there was some dispute between them and the guards, who charged at the same time with the th, to whom it properly belonged; but i imagine the th must have been the captors, for sergeant masterson soon after received a commission for his gallantry, and is now a captain in that regiment. the th, the french regiment, which had been sent into the wood to turn our left flank, by some means got entangled; for, except their light company, no part of the regiment ever got into action again; and when their columns were routed, they found some difficulty in effecting their retreat. there is something rather extraordinary and very interesting in the story of the eagle and the th regiment, if it be true, and which i see no reason to doubt. they were one of the regiments, it is said, which were engaged at talavera, and were particularly distinguished; and it is further said, that the th was one of the regiments opposed to them, and over which they gained some advantage; that is, the french troops caused the british brigade, in which the th was serving, to retire with considerable loss; and that it was for their conduct in this action that bonaparte had placed a golden wreath of laurel round the neck of the regimental eagle with his own hand. if such was the case, it is most remarkable that the very regiment by whom they should have obtained this honour, should be the regiment that deprived them of their eagle, which had been so highly honoured. but here, poor fellows, although they did not lose their honour, they lost very nearly the whole regiment; for out of which entered the field, not more than of them entered chiclana after the action. indeed i never witnessed any field so thickly strewed with dead as this plain was after the action; and i feel confident, and all accounts agree in confirming the opinion, that the loss of the french on this occasion was little short of men; ours was about . here then we have a loss of men in about an hour and a half, out of about , which composed the two armies. in this action, colonel bush was almost absurdly brave and conspicuous. as soon as he got his portuguese fairly into action, he rode slowly backward and forward among them, with his spectacles on, crying out as the balls whistled past him, "que bella musica!" what delightful music! poor fellow, he did not ride there many minutes; for, being within a very short distance of the enemy's tirailleurs so conspicuous an object, it was not to be expected he could escape. he died a few days after the action. colonel barnard, my commandant, (now sir andrew,) about the middle of the action, received a severe wound, and was borne away to the rear. whilst the surgeon was dressing him, another shot struck him, and inflicted, i believe, a worse wound than the former. the horses of my battalion suffered greatly in proportion to their numbers. we had only four in the field, two of which, major ross's and my own, were killed, and colonel barnard's wounded; only the adjutant's escaped with a whole skin. indeed there was scarcely an officer or soldier in the action that had not marks of shot about him. the caps of the tall guardsmen were riddled as it were; while the greater part of the enemy's shot passed over our little fellows, who were both too near them, and too low for their fire. i may remark on this subject that the french generally fire high, but here i think unusually so; for, after a considerable quantity of ammunition had been expended by my battalion, it became my duty to look out for a fresh supply. i accordingly posted off to the rear, where i expected to have found some mules which had been attached to us, with ammunition on their backs; but on my way thither, the ground was actually ploughing up on all sides by the enemy's large shot, and their musket-balls falling very thick; so much so, that some of our mules far to the rear had been wounded, and the others had dispersed. hence also the second wound which my gallant commander received, where he ought to have been completely out of danger. some ammunition for our rifles was, however, found in a one-horse cart belonging to the artillery, and out of it those whose ammunition was expended were replenished. but during my absence to the rear, the gallant and decisive charge had been made; and when i again reached the front, i perceived the enemy's columns in full retreat, covered by the remainder of their light troops, closely followed by some of my people. the retreat was accordingly sounded to recall them from the pursuit, and our brave and victorious little army cheered the enemy as his beaten and disheartened columns left the field. immediately after our army began to move off towards the isla, our general being, as i understood, so much exasperated with the apathy evinced by the spanish general, that he would no longer co-operate with him, and consequently drew off our troops into the isle of leon. my battalion, however, was destined to remain on the field all night to protect the numerous wounded from any marauders, or small parties and cavalry patrols of the enemy, which might happen to return. however, not a frenchman made his appearance there again that night. when it was determined to withdraw the british army, major duncan, with great humanity, (approved of course by our excellent general,) cast off from the artillery-carriages all the spare ammunition, in order to make room for as many of our wounded officers and soldiers as those carriages could accommodate, and thus a considerable number of them were carried from the field immediately. after they had left us, and my battalion was still standing in front of the position last occupied by our troops, all having retired but ourselves, and it now began to draw towards night, and we were preparing to move off, an unfortunate french sergeant attracted our notice. poor fellow, he had been shot in the small of the back, and (on our surgeon examining him) pronounced to be mortally. he appeared to be a man above forty, and apparently a veteran, who had fought many a hard field; and was, i think, one of the most respectable-looking men of his class that i have seen. when he saw us preparing to leave him to his fate, the expression of his countenance became the most piteous and beseeching imaginable; imploring us in french not to leave him there to perish. my heart bled for him; but unhappily we had no means of removing him, had there even been a hope of his recovery. when he saw that his fate was inevitable, he crawled in the best manner he was able to a broken ammunition-box, and raising himself on his knees, supported by it, besought that being who never casts out the cry of the unfortunate, and who, i sincerely hope, imparted to him that strength and comfort which his unhappy circumstances so greatly required. i doubt not he was a sincere christian; never shall i forget the impression his unhappy fate made on my mind. to be left in solitude and darkness on this blood-stained heath, with the prospect of his own certain death before his eyes, and without any to comfort him in his last agony, must indeed have been a severe trial to his fortitude. would to god i could have relieved him! his case was not singular, it is true; but none ever presented itself to my view under such truly affecting circumstances as this unhappy veteran's did. after dark, my battalion retired over the field where the thickest of the dead and wounded were strewed, and many were the dying groans which struck upon our ears, as we traversed this bloody field; but, except these groans, no sound was heard, where lately the din of arms had been loud and fierce, and where war had raged in all its fury; till coming to the house upon the sea-beach, where many of the wounded had been collected, we were formed into square on a sand-hill near it, and in this position rested on our arms for the remainder of the night. on our way from the front, we passed not far from where my horse had fallen; and as saddlery was scarce at cadiz, i thought it would be prudent to try to recover that on which i had been riding. i found it; but my horse having fallen with his back inclined to the front, it was perforated by shot in five places, and the tree was broken. however, i disengaged it, and giving it to one of the men, whose rifle i carried in return, i got it safely into isla. about twelve at night, poor general rousseau died, a cannon-shot having carried away the greater part of the flesh of one of his thighs; and as no other troops were near, the task of paying him the last sad duty devolved upon me. i went to the house aforesaid, and procured a shovel or a spade, and digging a hole in the sand by the light of the moon, his body was deposited, where it in all probability will remain till the last trumpet shall summon it to rise. poor drunken gilles, one of the men i had employed on the occasion, pronounced the only service as he was committed to the dust, which was, "god rest his soul!" i indeed sincerely hope so. poor rousseau had been a noble soldier; in his pocket was found a leave which he had obtained to return to france on account of ill health; but in the prospect of the approaching action he had delayed his departure, and thus fell a victim as it were to his patriotism and his sense of honour. he was military governor of xeres de la frontera, from whence we have our wine called sherry, a corruption of xeres. he was a small slender person, and apparently had suffered greatly from ill health. during the night some spaniards were sent into the field to look for and bring off the guns we had taken, which they did. as it approached towards morning, major ross, seeing all was quiet, moved us off by the beach towards our former quarters; and passing over the position of bermesa, which the spaniards still occupied, and crossing the santi petri by the lately erected bridge, we returned weary and hungry to la isla, and where our friends received us once again with great cordiality. if my reader is not tired of the subject, i would just beg to draw his attention for a moment to the circumstances attending this action. the french troops were at least (some say ) strong, well clothed and appointed, and apparently well fed, and fresh from their cantonments, none of them probably having marched more than four miles. they were some of the best in the french service, and commanded by one of bonaparte's ablest generals, a marshal of france, victor, duke of belluno. they occupied a fine position, having the ground completely at their choice; while we did not muster more than at most. we had been marching for sixteen hours successively through the night over bad roads; and being taken in a manner by surprise, we came out of the wood _beneath_ the enemy, broken and disjointed, and were instantly hurried into action. the french fought desperately; for when their marauding columns came down upon us with an intrepidity seldom seen in the french army, and opening out their heavy and destructive fire, my heart quaked within me for the safety of our little army, and the honour of our country, for i thought it would be impossible to resist them. however, the steady valour of our troops repelled the assailants, and, taking advantage of their proximity, charged as before stated, and completely overthrew them. it is certain, as general graham says, that _all_ must have done their duty on this occasion; notwithstanding, we may sing with great propriety, "non nobis, domine"--"not unto us, o lord, but unto thy name be the praise;" for it is certain we must have been specially favoured by a kind providence, or it is impossible we could have gained _such_ a victory under so many and so great disadvantages; for never was victory more complete. in less than three hours from the first glimpse we had of them as we debouched from the wood, a frenchman was not to be seen in all the field, save the numerous killed and wounded. although our general did not say any thing in his public dispatch of the abominable conduct of la pena, no doubt he stated truly in his private information how ill that general had behaved; for he and the , or , spaniards he had with him remained within two miles of the field of action, quiet and passive spectators of the scene, without making one effort to support us had we been beaten, or to take advantage of the victory should we gain it; and the consequence was, the french retained their ground and works by which they invested cadiz and la isla, whereas, had he made the slightest movement during or after the fight, they would have all gone off, and the siege would have been raised, for it is evident they contemplated and were prepared for this, the soldiers having each three or four days' bread in his possession. a considerable number of other officers besides generals ruffin and rousseau were taken. ruffin was wounded in the neck by a rifle-shot, which touched the spinal marrow, depriving him of the use of his limbs. he was soon after embarked for england, but died as he came within sight of the isle of wight. he was an immense and a fine-looking man, about six feet two inches or six feet three inches high, and ate enormously. he every day received a mess from our general's table. the other officers also were treated with the greatest politeness and attention, dining first at one regimental mess, and then at another. they were fully sensible of the kindness shown them, and expressed themselves very grateful. they were afterwards sent to england. i cannot omit here noticing the high estimation in which general graham was held by every officer and soldier of this little army. i may truly say, he lived in their affections; they not only looked up to him with confidence as their commander, but they esteemed and respected him as their firm friend and protector, which indeed he always showed himself to be. in all my fighting i never was in an action where the chances of death were so numerous as in this; and i may say, i never was in an action where i was less prepared to die. it is therefore of the lord's mercies that he spared me--i hope, for good at last. footnote: [ ] the distance to which the french threw these shells is truly amazing. the longest range of heavy iron sea mortars is only about yards, whereas the distance from the french batteries on the trocadero to the nearest point of cadiz was, i believe, or more; but they exceeded this considerably, for, as i said above, some of their shells fell in the sea beyond the town, near the lighthouse, a distance of at least or yards farther. the shells were always half filled with lead, to increase their flight, so that when they burst the mischief they occasioned was never extensive; i believe not more than about half-a-dozen individuals suffered from them in all. chapter vii. the d battalion of the th rifles ordered to proceed to portugal--our author visits england--returns to portugal, and joins his regiment at rodrigo--the army move towards badajos--siege of badajos--badajos surrenders--insubordination among the troops--quelled by the prompt measures of lord wellington. we remained at isla till june, without any thing of importance occurring, but at this time i was brought nigh to death's door by the bursting of a bloodvessel in the lungs. i was so ill that it was deemed necessary to send me home for change of air, it being exceedingly hot at this time at isla. i was accordingly removed to cadiz to wait for the first ship returning to england, and while there i suffered greatly, not being able to lie down in bed. however, before a vessel could be had, an order was received for my battalion to proceed to portugal, and our esteemed commander was likewise ordered to proceed to that country. as i felt myself somewhat better, i obtained permission to accompany my battalion to portugal, and i accordingly embarked with it at cadiz on the th of that month, on board a transport, the name of which i forget. general graham intended to have gone in a gun ship that was leaving that port for england, he being to be left at lisbon in passing. he sent an aide-de-camp on board to prepare for his reception; but he met with such treatment while on board, as induced the general to alter his plan and go in a frigate, on board which some of our people were embarked. it is said, that after the aide-de-camp had been shown the accommodation, the captain intimated to him, that it was expected the military officers would always keep on the leeward side of the quarter-deck. the windward side on board a man-of-war is considered the most honourable, therefore this was in fact putting the general beneath himself. he suffered, however, for his ill-timed assumption of supremacy, for there was a quantity of specie at cadiz which was to be transported at the same time for the use of the army in portugal, and which was intended to have gone in the ship with the general; but after this reception of his aide-de-camp, and the imperious condition attached to his going in this ship, he went on board the frigate with his suite, and took the money with him, thus depriving him of a considerable premium for its transport, to which he would have been entitled had the general gone with him. he, however, being the senior officer, we were all put under his charge, save the frigate before mentioned, and we were greatly annoyed by him during our passage, which our master said he prolonged in looking out for american merchantmen, there being then an appearance of war between the two countries. they said he actually detained one or two which left cadiz when we did, and that he fired small arms into them to bring them to, although war had not been declared. one day during the passage he made a signal to the transports which we did not immediately perceive. we were astonished at the report of a gun, and at the same time a cannon-shot whizzed past our rigging. this is not, i believe, customary, a blank gun being generally fired first, and when nothing else will do, a shot a-head of the vessel, but he appeared not to stand on any ceremony. we were glad when the voyage was over, it continuing from the th june to the th july, although three or four days only is the usual time. we landed at lisbon, and immediately set about preparing for our journey up the country to join the army; but colonel barnard having received letters respecting the settlement of our late colonel (general manningham's) affairs, which could not be easily arranged without my presence, determined to send me home for the purpose, with a promise, however, that i should immediately come out again. i accordingly embarked on board the same transport with a ship full of all kinds and descriptions of people, sick and wounded, and lame and lazy; such a motley group i have seldom seen. our paymaster also returned home with me, and besides him i did not know a person on board. we had a long and tedious passage, not reaching portsmouth till the th august, although we embarked on the st of that month. when we entered the chops of the channel, there was a considerable swell in the sea. our master, for some purpose or other, had got up from the hold a small quantity of ballast (gravel), which was laid upon the quarter-deck. a fine stout young irishman, an officer on board, came up the companion, and seeing the ballast lying there, asked where it came from. "why, don't you see," says the master, "how rough the sea is? it has been washed up from the bottom and thrown upon the deck." the hibernian seemed quite astonished at the effect of the swell, but believed the story with all the simple-hearted credulity of a johnny-raw, as the soldiers term a young and inexperienced soldier. our paymaster was a little of a gourmand, and having for some time been deprived of luxuries, determined to indulge a little now we had come to the land of plenty. on our road, therefore, to london, (he and another officer and myself posting it,) we stopped at godalming for dinner; he would needs have a carp, which he happened to see in a pond in the garden, made ready for our dinner. it was prepared according to his request, and with it and other good things we contrived to fare pretty well; although, according to my taste, a fresh herring would have been preferable. but lo, and behold! when the bill was called for, the awful sum of _half a guinea_ for the carp was added to the other items of the dinner, which amounted to quite enough without it. to remonstrate would have been useless; we therefore paid the bill and set off, determined to be more economical in future. i passed through london, and reached the depôt of my battalion, then stationed at ashford in kent, where, after having arranged the business for which i had been sent home, i obtained a three months' leave of absence to visit my native place, where i arrived, thank god, in a much improved state of health, and where i found all my friends and connexions as well as could be expected, and no doubt happy to see me. about the middle of november of the same year, i started once more for foreign service, and embarked at portsmouth for lisbon on the d of that month, on board a small brig heavily laden with corn for the army in portugal. we remained some time wind-bound, but at length got to sea and proceeded on our voyage, but shortly after the wind headed us and began to blow very fresh. we were therefore compelled to run for the race of portland, where we came to anchor. but the wind coming more favourable in a day or two, we weighed again, and got as far on our voyage as opposite torbay; but here again the wind coming foul, we were obliged to enter the bay and drop anchor again. we were detained here a good many days, during which i went ashore with another officer, who was on board with me, and indulged in some devonshire clotted cream at brixham. in about a week we again started, and got about half way across the bay of biscay, when a heavy gale overtook us, and in which we lost a considerable portion of our quarter-bulwarks (i think they are called). indeed, from the brig being so heavily laden, the water being within a very little of her gunwale, she did not weather the heavy seas which struck her very well, for during the night one came clean over her, partly filling the cabin where we lay with water; and i own i had considerable apprehension for our safety, which i believe was pretty universal on board. it pleased him, however, who ruleth over all things, to bring us through the gale without further injury, although we appeared next morning in a very shattered condition, and after a few more days' sailing, we reached the tagus, and landed at lisbon about the middle of january , and immediately commenced equipping for a campaign with the army which was at this time besieging ciudad rodrigo. i had to purchase a riding-horse and a mule to carry my baggage, and a great deal more of essential requisites to enable me to do my duty in the field; and to say truth, i had not, by any means, sufficient funds to meet these considerable expenses, and was consequently forced to borrow, and glad enough to find a friend who could and would lend me enough for the occasion. and here i cannot but remark, that it seemed peculiarly hard on junior officers, on their taking the field, to be compelled to furnish all this equipment at their own expense. i have known several who did not recover from the debt they thus incurred (could they find a friend, as i did, to lend them what they wanted) for a considerable time after they had joined the army; nay, i believe some never recovered it, and the persons who were kind enough to oblige them lost several large sums in this manner. in my own case, i know, i was most wofully put to it to raise a sufficiency for this purpose; and many, i know, have been compelled to take the field without the necessary equipment to render them efficient. they were thus of little service to the army for a considerable time after joining, and many of them were obliged to leave it again, after striving to do their duty, inadequately provided with the conveniences and comforts requisite to enable a man to bear up against the fatigues he had to encounter. it struck me as but just, and in this opinion i am not singular, that all officers who have not sufficient pay and allowances to enable them to provide themselves with the means of transport, ought to be furnished in the first instance at the public expense, and then be afterwards obliged to keep them in a fit state for service at their own. i set out from lisbon soon after, and joined my regiment, which was one of those that formed the light division, and found them cantoned in the neighbourhood of rodrigo, that fortress having fallen some days previous to my arrival. i had not been many days with the regiment till the division was assembled at a village called ituera, on the banks of the azava, to carry into execution the sentence of a general court-martial, before which seven men of the division had been arraigned for desertion to the enemy, they having been taken in rodrigo at the capture of that place. they were of course all found guilty, as they were taken as it were out of the enemy's ranks, and never attempted to plead not guilty; but they had said in palliation of their heinous crime, that they were forced to desert from want of food and clothing; indeed the army had not been so well supplied for a short while previously, as they had been accustomed to, but there never was any thing like want. i understood the clothing also was getting bad, but the men could not be got up the country for want of transport, and they were no worse off than their comrades. indeed, from all i could learn, they had acted in a most diabolical manner; for at the attack of the breaches in assaulting the place, they were distinctly heard crying out to one another, "now here comes the light division; let us give it them, the rascals," or something to that effect, and had, it is said, done more injury to the assailing party than twice their number of frenchmen. death of course was their sentence, and now the wretched victims of delusion were to atone with their lives for one of the greatest crimes known in the criminal code of the army. the division was formed into three sides square, on a plain in front of the village, the graves of the hapless beings occupying a part of the fourth face of the square. when all was ready, and a firing party from each regiment had been formed in the centre, the provost-marshal went to the guard-tent, where the prisoners were in waiting, to conduct them to the place of execution. they soon after appeared, poor wretches, moving towards the square, with faces pale and wan, and with all the dejection such a situation is calculated to produce. their arms had been pinioned one by one as they came out from the guard-tent, and all being ready, the melancholy procession advanced towards the centre of the square. the proceedings of the court which tried them, together with the sentence, and the approval of the commander of the forces, was read by the assistant adjutant-general, in the hearing of the whole division; which concluded, the prisoners were marched round in front of every regiment, that all might see and avoid their unhappy fate. they were then moved towards their graves. i ought to observe that the chaplain of the division had been with them in the guard-tent some little time previously to their leaving it, and when they quitted as above described, he followed them at a considerable distance, apparently ashamed of his peculiar calling, and the duty incumbent on him in such a conjuncture. they were led, as i said before, towards their graves; and when they reached the bank of earth in front of each, they were made to kneel down with their faces fronting the square, and then being one after another blindfolded, and left for a few moments to their own reflections or their prayers, the provost-marshal proceeded to the firing party, who had been previously loaded, and directing the men of each regiment to fire at their own prisoner, he advanced them to within about ten or twelve paces of the wretched men, and giving the signals by motion for their making ready and firing, the whole fired at once, and plunged the unhappy criminals into eternity. there was, indeed, one melancholy exception to this. one of the prisoners belonged to the troop of horse artillery attached to the division, and it seems the provost, in giving his orders for the soldiers of each regiment to fire at their own man, had not recollected that the artillery had no men there to fire. he was thus left sitting on his knees, when the others had fallen all around him. what his feelings must have been it is in vain to guess; but, poor fellow, he was not suffered long to remain in suspense, for a reserve party immediately approaching, they fired and stretched him also along with his companions in crime and misery; and in such of the others as they perceived life still remaining, they also immediately put an end to their sufferings, by placing their muskets close to their body, and firing into them. one poor man, when he received his death wound, sprung to a considerable height, and giving a loud shriek, he fell, and instantly expired. when all was finished, the division was formed into column, and marched round in front of the bodies, where each soldier might distinctly perceive the sad and melancholy effects of such a fatal dereliction of duty. they were then, without more ado, thrown into their graves, which were filled up without delay, and the division separating, each regiment marched to its quarters. i cannot describe the uncomfortable feelings this spectacle produced in my mind--nay, not only there, but in my body also--for i felt sick at heart; a sort of loathing ensued; and from the recollection of what i then suffered, i could not easily be persuaded to witness such another scene, if i had the option of staying away. death in the hundred shapes it assumes on the field of battle seems honourable, and not near so revolting to the feelings, and withal comes suddenly; but to witness the slow and melancholy preparations for an execution such as this, is productive, in any heart that can feel, of the most unpleasant sensations, i think, imaginable. one of the poor wretches was the little shoemaker of our highland company, by name m'guiniss, whom i had known for many years, and who formerly bore an excellent character; but he had most likely been seduced by some of his companions to commit this heinous crime. not many days after this, the whole army began to move towards badajos. on the th of february we left our cantonments, and passing by way of castello branca and villa velha, we reached a village not far from niza, called povo das meadas, where my battalion took up its quarters for a time. from hence i was dispatched to lisbon for the regimental clothing, which had then arrived at that port; but being unable to procure the means of transport, i was obliged to return without it. i rejoined them in the camp before badajos about the th of march, and witnessed the siege of that fortress from this period to its fall on the th of april. the breaches having been reported practicable by the engineers on the th, in the evening the army was assembled for the assault, and was disposed as follows: the d division under general picton was ordered to attack the citadel, and to endeavour to establish himself there by escalade; the th and light divisions, the former under general colville, and the latter commanded by colonel barnard, were destined for the breaches; the th division, which had not co-operated hitherto in the siege, but brought this evening into the neighbourhood, was ordered to occupy the ground in front of the town by way of reserve. one brigade of that division was ordered to make a false attack on a work called the pardeleras, which was connected with the town, although not actually belonging to it. another brigade of the same division was ordered to make another false attack round towards the gate near the river guadiana, which latter was to be turned into a real attack, if circumstances permitted general walker, who commanded it, to do so. there was also a brigade of portuguese, which was ordered to attack st cristoval, a fort on the other side of the river. every thing was arranged in the clearest and most satisfactory manner; all knew what they had to do, the point they were to occupy in the attack having been pointed out to most of them the day before. soon after dark, the different divisions began to move towards their destined posts, all elated with the certainty of success. i was then in the mess of the senior captain of my battalion, who commanded it on this occasion; and my other messmates were poor little croudace and cary, both lieutenants, the latter acting adjutant, and another. we had taken a farewell glass before we got up from dinner, not knowing which of them would survive the bloody fray that was likely soon to commence. poor croudace, a native of the county of durham, and consequently a near countryman, put into my hand a small leather purse, containing half a doubloon, and requested me to take care of it for him, as he did not know whose fate it might be to fall or to survive. i took it according to his wish, and put it into my pocket, and, after a little more conversation, and another glass, for the poor little fellow liked his wine, we parted, and they moved off. although i had thus, as it were, settled it in my mind that i would not go with them on this occasion, for my services could have been of but very little utility, yet, when they went away, i felt as if i was left desolate as it were, and was quite uneasy at parting from my beloved comrades, whom i had always accompanied hitherto. i therefore slung over my back my haversack, containing my pistol and a few other things, and moved forward, to try if i could find them; but falling in with some of my friends, staff-officers of the d, who were in the same brigade, they strongly dissuaded me from it, representing to me the folly of uselessly exposing myself, and the little service i could render there; and one of them requested me to accompany him to a hill immediately in front of the breaches, where we could see the business as it proceeded. we waited till about ten o'clock, when the fire first commenced from the castle upon the d division, as they approached it; but the fire from thence did not appear very heavy. not long after it opened out at the breaches, and was most awfully severe; indeed it was so heavy and so incessant, that it appeared like one continued sheet of fire along the ramparts near the breaches, and we could distinctly see the faces of the french troops, although the distance was near a mile. all sorts of arms, &c. were playing at once, guns, mortars, musketry, grenades, and shells thrown from the walls, while every few minutes explosions from mines were taking place. the firing too appeared to have such a strange deathlike sound, quite different from all i had ever heard before. this was occasioned by the muzzles being pointed downwards into the ditch, which gave the report an unusual and appalling effect. this continued without a moment's cessation, or without any apparent advantage being gained by our struggling but awfully circumstanced comrades. lord wellington had also taken his stand upon this hill, and appeared quite uneasy at the troops seeming to make no progress, and often asked, or rather repeated to himself, "what can be the matter?" the enemy had adopted an excellent plan to ascertain where our columns were posted; they threw an immense number of light balls on all sides of the town, and when they found out where there was a large body, a rocket was fired in the direction of where it stood, and instantly every gun, mortar, and howitzer, not previously engaged, was turned in that direction, and grievous was the destruction their shot made in the ranks of these columns. still our people at the breaches did not get forward, although we distinctly heard, with emotion, the bugles of our division sounding the advance. his lordship seemed now to lose all patience, and aides-de-camp were sent to ascertain the cause of the delay. they flew like lightning, while the whole rampart round the town seemed enveloped in one flame of fire. our brave but unsuccessful comrades were heard cheering every now and then; but still the fire at the breaches did not slacken. at length a dispatch arrived from general picton, stating, that he had established himself in the castle. this was cheering news to his lordship, who expressed very strongly the gratitude he felt for that gallant general. during the reading of the dispatch, which was done by torchlight, the enemy, perceiving the light, and that a number of people had assembled on the hill, directed a shell in that direction; but it fell short, and did us no injury. his lordship now rode off, and ordered our people at the breaches to retire, as the town was now perfectly secure. i also set off to inform my people of the happy circumstance. i found them drawn off from the glacis a few hundred yards; but, oh! what a difference in their appearance now from what they were previous to the attack! the whole division scarcely mustered at this time men, so many had been killed and wounded, and many had been sent to the rear with the latter. i informed them that general picton had got possession of the castle, but my story appeared to them an incredible tale; for it was actually impossible, they thought; and although they made me repeat it over and over again, they could scarcely bring their minds to credit such unexpected news. it was now dawn of day, and the firing had ceased at every point. here i learnt the fate of my two beloved friends and messmates: croudace had been shot through the body, and carried to the rear; cary had fallen, but they could not tell what had become of him. i now went forward towards the breaches, where i found that several men of both the th and light divisions had remained; and when general picton moved from the castle towards that point, which i believe he stated in his dispatch to be his intention, the enemy, finding themselves attacked in rear, began to abandon the defence of the breaches, and our people were then enabled to enter. never did i witness any thing like the artificial impediments which the enemy had here thrown up, which, added to the natural ones, that is, to the breaches not having been so perfectly practicable as was desirable, rendered it next to impossible to enter, even after all opposition on their part had ceased. in one breach (the large one) this was literally the case; for at the top of it was fixed a chevaux-de-frize extending the whole width of the breach, and composed of a strong beam of wood, with sharp-pointed sword-blades fixed in every direction, they being generally about three quarters of a yard long, and so closely set together, that it was impossible either to leap over them or penetrate between them, and the whole so firmly fixed to the works at the top, that it could not be moved. in addition, they had fitted a number of long and thick planks, with spikes about an inch or more in length, and laid them all down the breach, but fixed at the top, so that it was impossible for any one to get up without falling on these. beyond the chevaux-de-frize several ditches had been cut, into which those must have fallen who surmounted the obstacles on the breach; but i believe none did, although i saw one portuguese lying dead upon the ramparts; but i imagine he must either have been thrown up there by some explosion, or been one of those of the d division who came from the castle. in addition to all the above, from the covered way down into the ditch was, i should imagine, at least thirty feet; our people had descended by ladders, and, i doubt not, in the dark, and, in the hurry and confusion of the moment, many were thrown down and killed. in the middle of the large ditch a smaller one had been cut, which was filled with water, and in which, added to the inundation close to the right of the breaches, (which had been caused by bringing the river partly into the ditch,) numbers were drowned. small mines had been constructed all along in the ditch, which were exploded when it was filled with people, and which produced infinite mischief. on the top of the ramparts the enemy had a considerable number of shells of the largest size, ready filled and fused; and when our people had filled the ditch below, these were lighted, and thrown over on their heads, each shell being capable of destroying from twelve to twenty men or more. they had beams of wood also laid on the ramparts, with old carriage-wheels, and every sort of missile imaginable, which were poured upon the unfortunate people below. when these things are taken into consideration, added to the incessant and destructive fire of from to men, all emulous to do their duty, at the short distance of perhaps twenty yards, with the ditch as full as it could possibly stow, the reader will be able to form some idea of the destruction that must naturally ensue: and awful indeed it was, for, within the space of less than an acre of ground, i should imagine not less than from to men were lying: it was a heart-rending sight. i learnt afterwards that many were the desperate efforts that had been made to ascend the breaches, but all in vain; that many had nearly reached the top, but they being either shot or blown up, the others were forced down again. another and another trial still was made, but each succeeding party shared the fate of their predecessors. at last the bottoms of the breaches were nearly blocked up with the bodies of those who fell. by this time, general philippon, the french governor, had surrendered. when he found the d division had got possession of the castle, and were preparing to move down to second the attack of the breaches by taking the enemy in rear, and that general walker, with a part of the th division, had escaladed, and established themselves at the other end of the town, he deemed further resistance useless, and retired, with the garrison, to st cristoval, on the opposite side of the river; and shortly after the whole surrendered prisoners of war, the troops, after being stripped of their arms and accoutrements, being marched along in the ditch to one of the gates, from whence they were escorted on their way to elvas. they passed near the breaches while i was there, and i had a full view of them as they moved along. i thought they seemed under great apprehension for their safety, as they appeared quite downcast and dejected, which is not generally the case with french prisoners, who will shrug their shoulders, and tell you it is the fortune of war; but these poor fellows, who certainly had made a noble defence, seemed low-spirited and timid to a degree. certainly by the rules of war, i believe, they might have been put to death, for having stood an assault of the place; but a british general does not resort to the same measures which their marshal suchet did at tarragona, when he put all, both soldiers and inhabitants, to the sword. soon after daylight, the remaining men of attacking divisions began to rush into the town, in hopes of sharing, with those who had already entered, the plunder they imagined it would afford; and though every thing was done by colonel barnard, aided by the other officers, to keep out those of the light division, it was useless, although he even risked his life to prevent their entering. he had bravely, during the attack, repeatedly ascended the breach, in hopes of overcoming the obstacles which presented themselves, but he had always been driven back, although he escaped unhurt where all was death around him; and now his life nearly fell a sacrifice, in endeavouring to restore that discipline in his division which this unfortunate and unsuccessful assault had considerably impaired. he opposed his personal and bodily strength to the entrance of the plunderers, but in vain. they rushed in, in spite of all opposition; and in wrenching a musket from one of the soldiers of the d, who was forcing past him, he fell, and was nigh precipitated into the ditch. he, however, finding resistance here in vain, set off, accompanied by several other officers, into the town, to endeavour to restrain, as much as lay in his power, the licentiousness of those inside, whose bad passions, it was but too evident, would be let loose upon the defenceless inhabitants. i had been in company with captain percival, my commanding-officer before alluded to, from the time of my first coming down to the division before daylight; and now he and i, hearing the heart-piercing and afflicting groans which arose from the numbers of wounded still lying in the ditch, set to work to get as many of these poor fellows removed as was in our power. this we found a most arduous and difficult undertaking, as we could not do it without the aid of a considerable number of men; and it was a work of danger to attempt to force the now lawless soldiers to obey, and stop with us till this work of necessity and humanity was accomplished. all thought of what they owed their wounded comrades, and of the probability that ere long a similar fate might be their own, was swallowed up in their abominable rage for drink and plunder; however, by perseverance, and by occasionally using his stick, my commandant at length compelled a few fellows to lend their assistance in removing what we could into the town, where it was intended that hospitals should be established. but this was a most heart-rending duty, for, from the innumerable cries of,--"oh! for god's sake, come and remove me!" it was difficult to select the most proper objects for such care. those who appeared likely to die, of course it would have been but cruelty to put them to the pain of a removal; and many who, from the nature of their wounds, required great care and attention in carrying them, the half-drunken brutes whom we were forced to employ exceedingly tortured and injured; nay, in carrying one man out of the ditch they very frequently kicked or trode upon several others, whom to touch was like death to them, and which produced the most agonizing cries imaginable. i remember at this time colonel (the late sir niel) campbell passed out at the breach, and, as he had formerly been a captain in our regiment, many of the poor fellows who lay there knew him, and beseeched him in the most piteous manner to have them removed. he came to me, and urged upon me in the strongest manner to use every exertion to get the poor fellows away. this evinced he had a feeling heart; but he was not probably aware, that for that very purpose both my commanding-officer and myself had been labouring for hours; but it soon began to grow excessively hot, and what with the toil and the heat of the sun, and the very unpleasant effluvia which now arose from the numerous dead and wounded, we were both compelled, about mid-day, to desist from our distressing though gratifying labours. it was now between twelve and one o'clock, and though we had had a great many removed, a much greater number lay groaning in the ditch; but our strength was exhausted, for he was lame and unable to move much, and i had been obliged to assist in carrying many myself, the drunken scoundrels whom we had pressed into the service seldom making more than one or two trips till they deserted us. but my lamented friend and messmate, poor cary, was still to search for, and, after a considerable time, he was found beneath one of the ladders by which they had descended into the ditch. he was shot through the head, and i doubt not received his death-wound on the ladder, from which in all probability he fell. he was stripped completely naked, save a flannel waistcoat which he wore next his skin. i had him taken up and placed upon a shutter, (he still breathed a little, though quite insensible,) and carried him to the camp. a sergeant and some men, whom we had pressed to carry him, were so drunk that they let him fall from off their shoulders, and his body fell with great force to the ground. i shuddered, but poor cary, i believe, was past all feeling, or the fall would have greatly injured him. we laid him in bed in his tent, but it was not long ere my kind, esteemed, and lamented friend breathed his last. poor croudace had also died immediately after reaching the hospital, whither he had been carried when he was shot. thus i lost two of my most particular and intimate acquaintances, from both of whom i had received many acts of kindness and friendship. they will long live in my memory. cary was buried next day behind our tents, one of the officers (my other messmate) reading the funeral service. i cannot help adverting to some of the scenes which i witnessed in the ditch, while employed there as above noticed. one of the first strange sights that attracted our notice, was soon after our arrival. an officer with yellow facings came out of the town with a frail fair one leaning on his arm, and carrying in her other hand a cage with a bird in it; and she tripped it over the bodies of the dead and dying with all the ease and indifference of a person moving in a ball-room,--no more concern being evinced by either of them, than if nothing extraordinary had occurred. it was really lamentable to see such an utter absence of all right feeling. soon after this the men began to come out with their plunder. some of them had dressed themselves in priests' or friars' garments--some appeared in female dresses, as nuns, &c.; and, in short, all the whimsical and fantastical figures imaginable almost were to be seen coming reeling out of the town, for by this time they were nearly all drunk. i penetrated no farther into the town that day than to a house a little beyond the breach, where i had deposited the wounded; but i saw enough in this short trip to disgust me with the doings in badajos at this time. i learnt that no house, church, or convent, was held sacred by the infuriated and now ungovernable soldiery, but that priests or nuns, and common people, all shared alike, and that any who showed the least resistance were instantly sacrificed to their fury. they had a method of firing through the lock of any door that happened to be shut against them, which almost invariably had the effect of forcing it open; and such scenes were witnessed in the streets as baffle description. one man of our first battalion, i am told, had got a hogshead of brandy into the streets, and, getting his mess-tin, and filling it from the cask, and seating himself astride like bacchus, swore that every person who came past should drink, be who he may. his commanding-officer happened to be one who came that way, and he was compelled to take the tin and drink, for, had he refused, it is not improbable the wretch would have shot him, for his rifle was loaded by his side, and the soldiers had by this time become quite past all control. another, who had been fortunate enough to obtain a considerable quantity of doubloons, put them in his haversack, and was making his way out of the town, but was induced, before he left it, to drink more than he could carry. he laid him down somewhere to take a nap, and awoke soon after without even his shoes, and not only were the doubloons gone, but all his own necessaries also. in, short, a thousand of the most tragi-comical spectacles that can possibly be imagined, might be witnessed in this devoted city. the officers did all they could to repress these outrages, but the soldiers were now so completely dispersed that one quarter of them could not be found; and indeed the only benefit almost that the officers could render was, by each placing himself in a house, which generally secured it from being broken open and plundered. the different camps of our army were for several days after more like rag-fairs than military encampments, such quantities of wearing-apparel of all kinds were disposing of by one set of plunderers to the other. but they were not content with what they had brought out of badajos; they had now got such relish for plunder, that they could not leave it off when driven out of the town. a night or two after the surrender of the place, they stole no less than eight horses and mules belonging to my battalion, and took them to some of the other divisions, where they sold them as animals captured from the enemy. i lost on this occasion an excellent little mule, worth at least l. , and for which i of course never obtained a farthing. we used every exertion to discover both the perpetrators and the animals, but without success. an english army is perhaps, generally speaking, under stricter discipline than any other in the world; but in proportion as they are held tight while they are in hand, if circumstances occur to give them liberty, i know of no army more difficult to restrain when once broke loose. a reason may perhaps be assigned for it in part. on such occasions as this siege, where they were long and much exposed to fatigue almost insupportable, to the most trying scenes of difficulty and danger, which were generally borne with cheerfulness and alacrity, they perhaps reasoned with themselves and one another in this manner,--that as they had borne so much and so patiently to get possession of the place, it was but fair that they should have some indulgence when their work and trials were crowned with success, especially as the armies of other powers make it a rule generally to give an assaulted fortress up to plunder. they had also become quite reckless of life from so long exposure to death; but an english army cannot plunder like the french. the latter keep themselves more sober, and look more to the solid and substantial benefit to be derived from it, while the former sacrifice every thing to drink; and when once in a state of intoxication, with all the bad passions set loose at the same time, i know not what they will hesitate to perpetrate. the reader will judge of the state of our soldiers who had been engaged in the siege, when lord wellington found it absolutely necessary to order in a portuguese brigade to force the stragglers out of the town at the point of the bayonet. at this time i think i was fairly tired of life, so disgusting and so sickening were the scenes the few last days had presented. i had also lost two of those for whom i had a great regard, together with several others of my brother officers, all excellent young men, with still a greater number wounded,--in all, in our fifteen companies, to the amount of twenty-six,--and men in equal proportion. it was indeed a trying time. notwithstanding what has been said above of the bad conduct of the british troops on this occasion, i am fully persuaded there is more humanity and generosity to be found in the breast of an english soldier than in any other in the world, for, except when inflamed by drink, i am confident it would be most revolting to his feelings to be ordered to proceed with cool deliberation to the execution of such horrid butcheries as we read of in the armies of other nations.--no! when calm and sober, no man acts with more tenderness towards those in his power than an english soldier. bonaparte would not have found in them the willing actors in his political tragedy in egypt, when he coolly fusiladed several thousands of his unfortunate turkish prisoners, as related by sir r. wilson. if i may be permitted to make a few remarks on the taking of this strong fortress, and of the conduct of the besiegers, i would say that never in the annals of military warfare was greater devotion shown by those of all ranks, from the general to the common soldier. the arduous and dangerous service of the trenches was cheerfully performed by every individual whose duty called him there; but the most conspicuous gallantry was manifested in the assault. conceive of the heroic picton and his brave division escalading a wall probably forty feet high, built on the summit of an almost inaccessible rock, and with troops at the top of all to oppose them as they reached its summit. it is true the enemy were not numerous here, having only about men in the castle, but still one man in this situation was able to destroy probably twenty of the assailants, by throwing down a ladder after it had been set up; most of those ascending would be crushed to death by the fall over such a precipice. but he carried every thing before him, and after establishing his own division in this commanding situation, he either actually did, or prepared to move upon the body of the enemy, who were defending the breaches. general walker also, who commanded a part of the th division, bravely forced an entrance into the town at the opposite side, overcoming every one of the numerous barriers and obstacles which presented themselves; and where he himself, in the act, i believe, of mounting the rampart, received a most desperate wound. it was said, but i know not how truly, that when he fell, the french soldier who wounded him was about to repeat the blow, which in all probability would have deprived him of life, but that the general, whether intentionally or not it is not said, made the masonic sign, which was understood by one of the frenchmen, and that he instantly interfered in his behalf and stopped the blow. they say the general some time after found out that his brave deliverer had been sent to scotland with his fellow-prisoners, and that he had him searched for and handsomely rewarded, and, i believe, procured him his liberty. it is well known, i believe, to be the rule in all services like the assault of fortresses, &c., that those, both officers and men, who form the forlorn hope and the storming party, are volunteers, these being services of extreme danger, and which generally procure for the officers who survive a step of promotion; but it might as well have gone (in the light division at least) as a tour of duty, for on all occasions of this nature, with only one or two exceptions, the senior officers of each rank insisted upon being sent on that duty. nay, in one instance this heroic feeling was carried to an almost censurable excess. lieutenant harvest of the d having been some time the senior of his rank in that regiment, and there being a vacancy for a captain, he had been recommended for the company; and although he had not been gazetted, yet it had been intimated to him through his commanding-officer that his name should shortly appear as captain. thus his promotion was perfectly secure; notwithstanding, when volunteers were called for for the storming party, he insisted on his right of going as senior lieutenant; so over scrupulous was he that his permitting a junior officer to occupy this post might be construed to the detriment of his honour. he went, and fell; and thus not only lost his company but his life, and by his too refined sense of honour deprived another officer, probably, of that promotion which would have been the consequence of going on this duty had he survived. among the men also the same noble enthusiasm prevailed, for he who was selected for this dangerous service out of the superabundant numbers who always volunteered, was envied by his comrades as truly fortunate. in fact, it required a character for good conduct to entitle a man to this honourable employment. whatever, therefore, their other faults might be, a want of bravery was not one of them. chapter viii. the army leave badajos on the th of april, and move into quarters near the river agueda, where they remain till the th of june--advance towards salamanca, which, with the exception of three forts, the enemy had evacuated--the forts invested--the main bodies of both armies bivouack within a mile and a half of each other, in the vicinity of monte rubio and morisco--the forts of salamanca surrender--the main body of the enemy retire to tordesillas--movements of the army. on the th april we left badajos to return again to the neighbourhood of rodrigo, the french having, during the absence of our army from that frontier, made an irruption into portugal, and penetrated as far down as below castello branca, completely ravaging the country. our first march was to campa mayor, where we were quartered in the town. we next day reached arronches, where we bivouacked in a wood near it. the following day we marched into portalegre, and on the th, niza; the th we crossed the tagus at villa velha, and moved on to larnadas. here we began to perceive some of the effects of the recent visit from the french; but at castello branca, which we reached next day, the devastation they had caused was truly deplorable. we halted here one day to refresh the troops and get forward our supplies, and the next day reached escallas da cima. here we began to get very close upon the rear of the enemy; it therefore became us to move forward with circumspection, for our force on this side the tagus was yet but small. we advanced, however, and occupied successively st miguel d'arch, penamacor, and st bartholomo, near sabugal, which last town we passed through on the d, and bivouacked that night at alfyates. the utter desolation of sabugal was beyond conception; filth and misery presented themselves in every direction. it had been made a depot for provisions by the french, i imagine, for on all sides the entrails and other offal of bullocks and sheep polluted the atmosphere by the abominable stench they caused, and had attracted multitudes of vultures and other birds of prey, who had by this time become horribly tame and familiar: one vulture sat so long upon a dead horse as i was riding along the road, that he allowed me to come near enough to make a cut at him with my sword, as he stretched his enormous wings to mount up from his prey. on the th we reached ituera, where we halted for two days. we had now entered spain, and it not being intended as yet to commence another active campaign, we moved into quarters near the river agueda, my battalion and the d occupying the village of la encina, or "the oak." here it was necessary that every exertion should be used to re-equip and prepare the troops for service, as it was intimated that another campaign would speedily commence. all the winter and spring hitherto had been spent in active service, consequently much required putting to rights before we again took the field; all hands were therefore employed to patch up and repair our clothing and shoes, and to get every thing in good order when our services were again to be called for. while we were here, i began to experience some of the ill effects of a deep-rooted enmity which one of my brother officers had conceived against me, though till now partly concealed. i was unconscious of having given him any cause for this; but he, without ever giving me any opportunity for explanation, used all his influence in endeavouring to injure me in the opinion of two of my superior officers, who had hitherto been friendly to me; and not only with them, but, i have reason to believe, with our acting brigadier, whose mind, with the others also, he completely estranged from me for a time. but though he misled them then, they did not retain the ill opinion of me which his misrepresentations had produced, for there are testimonials from all three at the end of this volume. i was not so fully aware of his dislike of me, till one day i was dining at the table of our acting brigadier, when he and one of those before noticed were also guests. i overheard him telling this officer, (with an intention, i almost imagine, that i should hear,) that i must be a bad man, for that i was sitting silent when all the rest were talking, in order that i might listen to their conversation. but i was the junior officer there, and it did not become me to be talkative; besides, i never was loquacious. i said nothing, (although some may blame me for it, but i loved peace,) trusting that one day such forbearance would not be forgotten; but i felt it deeply, and mourned over it in secret with great bitterness of spirit. in this place also i began to receive very pressing letters from the merchants in england, from whom i had purchased a quantity of goods when last at home, but which, for want of transport, could not be got up to the army in order to their being disposed of; and, in short, scarcely a post arrived that did not bring some unwelcome and distressing tidings. i had purchased a fine mule in place of that stolen from me at badajos, for which i had given about £ . i sent him down to lisbon with my batman, to bring up as many of the goods as the mule could carry; but he had not been long gone till i had the mortification to learn that this mule also was lost. the man said he had been stolen, but i had every reason afterwards to believe that he had sold him. be it observed, i could but very ill afford losses of this extent out of my pay and scanty allowances; but i endeavoured to bear up as well as i could against these misfortunes, although it is certain i was not able to bring religion to my aid at this time of trial, for i had lived hitherto in total neglect of that most momentous of all concerns, and, although i endeavoured to amuse myself occasionally by fishing in the agueda, my mind began to be greatly depressed. about this time an order was issued for each british regiment in the peninsula to endeavour to enlist fifty spaniards to be incorporated in the regiment. i was sent in company with another officer into the mountains of gata, not far from the city of placentia. we were not successful, for although we obtained the names of some who promised they would follow us to la encina, they never made their appearance. however, the beauty and magnificence of the mountain scenery amply repaid us for our trouble. from this village also i had the pleasure of visiting, for the first time, the lately captured fortress of ciudad rodrigo, and some of my brother officers who had shared in the toils and dangers of the siege, pointed out to me the most remarkable scenes about it. like badajos, it had been battered till practicable breaches were made to admit the besiegers, and then stormed in the same manner, but its defence was feeble compared with badajos; and yet, to look over the ground in the neighbourhood of the trenches, one would imagine it impossible for troops to have lived, so completely was it ploughed up with shot and shells, each of the latter generally making an excavation sufficiently large in which to bury a horse. whilst we remained in these cantonments, the officers of the division once or twice got up a sort of "pic-nic," every one contributing something towards the feast, which was held in a large wood in the neighbourhood of ituera. on our way from la encina to this assembly, we passed over the ground where the th and th regiments had so distinguished themselves in september , against a very superior force of the enemy's cavalry. the bones of the combatants lay bleaching upon the plain, the flesh having been very soon devoured by the innumerable birds of prey, which appeared as if collected from every part of the peninsula. indeed so numerous were the battles and skirmishes which took place along this frontier, together with the offal from the animals killed for the use of the armies, that they were no doubt better fed than they had in general been accustomed to. but the period of our stay in this vicinity drew to a close, and on the th june we broke up from our cantonments, and passing the agueda, the division assembled in a wood about a mile or two in front of rodrigo. while we were here a rather remarkable phenomenon appeared about mid-day, or soon after; the sun, which shone most brightly, and the moon, with several stars, appeared all at the same time, the latter being distinctly visible. this of course attracted great numbers, and many were the sage remarks that were made, some believing it ominous of disastrous events; and indeed very shortly afterwards a circumstance occurred which in some degree confirmed their prediction. a grenadier of the th regiment (i think it was) had come over from his own division, to endeavour to prevail upon his wife, who had deserted him and taken up with a sergeant of our first battalion, to return with him, she having, as i understand, left him with one or more children, the first of their marriage, which he was anxious she should come and take care of. they had often, i fancy, quarrelled, and he had probably used her ill, but he was now desirous of a reconciliation, and entreated her to return with him to his regiment. he prevailed upon her to accompany him to some distance from the bivouack, that they might the more freely discuss the subject, for she had hitherto refused to agree to his request, being probably better provided for by the sergeant than she had been with him. while walking in a field close to the wood in which the bivouack was situated, and arguing the point with some heat, and she still persisting in remaining where she was, he became so exasperated at her continued refusal, that he, in a rage of jealousy and anger, drew his bayonet and plunged it in her bosom. her cries soon brought people to the spot, who at once secured him, and he was instantly committed to the provost prison tent, and her body of course brought in and buried. poor creature! she was one of the gayest of the females which graced our rural balls near ituera only a short while previous, and had often danced with old general vandaleur on those occasions. i believe he was not brought to trial for it, as her ill conduct probably had been considered as in some measure palliating what he did, and that he might be supposed to have been irritated to a degree of madness when he perpetrated the fatal act. i subsequently learnt that he was a brave soldier, and that he afterwards fell in the hard-fought battle of the pyrenees. we moved forward the next day in the direction of salamanca, halting on the th at alba de yeltes, on the th at sancho bueno, the th at matillo, in a large plain in front of which we bivouacked, where were the most luxuriant meadows i think i ever saw, the horses on our arrival being literally up to their bellies in fine rich grass. what a pity the natives know nothing of hay-making! this fine herbage is permitted to stand there till it perishes, and yet in the winter they are frequently very ill off for provender for their cattle; indeed i do not exactly know how they contrive to feed them in that season, but i know we were always greatly put to our shifts to procure any sort of long forage for our animals, being generally compelled by necessity to resort to this grass, rotten and dead as it was. i believe they use a considerable quantity of straw, which they chop very short, and which in truth is no bad substitute for hay; but when it is so very plentiful and so good, common sense, one would imagine, would induce them to preserve it. lord wellington in the following season caused a considerable quantity of hay to be made in portugal, getting scythes, &c. out from england, but we never returned that way afterwards to reap the benefit of it. all this immensely rich and extensive plain is in a complete state of nature--no enclosures to mark the different boundaries of the proprietors, should it have any, but where there are "landmarks," the mode of ancient days is resorted to. on the th we moved forward to within about five miles of salamanca, and bivouacked near a range of low hills extending from the rio valmuso (which we had just crossed) to the city. in front of this place our cavalry fell in with that of the enemy, with whom they had a _petit affaire_, and had captured a few of them, who, in the afternoon, passed our bivouack, on their way to the rear. we observed as they passed that they wore long queues, which had an odd appearance in our eyes, the british army having for so many years left them off. next morning we advanced towards the city. we had gone, i think, about three miles, when ascending one of those heights over which the road passes, we had a most interesting view of this beautiful place. it seemed thickly studded with elegant and highly ornamented spires, springing from the numerous cathedrals and colleges, &c. which it contained; but what heightened the effect was an immense column of smoke rising from some magazines which the enemy (not having time to carry off) had set on fire. we feared it was but the prelude to the whole city sharing the same fate, for their barbarous conduct in portugal during massena's retreat, rendered it but too doubtful they were resorting to the same mode of warfare here. they still retained possession of a portion of the town, in which they had constructed three forts; one very strong, and capable of containing about or men; the other two were smaller, to cover and act as supports to the principal one. in constructing these works they had destroyed the greater part of the colleges, and a considerable number of other public buildings, besides several extensive streets which salamanca had formerly contained; but even now it was still a beautiful and interesting city. one of these works commanded the bridge, which rendered our crossing the tormes here impracticable. we were in consequence moved about a league higher up the river, where we crossed by a rather deep ford. however, all got safely over, and we halted for the night on a small plain, a short distance from the ford, the main body of the enemy having retired and left men in the forts before mentioned. these occupied but about one-third of the town, of course the remainder was open and free, and, as might be expected, every one was anxious to have a peep at this famous university. consequently away a number of us scampered, and soon entered the city, the inhabitants of which were overjoyed to see us. the nuns were seen waving white handkerchiefs out of their iron-grated windows, and the padres and other respectable inhabitants welcomed us with a thousand vivas, embracing us, and using every means of testifying their joy at our arrival. i need not attempt to describe the place, for i am not able, and it has so often been described that my reader will not be disappointed at my declining to do it here; suffice it to say, the buildings in general, and the religious edifices in particular, were most superb; but the goths had destroyed the finest portion of the city. the forts were immediately invested, and we went and had a look also at them. they seemed remarkably strong, having been constructed principally of hewn stones, taken from the buildings they had destroyed; and on all sides of them a space of perhaps two hundred yards or more was cleared away to make room for the play of their artillery, and to prevent a lodgement being made by the besiegers. we next day moved from our bivouack near the ford, and marched to the village of aldea secco, in front of which our cavalry and the enemy had a rencontre, after which the latter retired: this was about a league and a half in front of salamanca. next day we were suddenly assembled in consequence of the enemy, in great force, making his appearance at some distance in front of our bivouack. we were then removed from the plain, and took up a position on a height called monte rubio, or red hill, a little to the right. soon after, also, the other divisions of our army began to assemble on the height, and our chief arriving on the spot, every thing had the appearance of something serious being about to take place. here also, for the first time, i saw don carlos de espagna with his few followers. these were better clothed and equipped than almost any other spanish troops that i had seen. the day passed over, however, without the french making any attack, and without any movement being made on our side, farther than putting the different divisions into position as they arrived on the ground. the french were continually receiving reinforcements, or rather their different divisions were rapidly arriving in succession, when they all bivouacked in the plain in front of us, at perhaps a mile and a half distance, and near to the village of morisco. this they very soon gutted of every portable article, whether it was food, clothes, furniture, or whatever they could carry off; nay, they unroofed the greater part of the houses for fuel for the troops, but this latter proceeding could not be avoided, there being no wood near them. englishmen may well feel thankful that their dwellings have not been exposed to such visitors, who, in half an hour, will convert a comfortable and smiling village into a heap of ruins. we remained in this position for some days, the two armies, like two experienced pugilists, each waiting for the other to strike the first blow, by which he would in some measure lay himself open. it was not, however, lord wellington's game to commence operations, seeing a part of our army was then employed in the siege of the forts in salamanca; besides, it is said, when some one ventured to hint that we should attack the enemy, that his lordship judged it would make a difference of men less on the side of the attacking army. i know not if this story be true, but certainly great prudence was displayed on both sides. however, the enemy had occasionally cannonaded us a little from the first; but about three days after their arrival, they made a very brisk and vigorous attack upon a conical hill immediately in front of our position, and a little to the right of morisco. it was defended by the seventh division, which repelled the attack with great gallantry, driving the enemy down the hill again with great precipitation. the th regiment distinguished itself greatly, but in their pursuit of the beaten enemy, they advanced too far into the plain, and which the french observing, a forward movement was made again by them, and before our people could recover the high ground, captain m'kay and lieutenant m'donald, with a considerable number of their men, were made prisoners. poor m'kay received i know not how many bayonet wounds on this occasion, i believe not less than ten or twelve, but none of them very serious of course, or he could not have survived. he, with the others, were taken into the french lines, but he was so ill when they retired a few days after, that they were obliged to leave him in morisco. the enemy's artillery played upon our line during the greater part of this attack, and caused us some loss, but not of any consequence, the horses appearing to have suffered more than the troops. the french seemed disappointed and annoyed at our sticking so pertinaciously to the hills on this occasion, and told m'donald (from whom i afterwards had this information) that it was only when we had every advantage on our side that we durst give them battle. our armies were, i think, pretty nearly equal, each having perhaps about , , but they were, i believe, superior in cavalry, and of course the plain was the very ground for them. marmont seeing himself thus foiled, withdrew from before us, and made a movement to his left, crossing the tormes with a considerable part of his force, and advanced on the other side of the river towards salamanca. our heavy german cavalry, under general baron back, opposed them here, and greatly distinguished themselves, driving the enemy's cavalry from the field. our army made corresponding movements with the enemy, changing in parts our position. meantime the siege of the forts had been proceeding with from the first day of our arrival, and as the distance from monte rubio to the town was not great, several of us rode in to see how the siege was progressing, as the americans have it. an attempt had been made to carry them by escalade, but it had failed; general bowes, who led the attacking party, with several officers and men, having fallen in the attempt. his lordship now deemed it necessary to batter them regularly previous to another assault being made upon them. heavy ordnance was therefore got into battery, which not only effected a breach in the smaller fort nearest the principal one, but which also threw a considerable quantity of hot shot into a building in the centre of it, which served as a barrack to the troops, the roof of which was presently set on fire, and the only shelter they had was thus destroyed. they thus were compelled on the th to surrender prisoners of war. it is not easy to describe the effect produced on those inhabitants who lived nearest to the forts while the siege was going forward. just as i entered one of our batteries, which had been established close behind a street, still occupied by the people, one of our artillerymen was carried out shot by a musket ball in the breast, and dead; the poor people when he was brought out into the street assembled round his body, and set up the most piteous lamentations imaginable. this impressed me with the good feeling which must have existed in their minds towards the english, for they are not a people, as the reader will be aware, who are very susceptible of horror at the sight of blood. a few hours after these forts surrendered, i went to visit the principal one--the devastation caused by our hot shot on the house before mentioned was awful. they had been obliged to make this their hospital also as well as barrack, and it was really lamentable to see the poor wounded frenchmen lying there in a house that was literally falling about their ears, the roof having been completely fired, while burning beams and rafters were continually dropping upon these poor helpless beings. a french surgeon was still in charge of these men, and he had the politeness to show us all over the fort. as it had appeared from the outside, it was in reality remarkably strong, and the place where our people had made an attempt to escalade it, was pointed out to us; he said it was heavily mined, and that if our people had carried it by escalade, the mines would most likely have been sprung. there was fixed immediately opposite the gate a beam of wood, with holes bored in it, and about twenty musket barrels fitted into them, so as to command the entrance. these, i imagine, it was intended to have fired by a train, as our people forced the gate, and it would have been like a little volley, which must have swept away the first of the assailants. the inhabitants seemed greatly rejoiced when this business was concluded, and peace once more established in their city, and they vied with each other in showing us every mark of attention and kindness, looking upon us as their deliverers. if i am not mistaken, it was here where our illustrious chief played off a sort of innocent _ruse_ upon some of the padres of the place. soon after our arrival, and before the attempt upon the forts had failed, he went to visit some of the principal cathedrals, &c. which remained entire; the priests of course were proud to show their churches on such an occasion. he admired them greatly, and praised them much; but what seemed particularly to attract his attention was the extreme whiteness and cleanness of their walls and ceilings, although they were so very lofty. he enquired how they managed to get up to them to keep them so; and the unsuspecting padre, without hesitation, led him to where they kept the immensely long ladders by which they ascended. this was just the very thing he wanted in his meditated attempt upon the forts, and of course they, with others of a similar description, were procured for that service. i will not vouch for the truth of the above, although i heard it, and i think it was not unlikely to have taken place. indeed had he made a formal demand for such things, it is not improbable they might have denied they had them; but his having seen them himself precluded this. the forts surrendered on the th, and on the th the enemy's main body retired altogether; for they soon learned the fate of the besieged, as they had occasionally communicated in some measure by rockets thrown up, and answered. on the same day, our division moved forward to castilbanos; and the day following to parada de rubiallis. on the th, we reached castrillo de aguerino; and on the st of july, the town of ravel-del-rey. the next day, we moved on towards rueda, a considerable town. here we found the french in some force, their main body having retired across the duero to tordesillas. the force in and about rueda consisted of both cavalry and infantry, and seemed to act as a rearguard till the enemy's columns had time to file over the bridge at tordesillas. i was at some distance in front of our division, the cavalry having preceded it, with whom i went forward. as we approached the place, a pretty large column of the enemy's infantry left it, and moved in the direction of the bridge. some of our horse-artillery at this time came up, and fired shrapnel shells into it, which did considerable execution; one shell particularly having killed and wounded great numbers, among whom was an officer, i think one of the handsomest men i had almost ever seen. our cavalry had a little brush with some squadrons of the enemy a little further on in the plain, and captured a few prisoners. one of these was the sergeant-major of one of their hussar regiments, and of all the men i ever saw taken, this man evinced the greatest trepidation and alarm. he was absolutely like to sink to the earth, either from fear of what awaited himself, or from the effects of the contest in which he had been engaged. he had lost his cap in the fray, and seemed like a person deprived of his senses. he must, notwithstanding, have been looked upon by the french as a good soldier, and a valuable non-commissioned officer; for i learned afterwards that they sent in a request that he might be exchanged for one of our sergeants whom they had captured, as it was intended immediately to promote him to the adjutancy of his regiment; of course this was immediately complied with. the enemy retired to tordesillas, and we bivouacked near rueda, a part of the officers being permitted to go into houses in the town during the day. in this situation we remained for a day and a night; but the sun being so powerful, the troops began to feel the ill effects of the heat. they were accordingly brought into the town and quartered in the houses. here i experienced more of that hostility before spoken of, on the following occasion. in the number of houses allotted to my battalion, there happened to be some of the best of them without stables; but as there was not time to examine farther than their outward appearance, this could not be known by me. i therefore marked off the houses according to custom, giving the best, in point of appearance, to the senior officers in succession, and so on till all were served. it so happened that the house allotted to this officer, who had nearly the best in the battalion given him, had no stable. this i was, from the fore-mentioned cause, totally ignorant of. neither had i any stable in the house i occupied, but, after some trouble, i had found one in a house occupied by some of the men, where i had put up my horses and mules, and went about the other duties of my station. in the evening i was informed by my servant that my animals had been turned out by this officer, and his own put in, in their stead; and that mine were running loose in a yard, he not caring what became of them. my saddlery, and all the mule-apparatus, (precious articles in this country,) had also been cast out. he was my _senior_ officer, and i was consequently obliged to bear this ill-treatment. i mention this little circumstance, because it will show with what determined and unrelenting hostility he pursued me. indeed it might not have been so trifling an affair, for had i not heard of it in time, i might have lost every horse and mule i possessed, which would have been one of the most serious disasters that could have befallen me. i could obtain no redress, for the captain before mentioned, who commanded the battalion, and this officer, being on rather unfriendly terms, he felt delicate in interfering in my behalf. indeed i have some reason to believe, that it was partly on account of his enmity to this captain (with whom i still messed) that he so persecuted me. i own i was on this occasion strongly tempted to demand that satisfaction which the rules of honour (as they are termed) dictate, for i then had not a christian feeling on this subject; but after consideration and consultation with some friends, it was feared he might take advantage of his superior rank, not only to decline giving me that satisfaction, but to report me, and thus destroy my prospects for life, for he would have been compelled to the latter step had he not acceded to my demand; and from the feeling he displayed towards me, there is not the least doubt he would have rejoiced at such an opportunity of ruining me. at this time, also, i had very few _real_ friends who would have stood by me; for his secret machinations, and his having the ear of our brigadier, tended greatly to estrange my former friends from me. all this, as might be expected, tended powerfully to depress my spirits, and to cast a gloom over a mind but too susceptible of impressions of that nature; for there is not any thing almost i would not do or submit to, to live on good terms with those i associate with, and indeed with all men. my mind was also much harassed at this time by receiving very unpleasant letters from england on the subject of the goods i before mentioned, and which had not yet reached any farther than abrantes; and as the men began to be ill off for want of clothing, i obtained leave to proceed forthwith to abrantes, to endeavour to get both the clothing and goods brought up to the regiment. i therefore set off, accompanied by one servant on a mule, leaving the other animals with the battalion, and proceeded on the th on my journey, and passing through ravel-del-rey, i halted for the night in a village where the seventh division was quartered. as i knew some of the officers of the st, i took up my abode with them for the night, and they indeed received me very kindly. my friends spent the evening very merrily; but, about midnight, they were called out and put under arms, expecting shortly to turn in again, as they told me; but they were marched off, and left the place entirely, leaving only my servant and myself in occupation of the town. it seems that marmont, with his whole force, had moved from tordesillas, and had threatened lord wellington's communication with salamanca. in order, then, to keep up a corresponding movement, and be ready to take advantage of any false step the enemy might make, his lordship withdrew his whole force, and began to retire as marmont advanced. thus, in the morning, to my surprise, all the army had left the neighbourhood, and as i was not certain who the next visitors might be, i quickly decamped from a village now left open to the enemy. i got on at a considerable pace, as both my servant and myself were riding, and on the th i reached salamanca. during yesterday's march i heard a considerable cannonade to my right and rear, and i afterwards learnt that the two armies had come nearly in contact with each other, and some skirmishing and exchange of shots had taken place. i did not stop in salamanca longer than to draw rations for ourselves and animals, being anxious to get on as fast as possible, to try to get up the supplies while the army remained near the frontiers, for it was still expected they would advance into the heart of spain, notwithstanding the present partial retreat. i accordingly moved on that evening to matilla, and continued thus making stages of thirty or forty miles a-day, and on the th i reached abrantes; but on the preceding day i was overtaken by lord clinton, going home with the dispatches relative to the glorious and decisive battle of salamanca, which took place on the d. his lordship was nearly worn out, being actually asleep on his horse as he rode past me, for he had never once stopped from the time he first set out. i learnt the news from the person who accompanied him. it is impossible to describe the joy this information created among the portuguese inhabitants of the village. i stopped for the night at gaviæ. i found at abrantes a detachment of our second battalion proceeding to join the army; but, to my sorrow, learnt there was no chance of procuring transports for the clothing, &c., for months to come. this was distressing information to me, and of course added to the despondency already preying upon my spirits; for the merchants' letters i was continually receiving began to be most importunate, and indeed attributing the non-remittal of their money to a want of principle, and talked of reporting my conduct to the commander-in-chief. want of a proper religious feeling, under such circumstances, as might be expected, laid me open to great temptations. i therefore, to drown sorrow, and because i had always been too much addicted to it, began to give way to intemperance, and, falling in with a number of officers of very dissipated habits, i was led on to indulge in the most vile and abominable of all vices, _drunkenness_, to an excess almost incredible. but the gloom still seemed to thicken, and a dark cloud seemed impending over me, of which i was fully aware, and wrote home to my friends to that effect. at length my birthday, the th of august, arrived, and which must, as my unhappy companions in sin urged on me, be kept with all due jollity. accordingly, a dozen of strong port-wine was procured, and we boozed away most joyfully, the whole being drank by about four or five of us. this produced constipation in the bowels, and had nigh brought me to my end; but my mind was more affected, if possible, than my body. about two days after this debauch, on my retiring to bed at night, i felt an unusual inclination to rise up and fall down on my knees, to offer up my evening prayer; for, notwithstanding all my wickedness and forgetfulness of god, i had not altogether abandoned the _form_ of _saying_ my prayers at night, but it was always after i lay down. i resisted this impulse, however, to rise and pray, and, after mumbling over my _form_ without the _spirit_, i endeavoured to compose myself to sleep. i did sleep for a while, during which i was troubled with some confused and incoherent dreams; but soon after awaking, gracious god! what were my feelings then? despair, black despair, had seized upon me. i rushed out of bed, and rolled upon the floor like one distracted, as indeed i was. oh! what would i then have given that i had never been born, or that i could cease to exist! had it been possible, by throwing my body into the flames, to annihilate for ever my consciousness of being, how gladly would i have done it! but no--the terrors of the lord were upon me, and drank up my spirits; and no one who has not been in a similar situation can form the most distant idea of the misery which preyed upon me. the pains of hell got hold upon me, and hope seemed for ever to be shut out from my mind. i believed i had sinned past all redemption; that the mercy of god could not possibly be extended to me; and of the efficacy of the redeemer's blood i knew nothing. oh! this was a time much to be remembered by me, for none but he who afflicted me, and my soul which bore the affliction, knows what i then suffered! at length the morning came, but with it no comfort for me. one of my sinful and dissolute companions came to see me, but he seemed greatly shocked at the recital of my woful tale, and i believe then formed for himself resolutions of amendment, which i fear, poor fellow, he never was able to fulfil. he did not long survive, but was shortly after called to his awful account, whilst i am spared,--a monument of the long-suffering mercy of god. amongst all my companions in error and wickedness, i could not procure a bible, and, as a proof of the ungodly state i was then in, i had not one myself. this poor friend, however, had a prayer-book, which he lent me, and out of which i eagerly sought for comfort and hope, but in vain, for all was against me. yes--and all who make god their enemy, will find in the hour of need, that every other creature and thing will fail to yield them comfort; but i had sinned too deeply and too perseveringly to find peace speedily. oh! in what black array did the sins of my whole life pass before me, and how did i sigh for annihilation; or, if i could in any way atone for my wickedness, if i could but go and bury myself in a cave or den of the earth, and forego for ever all intercourse with mankind, how easily and how cheaply did i then conceive i should purchase pardon and peace! but, alas! i knew nothing of the way of reconciliation with an offended god, although i had been duly instructed in my youth. i was in such agony of mind that i scarcely heeded my body, but was prevailed upon to have a surgeon, who administered what he considered necessary, but without effect. my bowels had ceased to perform their functions, and this no doubt would greatly affect my head; still, although this, as a _second_ cause of the distraction of my mind, was easily discoverable, yet the _great first cause_, not only of my disorder, but of all its effects, was the god against whom i had so grievously sinned, and from whom alone i could hope for the removal of my present sufferings. but hope was at this time banished from my breast, and i gave myself up to all the agonies of a soul that is lost for ever; but still i could not _rest_ in this sad situation. i therefore now determined to set off for lisbon, in hopes that i might obtain from the chaplain, who was stationed there, some slight alleviation of my misery, for none but roman catholic priests were to be found where i then was. i accordingly set off, accompanied by my servant, but in such a hurry, and so utterly regardless of all worldly concerns, that i left my baggage in my quarters, which was taken care of by the friend before mentioned. i started in the afternoon of the second day after my attack. the sun was scorching hot above my head, but i regarded it not, seeing there was a hotter fire within me; indeed i believed i could not mortify my flesh sufficiently, so blind was i at this time of the nature of atonement. my feeling was, that i had an almighty enemy over me; that his eye was upon me for evil, let me go where i would; and that i could not possibly escape from the destruction which he would shortly inflict upon my soul. how gladly, as i rode along, would i have solicited the rocks and mountains to fall upon me, and hide me from his sight, did i believe they could have availed for this purpose! but no--i felt it was impossible, and that i must endure for a short while longer the lighter punishment he had then laid upon me; and by and by i must drink to the dregs the cup of his everlasting indignation. o, sinners! be persuaded to flee from the wrath to come, for indeed one of the slightest terrors of the almighty is enough to drive to distraction the strongest mind, and to appal the stoutest heart! i arrived at galigao, the place of my intended rest for the night--and here i was attacked with ague and fever in addition to my other disorder--this was the effect of my exposure to the sun in so weak a state. but i cared not for my body. i knew that would return to the dust from whence it was taken. but oh! the never-dying soul--to think that it should endure eternal and omnipotent wrath, overwhelmed me with dread indescribable. my mind, it is true, was affected by my disorder; but it could not be termed insanity or madness, for i even now remember with great distinctness the feelings i then experienced, and those feelings remained with me for a considerable time afterwards. here i felt myself extremely ill, and believed i could not survive till morning. i consequently got my servant to make down my bed in a corner of the room i occupied, with his own near it, and told him to leave the candle burning, for that my time could not be long. i was compelled to submit, and quietly lay myself down, in dreadful expectation of the fatal hour, and when, as i imagined, the infernal fiend would be commissioned to seize and carry off my soul to its abode of everlasting misery. i could not pray, nor had i any the most distant hope that my sentence could be reversed, for i fully believed it had been finally pronounced by him who changeth not. during this woful night, i appeared to possess a sort of second self, a being which existed and thought and reasoned quite distinct from that _me_ who was stretched upon the floor, and which appeared to upbraid me with the misery it was then suffering, and was still to suffer, for the sins of my past abandoned life. i know not whether any other person in despair ever experienced this feeling; but to me it was quite obvious, for i remember distinctly the sin to which it more particularly drew my guilty attention. was not this the soul which will exist when the body is dissolved, and may not such an upbraiding take place between the body and the soul when the former shall be raised to join the latter in the judgment? but the fact is, my soul was that night as it were on the point of taking its departure from the tenement of clay, and seemed strong to endure the everlasting wrath of god. i do not know whether i slept any during this dreadful night; but morning came, and with it a certainty that i was still in this world, but without the hope that this might have been expected to produce. i felt as in a fire, yet i scarcely durst put my burning hands into the water my servant brought me. i felt convinced that i had forfeited all claim to any thing like blessings, and that curses, both in body and soul, were alone my due. ill as i was, however, i proceeded on my melancholy journey, not with any hope that a minister of religion could give _me_ any relief, but a drowning man will catch at a straw. oh! how strong, how awfully strong, did my soul appear at this time, to endure the tremendous wrath of omnipotence, whilst my body seemed fast sinking into its original element! i reached lisbon in two days from this time, having taken a boat at santarem. i ate nothing, with a trifling exception. i had no inclination for food, nor did i think i ought, for the reason before given; my only sustenance was a little water which i kept in a bottle, and with which i now and then moistened my parched lips. i arrived at lisbon about daybreak in the morning, and proceeded as well as i was able to a friend's house, and knocked at the door; but shocked indeed were he and his wife, when they saw me standing below, more like a ghost than an inhabitant of this world. indeed it is not easy to describe my looks at this time; there must have been much of that spiritual misery depicted in them which a confirmed despair no doubt produces. they took me in, and after hearing my woful tale, prepared to do for me the best that lay in their power; they gave me their own bed, taking a pallet for themselves, and treated me as if i had been their brother. he, poor fellow, is no more, but his beloved and kind partner still lives, and may she always enjoy that happiness she seemed so desirous of contributing to on this occasion, and everlasting happiness hereafter! as soon as it could be conveniently done, the clergyman was sent for, and also a medical officer, although from neither had i any hope. but, alas! from the former, although a kind and sympathizing man, i derived but little benefit. he did not direct me to the only source of a sin-sick being's hopes, the lamb of god which taketh away the sins of the world. he made my hopes to centre too much in my own resolutions and after-doings. no doubt, as my sins had been enormous and flagrant, my repentance ought to be proportioned; but when he saw me bowed down under an indescribable sense of guilt, oh! had he, like paul to the jailer, pointed me to the saviour, how unutterably precious and acceptable would it have been to my soul! i do not remember that any one character in scripture is described as having felt more fully and more keenly the sinfulness of sin, and of its consequent danger to the soul, than i did at this time. how thankfully would i have accepted the mode of salvation pointed out in the gospel; for indeed i was but too much (as all natural men are) inclined to expect pardon and happiness from the things which, if god spared me, i intended to perform. but he only knows best. this kind gentleman wrote me out prayers, and seemed much interested in my welfare; notwithstanding, the gloom of despair still hung heavy on me, and at length; and when the kind medical friend was enabled, after repeated efforts, to procure me some relief, i felt as if it was only the prolonging of my existence, in order that i might fill up the measure of my iniquity. this, i am now fully persuaded, was a suggestion of the father of lies, in hopes probably of prevailing upon me to adopt the awful and miserable resolution of judas to get rid of life. i thank god this was the only temptation of that nature which he permitted me to be exercised with; for i felt no inclination even in my darkest hours to commit suicide, fully believing that the utmost of my sufferings here could bear no proportion to those of the damned in hell. i consequently had no inclination to hasten them by rushing into eternity; this, it is evident, was of the merciful goodness of the lord, and for which i am bound to be truly thankful. i continued in this state of mind for several months, and could not, with all my reading, praying, and doing, find peace. my reading and praying seemed to me more like an irksome task, than an exercise in which i took delight. i had formed a resolution from the first to retire from the service, where it appeared to me i was exposed to so many temptations; but here the experienced christian will perceive how erroneous were my views, and i think feel pleased that i never fully effected my purpose, although i made preparations for it. indeed i could not well feel _certain_ that i should act right by retiring from the post to which god's providence had appointed me, although my firm determination was to live devoted to him. but, alas! how wofully have i failed of maintaining that resolution! my health now gradually improved, under the kind and fostering attentions of my warm-hearted host and hostess, and it became necessary that i should resume my station at abrantes, which i did, in hopes of being able to obtain transport from thence, although the army was at this time in the neighbourhood of madrid. but after returning to abrantes i suffered a relapse, and was again brought to the borders of the grave, my mind still deeply impressed with my former ill forebodings, although not quite so distressing as before. i got my servant to read to me while i lay groaning on the floor, for i could not bear to sleep in a bed at this time, but felt little comfort from his endeavours, the scriptures being at this time "a sealed book" to me; so true is it that till the grace of god dispels our darkness we have no light in us. i think it is probable that some of my readers, on perusing this part of my narrative, will be inclined to say, "surely this man must have been an uncommon and atrocious sinner, above all others, or he never would have suffered thus." i acknowledge with shame that i have been a most abominable and vile sinner, deserving of all the lord laid upon me, and much more, for i was, and am, fully deserving of hell fire; and should that be my portion (as, through the merits and sufferings of my saviour, i have a humble hope it will not be), i must acknowledge the kindness and justice of god, although i perish for ever. but i would say to such readers, as our saviour said to the jews, that "except _ye_ repent, _ye_ shall likewise perish." others may be inclined, on the contrary, to say, that all this was merely the effect of disease, and not at all to be resolved into god's hatred of sin and punishment of it in this instance. i acknowledge that it was the effect of disease. but when god laid that disease upon me, he knew what effect it would produce upon my mind; consequently, both disease and mental agony came from him; and, because i knew it came from him, "i held my tongue and said nothing." and i have now, and i hope shall have for ever, the greatest cause to bless his holy name for this, as one of the greatest mercies he ever showed me, for having thus taught me to know how evil and bitter a thing sin is, and to set a juster estimate upon his favour. he thus taught me also to value and love the saviour, who alone can deliver me from the punishment, the power, the pollution, and the love of sin, and to make me happy for ever. blessed be his holy name, for he has done to me all things well, and i humbly hope to enjoy his favour for ever. during my stay at lisbon, my batman, whom i before mentioned as having lost, or rather sold, my mule, and who had here rejoined me to take care of the horse and mule i had with me, either from remorse, or some other cause, made an attempt to cut his throat, and succeeded so far as to sever the windpipe, i believe, but did not quite effect his purpose. he was found in a field near lisbon bleeding nearly to death, and brought into the hospital, where, with great care, and after some time, he recovered. indeed was a sickly year, and many were affected strongly in the mind, several having committed suicide, i believe. while i lay here ill the second time, i received a letter from the regiment telling me that the paymastership had become vacant, the poor old gentleman with whom i returned to england last year, having come out again to the peninsula, and got as far as rodrigo on his way to the regiment, and there, being attacked with the same disease i had suffered so much from, died; and that as general stewart, our colonel, had arrived at lisbon, i was to go and wait upon him, and that letters would be written from the regiment requesting him to recommend me for the situation. i with great difficulty again reached lisbon, and waited upon the general, but to my great mortification i found the promised letters from the regiment had never been received, and that another person had, in consequence, been recommended, he being the son of the late paymaster, and had applied some time before. my disappointment did not prey upon my mind, for at this time i set very light indeed by the good things of this world, and felt conscious that i already possessed much more than i deserved. i was compelled through illness to remain again in lisbon some time, but found great difficulty to obtain permission from the commandant for so doing. my general, however, procured me leave to stay till i should be able to resume my post at abrantes. here, not only myself, but all the officers who were then in lisbon, and also at the army, suffered much from the want of subsistence. i had at this period seven months' pay due me, and could not obtain a dollar from the public chest, although i wrote a note to the commandant showing him how i was suffering from want of money. the army had in the meantime pursued the french, as before noticed, on one side to madrid, and on the other to burgos; but the attempt to take the latter by storm having failed, and the enemy having been able to assemble a more numerous force than lord wellington had before it, he was obliged to retire from both those places to the frontiers of portugal. the division from cadiz, the siege of which having been raised by our forward movement in summer, had joined the army at madrid. much was suffered, i understand, during this retreat, the troops having been exposed to great privations, and the weather being exceedingly wet and unpleasant. my division, after the retreat, took up its quarters again in the villages on the portuguese side of rodrigo--my battalion being stationed at the village of espeja. the army, as might be expected from the late severe and harassing service they had been engaged in, began to be extremely ill off indeed for want of clothing, many of the men being nearly quite naked; in consequence, the most pressing orders were sent from head-quarters to use every means possible to have the supplies immediately forwarded, for abrantes at this time contained stores belonging to almost every regiment in the army. my health having been considerably improved, i again returned to that depot, and, after waiting a few weeks, the means of transport were at last given me by the commissary there. i need not say with what alacrity i prepared for and commenced my long wished for journey. i had got a sufficient escort assigned me, from a detachment of our men being about to join the regiment. we started about the beginning of january , and proceeded on our route by way of niza, &c. i had been obliged to buy another horse from some cause which i do not now recollect, but when we were leaving the town just named, i found, on turning out to move off, that a large nail had been driven right up into the centre of one of his feet. whether this was done accidentally, or by design, i never could learn, but the consequence was the loss of the horse. i had great trouble also to keep the convoy, which consisted of about a dozen bullock carts, with as many soldiers as an escort, together; the drivers, if they were not strictly guarded, very often made their escape, taking their bullocks with them during the night, and leaving the cart in our possession, glad, i dare say, that they got off so cheaply, for they seemed to have a great antipathy to go with us. i was therefore compelled to collect them all together near castello branco, and making the soldiers load their rifles before them, told them as well as i was able that they had orders to shoot the first who attempted to desert with his bullocks. this had a good effect, for i believe we lost no more till we reached the regiment; but, as we approached the frontiers of spain, several of the drivers ran away without their cattle, preferring the loss of both bullocks, cart, and payment, rather than enter that country, of which the peasantry in general seemed to have a great dread. those who stuck by us to the last, were rewarded with the bullocks and carts of the deserters; but i think we did not take more than two or three out of the twelve to the regiment, the rest had all made their escape. nothing can be conceived more tiresome than travelling with such a convoy. the carts are all constructed upon the principle of the irish car; that is, the axle rolls round with the wheels, they being firmly united; consequently the creaking noise created by the friction is loud and most unpleasant, and they have no idea of grease or tar to diminish this, but believe in many parts, if not in all, the noise to be a sort of holy noise, which keeps the devil from them. i found, in removing these stores, that great robberies had taken place upon them, several of the bales having been opened while on board ship, great quantities of goods taken out, and their place filled up with old transport bedding, &c. i found it necessary, however, to endeavour to bear up against all this, for my mind would not suffer me to dwell too much upon such misfortunes. at length i arrived at the regiment, where indeed i was a welcome guest, for they were greatly in need of all kinds of equipment. the officer who had rendered my life so unhappy before, had left the regiment, and gone into another far distant from my present place of abode, for which i was truly thankful, and his absence i found produced a great change in my favour; for every one seemed glad to see me, and sympathized with me in my late alarming illness; in fact, the face of things was entirely changed for the better. i myself had benefited much by my late chastisement. i had learned to think meanly of myself, and to be kind and submissive to all to whom i owed submission; a virtue which, i fear, i was but too deficient in before. all things now went well with me. the goods, which before had been such a source of uneasiness and trouble, were rapidly disposing of, and thus the prospect of my soon being able to pay my creditors became every day brighter. but, in the mean time, what i had hinted at before took place: one of the merchants had actually reported me to his royal highness the duke of york. this might, indeed, have deprived me of my commission, had his royal highness been harsh with me; but he caused a letter to be written to my commanding-officer, (now sir andrew barnard,) to call on me to explain why i had not remitted the merchant what i owed him, and to account for my not answering his letters, which he said i had failed to do for several months. my answer was very simple, as the reader is aware; but, with respect to the letters, i showed the colonel one, in which the merchant acknowledged having received one from me a short time previously. this also was satisfactory, and i had moreover remitted him a short while before l. of the money i owed him. the colonel was fully satisfied, and wrote off to his royal highness accordingly, and i heard no more of the business. soon after the captain, who had been acting as paymaster, was obliged to return to england, on account of ill health. after some necessary steps i was appointed to this duty, it being an addition of s. per diem to my pay. according to the army regulations, a person in my situation could not be appointed acting paymaster; but a committee of three captains was formed, who took all the responsibility of my transactions upon themselves, giving me, as before said, the whole s. per diem. this showed, at least, that they were not afraid to trust themselves in my hands; for i might have involved them deeply. in short, whatever i did (almost) prospered, and a kind providence seemed to smile upon me; and i believe that from this to the close of the peninsular campaigns was the happiest part of my life. i have reason, therefore, to bless god for his unbounded goodness to me. chapter ix. preparations for the field--amusements in winter quarters--grand review--advance of the army in pursuit of the enemy--come up with their rearguard in the vicinity of hornilla de camino--skirmishing--encounter with the st brigade of the enemy, who are beaten, and forced to retreat--our army advance in pursuit--an affair between the rearguard of the enemy and our th brigade--vittoria--general engagement--the enemy defeated--remarks. i begin this chapter, through the mercy and goodness of god, with brighter prospects than any i have written hitherto; for though i was still ignorant of the peculiar doctrines of christianity, i believed god was at peace with me, and, from my late dreadful sufferings for sin, i certainly walked very circumspectly, and i believe i had also more of the genuine feelings of a christian, though not the knowledge; for i was lowly in my own eyes, and loved all mankind. in me was fully verified at this time that sublime, but seemingly ill understood, saying of our saviour's, "blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." i now was meek and lowly, and i had friends in abundance, and may truly be said to have possessed or inherited the earth, for i had plenty of every necessary good, and, withal, peace and contentment. i could not enjoy more had i been in possession of more. alas! how lamentable is it that chastisement should produce a better effect upon me, than love and gratitude to god is capable of doing; for, to my shame be it spoken, pride and selfishness now prevail much more in my heart than they were able to do then; and i find it much more difficult now to bring my mind down to that lowly and contrite feeling which with god is so acceptable, and with the possession of which only he promises to dwell. as the officer whom i have had occasion so often to mention owed me a trifle of money, i wrote to him, in as friendly a manner as i could, hoping, now we were separated, that his enmity would cease, and i was desirous of being at peace with all mankind; for, as i said before, i never yet knew why he was my enemy. he wrote back, with an order for the money, telling me, he hoped never to hear from me again, for that he was anxious to forget that such a person had ever existed in the world. this, as might be supposed, wounded my feelings deeply, but i remembered that i had myself sinned as deeply against god, and that he might raise up such instruments for my correction as seemed good to him. my feelings, therefore, towards this person were more of regret and pity than of resentment, and i think i did not forget to pray to god for him. poor fellow, he has a good while since been called to his account, and that in rather an awful manner; he fell in a duel, but which (from all i could learn) he was engaged in from the best motives, that of endeavouring to prevent the seduction of a young female belonging to his regiment. i hope he is at peace. during our stay in winter-quarters every exertion was made to put the troops in a proper state to take the field again, so soon as the season was sufficiently advanced. while we remained here also every sort of innocent amusement, at least generally innocent, was had recourse to, both by officers and men, not only to pass the time of inactivity with pleasure, but to keep up that readiness for action always so necessary in a state of warfare. we accordingly had races, balls, plays, and every other description of pastime our situation admitted of. we in espija established what was termed a _trigger_ club, each one in turn giving an entertainment at his house, and at which, as the name would imply, as much game was produced as our sportsmen could procure. the plays were generally held at gallegos, the quarter of the d, and which were indeed got up in a surprising style, considering the means of doing so. a _walking_ club was established in our st battalion, which was quartered at alamada; we were of course frequently favoured with the company of its members, for they thought nothing of setting out, each with a long pole in his hand, and walking twenty or more miles to dinner. thus harmony and a brotherly feeling was promoted amongst the officers of the division,--a thing of great moment where regiments have to act together, as well as pleasant to all parties. some of our people also occasionally had a wolf-hunt, for these animals were quite numerous in this part of the country; nay, so bold were they when pressed with hunger, that they did not scruple sometimes to enter our villages, and devour whatever fell in their way that they could master. an officer of ours had an ass or a mule torn to pieces one night while standing in the yard behind his house. the mode of hunting them was, to have a certain number with arms stationed at the different passes in the wood, whilst a large party of drivers scoured the wood in line, driving every thing before them, when the animals, coming upon the armed people, were shot; but i do not think they were at all successful: it requires people accustomed to the business to enable them to kill many. there is a premium given for every wolf's head, but i forget how much it is. i sometimes took a trip to the azava, or the agueda, on a fishing excursion; but i was ill off for fishing tackle: the hooks the spaniards make are the clumsiest things imaginable, and would not, i am persuaded, be made with less dexterity by the natives of new zealand. those which we were forced to use for fly-hooks had a hole or eye at the top, like the crook which you will sometimes see in a butcher's shop, intended to be hung upon another, which was formed by turning the wire down again, and through this they run their line; besides, they almost invariably broke, and i have been wofully tantalized sometimes by having the hook break off the only fly that the fish were taking; notwithstanding, i caught some very fine trout in the agueda, this river abounding with them. i sometimes also caught barbel in that river; but it was literally swarming with a sort of roach, or what some of our people called rock-fish: they generally feed from some stuff they find on the large stones. but as the season approached which was to call us to the field, a review of the whole division was ordered to take place on the plain of espija, and which, i think, was as brilliant a spectacle of that description as it was possible for men to make. every regiment was in high and complete order, the whole having by this time been fully equipped for the campaign: the movements, too, were beautiful, and executed with great precision and promptitude, and, as might be anticipated, called forth the unqualified approbation of our illustrious chief. a new and different arrangement was made this campaign with respect to both officers and men in their field-equipment. experience had proved that constant bivouacking injured the men's health, as the mode they had adopted last year, though very ingenious, was not calculated to protect them sufficiently from exposure to the weather. they had last campaign been ordered each man to have loops sewed on at the corner of his blanket; thus, when in the field, two of these were united, and spread over two stand of arms set up at the ends for poles, and being fastened down at the other corners with bayonets, they formed a sort of tent, into which perhaps four men might creep; but then they had thus only two blankets to serve as a bed for the whole four men; consequently they would, in cold weather, be much exposed. this campaign each company received four tents; thus allowing about twenty men for each, and the officers of each company had one among them, and the field and staff officers in like proportion. these were carried on mules, which before had carried the camp-kettles; but these being exchanged for smaller ones, the men carried them in turns upon their knapsacks. thus it rarely happened that the tents were not on the ground nearly as soon as the men; but strict orders were given always to encamp out of sight of the enemy, if practicable, that they might not be able to calculate our numbers. how very different from the ancient mode of encamping! each of which being more like a town laid out with regular streets, &c. &c. but war was a very different thing in those days, and could marlborough have risen to see one of our straggling and irregular mountain camps, i know not what his feelings would have been: he would, i fear, have thought we had sadly degenerated. all being now ready for opening the campaign, a part of the army, under sir thomas graham, crossed the douro low down in portugal, and proceeded up the right bank, while we, with sir rowland hill's corps, moved forward in the direction of salamanca and toro. on the st of may, our division broke up from its cantonments, and assembled at the village of st felices el chico, a few miles below ciudad rodrigo, each regiment having had the agueda to ford in its march to this camp. our division at this time consisted of the following corps:--viz. the st brigade, under general kempt, was composed of the d regiment, th portuguese, and the st and d battalions of my regiment; the d brigade, under general skerrit, contained the d regiment, st and d portuguese caçadores, and the d battalion of my regiment; one troop of horse artillery, under colonel ross, was attached to the division; the whole being under the command of general charles alten. on the d, we moved on to martin del rey, near the river yeltes, by the side of which we encamped. on the d, we marched to and encamped near san munoz, where the division had, i understand, suffered considerably during the retreat of last year, from the french having gained ground upon them, and severely cannonaded them from a height near this village. on the th, we moved on to robliza, having halted the day before to enable the other division to come up with us. we next morning moved forward to the little river valmuzo, a few miles on the portugal side of salamanca, and alluded to in my former advance. here we halted for three hours during mid-day and cooked, and in the afternoon advanced to the ford of el canto, on the river tormes, and about two leagues below salamanca. here we encamped for the night, and remained next day also. lord wellington, with some cavalry we understood, had entered salamanca, where only a small force of the enemy's cavalry had been found, and which retired immediately; but i believe some little skirmishing took place between the parties. on the morning of the th we forded the tormes, and advanced towards aldea nueva de figuera, which we reached late in the day, the distance being about twenty-four miles. while we lay at el canto, a few of our officers visited salamanca, in hopes of meeting some of their old friends of last year; but not a _viva_ greeted their ears on entering the city; a sort of suspicious look of recognition was all they could obtain from those people, who had received us only last summer with such extravagant demonstrations of joy. no doubt they had been made to suffer for their former expressions of attachment to us, for the french had in almost every place their partisans, who doubtless would not fail to give them, on their return, an account of the manner in which the english had been received, and the contributions would be laid on accordingly. we remained at aldea from the th may to the d of june, waiting for information from the corps under sir thomas graham, it being intended to form a junction at or about toro, where it was expected the enemy had a considerable force; this was distant from us about thirty miles. while we continued here, i took a trip to sir rowland hill's division, where i had a townsman, an officer in the th, but had not the satisfaction of seeing him. i had other friends in that division, however, with whom i and my companions spent the day in great harmony and satisfaction, and at evening returned to our camp, about four miles distant, highly gratified. on the d of june, we set off early in the morning, and arrived at villa buena about mid-day, where we halted for three hours to cook and refresh, after which we continued our march towards toro, which we reached in the evening, but the enemy having destroyed the bridge across the douro at this place, we encamped for the night in some fields on the left bank of the river. we learnt here that the hussars attached to sir thomas graham's division had attacked a corps of french cavalry soon after their having quitted toro, and with whom a very smart affair had taken place, the enemy being completely routed, and about prisoners taken from them. our cavalry, i believe, lost an officer on this occasion, who fell into the hands of the enemy. nothing could exceed the miserable appearance of the horses taken from the french on this occasion; they appeared really half starved, although at this season there was plenty of green forage to be had; they must either have been sadly neglected, or have been doing exceeding hard duty. the bridge having been rendered passable for the men, the division crossed on the following morning, the horses and mules fording the river. we left toro immediately, and moved on in pursuit of the enemy, and encamped that night at terra buena. on the th, we reached the convent of espinar, and encamped on a height just over it. it was a most picturesque and beautiful piece of country around this convent, but itself appeared to have been lately rendered uninhabitable. i believe the monks had been driven away by the french, but not a soul remained to enquire of; all about the building was desolation. we next day advanced to the village of muderra, and on the th to amperdia, and on the th we marched through the city of palentia, and encamped outside the walls, on the banks of the river carrion. here the inhabitants evinced the same degree of enthusiasm on our entrance as we had been accustomed to witness in other large towns, till the french had taught them a little more circumspection, and which the good people of palentia would have been most probably fully taught, had these good friends of theirs ever got possession of their city again. some time after we had pitched our camp, and were strolling about the city, the lifeguards entered, and were of course saluted with repeated vivas. one of the men, a rather country-looking young fellow, cried out, "ay, the folks be always glad to see we lifeguards," happily supposing, no doubt, that they were intended as a particular compliment to his corps alone. all the country through which we had marched for several days past, was one continued plain of waving corn, mostly wheat of the very finest description. there are no hedges or dikes, but, as before noticed, only landmarks to divide the different fields, so that its appearance is like an immense sea, stretching as far as the eye can reach, the long corn undulating with the wind as the waves in the ocean. on the th we marched forward and encamped at the village of tamara, the weather having, from being exceedingly fine, and indeed rather hot, set in extremely wet and cold, and thus rendered marching very unpleasant. we next day reached la peña, (the name, it may be remembered, of the barossa spanish hero,) the weather continuing very coarse and stormy. on the th we continued to advance, and marching through the village of framosa, and passing over a canal which crosses here, we halted for the night on the right bank of the river pisuerga, near the village of lantadilla. in all these late movements, we had experienced a great deficiency of fuel for cooking and drying our clothes when wet, neither forest nor bush-wood being to be seen for days together, and indeed scarcely one solitary tree to be met with--nothing but corn; so that we were occasionally compelled to resort to the cruel and unchristianlike expedient of pulling down houses to obtain the timber with which they were built for the purpose of cooking, or we must have eaten our food raw. this, however, was done in a regular and systematic order, the alcalde of the village pointing out such of the houses as were to be doomed to the fire, and the troops taking no more than was absolutely necessary. it is astonishing to me how the natives themselves exist for want of this article of first necessity. from this village we moved forward on the th, and crossing the pisuerga, marched on the town of pallacio, which we passed, and reached the village of landrino, near which we encamped for the night. from the time we left toro, the enemy had been gradually retiring before us, having withdrawn his forces from all the strong places on the douro, and seemed concentrating somewhere in the direction of burgos or vittoria. excepting our cavalry, no part of our forces ever had the satisfaction of seeing a frenchman hitherto during the whole of this long and rapid march; but on the morning of the th, as we now approached burgos, it was fully expected that we should be able to get a sight of the fugitives; and accordingly, after we had left our last night's quarters, and marched a few miles in the direction of the city, a pretty strong body of the enemy's cavalry was seen drawn out on a high plain, a little above the village of hornilla de camiño. these were supported by a division of infantry formed in square, and occupying the outer edge of the high plain facing the way we advanced, and apparently observing our motions. on discovering this force, our division was halted to give the cavalry attached to us time to ride forward to reconnoitre, and ascertain more exactly the force before us, than could be done while we were on the low ground. i rode forward with our cavalry, which, passing by the enemy's square of infantry, approached the main body of their cavalry. it not being, however, the intention of the french to fight here, they slowly and orderly retired before us across the plain; but as we had left the square of infantry nearly behind us, the guns attached to our cavalry turned in that direction, for this body seemed indifferent about the movements of our cavalry, and it was not till our division began to ascend the hill that they evinced the slightest intention of stirring. on seeing them, however, they quickly decamped, and as they had to pass within yards of the position our guns had taken up, i imagined considerable execution must have been done upon them before they got out of our reach. but, strange to say, i believe only one single man was knocked down by the great numbers of shot fired at them. it must have been owing to the relative situations of the two parties; they passed down a hollow way which led from the high plain in the direction of the burgos road, and which covered them completely till they came immediately below our guns, when it became a difficult matter to depress them so as to bear upon the enemy's square as they passed us. however the whole turned round and gave us a regular volley, for, as we were so much above them, there was no danger from their firing in square; but this, although the shots flew pretty thick about us, was not productive of any mischief that i remember. they retired across the plain below us, pursued by another division of ours which had advanced on our right, and between whom and the french a pretty smart skirmish took place. so soon as their infantry were clear from us, their guns opened out from the opposite side of the river upon us on the height, but, the distance being considerable, their shot did little execution. it was evident this force was only left here as a rearguard, to ascertain our movements and force, &c. we encamped for the night near the road by which we had ascended the high plain; but were awoke early next morning by a tremendous explosion which shook the earth beneath us, although at the distance of or miles from burgos, the castle of which the enemy had blown up, and retired altogether. we soon after commenced our march, and, leaving that city to our right, made a long march in the direction of the ebro, and halted for the night near the village of tovar. the next day we moved on to quintanajar, and on the th, after a long march, we reached the ebro, and halted at the village of puente arrenas, situated in the delightful valley of veras. this is one of the most picturesque and beautiful valleys in europe, i dare say. when you arrive at the brow of the high ground over the ebro, a sight breaks upon you all at once which is indescribably grand and beautiful;--a large river rolling under you, beyond which a rich and fertile valley, laden with the fruits of a hundred orchards, with charming villas and farm-houses dispersed through all the lawn; a stupendous bridge, of i know not how many arches, leading you across this magnificent river; and the whole closed by high and beetling rocks jutting out of the high woody bank on the opposite side. it really appeared like enchantment when we first arrived within sight of it, from the long dreary plains we had been so long traversing. here, for the first time since we entered spain, did we meet with "manteca de vaca," or "cow butter," all the other we had been compelled to use hitherto for want of better, was what they call "manteca de puerco," or "hog's-lard." the women who brought it wore a quite different dress from those we had seen in the parts we had passed through; the women had on generally yellow stockings, with abundance of petticoats of red, yellow, green, &c. &c., and were all very stout-made; they were, i believe, from asturias. poor creatures, many of them followed us with loads of butter, wine, cheese, &c. &c., even into france, so pleased were they with the excellent prices their merchandise brought amongst us; indeed, we had been so long debarred the enjoyment of butter and cheese, that we would have given almost any price to get them sweet and good. they carried their loads (and tremendous ones they were) as the flesh-wives in newcastle carry theirs, that is, by passing a broad leather belt across the forehead and over the shoulders, and so underneath the heavy load upon their back. they were a civil and obliging race of beings, and apparently much more industrious and cleanly than the rest of their country people. we left this delightful spot on the morning of the th, following the course of the river upwards for about a league, then turning short to the right, passed through an enclosed country, and halted for the night at the town of medina del pomar. this is a considerable-sized place, in which was a nunnery, the inmates of which greeted us with hearty welcomes and vivas, with waving of handkerchiefs, &c., through their strongly iron-grated windows, where they more resembled criminals of the worst description shut up in a strong prison, poor things, than people who had devoted themselves to the service of their maker. next morning, we moved forward through a country almost without roads; we were, in fact, crossing the country in order to get nearer to the great road leading from madrid to vittoria, and on which the enemy's army was then retiring. we encamped for the night, after a fatiguing day's march, on a woody height near the little river loza. we took the high ground on this occasion for our encampment, although extremely inconvenient and uncomfortable, being among stumps and brushwood, where there was scarcely room to pitch our tents; this was in consequence of being in the neighbourhood of a considerable force of the enemy, which was retreating, as before noticed, along the great road. the next morning, the th of june, we started pretty early, and calculating that we should this day come in contact with the above force, we marched in such a manner as to be ready, when that event took place, to take advantage of any favourable circumstances that might offer. we had in our front a squadron of hussars belonging to the german legion, and which were generally attached to our division. about mid-day the squadron in front of us reached the village of san millan, where the road on which we were then marching, and the great road on which the enemy was retreating, unite; the latter descending from a high tableland just above the village, and passing a narrow defile between two high rocks. our cavalry, on reaching this village, descried the advance of the french, composed also of cavalry; and what was not a little singular, they also were germans in the french service. our brave hussars instantly charged those of the enemy, and immediately overthrew the body opposed to them, and in the charge captured several men and horses, which they brought in prisoners. by this time the head of the division had reached the spot, (my st battalion leading,) which in a few minutes got warmly engaged with the enemy's voltigeurs, a considerable number of whom had advanced to oppose us, in order that the main body of their division might be enabled, under cover of their fire, to pass through the village on the way towards vittoria. our people, however, pressed them so hard, that the whole of their leading brigade was obliged to join in the action. at this moment our illustrious chief came galloping up; for, whenever any thing was to be done, he was always present. he had also taken care to have our th division moved so as to arrive at the village of espija, a town about a league in front of us on the great road, nearly about the same time, so that, should the french contrive to get away from us, they might fall into their hands. he immediately sent me off to the leading company of our people who were engaged, for the guide they had had with them, in order that he might conduct his lordship to espija; but that was no place for a spanish peasant who had neither honour nor glory to gain, and he had accordingly made his escape the moment our folks got into action. his lordship instantly dashed off without a guide, while our two battalions, that is, the st and d of my regiment, kept advancing upon the enemy, and fairly drove them through the village, being supported by the other regiments of the brigade, but who had not any occasion to come into action. the first brigade of the enemy being thus beaten, retreated along the great road in the direction of espija, leaving their second brigade and all their baggage to their fate. these latter being pressed by our second or rear brigade, and seeing us in possession of the village, and the road they had to pass, immediately broke in all directions, and dispersed themselves in the mountains over the village, each man making the best of his way. this their baggage could not do, and it consequently fell into the hands of the captors, an easy and valuable booty; but although my brigade, by beating and dispersing the enemy at the village, had been the principal cause of its capture, yet those whose hands it fell into had not the generosity to offer the least share of it to us, but divided it amongst themselves. during the skirmish in the village, a french hussar chased one of our officers several times round one of the trees growing by the side of the road, and repeatedly cut at him with his sabre, and it is likely would have cut him down at last, had not the officer seen a rifle lying near, belonging to a man just killed; and luckily it was loaded when he picked it up. he waited for the frenchman, and coolly shot him through the body, and instantly seized his horse as lawful prize; had the rifle missed fire he was gone. we had not rested long after this brush till we heard a firing in our front, where indeed it was expected. the troops which had just left us, i imagine, had been attacked by the th division, and we, the st brigade, were instantly ordered to their support should they need it; but before we reached espija, the enemy was completely beaten, and had retired in the direction of vittoria. we had to retrace our steps and join our other brigade, and encamped for the night in the neighbourhood of san millan. our loss on this occasion was but trifling, considering the smartness of the affair. an officer of my regiment, of the name of haggup, a countryman of my own, received a most dangerous wound in the abdomen, of which it was feared he would die, but he soon after completely recovered. an aide-de-camp of the french general was wounded, and taken prisoner, but he soon after died, poor fellow. along with the captured baggage were a number of spanish ladies, who had been attached to the french officers to whom it belonged, but they did not appear over faithful to their protectors, for most of them, i believe, preferred remaining in the hands of their captors, to being forwarded after their beaten and now ill-provided former companions; such is generally the fidelity to be expected from that sort of people. on the th we advanced by the same road the french had retired, till we reached the town of salinas, where there were very extensive salt-works, as the name of the place denotes. we encamped for the night near the village of pobes, on a small rivulet named bayas, i believe. near the end of our march to-day we had a view of the enemy's rearguard, as they rounded the end of a mountain, which lay immediately before us, and over which the road to vittoria passes. after rounding the mountain, this part of the enemy's force fell in with our th division again, which had been moved forward from espija by another road. a very smart skirmish was the consequence, which we distinctly heard, and in which a good number fell on both sides. the french retired from hence into their position in front of vittoria. during the next day, while we halted here, it began to be whispered that the enemy had concentrated his forces in and around vittoria, which was distant from us perhaps about ten or a dozen miles, and that the divisions of our own army had that day approached nearer together, which indicated a determination on the part of our chief to try his hand with king joseph, should he be bold enough to stay where he then was. many, of course, and various would be the reflections which occupied the minds of the different individuals composing the two armies; but i can speak from experience, that those are of a much more pleasing nature which a consciousness of superiority and a good prospect of success inspires, than those which a retreating army are compelled to entertain. pretty early in the morning of the st, we fell in and moved forward by the way the french rearguard before-mentioned had taken, and after having passed the end of the mountain and descended into the valley on the other side, we saw evident proofs that the affair between our th division and the french, above alluded to, must have been pretty warm. we continued to advance on the road to vittoria, till, on ascending a rising ground, the french army appeared in position immediately in front of us. it was a noble and animating sight, for they appeared as numerous almost as grashoppers, and were posted as nearly as i can recollect in the following order. immediately before us ran the river zadora, passing from our left and front to our right and rear. in the centre of an extensive plain rose a pretty lofty conical hill, from which extended to their left a sloping plain, through which the great road lay, and terminated by a long range of mountains, stretching from puebla de arlanzon, just above the river, to a considerable distance beyond vittoria. the city was shut out of our view by the conical hill before mentioned, and was distant from it about four or five miles; to the right of this hill, along the bank of the river, it appeared broken, and not easily approachable. on the face of the conical hill, and to its very summit, it appeared as thickly set with troops as if they had been bees clustering together; it was also thickly studded with batteries and other field-works. on the plain between that and the long range of mountains, the troops appeared to stand so thick that you might imagine you could walk on their heads. there did not appear any great force on the mountains to their left, and what they had to the right of the conical hill and towards vittoria we could not discern, but it turned out they had a strong force there. there were several small villages in the plain and on the side of the mountains; the largest stood rather to the right of the plain, with a wood immediately behind it; this, i believe, is called subijana de alva. on the bank of the river also were three or four villages, most of them on our side, with a bridge at each village. the french army did not extend immediately to the river bank, but was placed at some little distance beyond it. the river was easily fordable. our army began to arrive by divisions, and was posted as follows--general hill with the d division, consisting of about , men, was on our extreme right, except about or spaniards under general morillo, who were still more to the right, and facing the long range of mountains before mentioned. in the centre was his lordship with the d, th, th, and light divisions, perhaps , strong, with the main force of artillery and cavalry. sir thomas graham had been early detached to our left with the st and th divisions and some portuguese, about , in all, to turn the enemy's right flank, and to try to cut him off from the great road leading from vittoria to france, which ran in that direction. whilst this movement was executing, and the different divisions were getting into their several stations, we, who had arrived first, were allowed to pile our arms and sit down. his lordship, with a numerous staff, went down a little nearer to the river to reconnoitre the enemy's position. i wandered down with them, and got as near as i could in order to ascertain the opinion of the big-wigs as to the business about to take place. one staff-officer, after carefully examining the position of the enemy through his glass, gave it as his opinion, that we should scarcely be able to make any impression upon so numerous an army, and so very strongly posted; but this opinion must have been dictated, i think, by his rather desponding temperament, for i believe it was entirely singular. the enemy, however, did not fail to notice this movement of our general and his staff, and instantly detached a corps of voltigeurs, who, rushing down to the river, dashed across the bridge at the village of villoses, and immediately took possession of a small woody height on our side of the river, from whence they opened a fire on his lordship and those that were with him. this of course could not be borne; and as my battalion was the leading battalion of the column and nearest at hand, we were ordered (with two companies of our st battalion, which stood next to us) to take our arms, and drive those fellows across the river again. thus we had, i believe, the high honour of commencing the action on that memorable day. we soon chased the voltigeurs from the woody height, down through the village, and over the bridge, where they took post and remained, we not having orders to pursue them any farther. we took possession of the village, and continued skirmishing with the enemy, a good many men falling on both sides, as the river was not more probably than thirty or forty yards wide, and a constant fire was kept up by both parties till the french were afterwards driven away by our divisions crossing lower down the river. after we had chased the enemy along the bridge, and they were fairly clear of the village, a french battery, situated a little above the river towards the conical hill, opened its fire upon us, from which we suffered a good deal, one shot having taken our people, who were lining a garden wall, in flank, and swept away five or six at a stroke; after this we kept more under cover. almost the first person who fell on our side was a lieutenant of the name of campbell. he had, i am sure, a strong presentiment of his death, for he had, i believe, made his will the evening before; and when we first came in sight of the french army, and the others were all animated with life and glee at the prospect of gaining laurels in abundance, he, poor fellow, sat down by himself quite pensive, and seemed lost in thought. he received a shot in the forehead which terminated his career in a moment as it were, and plunged him into an eternity of bliss or woe. i hope he was prepared, but scarcely dare say i believe he was. our duty having been accomplished by taking possession of this village, and keeping the french from coming over, we had now leisure to look round us and see what was going forward; and we had certainly a noble field for observation. my commanding-officer, with the rest of the staff-officers and myself, together with half a company of men, took up our station at the church, which, standing high, gave us a fine opportunity of witnessing the movements of both armies. a short while after we had taken post here, we observed the smoke to arise in dense columns in the direction which sir thomas graham had taken, which showed he had commenced the attack on that flank of the enemy, and this was the signal for commencing operations on our right and centre. sir rowland hill's people, with the spaniards, instantly forded the river, and advanced along the top and side of the mountains before mentioned; and as this was done in considerable force, it seemed to disconcert king joseph a good deal, for instantly his aides-de-camp were seen galloping in every direction, and the troops which stood upon the plain began to move in that direction, while those upon the conical hill began to descend in great numbers into the plain. this was precisely what our chief had calculated upon; and now, by a rapid movement, he threw the centre divisions across the river, by the bridges of trespuentes and nanclara, a little below our village, and attacking the remaining troops upon the conical hill, they were overthrown as fast as our divisions reached them. the d, sir thomas picton's division, here particularly distinguished itself. general hill's people were by this time very warmly engaged, for the enemy having, as stated above, strongly reinforced that point, they made a rather obstinate defence, particularly at the village and wood of subijana de alva, which latter was filled with their light troops, and where our th regiment, which was opposed to them, suffered considerably, and were not able to make much impression. the action had now become general, and our people on every side advancing; at this moment old douro, who never failed to inspire confidence wherever he appeared, came dashing down into our village, and seeing the light troops which had been opposed to us had retired, instantly ordered us to advance, and join our division on the other side of the river. we accordingly moved forward, and marched with all expedition to reach our point; but the french had now begun to retire, and our people to follow them, so that we found it difficult to overtake them, and did not do so till they had passed the conical hill. when we came near that eminence, i rode up to have a peep at the field before us, and never did i witness a more interesting and magnificent sight. a beautiful and extensive plain lay before me, covered with the cavalry, infantry, and artillery of the contending armies; while the noise and din, occasioned by repeated volleys and rolls of fire from the infantry, with the rattle of upwards of pieces of artillery, almost stunned the ear. near the end of this plain, and to the left, arose the lofty spires of vittoria; and beyond that again, the smoke arising from the attack of sir thomas graham's people added animation to the scene. i had not contemplated the scene before me above a minute or two, till a howitzer-shell from the french fell close at my feet. my horse's bridle was hooked on my arm, and i was standing looking through my glass; but when this unwelcome visiter descended so near me, i thought it high time to be packing. my horse, however, not having the same fear of the consequences that i had, would not move but at a snail's pace. i was, therefore, constrained to leave him to take his chance, and get myself out of the way. it burst, but providentially without injuring either horse or man, but in the scramble i lost the top of my glass, which i could not afterwards find. i got down the hill, and joined my people, who had by this time passed it; and just at this juncture i observed a body of troops a little to our right, moving in the same direction we were. they were dressed in blue, and had caps covered with white canvass. i took them for spaniards; but upon consideration that no spaniards ought to be there, and a closer inspection, i found they were a battalion of french, and most likely those who had been so warmly engaged with the th at the village of subijana, and who having stood perhaps too long, and afterwards having the wood to traverse, they had been detained considerably behind the rest of the army; for by this time our advance, and consequently the french rear, could not be less than half a mile in front of us. i pointed them out to one of our lieutenant-colonels; but as we had received orders to push on with all haste, and he not liking to disobey his orders, and withal a ravine being between them and us, which would have prevented our closing with them, they were allowed to move quietly off, which they did with a pretty quick but steady pace. before we reached our division, we had to pass a village, over against which was a very strong french battery, and where they peppered us considerably, but without doing much harm, i believe. we here joined our brigade. immediately in front of this village the enemy made one of his longest stands. our brigade now formed lines of battalions, and lay down in some ploughed fields, while their artillery kept playing upon us. on our left the d division was warmly engaged. in about half an hour we moved in that direction. the th we found posted behind a thin thorn hedge, with its commanding-officer poor colonel ridewood, whom i had known before, lying on its right, gasping in the agonies of death. a great many men of this regiment had fallen here. we passed them, and continued to advance along the plain by brigades and battalions; but we found the ground much intersected with ditches, which would have retarded us had we wished to advance rapidly; but from some cause or other, which we could not then comprehend, we never pressed upon the enemy closely, but gave them time to get quietly away. we were still, however, in expectation of their making their final stand; for at every short interval a beautiful little position presented itself, which the french invariably occupied in the finest style possible, forming their lines on these little eminences with the greatest precision, and in beautiful order; but they never stood to let us get at them, for the moment we began to come within musket-shot, they instantly began to retire to another, which they took and abandoned in like manner. all this time, indeed, there was continual skirmishing going on between the light troops of the two armies, and a constant cannonade, and occasionally the heavy lines came in contact; but their infantry appeared to us to leave the field in the main unbroken. we continued these movements till near dark, by which time we had considerably passed vittoria, and the enemy's artillery had nearly ceased. our cavalry now got at them; and although, from the nature of the ground, their movements were greatly cramped, yet they continued to charge, and nearly captured king joseph. we halted when we had got about four miles beyond vittoria, which we passed on the left hand. we thought we had indeed gained a victory, but it appeared to us to be a most barren and useless one; and many were not over well pleased that the enemy had been allowed to get off so easily. but our noble chief knew well what he was about, for he reaped all the fruits from this that could have been possibly gained from the most bloody battle. indeed it was far from being a bloodless victory, but he certainly did not sacrifice one half the men that some in the action would have done; they thought we should have pressed the enemy far more, and brought him to closer action. after we halted, i (being the only quartermaster present) was sent in search of the baggage belonging to the division, and which had followed as far as they could along the great road. i passed through vittoria on my way to the rear in search of it, and saw as i entered it several of morillo's men, who had descended from the mountains and come into the town. from the vivas and other marks of gratulation which some of the inhabitants were rendering these ragged ruffians, a stranger would have thought that don morillo, with his or spaniards, had achieved the whole victory themselves. it is certain they are a vainglorious people. i passed through the town, and, taking the great road, i soon had ocular proofs of the value of our day's work; the road being literally blocked up with every description of carriage-guns, tumbrils, waggons, &c. &c. which filled the great high-road for nearly two miles to the rear of vittoria. i found it difficult to make my way through them, but at last fell in with the baggage; i could not, however, get it through, and was obliged to leave it, after giving directions where to find the division in the morning. i again passed through vittoria in returning to the division; but oh, what scenes had i now to witness! the followers of an army are sometimes very numerous, and here they were abundantly so; muleteers, portuguese and spanish concubines, with every description of vagabond you can imagine. these were by this time all labouring hard in their avocation of breaking open and plundering the carriages and waggons, &c. that had been left by the enemy. among these were hundreds of soldiers, who were now beginning to feel the effects of the wine, &c. which they had found in the enemy's baggage; and such a babel was here to be witnessed as is not easy to conceive. i had some difficulty in forcing my way through the town, at the end of which i was accosted by five or six soldiers' wives, belonging to one of our light cavalry regiments, who wished to accompany me, in order that they might find their husbands, as that regiment was attached in some measure to our division. of course it would have been cruel to refuse them; and as they were all mounted, away we posted, but had great difficulty to make out where the division now was. many were the waggons and other carriages we passed on the road, either broken down, upset, or with people plundering them; and i did not reach the division till o'clock at night. i was very glad when i found them, being then excessively fatigued and hungry; and just as i reached my people, i found the mess to which i belonged cooking a piece of thin mutton, which they had cut off from a sheep that had been taken from the enemy. this was all the plunder i got that memorable day, although, had i done as many others did, i might have obtained a great deal both of money and other valuables; for, as i said before, the numerous carriages i passed gave me an opportunity which many would have rejoiced at of possessing myself of immense wealth; but plundering never was my forte. one officer whom i knew got, i believe, near l. worth of money, and other valuable property; and innumerable others got considerable sums, more or less. i am glad now that i refrained from what _might_ have been accomplished with ease and safety, but what also _might_ have entailed upon me disgrace and ruin. one officer i heard of, who, while in the rear, where he ought not to have been, found a box full of money, most likely silver, but very heavy. a german dragoon coming up at the same moment laid claim to half of it, and when this officer took hold of it to remove it, the german also laid hold to prevent him. a sort of scuffle ensued, when the german made use of most abusive and mutinous language, with threats, which the officer was obliged to submit to, knowing, as both of them did, how far he had descended from his station, thus putting it in the power of the soldier to treat him as a brother plunderer. surely the mention of such an occurrence is enough to deter any man who possesses the least spark of honour from ever putting it in the power of a soldier to treat him so. besides, if an officer plunders before his men, what may not soldiers be expected to do? in looking back upon the events of this day, i cannot help being struck with the bad generalship of those who commanded the french army. marshal jourdan, i understand, was joseph's adviser on this occasion. he had always borne the character of an able general, but here he showed but little ability. why did he so much weaken his force on the conical hill to support his left? had he maintained his ground there, which is strong by nature, and they had rendered it stronger by art, he might have completely checked us on the right; for if we had advanced too far on that side, our wings would have been separated, which would have been a dangerous experiment; and i think lord wellington would not have hazarded it. and after leaving his first position, why did he not fight at every one of the beautiful little positions which he afterwards took up but never defended? this conduct is most unaccountable, for had he made a longer stand, even although he should be beaten, which no doubt he would have ultimately been, yet, by making this stand, he might have got off the greater part of his materiél, instead of which he carried off with him one gun and one howitzer only, leaving upwards of pieces of ordnance in our hands. most of his infantry left the field apparently unbroken; for only here and there they had stood to let our people get at them. it is true sir thomas graham early cut off their retreat by the great road to france; but what then? this ought to have made them fight the more desperately, to enable them to get off the better by the pamplona road. the infantry should have stood till the last, and not retired till fairly beaten out of the field. nothing could be finer than the movements of our army. every thing our chief attempted succeeded to a tittle. the only thing i did not like was the delay we occasionally made in following up the enemy; but i could not, of course, comprehend the general movements, from seeing only a small part of them, and i believe the victory would not have been more decisive by being more bloody. we lost in the village, where we first began the fight, nearly thirty men, with the officer before mentioned as killed, and a considerable number wounded. there was something remarkable in the fate of one of the men who were killed by the cannon-shot i before noticed. this man was remarkably averse to fighting, and had shown, on all occasions, a disposition to leave that kind of work as soon as practicable. poor fellow! his failing was known to all; and on this occasion those about him had orders to watch him, and keep him to his duty. they had not been in the village many minutes when this fatal shot swept him and about five others into eternity in a moment. it has often been remarked, that this description of people are generally the first to fall. it may not be generally known, perhaps, that a battle was fought on the d april , a little higher up this river, near the village of novarete, between our edward the black prince, and henry the bastard, who had usurped the throne of don pedro, king of castile. the history of it is given by froissart, who says, "a little before the two armies met, the prince of wales, with eyes and hands uplifted towards heaven, exclaimed, 'god of truth, the father of jesus christ, who hast made and fashioned me, grant, through thy benign grace, that the success of this battle may be for me and my army; for thou knowest that in truth i have been emboldened to undertake it in the support of justice and reason, to reinstate the king upon his throne, who has been disinherited and driven from it, as well as from his country.'" this zealous prayer was immediately followed by the onset, the prince crying aloud, "advance banners, in the name of god and st george!" "at the commencement," says froissart, "the french and arragonese made a desperate resistance, and gave the good knights of england much trouble; but at last, when all the divisions of the prince were formed into one large body, the enemy could no longer keep their ground, but began to fly in great disorder; and henry, the usurper, perceiving his army defeated, without hope of recovery, called for his horse, mounted it, and galloped off among the crowd of runaways. the english pursued them through the town of najara, where they gained considerable plunder; for king henry and his army had come thither with much splendour, and after the defeat they had not leisure to return to place in security what they had left behind them in the morning." there is a striking coincidence in many parts of the two actions and their consequences, which the reader cannot fail to notice. the most material difference, i think, in the two stories is, the offering up of the prayer by the prince, and the modern practice of not recognising, publicly at least, the hand of god at all in any of our victories. this is to be lamented. chapter x. advance in pursuit of the enemy--our forces retreat, in order to counteract soult's movements for the succour of pamplona--total defeat of soult in the several actions near pamplona--our forces again advance--come up with the retreating enemy at the bridge of yanzi--the enemy take up a position behind vera--a considerable body of the enemy attacked at the pass of eschallar, and forced to retreat. we remained in bivouack all night where the battle had terminated; and did not begin to move till near mid-day on the d, when we set off in the track of the enemy, and at night reached salvatiera, where king joseph had slept the night after the action. the poor beaten french must have had a long march after the fight, for this was probably sixteen or eighteen miles from vittoria. we started early on the morning of the d, and very soon began to overtake the rear of the enemy. they now resorted to a system of retarding our march, at once both cruel and cowardly; every village they passed through they set on fire. of course this caused us some delay, as the road generally ran through the middle of the village, and the country on each side was enclosed, but still nothing could justify such barbarity to the unoffending natives, who were thus deprived of house and home, and probably all they possessed in the world. we overtook their rearguard near a village about two leagues from salvatiera. they attempted to make a stand while the village was in flames, but a shrapnell shell from our horse artillery set them instantly in motion. we came upon a considerable body of them again near the village of la cunca, where we again cannonaded them, and where our people had some slight skirmishing with their rear. we encamped for the night near this village, and again started after them in the morning early. my battalion led the column to-day, the post of honour. we had marched, i think, about eight or ten miles without overtaking any of the flying foe before us, but at last we came to an open country, that which we had traversed being pretty thickly enclosed, with bad roads and wet weather, which rendered marching very uncomfortable. here a halt was ordered, as the enemy was in front in some force; here for the first time we got upon the great road leading from pamplona towards bayonne; and here, where it turned the corner of a mountain, forming a pretty acute angle, they had the only gun and howitzer they had saved from the fight in position, and ready to receive us. the men of my battalion, and a part of our st battalion, were ordered to put their knapsacks up behind the hussars of the german legion, as it was not expected they would be wanted, and it thus rendered our people better able to run. the enemy appeared to have two battalions here, one of which remained on the great road near the two pieces of artillery, while the other moved off more to our right, down a valley which they imagined would, at the other end, let them out into the great road again. we now began to move forward, and as i happened to be the first mounted person who left the enclosed road we had been in, i was honoured with the first shot from their gun, which, although a good shot, did me no injury. our people now pushed on at them pretty smartly, which caused them, after firing a round or two more, to limber up and retire with their artillery, though they of course retired as leisurely as possible, to give time for their troops, whom they were covering, to get away. the skirmishing between them and our people continued for about two miles, they gradually retiring before us; but when they came to a sort of pass in the road, formed by two rocks nearly meeting in the middle, their bugles or trumpets sounded first the halt to their troops, and afterwards the advance upon us. we could not comprehend the meaning of this, till in a few minutes the battalion which we had observed go down towards the right, suddenly made its appearance out of a wood among our skirmishers. of course a sharp contest now took place, and the firing on both sides became more brisk; this battalion, it appears, had miscalculated on getting out of the valley, down which it had retired, and had been compelled, at whatever risk, to make the great road again before they passed the rocks before mentioned; and in order to let it do so, the other skirmishers had advanced to cover its movement. this battalion suffered considerably before it reached the road, and we did not get off scot-free, having lost out of our five companies about twenty-four men. our artillery being pretty near at hand, colonel ross brought up two guns, and fired into their retreating column, doing considerable execution. we now moved forward in close pursuit of the enemy for about two miles farther, when a shot from colonel ross's guns having struck one of the leaders in their gun, and our people at this time pressing them so closely as not to give time to disentangle the dead horse, they unwillingly were compelled to throw their only gun into the ditch, and there abandon it. we continued the pursuit till we drove them under the walls of pamplona, which i understand, poor wretches, they were not allowed to enter, on account of the scarcity of provisions in that fortress, and which after events proved was the case. we retired to the village of aldava and others in the neighbourhood, where we remained for the night. on the morning of the th, we advanced on the road to pamplona, the enemy having all retired towards france, till we came within about one mile and a half of it, when we branched off to the left, and moved along a range of hills at about a mile distant from the works of the place, till we reached the town of villaba, on the mountain-road from pamplona to france; thus cutting off all retreat from the garrison, and thus in fact investing the place. during our movements to-day, my people being in the rear of the th portuguese regiment, i was riding in company with my commanding-officer at the head of the battalion, when the horse of the portuguese major threw out with both his hind feet with all his might, and struck me with one foot on my thigh, and the other on the calf of the leg. the blow was so severe that i nearly fainted, and was obliged to dismount and throw myself on the ground; but as no bones were broken, i gathered myself up again, and mounted and set off after the troops. we encamped on the pamplona side of villaba, distant from the former about one mile and a half. the captain in whose mess i was, with his company, was that night ordered on picquet within about three quarters of a mile of the city. i went there to get my dinner, during which several poor people, who had made their escape from the place, came and welcomed us in the name of the people, telling us they were heartily tired of their present lodgers; of course there would be different opinions among them, but i believe the generality at that time hated the french most cordially. there was a division of the french army under general clausel, which had not partaken of the flight at vittoria, being then stationed at logrona, and he having learnt the fate of his companions in arms, and their retreat into france, was moving through the country to our right, in order to effect his retreat also. next morning, therefore, the d and our divisions were despatched in pursuit of this french corps. we marched that day to near taffala, and halted at the village of muro, at the junction of the great road from logrona with that we now occupied, but we learnt that clausel had kept more to his right, and was directing his course towards the mountain-road, which passes near caceda and languessa, into france. we accordingly passed through taffala and olite, and encamped for the night. next day we started early, and moved on till mid-day, when we halted for an hour or two to cook and refresh near the village of murillo del fruto. we here came upon the river arragon. this had been already a long day's march, and the greater part of the division were ready to lie down now, but a much longer portion still remained to be accomplished. accordingly, we set off after a short rest, and traversed the right bank of this river for about ten hours longer. night marches at all times are unpleasant, but much more so on such a road or path as this was, and every one so nearly tired before beginning it. we crossed the arragon at the village of galla pienzo, and lay down in a field not far from the village of caseda. very few of the division reached this place until daylight next morning. but when i got in i unfortunately lay down on a ridge immediately behind our column, and where, had i given it a thought, i was continually liable to be disturbed. and indeed i was most wofully disturbed, for every fresh batch that came in tumbled themselves down upon me, or in blundering about in the dark were sure to stumble over me. it must be observed that my leg by this time, instead of getting better, had begun to swell dreadfully and to suppurate, consequently i was in a high state of fever; and to the thumps and kicks which i received in the dark during this uncomfortable night, i cannot but attribute much of my subsequent suffering. next morning we discovered that all our labour had been in vain, for clausel had got the start of us, and had got off by another road into france. we next day moved into languessa, from which we were not far distant, but i could no longer accompany or precede the troops, my leg was now so bad. i was therefore obliged to get a pillow laid on my holsters, and then ride with my leg resting upon it, (a most uncomfortable position, could i have found a better,) while one of my men led my horse, and thus follow them as well as i was able. we rested in languessa all the th and st july; and on the d reached deriza, having passed through monreal. here i was obliged to be lifted off my horse, and put to bed. i was almost stupid from the pain i suffered; for my leg was now swoln as large as my thigh. we next day moved into villaba, from whence we had started in pursuit of clausel, and thence into some villages on the plain, close to pamplona. here i believe some works were thrown up to shelter the troops, either against the shot from the fortress, or a sally from the garrison. this continued all next day. i remained very ill in bed. on the th, the division left this quarter, and set off on the road towards france; but i could not follow them. i got with great difficulty from my present station, which was now occupied by other troops, and stopped at a village, the name of which i forget, just over the ridge where i received my hurt, and a few miles distant from villaba. here i found out that dr jones of the th regiment was in the latter town; and, as he had formerly been in our regiment, i took the liberty of requesting he would come and see me. this i found out by my servant going in for provisions. he very kindly came, and gave me the best advice he could. by this time my leg had burst, and had discharged a prodigious quantity of matter. i remained in this village till about the th, during which time a priest had shown himself remarkably kind and attentive; there were very few inhabitants remaining besides him. he told me in one of the conversations that i had with him, that, from the first entry of the french troops into this country, one million had passed out of france into spain, for he had had good opportunities of making a just calculation; and that, out of that vast number, not more than , had returned, thus proving that the enemy had lost in that country , men. and this is not to be wondered at, for nearly the whole population during that time had been in arms against them; and, although not acting as soldiers in the field, they never failed to assassinate the french wherever they could accomplish it. he said, moreover, that mina, with his little band, could produce documents to prove that he had destroyed , frenchmen. about the th, i set off from this village, as my leg had by this time become somewhat easier; and, passing through lantz, elizonda, and st estevan, arrived at sumbilla on the th, still obliged to ride sideways with my leg over the pillow and holster. here i found my division; and, as this journey had again brought my leg to nearly as bad a state as before, i was obliged to have it opened in two places, but without reaching the matter, as nothing but blood was discharged. on the th, my division moved forward to the town of vera, the last town on the spanish frontier. here the enemy had taken up a strong position, both in front and rear of the town; the front position was on santa barbara, an exceeding high and almost inaccessible mountain. they were dislodged from the position before the town by my brigade, and retired into the puerta, or pass of vera. i was not present on this occasion, having been again compelled to stay behind on account of my leg. while i remained at sumbilla, i had been obliged to have my horse shod by a spanish blacksmith, who drove a nail right into the quick. this i did not discover till several days after, when i found my horse quite lame. on the th, i again crept on after my people, whom i found encamped on the height of santa barbara, from which i before said they had driven the enemy. here we remained till the th, during this time my horse's foot had also suppurated, and he was quite unable to move. my leg also was daily discharging a vast quantity of matter, so that i felt at this time very uncomfortable; particularly as very stormy weather came on while we were here, which killed a great number of our animals, horses and mules, i believe not fewer than seven or eight in one night. it will be known to the reader, perhaps, that on the th, soult (who had now been appointed to the command of the french army) made an attack upon our posts at roncesvalles and maya, and had driven the divisions stationed there from their posts. he moved on towards pamplona, in hopes either of beating back our army to vittoria, (as he vainly talked,) or of being able to supply pamplona with provisions, which it greatly needed. in consequence of this movement of the enemy, we also were compelled to fall back, although the troops in front of us made no demonstration of advancing. accordingly, on the th, we began our retrograde movement, being myself at that time in as pitiable a plight as can well be conceived. my horse was so utterly lame, that he could scarcely hop on three legs, while i was totally unable to walk a step. my kind friend captain perceval, with whom i had long messed, helped me out of my trouble, by dividing the load of one of his baggage-ponies among the other animals, and lending it me to ride upon. we retired from the height, and crossed the river bidassoa, near lizacca, through which we passed, and kept along the mountains on the left bank of that river till we reached a height opposite sumbilla, where we pitched our tents, and remained for the night. we did not move all next day; but just as night set in, we were ordered under arms, and continued our retreat. this was a still more distressing night-march than any i had previously witnessed. we were now, it may be noticed, in the midst of the mountains of the pyrenees, where precipices abound; consequently the precaution to avoid falling over them would be doubled. one little streamlet, i well remember, delayed the division probably two hours. it came down from the sides of the mountain which overhung the road, and crossed it at a very dark and ugly-looking place, making a considerable noise as it fell from rock to rock. this of course made every one extremely cautious; and in consequence a poor good-natured corporal, who was killed soon after, got himself into the middle of the streamlet, and took hold of every person's hand as he passed, conducting him safely to the other side. poor fellow, he was extremely anxious to help me and my miserable little pony safely over. this and a few other places, something similar, prevented us reaching our destination till an hour after daylight next morning, although the whole distance was not more than ten miles. we arrived at zubietta in the morning. this place is about a league to the right of st estevan, more into the mountains. here we remained that day, and the next day moved higher up the mountain, behind the town, where we encamped, and remained till evening, when we again commenced our retreat. we had not quite so bad a march of it this night, the road being much more even, although, just at the outset, our adjutant, in riding along, had his cap pulled off by the bough of a tree, and in endeavouring to save it from falling, he pulled his horse right over a small precipice, which the two rolled down together. luckily it was not a deep ravine into which he fell, or he would not have escaped so well: neither man nor horse were much hurt. we reached the village of saldias in the morning, where we remained for the day. last night my servant told me he had been obliged to leave my little horse behind, as he could not get him to hop any farther. i felt grieved at this, for he had brought me all the way from lisbon, and shared both my good and bad fortune; however, it was no use to fret, for that would not improve my situation, which indeed was not an enviable one, my leg all this time being extremely painful. on the th, we made an excessively long march, (by day,) and at night reached lecumberg, where we encamped. during the latter part of this day's march, we had heard an incessant cannonade and firing of musketry in the direction of pamplona, from which we were apprehensive that soult had penetrated too far; but as it did not appear to recede, we believed our people had been able to hold him in check at least. we were now on the great road from bayonne to pamplona, in order to keep up the communication between our right, where the fighting was now going on, and sir thomas graham, who was besieging st sebastian. we were here also to intercept any of the enemy's columns that might either advance or retreat by this road. towards evening of the st, an aide-de-camp arrived from lord wellington, more dead than alive from the excessive fatigue which he had undergone for the last three or four days, with news of the total defeat of soult in the several actions near pamplona, termed the battle of the pyrenees, and ordering us to retrace our steps, and again advance. we set off in the evening, and reached larissa, where we halted for the night. it was whispered that it was expected we should have gone much farther this night, but i am not certain whether it is true; but certainly we might have proceeded to saldias, if absolutely necessary. on the morning of the st of august, we again started pretty early. it was again reported this morning that another dispatch had been received during the night, directing us to proceed with all haste, as the enemy were retreating by st estevan, and that we were to attack them wherever we met them. we now of course stepped out very freely, and presently gained zubietta. here i had ridden forward to get a shoe fastened on, my horse having cast one in coming over the mountains; during which time the quartermaster had been called for some purpose or other, as i was not there. my general was not well satisfied: he saw me in this village, and asked me why i had not been present when i was wanted. i told him the cause, but he still did not appear satisfied, and, by way of punishment, directed me to remain in the village till the baggage came up, and show them the way the division had gone. i may here observe, that it was a little unreasonable in my general to find any fault with me on this occasion; for, had i not got the shoe put on my horse, i could not have been of any use at all as a quartermaster. my punishment indeed was slight, and i rather think he was glad to find any excuse to delay me for the purpose for which i was left. i am confident the officers of the infantry suffered more anxiety and even loss on account of the great want of farriers or horse-shoers in their regiments, than from almost any other cause. without the officer was pretty high in rank, he had not only to pay most exorbitantly for any thing of this kind which he got done, but to beg and pray, and to look upon it as a favour conferred on him. most of the good shoers were taken by the staff or general officers, consequently only the inferior ones were left for the regimental officers, and in several cases none at all. the consequence of all this was, the loss of several valuable animals, both horses and mules; besides, in some cases, the officers being rendered incapable of performing their duty as they otherwise would have done. to this i attribute a considerable loss in animals during this service. it might easily be remedied by each infantry regiment having a proper establishment of farriers, (say two,) with tools, &c. in proportion, and the means of carrying them; and then every officer, whose duty requires him to be mounted, might be served. i myself bought tools to the amount of l. , and never had but one horse shod with them. i could not get a man to do it. as soon as i saw the baggage on the right way, i pushed forward, and joined the division again. we were literally at this time climbing up a mountain, where i could not ride, but was obliged to crawl up, and pull my horse after me. my leg by this time had much improved. we followed the road by which we had retreated a few days before, and at length came to the rivulet that had so alarmed us all on our night-march. it was really surprising that we should have been stopped so long by such a trifle; but in such a situation, and at such a time, things of that kind are magnified a thousandfold by the imagination. we passed our old camp ground opposite to sumbilla, and here we came in view of the enemy's columns retreating along the road on the opposite bank of the bidassoa. this gave our men new life; but here the d and other regiments of the d brigade were obliged to halt: they could proceed no farther. we had marched by this time to-day two and a half of the stages we made in retreating; but the d brigade had been in the rear of the column all day, and had consequently suffered much from stoppages, &c. my battalion, our st battalion, and the d regiment, continued to move on, and as they approached, the enemy seemed to acquire fresh vigour. at length we reached the point of attack,--the bridge of yanzi,--and here the st battalion turning down towards the river, at once left the wood and ground above the bridge to be occupied by us. the enemy sent a pretty strong corps of light troops across, which got engaged with our people; but we soon drove down through the wood again towards the bridge. at length, we got two companies posted just over the bridge, in front of which all the rear of the french column had to pass. poor creatures! they became so alarmed, that they instantly began to cut away, and cast off, all the loads of baggage, and both cavalry and infantry, &c. to make the best of their way. but the mountain on their right was inaccessible; consequently they had all, as it were, to run the gauntlet. great was the execution done amongst the enemy at this bridge, and many were the schemes they tried to avoid passing. at length they got a battalion up behind a stone wall above the road, on the opposite side, from whose fire we received some damage; consequently those poor people who had afterwards to pass were not so much exposed. just about the close of the business, my kind friend, captain perceval, received a shot through his right wrist. his left hand had been closed for a length of time before, in consequence of a wound through that wrist, which had contracted his fingers, besides being lame from a wound in the hip. now he was rendered completely useless. towards dusk i went with him a little to the rear, and got his tent pitched, and made as comfortable as circumstances would admit. i pitied the french on this occasion, they seemed so much alarmed. the whole of their baggage fell into the hands of our th division, who were closely following them up on their side of the bidassoa. in this affair, the french were reduced to a dreadful dilemma; great numbers of their wounded had been brought off from the battles of the th, th, and th, near pamplona, which were carried on biers or stretches by men of this division. when they saw us in front of them, where they had to pass, as it were, immediately under the muzzles of our pieces, they were compelled to adopt the cruel alternative of either throwing their wounded men down to perish, or run the risk of being shot or taken themselves. i believe the former, shocking as it seems, was generally adopted; and i have reason to believe that the greater part of them were thrown into the river; for, from the point where we first came in view of them to near where this affair took place, the bidassoa was literally filled with the dead bodies of frenchmen, and they could have come into it in no other way. we lost only a very few men on this occasion, not more than six or eight, while that of the enemy must have been extremely severe. here the effects of rifle-shooting were plainly visible. in remarking on this affair, i beg to draw the reader's attention to the following circumstances; viz. probably never troops made such a march over such a country before. we travelled at least thirty-two miles over mountains such as i before described, where you were sometimes nearly obliged to scramble upon your hands and knees. the day was exceedingly hot, and occasionally there was a great want of water. i am told that one of the regiments in our d brigade, which, it may be remembered, were obliged to halt, as they could go no farther, had no less than men fell out, unable to keep up, and that some of them actually died of fatigue. i heard of one poor fellow, who, when he came to water and had drunk, lost his senses, fell to the ground, and shortly after expired. i have reason to be proud of my battalion on this occasion, which, when the roll was called, just before the action commenced, had only nine men fallen out; but they had been in the front all day, a great advantage in marching, particularly over a mountainous country. this day's work gave me a higher idea of the powers of human nature, when properly trained, than ever i possessed before; for when you consider that each of those soldiers carried a weight of not less probably than forty or fifty lbs. and some much more, it cannot but be surprising that men should be able to sustain such fatigue for such a length of time--at the end of which to fight, and gain a victory. next morning were clearly observable the effects of the evening's work. in the house, the yard, and on the road opposite the bridge, were a great number of dead frenchmen; and to the rear, by the way they had advanced, the road was literally strewed with baggage, and equipments of every description. some of our people picked up a number of visiting cards, with general vandermason on them, very elegant; so that his baggage, no doubt, had been cast off, as well as that of inferior people. soon after daylight, we were ordered to fall in, and move forward towards vera. just as we cleared the bridge, old douro, with his staff, came riding up, who, when he saw how we had handled the enemy the night before, gave his head a significant nod, and smiled, which conveyed most intelligibly his approbation. we soon reached the neighbourhood of vera, behind which, in the pass of that name, as before stated, the enemy took up a strong position, from which their picquets had never yet been driven. we were ordered to encamp a little below the bridge leading to lezacca, between that and vera, while the other regiments were intended to occupy the heights of santa barbara, from which we had before retreated. but towards mid-day it was discovered that the enemy still had a considerable body of troops in and about the pass of echallar, a few miles to our right. our brigade was therefore ordered again under arms, with the intention of co-operating with the th division in an attack upon those people. it was a thick mist, so that we could scarcely see twenty yards before us; but when we reached the bottom of an immensely high hill, on which the enemy were posted, we presently discovered whereabouts we had them. our st battalion extended to the right, and my battalion moved straight forward up the hill. for a considerable time the enemy's fire did us no injury, being deceived, i imagine, by the denseness of the fog. they fired almost always over our heads, some of which shots struck the men of the d, a considerable way below us. at length we began to approach the summit of the mountain, where the enemy were of course much more condensed, the ground they had to occupy being much smaller. our people were advancing regularly up the hill, when we run right up against a rock, on the top of which was collected an immense body of the french, and from whom our people received a most destructive fire, knocking down fourteen men in an instant. this unlooked-for circumstance checked our people, and made some of them retire for an instant behind a broken part in the mountain, from which they kept up the best fire they could. during this transaction, the french, who were not more than ten or twelve yards distant, were calling out to us in spanish to advance, and abusing us most lustily. a spaniard (one of the recruits i formerly mentioned) was so much annoyed, that he began in his turn to abuse the french; and, as if words were not enough, accompanying them with the best shot he could give them. poor fellow, he was instantly shot through the body, and fell to rise no more. they now began to get courage, and made a show of advancing upon us: they did do so on the right against our st battalion, but my commanding-officer calling out to cheer our people, set up a shout, which had the effect of intimidating them, and they did not dare to advance. i was now sent away by colonel barnard to request the d (who were behind us) to send a company to support our st battalion, which they instantly did; and just as i returned, i found the french had evacuated the rock from which they had annoyed us, on the top of which we found a great number of caps and pouches, &c., belonging to men who had fallen there. we followed them over the hill, but they now gave us leg-bail, posting down into the valley towards france with all expedition. the th division had some pretty sharp work before they dislodged the people in front of them, and had suffered very severely in effecting their object. when every thing was settled, one of our men thought he saw a man hiding behind a tree just below us: he went to see what it was, and dragged out by the neck a french soldier of the d light infantry. poor fellow, he came out shrugging his shoulders, and, putting on a most beseeching look, begged we would spare him, as he was only a "pauvre italien." of course no injury was done him, only the soldier who took him claiming and taking from him his knapsack, which appeared a fine full one, and which he appropriated to himself. i thought it cruel, and would have prevented it, had my voice been of any weight; and yet, had it not been taken from him now, it would very soon after, when he became a prisoner. one battalion was ordered to remain and occupy this hill, which dreadfully alarmed me, lest it should be ours, for it was bitter, bleak, and cold. luckily a portuguese battalion was ordered up, and we returned to our snug camp by the river side; and here, as if to crown our good fortune, one of our men, who had been left behind in charge of the tents, had got some meat roasted for our mess, of which we all partook with great delight and thankfulness. a friend of mine of our st battalion, during the advance the french had made upon that battalion, was nigh falling into their hands. they rushed at him, but he perceiving, and endeavouring to avoid them, fell into a bush, which scratched him most wofully, and in the fray lost his cap and sword. they grasped at the latter, (which was not drawn,) but which luckily broke loose from the belt, or they would have had him. this hill was always known afterwards by the name of barnard's hill, in honour of colonel barnard, who commanded on the occasion. chapter xi. the author, from a mistake, loses his servants for a few days--a feast of death--a feast of life--fighting near st sebastian--singular instance of spanish bravery--st sebastian is captured, but no details given, the author not having been present--attack of the pass of vera. we remained at rest here for some time, during which i, as acting paymaster, had several trips to tolosa, a considerable town on the great road from bayonne to madrid, where the paymaster-general had taken up his residence with the military chest. in one of them i went and had a peep at st sebastian, the siege of which was then going on. while here, i received directions from general sir william stewart to attend him at villaba, where he lay wounded, he having received two balls in the late actions. i set off, directing my servants with my baggage to follow close after me: by some means they were delayed a few minutes, and, supposing i was going again to the paymaster-general at tolosa, went off in that direction, without asking any questions. i imagined they knew very well where i was going, and still went on slowly, every now and then looking back to see if i could descry them coming; but although there was no appearance of them, i simply enough continued my route till i reached st estevan; and here i put up for the night, thinking, of course, they would come by and by. in the morning, i was fully convinced they must have gone some other road, and as all my books, &c., from which i wanted information, were in my baggage, i thought it useless to proceed any farther. in retracing my steps, which i did leisurely, i had an opportunity of seeing the great number of bodies which the french had thrown into the river, the road running close by its brink nearly all the way. it was really shocking to behold such numerous wrecks of mortality, with the disgusting appearance which most of them had assumed; many of them were half eaten by the fish, and of others the flesh was hanging in rags, and bleaching in the stream. of course i returned home, but did not see my servants again for several days, as it took three or four to accomplish the journey to tolosa and back, and they had waited there a day for me. on the day that i was absent, all the officers of my corps had had a sumptuous and splendid entertainment, it being the th august, the anniversary of the regiment's first formation. they had dug a ditch in an oblong shape in the middle of a field, the centre of which served for a table, while they sat with their feet in the ditch. i am told the french, who were just above, and overlooked them from the heights behind the town, assembled and viewed them, as if in astonishment to see them regaling themselves with so much glee in the midst of the wild pyrenean mountains. no doubt the wine went merrily round, and many were the toasts which were drunk with three-times-three. during this interval, i often amused myself with fishing in the bidassoa, in which there were many excellent trout, and i was pretty successful, for i had got some tackle from one of our captains, which he had brought from england. on one of these occasions, while i was wading in a pool, i spied a fine salmon laying just below me; i threw in and brought my flies right over him, at which he instantly rose, but i missed him. i tried again, and hooked him, but in a moment he plunged right across the river, carrying with him all my flies and part of my line, for i had no reel. i might have calculated upon this, if i had thought for a moment; but the opportunity was so tempting, that i could not resist it. at length the st of august arrived, the day on which st sebastian was to be stormed. we knew this, for we had furnished a number of volunteers, both officers and men, to take part in the assault; many of our higher officers had gone to witness the glorious spectacle. but early in the morning, we were all astonished at the bugle sounding through the camp the alarm, or assembly, and instantly orders were given for the tents to be struck, the baggage to be packed, and to set off with it to the rear without a moment's delay, for the french were advancing; of course all this was done in as short a time as possible, and the troops were ordered to move on to a hill just over the bridge of vera. a detachment of ours had joined the evening before, and it cannot easily be conceived the strange effect this sudden alarm had on some of them. one of them, a lieutenant, was all in a bustle getting his pistols put in fighting order, and came to me begging i would take some money to keep for him. i told him that it was likely to be in as much danger with me as with himself, and of course declined. the old hands, on the contrary, were as cool and quiet about it as if it was an everyday occurrence. we moved to the height before mentioned, and saw a cloud of fellows with white caps coming down to the left of the town, and of course prepared to give them the best reception we could. i was sent with orders to my commanding-officer from the general, 'that he was, when pressed, to retire till he got on the ridge just over his house, (which was on the road a little to the rear of where we then were,) and that he was to stand there as long as it was possible.' i thought something very warm was going to occur, seeing such a cloud of frenchmen were then approaching us, but we were all disappointed; they went quickly to their right after descending from the heights, and forded the river below the town, setting their faces towards st sebastian. all this was effected under a cannonade from the heights. our st brigade (except my battalion) was then ordered to cross the river by the lezacca bridge a little behind us, and to move parallel to the enemy along the ridge above that town, which had all along been lord wellington's head-quarters. as soon as they got across, they sent a body of troops to the bridge of vera, close to which some of our people were stationed, and from thence they kept firing on us all day from some small mountain guns, which they had brought down with them, and occasionally with musketry. we were now somewhat curiously situated. the french position was on the side we occupied, while the other side of the bridge had been fortified by the spanish general longa, to protect himself during the last excursion of the french towards pamplona; but now they occupied the side on which the intrenchments had been thrown up, and turned them against us of course; they did little execution by their fire. lord wellington, seeing the intention of the enemy, assembled all the british troops he could easily collect, and brought them in rear of a corps of spaniards, which met the french in this direction; and finding this a fair opportunity of seeing what the don could do, withheld the british, and let the spaniards attack them by themselves. they had now the best chance of showing their valour that ever had or might present itself; they had the high ground, and the enemy had to climb up on their hands and knees to get at them; besides, they had behind them backers that would not see them get foul play. so away they set at them, and indeed they did tumble the french down in good style, upsetting them in all directions; so that our english division had nothing to do but to look on. this was the only time i ever knew the spaniards act in a body like good soldiers. the enemy, being beaten, were obliged of course to retrograde; but it came on one of the bitterest nights i have almost ever witnessed; the rain fell in torrents, and the lightning was very vivid. the french endeavoured to retrace their steps during the night, fording the river where they had crossed it in the morning; but the heavy rain had so swoln the river by midnight, that they could not continue any longer to wade it. a considerable number of them still remained on the other side, and no way presented itself of extricating themselves, but by forcing their passage across the bridge, near which a company of our d battalion, under captain cadoux, was posted, with one of ours, a short distance in the rear, to support him. captain cadoux's people were stationed in houses about thirty yards from the bridge, and had a double sentry on the bridge. the enemy's column approached very quietly, and then made a rush; but the rain having wet the priming of the sentries' rifles, they could not get them to go off to give the necessary alarm, and were in a moment driven from their post. the french then, seeing they had effected a passage, set up a shout, and rushed towards the houses where cadoux's people were, who turned out at once, and with the supporting company, opened a deadly fire upon the enemy's column; but poor cadoux fell instantly almost, as he had imprudently mounted his horse on the first alarm; his lieutenant also was severely wounded. the firing of course soon brought the whole brigade to the spot, which kept up a constant and well-directed fire during the whole of their progress along the little plain towards vera. the enemy suffered dreadfully on this occasion, leaving the ground literally strewed with their dead, who, like the others before mentioned, were next morning thrown into the river; so that the fish had ample feeding for some time after. some people afterwards reflected upon general skerrott, who commanded here, for not posting a stronger force at the bridge, and for not blocking it up with an abbatis; the former he might and ought to have done; but the latter was impracticable, from the enemy holding the breastwork at the other end of the bridge, which was not more than about thirty yards long. had a battalion been posted there, it is probable the french, who were compelled to have recourse to this daring attempt, might have been induced to surrender; but i believe the general never imagined they had need to make such an attempt. our loss on this occasion was rather severe also. a great many of captain cadoux's men fell; lieutenant travers, who commanded the company of my battalion, was wounded, and a considerable number of men were killed and wounded; among the former, some of the poor fellows who had joined from england only the day before. thus was soult's second attempt frustrated, and st sebastian fell into our hands. as i was not present at that glorious exhibition of british valour and prowess, i cannot take upon me to give any account of its capture. the volunteers who went from our division to assist in the storm or assault, sustained their full share in the casualties attendant thereon. the field-officer, colonel hunt of the d, was severely wounded; a lieutenant of the d, brother to mr o'connell, the famous roman catholic advocate, was killed; two lieutenants of our first battalion, named percival and hamilton, were severely wounded. the latter, i believe, was a volunteer on the occasion, not being entitled, from his standing, to take it as a tour of duty. he was conspicuously brave, and received two severe wounds, from which it would scarcely be imagined possible any one could recover. a few days after the surrender of st sebastian, i had again occasion to go to tolosa for money, and took the road by passages, the port where we now received all our supplies from england; and also to see the ruins of that late formidable fortress. when i reached it, the houses were still on fire, and not i believe half-a-dozen in the whole town that remained habitable, or the inhabitants had quite deserted it. i went up to the citadel and examined it, and i believe this, with proper casemates or bomb-proofs, might be rendered one of the strongest places in spain, next to gibraltar; but the french had suffered dreadfully from our shells, which had literally ploughed the ground on the top of this naturally strong height, and from which cause they had been compelled to surrender. st sebastian was indeed a melancholy spectacle at this time. i returned from tolosa by a part of the road which we had traversed in our late retreat and advance again, as i now began to hope i might perhaps recover my little horse, for i suspected from some cause that my servant, instead of having been obliged to abandon him, because of his lameness, as he told me, had sold him at that time; and this i actually found had been the case. i compelled him to tell me where he had disposed of him, and, with my broken spanish, traced him from thence for near twenty miles farther into the mountains, where i found him in a village, the name of which i do not recollect, but where a squadron of our german hussars were quartered. i of course claimed and took possession of the horse, giving the person the amount he had paid for him; but he being still lame, the commanding-officer of the hussars kindly permitted me to leave him with his farrier till he got well. he afterwards sent him to me, and would not even allow the farrier to receive any remuneration for his trouble, so kindly and politely did he behave. september passed away without any thing remarkable occurring. my friend captain (now major) perceval had been obliged to return to england, and captain balvaird succeeded him as senior captain of my battalion. i still continued in that company's mess. at length it was determined to attack the puerta, or pass of vera, which the enemy had rendered exceedingly strong. the left of our army, under sir thomas graham, were ordered to attack in their front, and force the passage of the bidassoa, and establish themselves in france. we were merely to drive them from the heights above the town of vera, taking possession of all the strong ground between that and france. the fourth division was brought up to support our attack, and formed immediately in rear of the town. one of the captains who formed the committee of paymastership, and who, it may be remembered, were held responsible for my accounts, and the due appropriation of all public money which might come into my hands, took a fancy that i exposed myself too much, and requested the commanding-officer, colonel ross, to prohibit my again entering into action, except for the purpose of bringing ammunition, &c., when my duty required me; in consequence of which the adjutant was sent to me this morning, previous to the operations commencing, with an order for me not to accompany the battalion. it may seem to the reader perhaps like affectation when i tell him i felt hurt at this order, and determined not very strictly to comply with it, for i believed that my respected commanding-officer had no objection that i should accompany him, did not this untoward circumstance interfere with my so doing. accordingly i remained a looker-on among the fourth division. my battalion was destined to commence this attack by driving the enemy from a high and rugged hill on the right of the pass, which was a necessary operation before the pass itself could be attacked. accordingly he extended the battalion, and encircled its base on the side next to vera; and i believe, without firing a shot almost, he marched right up to the top of the hill, notwithstanding the sturdy resistance made by the enemy, and in a very short space of time completely cleared this formidable height. this operation was the admiration of the whole fourth division, (for it was clearly observable by every one,) and they were most lavish of their praises for such a workmanlike movement. when my people approached the top of the hill, i felt alarmed for their safety and their honour, for the french commander closed all his force to one point, and, forming them into line, made them fix bayonets, apparently with a determination to charge them down the hill again; and i saw that my people, for they could not perceive what the french were doing, were likely to be taken by surprise. whether the frenchman's heart failed him i know not, but when colonel ross reached the top of the hill, the enemy went to the right about, and instantly retired. i felt proud of belonging to that corps, and happy at such a termination of this dangerous operation, and feeling a desire i could no longer resist, i set off to join them. by the time i reached the height just mentioned, the attack of the puerta was going on, and a most arduous undertaking it was. my brigade attacked the right or strongest pass, which they carried in fine style, without much loss, although the enemy had a breastwork at every available point of ground. our d brigade did not attack the left pass quite so soon as the other, and when they had got about half way up they encountered the most formidable opposition. a redoubt which the enemy possessed was filled with men, who waited till our battalion came within a few yards of them, and then poured in the most destructive fire imaginable, making the battalion recoil, and leaving one-third of its numbers on the ensanguined ground. but the d regiment being close behind, promptly supported them when rushing on together to the charge, and the french, after some hard fighting, were finally driven from this stronghold. after this they never made any obstinate stand, although there was occasional fighting all the way from the pass down into the plain below, where some of our people followed them; but it not being intended to quit for the present this high and formidable barrier, they were afterwards recalled. the boundary lines passed along this ridge. we lost a few men on ascending the first hill, and a few in skirmishing afterwards, but our loss was not severe. but that of the d battalion, before noticed, was awful; several of that battalion who fell in this action had only a few days before joined from england, and this was their first action. on looking at the ground on which this affair took place, one would imagine it almost impossible that any army could force a passage through such innumerable difficulties. the hill itself was nearly impassable, and with the numerous redoubts and breastworks, with which it was literally covered, no troops in the world, i think, but british, would have dared to attempt it. we found that the french, who occupied this station, had rendered themselves extremely comfortable, considering the kind of country and ground where they were posted. they had been at great pains in building very convenient and substantial huts in lines and streets, the same as an encampment, and which were indeed remarkably clean and neat. they had even built arm-racks at the end of each line, where their arms were stowed away most securely, and where they were preserved from the effects of the bad weather. indeed, from the pains they had taken to render themselves comfortable here, it would appear as if they had not expected to be driven from it so soon. the left of our army, under sir thomas graham, also established themselves within the french territory. a corps of spaniards on our left, between us and sir thomas, had likewise made a forward movement corresponding with the british. some spaniards were on the right of our division also, and were destined to drive the french from la rhune, an exceeding high rock, which overlooks all the other mountains, as well as the plain below. this they failed to accomplish, the enemy keeping possession all that night, and the skirmishing between the two forces continuing till after dark. my battalion was sent on the outpost duty in the evening down into the french plain below, and relieved the spanish general longa, whose corps, with our d brigade, were ordered to assist in the morning in dislodging the enemy from la rhune. i will not say whether the sight of the red-coats coming against them the next morning had the effect of alarming them, but they certainly evacuated that exceedingly strong post without much farther opposition, and established themselves on a similar rock, but lower, on the french side, and called by them petit or little rhune. but the possession of this lofty peak gave us the power of overlooking all their movements for miles around us, as well as of surveying la belle france as far as the eye could see, and indeed, compared with the bleak and barren mountains in which we had so long been residing, it did appear a beautiful country, although, in reality, it is far from being such. but we gazed upon it with strange and mingled emotions, hardly believing it possible that we had now reached and entered the territory of that once formidable nation whose victorious armies had penetrated to the farthest confines of europe, who had overrun and subdued some of the most warlike nations of the continent, and who had so often threatened, and as often alarmed, the inhabitants of england with the invasion of that sacred soil, on which never yet a frenchman has dared, in hostile array, to set his foot since the days of the norman william, but who met there either with a prison or a grave. we now pitched our camps by battalions, each occupying a post more or less important, and the enemy began again to construct their huts, and make themselves as comfortable as their circumstances would admit; soult, no doubt, being mightily chagrined that we had now fairly beat them out of spain, when he (as we now learnt) had promised his followers that he would soon lead them again to the plains of vittoria, where they might again retrieve their lost honours, and at which city they would celebrate the emperor's birthday. he thus boasted, and no doubt would have effected his purpose, had he not been so promptly met near pamplona by his never-to-be outmanoeuvred antagonist. we now began to suffer greatly from the severity of the weather. it became exceedingly wet and stormy; and not infrequently the tents were blown away from over our heads, or the pole was forced up through the top, letting the wet canvass fall comfortably down about our ears while we were perhaps in a sound sleep. i had two streams flowing past my head, one went round the trench outside my tent, while the other i was fain to let pass through it; their murmurs lulled me to sleep, and i do not remember that ever i slept sounder than i did here, having made my couch comfortable by gathering dry fern, and spreading my mattress upon it. whilst we remained here, a few officers were appointed to watch the motions of the enemy from an old work which we understood had been constructed by the spaniards and emigrant french against their revolutionary neighbours, whom they endeavoured to keep from entering spain; and, of course, this was the daily lounge of those who had no better employment, not only that they might themselves see, but hear also from others what of importance was passing. on one of these occasions, a vessel was descried (for the sea was not more than five or six miles from us) making for the harbour of bayonne, or st jean de luz, with a small schooner following her in chase, and every now and then giving her a shot. the vessel, (which turned out to be a french brig going with provisions for the few frenchmen who still retained the castle of santona,) seeing she could not get clear of her unwelcome neighbours, her crew set her on fire, and taking to their boats, abandoned her, and escaped on shore--she soon after blew up with a tremendous explosion. on the st of this month pamplona surrendered, the garrison, consisting of men, under major-general cassan, the governor, becoming prisoners of war. they had been compelled to adopt this measure from sheer starvation, of which they, i understand, had suffered dreadfully. i happened to be at passages on the day they reached that port, where they embarked, on their way to england. the general was a stout, handsome, and intelligent-looking man, and such a one as i should imagine would make a noble officer. the soldiers seemed quite unconcerned about their fate; whether from the change being actually an improvement of their condition, or from the lightness and gaiety of their natural temper, i know not, but they were jesting and making as merry as if nothing had happened. during the time we lay on these mountains, i regret to state my gallant and respected commanding-officer, colonel ross, suffered so much from rheumatism, that he was compelled to leave the regiment, and take up his abode at rentaria, a village near to passages. it was reported that lord wellington intended attacking the enemy along his whole line, early in november, but the weather having rendered the roads impassable, it was postponed. on the day previous to the intended attack, the commanding-officers had been taken up to la rhune, and the post that each corps had to occupy, with the movements they were intended to make, were clearly pointed out to them; an excellent plan, when practicable, as it leaves no one any excuse for mistakes or blunders during the action. at length, on the th of that month, i believe, it was settled to take place; but on the th i was ordered to set off with the mules of the battalion, to fetch corn from passages, a distance of about thirty miles. i suspected this was a scheme of the captain i before mentioned, as one of the committee of paymastership, in order the more effectually to keep me out of danger, for certainly had any thing serious happened me, they would have had some difficulty in rendering their accounts. it was not quite certain the attack was to take place next day, although it had been so rumoured; however, i was determined to try and reach the division as early as possible on that day. i accordingly got my business done in passages as early as i could get the commissary to work; and having got the corn, and come on to rentaria, which i reached about mid-day, i took the liberty of leaving the animals in the charge of the non-commissioned officer who had accompanied me; and calling on colonel ross, obtained his permission to let the sergeant proceed in charge of them to the regiment, while i might, if i chose, push on at a quicker rate. i had heard by this time, that the action had commenced by daylight that morning. i accordingly set off at as quick a pace as my starved animal could carry me; and passing irun, and crossing the bidassoa, and keeping along the great road for a considerable distance, i then inclined to my right, and skirted the pyrenees along the whole plain. i had thus an opportunity of witnessing the conflict carrying on by the left wing of our army, as i passed along towards la rhune, but with every exertion of myself and my poor jaded horse, night closed in upon me before i had nearly reached the station of the light division. i was compelled to work my way through a country which i had not hitherto passed, and which having been the scene of a sanguinary combat, presented no very pleasing aspect. at last i heard some strange and foreign voices before me, for it was now quite dark, on which i turned into a field, and waited till they passed, by which i learned they were spaniards. i was apprehensive i might have kept too far to the left, and had got into the french lines, which would not have been so comfortable; but after finding them to be men of general frere's spanish division, i then had hopes of shortly meeting with my own people. directed by those good spaniards, i at last reached petit la rhune, the late formidable position of the enemy, on which the blazes from a thousand of their huts were rising to the clouds, and enlightening the atmosphere around. but it being now ten o'clock, i found myself incapable of proceeding farther, more particularly as the portuguese, among whom i now found myself, could not give me any certain directions which way my division had gone. i was fain therefore to take up my abode, and gladly did so, in a cottage with colonel st clair and several other officers of the sixth caçadores. let it not be supposed that a fighting disposition induced me to use so much exertion to reach my division on this occasion--no; but as i considered that a sort of trick had been played off upon me, i did what i could to render it nugatory; no man liking, as i imagine, to be the dupe of any other party's manoeuvres, with whatever friendly intention these may have been put in operation. i arose next morning early, and hastened to the point where i expected to meet my brave comrades, anxious to learn the fate of all i loved amongst them. i saw them and the third division at a considerable distance, each on a height in front, appearing like flocks of sheep huddled together as close as possible. i soon reached them, and learned with sorrow, that the brave colonel barnard was, as they supposed, mortally wounded, the ball having passed through the chest, and that little lieutenant doyle was killed. this was a most stupendous action; the scene of operations extending from right to left, embracing, i imagine, not less than thirty miles of country. the centre had fallen to the share of my division, which, in the eyes of the best judges, was the strongest part of the enemy's line, for it had been fortified with the most consummate skill, and no labour had been spared to render it impregnable, as the enemy had been busily employed in the construction of forts, redoubts, and other field-works of every denomination, from the day we drove them from the pass of vera; one in particular, a stone built fort, in the shape of a star, was exceedingly strong, and which was attacked and carried in the finest style possible, i understand, by the d regiment; the d also surrounded a fort in which the french th regiment was posted, the brave commander of which not having received any orders to evacuate it, remained till the retreat of the french left him no other alternative than to surrender at discretion. the part my battalion had to play, was to cross the valley separating the two la rhunes in double quick time, and attack the french rock by a gorge, which allowed a passage from that valley into their position. this was to be in conjunction with the attack of the star fort by the d, as it in some measure took that work in reverse. in short, every corps in the division, and i believe in the army, had a most arduous duty to perform, and most nobly did they execute it. the left of our army, under sir thomas graham, did not succeed in driving the enemy from his innumerable works which covered st jean de luz, and which he retained possession of till the next morning; when the centre, that is the d and light divisions, together with the spaniards on our right and left centre, made a movement in advance, and crossed the nivelle river, from which this action derives its name. our movement, which threatened to separate the wings of the french army, caused the enemy to abandon his strong position in front of st jean de luz, as well as that town, on which occasion he attempted, and partly succeeded in destroying the bridge over the nivelle at that place; but it being soon after repaired, sir thomas graham's corps took up their quarters in the town. we encamped for the night in front of the village of serres, or sarre, or zarre. it had rained hard all the day of the th, and it continued almost without intermission till our camp was literally swimming. i remember perfectly that the water in my tent was several inches deep; and when i awoke in the morning, i found a portuguese boy (who had followed us, and had attached himself to our mess as a sort of servant) was sitting holding by the tent-pole, that being the only place where he could find rest for the sole of his foot. in short, we were as wet, clothes and beds and all, as if we had been dragged through a river. the evening before, i well remember, we had been highly amused by my scotch quartermaster-sergeant and his friends, who had taken up their abode close by, singing, till they rather grew tiresome, "we are nae fou', we're nae that fou', but just a drappie in our e'e." this of course was done to drive away dull care, and to make the best of an uncomfortable situation. the next day towards afternoon, a considerable firing was heard on our right, which had continued but a short while, till our gallant and unwearied chief came galloping up, with some few of his staff following, who could with difficulty keep pace with him, and asking most anxiously whereabouts and what the firing was. we could only point out the direction in which we heard it, but could give him no account as to its cause. away he galloped in the direction we pointed out, and no doubt soon reached the spot. i forgot to mention, that a man of the brunswick oels corps had been hung the day before for plundering by the provost marshal, no doubt in compliance with superior orders. it was necessary thus to give the army an example of severity, in order to deter them from committing those acts to which all armies are but too prone. we found indeed very little to plunder, had we been so inclined; for the greater part of the inhabitants had left their houses, taking every thing portable with them. this they had been induced to do from the false statements which soult had set forth in some proclamations he issued about this time, in which he described the english as savages, nay, even as cannibals, who would not scruple to commit the most monstrous atrocities; so ignorant were the generality of these poor peasants, that many of them implicitly believed his representations. this, no doubt, was done with the view of raising the whole population in arms against us, in order to defend their homes against such a set of wretches as he made it appear we were; but, although many of the natives joined the french army at this time, with which they were incorporated and led to battle, the result of his famous proclamations was not equal to his expectations; for a great part of them declined warlike proceedings, and retired into the interior of the country with their families, leaving only a very small proportion indeed who remained in their houses. as might be expected, the empty houses suffered dreadfully; every piece of furniture almost being destroyed, either for fire-wood, or in seeking for valuables; while the houses of those who remained in general escaped. general harispe, being a basque himself, had the organizing of the new levies now raised; indeed, many of these had taken a part in the irruption into spain on the th july for the relief of pamplona, and many of them fell on that occasion. we were not so fully aware of the extent of the misrepresentation to which soult had gone in these proclamations, till some time after we had entered france, and had penetrated considerably into the interior, when some of our officers, either during or after a march, entered the cottage of a peasant who had not left his home, to get a little milk. the poor woman was remarkably civil, offering them any thing the house afforded. they got some milk, for which they offered her money, but which she declined. her child was running about the house at this time, which, coming near one of the officers, he took it between his knees, and patted it on the head, with which the child seemed very well pleased; but the poor mother, standing at a little distance, and eyeing most intently every motion of the officer, was like to swoon with fear and agitation. but as the mother had declined receiving any thing for the milk, the officer who had the child gave it some small coin, and letting it go, it ran to its mother, who snatched it up into her arms with the utmost joy, and altering her look, began to say, she thought they had been deceived; for that they had been led to believe from the proclamations of soult, that we were such barbarians that we would not scruple to kill and eat their children, and which was the cause of her late fear and anxiety, as she expected the officer had taken the child for that purpose; but now she found we were not such people as she had been led to believe. of course the officer laughed most heartily at having been suspected of a man-eating propensity, and soon convinced the poor woman that the english were not quite such barbarians as that, whatever she might have heard to the contrary. chapter xii. the british army advance farther into france--pass the nive--soult's plans baffled--two or three battalions of the nassau and frankfort regiments come over from the french--french politesse--threatened attack by the french--battle of the nive--account of the basques. we left our wet camp on the th, and advanced to the village of arbonne, where, for the first time during the campaign, we were quartered in houses, except once or twice. during our stay in the camp at serres, or zarre, we sent our baggage animals to passages for corn, on which occasion i lost another horse, the batman pretending it had been stolen, but which, no doubt, he sold, as that trick had often been resorted to by this time, and there was no detecting it. on the th we left arbonne, and advanced to arcangues, sending forward picquets to the village of bassozari, about half a mile in front. my battalion took up into quarters in some straggling houses in front of the church of arcangues, while our first battalion occupied the chateau and outhouses of arcangues, about a quarter of a mile to the right and front of the church. the enemy's picquets were close to bassozari, so that in some places scarcely a quarter of a mile intervened between our quarters and their outposts. they allowed us to take up our outposts very quietly, they being now established in their intrenched camp in front of bayonne, and which was not far distant from our advance. there were some houses in the line of posts occupied by the french, which, if in our possession, would add greatly both to our security and convenience, and which it was determined to wrest from them if practicable. accordingly, on the d the division was put under arms, and our brigade, being in front, had this task assigned to them. the d, not having had so much work during the campaign as our two battalions had, was selected for the purpose of driving in the enemy's picquets, whilst we supported them. they accordingly attacked and carried the houses without a moment's delay; but unfortunately, captain hobkirk of that regiment, advancing with his company beyond the line at which it was intended to halt, got immediately in front of some of their intrenchments, from which he could not extricate himself, in consequence of which our first battalion was ordered to advance to cover his retreat; but he had by this time fallen into the hands of the enemy, with a considerable number of his men: his lieutenant was killed, and altogether the company suffered great loss. the remainder retreated, our first battalion people holding the houses it was intended to occupy. this occurred on the left of the ridge. on the right, and adjoining a marsh which separated us from some high ground near the river nive, and which was occupied by another division of our army, were two or three houses also which it was intended to take, as their possession secured us a passage across this marsh by a causeway, which connected two eminences, that on which we stood, and that occupied by the other division, the principal object upon the latter being a large chateau called garratt's house. one company of the d also took those houses, supported by some more of that regiment and my battalion; but after they were taken, from what cause i know not, an order was sent to evacuate them, on which the d retired. soon after, they were again ordered to be re-occupied, when a company of ours advanced, and took possession, but had not been there many minutes till another order was sent for them to be evacuated. this order, however, had scarcely reached them, when a charge was made on them by a body of french cavalry, supported by a strong column of infantry. the officer who commanded the company, either from the order he had received, or from want of presence of mind, called to his men to run to the rear when the cavalry charged him, by which he did not suffer much in point of losing men, for only one was wounded by the cavalry; but it had a bad appearance to run away from cavalry, a description of force which we had learnt by this time almost to despise, especially as, from his post, he might have knocked down great numbers of them, and finally have repulsed them, had he allowed his men to fire. the houses were, however, eventually taken possession of by another company of our battalion the next day, which retained them in despite of the enemy. the man who was wounded by the cavalry was shot in the head by a pistol ball: he came to the surgeon, where the main body of the battalion was standing, to be dressed; while this was doing, and the orderly man holding a tin-full of water near, from which the surgeon was sponging and cleaning the wound, a ball came, and, striking the tin, carried it right out from between the hands of the orderly. i was standing close by, and shall not easily forget the blank look which, as might be expected, the poor orderly put on. there was a good deal of firing all day, which, except what the d suffered, as before noticed, did little damage to the brigade. on the occasion of our company taking these houses the next day, a very young officer, who happened to command it, evinced great fortitude and presence of mind. he advanced on the enemy, who, being then rather inclined to quietness, retreated gradually before him; but after reaching the hedge, just beyond the principal house, told him (for they were quite near enough to speak) that he must not advance any farther, or they would be compelled to fire on him. the young fellow, solicitous about nothing but obeying his orders, told them that he was determined to have the house, and immediately putting his men under the best cover he could, called out that they might begin to fire whenever they pleased, he was ready for them. this young officer (whose name was cary, and brother to my friend who fell at badajos) spoke excellent french, so that the enemy understood him perfectly. the enemy did not contend any longer for the post, but planted their sentries within about thirty yards of ours. these sentries, indeed, were still so posted as to prevent a passage across by the causeway, had they been so inclined; but the next day i went with another officer across by this road, on which occasion we actually passed to the rear of the french sentries. a disposition had for some time been gaining ground with both armies, to mitigate the miseries of warfare, as much as was consistent with each doing their duty to their country; and it had by this time proceeded to such an extent, as to allow us to place that confidence in them that they would not molest us even if we passed their outposts for the purpose i have mentioned. and this mutual confidence in each other was productive of the most comfortable results to both parties. we could move about at any time, and almost in any place, shooting or otherwise amusing ourselves, without the dread of falling in with an enemy's patrol, or of getting among their sentries. they never molested us from this time, except when we either advanced upon them, or they upon us, in hostile array. our division had two main picquets; all this took place at the right picquet. a few days after i happened to be at the advanced post on the left, commanded by one of my battalion, when the french officers beckoned to us. we, to show we were peaceably inclined, pulled off our swords, and advanced to meet them. a number of inhabitants, who had left their houses on our first entering the country, having heard that we were not what we had been represented, were desirous of returning to their homes, and the officers wished us to admit them, and see them safe through the advanced posts. this of course we gladly promised, and the poor people were quite overjoyed at being permitted to visit their dwelling-places once again; but, poor creatures, i fear they would find little there except the bare walls, if indeed these remained entire, for, from the reasons before assigned, it could scarcely be expected that houses without inhabitants, in the midst of an invading army, would be much respected. each individual among them, old and young, carried heavy bundles on their heads, no doubt they having removed every thing that was valuable, if portable. the french officers were extremely polite, and asked us many questions of the news of the day, &c.; but the commander-in-chief, hearing of the familiarity which subsisted between the two armies, issued an order, prohibiting british officers from holding conversations with the enemy; for as all these conversations were necessarily conducted in french, (very few indeed of their officers being able to speak english,) he was apprehensive they might gain such information from our people, from their imperfect knowledge of the french language, as might materially injure our future proceedings. before this order was issued, the most unbounded confidence subsisted between us, and which it was a pity to put a stop to, except for such weighty reasons. they used to get us such things as we wanted from bayonne, particularly brandy, which was cheap and plentiful, and we in return gave them occasionally a little tea, of which some of them had learnt to be fond. some of them also, who had been prisoners of war in england, sent letters through our army-post to their sweethearts in england, our people receiving the letters and forwarding them. they told us also how hobkirk was situated, and were astonished at the extent and splendour of his equipage, (for he was a great dandy,) and could scarcely be persuaded he was only a captain. my present commanding-officer, who was the senior captain, and in whose mess i then was, had sent to england, and got out from thence two immense pies, weighing nearly a hundred-weight each, and packed in tin cases. they were composed of every kind of game, and the best description of fowls, such as turkeys, &c., with the bones taken out, and the meat baked till it became like brawn when cut in slices. they were most excellent. one of these he had made a present of to our major-general, and the other we were eating in the mess. we had also at this time a considerable quantity of good wine, which, by some accident, we had got hold of. we also had bought a pig and killed it, both living quite sumptuously at present, and having a good stock for future use. but while we ourselves fared so well, our poor horses and mules were literally starving. there was no kind of forage for them, except what they could pick up in the now completely exhausted fields around us. we had nothing else to give them. in this way we were going on, when, on the th of december, lord wellington, determining on passing the nive, preparatory to future operations, ordered our division and all the left, under sir john hope, who had now succeeded sir thomas graham, to make a movement in advance, in order that the enemy's attention might be attracted to this point, while he threw over some divisions to the right bank of that river. my battalion had to advance along the ridge by which i had formerly passed in peace, to meet the returning inhabitants, as may be recollected; but now the face of affairs was completely altered;--a heavy fire was kept up by the french picquets from the moment they saw us advance in arms, but we soon drove them from their advanced works, and they were obliged to take shelter in their intrenched camp, which was remarkably strong, and which it was not intended we should attack. we accordingly halted on the brow of the ridge, while they kept up an incessant fire, both from their guns and infantry, but which, considering its extent and duration, was not by any means a destructive fire. sir john hope had a more laborious task to perform, or else his troops went beyond the point intended, for they continued the fight nearly all day, and at one time were considerably in advance, but afterwards recalled. the passage of the nive was completely effected, and in the evening we returned to our comfortable houses, a short distance in the rear, and went to bed as usual. next morning, however, very early, orders were given to turn out immediately, and stand to our arms, for the enemy was advancing; and indeed, when i came to the door, i heard a good deal of firing. the troops turned out at once, but the mules were to get, and the baggage to pack, and send away to the rear, or it might be lost; so i set myself about this with all dispatch; but before any of it was put up, i saw posting by me, with all expedition, a civil officer, who had only a short while joined us, and who, in his hurry, had put up all he could scrape together on his horse, on which he himself was riding. his boots, tied together, were slung over the horse's neck, and in short he looked more like a bagman than an officer, from the number of things he had hanging about him. it was most laughable to see him. i called out and asked him why he was in such a hurry, but he did not stop to give me an answer. i got up our baggage very well, but what to do with the pie, the pig, and the wine, i knew not, so was constrained to leave them as they were, hoping we might not allow the enemy to penetrate so far. i then moved off the baggage, and, directing the servants who had charge of it to proceed up a lane which carried them towards the rear, i moved on and joined the battalion. just as i reached the plateau, or high ground in front of the church of arcangues, i met an officer of ours to whom i had lately lent a fine young mare, for which i had not food sufficient; and he having no horse himself, i thought he would take care of her; but here i met him going into the fight riding on the poor animal, although scarcely able to drag one leg behind the other. i remonstrated with him, but he did not mind me. the result was as might have been anticipated--she soon after dropped down, unable to move farther, and died; thus i lost l. more, which she had cost me. by this time the enemy had driven in the regiment which had been on picquet, and one or two of our companies were sent forward to cover their retreat to the church behind us, where they were ordered to take post, it being a high and fine position, and had by this time been partly fortified. my people retired gradually before the enemy, who now advanced in great numbers. our st battalion were not so fortunate in effecting their retreat. an officer and some men having got into a hollow way, were surrounded by the enemy and taken; another was killed; and another, with his section, had to force their way through a strong body which had got in his rear. my battalion did not fall into any scrape of that nature, but sustained a considerable loss in killed and wounded, from the vast superiority of the enemy in point of numbers, who, no doubt, did not escape with impunity. we held our ground at the bottom of the hill on which the church is built, the french not being able to force us farther back; the st battalion, at the same time, holding the fence and ditch in front of the chateau, as well as that building itself. but a rather unpleasant occurrence took place at this time. when the enemy appeared on the plateau before mentioned, a regiment behind us, without orders, i believe, opened a heavy fire upon them, several shots of which struck among our men. one of them went in at the back of one of our soldiers, and killed him on the spot; another penetrated the back window of a house into which a party of ours had entered for defence, and very near struck an officer, who was in the room at the time. these shots must have been fired either by young soldiers, who scarcely knew how they pointed their muskets, or they must have taken our people for the enemy, from which, indeed, they were not far distant. i am confident it was purely accidental, for no two corps could be on better terms than that regiment and ours always were. the skirmishing continued till dark. this was one of a series of masterly movements between the two contending generals. lord wellington having sent a pretty strong force across the nive, as before mentioned, soult imagined he had so weakened his force on the left, as to render it probable he might penetrate it, and thus cause his lordship to withdraw his troops again from the right bank of the nive; but he was anticipated; for lord wellington had no sooner established himself on the other side of the nive, than he brought one of the supporting divisions of that movement to support us at the church of arcangues, it being an important post to hold; so that, when we looked behind us, after we retired into position, we saw innumerable bayonets glistening in the sun, and ready to move forward whenever they should be required; but they never were wanted here, the light division being quite sufficient to sustain any attack the enemy had yet made on them. this, however, showed the provident care of his lordship, and how completely he had penetrated soult's design. this night two or three battalions of the nassau and frankfort regiments came over and left the french. they had heard that the dutch had declared against bonaparte, and wished to be transported to holland, with all their arms and appointments, which they brought with them. we remained in bivouack on the ridge extending between the church and chateau of arcangues all night, our picquets remaining in possession of the houses and hedges at the bottom of the hill, where we stopped the french in the morning. i visited the picquets at night, in company with my commanding-officer, where we found all well, and alert. the next day, there being no firing between us and those in our front, three french officers, seemingly anxious to prove how far politeness and good breeding could be carried between the two nations, when war did not compel them to be unfriendly, took a table and some chairs out of a house which was immediately in our front, and one which we had lately occupied as a barrack; and bringing them down into the middle of the field, which separated the advance of the two armies, sat down within yards of our picquet, and drank wine, holding up their glasses, as much as to say your health, every time they drank. of course we did not molest them, but allowed them to have their frolic out. during the day, also, we saw soldiers of the three nations, viz. english, portuguese, and french, all plundering at the same time in one unfortunate house, where our pie, our pig, and wine had been left. it stood about or yards below the church, on a sort of neutral ground between the two armies; hence the assemblage at the same moment of such a group of these motley marauders. they plundered in perfect harmony, no one disturbing the other on account of his nation or colour. there were a great number of apples in it at the time we left it, belonging to the owner of the house, but when we returned, two or three days afterwards, the desolation was complete. our once comfortable quarter contained nothing now but filth and dirt. one poor girl had remained in it all the while, but she could not save one article; indeed, in such a case it would have been a service of danger to attempt it. at night one of our sergeants played the french a trick. he took with him a few men, and, knowing the ground well, they passed the french sentry unobserved, having reached the house at the top of the field out of which they had brought the table, &c., where their picquet was stationed. he made a rush at their arms, which he found piled in front of the house, and set to work and broke them before the french had time to recover from the consternation into which they were thrown by so unexpected an assault. he and his party then came running off without sustaining any injury. he was a most determined brave soldier this, but afterwards lost an arm at toulouse, and was of course discharged with a pension. on the th, the enemy made a mighty show of attacking our position, having greatly increased their force in front of us, and had, some way or other, found the means of spreading a report in our lines that grenadiers had been chosen to lead on the attack. they also traced out batteries, and cut embrasures, apparently with the intention of burning or knocking down the chateau of arcangues, the owner of which remained in it all this time, and was rather suspected of holding correspondence with his countrymen. it is not unlikely it was by his means the report above alluded to was propagated. every thing now wore a serious aspect, and of course every thing was done to render their attack abortive. all were animated with the best disposition to defend the post to the last extremity; but while the generality believed all these preparations were serious, there were others who thought it only a _ruse de guerre_; indeed, had our friends, the german hussars, (with whom we had often acted in concert,) been here at this time, it is more than probable they would have been strongly inclined to the latter opinion, for they scarcely ever saw the french make a great bustle and noise, as if about immediately to advance and attack, but they would coolly say, after eyeing them awhile, "oh, he not come to-day!" "he go away!" and were generally certain of being right. so full of trick and artifice are our french antagonists, that they generally act in quite a contrary manner to what appearances indicate. but they began to be known; hence the scepticism of some of our people on the present occasion. accordingly, about midnight, when the attack was to have been made, away they went, and retired nearly into their lines, leaving only a few to keep the ground. at daylight next morning we again moved forward, on which there was a good deal of firing between the portuguese battalion that had followed them and their rearguard; but when our people advanced to our old post on the ridge, i, happening to be first, took off my cap, and, putting it on the top of my sword, held it up, which the french taking for a signal of peace, as it was intended, the firing on both sides ceased, each party taking up the post they held previous to the late movements. we wondered why the french had retired, but presently heard a tremendously heavy firing in the direction of the nive. soult, it seems, had withdrawn nearly all his troops from our flank, and marching rapidly through bayonne, had attacked general hill, who commanded on the other side of the nive, with great impetuosity, thinking lord wellington had weakened that force to strengthen us; but here again soult was outwitted, for he found on that side quite sufficient to give him as sound a drubbing as he ever got; the portuguese on this occasion, i understand, performing wonders. these five days' fighting (for on every day there was firing, more or less, in one part or other of the line) were called the battle of the nive. we had had three days' work of it--they on our right two--and sir john hope's people, on our left, four, i believe, and they not trifling ones. in every thing soult undertook, he was completely foiled--all his schemes having been clearly seen through by his more sagacious opponent. indeed he had inflicted a heavy loss on our left wing, commanded by sir john hope, where the fighting had been most severe, but no doubt he suffered equally, if not more severely than they did. i am told that the enemy's light troops were most insolent and annoying to our heavy regiments on the left, on this occasion. what a pity that they could not have been opposed by troops of a similar description! it may be remembered the civil officer of whom i made mention, as having rode away with the greater part of his wardrobe hanging about his horse; he was more fortunate than we were, for the things which he left, his kind landlady took care of, and hid in some snug corner till the business was over, and on his return restored them all to him. he said the cause of his going off in such a hurry arose from a cannon-shot having struck the lintel of the door or window of his house while he was in the act of shaving, on which he bundled out with whatever he could scrape together, and set off. i verily believe it must have been the effect of imagination, for i remained behind him at least a quarter of an hour, and although our houses were close together, i did not either hear or see a shot fired in that direction till we had reached the hill, nearly an hour after; but he constantly maintained that it was so. we again took up our old quarters in front of the church; but oh, how changed were they now from what they had formerly been in point of comfort! nevertheless, they still afforded us shelter from the inclemency of the weather. soon after dark on this evening, a rather unpleasant affair occurred at the left advanced post of our division. an officer and two men coming from the french advance, with what intention is not known, were observed by the corporal who was stationed at our abatis, who immediately took out his rifle and shot the officer through the body, on which his two men lifted him up and carried him into their picquet-house. we were apprehensive this would put an end to that good understanding which had hitherto subsisted between the picquets of the two nations, and much regretted the circumstance. it is more than probable the officer was coming as a sort of patrol, to ascertain whether or not we had left the post, which, being a military undertaking, subjected him to all the chances of war attendant thereon. this is the more probable from his having two soldiers with him armed, as i understand they were; but if it was meant as a friendly visit, as formerly sometimes took place, it was greatly to be lamented; however, they did not, on account of this occurrence, manifest any soreness or ill-will afterwards, and the mutual good understanding continued to subsist between us. while we remain at rest here a short space, i will endeavour to put the reader in possession of the character of the inhabitants, among whom we have been sojourning for a few months past--i mean the biscayans. from the time we crossed the ebro, a wonderful change took place in the appearance of the natives; and i believe the same description of people extend considerably into france, although under another government; they, i understand, still retain their ancient customs, dress, and language; they are denominated basques, from the name of the province, i apprehend, which is called biscay. they speak a different language from either the spaniards, who border them on one side, or the french, on the other; and some of our officers who spoke welsh, said they could understand a few of their words; it is denominated the basque language. they generally wear cloth of their own manufacture, which is commonly blue, in some parts red or brown; in the neighbourhood of pamplona, almost always the latter. the men wear a sort of scotch bonnet, with a short jacket and trowsers, and are an amazingly athletic and active people. the women wear a short jacket also, of the same colour with their petticoat; and with their hair, which they encourage to grow to a great length, plaited in one large plait, and tied with a small piece of ribbon; it is allowed to hang down their back, and almost in all cases reaches to, or below their middle. they wear a handkerchief tastefully disposed upon their head. they are a fine, tall, and handsome race of women; but they have a custom of compressing their breasts, so that they appear as flat in the bosom as the men, which, to an english eye, is not becoming. the women do the same kind of work as the men, that is, they plough, and labour at all sorts of husbandry; but what seemed most remarkable to us, was their sole management of the ferry-boats about passages and st sebastian; they row as well as any men, being amazingly strong and active; they seem content with their lot, and always appeared cheerful and happy. i believe they are strictly virtuous; and although very handsome in general, they did not seem so fond of admiration as the females of many other countries are; upon the whole, i think they resemble the welsh more than any other people with whom i am acquainted; their countries are exceedingly similar, being mountainous, and in general not over fruitful, so that constant labour seems to be rendered absolutely necessary to insure to them the means of subsistence; hence they are industrious and frugal, and, upon the whole, an interesting and moral people. chapter xiii. the author's battalion quartered in aurantz on d january, --the cantonments at aurantz broke up on th february, and the campaign of commenced--farther advance into france--skirmishing with the enemy--military manoeuvres--battle of orthes--defeat and pursuit of the enemy--succession of attacks on them--they are driven from their position in and near tarbes--skirmishing at tournefoile--the enemy retire towards toulouse. on the d of january , we were ordered to quit a part of the country, which, from the various occurrences that had taken place since we first arrived in it, had, in some measure, rendered it interesting to us. we moved a little to the right, and crossed the nive, and again moved in advance about a league or more. this movement was made in support of some operations which lord wellington was conducting in the direction of the adour, which being completed, we returned to the nive, and took up our cantonments in the villages of ustaritz and aurantz. about this time, nearly the whole of the peasantry, who had fled on our entering france, were now returning to their habitations, all fear that we should murder them, and eat their children, having by this time been completely dissipated. indeed we were often told after this, that they would much prefer having a british army among them, to their own people, for they were always haughty, they said, and overbearing, and never scrupled to take whatever they had a mind for, while we were orderly and quiet, and never took an article without amply repaying the owner for it. indeed i am well convinced the change the poor people had made in their lodgers was greatly for the better to them. my battalion was quartered in the village of aurantz, from which we often took a stroll, to look at the scene of our late operations. the french having, in consequence of lord wellington's movements near the adour, strengthened their army in that direction, which of course rendered it necessary they should contract the limits of their front on the side towards spain, they had consequently withdrawn their advance considerably within their former lines. we now also had plenty of opportunity for shooting, but were but ill supplied with fowling-pieces, or we might have killed an abundance of woodcocks, every thicket in the neighbourhood being filled with them. the weather now was extremely bad, and the roads impassable, except by yourself wading up to the knees, or having your horse almost continually nearly up to his belly. in consequence of the difficulty of communicating by dragoons, on account of the roads, telegraphs were established all along from the right of the army, on the banks of the adour, to st jean de luz on our left, the head-quarters of the army. while in these cantonments, an account arrived of our gallant major-general (kempt) having been appointed to the colonelcy of the th battalion of the th regiment, which had just been raised. at the recommendation of my commanding-officer, now major balvaird, the general kindly transmitted my name to the war office for the appointment of paymaster of his battalion; but unfortunately for me, before my name arrived, his late royal highness the duke of york, as colonel-in-chief of the regiment, had nominated another person to the situation. it had always hitherto been customary for colonels-commandant, and not the colonel-in-chief, to nominate their own staff, but on this occasion another rule was adopted, which, of course, was a great disappointment to me, as i had, with considerable trouble, got all my sureties, &c. prepared, although they were now not needed. i had, during our stay here, one or more trips to the paymaster-general for money, for although the paymaster of the battalion had by this time arrived, i had several months' pay still to draw, the army being considerably in arrear in their pay. i had thus an opportunity of visiting st jean de luz, and all the enemy's late fortifications and position in that neighbourhood, and amazingly strong they had indeed rendered the ground in front of that town. it was a considerable and well-built town, partaking a good deal of both the spanish and french character of course, it being the first french town next to the frontier; and, as i said before, there being very little difference between the basques on either side of the bidassoa, the change of countries in respect to inhabitants was not very observable except among the better orders. on the th of february we broke up from our cantonments in aurantz, and commenced the campaign of , crossing the nive at ustaritz, and moving on in the direction of la bastide de clarence. we encamped on a wild heath, without any village or town being near us, and again the next morning continued our route to the place above-named, which we reached about noon, and encamped on a hill beyond it. on the d we advanced to st palais, having passed other villages, the names of which i have forgot, in the intermediate days. nothing, however, of any note occurred in that period. on the d we encamped near la chere and charrette; on the th we crossed two rapid and deep streams of the bidowse. the first we got over with considerable ease,--it was the gave de mauleon, which we crossed at nabes; but the second, the gave d'oleron, was not only both deeper and more rapid than the other, but the passage seemed intended to be disputed with us; some french cavalry having made their appearance on the opposite bank, as we approached the river. the resistance they could offer, however, seemed very trifling, for, on our bringing up some guns to the bank, and a few shots having been fired from them, and from a company of our second battalion, they withdrew. we now prepared to go over; accordingly, every man was ordered to take off his pouch and buckle it on the top of his knapsack, the ford being so deep as to take the men up to or above the middle. on this occasion i had i know not how many of the poor men hanging about me and my horse. some were holding by the stirrup, some by the tail, and others by the mane, or wherever they could lay hold, for the stream was so rapid as to nearly sweep them off their legs. indeed i understand several of those who followed us were actually swept down, and perished. on reaching the farther bank, we found the french had endeavoured to render it impassable, by throwing harrows, &c., with their spikes upmost, in the only places where you could ascend from the river. i believe a trumpeter of the french was all who fell on this day. we passed through ville neuve, and formed in a field beyond the village, till the whole division had got over. it was in this village where the scene between the mother, the child, and some of our officers, took place. when joined and formed, we moved on to a high and ugly common, not far in rear of the village of orion, where we bivouacked for the night. it was most uncomfortable. before we reached our ground this evening, we observed, at a short distance to our left, a body of about french infantry moving on parallel to us, but apparently making all haste to get away in front of us. some suggested the idea of attacking and taking them prisoners; but as they were rather before us, it could not have been done without setting one of the battalions at them in double-quick time, and which would not have been an easy operation, after a long and fatiguing march, and fording two rivers. besides, as our quartermaster-general said, it was certain they could not be far from their support; consequently it would only bring on an affair, which it was not the general's wish to do at that time, for there was none near to support us should the enemy send a force against us. this day general picton's division had a sharp affair at navarreins, where they forced the passage of the gave we had crossed. on the th, we moved forward early in the morning, and on reaching the village of orion, we found that soult had had his head-quarters the night before, with a considerable portion of his army, in and around the village; it was therefore fortunate we did not attack the french detachment before mentioned, for we should certainly have had soult, with all his people, upon our single division. a french band had remained in this village till our arrival, having deserted in a body from the regiment to which they belonged, or they, seeing they could not make their escape, pretended to desert and join our army. we bent our course towards orthes, which was now only a few leagues in front of us. a man brought a cask of excellent wine to the roadside, with the intention of giving every man of the division a drink, but we could not wait, and were consequently obliged to leave the good man's gift. it showed that either good-will or fear had prompted him to this act. i rather think the former was the cause, as he lived some distance from the road. we had not continued long on the march, till we heard a loud and thundering explosion in front of us, which, as it was expected, turned out to be the bridge of orthes, which the enemy had blown up. a short while after we came in sight of the town, and one of our portuguese caçadore regiments being sent forward, a smart skirmish commenced between them and the french, who had been left on and about the bridge to prevent our repairing it. i foolishly went down to see what was going on, and had nigh paid for my curiosity. we took up our ground behind a height which overlooked the town, through which the enemy were passing in large columns. in consequence of this, we got some guns into a field in front of our hill, and commenced a cannonade upon them, which, we could observe, made them hurry their pace considerably. they also brought some heavy field-guns to bear upon us, and fired some shots, but without doing us much injury. throughout the whole of the road by which the french had come before us, desolation and misery marked their footsteps; and in the village of orion, where soult himself had slept the night before, nothing could exceed the despair and misery of the few remaining inhabitants, who told us they had been literally stripped of their all; indeed, they appeared most forlorn and wretched beings, and, as might be expected, poured out the most heavy and bitter complaints, not unmingled with imprecations, on the heads of their plundering countrymen. i went into a poor weaver's house here, where, if i mistake not greatly, the marauders had actually cut the web he was weaving out of the loom, and carried it off with them. we remained on this ground all night, and the next morning his lordship was intently occupied for a considerable time in reconnoitring the enemy's position. at length, as if he had fully made up his mind how to act, he ordered our division to fall in, which was promptly obeyed; then, sending his staff with directions, we were ordered to file to the right, and to move down towards the river, apparently with the intention of crossing a little above the bridge, which had been destroyed. on the other side, immediately opposite what appeared to be the ford, were large bodies of infantry, together with a great quantity of artillery. i recollect my battalion was leading the division, and it appeared at this moment as if we were going to be engaged in a most arduous and hazardous undertaking; for the enemy's artillery would have swept us off the face of the earth before we could possibly have reached the farther bank; however, this was only a _ruse de guerre_, and a most deep-planned and well-executed one it was; for while we were moving down towards the river, a staff-officer came riding, and ordered us all to hide as much as possible from the view of the enemy, by crouching down, &c. as we moved along. it may seem rather paradoxical to be ordered thus to act, at the same time that we wished the enemy to observe our movement; but the fact is, there were probably a thousand eyes fixed on us all the time we lay here, and who watched most closely our every movement; consequently, we could not stir without the enemy being aware of it; and if on this occasion we had made a show and a parade of our movement, it would have been suspected as only a feint at once, as the french themselves, from often practising this stratagem, would have penetrated immediately our object. but our chief went a step too deep for them, adepts as they are in all the arts of this kind; for he made a pretence of hiding from them his movement, knowing well that we were observed; and this completely deceived them. this threat of crossing here was made in order to favour the construction of a bridge about eight or ten miles down the river, and the crossing there by another division, as they were thus enabled to guess where the principal force for opposition would be required. i believe a better planned or more successful stratagem was never practised. but i own, when we were marching down to the river to cross in front of the immense masses which we saw ready to oppose us, i believed that few would survive to tell the tale hereafter. the moment when we were just opening from the covered ground to plunge into the river, we were instantly countermarched with all expedition, and moved down the river at a quick pace till we reached the pontoon bridge which had been so successfully constructed and thrown over at the village of sala. this being now perfectly safe, we encamped at the village for the night. on the morning of the th, we early crossed the river called the gave de pau, and moved forward in the direction of the town of orthes by the great road. on the right bank of that river, when we came within about two miles of the town, we were moved more to our left, ascending the high ridge which runs parallel with the river, and on which the french had taken up a strong position, and were said to be between , and , strong. one division had been ordered to move along the summit of this ridge, on which ran the great road to peyrehourade, and to attack the enemy on that flank, while our division communicated with that and the d division to our right. when the action was commenced, the d division had been directed to ford above the bridge, where our feint had been made the day before, and passing through the town, to attack on the opposite flank, and thus cut off their retreat towards the pau. the enemy's position proved to be exceedingly strong, and difficult of access by us. the action commenced by the th division attacking on the road leading along the ridge, where an obstinate and bloody conflict took place, without our people being able to make any impression. the attack of the d division, on our right, also commenced immediately after; but such was the nature of the ground on this side, being mostly in long pointed ridges, running out like the rays of a star, and which were exceedingly strong, that no efforts were able to force them from this ground. general hill had by this time got over the river, and was approaching the position. my division, having been deprived of two of its regiments, which had been sent, previous to the commencement of our operations this spring, to receive their clothing at st jean de luz, being rendered weak in consequence, it was kept in reserve, as i before mentioned. during this unsuccessful attack, our gallant chief was for a considerable time immediately in front of us, watching with the most anxious care every motion of both armies. he appeared to me to be extremely thoughtful and serious on the occasion, as our troops did not succeed in forcing this stronghold of the enemy. the firing at this time was extremely animated, particularly on the ridge to our left, where great slaughter was made on both sides. and the french having discovered where he and his staff were assembled, opened a smart cannonade on the group, but without doing any mischief, i believe, and without being noticed by him. their shots generally fell about our division, which was formed immediately behind the hill on which he stood. at length, whether from the request of colonel barnard, who was at this time by his lordship's side, or whether by his own direction, i know not, but the colonel was ordered to take on the d and st portuguese belonging to the caçadores, our d brigade, and endeavour to force a passage through the french line, by the gorge of the valley, which lay immediately in his front, and they would thus, if successful, penetrate into the centre of the enemy's position. they accordingly moved up the valley in column of companies, sustaining all the time the most galling and destructive fire, for the enemy were thus on each of their flanks, as well as in front. when they reached within a short distance of the centre height, they formed line, and moving on at a brisk pace and carrying every thing before them, they drove the enemy from the plateau, and thus penetrated into the very heart of their army. this was a most daring and intrepid movement, for although assailed by ten times their force, and nearly surrounded by the enemy, these gallant corps hesitated not to push on, although the very elements seemed as it were to fight against them; for on the brow of the enemy's position the fire had been so heavy and so incessant, that the very furze bushes and herbs of all kinds were in a blaze along the front, through which, with innumerable foes behind it, these gallant men forced a passage at the point of the bayonet. this movement had the effect of at once deciding the fate of the day, for soult seeing his very centre and strongest position carried, which separated between his wings, at once ordered a retreat of his whole force. the remainder of our division were now despatched with all speed in pursuit of the flying enemy, but they never attempted after this to make a stand, and nothing was left for us to perform but to give chase to the fugitives. when we reached the enemy's centre position, we found that every thing had been cleared away which could in the least impede his movements; every hedge and ditch had been completely levelled, so that nothing remained but a beautiful plain on the top of the ridge, except where works of defence had been thrown up. we were not successful in capturing any of the enemy, except the wounded, who had necessarily been left on the field, and we did not lay hold of any of his materiél, except a few guns which he had been obliged to abandon in a swamp below the position. i have related only such things as fell within my own observation, but no doubt many were the heroic and gallant deeds that were performed in this hard contested battle, besides what i have detailed. as might be expected, the gallant d and its supporting corps, the st portuguese caçadores, suffered dreadfully, leaving probably one-fourth of their numbers on the field. but i must not omit mentioning one trait of gallantry which attracted the admiration of the whole army. lord march (now the duke of richmond) had for some time been on the personal staff of lord wellington, where his services had been most efficient. he also was at this time a captain in the d regiment, but from his high civil rank had never served as an infantry officer with his regiment. he was determined to know and practice his duty in every situation, and therefore requested leave from his lordship to be permitted to join his corps as a captain, which was granted of course, and this was his first debut in the character of an officer of foot. it was no doubt a sharp trial; and poor fellow, while bravely leading on the company which his majesty had intrusted to his command, he fell dangerously (then supposed mortally) wounded. this was a noble example to set our young nobility, and they cannot do better than to follow such a precedent. i understand he has been heard to say, "that the chance of a staff-officer being hit in action, is not near so great as that of an officer of infantry, who must quietly brave all that comes against him, while a staff-officer, being well mounted, can quickly get out of danger; and that if a gentleman wishes truly to learn his profession as an officer, he ought to serve for a time in the infantry whilst engaged in operations in the field." this was a most decided, but withal an unfruitful victory, and only tended to establish more firmly the superior skill of our commander, and the superior bravery of the british army. we had heard of the proceedings of the allies in the north, and of a number of the french generals having deserted the cause of their once potent, but now fallen master. and i verily believed that soult had collected his whole force together here for the express purpose of either allowing himself to be surrounded, and thus make a show of being compelled to surrender, or of inducing his whole army to come over at once to the side of the bourbons, but in all these conjectures i was completely mistaken; for whatever may have been soult's faults as a man, he has always shown himself a consistent and an able defender of the cause he first espoused, and as such is certainly respectable. we pursued the flying columns of the enemy for about two leagues beyond the field of action, crossing in our pursuit the river luy de bearne, and at night took up our abode in bivouack, near the village of bonne garde. the night proved extremely cold and frosty, for in the morning when i intended to arise, i found my cloak frozen to the ground. we had no kind of covering. my commanding-officer had taken up his abode in a cottage close by, where there was no bed but what the people occupied. he therefore got into the kneading-trough, in which he slept very comfortably; but in the morning i remember he turned out like a miller. we started soon after daybreak, and continued our march, crossing the small river luy de france. here i remember our assistant quartermaster-general told us what great difficulty he found in obtaining information from the inhabitants as to the by-roads which run parallel to the great road from orthes; for these good people could not conceive why he should be hunting after by-roads of this description, which were generally very bad, while the great road, which was always good, lay so near the line by which he wished to move, not knowing perhaps, or not understanding, that other divisions of the army were moving on the high-road, while we wished to make a corresponding movement on their flank. they would always, however, after directing him how to proceed for a while, bring him again on to the great road, which he wished to avoid for the reason before given. the comfort, and the efficiency of an army in the field depends more, i am persuaded, on the abilities and zeal of officers in the quartermaster-general's department, than on any other branch of the service; for if they are remiss or unacquainted with their duty, the marches and counter-marches, the halts, and the changes of direction, are so numerous and annoying, that the spirits and strength of the troops are soon worn out, and of course dissatisfaction and inefficiency soon follow. but to the credit of the officers of this department at the period of which i am writing, i believe never army possessed more able, more zealous, or more active staff-officers, than we did, and that principally owing to the excellent example set them by the head of this department, than whom a more able conductor of an army does not exist. on one of these occasions when our assistant quartermaster-general had occasion to wait upon the authorities of a village, he jokingly asked them for passports, as is customary in france, to proceed into the country. "ma foi," says the worthy mayor, "you obtained your passports at vittoria, you need no others now." we halted for the night near the village of duerse. in the morning, we forded the adour near a small village, the name of which i forget, and making a long and rapid march, we took possession of the city of mont de marsan, where we found immense magazines of provisions, which had been collected by the enemy. this was the most valuable capture that had been made by the british army since its arrival in the peninsula; for although a great deal of treasure was obtained at vittoria, yet a considerable portion of that fell into the hands of individuals; but this was secured for the benefit of the whole army. the enemy had abandoned the city previous to our arrival, consequently it was a bloodless conquest, which rendered it the more valuable. mont de marsan is what may be termed a fine and an extensive city, containing about inhabitants. the people received us kindly upon the whole, and showed us great attention. here we had superb quarters, and the change from what we had lately been accustomed to, produced a rather uncomfortable feeling; for our clothes and all our equipments so little corresponded with the magnificence around us, that we should have preferred less stately mansions, if comfortable, as more congenial with our respective establishments. but we did not long enjoy our splendid lodgings; for, having secured the booty, we left the city, and returned to the banks of the adour. the march both to and from this city had been along straight flat roads, cut through an immense pine forest, with which this department is almost completely covered. the roads had been for some time much traversed, and having a sandy bottom, were consequently very bad at this season of the year; added to which, a violent storm of snow and sleet assailed us all the march of this day, which made it a rather uncomfortable business. we halted for the night in a village named, i think, st maurice, and the next day were moved into st sever, a considerable town on the left bank of the adour, in which lord wellington had taken up his head-quarters. here we remained some days, doing duty over his lordship, when we crossed to the right bank, and moved up the river, halting at the town of grenade. we next morning continued our route up that bank till we reached barcelonne, a considerable town some little distance from the river, and nearly opposite aire, a large town on the left bank, and near which general the hon. wm. stewart, with the d division, had had a smart brush with the enemy on the day we captured mont de marsan. on the evening of the th we halted at the village of arblade, and, on the th, entered tarsac, where we remained for the night. we were next morning pushed on to a village in front, about a league distant, but were allowed to remain there only for one night, for the enemy now began to appear in our front in considerable force. we were consequently withdrawn, and, passing through tarsac, the division formed in a wood about half-way between that and aire. we expected something serious was about to occur, but, from what cause i know not, the enemy again retreated, leaving a body of cavalry on the road about half-a-league beyond tarsac, to which we again returned and took up our quarters. on the th, as these fellows still continued so near us, although evidently without any infantry to support them, it was determined either to drive them away or take them prisoners. i must observe, our th hussars were at this time occupying tarsac with ourselves, and one squadron of them were selected for this service. the advance of the french consisted only of one squadron, the remainder of their regiment being at some distance in rear as supports; consequently it was but fair that an equal force should attack them. captain hancox's squadron (in which was captain booth, with his troop) was pitched upon for this affair. the remainder of the th were drawn out to support them, if needed, but were not to take any part in the combat. every one of course went out to see the fight. accordingly this squadron moved on to the front, and steadily advanced upon the enemy, who seemed determined to stand the charge, as they put every thing ready to receive our gallant dragoons. when within a proper distance the word "trot" was given, and soon after "gallop," and then "charge," when our fellows dashed in among the french, upsetting them in all directions, and cutting many of them down to the ground. in a few minutes the business was settled, for our people returned, bringing in with them the captain commanding, (and who, i believe, had been personally engaged with captain hancox,) with about twenty-five men, prisoners. the rest made their escape. the french captain, and the greater part of the twenty-five men, were wounded, and some were left dead on the road. i shall not soon forget the little wounded captain. he, i believe, was either a native of tarsac, or somewhere near, and had been determined to show his valour to the utmost; hence his standing, when he ought to have retired; but all the way, as they were bringing him along into the village, and after he reached the house where he directed them to take him, he kept crying out, "i'm as brave as a lion!--i'm as brave as the devil!" and could scarcely be got to hold his peace while the surgeon was dressing him. most piteous moaning was made by many of the inhabitants, to whom it seems he was well known. we understood afterwards that this regiment, the th french hussars, had fallen rather under the displeasure of soult, for some ill conduct on a former occasion, and that they were thus determined to wipe off the stain and retrieve their character; but they would have shown more sense, and have rendered more service to their country, had they retired when they saw it was determined to drive them away. on the th, we again advanced by the road the french had taken, and, crossing the adour at the bridge and village of la row or arros, we pursued our route till we reached the town of st germain's, where we halted for a short space; and thence to plaisance, a good town, where we remained for the night. an unfortunate circumstance occurred in or near this town, which might have produced the most disastrous consequences:--a man, who most likely had been resisting the plundering of his house, was basely murdered by some soldier or soldiers of the division; but although every endeavour was made to discover the perpetrators of this vile act, they could not be found out; but a subscription was set on foot among the officers of the division, and guineas were collected and paid to the unfortunate widow, who, though grieved for the loss of her husband, was thankful for the money. i strongly suspect my friends the portuguese were the culprits on this occasion. on the th we again moved forward, and, passing obrigort, halted for the night at the village of aget. towards the close of this day's march, we both heard and saw smart skirmishing, down on the great road which runs parallel to the ridge on which we were, and from auch to tarbes, along the plain on our right, and passes through vic bigore. near this town the firing was very brisk. we understood it was picton's division driving the french before them. the next morning we started early, and, continuing our march along the ridge of the height on which our last night's quarters were situated, we reached pretty soon the town of rabasteins, where we learnt that the enemy had taken up a position in and near the town of tarbes. we, accordingly, changing our direction, moved to our right, down the road leading from the former to the latter place. we passed on this road the sixth division, which, it seems, was ordered to keep on the flank of the enemy, which, should he make a stand, this division was to turn. when we got within about a mile and a half of tarbes, we discovered the enemy posted on a strong woody height on the left of the road, with a windmill on its highest and most distant point. the whole of our th people were accordingly ordered forward, to endeavour to drive them from this position. my battalion formed the right, the d battalion the centre, and the st battalion the left of our line of skirmishers. we found them covered in front with a great number of light troops, which occupied us some time in driving in, and in which service we suffered considerably, for they occupied the hedges and dikes on the high ground, from which it was necessary we should dislodge them. we had also a considerably-sized brushwood to pass through before we could get at them. at length, after much smart skirmishing, we gained the height, but found the whole of their heavy infantry drawn up on a steep acclivity, near the windmill, which allowed them to have line behind line, all of which could fire at the same time over each other's heads, like the tiers of guns in a three-decker. we continued, however, to advance upon them, till we got within a hundred paces of this formidable body, the firing from which was the hottest i had ever been in, except perhaps barossa. at this moment i received a shot through my right shoulder, which compelled me for a moment to retire; but meeting the main support of my battalion advancing with colonel ross at its head, and finding my wound had not disabled me, i again advanced with him, until we got close under the enemy's line, and took post behind a hillock, which protected us from their fire. we here found colonel norcott, who then belonged to the d battalion, riding about on his large black mare; but he had not ridden long till he also was wounded through the shoulder, from which he still suffers. while we were in this situation, a shot struck a captain of ours in the side where he had his drinking-horn slung; in fact it struck both the horn and his side; but, from some cause, it did not penetrate the flesh, but bruised it sore, which is generally painful. the captain, and those about him, thought he was shot through the body; they accordingly picked him up, and were carrying him off to the rear, when he cried, "stop, let me feel," and putting his hand down to the place, and finding no wound, he sprung out of their arms, and, with the most ludicrous appearance possible, returned to his post again. no one present could refrain from laughing at the ridiculousness of this occurrence, although at the moment the men were falling fast around us. at this time also, a spent shot, one which i imagine had first hit the ground, struck me on the left arm, but did not injure me. i now thought it better to go to the rear to get my shoulder dressed, immediately after which i became quite faint from loss of blood. the firing still continued most animated on both sides; but before an hour had elapsed, the french were driven completely from every position they held on this very strong hill; and as i returned, (after having been dressed, and having swallowed some spirits to remove the faintness,) i found them posting away with all expedition to the plain below, some guns, which had just arrived, giving them an occasional shot, but from which they did not suffer much, they marched with such rapidity. we immediately followed them down to the plain, on reaching which, we perceived a body of french troops coming apparently from the town of tarbes, pursued by the d division, with whom they had been engaged, and which, with some exertion, we thought we could intercept and cut off; but they, perceiving our intention, inclined considerably to the right, and marching with all speed, they got away before us. the enemy now having all retired across the plain, began to take up a strong position on a height at its extremity, towards which we continued to advance; but lord wellington having expected that the th division would by this time have reached their position, and, attacking in flank, have rendered our attack in front more likely to succeed, and they not making their appearance, although it was now nigh dusk, he ordered the divisions here to halt, and bivouack for the night on the plain. i never saw any one more disappointed, or apparently more annoyed by this last order, than our adjutant-general, the lamented sir edward packenham; he was for attacking them at once; but this could not have been done without a great sacrifice of excellent troops, as all those were who now filled the ranks of the british army, having by this time been completely seasoned, and become almost invaluable. in reviewing the operations of this day, i need say little, as facts speak for themselves. the enemy had on the windmill hill, as it was vulgarly called, or more properly the hill of oleac, i believe a whole division, consisting of at least or men, while not a shot was fired by any but by the sixteen companies of my regiment, amounting probably to or men; it is true the other regiments of the division were drawn up in rear of us, and would have supported us had we been repulsed. but it is not so much to the driving away of this so much stronger force, that i would draw the reader's attention, as to the great loss the enemy sustained, and solely from our fire. i believe i shall not be far from the truth, if i state their loss in killed and wounded as equal to the whole strength of our sixteen companies. lord wellington, in his dispatch, mentions the destruction caused in the enemy's ranks as unusually severe; hence the advantage of rifles over the common musket, or else the superior mode of using our arms beyond what is practised in the line. the americans tauntingly tell us, our soldiers do not know how to use the weapons that are put into their hands; and, truly, if we are to judge by the awful destruction which they have occasionally inflicted upon our brave soldiers, we should be led to suspect that they understand this science much better than ourselves. it might, however, be easily remedied, if more attention were paid to the instruction of the recruit in this most essential qualification, and more time and ammunition devoted to target practice; but, at the same time, every officer should be made to know something of projectiles in general, or he will, as at present, be incapable of instructing his men. i will venture to assert, that eight out of ten of the soldiers of our regular regiments will aim in the same manner at an object at the distance of yards, as at one only . it must hence be evident that the greater part of those shots are lost or expended in vain; indeed the calculation has been made, that only one shot out of fired from muskets in the field takes effect, while one out of twenty from rifles is the average. my opinion is, that our line troops ought to be armed with a better description of musket. if five shillings more were added to the price, it would make a great difference in the article, and be very trifling to the public. our army has always been too sparingly supplied with flints, which may be had almost for an old song; but if wanted in the field, nothing can supply their place. many a brave soldier has fallen while hammering at a worn out flint. it is true we can, with the weapons we have, drive any other army out of the field, but not without occasionally sustaining an overwhelming loss, particularly when opposed to the americans; and could we meet them with the same advantages they possess in point of shooting, our chances of victory would be greater, and at less expense. these are my private opinions only, and are deduced from the experience i have had, both as a heavy infantry soldier and a rifleman. i am now firmly persuaded, that of the near shots i fired on the d of october , in holland, not one took effect, from my total want of knowledge how to aim. what an useless expenditure this was of both time and ammunition! much indeed has lately been done by sir henry torrens, to supply the deficiency of which i have been speaking, but still not sufficient, in my opinion, to remedy all the evils attendant thereon. our loss on this occasion was very heavy, being about men and eleven officers killed and wounded; the proportion of officers being nearly double what usually takes place. the regiments which supported us also had some casualties, arising from the shots which passed over our heads striking among them; but they were not considerable. my servants having heard i was wounded, went to tarbes, (where all the wounded were collected,) with my baggage. i should consequently have been very ill off, had not my kind friend and messmate, major balvaird, lent me his tent and bed, as he himself had been ordered on picquet. immediately after nightfall, the enemy had all retired from the position in front of us. we accordingly next morning continued the pursuit, and halted at night at the village of lannemazen, not far from the borders of the pyrenees, towards which, in their retreat, they had been inclined. this day and night, my shoulder had become extremely painful. we started again in the morning; but leaving the pyrenees, we turned our faces more towards toulouse, and took up our abode for the night at a considerable-sized town, called castelnau; here the inhabitants received us very kindly, and we had excellent quarters. however, on the following morning, we were obliged to continue our march, and passing through several villages on the road, halted for the night at l'isle, in dodon. during this day's march, my poor old horse played me a sad trick. he was one which i had been compelled to purchase as soon after i lost my little portuguese one by the bad shoeing of the blacksmith at sumbilla, as i could fall in with one for sale. he was a very tall grey horse, rather old, and whose mouth had not been well made in his breaking; he was withal rather stubborn, or more properly speaking stupid, consequently he did not always obey the rein as he ought. the roads were excessively deep and dirty, and as i was riding at the head of the battalion, and had occasion to pull him a little to one side, for some purpose or other, he either would not, or could not, obey the pull of the rein; and as i had but one hand, he took advantage of it, and sat down completely on his haunches, in the very deepest of the mire. of course i was tumbled right over his rump, and rolled in the mud, and after extricating myself as well as i could, i crawled out, as pretty a figure as may well be imagined. this, as might be expected, raised the laugh of all who saw it, at my expense; but, uncomfortable and ridiculous as my situation was, i was not hurt, the mud being sufficiently deep to protect me from any injury by the fall. in this village i fell in with a frenchman who had just come from toulouse, towards which he understood we were bending our course. he gave me such a flaming account of the "belle position" in the neighbourhood of that town, and of the impregnable works which soult had caused to be thrown up, and of the superb artillery which were stationed there, and which, he said, were those who had served in the famous battle of austerlitz, and of the utter improbability of any impression ever being made on them by an enemy, that if i had given credit to the half of what he told me, i might have been filled with fear lest all our laurels might here be tarnished. from what motive this rather exaggerated statement was made, i know not, but am inclined to think it was merely an inclination to indulge in a trifling gasconade. on the th we reached mont ferrand, where we halted for the night. on the th, in the morning, we were moved forward to the village of tournefoile, where it seems some of our cavalry had been quartered the night before, but who had had their quarters beat up during the night by a body of the enemy, who still held the ground beyond the village. my battalion, and a portuguese battalion, were sent forward, the remainder of the brigade following. we found the enemy occupying the road leading from the village to a bridge about half a mile distant, together with the hedges and enclosures in the vicinity. my people extended to the left, while the portuguese battalion kept on the road. a smart skirmish now commenced, during which the enemy gradually retired towards the bridge; but at this time a most remarkable occurrence took place. one of our men (the servant of a friend of mine) received a shot in the mouth, which struck out several of his teeth. one of these was propelled with such force by the blow that it flew at least twenty yards, and, entering the left arm of one of the portuguese on the road, inflicted a deep and severe wound. when the surgeon of the d, who was the nearest to this man at the time, came to dress the wounded portuguese, he, instead of a ball as every one expected, extracted a tooth, at which, no doubt, both he and all about him were quite astonished; and a report was immediately set afloat that the enemy were firing bones instead of balls. this most extraordinary circumstance was not cleared up till they were informed of our man having had his teeth knocked out, when, after comparing the relative situations of the two men, it became quite evident how this most uncommon wound had been inflicted. if any thing like a joke might be permitted on such an occasion, it may with great propriety be said, the frenchman who fired the shot had killed two birds with one stone. i happened to be near our man at the time, and besides seeing him wounded, i enquired minutely into the circumstances, or i own i should have hesitated before i gave implicit credit to the story; so it may probably be with my reader. poor fellow, he had afterwards nearly all his intestines torn out by a cannon-shot at the fatal attack near new orleans, and where i saw him writhing in the agonies of death; his name was powell, and he was, i believe, a welshman. not long after the commencement of the skirmish, the artillery on both sides was brought into play; but the enemy kept gradually retiring till they crossed the bridge, and as we did not pursue them, they quietly walked off, taking the road towards toulouse. i cannot conceive for what purpose this body of troops had been sent here, unless it was intended as a reconnoissance, to ascertain whether any, and what description, of troops had arrived at this point, as their waiting, after driving out our cavalry, to see whether any infantry approached, would seem to indicate. major balvaird was conspicuously brave on this occasion. the loss on either side was but trifling. chapter xiv. the british army cross the garonne--advance on toulouse--prepare for the attack--the attack--spaniards driven back--battle very hot--french completely defeated--soult evacuates toulouse, and tardily adheres to the bourbons. on the th or th, we were moved forward, and after a short march we reached a beautiful plain, with toulouse appearing most magnificent in the distance. here we went into cantonments, in the different villages and chateaux in the neighbourhood, the greater part of which were completely deserted, and many of them most wofully sacked and plundered, which could have been done only by their own troops. a noble and stately mansion, belonging to a mr villeneuve, stood immediately in front of our outposts, which had shared the same fate with all the others, every article of furniture having been entirely destroyed. the cloth had been torn from the billiard-table, the splendid pier-glasses shivered into a thousand atoms, and, in short, every article of luxury or splendour which a man could wish for, might have been found in this princely habitation previous to its desertion by its owner; but now devastation and destruction had laid its unhallowed hands on all in which its possessor had formerly delighted. i, with my messmates, took the liberty of visiting mr v.'s fish-ponds, where we found some fine-looking carp; and having some hooks by me, we caught a considerable quantity, which we imagined would be a great treat to our messmates; but we found them excessively muddy, and not worth eating. here also we rejoiced in being able to procure some good provender for our still half-starved horses and mules. the grass and cinquefoil which we found in this beautiful and luxuriant plain, in a few days began to make a wonderful improvement in our poor fellow-travellers. i know not a more gratifying feeling than we experienced in thus being able to feed the hungry; for although they were but of the inferior creation, yet so much did our own comforts, and, indeed, efficiency for service, depend on their being capable of performing the task allotted to them, and so much did the circumstance of our having passed through trials and dangers together attach us to them, that i very frequently would have preferred getting them a meal even at the expense of wanting one myself. here my little portuguese horse, which i had originally brought from lisbon, and who had been my companion in all my wanderings, (except when he was left for a while owing to his bad foot,) began to look quite brisk and lively again; for hitherto his spirits had been very low indeed since he happened by his misfortune, and had been literally starved into the bargain. a pontoon bridge having been constructed some distance above the town, and which our engineers had been able to accomplish on account of its being thrown over above the junction of the ariege with the garonne, on the st we moved down towards this point, and crossing it, my battalion was left as its guard in a village on the bank of the river. the remainder of the division, and the ---- division,[ ] moved up the ariege river with the intention of crossing, and thus approaching toulouse in that direction; but, from the heavy rains, the river was too much flooded, which, together with the dreadful state of the roads, these troops were unable to effect this operation, and were consequently recalled. by the d of april the whole had recrossed the garonne, when we again went into our cantonments on the plain, but now farther down the river than before. we remained here a few days, and i cannot help recording a remarkable circumstance which took place at this time. for want of dwelling-houses we had been obliged to put a certain number of the men of my battalion into a sort of wine-house; it was not a vault, for it was above ground, but had a considerable number of barrels of wine in it, amongst which the men were obliged to sleep. it will scarcely be credited, but not one of these men ever appeared the least intoxicated during the whole time they lay there. whether they were completely tired of wine, or whether their having been placed in such a situation produced a feeling of honour and pride among them, i know not, but i verily believe less wine was drunk by these men during the time they remained here, than would have been had they had to pay most exorbitantly for it. with soldiers i believe it is as with mankind in general; what is prohibited always appears more valuable or more pleasurable in our eyes, than what we may with freedom enjoy. on the th we moved down the river till within a short distance of grenade, about twelve miles below toulouse. we halted near a small village, and encamped. a pontoon bridge had been thrown over the garonne here, and one division (i believe the d) had crossed; but now, owing to the swollen state of the river, together with several attempts which were now made by the enemy to destroy the bridge, by floating down trees, &c. which might eventually carry it away, it loosened at the farther end, and the anchors being taken up, the whole was allowed to float down to our side of the river, keeping fast the end next our own bank. we remained in this situation for several days, one division only being on the opposite side, with which it was impossible to communicate, or, if attacked, to afford it almost any support. now was the time for the enemy to bestir himself; for had he marched out of toulouse with half his force, and been met at this place by the force he had at montauban, they must have annihilated this division, or taken them prisoners. it is true we might have rendered them some little assistance by our artillery from the bank we occupied, but the distance was so great that a determined enemy would not have held back from the dread of it. i took a trip from hence to grenade, where the paymaster-general had established the military chest, as i had not yet quite finished my paymaster's duty. it is a good-sized town, but contains nothing remarkable, only here i remember i got some excellent wine of the champagne kind, and which my friend poured out of an immense magnum bottle. i understood our chief was most anxious to have the bridge re-established by the th, which was easter eve, the weather having now somewhat taken up, and the river of course had fallen; but although the engineer thought he could effect it, and had promised his lordship it should be ready by that time, it was not passable till the morning of the th. early on that morning, my division crossed to the other side, together with the th and th divisions, and a whole host of spaniards. i omitted to mention, that these latter gentry, on their entering france, had behaved most wantonly, and had committed numerous atrocities; on which, his lordship, as generalissimo, had ordered them back to their own country again; but upon the promise of good behaviour, and an anxious desire to participate in the honourable achievements of the allied troops, he had granted them permission to rejoin the army, and they were to have a post of honour assigned them at the ensuing battle. such was the current report which prevailed among our army newsmongers: be it as it may, however, they were here in number, i should think, about or . the whole army now present having crossed, except general hill with the d division, advanced upon the town of toulouse. we here found a beautiful country and excellent roads, along which we got on rapidly. the town stands close to the right bank of the river, along which there are numerous quays, and over which there is an excellent bridge, communicating with the suburb on the opposite side, called st cyprian. from the river on the north side of the town runs the famous canal of languedoc, with which it communicates by locks, and which, encircling the town on that and on the east sides, with the river on the west, almost entirely encloses it. on the east side of the town, and just beyond the canal, a considerable eminence arises, forming a sort of chain or ridge, on the top of which numerous redoubts and batteries had been constructed, and which, both from the nature of the ground and by the great labour bestowed upon them, had been rendered, as the frenchman told me, nearly impregnable. the th division, supported by the th, had been ordered to move considerably to the left, and, after crossing the garonne, to attack this formidable position on the outer side, while the spaniards were to attack it immediately in front. my division was ordered to communicate with the right of the spaniards, and, extending down to the great montauban road, was to press upon the town in this direction, in order to aid the attack upon the height before mentioned. the d division joined our right at the montauban road, and extended from thence down to the river, and were ordered to act similarly to us. the d division, under general hill, remained on the other side of the river, and was to co-operate by attacking the suburb before mentioned, together with the works for the protection of the bridge, and for the same purpose of our attack, namely, to keep the troops in these parts of the town employed, while the th division and spaniards attacked the height. immediately in front of our division, we found considerable bodies of troops, at some distance from the town, occupying the houses all along the road, and which it took us a considerable time to drive in. they had also constructed a battery on the bridge over the canal, where the great road passes, and from which they kept up an almost incessant fire. at the hither end of the bridge also there stood a very large convent, which they had fortified in a very strong manner, having loopholed the whole of the surrounding wall, which was twenty feet high, and had also looped the upper part of the convent, which contained a garrison of probably or men. we commenced operations in conjunction with the d division on our right, in driving these people in, and with whom a smart firing was kept up during the whole day. the french had also other troops beyond the canal, and on the moorish or roman wall which encircled the town inside the canal, and both of which they had fortified; so that, had it been intended we should force the town on this side, we should have found it a difficult undertaking: we were, however, merely (as said before) to press upon them without committing ourselves; but unfortunately, in the eagerness of some of our people to push forward, they got immediately under the muzzles of the pieces of the men who were defending the convent, and from the loopholes several of our poor fellows were shot without being able to see their antagonists. a good number fell here; for it was not more than thirty yards distant where they had taken up their post, and an unpleasant one it was as well as dangerous; for they were obliged to stand in a drain which ran from a jakes, and which of course emitted no very desirable flavour; or, if they had left it for a moment, they were immediately shot. our adjutant escaped here as by a miracle, the bole of a very small tree having stopped the ball that would have pierced his body. when, however, we had got them fairly driven in, we had then time to look about us, and the first thing we saw was the don moving on to the attack of the height with all due ceremony. they gained the first or lower ridge without much opposition, and here getting up some artillery, a pretty heavy fire was opened on the enemy; but the french remained quite passive, not offering to resist the approaching spaniards till they got within a certain distance of their works on the top of the hill. the spaniards, elated by having gained the first ridge so easily, pushed on too rapidly, and without having taken time to re-form their columns after the first conquest. they were not aware either that a rather deep ravine separated them from the enemy's works; however, on they pushed, in a very disorderly manner, till they reached the point the french intended they should reach, when a fire was opened out upon them, such as they had never witnessed before. few troops would have remained unshaken by such a reception, but to the spaniards it was intolerable; consequently they broke into a thousand parties, and, turning tail, it was who should be first away from such unpleasant doings. i am told that lord wellington at this moment could scarcely hold his sides for laughing, and cried out he "wondered whether the pyrenees would bring them up again, they seemed to have got such a fright." he did not indeed depend on their valour, or he would have made a bad winding up of his peninsular campaign. the moment they left the height, every man took the way that seemed to him best, and they soon after literally covered the whole plain, and set to work with all expedition to plunder at least, if they would not fight. some of the villains had the audacity to come and take a poor man's horse out of the stable of the very house which we were then, as it were, defending, and had nigh got off with it; but having been perceived, it was taken from them, and restored again to its owner. the left of our division was now obliged to be moved up to fill the space vacated by these vagabonds; and in doing which a good deal of hard fighting took place. this also made the people in front of us rally again, and coming out in great numbers hurraing and shouting, we had something to do to drive them back. but by this time we heard, in the distance behind the hill, a dropping and now brisker fire; by and by, approaching the summit, it became quite animated. we could plainly perceive now the different appearance which the french assumed; they no longer lay supine and passive till their enemy approached their works, but fought for every inch of ground, and all was now animation and bustle among them, hurrying to the support of those troops who defended the redoubts, &c. on the point assailed. the battle now raged with great fury, each party with all their might for the mastery, and the french, we could perceive, when compelled by sheer force to yield ground, did it with the utmost reluctance. at length, we saw the british colour waving on the summit of the hill, with the most deadly warfare raging on each side of it; but every move we saw was in favour of the british. the d regiment had by this time gained possession of the principal redoubt, which they held till their ammunition was all expended, and which the enemy perceiving, or suspecting, again advanced, and gained possession of it. things did not now wear quite so favourable an aspect; but being promptly supported by other troops behind them, a movement was again made in advance, and again the french were expelled from the redoubt. great was the slaughter in and about this place, as i saw next day when i visited it. the enemy were now reluctantly compelled to yield up all those famous works, on which so much time and labour had been expended, and on which they so much relied, and were obliged to abandon (slowly indeed) this long disputed ridge; but they fought till they were fairly forced down into the town, where they still kept up a feeble fire; at length it gradually subsided. this was the principal part of the drama; but it had many subordinate plots. on our right, general picton, with that ardour which ever characterised him, was scarcely well satisfied to play an under part on this occasion; and, instead of merely keeping his opponents in play, as i before hinted, he was for effecting a forcible entry into the town. he accordingly attacked with his division a strong and well-secured battery, near the canal, in doing which his brave connaught rangers, who had scarcely ever hitherto known a reverse, met with a severe and bloody repulse, in which they lost a great number of excellent officers and men. the other corps of his division, who co-operated, also suffered greatly. general hill strictly obeyed his instructions, and, as he always did, effected every object at which he aimed. in this action i had another opportunity of witnessing the effect of presentiment. early in it i was sent forward by my commanding-officer with some orders to a company of ours, which was in front skirmishing, and which had taken possession of a house, which partly screened them from the enemy's battery on the bridge. behind this house, one of the men was sitting on a heap of stones with the most woe-worn countenance possible. he had separated from the rest of the men, and was sitting here apparently ruminating on his fate, and appeared to be quite absorbed in his meditations. i remarked him most particularly, wondering what could render him so different from the rest of his comrades, who were all life and animation, and from what he had formerly been himself in action. he presently went forward with some of the other men, and soon after fell to rise no more. the poor man's melancholy look made a deep impression upon me at the time, together with his fate soon after. thus terminated the battle of toulouse; our troops maintaining the ground they had gained, while the enemy had retired into the town completely beaten. soult seemed undetermined how to act, whether to endeavour to hold the town, (which indeed he might have done for a day or two perhaps,) or to leave it by the road towards the south, the only one now open to him. we rested on the field all night, the enemy sending an occasional shot or shell in the direction of our camp. next morning we still found the enemy retaining possession of the town; and nothing being likely to be done, i rode up with another officer to see the bloody field, with all its redoubts and batteries, and also to see, if i could, in what situation the enemy now appeared. just as we reached the summit, a cry was given by the d sentry, "turn out the picquet." there was a good deal of firing going on in the suburbs nearest to the position, which this highlander thought it right to apprize his people of. we looked a considerable time with our glasses, and observed a good number of troops on a green and open space in that part of the suburbs, and who every now and then would fire their muskets. i thought it must either be a sort of _feu-de-joie_, or a funeral, and it turned out to be the latter. they were burying a general officer, who had fallen the day before, and to whom they were paying the last melancholy honours; but it was conducted in a quite different manner from our military funerals, for they did not fire in volleys like us; but every few minutes apparently a few men only fired, and by and by some others. this had the effect, however, of turning out our whole line in the neighbourhood of the position; and as i was afterwards returning, i met colonel barnard and colonel colborne (than whom there were not two better officers in the army) riding up to see what was the matter. colonel barnard asked me what it was. i told him what i thought it was. he said the whole line had fallen in, thinking it was an attack. towards evening we heard that the inhabitants of the city had been most urgent on soult to withdraw from it; and that he had promised to do so. indeed, had he not, lord wellington might, if he chose, have soon reduced the town to ashes; for the heights we had taken were not yards distant from the city, and completely overlooked it. on the morning of the th, therefore, soult marched out, and was not molested by our troops. he took the road to villefranche and carcassonne, up the canal of languedoc, our cavalry following their track. now all the loyalists came rushing out of the town to meet and welcome us; every one wearing white scarfs or favours to denote his attachment to the bourbons. now all was joy and festivity, and nothing but shaking of hands and embracing was to be seen in all directions. this day also arrived lord stewart from paris with the account of bonaparte's abdication, and of the bourbons having been reinstated. it was also rumoured that soult had received this news previous to the battle; but not being inclined to yield obedience to that dynasty, he had allowed the warfare to proceed. indeed, what almost puts this beyond a doubt, was his still continuing for many days after this to refuse sending in his submission to the bourbon government. we also heard afterwards that the courier bringing the official information of bonaparte's fall, &c. had been detained by the postmaster of montauban by soult's direction; for although he had had private intelligence of the fact, he imagined the detention of the official information might screen him hereafter. such are the surmises of the wise heads respecting this affair, which, as it turned out, is to be regretted; for the sacrifice of so many valuable lives on both sides was a thing of no trifling importance; but i believe soult felt sore at his having been so often worsted, and hoped here in some measure to retrieve his lost honours; for it cannot be doubted, i believe, that he expected to be able to repel our attack at least, if not to force us to retire from toulouse. on the th, the divisions marched into the town; my battalion having the fauxbourg adjoining the lately disputed position assigned to it, and in which we found very comfortable quarters. to show that the french people of this place took lord wellington either for a very generous person, or a great fool, a man who owned a house on the border of the position, and which the french had fortified by loopholing it, and otherwise rendering it unfit for occupation by its owner, sent in a memorial to his lordship, praying him to order that he might receive out of the military chest a sufficient sum to enable him to put his house in its former state; and this, although it had been done by his own countrymen. i suppose his lordship would laugh at it when he saw it. i should have been inclined to be angry with the fellow. the man showed the memorial to the adjutant and myself before he sent it in--a step which of course we dissuaded him from taking. notwithstanding it was notorious that bonaparte's career was at that time finished, soult still made a show of holding out for him; in consequence of which the army was again put in motion to compel him either to send in his adhesion to the new government, or to resign his command of troops who had not now a master. he had taken up a position near villefranche. accordingly, we marched, i think, on the th or th, the which rather alarmed him; and in consequence he despatched count gazan with terms to offer to his lordship, the which, after some alterations, were finally agreed upon, and the army returned once more to toulouse, where we resumed our former quarters. thus finished the peninsular war, the last campaign of which had been the most active probably that is recorded in history. in ten months and a half we had marched from the frontiers of portugal, had completely traversed spain, which we had cleared of its long troublesome and insidious invaders; had penetrated far into the interior of that country, which three years before gave law to most of the continental nations; and had worsted, in various actions, those troops, which, except when encountering the british, had been accustomed almost invariably to conquer. footnote: [ ] some obscurity is occasioned here and elsewhere, by blanks being left in the ms., which the death of the good-humoured and kindly author has rendered it now impossible to fill up.--ed. chapter xv. author's happy state during and --character of the veritable french--british distributed over the country--civility of the inhabitants of grissolles--amusements in quarters--the british prepare to quit france. when i look back on the events of and , i cannot but deem that the happiest period of my life, for i had been actively, and, as i believed, usefully employed. my mind during this time was tranquil, and i was, with a few exceptions, prosperous in my outward circumstances. all those among whom my lot was cast were now sincerely friendly to me, and i believe i may with confidence affirm that i had not (with the exception of the person before mentioned, and who was now far removed from me) a single enemy in the world. it is true my occupation had not been, strictly speaking, of a christian character, but i believed i was fulfilling my duty; hence the peace of mind which i enjoyed. i have since learned certainly, that a christian, to resemble his master, should be more ready to save than to destroy men's lives; but, at the same time, i cannot see why a christian soldier should not be as zealous in the defence of his king and country, as those who are actuated by other motives; and it is certain, i believe, although i once doubted whether there was such a precept, that in whatever calling or occupation a man is in when called to become a christian, that therein he should abide, st cor. vii. , , and . but i attribute the peace of mind i then enjoyed as much to the constant employment which the nature of our services entailed upon us, as to any other cause. be it remembered, i was doing the duties of both paymaster and quartermaster during this period, and my battalion had been as often called into action as any in the army, having been engaged in battles and skirmishes no less than sixteen times in less than ten months. this naturally left little time for reflection. but, above all, i am bound to render thanks to where alone it is due, to that gracious and beneficent being, who not only watched over me during this period, and protected me from harm, but who poured his choicest blessings upon me, even the blessings of a cheerful and contented heart, together with the means of retrieving my sadly deranged finances; for had i not been appointed acting paymaster, i might have gone to prison on my return to my native country, from the unavoidable losses i had sustained, and which i shall mention by and by. another cause of comfort and cheerfulness arose from our operations against the enemy having been invariably successful; for we never, from the time of our leaving the frontiers of portugal, till we took possession of toulouse, met with any thing like a serious reverse. most of my readers no doubt know that the city where we had now taken up our quarters is one of the largest and finest in this part of france; but as it has been so often described, i shall content myself with merely informing my readers, that the people among whom we now resided were truly and veritably french. the character of the inhabitants, since we left our poor friends the basques, had materially changed; that kind, but rude and simple hospitality, which had on most occasions been displayed by those honest mountaineers, had now given place to all that imposing, but less sincere politeness of the real french character. we were, indeed, treated here with every degree of respect; and perhaps more, or at least an equal degree of attention, was paid to our convenience and comfort, as they would have shown to their own troops. we had every reason, therefore, to be perfectly satisfied. in this part of the country there are a great number of protestants, which, of course, permitted us to live on better terms with them than had they been all such stanch and bigoted catholics as we met with in some parts of the continent, and where our heretical presence was frequently looked upon as a contamination; for i remember well in the small village of zalada, where we lay for some time, near astorga, we never left the village, as they supposed, for a permanency, but the joy bells were rung for our departure. it was our lot, indeed, to be frequently quartered in this village, and such was their invariable custom. it is true the padre and people of the place only expressed openly the feeling that was covertly, but universally, entertained throughout spain and portugal respecting us; for although the monks and priests made great pretences of friendship and good-will towards us, while we were upholding them in their iniquitous dominion over the minds of the people, yet secretly they cordially hated us, and were glad when at last our successes contributed to rid their country of both the invaders and their conquerors. one noble spanish lady, (i remember well,) when i was quartered at cadiz, made use of an expression which i am sure would shock and horrify my simple and delicate countrywomen. she said, "she should rejoice to see all the french then in their country hung up in the intestines (las tripas) of the english, who had come to drive them out." thus they should get quit of both. this lady, as might be supposed, was a most depraved and abandoned being, yet even she, it seems, looked upon us in the light of a curse or plague sent upon their country, rather than as a generous and gallant people, who had not hesitated to sacrifice much, both of blood and money, in freeing them from their french oppressors. but such, i fear, is the too general feeling in that country; for while the innumerable religiosos which overrun that nation maintain their cursed dominion over the minds of the other classes, an englishman will always be looked upon by them as a dangerous and hateful being, uniting in himself both the mortal sins, first, of having totally cast off the pope's authority, and being the subject of a free and popular government--than either of which, not even satan himself could be more odious to them. we were not allowed, however, to remain long in toulouse, but were distributed over the country in the neighbourhood, lines of demarcation having been pointed out which were to separate the french and british armies. my division was sent down the right bank of the river, and occupied castel sarazin, grissolles, and castelnau, &c. my battalion was stationed at grissolles. during our stay here i had two or three opportunities, in company with others, of going to see montauban, the seat of a protestant college, and famed in romantic lore. the people were kind and obliging, and showed us every attention; but unfortunately a french garrison was quartered in it, the officers of which took every opportunity of quarrelling with ours. indeed we had no business there, and were consequently obliged to put up with more than we should have otherwise done, for we were strictly forbid to enter any place within the french lines; but we did not conceive that those fellows, who had shown themselves so friendly and polite near bayonne, while we were avowedly in arms against each other, would now turn round upon us when peace was made, and endeavour to engage us in quarrels and duelling. but i believe they felt a degree of soreness at our acknowledged superiority as soldiers, (for even the inhabitants of montauban, where they lay, did not hesitate to express it,) and thus wished to be revenged for the many victories we had gained over them. indeed there was a sort of recklessness about them which is not easily accounted for, unless they supposed their occupation was gone, and cared not what became of themselves; but they did not succeed, i think, in any instance in obtaining their wishes, for they would not fight with pistols, the only weapon which gives each a fair and equal chance, but insisted upon using the sword,--a mode of fighting to which the english in general were utter strangers. the people uniformly gave us warning as soon as ever they learnt that a plot was laid to insult us, on which we generally came away without subjecting ourselves to it; and when their designs became too evident, we refrained from going there. it was only a short distance from our quarters. during our stay here, also, the marquis de pompignan, a gentleman residing between grissolles and castelnau, and where our major-general had taken up his quarters, gave to the officers of the brigade a splendid fête. i know not exactly how to denominate it, for it was a sort of dramatic medley, part of it being performed in the garden and part in the house, where a private theatre had been fitted up; that in the garden, it was said, was intended to represent some military event,--i think it was the burning of moscow, and in which the marquis's beautiful daughter bore a part. this young lady was said to be greatly enamoured of an honourable gentleman, aide-de-camp to the general, who was quartered in their house, and between whom it was expected a match would have taken place. she was extremely beautiful and engaging. we sometimes went a-fishing while we remained here also, but were not successful, there being none other than lake-fish, such as perch, &c., in the neighbourhood, which were scarcely worth taking. here, also, for want of better occupation, some of our young gentlemen amused themselves by hunting and lashing the spanish muleteers as they were returning, after having delivered in their loads at the commissary's stores. they always rode one mule, (sideways, like a woman,) and led one or two more, and were most dexterous in handling the long shank of the halter, with which they sometimes soundly belaboured their pursuers; and had they not been set on by two or three at a time, they would not have liked better fun than to fight one of our gentlemen with his whip, for they saw that it was only for amusement, and generally took it good-naturedly; but our young gentlemen, as they generally do, carried the joke too far, and it was consequently put a stop to. of course none but the young and idle took any part in this exercise. we had, while we lay here, also several little balls and hops; and here, for the first time, several of our young men began to dance quadrilles; in short, there was no want of amusement among this gay and lively people, who are ever intent upon pleasure themselves, and who of course found our wild and thoughtless young fellows ever as ready to second their endeavours to get up something new and entertaining. certainly their morality is not the highest in the world, but their vices are most of them divested of that coarse and disgusting appearance which similar vices carry on their front in england; and thus, while they are generally more pleasing, they are the more seducing, and consequently the more dangerous. however, as no person is compelled to enter into these scenes of dissipation and voluptuousness which they rejoice in, i found it, upon the whole, a very comfortable country to live in. the people were kind and civil, and were always good-natured and polite, and, as we now had plenty of the good things of this world at our command, i spent two months here very contentedly. it is true we had none of those excellent privileges with which my native country abounds, and which i have since learnt highly to prize,--i mean the privileges of the gospel,--the food for the nobler and never-dying part; but i was then ignorant of their value, for although i had been convinced and convicted, i had not been converted. i was still in darkness respecting the way, the truth, and the life, and yet my foolish and carnal mind whispered peace; hence my contentedness in this situation. no! it was not till some years that i discovered that there is but one way to real happiness, but one true foundation on which to build our hope,--even that which is laid in zion. but the time had arrived for us to move down towards bordeaux, preparatory to our quitting france. accordingly, on the d june, we forded the garonne, and stopped all night in grenade, a place i formerly mentioned. we next day reached cadours, a village near cologne, where our d battalion was that evening quartered. in the afternoon of that day, a storm collected in the north, which i think had the most frightful appearance i ever witnessed. it was actually as black as night in the direction in which we saw it. it did not reach us, but it alarmed the inhabitants of our village so much, that they set on ringing the church bells with the utmost fury imaginable. we could not account for this strange proceeding till we enquired of them why it was done. they told us the devil was in the storm, and the bells being holy, he durst not, when he heard them, proceed any farther in that direction. indeed they had ample reason to be in dread of its reaching their village; for the next day, as we passed along the country where it had raged most furiously, the whole face of the country was desolated. it had been a hail-storm such as i never before witnessed. the hailstones were still lying, some of them larger than a bullet; the vines had been all destroyed; the crops of corn completely swept from the face of the earth. trees knocked down, birds killed; in short, nothing could equal the appearance of misery and woe which this awful hail-storm had inflicted upon the unfortunate inhabitants, many of whom were going about wringing their hands in all the bitterness of heart, which a consciousness of being deprived of every hope of subsistence for the year to come would naturally inspire. indeed most of them were literally stripped of their all. on the th we marched into lectoure, a fine town on the river, and famous for having given birth to marshal lannes, one of bonaparte's best generals. it stands on a high ground near the river, and overlooks one of the richest and most beautiful plains i think i ever saw. here i experienced another misfortune in my steed. my little portuguese horse (which was now in high condition, and being an entire horse was apt to fight) quarrelled with a large horse belonging to one of our officers, while i was serving out the billets; and although we were both mounted at the time, the quarrelsome animals reared up against each other, and fought most desperately; but his, being the strongest, pulled mine and myself down to the ground. i luckily fell clear of him, and was not hurt; but he by some accident got a kick in his hind leg or foot, which completely lamed him, and i could not ride him any longer. we passed through condom, another fine town, and nerac, also a good town, and nearly full of protestants. we next day halted at castel jaloux, where i was quartered on a house of religeuse. here my poor little horse was so very ill that i could not drag him any farther. i was consequently obliged to leave him with those good dames, to whom i made him a present, and parted from him in the morning with sincere regret. they promised to take care of him, which i hope they did. we next reached the town of bazas. here there was to be another parting scene exhibited. the portuguese were ordered to leave us here, and proceed towards their own country. the spanish and portuguese women who had followed the men were either to be sent home from hence, or their protectors were to consent to marry them. some adopted the latter alternative, having had children by them, and some others who had not, and the remainder, of course, were compelled to separate. our division drew up in the morning they marched, and honoured the brave portuguese (for indeed they had always behaved well in the field) with three cheers, as they turned their faces towards portugal. many were the heavy hearts in both armies on this occasion; for it is not easy to conceive how the circumstance of passing through scenes of hardship, trial, and danger together, endeared the soldiers of the two armies to each other. it was perhaps never before felt so fully how much each was attached to the other; but the departure of the poor women caused many heavy hearts, both among themselves, poor creatures, who had a long and dreary journey before them, and among those with whom they had lived, and who had shared in all their good and bad fortune; but among these, several on both sides were not oppressed with too fine feelings. a friend of mine, who was an officer in the portuguese service, told me afterwards that the women marched down to spain and portugal at the same time his regiment did; that they formed a column of or strong; that they were regularly told off into companies; and that the commanding-officer, a major, and all the captains, were married men, who had their families with them--all excellent arrangements; but that they were the most unmanageable set of animals that ever marched across a country. the officers had to draw rations for them all the way; but many of them, he says, left the column and went wherever they pleased. few reached portugal in the order in which they started. we reached langon on the th, and barsac on the th june. this latter place is famed for a fine white-wine, something resembling sauterne. the adjutant (who had now been my chum for some time) and i were here quartered in a fine old baronial castle, the inmates of which showed us great attention. a ball was given in the evening to the officers of the brigade. on the th we halted at castres, and on the th entered bordeaux. this was the finest town we had seen since we entered the peninsula, except lisbon and madrid. this town had been occupied by the british for some time, a division of the army having been sent by lord wellington to take charge of it in the name of louis xviii. we were not, however, destined to be quartered in this southern capital of france, but marched right through it, on the road towards the village of blancfort. on the road the division was formed, and very minutely inspected by our gallant chief, who was dressed in all his finery, his orders, and medals, and ribbons, &c., which he wore for the first time that ever i had seen. he looked most splendid indeed, and right proud were we to see him in them. after inspection we moved on to the camp at blancfort, where we found a great part of the army assembled, waiting for the arrival of shipping to carry them off. some had sailed a considerable time before our arrival. besides our tents, the adjutant and i had got a cottage close by, in which our servants and our baggage were put. we had not been here above two or three days, i think, till his two servants, that is, his servant and groom, took it into their heads to desert. this was not the first instance of desertion that had taken place lately; for as we drew near the time of departure great numbers ran off into the interior, mostly bad characters. however, on this occasion, these worthies were determined to have something to carry them on the road, and, without hesitation, broke open their master's panniers, or boxes, and took away all the money he had, which did not indeed amount to any great sum, for it was only dollars, (about l. british,) but it being all he was worth it was a great loss to him. i have reason to be thankful to providence for my escape on this occasion. my paymaster's chest was standing close to the adjutant's panniers when they broke them open, and they did not touch it, although it contained about l. worth of gold. had they taken that i might have gone after them. i of course expressed my thankfulness for this lucky escape, and told several people of it. i fancy some person (my groom, i suspect) overheard me telling what a lucky escape i had been favoured with, and determined in his own mind that i should not always come off so well. the sequel will show: a few days after this i had occasion to go into bordeaux to draw some money from the commissary-general. the amount was dollars, or about l. . as i could not conveniently carry them out to the camp, i requested major balvaird, who had a quarter in town, to allow me to put them in his portmanteau till i had an opportunity of getting them sent out. his servant had overheard this conversation, and made up his mind at once to desert and take this money with him; but providentially again i escaped. i found the means, before night, of carrying it out to the camp, and the major gave it me unknown to the servant. that night he broke open the portmanteau, and, taking every thing worth carrying away, (among which was a gold watch of mine,) deserted, and got clear off. this money, also, had it been taken, would have sorely crippled me, although i might perhaps have overcome the loss. we marched in a few days after, passing through the district of medoc, famous for bordeaux or claret wine, and halted for the night at castelnau de medoc. the next day we passed through chateau margaux, where the best and most expensive of the claret grows, and again encamped at pauillac, from whence we were to go on board. now was the time for the person who had overheard me speaking about my escape with the l. , to make his grab and start off, or he would be too late. accordingly, after dark, he or they lifted up a part of the tent where the box was standing, and, pulling it out, set off with it bodily. but, again directed by providence, i had taken the money out of the box, and given it into the hands of a gentleman, to take care of for me; and there remained in the box my papers and books, public and private, about l. in money, an old silver watch, and, among other things, the half doubloon which poor croudace had given me to take care of for him on the evening previous to his death at badajos, and which i was preserving as a memorial for his afflicted friends. as soon as the box was missed i instantly raised the hue and cry, and, reporting the circumstance to my commanding-officer, he ordered the rolls to be called, to see if any man had deserted; but no, they were all present. i then offered a reward of forty dollars to any one who would bring me the box and papers, and did not regard the money. instantly the whole camp was in a move to find the box, and search was made in all directions. i of course was not idle myself on the occasion; and having a man or two with me, i actually discovered where the box had been opened, for i found the inkstand, that had been in it, lying near a heap of wood close to the bank of the river, into which, after plundering it, no doubt they had thrown it. i now went down to the town and waited on the mayor, offering the same reward to any of his people that would try to find it in the river; but, unfortunately, just as there was the best chance of recovering it, the order came for us instantly to go on board.--thus was i deprived of every document i possessed, both paymaster's, quartermaster's, and private. i had fortunately got my paymaster's accounts made out up to the very latest period, and transmitted to the war-office, or i know not what i should have done; but my duplicates were gone, and when afterwards objections were made to some of the items in the charges, (as is always the case,) i, being unable to answer them, was obliged to submit to the loss of them. i had also several private accounts unclosed, on which i lost considerably, so that altogether i calculate this loss fully amounted to l. , besides the vexation of not having my papers to refer to when wanted. i had been obliged to part with all my remaining animals for next to nothing, for when the french people found we were obliged to leave them, they offered us the most shameful trifles possible, but which we were compelled to take or give the animals away. one i did actually make a present of, besides my little portuguese horse before-mentioned. i made a close calculation, and found that my losses in horses and mules, from the beginning of to june , did not amount to less than l. , besides sums that i lost by officers who died. by one i lost l. , and another l. odd, so that, as i said before, had i not fortunately been appointed acting paymaster, i should have been so much involved, that at this time i durst not have returned to my native country. i do not complain, for most of my losses were sent by providence, who saw best what was fitting and good for me; but never, till the peninsular campaigns, were officers obliged generally to provide and keep up their own baggage-animals, and from the loss of which i had suffered so severely; and i cannot but think that rule, always acted upon till these campaigns, ought to be continued, and that subalterns at least ought to have their baggage always carried at the public expense. chapter xvi. author's battalion embark for england--land at plymouth--expect to be again ordered on foreign service--order received--embark, with other troops, for america--land at pine island. we embarked on the th july on board his majesty's ship dublin, of guns, commanded by captain elphinstone, which took the five companies of my battalion, with two companies of the d. we sailed the next day, i think, and had generally fine weather during our voyage, which lasted till the th, when we arrived at plymouth. she was but a dull sailer, or we ought not to have occupied so many days in so short a passage. during our voyage, as remarkable an instance of heroic fortitude and bodily strength was exhibited by a sailor of this ship as i ever remember to have witnessed. he was doing something on the fore-yard, and by some accident he was precipitated into the water, but in his fall his shoulder came in contact with the flue of one of the anchors, by which it was deeply and severely cut. the ship was going at about five knots an hour, and it took near half an hour before she could be brought round and a boat sent to his assistance; and notwithstanding the severe cut he had received, from which the blood was fast streaming, he not only contrived to keep himself from sinking by buffeting with a heavy sea, but actually stripped off his jacket in the water, as it seems it had been an encumbrance to him. when the boat reached him, the poor fellow was nigh exhausted, and a few minutes more would have deprived the ship and the service of an excellent sailor, but having been got into the boat, he was brought on board more dead than alive, where every attention being paid to him, he soon afterwards recovered. we landed at plymouth on the th, and occupied one of the barracks. we did not exactly know what was to become of us. kent being our regimental station, we expected to be ordered to march and join the left wing in that county, but were still kept at plymouth, where we met with great kindness and attention from the inhabitants in general, who are upon the whole, i think, an excellent and a moral people. we also fared sumptuously here, every description of food being both cheap and good. fish in particular is most abundant and excellent. in short, we were here as comfortably and as well quartered as we could desire, and every thing tended to make us perfectly satisfied with our lot. we relaxed by attending the theatre occasionally, which is one of the best provincial ones in the kingdom, and at this time could boast some very good actors. there were a variety of other amusements, such as fishing, &c., which of course we indulged in occasionally. from hence i was called up to london to meet our colonel, the hon. sir w. stewart, to arrange our battalion concerns, &c. for the few latter years of hurry and confusion, and which was at last got done to the satisfaction of all concerned. here also we began to replenish our wardrobes, which, it will easily be imagined, were not the most magnificent in the world on our first arrival. but we were not long permitted the enjoyment of english society or english comforts, for we had scarcely been a month at plymouth till we received an order to prepare again for foreign service, and the nature of that service being kept a profound secret, we scarcely knew what necessary articles of equipment to prepare. the general opinion, however, was, that our destination was some part of america, consequently we endeavoured to meet all contingencies by preparing both for a warm and cold climate. all hands of course were vigorously set to work, in order to be ready when the summons arrived, which we knew might be very soon expected. an alteration was made in the arrangement of our battalion. the staff was ordered to proceed to join the other wing at thorncliffe, which of course included myself, but major mitchell, who was now appointed to the command of these five companies, was anxious to take me out with him in the capacity of acting paymaster, and to his friendly and earnest endeavours, added to the kindness of captain james travers, who had at first intended to apply for that situation himself, but renounced it on my account, i am indebted for again having an addition of s. per diem made to my regimental pay during the continuance of service on this expedition. at length the order arrived for our embarkation, and on the th september, just two months from the day of our arrival in england, our five companies were sent on board his majesty's ships fox and dover, both frigates of the smaller class, and which had been prepared for the reception of troops, by having a part of their guns taken out, and being, as it is termed, armed "en flute." the commanding-officer, with the staff and three companies, were put on board the fox. we laid in an immense sea stock of provisions, &c. not knowing how long we might be on the water, but unfortunately for us we had scarcely put foot on board, when the order was given to weigh and proceed to sea forthwith, so that no time was given for the stowing away of all the stock, which had cost us about l. per person; the consequence was, a great part of it was lost or destroyed, from its being knocked about the deck in the midst of the confusion and bustle consequent on the crew and the soldiers (strangers to each other) being set to work to weigh anchor and make sail in such a hurry. little assistance was afforded us from the ship on this occasion. we thus lost nearly the half of what we had been at so much pains to provide; but such things being common occurrences in a life like ours, it was therefore vain to fret. the force that embarked at the same time with us, consisted of the d highlanders, a company of artillery, some rocketeers, a squadron of the th light dragoons, without horses, and our five companies, the whole under the command of general keane. the good people of plymouth, as is customary, cheered us as we left their shore, wishing us the most ample success and good fortune, and which we, who had for so long a time been in the habit of conquering, did not for a moment admit a doubt of being fully realized. we sailed, as i said, on the th september, and stood down the channel with a pretty fair breeze, till we reached what are commonly called its "chops," where we encountered adverse winds, and blowing a succession of gales (equinoctial, i imagine) which detained us beating off and on for seven days. this was as uncomfortable a beginning of our service as could well be imagined. high winds, with rain, and contrary to the way we wished them, were certainly rather trying to the patience of us landsmen, and there was something in our situation on board this ship which did not at all tend to alleviate our discomfort. in fact, we wished our fortune had placed us on board a transport rather than where we now found ourselves. all the discipline and strictness of a regular man-of-war was enforced, without any of the countervailing comforts and conveniences usually found on board such ships; and to such a length was this carried, that because our officers sometimes stood on the quarter-deck, holding on, in the rolling of the ship, by the hand-ropes which surround the companion, not only these, but the ropes which were stretched to prevent people falling out at the gangway, were ordered to be removed, that nothing should remain by which lubbers like us might hold on in the heavy rolls to which the vessel was subject in gales like those i have been describing. we were no less than twenty-four people in the cabin, twelve of our officers and twelve gentlemen of the commissariat department, so that we were sufficiently crowded, besides being in several other respects ill provided. but all this would have been borne with cheerfulness and good-will, had we not experienced such a total want of kindness and urbanity from a quarter where we least expected it, and from which that unkindness could be made most effectual. we lost the fleet during the continuance of these gales, but sealed orders having apprized our commander where to rendezvous, we made sail for the island of madeira, which we reached on the th october, and where we found the fleet. some of the wags of our other two companies on board the dover, pretending to think we must have been cast away and lost, had erased all our names from the army list as defunct. this rather annoyed some of our folks, but it might have been easily seen it was only a little waggery in which they had been indulging themselves. a day or two before we reached madeira, we fell in with a strange sail, to which we gave chase, and brought her to; she proved to be an english merchant brig. it was said our commander wished to have a little independent cruise, which caused him to part from the fleet, and that there was a famed american privateer called the wasp that had made a great number of captures, and which he was anxious to fall in with that he might take her. had such a thing occurred as the wasp appearing in sight, and we had given her chase, i could have compared it to nothing but to a vulgar simile which i have sometimes heard used, that of a cow endeavouring to catch a hare, for indeed she was, i believe, one of the fastest sailers that had ever been known, while we, on the contrary, were in comparison just like the cow to the hare. this also must have been a piece of waggery on the part of those who first set such a report afloat, for no man in his senses would have ever thought of chasing privateers with the fox frigate at the time of which i am now writing. i regret i did not go on shore on this beautiful island, the town and scenery of which were most inviting, but as our stay was only to be so very short, it was scarcely worth while. we sailed again on the th, after having first got a cask of excellent madeira wine from the house of messrs gordon and co. this was the best, i think, i ever drank. we stood almost due south, passing pretty close to teneriffe and the other canary isles, until we fell in with the trade-winds, when we kept more away towards the south-west. our voyage now became delightful, for a gentle and refreshing, but constant and steady breeze, carried us on at the rate of about five or six knots an hour, without having occasion hardly to alter a sail or rope. we passed to the tropic of capricorn on the th october, when our sailors prepared to indulge in the same innocent but amusing ceremonies that are adopted on crossing the equator. neptune, with his amphitrite, got dressed in full costume, and every other appendage being ready, it only now remained that the commander's sanction should be obtained to their commencing the imposing ceremony; but no! his godship was dismissed in no very courteous manner, and told to go and attend to his duty. thus the fiat of a greater than neptune, even in his own element, reduced him from the godlike rank he held to that of a mere forecastle sailor; and thus were all our expectations frustrated. in all the other ships of the fleet the amusement was carried on with the greatest good humour, as we could plainly perceive with our glasses. on the th, we passed pretty near the isle of st antonio, the westernmost of the cape verde isles, and then bearing off still rather more to the west, we kept our course generally at about or north latitude, and in this manner crossed the atlantic. from the time that we had entered between the tropics, we had seen numerous shoals of flying fish, some of which, when closely pursued, (by the dolphin generally,) actually fell on board our ship. a very accurate drawing of one of these was made by one of our lieutenants, a friend of mine, who, i believe, has it to this day. they were generally about the size of a herring, and much resembling that fish in shape and colour, with two fins projecting from behind their gills, nearly as long as their body. these are their wings, with which they can fly generally for , or , or sometimes yards, when they fall again into the water. we also caught a dolphin about this time, our carpenter having harpooned it from the bow of the ship; but i was considerably disappointed in finding it did not exceed from twenty-four to thirty inches in length; and the hues of it, though beautiful when dying, by no means answered my expectations. on the ---- november, we made the island of barbadoes, and anchored in carlisle bay, off bridgetown, the capital of the island. it is not easy to describe the effect which is produced on an european the first time he beholds the beauties of a tropical country, and which, i think, he does in the greatest perfection while they are yet distant from him. robertson's description of columbus's first view of a west india island is, i think, as correct and as beautiful as any thing can possibly be; and his feelings for the moment (heightened indeed by the circumstance of his having at length attained to his long-looked-for western india) will describe pretty nearly what every one must feel, who has not before beheld the productions of a tropical climate. but oh! how is the scene changed when you get on shore! nature indeed is still beautiful and rich beyond the conception of a northern native; but man--how fallen! here (i think i shall not far err if i say) you behold man in his lowest state: the savages of the woods are, in my opinion, much higher in the scale of being than those whom our cursed cupidity has introduced to all our vices, without one alleviating virtue to counterbalance the evil. but how could the poor africans learn any thing that is good from those who do not practise good themselves? one of our people while here said, "he thought the men were all rogues, and the women all unfaithful." of the slave population the latter is certainly a correct description, almost universally, in bridgetown; for, with shame be it spoken, their masters and mistresses calculate upon their worth as if they were brood-mares, by the number and the description of wretched beings which they can bring into this world of misery. what indeed could you expect from those who can thus act, and those who sanction such conduct, but the like treatment that mr shrewsbury met with, if you endeavour to show them to themselves or to others in a true light? while the strong man armed keepeth his castle, his goods are in peace; but let another endeavour to bind this strong man, and take his goods from him, and oh, what a resistance may not be expected! let the west indians have slaves whom they may treat as cattle for their own gain and profit, even if it be at the expense of the souls of the poor wretches whom they thus destroy; but endeavour to show these degraded human beings that they are capable of being raised to a level with their unfeeling and avaricious masters, and you may shortly expect the fate of a smith or a shrewsbury, so regardless are these dealers in human flesh of their duty as men who must soon render an account of all their actions. it may be said, that i saw little, while here, but the very worst of society, and this may in a great measure be true; but it is evident that such things were done and sanctioned at bridgetown when i was there, in , as led me to pray that my lot might never be cast among such people. i now gladly turn from this scene of vice and misery, and pursue my narrative. in the bay at this place a hulk was stationed for the reception of prisoners of war. our boats usually passed pretty near it on going on shore for water. a number of americans were on board as prisoners. on one occasion, or more, i believe, they called out to our fellows as they passed under her stern, "so you have come out from england to attack our country, have you? i hope you have brought your coffins with you, for you will need them before you return." and, in truth, many of those fine fellows to whom this insolently coarse but patriotic speech was addressed, did indeed require coffins before the business we were going upon was finished. we left barbadoes on the ----, and, passing down through the midst of the islands, we left st lucia on our left and martinico on our right hand. we also passed close to dominico and guadaloupe, with several smaller islands which i do not recollect, and, keeping to the southward, passed st christopher's, santa cruz, porto rico, and st domingo, having a fine view of the whole as we moved delightfully along. this latter large island took us more than two days in passing; but on the st we came in sight of jamaica, the chief of our west india possessions. we stood off and on near to port-royal till the d, when we made sail to the westward, and on the th came to anchor in negril bay, at the extreme west end of the island of jamaica. here we found several sail both of men-of-war and transports, having on board the troops which had been engaged in the operations against washington and baltimore, &c., and consisting of the th, st, th, and th regiments, with some artillery. they were not strong indeed, having been considerably reduced by their late arduous services; but their numbers, added to ours, we thought quite sufficient to enable us to make a descent upon the american coast, near new orleans, which it was now whispered was our destination: indeed this had been conjectured from the time we left england, but nothing certain was known, and even now it was not officially made public. a day or two after our arrival here, two of the west india regiments also joined us, the st and th, at least a part of both; so that we now mustered a respectable force. admiral sir alexander cochran commanded the naval part of the expedition, he being here on our arrival on board the tonnant ; several smaller vessels also, with stores, &c. &c. joined us from port-royal. when the whole were collected together, we felt proud of our fine force, which we vainly imagined nothing we should have to encounter could withstand for a moment: but the battle is not always to the strong; and we were shortly after painfully reminded of this truth. but i must not anticipate,--evil always comes early enough. during our stay here, i went on shore for a few hours, and visited some of the farms or plantations. indeed, while we remained, the place where we landed was generally like a fair; for the inhabitants had assembled in great numbers, bringing with them live stock and poultry and vegetables, &c. for sale, all of which were greedily bought up at prices high enough, i warrant you. the vegetation at this place was most luxuriant, even in this the middle of winter almost; but i apprehend this was the finest season of the year, for it was not at all intolerably hot, and every thing, had the appearance which our country assumes in the height of summer. an accident occurred whilst we continued here, which had nigh proved serious. the alceste frigate, one day, in shifting her berth, run with her head right on board the dover, where our other two companies were on board. she cut her up from the stern into the cabins, not less i am sure at the top than ten feet. two of our people were in the cabin at the time playing at backgammon, and were not a little astonished to see the prow of another large vessel tearing its way right into the very place where they were sitting. on the th, signal was made to weigh, when the whole got under way, and started in fine style; our now gallant fleet covering the ocean for many miles. we kept along on the south side of cuba, and on the d december made cape st antonio, the westernmost point of that large island. from hence we now stood to the northward, crossing right athwart the gulf of mexico. during our stay at barbadoes, we had purchased a live sheep and a pig, as we feared our stock might run out before we landed. the sheep was productive of great amusement to our messmates, at the expense of the poor caterer. in all hot climates, i believe, the wool of the sheep becomes in course of time more like the hair of a goat than what it really is. this was the case in the present instance, most of our people declaring they would not eat of such an animal, which was, as they conjectured, a sort of mule bred between a sheep and a goat; while the poor caterer was like to have the sheep thrown on his hand. this produced many a bickering, even after it was known that such was the case in warm climates; for they kept up the fun as long as possible, always trying to keep the unfortunate caterer in hot water about it. the sheep was killed, and produced excellent mutton--not fat indeed, but eatable. we were not so fortunate, however, with our pig; it appears it must have been diseased--what, i believe, is usually termed measly. it was dressed without this being known, and eaten; and the consequence was, all the twenty-four of our mess, except myself and another were literally poisoned. in the middle of the night, when it began to take effect, the most distressing scene took place imaginable, and the medical men were kept busily employed for a considerable time afterwards preparing and administering emetics, which providentially had the desired effect on all, for in a short time the whole recovered; but had medical assistance not been promptly administered, the chances are some of them would have suffered. its effects were something like cholera morbus, working both up and down in the most violent manner. on the th december we made the american coast off mobile, where we fell in with a vessel, on board of which was colonel nichols of the marines, with three or four indian chiefs of the creek nation, to which people he had been for some time previously attached, they being then at war with the americans, and consequently our allies. they came on board our ship, and were shown every thing curious; but their reason for visiting us was, that they might see our rifles, for they considered themselves good shots, and wished to examine our arms, with which they did not express themselves over-satisfied, as they had been accustomed to see no other description of rifles than those used by the americans, which are both much longer and heavier, but carry a much smaller ball. indeed they had never seen any military rifles, but only such as the above, and which are constructed solely for the purpose of killing deer and other game. the gallant colonel endeavoured to amuse us a little on this occasion with the wonderful feats of his protegés. he told us, that they being generally very short of balls, were always very careful how they expended them in hunting; and that their rule was never to fire at a deer, until it was in the act of passing between them and a tree, that, should the ball go through its body, as it sometimes did, it might lodge in the tree on the other side, and they would then go and pick it out, and recast it. we thought he ought to have told that story to his own corps the marines; for i believe he did not get many of us to give implicit credit to so wonderful a tale. they were most grotesque-looking figures; most of them were dressed in some old red coats, which they had got hold of by some means, with cocked hats of the old fashion. these i believe had been given them by some of our people, for they were english manufacture. but they had tremendous large rings, &c. hung in their ears, the laps of which were stretched nearly to their shoulders; some of them also wore rings in their noses; and some of them were without any sort of lower garments, having nothing but a sort of cloth tied round their waist, which passed through between their legs and fastened before. these people it was intended should bring their warriors to join us near new orleans; but, owing to some cause with which i am not acquainted, none but these three or four chiefs ever came near us. on the th we anchored near the chandeleur islands, at the entrance into lake ponchartrain. but it was discovered that the americans had some gun-vessels, which, on account of their drawing only little water, had been stationed in this lake for its protection, and on our appearance had retired nearer to new orleans. it was necessary that these should be previously disposed of in some manner, before the disembarkation of the troops could with safety be effected. none of our ships could follow them on account of the shoalness of the lake. an order was therefore issued for all the men-of-war to prepare their boats for an attack on these vessels, the chief command of which was given to captain lockyer of the sophia gun-brig. on the morning of the ----, they therefore assembled for this purpose, and pushed up the lake in search of the gun-vessels, which were discovered moored near some islands called by the natives, "les isles malheureuse," or the "unfortunate islands," and which form the entrance from lake ponchartrain into lake borgne, or blind lake. no time was lost in attacking this formidable flotilla, consisting of vessels carrying from five to six guns each, and commanded by a lieutenant of the american navy, named by them commodore jones. a most determined and gallant resistance was made by the americans; but superior numbers, with equal, if not superior courage and seamanship, prevailed, and in a short space of time the whole were captured. both the commandants were severely wounded, with a great number of officers and men killed and wounded. nothing could exceed the gallant intrepidity, i understand, with which our boats advanced to the attack; for, from experience i am well convinced, the fire from those gun-vessels must have been most destructive; for better shots, either with artillery or small arms, do not exist than the americans. orders were now issued for the army to prepare to land; but the distance, from where we had been obliged from shoal water to stop to the town, being so great, it was determined to form a sort of depot on a small island, near the mouth of the pearl river, called pine island; and farther to facilitate the transport of the troops, small brigs, &c. were sent as far up the lake as possible, into which the troops were put successively from the larger vessels, and from which they generally took their departure for the above island. on the th our people left the fox, and were moved up the lake into one of the brigs before noticed, where we were packed in as tight as herrings, there being near men on board a little thing scarcely calculated to contain the fourth of that number, and where there was not literally room to lie down. but, on the th, we were relieved from this rather close confinement; and being put on board of long boats, we pushed off for the island, which lay at a considerable distance, notwithstanding the measures that had been adopted to shorten our voyage. the weather proved extremely rough and unpleasant, which rendered our trip neither over-safe nor comfortable; and to mend the matter, the seamen on board our boat were rather in the wind, and did not manage her so well as was desirable; for, poor fellows, they had been engaged in this fatiguing service for several days, (a considerable number of the troops having been previously landed,) and were consequently the more easily prevailed upon to indulge when grog came in their way. our middy too was quite worn out with fatigue, and slept nearly all the time we were on board. our boat was several times on the point of being swamped, for the water came in quite plentifully on occasions of her being laid down by sudden squalls. another boat, which accompanied us, had her mast carried away. we landed on the island before mentioned in the evening, and of course looked out for the best shelter we could find. but it was a complete desert; nothing but reeds grew on it, except a few stunted and scrubby bushes at the lower end of it. it came on a most severe frost during the night, which i understand caused the death of several of the sailors, who had indulged perhaps a little too freely, and had lain down without any covering. some of the poor blacks also, i understand, suffered in consequence of the severe cold, a thing with which they were totally unacquainted, and against which they were ill provided, having nothing but their light and thin west india dress to keep it out. it was laughable the next morning to see them examining so intently the ice which had been formed on the pools near our bivouack. they could not conjecture what it was; some of them asserting it was salt; while the greater part were totally at a loss respecting it. i had by great good luck got into a sort of hut belonging to some of the officers who had previously landed; but i do not remember in all my campaigning to have suffered more from cold than i did this night, and was extremely glad when daylight appeared, that i might be able to move about. chapter xvii. proceed to attack the enemy, and capture one of their picquets--advance in search of a bivouack--alarmed by shots in front--fired on by an american schooner--captain hallen severely attacked--manoeuvres on both sides--ruse of the enemy--fighting continues--enemy repulsed at all points--courage of the british--a british battery brought into play--activity of the enemy. by the st, the whole army had been landed on this island, when they were told off into brigades, and inspected by the general. during our stay here, about five or six french americans, (the natives of new orleans, or neighbourhood,) arrived as friends, and told us that there were scarcely any troops in the district; so that we had nothing to do but to land on the opposite side, and march right on to the town, and that the inhabitants would welcome us most cordially, and that no resistance might be expected. i did not, i confess, put much confidence in their information, and believed at the time, that they came more as spies than with any view of befriending, as they pretended, our cause. more correct information was obtained from spanish fishermen, who had been following their occupation at the mouth of a creek on the new orleans side of the lake, and who had come across, i believe, at the suggestion of major peddie, our assistant quartermaster-general, who had been despatched to find out a suitable landing-place for the army. from one of them, i learned afterwards that there were troops in the town, commanded by general jackson, and that a battery of two guns had been erected on the road, by which we must advance. what they told the general, i do not know, but fancy he saw no reason to alter his plans, from the information of either party. every thing being ready by the morning of the d, the advance guard, commanded by colonel thornton, and consisting of the th and th regiments, with two light three-pounders, some artillery and some rocketeers, accompanied by a few artificers to repair bridges, &c. embarked on board the boats, that had been assembled for the purpose--two companies of the d followed us; these troops occupying the whole of the boats that could be mustered in the fleet, consequently the remainder of the army had to remain where they were till the return of the boats. the distance was not less, i should think, than from thirty to forty miles. we pushed off about two o'clock p.m., the wind being favourable for a considerable part of the way, but it failing, the men were obliged to commence with the oars. we were completely wedged in, so that there was no moving, let the call be ever so urgent. i suffered much from a severe pain in my side, from being obliged to remain so long in the same position; but we endeavoured to divert the tedium in the best manner we could by amusing stories, &c. my luck placed me on board the bang-up, a fine cutter belonging to the admiral, and commanded by a countryman of mine, a lieutenant foster of that ship. we did not reach the mouth of the creek, or bayou, as it is called by the natives, till a long time after dark. as we approached it, some light boats were sent forward with captain travers of ours and his company, to endeavour to surprise a regiment of the enemy, which we knew were stationed in some huts at the mouth of the creek, and which huts belonged to the spanish fishermen before mentioned. from the information they gave, the best arrangements possible were made for effecting this; for travers, moving silently on, and landing his men at the opposite ends of the hamlet, there remained no way of escape open for the troops in the houses. as soon as all was ready, they rushed forward and secured the whole picquet without a single shot being fired, with the exception of two men, who preferred venturing into the marsh, in rear of the huts, where it is not improbable they perished. the duty was conducted so quietly, and so expeditiously, that very few of the other troops knew any thing of the matter; but this alone secured us a landing without opposition, for had a firing been begun on either side, it must have alarmed the american army, who, no doubt, would have used their endeavours to oppose our landing. we soon after began to enter the creek, but such was the darkness of the night, and the shoalness of the water, and such the uncertainty of the way by which we had to proceed, that very little progress was made during the remainder of the night; daylight, however, enabled us to move forward at a brisker pace, but from the obstacles that had presented themselves in the dark, the squadron of boats was sadly dispersed; and when we reached the head of the creek, only two or three of the light boats, with the staff and naval officers, had arrived, and considerable intervals of time elapsed between the arrival of the different boats with troops; so that had the enemy been aware of our intention, and had they had a force of a few hundred men hid in the high reeds which grow in this marsh, they might, i am persuaded, have cut us off in detail, for from the causes before mentioned, no two boats were sufficiently near to assist each other. we got on shore about an hour after daylight; and right glad was i to be enabled to stretch my legs, which had been kept motionless for the last sixteen hours. as soon as the whole advance-guard had landed, and a few planks had been thrown over a deep rill which we had to cross, we moved forward towards the high ground, captain travers' company leading; and, in order to magnify the appearance of our force, should any concealed american be looking on, we extended our files to double the usual distance, and thus passed through a wood which skirted the swamp, and which it was necessary to traverse before we could reach the open country, which we did about six miles below new orleans. as soon as our advance cleared this wood, they observed a good-looking farm onstead, towards which they moved in double quick time, and arrived just in time to seize and make prisoner a monsieur villerey, a major of the militia, just then setting off to join his people. we heard (but i will not vouch for the truth of the report) that a considerable body of the enemy had been assembled on the high-road, near to monsieur villerey's house, but on learning that we had landed, and were moving rapidly forward, they separated, one part retiring towards the town, while the other went down the river. our advance now moved on with celerity, and dashing on to the different farm-houses in the neighbourhood, seized several groups of arms at each of them, which it seems had either been abandoned by the troops to whom they belonged, or had been collected there for some military purpose. they captured at some of these farm-houses to the amount of twelve or twenty stand; and in all not less than fifty. monsieur villerey unfortunately contrived to make his escape, through the too great leniency of one of our lieutenants. i think the most probable opinion respecting the arms and the troops assembled near monsieur villerey's is, that it was the militia of the district just at that moment assembling, which will not only account for the arms being found in such numbers, (under the verandas of the houses,) but also for monsieur villerey himself being then on the point of setting out in his warlike costume, and the number of men which were observed near his house. about twenty militiamen were also captured in and about these houses. except there, the whites had all abandoned their houses; but a considerable number of black slaves remained at each, whether of their own accord, or left to protect the property, and occasionally convey information to their masters, i know not. as soon as our advance had sufficiently reconnoitred the adjacent houses, &c. the whole of the troops moved on past the house of monsieur villerey, and turning to the right, followed the great road to new orleans for about half a mile, till a suitable piece of ground presenting itself in the neighbourhood of some other farm-houses, the whole turned in to a green field a short distance from the road, and forming into close columns of battalions, commenced bivouacking for the night. the road ran partly on, and partly alongside of the river dike. immediately between the troops and the river, this dike was perhaps about three feet high. on our right was a farm-house, and a little to the right and front another--the latter a pretty large one--all these, and indeed all the farm-houses in this neighbourhood, are surrounded at one end by the huts of the slaves, and generally on the other by barns and other out-buildings, and in the rear a garden or orchard. the ground in all this country, which is perfectly flat, apparently of alluvial formation, is divided into fields, &c. by wooden paling of the common description, very few hedges being to be seen. the situation in which the troops were placed, was as follows, viz. the artillery and rocketeers in one line; immediately behind them, my battalion and the th, in close column; the th in rear of us, and the d two companies in rear of the th; the whole in close columns. the men, as soon as dismissed, instantly set about cooking, for they had had nothing from the morning before, and it was now considerably past mid-day. captain travers' company, which had formed the advance-guard, still remained in front as a picquet, and occupied a post on the great road, about a mile in front of the division. about three o'clock p.m., we were all alarmed by some shots at the advanced picquet; and, on enquiry, found that an american staff-officer, escorted by about thirty cavalry, had come galloping down, no doubt for the purpose of reconnoitring us; when within distance, our people instantly fired, one of which shots wounded the staff-officer, and another killed a horse, but they contrived to get him off. this caused the whole of the troops to fall in till the cause of alarm was ascertained, after which they set about their cooking again with great glee. considerable discussion now began to take place amongst the knowing ones, as to the merits and demerits of our situation, in point of security; and of course various opinions were given on the occasion. one officer of ours, a particular friend of mine, did not hesitate roundly to assert, that we were in a most unprotected and dangerous situation. i do not remember exactly the reasons he assigned; but certainly, could he have foreseen what yet remained in the womb of time, he would have had much stronger reasons for his opinion. another company of ours, (captain hallen's,) and one of the th, were ordered to prepare at dusk to relieve the picquet in advance; and as i messed with captain hallen's company, i accompanied it on this duty. i did not go with the main body of the company, there being no house at that post, but with one section, commanded by lieutenant forbes, and we occupied a small house to the right, and a little to the rear of captain hallen's party, which was stationed on the great road. the company of the th occupied the large farm-house before-mentioned, a little to the right and front of the column. i had purchased an excellent turkey on our arrival at monsieur villerey's house, which we had dressed at this little house, and made a most hearty meal indeed, after which we took each a tot or horn of grog to comfort us. we had not long finished our comfortable meal, when we were astounded by the report of heavy ordnance, apparently close to the bivouack of the column, and which reports followed each other in quick succession. a cheer was also given, but by whom, or what the occasion of the firing was, we were totally at a loss to conjecture. i at first imagined it was some of our men-of-war that had been able to pass the forts down the river, and that they were firing a salute and cheering in consequence; and yet this seemed a strange conjecture; but we did not long remain in suspense, for we were soon after informed of the real state of the case, that it was a large american schooner, with at least fourteen guns, and which she had been enabled to bring to bear upon our unfortunate bivouack with the most deadly precision, great numbers having fallen at her first broadside. the troops of course dispersed in some measure, leaving their fires, which had too well served as a direction for the fire of this terrible schooner. but the time was not far distant when we should have other enemies to encounter; for by the time the schooner had fired a dozen broadsides, a noise was heard in our front; and just at this moment an american was brought in by a man from captain hallen's post, who had foolishly come right into the centre of his picquet, and asking if they could tell him which way the regulars had gone. this showed that he was a young soldier, who did not know our troops from his own; but it also showed that the regulars which he was seeking could not be far distant; consequently, every thing was got ready to give them the best reception possible; but as the people we had heard in front of the post where i then was appeared to be rather to our right, i feared lest they might get unawares upon the company of the th, which was stationed in the farm behind us. i consequently set off with all dispatch to give them timely warning, but when i arrived there, i could not find the officers, nor could i see where the picquet was posted; i therefore thought they must be on the alert at the bottom of the garden, which lay in the direction in which we heard the noise; and meeting here an officer and several of our men, who had moved in this direction, from the fire of the schooner, i told him i was certain that hallen would be shortly most vigorously attacked, from the information i had learnt respecting the regulars, and advised him to collect all the men he could, and proceed forthwith to reinforce him at the advance. this he instantly did, and it was well, for by this time the firing had commenced in volleys at that post. i then returned to the picquet-house, where i had previously dined, and found the officer was going round his sentries; but as the firing was going briskly on at hallen's post, i expected every moment to be attacked here, and began, in the absence of the officer, to post the men as advantageously as the nature of the ground would admit. the house stood on a little path, or bye-road, running across the country, from the river towards the wood, and which, before he could get into, the enemy would have to clamber over a railing which lay on the side from which they were advancing. on the hither side of the road was a ditch, with a hedge, almost the only one to be met with, and a little copse of small trees. into this copse i put the men, extending them along the inside of the hedge, which would not only keep them from the view of the enemy, but be some little protection from their fire, and would leave them the more at liberty to retreat when overpowered by numbers, as it was certain they must shortly be. but all my labour was in vain, for when forbes came from visiting his sentries, he did not approve of my disposition, but took them all out, and formed them on the open road, without any cover, and with a hedge and ditch in their rear, both of which they would be compelled to pass the moment the enemy pressed upon him. i felt annoyed, not only at his want of courtesy to me, but that he would thus expose his men to almost certain destruction, without being able to effect any thing against the enemy, or at all check his advance. i accordingly left him in a huff, and went again to try to find the picquet of the th in the house behind us. i was determined to make a more close and thorough search than i had done before, and for this purpose went over the gates, &c. into the yard behind, when lo, i found myself within a yard or two of a strong body of the enemy, which had got into the garden at the lower end, and were just advancing to the house. i crouched down, and hid in the best manner i could, and luckily was enabled to creep off without their discovering who i was. just as i reached the outer gate, i found a sergeant of ours there, to whom i said, we must set off with all possible speed; and accordingly we both took to our heels, and ran like heroes; the noise of which brought the fire of twenty or thirty rifles after us, but luckily without effect. i now made the best of my way towards where i judged the main body of our people were, on the great road, in order to inform colonel thornton of what i had seen, of this column of the enemy having got possession of the house and garden i had just left, and by doing which they had nearly separated the advance picquet from the main body. he said he had sent two companies of ours, and two of the th, to the house immediately in the rear of this i speak of, and in a short time afterwards they and the americans came into close contact, for they immediately commenced firing; and where as strange a description of fighting took place as is perhaps on record. the enemy soon discovered from some men, whom they had unfortunately taken, what the regiments were that were opposed to them--and with all that cunning which the yankees are famed for, instantly turned it to the best account--for in several places they advanced in bodies, crying out at the same time, "come on, my brave th!" or "my brave th!" and thus induced several of our small detached parties to go over the rails to them, supposing they were some of our own people, when of course they were instantly made prisoners. this _ruse_ did not always succeed, however, for some of the parties turning restive on their hands, refused to surrender, and thus a fight hand to hand took place, and in which they generally had the worst of it. on one occasion of this kind our people made a body of them prisoners. the men and officers being requested to lay down their arms, the officer, after surrendering, when he saw there were not many of our people, drew a sort of dirk or knife, and made a stab at the officer of ours who had taken him. we instantly cried out to the men near him, one of whom took up his rifle and shot the villain through the body. they had before this time brought two of their regular battalions close in front of our advance, which did not consist of more than men, and were pouring in dreadful volleys into that small but gallant detachment; but even in this they showed themselves young soldiers, for they formed up the two battalions in line at about forty or fifty yards in distance from the post, and gave the words "ready--present--fire," with all the precision of a field-day; but being so near, of course every word was heard by our people, who, at the critical moment, always took care to cleave as close to the ground as possible, by which they escaped most of their shot. they then up and at them, and, pouring in a desultory but most destructive fire, brought great numbers of them to the ground. their force, however, was too great to be opposed successfully by such a handful of men, and these brave fellows were at length compelled to yield a little ground; but it was not more than just to enable them to cover themselves, and form again in proper order; and from this time all the efforts of these two battalions were unable to remove them. indeed, not long after, our people became the assailants, and, advancing again, retook their original position. poor hallen was severely wounded on this occasion, and lost about forty of his men. two or three naval captains came also to see the fight at hallen's post, one of whom soon fell severely wounded. the other, the gallant captain of the dover frigate, with whom part of our people went out, and with whom we all came home, behaved most nobly. whenever the enemy had fired their volley, he cried, "now, my lads, up and give them another broadside!" and thus contributed, by his animating conduct, to inspire all around him with confidence. poor forbes just met the fate that i expected. he stood upon the road, and opened his fire upon the enemy as they approached; but they being perhaps more than twenty times his number, he was instantly compelled to give way, after being himself wounded, having his sergeant killed, and losing nearly the half of his men. the schooner all this time kept up a most galling and incessant fire. some attempts were made with our light three-pounders, and with rockets, and even with small-arms, to compel her to sheer off, but they were all in vain. her men, protected by her stout bulwarks which surrounded them, defied all our efforts, and continued to pour in both round and grape wherever they judged, from the direction of the fire, our people were stationed. luckily the darkness of the night rendered her fire less destructive than it would otherwise have been. a considerable body of the enemy had penetrated to the house immediately on the right of our original bivouack, where the firing was kept up between them and the parties opposed to them with great spirit for a long time; but the general, having detached the th regiment to form line a little to the rear and right of that house, completely secured that flank from being farther turned. notwithstanding this, the skirmishers of both armies extended to the wood, some of whom we found lying the next morning almost touching each other. the firing now began to slacken, the enemy having been repulsed at all points, and, towards three o'clock in the morning, it had completely ceased, when they retired, leaving us in possession of the warmly-contested field. my battalion had been extremely unfortunate in this action; for almost at the very outset, when the attack on hallen's picquet commenced, major mitchell, our commandant, had taken a party of about twenty or thirty men, and advanced for the purpose of supporting that post. between the bivouack, however, and the point he intended to reach, he unexpectedly fell in with a large body of americans, (for it was so dark he could not distinguish who they were,) when both himself, and all the men he had with him, were made prisoners. the loss of our five companies in this action was about men; that of the th more, i believe; and in all, i think, it amounted to about men. the loss of the enemy must have been considerably greater, if we are to judge from the number of dead they left on the field, and, which is a good criterion, the general average being about ten wounded for one killed. nothing could equal the bravery of the few troops we had in the field on this occasion. their numbers certainly did not amount to men; while the enemy could not have had fewer than from to . they had two regular regiments, the th and th; they had a large corps of irregular riflemen from kentucky, and another stronger corps from tennessee, with all the militia of new orleans and its neighbourhood, every man who is able being compelled to bear arms in case of invasion. they had about irregular horse, whether militia or not i cannot tell, but think it likely they were in all at least men--with the great and effectual assistance of the schooner, which did us more mischief than men could have done, probably not so much by the loss she occasioned us, as, by being able to fire on our flank, and even in our rear, she rendered the enemy the most essential service, besides the fire of the ship on our advanced picquet. we were thus completely surrounded on three sides, and had not the troops behaved with the most determined courage and intrepidity, we must have been driven back, and eventually the greater part would have been taken prisoners; for the path to the water was quite narrow, and even should we reach the head of the creek where we landed, the boats had probably all left it by this time to return for the other troops. indeed it was reported afterwards, that the arrangements of general jackson were such, that we were to have been attacked in the rear at the same time as in front, and by the schooner; but the troops for that purpose either not being in readiness, or being too distant to arrive in time, were too late to take part in the action, but arrived about three o'clock in the morning, when they met with a half-drunk artillery-driver of ours near mons. villerey's house, as he was returning from the field, and who, seeing a large body of men, which he took for some of our other regiments that had landed, cried out to them, "come on, my lads, for the yankees never got such a licking in their lives!" this, it is said, had the effect of frightening them back, without proceeding farther. i will not vouch for this being fact, but such was the report the next morning; and indeed it is feasible, from the number of people (apparently going with orders, &c.) which we saw galloping down on the other side of the river in the afternoon; and it is certain that a considerable body of militia must have resided down the river, setting aside the report which i mentioned, of some troops having retired in that direction in the morning, when we first advanced; and nothing would have tended more to our complete overthrow than such an attack on our rear, could it have been accomplished. i might here mention, that captain hallen saw the schooner as she passed his picquet, on her way down from new orleans, on which he instantly despatched a man with the information; but she having the current in her favour, sailed much quicker than the man could run, consequently his information came too late. i omitted to mention also, that a large ship of guns came down the river at the same time with the schooner, but being less manageable than that vessel, she had anchored abreast of hallen's picquet; and that he had to sustain her fire, as well as that of the troops in his front, during the whole of the attack of the d. she remained at that spot without moving. i will here also notice another circumstance which took place at this post. an american rifleman fell into the hands of some of captain hallen's people, who, when he was brought in, were desired to take his arms from him. these he seemed reluctant to part with, and said to the officer, "recollect i shall hold you responsible for that rifle, if you take it from me!"--on which the officer took hold of it by the muzzle, and flung it right into the river. i daresay the poor fellow thought they were a strange sort of people he had got amongst; and i doubt not he had set a great value upon his rifle. another officer and myself had a providential escape the next morning, for we had scarcely left a little wooden hut, behind which we had taken up our abode, and slept for a few hours after the fight, when bang comes an eighteen-pound shot right through the house, just at the very spot where we had a minute or two before been sitting. it seems the captain of the schooner, which still lay abreast of us at about yards distance, and from which this shot had been fired, was determined we should not occupy any of the houses in the vicinity, for, beginning with our hut, which was nearest to him, he fired into every house within reach of his guns, although he saw as plainly as we did that most of them were filled with the wounded; nay, he carried his savage cruelty so far, that he actually fired on a party of the th as they were removing one of their wounded officers. it could not be pleaded that he did not know what it was, for, being only half-a-mile distant, and much elevated above our level, with a glass he could see as well as we could what they were doing, for they were carrying the poor fellow on a bier, on their shoulders. he continued this cruel work all the next day, the ship also giving us an occasional shot. one shot which he fired went through the front of a house in which some of our wounded men were lying, and, striking low, it carried the knapsack out from under the head of a man of ours named rayour, which he had put for a pillow, without doing him the smallest injury. i could not credit the story till i went and actually saw the hole by which it entered, the knapsack and the shot lying near the fire-place. after this i went to view the house where i had fallen in with the column of the enemy the night before, and where the th were now stationed; but the fire of the schooner still continued, one shot from which we saw was directed towards us. it fell right in among the th, and, striking a corporal about the breach, as he was endeavouring to get out of its way, it passed out at his breast, on which he gave himself a sort of shake, and fell lifeless to the earth. nothing could exceed the great annoyance this mischievous schooner continued to be to us all that and the next day, for they not only saw every thing we did, but we could not move in any number without being saluted with an lb. shot, and we had no means of retaliation. but during the th, efforts were made to get up some heavier guns from the fleet, and every thing having been settled as to the plan, &c., a battery was constructed as close to the water's edge as possible in the river dike, and a number of gun barrels having been collected from those broken, &c. during the late fight, a sort of furnace was erected for the purpose of heating shot, with which it was determined to give her a salute the next morning. every thing succeeded admirably. the battery was constructed, embrasures cut, and shot heated, and all ready by daylight on the morning of the th; of course we were all looking out to witness the effect, and most noble it was, for when the guns opened out upon her, the people on board seemed quite thunderstruck, and although they attempted to return our fire, it was only like the blows of a man beat blind by his antagonist, for her shot fell in every other direction but that in which she should have thrown them. however, they could not stand to fire more than one round, as our hot shot rendered their situation very soon untenable, and taking to their boats, they made their escape to the opposite shore with all expedition. the distance from the battery to the schooner had been so accurately measured by major blanchard, who superintended the construction of the work, that almost every shot and shell penetrated the hull of the vessel, and in a short time after her crew had left her, she broke out into a blaze of fire, which soon reaching the magazine, she blew up with a loud explosion, to the great comfort and joy of all our army. this of course deserved and obtained three as hearty cheers as i believe were ever given by britons, and no doubt the americans were greatly chagrined at the loss of their fine and exceedingly useful vessel. a shell or two were directed towards the ship, but she having seen the fate of the schooner, got out her boats, which, taking her in tow, she set off up the river in all haste. could a battery have been constructed to fire upon her at the same time, it would have saved us some hard knocks afterwards. she, however, effected her escape, and we now remained in peace for a few days at least. on the th, sir edward packenham and general gibbs had arrived; the former immediately assumed the command, and they both set off to the front to reconnoitre the enemy and the kind of country around us. every night since our arrival the enemy had been incessant in their means to harass and annoy us, as in truth they had a right to do if they pleased, but it was exceedingly distressing to the troops, and therefore i mention it. they seldom let an hour pass during the night, that they were not firing at some of our out sentries, and on some occasions they brought the body of irregular cavalry, before mentioned, immediately in front of our outposts, and fired volleys, which, although it did not do much injury to our advanced picquets, had the effect of turning out the whole line, and that often repeated, with the annoyance from the schooner, certainly did not leave us much time for comfortable rest. they frequently lay in ambush for the reliefs of our sentries also, and patrols, and fired upon them sometimes with effect. in short, they did all they could to annoy and weary us out, but of which we ought not to complain, as they were defending their own country, and allowances ought to be made in such a case that would not be tolerated in an army having no interest in the soil. i trust englishmen will be equally zealous and bitter to their enemies should our country ever be invaded. chapter xviii. british army told off into brigades--advance, and are hotly received--heroism of a young artillery officer--we take up a fresh position--the enemy work incessantly in raising an extensive breastwork--two batteries erected, from which our heavy ship artillery are brought to bear against it, but without effect--the enemy also place their ship guns on batteries--colonel lambert arrives with the th and d regiments--preparations for a grand attack on the enemy's lines, which entirely fails, and the british are repulsed with great loss. the remainder of the army all arrived during the th, and were put in bivouack in an oblique direction, with their front to the late field of action, their right thrown back towards the wood, and their left towards mons. villerey's house. the d formed line in advance at an angle of the wood, as a sort of outpost, while the th and ours were stationed in and around the house, to which i have so often alluded, _i. e._ where i fell in with the column of the enemy. our advanced picquets remained the same as before the action. if i might here be permitted to hazard an opinion, i should say that had we advanced upon new orleans the morning after the fight, i think there is little doubt we should have been successful; for when an irregular and undisciplined body of troops once meet with a reverse, it is difficult to bring them into action again with that steadiness and determination which they often evince in their first essay. i understood general jackson had some trouble in keeping them together after their defeat on the night of the d, and the only mode in which he could get them to form was, in planting the first who retired in line near the road, and as each successive detachment arrived from the fight, they were made to form on their left, the whole line sitting or laying down for the remainder of the night. it is easy to perceive that they would have been quite unmanageable should they have been seriously attacked, while their spirits were depressed by their recent failure, and as the works which we afterwards encountered did not then exist, at least only in part, i think they would have retired after a very slight resistance indeed. i had the information as to the manner in which they formed, from some of those who were made prisoners, and who witnessed it. all this, however, is merely the opinion of a private individual, who judged from appearances only, and it is not in the nature of things probable that i should be able to form so correct a one as those who possessed more ample information. after the arrival of the two general officers before mentioned, the army was told off into brigades as follows, viz. the st brigade, commanded by general gibbs, consisted of the th, st, and th british, and th west india regiments; the d brigade, commanded by general keane, consisted of the th, d, and th british, and st west india regiments, (observe, the west india regiments had by this time become exceedingly reduced in point of numbers from cold and hardship, which they seemed unable to bear, and very soon after almost ceased to be regiments, so many of them were sent away sick;) the artillery was commanded by colonel dickson, an excellent officer; the squadron of the th light dragoons not being able to get mounted, formed the guards at the hospitals, and at head-quarters, &c. every thing having been previously arranged on the morning of the th, we advanced in two columns, the right near the wood commanded by general gibbs, and ours on the left by the great road near the river, commanded by general keane. the enemy had all along kept possession of those farm-houses which lay at some distance in front of our picquets. they were consequently driven from these as we moved forward, which we did, i should imagine, to the distance of about three miles, their picquets retiring gradually before us. we here discovered that the enemy had thrown up a strong field-work, which extended from the river to the wood, and which consequently shut up every avenue to our farther advance, without fighting. we also found that their numbers had considerably increased, as we could perceive by the immense bodies of troops behind their works. as we pressed upon their picquets as they retired, we got a shot or two at them with our field-guns; but every thing remained quiet within their lines till we had arrived within about yards of them, when they opened out on the head of our columns as destructive a fire of artillery as i ever witnessed. one shot struck in the column of the th, which knocked down two officers and about ten men. my battalion was leading, and being partly extended skirmishing, they did not offer so fair a mark for artillery as a solid body, and consequently escaped this. the ship also, which was anchored a little in advance of their work, opened her broadside on the columns on the road at the same time. our gun and howitzer, the only two pieces we had there, endeavoured to return the fire of the ship, but without doing her much injury. when the fire was found to be so galling, the troops were moved off the road into the fields on the right, and my battalion advancing about paces farther, was ordered to lay down in a sort of ditch which was there, and to shelter themselves the best way they could. the th and d formed also more to the right, and secured themselves as well as the nature of the ground would admit. it was only intended as a reconnoissance, consequently the troops did not advance farther, as soon as the nature of their position was ascertained. it appeared to be a high dike of casks, formed as a breastwork, with a considerable quantity of artillery mounted on it, and with a sort of canal or wet ditch in front of it. of course, all this took some time to ascertain, during which they kept up an incessant cannonade, both from their works and from the ship. the latter poured in an immense quantity of large grape, which rendered the situation of those exposed to it extremely unpleasant. our two fieldpieces were very soon silenced by the superior fire of the enemy, and in an hour after our arrival at this point, there was not a man left with them but the officer, who was quite a youth, but yet stood as steady as if he had been on a common parade, although all his men were knocked down about him. i never witnessed more devoted heroism than this fine young man displayed. one shot, nearly towards the last, struck off his sergeant's head, and sent his cap spinning over a ditch, where another officer and i had taken up our post. some rockets were also tried from this point, both against the ship and the enemy's works, but those directed against the vessel flew quite wide of the mark, and totally failed. some of those fired into the works, we saw pass over the heads of the men posted in them, but whether they produced any effect we could not see. the enemy either had set fire to the houses near us before they retired from them, or they had fired heated shot with a view of producing that effect; but we had not been long here ere the whole of the houses in the neighbourhood were in one grand and terrific blaze of fire. i do not exactly know what was done on the right, for we could not see distinctly for some trees which grew in the garden of the farm in that direction, but imagine they encountered something similar to ourselves, as the play of artillery from the enemy's line in front of them was equally unceasing with that in our front. not a man showed himself out of the enemy's works. when every thing was ascertained that could be, the troops began gradually to draw off, but this was obliged to be conducted in a very cautious manner, or the loss from their fire would have been severe. the d retired first, by separate wings, afterwards the th, but ours did not leave their ground till after dark, when, i believe, some of the yankees began to advance in a rather triumphant and bullying manner, but were taught to keep at a respectful distance by a few shots well laid in among them. a party of sailors had been sent forward to bring off the two fieldpieces, there being no artillerymen left to do it, and we had no horses. they undertook and accomplished this task most cheerfully and effectually, without a man hurt i believe. the loss of my battalion on this occasion was not great. the army now took up a fresh position in which to bivouack, at about a mile and a half distance from the enemy's line, but which they could easily reach with the shot and shells of their larger pieces. the head-quarters were removed from monsieur villerey's house to a large farm or chateau behind our new lines, and which were formed in the following manner, viz.:--the th and th composed one line, with their right near the wood. the st formed on their left, but with an intervening space between them. the th and d formed one line on the left of the st, with an interval between their line and that regiment. this latter line was rather in an oblique direction, with its front towards a farm-house in advance and to the left, and where my battalion was ordered to take its station. this latter post was more exposed to the enemy's shot than any of the others; it being a good deal advanced, and being close to the river, the guns from the opposite shore ceased not firing on it, generally with hot shot. the men were put into a sugar house belonging to this chateau, the floor of which being sunk a little below the surface of the adjoining earth, protected them wonderfully; but on occasions they had their very cooking utensils knocked off the fire by the enemy's shot, in consequence of the exposed situation of this house. the acting quartermaster and myself being deemed civilians, and having no inclination to be deprived of our natural rest at night, as long as we could be allowed to obtain it, took up our abode in one of the outhouses at head-quarters, which we found unoccupied, and where our respective duties could be carried on with as much facility as if we were in the same house with the battalion, the distance between them being only about half a mile. here, also, the sick and wounded were brought, where they could enjoy more comfort than in the sugar-house, till an opportunity offered of sending them down to the shipping. to secure our front a little more, and to protect the troops against the shot from the opposite shore, a redoubt was thrown up about half a mile in front of the right, and pretty near the wood; while batteries and breastworks were constructed on the road, to fire on any vessels of the enemy which might come down the river. these latter were principally constructed of hogsheads of sugar, which were found in the sugar-houses of the different plantations in the neighbourhood. but nothing could have answered worse than they did for this purpose, the enemy's shot going quite through them, without being at all deadened almost by the resistance they offered. in front of the left also, inside the road, a breastwork was thrown up, which secured the persons of a corps of marines and sailors, who occupied that part of the line. this body was, soon after the th, landed from the fleet; and the latter, having brought small arms on shore with them, acted as a small battalion. it is evident the enemy must have worked incessantly, from our first landing, to complete the work they occupied; for, from the information i before mentioned, as given me by one of the spanish fishermen, it is clear they had only two guns, mounted on something like a battery, on the great road. but now that work extended even into the wood, a distance of at least three quarters of a mile, and at this time there could not be less than ten or twelve pieces of heavy ordnance mounted on it. we were told by the slaves who had remained in the houses, that the ditch behind which they had constructed this work was a sort of small canal, which the gentleman who owned the property used for the purpose of transporting the produce of his farm from thence into the river. from this time we could plainly perceive great numbers of men continually at work upon it, mostly blacks, of which they would, of course, have abundance; but their white people also (the army, we conclude) were constantly employed upon it. we could see distinctly that they were widening and deepening the canal in front of the work, and raising the parapet to a considerable height. it was now determined to try what our heavy ship-artillery would do against this work. accordingly, the greater part of the army were employed in bringing up these unwieldy machines, and to effect which required no slight power and perseverance, as we had no means of transport but the sheer strength of a number of men combined, to drag them successively through the deep soil. a sufficient number of them having been brought up by the st, strong working parties were employed all night in erecting two batteries, as near to the enemy's works as they could with safety venture, and getting the guns, carriages, and ammunition, &c., into them. these were formed principally of casks, &c., filled with earth; and i am not sure that some sugar hogsheads were not used on the occasion. however, at daylight on the morning of the st jan. , the whole of the troops were ordered under arms, and moved forward to nearly the same points they occupied on the th ult. this morning there was an extremely thick fog, which greatly favoured our movements, the americans being, i believe, totally ignorant that any alteration had taken place in the situation of our army. as soon as the fog cleared away, our artillery opened out a tremendous and thundering cannonade upon the enemy's line, which so completely astonished them, that there was not a shot returned for twenty minutes at least, so little did they expect heavy artillery there. nay, we heard afterwards that a great number of the irregular troops were so alarmed, that they actually quitted the lines without orders, and were posting off to new orleans, and were with great difficulty brought back again. as soon as they perceived, however, that nothing more than a cannonade was intended, and that our troops did not advance to the attack, they commenced gradually with their artillery against ours, the fire of which increasing as their confidence increased, they were not long in silencing our guns, and in dismounting some of them. the fact is, our works had been thrown up in such haste, that they were not nearly so strong as they ought to have been made, had there been more time; the consequence was, their shot penetrated into every part of our works, and caused us not only considerable loss in artillerymen, (with one officer killed,) but, as i said before, actually dismounted a great many of our guns. this consequently entirely failed of having the desired effect; but with such a very favourable opportunity as this morning's fog presented, together with the alarm and terror with which the enemy were struck on opening our artillery upon them, there is not the most distant doubt that we should have at once got possession of their lines, had we but advanced to the attack. it is true, we were not prepared for passing the ditch, having no fascines or other necessaries for that purpose; but the resistance, in my opinion, would have been so slight, that we might almost have chosen our own place to cross it; and it was not very deep at any place. the battalion of sailors were quite annoyed at being kept looking on, while so fair an opportunity, as they thought, offered, and were crying out one to another, "why don't we go on? what is keeping us back?" 'tis not to be doubted that the first effect of any new thing in warfare is always the most certain of producing success, particularly against inexperienced troops; but let them see and know the whole of the effects that such a thing is calculated to produce, and the alarm wears off, and confidence and courage return with wonderful rapidity. so it was here; the first fire of our guns struck them dumb with amazement and terror--but mark the contrast! both the latter part of this day, and on the th, at the general attack, how little they seemed to care for all the artillery we could bring against them! their gun, a -pounder, was a most bitter antagonist to our principal battery. this happened to be erected nearly in front of that part of the line where this gun was situated, and when it fired, its shot always struck the battery at the first bound, and then it ricocheted into the redoubt where i had taken up my post. general keane, with a part of his brigade, was in this latter work, and some of them narrowly escaped the effects of the numerous balls thrown from this gun. we were told the captain of the schooner, after having been deprived of his vessel, had been appointed to the charge and management of this gun, with some of his crew to work it; and indeed it seemed very like the bitter and determined manner of our former opponent, for any of the other guns seemed like children's play to the unceasing and destructive fire of this heavy piece of ordnance. i could distinctly see that they were sailors that worked it--one of whom, a large mulatto, with a red shirt, always spunging her out after firing. in what i am going to relate, i know i shall incur the risk of being deemed a _traveller_ by some of my readers, but that shall not deter me from telling what i plainly and repeatedly saw with my own eyes, assisted by a glass. at the distance of three quarters of a mile, i could distinctly perceive the ball from this gun every time it was fired, it appearing like a small black spot in the midst of the column of white smoke, and which gradually grew larger in appearance as it approached us. in many instances i was providentially the cause of saving some of the men who were in the redoubt with us, because, seeing which way the ball was coming, i told them when to lie down; and on one occasion was the shave so close, that it actually carried away one of the men's packs as he lay on the ground. another shot struck about three feet above our heads, and carried away part of a piece of timber which supported a shed just behind us. i forgot to mention, that, after the th, the americans, conceiving that the guns of the ship would be of more use if taken out and placed in batteries, this was accordingly done; the greater part of them being planted on the other side of the river, and being completely on our flank, were enabled to annoy our people considerably, who were posted near the great road. about two or three o'clock in the afternoon of the st, the army began again to retire to its bivouack, leaving covering parties to protect the batteries; and after night, the whole having formed, working parties were sent to bring off as many of the heavy guns as possible. some of these, however, they were obliged to bury in the earth, not being able to drag them away before daylight next morning. this work seemed more oppressive and fatiguing to the troops than the bringing of them up did, inasmuch as they were animated in the latter instance by the hope of their being able to effect something against the enemy through their toil and labour; but now disappointment added poignancy to their sufferings. however, although things began to assume not quite so favourable an aspect as formerly, yet every thing was borne with the greatest good-will, as they were still confident of all their laborious services being ultimately crowned with success. in all these fatiguing services, the sailors bore an ample share, and were of the very utmost benefit to the whole army, for they could readily contrive the means of moving those immense masses of metal by purchases, &c., which to a soldier would be utterly impossible. indeed, throughout the whole service, the gallant tars deserved the very highest praise, for they were equally brave as laborious and willing. all hands, both soldiers and sailors, had been up the whole of the night of the st, and now up again all night of the st. this was very trying, no doubt. if any thing like dissatisfaction was evinced, this incessant toil and want of rest in encountering it, arose more from a desire to be led on to the attack, than from any wish to be rid of their labours, however painful these were. as this attempt had failed, no other scheme now appeared to present itself, but a vigorous and well sustained attack on their line; for several efforts had been made to penetrate through the wood, to endeavour to ascertain whether it was possible to turn their position at that point, but all these efforts had failed. the last that was attempted was conducted by lieutenant wright of the engineers, but both himself and nearly all his party perished; for it seems they fell in with a body of american riflemen, who, being much better accustomed to travelling in woods than our people were, fell on them, and, as said before, nearly cut off the whole party; yet it is evident it was not utterly impassable, or the two parties could not have met. i do not recollect to what regiment the men belonged who accompanied wright, but think it probable they were altogether unacquainted with that description of service, which led them into the fatal snare in which they fell. i am confident i saw blacks, who passed and repassed by the wood, but it is certain that no attempt upon a large scale could be made in that direction to turn their position; and it was probably the better plan to abandon the idea altogether. a very excellent expedient was however devised, for the purpose of turning the right flank of the enemy; it was certainly a bold and vigorous idea, and one which, if successful, would no doubt have secured to us the victory and the possession of new orleans. this was no less than cutting a canal, in order to unite the mississippi with the lake by which we had arrived, and by getting boats out of the latter into the river, to transport a sufficient number of men to the opposite shore, for the purpose of making a diversion in aid of the principal attack on this side. nothing could exceed the grandness of the conception. accordingly, all hands were set to work to widen and deepen the rill of water which flows into the creek at the landing-place, and, continuing it up past monsieur villerey's house, to let it enter the river a little above that point. this, as may easily be conceived, was most laborious and dirty work; and, lest the health and spirits of the troops should suffer from such incessant fatigue, they were told off into four watches or spells, each of which followed the other in regular succession, so that the work never stood still. when it had reached near the house and high-road, screens were put up on the latter, to prevent the enemy on the opposite bank of the river from seeing what was carrying on; but as the blacks were passing and repassing almost continually by the wood, as i before mentioned, no doubt the americans were well acquainted with what we were doing. on the ---- general lambert arrived with the th and d regiments, to our great joy, two finer regiments not being in the service. consequently every eye now sparkled with hope, that our labours and privations would soon terminate, as every one confidently anticipated a favourable result, and seemed still inclined to despise that enemy who had shown us that we could not do so with impunity. we were glad to meet many of our old peninsular friends in these two fine corps, and of course welcomed them to the new world in the best manner we were capable of. they took up their ground a little in front of the canal which was cutting, there not being room sufficient for them in the line of our bivouack. we were now about effective troops, and all beginning to cheer up again, imagined nothing could withstand us. by the th the canal was finished, and the boats brought up into it. there was obliged to be a lock in it at the entrance from the river, for the strength of which sir edward, our chief, i understand, expressed his apprehensions, but was assured by the engineer that there was not the slightest danger. i give this merely as report. on the th the arrangements for the attack next morning having been completed, orders were issued to that effect. the arrangements were as follows, viz.--a corps consisting of the th regiment, with sailors and marines, and the th west india regiment, with four light fieldpieces, the whole under the command of colonel thornton, was to embark in boats by twelve o'clock, and to be all across the river by daylight next morning. this force would amount to about or men, and were destined to attack and carry the works on the opposite bank, getting possession of the guns without allowing them to be spiked if possible, when they were to be turned upon the right flank of the enemy's position, on this side the river, to favour our attack. it is clear, then, that this movement should precede that of the grand attack by a considerable space of time. in the grand attack the troops were to be disposed as follows, viz.--the right column, under general gibbs, was to consist of the th, st, th, and three companies of my battalion, which latter were to extend as close to the enemy's work as possible, previous to the advance of the column, and, by maintaining a constant fire, were to endeavour to keep the enemy down as much as possible. the th was to be divided; one-half of that corps was to carry fascines, &c., which they were to throw into the ditch on reaching it, in order that the remaining regiments of that column might be able to pass it. these fascines were to be had in the redoubt i before mentioned. the other wing of the th was to lead that column, followed by the st, and then the th, regiments. this was to be the principal attack. the left column, commanded by general keane, was to be composed as follows, viz.--one company of the th, one of the st, one of the d, and two of ours. the whole to be supported by the d regiment. these were to make a feint attack upon the half-moon work which the enemy had constructed near the river, and if opportunity offered, to turn it into a real attack, and penetrate the enemy's line, co-operating with the other column. our two companies were to act here in the same manner as the other three with whom they were to form a junction, thus covering the whole front of the enemy's work. some blacks of the st west india regiment were to enter the wood on the right of our right column, and to keep up as much noise as possible by firing and sounding bugles, &c. to induce a belief that a large body of troops was moving in that direction. the reserve, under general lambert, was to consist of the th and d regiments, and was to be so stationed as to be able to render aid to either of the attacking columns. strict orders were given that no obstacle was to be permitted to retard the advance of the columns, but that they were to press forward and endeavour to overcome every hinderance that might present itself. as far as i recollect, and from the information i have since gained, these were substantially the orders issued, and arrangements made, on this occasion. the commanding-officers and heads of departments were also assembled, and each told the part he had to perform; on which occasion, i understand, the commanding-officer of the th expressed himself in terms which i could scarcely conceive it possible could fall from the lips of a soldier, which were, that "it was a forlorn hope with the th." in all my campaigning i never yet heard a commanding-officer who did not look upon the post of danger as the post of honour, and who did not rejoice, as if a favour was conferred on him, when appointed to an arduous or hazardous duty. had the commanding-officer of the th served in the peninsula under our illustrious leader there, he would, i am confident, have been animated by a quite different spirit. after dark i went with my commanding-officer and adjutant to view the ground over which our battalion was to march next morning, and to find out the wooden bridges, &c. over some ditches which lay in the way, that no delay might take place when they were to be called upon to act. i was sadly disappointed at our not meeting with any other commanding-officers engaged in this most necessary duty, and at the time i expressed my apprehensions as to the result. i pointed out to him the different manner in which the business had been conducted previous to the assault of badajos, and previous to the attack on the enemy's position on the nivelle, where every commanding-officer, or others, who had any particular duty assigned to them in the next day's operations, were brought to ground from which it was clearly pointed out to them how they were to move and act; but here all seemed apathy and fatal security, arising from our too much despising our enemy. this latter, i believe, was the principal cause of our not taking the necessary precautions, and consequently of our failure; particularly the commanding-officer of the th ought to have been brought and shown where the fascines were lodged, that no excuse of ignorance on that score might be pleaded. a rocket thrown up was to be the signal for the troops to advance to the attack, after they had been properly posted under the cover of night for that purpose. i own i did not at all feel satisfied with what i had seen and heard, and retired to rest with a considerable degree of despondency on my mind; and as i knew i could render little aid to the service in a case like the present, i determined i should not take any part in it, for i almost felt confident of its failure. the whole of the troops were at their post by the time appointed; but, unfortunately, as the sailors, &c. were getting the boats out of the canal into the river, the lock gave way after only a very few had passed it. thus the whole business seemed at one blow to be totally ruined. every effort was made to remedy the evil, but it was irremediable. they toiled, however, to get more boats into the river, but the delay had been so great that it began to draw towards dawn before they had effected any thing worth mentioning. poor sir edward seemed like one bereft of his reason, for this failure had blasted all his most sanguine hopes; and as the troops were now close under the enemy's works, and could not be withdrawn before daybreak, nor without being perceived by the enemy, he thought it as dangerous to turn back as to go forward with the operation, consequently he ordered the rocket to be fired, although it was considerably past the time for the attack to take place, and no troops on the opposite shore. as soon as this was done, he galloped to the front. but the enemy had been quite prepared, and opened such a heavy fire upon the different columns, and upon our line of skirmishers, (which had been formed for some time within about or yards of the enemy's work,) as it is not easy to conceive. i was not in it as i said before, but i was so posted as to see it plainly. but the th, with the fascines, were not to be found. their commanding-officer had taken them considerably past the redoubt where the fascines were placed, and when he bethought him of what he had to do, he and his men were obliged to turn back to seek them; and thus, when he ought to have been in front to throw them into the ditch to allow the other troops to pass over, he was nearly half a mile in rear seeking for them. but i believe it would not have availed much had they been there in time, for the right column never reached the point to which it was directed; but from the dreadful fire of every kind poured into it, some of the battalions began to waver, to halt and fire, and at last one of them completely broke, and became disorganized. sir edward seeing this rushed forward with his hat in his hand, and endeavouring to animate them by his presence, he cheered them on to advance again; but at this moment he fell, after receiving two wounds, the last of which was mortal. general gibbs also fell nearly at the same time mortally wounded, and was borne off the field. thus was the right and principal column deprived of both its leaders; and although one regiment gave ground, and could not be brought again to the attack, the other continued to keep in a body, although any attempt now must be hopeless, and they were losing such numbers of men that they must shortly be annihilated. they accordingly retired without effecting any thing. the left column succeeded somewhat better; but, as things turned out, it was only to enhance their own loss. they forced their way into the circular work before mentioned, in which they made all the men who defended it prisoners. but the canal still lay between them and the main work, which was passed only by a plank; and being so few in numbers, it would have been madness in them to attempt to go beyond where they had at present stationed themselves. indeed, they were in a most critical situation; for, being within a few yards of the enemy's main body, they could not move without being shot through the head by their riflemen; and it was not till they had threatened to shoot the prisoners they had taken, that they induced the americans to desist from attacking them; for by this time general keane also had fallen severely wounded, and the d had been nearly cut to pieces; and general lambert, with the reserve, had been obliged to advance and cover the retreat of the other columns. colonel dale, who commanded the d, fell early in the action, and the command devolved on colonel creagh; this officer, being unwilling to retire his regiment without effecting the object aimed at, although the men were literally mown down by the murderous fire of the enemy, and the other column had given way, still endeavoured to advance, but was at length reluctantly compelled to retrograde, taking care to keep his men together. this showed a fine and noble feeling in him, and is equally honourable to his gallant regiment; but unfortunately it tended only to swell the list of killed and wounded on this lamentable occasion. my people were thus left to shift for themselves, and to get away in the best manner they could. but being extended, and not being so good an object for the artillery to fire at as the columns, they escaped with much less loss than could well be supposed. some few of them reached the ditch when they saw the columns advancing, and which they say could have been passed with ease; but the columns never advanced so far, which had they done, and that rapidly, their loss would not have been half so great; for the enemy's troops in front of the right column were evidently intimidated, and ceased firing for some seconds as the column approached; and there is little doubt, had they pushed on to the ditch with celerity, the americans would have abandoned their line; at least, such is my humble opinion. but the poor fellows on the left, who had gained the only work which fell into our hands on this bank of the river, were still detained there, unable either to advance or retreat; and not one durst show his head above the parapet, or he was instantly shot dead. such was their confined and critical situation at this period, that an officer of the th, whose name i forget, being himself rather tall, and wearing at this time the high narrow-topped cap, could not squeeze in sufficiently close to cover himself completely by the parapet, the top of the high cap he wore sticking above the top of the work. this part of the cap, which was visible to the americans within the line, had no less than four or five rifle-shots put through it while he lay there, but without touching his head. all this information respecting these three companies i had from lieutenant steele of the d, one of the officers who was in the work. they were obliged at last to adopt a very singular but politic expedient, which was, to make one of the american prisoners embrace a man of the d, and thus to stand up together to see what was going forward; for hitherto they were totally ignorant, from the causes above assigned. the enemy durst not fire in such a case, for fear of killing their own man. the news they now learned was most disheartening indeed, which was, that the whole of the british had retired, and that the americans were coming out of their lines, and were moving in the direction of that work. nothing now remained but to surrender, or to make an attempt to retreat, at the risk of being every man knocked down. the latter, however, they preferred; on which colonel rennie, of the st, who commanded these three companies, was the first to make the experiment, and in doing which, the moment after he left the fort, he fell to rise no more. they thought it better for them all to go at once, and instantly the whole party made a rush out of the work. the greater part of them providentially succeeded in effecting their escape, although many a brave fellow fell in the attempt. chapter xix. bravery and success of colonel thornton--negotiation for leave to transport the wounded across the river--insult offered to the british--they retreat--our army embark, and determine to make an attack upon mobile--proceed in the direction of mobile bay--a brigade detached to reduce fort boyer--the fort surrenders, the garrison becoming prisoners of war--intelligence of a treaty of peace being concluded at ghent--cessation of hostilities. it now remains to detail the operations of colonel thornton's party. it will be seen, that, although his people were all ready at the appointed hour, they could not get a sufficient number of boats to transport them to the opposite shore. in fact, they did not get on board till it was near daylight, and then only about one-half of the appointed number. but, although at the risk of sacrificing himself and the few men he took with him, he hesitated not to make the attempt of fulfilling his orders. the signal for the general attack, however, was made before he could reach the opposite bank, and he had then to land, and after making his disposition with the few troops he had, to advance and attack a corps of men, mostly covered by works, some of which were extremely strong. he dashed on, however, the advance of the enemy giving way before him, till coming to their principal battery, he was obliged to detach a part of his force through the wood on his left to turn their flank, while he with the remainder attacked in front. this was conducted in such a soldierlike manner, that, after a short conflict, the enemy gave way on all sides, and retiring with precipitation, abandoned to the victors batteries and works containing sixteen guns of various calibre. but, alas! all this success came too late; for the principal attack had by this time ended in a total failure, attended with the loss of three out of four generals, and with nearly officers and men killed, wounded, and made prisoners. had providence prospered the work of the canal, and the troops could have been got across at the appointed hour, and in sufficient numbers, there is every reason to believe that the effect produced on the main body by such a powerful diversion, would have tended to the complete overthrow of the whole force before us; for so insecure did general jackson feel himself to be after our establishment on the other bank of the river, and so alarmed at its consequences, that, in the evening of the fatal day, he would not consent to a cessation of hostilities, to enable us to bring off our numerous wounded, till general lambert (who had now succeeded to the command) agreed as a preliminary to withdraw the force under colonel thornton from that bank; and this, although with great reluctance, the general was compelled from motives of humanity and other causes to consent to. before, however, a final answer was returned to general jackson, i believe it was suggested to our general, that, with the possession of the other bank of the river, and with the th and d nearly yet entire, and with the remainders of the other regiments, our chances of success had not yet entirely departed, particularly as jackson evinced such eagerness for our withdrawing from that bank. general lambert in consequence used means to ascertain the feelings of the troops on this proposition, but without their knowledge of his having done so; but i regret to state, they seemed utterly hopeless of ever being able to overcome such formidable difficulties as had presented themselves, particularly now that their means of overcoming them had been so lamentably diminished. the idea was consequently abandoned. in this negotiation between the generals, which continued for some hours, lieutenant-colonel smith, our assistant adjutant-general, had repeatedly to pass from army to army with flags of truce, before the matter could be finally arranged. this officer was most indefatigable in his exertions on this unfortunate expedition, and to him the army is greatly indebted for his zeal, ability, and gallantry, on this and every other occasion where they could be of service to his country, and by those in authority no doubt they are duly appreciated. thus terminated the fatal attack on the lines of new orleans--a termination probably as disastrous in its consequences as any of modern date--not even excepting that of buenos ayres; for that, discreditable as it was to our arms, did not cost the lives of such a number of fine soldiers; and i fear we have not yet experienced the full consequences of this failure, for it is certain that the americans are greatly elevated by it in their own estimation, and it is not improbable they may be thence induced to maintain a higher tone in all their future negotiations with this country. one instance may be to the point, as showing the feeling of individuals of that country on this subject. a fellow in the shape of an officer asked colonel smith, (i think it was,) "well, what do you think of we yankees? don't you think we could lick any of the troops of the continent easily?"--"i don't know that," says our officer.--"why, i'll prove to you," says jonathan, "that we have shown ourselves the best troops in the world. didn't the french beat the troops of every other continental nation? didn't you beat the french in the peninsula? and haven't we beat you just now?" this of course was conclusive, and no farther argument on that subject could be advanced. the remainder of the troops retired in the evening to their sorrowful bivouack, worn out and sadly dispirited. all that night was of course devoted to bringing off the unfortunate wounded; but several of those who fell far in advance had been taken into the american lines, and, i have every reason to believe, were treated with the greatest humanity. every effort was used, during the continuance of the truce, to bring away the great numbers who lay wounded in the different parts of the field; and on this as on all other occasions, the sailors with their officers, evinced the utmost solicitude to render assistance to the army; a great number of them were employed all night on this distressing duty. during the whole of that afternoon, both while the negotiations were pending, and at other times, the american officers were unceasing in their endeavours to induce our soldiers to desert and join their army. too many, i regret to say, listened to their offers, and accepted them. to some they promised promotion, to others money or grants of land; in short, they were more like recruiting sergeants, i understand, than the officers of a hostile army. my battalion did not quit the field till after dark, and it is from some of them i have this information. a group of two sergeants and a private of ours were accosted by an american officer of artillery with a request that they would enter the service of the united states; that the sergeants should be promoted if they wished to serve, or that they should have grants of land if they preferred a civil life; but that, if they chose to enter the army, he would ensure them the rank of officers. our people listened to this harangue for some time, and then began, i regret to say, to give him some bad language; telling him, at the same time, that they would rather be privates in the british army, than officers among such a set of raggamuffins as the americans, and told him to sheer off or they would fire upon him. this so exasperated the cowardly villain, that he went off instantly into the line, they watching him all the while, and pointing the gun, of which, it seems, he had charge, it was fired, and knocked down the private, who was only wounded, however, by the shot. innumerable attempts of this nature were made both now and all the time we remained before their lines subsequently, but which attempts, i am proud to say, as far as i have been able to learn, failed in every instance in the men of my battalion. much about the same time, an american soldier came within about yards of our line, and began to plunder such of the killed or wounded men as he thought possessed of any thing valuable. he at length commenced upon a poor wounded man belonging to my battalion, which being perceived by a corporal scott of ours, he asked permission from his captain to take a shot at him. this being granted, (although a sort of truce had been established while the negotiations were going on,) he took up his rifle, and taking a steady aim, he fired, and tumbled the plundering villain right over the body of the poor wounded man. the loss of our five companies in this attack amounted to seven officers and about ---- men killed and wounded. some of the other regiments, the d in particular, had suffered dreadfully, having lost more than half their numbers. the sad ceremony of burying such of the officers whose bodies had been recovered, together with attention to the wounded, occupied several days from this period, and sending the wounded, who were able to bear removal, to the shipping, kept great numbers of the remaining men continually employed; and the attention of all was now turned towards drawing off from this scene of our late disastrous attempt. the general entered into a negotiation with jackson about being permitted to send a portion of our wounded down the river in boats; for which permission some equivalent, which i forget, was to be granted on our part, and which, after considerable discussion, was eventually agreed to. the sick, the wounded, the stores of every description, were now despatched as fast as circumstances would allow; but the effecting of this occupied not less than nine days, during the whole of which time the enemy was incessant in his attempts to harass and annoy us. all their heavy ordnance was brought to bear on our bivouack; the sugar-house our people occupied, and even the head-quarters, did not escape; night and day they kept up a fire of shot and shells upon these points; but the distance being considerable, no very great mischief resulted from it, further than the continual state of uneasiness and alarm in which it kept the troops. on one occasion, however, a shell was thrown into the lines of the d, who had since the attack occupied a part of the general bivouack, and which, falling into a hut occupied by lieutenant darcy of that regiment, while he lay asleep, carried off both his legs as it fell. poor fellow! he would thus be awakened in a rough manner indeed. i have since seen him in dublin, the government having kindly compensated him by giving him a company, and i believe two pensions. several shells were thrown into the head-quarters premises, but providentially without injuring any one. one fell in the yard while a party of troops was halted there for a short while, and which falling on one of the men's knapsacks, which he had put off, it carried it, with itself, not less than six feet deep into the earth. it did not explode. some fell on the roof, which penetrated through all the stories to the very ground. every night also the picquets were kept in a state of agitation and alarm by the continual attacks of small parties of our skulking enemy, and my battalion, as did the others also, lost considerable numbers by this petty warfare. in short, the men's lives began almost to be a burden to them. there was another source of annoyance adopted on the part of the americans on this occasion, but which, affecting only the mental, and not the bodily powers of our soldiers, was not so much heeded. every day almost they assembled in large bodies on the parapet of their line, with flags of various descriptions, some with "sailors' rights" and numerous other devices, &c. painted on them, using the most insulting gesticulations towards those who were near enough to see them, a band playing yankee doodle, and other national airs, all the while, and sometimes ironically favouring us with rule britannia. considerable numbers of our men deserted about this time. every encumbrance being removed, however, by the th, orders were issued for the march of the army on the following evening soon after dark, leaving the picquets as a rearguard, which were not to march till a short while before daylight. in retiring, some of the wounded, who were unable to bear removal, were necessarily left in the houses where they had been collected; but there were not many so left, and no doubt the enemy acted humanely by them. there were seven men of my battalion left, out of which three rejoined us after the conclusion of peace; the other four, i believe, were very badly wounded, and died in consequence. it was also necessary to abandon such of the guns as remained in the advanced batteries, because, both from their weight and their being so near the enemy, they could not be brought off without exposing our intentions of retreating. neither were these numerous, and most of them only iron ship-guns, which are of no great value. the movement commenced according to the preconcerted plan, and being conducted with secrecy and regularity, every soldier was brought off, over a country almost impassable, and where, if followed and harassed by an enterprising enemy, great numbers must have either fallen into their hands or perished in the swamp. but i believe, had the americans even been aware of our intention, they would have hesitated before they came into collision with our highly exasperated army, and would scarcely have dared to attack us in the open field: they had had enough of that work on the d, to give them a specimen of what british soldiers could do when met fairly, front to front. the marsh, it may be necessary to mention, extended from the lower skirt of the wood to the fishermen's huts at the mouth of the creek. this creek we had sailed up on our advance, but this could not possibly be the case at present, both on account of our numbers being much too great for the number of boats, and of the danger to which it would have exposed the troops had they been attacked from the shore, but principally on the former account; a sort of road had therefore been constructed by our artificers, by cutting down boughs from the wood, and laying them across such places as required something on the surface on which to tread. this road extended, as nigh as i can judge, about eight or ten miles, and in passing which numerous slips were made into the sloughs on each side; but there being plenty of assistance generally at hand, they helped each other out: some men, i understand, were lost, however, in this night-march through the swamp. having arrived at the huts before-mentioned, the whole army set about forming such places of shelter as the desert swamp afforded. there were certainly reeds in abundance, but we wanted some sort of timbers for the support of the outward covering. we, however, did the best we could; and now every exertion was made by the navy to bring the army off from this most uncomfortable place of abode, and regiment after regiment were despatched as fast as the boats and other small craft could go and return, the distance from hence to the shipping being about seventy miles. while we remained here, we who were fond of shooting found plenty of wild-ducks on which to exercise our sporting abilities; but, alas! we wanted shot, and were therefore seldom able to bring home a couple for dinner. a considerable number of slaves, belonging to the estates where we had lately been stationed, followed us down thus far, some of whom would not return, but were afterwards sent on board of ship. these, male and female, often amused us with their native dances, the men generally having a number of rings or bells about them, which sounded as they kept time to the tune. some of their dances were, however, far from decent, particularly on the part of the females, which, it may be supposed, highly delighted some of our young and thoughtless countrymen. some were induced to return to their masters: for those who came on board of ship, i believe it was not till very lately that the two governments came to terms as to the remuneration which their owners claimed for them. at length the turn came for my battalion to go on board, which we did on the th of january, when our whole five companies were put on board the dover, the ship that had brought out two companies of the battalion, and which were then not much fewer in number than the five at present were; in fact, we had lost more than half. the whole army did not get embarked till ----, when the th fusileers came on board. this regiment had been necessarily left alone at the fishermen's huts till the boats could return, as before stated, to bring them off, and yet even this single battalion the enemy, with upwards of , men, dared not come down and attack, although there were no works to protect it in this exposed situation. nothing could possibly demonstrate more fully and clearly, that, notwithstanding the repulse they had unfortunately given our troops, they dreaded them in the open country; or else it must be attributed to the prudent sagacity of their leader, who, having gained a victory which he had previously scarce dared to hope for, now wisely resolved not to risk the tarnishing of his dear-bought laurels. it is not an easy matter to reconcile this cautious and timid conduct with their furious onset on the night of the d, and with their boasting speeches after our failure on the th instant. now, while we remain at rest for a short while on board of ship, let us take a retrospective glance at the late events. it is certain we were singularly unfortunate. providence, which had smiled upon us in our late operations against the most formidable army in the world, the french, here taught us most painfully, that the victory is not always to be gained by strength or courage. indeed it was but a just punishment for the contempt we entertained for our opponents, and which unfortunate feeling, i believe, was almost universal. i own i entertained it in a high degree; for i judged it next to a moral impossibility that an army of undisciplined and unmanageable peasants, however numerous, could for a moment withstand the attack of those troops who had overthrown the victorious legions of bonaparte. but every soldier was a patriot, and they fought for their country, and for a country of all others most suitable for the operations of such troops; full of fastnesses, composed of creeks, and necks, and woods, &c. of all which they did not fail to take the utmost advantage. for this work of theirs, constructed on a spot of ground said to have been pointed out by general moreau, completely shut us out from all approach towards the town, and compensated for every disadvantage under which they, as irregulars, laboured; for it was not only a formidable barrier to our army, but it gave them, by the protection it afforded their persons, all the steadiness of troops inured to combat, and permitted them the full exercise of that superior skill as marksmen for which they are famed, and which exposure in the open field would have deprived them of; for here they were covered up to the chin, and suffered comparatively nothing from all our fire. but i fear we have something for which to blame ourselves on this occasion. it is certain, i believe, that they had been timely apprized of the destination of our expedition, however secret we pretended to keep it ourselves, and if rumour may in such a case be permitted to go for any thing, it is said that information was conveyed from jamaica to new orleans direct by a french ship, which left the former for the latter place some time before our arrival. how she came into the possession of that information, i cannot justly tell. it is certain, however, that the americans must have had timely notice, or general jackson could not have had the men from kentucky and tennessee to oppose us the first night we landed. i before hazarded an opinion, that had we pushed forward on the th december, we should in all probability have proved successful. i will say nothing as to the point of debarkation being well or ill chosen, although many have said we should have been more likely to succeed had we attacked fort ----, which, after carrying, would have allowed us to land behind the town, instead of three leagues below it. these things i am totally incapable of judging of, from my ignorance of the country. i also before expressed my opinion, that had we attacked on new year's day, when our artillery produced such an effect on the appalled americans, we should have had a better chance of carrying their works. another thing in which i venture to differ from the plan adopted by our lamented commander, is, that i would have employed the th and d to the post of honour, instead of keeping them in reserve. they, it was well known, had each established a reputation for being the finest regiments in the service, and every reliance might have been placed in their executing whatever task was assigned them, if executable by human powers. far different was it with those who unfortunately led the attack, for except one of the regiments of the attacking column, they had not any of them been conspicuous as fighting regiments. it was, i believe, a well known maxim of bonaparte's, always to put his best troops in front; if they were successful, their example served to stimulate the others to copy their example; if unsuccessful, their discipline and valour never permitted them to become so totally disorganized as to render the reverse irretrievable. the onset also of these better troops, must produce a far different effect on the enemy than the hesitating and dispirited attack of inferior ones. had our troops on this occasion rushed forward to the ditch in double quick time, or at least at a quick march, i venture to affirm the work would have been carried with the fourth part of the loss of what they suffered. reason itself must point out to any man, whether acquainted with military matters or not, that to move slowly under a galling fire is more trying and destructive to the troops so moving, than to rush at once to the point aimed at; but much more, to halt at the very point where every fire-arm can be brought to bear upon them with the deadliest effect, is of all other modes of proceeding the least likely to succeed. they were thus exposed for hours to as destructive a fire as ever was poured upon the heads of an attacking army, while, had they pushed on at the rate i mention, a few minutes would have sufficed to put them from under the fire of the artillery at least, for when close to the ditch, it could not be brought to bear upon them. mark the mode in which the three companies on the left effected the task assigned to them. before the enemy were aware almost that they were to be attacked, these troops were in possession of the work they were destined to storm; so quickly indeed that the defenders of that work had not time to effect their retreat, and were, as before noticed, made prisoners by the attacking party. this not only secured their safety while left there by themselves, but enabled them, in some degree, to effect their retreat with less loss than they would otherwise have been exposed to. i have dwelt perhaps too long on this, but of all other causes i deem this to have been the greatest of our sad failure. it is lamentable, however, to be obliged to confess, that ill conduct on the part of some parties, but of one individual in particular, contributed in no small degree to our repulse on this melancholy occasion. for the rest, nothing could exceed the determined courage and patient endurance of hardship that the army in general evinced, and certainly nothing could exceed the gallantry of our leaders. it was now determined to make an attempt upon mobile, a town lying about thirty or forty leagues to the eastward of new orleans. accordingly, the fleet got under weigh and proceeded in the direction of the entrance into mobile bay, which is protected on the west side by shoals and isle dauphine, and on the east by a fort, built on a point of land called mobile point, and mounting about twenty pieces of heavy ordnance. its name is fort boyer, i believe. before our arrival in this country, an attempt had been made on this fort by one of our frigates, but which entirely failed, owing to her taking the ground on the shoals before mentioned. as she could not be got off, and as she lay under the fire of the fort, her crew were compelled to abandon her, but, i believe, not till they had first set her on fire; her wreck lay here when we came. until this fort was taken, no vessel of any size could enter the bay, consequently it became necessary to attack it in form. the brigade formerly general gibbs's, consisting of the th, st, and th, was therefore landed a little behind the point, and proceeded without delay to invest it; the remainder of the troops were landed on isle dauphine. we were put on shore on the th february, and instantly commenced hutting ourselves by brigades. some of the officers had tents issued out to them; the acting quartermaster and myself had one between us. this island is almost covered with pine-wood, but in other respects it is nearly a desert, and without any inhabitants resident on it, save one family, a mr rooney, formerly from belfast i understand, but now a naturalized american. he was married to a native of louisiana, a lady of french extraction. he had been a midshipman in the american navy, but had been dismissed for some misconduct, it was said, and banished to this island. he appeared to us to be no great things. i omitted to mention that the th regiment had arrived from england before we left the banks of the mississippi, but it being after the failure they were of no use, and were consequently not permitted to land. they were afterwards placed in our brigade, which now bivouacked near to the point of the island facing the bay. when we arrived, the island contained a considerable number of cattle, with pigs, &c. belonging to rooney, but which had been permitted, as is customary in this country, to run wild in the woods, there being no danger of their leaving the island. these, however, soon fell a prey to such hungry fellows as we were, who had been for some time past on rather short commons. but they did not answer our expectations, being in taste, what may appear singular, quite fishy. this was attributed to their feeding so much on marine vegetables, there being little other pasture for them on the island. a hoax was played off upon great numbers of our young hands respecting this fishiness. there was on one point of the island a considerable oyster-bed, and it was generally pretty near this that the cattle were found and shot, that being the most distant from our bivouack. it was therefore said the flesh of the cattle became of that peculiar flavour from feeding upon oysters. some, without reflecting, credited this strange story, as the assertor generally said he had seen the cattle opening the oysters with their tongues. this oyster-bed, however, was a source of great luxury to us, for it not only afforded us the means of rendering the salt junk more palatable by having an excellent sauce to make it go down, but it even afforded a most wholesome and delicious meal upon occasions by eating them raw. we also made the best use of our time when not employed on military affairs, in endeavouring to catch as many fish as we could; and for this purpose, my mess purchased from one of the poor spanish fishermen before mentioned (and who, for the information and kindness they had shown us, were obliged to quit their habitations and follow us), an excellent casting-net, with which the acting quartermaster and myself occupied ourselves from day to day, generally bringing home a sufficient quantity of fish to serve our mess. i never laboured more assiduously in any occupation than i did in this, not only from a relish for such amusement, but because we really wanted something to eke out our scanty meals. we at length got a siene-net from one of the men-of-war, with which we were not only able to supply ourselves most abundantly, but always had a large quantity to give away to the soldiers. wild-fowl also were very plentiful when we first entered the island; but from the number killed, and the constant shooting at them, they soon became scarce and difficult to get at. here also there were abundance of alligators, and on our fishing and shooting excursions we frequently started them from their lurking-places, which were generally among the reeds by the side of an inland lake, or rather creek of the sea. on these occasions we seldom saw them, for they always endeavoured to avoid us; but wherever they ran along the bottom of the water, they stirred up the mud so greatly all the track they took, that we had no difficulty in tracing them. i never remember to have seen a live one on these occasions, but a dead one once afforded us considerable amusement. one evening, on our return home from our constant occupation, there being three or four of us of the party, i was in front, and the acting quartermaster and the others in the rear of me. on a sudden i was alarmed by the cry of "oh stop, here's an alligator!" and before i could look round, a shot was fired apparently into the earth, close beside their feet. i went back to see what was the matter, and found indeed, as he had said, an alligator, but one which i suppose had been dead for several months at least. it was buried in the sand, and only a part of its body appeared; but whether he imagined it might have placed itself in that situation intentionally, with the view of enticing its prey within its reach, or what other thought he had, i cannot tell, but, to make assurance doubly sure, he fired his rifle right into the body of the half-rotten alligator. he was long and often severely roasted about this afterwards. a young one was caught alive, however, by some of the th dragoons, and brought home to england, and afterwards, i understand, presented to the british museum. all this while the siege of the fort was going forward, but as we had nothing to do with it, we had plenty of time, not only to hunt for extra prog, but to amuse ourselves in any other manner we pleased. the army, about this time, was inspected by our chief, general lambert, by battalions. my kind late commanding-officer, captain travers, who was severely wounded at the attack on the th, had rejoined by this time, although still very lame. during the inspection, the general said to him, "travers, i am sorry to hear that your sergeant-major ran away on the night of the d, during the attack."--"that is impossible, general," said travers, "for he fought as bravely as any man could possibly do, and was carried off the field near the end of the fight, severely wounded. but i have a guess what has given rise to this report. a sergeant of ours left his battalion, i believe, either during or after the fight, and having taken up his quarters near one of the houses where the wounded were carried, the surgeon pressed him to remain with him as hospital-sergeant. i made efforts to have him sent to his battalion, but could not get it done. this must have been the cause of such a story having got abroad."--"ah," says the general, "i am sorry that the poor sergeant-major should have lain under a stigma, of which he was altogether undeserving; and, now since we have done him an involuntary injustice, and he is a deserving man, we must try what amends we can make him for it." he accordingly recommended him for an ensigncy in one of the west india regiments; and before that day twelvemonth, he had risen to the rank of lieutenant. nothing could be finer than the feeling of sir john lambert on this occasion; indeed, he has always shown himself a most excellent upright man, and a gallant officer. about this time, a russian vessel was detained going up to new orleans with a cargo of wine from bordeaux; but although she would, i doubt not, have been a legal capture, for breaking the blockade, the master was permitted to dispose of his cargo to our army, and an excellent thing he made of it, for the wine, which he must have purchased for about one shilling or one and sixpence a bottle, he charged us in general about four shillings for; we were glad, however, to get it at any price, and a most seasonable supply it was indeed. on one of our shooting excursions, an officer of ours fell in with a sow and two or three pigs, in the wood; he instantly fired at one of the pigs and killed it; but when going to pick it up, the sow set upon him with such fury, that he was glad to abandon his prize, and retreat with precipitation. when the army landed near new orleans, the th light dragoons had taken their saddles and other horse equipments with them, in hopes of being able to get mounted in the country; and which, being bulky, required a good large boat to bring off again. they were therefore put on board a considerable-sized one, with an officer of the regiment and a guard to protect them. on their way down towards the shipping, night overtook them before they could reach their destination, on which they pushed towards the shore, whether of an island or the mainland, i cannot say, in hopes of being more secure for the night; they consequently put on a sentry, and all lay down in the boat to sleep. soon afterwards, however, a boat came rowing rapidly alongside, and before the sentry could discover who or what they were, they boarded, and instantly made the party all prisoners. the officer, i believe, when called on to deliver up his sword, was so annoyed at being trapped in such a manner, that he threw it into the lake, as far as he could fling it. the american officer who captured them was a lieutenant in their navy, and went by the name of commodore shiel (for every fellow is a commodore who commands even a few boats). he was so elated by his success on this occasion, and, i believe, by having taken another boat with stores, that he boasted to his prisoners, that he would take even admiral cochrane himself yet, before he left the country. while we remained on isle dauphine, a commissary, with a sergeant and party of our men, were sent on shore, on the mainland, to shoot bullocks for the supply of the army. they had landed, and the commissary, with the sergeant and i think two men, went off into the neighbouring wood, leaving the two or three other men at the landing-place to protect the boat. here again mr shiel made his appearance, quite suddenly and unexpectedly, having come round a jutting point before the men were aware of his presence; he instantly, of course, made them prisoners, and, taking their arms from them, he put them on board their own boat, then, sending a part of his crew on board to manage it, despatched it for the american harbour. he now with a few more of his people went in search of the commissary and his party, whom he soon found; and they seeing resistance would be vain, when their own boat was departed, were compelled at once to surrender. he instantly put them into his own boat; and taking the commissary into the after-sheets alongside of himself, the sergeant and the other men were put forward to the head of the boat. whether any preconcerted scheme and signal had been agreed upon between the commissary and the sergeant, i do not know, but an opportunity soon after offering, the commissary gave the sergeant the wink, and instantly seizing mr shiel by the thighs, pitched him right overboard in an instant; the sergeant, at the same moment, seizing the stoutest of shiel's men, and serving him in a like manner. the others being attacked by the remaining two men, at once surrendered, and, i believe, suffered themselves to be bound; and our people, having now resumed their arms and become masters of the boat, admitted mr shiel, who, i fancy, had clung to the boat to prevent his drowning, to come once more on board. what became of the other man who was thrown over, i know not; whether he swam on shore, or was drowned, or was afterwards taken into the boat, i cannot tell; but the result was, that the great, the boasting commodore shiel, was brought to the island a prisoner, where he landed like a drowned rat, and quite chopfallen. the commissary, who was a fine, stout, and gallant young fellow, spoke highly in praise of tom fukes, our sergeant, for his bravery and good management on the occasion. at length the works being all completed for battering the fort, colonel smith was sent in with a flag of truce to demand its surrender. the commandant was quite undecided how to act, and asked the colonel what he, as a man of honour, would advise him to do. "why," says the colonel, "do you not see that our guns are now overlooking your whole work, and that we could, in a very short time, knock it down about your ears? i have no hesitation in telling you, that the rules of war will fully justify you in surrendering to such a superior force, and when the siege has advanced to such a point as it actually is." his arguments, together with the truth of his statements, at length overcame the courage and determination of jonathan, and he instantly agreed to surrender, the garrison, afterwards becoming prisoners of war, marching out and laying down their arms on the glacis. thus, on the th february, this important fortification fell into our hands, together with men of the d regiment of the united states, and either one or two american colours. this obstacle removed, every exertion was now made to advance up the lake to the attack of mobile; but on the th, a vessel arrived with the unexpected, but cheering information, that peace had been concluded at ghent between the two nations, and that it only required the ratification of mr maddison, the united states' president. of course, all further operations of a warlike nature were suspended for the present, till it was known whether the treaty would be ratified or not. this ship also brought out the notification of our two generals, lambert and keane, being appointed knights of the bath. some of our colonels also were included in the list, viz. blakeny of the the th, and dickson of the royal artillery. and now nothing was thought of but amusement, and making ourselves as comfortable as possible. but we began to get very short of provisions. our people were therefore obliged to send to the havannah, where they procured the strongest sort of beef i ever saw. it was not salted; but after the cattle had been killed, all the thin belly part had been cut round the whole bullock, in narrow stripes, of about two inches in width; this being laid, or hung up in the sun, which is extremely powerful in that country, it was dried without having the least offensive taste or smell, farther than a little rancidity, which was not by any means unpleasant; but when brought from on board, it had much more the appearance of coils of ropes (for it was coiled up in a similar manner) than provision for the use of man. an aide-de-camp of general lambert's, then lieutenant, but now major d'este, son of his royal highness the duke of sussex by lady augusta murray, used frequently to join the shooting party of our acting quartermaster and myself; and, on one occasion, having obtained a canoe, a trip to the mainland was projected, for the purpose of shooting; accordingly we took two or three men with us, and started from the northernmost point of the island, that being the nearest to the main, which we saw before us, and not more than five or six miles distant. it was considered the best mode of proceeding for us all to get into the boat, except one man, who was a famous wader, (having often accompanied us in our expeditions around the island,) and who was to wade as far out into the sea as he could, dragging the canoe after him. this he could do very easily, for she was quite light, and the water was exceeding shallow for a great distance into the sea. he continued towing us in this manner for about half a mile, when, being fairly up to his chin, he and we thought it was high time for him to come on board; but, in doing this, he gave her such a cant as turned her right over, and pitched us all into the water. i luckily had my eye upon the man when he sprung to get into the canoe, and suspecting that she could not bear so rough a pull, was ready; and accordingly, when i saw her going, leaped out, without being plunged overhead, as all the others were. but all our rifles, &c. were pitched out, and of course sunk to the bottom, to which we were obliged to dive before we could get them up. this accident put a stop to our excursion, and we waded out again, looking extremely foolish. nevertheless we ought to have been truly thankful to providence that it occurred before we got out of our depth; for, with such a frail bark, it is more than probable some accident would have happened before our return, had not this prevented our further progress. innumerable were our adventures of this nature, for the water was delightfully warm, and having no military occupation at the time, we could not find any better amusement. a party, indeed, suggested the getting up of theatricals, which being approved on all hands, workmen were instantly set about erecting the theatre-royal, isle dauphine. this, of course, with the getting off of parts, occupied the managers and the other performers for some time; but at length all being ready, most excellent entertainments took place, following each other in quick succession. at some of these parties, american officers, who now often paid us visits, were highly entertained, and paid us high compliments, not only as to the splendour and magnificence of our theatrical representations, but to our ingenuity as displayed in hut-building, which, they said, even surpassed the architectural abilities of the indians in that branch of the art,--a high compliment indeed! chapter xx. ratification of the treaty of peace--exchange of prisoners--our troops embark for england--when off the coast of ireland, receive intelligence of bonaparte's escape from elba--the author and his battalion reach the downs, and proceed to thorncliffe--embark for france--arrive at paris, and occupy the champs elysées--review of the russian guards--russian discipline--british troops reviewed--accident to prince blucher--amusements in paris--the allied forces, except the army of occupation, leave paris--the author's battalion embark for england--reach dover, and return to thorncliffe--he obtains leave of absence, and visits his family--his battalion ordered to ireland--sets out to join it, accompanied by his wife, who dies three days after they reach dublin--his battalion reduced--joins the first battalion at gosport, which is ordered to scotland--arrive at leith, and march to glasgow--the author returns home in ill health--his father dies--joins his battalion again--winters at home--his battalion ordered to ireland--joins it at belfast--they occupy different stations during the whiteboy insurrection--six companies of his battalion ordered to nova scotia, but the author remains with the other four companies--he is shortly ordered to proceed to nova scotia--his health declines--returns home in consequence, takes advantage of lord palmerston's bill, and retires on full pay. on the th march, the ratification of the treaty of peace, by mr maddison, arrived; and now all our thoughts were turned towards our dear native country. on the th also, all our poor fellows, who had been made prisoners by the americans, joined us at this island, an exchange in consequence of peace having of course taken place. many of these were strange-looking figures when they came among us, most of them having been stripped of great part of their uniforms, their caps particularly, and wearing mocassins, a sort of indian sandals, instead of shoes or boots, and being so sunburnt as to be scarcely recognisable. major mitchell told us that general jackson had treated him exceeding harshly, because he did not choose to give the general such information respecting our numbers, &c. as he wished. he also said he met with great insolence on his way up to natchez, where the prisoners were kept, from the different parties of kentucky men, and others, whom he met on their way down "to take a shoot," as they termed it, "at his countrymen." he met many thousands in this manner, so that or , is the very lowest number that jackson could have had for the defence of his lines. i do not remember that we ever had divine service performed during the period of this expedition except once or twice, and that about this time. indeed the activity required of the army at all times, during the continuance of hostilities, almost necessarily precluded it. at this time i remember perfectly the preacher's text was, "my son, give me thy heart." alas! how few of the hearts of his hearers were given at that time to him who only had a right to demand them! i confess with shame and sorrow, that almost any trifle, however unworthy, possessed a greater interest in my heart than he who had formed it, and who alone is worthy of supreme regard.--the good lord pardon this neglect, for christ's sake! the regiments now began to go on board the different ships, as fast as arrangements could be made to receive them; and when on board, they sailed at once without waiting for the others, there being now no danger of falling in with an enemy. the weather now began to grow exceedingly warm, which brought out alligators and snakes in abundance. the latter were extremely annoying, for they sometimes got into our very tents, and one on one occasion so frightened a captain of ours (who was not afraid of man) as to make him sprawl up the tent-pole to get out of its reach, roaring out at the same time most lustily for help. it was killed and put into a bottle of spirits, and i believe he brought it home. it was an exceeding small one, but with the most beautiful crimson, or rather pink-coloured wavy streak running down its back imaginable. we were told it was one of the most venomous of all the american reptiles, save probably the rattlesnake. the thunder and lightning also became very frequent, and the former, i think, the most awfully grand i ever heard. it appeared to roll along just on the very tops of the pine-trees, many of which indeed were scathed to the very roots by the latter. on the st march our turn came to go on board, and we were rejoiced to find that the dover, our old friend was to be our principal ship, the remainder of the men beyond what she could hold being sent on board the norfolk transport. while we were preparing for sea, i took a boat and a party with a siene, and went on shore on a sandy point of the island, where i had not been before, and in a short time caught a fine load of fish, mostly grey mullet, with which we returned on board, greatly to the satisfaction of all those who shared in them. every thing being now ready, we weighed and bid adieu to america on the th april, shaping our course for the havannah, where our captain intended to call for various purposes, but principally to replenish his stock, which had begun to get exceedingly low. on our passage thither we encountered a heavy gale, which detained us longer than we had calculated for our voyage. we did not reach that place till the th. here we found ourselves once more in espana, every thing here being exactly like what you meet with in the mother country,--the same stink of oil, garlic, and dried fish. speaking of the latter, which is called by them bacalao, an officer of ours who kept a journal, when describing this place, says, "the natives catch a great quantity of fish on the coast, called bacalao." unfortunately it is not called bacalao till after it is dried, but piscado. this brought, as it might be expected, lots of laughter upon his head. i need not describe the havannah, because any one who has a gazetteer, may there read an account of it; and which, though perhaps not altogether a correct one, will be sufficient to give him an idea of what it is; suffice it to say, it is an exceeding strong place, and would not, i apprehend, be so easily taken, if the inhabitants are true to their country, as it was in the year . the capture of it at the time above stated, made the place extremely interesting to me, for one of my earliest and best friends served as a lieutenant in the th grenadiers at the taking of it; and often have i heard him expatiate, with great delight and animation, on the scenes he witnessed, and the dangers he encountered, in this most arduous undertaking. he is now, poor man, no more, having died only very lately, and i sincerely trust and hope he is in peace. the moro and the punta, and all the other immense fortifications, attracted my particular regard, on this old gentleman's account; but so extremely jealous were the spaniards, that they would not permit even us, their late faithful helpers and friends, to view the works. we visited the theatre, which is a fine building, but heavy and badly lighted, but apparently well supplied with performers. the piece on this occasion was anthony and cleopatra. there were also some equestrian performers here from the united states. they had built a fine circus, at about half a mile's distance from the city, to which every one of course repaired. all the world was there; even little connolly, whom i had known at cadiz as a major in the spanish service, was here in the command of a regiment, and had attained the rank of full colonel. he did not seem over anxious to recognise any of his former acquaintances, nor even to let it be known that he was so much of a briton as to have acquaintance with any people of that country; in short, he wished to be considered a complete spaniard. i doubt not he is now a rank apostolical. we paid a visit also to old woodville, the famous cigar-maker. he was an expatriated englishman, from portsmouth i believe, obliged to flee his country on account of some smuggling transaction, and, in doing this, he had changed his name. we found the old man ill in bed, but able to sit up and speak with us. he wore an immense long white beard, reaching down nearly to the bed as he sat up. yet this old man had a young black wife, and a whole fry of young mulattoes running about the house like as many little pigs. he was very kind, but apparently not over well to do. we bought each a considerable quantity of his famed cigars, for which we paid him, i think, four dollars a thousand--more, i apprehend, than he usually gets from the spaniards for them. having laid in such sea stock as we could conveniently procure, and having stored ourselves well with the delicious preserves of this country, and withal bought a fine turtle, weighing about two cwt., on the th we set sail for old and happy england, glad once more to set our faces homeward. we had a quickish run through the gulf of florida, or, as it is more properly called, the bahama channel, and, keeping to the northward of bermuda, shaped our course so that we passed a little to the south of the great newfoundland bank. from hence the wind was roughish generally, but quite fair, so that we frequently ran at the rate of miles in the twenty-four hours, the transport being an excellent sailer. nothing particular occurred till we were within a few days' sail of ireland, when we fell in with an american who had just left england. from him we learned the totally unlooked-for information, that bonaparte had made his escape from elba, and had returned to france, and that the whole continent was once more involved in war. nothing could exceed the change which this unexpected news produced among our people. some who were desponding at the gloomy prospect of half-pay, revived in a moment, and again set honour, glory, and promotion, once more before the eyes of their imagination. indeed, i think no one seemed sorry at the change; but some probably would have preferred a short repose, before they were called upon again to leave that home which they had painted to themselves so comfortable and happy. on the ---- we arrived at plymouth, where the good folks received us with great cordiality; but the news from flanders now engrossed all attention, and our unfortunate business seemed forgotten. it was as well perhaps that it was so, for we had no victory to boast; and with the world it is but too often the case, that a want of good fortune is almost tantamount to a want of good conduct. we were ordered on to portsmouth, which we reached in two days; and from thence proceeded still onwards to the downs. our arrival was telegraphed to london, from whence, after some communication by post also with the commander-in-chief, we were ordered to disembark, which we did on the d june. the cause of this being ordered, and of our not proceeding direct to flanders, was, that we were extremely ill off for equipment, nearly one-fourth of our men being without arms or appointments, all those who had been prisoners, and many of those who had been severely wounded, having been deprived of them. in some respects the order for our landing was unfortunate, as far as regards the honours of that great and crowning victory of waterloo, in which we consequently had no share; and, on the other hand, as far as regards my own public accounts, at least it was fortunate for me, for i was thus enabled to have them prepared, and forwarded to the war office, and finally settled without loss of time, which i could not have done had we left england again immediately. we were ordered from deal to thorncliffe, our old quarters, where we found three companies of my battalion, and five or six of the other two. all our old friends were of course glad to see us; and, under such circumstances, the meeting of those between whom friendship has long subsisted, is in a great measure a compensation for the toil and sufferings of a soldier's life. we continued at thorncliffe for some time, but busily preparing once more to take the field; and had bonaparte not been so precipitate in his movements, we might have shared in the glory of his final overthrow. i was compelled to go to london while we remained here, for the purpose of settling a variety of accounts, &c., and while there was persuaded to appear before the medical board, for the purpose of obtaining a certificate as to the nature of my wound, on which to found a claim for a year's pay, the amount at this time given to all whom that board recommended as fit subjects for this bounty. i had omitted doing so when in london before, because i thought no one had any claim for it, except such as had suffered most materially in health in consequence of their wounds. however, at the suggestion of my friends i did appear before the board, who considered my wound of such severity as to entitle me to that bounty; and i accordingly soon after received the sum of l. , s. d., the amount of one year's pay. i have reason to be thankful both to the government and to my friends for this unlooked-for augmentation of my funds, and trust i did not make an ill use of it. but at length the news of the memorable battle of waterloo arrived, and we had no share in it. i know not whether i shall be believed, but i think there were few of my companions in the late expedition but felt somewhat disappointed, and rather vexed, that this decisive action should have taken place so early, and almost wished that the government had despatched us even as we were on our first arrival in england; for really, as it turned out, it was most unfortunate to those of my friends, who had been undergoing probably as severe and hazardous a service as any our army had lately been engaged in, and that all that should be looked upon as almost worse than nothing, while some young fellows, who had never before seen an enemy, should be covered with the honours and distinctions which were so amply lavished on them, merely because they had the good fortune to share in that brilliant and decisive victory. but regret is vain and unprofitable, and a soldier must make up his mind to meet with bad as well as good fortune, or he will only render his life the more miserable. on the th of july we embarked at dover, and on the th landed at ostend; but we were entering only on a barren service, the honours having been all acquired previous to our arrival. we moved forward by the way of bruges, ghent, oudenarde, and mons, and then through bavay and chatelet to peronne; from peronne through roye, pont lant, maxence, and louvre, to paris. here we were posted to the brigade in which our other two companies were stationed, and occupied the champs elysées as our camp. certainly the sights we witnessed in this far-famed capital amply repaid us for our trip to france, however devoid of military glory that might be. it will not be expected that i should enter into a detail of all the lions which this splendid city contains, and which have attracted the curiosity of nearly half the gentry of this country. suffice it to say, we saw the palaces of the tuilleries, st cloud, luxemburg, and versailles, with all the splendour they contain--the churches of notre dame and the pantheon--the hospital of invalids--the garden of plants--the hotel de ville--the palais royal, and the far-famed louvre. in this latter, a person might at that time spend a twelvemonth, without exhausting the curiosities and beauties it contained; but, during our stay here, we witnessed its divestment of nearly all its most valued specimens of art, to the great regret, grief, and annoyance of those who had ransacked almost all nations to decorate this splendid gallery. this was undertaken and executed by our illustrious chief, in the name and on the behalf of this our generous nation. he dealt out with a just and impartial hand, to all who had claims upon this magnificent collection, the specimens of art which had formerly adorned their national churches and palaces, without one painting or one statue of the meanest description being reserved for himself, who had been mainly instrumental in this restoration, or for the nation which he represented. we saw also the triumphal arch of bonaparte, in the place de carousel, stripped of its four matchless venetian horses. the stately pillar in the place vendome was also deprived of the effigy of him who erected it. in short, every thing was done by the bourbons at this period, sanctioned by the allies, to obliterate even the very remembrance of such a character as bonaparte. we visited also the splendid manufactory of china at sevres--the national museum of antiquities--the royal library, and the theatre français, to witness talma's performance of hamlet, with various other places of curiosity, too tedious to notice here; and, finally, the catacombs, the repository of millions of human bones. here it is where man is taught to remember what he is--a worm--a shadow that departeth--even a vapour, which appeareth for a moment, and then passeth away for ever. oh, how does all human greatness dwindle into nothing, while you stand viewing these silent memorials of our frailty! the myriads of generations that have passed away, multitudes of whose bones are collected in this vast, dark cavern! now how noiseless those who perhaps once shook the world with alarms! i love to meditate on this sad scene, which, if duly considered, teaches the soundest wisdom. how apt are we to be allured by the gay fantastic follies of an hour, to forget that we must soon, so very soon, take up our abode in the dark and silent tomb! oh! to be ready, when called upon, to descend into the house appointed for all living! but though these meditations may be pleasing to myself, they may not be so to my reader. i will therefore leave this dark, deep, and capacious charnel-house, and once more ascend with him to the light of the sun. we had not remained long in paris, till there was a grand review of the emperor of russia's guards, and which took place in the place of louis xv., immediately in front of the tuilleries. nothing could exceed the uniformity and the steadiness of these northern warriors. there were troops of all armies amongst them; the cossacks, the hussars, the artillery, the grenadiers, and the regular infantry, all vied with each other in their endeavours to please their beloved czar. here were all the great ones of the earth assembled to witness this imposing spectacle; exhibited, no doubt, as much as any thing, for the purpose of showing the french the power of those who now held them in subjection. but that arbitrary power which is so intolerable to the ideas of an englishman, was here exhibited in all its native deformity. a colonel of one of the regiments, whose movements did not please the emperor, was, without the least ceremony, taken from the head of his regiment, and rammed into a common guard-house, where an english officer was on duty. he hesitated to receive him, until assured that such was the custom in the russian service, and that it was the emperor's orders. my battalion was soon after removed from the brigade it was originally posted to, and joined another, stationed on montmartre. here the adjutant and myself were quartered on a proprietor of the pits out of which the famous plaster of paris is dug. these pits are situated on the side of this hill, facing the city. from hence i often took a fishing, or a shooting, or a coursing excursion. the first was generally confined to the canal del ourq, in which i found pike, perch, and tench. i never was very successful, however, both from the vast numbers of fishermen which frequented this water, and from the scarcity of fish. partridges and hares were abundant in the neighbourhood of paris, but we had not a good dog among us. we obtained leave from the duke of orleans to shoot in one of the royal preserves, the forest of bondy. in our coursing expeditions we were more successful, sometimes bringing in to the amount of seven hares in a day. this would be looked upon almost as poaching in england, but in france it was otherwise; they know nothing of coursing there; and nothing could exceed the beautiful country round paris for that sport; it was a dead level generally, without a hedge, sometimes for miles together, and a rich corn country, so that hares abounded. towards autumn, we had two or three reviews of the british troops; these were splendid exhibitions of the tactics of our great general. but though the army had the appearance of a fighting army, i do not think it equalled the russians in point of regularity and uniformity; with them the whole army is nearly dressed alike, especially the infantry; while the variety of our facings, and other distinctions of regiments, detracts greatly from the appearance of the army as a whole. here also the crowned heads of europe assembled in this city, paid us the compliment of their presence, the emperor alexander inspecting most minutely every regiment and division as it passed him. the austrians and the prussians also occasionally showed themselves in bodies, but i do not remember to have seen a general review of either of these armies; indeed neither of them had a large force in or near paris, they being mostly at some distance from the capital, i believe. but we were often delighted with the austrian emperor's band, in which there were no less, i believe, than seventy performers, and all these the very first-rate musicians. we also had horse-races occasionally, that is, among the english officers; at one of which i witnessed poor old blucher receive a hurt, from which he never recovered. near the winning-post, the course was roped in, which the brave old fellow, as he came galloping down, all life, from the city, did not perceive, and coming up against them with great force, he was thrown from his horse, and unfortunately broke his arm. he lingered some time afterwards, but never got well of it, till death released him. we had two english boxers over there also, to amuse the people; they only sparred of course, with gloves on; and i rather think they realized a good deal of money by these exhibitions. balloons also were set up from the gardens of tivoli, with various other sources of amusement, so that to recount them all would only tire out my reader; suffice it to say, that in paris, with plenty of money, and with an inclination to enter into all the gaieties of the place, no city on earth, i believe, is so fruitful of the means of pleasure and dissipation; but they leave a sting behind, which far outweighs these momentary gratifications; and if i was asked which i considered the most sinful city in the world, i would without hesitation say paris. towards december arrangements were made for the army leaving paris, and going into cantonments on the north-eastern frontier; but the remainder of the troops above the number required for the army of occupation were ordered home to england. my battalion was among the latter number; and, accordingly, we left the french capital on the d december, and marched out to st denis, that famous burying-place of french royalty. from thence we passed near beaumont, through noailles to beauvais, thence through some small villages, where we halted for the night, and on the th reached abbeville. on the th we quartered in montreuil-sur-mer, and on the th reached calais, where we embarked for dover. we landed at the latter place on the d, and the next morning proceeded to our old quarter thorncliffe. all warlike proceedings having now terminated, i made application for, and obtained, leave of absence to revisit my wife and my family, whom i had not seen for four years. i need not describe my feelings on once more beholding those i loved, and the reader will best appreciate them by placing himself in my situation. but i had not long enjoyed this pleasure till i heard that my battalion had been ordered to ireland. i confess i did not much relish the information. when my leave expired i started for that country, and endeavoured to procure a passage across to dublin; first from maryport, in cumberland, but without success. i then tried workington, next whitehaven, but was equally unable to get off from either of these. i then moved on to liverpool, and took my place in one of the packets; but, after waiting several days, i was obliged to start for holyhead, the only place from whence i was able to proceed to ireland. all this disappointment and fatigue, together with some sad punches which a large woman in the coach had given my wife with her masculine elbows, so preyed upon her health and spirits, that three days after our arrival in dublin she breathed her last. she had been in delicate health for a number of years, of an affection in the chest, but she complained mostly of this woman's elbows, which she said had injured her much. it will easily be conceived how afflictive such a dispensation must have been to him who had to bear it. but god does all things well; and even in the midst of our severest chastisements, we should view him as a kind and tender parent, who only chastens us for our good, and who does not willingly afflict the children of men. a part of the battalion had arrived in dublin when the melancholy event took place, almost all the officers of which favoured me by their presence at the funeral. i had her buried in st mary's churchyard, mary being her own name. we remained in dublin for twenty-seven months--a longer period than any other regiment i believe; and here i think i may truly say i acquired the first knowledge of the only way of salvation; for although born and reared a christian, and having, as the reader may recollect, been brought sensibly to the knowledge of myself as a condemned sinner, i had as yet no distinct knowledge or apprehension of the nature of the christian faith; and i think i may, under the blessing of god, attribute my earnest search after a sure foundation of hope to the reading of doddridge's "rise and progress of religion in the soul," and to the truly evangelical sermons i heard from the many eminent preachers which fill the pulpits of this capital, but more particularly to the rev. mr matthias, chaplain to the bethesda institution. my narrative will contain nothing interesting from this period to the general reader. i will, therefore, generalize as much as possible. from dublin we marched to birr, in the king's county; and while here, it was determined upon by government to reduce the battalion to which i belonged, which was carried into effect in january ; but as i was then the senior quartermaster of the regiment, i was ordered to join the st battalion of the corps at gosport, which i did in february. here we remained till september, when the radical war called us to the north. we embarked on board the liffy frigate and ---- corvette, in about three or four hours' notice, on the th of that month, and landed at leith on the th, whence we marched to glasgow, the seat of this unhappy disturbance. i need not describe the radical war, it being well known. here my health began to be much impaired. the affection of my chest, occasioned by the rupturing of the bloodvessel at cadiz, produced most distressing effects upon my general health. i consequently obtained leave, and returned home for a few months. during my stay at home my dear father departed this life; and i had thus the melancholy satisfaction of witnessing the last sad scene, and of paying the last duties of a child to a beloved parent. he was not, as i mentioned at the beginning of my narrative, a religious man when i left home; but towards the close of his life i have every reason to believe he was a sincere penitent, and a believer in him through whom alone our sins can be forgiven; and i have a well-grounded hope that he is now enjoying eternal felicity in heaven, whither i hope myself to come through him that loved me, and washed me from my sins in his own blood, and to whom be praise and glory for ever. amen. i joined again in the spring, and remained there all that summer, during which i had many pleasant fishing excursions into the country. i visited the falls of the clyde, and proceeded to some a considerable distance higher up, where another officer and myself caught abundance of trout. i also took a trip into the highlands of argyleshire, where i had excellent sport. but at the approach of winter i was again obliged to leave glasgow, the damp atmosphere of which, together with the smoke of the numerous steam-engines employed in its manufactories, fairly drove me out. i again went home for the winter; but during this period this battalion also got an order to embark for ireland, and i joined them in belfast in january . from hence we marched in the spring to armagh, where i had the high privilege of becoming acquainted with a sincere and pious clergyman, one of the reading vicars of the cathedral; and i trust i benefited by this favourable opportunity. from armagh we marched to naas, the country to the south having become much disturbed by the whiteboys, as they termed themselves. we did not remain long at naas, but were pushed on to kilkenny, where i first became acquainted with that truly christian minister, the rev. peter roe, a gentleman well known in the religious world. i am proud and happy that i ever had the privilege of knowing him. may god prosper his pious and unceasing endeavours to benefit the souls of his fellow-creatures! we did not remain long, however, at kilkenny, but moved on to fermoy, and thence to newcastle, in the county of limerick, the cradle of the whiteboy insurrection. here we were for a time actually shut up as in a besieged town; and no individual belonging to the army durst attempt to move out without a sufficient number being together, to deter the misguided peasantry from attacking us. innumerable were the murders that were committed about this neighbourhood at this time; and one's blood runs chill to think that these miscreants, when taken and brought to the gallows to atone for their crime, protested their innocence with their last breath, although hundreds around them could attest their guilt. this rockite war gave us considerable trouble, and it was not for a long time after that it was finally put down. we remained in newcastle till september, when we marched to rathkeale, in the same county. here we continued stationary till october , when we marched again for dublin. i had thus an opportunity of again hearing my favourite preacher; but the place was always so crowded that it was seldom practicable for strangers to obtain seats. from dublin we marched to belfast, in september , where we continued till july , when my battalion was ordered for service in nova scotia. the orders of the army being now for only six companies out of the ten to go abroad, the other four remained at home, to form what is termed the depôt. application was made for me to remain and act as paymaster to this body; but it having been decided that quartermasters could not act as paymasters, according to the new regulations, this boon was refused me, although i had acted four times before. this is to be attributed to the ill conduct of many of my brother quartermasters who had obtained paymasterships during the war, but who generally did not conduct themselves as men of honour and integrity ought to do, and many were consequently dismissed from the service. it was perfectly correct for those in authority to consult the good of the public in all appointments of this nature, but it was hard on those who were thus made to suffer for the sins of others,--nay, this ineligibility of quartermasters extended farther than to the appointment of acting paymaster. they have since been precluded from holding the situation of full paymaster, however well recommended they might be. i was a second time recommended, in , by lieutenant-general the hon. sir william stewart for the paymastership of his own battalion, that is, the one in which i was serving, but received the same answer from the secretary-at-war, that quartermasters were ineligible to the situation. i cannot but feel keenly the degradation to which the ill conduct of certain individuals has reduced that situation, which formerly was only like a step towards the more lucrative and more respectable one of paymaster; but, as i said before, we must not murmur at the dispensations of providence, however severely they affect our worldly prospects; and no doubt all this was done by the direction of him who cannot err. however, i have great reason also to be thankful to lord palmerston, notwithstanding my disappointments as above stated; for he--taking into consideration the injury that the present quartermasters had sustained, in consequence of the ill conduct of the individuals before noticed, and their consequent deprivation of all prospects of farther promotion, however eligible in other respects they might be, and however exemplary their conduct--brought in a bill in the session of , to allow these officers to retire on _full_ pay after twenty years' service in the army, provided their health was such as to render them incapable of farther service. this could not formerly take place till after thirty years' service. i have, therefore, abundant cause of gratitude to that right honourable lord, for his kind remembrance of us on this occasion, as well as for his kindness in permitting me to avail myself of the benefit of this act; and i have on this, as on all other occasions, abundant cause of thankfulness to the great disposer of all events, not only for what he has permitted me to enjoy, but for what he has withheld from me; for he only knows what is really good for me, and i doubt not will give me always that. i may with great truth declare, that goodness and mercy have followed me all my days, notwithstanding my seeming disappointments, and which i believe were inflicted on me solely for my everlasting good. to him, therefore, be praise and glory for ever. but to return. having been disappointed of obtaining the acting paymaster's place, i remained with the depôt in my capacity as quartermaster till the spring of , when i received an order to be ready for embarkation to join the battalion in nova scotia. accordingly i embarked, with four other officers, at liverpool, on the th of june, on board the robert burns merchant brig, and reached halifax after a rather tedious passage, in which we encountered some roughish weather on the d july. i scarcely need say any thing of halifax, which, being one of our oldest colonies, must be well known to almost all my readers. neither was i there a sufficient time to enable me to enter into a minute description of the town or country: suffice it to say, it appears to be a town built mostly of wood along the face of a hill, on the left-hand side of the harbour, reaching close down to the latter, which is so deep, capacious, and sheltered, that i question whether there is a better in the world: a seventy-four can lie close alongside the wharfs. the town contains, i understand, about , inhabitants, composed of settlers from different countries, but chiefly english, irish, scotch, and dutch. there are a few negroes, a part of the slaves taken from the americans during the late war having been located here. the colony is not so flourishing as it was during war, as it was then greatly supported by the immense number of ships and troops which always were stationed here. the country round halifax is barren in the extreme, except a very small portion, where hay is generally grown. it seems incapable of cultivation, being little else than rock, with forests of stunted pines, &c. growing upon it. in some parts of nova scotia, however, there is excellent land, which yields a great return for cultivation; and were it not for the severity of the winter, which in this country is both long and severely trying to weak constitutions, it would, i doubt not, be an excellent country to which to emigrate. the waters in every direction afford abundance of fish, but not of the best quality. there are portions of two tribes of indians occasionally in the neighbourhood of halifax. i forget their names; but the men of one tribe are exceedingly tall, being seldom below five feet ten inches, and many reaching to six feet three inches. the men of the other are in general short. both tribes are fast diminishing in point of numbers. they are greatly addicted to the fatal vice of drunkenness, whenever they can command the means of becoming so; and in halifax it is no difficult matter, for the abominable rum which is sold here may be had almost as cheap as ale in england. these unfortunate wanderers have hitherto resisted all efforts to induce them to settle and cultivate the land, although many of them are _good christians_, their progenitors having been converted by the roman catholic priests while the french held the country. the woods, &c. in the neighbourhood of halifax contain little game of any kind. there are a few what they call partridges, which, i believe, roost on trees; but they have more the appearance of grouse than the partridge of england. there are some woodcocks also in the season, but they are rather scarce. snipes also, and several species of plover, may be met with occasionally; but you will seldom be able to fill your game-bag with any thing. there are some hares of a very small description, little larger than our rabbits; but these are rare. bears also, with a few other wild animals, occasionally show themselves; but in winter, i am told, a deathlike silence pervades the whole face of the country, as if every living animal had totally deserted it, and i believe with all the winged tribes this is actually the case. the women here are remarkably fair and beautiful, and, generally speaking, are, i believe, as virtuous as at home; but among the lower orders, whose virtue is so frequently assailed by the temptations which a large naval and military force always brings with it, like our portsmouth, and other places of a similar description, the scenes of vice and abomination are extremely disgusting. a great many of the unfortunate blacks before mentioned are included in the number of these unhappy prostitutes. the places of worship in halifax are both good and pretty numerous. there are two churches, two or three presbyterian or scotch churches, two baptist, two or three methodist, and one or two roman catholic places of worship. i did not remain here long; for, finding that my broken and debilitated constitution could not possibly withstand the severity of a winter in this climate, i was ordered to be examined by a board of medical officers, who recommended my return to england without delay. accordingly, on the th of september, i embarked on board the borodino transport. we sailed on the d, and on the th encountered one of the severest gales i almost ever witnessed. it carried away every sail we had set, and swept away our jolly-boat from the quarter. i often wished i was once more snug in england, and my hope was, i should then tempt the sea no more. that same all-gracious being who had so long watched over me, and had brought me in safety that far on my journey, he also brought me to my native land once more in peace; for on the th of october i landed at portsmouth, having been only three weeks in returning from, while we had been nearly six in going to, halifax. i immediately set off for london, where, having reported myself to the secretary at war, i was ordered to be examined by the director-general of hospitals as to the state of my health, and with a view to avail myself of the benefits of the act of parliament before mentioned, and being prospered by him who has always been better unto me than i could possibly deserve, i have been permitted to set myself down in peace in this my own native village for the remainder of my life, having the unspeakable privilege of being surrounded by many kind and dear relations, who vie with each other in their endeavours to render me comfortable and happy, and where i can in serenity watch the gradual approach of that enemy which my saviour has overcome for me, and which, my hope is, he will deprive of all his terrors, as i trust he has done of his sting, and that, when i shall have continued my appointed time in this vale of tears, i, as well as the reader of this narrative, shall be taken to himself, to dwell with him for ever. appendix. the following are copies of fifteen testimonials addressed to the late quartermaster surtees. no. .--from lieut.-col. duffy. _birr, th january, ._ dear sir, as you are on the point of removing to the st battalion, i take this opportunity of expressing my entire satisfaction at the very regular and orderly manner in which your department has been conducted during the time you have been placed under my command; and it will give me great pleasure should an occasion occur where my testimony to your gentlemanlike conduct can be of service to you. i remain, dear sir, very faithfully yours, j. duffy, lt.-col. rifle brigade. quartermaster surtees, st bat. rifle brigade. no. .--from major travers. _tuam county, galway, th april ._ dear surtees, with feelings of most sincere regret i read your letter to me, which i received yesterday, and lose not a moment in complying with your request, which, should it prove to be of any use to you, i am sure will be productive of the most heartfelt gratification to every one of those concerned, whose opinions of you are, as they always have been, of the highest description. your conduct, both as a gentleman and soldier, has ever been such as to excite in the breast of your brother officers sentiments peculiarly favourable; and for myself, i have only to say, that few of my old acquaintances in the corps have had my esteem in a higher degree. i send you the sentiments of such of your old brother officers, in the shape of a certificate, as i could obtain, whose standing may have some influence in the procuring the accomplishment of your wishes, and regret that the dispersed state of the regiment prevents its being more general. dear surtees, yours faithfully, jas. travers. wm. surtees, esq. quartermaster, rifle brigade. no. .--from officers of the d battalion rifle brigade. the following testimonial is subscribed by us, in hopes it may prove beneficial to an officer who has so long supported the character which we are desirous to portray in the terms it deserves. we certify, that mr william surtees, late quartermaster in the rifle brigade, has been for a considerable number of years known to us in the regiment, and that for soldierlike and gentlemanly conduct, no person bore a higher character. he served in the situation he filled in the corps, particularly that of acting paymaster, for two considerable periods in the peninsula, and with the expedition to new orleans, with credit to himself, and satisfaction to his superiors, and, to our knowledge, obtained the general esteem and approbation of all his brother officers of the regiment who knew him. s. mitchell, brevet lieut.-col. and major, d bat. rifle brigade. jas. travers, brevet-major, rifle brigade. wm. cox, capt. rifle brigade. boyle travers, capt. rifle brigade. chas. geo. gray, brevet-major, rifle brigade. wm. hallen, capt. rifle brigade. t. h. ridgway, m.d., surgeon, rifle brigade. _tuam, th april ._ no. .--from lieut.-col. ross, c.b. _paisley, th july ._ dear sir, i learn with extreme regret that you consider it to be expedient to make application to be removed as quartermaster to a veteran battalion. i have stronger reason to feel this regret than i believe any other of your brother officers, as i have known you longer, it being now about twenty years since we met at the formation of the rifle corps; during the greater part of this time you served, i may say, under my immediate command; and i can bear the most ample and unqualified testimony to the zeal, intelligence, and gallantry with which you discharged the duties of the different situations you have filled in the corps. i shall have great pleasure in hearing of your future welfare; and should it ever happen to be in my power to promote your views in any way, i hope you will consider that you will only have to make them known. believe me, my dear sir, ever yours most sincerely, john ross, lt.-col. major, rifle brigade. quartermaster wm. surtees, rifle brigade. no. .--from lieut.-colonel smith, c.b. _halifax, nova scotia, th august ._ my dear sir, were it permitted a soldier to regret the loss of his comrades, then truly should i deplore yours; i have only just learned that you are about to avail yourself of lord palmerston's permission to retire from the service on account of ill health, after having in your present situation completed your period of twenty years. you have struggled against indisposition with manly fortitude in various climes, and have ever performed your duty zealously and conscientiously. i, as well as the other officers of the corps, have ever lamented that your natural zeal and talent as a soldier, should not have been called forth in a more conspicuous situation; and there is not an old officer in the regiment who has not witnessed your intrepid bravery in the field. i must again assure you, that you leave us with the most heartfelt good wishes for your welfare, and the universal regret of the corps, in which you have served so many years with the most rigid integrity and zeal; and should i have it in my power upon any future occasion to render you any service whatever, it will afford me as much satisfaction as i now feel distress, in losing one of my old companions in arms, with whom i have been so many years happily associated. and ever believe me, your very sincere friend, h. g. smith, brevet lieut.-col. rifle brigade. quartermaster surtees, rifle brigade. no. .--from officers of the st batt. rifle brigade. _halifax, nova scotia, th august ._ we the undersigned officers present with the st battalion rifle brigade, who have had the satisfaction of an intimate acquaintance with mr surtees for a series of years at home and abroad, beg leave to add our testimony as to the valour, integrity, zeal, and gentlemanlike conduct which we have ever witnessed in him; and beg to express our sincere regret at the prospect of losing his society and services. j. logan, major. w. johnstone, captain. a. wade pemberton, captain. g. hope, captain. john cox, captain. j. kincaid, lieutenant. joseph burke, m.d. surgeon. george simmons, lieutenant. no. .--from colonel norcott, c.b. _halifax, nova scotia, th august ._ my dear sir, i most truly and sincerely regret that your long, zealous, and indefatigable duties have so seriously undermined your constitution, as to oblige you to retire from the service. although i feel a very lively gratification in bearing testimony to your merit and gallantry in the field, as well as to your public and private character as an officer and a gentleman, in the most unqualified sense, during a period of twenty-four years which i have known you, i cannot, at the same time, but lament the circumstances which bind me, in justice to your meritorious services, to tender you this my humble tribute of regard and esteem for all you have done for the service and the corps, and for such unremitted integrity and worth. you have my ardent wishes for your health and happiness wherever you go. believe me to be, my dear sir, always sincerely yours, a. norcott, colonel. no. .--from lieut.-colonel fullarton, c.b. _halifax, nova scotia, th august ._ dear sir, having served in the same battalion with you for eighteen years, during which time i had every opportunity, both public and private, in various situations of home and on foreign service, of witnessing your very exemplary conduct, both as an officer and a gentleman, i, with my brother officers, have to regret that your ill health has deprived the regiment of a valuable officer, and your companions of a friend, whose amiable and excellent qualities will ever be revered by them. with regard to myself, it will afford me the greatest pleasure if at any future period i can in any way be of service to you. believe me, my dear sir, yours most truly, jas. fullarton, lt.-col. major, rifle brigade. quartermaster surtees, rifle brigade. no. .--from lieut.-colonel balvaird. _naas, d june ._ my dear sir, it affords me much pleasure to assure you, that during the time i was in the rifle brigade ( years), and more particularly when you served under my immediate command, i can bear the most ample and unqualified testimony to the zeal, intelligence, and gallantry with which you discharged your duty--and wherever you may go, you carry with you the good wishes of, yours most sincerely, w. balvaird, lt.-col. late major, rifle brigade. quartermaster surtees, rifle brigade. no. .--from major-general sir a. f. barnard, k.c.b. _albany, th october ._ dear sir, i have heard with great regret that your state of health has obliged you to avail yourself of the regulation which enables you to retire from the rifle brigade, in which corps i had such frequent cause to praise the gallantry and assiduity which you showed in the discharge of your duties in the field, and your regularity and assiduity in quarters. the officers of the corps, i am confident, will all regret the loss of a person whose mild and gentlemanlike manners and disposition had so much endeared him to them. with every wish for your future welfare, i remain, dear sir, very sincerely yours, a. f. barnard. quartermaster surtees, rifle-brigade. no. .--from major logan. _london, th october, ._ my dear surtees, i have just learnt with much regret that you are about to retire from the rifle brigade, from an impaired constitution, owing to your unwearied and zealous exertions in the service. from the period of my entering the corps, _twenty-two years_ ago, i have had the pleasure of being intimately acquainted with you, and i must do you the justice to state, that a more gallant, zealous, and indefatigable officer, i have seldom fallen in with. as a gentleman, your conduct always won and gained the esteem of your brother officers. believe me i shall ever feel warmly interested in your welfare. yours, my dear surtees, most faithfully, j. logan, major st bat. rifle brigade. to quartermaster surtees, st bat. rifle brigade. no. .--from lieut.-colonel beckwith, c.b. _london, th october, ._ my dear surtees, i cannot suffer you to return to your home, without adding my mite of applause to that of our brother officers, who have, together with myself, known you so well and so long. from the day that we were employed together at ipswich, in obtaining volunteers from the militia, when you were so instrumental in obtaining so large a number of men for the service, and during the whole of our services in the peninsula, and elsewhere, when my situation as assistant quartermaster-general of the light division threw us so constantly together, until the last period of our regimental service, i have always known and respected your courage, your active discharge of your duties in times of difficulty and hardship, and your zeal and affection for the rifle brigade. your present poverty is the surest testimony of your integrity, which you have always kept in times of strong temptation, when very many others similarly placed have not resisted so well. all my feeble services are constantly at your disposal, and wishing you content, and as much happiness as we can reasonably expect here, i remain, my dear surtees, yours, most sincerely, charles beckwith, lieut.-colonel. quartermaster surtees, rifle brigade. no. .--from lieut.-general the honourable sir wm. stewart, g.c.b. _cumloden, newtonstewart, nov. , ._ if the three or four-and-twenty years, my dear sir, that i have had the satisfaction of having had you under my command in the rifle regiment or brigade, suffice not to authorize my full approval of your conduct, both towards that corps and towards the public service, i know not what experience would do so. to this extent and to still farther extent, if it be required in detail, i am gratified by your having given me this opportunity of certifying the above. the loss that my battalion will sustain by the deprivation of your services will be great, and the only consolation that i shall have will be in learning that your present object of retiring on full pay be obtained, and that your health, injured, as my own has been, by perhaps too great a zeal in the fulfilment of our respective duties, may be somewhat amended by your retirement in private life. i have much to thank you for the most justly merited encomiums from your several commanders and from your elder brother officers, enclosed in your letter of the th instant, and to these honourable documents favour me by adding this one. i wish it was in my power to be of any service to your views towards a civil appointment under government, but as your age much exceeds that to which all official nominations are now limited, application for such will be fruitless. i have the honour to be, my dear sir, with repeated assurance of regard, your faithful friend and obedient servant, wm. stewart, lieutenant-general. quartermaster surtees, st bat. rifle brigade. no. .--from major eeles. _dublin, nov. , ._ my dear surtees, i enclose herewith copies of two letters which i have received from the office of his royal highness the commander-in-chief. in congratulating you on their contents, i cannot refrain from expressing, strange as it may seem, not only my gratification but also my regret; gratification that you have succeeded in obtaining the object of your wishes, and regret the most lively, that your state of health should have obliged you to quit the corps; the more particularly, as the regiment will not only by your retirement be deprived of the benefit of your zealous and meritorious services, but i shall lose the society of one of my oldest and most valued friends. the senior part of the regiment will ever remember with pride the glorious occasions in which you so often signalized yourself in the field, while the younger members of the corps will not fail, equally with the former, to admire the gentlemanlike conduct and urbanity of manners which have secured to you the friendship and good wishes of us all. believe me, my dear surtees, very sincerely yours, william eeles, major, rifle brigade. to quartermaster surtees, rifle brigade. no. .--from major-general sir t. s. beckwith, k.c.b. _gilsland, june , ._ my dear sir, in returning to you the packet you have favoured me with the perusal of, i cannot refrain from expressing, in common with all your old friends and brother officers of the rifle brigade, my regret that your health made it necessary for you to retire from a corps, where your faithful and unremitting services for nearly thirty years had been so eminently useful, and where you possessed the friendship and confidence of every individual of any standing in it. that your concern is as sincere as theirs in parting with them, i am perfectly convinced; yet it will be matter of real consolation to you to be able to reflect that you never gave just cause of offence to any member of the corps, and never neglected an opportunity of rendering them a service when in your power. that you have not retired a richer man, is a subject of regret to us all; and we shall learn with great satisfaction of any event, that may tend to increase your means of doing good to those who look to you for protection. should any such opening present itself, i do not hesitate to express my conviction, that whoever may employ you, will never have reason to repent doing so; as i am well assured you will undertake no situation, without due reflection, and the nature of which you do not understand; and that, once taken in hand, you will discharge the duties of it with the same diligence and fidelity that you have performed those of your public life for so many years past. earnestly wishing that a little repose after such a lengthened series of toils and dangers, may restore you to health and strength, i remain, my dear surtees, your sincere and faithful friend, thos. sidney beckwith, col. d bat. rifle brigade. to william surtees, esq. late rifle brigade. finis. edinburgh: printed by ballantyne and company, paul's work, canongate. * * * * * transcriber's notes obvious punctuation errors repaired. presumed archaic spellings have not been changed: apprize, assertor, fusileers, grashoppers, harraing, mocassins, reconnoissance, sailer, siene, shrapnell, spunging, vere, visiters, woful. the following words appear both with and without diacritical marks and have not been changed: camiño, depôt, peña. there are two chapters "iv". the second one is denoted with an asterisk. hyphens removed: "quarter[-]master" (page ), "wind[-]mill" (page , twice), "porto[-]real" (page ), "brush[-]wood" (page ), "death[-]like" (page ), "road[-]side" (page ), "fore[-]yard" (page ). hyphens added: "farm[-]house" (page ), "mid[-]day" (page ), "half[-]way" (pages , ), "field[-]work(s)" (page , ). page xi: "ships'" changed to "ship" (place their ship guns on batteries). page : "apppeared" changed to "appeared" (separate body which appeared). page : " th" changed to " th" (the rifle corps, or th). page : removed duplicate "on" (to stand on the same tack). page : "lhe" changed to "lehe" (bremer lehe to the city of bremen). page : "feversham" changed to "feversham" (i joined it at feversham). page : illegible number changed to " d" ( d battalion of my regiment). page : " th" changed to " th" (in this affair the th hussars were engaged). page : "call" changed to "called" (called the tore alto). page : "pompadours" changed to " th rifles" ( d battalion of the th rifles). page : "bettter" changed to "better" (no doubt better fed). page : "morilhl" changed to "morillo" (thought that don morillo). page : "officer" changed to "officers" (the commanding-officers had been taken up). page : "horse" changed to "horses" (our poor horses and mules). page : "numder" changed to "number" (to put a certain number). page : "chooner" changed to "schooner" (the fire of the schooner). page : redundant "the" removed (blakeny of the th). page : "brough, ast" changed to "brought, as" (this brought, as it might be expected). secrets of the sword secrets of the sword translated from the original french of baron de bazancourt by c. f. clay, with illustrations by f. h. townsend _la pointe d'une épée est une réalité qui fait disparaître bien des fantômes._ bazancourt. [publisher's mark] london: george bell & sons, york street, covent garden; and new york. mdcccc. cambridge: printed by j. and c. f. clay at the university press. preface if french is, as we have been told, the natural language of the art of fencing, it seems a particularly rash venture to translate a french book on the subject into english. this is especially the case when the original is such a work as _les secrets de l'Épée_, which so far from being a dry technical manual, that might be sufficiently rendered by a baldly literal version, is one of those fascinating, chatty books, written in a happy vein, in which the manner of writing is the matter of principal importance. but the delightful ease and artful simplicity of style that captivate the reader are the translator's despair. i have made the attempt for my own amusement, and i am publishing my translation because the original work, which was first published in and reprinted in , has been for some years inaccessible, and because i think it is a book that will interest english fencers. an interesting and appreciative account of the book is given in the introduction to the volume devoted to fencing in the badminton library, together with some criticism of the author. the would-be fencer is cautioned that the baron de bazancourt is 'a very expert literary dodger' whose specious arguments must be studied with the greatest caution. the warning note is no doubt wise in a book intended for the english fencer, for english fencing certainly shows no tendency to be excessively correct, but is rather inclined to err in the other direction. but no fencer who reads the work attentively can fail to derive from it a real profit, and, i hope, a real pleasure. the keynote of the book is that a fencer must fence with his 'head.' bazancourt generally calls it 'instinct,' or 'inspiration.' but call it what you will, there can be no doubt that the continual tax that fencing makes on the resourcefulness of the player gives it its subtle and enduring charm. the unforeseen emergencies that have to be faced, and the varieties of play that are encountered in meeting different opponents, make fencing of all sports the least mechanical and the least monotonous. we are often told that fencing will never be popular in england, because it is no longer required for practical purposes. but does anyone suppose that we are guided by practical considerations in choosing our sports? fencing is a most exhilarating exercise and one that is particularly suitable for those of us who live a town life. a dull day in london may be very sensibly enlivened by a brisk assault. the luxury of getting into flannels is increased by the reflection that for an hour at any rate one will think of nothing but the foils. for no exercise is so absorbing as fencing. whether you are taking a lesson or are engaged in a friendly combat your whole attention cannot fail to be occupied. there is room for nothing else, and on that account alone fencing must be commended as a mental relaxation of the highest value. compared with boxing, fencing has the advantage that it can be continued even into old age. now, however willing one may be to be punched and pommelled, there usually comes a time when it is inconvenient to appear in public with a black eye or a bruised cheek. few men who take to fencing and master the preliminary stages can make up their minds to give it up, until they are obliged to do so for want of time or opportunity. the cosmopolitan character of fencing is another point in its favour. not only throughout france and italy, but wherever french or italian is spoken, fencing rooms abound, and the stranger who visits them is sure to be received with friendly interest and hospitality. fencers are always glad to try conclusions with a new blade, and a very moderate knowledge of the art may often serve as a pleasant and informal introduction in a strange country. the art of translation is perhaps as slippery and elusive as the art of fence. _l'escrime vit de loyales perfidies_ says the baron de bazancourt. he might have said the same thing of translation. i have endeavoured to give a faithful rendering of this book. it has equally been my object to make my version readable. i am conscious of many defects, and cannot hope to have avoided mistakes, but if i have sometimes been perfidious, i trust that i have never been disloyal. i have to thank many friends for assistance and advice, and i am especially indebted to mr f. h. townsend for the spirited series of fencing drawings that accompany the text. c. f. clay. london, _october, ._ introduction [illustration] i. why have i written this book? i will tell you. for of all the subjects that might have occurred to me, this i am sure is the last in the world on which i should have ever dreamed of trespassing. accident, however, is apt to take a hand in the most trivial things of this world as well as in the most important. it is continually responsible for the most unlikely events, and it was in fact by accident that i undertook this work, in which i have collected and jotted down remarks that are entirely my own, concerning an art to which i have devoted myself for more years than i care to remember. i was staying in the country at an old manor house belonging to one of my friends. the litter of autumn, fallen leaves and withering herbage, was scattered over field and woodland. this is a favourite season with poets, when nature before her winter sleep affects a serene and melancholy air, that inclines to reverie and lends wings to fancy. the season also favours sportsmen. coverts in which the game has hitherto found shelter are no longer impenetrable, and every day the wind robs the poor persecuted beasts of some fraction of their shield of verdure. at my friend's house there were no poets, but there was instead a large shooting party. we used to take the field after breakfast, and come home towards dusk, all of us as tired as a man has a right to be when he has done six or eight hours' walking. after dinner we invariably adjourned to the smoking room, and spent the evening in discussing things in general over our cigars. ii. one evening--i quite forget how it came about--we found ourselves talking about fencing. some one's casual remark, as erratic as the blue wreaths of smoke that floated vaguely towards the ceiling, was taken up by some one else, and led to other remarks, which gradually became more definite and finally solidified into a conversation. one can always talk, and one enjoys talking about a subject in which one is interested. that is one of the general truths. and as i have always been devoted to the practice of arms, i found myself talking at some length and expounding some views of my own, which i have tested by practical experience and observation till they have established themselves in my mind as axioms. i was listened to with attention, though there were few fencers present. and after all the art of fence does furnish a most interesting fund of conversation--the art of skilful fighting at close quarters, which implies a knowledge of theory combined with a trained power of execution, which taxes eye and hand, vigour and judgment, and brings into play every faculty of mind and body, each doing its part, and each in turn supplementing and reinforcing the other. iii. "are you aware," said one of my friends, "that these are the secrets of the sword that you are revealing to us?" "only," i replied, "those secrets which i happen to know. but really you have hit upon the right word, for the secrets of the sword are innumerable. it is a proteus in the hand that orders it, and obeys the least motion of the will with the quick docility of an attendant spirit. it can be the insolent and overbearing bully, it can be the wary and diplomatic courtier. at one moment it is all menace, a keen attacking point, the next it changes to a protecting shield. "but alas for our poor faithful servant; to-day the sword and its secrets are almost forgotten, or at least but little valued. there was a time, and a time not so very remote, when a knowledge of sword-play was considered one of the credentials of a gentleman. apply that test now; apply it to yourselves. we have here in this room a large number of gentlemen met together, and i do not doubt that each one of you could make good his title to gentle birth, and that in more ways than one; and yet how many of you would be seriously embarrassed if you were required to manipulate a sword! how many of you, if you will allow me to say so, would make but a very pitiful exhibition of yourselves!" i saw by the smile that went round the room that my remarks were only too well founded. "of course," i continued, "i know the usual answer:--'true,' you will say, 'we may be duffers, but we are not afraid of fighting.' yes, you are not afraid of fighting, that is to say you are willing to be killed by the first bully, who chooses to force a quarrel upon you. brave words truly! but after all is it worth while to be the owner of so many talents, youth and strength, a cultured mind, a healthy body, and yet not even to know how to defend your life? "i am reminded of the story told of a certain general. when one of his officers, who disagreed with him on the policy of some strategic movement, had said:--'well, general, when the time comes i will show you that i know how to die.' 'don't be a fool, sir,' replied the general, 'your duty is not to see that you get killed, but to take care that you don't'." "surely," suggested one of my friends, "the real difficulty is that it takes years of conscientious and continual application to make even a moderate fencer." "quite a mistake, i assure you." "why, only the other day i happened to pick up one or two books about fencing and glanced through them. i assure you, they really are appalling." "there we have it," i exclaimed, "and with that word you go over bag and baggage to the enemy's camp. you are not the first to be appalled, merely because the professors have omitted to caution the reader, that they cannot in the exercise of their craft afford to be otherwise than omniscient, and that their omniscience must be aired. it is because they are afraid of being taxed with ignorance, or of being rated as less men than their predecessors, that they insist on science at any price; science they must have, interminable and unmitigated science, and so they produce their laborious treatises, monuments of erudition, but as you say--appalling. "for my part, after reading and rereading, with the most scrupulous attention, everything that has been written on the subject, i remain convinced of this, that if i were writing a manual of fencing my first object would be to get rid of the alarming jargon of technical terms, which are supposed to be indispensable--a formidable array, quite enough, i freely admit, to give pause to the most resolute, and to blanch the cheek of the keenest aspirant." "ah, you are quite right," said my host with the air of a man who had made the experiment. "how much the art and the professors too would have gained, if they had only studied simplicity, and taken the trouble to make themselves intelligible." iv. the conversation, you see, was getting on. "unfortunately," i continued, "most of the professors who have committed themselves to paper have thought otherwise. they plunge into interminable dissertations on the denomination of thrusts. they use words which, it is true, may be found in the dictionary but which have an unfamiliar appearance. for instance they talk about the hand _in pronation_ or _in supination_, instead of simply saying the hand with the nails turned up, or the hand with the nails turned down. "others have devoted their energy to working out combinations and classifications of feints, parries, and ripostes, distinguishing between them by the nicest shades of difference, and to devising subtleties of terminology, even going so far as to compile and exhibit with the pride of a collector a prodigious catalogue of twelve thousand five hundred strokes.[ ] what memory could possibly contain them? "now i, on the contrary, should have spared no pains to prove that it is perfectly possible to learn the practical management of the sword without a superhuman effort, and that sword-play is worth cultivating as a delightful exercise and one of the finest kinds of sport. "for unfortunately we have to remember that latin, which one uses so seldom, perhaps once or twice after leaving college, and greek, for which one has even less occasion, are considered useful and even necessary parts of polite education, but that such things as swimming, which may on an emergency be the means of saving your life, or fencing, which is one of the most healthy of athletic exercises, the best thing in the world for developing and bracing a feeble youngster, and which enables you to defend yourself if you are challenged by a bully or assaulted by a blackguard, are reckoned merely frivolous accomplishments. and it is generally recognised of course that it is not right to waste time on mere accomplishments. "i mentioned latin and greek, which we all learnt more or less at school. well, do you suppose that the man who is going to make learning his profession carries his studies no further than the rest of us, however scholarly some of us may be? no, of course he must go deeper and examine the remotest bearings of the particular branch of knowledge, which he will presently have to teach. v. "if you want a still more striking analogy, take horsemanship. most men learn to ride, and can as a matter of fact manage a hack in the park without making an exhibition of themselves, or even join the road-riders when it is a question of following the hounds. but do you suppose that the mere man on horseback takes the trouble to acquire the whole art of horsemanship, the severe mastery which the professional requires, the 'high airs' of the school rider? does every one study the fundamental principles, and analyse the nice distinctions, which go to make the finished equestrian,--such a man as the late mr astley? "how few there are who attain or pretend to attain this rare degree of excellence. and yet they alone can tell you how much perseverance, how much continual application, and downright drudgery they have had to go through. for you may be quite sure that perfect mastery of any kind whatever can only be the matured result of extraordinary diligence. yet you seldom meet a man who cannot ride tolerably, and you find that men ride with more or less grace, or freedom, or vigour, according to their natural disposition, and gradually perfect their style, or if you prefer it, unconsciously complete their education by the growth of habit and experience. it is just the same with fencing. "if you would be an accomplished swordsman, you will certainly require years of hard work, close application, and incessant practice. but do you need this recondite skill? what would you do with it? you would find it embarrassing. all that you need as men of leisure, is to be able to use a sword as you do a horse, for your amusement, and when you have occasion for it. and observe i say for your amusement, for no sport is so attractive for its own sake, or so engrossing as the practice of arms." "you are of opinion then," remarked the comte de c..., "that a man can learn to use a sword without devoting to it more time and trouble than he does to riding?" "i am sure of it; but don't misunderstand me, i mean riding in the sense of sticking on. in fact, without driving the analogy too hard, i should say that for both exercises a year at the outside is all that is required to obtain useful and solid results. and i should add that after a few months' trial you will find that you cannot resist the fascination that belongs unmistakably to both these sports. surely that is not too much to ask for putting you into good trim, and teaching you how to protect yourself?" "then, why don't they say so?" some one remarked. "well, i do say so," i replied. "and what is more i will make my words good, if one of these days you care to continue this discussion." i was unanimously called upon to keep my word, and that the next day. "well, to-morrow then," i replied, "i shall do my best to convince you; but you don't give me much law." "what, with twenty-four hours' notice?" "there's something in that--i will sleep upon it--and so--good-night." that is the true history of the making of this book. the following chapters are the record of our conversations, which i have simply put into shape and revised. [illustration] the first evening [illustration: _keep the right foot straight._] i. the next day after dinner we all reassembled in the smoking-room. "well," said my host, "your audience you see is complete, our cigars are alight, and we are ready to give you our best attention." "of course," i replied, "you will understand that i have no intention of inflicting upon you a course of instruction. as far as that goes, the books, especially the two that have appeared most recently, by professors gomard and grisier, have said all that is worth saying, and in my judgment perhaps a great deal more. they give too much good advice, too many excellent rules, too many excellent maxims, too many thrusts, feints, parries, ripostes, counter-ripostes, and so forth. "i am very far from holding with the received doctrine of the necessity or the importance of a great variety of play. i believe that the effectiveness of a skilful fencer depends on the correctness of his inferences, on the alertness and nicety of his judgment, on quickness of hand and precision of movement, whether in attack, parry, or riposte, rather than on a very varied play, which necessitates a much more elaborate training, and so far from being of any real use serves only to perplex the mind. "the alphabet of fencing, if you will allow the expression, is as fixed and immutable as any other alphabet. its characters are ascertained and definite motions, which are combined in accordance with the structure and balance of our organism, the natural action of the muscles, and the flexibility possible to the limbs and body. i do not set up for a schoolmaster, and shall not attempt to teach you this alphabet. i assume that you are already acquainted with it. all that i shall do, or at all events try to do, is to discuss the theoretical principles, for apart from them the material factors are only so much dull and senseless machinery. "i shall try to keep within bounds, and to advance a few simple arguments, to convince you that swordsmanship is neither so slow nor so perplexing as you are inclined to suppose. above all, i hope you will not allow me to forget that this is a conversation. remember that you are at liberty to make any remarks that occur to you. that is part of the bargain." several of my friends assured me that i need have no anxiety; they did not mean to let me off too easily. ii. "to begin then; my first object will be to make my meaning perfectly plain. the thing to do will be to take fencing in its broad outlines. it would be labour thrown away to enter the bewildering labyrinth of those interminable details, which after all are nothing more than the mathematical extension of elementary principles, which may be continued to infinity. "fencing in its infancy had to feel its way; its methods were yet to be found, its possibilities to be explored. little by little, as one period succeeded another and the art became in many respects perfected, changes were introduced, and especially changes that tended to greater simplicity. old theories became old fashioned and were thrown aside to make room for new doctrines. "fencing, in fact, was developed like most other things. but we must not lose sight of the fact that the early methods of the old masters, both in italy and france, date from the sixteenth or seventeenth century, and that the weapons employed in those days differed materially from ours in shape, weight, and function. the change of weapon has naturally led to a change of method. "it would doubtless be interesting to the antiquary to trace the successive changes that have taken place in sword-play, and to compare it as it exists to-day with what it was in , when marozzo wrote his treatise on the sword. (pray excuse my erudition.) the sword of that period was a wide straight blade with two cutting edges. i need not say that marozzo was italian. the first french work on the subject was, i believe, a treatise by henri de saint-didier, which was published in , and dedicated to charles ix. at that time france was a long way behind italy, where for twenty years already the edge had been abandoned for the point. "it is not my intention to retrace the abstruse history of the development of swordsmanship; such an inquiry would, however, prove that in all ages the new truths were invariably denied before they established themselves as accomplished facts. there is no need then, as you will doubtless be relieved to hear, to discuss the systems of antiquity; we will pass over the intervening periods without further preface, and come down at once to modern times. iii. "we are told to draw a hard and fast line between two schools,--probably for the convenience of putting ourselves in the right and our opponents in the wrong. "for my own part, and speaking seriously, i fail to recognise more than one. true, that one may be regarded from several points of view. i can distinguish three very clearly, but these different aspects are very far from being distinct in the sense of clearly defined natural orders. i will describe three kinds of play, which are adopted by fencers according to fancy. "the first is fencing regarded as a graceful athletic exercise, contrived very much on the lines of a ceremonious dance, the interlacing movements of the combatants, as they close and fall back to their original positions, recalling the figures of a quadrille. one might almost say that the simplest example of this method is the single combat of melodrama, the stage duel with its concerted movements, and that it finds its most perfect expression, or, if you prefer the phrase, attains its object in the execution of a series of _voltes_ and _passes_ or dodgy side-steps, a complicated succession of attacks, parries, and ripostes, skilfully delivered, and brought off strictly in accordance with prescribed regulations. "the second is fencing conceived as an exact science. here it is 'the noble art' that calls for profound study and arduous research. the student must explore its truths and consider them in all their bearings, pursue theory to its remotest ramifications, and drag to light its most reluctant secrets. solid hard work and assiduous application, such as science always demands of her votaries, backed by physical and intellectual resources naturally fitted to the task, are the only means which will enable you to achieve this consummate skill, the highest degree of attainment in the art. you will not be surprised when i say that the annals of the sword record but few names of undisputed preeminence, new stars that mark the epochs in its history. "the third is fencing considered from the point of view of practical self-defence. in this case the method is fashioned, so to speak, by personal inspiration, and is impressed with the stamp of individual character. this is the real thing, battle in deadly earnest, complete with all the terrors and sudden crises of warfare. instead of passes ingeniously complicated, and foiled by parries as scientifically elaborate, steel clashes with steel, intent on forcing somewhere a passage for the point. the game becomes a fight, and a fight all the more grim, because the fighting animal is reinforced by science, and chooses from her armoury the weapons that make him strong, rejecting whatever is cumbrous or likely to obscure his 'native hue of resolution.' "we now see the difference between the two styles,--call them schools if you like. one wishes to preserve intact and unalloyed the ancient academical traditions,--i had almost called them the traditions of the dancing master,--while the other inclines to what nowadays we call realism. is that a gain or a loss? at the present time everything tends to realism, but we are not, so far as i know, obliged to admit that the dream is the type of perfect beauty, and the real the type of all that is ugly and bad. we live in a practical age, perhaps too practical. sometimes one may regret that it is so; but what other result could you expect to follow from the convulsions that have so frequently shattered it? the ideal, scared by the noise and confusion of our revolutions, so often repeated, so seldom foreseen, has used its wings to some purpose, and taken flight to a world far removed from ours. iv. "you will tell me that my comment is too grave for my text, but you know as well as i do that small things and great are linked together by bonds, which may be invisible but are none the less real." "every age," remarked one of my friends, "has its own manners and customs. we no longer live in the days when every gentleman carried a sword at his side and as a matter of course knew how to use it. the taste for fencing is not so universal that we are all impatient to be initiated into its inmost mysteries. some of us may not have sufficient leisure or sufficient inclination; we are too busy or too lazy. i believe that what most men think about it can be put in a very few words:--'_we don't want to fight but_--if we must, we should like to be able to show our teeth and fight like gentlemen,' that is all that the average man wants with fencing." "quite right," chimed in the vicomte de g. with a laugh, "we only want just so much of it as will serve our private ends." "all that you say," i continued, "is true, but it is not the whole truth, as you would readily admit if you paid a visit to one of the fencing rooms of paris. if you happened, for instance, to drop in on my friend and esteemed master, m. pons, you would find a gathering of amateurs, who are devoted to the practice of arms, who keep up the traditions with taste and culture, and understand thoroughly well how a sword ought to be used. "but, to be quite fair, i must hasten to add that the prowess and prestige of these brilliant players would not suffer by the simplification of sword-play. the point i wish to make is that a treatise on fencing for the use of gentlemen, who have so little time to spare and so much to waste, is a book to be written, a book of real utility and importance, and indeed almost indispensable. i have put my finger on a felt want, and if you will allow me i will briefly explain how i think such a book ought to be written, and what it ought to teach. i know, of course, that i shall be violently contradicted, but after all--i know that i am on the right track. v. "i have told you that we are asked to make an absolute distinction between two schools of fencing. obviously it is the new school that is wrong, and, as i happen to belong to that school, you must give me leave to defend it, or, at all events, to explain its tendencies logically, theoretically, and practically." "take care, sir," a voice was heard to remark, "those three words are decidedly appalling." "don't be afraid," i answered, "they are not so formidable as they seem at first sight. you will find that if we thresh out the general principles, what i have to say presently will be much simplified and easier to follow. "you often hear men say: 'there is no pretty fencing nowadays. it has relapsed into its primitive brutality.' "not at all," i should answer, "it has come back to its proper object. for consider,--an exercise, an art which starts with the fundamental idea of a fight between two men who are thirsting for each other's blood, cannot be regarded as a mere amusement, or as an academical study in civility and good manners. one might argue with some effect, that to sacrifice the first essential principle of the art to superior refinements, which were really too exclusive, was a risky game to play, and that, sooner or later, the players were sure to discover that fact to their cost. now i should maintain that the revolution, which has been brought about, is a clear advance, and only brutal, if you will have it so, because it is the assertion of the brutal truth. "with the exception of the few who have the ambition to make themselves accomplished swordsmen, men you meet in the fencing room do not as a rule come there to sit at the feet of the professor, and imbibe the mystic lore of scientific theory which he expounds, but rather to be drilled and disciplined in the practical use of the sword which he holds in his hand. "as a young man i was passionately fond of fencing; i worked at it with enthusiasm; my diligence and devotion were untiring. among my contemporaries were several very strong amateurs, really skilful swordsmen, experts worthy of the best days and most glorious traditions of the sword. i am thinking of such men as ambert, caccia, choquet, lord seymour, the marquis de l'angle and others, a group of amateurs well able to hold their own with the most skilful masters. i believe that at that time, and i give you this as my sincere conviction, fencing reached as high a level as at any period in its history. vi. "it was the opening of a new era. hitherto the art had advanced along a narrow track. now the old ways suddenly broadened out. old methods were superseded. fencing was no longer treated as an academical accomplishment, a graceful exercise in courtly skill and bearing, from which originality was barred. it had become something more than the glib repetition of set phrases, that had been got by heart from a book and carefully rehearsed. the new movement, as it may well be called, though it abandoned the perfect manner, which had grown too perfect, brought our elusive art back to regions less celestial, i readily admit, but at the same time brought it face to face with other than imaginary difficulties. "the art received a new impetus. 'natural fighters,' men equipped with abundant energy and assurance, who were convinced that all that was necessary for self-defence was a general athletic training such as they possessed, called the fencer's skill in question. regarded as fencing their style may have been faulty, not to say atrocious, but they confronted the fencer with this logical dilemma:--'you are a master of the sword or an accomplished amateur, i, on the other hand, know nothing about it. hit me and do not let me hit you. that is all i ask. i shall fight by the light of nature and do what i can; you will be strictly scientific and keep to your rules.' "to my mind the only way to silence an opponent of this sort was to take sword in hand, and literally demonstrate to him that he was equally ignorant and incapable. this course, however, did not commend itself to others, who were content to fight this modern hydra, which reappeared every day in some new shape, with--contempt. "the professors gnashed their teeth and swore, though a few of them kept their temper:-- 'is our art then,' they declaimed, 'a mere delusion, a fallen idol? are we to prostitute and expose it to the barbarous excesses of a brutal and ignorant mob? are we to join in an outlandish babel, where every one claims to be heard in his own tongue, some jargon which no one can understand?' "there certainly was something in this line of argument, however magisterially it might be stated. but at the same time it was impossible to deny that there was, wrapped up in these ungainly eccentricities, a real truth, which could not be entirely neglected. for among the noisy crowd, who would have liked to set their fads upon a pinnacle, one found fencers of experience, men who by long training and the use of scientific method had acquired sound judgment and thorough workmanship. these men, it is true, had the courage to trample on the ancient superstitions, and gladly welcomed the widening of the field, which would give ample room, and scope for every kind of bias. "it was clearly a revolution, and declared itself by the unmistakable signs of all revolutions, by its aggressive attitude and by its onslaught on old ideas and traditions, which till then had been thought unassailable. "molière's famous maxim,--'hit and don't be hit back,'--asserted itself triumphantly. truth and falsehood went hand in hand. the thing to be done was to winnow the chaff from the corn, and not reject the whole as worthless. vii. "well, let us now see if we can sum up the real changes which the new school introduced. "as a matter of fact it proposed absolutely none that was unreasonable. its tenets amounted to this:--'a fencer must be judged not so much by his graceful attitude and classical style, not so much by his masterly command of precise execution, as by his power of quickly conceiving and quickly delivering the right attack at the right moment. 'when once a beginner has learnt the rudiments of sword-play; when he has learnt that the movements of hand and body must correspond, and maintain an even balance in every position; that the wrist must be quick to follow the adverse blade and form a close parry, without flying wild and wide in uncontrolled disorder; when he can appreciate the value of a step to the rear and the value of a step to the front; when he has grasped the danger to which he is exposed in making a complicated attack, and realises that the effectiveness of a simple attack depends on the power of seizing the critical moment,--then he should be left to follow his natural instinct, and allowed to exercise his own judgment in making use of the knowledge he has acquired.' "you should not say to him:--'we must now describe an exact circle, beyond which, by thought, word, or deed, you must not budge. you find it a more natural position, and easier for attack and riposte, to lean your body forward and double yourself up. it cannot be helped, you are required to keep the body upright by the rules of classical fencing. 'you prefer to keep out of distance, because you find that at close quarters your nervous dread of a surprise attack or of a quick thrust is disconcerting and disturbs your equanimity. you must not keep out of distance. you are required to keep the prescribed distance and to join blades. 'you are afraid of attacks on the sword, such as beats, binds, and pressures, or of surprise attacks, and to avoid them you refuse to engage your adversary's blade. you must not refuse. you are required to engage swords by the rules of the game; only bad fencers attempt to avoid the engagement. 'you attack in the low lines, perhaps you hit your opponent below the belt. quite true, the hit would be fatal in a duel, but in sword-play it is considered a foul blow; the code does not allow it, therefore the hit is bad.' viii. "this sort of thing is mistaken prejudice. the assault ought to be a sham fight. "it follows that everyone should have liberty of action. do not attempt to force a. to be graceful and elegant, if he is not built that way. permit b. to develope his own style in his own fashion, and do not try to make him a servile copy of yourself, merely for the sake of emphasising your superiority. if he makes mistakes, take advantage of them, that is the most convincing kind of correction. if his play is dangerous but incorrect, show him that you can be at once correct and dangerous. "in short we ask for a fair field and no favour for every sort of style and theory that is based on a study of the weapon. science you know is the result of intelligent application. do you seriously believe that these fencers are devoid of science, because they refuse to be judged by your standard, or because they try to obtain new results, where you persist in seeing nothing but annoying tricks? "you must allow one of two things. either the methods which these fencers employ, their plans of attack and defence, are based on policy and their knowledge of the weapon, and their source of inspiration is the same as yours; in that case they are justified by results, they have teeth and can bite, and are not the easy prey, which you expected to find them. or on the contrary, they go to work without judgment, they let fly at random, and advance or retire without any notion of time or distance, their parries are wide and weak, without any sense of touch, their attacks uncertain, wild and incoherent. in that case they are not dangerous. chance may perhaps protect them once, but you with your experience and skill of course will easily defeat them, and their slap-dash play will lead them promptly into every trap which you choose to set for them. ix. "such is the controversy, the great quarrel between the two schools, the feud between the white rose and the red. i have attempted to explain it to you in its general outlines as clearly as i possibly could. you will find it easier to understand the details, which we shall consider when we continue this discussion." "what will your subject be to-morrow?" asked my host. "i really cannot say," i replied. "it would be difficult to lay down a regular plan. no doubt something will turn up to talk about. and, by the way, this morning i noticed in the library one or two old books about sword-play, and i shall try to find time to turn them over." [illustration] the second evening [illustration: _the legs are springs._] i. it began to dawn upon me that my undertaking was more serious than i had anticipated, and that i had let myself in for some uncommonly hard work; for i should have to advance solid reasons in support of the theories that i had so rashly propounded. i had committed myself to nothing less than the exposition of a system to men who, for the most part, knew nothing at all about sword-play, and could not be expected to understand the meaning of the technical terms. i should have to be clear and precise and ready to answer any questions that might be put to me. i was particularly anxious to carry my little audience with me, because i venture to think that no gentleman's education is complete without some knowledge of fencing, and i consider that parents and guardians are much to blame if they fail to recognise the two-fold importance of this indispensable exercise, which not only strengthens and developes the learner's body, but also insures his life. "ah," i exclaimed, as i joined the company in the smoking-room, where we met every evening, "my audience i see is before me." "you have kept your audience waiting," said my host, "and we have kept an armchair waiting for you. sit down, and begin as soon as you please." "thank you," i replied sitting down,--"i will begin at once." ii. "i remarked, yesterday, that the art of fencing would greatly benefit by simplification, and that it does not require such formidable and protracted study as some of the text-books by their elaborate display of intricate and interminable combinations would lead you to suppose. "the elementary principles of sword-play are four in number. they are these:-- simple attacks. composite attacks. simple parries. composite parries. "here is a table of the attacks and parries:-- simple attacks. the straight thrust. the disengagement. composite attacks. one, two. beat straight thrust. beat disengage. feint disengage. feint cut over. cut over and disengage in tierce or quarte. simple parries. quarte. tierce. seconde. low quarte, or quinte. counter parries. counter-quarte. counter-tierce. circle. iii. "my classification, you see, is not very complicated." "but," some one objected, "you are surely forgetting to name an immense number of strokes and parries; for it is impossible that the long lists of names, which are given in the books, and the directions for the various passes, which have the air of cabalistic formulae and are about equally intelligible, can be reduced to such simple terms." "i am willing to forget them," i replied, "in fact more than willing, for i am convinced that they only serve to distract the learner's mind. the simpler the principles, the simpler the practice. give him fewer things to do, and he will do them more easily, and he will certainly learn to do them in a shorter time. "i have always said that a text-book of fencing, which contained nothing that was superfluous, would not fill a volume but might be written out on a sheet of notepaper, and besides, i would have you notice that several of the attacks, parries, and ripostes included in my list might logically have been omitted, because they are simply different ways of executing the same movement. "for instance, what i have called "_one, two_" is the combination of two _disengagements_, one delivered in quarte, the other in tierce. the _beat straight thrust_ is the combination of a _beat_ on the sword with a _straight thrust_. the _beat disengage_ is simply a _beat_ followed by a _disengagement_. _feint cut-over_, _feint disengage_ are in like manner the different methods, which are most commonly used, of executing the _straight thrust_ or the _disengagement_, the two fundamental strokes of sword-play. "even the _cut-over_ is really a sort of _disengagement_, since it starts from the same position, is aimed at the same point, and may be met by the same parries. the only difference is that the _disengagement_ passes under the blade, while the _cut-over_ passes over the point. the _cut-over and disengage in quarte_ is the same movement as _counter-quarte_, conceived and executed in the one case as an attack, in the other as a parry. _cut-over and disengage in tierce_ is related in precisely the same way to _counter-tierce_. "you see, then, that the multiplication of strokes, far from extending to infinity, may be reduced to very narrow limits. and i am firmly convinced, that if you transgress these limits you are at once involved in endless confusion, which you ought to be very careful to avoid.--you will, i am sure, admit the force of my argument. "the attacks and parries which i have described traverse all the lines which are open to the passage of the sword, that is to say _the high and low lines, the inside lines and the outside_. the fencer whose mind is set free from the perplexity of parries complete and parries intermediate and so forth, understands more clearly the materials that are available for his combinations, and the measures that he must take to meet the adverse attack. "the lucidity of his mind is reflected even in the movement of his hand which goes straight to its mark without hesitation or confusion. speed and freedom of delivery follow as a matter of course. and we must not forget that quickness of hand, combined with what may be called fencing judgment, is of all qualifications the most important, the most necessary, the most vitally indispensable. iv. "we may as well follow up the turn our conversation has taken, and pass under review without further preface the three watch-words of swordsmanship:-- judgment; control; speed. the man who should master these three would be the pattern of the perfect fencer. "well, what of fencing judgment? why in the world should you be afraid of it, as though it were the hundred-headed hydra that guards the sacred portals? what is it but that part of the understanding that we all bring to bear on the conduct of everyday life? nothing in human affairs however trivial or however great can be done without it. "fencing judgment implies more especially distrust, cunning, a wise caution, the power of interpreting the dumb language of the sword, the faculty of drawing correct inferences. these faculties are in the first instance directly stimulated by the master's lessons, and natural intelligence, acting without any conscious effort on your part, combined with experience, will make the good seed grow. do not concern yourself about it. over-anxiety always has a most disturbing effect on the mind. "the other night when i spoke of the alphabet of fencing, i had a special object in view. there is a language of the sword, by which questions are asked and answered. as soon as you have learnt the words you can speak and understand it. to admit that it is necessary to make a separate study of every possible phrase implies that a simple and straightforward method of instruction, which i hold to be of the highest importance, is unattainable. v. "in like manner the faculty of control is a thing that may be gradually acquired by practice. it is the result of imparting a supple 'temper' to the wrist and body, and consists in the knitting up of the various operations into one continuous movement. but, as in the case of fencing judgment, so here, the desired result cannot be obtained all at once. it is the first and most natural consequence of your master's instructions. it comes of daily practice and you must patiently watch and wait for it, as you might wait for a peach slowly ripening on a sunny wall. let it grow upon you like a habit, by slow degrees, till it becomes a second nature. "speed, not of course mere quickness of hand, but the rapid execution of every movement, is one of the fencer's great resources, whether in attack, parry, or retreat. it is to my mind the main point to be insisted on from the very first. "and, accordingly, i think that the master should be careful not to overdo the sort of teaching, that consists in delivering a running commentary such as this:--'steady now: not too fast: take your time about it: think what you are doing: keep your hand in order: mark each motion: at the word _one_,--and so forth: don't hurry, you will go fast enough by and by.' "it is certainly useful to practise the hand by exercising it on the master's jacket, but it is useless to practise it by slow movements. first explain how the stroke is to be executed, and then without more ado make your pupil get into the way of taking it quickly. slowness is convenient, because it renders execution easy, but the ease of execution that is derived from it is dangerous, because it reacts on the judgment and accustoms the mind to lazy ways. your object is, no doubt, to bring the hand under control and analyse the stroke in detail, but if the result of your teaching is that your pupil falls into a sluggish habit you are sowing the seeds of a vice, which you will probably never succeed in extirpating. "suppose you are teaching a child to walk, you are not surprised that his first steps are wavering and unsteady, and that he cannot plant his feeble feet firmly on the ground. you hold him up, but you let him walk. in due time he learns to use his strength, as a bird learns to fly. the young fencer is the child learning to walk. as his knowledge and experience gradually expand, many faults will disappear of themselves, or will be more easily seen and corrected by his maturer judgment. "speed is a mechanical force, unreasoning, unconscious, but a force capable of development. you must add fuel to the fire and not allow it to go out. do you suppose that all you have to do is to change the word of command:--'now do quickly what you have done slowly hitherto'? your new command introduces a new idea and creates new difficulties. "such, speaking generally, are the essential principles of fencing. i cannot say whether i have succeeded in showing you clearly how simple the lesson on these lines may be made, or how far i have been able to reassure those, who have inadvertently opened a treatise on sword-play and have fought shy of the subject ever since, but i am convinced that a course of instruction such as i suggest would produce very good results. "to explain myself more fully, as i am talking among friends and there are no professors present, i will go on to tell you briefly how i should set about teaching the use of the sword. vi. "i should expect my scholar during the first month to give up _half an hour a day_ to foil practice, and after that to keep it up _three times a week_. my first lesson would be devoted to showing him theoretically and practically the vital importance of establishing a perfect concert or balance between the various movements. this is the fundamental principle of all athletic exercises, and applies equally to riding, swimming, gymnastics, and to fencing. "i should make him advance and retire, lunge and recover, taking care not to lose his balance. this first lesson is sufficient to enable the least intelligent to understand the mechanism of the different movements, which are based on the natural and instinctive faculties of the human body. "come, c----," i said, rising from my chair, "unless i am mistaken, you have never attempted to fence. will you allow me to make use of you by way of illustration?" "i shall be delighted," replied c----, "but i shall be very awkward." "perhaps you will be for the first five minutes. it is the common lot from which no one can escape. now place yourself 'on guard'; the words explain themselves:--to be on guard, to protect yourself, that is to say to hold yourself equally ready for attack or defence. "bend your legs. let me use an expression which is perhaps incorrect but which explains my meaning clearly:--sit well down. "your right arm must be half extended. as a general rule the wrist should be at the height of the breast. you will be able later to modify these elementary studies, by adapting them to suit the position which comes to you most naturally. the important thing is to acquire an uncramped easy style, and to keep the body evenly balanced. in this position the sword can most easily traverse the various openings that are offered to it. "i advance on you. in order to get back and always keep your distance you have only to carry the left foot to the rear, and let the right foot follow it immediately. to advance on me, simply reverse these movements. bring the right foot forward and follow it up with the left. "bravo! you advance like a professor. see that you keep your legs bent and the body upright, so as to be always ready for advance or retreat. if you cannot avoid stooping, lean forward rather than backward. by carrying the body forward you are no more exposed than you were before; for the body by its inclined position protects itself, presents a smaller surface, and makes it more difficult for your opponent to fix his point, when he might otherwise hit you; but if you throw the body back, you lose the power of making a quick attack and a quick riposte. are you tired?" "no." "good! that shows that your position is correct, and that it does not cramp your muscles or paralyse any of your movements. you understand, of course, that by standing sideways you present a smaller target to your adversary. "so much for defence. now, for the attack. vii. "in order to attack, you lunge, by carrying the right leg smartly forward and straightening the left, so as to give the body its full extension. "whatever the attack may be, whether simple or composite, the movements of the hand must be completed and the arm absolutely straight, before the lunge is made, though the different movements must follow each other without the least interval. "it is equally important to remember that the recovery must be as smart as the attack. the great danger of the attack is that it should be too intemperate, for a too intemperate attack leaves you exposed to danger, without strength or speed to escape." "but," some one asked, "is it really necessary when you are on guard, to arrange the left arm above the head in a graceful curve, and then swing it down to the leg as you lunge?" "the graceful curve is not an absolute necessity. place the arm behind your back if you prefer to do so, for if you bring it to the front you drag forward the left shoulder, and thereby expose a larger target to your opponent's point. the arm, you see, acts the part of a rope-walker's balancing pole. it steadies the movements and balances the weight of the body. since you have a spare arm you must place it somewhere, and if you consider you will see that it is least in the way where i have placed it. it serves a useful purpose in the general arrangement,--that is the only object of the position. i need not refine the point further. "in fencing, the movements of the body and limbs are of great importance. all the mechanical part of sword-play depends on the principles which i have just explained. i have now taken the mechanism to pieces and shown you how it is put together. viii. "one word more. what was the reason for choosing this attitude and these movements? "they were chosen because they are natural and instinctive. instinct dictated the rule, which is based on experience, on practical necessity, on correct principle. "what is the object to be attained? "first, for defence, to allow the limbs their complete liberty of action, their natural elasticity and easy play; secondly for attack, to give the extension of the body its full force. "now try to change the position; straighten your legs; you will at once notice the increased difficulty of executing the different movements, whether of attack, defence, or retreat. you lose your balance, and the lunge either precedes the action of the hand and the extension of the arm, or follows those movements too late. "the legs are springs which support the body and determine its most rapid movements. if you are out shooting and want to jump a ditch, you bend your legs in order to obtain the necessary spring. or again, if you jump down from a height, you bend your legs at the moment your feet touch the ground; if you do not, your whole body is jarred. "i dwell on this point in order to convince you of its absolute necessity, and to make you understand clearly the why and wherefore of the position. but, i repeat, instinct was the first teacher, experience came later and has only confirmed the principle. "one last caution. when once you have learnt by practice how to harmonise your movements, and have realised how great a power at a given moment the faculty of making these movements with ease and rapidity may be, then, and not till then, venture to take your personal inclination into account. and if after carefully weighing the pros and cons you come to the conclusion that you can, owing to some personal peculiarity, improve upon the elementary rules of the lesson, do not hesitate to depart from them without scruple, but never without good reason. the best position is that which allows you complete freedom and perfect balance. but never forget that all exaggeration is bad, and that nothing can be worse than the exaggeration of an ungraceful and ungainly style. that is all i have to say this evening." [illustration: _keep the left shoulder back._] the third evening [illustration] i. "we will continue the course of instruction of which you have studied at present only the first page; i am going into very minute detail, as you see. "our scholar now knows the different positions, and can appreciate why they are to be commended, and what is to be gained by adopting them. at the next lesson,--and each lesson would consist of not more than three bouts of eight or ten minutes each,--i should show him and make him execute the simple attacks and the simple parries:--_disengagements in tierce and quarte, straight thrusts, the cut over, and parries of quarte and tierce._ the attacks will exercise him in the lunge, the parries will improve the flexibility of his wrist. "i should make him continually retire and advance. i should, even at this early stage, take pains to secure a certain degree of life and speed in his execution, and i should be careful to vary the exercises, and never appeal to his intelligence at the risk of checking the activity of his movements. sluggishness, i repeat, is a deadly foe, against which every avenue must be closed from the very first. "next i should go on to composite parries and composite attacks. i have already named them, and you remember that they are not very numerous. _counters_, _double counters_, and combinations of the _cut over_ and _disengagement_ are the most useful things to practise, because they work the wrist in every direction, and make it both quick and supple. "although a great many instructors would say that i am wrong, i should make it my principal aim to form and cultivate a habit of executing all movements at speed. i should insist less on precision of control than on smartness of execution, and at the same time i should call my pupil's attention to the mistakes which he must be most careful to avoid, and to the points of danger where he must exercise the greatest caution. "i should practise him in retiring quickly, and should make him deliver simple attacks on the march, keeping his blade in position. after a few lessons i should repeatedly place my button on his jacket, if he did not parry quickly enough, or if he was slow on the recovery. in a word i should put plenty of life and go into my lessons from the first, and not allow them to become tedious. "after every lesson i should direct his serious attention to the principal faults i had noticed, and i should make him understand the dangers to which these faults must inevitably expose him. for instance, if he caught the fatal trick of dropping or drawing back his hand, i should take care to make him attack and riposte in the high lines, in order to get him to carry his wrist high, and vice versa. in this way i should exercise his judgment by making him think, and his hand and body by keeping him closely to his work. ii. "above all, the master's lesson must not lose itself in a maze of attacks and parries and ripostes, which in some treatises are as numerous and interminable as the stars of heaven. the strict limitation of the number of strokes to be taught renders their execution proportionately easier, and makes a clear impression on the mind. experience and fencing instinct teach, far better than any lesson, certain niceties, which give life and finish and character to the play. there you have the lesson complete. "as the scholar gradually grows stronger, he learns to hold himself correctly, and acquires ease. he understands what to do without being told, and his hand is in a fair way to become the faithful echo of his thought. iii. "we here touch on another point, where i find myself at variance with nearly all the professional instructors. "i have read in the books which deal with this subject of 'the danger of premature loose play.' 'you run the risk,' say some, 'of spoiling a promising pupil, and of arresting his future progress, just when he is beginning to form good habits.' others go further and declare that: 'the instructor who allows his pupil to commence loose play too soon sacrifices by an act of fatal indulgence the whole future of fencing.' "i do not agree with this view. i cannot even see that it logically applies to those who mean to devote all their time to the study of sword-play, and who are prepared to make a determined effort to reach the topmost summit of this difficult art. much less, then, to my mind, is it applicable to the generality of men, who have no ambition to become such learned fencers, as we were saying the other evening. the professors wilfully refuse to see this. "and yet of all arts, the art of fencing may be considered from the most widely different standpoints, and particularly may be approached with very varied degrees of knowledge and application. is it so very certain that 'premature loose play,' as the professors love to call it, is so pernicious as they think,--the bad seed that cannot fail to produce an evil crop of vices? right or wrong, i can only say once more that i am of quite the contrary opinion. "i fail to see that it is dangerous for a pupil to attempt the assault, when he has learnt by taking lessons for a month,--more or less, according to the progress made and his natural capacity,--to understand the various strokes i have described, and can already execute them with some degree of liveliness and control. iv. "of course i am quite ready to admit that his first assaults, like all first attempts that require a trained habit of mind, cannot be free from mistakes, exaggerations, faults of all sorts. but is not the master there to correct these errors with his lesson, and to bring his pupil, who is inclined to go astray, back to the right path? cannot the leading strings be readjusted? "the very fact that the master has had an opportunity of observing the mistakes, to which his pupil is most liable, when left to himself, enables him to devote all his care to overcome and correct them by both practice and precept. more important still, he has also had an opportunity of observing his pupil's bias; he notices the strokes which come naturally to his hand, the parries he most affects, the natural promptings of his impulse, impetuous or cautious as the case may be. he makes a study of his artless scholar, who is clumsily feeling his feet, reads him like a book, catches him in the act so to speak, and detects the working of his character, and thenceforward he knows the way in which his studies may be most profitably directed to give full play to his individual temperament. "the assault teaches the novice what no amount of lunging at the master's pad can drill into him. it enters him to the sudden emergencies, which in one shape or another arise at every moment, to the movement and exertion and keen emulation of real fighting. the assault is in fact a lesson subsidiary to the formal lesson, and you may rest assured that the instruction it conveys is equally salutary." v. "then," smilingly remarked the comte de r., "you are for open war with the existing routine?" "and with the old traditions. yes, i am afraid i am. but what can i do? you admit the force of my arguments?" "certainly." "and that fencing taught on my plan loses its terrors?" "yes, i quite admit that." "and in fact it is not really formidable. my system is able to satisfy the requirements of all, and i do not overshoot the mark, by over-anxiety to reach it. "it is most important to bear in mind that it is not necessary or even desirable to attend all the professor's lectures, to pass all the examinations and finally to qualify as bachelor of arms in order to become a fair ordinary fencer. after all in every art one usually admits the professor's right to dictate the elementary principles of his subject, but after the elementary stage is passed we are not, i believe, always ready to accept the professor's estimate of the importance of the art which he happens to teach. the remark applies equally to music, to painting, to literature, and why not to fencing? poets we know are nothing if not first-rate, but why should fencers be singled out for this invidious distinction? "you may judge how firmly my own belief is rooted, when i say that i am as strongly convinced of the good results that follow from 'premature assaults,' as i am of the necessity of making the lesson as simple and as clear as possible. vi. "i remember a story told by my friend, m. desbarolles, an artist who is endowed more liberally than most of my acquaintance with the warm artistic temperament. it is to be found in one of his neatly written essays. he had, it seems, studied fencing for two years under a french master, in germany i think, when he paid a visit to m. charlemagne, one of the most famous instructors of the day, to whom he had an introduction. "he fenced before the professor, and when the bout was over expected to be complimented, under the impression that he had done rather well. 'will you allow me, sir, to give you a word of advice?' asked the great man. 'by all means,' replied my friend. 'then, let me recommend you to give up loose play altogether for at least a year, and confine your attention entirely to the lesson.' "good heavens, what amazing perversity, what pompous humbug! m. desbarolles remarks that he was utterly taken aback, and i can well believe him, but he goes on to say that he accepted the master's verdict, and never had reason to repent it. "if he had not given his word for the fact, i should certainly have ventured to hope, most sincerely, that his sense of humour was sufficient to save him from following such a piece of advice to the letter, and in any case i am sure that it was quite unnecessary for him to do so, in order to become the charming fencer that he is and one for whom i have the warmest admiration. "do not tell me that the quickness of hand and rapidity of movement, the alertness of body and mind required in loose play, can be imparted by the lessons of a skilful instructor, if only he is careful to graduate his instruction in proportion to his pupil's progress. the result is mere clock-work with the professor for mainspring, counterfeit vitality set in motion by the word of command; a most mechanical use of the intelligence. the pupil cannot go wrong because he is tied to his master's apron-strings. the master's sword shows him exactly where to go with the precision of a finger-post. he is like a man swimming in a cork jacket, practising the motions of swimming at his leisure, and not caring in the least whether these motions would really support him on the surface or let him sink to the bottom. "that the formal lesson is useful i do not doubt, that it has a monopoly of usefulness i emphatically deny. why allow it to meddle with and domineer over things which do not concern it? let it keep its place and refrain from trespassing outside its own dominions. "the lesson can explain the logic and theory of fencing, it can assign reasons and exhibit the mechanical process, but it cannot deal with the great unknown, the tricksy spirit, which suddenly starts out on the fencer under every shape and form, always assuming some new disguise and upsetting in a moment the most perfect theories and the most scientific combinations. "the young fencer who undertakes his first assault is like the heroic youth of the fairy tales, who leaves his humble cottage and goes out into the wide world to seek his fortune. like him he will meet with many strange adventures, which will try his mettle, put his character to the touch, and call into play all the resources of his intelligence. vii. "perhaps you think that by continually presenting this question to you in a new light i am detaining you too long on one part of my subject. my intention is to bring home to your minds the conviction i so strongly feel myself. if you only knew how many striking examples i have witnessed of the truth of my assertion! "you may see one of these pupils taking his lesson. he is a magnificent spectacle; his hand perfectly correct, a grand lunge, his action smooth and free; he follows his master's blade through a cunning series of feints and false attacks, ripostes and counter-ripostes, his parry is never beaten; not a fault, not a single mistake; he is an animated illustration of his master's treatise, which the author with pardonable pride displays before you. "now in the assault pupils of this type are far from maintaining their superiority. their mechanical agility is paralysed, when it is no longer set in motion by the accustomed spring. they know too little and at the same time they know too much. they find out that the assault is not the same thing as the lesson. their opponent's blade does not accommodate itself to theirs with the precision to which they are accustomed; the touch of the steel no longer conveys those delicate hints, to which they formerly responded with such alacrity, and of course they lose their bearings. they have not acquired the sort of defence which is ready for anything, alike for well directed thrusts and for more eccentric methods of attack, and they look in vain for a succession of passes strictly correlated in a systematic order. "instead of marching with a swing along the broad highway to which they are accustomed, they find themselves lost in a wild and difficult country without a guide and without confidence. habit will perhaps enable them to maintain some smartness of appearance, but they make few hits, and in spite of their science and the skill, which they undoubtedly possess up to a certain point, they are continually beaten by fencers, who are less scholarly perhaps, but who have been better entered than they to the actual combat, the manifold emergencies of practical fighting, and who have learnt that strange language, by which the sword contrives to reveal the most delicate shades of meaning. "i have seen this happen so often, that i have taken some trouble to study the question, and i am convinced that if these same pupils had been at less pains to make themselves pedantically perfect in the peaceful and philosophic practice of the lesson, and had been made familiar at an early stage with the changing incidents of the assault, they would have been equally well disciplined, and at the same time really dangerous fencers. of course i freely admit that exceptions may sometimes be found, but they are the exceptions which prove the rule. viii. "we have now reached a point from which we may survey the thrilling spectacle of the assault, as fencers call the mimic combat, in which desperate and brutal fighting is controlled by skill, the hazardous duel, full of fire and fury, between two combatants, who summon to their aid all that they know or all that they think they know. "i can say with literal truth, that i have never taken a foil in my hand for a serious assault without feeling a real tremor, and most fencers have experienced and indeed are generally conscious of the same sensation. "you have listened so kindly to my rough attempt to put together an extemporary course of instruction, that i can confidently claim your attention now; for we are about to find in this great arena the rival systems face to face. i shall put before you and examine at no great length the various situations which are likely to occur. "our imaginary pupil has now become a fencer. he will no longer lunge merely at the master's pad, henceforward he will cover his manly face with a mask. shall we follow him in his career?" "we will"; replied my host in tragic tones. "the standard of revolt is raised. lead on, and we will follow you." "'tis well," i answered in the same spirit. "the tryst is here, at the same hour,--to-morrow." [illustration: _a parry of prime._] the fourth evening [illustration: _coup double._] i. the next day i continued my discourse thus:-- "in the assault with its incessant alarms and perilous crises, in encountering the wiles and avoiding the snares of the enemy, those who use the sword find their 'crowded hour of glorious life,' the hour crowded with illusions and disenchantments, the rubs of fortune, the ups and downs of victory or defeat. "what legions of cunning counsels and crafty wiles, from the deep-laid stratagem down to the sudden surprise, one finds marshalled in the text-books, and how unmanageable and superfluous they generally are. all that the spartan mother said to her son when he was setting out for the wars was:--'be bold, be resolute, be cautious.' do not her words contain the whole? for all fighting, whether at long range or at close quarters, is very much alike, from schoolboys' games to the most elaborate military operations; and all the advice of the world may be summed up in the eternal law of attack and defence, which is stated in these four words:--cunning, caution, energy, audacity. "deceive your enemy: seize the critical moment to attack him, that is the secret of fighting. cultivate the mistrust which suspects the hidden snare, the caution which frustrates his plots, combined with the energy and audacity which surmount difficulties; try to encourage in your enemy a spirit of wanton confidence; turn a strong position which you cannot carry by a direct attack; threaten one point when you mean to concentrate your whole strength on another; draw your adversary by a show of weakness to attack you in your strongest position; keep your plans secret; mask your approaches; and then by the sudden impetuosity of your attack take him unawares, and if you cannot secure a victory, contrive a safe retreat. such from the earliest times have been the methods of the greatest commanders. "the tactics of the field of battle and the tactics of hand-to-hand fighting are identical, for the simple reason that skill, or strategy, or science, call it what you will, are but different names to express the same idea. these are the sage counsels; the rest belongs to inspiration, the inward monitor which in moments of danger warns us with tenfold insistence, and guides us right. "too much stress is laid on education, too little on individual intelligence. the lessons are supposed to have trained and directed this intelligence. but if your pupil is so wanting in intelligence that he cannot enter into the spirit of the game, if he can never rise to the occasion, and never strike out a line of his own, what can you expect? you may advise for ever, but his mind will not respond, he will only listen and forget. "it is here that the two schools begin to part company. i have already given you a general view of the points in which they differ, and we need not now recur to the consideration of general principles, with which you are already acquainted. ii. "if we could return to the past, and witness an exhibition of sword-play as it was understood by the professors of only fifty years ago, what a contrast we should find with the style of our own day, even with our most severely classical style. our methods would certainly be called revolutionary. "it was usual not so very long since to display upon the bosom a fair red heart, stitched to the fencing jacket, to show plainly for all eyes to see the spot where hits should be placed. attacks, parries and ripostes were restricted by convention to a very narrow circle. any hit that went wide of the mark was accounted execrable and received with the most profound contempt. modern fencing is inclined to be somewhat less fastidious. hits in the low line are generally acknowledged. but a hit below the belt! 'you really do not expect me to follow your point down there!' is still the attitude of most fencers. 'call it a hit if you like, but really it is not fencing. a school of arms, you know, is not a school of surgery, you might leave those base regions to the medical students.' "you smile, but i assure you that they mean it seriously, without the least sarcasm. it is quite true that any wound in that despised region would be mortal almost to a certainty. that is a detail; and they forget that a sword, though it may be a civil and gentlemanly implement, is still a lethal weapon. it really is very strange to admit that it is wrong to disregard the deadly character of the point when aimed in one direction, but to claim that it is right to disregard it when aimed in another. yet most men cling to this error with the utmost pertinacity. "that you should despise a hit in the leg or fore-arm i can well understand. by all means concentrate your whole attention on the protection of the parts of the body which contain the vital organs. but not to use your utmost care, your surest parries, your most anxious precautions to defend the trunk,--high lines and low,--always has been and is still a delusion, a delusion which those who attempt to draw an impossible distinction between the assaults of foil-play and real fighting with sharp swords, vainly ask us to accept as an unassailable article of faith. "there is a real distinction, for after all foil-play can only be an imperfect representation of real fighting. our object should be to make the resemblance as perfect as possible, and so minimise the chances on which the ignorant and brutal too confidently rely. "let them see that you both know the correct answer to a correct combination, and that you are equally prepared to deal with the wild and disorderly antics of an untutored point. iii. "you may often hear men say:--'i do that in the fencing room, i should be very sorry to attempt it in a serious fight.' "then why attempt it at all? if your judgment tells you that the stroke is good, it is good for all occasions. if it is bad it cannot be justified in any case. "always bear in mind that you must pay attention to all thrusts which might prove fatal in a serious encounter, and then if some day you have the misfortune to find a real sword in your hand, you will have the satisfaction of knowing that you are fore-armed by habit against known and familiar dangers. i cannot emphasise this point too strongly. "in short, the refusal to acknowledge hits however low is a dangerous and a gratuitous mistake. why should a thrust aimed in that direction not be of its kind as brilliant and meritorious as another? why should it be boycotted? is there any reason for this mysterious taboo?" "the old master who used to teach us fencing at school," remarked my host, "would fall foul of you with a vengeance, if he heard you talk like that." "i do not mean for a moment," i replied, "that i have any preference for hits in the low line, but rather that i am more afraid of them, because i have fenced too often with fencers good and bad not to know how necessary it is to be on one's guard against the dangers of wild play. "for instance, those who make a practice of straightening their arm as they retire nearly always drop their hand, and the point of their weapon, whether they wish it or no, is necessarily directed towards the low line. it is equally inevitable that the same part should be threatened by those who rightly or wrongly reverse the lunge by throwing the left foot back on your attack, at the same time stooping forwards, so as to let your point pass over their head; and ignorant fencers nearly always hit you there, quite innocently and unintentionally. "you should therefore guard that part of the body as strictly as you guard the chest, and, by a parity of reasoning, when you meet an adversary who neglects to protect the low line annoy him in that region frequently. iv. "it often happens that things that are most neglected in one age become the ruling fashions of the next, just as things once highly honoured may often fall into complete discredit. "take this instance. in an old and dusty folio, entitled '_académie de l'espée_[ ],' which i discovered yesterday banished to the darkest corner of the library, i found several pages entirely devoted to the art '_of delivering a stroke with the point at the right eye_.' the point is specified because in those days cuts and thrusts were held in equal favour. "what do you say to a thrust in the eye? and yet if you will consult my folio you will find a collection of plates illustrating all the passes by which this brilliant stroke may be brought off. "you know what is thought now-a-days of a hit in the face, that is to say on the mask; we are taught,--again quite wrongly,--not to take the smallest notice of it. and this leads me to hope that some day we may yet see a revolution, by which the vulgar belly will claim its rights and in its turn drive out the lordly bosom. it will be rated too highly then, as it is too much degraded now. but when did revolutions ever know where to stop? "for the assault the one thing needful is self-reliance. trust to your own resources, and do not imagine that you have to repeat word for word the lesson that you have got by heart from your book, but rather look for inspiration to the resources of your native wit. v. "if any one came to me for advice, the course i should recommend, not as a hard and fast rule, but in a general way, would be something of this sort:--act as much as possible on the defensive, keep out of distance, in order to prevent your opponent from attacking you without shifting his position, and in order to compel him to advance on your point, the most dangerous thing he can do, and without a doubt the most difficult art to acquire. if you make up your mind to stand your ground whatever happens, and to attack always in exact measure, instead of retiring and advancing with quick and irregular movements, and instead of trying to surprise and overwhelm your adversary with combinations for which he is unprepared, you are to my mind simply acting without the least judgment, or rather you are making a perverse blunder. "then i should go on to say, always supposing that i was asked for my opinion:--make a practice of stepping back as you form the parry, if only half a pace. there is everything to be gained by it, and there is no objection to it that i can see, unless it be the strong objection that your opponent will feel to being considerably embarrassed on every possible occasion. "the advantages, on the other hand, are manifold. by stepping back you increase the effectiveness of the parry, because by withdrawing the body you, in a sense, double the rapidity of the hand. if the attack has been delivered with sufficient rapidity to beat the parry, by retiring you parry twice, the first time with your blade, with which you try to find your adversary's weapon, the second time by removing the body to a greater distance, with the result that the point, which would have hit you if you had stood your ground, does not reach your chest. "by employing this manoeuvre against simple attacks you counteract rapidity of execution, and by employing it against composite attacks or against feints you encounter the last movement forcibly. it is also of service in screening one from attacks made by drawing back the arm, for it often happens if you stand your ground, that your hand starts too soon, and your sword encounters nothing but empty air. it has the further advantage of increasing the fencer's confidence in himself. "do not imagine that it hinders the riposte. it renders it easier and more certain. nearly always, when a fencer has lunged right out, and--as often happens--does not recover immediately, the two opponents are so close together that it is very difficult to get in the riposte without shortening the arm, and so giving an opportunity for a _remise_. "the parry and riposte without breaking ground are certainly of value, i do not dispute that, but against the fencers of all sorts, whom you have to meet, and who offer all sorts and kinds of difficulty, they should not be employed except occasionally, and only when they are almost certain to succeed. to my mind it would be dangerous and unreasonable to adopt them as the systematic basis of your play. vi. "my reason for insisting so strongly on this point is that i have nearly always found that it is thought to be very magnificent to stand up to the parry, whereas breaking ground is regarded as the shift of a man hard pressed, a last resort when the hand has proved too slow, or when it is necessary to retrieve an error of judgment. "now my plan provides you with a second line of defence, without infringing any of the recognised canons; it is consistent with the most classical style, and with perfect control of your weapon. and one may well ask why, when two chances of safety are at your disposal, you should deliberately resolve to avail yourself of only one of them? "i should accordingly reverse the usual advice, thus:-- 'as a general rule and on principle break ground as you parry, either by a few inches or by a clear pace, according to the momentum of your opponent's attack, for by breaking ground i do not mean to say that you are to avoid a hit by continual and precipitate bolting. 'sometimes stand firm, but only when you are sure that you have at last induced your opponent to develope an attack, which you have long been waiting for him to make.' vii. "unless i know my man, or have come to an understanding with him beforehand, i have very little faith in a prolonged concatenation of parries, ripostes and counter-ripostes, and here again i should try to relieve the mind, as much as may be, from an unnecessary burden, by getting rid of complications instead of multiplying them. "i look at it in this way. if a fencer has to concern himself with the different lines in which he may be attacked, he must be in a state of continual suspense. he will be continually asking himself whether the attack is coming in the inside line or the outside, in the high line or the low. thus, in order to parry to advantage and correctly he must wait until his enemy's object is clearly disclosed. take the case of a simple attack promptly executed; it is obvious that the attacker must gain a considerable start. true, there are a few fencers, but very few, gifted with so fine a sense of touch, that they can divine their adversary's intention, and read his inmost thought. "less gifted mortals should be content with a parry which mechanically traverses all the lines. such a parry must of necessity encounter the adverse blade forcibly in whichever line the enemy has selected for his attack. when once you have acquired this universal parry the strain is lessened, your mind is more at ease, you are more sure of yourself and feel that you can act with certainty and decision. viii. "there are two kinds of parry, among those which i enumerated the other day, which answer this purpose equally well. the first consists in combining the parry of _tierce_ or _counter tierce_ with a _cut over_ and beat in _quarte_; the second in parrying _counter tierce_ and _counter quarte_ in succession, and vice versa, or _counter quarte_ and _circle_. "these covering parries though they are technically composite, in practice are fairly simple, and rapidly pass through all the lines that are open to attack. choose the one which you prefer instinctively, which is another way of saying the one that comes most naturally to your hand. or, if you like, use sometimes one, sometimes the other." "but what if this parry is deceived?" asked the comte de r. "well," i answered, "'deception no cheating' is the fencer's motto. there is no such thing as an attack that cannot be parried, or a parry that cannot be deceived. sooner or later the fatal moment comes, and superior activity or superior cunning prevails. "if any professor can invent an attack which it is impossible to resist, or a parry which it is impossible to deceive, i should advise him to take very good care to secure the patent rights of his invention without a moment's delay. he would certainly have no difficulty in floating a company to put it on the market in all the capitals of europe. "i have already expressed my opinion that a fencer's strength lies much more in presence of mind and in quickness of hand than in a very varied play. this is so true that the majority of fencers, amateur and professional alike, affect certain favourite strokes; they have favourite attacks, favourite parries and ripostes, and always come back to them as to old friends on whose services they can confidently rely. in the course of an assault the same stroke is often repeated in many different ways; the shape it takes changes with the changing incidents of the fight, and accordingly as it is adapted to suit the peculiarities of the individual against whom it is employed. that is the great beauty of a stroke in fencing. "some of you, i know, are not fencers, but there are one or two connoisseurs present, who have studied the art, and are experts. it is to them that i now appeal. as an illustration of my argument i will take the most simple parry, the parry of quarte, and i will ask them if it is not the fact that it constantly changes and undergoes surprising transformations? sometimes it is a light touch, sometimes a vigorous, almost a violent blow; it may form a high parry, it may form a low parry, it serves for every purpose and answers every call that can be made upon it. watch the blade as the parry is formed;--perhaps it just meets the adverse blade and suddenly quits it or it may hold and dominate it. "it is this power of varying the stroke and transforming it at will that marks the true fencer. "the man, i repeat, who is content to recite his lesson by rote, however well he has learnt it, can never be anything more than a school-boy; call him that or an accomplished parrot, whichever he prefers. ix. "i was reading one of the ancient treatises, which are reposing peacefully on your dusty shelves, my dear c., when i came across the following passage, which rather struck my fancy:-- _the law of defence declares that your motions should be the natural motions of a man's body. but, however sacred the dignity of law may be, nevertheless you ought to consider that necessity knows no law, and that it overrides even the weightiest laws of human contrivance._ "that was written in . the maxim is a trifle too sweeping for general application, but it seems to me to be a good and serviceable maxim when applied to sword-play. "my remarks are perhaps somewhat disconnected. i am simply giving you my ideas at random, as they occur to me. but my main object is to direct your attention to the points which appear to me of some importance. "after the parries come the ripostes. on this subject a few words will suffice. never forget that the parry and riposte are twin sisters, whose lives are so closely bound up in each other, that they cannot exist apart. riposte and parry ought to be so closely allied that the riposte may seem to be the second part of the parry. therefore, as a general principle, riposte direct, in the line in which you have found the blade. changing the line wastes time, and gives your adversary an opportunity to pull himself together and make a _remise_ or renew the attack. never, on any consideration, allow yourself to draw back your arm, for then your riposte is lost,--as well throw your purse in the gutter. "if your judgment tells you that your adversary is waiting for your direct riposte, and has attacked you with the object of drawing it, or if you have noticed that he covers himself effectively on that side, while he leaves you a clear opening elsewhere, then avoid the trap by a disengagement or a cut-over; but only make one feint, never more than one. for, if you do, though you may succeed once, you will probably find out later that your success was dearly bought. it is always wise, you know, to count the cost, and economise your resources, unless you wish to take the straight road to ruin. x. "our chat to-night," i remarked after a moment's silence, "if it has not been very long, has at least been very serious. i only complain that you have not sufficiently interrupted me." "we have been listening to you," said the comte de r., "very attentively, because you warned us of the importance of your subject." "very well, my dear r.," i replied. "now just imagine you are in court, and let us hear how you would sum up the case for the benefit of the jury." "i fancy i can do that rather well," answered r. "let me try:--the lesson, you say, is the school-room, the assault is the fencer's career, a free field for enterprise, where he must stand or fall by dint of his own unaided genius. the only counsels, which are worth anything, are those which have governed attack and defence from time immemorial. for attack, the union of desperate energy with cool and calculating caution; for defence, firmness, wariness, self-reliance. "then, passing from the general question to points of detail, or execution, i should add:--it is a great mistake, a piece of inconceivable folly, to have boycotted, to use your own expression, hits in the very low lines, because the fencer is prevented thereby from acquiring the habit of strictly guarding those parts of the body, where in a serious encounter any wound would probably prove fatal. "as a general rule step back as you form the parry, to make assurance doubly sure, and to give greater freedom to your riposte. stand your ground only when you think you have judged the stroke to a nicety, and when you hold your adversary in a tight place, from which he cannot escape." "i am infinitely obliged to you, my dear r.," i remarked. "you have summarised most excellently the points that i have worked out in detail, and you have exactly caught my meaning." "very good of you to say so," answered r., "but let me finish:--in order to keep your wits about you, and to avoid trying to think of too many things at once, adopt as a rule a universal parry, which will cut all the lines, and must meet and drive away your opponent's blade. always riposte direct, and be careful on your riposte to avoid making feints which expose you to a _remise_ or to a renewal of the attack. does that satisfy you?" "you have taken us over the ground most admirably, my dear professor. to-morrow, i propose to discuss the attack, and in this connection we shall have to consider what is usually called '_le sentiment du fer_,' the fencer's sense of touch. "to this sovereign principle we are asked to swear allegiance, as though it occupied the throne by divine right. i shall ask you to consider the pretensions of another claimant of very noble lineage to a share of the royal honours." [illustration: _a riposte in tierce._] the fifth evening [illustration] i. although our conversation was quite informal and simply an after-dinner amusement, i found that it involved diligent preparation, especially when i was approaching one of the questions where i was in open conflict with current theories, which are often taken for granted on no better ground than their respectable antiquity. one of these theories, which is described in fencing language as the importance of judging the blade by touch, i was now prepared to challenge, and i was ready to maintain the superiority of another principle, against which the professors raise their voices, almost with one accord, in a chorus of unmerited abuse. accordingly when we assembled in the smoking-room, i took my usual seat and began without preface. ii. "perhaps i had better explain what is meant by refusing to join blades. it means that, as soon as you have come on guard, you break away from the engagement, and avoid crossing swords with your adversary, instead of allowing the blades to remain in contact. "this, i consider, was one of the most successful innovations of what it is the fashion to call 'the new school'; and i am therefore very far from sharing the opinions of the professors, who discover in the practice the corruption of the best traditions of sword-play, and declare that the refusal to join blades is equivalent to fencing blindfold, and without judgment; it leads, they say, to mutual hits, and deprives the fencer of one of the finest accomplishments he can acquire, the power of judging the sword by touch. iii. "undoubtedly the fencer's touch is a great resource; i am even willing to allow that it is invaluable, and it is a thing that can only be obtained by practice and perseverance; it gives lightness and dexterity to the hand, and enables the foil to be manipulated with accuracy and speed. "it is the refined result that is derived from extreme ease in regulating the extension of the arm, from exquisite subtlety in the use of the fingers, and from precision of play, which involves its victim almost unawares, dismays, and utterly confounds him. i profess the greatest admiration for this consummate power of fence, so seldom seen to perfection. no one can think more highly of it than i do, and on that account i am strongly convinced of the necessity of devising a means to resist it, when it is used against me. i shall perhaps be told to combat it by an equally fine sense of touch;--but it is still more rare to see a bout of fencing in which the two men are evenly matched in this respect, and general principles should be based on general grounds, not on exceptional cases. "the man who possesses this consummate sleight of touch may almost be said to control his opponent's blade by the exercise of his will. by a sort of hypnotic influence or fascination he does with it what he pleases. if you refuse the engagement, you create a difficulty for him; if you do not allow him to bring his blade into contact with yours, you put an impediment in his way, which his skill will doubtless overcome, but with less certainty; his course is not so clear, and he is no longer completely master of the situation. for if you join blades you are always within striking distance of his point, that is to say he can attack you at any moment without shifting his ground. now such attacks are exceedingly difficult to stop, even for the most practised hand, especially simple attacks such as straight thrusts or simple disengagements. "the mind perpetually held in suspense is harassed and distressed, you have no leisure to think for yourself and are demoralised by the slow torture of a constant strain. for, i repeat, it is very rare to find two fencers so evenly matched in this respect that the risk is equally divided. "in that case i should say:--'do what you please.' in the other case:--'by refusing the engagement you can at first keep your opponent out of distance, which will compel him to advance in order to attack you, and so give you fair warning of his intention. you are no longer exposed to the paralysing influence of a constantly threatened attack, which destroys your liberty of action and judgment; you disconcert your adversary by leaving him in the dark as to the line in which he will encounter your blade; and you can choose your own time, when you are ready to attack or parry, to engage his blade with decision.' "for my own part, i am quite satisfied that the system is a safe and sound defensive measure, which offers advantages that cannot be denied. pressures, binds, beats and _croisés_, all those dangerous movements by which your opponent can bring the _fort_ of his blade to bear on the _faible_ of yours, are rendered very difficult to perform, and are much less likely to succeed. surprise attacks are entirely or at least so nearly eliminated, that their occurrence is a rare event. iv. "i have endeavoured to state as clearly as possible the advantages that a weak fencer may derive from this system, when he is opposed to a combatant more experienced and more skilful than himself; but further than that, i believe that the skilful and experienced fencer has also something to gain by adopting this much despised method. i have myself never been able to discover that it is incompatible with perfect 'form,' or that it tends to wild play. it opens a wider field, it shows the fallacy of certain ideas, which have been wrongly supposed to be unassailable, and it furnishes a whole range of new situations, another world to conquer. "what ground is there, i would ask my critic, for your assertion that i must be fencing blindly, because my sword does not happen to be in constant touch with yours? why do you say that mutual hits must occur more frequently? if you are talking of a pair of duffers, who charge each other blindly, you may trust them to commit every possible blunder, whether they join blades or not. "but why should you exalt so highly what you call the faculty of touch, the power of judging the blade by touch, and be so ready to degrade that other sovereign principle, which may be called the faculty of sight, the power of judging the sword by eye? can you deny the controlling influence of the eye, the authority that belongs to it? do you believe that the eye cannot be trained to the same degree of nicety as the hand? why, when you have these two forces at your disposal, are you content to let one of them do duty for both? "you may keep your opponent at his distance by the menace of your nimble point, which flashes in his sight incessantly; while your watchful eye follows the movements of his sword and reads his thought, as well as if the blades were crossed and questioned each other by the language of the steel. then, when it suits your convenience, when you see a favourable opportunity, when you have by a rapid calculation reckoned up the situation, weighed the chances, taken everything into account, then is the time to offer your sword, then is the time to engage your adversary, or by bold decided movements to get control of his blade." v. "but," objected one of my hearers, "what if your adversary adopts the same tactics, and refuses the engagement?" "that is where science and strength, skill and personal superiority tell. what is fencing if it is not the art of leading your opponent into a trap, the art of making him think that he will be attacked in one place, when you mean to hit him in another? the skill to outwit his calculations, to master his game, paralyse his action, outmanoeuvre him, reduce him to impotence?--that is the sort of thing the accomplished fencer sets himself to do. "your adversary, you say, will not come to an engagement. very good; then you must force him to it by feints, or by threatening to attack. either he attempts to parry or he attempts to thrust. in either case you get command of his blade by a simple or by a double beat, as the case may be, and then you drive your attack home. "it holds good with fencing, as it does with all warlike measures, whether on a large scale or small, that you must not wait for what you want to be brought to you; you must learn to help yourself; take no denial, but by force or fraud get possession. "now, i appeal to you all as critics, not on a technical question of fencing, on which no one can be expected to give an opinion without a thorough knowledge of the art, but on a simpler matter. i will contrast two assaults. imagine that you are the spectators. the first is between two fencers of the classical school, to use the conventional phrase. "the swords are crossed, and the two adversaries, both gifted with consummate skill, stand facing each other, foot to foot. feint follows feint, and parry parry; a simple attack is delivered, it is succeeded by a combination. the attitudes of both are irreproachable; the body always upright; the quick hand with exquisite finesse manipulates the dancing point by subtle and accurate finger-play. you admire the exhibition; for a moment you follow the quick passage of the blades, but your sympathies are not aroused, you are not carried away, or enthralled in spite of yourself in a fever of anxious expectation. "now turn to the other assault. this also is fought by two skilful fencers, but they go to work on quite a different system. "look at the combatants. instead of standing foot to foot, and blade to blade, they are out of distance, on the alert, ready to strike but cautious. their eyes follow each other, and watch for the tell-tale movement. suddenly they close, the blades cross, interlock, and break away. that was a searching thrust! but by a sudden retreat, a rapid movement, perhaps a leap backwards, the fencer evades the hit, and is ready on the instant to give back the point. this assault is a battle between two men, who mean hard fighting, keen swordsmen, dodgy, artful, and slippery, who bring to bear all their science, employ every trick they can think of, and throw themselves body and soul into the fight. "now let me ask you, which of these two assaults is the more interesting to follow? vi. "i remember an assault, in m. pons's rooms, between one of my friends and a man who was generally considered and really was a strong fencer, although he insisted on clinging to that mischievous routine, which with some men is a superstition. "they came on guard, and my friend, after crossing swords to show that he was ready to defend himself, quitted the engagement, attacked, and hit his opponent several times. 'but, sir,' his opponent objected, 'you do not join blades.' 'why should i?' 'unless you join blades, how am i to fence?' 'that is your look-out.' 'but you must join blades.' 'why _must_ i? my only object, i assure you, is to endeavour, as well as i am able, to disconcert my opponent, and as i find that this plan disconcerts you considerably, i see all the more reason why i should continue to employ it.' 'that may be,' rejoined the other sticking to his point, 'but if you do not join blades, it is not fencing.' 'well,' said my friend, 'let us try for a moment to discuss the matter. tell me, are my hits improperly delivered?' 'oh, no.' 'did i stab, or come in with a round-arm?' 'certainly not' 'is there anything wrong with my parries? are they too wide, or what? is my hand too heavy, or do you complain of mutual hits?' 'no, that is not the point.' 'then, what more do you want?' 'i want you to join blades.' 'to oblige you?' 'no, i do not say that. but unless you join blades it is not fencing.' "and say what one might, nothing would make him budge from his everlasting axiom. "it is always so, whenever an attempt is made to interfere with the traditions of any art whatever. the man who tries to strike out a new line cannot fail to disturb the tranquil repose of ancient custom. the conservatives resist, they object to interference, they feel that their placid triumphs, their cherished habits are threatened. the regular routine, which has been drilled into them, till they know it like an old tune of which every turn and every note is familiar, will be unsettled. they have good reason to be annoyed, but that does not prove them to be right. vii. "at the present day people have gradually come to admit that there is some good in these innovations, which have suddenly enlarged the scope of fencing. 'fencing,' they say, 'is more difficult than it used to be, but less graceful.' are these qualities then necessarily incompatible with each other? "in order to make a clear distinction between those who run after strange gods, and the 'auld lichts' who have preserved intact the primitive tradition of the true faith, a phrase has been invented to describe the backsliders. they are said to be 'difficult fencers.' "now what are these words supposed to mean? do they imply that a graceful fencer is not difficult? no doubt, classical grace and a masterly style are very fine things, which i, for one, can appreciate and admire. but if i am asked to choose between the graceful and the difficult fencer,--if it is not possible to be both at once,--i much prefer the latter, for i suppose that 'difficult' can only mean difficult to hit, difficult to defeat. "but there is no need to suppose that difficulty is incompatible with grace, at least with grace of a certain kind, the grace of manly and robust energy, which sits well upon the fighting man, such grace as in old times so well became the gallant chevaliers, who illumined by their prowess the spacious days of ruff and rapier. "we have here another of the important points of difference between the two schools. some people treat the newcomer like an inconvenient guest, whom they cannot very well turn out of doors. but they may as well make up their minds that the intruder can take care of himself, and will find room for his ample proportions in the domestic circle. he has come to stay, and whether they like him or not he means to make one of the party. "the axiom--'hit and do not be hit back' ought, in spite of everything that can be said against it, to be the motto of all who fight with the sword. science may teach how to hit well, but its first lesson should be, how not to be hit at all by the arrant duffer, who uses his sword by the light of nature. when swordsmanship fails to keep this end in view, we may be very sure that it is off the track. 'business first' must be the invariable rule. viii. "there was a time when the mask was not worn for the assault. and i remember reading some time ago in the _encyclopaedia_, published about the middle of last century ( ), under the word _mask_ the following remarks:-- 'in foil-play fencers have sometimes carried precaution so far as to wear a mask, to protect themselves from possible hits in the face. it is true that those who have acquired little skill in the art may chance to wound their adversary by a clumsy thrust, or cause themselves to be wounded by throwing up the point with a bad parry. it is however never worn at the present day.' "this encyclopaedia evidently reflects the ideas which were generally accepted at the time. to wear a mask in a bout with the foils was as much as to say that you considered your opponent a duffer, and was not far short of an insult. "fencing in those days was nothing but a formal series of attacks, feints, parries and ripostes, well understood and defined by the code; every movement led up to some other movement, which was rigidly prescribed. if a fencer had ventured on a straight thrust while the feints were in progress, instead of elaborately following the blade through every turn of the labyrinth, he would have been considered an unmannerly cub, and sent back to study his rudiments. it was only in the last years of the period signalised by the famous saint-georges that the mask came into general use. even then the only masks used were made of tin, and the professors' view was that such safeguards were permissible for rough players. but it so happened that three professors each lost an eye. and their respect for ancient tradition did not go far enough to induce them to risk losing the one that remained. after that the wire mask was generally adopted, but not without regret. ix. "every generation takes the march of progress one stage further, or at least modifies existing institutions in its own way. it is not so long since the fanciful multiplication of feints, of which i was speaking just now, was considered the correct game; the right thing to do was to follow the blade until you found it. at the present day it is no longer part of the necessary ritual to follow always every vagary. suppose you feint inordinately, i suddenly let drive with opposition of the hand, or simply straighten my arm and hit you with a stop thrust, which interferes rather effectively with your trickiness, and spoils the magnificent flourishes of your arabesques. these hits are now recognised and regularly taught. if need be, instead of lunging you slip the left foot to the rear, throw the left shoulder well back, so as to be out of the way, and drop the body, in order to avoid being hit yourself. "the system of our fathers, which in many respects was excellent but at the same time was remarkable for several very odd and very peremptory theories, has in many instances been successfully assailed. perhaps in some cases its assailants have themselves been too peremptory, and this has led to that loss of temper and angry recrimination, by which the debate has been embittered. "but i must not tax your patience further to-night. we had better adjourn the discussion until to-morrow; otherwise you will be tired of hearing me talk, and i am sincerely anxious to command your whole attention." [illustration] the sixth evening [illustration: _a very old trick._] i. "fencing," i began, when we had all reassembled as usual, "is such an inexhaustible topic, that i could not, if i would, pretend to go minutely into all its practical details. no one gifted with a modicum of sense, a little determination, and a dash of enterprise, can fail to strike out a line for himself. i am obliged, as you see, to content myself with a general view. for we cannot consider the assault, and especially an assault in which the combatants use their heads as well as their hands, without assuming that our young friend has gained some science, and has become an educated fencer. "i have already spoken of parries and ripostes, and you have seen that the lesson teaches how these should be employed. you know what use may be made of the sense of touch, the power of feeling the blade, and of the electric influence of the eye. it remains to say a few words on the subject of attacks. "it is more dangerous to attack than to parry. instead of waiting you let yourself go. and the great difficulty is to know how to let yourself go far enough without going too far. "remember that discretion is the better part of valour; but do not confound discretion with timidity. i have already said that you ought to be able and willing, and more than that, that you ought to make it your object to encounter every sort of style, even those styles which are hardly worthy or--to be quite candid--are quite unworthy of the name. as a matter of fact there are such styles, and therefore it is just as well not to allow their exponents to become conceited, or to imagine that by any chance they can possibly be effective. "it is important for the prestige of fencing, that those who have no knowledge of their weapon, or at most a mere smattering, should not be allowed to suppose that they can depend upon mere energy and a blind rush to defend themselves against a man who has been trained to the skilful handling of the sword. confidence, that mainest mainstay of defence, ought not to be possible for the ignorant fencer; it ought to be the peculiar privilege of the trained and scientific expert. ii. "to come back to the various situations which may occur in the assault. if i see a fencer, as soon as he falls on guard, engage swords, and at once hurriedly let fly thrust after thrust, attack following attack in quick succession, if he neglects to test the length of his opponent's sword by gradually feeling his way, by employing all the necessary tactics of the preliminary skirmish, by prospecting for information and discreetly sounding the enemy, then to my mind he may be classed at once. he may have some dexterity, a certain power of execution, but by the mere act of joining blades he may be set down as a blind fencer, far more truly than the man who keeps out of distance, and chooses the proper moment at one time to refuse, at another, when least expected, to take the engagement, or to seize his opponent's blade with courage and resolution." "i suppose," remarked the comte de r., "that, a few years hence, it is highly probable that a new set of theories will be invented to supersede these modern ideas, which are so hotly disputed now, and they in their turn will be considered out of date." "no doubt that is to be expected in the nature of things. the form may or rather certainly will change, but the substance will be unaltered. let me submit evidence to prove it. i mentioned the other day some old books on sword-play which i hoped to look through. i will only refer to them for one moment. i managed to read them all, and dreary reading it was, but i got through them, being supported by a conscientious sense of duty, and i unearthed among others the two following passages. "the first on the subject of _approaches_ was written in the seventeenth century, that is to say, it is about two hundred years old:-- 'the reason why you must make your steps of unequal measure is that thereby you always hold your adversary in suspense and uncertain what you would be at. for if you always go about your business of a set way and with a set regularity of step, it may happen that the enemy will make his reckoning so exactly, that he can direct his sword not only at the place where he sees you to be, but even at that place to which he knows you will presently come, whereof by this means he is hindered.' "one might suppose that this was written yesterday. could any professor, however skilful, put the point better or more logically? the weapons however were very different from ours, heavy cut and thrust rapiers, wielded sometimes in one hand, sometimes in both; but the laws of judgment, caution, and strategy were the same, and will be the same a hundred years hence. "to prove once more that this new school, which a few years since was received with a howl of abuse, really did not advance such very extravagant doctrines, and that the power of eye, which we were discussing yesterday, is intimately connected with the power of touch, i have made a note of these other few lines, still on the subject of attacks:-- 'it follows that the great gain that science gives is security in making your approaches, which cannot be obtained except you thoroughly comprehend the importance both of touch and eye; and you may rest assured that bodily activity and readiness of hand are alike as nothing when weighed against a good approach.' "and we are reluctantly obliged to admit that after all our original ideas have been anticipated, and we stand convicted of plagiarism. "i might revenge myself for the trouble i have taken to ransack these ancient folios, by inflicting upon you any number of quotations, but i will be merciful, and am content to have demonstrated that the ideas that are supposed to be most radical are often, when they come to be examined, most truly conservative." iii. "i have another question for you," continued the comte de r. "you were speaking the other day of feints and stop thrusts. of course it was ridiculous to expect an opponent to follow every gyration, which you chose to describe with the point of your sword, but don't you think that nowadays the practice of straightening the arm on every possible occasion is utterly overdone?" "no doubt it is by some men--overdone, or rather very badly done, which amounts to the same thing. '_ne quid nimis_' you know is a good motto, and i quite agree with you, however little you may like it, that this movement, which comes more by instinct than by intention, is now the refuge of those who cannot parry; but, mind this, it is a refuge, from which it is often very difficult to dislodge them. i quite admit that those who straighten the arm without any justification are hopelessly unscientific, but they present a difficulty to surmount, which requires serious attention. "let me explain before going on. there is a distinction to be made between stop thrusts, and time thrusts. the stop thrust is taken, when your opponent advances incautiously, or when he draws back his arm while executing a complicated attack, whenever in fact he makes a movement which leaves him exposed. the time thrust on the other hand, correctly speaking, is a parry of opposition,--the most dangerous of all parries, for if it fails it leaves you absolutely exposed and at the mercy of your opponent. i have seen it taught in the lesson by every master (as an exercise no doubt), but i have hardly ever seen a master put it into practice in the assault. the thrust has nothing to recommend it, but on the contrary it is to be condemned on many grounds. i should like to see it ignominiously expelled from the fencing room, as the buyers and sellers were expelled from the temple. iv. "do you follow the distinction? a time thrust is taken on the final movement of an attack, when you think you know exactly what is coming, and can judge with certainty in what line the point will be delivered. very well, then parry instead of timing; for if you are wrong--and who is not sometimes?--you can at any rate have recourse to another parry. whereas the time thrust, when misjudged, results in a mutual hit, and for one that is good tender how much base metal you will put into circulation. the stop thrust, which is taken, as i have said, on the opponent's advance, is less dangerous. therefore never attack a man, who straightens his arm on every occasion, without making sure of his blade, and you need have no fear of the result. "it is quite true that the practice of straightening the arm is much more prevalent than it used to be; simply because this style of play, which is of great antiquity, had gone out of fashion, and given place to another method, which in its turn was overdone,--the method of feints and flourishes. "so too, the trick of reversing the lunge by throwing back the left foot and dropping the body, to allow the attack to pass over your head, is not an invention of the 'romantic' school, as it has been ridiculously christened. it is an old trick, a ruse of great antiquity, which may or at all events ought to be found in homer. still, unless your opponent drives you to it by wild and frantic rushes, it is a stroke to be used sparingly, and with the object of letting him know that you are ready to receive him. by this means you will stop him from rushing at you on every possible occasion. i like to see a stop thrust correctly taken, always provided that i do not see others in the course of the same assault taken incorrectly,--for then it is obvious that the correct thrust was a simple fluke. v. "i am speaking now from the scientific standpoint. perhaps i can put my point more clearly. if my opponent says:--'i don't profess to be scientific; i simply defend myself by the light of nature,' he may do what he likes, i shall not complain of his mistakes; he is perfectly within his rights and knows no better. but the expert fencer has no business to make mistakes, or at least he should try to avoid them as far as he can. "even at the risk of being lynched for my unorthodox opinions, i should venture to say to the would-be fencer:--'above all things make yourself dangerous. be 'a difficult fencer,' since that is the stereotyped phrase. without it there is no salvation; your guns are not shotted, your performance is mere fire-works.' "but be careful not to give these words a wider application than they are meant to carry. all that i would say is this:--that you are to follow your natural instinct, to trust your impulse, to be yourself and not your master's puppet. i do not mean to propound an acrobatic theory of fencing, or to recommend a meaningless, objectless, indiscriminate charging about, like the convulsive struggles of a wild beast, that has received its death wound. it would be as wrong to take such extravagant exceptions for your model, as it would be unfair to argue from them in order to demonstrate the futility of the new school. "no doubt fencers of this kind,--they call themselves fencers,--may score an occasional hit, for, as i have had occasion to remark already, there is always a certain amount of luck in fencing; but this sort of thing is not fencing; it is much more like mere brutal fisticuffs. such eccentric methods are of no importance, they are not based on any sort of principle, but are the mere outcome of ignorance; they belong to no school and have no permanent value. but it does not do to despise an unbeaten enemy. therefore confront these methods and defeat them first; you can afford to despise them afterwards." "quite so," exclaimed monsieur de c., "that is exactly my opinion." "one moment," i said, "i have not quite done. i was going to say, that i have very little faith in the stories one hears of the regimental fencing master being run through by the recruit. such an event may happen, just as a chimney-pot may fall on your head when you are walking in the street, but i fancy that if you were to apply the rule of three to all the cases the result would not exactly support the paradox. "there is a class of fencers who are thoroughly--in fact too thoroughly--convinced that they are very dangerous fellows, and that they are never hit. you repeatedly come across this sort of thing in the fencing room:--your opponent delivers an attack which you parry; he stays on the lunge doubled up, with his body dropped forward; your riposte lands perhaps in his mask, perhaps in his back, or arm. thereupon he recovers and remarks with a negligent air: 'hit in the mask,' 'hit in the back,' 'arm only,' as the case may be. "oh, only in the mask! but, sir, the point would have run you through the head and traversed your brain. in fact it would have been quite as effective as a hit in the chest, which penetrated your lungs. the other would have gone six inches into your back; while the third would have pierced your arm and run you through the chest afterwards. you offer your head, back, or arm instead of your chest, i hit the part exposed and am quite satisfied. you cannot evade or parry a thrust by substituting for the part that would otherwise be hit some other part, which you do not attempt to cover; all that you do is to offer an exchange. vi. "do you suppose that these fencers would pursue the same tactics, if they had to face a naked point instead of the button of a foil, and that they would fancy themselves out of danger, if they laid themselves open to be run through the head or back or neck? such wounds are not trivial and cannot be ignored. a sharp point is a peremptory fact, which makes short work of illusions. "or again, do you imagine that anyone would be very anxious in a real fight to run the risk of double hits, by which he might succeed in inflicting a serious wound, but only at the expense of being run through the body himself? no one would resort to such desperate measures as these, unless there was absolutely nothing else left to be done. "this is so thoroughly true, that if you set two men to fight in a fencing-room with blunt swords, you notice at once that the assault is something very different from what it would have been with mere foils. you might almost fancy that the swords, though they can no longer wound, are still possessed by the spirit of mortal combat, and retain some reminiscence of the real thing, of naked chest opposed to naked steel. "there is none of that brilliant dash, none of those brilliant strokes that are usually more conspicuous for temerity than judgment. the fight is a sham fight still, but the players cannot help taking it seriously. each is saying to himself:--'now let me see what would happen, if we were in earnest.' the different shape of the hilt, the harsh grating of the steel affect the imagination. 'watch that fellow, see what he is up to, make him keep his distance, give him something to think about.' that is the sort of caution that the swords are whispering. "you may easily satisfy yourselves of the truth of my remarks the next time you have an opportunity of watching a bout of this sort. and if there is so great a difference between simple foils and blunt swords, you will have no difficulty in believing that the difference between blunt swords and sharp is far greater. wild play subsides, and those who were willing to charge blindly, when they risked nothing more than a dent in a leather jacket, prefer to study ways and means a little more closely. it is a very natural prompting of the instinct. the rule is almost universal, but there are occasional exceptions, which you may be called upon to face, and if you do not want to be taken by surprise, you had better make yourself acquainted with them beforehand for what they are worth." "then you approve," said m. de c., "of occasional practice with muffled swords?" "not only of occasional but of constant practice, and that not in the assault only, but in the lesson too. the greater weight of the sword and the wider blade, which is straight and less whippy than the foil, steady the hand, keep it in position, and give a truer aim." vii. "i notice," observed one of my friends, "that you have said nothing about left-handed fencers." "no," i answered. "the fact is, there is hardly anything to say, and even the text-books, which do not usually err on the side of brevity, devote very little space to them. for there is really no particular rule, which applies to them exclusively." "but surely they are very difficult?" "yes in a way no doubt they are, though one of my friends, a left-hander of course, used to say that the supposed difficulty is only a convenient excuse invented by right-handed fencers. his suggestion is more witty than true, and i am willing to allow, without hesitation, that left-handers really are puzzling to those who are not accustomed to fence with them. their only real advantage is that they have more opportunities of fencing against right-handers, than right-handers have of fencing against them. when once you are used to them the difficulty vanishes. the left-hander on the contrary, when it comes to fighting, is never rid of the far graver risk which he takes by exposing his left side. "i may add that the left-hander's advantage, which consists entirely in his incognito, would exist no longer, if the professors,--who i hope may take the hint,--would make a practice of giving lessons occasionally with the left hand. some of them do so already, and i congratulate them on their good sense. if you come to think of it, there is not a single left-handed thrust or parry, which cannot be equally well executed by a right-handed player. only, from want of practice, the latter finds it more difficult to direct his point because the lines are reversed. _quarte_ becomes _sixte_, and vice versa. the left-hander prefers to take the inside engagement, that is to say _quarte_. this line suits him better, and accordingly it is good policy not to let him take it without a struggle. it is usually more difficult to hit him in the outside line. "so much for general principles, for of course left-handed play varies as much as right-handed, although the contrary is sometimes maintained. but if all left-handers were providentially made alike, one would think that it could not be very difficult to get to know the pattern by heart. viii. "well, you must admit that in the course of my remarks i try not to pass over anything that is likely to interest those who have, or those who should, could, or would have a fancy for sword-play. "my object is to bring out the essential features in clear relief, and i intentionally omit the thousand and one minute details, which would overcrowd my canvas, and prevent you from properly appreciating the leading features. these refinements, which come with experience and habit, cannot be forced, they must be slowly acquired by the friction of the blades, by meeting all sorts and conditions of fencers, by facing the unforeseen and sudden perils, which confront you just when they are least expected. "you know how awkward a young fellow is when he makes his first appearance in society. when he finds himself in a drawing-room, he is shy and uncomfortable, he does not know how to sit down or how to stand up or how to talk, but presently without consulting any professor, simply, so to speak, by the daily friction of his common intercourse with other people, older and more experienced than himself, he acquires confidence, ease, address, manners, and so forth. "it is just the same with fencers. craft, finesse, tact, and judgment come by degrees, as wings grow out of feathers; but do not forget that the lesson and the master's pad are your first instructors and must not be neglected. to neglect them would be ungrateful, and ingratitude is always base. besides you cannot afford it. "i am sure i don't know what else i can find to say; i shall be in a difficulty to-morrow, unless you promise to help me out." [illustration: _a stop thrust._] the seventh evening [illustration: _toucher et ne pas l'être._] i. "well, what is your text to-night?" asked my host as he joined the group which had met as usual in the smoking-room. "oh," i replied, "i have nothing left to preach about." "and i," said the marquis de g., who was looking through the evening paper, "don't mean to let you off so easily. here is a piece of news, which is very interesting in connection with our nightly symposia." "read it! read it!" exclaimed a chorus of voices. the marquis read out the following paragraph:-- 'an unfortunate encounter recently took place in the papal states between the young marquis de monte c. and the chevalier d'a. the duel arose out of a very singular incident. the chevalier d'a., a neapolitan, has the reputation of a _jettatore_, that is to say he is supposed to have the evil eye. the marquis de monte c., happening to meet him in a drawing-room, took up without thinking a little coral hand, a charm that he was wearing on his watch-chain, and pointed it at the chevalier d'a. as he was passing close by him. the chevalier who knew what people thought of him, noticed the movement and called the young marquis out. they met the following morning, and the unfortunate marquis received a sword thrust in the chest and was killed outright. the chevalier, besides being a very expert swordsman, is said to have acquired a knowledge of several secret thrusts.' ii. the reading of this paragraph was followed by a momentary silence. then someone remarked:--"i have often heard 'secret thrusts' spoken of, but how is it that they are not taught by the professors?" "well," i said smiling, "for one sufficient reason, that if they were taught they would no longer be secret. but, joking apart, i may as well say at once that my belief in secret thrusts is about equal to my belief in ghosts." "come, this must be looked into." "i believe in out of the way and unlooked for strokes, but further than that i cannot go." "yet, surely they must have existed some time or other," objected my critic, "or how did they come by their name?" "oh, they existed more or less at one time, or perhaps it would be nearer the mark to say that they were supposed to exist. they are a shadowy survival, a sort of family ghost that we have inherited from the italian school. for french fencing, though it has developed characteristic features of its own, traces its descent, as you know, in a direct line from italian ancestry. "secret thrusts died and were buried when science was in its infancy; and science has since grown up in other conditions, and grown strong by working on other lines. they could not be revived, unless the attendant ritual of an effete tradition, the system of a bygone age long since forgotten, were revived along with them. "at the present day, with our modern weapons and our modern methods, to use a secret thrust would amount almost to a crime. and if it were not exactly that, if a charge of murder or manslaughter would not lie, it certainly would be considered iniquitous by all honourable men. no one with a conscience could conceivably buy success in an affair of honour at such a price. iii. "before we leave this question i should like to make my meaning perfectly clear. in the world as we find it there are some things for which no definite penalty is prescribed, things that do not bring a man within the law, but that are none the less offences in the court of conscience and very properly censured. an action, such as we are now discussing, is to my mind a case in point, always supposing it to be a possible action; but is it possible?--that is the question. "put yourself in the place of a man who is compelled by force of circumstances to fight a duel. your success, if you do succeed, may be due to the blessing of providence, to skill, or to accident, but it must satisfy one condition,--it must be unequivocal. you are meeting an honourable enemy in an honourable fight, and obviously the means you employ must be beyond all question 'straight,' and not devices so crooked as almost to deserve the epithet 'felonious.'" i found myself speaking with some warmth, and was pleased to see that my remarks were received with great interest. "of course," i continued, "in speaking or writing on a subject of this sort, one can only express a strictly personal opinion. now, what do you say? we have been let in for this duel by an evening paper. shall we drop it, or shall we see it through?" i was answered by a general cry:--"go on!" "i am afraid it may take us rather far afield, for it involves important considerations." "so much the better," observed my host, "we have plenty of cigars, and the night is young." we provided ourselves with fresh cigars to follow those already alight, and settled down in our arm-chairs, and the most profound silence reigned in the smoking-room. iv. "well," i began, "hitherto we have had in view sword-play in the literal sense of the word, that is to say theoretical fencing, fencing regarded as a sport, as a bout with the foils in a fencing room. we shall now have to consider it from the strictly utilitarian standpoint. "in the one case we have an assault, consisting of a succession of fancy strokes played by connoisseurs, who in point of skill may of course be equally or unequally matched, but who nevertheless play the game on the whole in accordance with principles that are tolerably well ascertained. in the other case we have a serious encounter with swords sharply pointed, flashing in the sun, and dangerous to life. the first hit, correct or incorrect, is decisive, no matter how it is delivered, no matter where. "do not forget that you have to reckon not only with skill but with the possibility of surprise, not only with subtlety but with brute force, not only with science but with blind and headlong ignorance. your opponent does not greatly care whether he lets your blood in orthodox style, or whether he operates on your face for instance, or on those parts of the body that are too much neglected in the fencing room. you do not choose your opponent, he is chosen for you by accident; he may be tall or short, strong or weak. you are no longer engaged in a sport in which your object is to play correctly, in a contest of skill in which you may perhaps allow yourself to be hit occasionally in order to lead your opponent on and afterwards defeat him more easily. the man who confronts you with that threatening point may be an artistic and accomplished swordsman, but he may equally well never have touched a sword in his life, and be trusting to luck, or to his general smartness, or to a cool head. you may find that you have to do with an enemy whose every movement is studied; who keeps his distance cleverly; who never advances or retires without a reason. or on the contrary, it may turn out that your opponent, trusting to one supreme effort of audacity, in defiance of all calculation, and throwing to the wind every shred of theory, will make such brutal use of his sword as the primitive and untutored instinct of self-preservation dictates. v. "we realise at once how far we have got from the harmless diversion of the assault, the sham fight conducted under the master's eye on strictly correct principles and with inoffensive weapons. the assault and the duel are even further apart than the assault and the formal lesson. in short this newspaper paragraph has brought us face to face with the real duel, and what we have to do is to discuss it in all its bearings,--so we had better begin at the beginning. "unfortunately, one always finds that it is impossible to discuss the art of fence without coming to the duel; for say what you will, cases must sometimes occur when an affront for which the law offers no redress compels you to go out. 'the duel,' as someone puts it, 'cannot be suppressed. it is like a bad neighbour with whom we have to live on the best terms we can.' "some years ago i happened to read a great deal of fencing literature. the various authors, though not one of them could find a good word to say for duelling, contrived between them to fill in a sketch of its rise and progress from the earliest times down to the present day. "this is evidently one of the points where the civilised man and the savage meet on common ground, and is an instance of the law that civilisation modifies, refines, perhaps transforms our instincts, dresses or disguises them in the latest fashion, but never gets rid of them. "at one time the duel was called trial by battle or simply the judicial combat. then it was pronounced illegal, and those who fought in a private quarrel were sentenced either to death or to long and cruel periods of imprisonment. "at a later period, growing insolent with impunity, the duel like a strayed reveller swaggered in the streets and public places; we find it haunting the taverns, we see the flicker of the blades under a street lamp,--drawn for a word, for a ribbon, for a bet, for anything, or for nothing. even the seconds who parted good friends over-night did their best to spit each other next morning. "well, what better evidence could we require to prove that this last resort of wounded honour is somehow deeply rooted in human nature, than the fact that the ancient and honourable practice of duelling has remained the final court of appeal, in spite of changed surroundings, in spite of hostile opinion, and in spite of the extravagant follies that have sometimes disgraced it? vi. "but this is a digression for which i apologise. i was led astray by my subject and drifted quite unconsciously into an unpremeditated preface." "don't apologise," said m. de c., "your digression is charming." "and besides," i continued, "you know i have a sort of moral claim on your indulgence, for i might have displayed my erudition, and have quoted names and dates and facts unearthed from dusty folios, and yet i have mercifully spared you." "oh, thank you, thank you!" came from several arm-chairs. "when one talks of duelling, there is a point that strikes one at the outset, and though it is not directly connected with sword-play, it is too nearly allied to the duel to be dismissed without notice. i mean the duties of seconds. "i shall not now enter upon the question of what those duties may be before the combatants meet. these consist in pressing for moderate counsels, in acting or even over-acting the part of peacemaker. you all know as well as i do that no chance of arriving at an honourable settlement should be neglected before allowing your men to go out. "what should we think of the man who could forget that his friend's honour and his friend's life are equally committed to his keeping, and that he ought not, out of a quixotic regard for the one, to jeopardise the other needlessly? "when a man fights, his conviction that right is on his side is everything. and therefore the correct attitude of a second is that of a man, who acting calmly but firmly in his friend's interest seeks to avoid a quarrel. any other attitude is not only incorrect but even renders him liable to be called to account for neglecting his bounden duty. "personally, if after exhausting every effort to obtain a friendly settlement i found that a meeting was unavoidable, although i was thoroughly satisfied in my own mind that it was a case not of injured honour but only of injured vanity, or of wounded pride, i should not hesitate to withdraw. duels played to the gallery are either odious or absurd; they are out of date, and should be numbered with the obsolete fashions of the past. vii. "they arose in the manners and customs of a flamboyant era, when everyone carried a sword and it was considered the right thing to air it on every opportunity, in order to fill up the time which might otherwise have passed somewhat heavily. every age has its fashions and its vices, its childish toys and favourite follies. those gallant blades that cut such a tremendous figure in the old days would meet with a very poor reception now, if they could revisit the scenes of their dashing exploits. "but if it is the duty of a second to play the part of mediator before the action, it is equally his duty to be cool and collected on the ground. his personal responsibility is increased, but otherwise his rôle remains unchanged. "it then becomes imperative on him to anticipate and allow for every contingency, he must let nothing escape him, and must give the closest attention to the minutest detail, in order that his principal may be relieved of all anxiety, and may preserve that cool presence of mind which is so absolutely indispensable. viii. "in short the fact that has to be grasped is simply this,--that not one of the thousand and one preliminary details is unimportant; and that things seemingly the most trivial may suddenly assume the most unexpected gravity. the stake is too high to justify any man in gambling it away with a light heart. "in the first place the selection of the ground must be carefully considered. the surface should be smooth and even, without dips or inequalities that can be in the slightest degree dangerous. be particular to avoid a spot where there is any grass. grass is slippery and may imperil your friend's life. "here is another point worth remembering. run your eye quickly but carefully over the ground where your friend will stand; he is very likely to neglect this precaution himself, and may fail to see a root for instance, almost unnoticeable to a careless glance, which might very easily trip him up or throw him off his guard at a critical moment, when it was too late to stay the impetus of his opponent's point. all this no doubt seems extremely trivial; but how do you know that the tuft of wet slippery grass, the half hidden root, or treacherous stone will not turn the scale a moment later? "the contending parties, it has been said, are entitled to a fair division of light and ground. if that is so, you will be well advised not to stand out for your share of light, and you should never consent to let your principal face the sun. the glitter of the blades confuses the eye and causes hesitation. remember that in fighting the eye is an implement at least as important as the sword. seeing in this case is thinking. the eye warns you of danger, and instinctively picks out the enemy's weak spot. and more than that, a steady eye, an eye that looks one in the face unflinchingly, overawes and fascinates. while the sword threatens, the spying questioning eye is the intelligent scout. "again, never allow the combatants to strip. the impression of the cold air on the bare skin and the unaccustomed exposure may affect one more than the other, if he is naturally more sensitive, even though he may be quite unconscious of the fact." "but," objected the comte de r., "what if the other side insist?" "you must refuse to give way. no one has a right to insist upon it. it is a barrack-room practice, usual among soldiers, and does not hold good outside the guard-room." ix. "while we are on this point," remarked one of my friends, "there are two questions i should like to ask you." "i will do my best to answer them," i replied, "for--as my lawyer would put it--i may say, that i am thoroughly acquainted with all the leading cases." "well, is it allowable to use a fencing glove?" "it is usual. but custom is not always right, and though many men suppose that they are entitled to it as a matter of course, they cannot strictly speaking claim it. generally the parties agree beforehand whether fencing gloves shall be used or not. it nearly always happens that both sides prefer to use them, for with the help of a fencing glove you get a firmer and more confident grip of the sword, and are less likely to be disarmed. besides, the hilt of a sword is hard; it tires and bruises the hand; the fingers in contact with it are jarred at every parry that is at all strong, or whenever the blades meet sharply. on these grounds fencing gloves are generally allowed. however, if the seconds of one side object, the seconds of the other side cannot either require them to use a fencing glove or claim the right for their own principal. "for instance, the objection may be raised that the use of a fencing glove is familiar to a man accustomed to fencing, but unfamiliar and of no value to one who has never fenced. true, this objection is seldom raised, because, as i pointed out just now, the man who is not used to fencing is of all men the one who finds a serious difficulty in handling the rough hilt of a sword, and who has everything to gain by using a padded glove. "in any case you are at liberty to wear an ordinary leather glove, whether your opponent chooses to do so or not. or you may wrap a handkerchief round your hand, to give you a firmer grip of the sword, provided you are careful not to leave a hanging end, which may dangle loose, and hinder the action of your opponent's point." x. "i will now put my second question," continued my inquisitor. "well, what is your second question?" "is it permissible to use the unarmed hand to parry and put aside your opponent's blade?" "oh! that is a very serious matter, which i did not mean to pass over in silence. but it involves the consideration of several points, which would perhaps take us too far to-night. suppose we leave it for to-morrow." "then we adjourn until to-morrow," said the comte de c. and so we broke up. [illustration] the eighth evening [illustration: _a parry with the hand._] i. "you asked me yesterday, if it is allowable to use the unarmed hand to parry and put aside the sword. "my answer is very emphatic:--no." "but what if the parties agree to allow it beforehand?" asked the marquis de r.... "that is an agreement which in my opinion ought not to be made. the practice is wholly foreign to our ways and to the traditions that have come down to us. "i am fully aware of the fact that there is the authority of a very profound writer, the comte de chatauvillard, who has many strong supporters, for the statement that 'the parry with the hand may be a matter of agreement.' and other writers, among whom is more than one eminent master, may be quoted for the view that it is a proper matter for arrangement between the contending parties. that does not affect my opinion in the least; and i say very emphatically and very distinctly:--as you clearly have the right to say yes or no, say no invariably. "such a concession or such an agreement, even if it is freely entered upon by both sides, is only too likely to lead to disastrous and fatal mistakes, while it does not offer any counterbalancing advantage. i will try to explain why. "the parry made with the hand that does not hold the sword goes back to the ancient traditions of the italian school, to the methods in vogue when men fought with sword and dagger. they parried and attacked with either weapon indifferently, bringing one or other into play by voltes and passes, which have been dismissed from the theory and practice of modern fencing. the art, which was adapted in those days to the double means of offence and defence, employed a system very different from that which prevails now. this parry, or to speak more accurately this method of diverting an opponent's blade, which was done with either hand indifferently, was reasonable then; nowadays it would be a fantastic and dangerous anomaly. "i remember trying by way of experiment, some years ago at naples, several assaults of this sort with an italian professor, named parisi.--the poor fellow died i believe in prison, after taking part in one of the many revolutionary attempts that were made to wreck the kingdom of naples. parisi used to come regularly to my house where i had furnished a room for fencing. i wished to make a serious study of italian play, and of the surviving traditions of this school, which is rapidly disappearing and is only connected with its past by a few almost invisible threads. "well, parisi used to fence with a long italian sword in one hand, and in the other a sort of stiletto, which he employed to parry my attacks in certain lines; and while he thus stopped my attack with his dagger, he made not exactly a riposte but rather a simultaneous counter-attack on me with his sword. this kind of play, which continually produced new and difficult situations, was very interesting. "if parisi dropped his dagger, what happened? his left hand, instead of following my blade, sprang at once to a fixed position. and to what position? why, you could see at a glance, by the way he carried his forearm, thrown rather high across his chest and only a few inches away from it, that he was ready for the parry with the hand, in fact doubly ready for it, both by the position of his body and by the forward position of his left arm. "now we who follow the rules of french fencing do just the reverse. we carry our left arm to the rear, and so leave a smaller surface exposed to our opponent's point; we therefore cannot bring our left hand into play without abandoning the french position, or at all events without sacrificing some of its fundamental principles. ii. "it is a good many years since i first took up fencing; i have been in all the fencing-rooms; i have fenced with many professors and with all sorts and conditions of amateurs, and no one has ever suggested to me that we should agree to parry with the hand. i have never, no not once in all the assaults that i have witnessed, heard such a suggestion made; i have never seen this kind of parry employed; i have never heard of a master showing or teaching it to his pupils as a possible case or even as a highly improbable case, against which it was his duty, as a wise and experienced professor, to put on their guard those whose instruction was committed to his care. "then why, when the assault ceases to be an exercise or an amusement, why, when you stake your life upon the issue, should you go out of your way to suggest or assent to something foreign to all recognised practice? "if you approve of the surviving methods of the old italian school, you should admit all the precepts of that school, and then you will at least be logical. "your sword will have a long heavy blade, broad and perfectly rigid; the hilt will be surmounted by a little cross-bar of steel on which you will place your fingers, and to which you will attach them with a long ribbon; incidentally you will do away with the freedom of the hand, the supple action of the wrist and the niceties of finger play. you will have to make frequent use of parries of contraction, which are indispensable to italian play, though they are little valued, not to say altogether ignored by the french school. you must learn your voltes and passes, the manoeuvres of ducking and dodging; and then, i repeat, you will at least be logical. but an agreement which recognises only one of these practices, while it disregards all the rest, seems to me absurd. "let me now show you the danger, which can hardly be avoided, of admitting this parry with the left hand. "between the open palm, which merely brushes the blade aside, and the hand, which by a nervous movement closes unconsciously on the blade and holds it fast, the difference is very hard to seize. the thing is done in a moment. it passes like a flash in the confusion of the encounter and leaves no trace behind. "without a doubt the man who has unconsciously arrested the blade, instead of merely turning it aside, will be in despair, and in the loyalty of his heart will be the first to accuse himself. but if his point has taken effect, if he has delivered a fatal thrust, will his despair or regret or any self-reproach heal the wound that he has inflicted, or restore the life that he has taken? if the odds were a thousand to one against a fatal issue, that one chance would be enough to condemn fatally this dangerous agreement. "moreover, i may remark, speaking from the experience that is obtained by long familiarity, and perhaps from some small skill in the practice of arms, that it is often very difficult, not to say impossible, for the most practised eye in the confusion of a multitude of thrusts, swiftly parried and as swiftly returned, to follow with accuracy the course of two swords, that pass to and fro and interlace like living things, or to judge with indisputable certainty the difference between these two movements, one of which is authorised by consent, while the other may suddenly turn an honourable fight into a foul assassination. "the mere act of judging so bristles with difficulties, that it is likely to lead to a conflict of opinion between even the most unbiassed judges. who can decide between them? the fact on which their judgment is based is there no longer. it passed in a moment, quick as thought. consider the terrible position in which you are placed, in the presence of a man lying stretched on the ground before you, cold and lifeless, who ought to be a living man full of strength and vigour. "and now, i appeal to all seconds. in the name of good sense, in common fairness, could you or could you not with a clear conscience take the heavy responsibility of such a risk? iii. "i am trying, you see, to obtain a comprehensive view of the manifold duties of seconds, and to omit none of the minute matters of detail, which it is their duty to attend to, and which ought to be present to their minds. here is another point, which is worthy of their serious attention. "when the combatants have taken sword in hand and the blades are crossed, the seconds should stand within reach, holding a sword or walking-stick, and ready to stop the fight should any irregularity occur, or if either of the men should slip, or stumble, or be disarmed, or wounded. this last case especially requires their utmost vigilance, for there are two events, both equally disastrous, that may occur. "suppose one of the men is wounded. in the natural excitement of the moment, the man who has delivered the thrust is often unaware that his point has taken effect. before he can tell that his opponent is disabled, perhaps before he can check himself, he may inflict a second wound, unless the swords are instantly knocked up. "the wounded man, on the other hand, may not immediately feel the effect of his wound, and by continuing to fight may run the risk of being wounded a second time, and that more seriously. it may also happen, and this is the great danger, that in a fit of blind rage he will rush madly on his opponent. "again, the man who has inflicted a wound and has felt his point go home, instantly and instinctively stays his hand, and even if his opponent renews the attack hesitates to strike a second time one who is already hurt. it is during this juncture of a moment's pause with a moment's hesitation that the wounded man may make his mad rush, and either run his opponent through the body, or meet his own destruction, if his opponent has promptly recovered his guard, and calmly offers him his point. iv. "both cases are alike disastrous, for either may lead to a fatal result at a time when by the wound already received the fight may be regarded as closed, or at least as suspended. the seconds, who by redoubling their precautions might have saved the useless shedding of blood, will of course be held to blame. "no doubt it sometimes happens that in spite of the closest attention the attack is so prompt, so impetuous, so swift, that it is impossible to intervene in time. but then at all events the seconds will have no cause for self-reproach. fortunately such cases are of very rare occurrence, but they do sometimes happen; and it is therefore very necessary for the seconds to watch the crossed swords incessantly, and to follow their every movement, in order to intervene the moment that one of the men is wounded, however slight the wound may seem. "if on examination the wound is found to be so trivial that the fight can continue without disadvantage to the wounded man, the combatants will at least have had time to recover their coolness and self-possession. "this close attention is one of the most important points; it is in fact a matter of absolute necessity. here is the seconds' real difficulty, for here the whole responsibility rests with them. "i have still several things to say, of which you will recognise the importance. but it is getting late, and if you will allow me i will postpone them to our next meeting." [illustration] the ninth evening [illustration: _corps à corps._] i. "i wish," remarked the comte de c..., when we met the next day, "that you would tell us what you think of the _corps à corps_ in the duel." "that," i replied, "is the very thing i was going to talk about." "the right course in my opinion is to come to an agreement with the seconds of the other side that the combatants shall be separated and start afresh, when they become entangled at close quarters in what is termed a _corps à corps_. otherwise, in a struggle of this sort it is impossible to say what may happen, except that both men are likely to receive their quietus,--a very symmetrical settling of their accounts by the process of double entry. "but here again, one cannot help feeling that we have another thorny case, which calls for the exercise of judgment with due regard to the circumstances of the moment and fair play for both sides. "if one of the men makes a furious rush on the other, the seconds ought not to knock up the swords until the man who has stood the attack has delivered his riposte. for he has gained this clear advantage, that after stopping the rush he is prepared with an effective rejoinder, and this advantage he is clearly entitled to use. "many questions of duelling must be left to the impartial discretion of the seconds. there is therefore no need to consider what would happen, if a second were to take unfair advantage of an agreement, honourably entered into on both sides, by interfering when the case expressly provided for had not arisen." "well, but suppose such a thing did happen?" "why, then, your conscience must tell you how to act. perhaps you might interfere summarily to stop the proceedings, if the nature of the quarrel allowed it, or you might call upon the second who had so misconstrued his duty to withdraw and take no further part in the affair. "i have often heard men say:--'if i were acting second in an affair that was not so serious as to warrant a fatal issue, and were to see that my principal was about to be run through the body by a thrust that would certainly be fatal, i should not hesitate to knock up the swords. i could not resist the temptation; my feelings would be too strong for me. and as a matter of fact should i be very far wrong?' "yes, my friend, you would be absolutely wrong. you would be assuming the most onerous, the most terrible responsibility, and your action, though dictated by a praiseworthy impulse, would probably cause you the most bitter remorse. "for consider:--you have arrested the sword which would have struck one of the opponents full in the body. the fight continues, and the man whose blow you intercepted with the praiseworthy motive, i quite admit, of preventing a mortal wound, is himself wounded or possibly killed. fortune which favoured him at the outset suddenly turns against him and favours his opponent, perhaps with a lucky fluke, a thing which no foresight can prevent. what would your feelings be, when you saw stretched at your feet a man whose death you had caused by exposing him to a danger that he ought never to have encountered? "a duel is always a miserable business; but when once you have faithfully and energetically done all that you can to prevent it, you must leave chance to decide between the combatants; only see that you take all the measures that are in your power to minimise the chances of a fatal issue." "it seems to me," someone remarked, "that if, when a friend asks you to oblige him with your services, one were to think of all these innumerable responsibilities, one would invariably decline to act." "i don't know whether one would always decline, but i know very well that the second's part is one of unsparing self-sacrifice and devotion. i know that the man who undertakes it lightly cannot be too severely blamed, and i may add that i have never accepted the charge without passing a sleepless night haunted by the most gloomy forebodings. the second who conceives that he is merely required to be a passive witness, robs the part of all its meaning, all its value, all its dignity. "you remember, i was speaking just now of the case of a second who acting on the spur of the moment instinctively intercepts a blow. i will give you an experience of my own. "i was once acting for a friend in an affair of honour; i was thoroughly on the alert and carefully following the play of the points with that close attention, and perhaps i may say with that sureness of eye, which one acquires from some familiarity with sword-play, when i saw the opponent's point coming straight at my friend's body. before i could think, i saw in an instant, as no one accustomed to fencing could fail to see, that the wound would be mortal. i knocked up the swords, and as the two men had got to close quarters, i called out:--'on guard.' but i had hardly done so, when i realised the full extent of my unconsidered action, and i felt--well, i really cannot tell you what my feelings were at that moment. luckily for me, my friend, who was no less clumsy than brave, was not the man to leave me long in this cruel position. he fell a few seconds later seriously wounded. "the simple fact is, that where so many considerations have to be taken into account, you cannot be too careful never to go a step beyond the limits of strict and unassailable justice, in fairness to yourself and to everyone else concerned. ii. "in this connection i am reminded of another case, which not unfrequently occurs, and on which i have sometimes heard the most contradictory opinions expressed, for it presents a really difficult problem. "in the course of the fight one of the antagonists calls for a halt--have you the right to insist that the fight shall continue without interruption? "in my opinion you unquestionably have that right, unless the case has been already provided for, or both men consent." "still surely," said the comte de c..., "in a prolonged set-to, if your opponent is exhausted, if he is so done that he can hardly hold his sword, if he is blown and distressed, you cannot refuse to give him a minute or two to recover his wind." "well," i replied, "i have stated what i believe to be the rights of the case, on which either combatant can fairly insist. i will now give you my reasons. "your opponent, you say, is done; well, perhaps he may be, but have you considered why? is not his fatigue due to the violence and the excessive energy with which he began the fight, to the regardless eagerness with which he has assailed you, without consulting his staying powers or husbanding his strength? you have had to bear the brunt of all this fury, you have sustained incessant attacks, but you with more skill have economised your resources and have bided your time to attack him. that opportune moment evidently comes just when your opponent, exhausted by the failure of his repeated attacks, is likely to offer you the least resistance. "then what happens? he calls for a halt! and are you to let him off without pressing the advantage that you with your judgment and self-restraint have held in reserve? are you to give him leave to recover his wind, that is to say to recover his strength and rally his scattered forces, in order that he may start afresh to make a second onset with the same ardour and the same violence as before? the danger that you have safely encountered once may prove too much for you the second time. how does that strike you? surely it is as though a man, engaged in a duel with pistols, in which each party is at liberty to fire when he chooses, were to be in too great hurry to let fly at his opponent, and then, when his barrels were emptied and useless, were to ask permission to reload, before he has received his opponent's fire. iii. "situations requiring nerve and self-control undoubtedly occur in a duel with pistols, but similar situations, more trying and more critical, occur in a duel with swords. you are willing to admit them in the one case, yet you refuse to admit them in the other." "but, after all," persisted my critic, "you can hardly strike a man, who is so utterly done that he can hardly keep his point up." "quite true; but do you feel that hesitation, when you raise your pistol to fire on a man who has emptied his barrels? do you not say, and with perfect justice, 'i have stood his fire, it is his turn now to stand mine'? yet the cases are strictly parallel. in each case you have taken the risk and have escaped unhurt, and the empty pistol in your opponent's hand is more completely spent than a sword in a hand that is nerveless from fatigue. for no power can recharge the pistol with the ball that has sped, but on the contrary a man with a sword in his hand may possibly by a supreme effort pull himself together, and dangerous to the last strike you before you can strike him. "but here, as usual, fashion refuses to be logical, and the sentiment of chivalry, which we look for in all right-minded men, does not nowadays allow us to make use of an advantage, which some day or other, perhaps in precisely identical circumstances, may very likely be claimed without scruple. iv. "there is, by the way, another argument which i remember was once put to me by a friend, and which struck me forcibly at the time. "my friend, who is something of a scholar, and has not forgotten his latin, quoted these lines from virgil:-- ille pedum melior motu fretusque iuventa; hic membris et mole valens; sed tarda trementi genua labant, vastos quatit aeger anhelitus artus[ ]. "these verses describe the fighting qualities of two heroes, who are about to enter the ring. "no one, i suppose, would seriously maintain that they ought to be handicapped, that one of them should be made to concede some points in which he is superior, that is to say some of the chances in his favour, while the other retains all that he can muster. and yet can we not easily imagine two men meeting to fight a duel, one of whom has in his favour every chance but one, advantage of reach, dexterity, speed, and swordsmanship, while the other relies only on sound condition and great staying power? "in an unequal combat such as this, what can the latter do but tire his opponent out, get him thoroughly well blown, and so reduce the balance of advantage, which until then tells with full force against him? the other man who thereupon calls for a truce is practically asking his antagonist to forgo his superiority of sound wind and limb, while he, so far from giving up his own advantages of reach, dexterity, and science, has every intention of making the most of them when the fight begins afresh. "then again, the staying power which you handicap, is very likely derived from a well developed chest which incidentally offers a larger target to the adverse point; the greater vigour may be due to the fact that its owner is thick-set, with heavy muscular limbs which make his movements slow and ponderous. why recognise the inequality of the match in the one case, and disregard it in the other? v. "suppose, added my friend, that the question is discussed by the seconds before the fight begins. one side might say:--'if our man is tired or blown, you will have no objection, we presume, to allowing a short interval?' 'we cannot agree to that,' the other side would reply. 'the only chance we have of making an even fight of it is that our man should outstay yours.' "if they insist, the answer is this:--'your man has every acquired advantage, ours has only the one advantage of superior physique. if we are to give up our points, you must forfeit yours, and how can you?'--some arguments are so one-sided. "in conclusion, i think that such questions may very properly be debated between the seconds, but that they ought never to come to the ears of the principals, for one of them might seem to be asking a favour, which the other would have a perfect right to refuse. "i feel that i have dwelt on this matter at great length, but i was anxious to sift it thoroughly, because it is of vital importance and has often given rise to a serious conflict of opinions. i have tried to give you the rights of the case in a strictly impartial spirit. exceptional cases may occur, to which the rule cannot be applied without hardship, but such circumstances, as for example the bad health or feeble constitution of one of the combatants, should be provided for by arrangement." vi. "one more question, please," continued the comte de c., "just to complete my cross-examination. when a man is called out, can he be required to fight two duels with two opponents in succession?" "no, that cannot be expected of him. the man who has fought once ought to be treated as a privileged person, and cannot in any case be compelled to cross swords a second time. tired as he is, or as he may be by the first encounter, he stands at a disadvantage in meeting a fresh antagonist. a second encounter, if it cannot be avoided and if both sides consent, ought not to take place until the next day, or after an interval of at least some hours, unless the party interested, that is to say the man who has already fought, requests that it may take place at once. "but on no account should the man, who at a later stage may probably or possibly become a principal, witness the first encounter either as a simple spectator or as a second. for the mere fact of his presence gives him a real and indisputable advantage, especially if the duel is fought with swords. and then the first law of the duel,--that it should be a fair fight with no favour,--is broken. "there is one case and strictly speaking only one, in which his presence is permissible. that is, when being the party injured and therefore having the choice of weapons he selects different weapons from those employed in the first encounter,--pistols for example, if the former fight was with swords, or swords if it was fought with pistols. but, i repeat, this can only be allowed, if the man who has already fought wishes it or consents to it freely. in any other circumstances if i were acting second on an occasion of this sort, i should refuse to countenance a duel which i should consider equally irregular and unfair. vii. "take the question on its merits. in a duel with swords there are two things you want to know: first, what is your opponent's natural temper, when he is fighting in earnest; secondly, what is the character of his play and the quality of his swordsmanship. no one can deny that it is very advantageous to know, whether the man that you have to face is impatient and excitable or self-possessed and cool; whether he will attack you with resolution or play a waiting game; whether he will attempt to parry or simply offer his point; whether he is energetic or the reverse, skilful or clumsy, an ugly customer or not particularly formidable. the fact of your presence at a previous encounter is sufficient by itself to give you information on all these heads. you are reassured and reinforced; undisturbed by doubt and hesitation you can mature your plans at leisure with a quiet mind. you have been over the ground and know how the land lies. even if you have not the vaguest notion of fencing, if your ignorance is so complete that you are not in a position to make the best use of all this valuable information, still the fact that you have been a spectator of the first fight, apart from any conclusions you may draw, robs of its imaginary terrors the great unknown, and shows you what you have to do. "your antagonist on the contrary has everything to learn. he does not know whether you are skilful or incompetent; whether he ought to attack you or to wait for your attack; whether your nerves are shaky or firm; whether you are naturally cool or excitable. he is in the dark, a stranger feeling his way in a new country. you, meanwhile, having no need to waste time on such deliberations, go to work at once, with every probability of winning an easy victory. "therefore, just as in the case of the man who is at a disadvantage in point of science and practice, but superior in bodily strength, soundness of wind, and condition, i maintained that he has as much right to make full use of those advantages as his opponent has to use those which he possesses, so in the situation we are now considering, i maintain that we must refuse to allow anything that goes to handicap the combatants, or tends to incline the scales unfairly on one side rather than the other. "it may be that some of the considerations, that i have put forward, have not occurred to you before. but now, bearing them in mind, can you say that you really and truly believe that such a fight as this is a fair fight, or that you would consent to have anything to do with it? "i think that i have said everything that i had to say on the duties of seconds, as they appear to me in the light of my own experience and of the history of the subject. to-morrow we will discuss a still more important matter, the methods to be adopted by the principals." [illustration] the tenth evening [illustration: _the instinctive position._] i. the next day found us lighting our cigars as usual. brilliant conversation, you know, cannot be maintained without something to smoke. our talk this evening was to be about the methods of attack and defence, which offer the most likely chances of success in an actual duel. i began at once:--"yesterday," i said, "i was speaking of the whole duty of seconds. i endeavoured to describe as clearly and fully as possible, what they ought to do and provide for, and i showed why it is essential that they should follow every stage and every incident of the fight with the utmost keenness, for the onus of responsibility is rightly held to rest on them. "the preliminaries are now settled; the antagonists, armed with swords of equal length, stand face to face. one of the seconds is stationed between them. he addresses to each in turn the venerable formula:--'are you ready?--on guard.' upon their assenting he steps back and gives the fatal word:--'go.' "the fighting is about to begin, and the two men stand expectant, neither stirring yet, each sheltering his life behind a few inches of cold steel. ii. "there are only three contingencies that we need consider, which naturally divide the discussion under three heads. the first arises, when a man who has never touched a sword finds himself opposed to an old hand. the second, when both antagonists are alike unskilled. the third, when both are adepts. "i may say at once with regard to this last case, that in a duel between two skilful opponents the advantage of superior science which one or the other of them may possess vanishes more often than not, and is compensated for by difference of temperament. for i cannot remind you too often, that in actual fighting it is not a question of hitting your opponent often, or of placing your point artistically, but of striking somehow and anyhow one blow and only one. "swords are not worn now, and swordsmanship as a necessary part of polite education has gone out of fashion. our more punctilious ancestors prided themselves on never wounding their antagonist except with some thrust ingeniously conceived and brilliantly executed. perhaps it was better so. it was certainly more picturesque, more chivalrous and magnificent. to mistake your sword for a spit, though you might succeed in running your antagonist through and through, would have been voted a blackguardly proceeding, unworthy of a gentleman. molière's principle is good enough for us:--'_hit the other man, and don't be hit yourself._' our object is to hit no matter where,--no matter how. the art of fence is now so much neglected that it seldom happens when two men go out to fight, that they have even a passable knowledge of their weapon. iii. "when a man knows nothing about fencing, either because he has never touched a sword, or because he has only knocked about with his friends in a rough way and very occasionally, his first thought when he has to fight is to call on a professor, and endeavour to obtain some ideas which will enable him to defend himself on the field of battle. i will describe one of these lessons which the professor is expected to give, and i shall try to point out the only sort of advice that is of universal application in such cases. "the novice explains that he has to go out the next morning, and requests the professor to be good enough to give him a hint or two. 'do you know anything about fencing?' enquires the professor. 'no, practically nothing.' 'you know that one holds the sword by the hilt and tries to hit the other man with the point, and that is about all, i suppose,' continues the professor, who will have his little joke. and he takes down a pair of swords provided with buttons, hands one to his pupil, and the lesson begins. "one wonders how often this same lesson has been repeated. it never varies, and it never ought to vary. its whole value lies in its simplicity. "the ignorant fencer can do nothing without a cool head and steady nerve, which are the more effective, when they are opposed, as they often are, to bluster and over-confidence. "first and foremost the professor must make his pupil understand the absolute necessity of standing firmly on his feet with an easy balance that allows perfect freedom of movement. the position, whatever it may be, that your extempore pupil falls into naturally, is the position you must accept. it is important to give him confidence in it and to modify it only so far as is absolutely necessary to enable him to move about easily. your business is to make the best of this position, and if possible turn even its defects to account. "the body should be inclined forwards rather than backwards. in this somewhat crouching attitude the upper part of the body, that is to say the chest, by its advanced position with the sword arm held in front, acts as a kind of natural rampart or shield to cover the lower part, where a wound is almost certain to prove mortal. "keep in view from the very first the importance of inspiring confidence in the unpractised fencer. for confidence alone implies some sort of self-possession and reacts immediately on nerve and muscle. he soon begins to feel somewhat more at ease. some slight modifications are all that is required to correct the glaring faults that are most obviously dangerous. "i am not afraid of putting the truth of my statement to a practical test. if you will now, all of you, take one of those swords which i see hanging on the wall and place yourselves on guard, not in what you imagine to be a fencing attitude, but as you would stand if you were seriously threatened, you will find that the attitudes you assume will all be very much alike, apart from such slight variations as are due to differences of physique." iv. "come, i'll be your shocking example," said one of my hearers. "i have never touched a sword in my life. see what you can make of me." "very good," i replied, rising as i spoke; and taking down a pair of swords i handed him one. then without giving him time to think, i made a quick movement and threatened him with the point. instinctively he threw himself on guard. "there, that will do," i said, "stay as you are; i only wish you could be photographed to illustrate the instinctive attitude. oh, don't be too conceited; i do not mean to say that your position is faultless,--very far from that; but the attitude in which you are standing is the origin of the orthodox guard as taught in the fencing-room, because it is essentially the attitude that accords with our natural fighting instincts." "i am getting tired of this," observed my patient, who had scrupulously stuck to his position. "one moment," i replied. "you are tired because your arm is too much extended. draw it back a trifle, to relax the muscles and give them their natural play. carry yourself more upright by slightly raising the body. your left foot is too far from the right; bring it rather more forward; sink down a little on your legs, so as to be ready either to spring quickly to the rear or to advance. "bring your right shoulder forward, in order to expose your chest less, but not further than you can manage with comfort. you see i am not very exacting. "there, that will do very well. "now, if i make a movement, straighten your arm boldly, and step back. "very well done. "and yet you tell me you have never touched a sword, or even a foil in a fencing-room. then all i can say is that i could not have chosen a better subject for my demonstration. "we will now put the swords back in their place, and return to our discussion. perhaps i may have occasion to trouble you again by and by." "i am entirely at your disposal, professor," replied my obliging pupil. v. "the rest of the lesson may be summed up in a convenient formula. for so far as i know, there is only one really useful tip that a professor can give to the uninstructed novice who says:--'this afternoon or to-morrow morning i have to go out.' "the professor will make a great mistake if he attempts to teach him some fancy stroke, for he will only disturb the natural working of his instinct, without controlling it. he must remember that the excitement of fighting does not leave much room for thought, and he must accordingly take care to limit his instruction to the simplest and clearest ideas, easy to understand and easy to put into practice, such as arise naturally out of the instinctive sense of self-preservation. "these remarks of course do not apply to those dull and inert creatures, cursed with a temperament so heavy, and so sluggish, that they do not know what it is to move briskly and can never rise to the occasion. you can put nothing into such as these and can get nothing out of them. "when swords are crossed, the thing to do is simply what our friend here did just now:--retire. i say 'retire' in order to avoid saying 'run away.' retire always, retire incessantly, but retire little by little, so as not to consume once and for all the entire _hinterland_; retire in short, not like a man in a panic, but like one who is watching his opportunity. "never forget this,--the only principle that at the critical moment is available for him who cannot count on science to assist him:--_get back and straighten the arm_;--or in other words:--_defend yourself by threatening your opponent_. never attack; that is the point on which your attention must be concentrated." "but," exclaimed one of my hearers, "what do you mean by 'threatening?' it is not so easy to threaten when you are an absolute duffer." vi. "the naked point of a sword resolutely offered at the body or at the face is always a threat. no one who sees it directed straight at him with a set fixity of purpose and a suggestive glitter can fail to be alarmed by it or can afford to disregard it, more especially perhaps if he knows that the man behind it is unsophisticated, and cannot be depended upon to obey the ordinary rules, that he has no deep design or artful scheme in the background, but just one idea--to keep his point always there, like a sentry at his post. "put shortly, my advice amounts to this:--defend yourself by retreating; threaten by offering the point. offering the point, that is to say straightening the arm, is the attack of the incapable fencer. "by retreating you maintain the distance between yourself and your opponent, and make it difficult for him to get command of your blade on a simulated attack. "there is only one other movement that i should teach to a novice, who came to me for advice in these circumstances. i should tell him--as he retires and straightens his arm--to change the line occasionally; that is to say to pass his point under his opponent's blade and threaten him on the other side, in fact a simple disengagement. it is the easiest thing in the world to understand, and anyone, however little he may be skilled in the art of fencing, can do it with the greatest ease; the act of retiring itself facilitates the execution of the movement. an hour's practice will make him familiar with this change of line, which as i remarked just now answers the double purpose of attack and defence. "i should make my pupil repeat this very simple performance over and over again, instructing him to straighten his arm, sometimes with his point held high on a level with the chest, attacking the high lines, sometimes with the point lowered, attacking the low lines. you understand of course what is meant by the high and low lines. it is the a--b--c of fencing. "notice that my lesson is simplified to a degree that is almost ludicrous. i dissect every movement and explain how the parts are put together, being particularly careful to avoid the use of technical terms, for my imaginary pupil is supposed to be completely ignorant, and he would be hopelessly puzzled by them. if on the other hand he happens to have some smattering of knowledge he will appreciate more fully and derive all the more benefit from the lesson thus reduced to its simplest expression." vii. "you say nothing," remarked one of my hearers, "about the movement, which consists in reversing the lunge." "no," i answered; "because i believe that this device, which is only proper in certain exceptional circumstances, is likely to prove very dangerous if it is employed at the wrong moment or at random. if it does not come off, you are left without defence at your opponent's mercy. "to put the matter shortly:--if you adopt my plan, you retire and at the same moment offer your point either with a straight thrust or with a disengagement; then you immediately recover your guard and bring your forearm back to its original position. whether your thrust has succeeded or not, you are always provided with a sound defence, you are set firmly on your legs, your balance is undisturbed, and upon your opponent's advance you can repeat the process again and again. "now suppose that you decide to lunge to the rear; that is to say, to reverse the lunge by throwing the left leg back to its full extent and dropping the body, without moving the right foot; well, when will you do this and how? "you are not an expert. what secret instinct will inform you that the opportune moment has come for executing this manoeuvre? for after you have executed it, you must recover, and recover smartly, if you are to regain your guard; no easy matter, i assure you. in attempting to perform a movement so complicated, you with your want of experience can hardly fail to be thrown into disorder, to the great advantage of your adversary, who will seize the opportunity to press you briskly and get command of your blade. "even supposing that you escape from this danger, you cannot go on repeating the process continually; you cannot repeat it indifferently on every attack, or on every semblance of an attack that is made upon you. you must judge your opportunity. now fencing judgment, especially in a duel, implies knowledge, and remember we are arguing on the assumption that you are ignorant. "for these reasons i should never think of recommending the lunge to the rear to anyone who has not acquired some familiarity with his weapon. viii. "if we now turn from the man whose only chance lies in his getting a rule of thumb to work by to the man who is more or less used to fencing, the case is different. the scope of the lesson is enlarged. the pupil knows a few words of the language, we must try to turn his knowledge to account. "my advice to him would be:--in the first place, take the same guard as that already indicated; but make a little play with your point, by changing the line occasionally from inside to outside and so on, in order to bother your opponent. make a show of attacking now and then, in order to recover any ground that you may have lost by retreating. but be very careful never on any account to attack in real earnest. you must be doubly strong and doubly sure of all your movements to enable you to attack without getting out of your depth, and perhaps throwing yourself away in a moment of inadvertence. "and then i should go on to say:--sometimes, but always accompanying the movement with a short step to the rear, make a parry of counter quarte and circle, a sweeping parry which cuts all the lines, and is bound to find the blade somewhere. come back to your first position at once, holding your point well in front of your body. then if you find that your opponent means to develope his attack fully, and that his point is directed high, throw your left foot back boldly, remembering to drop your head and body at the same moment, in order to avoid the point which would otherwise strike you in the upper part of the chest or in the face. above all, recover as smartly as you can by springing quickly to the rear, so as to regain your defensive position before your adversary, if he has avoided or parried your thrust, can take advantage of his opportunity. "but once more i must caution you that this sort of thing requires such training and judgment as i should not expect anyone to possess who has not by regular practice made himself thoroughly at home with the sword." ix. "we are allowed to criticise, i believe," remarked the comte de c. after a pause which followed these remarks. "by all means," i replied; "i not only allow but invite criticism. in working out an idea, i may very likely neglect some side of it that ought not to be passed over." "well, you seem to me inconsistent. you said the other day, and i quite agreed with you:--'the first and fundamental rule of fencing is to parry;' and now you tell us on the contrary not to attempt to parry." "that is fair criticism," i answered, "but i do not admit the inconsistency. you will remember that we were then talking of scientific fencing, that is to say of the systematic study of swordsmanship. but that has nothing to do with the present question. the whole art of fencing cannot be learnt in three or four hours. "let me give you an analogy, for an analogy often serves to put an argument simply. two men are on a sinking ship; one of them knows how to swim, the other only knows how to go to the bottom and stay there. meanwhile the danger is immediate. would you say to the man who cannot swim a stroke:--'look here, this is the way to swim; you move your arms like this, and at the same time you move your legs like that'? do you mean to tell me that he will be able to put into practice straight away what you have just shown him? or do you suppose, that thanks to your demonstration he will be able to swim when he finds himself in the water? no, of course you are not so foolish as to suppose anything of the sort. you would of course tell him to catch hold of something or other, anything--a spar, an oar, or a plank, and to support himself on it as best he can; that is his only chance. "well, my case is on all fours with that. my pupil is in imminent peril of his life. my business is to give him the spar or the plank, which may serve to keep him afloat. i don't bother about teaching him to swim. x. "of course there is nothing to prevent one from showing one or two parries to the novice who has to fight a duel at short notice. but the only parries that would be of any use to him are the comprehensive and rather complicated parries, which sweep through all the lines. what would be the result? "his parries would be weak, undecided, and slow. instead of tripping neatly round the blade, they would labour painfully after it in wide circles. to deceive them would be the merest child's play, and the poor novice, encountering nothing but empty air, would let his blade fly into space, and send his arm after it, leaving himself completely exposed. "even supposing that his opponent does not take advantage of his opportunity, the novice realises how helpless he is, and racks his brains for some device to avoid the danger when he is again attacked. then he does not know what to do, what not to do; he loses his head and is seized with panic; he strikes wildly at his opponent's blade, as a drowning man strikes wildly at the water, and nothing remains to be done but to wait for the finishing thrust, or to rush blindly at his opponent, with the probability that he will run upon his point. those are my reasons for not attempting to teach an untutored novice things which he cannot possibly perform. "now, on the other hand, consider in detail the measures that i do put at his disposal. by retiring he evades the point. evading the point, by drawing the body back or by springing to the rear, may not be the same thing as parrying, but it amounts to much the same in the end, since you retire out of range and are not hit. or if you are hit, at the worst you can be only lightly touched, because by retiring you make your opponent lose the ground which he reckoned on gaining by his attack. "moreover when he sees that you straighten your arm every time on the chance of reaching him, he dare not lunge out recklessly. if he does, you have at least a chance of hitting him,--by a fluke no doubt, but i suppose you do not much mind that. xi. "there is one last objection that i will anticipate. "what, i may be asked, becomes of your scheme of defence, if, the moment that the novice extends his sword at a venture, the adversary engages it? "without a doubt that is what he ought to do, and what he will do, as i shall presently explain. but you do not imagine, i suppose, that a man completely ignorant of the use of his weapon, who goes to a professor for advice on the eve of an encounter, can hope to come away comforted with the assurance that he has learnt the whole art of how to hit his opponent without being touched himself? that, i fancy, would be too convenient. it would be better then to study the art of not learning to fence, instead of spending months and years in studying the art of fencing. ignorance would indeed be bliss and wisdom folly. "the man who has not learnt the use of the weapon to which he entrusts his life, may think himself lucky if he can lessen the chances, to which he is exposed, of a fatal issue. the master can hope to accomplish nothing more than to give his pupil some confidence, and show him the only course that can be commended by common sense and at the same time furnishes some sort of defence. "if the novice does what he is told he will, i repeat, put difficulties and dangers in the way of his opponent; he will force him to act with caution, he will keep him at long range, and compel him to shift his ground when he attacks. in shifting his ground he may, either through carelessness or in the excitement of the moment, leave himself uncovered, and give an opening to the point that is continually directed at him. but i do not for a moment suppose that a wary and experienced fencer, who keeps his head cool, will not easily defeat such elementary strategy. "you may tell your pupil to be prudent, you may tell him to be calm and resolute, but now or never you should add the pious wish 'heaven help you'." xii. "may i ask one more question?" said one of my friends. "i have often heard it said that if you don't know much about fencing the best thing to do is, as soon as you come on guard, to make a sudden rush at the other man before he has time to collect himself." "well," i replied, "if you wish to make sure of being incurably spitted, that is the most infallible way to set about it. "the seconds, before giving the signal to begin, have just asked your opponent if he is ready. is it likely that he will allow himself to be rushed, or to be victimised by such a transparent piece of bluff? "is it not much more likely that he will have been told to look out for a surprise attack? one of two things,--either the man who confronts you is a skilful fencer, in which case he will not want you to give him time to collect himself, but will be quite capable of taking his own time; or his ignorance of fencing is on a par with yours, and then it is a toss up. it follows that if this desperate plan of attack is chosen, because it is thought likely to succeed, it is absurd. if however it is chosen, because the man who chooses it is of a restive impatient disposition, one who cannot wait and for whom cool defensive tactics are an impossibility, the case is different. "all that one can say to the pupil, whose temper is such that he cannot play a waiting game, is something of this sort:--trust your instinct, be guided by your natural impulse. you quite understand that by acting as you propose you run a greater risk; for your attack is delivered at random, you are embarking on a wild and hazardous speculation. your only chance of success, as you yourself admit, is that you may, by suddenly and violently letting yourself go for all you are worth, take your opponent by surprise and put him off his parry. i can only give you one word of advice. before letting yourself go, try at any rate to beat the other man's sword out of line in any way you can. knock it up or down, to one side or the other; as soon as you have made your beat, let yourself go straight, without the least hesitation. by this means you will avoid an interchange of hits or a stop thrust. but i warn you this is not so easy as it sounds. "possibly, where so much depends on luck and accident, you may bring off your hit. but if you are the wounded man, you will be wounded with a vengeance, for you will probably run on the sword up to the hilt,--a trifling consideration, which is perhaps worth taking into account. "this plan in fact can never be recommended; it involves not only too many risks, but risks that are too serious and too certain. i will show you presently in greater detail why this is so, when we look at the question from the other side, from the point of view of a fencer more or less skilful, who is opposed to a novice ignorant of swordsmanship but a determined natural fighter, who is thoroughly roused by a keen sense of danger. xiii. "the case we shall consider next will be the reverse of this. by reversing the position we shall hear what is to be said on both sides, and we shall then have considered from every point of view, the probabilities of victory or defeat, which are likely to occur in a duel. we will leave that for to-morrow." and so we broke up. [illustration] the eleventh evening [illustration: _the real thing._] i. we have now to examine the duel with swords from a different point of view. the ignorant and inexperienced fencer, trying at the last moment to find a desperate remedy for a desperate state of affairs, may be dismissed, and we have now to consider the case of combatants who are more or less evenly matched, and who are fighting in deadly earnest. for as i have already said, a duel generally equalises the forces on either side, except when a skilful and resolute swordsman meets a clumsy hesitating duffer, or when a cool head is opposed to that rash and furious bluster which more often than not leads a man to his destruction. "first and foremost, your invariable rule must be:--distrust your enemy; never be overconfident. i cannot too often repeat that the unexpected always turns up just when you are least prepared for it. it is this glorious uncertainty that to my mind makes fighting with swords the only sort of duelling that is fair and sportsmanlike, the only sort in which energy, courage, and resolution always give some chance to the weaker combatant. "in a duel fought with pistols, what a wretched rôle is assigned to the combatants. energy is of no use, courage of no value; you stand up like a target to be shot at, without any possibility of defence. courage and cowardice meet on equal terms; the feeblest and most spiritless sneak may succeed in defeating the most determined courage and the manliest energy. a finger presses a trigger, and the thing is done. duelling with pistols has always seemed to me a monstrous practice. i am delighted to see it disappearing from our manners, and going more and more out of fashion every day. ii. "to return to my subject,--there are certain elementary principles of self-defence, from which the prudent fencer ought never to depart; principles of such universal application, that they may be considered the foundation on which is based all serious fighting, which is conducted with any sort of method. "as soon as the second who undertakes to start the proceedings has put you on guard, and steps back, leaving you at liberty to set to, you should immediately take two or three paces to the rear, before your opponent can realise or anticipate what you are about. by this means you at once put yourself out of range, and out of danger either from a surprise or from one of those blind and frantic rushes, to which, as we have seen, some men are apt to pin their faith." "but," exclaimed one of my hearers, not altogether seriously, "if your opponent does the same thing, you will find yourselves at a range more suitable for pistol practice than for sword-play." "in that case," i replied, taking him seriously, "you have three advantages for one,--surely a substantial gain. "in the first place, if the same idea has occurred to your opponent as to you, or if the same advice has been given to you both, the advice is the more likely to be sound. "in the second place, his quick strategic movement to the rear tells you very plainly that he too has no fancy for a surprise, or for that rough and tumble style of fighting which reduces sword-play to a sort of fisticuffs. you are able to make up your mind at once that he is not that sort of fighter, and that his attacks will be prudent and well considered. "in the third place, the brief pause gives you a moment or two to pull yourself together and get steady, to take a good look at your opponent's point, and get over that first involuntary sensation, that momentary chill, which no one, not even the bravest of us, ever fails to experience. it also gives you time to run your eye over your antagonist, and by noting how he stands, how he holds his sword, in a word how he shapes, to look the situation in the face and settle your plan of campaign. "that, i think you will admit, is something gained, even if you have to stand for a few seconds at a range which, as you say, seems more suitable for pistol practice. iii. "have you never observed how all animals, from the most insignificant creatures up to the most savage beasts, set about fighting? look at two cocks in a back-yard or two bulls in a field. notice how they skirmish and spar before really letting themselves go; notice the wicked glitter of their eyes as they intently watch for an opening, where they will presently plant their most telling blow. "what teaches them not to rush at each other's throat in blind fury? why, simply instinct, the science of self-preservation which is common to every living thing; and common instinct should teach you the same lesson. "you will easily realise how completely you upset or at least disturb the calculations of the man who is clinging to advice of this kind:--'the moment you are on guard,--lunge, before your opponent has time to collect himself'; or of the man, whose one idea is to make a wild and indiscriminate charge. "such men, however lacking they may be in brains, can hardly fail to perceive that the distance between you and them makes a surprise impracticable. if they do attempt it, their movements will be disconcerted; they will give themselves away, and may probably run upon your point if you hold it straight before you, or in any case they must give you time to see them coming. you may be attacked no doubt, and attacked furiously, but you will not be surprised. iv. "when you have placed yourself out of range you remain free to choose your next move. if your opponent now seems inclined to shorten the distance between you, wait for him without breaking ground. he is compelled to advance, and therefore is at a disadvantage; for if he exposes himself, you are ready for him; you do your best to harass his advance, you watch your opportunity, and whatever movement he makes you let him see that he is continually threatened by your point. he cannot help giving you notice of his attack; you see what is coming, and are able to take your measures accordingly. the way he manages his advance, and the accompanying movements of his point, hand, and arm, are sure signs by which you can tell how much or how little he knows. "if on the other hand he stands on the defensive and seems inclined to wait for your attack, you may advance cautiously, with short steps, keeping your legs well under you and your body well balanced, levelling your point now at his eyes, now at his chest;--for you must be careful to guard against the dangers that i have just mentioned. "in order to counteract, or at least to lessen the disadvantage to which you are exposed on your advance, you must occupy your opponent's attention by continually threatening him in the different lines; for by compelling him to protect himself you prevent him from attacking you, and meanwhile little by little you gain ground. "it is a good plan to feint a serious attack in order to compel him to show his hand, and to find out whether he means to rely on a parry, or if he will simply straighten his arm. but you must be very sure of yourself, and have complete control of your movements, or you will very likely disclose your own plans by some involuntary and incautious gesture. "all that i have said applies with equal force to good and bad fencers, to the expert as well as to the novice. prudence and self-control are more than half the battle. to these must be added science, which enables you to deceive your opponent by deluding him as to your real object, while you compel him unwillingly to betray himself. v. "i hope," i said, interrupting myself, "that you find me tolerably intelligible and that you follow the connection between the successive steps of my argument?" my audience with one voice assured me that i was perfectly intelligible, and that they were following me with the greatest interest. "i may be a trifle long-winded in dealing with these points, but please remember that after pointing out a danger or giving a piece of advice, i have to show how the danger may be met, by explaining the answering move. "to proceed,--whichever of you has made the first advance, you are now within striking distance. "if you are absolutely ignorant of sword-play, like the unfortunate duellist whose case we were considering last night, i have already told you what in my opinion you can do, or at least may attempt to do. i have nothing more to say on that head. "the opponents that we now have in view are supposed to have a knowledge of the use of weapons. it follows that the questions to be considered will naturally resemble those that we have already discussed when talking of theoretical sword-play and more particularly of the assault. the only difference is the difference between a sham fight and a real fight, the difference between a muzzled foil and an unmuzzled sword. besides that, in an assault you are governed by conventional restrictions clearly defined and well understood; you do not attempt to hit your opponent except in accordance with the rules; you wear a mask and a jacket. "but the mistakes which you are most anxious to avoid in an assault are the very things that you try to turn to account in a fight, in order to perplex your opponent and spoil his game. for fencing, if the professors will allow me to say so, is perhaps the one art in which mistakes may upon occasion prove of the greatest possible advantage to him who makes them. otherwise it would be mere bookwork, to be learnt more or less thoroughly, and the man who knew his book completely would have nothing to fear; but to my mind it is nothing of the sort. no knowledge of fencing can make a man invulnerable. if anyone imagines that he is an exception to the rule he betrays a singularly misplaced confidence in his own powers,--a very dangerous error. "but ought we to condemn swordsmanship on that account? my own opinion is that this uncertainty is the great beauty of the sword, the one feature that distinguishes it as the only weapon for a fair fight; for even the weakest player has his opportunity, his lucky moments, his strokes of fortune, which must always prevent the duel from degenerating into simple butchery. "if fencing were an exact science, if you knew, that as sure as two and two make four, you could certainly hit your man, and that he as certainly could not hit you, how could you in common honesty cross swords with him? vi. "i am afraid that i have been wandering somewhat from my text; but this digression, though it may at first sight seem out of place, still when one comes to consider it is very closely connected with our subject. for it serves to emphasise once more the fact that, in spite of every probability, luck may always turn the scale in favour of the other side, and to remind you that you cannot attach too much importance to the most minute particulars of your defence. "habitual mistrust is one of the most necessary requirements for this complicated art. put in another way it is the careful study of the enemy whom you have to face. the mistrust that marks the wary, calculating player, not only preserves him from danger but creates dangers for his opponent. vii. "i was saying the other day that i did not believe in secret thrusts, and that the thrusts that have received this absurd misnomer are nothing but strokes that are not generally recognised by the ordinary rules of fencing. strip them of their imaginary terrors, and far from being dangerous to you they become more than a little dangerous for the man who attempts them. "to describe them, we need not distinguish more than two sorts,--methods of attack, and methods of evading or dodging an opponent's attack. these tricks are all very much of the same character. take this for an example:--lunge as though you were making a simple attack, then suddenly draw your arm back to make your opponent parry in the air, throw yourself out of line and let drive, hitting him in the ribs. "or again:--after a false attack, dodge by stooping low to avoid the parry and riposte, and hit your opponent in the low lines. the sudden disappearance of your body will probably astonish him. "some men delight in charging at you with a shout, at the same time drawing back their arm to avoid your parry. this strange war-cry occasionally has the effect of causing a moment's involuntary pause, of which they take advantage to drive their point home anyhow and anywhere. "others again, when the blades are engaged in tierce, suddenly bring their left foot to the front, at the same time swinging the body round, left shoulder forward and out of line with your point. "if on the other hand these strokes, which if not foul are decidedly irregular, are employed to meet an attack, the same thing is done with slight variations. suppose i deliver an attack; my opponent, instead of parrying, springs aside out of line. sword and body vanish; the target has moved away; my attack loses itself in space, and i am hit by a flank movement. "or again, he ducks suddenly, supporting himself on his free hand, and allows my point to pass harmlessly over his head, while at the same time he hits me somewhere,--in the low lines of course. "or again, he seizes my blade in tierce, swings the left foot round to the front, suddenly arrives at close quarters, and before i have time either to retreat or to recover my guard, stabs me by drawing back or dropping his hand. "i might extend this list of examples indefinitely, but you see that all these strokes are contrived on the same plan, and only differ from each other in unimportant details. it needs no argument to prove how completely the man who resorts to such tactics gives himself away if they are unsuccessful, for in order to make them really formidable there must be no hanging back,--you must let yourself go without the least reserve." viii. "but surely," someone objected, "in the hands of a skilful swordsman they would be doubly dangerous?" "that contingency," i replied, "is worth considering, but a skilful swordsman would be very unlikely to resort to such methods. why should he? if his opponent is a duffer, he has no need to be so tricky. if on the other hand his opponent is a cool-headed fencer, as skilful as himself, he knows the penalty of failure too well to make the attempt. "i need hardly tell you,--though i believe i have mentioned the fact already,--that when you attack you ought to be particularly careful not to let yourself go so completely that you cannot recover your defensive position, if your attack fails. "all these remarks illustrate how necessary it is to distrust your enemy, to approach a strange antagonist with caution, and always keep him at a distance. by retreating the moment you come on guard you have already provided against a surprise and against wild rushes. when you are within range, take my advice and do not join blades, and always, as much as possible, avoid coming to such close quarters that your opponent can reach you without breaking ground. but do not misunderstand me when i tell you not to join blades. i do not mean that you are never to cover yourself, and never to allow the blades to meet; that would be a mistake. all that i mean is that you should take care never to allow your opponent to hold your blade. by playing light and refusing a proffered engagement you put a stop to all forcing strokes,--_croisés_, beats, binds, _flanconnade_,--which are the most dangerous of all strokes, because they are the most certain. i call them certain, because by holding your blade prisoner they control it forcibly, and make a stop thrust or an exchange of hits impossible. ix. "there are of course several ways of dealing with a man who refuses to engage, but they are difficult and require much practice. it generally happens that your refusal disconcerts your opponent. he has no definite point to start from, he hesitates, and his hesitation retards his attack. "if his attack is complicated, you may venture on a stop thrust, offered with caution and accompanied by a short step to the rear; and you worry, and annoy, and wear him out to the best of your ability. "if his attack is simple, he will be afraid of an exchange of hits; and the more skilful he is, the more cautious you will find him; and as i said when speaking of the assault, you may lessen the danger of a simple attack by a brisk retreat to a greater or less distance, as the case may be. by this means you parry more easily, you increase the distance to be traversed, and you counteract the rapidity of the attack by two methods of defence instead of one. "if you are hit, the wound is slight, or at all events much less severe than it would have been, if you had tried to parry without breaking ground. if on the other hand your parry is successful, you have escaped the danger of a _corps à corps_, and are in a better position for delivering your riposte. "so much for the defence, now let us suppose that you are the attacking party. you attack, either because you place more reliance on the quickness of your hand than on the certainty of your riposte, or because your opponent, by confining himself to defensive tactics, compels you to do so. you must be doubly cautious now. x. "if it is important, as i have just now pointed out, to avoid engaging blades when you are acting on the defensive, in order to protect yourself from what may be called attacks on the sword, it is obviously of equal importance never to attack without first attempting to master your opponent's _fort_. "eschew feints;--i have shown you how dangerous they are--therefore be content with direct attacks, prefacing them with an engagement in _carte_ or _tierce_, or with a pressure, or a beat, light or heavy, accordingly as you wish to draw your opponent to one line or another. your object will be gained more easily, if he is willing to join blades. "if on the other hand he is unwilling to do so, you must by force or fraud bring him to an engagement, and you should never finish your attack until you have succeeded in finding his blade; unless in his efforts to elude you he leaves himself completely exposed. when that happens a straight thrust is a certainty. "what you have most to fear is a stop thrust, the straightening of your opponent's arm on your preparation or advance. this is generally a favourite stroke with those who deliberately stand on the defensive. "in nine cases out of ten the refusal to join blades may be successfully met by a simulated attack, if it is well marked. either your opponent attempts to parry, or he straightens his arm; whereupon you immediately engage his blade, and drive your attack home, without quitting his blade, and above all without any feint. xi. "it is evidently impossible to enumerate in the course of conversation all the situations that may occur, or to describe all the traps that you may set for your opponent or that he may set for you. these things are matters of instinct and inspiration, the happy thoughts of the moment, and depend on character and individual temperament, physical and moral. the art of fighting cannot of course be learnt in a day; it grows upon you gradually, as you learn by experience to combine the various elements scientifically into a well-ordered whole. "picture for yourselves two men fighting.--you see them at one moment standing their full height, the next bent double, swerving to right and left, colliding violently, and entangled in a furious encounter; suddenly they break away, recoiling from each other with a bound, rest for a moment, panting and glaring, till suddenly they renew the struggle. do you suppose that all these intricate evolutions, and the subtle application of muscular force that they imply, can be systematically analysed and taught? of course not. "in every art proficiency can only be obtained by persistent and intelligent application. practice alone makes perfect. it is by studying combinations, by trying to adapt the means at his disposal to the object in view, that the artist tests the limits of his art and discovers its hidden secrets, fashions it at will, and makes it his obedient slave. "these remarks would not be complete, if i failed to caution you against a very pernicious habit, which one is apt to contract in the fencing-room, and which in a duel may easily lead to a fatal issue. i mean the habit of stopping after you have made a hit, instead of immediately recovering your guard and putting yourself out of distance. never forget this important point; if you do, you may after wounding your opponent receive a mortal wound, for which you will have only yourself to blame. "every fencer knows how commonly it happens in an assault, that a man ripostes automatically after he is hit, and strikes his opponent almost simultaneously, especially when the latter has not taken the trouble to attend strictly to his recovery. "remember that a sword-thrust, even though it be mortal, does not take effect immediately. there is always a momentary interval before the wounded man falters, or drops his sword, or falls to the ground unconscious. the moment you think you have made a hit,--for you may be mistaken,--get back as smartly as you can, and be ready to go on fighting. xii. "well," i added after a short pause, "nothing else occurs to me in the way of general advice, which i can commend to your notice. when the time for actual fighting arrives, your attention must be concentrated on the important points, and these may be summed up in two or three words:--self-reliance, well-judged caution, restrained and well-timed energy." "you have given us most excellent advice," exclaimed the comte de c. "if one could only think of it all at the critical moment, one would be well provided." "think of only half of it," i answered, "and you will not do so badly,--there are so many men who cannot think at all." xiii. the next day we all met as usual in the smoking-room. "well," someone asked me, "what are you going to talk about to-night?" "why," i answered, "my subject is exhausted, i have told you all i know, or at any rate all that i think worth knowing." [illustration] footnotes: [ ] lafaugère, _traité sur les armes_. [ ] _académie de l'espée_, by gerard thibault, antwerp, . [ ] dares the nimbler-footed, in manhood's confident ease; huge entellus of limb and of weight,--but his tardier knees totter, and troubled breath convulses his towering frame. virgil, _aeneid_ v. bowen. _small post_ _vo._ _s._ schools and masters of fence, from the middle ages to the end of the eighteenth century. by egerton castle, m.a., f.s.a. with a complete bibliography. illustrated with reproductions of old engravings and plates of swords, showing examples. * * * * * _small crown_ _vo._ _s._ fencing. by the late h. a. colmore dunn, barrister-at-law, inns of court school of arms, winner of the medal at the german gymnasium. with illustrations. * * * * * _small_ _to._ £ . _s._ _d._ _net._ the works of george silver. comprising 'paradoxes of defence' (printed in and now reprinted), and 'bref instructions vpo my pradoxes of defence' (printed for the first time from the ms. in the british museum). edited with an introduction by cyril g. r. matthey, captain, london rifle brigade; member of the london fencing club; and membre d'honneur du cercle d'escrime de bruxelles. with collotype reproductions from the ms. in the british museum. * * * * * london: george bell and sons, york street, covent garden. transcriber's note: every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as possible. italic text has been marked with _underscores_. oe ligatures have been expanded. photos and maps of trinity (atomic test) site the picture files are courtesy of u.s. army white sands missile range public affairs office: basecamp.gif -- base camp for trinity site workers. blast.gif -- trinity test blast at seconds. crater.gif -- oppenheimer and groves examine tower piling in crater. gadget .gif -- lifting the "gadget" into the -foot tower. gadget .gif -- norris bradbury with the "gadget". jumbo.gif -- unloading jumbo. mcdonald.gif -- mcdonald-schmidt ranch house, where plutonium core was assembled. patch.gif -- patch issued to manhattan project military participants. tr_map .gif -- map of roads to trinity site and visitors' site map. whitsand.gif -- emblem of the u.s. army white sands missile range. http://www.archive.org/details/ourbattalionbein rave our battalion [illustration] by l. raven-hill. "punch" office , bouverie street london e.c. our battalion. [illustration] [illustration: the whitefriars press.] bradbury, agnew & co., ltd., printers, london and tonbridge. [illustration: a.m. _sentry_: "sunrises are all bloomin' fine in their way, but i'd rather be in bed."] our battalion being some slight impressions of his majesty's auxiliary forces, in camp and elsewhere. by l. raven-hill. _"an' you're sent to penny-fights an' aldershot it."_ rudyard kipling. london: "punch" office, , bouverie st., e.c. . [_all rights reserved._] contents. page recruits on instructin' the system on the g.o.c. the seven ages of the volunteer what might happen the lost patrol camp diaries: no. . lt.-col. sir digby sandilands, m.p. no. . capt. and adjt. "jerry" benson no. . nd lieutenant fitzgerald lawless no. . pte. timothy simmons blank cartridges illustrations. page a.m. _frontispiece._ the "manual" not to be trifled with flag-wagging our first puttie parade - field training the firing exercise our review - army orders patrols a fair samaritan our n.c.o.'s (no. ) our n.c.o.'s (no. ) hints for patrols the best laid schemes, etc. - a conundrum studies ambushed - field-day reflections tactics field-day tragedies philosophies m.g. more army reforms - on guard a misunderstanding outposts at last! - off duty trouble in the band [illustration] [illustration] our battalion. recruits. the boy hesitated as he looked down the wet street of the little country town. "i've 'arf a mind not to go," he said, "blessed if i ain't----;" then, after a pause, with hands in pockets and coat collar turned up, he lounged off, muttering, "i'll see what bill ses." bill was waiting at the corner, looking somewhat sheepishly at the miscellaneous display in a "general" shop window. "goin'?" he said, as the other came up. "don't think i shall--at any rate not to-night." a depressing silence ensued, until a smart lad, with belt and bayonet, came by whistling and hailed them. "wot o! bill; you ought to be down at the ord'ly room by now, the sergeant's bin there ever so long. i told 'im i'd bring you two along to-night. wot are you scared about?" he continued, eyeing them critically. "ain't scared about nothing; we was only waiting till the rain cleared off." "well, 'urry up, i've got to go to the arm'ry." "all right," said the first boy. "come on, bill." the boys stared furtively round the orderly-room, a little box partitioned off from the disused malt-house that served as drill shed. on the walls were highly-coloured posters, setting forth the various advantages of his majesty's services, while in the corner a jumble of arms and equipment and a half-opened case of rifles caused them to nudge each other. a huge sergeant was writing at a table covered with army forms, drill books, and parade registers, amongst which a couple of cartridges attracted their attention. "ball cartridge, mark four," whispered the leading lad carelessly to the others. "ullo, what's this?" said the sergeant. "recruits? that's right. shut the door be'ind you, an' keep out the cold. i'm glad to see the lads about here is waking up, an' i wish more 'ud copy their example! them cripples in the next village ain't got enough spirit to get up a dog-fight, let alone learn 'ow to 'andle a rifle; all they're fit for is funerals. now let's look at you," he continued, and the deep-set grey eyes ran swiftly over the lads. "you'll do all right. now, listen to me; afore ye signs on, i've got to read over a lot o' reg'lashuns to ye, so as you'll clearly understand what ye're promisin' to do. now reg'lashuns is like acts of parlyment, no two persons can agree as to what they mean, so you won't understand them, probably; but that's not important, as my experience of the ways o' gov'mint teaches me that they'll be altered shortly, so there's no need for ye to worry. but the _one_ thing ye have to do is, to do as ye're told; attend to that now. it's the blessid privilege of the volunteer to endeavour to make himself a soldier in spite of all obstacles, an' what the reg'lar takes months to learn, an' the militia weeks, 'e 'as to try and do in _days_, so 'tis no picnic if 'e's goin' to do 'is duty. an' duty don't mean church parades, an' the annual dinner, an' as little else as you can; duty means everything you can possibly do, an' it's the pride of a good lad, that if there's an extry job o' work to be done, e's the lad that'll do it; for there's none better than a keen volunteer, an' no one worse than a slack one, that'll turn up smart when the drinks is free, but is most unduly anxious about 'is master's business on other occasions, a nuisince to 'is sergeant, 'is captin', 'is colonel, an' 'is country; an' if i thought you were that sort i'd send ye to the right-about now, but i think, by yer looks, ye have the makings o' soldiers. now, if there's anything ye want to know, now's the time to ask. what's that? ye don't know if ye're up to standard? fancy a lad 'avin' the face to ask me that! why, when i was a boy, with a couple o' corks in me heels, an' a wisp o' straw under me waistcut, i'd a' passed for a giant. when you've learnt to throw a chest and hold yer heads up, yer own mothers won't know yer. now, after i've read over these 'ere reg'lashuns, ye'll sign these papers, an' when the doctor's passed you, go an' tell yer best girls that ye'll 'ave yer futtygraphs took d'rectly yer uniforms is ready. you will p'rade at seven o'clock, sharp, mind ye, nex' monday." [illustration: "tiny"] * * * * * "recruitin's a funny business!" muttered the sergeant; officially colour-sergeant instructor of e company st downshire volunteer rifles, a battalion scattered over half a county, unofficially "tiny," for the most obvious reasons. "'tis a funny business, at least in these parts; p'raps it's different in london and them 'ere big towns, but if we told 'em all we was supposed to tell 'em, as it's laid down, 'twould frighten 'arf of 'em off the job; while if yer tell 'em in their own way, yer can get 'em to do anything. they say ye must _lead_ a volunteer, not _drive_ 'im, but 'pon me soul i think a judicious push is what 'e wants mostly." [illustration] [illustration: the "manual." _instructor:_ "now the hobject of these 'ere hexercises is to haccustom the recruit to 'is rifle so as 'e can 'andle it in a light an' heasy manner, same as i do this 'ere cane."] [illustration] on instructin'. "tiny" was in a shocking temper. "no one thinks 'igher of the volunteers than i do," he said to the junior subaltern. "but now an' then they gives me the fair 'ump. look at this 'ere las' business. fust of all they 'olds out as they ought to be considered part of the country's forces, instead of being shoved out of the way, so to speak. quite right. bimeby along comes a reg'lashun as they don't like. wot do they do then? take it quiet like the harmy does, an' do the best they can? no, they writes to the papers and gets up in the 'ouse and kicks up a row till it's knocked off. a reg'lashun _hain't_ a reg'lashun when it applies to volunteers. if that's their notion o' discipline, no wonder the reg'lars looks down on 'em. what if it did send their numbers down a bit; the rest 'ud be all the better for it: some good men would 'ave to go, but you take it from me, sir, the best of 'em would manage to stay. if a lad ain't fond enough of it to give up enough time to make a soldier of 'isself, 'e oughtn't to join, an' if there ain't enough of 'em who do it, the sooner they're made to the better; there's plenty as can find time enough for football or anything o' that sort, but duty don't suit them. 'it's a free country,' ses they. it is, sir. it's a good deal too free in more ways than one. "not but what you wants tact, sir, in dealin' with volunteers. for instance, you comes down to drill the recruits, an' instead of a crowd of intelligent lads, all anxious for to learn the rudiments o' squad drill, you find a lonely and depressed lookin' lad, that would 'ave recollected an engagement connected with a drink in about two minutes. now, what are you to do? you can't call it a drill, and it'll take the heart out of 'im if you send 'im off. an' mind you, often it's none so easy in a country battalion, with one company 'ere an' another there, an' a detachment in the nex' village, for the best of lads to put his drills in. there aint no drill 'alls with canteen attachments, and sergeants' mess, an' readin' rooms, so as a chap can pass a pleasant evening any time 'e likes; that's doin' it in style, sir. but what are you goin' to do? 'fall in,' ses you, 'an' dress by the right. stop that talkin' in the ranks,' ses you. 'i'm glad to see there's _one_ recruit at least as is fond of 'is duty, tho' 'e'd look better,' ses you, 'if 'e'd 'old 'is 'ead up. now actin',' ses you, 'as a rear rank, the front rank not being in their places, and 'aving been numbered off from the right which you 'aven't, and supposin' the first two men is elsewhere, what would you do on the command "form fours?" it's not a guessin' competition,' ses you. 'don't know,' ses 'e. 'well, you'll learn in time,' ses you. 'we will now proceed to something which is not laid down in the drill book, an' on which the reg'lashuns,' ses you, 'is discreetly silent. whenever you 'appen to be on sentry go an' the 'armless passer by that 'as been celebratin' 'is birthday won't listen to yer words o' wisdom, but wants to 'ug you round the neck, don't bring yer baynit down to the charge, or any foolishness of that sort, although you've bin expressly told to do it, but gently but firmly drop the butt on 'is toes, an' you'll experience all the delight o' hurtin' a fellow creature, without,' ses you, 'any unpleasantness at the inquiry afterwards. right turn. dismiss,' ses you. 'return the arms to the racks quietly an' without noise, an' tell the rest of the squad when you see 'em that you know a bit more than they do.'" [illustration] [illustration: not to be trifled with. _sentry:_ "'alt! who goes there?" _private:_ "whoy, jarge! don't 'ee know i?" _sentry:_ "'corse i do; but where be goin'?"] [illustration: flag-wagging. _newly-enlisted yeoman:_ "somebody--tell--those--silly--idiots-- to stop--frightenin'--my--horse!"] [illustration] the system. "i don't know whether you've observed it or not, sir," said "tiny" to the junior subaltern, "but in this great an' glorious country no one ever starts on a job without providing 'imself with something to throw the blame on in case 'e loses the trick. sometimes they blame procedure an' sometimes the constitution; in our case 'tis the system. what that system is no one even pretends to know. in one respect it's like the reg'lashuns; everybody starts off in the same way when discussing of 'em. you never yet met anyone that didn't preface 'is remarks on the subject with 'as far as i can understand,' an' that's about as far as 'e _can_. "the ord'nary man that runs a bank, or a railway, or a hire-purchase pianner works, would think to 'isself, ''ere's the old country, bless 'er, an 'ere's the boys to defend 'er. now, if the brutil an' licentious foe is dumped down on these 'ere shores, 'e won't go c'lectin' seaweed, neither will 'e pause for to admire the landscape, but, d'rectly the pistol's fired, 'e'll get off the mark, an' make a bee line for the winning post. now the question is, can these boys stop 'im or can they not? if they can, they must be got ready for the job, an' if they can't, we ain't running a charity bazaar, and i ain't going to pay anything for what's worth nothing, so we'll 'ave to think up something else.' but that haint the way they looks at it, bless yer 'eart. 'why, you've forgotten the votes,' ses the gov'mint. 'what in the name o' goodness 'as that got to do with it?' ses the plain man. 'poor hinnocent creature!' ses the gov'mint, an' turns an' addresses the deputation:-- "'friends! fellow citizens! gallant an' patriotic defenders of our island 'ome! you are unique in the history of this terrestral sphere. there is not another country,' ses he, 'as would treat you as you're treated here. yer self-sacrificin' spirit is the joy o' me heart, an' if there's not enough troops to go round i will allow you to line the back streets when processions is on, but yer "present arms" is a disgrace an' yer marchin' past makes me cold down the spine. yer shooting--well, we will pass that. but for your sense o' duty the curse of conscription would be weighin' on us, so let me point out the necessity of keeping your numbers up.' "but to answer the question of me noble friend, we 'ave not forgotten the great object for which you exist. in the disastrous an' unparalleled catastrophe of foreign invasion, which we 'ope will never come to pass, but which, if it does, we trust will happen when the opposition is in power--if, i say, at that momentuous time, you should be found unequal to the task, our plans is made. if our opponents is in, we shall demand a general election an' promptly proceed to throw them out; but, if by some mistake _we_ should be managing the vessel o' state at the time, we shall throw the blame on our predecessors for neglecting to train you properly. so our minds is easy as to the future. 'there's some guns we don't want in the corner, an' you can wear putties if you pay for them yourselves,' ses the gov'mint, 'an' we trust to you to vote straight at the nex' election.' "then the volunteer off'cer, being by nature contrary, wants to know something about 'is duties an' ses to the gov'mint, 'yer remarks is excellent an' to the point, but what can i do to correct me errors?' 'anything you like,' ses the gov'mint, cheerfully, 'that's not agin the reg'lashuns.' 'i give up my time,' ses the volunteer, 'an' pay for nearly everything out of my own pocket, an' i'm anxious for to learn, but i ain't a prophet,' ses 'e. 'give me someone to teach me.' 'i'll do anything you like in reason,' ses the gov'mint, 'but i will not train you.' 'tell me how to teach myself, then,' ses the volunteer. 'i don't know an' i don't care,' ses the gov'mint, 'but i'll spare the time to examine you if you pay yer expenses. an' meanwhile i will regard you in the light of a nuisance.' an' so matters 'ave stood, the volunteer trying to do 'is best an' the gov'mint doin' its level to stop 'im at it. [illustration: "very," ses the general.] "but now, along comes the general. 'th' army's not big enough,' 'e ses. 'we must 'ave more men or i won't be responsible for breakages,' 'e ses. 'serious?' ses the gov'mint. 'very,' ses the general. 'what am i to do?' ses the gov'mint. 'conscrip,' ses the general. 'i daren't,' ses the gov'mint in a whisper; 'the opposition 'ud get in at the next election.' 'the country requires it,' ses the general. '_does_ it?' ses the gov'mint. 'it requires _us_ more; it would be as much as my place is worth to ask every man to do his duty, an' besides, there's me brave and devoted volunteers.' 'they'll never be any real good till they have the m'litia ballot be'ind 'em,' ses the general. 'they're asking for it themselves,' ses he. 'never will i consent to force any one,' ses the gov'mint, 'in this land of freedom.' 'something must be done,' ses the general. 'ah,' ses the gov'mint, 'i have it! crowd them--i mean the volunteers--for all you're worth, an' if anything busts, we can throw the blame on them. increase the work an' cut down the pay, 'tis a sound business principle. now to turn to more important questions. is the new cap to have a peak, or is it not? an' who is it to be named after?'" [illustration] [illustration: our first puttie parade.] [illustration: field training. _captain of cadet corps:_ "i've come over to ask you if you would mind my cadets running over your land for once, mr. stubbles. i want to give them a little field work." _stubbles:_ "wull i dunno as i've got any objection, 's long as they don't do no damage; but whatever kind o' dog be they now? i know o' 'arriers an' beagles, but i never 'eard tell o' that sort afore."] [illustration] on the g.o.c. "the junior off'cers," said "tiny" to the youngest subaltern, "is on the whole as smart an' efficient a lot of young gents as i'd wish to see, fond o' their work, eager to learn, an' ready to take suggestions from their comp'ny instructors, but if you listen to them you'd think they was generals. they may not know 'ow to c'mmand a comp'ny as they should, but there never was one of 'em who, after being a week at aldershot, but what could have devised an' carried out a course of trainin' that would have been twice as good an' ten times more suitable to the requiremints of _their_ battalion at any rate. "it's true they don't go into details, but they're sure of the results. 'but,' i ses, 'think of the poor man that's in charge of all these 'ere auxiliary forces, d'you think 'e got the billet for 'is looks?' i ses. 'the general,' ses you, 'can't know the volunteer like the volunteer 'isself does.' 'now, put yerself in his place,' ses i, 'an' let's work the sum out to four places o' decimals. to commence with,' ses i, 'the first thing 'e does on being appointed to the job is to go an' 'ave a chat with the gov'mint on the subjec'. ses he, 'i've bin studyin' the thing.' 'i know ye 'ave,' ses the gov'mint; 'that's why you've got the place. we want a man as understan's the machine; it wants over'aulin' before we goes on tour with it. not simply washin' out the bearin's an' replatin' the 'andle bars, but takin' to bits, an' shovin' together agin. yer predecessor, poor man, did 'is best, but----, well, _de mortuis_, you know, _de mortuis_.' a sweet sentimint, sir, but one tendin' to untruthfulness. 'so,' ses the gov'mint, 'you see 'ow the matter stands. 'ere is the great mass of patriotic defenders of this glorious country, ready to be trained into a force that shall be the envy an' hatred of every foreign power. 'tis a noble an' inspirin' prospec' that unrolls itself before you, an' one that should stimulate yer vital energies to their utmost; the 'arder the work to you, the greater the glory to us. you 'ave a free 'and in the matter.' "'well,' ses the general, 'takin' into consideration that, if the volunteers is ever wanted, they'll be wanted in a hurry, i should suggest that they might be advantageously employed in fitting themselves for the task.' 'excellent,' ses the gov'mint; 'why ever wasn't it thought of before? go on,' ses he. 'they should be trained,' ses the general, 'to the use of the most modern weapons, an' practised in the lessons which we 'ave learned by bitter experience, to the end that, in the event of an invasion, threatened or actual, every unit shall be able to take the field without delay, sufficiently organised an' equipped to carry it through a short campaign.' 'marvellous!' ses the gov'mint. 'it's my dream realised. i will be interviewed on the matter to-morrow.' 'of course,' ses the general, 'this will undoubtedly entail a certain amount of hextra expense.' 'not another word!' ses the gov'mint. 'all bets is off! train 'em, give 'em transport, stand 'em on their 'eads, or teach 'em to sing; anything you like as long as it don't cost anything. take a fresh start,' ses 'e. "so the general sits down with 'is staff an' 'ammers away at it, an' cuts down the bills till 'e ain't givin' more than fifteen pence for 'arf-a-crown's worth of stuff, an' by an' by, round comes the gov'mint. 'i've dropped in to see 'ow we're getting on,' ses 'e. 'some of the corps,' ses the general, 'wants training in one way, i find, an' some in others, so i propose that the commanding off'cers of the various districts should adapt the training to the requirements of the troops under their command, an' should carry it out wherever we consider it would be most advantageous.' 'splendid,' ses the gov'mint. 'speak it into the funnygraph that i may listen to it by nights. we'll do it,' ses 'e, 'at some future date. just now i want ye to get 'em all together in one spot where the correspondents of the daily press can see an' realize from their own personal observation what a mighty weapon we are creatin'. the spectacle of tens of thousands of our brave defenders practisin' together the evolutions of war will be amazin' to them. never again will they dare assert that we are neglectin' the defences of the country. the next three elections,' ses the gov'mint, 'ought to be certs.' "'but,' ses the g.o.c., 'there won't be space to train quarter of them properly.' 'oh, never mind,' ses the gov'mint, 'give 'em enough room to turn round, an' stick a sintry on every telegraph pole, an' tell 'em it's all practice; they won't know any better. hevins an' earth! i ought to be playin' bridge with lady betty by now! tar-tar,' ses 'e; 'be good.' "'well,' ses the g.o.c., goin' to the sideboard an' mixing a couple o' stiff ones, 'wash it down with that,' 'e ses, givin' one to 'is staff. 'well, of all the dam nonsense!' 'e ses, fallin' into a chair. ''twas ever thus,' ses the staff, bein' by nature poetic. "an' now, sir," said "tiny" to the junior subaltern, "things bein' like this, what would _you_ do under the circumstances?" [illustration] the seven ages of the volunteer. [illustration: ( )] [illustration: ( )] at first the raw recruit, unused to arms and awkward at his drill, thinking the "manual" the very deuce. then the bold "lance," quick to salute, and glad to have escaped his turn as orderly. and then the sergeant, full of wrath because his section, squad, or what you will, misunderstand him, and do fail to grasp the thing he drives at. then he's a "sub," and cannot for the world imagine how on earth they ever did without him, don't you know. [illustration: ( )] [illustration: ( )] [illustration: ( )] [illustration: ( )] and after that he's captain, and at first wakes up his company, but as the years go on he slackens, and betimes he wonders if it is not time to chuck it, as it were. a major then, and now bestrides a "gee," thanking his lucky stars the "double" does no longer make him gasp. lastly, the colonel, sporting the bold v.d., wishing to goodness he had not to put his hand to pocket to such great extent; but dreading, all the same, the time when he must, in the course of things, retire. [illustration: ( )] [illustration] what might happen. "i would like to get 'old of some of the gentry as writes to the papers on warlike topics," said "tiny" to the world at large, "more especially them that takes the volunteers under their special care. i would unfold me mind to them. now 'ere's one of 'em as 'olds the opinion that shootin's _everything_, an' 'e quotes the opinion of a furriner who 'as bin through the war an' ses the first thing a soldier needs is to shoot well, an' the next thing is to shoot well, an' the last thing is to shoot well. now that's all right, but me worthy friend misses the first point, which is that it refers to a _soldier_, an' not a civilian. so 'e jumps off from the wrong place to start with. 'then,' ses 'e, 'teach 'em to shoot, an' take 'em down to the carefully selected position an' 'ave the distances marked off, an' the boers 'ave taught us that under these circumstances good rifle shots is a match for trained troops.' now there's where 'e run's the wrong side of the post. in the fust place this 'ere country ain't the transvaal, an' what 'ud be first rate out there 'ud be all wrong 'ere; an' in the nex' place, _is_ it just by good shootin' the boers 'ave done what they 'ave? don't think i despise shootin', but drivin' comfortable to the range an' gettin' up to the firin' line is two different things. [illustration: the firing exercise. our own thoughtful subaltern has carefully studied the new firing positions, and has also read that "methods must be improvised for utilizing the fire of two or even more ranks," and, by the above arrangement, he hopes to fulfil both conditions.] "i will ask you one question: 'if the king's prize man can only walk ten miles, an' 'e 'as to march twenty, how many bullseyes is 'e likely to make when 'e's fallen out an' lying in the ambulance? for there'll be no goin' down comfortable to a camp that's bin arranged an' catered for months before, an' finding yer tent up an' the tea ready. there'll be no breaking you in soft an' easy, so that at the end of the week too many of you won't fall out on a twenty-five mile field day. the bloomin' foe won't study yer convenience, an' you'll get no notice before'and of the picnic. the foreign power that 'as made up its mind for a slap at us will not advertize that it'll 'old a remnant sale in the metropolis on the first of nex' month. our relations will be most friendly with 'im 'till all of a sudden 'e ses, ''ere goes for london.' there'll be a navy fight first, an' twill be no ordinary one, for 'e'll lose two ships to our one, cheerfully, if 'e can clear the channel for a week. "we 'ope 'e won't manage it, and we don't think 'e will, but _if_ 'e does, it'll be no week's camp then. the orders one day, the assembly nex' mornin' an' the trains waitin'. 'arf the camp kettles ain't 'ere, sir.' 'can't be helped, you'll have to manage as best you can.' 'no room for that baggage. chuck it out, anywhere.' 'all in? right away!' heaven help the man that 'as forgot to stuff his haversack with a ration! twenty-four hours they'll be before they have a chance of a meal, an' then, heaven help the corps twice over as 'asn't been used to feeding itself, or that 'asn't give a thought to how to meet an emergency like this! quartermaster, captain, or corporal, anyone as knows his job at the camp kitchen, will be worth his weight in gold then, an' that's only the start. * * * * * "tired an' stale, the lads 'll work like niggers at the trenches, but before they're finished the order will come to get to somewhere without delay, the enemy not 'aving been kind enough to fall in with our plans. no trains this time, the lines being blocked. twenty miles before nex' mornin', an' all baggage to be left be'ind. the boys will stay in the ranks till they drop, an' where they drop they will stay. the ambulance? that's for the fighting line. 'ave ye ever seen a stiff field day? an' that's child's play. lucky the battalion that can feed its men that night. [illustration] * * * * * "'we're in reserve, thank god!' they'll cry, though every mother's son is only wishful to fight, an' they'll fall asleep by companies till the section commanders kick 'em to wake up. 'battalion will advance!' 'halt!' 'lie down!' 'advance!' 'halt!' 'lie down!' 'retire!' 'halt!' 'you've had an easy day, colonel. hold your men in readiness to attack at nightfall.' * * * * * "mile after mile through the mud. 'what are we going to do, dick?' 'spoil their beauty sleep; they've been kept at it two days, and if we----.' 'stop that talking in the ranks! close up there! what's that?' 'one of their patrols, sir.' 'push on, boys, push on! it's come at last.' * * * * * "'men, their picquets are on that hill, ready for us. we are going to take it, and hold it to the last man. the battalion will form for attack.' * * * * * "you'll want _soldiers_ then, gents; an' you must 'ave 'em ready before'and." [illustration] [illustration: our review] [illustration: army orders. great care should be exercised in reconnoitring woods.] [illustration: ( ) the simple mudcrusher thought it would be rather sporting to entrap the mounted scout and laid his plans accordingly.] [illustration: ( ) and the scout thought it was only his duty to bag the mudcrusher, so, disregarding his enemy's fire, he started to round him up.] [illustration: ( ) _scout_: "halt! you're my----"] [illustration: ( ) "---- my prisoner, i think!"] [illustration: patrols. _scout:_ "there's a pub down there right enough, but there's an officer coming up the hill." _corporal:_ "over the bank, boys; an' take cover behind those ricks!"] [illustration] the lost patrol. by the junior subaltern. wonder what we shall do to-day? it seems as if we'd been here for weeks, although this is only the third day; but i suppose one's first camp always seems like that. it _is_ different from anything else; the drill i've done before don't help me a little bit. it's all very well to pass exams an' get _p.s._ after your name in the army list, but that don't do much good out on a field day, as far as i can see. here comes my noble captain. he's a bit of a slacker, i fancy. wish he'd buck the men up more in their drill. they were simply awful yesterday, _i_ thought, but he didn't seem to notice it; in fact, i rather imagined he didn't approve of my goin' for 'em in the way i did. by jove, if i said "wake up those men," once, i must have said it a hundred times. "what's that? i'm attached to x company to-day, as young jackson is on the sick list? what beastly rot! why, they're the worst company we've got. chance for me to wake 'em up? that's all bally fine, but----all right, i'm off." this is a lively look-out. my goodness, they _are_ a lot! and their captain don't seem up to much either----"yes, sir. very good, sir. take no. section and join the advanced party?" "but--er--i've never----" "hurry up, for goodness sake, the adjutant's looking as black as thunder." "oh, _let_ him." "what _am_ i to do? straight along till i come to the cross roads, take the n.e. one, and keep on till i come in touch with the enemy? but----" "just ready, sir. i am only asking for final instruc----" "oh, no. section, right turn, quick march." oh, bother, i've forgotten to slope the arms. "slope arms, there!" by gad, that's a pretty poor start. what _is_ the adjutant howling about? "that isn't the way to march an advanced guard. where are my flankers?" "just going to send them out, sir." "where's the section commander? on the sick list? who is in charge then? oh, you, corporal. have you ever been in an advanced guard before? no? why--oh, it's your first camp, is it? any of the men been used to this sort of thing? you don't fancy so. well, we must do the best we can. take two men and examine that little wood on the right. i will halt the section at the corner till you rejoin." ullo, what does this cyclist want? "captain jones says, will i push on at once, as i'm stopping the whole column." "oh! forward." hang me if i see the good of sending out flankers if you can't wait for them to examine anything. "step out there, men, we're blocking the column." well, here are the cross roads. oh, my sainted aunt, _five_, an' not a blessed sign-post! "any of you men know which is the way to muddiford? no?" i wonder which _is_ the n.e. road. i thought it was all bally rot getting maps and compasses, but i wish to goodness i had now. if there was only a gleam of sunshine it would help, but you can't even guess where the sun is through these clouds. oh, damn that cyclist! oh, the adjutant's swearing like old boots? well, here goes. "take the turning down the hill, boys, and push ahead as hard as you can." thank goodness we seem to have got clear of 'em now, and by the powers, here's a villager. "i say, is this right for muddiford?" why, we are coming away from it! what the dickens am i to do? "is there a short cut from here?" "yes! yes! down that lane, across the common to the wood, straight on till you get to the path, and that will take us right on to the main road long before the rest of the column can get there." cheap at half-a-crown. [illustration] "fall in there. you shall have a rest when we pick the column up, we're a bit off the track. yes, yes, over the fields and straight through the wood. get ahead! what the deuce are you men opening out like that for? you've always been told to spread out when going through a wood? oh, all right." if they lose themselves it's their look-out. where is this beastly path? at last! which way do we go? oh, er--er, curse it, that fellow didn't tell me. let's see, we turned to the left and then again, so i think it must be to the right. well, it can't be helped--here goes. i daren't own up to the men that i haven't a notion where we are, but i haven't, and that's a fact. how this infernal path does wind about! "what's that, corporal? here's a _sort_ of a road? _this_ isn't a main road. well, the men must have a rest, so----where's the rest of the section? there aren't more than half of them here. expect they've gone back the way they came?" i'm beginning to wish _i_ had too. "corporal, there's no doubt that we've lost touch with the column. we must work our way along the road till we come across a house and find out where we are; unfortunately, i forgot to bring my map with me." _at last!_ a cottage. the men had better rest while i make a few inquiries. "oh, you're a stranger in these parts? but, my good woman, is there any place where i can find----the red lion? where's that? just down the road, where those soldiers are running to?" well, i'm----! [illustration:] [illustration: a fair samaritan.] [illustration: our n.c.o.'s (no. ). _captain:_ "look here, corporal, you know the great object of the new system is to train the n.c.o.'s to act on their own initiative and responsibility. now i want you to take a couple of men--understand? two men, and advance along the main road and select a position commanding a good view of the road, where your sentry can see without being seen--understand? now you should choose if possible a place giving some shelter for your men, as you are to imagine you've got to occupy it for twenty-four hours, and it ought to be so chosen that you could offer a certain amount of resistance if attacked--understand? you're in absolute command, and you are to do whatever you think best under the circumstances, keeping in mind the object for which you were sent out--understand?" _corporal:_ "yessir."] [illustration: our n.c.o.'s (no. ). the position the corporal selected.] [illustration: hints for patrols. "when reconnoitring a village, one of the inhabitants should be detained and questioned."] [illustration: the best laid schemes, etc. that able and efficient officer, captain smith, had prepared a really beautiful ambush that would have put the opposing force out of action without a doubt, had not this happened just before the psychological moment!] [illustration] camp diaries no. . lt.-col. sir digby sandilands, m.p. _saturday._--wretched morning. hunter tells me the barometer is falling again. we really get terribly bad luck with the weather. i know what it will be--we shall get to camp wet through, and find everything absolutely sodden. wish i had sent hunter on yesterday to look after things. lady sandilands says it's perfectly absurd going on a day like this; suggests that i should go later when everything is straight. women take the most extraordinary views of one's duty to the country, but really, under the circumstances, i almost wish it were feasible. williams has just come up to say that brown bess is very lame, shall he get sultan ready? it is really most annoying: he positively hates the band, while old bess is as steady as a rock. sharpe & sharpe write me about those mortgages. i really ought to see them. if i caught the express to town i could settle the matter, and then get to the camp about the time the battalion should arrive. major strahan would take charge of them; he rather likes doing it, i fancy. if there's nothing important to see to i think that's what i must do, but it is extremely annoying after looking forward to the week and making all arrangements. the girls very disappointed; say it's not worth while going to see the battalion start if i'm not there. promise them they shall have a wire letting them know the exact time of our return. they say that's not the same thing, as we invariably come back smothered in dust and looking generally disreputable. they seem to regard the whole thing as a mild form of amusement for them. have arranged everything with the adjutant. capital fellow. really relieves me of no end of little worries. * * * * * _sunday._--arrived rather later than i expected last night. found they had had rather a bad time getting here, but everything seemed all right; hope it is; always like the men to start camp in a good temper. we parade fairly strong, but men not so smart as i should like to see them. i must impress it on the company officers to look after that sort of thing rather more carefully. church parade not improved by slight drizzle; but the chaplain very sensibly shortened the service. quite forgot to provide myself with anything for the collection; asked the adjutant if he could lend me something; he had only half-a-crown and a sovereign; so--well, i suppose it's for a good cause. inspected camp this afternoon, seems fairly comfortable. our mess president tells me he has had a lot of bother with the caterers, but he hopes it will be better in a day or two. i sincerely hope it will. * * * * * _monday._--passed a terribly bad night. camp may be a pleasant change for younger men, but it really is a great trial in many ways for commanding officers. i find one misses what are usually termed, i believe, "home comforts." the work to-day is to be confined to sections and the training of the n.c.o.'s. this new drill reads simple enough in the book, but the men don't seem to catch on to it as quickly as they should; but really everything has so changed of late years that one hardly likes to criticize. spoke to the adjutant about it; he says they're doing quite as well as he expected. very irritating order from headquarters to the effect that as we are a manoeuvres camp, officers will not dine in mess dress. a most senseless order; if they allow us mess tents and board floors, and things of that sort, why on earth can't they allow us to dine as gentlemen? [illustration: reserves.] * * * * * _tuesday._--weather improving, am happy to say. to-day's training, i believe, is to be left in the hands of the company commanders; field officers to exercise general supervision. on the whole, not bad, although i doubt if they will be able to carry out my commands as intelligently as i could wish without a tremendous amount of explanation. i must impress upon them the importance of grasping the idea of the commands, at the same time acting on their own initiative, otherwise we shall have endless confusion. * * * * * _wednesday._--something about living in the open that has a very stimulating effect upon one. made quite an excellent breakfast. the adjutant gave a most interesting lecture on outpost work before we started; he mentioned several points that i don't mind confessing had slipped my memory. i feel sure, with a little careful instruction, the efficiency of the volunteer force would be enormously increased. must refer to it in the house on earliest opportunity. did an attack with the brigade this afternoon; very disappointing. up to certain stage everything went well, but, as attack developed, got in some way mixed up with the blankshires, who were, undoubtedly, far out of their proper line. had slight argument with their c.o. dear old chap, of course, but absolutely pig-headed. would not see my point. g.o.c.'s remarks rather uncalled for, under the circumstances. had to speak to several of the company officers about letting their men get out of hand. the various adjutants seem to regard the matter with an amount of levity which i don't altogether approve of. mess very uproarious to-night; most unnecessarily so in my opinion. heard afterwards one of the subalterns had given a lecture on "tactics, as he understood them." * * * * * _thursday._--inspection to-day. passed off fairly satisfactorily; faults found of course, but that's inevitable. a weary, worrying business. every one seems out of temper. thank goodness, that's over for a year. _friday._--every prospect of a hot day of course, on the one occasion that we should rejoice in a cloudy sky. hope there will be no trouble with the water-cart. got the battalion away early, so could give the men a rest before commencing operations. don't quite know what we're intended to be doing or where we're going. somewhat awkward, as i haven't been able to tell williams where to meet me with spare horse and a sandwich. rather a joke (or the reverse) if i had to patronize the water-cart! did exceedingly well. complimented on the way i handled the battalion in awkward position. very trying march back, but men stuck to it well. will back a country battalion against a town one any time for a stiff day's work, although they may not be so smart. ordered extra ration of beer, or its equivalent, to be issued to each man. capital camp fire at night, and some very good choruses. great pity that just as we have got into our stride, so to speak, we have to break up. nothing like camp for the men. wish we could have more of it. must bring up the question of extended camps in the house. [illustration: a camp fire.] * * * * * _saturday._--brought battalion home. never knew the men march better, and every man looks as hard as nails. the girls say i look years younger. quite sorry to get back. [illustration] [illustration: a conundrum. _ st umpire:_ "i say, jimmy, which would you consider the most sporting thing to do--award both sides the palm of victory, or put 'em both out of action?"] [illustration] no. . capt. and adjt. "jerry" benson. _saturday._--i don't think i ever felt less inclined to get up in my life. it is simply dreadful to contemplate the fact that for the next week there won't be a moment's peace for me after a.m. and something horrible is sure to happen--either the sergeant major will go sick, or the colonel's wine will be corked, or i shall be asked to explain things. the station master seems unduly flurried for one of his years--says we shall block the whole line if we don't get away soon. had no idea the railway system of the country was so easily upset. what is the matter with the youth thompson? oh, he is in charge of the baggage for the time being. it seems to excite him very much. fortunately, baggage has a nice little way of turning up in the long run, somehow. i wish they wouldn't ask me what sort of work we shall do in camp; they must think i'm a sort of military encyclopædia. frightful scene detraining, volunteers always remind me of flustered hens on these occasions. * * * * * _sunday._--"oh those dreadful bugles!" usual church parade. the colonel is certain to forget his purse, so i'll take a sovereign for him. his expression when he sees i've nothing less, will be touching. as a spectacle, effect somewhat marred by the presence of a cyclist in violent tweeds. * * * * * _monday._--really a very amusing day. the struggles of the various company officers simply fascinating to watch, they have so many ways of doing the same thing. i have never been able to fathom the mind of the volunteer n.c.o., but i should think he conceives his duty consists of remaining eternally in rear of his men. i asked one what he thought he was placed in charge of a section for, and he answered very truthfully that he didn't know. i think i must get him sent out in charge of a patrol when the brigadier is about, he will be so pleased. someone asked me what i thought of the men's drill. i said it was very interesting, and that i'd seen regulars do it quite as badly. * * * * * _tuesday._--had a most elaborate brigade drill, which i believe we are not supposed to do, but it afforded me great joy. everyone else seemed to loathe it. the colonel got rather worried, which was a nuisance, as i had to keep at his elbow to put him right. i don't think any one really knows what to do, but if you only take long enough about any movement, you generally get a fresh command before you've got absolutely wrong. by some miracle we didn't get quite in a muddle, which was a pity, as the brigadier would have given everybody the most awful "dirt." felt quite sorry when it was over. the colonel uttered a heart-felt "thank god!" * * * * * _wednesday._--a most amusing little field day. i think we did everything we should not have done. not a soul paid the faintest attention to cover, and when we got into the quite open country everyone took the opportunity to reform the lines. i pulled up a subaltern who was doing it in the most barefaced manner; he was very cheerful about it, said it would save no end of confusion, and it was much easier to do "out here" than when you were "bottled up in a bally wood!" i should rather like to know what the men think of field days. the issue of blank ammunition usually keeps them quite cheerful for the first half-hour; then, if they happen to be in reserve they get very sulky and think they're being "done in the eye," and when they eventually get into the firing line, they loose off every round they have as fast as possible, and from that moment take no further interest in the proceedings. * * * * * _thursday._--annual inspection to-day. took every precaution, carefully coached two companies in piquet duties, and put the rest in reserve. told the captains if they had any old soldiers in the ranks to put them in the responsible positions. thank goodness the chief invariably asks the same questions, so hadn't to bother about other things. it would be too dreadful if he started dodging us. i wish officers would _not_ say they've received no instructions about all sorts of things. it may be perfectly true, but you can't get them to see that they ought to say anything but that. had rather a fright when i heard the g.o.c. was paying a surprise visit to the outposts, but something kept him off us. the sergeant major said we should get an awful wigging over the camp, as it wasn't half cleaned up, so had to get the colonel to keep lunch going as long as possible. men turned out for inspection better than i expected, but one wretched youth in no. company got his bayonet jammed. thought we were in for it, but luckily his struggles were so pathetic that the chief had to laugh, and forgot to make any nasty remarks until he'd almost finished the inspection. we might train a humorously-minded boy to do something of the sort every time. * * * * * _friday._--usual wind-up field day. did "pooja" to everything i could think of, in the hope of being placed in reserve, but it didn't come off. had a positively dreadful time. our portion of the firing line seemed to fascinate the g.o.c., nothing would make him go away. gave us frightful "dirt" because the men insisted on standing up to see the commander-in-chief and staff go by, when they were supposed to be under cover and lying down. one of the staff got off rather smart thing--said the volunteers combined the minimum of expense with the maximum of inefficiency. * * * * * _saturday._--broke camp. i don't know which is worse, getting to camp or coming away from it. it doesn't matter what arrangements you make, it always results in hopeless confusion, and everybody goes about cursing somebody or something. i shall keep out of the way as much as possible, and i shall go on leave directly we get back. [illustration: the hired "charger" is not a thing of beauty!] [illustration: studies. _serious major:_ "you ought to look in to-night, youngster, we shall be having a 'kriegspiel' on." _frivolous sub.:_ "what's that, sir?" _major:_ "don't you know? why it's the war game." _sub.:_ "never heard of it! can you make any money at it?"] [illustration: ambushed! _extract from officer's diary._--"had lunch, practically on an unsuspected wasp's nest, and had to clear out, each man collaring whatever he could lay hands on. the colonel was the last to quit the field of battle."] [illustration: field-day reflections. _field officer_ (_a little out of touch for the time being_): "i wish to goodness our corps had stuck to their scarlet instead of goin' into this infernal khaki; you used to be able to spot 'em at any distance, but now i'm hanged if i can tell _where_ they are!"] [illustration: tactics. _slim subaltern:_ "not out of action? i should jolly well think you were, though! why i've been simply pumping lead into you for the last ten minutes!" _captain of opposing force:_ "that's all very fine, but it all depends on the range you were firing at." _slim subaltern:_ "don't you worry about that, cocky; i had one section sightin' at eight hundred, another at nine, 'nother at one thou, an' t'other at 'leven hundred!"] [illustration: field-day tragedies. "ullo, dicky! where's your company? lost?" "no, not lost, but gone before!"] [illustration] no. . nd lieut. fitzgerald lawless. _saturday._--utter rot limiting a fellow's baggage; i've simply chucked it. if there was any need, i could live in one shirt just as well as the next man, but i expect the sergeant major will think it his duty to point out that two kit bags, a hold-all, plus the regulation tin box, is almost up to field officer form, but i can't do it with less. i'm sure the amount of stuff the sergeants' mess take with 'em is simply appalling. trust our mess president will provide for our carnal appetites by the way, but shall take the precaution of laying in a small stock on my own. had huge jest with young simpkins in the train. rotted him about his new sam browne equipment; told him it wasn't on right, so we had it off him, and regularly trussed him up in it; he got awfully wrathy, so we sat him in a corner while jackson read "hints for young officers" to him. found my tent pitched close to the colonel's; rather a good egg, as they won't be able to try any larks on this time. that young ass blenkinsop, who was baggage officer, has lost one of my kit bags, and pretty well smashed up the other things. had the cheek to say it was lucky the only really efficient sub. in the battalion in charge, or the baggage would never have got here. gathered from the tone of his remarks that he'd had a pretty healthy time of it. * * * * * _sunday._--seems quite good to hear the bugles going once more. church parade. infernal nuisance having to wear busbies--always feel like a bally hungarian bandsman. as usual, forgot about the collection, so had to apply to watney, who, being a parson's son, is up to these moves; result--put in half-a-crown. fancy watney regards it as a little private field day, as he invariably has half-crowns and nothing else. told me afterwards he'd lent five. spent most of this afternoon trying to instil some measure of tidiness into my servant. * * * * * _monday._--on duty. inspected the grub first thing. awfully good chap our quartermaster; tried to show me how to spot bully beef. 'pon my soul i think the real work of a battalion is done off the scenes, as it were. how the deuce they manage to feed nine hundred beggars without a regular fuss, beats me. no complaints about the breakfast. my own a bit off, as i was late. preliminary training and drills. been trying to hammer a little knowledge into our n.c.o.'s. the non-commissioned man may be the backbone of the army, but i'll be hanged if he is of the volunteers. went round lines at dinner. two or three complaints; either too much fat or too little gravy. got rather good wheeze for these occasions; nearly always come from an untidy lot, so invariably say i never take complaints from a dirty tent; makes 'em very sick. turned out the guards; good thing in principle, generally a bally farce in practice. * * * * * _tuesday._--had to dig young brown out of his tent about a.m.; his man hadn't slacked off the tent ropes, and as there was rather a heavy dew, the whole show collapsed. fancy b. thought the camp had been rushed, as we discovered him clutching his sword. his lamp had been knocked over, and he was soaked in paraffin, and smelt vilely. rotted b. about it all day. fooled about in rear of my half company most of the time, as the captain was enjoying himself bossing everything; he might just as well have given me a separate job to do. got rather hauled over the coals for not seeing that the men laid out their bedding properly. asked the sergeant major what the regulation way was. wish he wouldn't _always_ preface his information with "i should have thought, sir, that that was one of the _first_ things an officer should know." rather a lark after mess; got young b. down and christened him "violet de parme," while jackson played "taint all lavender." suspected b. of harbouring thoughts of revenge, so collared a syphon of soda, and after putting out my light crawled outside and waited for him. just as he started letting the tent down, sallied forth and let fly the soda at him. stirred up the colonel, so had to lie awfully doggo. * * * * * _wednesday._--colonel rather grumpy about being disturbed. did a futile brigade attack to-day. got told off as escort to some machine guns. asked the johnnie in command of 'em what he was going to do. said he didn't know, but thought they wanted him to keep out of the way, and interrupt the attack as little as possible. m.g.'s usually looked on as a nuisance, i fancy. i suggested it would be rather sporting if we worked out well to a flank, and then imagined ourselves ambushed, and bolted back on the main body; give 'em awfully great opportunity of showing what they could do in an emergency, but he wouldn't rise to it. simply a lovely chance lost of rotting up the show. think i shall put in for the gun section next year. [illustration: the gun team.] went over to the wildshires in the evening. awfully sporting lot. found 'em having chariot races in armchairs with obstacles. being a guest, was asked to be passenger; nothing broken but the chair. musical lot, too. have great formula when they want a song from anyone, "will you come to the piano, or will you be fetched?" they generally come. rather late before i got back. never knew a camp with so many confounded tent ropes. * * * * * _thursday._--annual inspection. filthy day. inspected every ten minutes, with slight interval for showers. was hurried off to a piquet. rushed out patrols and sentries somewhere. got told to alter 'em. if you wanted to know anything you were told to ask some one else. always the same game. hardly a soul knows what they're supposed to be doing. you're not certain yourself, and if you are, you haven't time to tell your men. so everyone produces little red books, and studies "what to do and how to do it," by "one who thinks he knows." no wonder the regulars jibe at us; it's astonishing we're as good as we are. everybody a bit off to-day. * * * * * _friday._--paraded half an hour earlier, as we had about seven miles to march to the rendezvous. tried to stop my fellows from emptying their water-bottles at the first halt. it would do 'em good if the water-cart got lost for once, and they had to make the contents of their bottles last them the day. find we're to act as rearguard to something. got told off to occupy a bit of a wood right away on the flank. thank goodness they haven't told me what to do or how long to hold on, or anything, so i shall get out of touch as soon as i can and play off my own bat. rather good little wood. men awfully keen on the job. soon after we occupied position, spotted party of the enemy coming through gap in the hills. couldn't see them very well on account of the haze, so waited till they got fairly near, and then gave 'em a volley. they sent an orderly over to know what the deuce i meant by firing on the ambulance. felt rather an ass, but found out afterwards every party they had passed had paid them the same compliment. soon after scout came in with news of enemy. i wanted to ambush 'em, but some silly fool fired without orders, so it became a regular attack. put three companies out of action before we retired, but cut it rather too fine, and a few of my chaps got collared. found the rest of the rearguard had cleared before. some of 'em mistook us for the bally foe, and blazed into us like old boots. rotted 'em no end when we got up to them. everything got in the most awful muddle after a bit; no one knew who was which. after the "cease fire" sounded came across a lot of chaps firing like mad at anybody who came near. told 'em the "cease fire" had gone. "'cease fire' be damned!" said one of them. "we ain't had a look in till now!" rather rough time getting back to camp. thought at one time half my lot were going to fall out, so went for 'em like anything. called 'em a "bally lot of school-girls out for a sunday-school treat," which upset them somewhat, so they bucked up and not one caved in, although we were all pretty well "baked." awfully festive night. the wildshires had a camp fire, nearly all the brigade turned out. any amount of choruses. had fearful "rag" afterwards. scotson got hold of a wheelbarrow, formed a machine-gun detachment, and rushed the southshires' lines. awfully "pi" lot, and got very sick. whenever they started to object charged 'em with the "maxim," and drove 'em to earth. when i got back found my tent struck and a note on it begging me not to disturb the colonel when pitching it. got out my blankets, rolled up in them, and slept outside. * * * * * _saturday._--find i'm stuck in charge of the baggage. must see if i can manage it without the usual row. rather nice fellow is the a.s.c. in charge of transport. told him we'd got it all ready, and he needn't worry. shall just have time for my fellows to get breakfast and then slip into it. everything seems all serene, so i'll get a bite myself. oh, my aunt maria! i wish if they give a fellow a job to do they'd leave him to do it. found everybody pitching the stuff up into the wagons anyhow. how ever it got sorted out, goodness knows. had rather a row with the a.s.c. chap; told him he was muddling everything up. seemed to think a volunteer can't possibly know anything, but considering half my men come from the railway, i'll back them against all comers for loading a truck. started at last, about half an hour late. more trouble at the station; only two trucks there instead of the five indented for. my stock of ornamental profanity barely sufficient for the occasion. finally managed somehow. loaded up passenger coaches, horse boxes, anything; but men awfully sulky. thought they were going to curse the major when he wanted to know why everything wasn't done. got rotted by young blenkinsop for mucking the show up. major awfully good chap on these occasions; told me it's absolutely unavoidable when we have to manage to get a day's work done in about three hours. told ripping good jest against himself when _he_ was on baggage duty years ago. must try it again next year to see if i can do it differently. only one or two things gone wrong after all, by some miracle. home again. feel rather tired. jolly good camp, though. hope next year's will be as good. [illustration: off duty.] [illustration: philosophies. "chargin'," said the junior subaltern, "is all bally rot; and when we carried a beastly sword it was positively dangerous. you blew your whistle, bolted out in front of your men, howled 'char-r-r-ge!' shoved your foot in a hole, or got the scabbard between your legs an' came a regular mucker, and then some idiot behind either jumped on you or tripped over you, an' most likely prodded you with his bally bayonet."] [illustration: m.g. _extract from diary._--"we got our maxim into a capital position on the flank, but before we could fire a shot we were put out of action for some time."] [illustration: more army reforms. _our only sub.:_ "awful tommy rot big battalions, don't you know; ever so much jollier with just the mess an' the band."] [illustration: on guard. _officer of the day_ (_who believes in making sure that every man knows his work_): "ah? what are you?" (_no answer._) "er! what are your orders?" (_no answer._) "what the dooce are you doing here?" _recruit_ (_on sentry go for the first time_): "please, zur, i bz waitin' for they to tell i to come to tay!"] [illustration: a misunderstanding. _colonel_ (_to recruit who has forgotten to salute him_): "what company do you belong to?" _recruit_ (_mindful of his civil occupation_): "th--th--the gas company, please, sir!"] [illustration] no. . pte. timothy simmons. _saturday._--'ad a bit of a row with the old man afore starting; 'e wants me to give mother 'arf my camp pay, same as if it were wages. told 'im i would if i could, so i expect there'll be more rows when we gets back. said good-bye to mary, an' told her if i 'eard of any goings on with bill jenkins, as could go to camp if 'e wanted to right enough, i'd spoil 'is face for 'im. she said i ought to be walkin' 'er out instead o' wastin' my time playin' at soldiers, an' that bill's a very sensible chap. i ses as 'e's a waster an' a perfect bloomin' idjet at drill, always a throwin' us out. jawin' with 'er made me a bit late for parade, but our leftenant didn't seem to mind for a wonder. usually 'is temper's awful if things don't go as he likes. he cocked 'is bloomin' eye-glass at me, tho', in a way as made me think 'e was going to start cussin'. twasn't bad with all the village looking on, an' we marched off in style. got told off to the baggage guard at the station. blessed if i don't think it was for being late for p'rade. warn't sorry when the train started, as one of the chaps 'ad got hold of four bottles of beer as was all right. just before the train stops our serjint, 'e ses, "look after our own company's baggage, an' never mind what anybody ses." but we 'adn't more than about started when a off'cer on a horse comes along an' wants to know who's in charge an' where is 'e. i tells 'im, an' then he ses we can't be all day over the job, an' we're to put all this lot into that truck. we ses we was told to put it in t'other. "put it where _i_ tell you," 'e ses. bimeby along comes our off'cer, an' just takes one look at us, an' then started fairly in. as our corp'ril said afterwards, it were a treat. i'd 'ave given the price of a pint to 'ave been able to sit still an' listen to 'im, an' yet to look at 'im in the ordinary way you'd think he couldn't get further than "dash it all!" then up comes the off'cer on the 'orse. "are you in charge of this guard?" ses 'e. "yes," ses our off'cer. "well, you'll never get away at this rate, an' there's three more battalions to detrain after you, an' i must 'ave those trucks back from the camp by six o'clock." "very good; they will be here," ses our man. "not at this rate," ses t'other. "my dear fellow," ses our off'cer, "my men aint regulars, but they can manage it all right in their own way if you'll leave 'em alone; but you're simply muddlin' us up now." "can't help that," ses t'other. "i'm only responsible for the trucks, and they must be got away at once." "i'm responsible for the baggage," ses our man. "either leave the job to me or take the whole thing over." "oh, do as you like. i don't care a damn," ses the one on the 'orse. "no more do i," ses our off'cer. so we gets it together somehow an' marches off, the bloomin' traction-engine a-goin' about five miles an 'our an' we tryin' to keep up, all of us cussin' at everything. don't catch me on a baggage guard again in a 'urry. * * * * * _sunday._--bit tired to-day. couldn't get much sleep las' night; some of the chaps 'adn't been to camp afore, an' wouldn't shake down quiet. kep' growlin' at everything. off'cer comes round wantin' to know what the noise were about. i tells 'im as george hitchins 'udn't shut up, an' let us get to sleep. "'it 'im on the 'ed with a boot," ses the off'cer, an' i 'ad a bloomin' good mind to. church p'rade in the mornin'. never 'eard a blessed word till we got to the hymns. dinner pretty right, but could 'ave done with more of it. beer at the canteen not 'arf as good as we gets at the old "king's arms." went out with some of our chaps in the afternoon an' 'ad a sleep in a wood. not 'arf a bad day. if t'were goin' to be all same as this, i wouldn't mind. * * * * * _monday._--jack houghton, as was tent orderly to-day, goes an' trips over one of the tent ropes when he were bringing the coffee, an' spilt most of it. tried to get some more, but couldn't, so docked 'im of 'is share; even then we was precious short. section drill all the morning. never saw the off'cers so savage--nothing would please them; they're fairly easy all the year, but they makes up for it in camp. not but what some of the chaps want it--lots of 'em goes on enough to break a feller's 'eart, an' then we all gets the blame. that there houghton got hold of the wrong kettle at dinner an' come back with no. 's grub, which, as they're only seven in their tent to our eight, warn't good enough. complained to the off'cer as come round. 'e said if we couldn't look after ourselves better than that, we must take the consequences. that's all very fine, but it don't feed us. made houghton stand 'arf a gallon to the tent. 'e ses camp's a bloomin' swindle. if there's one thing i 'ates it is cleaning up the camp; the other companies chucks their rubbish into our lines, but t'aint no use to say so, you only gets shut up. [illustration: on the range.] got jawed at for a bit o' dirt in my rifle as you couldn't see. "clean it again," ses our leftenant. "i've cleaned the thing forty times," i ses. "forty-one's your lucky number," 'e ses; "try again." went for a stroll in the evenin', but these 'ere camps is too far away from anything to please me. * * * * * _tuesday._--my day as tent orderly. i never see such a lot of chaps to grumble as our tent. fust of all the bread warn't right, then i 'adn't got enough coffee, an' the bacon was done too much--why 'adn't i kicked up a row? "look 'ere," i ses, "you bloomin' well take wot you gets, an' if you aint satisfied you complain to the off'cer of the day; _'e_ won't stand much of yer lip. i know my work," i ses, "an' i done it." had to peel a reg'lar pile of taters, twice as many as they ought to want. "there," i ses to our company cook, "'ow's that?" "why, you've bin an' wasted nigh on 'arf of 'em," 'e ses. "an' then yer tent will be hollerin' out as i cheats 'em. _i_ know 'em," 'e ses. an' sure enough they did, only it were the gravy as they didn't like this time. i shall be bloomin' glad when i'm a sergint, an' 'as a mess to ourselves. 'ad narrow shave of being late for p'rade. you aint got no time to spare when you're orderly. thought nothing would satisfy our off'cers to-day. we was trying all sorts of things like they does 'em at the war, an' we was fairly sick of it, but the colonel 'e rides by an' sings out as we was the best company 'e'd seen that morning, so that was all right, an' we didn't mind being shoved about. * * * * * _wednesday._--we was practised in advanced guard the first thing this morning, all the companies working separate. after a bit, i'm blowed if yer could tell what any of 'em was at, they was so mixed up. afore we starts, our captain 'e explains to us what we was supposed to do; _'e_ may 'ave understood what 'e was drivin' at, but i'm blest if any of us did. 'owever, after a bit i begins to see what we was meant to be doin', an' bimeby the captain 'e tells me to take two men as a patrol to examine a wood as was near by. d'rectly we was out of sight one of 'em starts playin' the goat, till i gives 'im a shove in the back wi' the butt just to remind 'im as i was in command. the major come along jist then an' asks me what we was? i tells 'im as we were a patrol, an' 'e tells me the proper way to do it, an' what to report to the captain. after breakfast we was out again doin' outposts. wish they wouldn't 'ave so much make believe about it. supposin' now they puts yer in a group as sentries. "the henemy," they ses, "is somewhere over there, an' you've to watch that bit o' country in front of you; the countersign's 'bunkum,' an' you've to keep under cover." well, there aint no henemy, an' nothin' aint goin' to 'appen, an' yer wouldn't know wot to do if it did, so you just lies down an' smokes till the "assembly" goes, an' then you comes back. it may teach officers something, but it don't teach us much. as we was out for the day only 'ad a sort o' bread an' water picnic instead of dinner, which we 'as when we gets back to camp. we was put through what they calls an attack drill after, but i didn't think much of it; started off with about twenty yards between you an' the next man, an' then as we advanced, they comes crowdin' up from be'ind till the firin' line were like a bloomin' football scrimmage, with about four different battalions all atop o' one another, an' loosin' off right an' left whether they was in front or be'ind. "'ere," i ses to ted parminter, "this aint no place for us, it's too bloomin' dangerous. i'm going to be a casualty." an' we drops be'ind. "wot bally rot!" i 'eard one off'cer say, an' i quite agreed with 'im. * * * * * _thursday._--everyone 'ad to clean the bloomin' camp twice over to-day, as we was to be inspected. i niver seen such a place for getting dirty; you brushes yerself down an' blacks yer boots an' polishes up yer rifle, an' in ten minutes you are that covered in dust as you look as if you 'adn't washed for a week. got sent out with a patrol again. saw a general ridin' along our way, so we got be'ind an 'edge till 'e'd gone by. just after we got back to the picket another general comes along an' asks all sorts of questions, an' didn't seem to think much of the answers 'e got. we was all 'oping it were over for the day, when along comes a whole lot o' generals all together, and one of 'em calls out to us to fall in. we gets up an' begins dusting ourselves down a bit, when 'e yells at us for not being in our places at once, an' goes for us 'ot an' strong; then 'e starts asking questions as made me shiver. all of a sudden 'e ses: "who was in charge of the last patrol as went out?" the captain calls me up, and the general ses, "where did you go?" i tells 'im i went as far as the wood. "see anything of the enemy?" 'e ses. "there weren't none there," i ses. "how do you know?" ses 'e; "you ar'n't allowed to enter the woods about here." "well, sir," i ses, "we didn't go in, but there's only two places where anybody could get in without doing damage, and there weren't no footmarks there." "what forage can i get down there?" 'e ses. "there's about three ton o' bad 'ay, sir, at one of the cottages, but it aint worth 'aulin'," i ses, an' 'e tells me to fall back in the ranks, which i was precious glad to do. our captain said, when they was gone, as 'ow i'd answered very well, an' 'ow i ought to go for a stripe. i said as i should like to. paraded in the afternoon for the reg'lar inspection; was kept out in the burnin' sun standing still for about two hours while another general walked round an' looked at our buttons an' boots, an' found fault with every blessed thing. they seems to think yer kit is made to look at, not to use. as i ses to ted in the canteen after, "we comes to camp for trainin', an' this 'ere's nothing but wastin' time, as could be done at 'ome anywhere." * * * * * _friday._--revelly 'arf 'our earlier this morning, as we 'ad a longish march to do. precious 'ot it were, too, an' we were main glad to get a rest before beginning operations. don't know what we was supposed to be doin', but we got posted on the side of an 'ill where we could 'ave seen everything as was goin' on, but d'rectly you gets up to 'ave a look some one starts bellerin', "lie down there!" till we all got the bloomin' 'ump. after a bit they takes us back the way we come and we lay down again, then they advances us up the 'ill again; then they shifts us about all over the shop, backerds an' forrards, till we didn't know where we was. at last a off'cer comes galloping over to our colonel and they seemed to be 'avin' a few words, and we advances an' 'alts, advances an' 'alts, for about a hour an' a 'arf, an' then just as we was getting up to the firing line an' thinkin' this was a bit of all right at last, the bugles go, "cease fire." "taint fair," ses dick jennings; "let's shoot the bloomin' humpire." getting back to camp were a bit thick, 'ow we did it without fallin' out i don't know. no one who aint done it theirselves knows wot marchin' ten mile in fours on a road two inches deep in dust is like; yer rifle weighs about a ton, an' yer water's gone at the first 'alt. the bloomin' band as ought to 'ave met us an' played us 'ome, went an' lost itself, an' never showed up till we was almost back to camp. colonel 'e's give out as every man is to 'ave a hextra pint issued to 'im. i 'ad three more on my own; 'ad a bit of a sing-song in the evenin', but we was too tired to do much. * * * * * _saturday._--regular scrimmage striking tents an' getting blankets an' baggage together, but got it done some'ow--a regular nigger drivin' sort of job. felt quite sorry when we fell in on p'rade for the last time. camp's stiffish work an' everybody grumbles, but it aint bad fun on the whole; an' after all a chap as 'as been to camp is worth half-a-dozen as 'asn't, you learns things there that you can't learn nohow else, no matter 'ow clever you are. [illustration] [illustration: outposts. both the sentry and the group indulge in a little "nap."] [illustration: blank cartridges] what the service would be without the junior subaltern the junior subaltern cannot imagine. * * * * * do not anathematize the genius who formulates the regulations. he is quite right, if you could but understand him. * * * * * gun practice with obsolete weapons is instructive. one cannot know too much of the history of one's country. * * * * * a sealed pattern at the war office is something different from the kit you have just purchased. [illustration: at last! private jones having contrived to sit upon his bayonet, the various ambulances and bearer sections get a look in.] the expenses of the officer's dress should be reduced whenever possible. abolish ten shillings worth of lace, and substitute three buttons at three-and-sixpence apiece. there is only a slight difference, but every little helps. [illustration] rifles should be cleaned very carefully: one man should hold the rifle, and the other should manipulate the "pull-through." [illustration] the difference between field service kit and parade dress is very marked. you wear out the one and grow out of the other. [illustration: off duty. that enthusiastic volunteer, jack rackett, holds that, while in camp, you should consider yourself a soldier for the time being; but, he says, tommy has a "deuced good time, don't you know!"] [illustration: trouble in the band. _bugler:_ "'ere, if you go on increasin' at this rate, fatty, you'll 'ave to send in your resignation. you won't be able to reach the middle o' the drum soon!"] you may be traffic manager of a railway, but you cannot know as much about a baggage train as a second lieutenant in the army service corps who has been at it for a week. * * * * * now this is the creed of the subaltern.-- the subaltern knows everything and does everything. the captain knows (?) everything and does nothing. the major knows nothing and does nothing. * * * * * [illustration] there is such a thing as too much enthusiasm, and when, after joining the signalling section, edwin's fond epistles took the above form, angelina decided that it was time to break off the engagement. * * * * * if you want to know anything always ask the adjutant; recollect that he has nothing to do but to attend to _you_. * * * * * no water-cart is perfect. you may abuse it without incurring rebuke. * * * * * when in doubt say you have received no instructions. * * * * * many rules apply equally well in civil and military life. if you are in a responsible position, never do anything till you are absolutely pushed. presenting arms never killed the enemy, neither has physical drill, but each helps to make a soldier. * * * * * it is curious how an indifferent shot always gets a badly sighted rifle issued to him. * * * * * "intelligence in the obeyin' of commands," said "tiny," "is of the utmost importance. if you are with an off'cer as knows 'is work you may close yer eyes and rest in peace, an' just do as you're told without worryin'. but they differ. there's that little devil with the eyeglass now, if 'e's takin' you an' you see me convenient to 'is elbow you can be easy in your minds an' jump to the word, but if, by misfortune, 'e's out there alone, keep yer wits about yer an' step off slow, for 'as you were' an' 'mark time' is favourite commands with 'im.'" * * * * * "discipline is a good word; it fills the mouth and makes the chest swell with the sound, but it's easier to spell than to explain," said "tiny." "i have not my patent-instalment-plan dictionary with me, but 'tis in the nature of obedience, only more so. any fool can do as 'e's told, but the disciplined man will do it even when 'e thinks it's wrong--not, i want ye to understand, just because it's an order, but because 'e ses to 'imself: this is for a reason as i don't know on. f'rinstance, when the father told the boy to slip into the orchard an' shin up a tree an' collar all the apples 'e could, that boy didn't hesitate, but started 'tooty sweet,' as the french say. now, thinks 'e as 'e goes along, 'wot's the little game? the apples is rotten, the dawg's about, an' the farmer 'll catch me for sure. it can't be for the sake of getting me a lammin', cos,' says he, 'the ole man likes doin' that 'isself. i don't 'arf like the looks of it,' 'e says, 'but i'll take me precautions:' with that he shoves a bone in 'is pocket to amuse the tripe hound if he gets too pressing, an' takes a stone or two for the farmer, an' by the end of the campaign comes back to find that the enemy's attention 'aving been diverted to the orchard, the ole man 'as cleaned out the hen roost, an' there's a hot supper an' general rejoicings." [illustration: "all exercises should generally conclude with a conference, at which officers and non-commissioned officers should be encouraged to explain any action they may have taken." _vide_ army orders, .] [illustration] [illustration] * * * * * transcriber's note: the original hyphenation, spelling and grammar have been preserved. page , "reglashuns" changed to "reg'lashuns" [ed. for consistency] page , 'anywhere.' changed to 'anywhere."' page , "isself" changed to "'isself" [illustration: let's go!!] rookie rhymes by the men of the st. and nd. provisional training regiments plattsburg, new york may --august [illustration] harper & brothers publishers new york and london rookie rhymes copyright, , by harper & brothers printed in the united states of america published september, contents _page_ publication committee foreword robert tapley, co. , st p. t. r. part i--poems standing in line morris bishop, co. , st p. t. r. the first time onward christian science d. e. currier, d battery, st p. t. r. they believe in us back home anch kline, co. , st p. t. r. ode to a lady in white stockings robert cutler, co. , st p. t. r. "avoirdupois" d. e. currier, d battery, st p.t.r. go! j. s. o'neale, jr., co. , d p. t. r. the plattsburg code r. l. hill, co. , d p. t. r. a conference donald e. currier, d battery, st p. t. r. sunday in barracks anch kline, co. , st p. t. r. the ballad of montmorency gray pendleton king, co. , d p. t. r. girls robert m. benjamin, co. , st p. t. r. a lament h. chapin, co. , st p. t. r. the manual george s. clarkson, co. , st p. t. r. those "patriotic" songs frank j. felbel, co. , d p. t. r. saturday p.m. harold amory, co. , st p. t. r. how things have changed c. k. stodder, co. , st p. t. r. arma feminamque w. r. witherell, co. , d p. t. r. out o' luck w. k. rainsford, co. , d p. t. r. sherman was right joe f. trounstine, co. , d p. t. r. troopship chanty harold speakman, co. , d p. t. r. those rumors f. l. bird, d battery, st p. t. r. war's horrors kenneth mcintosh, d lieut. o. r. c., co. , st p. t. r. the call allen bean macmurphy, co. , st p. t. r. beans charles h. ramsey, co. , st p. t. r. forward "?" john w. wilber, co. , st p. t. r. chant of a derelict ed. burrows, co. , st p. t. r. preoccupation charles h. ramsey, co. , st p. t. r. inoculation day morris bishop, co. , st p. t. r. don't weaken r. t. fry, co. , st p. t. r. the three harold speakman, co. , d p. t. r. to the little black dog a. n. phillips, jr., d battery, st p. t. r. when east is west w. r. witherell, co. , d p. t. r. to my sweetheart every rookie in co. , st p. t. r. play the game e. f. d., co. , st p. t. r. the stadium, plattsburg harold speakman, co. , st p. t. r. rubaiyat of a plattsburg candidate w. kerr rainsford, co. , st p. t. r. dreams l. irving, co. , st p. t. r. a d regiment "who's who" j. elmer cates, co. , d p. t. r. eureka e. f. d., co. , st p. t. r. fourth company, n. e. song george s. clarkson, co. , st p. t. r. part ii--songs and parodies long, long trail g. gilmore davis, co. , st p. t. r. willie's pa j. felbel and l. h. davidow, co. , d p. t. r. company , new england paul j. field, co. , st p. t. r. to the reserve cavalry f. e. horpel, co. , st p. t. r. we're on our way to deutschland lieut. fletcher clark, o. r. c., co. , st p. t. r. i want to be a colonel f. e. horpel, co. , st p. t. r. i want to be a doughboy kenneth bonner, co. , st p. t. r. our battle hymn james c. mcmullin, co. , st p. t. r. new england will be leading lieut. cyril c. reynolds, o. r. c., co. , st p. t. r. on the banks of the river rhine j. j. riodan, co. , d p. t. r. "the simulating of the green" lieut. joseph gazzam, jr., o. r. c., co. , st p. t. r. don't send me home e. m. anderson, co. , st p. t. r. company nine o. w. hauserman, co. , st p. t. r. we're on our way to europe t. l. wood, co. , st p. t. r. company song james c. mcmullin, co. , st p. t. r. double time w. j. littlefield, d battery, st p. t. r. the th new england anonymous, co. , st p. t. r. marching on the rhine lieut. cyril c. reynolds, o. r. c., co. , st p. t. r. eggs--agerated robert b. house, co. , st p. t. r. with apologies to kipling's "the vampire" r. e. hall, st troop, st p. t. r. finis illustrations cover illustration, c. l. yates, co. , st p. t. r. let's go!! _frontispiece_ lieut. p. l. crosby, o. r. c., co. , d p. t. r. the first time _page_ r. k. leavitt, co. , st p. t. r. right dress--march! " c. l. yates, co. , st p. t. r. a test of discipline " c. l. yates, co. , st p. t. r. what's your name? " r. k. leavitt, co. , st p. t. r. a conference " r. k. leavitt, co. , st p. t. r. always with another fellow " mr. sleeper, co. , st p. t. r. there's a hungry surgeon waiting " r. k. leavitt, co. , st p. t. r. a shadow-pointin' boche " r. k. leavitt, co. , st p. t. r. s. o. s. " mr. baskerville, co. , d p. t. r. a miss at o'clock " c. l. yates, co. , st p. t. r. mess? yes!! " r. k. leavitt, co. , st p. t. r. title by anch kline, co. , st p. t. r. when east is west " r. k. leavitt, co. , st p. t. r. with the rookie to the end " mrs. gertrude crosby, wife of lieut. p. l. crosby, co. , d p. t. r. the end of a perfect day _end papers_ lieut. p. l. crosby, o. r. c., co. , d p. t. r. publication committee edward f. dalton, chairman co. , st p. t. r. st p. t. r. w. dyar, co. p. j. field, co. g. b. blaine, co. a. f. woodies, co. j. c. mcmullin, co. r. t. frye, co. m. b. phipps, co. d. loring, jr., co. c. h. ramsey, co. w. w. webber, co. s. s. gordon, tr. r. b. leake, btry. d. e. currier, btry. nd p. t. r. w. j. littlefield, btry. t. c. jessup, co. e. e. henderson, co. f. j. felbel, co. lieut. kenneth mcintosh, co. capt. richardson, co. pendleton king, co. h. mackay, co. herbert clock, co. e. s. murphy, btry. c. g. shaw, btry. m. n. kernochan, btry. foreword _river that rolls to the restless deep from sylvan-born placidity, stained issue of the undefiled by your own wayward will exiled from the crystal lap of a land-locked sea,_ _read me the meaning of your mood. the waters murmur as they flow, "strife is the law by which we live; stagnation, our alternative: this is the only truth we know."_ _the tides of mortal toilers meet to merge their rhythms in bloody fray, and, wave to wave, their armies call-- nay, summon us that we shall all assume the role we choose to play._ _so, at the cry, in loyal breasts, as smaller self-concern recedes, still burns the old achillean fire, still eager questing souls desire not life but living, not days but deeds._ part i poems standing in line when i applied for plattsburg i stood for hours in line to get a piece of paper which they said i had to sign; when i had signed i stood in line (and my, that line was slow!) and asked them what to do with it; they said they didn't know. and when i came to plattsburg i had to stand in line, to get a requisition, from five o'clock till nine; i stood in line till night for the captain to endorse it; but the q. m. had one leggin' left; i used it for a corset. we stand in line for hours to get an issue for the squad; we stand in line for hours and hours to use the cleaning-rod; and hours and hours and hours and hours to sign the roll for pay; and walk for miles in double files on inoculation day. oh, heaven is a happy place, its streets are passing fair, and when they start to call the roll up yonder i'll be there; but when they start to call that roll i certainly will resign if some reserve archangel tries to make me stand in line. [illustration] the first time my legs are moving to and fro i feel like a balloon; how my head swims, first time i go to boss the damn platoon. my throat and mouth are full of paste there's nothing in my hat; my belt is winding round my waist but where's my stomach at? onward christian science our christian science battery without a gun or horse, is just a simple oversight, that will be changed, of course. but while we're waiting patiently, and longing for the day, they have a funny little game they make us fellows play. bill hallstead _simulates_ the gun he's sort of short and fat and doesn't look much like a gun, but he's pretty good at that. and they've elected me a horse, off-horse of the wheel pair; i tie a white cloth on my arm so they can see i'm there. then when the battery is formed with each man in his place, they line the "pieces" in a row just like a chariot race. bill barnum's "greatest show on earth" has not a thing on us; we tear around the old parade and kick up _clouds_ of dust. for it's gallop all the morning long, they never let us walk. why, it gets so realistic that i whinney when i talk. i wouldn't be a bit surprised if i should hear some day that instead of mess they'd issue us that lbs. of hay. and so i'm looking for the man the one who said to me: "you don't want to be a 'doughboy,' go and join the battery." [illustration: right dress--march] they believe in us back home "lots of love to our lieutenant," writes my mother; and the letters from my brother contain facetious remarks about "majors" ... he calls me "the colonel" and laughs.... but they mean it seriously, those back home. they can't seem to realize how shaky is our berth up here ... how every "retreat" means a brief respite; each "reveille" the dread of some more foolish blunder ... some new bone-play. and yet sometimes our timid vanity blossoms under the warmth of their regard; our hopes take strength from their confidence in us. there came a blue envelope in the mail today. a square envelope delicately scented with myrrh.... and she ended with "_adieu, cher capitaine_." that very morning i started even our sphinx-faced commander by bawling out: "right dress--march!" "_adieu, cher capitaine_," she had written, and i can see the flecks of soft star dust in her eyes as she thought it. bitterly i swore at my luck ... then sent her that photograph taken of me on july fourth.... of me astride the horse of an officer. i scrawled a jest under it. but what else could i do? [illustration: a test of discipline] ode to a lady in white stockings lady, in your stockings white, as you flutter by the road, you inspire me to write an ode. though upon my manly back there reposes half a ton, why repine against a pack or gun? though the fire-tressed orb makes mirage upon the street; though the baking soil absorb my feet; though the sergeants stamp and rave; though the captain's eye is flame; pray, how should my heart behave-- the same? i become a thing of steel, buoyant none the less as cork; radiant from hat to heel i walk. lady, in your stockings white, don't you note my altered step? don't you feel, enchanting sprite, my pep? "avoirdupois" i sing the song of a fat man out on the skirmish line, with a pack chock full of lead and bricks a'hanging on behind. maybe you think it's funny when you're out there on the run, beside all that equipment to be pullin' half a ton. the captain has a heart of stone it makes no odds to him; he's there to teach you to skirmish, and you'll skirmish fat or thin. d'you suppose he gives a tinker's damn if when you're lying prone, the pack comes up behind your ears and whacks you on the dome? he just hollers "fire faster," though he knows you couldn't hit the broad side of a barn door, if you were fifty feet from it. he doesn't care a little bit, if you're gasping hard for breath, he's there to teach you to skirmish, if you skirmish yourself to death. oh, well, it's true about fat men being always full of fun, good lord, they've got to be, 'cause they can neither fight nor run. [illustration: what's your name?] go! your lips say "go!" eyes plead "stay!" your voice so low faints away to nothing, dear-- god keep me here! god end the war, and let us two travel far on love's road, you and i in peace, never to cease. your lips say "go!" eyes plead "stay"-- ah, how i know what price you pay. the plattsburg code by lake champlain, where bourbon tossed the dice of fortune and romance, where red-coats won and red-coats lost, we soldiers train to fight in france. though with no pomp and elegance of gold-laced beaux, we have their same old code of pluck and nonchalance-- "god give us guts to play the game." may winds that sing like troubadours of musket, sword and daring deed, and ideals won in early wars, inspire each warrior to succeed; to fight that nations may be freed, and through all hardships make his aim the punch of old-time heroes' creed-- god give us guts to play the game. and if to-morrow--who can tell?-- we hike along a hot white french highway, exposed to shrapnel shell, or occupy a first-line trench, 'midst poisoned gas and dead men's stench, and hand grenades that burst and maim; may not all hell our spirit quench-- god give us guts to play the game. if through entangled wires and mud, charging the boche, we madly run, with comrades dropping, dyed with blood, and sickening sights and sounds that stun, and in death's duel meet the hun 'midst shell holes, smoke, and battle flame, steel clashing steel and gun to gun-- god give us guts to play the game. [illustration] a conference i was sleeping in the barracks, a week or so ago. and in the midst of pleasant dreams i heard the whistle blow. lord, how i hate those whistles! well, it was time to "rouse," so we marched down 'mongst the thistles beside the old ice house. i looked around in misery, at last i took a seat, with nothing to lean up against and no place for my feet. as i sat there in the drizzle of a good old plattsburg rain, i wondered if i'd fizzle the lesson once again. the captain, who, like nero observing rome in flames, was seated on a packing-box perusing all the names. "mr. whitney, won't you tell us of patrols both front and rear? speak up, mr. whitney, so the men in back can hear." "and please now, mr. warnock, just tell us if you will what you'd do with this problem if you were sergeant hill?" "no! i'll ask you if i want you; never mind the hands. warnock, _you_ are sergeant hill, just call out your commands." "whitney! warnock! gee, what luck!" i chortled in my glee. my name is brown, t'was very plain he'd never get to me. so i listened to the questions and the answers one by one, and wondered if that rd degree was ever to be done. i thought of cups with handles on, of napkins and clean hands; i thought of all the pretty girls that live in _christian_ lands. i thought of cakes, and pies, and things, i thought of home in pain, and wondered if i'd ever sleep till o'clock again. i wished i had some lager beer or a nice silver fizz; when, "mr. brown, you tell us what a special order is." i rose, saluted, brushed my pants then mutely gazed around. i stood transfixed; the captain said "_sit down, mr. brown!_" sunday in barracks little silences sit in the corners munching their finger tips. i lie stretched flat upon my bunk.... i count the cracks in the pine-boards above me. i am alone. these others who fill the air with talk about right and wrong ... life and death ... with heavy-nailed footsteps and sometimes heavier profanity ... what becomes of them on sunday? dinners ... the beauty of women ... pretty talk. camaraderie beside the lake ... fellow for fellow, what does it matter? my little silences slide along the floor ... clamber up my bunk to grin at me in my loneliness. then i think of the millions who have none for whom to be lonely, french, english, german, russ.... what does it matter the language? we are all one, levelled in solitude. and i laugh at the silences, and laugh to see them scurrying back to their corners, gibbering. the ballad of montmorency gray i since we came to plattsburg training camp upon the th of may, a lot of clever candidates have fallen by the way; but the strangest fall among them all was montmorency gray. ii monty was a clever lad, as bright as bright could be; he came up days ahead of time-- ahead of you and me-- and got in strong right from the start. o a clever lad was he! iii for monty was an officer of uncle sam's reserve; his uniform was spic and span in every line and curve; and what he lacked in other things, he made up for in nerve. iv he learned the i.d.r. by heart before the st of june; he used to study late at night, and in the morning soon; no wonder that the captain let him lead the st platoon. v he asked the cutest questions in the study hall at night; he knew the difference between a cut and fill at sight. and when it said: "what do you do?" he always did just right. vi he memorized the map from chestnut hill to steven's run; he didn't have to draw a scale, as we have always done; he _knew_ that you could see five-six-- ty-six from six-o-one. vii and then this tragic episode of which i write occurred. it happened sometime in the night of june the rd that montmorency stole away, and left no sign or word. viii we found at dawn that he had gone and left us in the lurch. the colonel sent detachments out for miles around to search; a strong patrol to every knoll, to every house, and church. ix they found no trace in any place; it caused a lot of talk; they wired down to every town from plattsburg to new york. as it was plain he took no train he must have had to walk. x 'twas well into the fall before the mystery was cleared. (they'd never heard a single word since monty disappeared), when the colonel had a caller, an old farmer, with a beard. xi he said his name was topper, and he lived in table rock, and what he told the colonel gave the old man quite a shock; they were closeted together until after ten o'clock. xii from gettysburg to plattsburg mr. topper came to say how he'd found a man in uniform down near his home one day, who, judging from his clothing, must have walked a long, long way. xiii he told the sad and tragic tale of how he came to find, while on his way to hershey's mill with a load of corn to grind, the young man wandering on a hill, and wandering in his mind. xiv he took him to his farmhouse, where for seven weeks he lay and talked and muttered to himself in a most peculiar way. he gave his name before he died as montmorency gray. xv he seemed more sick than lunatic, mr. topper had to grant; as meek and mild as a little child, he did not rave or rant, he only cried, until he died: "you ought to, _but you can't_!" [illustration: always with another fellow] girls they wander everywhere about the dears in pink, the dreams in yellow, with fetching smile, with pretty pout, and always with another fellow. they spend their mornings baking cakes, their afternoons in making cookies; and, oh! the soul within me aches-- their sweets are all for other rookies. often, when 'neath their eyes we pass, i hear some maiden sigh divinely, and murmur to another lass, "dear, isn't _jackie_ marching finely?" ah, girls, a sorry lot is his-- dull are his days, his nights are dreary-- who knows no maiden where he is, who has no dame to call him "dearie." a lament (after c. lamb) all, all are gone, the old familiar glasses that used to range along the fragrant bar; gone, all are gone, and in their places milk, pop and dietade its beauty mar. the big four now has turned to prohibition, anhäuser busch no longer sells at par, bar-maids have joined the army of salvation, the voice of bryan governs from afar; all, all are gone, the old familiar glasses, where once they glistened on the fragrant bar. the manual did you ever run into the butt of your gun, or dig the front sight with your nose? did your stomach turn over and stand up on end, when you dropped the damn thing on your toes? when coming to port did the rifle fall short, and the swivel ram into your fist? when the rest did present did you so intent find a count that the others had missed? and when at "inspection" you clutched to perfection, then shot up the piece with a thrust, was there some dirty pup who pushed your cut-off up so your bolt dug a cave in the dust? then when on the range your windage you'd change for the flag that the anarchists wave, and the old cocking piece smeared your nose with red "grease," did you learn what it meant to be brave? how your old back did ache when you got the bad breaks with the rifle that now has such charms, and i'll make a good bet that you'll never forget that exhausting old manual of arms. those "patriotic" songs i to put the pay in patriot is the order of the day. and some delight to sing of fight for royalties that pay. the louder that the eagle screams the more the dollars shout, and, if you please, atrocities like this are handed out:-- (chorus) i love you, dear america, i love the starry flag, we're proud to fight for you-oo-oo; we never boast or brag. we always will remember you, we always will be true; maryland, my maryland! hurrah, boys, hurrah! as we go marching on to victory. ii that some are actuated by intentions of the best, is surely clear, and so we fear to class them with the rest. and yet conceive some long-haired chap, or sentimental miss, who takes the time to fit a rhyme to music, say, like this:-- (chorus) i love you, yes, i love you, and when i'm across the sea, i'll take your picture to the front, 'twill always be with me. i shall not mind the bullets when i am far away, you'll be a soldier's sweetheart, my girl in u. s. a. iii to make the war more horrible some chap will surely try to set to rag the starry flag, and dance the battle cry. we only hope we may be spared; it did not fail to come, a dashing trot of shell and shot, of bugle call and drum. (chorus) that khaki glide! o! that army slide, it seems to say: "march away, march away!" i feel so queer each time i hear the music of that military band. it's just too grand! fills me full of joy and pride, see them marching side by side, that's just the good old khaki glide! [illustration] saturday p.m. i when you've had a shave and a shower, and have picked up all the news; when you've donned your sunday stetson and your shiny pair of shoes; when your work for the week is over, you think that you are through. you're wrong, my son, you're wrong, my son there's something more for you. it's the needle, the needle, the prophylactic needle. there's a hungry surgeon waiting and he's waiting just for you. ii tho' you lasted through the horrors of a test in skirmish drill, and proved yourself a captain when you bellowed "fire at will!" you are very much mistaken if you think you've finished then; there is something after luncheon for all the plattsburg men. it's the needle, the needle, etc. iii tho' you stood a strict inspection and your dirty gun got by; tho' you'd grease spots on your breeches, and the captain winked his eye; tho' you ate your fill at dinner, and enjoyed a lucky strike; there is something at one-thirty that i know you will not like. it's the needle, the needle, etc. iv tho' you proved yourself a hero after three hours in the line, and when the doctor jabbed you just said, "let's have a shine!" and smoked a large-sized stogie and thought that it was fun, my noble-hearted candidate, you'd only half begun. it's the needle, the needle, etc. v when you woke up at twelve-thirty in a state of some alarm, to feel a tortured muscle in the region of your arm; when you heard the groaning barracks, you wiped your brow and said: "two million more next week-end, and i guess that i'll be dead." the needle, the needle, the prophylactic needle. you softly damn the surgeon, and his needle tinged with red. how things have changed when first i landed in this camp i used to write most every day to all my friends i left behind, and ask them what they had to say about the old town and the girls, or what they thought about the war; and in return the daily mail it brought me letters by the score. but now my friends write me and ask what keeps me from replying, and when i answer, "it's the work," why, they just think i'm lying. so now the letters i receive are few and very far between; they're mostly from my family and never any from a queen. [illustration] arma feminamque no man would doubt a woman's nerve, we know you're brave enough; you put a man to shame at times, you're tender--and you're tough. and yet i feel, with all your grit and talk of cave-men stuff, that you're sorter out of place when i'm twistin' up my face, a-thrustin' and a-jabbin' with my gun-knife. there's some things in this queer old world that's awkward things to see, they can't be tied with ribbon and they can't be served with tea. they're not the least bit sociable and women--as for me, i wish you'd stay away, while i'm training for the day that i'm goin' to get in action with a gun-knife. this ain't no country club affair of smiles and clever skill; there ain't no silver cups around when doughboys train to kill. it's you or me--and do it quick, a simple murder drill. so i want no women 'round, when i'm tearin' up the ground, a shadow-pointin' boches with my gun-knife. [illustration] out o' luck if, in spite of hopes and promises, your pay day doesn't come, if the sergeant antedates the call, or friday's fish is bum, or the waiter empties soup on you--don't let 'em see you glum. you're out o' luck, that's all. you're out o' luck. if you must deploy your skirmish line with nothing in your dome, or send supporting picket-lines to countermarch the somme, the chances are you've guessed it wrong and "may as well go home." you're out o' luck, that's all. you're out o' luck. if you drop between the battle-lines and no one finds the place, or jump into a pit and drive a bay'nit through your face, or try to stop a ten-inch shell and leave an empty space. you're out o' luck, that's all. you're out o' luck. [illustration: s.o.s.] sherman was right you may talk about your marching and your stiff, close-order drill; you may cuss out recitations, and of skirmish have your fill; the difficult manoeuvers which you do most every day may get your goat like everything, and spoil your plattsburg stay. but for me it's far, far harder makes me feel more like a prune, to march at strict attention past the hostess house at noon. troopship chanty the sea is green as green-pea soup and half-way down the green-o, a u-boat's lying snug and tight all bellied out with dynamite, and twenty guns between-o! and twenty guns between-o! so scrape yer hatchways clear of brine, and bawl yer jolly song-o. for if she "blows," my lads, why, then we'll blow her back to hell again, with compliments along-o! with compliments along-o! those rumors he sauntered in with a knowing grin, the news he'd been to hear; we knew right well he'd come to tell the latest from the rear. "a hundred went," he said, "to-day, "five hundred more must go they say; "looks bad, bill, guess you're on your way; "darn few of us can hope to stay. "i got this straight from a friend of mine, "a friend of his in company , "heard from a friend in company , "that company lost fifty men." with this you'd think our hopes would sink, it ought to change our humor. we knew the source, so smiled of course, it was an l. t. rumor. war's horrors i hate to talk of a regular without the proper respect; but given a chance to criticize, there's a bunch that i'd select. and they are those musical miscreants, those malefactors of noise, those rookie second cavalrymen, the amateur bugle boys. they blow retreat, and from head to feet coagulate your spine; or at company drill they send a chill a-shivering down the line. just try to salute to their twittering toot, their yodeling, rasping groan, their blithering bleat, and you'll swear that they beat the hindu quarter-tone, by gad! the hindu quarter-tone. the call spring to arms, ye sons of freedom, lift your country's ensign high; join her undefeated army, succor france, her old ally. stand for freedom, truth and justice, crush the prussian tyrant's power; emulate your worthy forebears in their homeland's crucial hour. britain, mother of your nation; france, her hope in ages past; belgium, home of peaceful people, seared by foul oppression's blast; russia, newly born to freedom; seeking honor, god and right, call on you to aid in crushing, prussianism's cursed blight. are ye men? then meet the challenge as your fathers did of old; help the cause of all the races, with your muscle, brain, and gold. [illustration: on the firing line "a miss at o'clock"] beans consider then the army bean so various and quaint. sometimes we find they're just plain beans, and then again they ain't. they're funny shades of yellow, brown, green, and red, and white; while striped and spotted, polka dotted beans our taste delight. but nix on beans manchurian, and beans of age silurian, which same could stand a buryin', when they come on--good night! forward "?" on the parade, soft and low, rookie hiccoughed, "forward, ho!" another youngster feeling smart, tried to shout, "forward, hart!" one requested, "forward, how!" from somewhere else, there came a "yow!" * * * * * perhaps a mile or so away we heard not "harp!" nor "harch!" but stalwart major koehler's voice thunder, "forward, march!" chant of a derelict sad is my song, mates, for i've got the axe, i've got to go, i've got to go; farewell to plattsburg and life in the shacks, home i must go, i must go. told not to let such a small matter grieve me, sent to the parents who hate to receive me, hearing my story, they'll never believe me, i've got to go, got to go. no more to sleep in a two-story bunk, back i must go, i must go; no more to sag 'neath a pack full of junk, home i must go, i must go. leaving the books i could never have learned, buying a straw hat--the old one was burned-- even the wrist watch must now be interned, back i must go, i must go. here is the moral of this plaintive cough, sung as i go, moaned as i go; here is the reason for my sounding off, now as i go, as i go: comrades in arms, oh! be prompt at formations, neat in your dress, and observe regulations, else, you, like me, will rejoin your relations, home you must go, you must go. [illustration: mess? yes!!] preoccupation the captain stops and yells to me, "wake up there, rear rank number three!" and then, perchance, he makes some mention of how i do not pay attention. but is it _my_ fault? no, it's you, with your persistent eyes of blue, that halt the flow of reason's stream and make me dream and dream and dream, until the captain comes and--well, to put it plain--he gives me _hell_. inoculation day my blood the surgeons fortify with antiseptic serum; the dread bacilli i defy, what cause have i to fear 'em? we form outside the pest-house door at one o'clock precisely, but if we get our dose at four we think we're doing nicely. and in our arm the surgeon stabs a hypodermic squirter, e'en as the hungry hobo jabs his fork in a frankfurter. i'm full of dope for smallpox germs, for typhus and such evils, for broken heart and army worms, for chestnut blight and weevils. i'm doped against the bayonet wielded by german demons; but no one seems to think i'll get dear old delirium tremens. don't weaken when you feel on the bum and the outlook is glum, and you're wonderin' what's comin' next; when most every thing's drear and life loses its cheer, and the skip and reverses are vexed; if this plattsburgish heat knocks you clean off your feet, or your bunkies they ain't even speakin'; keep your shirt on your back, don't knock over the stack, it's a great life, if you don't weaken. when they launder your sock till it ain't fit to hock, when they shrink up your shirt like a rag; if you blister your toes and then sunburn your nose and then can't even go on a jag; why, you're sure out of luck, but just pass the old buck, keep a stiff upper lip like a deacon; though you shoot ten straight blanks do not kick with the cranks, summon a grin and don't weaken. if you're late for retreat and must police the street, if at reveille you're still in your bed; if your girl sends you flags which some other cuss bags, or they clip all the hair off your head; if the mess comes out burned, so your stomach gets turned, or the "upper man" keeps you from sleepin'; don't you growl, that won't help, for they'll dub you a whelp; can the grouch--but don't weaken. the three three dead men rose on nimble toes above the frozen clay; and as they sped, each of the dead told how he died that day. said one, "i sent the regiment to safety as i fell." the second cried, "before i died i hurled the foe to hell." as for the third, he spoke no word but hastened on his way, until at last a whisper passed: "how did _you_ die today?" "there was a maid slept unafraid within a hut," he said. "i searched the place and for a space i thought that all had fled. "but her breast glowed white in the morning light as the early dawn grew red; tiptoe i came in lust and shame and stood beside her bed. "and there i fought an evil thought and won--and turned to go; then as i went into my tent a bullet struck me low." the others heard and spoke no word (for dead men understand), but 'round they turned and their deep eyes burned as they gripped his leaden hand. to the little black dog we see you in the morning when reveille implores; we meet you in the evening at end of daily chores. on march, fatigue, or drilling our friend we find you still, with kindly, pleasant bearing and independent will. you're small, you're thin, you're homely, you're battered, scratched, and lame; but in our tasks before us pray god we be as game! [illustration] when east is west see that man in khaki clothes, squirming in the dust; toying with a sketching board, uniform all mussed. squinting 'long a little stick, grunting fit to bust-- turning out a road sketch for his captain. first he drills a "starting point." then he takes a "shot;" someone's scare-crow gets a line, closes jones's lot. paces stiffly down the road, worried--tense--and hot-- turning out a road sketch for his captain. now an "intersection point;" watch the compass turn. think to see him finger it bloomin' thing would burn. missed an inch by motor truck; eyes it proud and stern-- turning out a road sketch for his captain. plants an orchard in the road; leaves a forest bare. runs a railroad through a house; fakes a village square. twenty contours in a swamp, thirteen in the air-- calls the thing a road sketch for his captain. to my sweetheart i love you when the bugle calls, "awake, the day's begun!" i love you as we work and sweat and drill beneath the sun. i love you at retreat, and when the sun sinks out of view; sweetheart of mine! quite all the time, i--love--you. play the game when everything goes wrong and it's hard to force a song, the proper stunt we claim, is to grin, and play the game. if things break worse than fair, say the frenchmen, "_c'est la guerre_." which to them is just the same, as to grin, and play the game. if you find the mess is punk-- kidney beans and other junk-- try to eat it just the same; stretch a grin, and play the game. when for nothing you've been bawled, though you've done your best get called, and you know you're not to blame; force a grin, and play the game. when we're hit by some big shell, and almost catch a glimpse of hell; when we think how close we came, we'll just grin, and play the game. while our work is being done we will show the mighty hun, in the land from whence we came, how we grin, and play the game. when the last long line is passed, and the victory's ours at last, greater far will be the fame, if we've grinned, and played the game. the stadium, plattsburg i hear the mighty song of singing men crashing among the pine-trees through the night, and thund'ring, trumpet-wise, down every glen, a song to france, whose soul is bleeding white. but hark!--out rings a deeper, stronger cry. a nation, which has newly learned to give, is singing as its sons go forth to die, because, god knows, they're going forth--to live! * * * * * o little maid of france, who rests in heaven, crowned with the lilies three (and lilies seven), send us the clear-eyed faith that came to thee, praying beneath the pines, in domremy. rubaiyat of a plattsburg candidate awake! 'tis morning, though it should not be-- come, can the yawns, it's speed they want to see-- and stagger forth upon a hostile world, in flannel shirt and cotton pants o. d. before the phantoms of the night were done, methought i idled somewhere in the sun, debating whether beauty to pursue, or touch a bell, and cultivate a bun. and lovely maids in garments pale did seem to shimmer round me in continuous stream, each with a glass of something in her hand, and then i turned--and lo! it was a dream! and ere the cock crew he that stood before the barracks, shouted "half a minute more! belts, bayonets, and pieces--on the jump-- and signal-flags and alidades," o lor'! i sometimes think that never battles din were so unwelcome as the words "fall in!" nor any victory could taste so sweet as french vermouth with ice and gordon gin. yesterday's problem 'twixt the red and blue involved our journey down the road peru; the day before we took the peru road-- i'll bet a hat we're there to-morrow, too. myself when fresh and full of zeal and spunk, hung on the words whence wisdom should be drunk; but this was all the harvest that i reaped-- to say "as fast as possible" is punk. platoon commanders, captains by the score, each takes his turn--and then is seen no more; but no one ever thinks of him again one half so kindly as they thought before. to-day's commander, with commands profuse, to-morrow to the rear rank will reduce. think, and you know not what he meant to say-- he knows not neither, so--ah, what's the use? waste not your hour to criticize or blame, you would have done it worse, or just the same. better to pack your troubles with your kit, to keep your shirt on, and to play the game. some for the shriek of shot and shell, and some sigh for the bottle of new england rum. oh, face the facts, and let the fiction go-- i'll bet "_la vie des tranchèes_" will be bum. one moment's rest, then back into the mill with butt and point to lacerate and kill. i often wonder what the germans teach one half so cultured as our "bay'net drill." for war is hell, and plattsburg not a jest, and yet, by gravy, we will do our best, till submarine and kaiser are forgot, or angel gabriel hollers out, "at rest!" dreams says captain peek to company two, "let's have an exam to-day; "so get your rifles and bayonet, boys, "and fall in right away. "line up whenever you're ready to go; "at route step do squads right: "light up your pipes, roll up your sleeves, "we'll try to make this light." with joyful faces they march to parade, fall out and rest on the grass. "will someone please perform right face? "we'll let slight errors pass." then captain peek shuts up that book "i won't give one black mark. "officers, beat it; get the hook! "i'll drill you right till dark. "you seem to know the drill all right; "don't bother about those maps; "put on your 'civies' as fast as you can, "and don't come back for taps." 'twill be thus perhaps in a happier land, when they've run that american drive, where we drill in white all armed with harps; but not while our cap's alive. a nd regiment "who's who" major collins is careful of his regiment's health. lemonade and other things, taken on march, have been known to cause soldiers to die, and pie? perish the suggestion! 'tis safe to bet the major was not born in new england. if in a deep wood or desert vast one would never be lost with captain barnes. he knows how to orient the landscape by sun or star. lieutenant meyer is tall, he holds his hat on by a strap under his chin. a cyclone couldn't blow it off. captain latrobe came on from texas way, "sif bofe" his saddle and himself. he might as well have saved the freight on the saddle, for he has no horse to ride on. he leads his steedless troop on charger invisible. arnold, major now, fares better. his horse is real and has white feet. do not talk to his command while it is marching, nor count for the men, or the winning smile will turn into a volcano, and you will be reduced to a shapeless mass. beware! carr's horse is black, and a beauty, too, but neighs out loud; hence never should be used to patrol. the enemy would listen, and know you were near. the straightest man on horseback is, doubtless, wainwright; and he doesn't lean backward to do it, either. matthews has a deep voice; no ear trumpet is needed to hear his commands. he believes in exercise. his men should be able to throw samson or sandow, if they are not dead by august eleventh. waldron knows how to patrol-- at least he wrote a book for thirty cents. he next should write a book on how to spot a periscope when we cross the sea. if we don't know that, we'll never spot anything else but bubbles on the ocean's face. capt. goodwyn just came up from panama, and brought chivalry with him. it's as hot here as there, but he is showing us how to make it hotter for certain people to the eastward. there is a fat q.m., whose name is unknown, but not his form. once seen never forgotten; he must have the keys to the ice-box. eureka it may be from hot tallahassee, it may be from cold northern nome, but there's nothing that can be compared with that big little letter from home. fourth company, n.e. song 'way up in plattsburg, right near the northern border, they sent us off in may, there for three months to stay, so we could all become lieutenants. then when they put us all in comp'nies we made new england four. it's the finest little company that ever did squads right and ran into a tree. new england, you've got to hand it to us-- good old company four! 'way up in plattsburg--that's where they make us soldiers-- they drill us every day. damn little time for play, 'cause when we do not drill we study. new england number four's our comp'ny, we're always full of pep. now if you want some men for good, hard work you'll always find this company will never shirk. new england, you've got to hand it to us-- good old company four! part ii songs and parodies long, long trail (_air: there's a long trail_) there's a long, long trail before us, into no-man's land in france, where the shrapnel shells are bursting, and we must advance. there'll be lots of drill and hiking, before our dreams all come true, but some day we'll show the germans, how the yankees come through. willie's pa (_air: solomon levi_) i o, willie jones's fond mamma brought him to plattsburg town, to see his father at the camp go marching up and down; and willie grew excited as the band began to play, and when he saw his papa march, the people heard him say: (chorus) "o, look at him, ma-ma, ain't he simply grand? see the way he holds his gun and swings his other hand. the captain's walking up in front, and now he's calling 'hep,' and everyone but my papa is marching out of step." ii o, willie jones, he loved to see the soldiers marching by, he went down to the target range to see the bullets fly, and every time they made a shot, he cried "ain't that a beaut!" and clapped his hands in glee to see his papa start to shoot. (chorus) "o, look at him, ma-ma, see him hold his gun, and every time he shoots it off it hits him on the bun. he puts his hand around the thing and gives an awful pull, the red flag there is waving, o! it must have been a bull." company new england (_air: "lord geoffry amherst"_) oh, good old uncle sam declared a war on kaiser bill, when, his pledges "bill" neglected to fulfill; and the war department ordered that a training camp should be, so they sent us up to plattsburg, don't you see? so they sent us up to plattsburg, don't you see? and the men from all new england came along and gathered there, and the companies they chose with greatest care. but out of all the candidates selected but a few to organize new england number . (chorus) oh, captain peek and company two they'll be names known to fame the whole world o'er. they will ever be glorious when the hohenzollerns reign no more. to the reserve cavalry (_air: the infantry, the infantry, with dirt behind their ears_) i the cavalry, the cavalry, they haven't any horse, they're taking riding lessons by a correspondence course, you'd think they were equestrians to hear the way they talk, but when it comes to riding, why! we always see them walk. ii the cavalry, the cavalry, are marching down the street, the cavalry, the cavalry, with blisters on their feet, the artillery is mounted now and ready for the course; but we never see the cavalry with any kind of horse. we're on our way to deutschland (_air: hit the line for harvard_) we're on our way to deutschland, we're yankees through and through, and we'll show the huns of germ'ny what the u. s. a. can do. with france and old england, victory or die; and we'll give a rousing cheer, boys, as the allied flags go by. i want to be a colonel (_air: i want to be back home in dixie_) i want to be, i want to be, i want to be at least a colonel, have the majors handing me salutes, and a man to black my boots. i want to be, i want to be, at least a colonel, c-o-l-o-n-e-l, hold down a desk and give the captains hell. i want to be, i want to be, i want to be a colonel _now_! i want to be a doughboy (_air: i want to be a yale boy_) i want to be a doughboy, doughboy tried and true; i want to be a doughboy, with a hat cord of baby blue. i want to be a doughboy, do as the doughboys do; so, papa, if i can when i get to be a man, i want to be a doughboy, too. our battle hymn (air: "battle hymn of the republic") i we have heard a lot about a place they call "somewhere in france," and we're going "over there" to put some pep in the advance; "there's a long, long trail before us," but you bet we'll take the chance, as five goes marching on. (chorus) glory, glory, for we're going to beat the hun, old hindenburg will execute a new strategic run, and kaiser bill will find he has no place beneath the sun, when five goes marching on. ii we are handy with the rifle and the bayonet and such; and though fritz is used to running and is sort of hard to touch, we will show him when we get there that it doesn't matter much, when five is marching on. (chorus) iii you may say that we're not modest, but our faults we will confess, we hate to rise at reveille, we're not too fond of mess; and we never, never, never get a good line at right dress, but we do keep marching on. (chorus) iv now all you other fellows who are going overseas, just remember that we guarantee the foeman to appease; so when you hear we're coming you may rest or stand at ease, when five goes marching on. (chorus) new england will be leading (_air: john brown's body_) new england will be leading when we're marching up the rhine, new york will be the rear guard and we'll leave them far behind, we'll conquer german cities and we'll capture kaiser bill, as we go marching on. glory, glory to new england! glory, glory to new england! glory, glory to new england! as we go marching on. on the banks of the river rhine (_air: "through those wonderful glasses of mine"_) germany, we're coming over, we are going straight to france; we are praying for a chance, just to make your soldiers dance. kaiser bill, your doom is coming; take a tip, old top, resign! for we'll drink beer in june, by the light of the moon, on the banks of the river rhine. "the simulating of the green" (_air: "wearing of the green"_) oh, major dear, and did you hear the news that's going round? we cavalry must simulate till horses can be found; we gallop and we single-foot as handsome as can be, but on our own two feet we ride--a horse you'll never see. 'tis the most amazing spectacle that's ever graced the green; a hundred men a-riding where no horses can be seen. oh, colonel dear, ye'll grieve to hear artillery's the same, compared to simulating guns, a horse is rather tame; last night i was the left rear wheel--it made me moighty sore, but dommed if i will be the swab and crawl inside the bore. 'tis the most amazing spectacle that's ever graced the green, a-firing rounds and salvos where no cannons can be seen. don't send me home (_air: don't take me home_) don't send me home, please don't send me home. tell me, where did i make that break? oh, oh, oh, oh, have a little pity. i'm a poor candidate, in search of war i roam. i'll do anything you want me to, but don't send me home. company nine (_air: "far above cayuga's water"_) hark, ye rookies, to the chorus of old company nine; captains, colonels, all adore us, when we fall in line. tho' we're doughboys, we're not slow boys, thanks to sargeant hill; and when we take our stand in deutschland, lord help kaiser bill! in the morning at the warning, "clothes on company nine!" feeling rocky, into khaki jumps our valiant line. we shun strawberries in the valley off the peru road, but in mess shack none can beat us at the order "load!" in pabst-less plattsburg, bone-dry rookies, waiting for our kale, our healths we drink in foamless bumpers, full of adam's ale. but when the "sammies" take their münchener on the river rhine, the toast will be to old new england and to company nine. we're on our way to europe (_air: "my wife's away in europe"_) we're on our way to europe, and we won't come back. and we won't come back. we're going to shoot an awful pill into the hide of kaiser bill. von hindenburg can't stop us; we laugh at him, hee! hee! we've shot the pistol twice before, can't hit the side of a barn door. we're on our way to europe to lay bill cross our knee. company song (_original music by mr. h. t. morgan_) on guard! we're always on our toes; plattsburg has taught us pep. we're good at being red or blue, but oh, that step! though we may lose a few patrols, just watch the allied drive. right where they reach the rhine, there you'll find new england five. forward! we're on our way to france; we'll make it hot for fritz. with bayonet or rifle, watch us score all hits. heads up! we're after hindenburg, we'll show him we're alive; when we get through with him, he will know new england five. double time (_air: tammany_) double time, double time! we're the boys with running feet, and we never mind the heat. double time, double time! battr'y three, you always see at double time. double time, double time! on the run we always keep, we even do it in our sleep. double time, double time! when we eat our food goes down at double time. double time, double time! always jump and run like hell, faster than a british shell. double time, double time! boche can't hit us, for we move at double time. double time, double time! it's the surest road to fame, if you live and don't get lame. double time, double time! hammond's favorite outdoor sport is double time. the th new england (_air: michael roy_) the eighth new england infantry is the one that shows them how; if kaiser bill could see us drill, the war would be over now. out in front of the hostess house, as we go marching by where the ladies are sitting, they drop their knitting, and all begin to cry: "for oh! for oh! what a wonderful company! it must be either the general staff or company n. e." if elihu root could see us shoot out on the rifle range he'd send us to russia to help lick prussia--oh, what a glorious change! if general pershing could hear us cursing the whistle that blows too soon, there'd be a decree that reveille would come in the afternoon. "for oh! for oh! what a wonderful company! it must be either the general staff or company n. e." marching on the rhine (_air: rocky road to dublin_) when marching on the rhine, boys, we'll be singing this song as we're marching along. when marching on the rhine, boys, on our hunt for kaiser bill, we'll shoot the germans out of france, we'll keep them on the run; when we get there the world will know, new england has begun, to fight for uncle sammy. we'll do our best, and never will rest, until old glory rises to the sun. over the sea, boys, over the sea to victory, new england will fight on forever. eggs--agerated since i've come to plattsburg i've eaten so many eggs, that feathers now adorn my skin, and spurs are on my legs. with apologies to kipling's "the vampire" a fool there was, and he made his prayer, (even as you and i) tho't he would hold down a colonel's chair, so he came up here to do and dare, but the skipper decided he wasn't there, (even as you and i). oh, the days we waste, and the pay we waste, and the work of our hands and feet belong to the days we did not know, (and now we know we never could know) enough to stand still at retreat. oh, the sleep we lost and the weight we lost, and the things we had to eat can never come back to make us want, (we hope they can't and pray they sha'n't) if they did we'd admit we were beat. the fool was stripped to his foolish hide, (even as you and i) and they wouldn't let him be rear guide, (so some of him lived, but the most of him died) and he stayed a "rookie" just outside (even as you and i). _finis_ _there's a lot that's pretty funny in the life we lead up here, the problems and the hikin' and the mess; but sometimes when i'm all alone i get a little blue, and that's the way with everyone, i guess._ _i often sit and wonder what it's really all about, and what the end of all this will be; it seems almost impossible that we will be at war, and see the things a soldier has to see._ _it's something more than just parade and something more than drill, and something more than hiking in the rain. it means that lots of friends we've made are going over seas, and some of them will not come back again._ _there's not a single man of us who really wants to fight, and maybe die somewhere in france--but then, it's war, and since it must be done, we'll try to do it right. god willing, we'll acquit ourselves like men._ [illustration: with the rookie to the end.] * * * * * transcriber's note: table of contents: the page numbering in the table of contents is off by one beginning with the call which the table of contents indicates should be on page . it actually begins on the next page. by the end of the book the page numbering is off by two. the final poem "finis" is on page . these numbers have been retained as printed. closing quotes were added to both stanzas of the poem "the th new england" which begins on page . none none project trinity - by carl maag and steve rohrer united states atmospheric nuclear weapons tests nuclear test personnel review prepared by the defense nuclear agency as executive agency for the department of defense destroy this report when it is no longer needed. do not return to sender. please noitify the defense nuclear agency, attn: stti, wasington d.c. , if your address is incorrect, if you wish to be deleted from the distribution list, or if the addressee is no longer employed by your organization. since declassified contents: list of figures list of abbreviations and acronyms report documentation page fact sheet preface chapters: introduction . historical background of project trinity . the project trinity site . the project trinity organization . military and civilian participants in project trinity the activities at project trinity . preshot activities . detonation and postshot activities . activities after july radiation protection at project trinity . organization . site monitoring group . offsite monitoring group dosimetry analysis of participants in project trinity . film badge records . gamma radiation exposure reference list list of figures - location of alamogordo bombing range - trinity site and major installations - tent used as guard post at project trinity - truck used as guard post at project trinity - organization of project trinity - the trinity shot-tower - the trinity detonation, hours, july - the south shelter (control point) - inside one of the shelters - the base camp, headquarters for project trinity - the base camp, headquarters for project trinity - project trinity personnel wearing protective clothing - "jumbo" after the trinity detonation list of abbreviations and acronyms the following abbreviations and acronyms are used in this volume: aec atomic energy commission dod department of defense lasl los alamos scientific laboratory maud [committee for the] military application of uranium detonation med manhattan engineer district r/h roentgens per hour utm universal transverse mercator report documentation page security classification of this page (when data entered): unclassified . report number: dna f . govt accession no.: . recipient's catalog number: . title (and subtitle): project trinity - . type of report & period covered: final report . performing org. report number: jrb - - - - . author(s): carl maag, steve rorer . contract or grant number(s): dna - -c- . performing organization name and address: jrb associates westpark drive mclean, virginia . program element. project, task area & work unit numbers: subtask u qaxmk - . controlling office name and address: director defense nuclear agency washington, d.c. . report date: december . number of pages: . monitoring agency name & address(if different from controlling office): . security class. (of this report): unclassified a. declassification/downgrading schedule: n/a since unclassified . distribution statement (of this report): approved for public release; distribution unlimited. . distribution statement (of the abstract entered in block , if different from report): . supplementary notes: this work was sponsored by the defense nuclear agency under rdt&e rmss code b u qaxmk h d. for sale by national technical information service, springfield, va . the defense nuclear agency action officer, lt. col. h. l. reese, usaf, under whom this work was done, wishes to acknowledge the research and editing contribution of numerous reviewers in the military services and other organizations in addition to those writers listed in block . . key words (continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number): trinity los alamos scientific laboratory alamogordo bombing range manhattan engineer district manhattan project personnel dosimetry radiation exposure nuclear weapons testing . abstract: this report describes the activities of an estimated , personnel, both military and civilian, in project trinity, which culminated in detonation of the first nuclear device, in new mexico in . scientific and diagnostic experiments to evaluate the effects of the nuclear device were the primary activities engaging military personnel. fact sheet defense nuclear agency public affairs office washington, d c. subject: project trinity project trinity, conducted by the manhattan engineer district (med), was designed to test and assess the effects of a nuclear weapon. the trinity nuclear device was detonated on a -foot tower on the alamogordo bombing range in south-central new mexico at hours on july . the nuclear yield of the detonation was equivalent to the energy released by detonating kilotons of tnt. at shot-time, the temperature was . degrees celsius, and surface air pressure was millibars. the winds were nearly calm at the surface; at , feet above mean sea level, they were from the southwest at knots. the winds blew the cloud resulting from the detonation to the northeast. from july through , about , military and civilian personnel took part in project trinity or visited the test site. the location of the test site and its major installations are shown in the accompanying figures. military and scientific activities all participants in project trinity, both military and civilian, were under the authority of the med. no military exercises were conducted. the los alamos scientific laboratory (lasl), which was staffed and administered by the university of california (under contract to the med), conducted diagnostic experiments. civilian and military scientists and technicians, with assistance from other military personnel, placed gauges, detectors, and other instruments around ground zero before the detonation. four offsite monitoring posts were established in the towns of nogal, roswell, socorro, and fort sumner, new mexico. an evacuation detachment consisting of to enlisted men and officers was established in case protective measures or evacuation of civilians living offsite became necessary. at least of these personnel were from the provisional detachment number , company "b," of the th technical service unit, army corps of engineers. military police cleared the test area and recorded the locations of all personnel before the detonation. a radiological monitor was assigned to each of the three shelters, which were located to the north, west, and south of ground zero. soon after the detonation, the monitors surveyed the area immediately around the shelters and then proceeded out the access road to its intersection with the main road, broadway. personnel not essential to postshot activities were transferred from the west and south shelters to the base camp, about kilometers southwest of ground zero. personnel at the north shelter were evacuated when a sudden rise in radiation levels was detected; it was later learned that the instrument had not been accurately calibrated and levels had not increased as much as the instrument indicated. specially designated groups conducted onsite and offsite radiological surveys. safety standards and procedures the safety criteria established for project trinity were based on calculations of the anticipated dangers from blast pressure, thermal radiation, and ionizing radiation. the tr- group, also known as the medical group, was responsible for radiological safety. a limit of roentgens of exposure during a two-month period was established. the site and offsite monitoring groups were both part of the medical group. the site monitoring group was responsible for equipping personnel with protective clothing and instruments to measure radiation exposure, monitoring and recording personnel exposure according to film badge readings and time spent in the test area, and providing for personnel decontamination. the offsite monitoring group surveyed areas surrounding the test site for radioactive fallout. in addition to these two monitoring groups, a small group of medical technicians provided radiation detection instruments and monitoring. radiation exposures at project trinity dosimetry information is available for about individuals who either participated in project trinity activities or visited the test site between july and january . the listing does not indicate the precise military or unit affiliation of all personnel. less than six percent of the project trinity participants received exposures greater than roentgens. twenty-three of these individuals received exposures greater than but less than roentgens; another individuals received between and roentgens. preface from to , the u.s. government, through the manhattan engineer district (med) and its successor agency, the atomic energy commission (aec), conducted tests of nuclear devices at sites in the united states and in the atlantic and pacific oceans. in all, an estimated , department of defense (dod)* participants, both military and civilian, were present at the tests. project trinity, the war-time effort to test-fire a nuclear explosive device, was the first atmospheric nuclear weapons test. * the med, which was part of the army corps of engineers, administered the u.s. nuclear testing program until the aec came into existence in . before dod was established in , the army corps of engineers was under the war department. in , years after the last above-ground nuclear weapons test, the centers for disease control** noted a possible leukemia cluster among a small group of soldiers present at shot smoky, a test of operation plumbbob, the series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests conducted in . since that initial report by the centers for disease control, the veterans administration has received a number of claims for medical benefits from former military personnel who believe their health may have been affected by their participation in the weapons testing program. ** the centers for disease control are part of the u.s. department of health and human services (formerly the u.s. department of health, education, and welfare). in late , dod began a study to provide data to both the centers for disease control and the veterans administration on potential exposures to ionizing radiation among the military and civilian participants in atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. dod organized an effort to: o identify dod personnel who had taken part in the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests o determine the extent of the participants' exposure to ionizing radiation o provide public disclosure of information concerning participation by military personnel in project trinity. methods and sources used to prepare this volume this report on project trinity is based on historical and technical documents associated with the detonation of the first nuclear device on july . the department of defense compiled information for this volume from documents that record the scientific activities during project trinity. these records, most of which were developed by participants in trinity, are kept in several document repositories throughout the united states. in compiling information for this report, historians, health physicists, radiation specialists, and information analysts canvassed document repositories known to contain materials on atmospheric nuclear weapons tests conducted in the southwestern united states. these repositories included armed services libraries, government agency archives and libraries, federal repositories, and libraries of scientific and technical laboratories. researchers examined classified and unclassified documents containing information on the participation of personnel from the med, which supervised project trinity, and from the los alamos scientific laboratory (lasl), which developed the trinity device. after this initial effort, researchers recorded relevant information concerning the activities of med and lasl personnel and catalogued the data sources. many of the documents pertaining specifically to med and lasl participation were found in the defense nuclear agency technical library and the lasl records center. information on the fallout pattern, meteorological conditions, and nuclear cloud dimensions is taken from volume of the general electric company-tempo's "compilation of local fallout data from test detonations - , extracted from dasa ," unless more specific information is available elsewhere. organization of this volume the following chapters detail med and lasl participation in project trinity. chapter provides background information, including a description of the trinity test site. chapter describes the activities of med and lasl participants before, during, and after the detonation. chapter discusses the radiological safety criteria and procedures in effect for project trinity, and chapter presents the results of the radiation monitoring program, including information on film badge readings for participants in the project. the information in this report is supplemented by the reference manual: background materials for the conus volumes." the manual summarizes information on radiation physics, radiation health concepts, exposure criteria, and measurement techniques. it also lists acronyms and includes a glossary of terms used in the dod reports addressing test events in the continental united states. chapter introduction project trinity was the name given to the war-time effort to produce the first nuclear detonation. a plutonium-fueled implosion device was detonated on july at the alamogordo bombing range in south-central new mexico. three weeks later, on august, the first uranium-fueled nuclear bomb, a gun-type weapon code-named little boy, was detonated over the japanese city of hiroshima. on august, the fat man nuclear bomb, a plutonium-fueled implosion weapon identical to the trinity device, was detonated over another japanese city, nagasaki. two days later, the japanese government informed the united states of its decision to end the war. on september , the japanese empire officially surrendered to the allied governments, bringing world war ii to an end. in the years devoted to the development and construction of a nuclear weapon, scientists and technicians expanded their knowledge of nuclear fission and developed both the gun-type and the implosion mechanisms to release the energy of a nuclear chain reaction. their knowledge, however, was only theoretical. they could be certain neither of the extent and effects of such a nuclear chain reaction, nor of the hazards of the resulting blast and radiation. protective measures could be based only on estimates and calculations. furthermore, scientists were reasonably confident that the gun-type uranium-fueled device could be successfully detonated, but they did not know if the more complex firing technology required in an implosion device would work. successful detonation of the trinity device showed that implosion would work, that a nuclear chain reaction would result in a powerful detonation, and that effective means exist to guard against the blast and radiation produced. . historical background of project trinity the development of a nuclear weapon was a low priority for the united states before the outbreak of world war ii. however, scientists exiled from germany had expressed concern that the germans were developing a nuclear weapon. confirming these fears, in the germans stopped all sales of uranium ore from the mines of occupied czechoslovakia. in a letter sponsored by group of concerned scientists, albert einstein informed president roosevelt that german experiments had shown that an induced nuclear chain reaction was possible and could be used to construct extremely powerful bombs ( ; )*. * all sources cited in the text are listed alphabetically in the reference list at the end of this volume. the number given in the text corresponds to the number of the source document in the reference list. in response to the potential threat of a german nuclear weapon, the united states sought a source of uranium to use in determining the feasibility of a nuclear chain reaction. after germany occupied belgium in may , the belgians turned over uranium ore from their holdings in the belgian congo to the united states. then, in march , the element plutonium was isolated, and the plutonium- isotope was found to fission as readily as the scarce uranium isotope, uranium- . the plutonium, produced in a uranium-fueled nuclear reactor, provided the united states with an additional source of material for nuclear weapons ( ; ). in the summer of , the british government published a report written by the committee for military application of uranium detonation (maud). this report stated that a nuclear weapon was possible and concluded that its construction should begin immediately. the maud report, and to a lesser degree the discovery of plutonium, encouraged american leaders to think more seriously about developing a nuclear weapon. on december , president roosevelt appointed the s- committee to determine if the united states could construct a nuclear weapon. six months later, the s- committee gave the president its report, recommending a fast-paced program that would cost up to $ million and that might produce the weapon by july ( ). the president accepted the s- committee's recommendations. the effort to construct the weapon was turned over to the war department, which assigned the task to the army corps of engineers. in september , the corps of engineers established the manhattan engineer district to oversee the development of a nuclear weapon. this effort was code-named the "manhattan project" ( ). within the next two years, the med built laboratories and production plants throughout the united states. the three principal centers of the manhattan project were the hanford, washington, plutonium production plant; the oak ridge, tennessee, u- production plant; and the los alamos scientific laboratory in northern new mexico. at lasl, manhattan project scientists and technicians, directed by dr. j. robert oppenheimer,* investigated the theoretical problems that had to be solved before a nuclear weapon could be developed ( ). * this report identifies by name only those lasl and med personnel who are well-known historical figures. during the first two years of the manhattan project, work proceeded at a slow but steady pace. significant technical problems had to be solved, and difficulties in the production of plutonium, particularly the inability to process large amounts, often frustrated the scientists. nonetheless, by sufficient progress had been made to persuade the scientists that their efforts might succeed. a test of the plutonium implosion device was necessary to determine if it would work and what its effects would be. in addition, the scientists were concerned about the possible effects if the conventional explosives in a nuclear device, particularly the more complex implosion-type device, failed to trigger the nuclear reaction when detonated over enemy territory. not only would the psychological impact of the weapon be lost, but the enemy might recover large amounts of fissionable material. in march , planning began to test-fire a plutonium-fueled implosion device. at lasl, an organization designated the x- group was formed within the explosives division. its duties were "to make preparations for a field test in which blast, earth shock, neutron and gamma radiation would be studied and complete photographic records made of the explosion and any atmospheric phenomena connected with the explosion" ( ). dr. oppenheimer chose the name trinity for the project in september ( ). . the project trinity site the trinity site was chosen by manhattan project scientists after thorough study of eight different sites. the site selected was an area measuring by kilometers* in the northwest corner of the alamogordo bombing range. the alamogordo bombing range was located in a desert in south-central new mexico called the jornada del muerto ("journey of death"). figure - shows the location of the bombing range. the site was chosen for its remote location and good weather and because it was already owned by the government. med obtained permission to use the site from the commanding general of the second air force (army air forces) on september ( ). figure - shows the trinity site with its major installations. * throughout this report, surface distances are given in metric units. the metric conversion factors include: meter = . feet; meter = . yards; and kilometer = . miles. vertical distances are given in feet; altitudes are measured from mean sea level, while heights are measured from surface level, unless otherwise noted. ground zero for the trinity detonation was at utm coordinates .** three shelters, located approximately , meters ( , yards) north, west, and south of ground zero, were built for the protection of test personnel and instruments. the shelters had walls of reinforced concrete and were buried under a few feet of earth. the south shelter was the control point for the test ( ). the base camp, which was the headquarters for project trinity, was located approximately kilometers southwest of ground zero. the principal buildings of the abandoned mcdonald ranch, where the active parts of the trinity device were assembled, stood , meters southeast of ground zero. seven guard posts, which were simply small tents or parked trucks like the ones shown in figures - and - , dotted the test site ( ). ** universal transverse mercator (utm) coordinates are used in this report. the first three digits refer to a point on an east- west axis, and the second three digits refer to a point on a north-south axis. the point so designated is the southwest corner of an area meters square. . the project trinity organization the organization that planned and conducted project trinity grew out of the x- group. lasl, though administered by the university of california, was part of the manhattan project, supervised by the army corps of engineers manhattan engineer district. the chief of med was maj. gen. leslie groves of the army corps of engineers. major general groves reported to both the chief of engineers and the army chief of staff. the army chief of staff reported to the secretary of war, a cabinet officer directly responsible to the president. figure - outlines the organization of project trinity. the director of the project trinity organization was dr. kenneth bainbridge. dr. bainbridge reported to dr. j. robert oppenheimer, the director of lasl. a team of nine research consultants advised dr. bainbridge on scientific and technical matters ( ). the project trinity organization was divided into the following groups ( ): o the trinity assembly group, responsible for assembling and arming the nuclear device o the tr- (services) group, responsible for construction, utilities, procurement, transportation, and communications o the tr- group, responsible for air-blast and earth-shock measurements o the tr- (physics) group, responsible for experiments concerning measurements of ionizing radiation o the tr- group, responsible for meteorology o the tr- group, responsible for spectrographic and photographic measurements o the tr- group, responsible for the airblast-airborne condenser gauges o the tr- (medical) group, responsible for the radiological safety and general health of the project trinity participants. each of these groups was divided into several units. individuals were also assigned special tasks outside their groups, such as communications and tracking the trinity cloud with a searchlight ( ). . military and civilian participants in project trinity from march until the beginning of , several thousand people participated in project trinity. these included not only the lasl scientists, but also scientists, technicians, and workmen employed at med installations throughout the united states. according to entrance logs, film badge data, and other records, about , people either worked at or visited the trinity site from july through ( ; ; ; ; ). although supervised by major general groves and the army corps of engineers, many manhattan project personnel were civilians. military personnel were assigned principally to support services, such as security and logistics, although soldiers with special skills worked with the civilians ( ; ). most of the military personnel were part of the army corps of engineers, although navy and other army personnel were also assigned to the project ( ; ). chapter the activities at project trinity the trinity nuclear device was detonated on a -foot tower (shown in figure - ) at utm coordinates on the alamogordo bombing range, new mexico, at mountain war time, on july . the detonation had a yield of kilotons and left an impression . meters deep and meters wide. the cloud resulting from the detonation rose to an altitude of , feet ( ). the trinity detonation is shown in figure - . at shot-time, the temperature was . degrees celsius, and the surface air pressure was millibars. winds at shot-time were nearly calm at the surface but attained a speed of knots from the southwest at , feet. at , feet, the wind speed was knots from the southwest. the winds blew the cloud to the northeast ( ). . preshot activities construction of test site facilities on the alamogordo bombing range began in december . the first contingent of personnel, military policemen, arrived just before christmas. the number of personnel at the test site gradually increased until the peak level of about was reached the week before the detonation ( ; ). on may at hours, lasl scientists and technicians exploded tons of conventional high explosives at the test site. the explosives were stacked on top of a -foot tower and contained tubes of radioactive solution to simulate, at a low level of activity, the radioactive products expected from a nuclear explosion. the test produced a bright sphere which spread out in an oval form. a column of smoke and debris rose as high as , feet before drifting eastward. the explosion left a shallow crater . meters deep and meters wide. monitoring in the area revealed a level of radioactivity low enough to allow workers to spend several hours in the area ( ; ). the planned firing date for the trinity device was july . on june , dr. oppenheimer changed the test date to no earlier than july and no later than july. on june, the earliest firing date was moved to july, even though better weather was forecast for and july. because the allied conference in potsdam, germany, was about to begin and the president needed the results of the test as soon as possible, the trinity test organization adjusted its schedules accordingly and set shot-time at hours on july ( ; ; ). the final preparations for the detonation started at on july. to prevent unnecessary danger, all personnel not essential to the firing activities were ordered to leave the test site. during the night of july, these people left for viewing positions on compania hill,* kilometers northwest of ground zero. they were joined by several spectators from lasl ( ; ). * "compania" also appears as "compana," "campagne," or "compagna" in various sources. project personnel not required to check instruments within the ground zero area stationed themselves in the three shelters or at other assigned locations. the military police at guard posts , , and blocked off all roads leading into the test site, and the men at guard post , the only access to the ground zero area from the base camp, ensured that no unauthorized individuals entered the area ( ; ). at hours on july, military policemen from guard posts , , , and met to compare their logs of personnel authorized to be in the ground zero area. the guards then traveled along the access roads to clear out all project personnel. as individuals left for their assigned shelters or stations, their departures from the test area were recorded in the military police logs. by the area sweep was completed, and the military police went to their shelters and stations. a final check of personnel was made in each shelter ( ; ; ). at the time of detonation, project personnel were in the three shelters: in the north shelter, in the west shelter, and in the south shelter. dr. oppenheimer, dr. bainbridge, and other key personnel awaited the firing at the south shelter, which served as the control point. figure - shows the exterior of the south shelter; figure - gives an interior view of one of the shelters, most likely the south. although most of the shelter occupants were civilians, at least military participants were spread among the three shelters ( ; ). the remainder of the test site personnel were positioned at the base camp kilometers south-southwest of ground zero, or on compania hill, or at the guard posts. important government officials, such as general groves and dr. vannevar bush, director of the u.s. office of scientific research and development, viewed the detonation from a trench at the base camp. the base camp is depicted in figure - . the military police of guard posts and were instructed to be in foxholes approximately five kilometers west and north, respectively, from their posts. the military police of guard posts and were instructed to be in foxholes south of mockingbird gap. a radiological safety monitor was assigned to the group from guard post . guard post personnel were to be in the south shelter, guard post personnel in the west shelter, and guard post personnel in the north shelter. the military police of guard post remained at that post, meters east of the base camp ( ). an evacuation detachment of between and officers and enlisted men was stationed near guard post , about kilometers northwest of ground zero. these men were on standby in case ranches and towns beyond the test site had to be evacuated. five radiological safety monitors were assigned to this detachment. ninety-four men of the evacuation detachment belonged to provisional detachment number , company "b," of the th technical service unit, army corps of engineers, from lasl. the identity of the remaining evacuation personnel has not been documented ( ; ; ; ; ). with the exception of the shelter occupants ( personnel) and evacuation detachment (between and men), the number of personnel at the test site at the time of detonation has not been documented. film badge records show that approximately people were at the test site at some time during july. the shelter occupants and men of the evacuation detachment are on this list. it has not been possible to pinpoint the location of many of the remaining personnel. some were at the base camp or on compania hill. since many of these people returned to the test site after shot-time to work on experiments, their film badges registered exposures from residual radioactivity on july. based on the documented personnel totals, at least the following individuals were at the test site when the device was detonated ( ; ; - ; ; ): o shelter occupants at shelters , meters north, south, and west of ground zero o to officers and enlisted men of the evacuation detachment, located kilometers northwest of ground zero near guard post o five radiological safety monitors assigned to the evacuation detachment to perform offsite monitoring of nearby towns and residences o one radiological safety monitor assigned to guard post o two military policemen at each of the seven guard posts (indicated by photographs such as figures - and - ). . detonation and postshot activities because of bad weather, the project trinity director (dr. bainbridge) delayed the detonation, which had been scheduled for hours. by , however, the forecast was better, and shot-time was set for . this gave the scientists minutes to arm the device and prepare the instruments in the shelters. the final countdown began at , and the device was detonated at : mountain war time from the control point in the south shelter ( ; ). no one was closer than , meters to ground zero at the time of the detonation. with the exception of a few men holding the ropes of barrage balloons or guiding cameras to follow the fireball as it ascended, all shelter personnel were in or behind the shelters. some left the shelters after the initial flash to view the fireball. as a precautionary measure, they had been advised to lie on the ground before the blast wave arrived. project personnel located beyond the shelters, such as at the base camp and on compania hill, were also instructed to lie on the ground or in a depression until the blast wave had passed ( ). however, the blast wave at these locations was not as strong as had been expected. in order to prevent eye damage, dr. bainbridge ordered the distribution of welder's filter glass. because it was not known exactly how the flash might affect eyesight, it was suggested that direct viewing of the fireball not be attempted even with this protection. the recommended procedure was to face away from ground zero and watch the hills or sky until the fireball illuminated the area. then, after the initial flash had passed, one could turn around and view the fireball through the filter glass. despite these well-publicized instructions, two participants did not take precautions. they were temporarily blinded by the intense flash but experienced no permanent vision impairment ( ; ). people as far away as santa fe and el paso saw the brilliant light of the detonation. windows rattled in the areas immediately surrounding the test site, waking sleeping ranchers and townspeople. to dispel any rumors that might compromise the security of project trinity, the government announced that an army munitions dump had exploded. however, immediately after the destruction of hiroshima, the government revealed to the public what had actually occurred in the new mexico desert ( ; ). immediately after the shot, medical group personnel began the radiological monitoring activities described in section . . . at , when most of the monitoring activities were completed, preparations began for entrance into the ground zero area. to regulate entry into the area, a "going-in board" was established, consisting of dr. bainbridge, the chief of the medical group, and a special scientific consultant. its purpose was to determine whether a party had a valid reason for entering the ground zero area. the board functioned for three days. military police at guard post and at three roadblocks set up along broadway controlled entry into the area. guard posts , , , and were within , meters of ground zero and thus remained unmanned. at the south shelter, the medical group set up a "going-in" station where personnel were required to stop to put on protective clothing (coveralls, booties, caps, and cotton gloves) and pick up monitoring equipment before entering the ground zero area. since it was not known how much radioactive material might be suspended in the air, all personnel entering the ground zero area wore complete protective covering and respirators for the first three days after the detonation. figure - shows two project trinity personnel wearing protective clothing ( ). on the day of the shot, five parties entered the ground zero area. one party consisted of eight members of the earth-sampling group. they obtained samples by driving to within meters of ground zero in a tank specially fitted with rockets to which retrievable collectors were fastened in order to gather soil samples from a distance. this group made several sampling excursions on and july. the tank carried two personnel (a driver and a passenger) each trip. no member of this party received a radiation exposure of more than roentgen ( ). five other men from the earth-sampling group entered the ground zero area in a second tank, lined with lead for radiation protection. the tank, carrying the driver and one passenger, made five trips into the ground zero area to retrieve soil samples on and july. on two trips, the tank passed over ground zero; on the others, it approached to within about meters of ground zero. the men scooped up soil samples through a trap door in the bottom of the tank. one driver who made three trips into the ground zero area received the highest exposure, roentgens ( ). this lead-lined tank was also used by ten men to observe the radiation area. these men, traveling two at a time, made five trips into the area on shot-day but never approached closer than , meters to ground zero. the highest exposure among these ten men was . roentgens ( ). the next party to approach ground zero consisted of a photographer and a radiological safety monitor. wearing protective clothing and respirators, the two men were about meters northwest of ground zero photographing "jumbo" from to hours. "jumbo," shown in figure - , was a massive container built to contain the high-explosive detonation of the trinity device and to allow recovery of the fissionable material if the device failed to produce a nuclear detonation. the plan to use "jumbo," however, was abandoned when the scientists concluded that a fairly large nuclear explosion was certain. the container remained on the ground near the shot-tower during the detonation. both the photographer and the monitor received an estimated radiation exposure between . and roentgen ( ; ). the last party to "go in" on shot-day consisted of six men retrieving neutron detectors. they entered the test area at hours. three of the men went to a point meters south of ground zero to pull out cables carrying neutron detectors located meters south of ground zero. the group wore protective clothing and respirators and spent about minutes in the area. the remaining three men drove as close as meters southwest of ground zero to retrieve neutron detectors. they got out of their vehicle only once, at about meters from ground zero, and spent a total of about ten minutes making this trip through the area. each man's radiation exposure measured less than roentgen ( ). most of the soldiers of the evacuation detachment remained in their bivouac area near guard post . according to a report written by the detachment commander, a reinforced platoon was sent to the town of bingham, about kilometers northeast of the test site, while offsite radiological safety monitors surveyed the area. the evacuation detachment was dismissed at hours on shot-day when it became evident from offsite monitoring that evacuations would not be undertaken. the detachment returned to lasl at on july ( ). two b- aircraft from kirtland field, albuquerque, new mexico, participated in post-shot events. their planned mission was to pass over the test area shortly before the explosion to simulate a bomb drop. after the trinity device had been detonated, the aircraft would circle near ground zero, while the men onboard would measure the atmospheric effects of the nuclear explosion. this would enable them to determine whether a delivery aircraft would be endangered. however, because of bad weather on shot-day, dr. oppenheimer canceled the aircraft's flight in the ground zero area. instead, the two b- s, each with men onboard, flew along the perimeter of the bombing range and observed the shot from a distance of to kilometers. among those observers was a navy captain who was also the med chief of ordnance ( ; ; ). . activities after july on , , and july, all personnel and visitors had to receive permission to approach ground zero from the "going-in board." on these three days, groups were authorized to go beyond the broadway roadblocks. most of those who sought this authorization were scientists and military support personnel whose job required that they work near ground zero. except for a group of two military men and three civilians who went to ground zero on and july and a group of two civilians who approached as close as meters on july, the reentry personnel came no closer than meters to ground zero. of these personnel, the individual who received the highest exposure during the three days was an army sergeant who received roentgens. during the same period, two civilians received roentgens and . roentgens, respectively. all other personnel received exposures of roentgens or less ( ; ). after the "going-in board" was disbanded on july, permission to enter the ground zero area had to be obtained from dr. bainbridge or one of his deputies. many scientists entered the ground zero area after july to retrieve instruments or to perform experiments. the population of the trinity test site was diminishing, however, as the emphasis shifted to preparing the devices that were to be dropped on japan ( ). on july, a week after the shot, chain barricades with prominent signs warning against trespassing were placed meters north, south, and west of ground zero. these barricades were supplemented with two concentric circles of red flags , and , meters from ground zero. except during bad weather, the entire ground zero area was visible from the roadblocks. no unauthorized person was ever detected entering the ground zero area ( ). on august, the broadway roadblocks were removed, and mounted military policemen began patrolling around ground zero at a distance of meters. each guard was assigned to a daily six-hour shift for a period of two weeks; in the third week, the guard was assigned tasks away from the ground zero area. the mounted guards and their horses wore film badges. no exposure greater than . roentgen was registered. on september, the mounted patrol moved to a distance of meters from ground zero, just outside a fence installed a week earlier to seal off the area. the same rotating patrol schedule was used. the guards' film badge readings showed an average daily exposure of . roentgens. the mounted patrol at the fence continued until early ( ). between july and november , groups entered the ground zero area. most of these parties entered in the month after shot-day. these were the scientists and technicians conducting experiments or retrieving data. by the beginning of september, most of those who entered the ground zero area were invited guests ( ). also during the period july through november, at least soldiers were at the trinity test site. twenty-five of these men were support personnel who never went within meters of ground zero. the remaining men were technical personnel, laborers who erected the -meter fence, or military policemen who served as guides. eleven of these men, probably members of the fence detail, spent several days at about meters from ground zero. working three to five hours per day between august and august, they would have been the only group to stay longer than one hour in the ground zero area. of the remaining personnel who approached within meters from ground zero, spent minutes and ten spent between minutes and one hour in the ground zero area. only people received exposures of to roentgens between july and november. most received less than roentgen. after november , no one approached closer than the fence which was meters from ground zero, although about civilian and military personnel worked at or visited the trinity site through ( ; ). according to dosimetry data, entrance logs, and other records, about , individuals were at the test site at some time between july and the end of . this number includes not only the scientists, technicians, and military personnel who were part of project trinity but also many visitors. some of the scientists took their wives and children on a tour of the area near ground zero, particularly to view the green glass called "trinitite," which covered the crater floor. trinitite was the product of the detonation's extreme beat, which melted and mixed desert sand, tower steel, and other debris ( ; ; ; ). chapter radiation protection at project trinity the tr- or medical group, shown in the figure - organizational chart, was responsible for radiological safety at project trinity. many of the physicians and scientists in the medical group had worked with radioactive materials before and were trained in radiological safety procedures. the chief of the medical group supervised the radiological safety operations and reported to the trinity director. in addition to providing medical care to trinity personnel, this group established radiological safety programs to: o minimize radiation exposure of personnel on the test site and in offsite areas o provide monitors to conduct radiological surveys onsite and offsite o provide and maintain radiation detection instruments o provide protective clothing and equipment. an exposure limit of roentgens during a two-month period was established. personnel were provided with radiation detection instruments to determine their exposures ( ). . organization the medical group consisted of physicians, scientists, and administrators, as well as radiological monitors. many of these personnel were nonmilitary, but all worked on the manhattan project under the administration of the army corps of engineers manhattan engineer district. the medical group was divided into two monitoring groups, the site monitoring group, which was responsible for onsite monitoring, and the offsite monitoring group. each reported to the chief of the medical group, and each communicated with the other during the monitoring activities. in addition to these two groups, a small group of medical technicians provided radiation detection instruments to medical group personnel ( ; ). . site monitoring group the site monitoring group consisted of a chief monitor, three other monitors, and several medical doctors. this group had the following functions ( ; ): o conduct ground surveys of the test area and mark areas of radioactivity o conduct surveys of the base camp and roads leading into the test area o provide protective clothing and equipment, including film badges and pocket dosimeters, to personnel o monitor all personnel for radioactive contamination and provide for their decontamination o maintain a record of radiation exposures received by personnel. the site monitoring group monitored the radiation exposures of personnel in the test area. the time spent by personnel in radiation areas was limited, and radiation detection instruments were provided to permit continuous monitoring of exposure rates. in many cases, a monitor from the site monitoring group accompanied project personnel into the test area to monitor exposure rates ( ; ). two members of the site monitoring group, a monitor and a physician with radiological safety training, were assigned to each shelter. the supervising monitor was stationed at the base camp and was in radio and telephone communication with all three shelters and the offsite ground and aerial survey teams. before any personnel were allowed to leave the shelter areas, a radiological safety monitor and a military policeman from each shelter advanced along the roads to broadway to check radiation levels. they wore respirators to prevent them from inhaling radioactive material ( ; ). since it was expected that any dust from the cloud would fall on one of the shelter areas within minutes of the shot, plans had been made to evacuate personnel as soon as the monitors completed their initial survey. because the cloud moved to the northeast, the south shelter (the control point) was not completely evacuated, although nonessential personnel were sent to the base camp. the west shelter was emptied of all personnel except a searchlight crew spotlighting the cloud as it moved away ( ; ). only at the north shelter did an emergency evacuation occur. about minutes after the shot, a detection instrument indicated a rapid rise in the radiation levels within the shelter. at the same time, a remote ionization monitoring device detected a rapid increase in radiation. because of these two readings, all north shelter personnel were immediately evacuated to the base camp, kilometers to the south. film badges worn by personnel stationed at the north shelter, however, showed no radiation exposure above the detectable level. it was later discovered that the meter of the detector in the north shelter had not retained its zero calibration setting, and radiation at the north shelter had not reached levels high enough to result in measurable exposures of the personnel who had been positioned there. however, fallout activity was later detected in the north shelter area, proof that part of the cloud did head in that direction. this also explains why the monitoring device detected rising radiation levels ( ; ). after ascertaining that radiation levels along the roads leading from the shelters to broadway were within acceptable limits, the radiological safety monitors and military police established roadblocks at important intersections leading to ground zero. the north shelter monitor and military police set up a post where the north shelter road ran into broadway. the west shelter monitor and a military policeman blocked vatican road where it intersected broadway. the south shelter monitor and military police set up a roadblock where broadway intersected pennsylvania avenue ( ). the monitor assigned to guard post surveyed the mockingbird gap area to ensure that it was safe for the guards to return to their post. this position controlled access to the mcdonald ranch road, which led directly to ground zero ( ). at hours, the chief monitor departed from the base camp with a military policeman to monitor the entire length of broadway. they first checked the roadblock at pennsylvania avenue and broadway. next they drove to the roadblock at vatican road and broadway. upon the chief monitor's arrival, the west shelter monitor traveled about nine kilometers west on vatican road to monitor guard post so that the military police could reoccupy the post. the monitoring excursion to guard post continued until the chief monitor had returned from guard post , located kilometers northwest of the vatican road roadblock on broadway ( ; ). the chief monitor arrived at guard post at about hours and found the post empty. he then continued five kilometers north along broadway to the foxholes from which the military police had watched the detonation. there he found the guards, the five radiological safety monitors assigned to the evacuation detachment, and the commanding officer of the evacuation detachment ( ; ). the military policemen refused to return to guard post , insisting that they had received orders over their two-way radio from the base commander to evacuate their post and head for san antonio, new mexico, a town kilometers northwest of the guard post. the base commander had noted that portions of the cloud were heading northwestward and, fearing that fallout from the cloud would contaminate guard post , had ordered the military police to evacuate. the chief monitor, however, had found no significant radiation levels anywhere along the northern part of broadway nor around guard post . the base commander, after being contacted by the chief monitor, drove to the foxholes and ordered the guards to return to their post. this was the only unplanned incident during the onsite monitoring ( ). after guard post was reoccupied, the chief monitor returned to the roadblock at the intersection of broadway and the north shelter road. the north shelter monitor informed the chief monitor of the sudden evacuation of the north shelter, whereupon the chief monitor surveyed the north shelter area and found intensities of only . and . roentgens per hour (r/h). the chief monitor then contacted the south shelter and informed dr. bainbridge that the north shelter region was safe for those who needed to return, that broadway was safe from the base camp to guard post , and that guard post was now manned so that personnel leaving for lasl could be checked out ( ). the chief monitor then returned to the south shelter and assembled the monitors from the three roadblocks and guard post to prepare for entrance into the ground zero area. the time was about hours. the military police at the roadblocks were given radiation meters to survey the adjoining area. broadway from the south shelter to guard post was remonitored occasionally to reassure the military police that there was no radiation problem. monitors also surveyed the base camp for hours after the detonation. no radiation above background levels was detected there ( ). the following brief description of the radiological environment in the trinity test area is based primarily on the results of the remote gamma recorders situated in the test area and on results of the road surveys conducted after the detonation ( ). within about , meters of ground zero (except to the north), radiation intensities between . and . r/h were detected during the first few minutes after the detonation. these readings decreased to less than . r/h within a few hours. at greater distances to the east, south, and west, radiation levels above background were not detected ( ). the cloud drifted to the northeast, and higher gamma readings due to fallout were encountered in this direction. about five minutes after the detonation, a reading of r/h was recorded , meters north of ground zero. several minutes later, the intensity there had increased to greater than r/h, and it continued to increase for several more minutes. gamma detectors , meters north of ground zero, however, recorded no radiation above background levels. this indicated that the cloud had passed over or near the , -meter area and only partially over the , -meter area where the north shelter was located. subsequent ground surveys of this area found no gamma intensities higher than . r/h ( ). gamma radiation levels at and around ground zero were much higher than in other onsite areas because of induced activity in the soil. twenty-four hours after the detonation, the gamma intensity at ground zero was estimated to be to r/h. this estimate was based on data provided by the tank crew that drove to ground zero to obtain soil samples. the intensity decreased to about r/h at meters from ground zero. gamma intensities of . r/h or more were confined within a circular area extending about , meters from ground zero (except in areas of fallout). one week after the shot, the gamma intensity at ground zero was about r/h. after days, intensities at ground zero had decreased to r/h, and intensities of . r/h or more were not encountered beyond about meters from ground zero. gamma intensities of to r/h were found at ground zero three months after the detonation ( ; ). . offsite monitoring group four two-man teams and one five-man team supervised by the chief offsite monitor constituted the offsite monitoring group. before the detonation, the four two-man teams established monitoring posts in towns outside the test area. these towns were nogal, roswell, fort sumner, and socorro, all in new mexico. the five-man team remained at guard post to assist in evacuation of nearby residences if the trinity cloud drifted in that direction. these residences, the fite house and the homes in the town of tokay, were and kilometers northwest of ground zero, respectively. since the cloud drifted to the northeast, evacuation was not required. all offsite monitoring teams were in radio or telephone contact with personnel at the base camp ( ). offsite monitoring teams in areas northeast of ground zero encountered gamma readings ranging from . to r/h two to four hours after the detonation. three hours after the detonation, surveys taken in bingham, new mexico (located kilometers northeast of ground zero) found gamma intensities of about . r/h. radiation readings at the town of white, nine kilometers southeast of bingham, were . r/h three hours after the detonation and . r/h two hours later. another team monitoring in a canyon kilometers east of bingham found a gamma intensity of about r/h. five hours later, the intensity had decreased to . r/h. it was estimated that peak intensities of gamma radiation from fallout on shot-day were about r/h at an occupied ranch house in this canyon area ( ; ; ). monitoring teams resurveyed these towns about one month after the trinity detonation. at bingham, gamma readings of . r/h and . r/h were found at ground level outdoors and at waist level inside a building, respectively. at the town of white, the highest outdoor gamma reading was . r/h. inside a building, the highest reading was . r/h ( ). surveys taken in the canyon area one month after the detonation indicated that gamma intensities at ground level had decreased to . r/h. the occupied ranch house was also surveyed, both inside and outside. the highest reading outdoors was . r/h, and the highest reading indoors was . r/h ( ; ). monitoring was also conducted in offsite areas other than those to the north and northeast of ground zero. monitors found no radiation readings above background levels ( ). significant fallout from the trinity cloud did not reach the ground within about kilometers northeast of ground zero. from this point, the fallout pattern extended out kilometers and was kilometers wide. gamma intensities up to r/h were measured in this region several hours after the detonation. one month later, intensities had declined to . r/h or less ( ). chapter dosimetry analysis of participants in project trinity this chapter summarizes the radiation doses received by participants in various activities during project trinity. the sources of this dosimetry information are the safety and monitoring report for personnel at trinity, which includes a compilation of film badge readings for all participants up to january , and film badge data from the records of the reynolds electrical and engineering company, which contain readings through ( ; ). these sources list individual participants with their cumulative gamma radiation exposures. . film badge records during trinity, the film badge was the primary device used to measure the radiation dose received by individual participants. the site monitoring plan indicates that film badges were to be issued to participants. the film badge was normally worn at chest level on the outside of clothing and was designed to measure the wearer's exposure to gamma radiation from external sources. these film badges were insensitive to neutron radiation and did not measure the amount of radioactive material that might have been inhaled or ingested ( ). personnel from the medical group had responsibility for issuing, receiving, processing, and interpreting film badges for project trinity. the site monitoring group compiled the film badge records for both onsite and offsite personnel. radiological safety personnel and military police recorded the names and identification numbers of individuals as they entered the test area. this information was recorded in an entry logbook and on a personal exposure data card. upon leaving the test area, individuals returned their film badges to the check station. when the film badges were processed and interpreted, the reading was entered on the individuals exposure data card. in this manner, the number of times an individual entered the test area and his cumulative exposure history were recorded and maintained ( ). . gamma radiation exposure the safety and monitoring report lists film badge readings for about individuals who participated in project trinity from july to january ( ). this list includes both military and nonmilitary personnel who were involved with the trinity operation and postshot activities. however, records are available for only of the to members of the evacuation detachment ( ). in addition, some of these film badge listings may be for personnel who were only peripherally involved with trinity activities, such as family members and official guests who visited the site. according to the safety and monitoring report, by january , individuals had received cumulative gamma exposures greater than but less than roentgens. an additional individuals received gamma exposures between and roentgens. personnel who received gamma exposures exceeding roentgens represent less than six percent of the project trinity participants with recorded exposures. as described below, these exposures generally resulted when personnel approached ground zero several times ( ). information is available regarding the activities of some of these personnel. one of the drivers of the earth-sampling group's lead-lined tank, an army sergeant who traveled three times to ground zero, received an exposure of roentgens. a second tank driver, also an army sergeant, received an exposure of . roentgens. three members of the earth-sampling group, all of whom traveled in the tank to ground zero, received exposures of , . , and roentgens. an army photographer who entered the test area six times between july and october received . roentgens ( ). four individuals involved with excavating the buried supports of the trinity tower from october to october received gamma exposures ranging from . to . roentgens. film badge readings for this three-day period indicate that the two individuals who operated mechanical shovels received . and . roentgens, while the two who supervised and monitored the excavation received exposures of . and . roentgens. the individual receiving . roentgens during the excavation operation had received . roentgens from a previous exposure, making his total exposure roentgens ( ). an army captain who accompanied all test and observer parties into the ground zero area between september and october received a total gamma exposure of . roentgens ( ). the activities and times of exposure are not known for other personnel with exposures over roentgens. according to the dosimetry records for , about people visited the test site that year. no one ventured inside the fence surrounding ground zero, and no one received an exposure greater than roentgen ( ; ). reference list the following list of references represents the documents consulted in preparation of the project trinity volume. availability information an availability statement has been included at the end of the reference citation for those readers who wish to read or obtain copies of source documents. availability statements were correct at the time the bibliography was prepared. it is anticipated that many of the documents marked unavailable may become available during the declassification review process. the coordination and information center (cic) and the national technical information service (ntis) will be provided future dna-wt documents bearing an ex after the report number. source documents bearing an availability statement of cic may be reviewed at the following address: department of energy coordination and information center (operated by reynolds electrical & engineering co., inc.) attn: mr. richard v. nutley s. highland p.o. box las vegas, nevada phone: ( ) - fts: - source documents bearing an availability statement of ntis may be purchased from the national technical information service. when ordering by mail or phone, please include both the price code and the ntis number. the price code appears in parentheses before the ntis order number. national technical information service port royal road springfield, virginia phone: ( ) - (sales office) additional ordering information or assistance may be obtained by writing to the ntis, attention: customer service, or by calling ( ) - . project trinity references *available from ntis; order number appears before the asterisk. **available at cic. ***not available, see availability information page. ****requests subject to privacy act restrictions. . aebersold, paul. july th nuclear explosion-safety and monitoring of personnel (u). los alamos scientific laboratory, atomic energy commission. los alamos, nm.: lasl. la- . january , . pages.*** . bainbridge, k. t. memorandum to all concerned, subject: tr circular no. --total personnel at tr. [base camp, trinity site: nm.] july , . page.** . bainbridge, k. t. trinity. los alamos scientific laboratory. los alamos, nm.: lasl, la- -h and washington, d. c.: gpo. may . pages.** . bramlet, walt. memorandum for thomas j. hirons, subject: dod participants in atmospheric tests, wo/encl. los alamos scientific laboratory. los alamos, nm. isd- . february , . pages.** . general electric company--tempo. compilation of local fallout data from test detonations - . vol. : "continental us tests." washington, d. c.: defense nuclear agency. dna - (ex.). . pages. (a ) ad/ao .* . groves, leslie r., ltg, usa. memorandum for secretary of war, [subject: trinity]. [washington, d.c.] july . pages.** . groves, leslie r., ltg, usa (ret.). now it can be told: the story of the manhattan project. new york, ny.: harper and row. . pages. . headquarters, th technical service unit, provisional detachment no. i (company "b"). [extract from: daily diary, provisional detachment no. (company "b"), th technical service unit.] army corps of engineers, department of war. [santa fe, nm.] july . pages.** . headquarters, special service detachment. supplemental special guard orders, with appendix. los alamos scientific laboratory, manhattan engineer district. [alamogordo, nm.] july . pages.** . hempelmann, l. h., m.d. [extracts from: "preparation and operational plan of medical group (tr- ) for nuclear explosion july ."] los alamos scientific laboratory, atomic energy commission. los alamos, nm.: lasl. la- (deleted). june , . pages.*** . hoffman, j. g. [extracts from "health physics report on radioactive contamination throughout new mexico following the nuclear explosion, part a--physics."] los alamos scientific laboratory, manhattan engineer district. [los alamos, nm.] [ .] pages.** . lamont, lansing. day of trinity. new york, ny.: atheneum. . pages. . los alamos scientific laboratory, public relations office. "los alamos: beginning of an era, - ." atomic energy commission. los alamos, nm.: lasl. . pages.** . oppenheimer, j. r. memorandum for group leaders, subject: trinity test. los alamos scientific laboratory. los alamos, nm. june , . pages.** . palmer, t. o., maj., usa. evacuation detachment at trinity. [manhattan engineer district, army corps of engineers.] [los alamos, nm.] [ july .] pages.** . reynolds electrical & engineering company, inc. [personnel radiation exposures, , ] las vegas, nv. microfilm.**** . warren, s. l., col., usa. directions for personnel at base camp at time of shot. los alamos scientific laboratory, manhattan engineer district. [alamogordo, nm.] july . page.** . warren, s. l., col, usa; hempelmann, l. h., m.d. extracts from: personal notes, subject: events in camp immediately following shot--july , . . pages.** . weisskopf, v.; hoffman, j.; aebersold, paul; hempelmann, l. h. memorandum for george kistiakowsky, subject: measurement of blast, radiation, heat and light and radioactivity at trinity. [los alamos, nm.] september . pages.**